CHRISTIANITY

AND

GREEK PHILOSOPHY;

OR, THE RELATION BETWEENSPONTANEOUS AND REFLECTIVE THOUGHT IN GREECEAND THE POSITIVE TEACHING OFCHRIST AND HIS APOSTLES. 

BY B. F. COCKER, D. D. , PROFESSOR OF MORAL AND MENTAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

"Plato made me know the true God, Jesus Christ showed me the way tohim. "

 ST. AUGUSTINE

NEW YORK: CARLTON & LANAHAN. SAN FRANCISCO: E. THOMAS. CINCINNATI: HITCHCOCK & WALDEN. 

1870. 

Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1870, by HARPER &BROTHERS, in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the UnitedStates for the Southern District of New York. 

TO

D. D. WHEDON, D. D. , MY EARLIEST LITERARY FRIEND, WHOSE VIGOROUS WRITINGS HAVESTIMULATED MY INQUIRIES, WHOSE COUNSELS HAVE GUIDEDMY STUDIES, AND WHOSE KIND AND GENEROUS WORDSHAVE ENCOURAGED ME TO PERSEVERANCEAMID NUMEROUS DIFFICULTIES, I DEDICATE THIS VOLUME AS A TOKEN OF MY MORE THAN ORDINARY AFFECTION

_THE AUTHOR_. 

PREFACE. 

In preparing the present volume, the writer has been actuated by aconscientious desire to deepen and vivify our faith in the Christiansystem of truth, by showing that it does not rest _solely_ on a specialclass of facts, but upon all the facts of nature and humanity; that itsauthority does not repose _alone_ on the peculiar and supernaturalevents which transpired in Palestine, but also on the still broaderfoundations of the ideas and laws of the reason, and the common wantsand instinctive yearnings of the human heart. It is his conviction thatthe course and constitution of nature, the whole current of history, andthe entire development of human thought in the ages anterior to theadvent of the Redeemer centre in, and can only be interpreted by, thepurpose of redemption. 

The method hitherto most prevalent, of treating the history of humanthought as a series of isolated, disconnected, and lawless movements, without unity and purpose; and the practice of denouncing the religionsand philosophies of the ancient world as inventions of satanic mischief, or as the capricious and wicked efforts of humanity to relegate itselffrom the bonds of allegiance to the One Supreme Lord and Lawgiver, have, in his judgment, been prejudicial to the interests of all truth, andespecially injurious to the cause of Christianity. They betray an utterinsensibility to the grand unities of nature and of thought, and astrange forgetfulness of that universal Providence which comprehends allnature and all history, and is yet so minute in its regards that itnumbers the hairs on every human head, and takes note of every sparrow'sfall, A juster method will lead us to regard the entire history of humanthought as a development towards a specific end, and the providence ofGod as an all-embracing plan, which sweeps over all ages and allnations, and which, in its final consummation, will, through Christ, "gather together all things in one, both things which are in heaven andthings which are on earth. "

The central and unifying thought of this volume is _that the necessaryideas and laws of the reason, and the native instincts of the humanheart, originally implanted by God, are the primal and germinal forcesof history; and that these have been developed under conditions whichwere first ordained, and have been continually supervised by theprovidence of God_. God is the Father of humanity, and he is also theGuide and Educator of our race. As "the offspring of God, " humanity isnot a bare, indeterminate potentiality, but a living energy, an activereason, having definite qualities, and inheriting fundamental principlesand necessary ideas which constitute it "the image and likeness of God. "And though it has suffered a moral lapse, and, in the exercise of itsfreedom, has become alienated from the life of God, yet God has neverabandoned the human race. He still "magnifies man, and sets his heartupon him. " "He visits him every morning, and tries him every moment. ""The inspiration of the Almighty still gives him understanding. " Theillumination of the Divine Logos still "teacheth man knowledge. " TheSpirit of God still comes near to and touches with strong emotion everyhuman heart. "God has never left himself without a witness" in anynation, or in any age. The providence of God has always guided thedispersions and migrations of the families of the earth, and presidedover and directed the education of the race. "He has foreordained thetimes of each nation's existence, and fixed the geographical boundariesof their habitations, _in order that they should seek the Lord_, andfeel after and find Him who is not far from any one of us. " Thereligions of the ancient world were the painful effort of the humanspirit to return to its true rest and centre--the struggle to "find Him"who is so intimately near to every human heart, and who has never ceasedto be the want of the human race. The philosophies of the ancient worldwere the earnest effort of human reason to reconcile the finite and theinfinite, the human and the Divine, the subject and God. An overrulingProvidence, which makes even the wrath of man to praise Him, took up allthese sincere, though often mistaken, efforts into his own plan, andmade them sub-serve the purpose of redemption. They aided in developingamong the nations "the desire of salvation, " and in preparing the worldfor the advent of the Son of God. The entire course and history ofDivine providence, in every nation, and in every age, has been directedtowards the one grand purpose of "reconciling all things to Himself. "Christianity, as a comprehensive scheme of reconciliation, embracing"all things, " can not, therefore, be properly studied apart from theages of earnest thought, of profound inquiry, and of intense religiousfeeling which preceded it. To despise the religions of the ancientworld, to sneer at the efforts and achievements of the old philosophers, or even to cut them off in thought from all relation to the plans andmovements of that Providence which has cared for, and watched over, andpitied, and guided all the nations of the earth, is to refuse tocomprehend Christianity itself. 

The author is not indifferent to the possibility that his purpose may bemisconceived. The effort may be regarded by many conscientious andesteemed theologians with suspicion and mistrust. They can not easilyemancipate themselves from the ancient prejudice against speculativethought. Philosophy has always been regarded by them as antagonistic toChristian faith. They are inspired by a commendable zeal for the honorof dogmatic theology. Every essay towards a profounder conviction, abroader faith in the unity of all truth, is branded with the opprobriousname of "rationalism. " Let us not be terrified by a harmless word. Surely religion and right reason must be found in harmony. The authorbelieves, with Bacon, that "the foundation of all religion is rightreason. " The abnegation of reason is not the evidence of faith, but theconfession of despair. Sustained by these convictions, he submits thishumble contribution to theological science to the thoughtfulconsideration of all lovers of Truth, and of Christ, the fountain ofTruth. He can sincerely ask upon it the blessing of Him in whose fear ithas been written, and whose cause it is the purpose of his life toserve. 

The second series, on "Christianity and Modern Thought, " is in anadvanced state of preparation for the press. 

NOTE. --It has been the aim of the writer, as far as the nature of thesubject would permit, to adapt this work to general readers. Thereferences to classic authors are, therefore, in all cases made toaccessible English translations (in Bohn's Classical Library); suchchanges, however, have been made in the rendering as shall present thedoctrine of the writers in a clearer and more forcible manner. Forvaluable services rendered in this department of the work, by Martin L. D'Ooge, Μ. Α. , Acting Professor of Greek Language and Literature in theUniversity of Michigan, the author would here express his gratefulacknowledgment. 

CONTENTS. 

CONTENTS. 

 CHAPTER I. ATHENS, AND THE MEN OF ATHENS. 

 CHAPTER II. THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. 

 CHAPTER III. THE RELIGION OF THE ATHENIANS. 

 CHAPTER IV. THE RELIGION OF THE ATHENIANS: ITS MYTHOLOGICAL AND SYMBOLICAL ASPECTS. 

 CHAPTER V. THE UNKNOWN GOD. 

 CHAPTER VI. THE UNKNOWN GOD (_continued_). IS GOD COGNIZABLE BY REASON?

 CHAPTER VII. THE UNKNOWN GOD (_continued_). IS GOD COGNIZABLE BY REASON? (_continued_). 

 CHAPTER VIII. THE PHILOSOPHERS OF ATHENS. PRE-SOCRATIC SCHOOL. _Sensational_: THALES--ANAXIMENES--HERACLITUS--ANAXIMANDER LEOCIPPUS--DEMOCRITUS. 

 CHAPTER IX. THE PHILOSOPHERS OF ATHENS (_continued_). PRE-SOCRATIC SCHOOL (_continued_) _Idealist_: Pythagoras--Xenophanes--Parmenides--Zeno. _Natural Realist_: Anaxagoras. THE SOCRATIC SCHOOL. Socrates. 

 CHAPTER X THE PHILOSOPHERS OF ATHENS (_continued_). THE SOCRATIC SCHOOL (_continued_). Plato. 

 CHAPTER XI. THE PHILOSOPHERS OF ATHENS (_continued_). THE SOCRATIC SCHOOL (_continued_). Plato. 

 CHAPTER XII. 

 THE PHILOSOPHERS OF ATHENS (_continued_). THE SOCRATIC SCHOOL (_continued_). Aristotle. 

 CHAPTER XIII. THE PHILOSOPHERS OF ATHENS (_continued_). POST-SOCRATIC SCHOOL. Epicurus and Zeno. 

 CHAPTER XIV. The Propædeutic Office of Greek Philosophy. 

 CHAPTER XV. The Propædeutic Office of Greek Philosophy (_continued_). 

 "_Ye men of Athens_, all things which I behold bear witness to your carefulness in religion; for, as I passed through your city and beheld the objects of your worship, I found amongst them an altar with this inscription, TO THE UNKNOWN GOD; whom, therefore, ye worship, though ye know; Him not, Him declare I unto you. God who made the world and all things therein, seeing He is Lord of heaven and earth, dwelleth not in temples made with hands; neither is He served by the hands of men, as though he needed any thing; for He giveth unto all life, and breath, and all things. And He made of one blood all the nations of mankind to dwell upon the face of the whole earth; and ordained to each the appointed seasons of their existence, and the bounds of their habitation, that they should seek God, if haply they might feel after Him and find Him, though he be not far from every one of us: for in Him we live, and move, and have our being; as certain of your own poets have said, _For we are also His offspring_. Forasmuch, then, as we are the offspring of God, we ought not to think that the Godhead is like unto gold, or silver, or stone, graven by the art and device of man. Howbeit, those past times of ignorance God hath overlooked; but now He commandeth all men everywhere to repent, because He hath appointed a day wherein He will judge the world in righteousness by that Man whom He hath ordained; whereof He hath given assurance unto all, in that He hath raised Him from the dead. "--Acts xvii. 22-31. 

CHRISTIANITYANDGREEK PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER I. 

ATHENS, AND THE MEN OF ATHENS. 

 "Is it not worth while, for the sake of the history of men and nations, to study the surface of the globe in its relation to the inhabitants thereof?"--Goethe. 

There is no event recorded in the annals of the early church so repletewith interest to the Christian student, or which takes so deep a hold onthe imagination, and the sympathies of him who is at all familiar withthe history of Ancient Greece, as the one recited above. Here we see theApostle Paul standing on the Areopagus at Athens, surrounded by thetemples, statues, and altars, which Grecian art had consecrated to Paganworship, and proclaiming to the inquisitive Athenians, "the strangers"who had come to Athens for business or for pleasure, and thephilosophers and students of the Lyceum, the Academy, the Stoa, and theGarden, "_the unknown God_. "

Whether we dwell in our imagination on the artistic grandeur andimposing magnificence of the city in which Paul found himself a solitarystranger, or recall the illustrious names which by their achievements inarts and philosophy have shed around the city of Athens an immortalglory, --or whether, fixing our attention on the lonely wanderer amid theporticoes, and groves, and temples of this classic city, we attempt toconceive the emotion which stirred his heart as he beheld it "whollygiven to idolatry;" or whether we contrast the sublime, majestic theismproclaimed by Paul with the degrading polytheism and degeneratephilosophy which then prevailed in Athens, or consider the prudent andsagacious manner in which the apostle conducts his argument in view ofthe religious opinions and prejudices of his audience, we can not butfeel that this event is fraught with lessons of instruction to theChurch in every age. 

That the objects which met the eye of Paul on every hand, and theopinions he heard everywhere expressed in Athens, must have exerted apowerful influence upon the current of his thoughts, as well as upon thestate of his emotions, is a legitimate and natural presumption. Not onlywas "his spirit stirred within him"--his heart deeply moved and agitatedwhen he saw the city wholly given to idolatry--but his thoughtful, philosophic mind would be engaged in pondering those deeply interestingquestions which underlie the whole system of Grecian polytheism. Thecircumstances of the hour would, no doubt, in a large degree determinethe line of argument, the form of his discourse, and the peculiaritiesof his phraseology. The more vividly, therefore, we can represent thescenes and realize the surrounding incidents; the more thoroughly we canenter into sympathy with the modes of thought and feeling peculiar tothe Athenians; the more perfectly we can comprehend the spirit andtendency of the age; the more immediate our acquaintance with thereligious opinions and philosophical ideas then prevalent in Athens, themore perfect will be our comprehension of the apostle's argument, thedeeper our interest in his theme. Some preliminary notices of Athens and"the Men of Athens" will therefore be appropriate as introductory to aseries of discourses on Paul's sermon on Mars' Hill. 

The peculiar connection that subsists between Geography and History, between a people and the country they inhabit, will justify theextension of our survey beyond the mere topography of Athens. The peopleof the entire province of Attica were called Athenians (_Αθηναίοι_) intheir relation to the state, and Attics _(Αττικοί_) in regard to theirmanners, customs, and dialect. [1] The climate and the scenery, the formsof contour and relief, the geographical position and relations ofAttica, and, indeed, of the whole peninsula of Greece, must be takeninto our account if we would form a comprehensive judgment of thecharacter of the Athenian people. 

The soil on which a people dwell, the air they breathe, the mountainsand seas by which they are surrounded, the skies that overshadowthem, --all these exert a powerful influence on their pursuits, theirhabits, their institutions, their sentiments, and their ideas. So thatcould we clearly group, and fully grasp all the characteristics of aregion--its position, configuration, climate, scenery, and naturalproducts, we could, with tolerable accuracy, determine what are thecharacteristics of the people who inhabit it. A comprehensive knowledgeof the physical geography of any country will therefore aid usmaterially in elucidating the natural history, and, to some extent, themoral history of its population. "History does not stand _outside_ ofnature, but in her very heart, so that the historian only grasps apeople's character with true precision when he keeps in full view itsgeographical position, and the influences which its surroundings havewrought upon it. "[2]

[Footnote 1: Niebuhr's "Lectures on Ethnography and Geography, " p. 91. ]

[Footnote 2: Ritter's "Geographical Studies, " p. 34. ]

It is, however, of the utmost consequence the reader should understandthat there are two widely different methods of treating this deeplyinteresting subject--methods which proceed on fundamentally oppositeviews of man and of nature. One method is that pursued by Buckle in his"History of Civilization in England. " The tendency of his work is theassertion of the supremacy of material conditions over the developmentof human history, and indeed of every individual mind. Here man ispurely passive in the hands of nature. Exterior conditions are thechief, if not the _only_ causes of man's intellectual and socialdevelopment. So that, such a climate and soil, such aspects of natureand local circumstances being given, such a nation necessarilyfollows. [3] The other method is that of Carl Ritter, Arnold Guyot, andCousin. [4] These take account of the freedom of the human will, and thepower of man to control and modify the forces of nature. They also takeaccount of the original constitution of man, and the primitive type ofnations; and they allow for results arising from the mutual conflict ofgeographical conditions. And they, especially, recognize the agency of aDivine Providence controlling those forces in nature by which theconfiguration of the earth's surface is determined, and the distributionof its oceans, continents, and islands is secured; and a providence, also, directing the dispersions and migrations of nations--determiningthe times of each nation's existence, and fixing the geographical boundsof their habitation, all in view of the _moral_ history and spiritualdevelopment of the race, --"that they may feel after, and find the livingGod. " The relation of man and nature is not, in their estimation, arelation of cause and effect. It is a relation of adjustment, ofharmony, and of reciprocal action and reaction. "Man is not"--saysCousin--"an effect, and nature the cause, but there is between man andnature a manifest harmony of general laws. ". .. "Man and nature are twogreat effects which, coming from the same cause, bear the samecharacteristics; so that the earth, and he who inhabits it, man andnature, are in perfect harmony. "[5] God has created both man and theuniverse, and he has established between them a striking harmony. Theearth was made for man; not simply to supply his physical wants, butalso to minister to his intellectual and moral development. The earth isnot a mere dwelling-place of nations, but a school-house, in which Godhimself is superintending the education of the race. Hence we must notonly study the _events_ of history in their chronological order, but wemust study the earth itself as the _theatre_ of history. A knowledge ofall the circumstances, both physical and moral, in the midst of whichevents take place, is absolutely necessary to a right judgment of theevents themselves. And we can only elucidate properly the character ofthe actors by a careful study of all their geographical and ethologicalconditions. 

[Footnote 3: See chap. Ii. "History of Civilization. "]

[Footnote 4: Ritter's "Geographical Studies;" Guyot's "Earth and Man;"Cousin's "History of Philosophy, " lec. Vii. , viii. , ix. ]

[Footnote 5: Lectures, vol. I. Pp. 162, 169. ]

It will be readily perceived that, in attempting to estimate theinfluence which exterior conditions exert in the determination ofnational character, we encounter peculiar difficulties. We can not inthese studies expect the precision and accuracy which is attained in themathematical, or the purely physical sciences. We possess no controlover the "materiel" of our inquiry; we have no power of placing it innew conditions, and submitting it to the test of new experiments, as inthe physical sciences. National character is a _complex_ result--aproduct of the action and reaction of primary and secondary causes. Itis a conjoint effect of the action of the primitive elements and lawsoriginally implanted in humanity by the Creator, of the free causalityand self-determining power of man, and of all the conditions, permanentand accidental, within which the national life has been developed. Andin cases where _physical_ and _moral_ causes are blended, andreciprocally conditioned and modified in their operation;--where primaryresults undergo endless modifications from the influence of surroundingcircumstances, and the reaction of social and politicalinstitutions;--and where each individual of the great aggregate wields acausal power that obeys no specific law, and by his own inherent powersets in motion new trains of causes which can not be reduced tostatistics, we grant that we are in possession of no instrument of exactanalysis by which the complex phenomena of national character may bereduced to primitive elements. All that we can hope is, to ascertain, bypsychological analysis, what are the fundamental ideas and laws ofhumanity; to grasp the exterior conditions which are, on all hands, recognized as exerting a powerful influence upon national character; towatch, under these lights, the manifestations of human nature on thetheatre of history, and then apply the principles of a sound historiccriticism to the recorded opinions of contemporaneous historians andtheir immediate successors. In this manner we may expect, at least, toapproximate to a true judgment of history. 

There are unquestionably fundamental powers and laws in human naturewhich have their development in the course of history. There are certainprimitive ideas, imbedded in the constitution of each individual mind, which are revealed in the universal consciousness of our race, under theconditions of experience--the exterior conditions of physical nature andhuman society. Such are the ideas of cause and substance; of unity andinfinity, which govern all the processes of discursive thought, and leadus to the recognition of Being _in se_;--such the ideas of right, ofduty, of accountability, and of retribution, which regulate all theconceptions we form of our relations to all other moral beings, andconstitute _morality_;--such the ideas of order, of proportion, and ofharmony, which preside in the realms of art, and constitute thebeau-ideal of _esthetics_;--such the ideas of God, the soul, andimmortality, which rule in the domains of _religion_, and determine mana religious being. These constitute the identity of human nature underall circumstances; these characterize humanity in all conditions. 

Like permanent germs in vegetable life, always producing the samespecies of plants; or like fundamental types in the animal kingdom, securing the same homologous structures in all classes and orders; sothese fundamental ideas in human nature constitute its sameness andunity, under all the varying conditions of life and society. The acornmust produce an oak, and nothing else. The grain of wheat must alwaysproduce its kind. The offspring of man must always bear his image, andalways exhibit the same fundamental characteristics, not only in hiscorporeal nature, but also in his mental constitution. 

But the germination of every seed depends on conditions _ab extra_, andall germs are modified, in their development, by geographical andclimatal surroundings. The development of the acorn into a mature andperfect oak greatly depends on the exterior conditions of soil, andmoisture, light, and heat. By these it may be rendered luxuriant in itsgrowth, or it may be stunted in its growth. It may barely exist underone class of conditions, or it may perish under another. The Brassicaoleracea, in its native habitat on the shore of the sea, is a bitterplant with wavy sea-green leaves; in the cultivated garden it is thecauliflower. The single rose, under altered conditions, becomes a doublerose; and creepers rear their stalks and stand erect. Plants, which in acold climate are annuals, become perennial when transported to thetorrid zone. [6] And so human nature, fundamentally the same under allcircumstances, may be greatly modified, both physically and mentally, bygeographical, social, and political conditions. The corporeal nature ofman--his complexion, his physiognomy, his stature; the intellectualnature of man--his religious, ethical, and esthetical ideas are allmodified by his surroundings. These modifications, of which all mendwelling in the same geographical regions, and under the same social andpolitical institutions, partake, constitute the _individuality_ ofnations. Thus, whilst there is a fundamental basis of unity in thecorporeal and spiritual nature of man, the causes of diversity are to besought in the circumstances in which tribes and nations are placed inthe overruling providence of God. 

[Footnote 6: See Carpenter's "Compar. Physiology, " p. 625; Lyell's"Principles of Geology, " pp. 588, 589. ]

The power which man exerts over material conditions, by virtue of hisintelligence and freedom, is also an important element which, in thesestudies, we should not depreciate or ignore. We must accept, with allits consequences, the dictum of universal consciousness that man is_free_. He is not absolutely subject to, and moulded by nature. He hasthe power to control the circumstances by which he is surrounded--tooriginate new social and physical conditions--to determine his ownindividual and responsible character--and he can wield a mightyinfluence over the character of his fellow-men. Individual men, asLycurgus, Solon, Pericles, Alexander, Cæsar, and Napoleon have left theimpress of their own mind and character upon the political institutionsof nations, and, in indirect manner, upon the character of succeedinggenerations of men. Homer, Plato, Cicero, Bacon, Kant, Locke, Newton, Shakspeare, Milton have left a deep and permanent impression upon theforms of thought and speech, the language and literature, the scienceand philosophy of nations. And inasmuch as a nation is the aggregate ofindividual beings endowed with spontaneity and freedom, we must grantthat exterior conditions are not omnipotent in the formation of nationalcharacter. Still the free causality of man is exercised within a narrowfield. "There is a strictly necessitative limitation drawing animpassable boundary-line around the area of volitional freedom. " Thehuman will "however subjectively free" is often "objectively unfree;"thus a large "uniformity of volitions" is the natural consequence. [7]The child born in the heart of China, whilst he may, in his personalfreedom, develop such traits of character as constitute hisindividuality, must necessarily be conformed in his language, habits, modes of thought, and religious sentiments to the spirit of his countryand age. We no more expect a development of Christian thought andcharacter in the centre of Africa, unvisited by Christian teaching, thanwe expect to find the climate and vegetation of New England. And we nomore expect that a New England child shall be a Mohammedan, a Parsee, ora Buddhist, than that he shall have an Oriental physiognomy, and speakan Oriental language. Indeed it is impossible for a man to exist inhuman society without partaking in the spirit and manners of his countryand his age. Thus all the individuals of a nation represent, in agreater or less degree, the spirit of the nation. They who do this mostperfectly are the _great_ men of that nation, because they are at onceboth the product and the impersonation of their country and their age. "We allow ourselves to think of Shakspeare, or of Raphael, or of Phidiasas having accomplished their work by the power of their individualgenius, but greatness like theirs is never more than the highest degreeof perfection which prevails widely around it, and forms the environmentin which it grows. No such single mind in single contact with the factsof nature could have created a Pallas, a Madonna, or a Lear; such vastconceptions are the growth of ages, the creation of a nation's spirit;and the artist and poet, filled full with the power of that spirit, butgave it form, and nothing but form. Nor would the form itself have beenattained by any isolated talent. No genius can dispense withexperience. .. . Noble conceptions already existing, and a noble school ofexecution which will launch mind and hand upon their true courses, areindispensable to transcendent excellence. Shakspeare's plays were asmuch the offspring of the long generations who had pioneered the roadfor him, as the discoveries of Newton were the offspring of those ofCopernicus. "[8] The principles here enounced apply with equal force tophilosophers and men of science. The philosophy of Plato was but theripened fruit of the pregnant thoughts and seminal utterances of hispredecessors, --Socrates, Anaxagoras, and Pythagoras; whilst all of themdo but represent the general tendency and spirit of their country andtheir times. The principles of Lord Bacon's "Instauratio Magna" wereincipient in the "Opus Majus" of Roger Bacon, the Franciscan friar. Thesixteenth century matured the thought of the thirteenth century. Theinductive method in scientific inquiry was immanent in the British mind, and the latter Bacon only gave to it a permanent form. It is true thatgreat men have occasionally appeared on the stage of history who, likethe reformers Luther and Wesley, have seemed to be in conflict with theprevailing spirit of their age and nation, but these men were thecreations of a providence--that providence which, from time to time, has_supernaturally_ interposed in the moral history of our race bycorrective and remedial measures. These men were inspired and led by aspirit which descended from on high. And yet even they had theirprecursors and harbingers. Wyckliffe and John Huss, and Jerome of Pragueare but the representatives of numbers whose names do not grace thehistoric page, who pioneered the way for Luther and the Reformation. Andno one can read the history of that great movement of the sixteenthcentury without being persuaded there were thousands of Luther'spredecessors and contemporaries who, like Staupitz and Erasmus, lamentedthe corruptions of the Church of Rome, and only needed the heroiccourage of Luther to make them reformers also. Whilst, therefore, werecognize a free causal power in man, by which he determines hisindividual and responsible character, we are compelled to recognize thegeneral law, that national character is mainly the result of thosegeographical and ethological, and political and religious conditions inwhich the nations have been placed in the providence of God. 

[Footnote 7: See Dr. Wheedon's "Freedom of the Will, " pp. 164, 165. ]

[Footnote 8: Froude, "Hist. Of England, " pp. 73, 74. ]

Nations, like persons, have an _Individuality_. They present certaincharacteristic marks which constitute their proper identity, andseparate them from the surrounding nations of the earth; such, forexample, as complexion, physiognomy, language, pursuits, customs, institutions, sentiments, ideas. The individuality of a nation isdetermined mainly from _without_, and not, like human individuality, from within. The laws of a man's personal character have their home inthe soul; and the peculiarities and habits, and that conduct of life, which constitute his responsible character are, in a great degree, theconsequence of his own free choice. But dwelling, as he does, insociety, where he is continually influenced by the example and opinionsof his neighbors; subject, as he is, to the ceaseless influence ofclimate, scenery, and other terrestrial conditions, the characteristicswhich result from these relations, and which are common to all who dwellin the same regions, and under the same institutions, constitute anational individuality. Individual character is _variable_ under thesame general conditions, national character is _uniform_, because itresults from causes which operate alike upon all individuals. 

Now, that man's complexion, his pursuits, his habits, his ideas aregreatly modified by his geographical surroundings, is the most obviousof truths. No one doubts that the complexion of man is greatly affectedby climatic conditions. The appearance, habits, pursuits of the man wholives within the tropics must, necessarily, differ from those of the manwho dwells within the temperate zone. No one expects that the dweller onthe mountain will have the same characteristics as the man who resideson the plains; or that he whose home is in the interior of a continentwill have the same habits as the man whose home is on the islands of thesea. The denizen of the primeval forest will most naturally become ahuntsman. The dweller on the extended plain, or fertile mountain slope, will lead a pastoral, or an agricultural life. Those who live on themargin of great rivers, or the borders of the sea, will "do business onthe great waters. " Commerce and navigation will be their chief pursuits. The people whose home is on the margin of the lake, or bay, or inlandsea, or the thickly studded archipelago, are mostly fishermen. And thenit is a no less obvious truth that men's pursuits exert a mouldinginfluence on their habits, their forms of speech, their sentiments, andtheir ideas. Let any one take pains to observe the peculiarities whichcharacterize the huntsman, the shepherd, the agriculturist, or thefisherman, and he will be convinced that their occupations stamp thewhole of their thoughts and feelings; color all their conceptions ofthings outside their own peculiar field; direct their simple philosophyof life; and give a tone, even, to their religious emotions. 

The general aspects of nature, the climate and the scenery, exert anappreciable and an acknowledged influence on the _mental_characteristics of a people. The sprightliness and vivacity of theFrank, the impetuosity of the Arab, the immobility of the Russ, therugged sternness of the Scot, the repose and dreaminess of the Hindooare largely due to the country in which they dwell, the air theybreathe, the food they eat, and the landscapes and skies they daily lookupon. The nomadic Arab is not only indebted to the country in which hedwells for his habit of hunting for daily food, but for that love of afree, untrammelled life, and for those soaring dreams of fancy in whichhe so ardently delights. Not only is the Swiss determined by thepeculiarities of his geographical position to lead a pastoral life, butthe climate, and mountain scenery, and bracing atmosphere inspire himwith the love of liberty. The reserved and meditative Hindoo, accustomedto the profuse luxuriance of nature, borrows the fantastic ideas of hismythology from plants, and flowers, and trees. The vastness and infinitediversity of nature, the colossal magnitude of all the forms of animaland vegetable life, the broad and massive features of the landscape, theaspects of beauty and of terror which surround him, and daily pour theirsilent influences upon his soul, give vividness, grotesqueness, even, tohis imagination, and repress his active powers. His mental characterbears a peculiar and obvious relation to his geographicalsurroundings. [9]

[Footnote 9: Ritter, "Geograph. Studies, " p. 287. ]

The influence of external nature on the imagination--the _creative_faculty in man--is obvious and remarkable. It reveals itself in all theproductions of man--his architecture, his sculpture, his painting, andhis poetry. Oriental architecture is characterized by the boldness andmassiveness of all its parts, and the monotonous uniformity of all itsfeatures. This is but the expression, in a material form, of thatshadowy feeling of infinity, and unity, and immobility which an unbrokencontinent of vast deserts and continuous lofty mountain chains wouldnaturally inspire. The simple grandeur and perfect harmony and gracefulblending of light and shade so peculiar to Grecian architecture are theproduct of a country whose area is diversified by the harmoniousblending of land and water, mountain and plain, all bathed in purestlight, and canopied with skies of serenest blue. And they are also theproduct of a country where man is released from the imprisonment withinthe magic circle of surrounding nature, and made conscious of his powerand freedom. In Grecian architecture, therefore, there is less of themassiveness and immobility of nature, and more of the grace and dignityof man. It adds to the idea of permanence a _vital_ expression. "TheDoric column, " says Vitruvius, "has the proportion, strength, and beautyof man. " The Gothic architecture had its birthplace among a people whohad lived and worshipped for ages amidst the dense forests of the north, and was no doubt an imitation of the interlacing of the overshadowingtrees. The clustered shaft, and lancet arch, and flowing tracery, reflect the impression which the surrounding scenery had woven into thetexture of the Teutonic mind. 

The history of painting and of sculpture will also show that the varied"styles of art" are largely the result of the aspects which externalnature presented to the eye of man. Oriental sculpture, like itsarchitecture, was characterized by massiveness of form and tranquillityof expression; and its painting was, at best, but colored sculpture. Themost striking objects are colossal figures, in which the human form isstrangely combined with the brute, as in the winged bulls of Nineveh andthe sphinxes of Egypt. Man is regarded simply as a part of nature, hedoes not rise above the plane of animal life. The soul has itsimmortality only in an eternal metempsychosis--a cycle of life whichsweeps through all the brute creation. But in Grecian sculpture we haveless of nature, more of man; less of massiveness, more of grace andelegance; less repose, and more of action. Now the connection betweenthese styles of art, and the countries in which they were developed, isat once suggested to the thoughtful mind. 

And then, finally, the literature of a people equally reveals theimpress of surrounding cosmical conditions. "The poems of Ossian are butthe echo of the wild, rough, cloudy highlands of his Scottish home. " Theforest songs of the wild Indian, the negro's plaintive melodies in therice-fields of Carolina, the refrains in which the hunter of Kamtchatkarelates his adventures with the polar bear, and in which the South SeaIslander celebrates his feats and dangers on the deep, all betoken theinfluence which the scenes of daily life exert upon the thoughts andfeelings of our race. "To what an extent nature can express herself in, and modify the culture of the individual, as well as of an entirepeople, can be seen on Ionian soil in the verse of Homer, which, calledforth under the most favorable sky, and on the most luxuriant shore ofthe Grecian archipelago, not only charms us to-day, but bearing thisimpress, has determined what shall be the classic form throughout allcoming time. "[10]

[Footnote 10: See Ritter, pp. 288, 289. Poetic art has unquestionablyits _geographical_ distributions like the fauna and flora of the globe. "If you love the images, not merely of a rich, but of a luxuriant fancy;if you are pleased with the most daring flights; if you would see apoetic creation full of wonders, then turn your eye to the poetry of the_orient_, where all forms appear in purple; where each flower glows likethe morning ray resting on the earth. But if, on the contrary, youprefer depth of thought, and earnestness of reflection; if you delightin the colossal, yet pale forms, which float about in mist, and whisperof the mysteries of the spirit-land, and of the vanity of all things, except honor, then I must point you to the hoary _north_. .. . Or if yousympathize with that deep feeling, that longing of the soul, which doesnot linger on the earth, but evermore looks up to the azure tent of thestars, where happiness dwells, where the unquiet of the beating heart isstill, then you must resort to the romantic poetry of the_west_. "--"_Study of Greek Literature_, " Bishop Esaias Tegnér, p. 38. ]

In seeking, therefore, to determine correctly what are thecharacteristics of a nation, we must endeavor to trace how far thephysical constitution of that people, their temperament, their habits, their sentiments, and their ideas have been formed, or modified, underthe surrounding geographical conditions, which, as we have seen, greatlydetermine a nation's individuality. Guided by these lights, let usapproach the study of "_the men of Athens_. "

_Attica_, of which Athens was the capital, and whose entire populationswere called "Athenians, " was the most important of all the Hellenicstates. It is a triangular peninsula, the base of which is defined bythe high mountain ranges of Cithæron and Parnes, whilst the two othersides are washed by the sea, having their vertex at the promontory ofSunium, or Cape Colonna. The prolongation of the south-western linetowards the north until it reaches the base at the foot of MountCithæron, served as the line of demarkation between the Athenianterritory and the State of Megara. Thus Attica may be generallydescribed as bounded on the north-east by the channel of the Negropont;on the south-west by the gulf of Ægina and part of Megara; and on thenorth-west by the territory which formed the ancient Bœotia, includingwithin its limits an area of about 750 miles. [11]

Hills of inferior elevation connect the mountain ranges of Cithæron andParnes with the mountainous surface of the south-east of the peninsula. These hills, commencing with the promontory of Sunium itself, whichforms the vertex of the triangle, rise gradually on the south-east tothe round summit of Hymettus, and onward to the higher peak ofPentelicus, near Marathon, on the east. The rest of Attica is all aplain, one reach of which comes down to the sea on the south, at thevery base of Hymettus. Here, about five miles from the shore, an abruptrock rises from the plain, about 200 feet high, bordered on the south bylower eminences. That rock is the Acropolis. Those lower eminences arethe Areopagus, the Pmyx, and the Museum. In the valley formed by thesefour hills we have the Agora, and the varied undulations of these hillsdetermine the features of the city of Athens. [12]

[Footnote 11: See art. "Attica, " _Encyc. Brit. _]

[Footnote 12: See Conybeare and Howson's "Life and Epistles of St. Paul, " vol. I. P. 346. ]

Nearly all writers on the topography of Athens derive their materialsfrom Pausanias, who visited the city in the early part of the secondcentury, and whose "Itinerary of Greece" is still extant. [13] He enteredthe city by the Peiraic gate, the same gate at which Paul entered somesixty years before. We shall place ourselves under his guidance, and, sofar as we are able, follow the same course, supplying some omissions, aswe go along, from other sources. On entering the city, the firstbuilding which arrested the attention of Pausanias was the Pompeium, socalled because it was the depository of the sacred vessels, and also ofthe garments used in the annual procession in honor of Athena (Minerva), the tutelary deity of Athens, from whom the city derived its name. Nearthis edifice stood a temple of Demeter (Ceres), containing statues ofthat goddess, of her daughter Persephone, and of Iacchus, all executedby Praxiteles; and beyond were several porticoes leading from the citygates to the outer Ceramicus, while the intervening space was occupiedby various temples, the Gymnasium of Hermes, and the house of Polytion, the most magnificent private residence in Athens. 

[Footnote 13: The account here given of the topography of Athens isderived mainly from the article on "Athens" in the _Encyc. Brit. _]

There were two places in Athens known by the name of Ceramicus, onewithout the walls, forming part of the suburbs; and the other within thewalls, embracing a very important section of the city. The outerCeramicus was covered with the sepulchres of the Athenians who had beenslain in battle, and buried at the public expense; it communicated withthe inner Ceramicus by the gate Dipylum. The Ceramicus within the cityprobably included the Agora, the Stoa Basileios, and the Stoa Pœcile, besides various other temples and public buildings. 

Having fairly passed the city gates, a long street is before us with acolonnade or cloister on either hand; and at the end of this street, byturning to the left, we might go through the whole Ceramicus to the opencountry, and the groves of the Academy. But we turn to the right, andenter the Agora, --the market-place, as it is called in the Englishtranslation of the sacred narrative. 

We are not, however, to conceive of the market-place at Athens asbearing any resemblance to the bare, undecorated spaces appropriated tobusiness in our modern towns; but rather as a magnificent public square, closed in by grand historic buildings, of the highest style ofarchitecture; planted with palm-trees in graceful distribution, andadorned with statues of the great men of Athens and the deified heroesof her mythology, from the hands of the immortal masters of the plasticart. This "market-place" was the great centre of the public life of theAthenians, --the meeting-place of poets, orators, statesmen, warriors, and philosophers, --a grand resort for leisure, for conversation, forbusiness, and for news. Standing in the Agora, and looking towards thesouth, is the _Museum, _ so called because it was believed that _Musæus_, the father of poetry, was buried there. Towards the north-west is the_Pnyx, _ a sloping hill, partially levelled into an open area forpolitical assemblies. To the north is seen the craggy eminence of the_Areopagus_, and on the north-east is the _Acropolis_ towering highabove the scene, "the crown and glory of the whole. "

The most important buildings of the Agora are the Porticoes orcloisters, the most remarkable of which are the Stoa Basileios, orPortico of the king; the Stoa Eleutherius, or Portico of the Jupiter ofFreedom; and the Stoa Pœcile, or Painted Porch. These Porticoes werecovered walks, the roof being supported by columns, at least on oneside, and by solid masonry on the other. Such shaded walks are almostindispensable in the south of Europe, where the people live much in theopen air, and they afford a grateful protection from the heat of thesun, as well as a shelter from the rain. Seats were also provided wherethe loungers might rest, and the philosophers and rhetoricians sit downfor intellectual conversation. The "Stoic" school of philosophy derivedits name from the circumstance that its founder, Zeno, used to meet andconverse with his disciples under one of these porticoes, --the StoaPœcile. These porticoes were not only built in the most magnificentstyle of architecture, but adorned with paintings and statuary by thebest masters. On the roof of the Stoa Basileios were statues of Theseusand the Day. In front of the Stoa Eleutherius was placed the divinity towhom it was dedicated; and within were allegorical paintings, celebrating the rise of "the fierce democracy. " The Stoa Pœcile derivedits name from the celebrated paintings which adorned its walls, andwhich were almost exclusively devoted to the representation of nationalsubjects, as the contest of Theseus with the Amazons, the more gloriousstruggle at Marathon, and the other achievements of the Athenians; herealso were suspended the shields of the Scionæans of Thrace, togetherwith those of the Lacedemonians, taken at the island of Sphacteria. 

It is beyond our purpose to describe all the public edifices, --thetemples, gymnasia, and theatres which crowd the Ceramic area, and thatportion of the city lying to the west and south of the Acropolis. Ourobject is, if possible, to convey to the reader some conception of theancient splendor and magnificence of Athens; to revive the scenes amidstwhich the Athenians daily moved, and which may be presumed to haveexerted a powerful influence upon the manners, the taste, the habits ofthought, and the entire character of the Athenian people. To secure thisobject we need only direct attention to the Acropolis, which was crowdedwith the monuments of Athenian glory, and exhibited an amazingconcentration of all that was most perfect in art, unsurpassed inexcellence, and unrivalled in richness and splendor. It was "thepeerless gem of Greece, the glory and pride of art, the wonder and envyof the world. "

The western side of the Acropolis, which furnished the only access tothe summit of the hill, was about 168 feet in breadth; an opening sonarrow that, to the artists of Pericles, it appeared practicable to fillup the space with a single building, which, in serving the purpose of agateway to the Acropolis, should also contribute to adorn, as well asfortify the citadel. This work, the greatest achievement of civilarchitecture in Athens, which rivalled the Parthenon in felicity ofexecution, and surpassed it in boldness and originality of design, consisted of a grand central colonnade closed by projecting wings. Thisincomparable edifice, built of Pentelic marble, received the name ofPropylæa from its forming the vestibule to the five-fold gates by whichthe citadel was entered. In front of the right wing there stood a smallIonic temple of pure white marble, dedicated to Niké Apteros (WinglessVictory). 

A gigantic flight of steps conducted from the five-fold gates to theplatform of the Acropolis, which was, in fact, one vast composition ofarchitecture and sculpture dedicated to the national glory. Here stoodthe Parthenon, or temple of the Virgin Goddess, the glorious templewhich rose in the proudest period of Athenian history to the honor ofMinerva, and which ages have only partially effaced. This magnificenttemple, "by its united excellences of materials, design, and decoration, internal as well as external, has been universally considered the mostperfect which human genius ever planned and executed. Its dimensionswere sufficiently large to produce an impression of grandeur andsublimity, which was not disturbed by any obtrusive subdivision ofparts; and, whether viewed at a small or greater distance, there wasnothing to divert the mind of the spectator from contemplating the unityas well as majesty of mass and outline; circumstances which form thefirst and most remarkable characteristic of every Greek temple erectedduring the purer ages of Grecian taste and genius. "[14]

[Footnote 14: Leake's "Topography of Athens, " p. 209 et seq. ]

It would be impossible to convey any just and adequate conception of theartistic decorations of this wonderful edifice. The two pediments of thetemple were decorated with magnificent compositions of statuary, eachconsisting of about twenty entire figures of colossal size; the one onthe western pediment representing the birth of Minerva, and the other, on the eastern pediment, the contest between that goddess and Neptunefor the possession of Attica. Under the outer cornice were ninety-twogroups, raised in high relief from tablets about four feet square, representing the victories achieved by her companions. Round the innerfrieze was presented the procession of the Parthenon on the grandquinquennial festival of the Panathenæa. The procession is representedas advancing in two parallel columns from west to east; one proceedingalong the northern, the other along the southern side of the temple;part facing inward after turning the angle of the eastern front, andpart meeting towards the centre of that front. 

The statue of the virgin goddess, the work of Phidias, stood in theeastern chamber of the cella, and was composed of ivory and gold. It hadbut one rival in the world, the Jupiter Olympus of the same famousartist. On the summit or apex of the helmet was placed a sphinx, withgriffins on either side. The figure of the goddess was represented in anerect martial attitude, and clothed in a robe reaching to the feet. Onthe breast was a head of Medusa, wrought in ivory, and a figure ofVictory about four cubits high. The goddess held a spear in her hand, and an ægis lay at her feet, while on her right, and near the spear, wasa figure of a serpent, believed to represent that of Erichthonius. 

According to Pliny, the entire height of the statue was twenty-sixcubits (about forty feet), and the artist, Phidias, had ingeniouslycontrived that the gold with which the statue was encrusted might beremoved at pleasure. The battle of the Centaurs and Lapithæ was carvedupon the sandals; the battle of the Amazons was represented on the ægiswhich lay at her feet, and on the pedestal was sculptured the birth ofPandora. 

The temple of Erechtheus, the most ancient structure in Athens, stood onthe northern side of the Acropolis. The statue of Zeus Polieus stoodbetween the Propylæa and the Parthenon. The brazen colossus of Minerva, cast from the spoils of Marathon, appears to have occupied the spacebetween the Erechtheium and the Propylæa, near the Pelasgic or northernwall. This statue of the tutelary divinity of Athens and Attica rose ingigantic proportions above all the buildings of the Acropolis, theflashing of whose helmet plumes met the sailor's eye as he approachedfrom the Sunian promontory. And the remaining space of the wide area wasliterally crowded with statuary, amongst which were Theseus contendingwith the Minotaur; Hercules strangling the serpents; the Earth imploringshowers from Jupiter; and Minerva causing the olive to sprout, whileNeptune raises the waves. After these works of art, it is needless tospeak of others. It may be sufficient to state that Pausanias mentionsby name towards three hundred remarkable statues which adorned this partof the city even after it had been robbed and despoiled by its severalconquerors. 

The Areopagus, or hill of Ares (Mars), so called, it is said, inconsequence of that god having been the first person tried there for thecrime of murder, was, beyond all doubt, the rocky height which isseparated from the western end of the Acropolis by a hollow, forming acommunication between the northern and southern divisions of the city. The court of the Areopagus was simply an open space on the highestsummit of the hill, the judges sitting in the open air, on rude seats ofstone, hewn out of the solid rock. Near to the spot on which the courtwas held was the sanctuary of the Furies, the avenging deities ofGrecian mythology, whose presence gave additional solemnity to thescene. The place and the court were regarded by the people withsuperstitious reverence. 

This completes, our survey of the principal buildings, monuments, andlocalities within the city of Athens. We do not imagine we havesucceeded in conveying any adequate idea of the ancient splendor andglory of this city, which was not only the capital of Attica, but also

/* "The eye of Greece, mother of art and eloquence. "*/

We trust, however, that we have contributed somewhat towards awakeningin the reader's mind a deeper interest in these classic scenes, andenabling him to appreciate, more vividly, the allusions we may hereaftermake to them. 

The mere dry recital of geographical details, and topographical noticesis, however, of little interest in itself, and by itself. A tract ofcountry derives its chief interest from its historic _associations_--itsimmediate relations to man. The events which have transpired therein, the noble or ignoble deeds, the grand achievements, or the greatdisasters of which it has been the theatre, these constitute the livingheart of its geography. Palestine has been rendered forever memorable, not by any remarkable peculiarities in its climate or scenery, but bythe fact that it was the home of God's ancient people--the Hebrews andstill more, because the ardent imagination of the modern traveller stillsees upon its mountains and plains the lingering footprints of the Sonof God. And so Attica will always be regarded as a classic land, becauseit was the theatre of the most illustrious period of ancienthistory--_the period of youthful vigor in the life of humanity, whenviewed as a grand organic whole_. 

Here on a narrow spot of less superficies than the little State of RhodeIsland there flourished a republic which, in the grandeur of hermilitary and naval achievements, at Marathon, Thermopylæ, Platæa, andSalamis, in the sublime creations of her painters, sculptors, andarchitects, and the unrivalled productions of her poets, orators, andphilosophers, has left a lingering glory on the historic page, whichtwenty centuries have not been able to eclipse or dim. The names ofSolon and Pericles; of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle; of Isocrates andDemosthenes; of Myron, Phidias, and Praxiteles; of Herodotus, Xenophon, and Thucydides; of Sophocles and Euripides, have shed an undying lustreon Athens and Attica. 

How much of this universal renown, this imperishable glory attained bythe Athenian people, is to be ascribed to their geographical positionand surroundings, and to the elastic, bracing air, the enchantingscenery, the glorious skies, which poured their daily inspiration on theAthenian mind, is a problem we may scarcely hope to solve. 

Of this, at least, we may be sure, that all these geographical andcosmical conditions were ordained by God, and ordained, also, for somenoble and worthy end. That God, "the Father of all the families of theearth, " cared for the Athenian people as much as for Jewish andChristian nations, we can not doubt. That they were the subjects of aProvidence, and that, in God's great plan of human history, they had animportant part to fulfill, we must believe. That God "determined thetime of each nation's existence, and fixed the geographical bounds ofits habitation, " is affirmed by Paul. And that the _specific_ end forwhich the nation had its existence was fulfilled, we have the fullestconfidence. _So far, therefore, as we can trace the relation thatsubsists between the geographical position and surroundings of thatnation, and its national characteristics and actual history, so far arewe able to solve the problem of its destiny; and by so much do weenlarge our comprehension of the plan of God in the history of ourrace_. 

The geographical position of Greece was favorable to the freestcommercial and maritime intercourse with the great historicnations--those nations most advanced in science, literature, and art. Bounded on the west by the Adriatic and Ionian seas, by theMediterranean on the south, and on the east by the Ægean Sea, herpopulations enjoyed a free intercommunication with the Egyptians, Hebrews, Persians, Phœnicians, Romans, and Carthaginians. Thispeculiarity in the geographical position of the Grecian peninsula couldnot fail to awaken in its people a taste for navigation, and lead themto active commercial intercourse with foreign nations. [15] The boundlessoceans on the south and east, the almost impassable mountains on thewest and north of Asia, presented insurmountable obstacles to commercialintercourse. But the extended border-lands and narrow inland seas ofSouthern Europe allured man, in presence of their opposite shores, tothe perpetual exchange of his productions. An arm of the sea is not abarrier, but rather a tie between the nations. Appearing to separate, itin reality draws them together without confounding them. [16] On such atheatre we may expect that commerce will be developed on an extensivescale. [17] And, along with commerce, there will be increased activity inall departments of productive industry, and an enlarged diffusion ofknowledge. "Commerce, " says Ritter, "is the great mover and combiner ofthe world's activities. " And it also furnishes the channels throughwhich flow the world's ideas. Commerce, both in a material and moralpoint of view, is the life of nations. Along with the ivory and ebony, the fabrics and purple dyes, the wines and spices of the Syrianmerchant, there flowed into Greece the science of numbers and ofnavigation, and the art of alphabetical writing from Phœnicia. Alongwith the fine wheat, and embroidered linen, and riches of the fartherIndias which came from Egypt, there came, also, into Greece someknowledge of the sciences of astronomy and geometry, of architecture andmechanics, of medicine and chemistry; together with the mystic wisdom ofthe distant Orient. The scattered rays of light which gleamed in theeastern skies were thus converged in Greece, as on a focal point, to berendered more brilliant by contact with the powerful Grecian intellect, and then diffused throughout the western world. Thus intercourse withsurrounding nations, by commerce and travel, contact therewith byimmigrations and colonizations, even collisions and invasions also, became, in the hands of a presiding Providence, the means of diffusingknowledge, of quickening and enlarging the active powers of man, andthus, ultimately, of a higher civilization. 

[Footnote 15: Humboldt's "Cosmos, " vol. Ii. P. 143. ]

[Footnote 16: Cousin, vol. I. Pp. 169, 170. ]

[Footnote 17: The advantageous situation of Britain for commerce, andthe nature of the climate have powerfully contributed to the perfectionof industry among her population. Had she occupied a central, internalstation, like that of Switzerland, the facilities of her people fordealing with others being so much the less, their progress would havebeen comparatively slow, and, instead of being highly improved, theirmanufactures would have been still in infancy. But being surrounded onall sides by the sea, that "great highway of nations, " they have beenable to maintain an intercourse with the most remote as well as thenearest countries, to supply them on the easiest terms with theirmanufactures, and to profit by the peculiar products and capacities ofproduction possessed by other nations. To the geographical position andclimate of Great Britain, her people are mainly indebted for theirposition as the first commercial nation on earth. --See art. "Manufactrues, " p. 277, _Encyc. Brit_. ]

Then further, the peculiar configuration of Greece, the wonderfulcomplexity of its coast-line, its peninsular forms, the number of itsislands, and the singular distribution of its mountains, all seem tomark it as the theatre of activity, of movement, of individuality, andof freedom. An extensive continent, unbroken by lakes and inland seas, as Asia, where vast deserts and high mountain chains separate thepopulations, is the seat of immobility. [18] Commerce is limited to thebare necessities of life, and there are no inducements to movement, totravel, and to enterprise. There are no conditions prompting man toattempt the conquest of nature. Society is therefore stationary as inChina and India. Enfolded and imprisoned within the overpoweringvastness and illimitable sweep of nature, man is almost unconscious ofhis freedom and his personality. He surrenders himself to the disposalof a mysterious "_fate_" and yields readily to the despotic sway ofsuperhuman powers. The State is consequently the reign of a singledespotic will. The laws of the Medes and Persians are unalterable. Butin Greece we have extended border-lands on the coast of navigable seas;peninsulas elaborately articulated, and easy of access. We havemountains sufficiently elevated to shade the land and diversify thescenery, and yet of such a form as not to impede communication. They areusually placed neither in parallel chains nor in massive groups, but areso disposed as to inclose extensive tracts of land admirably adapted tobecome the seats of small and independent communities, separated bynatural boundaries, sometimes impossible to overleap. The face of theinterior country, --its forms of relief, seemed as though Providencedesigned, from the beginning, to keep its populations socially andpolitically disunited. These difficulties of internal transit by landwere, however, counteracted by the large proportion of coast, and theaccessibility of the country by sea. The promontories and indentationsin the line of the Grecian coast are hardly less remarkable than thepeculiar elevations and depressions of the surface. "The shape ofPeloponnesus, with its three southern gulfs, the Argolic, Laconian, andMessenian, was compared by the ancient geographers to the leaf of aplane-tree: the Pagasæan gulf on the eastern side of Greece, and theAmbrakian gulf on the western, with their narrow entrances andconsiderable area, are equivalent to internal lakes: Xenophon boasts ofthe double sea which embraces so large a portion of Attica; Ephorus, ofthe triple sea by which Bœotia was accessible from west, north, andsouth--the Eubœan strait, opening a long line of country on both sidesto coasting navigation. But the most important of all Grecian gulfs arethe Corinthian and Saronic, washing the northern and north-easternshores of Peloponnesus, and separated by the narrow barrier of theIsthmus of Corinth. The former, especially, lays open Ætolia, Phokis, and Bœotia, as the whole northern coast of Peloponnesus, to waterapproach. .. . It will thus appear that there was no part of Greece properwhich could be considered as out of the reach of the sea, whilst mostparts of it were easy of access. The sea was thus the sole channel fortransmitting improvements and ideas as well as for maintainingsympathies" between the Hellenic tribes. [19] The sea is not only thegrand highway of commercial intercourse, but the empire of movement, ofprogress, and of freedom. Here man is set free from the bondage imposedby the overpowering magnitude and vastness of continental and oceanicforms. The boisterous and, apparently, lawless winds are made to obeyhis will. He mounts the sea as on a fiery steed and "lays his hand uponher mane. " And whilst thus he succeeds, in any measure, to triumph overnature, he wakes to conscious power and freedom. It is in this region ofcontact and commingling of sea and land where man attains the highestsuperiority. Refreshing our historic recollections, and casting our eyesupon the map of the world, we can not fail to see that all the mosthighly civilized nations have lived, or still live, on the margin of thesea. 

[Footnote 18: Cousin, vol. I. Pp. 151, 170. ]

[Footnote 19: Grote's "Hist, of Greece, " vol. Ii. Pp. 221, 225. ]

The peculiar configuration of the territory of Greece, its forms ofrelief, "so like, in many respects, to Switzerland, " could not fail toexert a powerful influence on the character and destiny of its people. Its inclosing mountains materially increased their defensive power, and, at the same time, inspired them with the love of liberty. Thosemountains, as we have seen, so unique in their distribution, werenatural barriers against the invasion of foreign nations, and theyrendered each separate community secure against the encroachments of therest. The pass of Thermopylæ, between Thessaly and Phocis, that ofCithæron, between Bœotia and Attica; and the mountain ranges of Oneionand Geraneia, along the Isthmus of Corinth, were positions which couldbe defended against any force of invaders. This signal peculiarity inthe forms of relief protected each section of the Greeks from beingconquered, and at the same time maintained their separate autonomy. Theseparate states of Greece lived, as it were, in the presence of eachother, and at the same time resisted all influences and all effortstowards a coalescence with each other, until the time of Alexander. Their country, a word of indefinite meaning to the Asiatic, conveyed tothem as definite an idea as that of their own homes. Its wholelandscape, with all its historic associations, its glorious monuments ofheroic deeds, were perpetually present to their eyes. Thus theirpatriotism, concentrated within a narrow sphere, and kept alive by thesense of their individual importance, their democratic spirit, and theirstruggles with surrounding communities to maintain their independence, became a strong and ruling passion. Their geographical surroundings had, therefore, a powerful influence upon their political institutions. Conquest, which forces nations of different habits, characters, andlanguages into unity, is at last the parent of degrading servitude. These nations are only held together, as in the Roman empire, by theiron hand of military power. The despot, surrounded by a foreignsoldiery, appears in the conquered provinces, simply to enforce tribute, and compel obedience to his arbitrary will. But the small Greekcommunities, protected by the barriers of their seas and gulfs andmountains, escaped, for centuries, this evil destiny. The people, unitedby identity of language and manners and religion, by common interest andfacile intercommunication, could readily combine to resist the invasionsof foreign nations, as well as the encroachments of their own rulers. And they were able to easily model their own government according totheir own necessities and circumstances and common interests, and tomake the end for which it existed the sole measure of the powers it waspermitted to wield. [20]

[Footnote 20: _Encyc. Brit_, art. "Greece. "]

The soil of Attica was not the most favorable to agricultural pursuits. In many places it was stony and uneven, and a considerable proportionwas bare rock, on which nothing could be grown. Not half the surface wascapable of cultivation. In this respect it may be fitly compared to someof the New England States. The light, dry soil produced excellentbarley, but not enough of wheat for their own consumption. Demosthenesinforms us that Athens brought every year, from Byzantium, four hundredthousand _medimni_ of wheat. The alluvial plains, under industriouscultivation, would furnish a frugal subsistence for a large population, and the mildness of the climate allowed all the more valuable productsto ripen early, and go out of season last. Such conditions, of course, would furnish motives for skill and industry, and demand of the peoplefrugal and temperate habits. The luxuriance of a tropical climate tendsto improvidence and indolence. Where nature pours her fullness into thelap of ease, forethought and providence are little needed. There is noneof that struggle for existence which awakens sagacity, and calls intoexercise the active powers of man. But in a country where nature onlyyields her fruits as the reward of toil, and yet enough to theintelligent culture of the soil, there habits of patient industry mustbe formed. The alternations of summer and winter excite to forethoughtand providence, and the comparative poverty of the soil will prompt tofrugality. Man naturally aspires to improve his condition by all themeans within his power. He becomes a careful observer of nature, hetreasures up the results of observation, he compares one fact withanother and notes their relations, and he makes new experiments to testhis conclusions, and thus he awakes to the vigorous exercise of all hispowers. These physical conditions must develop a hardy, vigorous, prudent, and temperate race; and such, unquestionably, were the Greeks. "Theophrastus, and other authors, amply attest the observant andindustrious agriculture prevalent in Greece. The culture of the vine andolive appears to have been particularly elaborate and the many differentaccidents of soil, level, and exposure which were to be found, affordedto observant planters materials for study and comparison. "[21] TheGreeks were frugal in their habits and simple in their modes of life. The barley loaf seems to have been more generally eaten than the wheatenloaf; this, with salt fish and vegetables, was the common food of thepopulation. Economy in domestic life was universal. In their manners, their dress, their private dwellings, they were little disposed toostentation or display. 

[Footnote 21: Grote, "Hist. Of Greece, " vol. Ii. P. 230. ]

The climate of Attica is what, in physical geography, would be called_maritime_. "Here are allied the continental vigor and oceanic softness, in a fortunate union, mutually tempering each other. "[22] The climate ofthe whole peninsula of Greece seems to be distinguished from that ofSpain and Italy, by having more of the character of an inland region. The diversity of local temperature is greater; the extremes of summerand winter more severe. In Arcadia the snow has been found eighteeninches thick in January, with the thermometer at 16° Fahrenheit, and itsometimes lies on the ground for six weeks. The summits of the centralchains of Pindus and most of the Albanian mountains are covered withsnow from the beginning of November to the end of March. In Attica, which, being freely exposed to the sea, has in some measure an insularclimate, the winter sets in about the beginning of January. About themiddle of that month the snow begins to fall, but seldom remains uponthe plain for more than a few days, though it lies on the summit of themountain for a month. [23] And then, whilst Bœotia, which joins toAttica, is higher and colder, and often covered with dense fogs, Atticais remarkable for the wonderful transparency, dryness, and elasticity ofits atmosphere. All these climatal conditions exerted, no doubt, amodifying influence upon the character of the inhabitants. [24] In atropical climate man is enfeebled by excessive heat. His naturaltendency is to inaction and repose. His life is passed in a "strenuousidleness. " His intellectual, his reflective faculties are overmasteredby his physical instincts. Passion, sentiment, imagination prevail overthe sober exercises of his reasoning powers. Poetry universallypredominates over philosophy. The whole character of Oriental language, religion, literature is intensely imaginative. In the frozen regions ofthe frigid zone, where a perpetual winter reigns, and where lichens andmosses are the only forms of vegetable life, man is condemned to thelife of a huntsman, and depends mainly for his subsistence on theprecarious chances of the chase. He is consequently nomadic in hishabits, and barbarous withal. His whole life is spent in the bareprocess of procuring a living. He consumes a large amount of oleaginousfood, and breathes a damp heavy atmosphere, and is, consequently, of adull phlegmatic temperament. Notwithstanding his uncertain supplies offood, he is recklessly improvident, and indifferent to all the lessonsof experience. Intellectual pursuits are all precluded. There is nomotive, no opportunity, and indeed no disposition for mental culture. But in a temperate climate man is stimulated to high mental activity. The alternations of heat and cold, of summer and of winter, an elastic, fresh, and bracing atmosphere, a diversity in the aspects of nature, these develop a vivacity of temperament, a quickness of sensibility aswell as apprehension, and a versatility of feeling as well as genius. History marks out the temperate zone as the seat of the refined andcultivated nations. 

[Footnote 22: Guyot, "Earth and Man, " p. 181. ]

[Footnote 23: _Encyc. Brit. _, art. "Greece. "]

[Footnote 24: The influence of climatic conditions did not escape theattention of the Greeks. Herodotus, Hippocrates, and Aristotle speak ofthe climate of Asia as more enervating than that of Greece. Theyregarded the changeful character and diversity of local temperature inGreece as highly stimulating to the energies of the populations. Themarked contrast between the Athenians and the Bœotians was supposed tobe represented in the light and heavy atmosphere which they respectivelybreathed. --_Grote_, vol. Ii. Pp. 232-3. ]

The natural scenery of Greece was of unrivalled grandeur--surpassingItaly, perhaps every country in the world. It combined in the highestdegree every feature essential to the highest beauty of a landscapeexcept, perhaps, large rivers. But this was more than compensated for bythe proximity of the sea, which, by its numerous arms, seemed to embracethe land on nearly every side. Its mountains, encircled with zones ofwood, and capped with snow, though much lower than the Alps, are asimposing by the suddenness of their elevation--"pillars of heaven, thefosterers of enduring snows. "[25] Rich sheltered plains lie at theirfeet, covered with an unequally woven mantle of trees, and shrubs, andflowers, --"the verdant gloom of the thickly-mantling ivy, the narcissussteeped in heavenly dew, the golden-beaming crocus, the hardy andever-fresh-sprouting olive-tree, "[26] and the luxuriant palm, whichnourishes amid its branches the grape swelling with juice. But it is thecombination of these features, in the most diversified manner, withbeautiful inland bays and seas, broken by headlands, inclosed bymountains, and studded with islands of every form and magnitude, whichgives to the scenery of Greece its proud pre-eminence. "Greek scenery, "says Humboldt, "presents the peculiar charm of an intimate blending ofsea and land, of shores adorned with vegetation, or picturesquely girtwith rocks gleaming in the light of aerial tints, and an ocean beautifulin the play of the ever-changing brightness of its deep-toned wave. "[27]And over all the serene, deep azure skies, occasionally veiled by lightfleecy clouds, with vapory purple mists resting on the distant mountaintops. This glorious scenery of Greece is evermore the admiration of themodern traveller. "In wandering about Athens on a sunny day in March, when the asphodels are blooming on Colones, when the immortal mountainsare folded in a transparent haze, and the Ægean slumbers afar among hisisles, " he is reminded of the lines of Byron penned amid these scenes--

[Footnote 25: Pindar. ]

[Footnote 26: Sophocles, "Œdipus at Colonna. "]

[Footnote 27: "Cosmos, " vol. Ii. P. 25. ]

 "Yet are thy skies as blue, thy crags as wild; Sweet are thy groves, and verdant are thy fields, Thine olives ripe as when Minerva smiled, And still his honeyed wealth Hymettus yields; There the blithe bee his fragrant fortress builds, The freeborn wanderer of the mountain air; Apollo still thy long, long summer gilds, Still in his beams Mendeli's marbles glare; Art, Glory, Freedom fail, but nature still is fair. "[28]

[Footnote 28: Canto ii. , v. Lxxxvi. , "Childe Harold. "]

The effect of this scenery upon the character, the imagination, thetaste of the Athenians must have been immense. Under the influence ofsuch sublime objects, the human mind becomes gifted as with inspiration, and is by nature filled with poetic images. "Greece became thebirth-place of taste, of art, and eloquence, the chosen sanctuary of themuses, the prototype of all that is graceful, and dignified, and grandin sentiment and action. "

And now, if we have succeeded in clearly presenting and properlygrouping the facts, and in estimating the influence of geographicalposition and surroundings on national character, we have secured thenatural _criteria_ by which we examine, and even correct the portraitureof the Athenian character usually presented by the historian. 

The character of the Athenians has been sketched by Plutarch[29] withconsiderable minuteness, and his representations have been permitted, until of late years, to pass unchallenged. He has described them as atonce passionate and placable, easily moved to anger, and as easilyappeased; fond of pleasantry and repartee, and heartily enjoying alaugh; pleased to hear themselves praised, and yet not annoyed bycriticism and censure; naturally generous towards those who were poorand in humble circumstances, and humane even towards their enemies;jealous of their liberties, and keeping even their rulers in awe. Inregard to their intellectual traits, he affirms their minds were notformed for laborious research, and though they seized a subject as itwere by intuition, yet wanted patience and perseverance for a thoroughexamination of all its bearings. "An observation, " says the writer ofthe article on "_Attica_, " in the Encyclopædia Britannica, "moresuperficial in itself, and arguing a greater ignorance of the Athenians, can not easily be imagined. " Plutarch lived more than three hundredyears after the palmy days of the Athenian Demos had passed away. He wasa Bœotian by birth, not an Attic, and more of a Roman than a Greek inall his sympathies. We are tempted to regard him as writing under theinfluence of prejudice, if not of envy. He was scarcely reliable as abiographer, and as materials for history his "Parallel Lives" have beenpronounced "not altogether trustworthy. "[30]

[Footnote 29: "De Præcept. "]

[Footnote 30: _Encyc. Of Biography_, art. "Plutarch. "]

That the Athenians were remarkable for the ardor and vivacity of theirtemperament, --that they were liable to sudden gusts of passion, --thatthey were inconstant in their affections, intolerant of dictation, impatient of control, and hasty to resent every assumption ofsuperiority, --that they were pleased with flattery, and too ready tolend a willing ear to the adulation of the demagogue, --and that theywere impetuous and brave, yet liable to be excessively elated bysuccess, and depressed by misfortune, we may readily believe, becausesuch traits of character are in perfect harmony with all the facts andconclusions already presented. Such characteristics were the naturalproduct of the warm and genial sunlight, the elastic bracing air, theethereal skies, the glorious mountain scenery, and the elaborateblending of sea and land, so peculiar to Greece and the whole ofSouthern Europe. [31] These characteristics were shared in a greater orless degree by all the nations of Southern Europe in ancient times, andthey are still distinctive traits in the Frenchman, the Italian, and themodern Greek. [32]

[Footnote 31: "As the skies of Hellas surpassed nearly all otherclimates in brightness and elasticity, so, also, had nature dealt mostlovingly with the inhabitants of this land. Throughout the whole beingof the Greek there reigned supreme a quick susceptibility, out of whichsprang a gladsome serenity of temper, and a keen enjoyment of life;acute sense, and nimbleness of apprehension; a guileless and child-likefeeling, full of trust and faith, combined with prudence and forecast. These peculiarities lay so deeply imbedded in the inmost nature of theGreeks that no revolutions of time and circumstances have yet been ableto destroy them; nay, it may be asserted that even now, after centuriesof degradation, they have not been wholly extinguished in theinhabitants of ancient Hellas. "--"_Education of the Moral Sentimentamongst the Ancient Greeks_. " By FREDERICK JACOBS, p. 320. ]

[Footnote 32: These are described by the modern historian and travelleras lively, versatile, and witty. "The love of liberty and independencedoes not seem to be rooted out of the national character by centuries ofsubjugation. They love to command; but though they are loyal to a goodgovernment, they are apt readily to rise when their rights and libertiesare infringed. As there is little love of obedience among them, soneither is there any toleration of aristocratic pretensions. "--_Encyc. Brit. _, art. "Greece. "]

The consciousness of power, the feeling of independence, the ardent loveof freedom induced in the Athenian mind by the objective freedom ofmovement which his geographical position afforded, and thatsubordination and subserviency of physical nature to man so peculiar toGreece, determined the democratic character of all their politicalinstitutions. And these institutions reacted upon the character of thepeople and intensified their love of liberty. This passionate love ofpersonal freedom, amounting almost to disease, excited them to aconstant and almost distressing vigilance. And it is not to be wonderedat if it displayed itself in an extreme jealousy of their rulers, anincessant supervision and criticism of all their proceedings, and anintense and passionate hatred of tyrants and of tyranny. The popularlegislator or the successful soldier might dare to encroach upon theirliberties in the moment when the nation was intoxicated and dazzled withtheir genius, their prowess, and success; but a sudden revulsion ofpopular feeling, and an explosion of popular indignation, would overturnthe one, and ostracism expel the other. Thus while inconstancy, andturbulence, and faction seem to have been inseparable from thedemocratic spirit, the Athenians were certainly constant in their loveof liberty, faithful in their affection for their country, [33] andinvariable in their sympathy and admiration for that genius which shedglory upon their native land. And then they were ever ready to repairthe errors, and make amends for the injustice committed under theinfluence of passionate excitement, or the headlong impetuosity of theirtoo ardent temperament. The history of Greece supplies numerousillustrations of this spirit. The sentence of death which had beenhastily passed on the inhabitants of Mytilene was, on sober reflection, revoked the following day. The immediate repentance and general sorrowwhich followed the condemnation of the ten generals, as also ofSocrates, are notable instances. 

[Footnote 33: When immense bribes were offered by the king of Persia toinduce the Athenians to detach themselves from the alliance with therest of the Hellenic States, she answered by the mouth of Aristides"that it was impossible for all the gold in the world to tempt theRepublic of Athens, or prevail with it to sell its liberty and that ofGreece!"]

In their private life the Athenians were courteous, generous, andhumane. Whilst bold and free in the expression of their opinions, theypaid the greatest attention to rules of politeness, and were nicelydelicate on points of decorum. They had a natural sense of what wasbecoming and appropriate, and an innate aversion to all extravagance. Agraceful demeanor and a quiet dignity were distinguishing traits ofAthenian character. They were temperate and frugal[34] in their habits, and little addicted to ostentation and display. Even after theirvictories had brought them into contact with Oriental luxury andextravagance, and their wealth enabled them to rival, in costliness andsplendor, the nations they had conquered, they still maintained arepublican simplicity. The private dwellings of the principal citizenswere small, and usually built of clay; their interior embellishmentsalso were insignificant--the house of Polytion alone formed anexception. [35] All their sumptuousness and magnificence were reservedfor and lavished on their public edifices and monuments of art, whichmade Athens the pride of Greece and the wonder of the world. Intellectually, the Athenians were remarkable for their quickness ofapprehension, their nice and delicate perception, their intuitionalpower, and their versatile genius. Nor were they at all incapable ofpursuing laborious researches, or wanting in persevering application andindustry, notwithstanding Plutarch's assertion to the contrary. Thecircumstances of every-day life in Attica, the conditions whichsurrounded the Athenian from childhood to age, were such as to call forthe exercise of these qualities of mind in the highest degree. Habits ofpatient industry were induced in the Athenian character by the povertyand comparative barrenness of the soil, demanding greater exertion tosupply their natural wants. And an annual period of dormancy, thoughunaccompanied by the rigors of a northern winter, called for prudence inhusbanding, and forethought and skill in endeavoring to increase theirnatural resources. The aspects of nature were less massive andawe-inspiring, her features more subdued, and her areas morecircumscribed and broken, inviting and emboldening man to attempt herconquest. The whole tendency of natural phenomena in Greece was torestrain the imagination, and discipline the observing and reasoningfaculties in man. Thus was man inspired with confidence in his ownresources, and allured to cherish an inquisitive, analytic, andscientific spirit. "The French, in point of national character, holdnearly the same relative place amongst the nations of Europe that theAthenians held amongst the States of Ancient Greece. " And whilst it isadmitted the French are quick, sprightly, vivacious, perhaps sometimeslight even to frivolity, it must be conceded they have cultivated thenatural and exact sciences with a patience, and perseverance, andsuccess unsurpassed by any of the nations of Europe. And so theAthenians were the Frenchmen of Greece. Whilst they spent their "leisuretime"[36] in the place of public resort, the porticoes and groves, "hearing and telling the latest news" (no undignified or improper modeof recreation in a city where newspapers were unknown), whilst they arecondemned as "garrulous, " "frivolous, " "full of curiosity, " and"restlessly fond of novelties, " we must insist that a love of study, ofpatient thought and profound research, was congenial to their naturaltemperament, and that an inquisitive and analytic spirit, as well as ataste for subtile and abstract speculation, were inherent in thenational character. The affluence, and fullness, and flexibility, andsculpture-like finish of the language of the Attics, which leaves farbehind not only the languages of antiquity, but also the most cultivatedof modern times, is an enduring monument of the patient industry of theAthenians. [37] Language is unquestionably the highest creation ofreason, and in the language of a nation we can see reflected as in amirror the amount of culture to which it has attained. The rare balanceof the imagination and the reasoning powers, in which the perfection ofthe human intellect is regarded as consisting, the exact correspondencebetween the thought and the expression, "the free music of prosaicnumbers in the most diversified forms of style, " the calmness, andperspicuity, and order, even in the stormiest moments of inspiration, revealed in every department of Greek literature, were not a mere happystroke of chance, but a product of unwearied effort--and effort toowhich was directed by the criteria which reason supplied. The plasticart of Greece, which after the lapse of ages still stands forth inunrivalled beauty, so that, in presence of the eternal models itcreated, the modern artist feels the painful lack of progress was not aspontaneous outburst of genius, but the result of intense applicationand unwearied discipline. The achievements of the philosophic spirit, the ethical and political systems of the Academy, the Lyceum, the Stoa, and the Garden, the anticipations, scattered here and there likeprophetic hints, of some of the profoundest discoveries of "inductivescience" in more modern days, --all these are an enduring protest againstthe strange misrepresentations of Plutarch. 

[Footnote 34: These are still characteristics of the Greeks. "They arean exceedingly temperate people; drunkenness is a vice remarkably rareamongst them; their food also is spare and simple; even the richest arecontent with a dish of vegetables for each meal, and the poor with ahandful of olives or a piece of salt fish. .. . All other pleasures areindulged with similar propriety; their passions are moderate, andinsanity is almost unknown amongst them. "--_Encyc. Brit. _, art. "Greece. "]

[Footnote 35: Niebuhr's Lectures, vol. I. P. 101. ]

[Footnote 36: Εύκαιρέω corresponds exactly to the Latin _vacare_, "to beat leisure. "]

[Footnote 37: Frederick Jacobs, on "Study of Classic Antiquity, " p. 57. ]

In Athens there existed a providential collocation of the most favorableconditions in which humanity can be placed for securing its highestnatural development. Athenian civilization is the solution, on thetheatre of history, of the problem--What degree of perfection canhumanity, under the most favorable conditions, attain, without thesupernatural light, and guidance, and grace of Christianity?[38] "Liketheir own goddess Athene the people of Athens seem to spring full-armedinto the arena of history, and we look in vain to Egypt, Syria, andIndia, for more than a few seeds that burst into such marvellous growthon the soil of Attica. "[39]

[Footnote 38: It has been asserted by some theological writers, Watsonfor example, that no society of civilized men has been, or can beconstituted without the aid of a religion directly communicated byrevelation, and transmitted by oral tradition;--"that it is possible toraise a body of men into that degree of civil improvement which wouldexcite the passion for philosophic investigation, without the aid ofreligion. .. Can have no proof, and is contradicted by every fact andanalogy with which we are acquainted. " (_Institutes_, vol. I. P. 271;see also Archbishop Whately, "Dissertation, " etc. , vol. I. _Encyc. Brit. _, p. 449-455). 

The fallacy of the reasoning by which this doctrine is sought to besustained is found in the assumption "that to all our race the existenceof a First Cause is a question of philosophy, " and that the idea of Godlies at the end of "a gradual process of inquiry" and induction, forwhich a high degree of "scientific culture" is needed. Whereas the ideaof a First Cause lies at the beginning, not at the end of philosophy;and philosophy is simply the analysis of our natural consciousness ofGod, and the presentation of the idea in a logical form. Faith in theexistence of God is not the result of a conscious process of reflection;it is the spontaneous and instinctive logic of the human mind, which, inview of phenomena presented to sense, by a necessary law of thoughtimmediately and intuitively affirms a personal Power, an intelligentMind as the author. In this regard, there is no difference between menexcept the clearness with which they apprehend, and the logical accountthey can render to themselves, of this instinctive belief. Spontaneousintuition, says Cousin, is the genius of all men; reflection the geniusof few men. "But Leibnitz had no more confidence in the principle ofcausality, and even in his favorite principle of sufficient reason, thanthe most ignorant of men;" the latter have this principle within them, as a law of thought, controlling their conception of the universe, anddoing this almost unconsciously; the former, by an analysis of thought, succeeded in defining and formulating the ideas and laws whichnecessitate the cognition of a God. The function of philosophy is simplyto transform ἀληθὴς δόξα into ίτιστήμη--right opinion into science, --toelucidate and logically present the immanent thought which lies in theuniversal consciousness of man. 

That the possession of the idea of God is essential to the social andmoral elevation of man, --that is, to the civilization of our race, ismost cheerfully conceded. That humanity has an end and destination whichcan only be secured by the true knowledge of God, and by a participationof the nature of God, is equally the doctrine of Plato and of Christ. Now, if humanity has a special end and destination, it must have someinstinctive tendings, some spermatic ideas, some original forces orlaws, which determine it towards that end. All development supposes someoriginal elements to be unfolded or developed. Civilization is but thedevelopment of humanity according to its primal idea and law, and underthe best exterior conditions. That the original elements of humanitywere unfolded in some noble degree under the influence of philosophy isclear from the history of Greece; there the most favorable naturalconditions for that development existed, and Christianity alone wasneeded to crown the result with ideal perfection. ]

[Footnote 39: Max Muller, "Science of Language, " p. 404, 2d series. ]

Here the most perfect ideals of beauty and excellence in physicaldevelopment, in manners, in plastic art, in literary creations, wererealized. The songs of Homer, the dialogues of Plato, the speeches ofDemosthenes, and the statues of Phidias, if not unrivalled, are at leastunsurpassed by any thing that has been achieved by their successors. Literature in its most flourishing periods has rekindled its torch ather altars, and art has looked back to the age of Pericles for herpurest models. Here the ideas of personal liberty, of individual rights, of freedom in thought and action, had a wonderful expansion. Here thelasting foundations of the principal arts and sciences were laid, and insome of them triumphs were achieved which have not been eclipsed. Herethe sun of human reason attained a meridian splendor, and illuminatedevery field in the domain of moral truth. And here humanity reached thehighest degree of civilization of which it is capable under purely_natural_ conditions. 

And now, the question with which we are more immediately concerned is, what were the specific and valuable results attained by the Athenianmind in _religion_ and _philosophy_, the two momenta of the human mind?This will be the subject of discussion in subsequent chapters. 

The order in which the discussion shall proceed is determined for us bythe natural development of thought. The two fundamental momenta ofthought and its development are spontaneity and reflection, and the twoessential forms they assume are religion and philosophy. In the naturalorder of thought spontaneity is first, and reflection succeedsspontaneous thought. And so religion is first developed, andsubsequently comes philosophy. As religion supposes spontaneousintuition, so philosophy has religion for its basis, but upon this basisit is developed in an original manner. "Turn your attention to history, that living image of thought: everywhere you perceive religions andphilosophies: everywhere you see them produced in an invariable order. Everywhere religion appears with new societies, and everywhere, just sofar as societies advance, from religion springs philosophy. "[40] Thiswas pre-eminently the case in Athens, and we shall therefore direct ourattention first to the Religion of the Athenians. 

[Footnote 40: Cousin, "Hist. Of Philos. , " vol. I. P. 302. ]

CHAPTER II. 

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. 

 All things which I behold bear witness to your carefulness in religion δεισιδαιμονεστέροις. --ST. PAUL. 

As a prelude and preparation for the study of the religion of theAthenians, it may be well to consider religion in its more abstract anduniversal form; and inquire in what does religion essentially consist;how far is it grounded in the nature of man; and especially, what isthere in the mental constitution of man, or in his exterior conditions, which determines him to a mode of life which may be denominated_religious?_ As a preliminary inquiry, this may materially aid us inunderstanding the nature, and estimating the value of the religiousconceptions and sentiments which were developed by the Greek mind. 

Religion, in its most generic conception, may be defined as a form ofthought, feeling, and action, which has the _Divine_ for its object, basis, and end. Or, in other words, it is a mode of life determined bythe recognition of some relation to, and consciousness of dependenceupon, a _Supreme Being_. This general conception of religion underliesall the specific forms of religion which have appeared in the world, whether heathen, Jewish, Mohammedan, or Christian. 

That a religious destination appertains to man as man, whether he hasbeen raised to a full religious consciousness, or is simply consideredas capable of being so raised, can not be denied. In all ages man hasrevealed an instinctive tendency, or natural aptitude for religion, andhe has developed feelings and emotions which have always characterizedhim as a religious being. Religious ideas and sentiments have prevailedamong all nations, and have exerted a powerful influence on the entirecourse of human history. Religious worship, addressed to a Supreme Beingbelieved to control the destiny of man, has been coeval and coextensivewith the race. Every nation has had its mythology, and each mythologicsystem has been simply an effort of humanity to realize and embody insome visible form the relations in which it feels itself to be connectedwith an external, overshadowing, and all-controlling Power and Presence. The voice of all ancient, and all contemporaneous history, clearlyattests that the _religious principle_ is deeply seated in the nature ofman; and that it has occupied the thought, and stirred the feelings ofevery rational man, in every age. It has interwoven itself with theentire framework of human society, and ramified into all the relationsof human life. By its agency, nations have been revolutionized, andempires have been overthrown; and it has formed a mighty element in allthe changes which have marked the history of man. 

This universality of religious sentiment and religious worship must beconceded as a fact of human nature, and, as a universal fact, it demandsan explanation. Every event must have a cause. Every phenomenon musthave its ground, and reason, and law. The facts of religious history, the past and present religious phenomena of the world can be noexception to this fundamental principle; they press their imperiousdemand to be studied and explained, as much as the phenomena of thematerial or the events of the moral world. The phenomena of religion, being universally revealed wherever man is found, must be grounded insome universal principle, on some original law, which is connate with, and natural to man. At any rate, there must be something in the natureof man, or in the exterior conditions of humanity, which invariablyleads man to worship, and which determines him, as by the force of anoriginal instinct, or an outward, conditioning necessity, to recognizeand bow down before a Superior Power. The full recognition and adequateexplanation of the facts of religious history will constitute a_philosophy of religion_. 

The hypotheses which have been offered in explanation of the religiousphenomena of the world are widely divergent, and most of them are, inour judgment, eminently inadequate and unsatisfactory. The followingenumeration may be regarded as embracing all that are deemed worthy ofconsideration. 

I. The phenomenon of religion had its origin in SUPERSTITION, that is, in a _fear_ of invisible and supernatural powers, generated by ignoranceof nature. 

II. The phenomenon of religion is part of that PROCESS or EVOLUTION OFTHE ABSOLUTE (i. E. , the Deity), which gradually unfolding itself innature, mind, history, and _religion_, attains to perfectself-consciousness in philosophy. 

III. The phenomenon of religion has its foundation in FEELING--_thefeeling of dependence and of obligation_; and that to which the mind, byspontaneous intuition or instinctive faith, traces this dependence andobligation we call God. 

IV. The phenomenon of religion had its outbirth in the spontaneousapperceptions of REASON, that is, the necessary _à priori ideas of theInfinite, the Perfect, the Unconditioned Cause, the Eternal Being_, which are evoked into consciousness in presence of the changeful andcontingent phenomena of the world. 

V. The phenomenon of religion had its origin in EXTERNAL REVELATION, towhich _reason_ is related as a purely passive organ, and _heathenism_ asa feeble relic. 

As a philosophy of religion--an attempt to supply the rationale of thereligious phenomena of the world, the first hypothesis is a skepticalphilosophy, which necessarily leads to _Atheism_. The second is anidealistic philosophy (absolute idealism), which inevitably lands in_Pantheism_. The third is an intuitional or "faith-philosophy, " whichfinally ends in _Mysticism_. The fourth is a rationalistic or"spiritualistic" philosophy, which yields pure _Theism_. The last is anempirical philosophy, which derives all religion from instruction, andculminates in _Dogmatic Theology_. 

In view of these diverse and conflicting theories, the question whichnow presents itself for our consideration is, --does any one of thesehypotheses meet and satisfy the demands of the problem? does it fullyaccount for and adequately explain all the facts of religious history?The answer to this question must not be hastily or dogmatically given. The arbitrary rejection of any theory that may be offered, without afair and candid examination, will leave our minds in uncertainty anddoubt as to the validity of our own position. A blind faith is only oneremove from a pusillanimous skepticism. We can not render our ownposition secure except by comprehending, assaulting, and capturing theposition of our foe. It is, therefore, due to ourselves and to the causeof truth, that we shall examine the evidence upon which each separatetheory is based, and the arguments which are marshalled in its support, before we pronounce it inadequate and unphilosophical. Such a criticismof opposite theories will prepare the way for the presentation of aphilosophy of religion which we flatter ourselves will be found most inharmony with all the facts of the case. 

I. _It is affirmed that the religious phenomena of the world had theirorigin in_ SUPERSTITION, _that is, in a fear of unseen and supernaturalpowers, generated from ignorance of nature_. 

This explanation was first offered by Epicurus. He felt that theuniversality of the religious sentiment is a fact which demands a cause;and he found it, or presumed he found it not in a spiritual God, whichhe claims can not exist, nor in corporeal god which no one has seen, butin "phantoms of the mind generated by fear. " When man has been unable toexplain any natural phenomenon, to assign a cause within the sphere ofnature, he has had recourse to supernatural powers, or livingpersonalities behind nature, which move and control nature in anarbitrary and capricious manner. These imaginary powers are supposed tobe continually interfering in the affairs of individuals and nations. They bestow blessings or inflict calamities. They reward virtue andpunish vice. They are, therefore, the objects of "sacred awe" and"superstitious fear. "

 Whate'er in heaven, In earth, man sees mysterious, shakes his mind With sacred awe o'erwhelms him, and his soul Bows to the dust; the cause of things conceal Once from his vision, instant to the gods All empire he transfers, all rule supreme, And doubtful whence they spring, with headlong haste Calls them the workmanship of power divine. For he who, justly, deems the Immortals live Safe, and at ease, yet fluctuates in his mind How things are swayed; how, chiefly, those discerned In heaven sublime--to SUPERSTITION back Lapses, and fears a tyrant host, and then Conceives, dull reasoner, they can all things do, While yet himself nor knows what may be done, Nor what may never, nature powers defined Stamping on all, and bounds that none can pass: Hence wide, and wider errs he as he walks. [41]

[Footnote 41: Lucretius, "De Natura Rerum, " book vi. Vs. 50-70. ]

In order to rid men of all superstitious fear, and, consequently, of allreligion, Epicurus endeavors to show that "nature" alone is adequate tothe production of all things, and there is no need to drag in a "divinepower" to explain the phenomena of the world. 

This theory has been wrought into a somewhat plausible form by thebrilliant and imposing generalizations of Aug. Comte. The religiousphenomena of the world are simply one stage in the necessary developmentof mind, whether in the individual or the race. He claims to have beenthe first to discover the great law of the three successive stages orphases of human evolution. That law is thus enounced. Both in theindividual mind, and in the history of humanity, thought, in dealingwith its problems, passes, of necessity, through, first, a_Theological_, second, a _Metaphysical_, and finally reaches a third, or_Positive_ stage. 

In attempting an explanation of the universe, human thought, in itsearliest stages of development, resorts to the idea of living personalagents enshrined in and moving every object, whether organic orinorganic, natural or artificial. In an advanced stage, it conceives anumber of personal beings distinct from, and superior to nature, whichpreside over the different provinces of nature--the sea, the air, thewinds, the rivers, the heavenly bodies, and assume the guardianship ofindividuals, tribes, and nations. As a further, and still higher stage, it asserts the unity of the Supreme Power which moves and vitalizes theuniverse, and guides and governs in the affairs of men and nations. The_Theological_ stage is thus subdivided into three epochs, andrepresented as commencing in _Fetichism_, then advancing to_Polytheism_, and, finally, consummating in _Monotheism_. 

The next stage, the _Metaphysical_, is a transitional stage, in whichman substitutes abstract entities, as substance, force, Being _in se_, the Infinite, the Absolute, in the place of theological conceptions. During this period all theological opinions undergo a process ofdisintegration, and lose their hold on the mind of man. Metaphysicalspeculation is a powerful solvent, which decomposes and dissipatestheology. 

It is only in the last--the _Positive_ stage--that man becomes willingto relinquish all theological ideas and metaphysical notions, andconfine his attention to the study of phenomena in their relation totime and space; discarding all inquiries as to causes, whether efficientor final, and denying the existence of all entities and powers beyondnature. 

The first stage, in its religious phase, is _Theistic_, the second is_Pantheistic_, the last is _Atheistic_. 

The proofs offered by Comte in support of this theory are derived:

I. _From Cerebral Organization_. There are three grand divisions of theBrain, the Medulla Oblongata, the Cerebellum, and the Cerebrum; thefirst represents the merely animal instincts the second, the moreelevated sentiments, the third, the intellectual powers. Human naturemust, therefore, both in the individual and in the race, be developed inthe following order: (1. ) in animal instincts; (2. ) in social affectionsand communal tendencies; (3. ) in intellectual pursuits. Infant life is amerely animal existence, shared in common with the brute; in childhoodthe individual being realizes his relation to external nature and humansociety; in youth and manhood he compares, generalizes, and classifiesthe objects of knowledge, and attains to science. And so the infancy ofour race was a mere animal or savage state, the childhood of our racethe organization of society, the youth and manhood of our race thedevelopment of science. 

Now, without offering any opinion as to the merits of the phrenologicaltheories of Gall and Spurzheim, we may ask, what relation has this orderto the law of development presented by Comte? Is there any imaginableconnection between animal propensities and theological ideas; betweensocial affections and metaphysical speculations? Are not theintellectual powers as much concerned with theological ideas andmetaphysical speculations as with positive science? And is it not moreprobable, more in accordance with facts, that all the powers of themind, instinct, feeling, and thought, enter into action simultaneously, and condition each other? The very first act of perception, the firstdistinct cognition of an object, involves _thought_ as much as the lastgeneralization of science. We know nothing of _mind_ except as thedevelopment of thought, and the first unfolding, even of the infantmind, reveals an intellectual act, a discrimination between a self andan object which is not self, and a recognition of resemblance, ordifference between _this_ object and _that_. And what does Positivescience, in its most mature and perfect form, claim to do more than "tostudy actual phenomena in their orders of resemblance, coexistence, andsuccession. "

Cerebral organization may furnish plausible analogies in favor of sometheory of human development, but certainly not the one proposed by Aug. Comte. The attempt, however, to construct a chart of human history onsuch an _à priori_ method, --to construct an ideal framework into whichhuman nature must necessarily grow, is a violation of the first and mostfundamental principle of the Positive science, which demands that weshall confine ourselves strictly to the study of actual phenomena intheir orders of resemblance, coexistence, and succession. The history ofthe human race must be based on facts, not on hypotheses, and the factsmust be ascertained by the study of ancient records and existingmonuments of the past. Mere plausible analogies and _à priori_ theoriesbased upon them, are only fitted to mislead the mind; they insert aprism between the perceiving mind and the course of events whichdecomposes the pure white light of fact, and throws a false light overthe entire field of history. 

2. _The second order of proof is attempted to be drawn from theanalogies of individual experience_. 

It is claimed that the history of the race is the same as that of eachindividual mind; and it is affirmed that man is _religious_ in infancy, _metaphysical_ in youth, and _positive_, that is, scientific withoutbeing religious, in mature manhood; the history of the race musttherefore have followed the same order. 

We are under no necessity of denying that there is some analogy betweenthe development of mind in the individual man, and in humanity as awhole, in order to refute the theory of Comte. Still, it must not beoverlooked that the development of mind, in all cases and in all ages, is materially affected by exterior conditions. The influence ofgeographical and climatic conditions, of social and nationalinstitutions, and especially of education, however difficult to beestimated, can not be utterly disregarded. And whether all theseinfluences have not been controlled, and collocated, and adjusted by aSupreme Mind in the education of humanity, is also a question which cannot be pushed aside as of no consequence. Now, unless it can be shownthat the same outward conditions which have accompanied the individualand modified his mental development, have been repealed in the historyof the race, and repeated in the same order of succession, the argumenthas no value. 

But, even supposing it could be shown that the development of mind inhumanity has followed the same order as that of the individual, weconfidently affirm that Comte has not given the true history of thedevelopment of the individual mind. The account he has given may perhapsbe the history of his own mental progress, but it certainly is not thehistory of every individual mind, nor indeed, of a majority even, ofeducated minds that have arrived at maturity. It would be much more inharmony with facts to say childhood is the period of pure receptivity, youth of doubt and skepticism, and maturity of well-grounded andrational belief. In the ripeness and maturity of the nineteenth centurythe number of scientific men of the Comtean model is exceedingly smallcompared with the number of religious men. There are minds in every partof Europe and America as thoroughly scientific as that of Comte, and asdeeply imbued with the spirit of the Inductive Philosophy, which are notconscious of any discordance between the facts of science and thefundamental principles of theology. It may be that, in his own immediatecircle at Paris there may be a tendency to Atheism, but certainly nosuch tendency exists in the most scientific minds of Europe and America. The faith of Bacon, and Newton, and Boyle, of Descartes, Leibnitz, andPascal, in regard to the fundamental principles of theology, is stillthe faith of Sedgwick, Whewell, Herschel, Brewster, Owen, Agassiz, Silliman, Mitchell, Hitchcock, Dana, and, indeed of the leadingscientific minds of the world--the men who, as Comte would say, "belongto the élite of humanity. " The mature mind, whether of the individual orthe race, is not Atheistical. 

3. _The third proof is drawn from a survey of the history of certainportions of our race. _

Comte is far from being assured that the progress of humanity, under theoperation of his grand law of development, has been uniform andinvariable. The majority of the human race, the vast populations ofIndia, China, and Japan, have remained stationary; they are still in theTheological stage, and consequently furnish no evidence in support ofhis theory. For this reason he confines himself to the "élite" oradvance-guard of humanity, and in this way makes the history of humanitya very "abstract history" indeed. Starting with Greece as therepresentative of ancient civilization, passing thence to Romancivilization, and onward to Western Europe, he attempts to show that theactual progress of humanity has been, on the whole, in conformity withhis law. To secure, however, even this semblance of harmony between thefacts of history and his hypothetical law, he has to treat the factsvery much as Procrustes treated his victims, --he must stretch some, andmutilate others, so as to make their forms fit the iron bed. The naturalorganization of European civilization is distorted and torn asunder. "Asthe third or positive stage had accomplished its advent in his ownperson, it was necessary to find the metaphysical period just before;and so the whole life of the Reformed Christianity, in embryo and inmanifest existence, is stripped of its garb of _faith_, and turned outof view as a naked metaphysical phenomenon. But metaphysics, again, haveto be ushered in by theology; and of the three stages of theologyMonotheism is the last, necessarily following on Polytheism, as that, again, on Fetichism. There is nothing for it, therefore, but to let themediæval Catholic Christianity stand as the world's first monotheism, and to treat it as the legitimate offspring and necessary development ofthe Greek and Roman polytheism. This, accordingly, Comte actually does. Protestantism he illegitimates, and outlaws from religion altogether, and the genuine Christianity he fathers upon the faith of Homer and theScipios! Once or twice, indeed, it seems to cross him that there wassuch a people as the Hebrews, and that they were not the polytheiststhey ought to have been. He sees the fact, but pushes it out of his waywith the remark that the Jewish monotheism was 'premature. '"[42]

[Footnote 42: Martineau's Essays, pp. 61, 62. ]

The signal defect of Comte's historical survey, however, is, that itfurnishes no evidence of the general prevalence of Fetichism inprimitive times. The writings of Moses are certainly entitled to as muchconsideration and credence as the writings of Berosus, Manetho, andHerodotus; and, it will not be denied, they teach that the faith of theearliest families and races of men was _monotheistic_. The early Vedas, the Institutes of Menu, the writings of Confucius, the Zendavesta, allbear testimony that the ancient faith of India, China, and Persia, was, at any rate, pantheistic; and learned and trustworthy critics, Asiaticas well as European, confidently affirm that the ground of theBrahminical, Buddhist, and Parsist faith is _monotheistic_; and that_one_ Being is assumed, in the earliest books, to be the origin of allthings. [43] Without evidence, Comte assumes that the savage state is theoriginal condition of man; and instead of going to Asia, the cradle ofthe race, for some light as to the early condition and opinions of theremotest families of men, he turns to Africa, the _soudan_ of the earth, for his illustration of the habit of man, in the infancy of our race, toendow every object in nature, whether organic or inorganic, with lifeand intelligence. The theory of a primitive state of ignorance andbarbarism is a mere assumption--an hypothesis in conflict with thetraditionary legends of all nations, the earliest records of our race, and the unanimous voice of antiquity, which attest the general belief ina primitive state of light and innocence. 

[Footnote 43: "The Religions of the World in their Relation toChristianity" (Maurice, ch. Ii. , iii. , iv. ). ]

The three stages of development which Comte describes as necessarilysuccessive, have, for centuries past, been simultaneous. Thetheological, the metaphysical, and the scientific elements coexist now, and there is no real, radical, or necessary conflict between them. Theological and metaphysical ideas hold their ground as securely underthe influence of enlarged scientific discovery as before; and there isno reason to suppose they ever had more power over the mind of man thanthey have to-day. The notion that God is dethroned by the wonderfuldiscoveries of modern science, and theology is dead, is the dream of the"_profond orage cérébral_" which interrupted the course of Comte'slectures in 1826. As easily may the hand of Positivism arrest the courseof the sun, as prevent the instinctive thought of human reasonrecognizing and affirming the existence of a God. And so long as everthe human mind is governed by necessary laws of thought, so long will itseek. .. 

[Transcriber's note: In the original document, page 64 is a duplicationof page 63. The real page 64 seems to be missing. ]

. .. . Eur, and consequently to develop its true philosophy. Itsfundamental error is the assumption that all our knowledge is confinedto the observation and classification of sensible phenomena--that is, tochanges perceptible by the senses. Psychology, based, as it is, uponself-observation and self-reflection, is a "mere illusion; and logic andethics, so far as they are built upon it as their foundation, arealtogether baseless. " Spiritual entities, forces, causes, efficient orfinal, are unknown and unknowable; all inquiry regarding them must beinhibited, "for Theology is inevitable if we permit the inquiry intocauses at all. "

II. The second hypothesis offered in explanation of the facts ofreligious history is, _that religion is part of that_ PROCESS OREVOLUTION OF THE ABSOLUTE (_i. E. _, the Deity) _which, graduallyunfolding itself in nature, mind, history, and religion, attains to thefullest self-consciousness in philosophy_. 

This is the theory of Hegel, in whose system of philosophy thesubjective idealism of Kant culminates in the doctrine of "_AbsoluteIdentity_. " Its fundamental position is that thought and being, subjectand object, the perceiving mind and the thing perceived, are ultimatelyand essentially _one_, and that the only actual reality is that whichresults from their mutual relation. The outward thing is nothing, theinward perception is nothing, for neither could exist alone; the onlyreality is the relation, or rather synthesis of the two; the essence ornature of being in itself accordingly consists in the coexistence of twocontrarieties. Ideas, arising from the union or synthesis of twoopposites, are therefore the _concrete realities_ of Hegel; and the_process_ of the evolution of ideas, in the human mind, is the processof all existence--_the Absolute Idea_. 

_The Absolute_(die Idée) thus forms the beginning, middle, and end ofthe system of Hegel. It is the one infinite existence or thought, ofwhich nature, mind, history, religion, and philosophy, are themanifestation. "The absolute is, with him, not the infinite _substance_, as with Spinoza; nor the infinite _subject_, as with Fichte; nor theinfinite _mind_, as with Schelling; it is a perpetual _process_, aneternal thinking, without beginning and without end. "[44] This _living, eternal process of absolute existence is the God of Hegel_. 

It will thus be seen that the _Absolute_ is, with Hegel, the sum of allactual and possible existence; "nothing is true and real except so faras it forms an element of the Absolute Spirit. "[45] "What kind of anAbsolute Being, " he asks, "is that which does not contain in itself allthat is actual, even evil included?"[46] The Absolute, therefore, inHegel's conception, does not allow of any existence out of itself. It isthe _unity_ of the finite and the infinite, the eternal and thetemporal, the ideal and the real, the subject and the object. And it isnot only the unity of these opposites so as to exclude all difference, but it contains in itself, all the differences and opposites as elementsof its being; otherwise the distinctions would stand over againstabsolute as a limit, and the absolute would cease to be absolute. 

God is, therefore, according to Hegel, "no motionless, eternallyself-identical and unchangeable being, but a living, eternal _process_of absolute self-existence. This process consists in the eternalself-distinction, or antithesis, and equally self-reconciliation orsynthesis of those opposites which enter, as necessary elements, intothe constitution of the Divine Being. This _self-evolution_, whereby theabsolute enters into antithesis, and returns to itself again, is theeternal _self-actualization_ of its being, and which at once constitutesthe beginning, middle, and end, as in the circle, where the beginning isat the same time the end, and the end the beginning. "[47]

[Footnote 44: Morell, "Hist, of Philos. , p. 461. "]

[Footnote 45: "Philos. Of Religion, " p. 204. ]

[Footnote 46: Ibid. , chap. Xi. P. 24. ]

[Footnote 47: Herzog's _Real-Encyc. _, art. "Hegelian Philos. , " byUlrici. ]

The whole philosophy of Hegel consists in the development of this ideaof God by means of his, so-called, dialectic method, which reflects theobjective life-process of the Absolute, and is, in fact, identical withit; for God, says he, "is only the Absolute Intelligence in so far as heknows himself to be the Absolute Intelligence, _and this he knows onlyin science_ [dialectics], _and this knowledge alone constitutes his trueexistence. _"[48] This life-process of the Absolute has three "moments. "It may be considered as the idea _in itself_--bare, naked, undetermined, unconscious idea; as the idea _out of itself_, in its objective form, orin its differentiation; and, finally, as the idea _in itself_, and _foritself_, in its regressive or reflective form. This movement of thoughtgives, _first_, bare, naked, indeterminate thought, or thought in themere antithesis of Being and non-Being; _secondly_, thoughtexternalizing itself in nature; and, _thirdly_, thought returning toitself, and knowing itself in mind, or consciousness. Philosophy has, accordingly, three corresponding divisions:--1. LOGIC, which here isidentical with metaphysics; 2. PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE; 3. PHILOSOPHY OFMIND. 

[Footnote 48: "Hist, of Philos. , " iii. P. 399. ]

It is beyond our design to present an expanded view of the entirephilosophy of Hegel. But as he has given to the world a _new_ logic, itmay be needful to glance at its general features as a help to thecomprehension of his philosophy of religion. The fundamental law of hislogic is the _identity of contraries or contradictions_. All thought isa synthesis of contraries or opposites. This antithesis not only existsin all ideas, but constitutes them. In every idea we form, there must be_two_ things opposed and distinguished, in order to afford a clearconception. Light can not be conceived but as the opposite of darkness;good can not be thought except in opposition to evil. All life, allreality is thus, essentially, the union of two elements, which, together, are mutually opposed to, and yet imply each other. 

The identity of Being and Nothing is one of the consequences of thislaw. 

1. _The Absolute is the Being_ (das Absolute ist das Seyn), and "theBeing" is here, according to Hegel, bare, naked, abstract, undistinguished, indeterminate, unconscious idea. 

2. _The Absolute is the Nothing_ (das Absolute ist das Nichts). "Purebeing is pure abstraction, and consequently the absolute-negative, whichin like manner, directly taken, is _nothing_. " Being and Nothing are thepositive and negative poles of the Idea, that is, the Absolute. Theyboth alike exist, they are both pure abstractions, both absolutelyunconditioned, without attributes, and without consciousness. Hencefollows the conclusion--

3. _Being and Nothing are identical_ (das Seyn und das Nichts istdasselbe), Being is non-Being. Non-Being _is_ Being--theAnders-seyn--which becomes _as_ Being to the Seyn. Nothing is, in somesense, an actual thing. 

_Being_ and _Nothing_ are thus the two elements which enter into the oneAbsolute Idea as contradictories, and both together combine to form acomplete notion of bare production, or the _becoming_ of something outof nothing, --the unfolding of real existence in its lowest form, thatis, of _nature_. 

The "_Philosophy of Nature_" exhibits a series of necessary movementswhich carry the idea forward in the ascending scale of sensibleexistence. The laws of mechanics, chemistry, and physiology are resolvedinto a series of oppositions. But the law which governs this developmentrequires the self-reconciliation of these opposites. The idea, therefore, which in nature was unconscious and ignorant of itself, returns upon itself, and becomes conscious of itself, that is, becomes_mind_. The science of the regression or self-reflection of the idea, isthe "_Philosophy of Mind_. "

The "_Philosophy of Mind_" is subdivided by Hegel into three parts. There is, first, the subjective or individual mind (_psychology_); thenthe objective or universal mind, as represented in society, the state, and in history (_ethics, political philosophy, _ or _jurisprudence_, and_philosophy of history_); and, finally, the union of the subjective andobjective mind, or _the absolute mind_. This last manifests itself againunder three forms, representing the three degrees of theself-consciousness of the Spirit, as the eternal truth. These are, first, _art_, or the representation of beauty (æsthetics); secondly, _religion_, in the general acceptation of the term (philosophy ofreligion); and, thirdly, _philosophy_ itself, as the purest and mostperfect form of the scientific knowledge of truth. All historicalreligions, the Oriental, the Jewish, the Greek, the Roman, and theChristian, are _the successive stages in the development orself-actualization of God_. [49]

It is unnecessary to indicate to the reader that the philosophy of Hegelis essentially pantheistic. "God is not a _person_, but personalityitself, _i. E. _, the universal personality, which realizes itself inevery human consciousness, as so many separate thoughts of one eternalmind. The idea we form of the absolute is, to Hegel, the absoluteitself, its essential existence being identical with our conception ofit. Apart from, and out of the world, there is no God; and so also, apart from the universal consciousness of man, there is no Divineconsciousness or personality. "[50]

[Footnote 49: See art. "Hegelian Philosophy, " in Herzog's _Real-Encyc. _, from whence our materials are chiefly drawn. ]

[Footnote 50: Morell, "Hist. Of Philos. , " p. 473. ]

This whole conception of religion, however, is false, and conflicts withthe actual facts of man's religious nature and religious history. If theword "religion" has any meaning at all, it is "a mode of life determinedby the consciousness of dependence upon, and obligation to God. " It isreverence for, gratitude to, and worship of God as a being distinct fromhumanity. But in the philosophy of Hegel religion is a part of God--astage in the development or self-actualization of God. Viewed under oneaspect, religion is the self-adoration of God--the worship of God byGod; under another aspect it is the worship of humanity, since God onlybecomes conscious of himself in humanity. The fundamental fallacy isthat upon which his entire method proceeds, viz. , "the identity ofsubject and object, being and thought. " Against this false position theconsciousness of each individual man, and the universal consciousness ofour race, as revealed in history, alike protest. If thought and beingare identical, then whatever is true of ideas is also true of objects, and then, as Kant had before remarked, there is no difference between_thinking_ we possess a hundred dollars, and actually _possessing_ them. Such absurdities may be rendered plausible by a logic which asserts the"identity of contradictions, " but against such logic common senserebels. "The law of non-contradiction" has been accepted by alllogicians, from the days of Aristotle, as a fundamental law of thought. "Whatever is contradictory is unthinkable. A=not A=O, or A--A=O. "[51]Non-existence can not exist. Being can not be nothing. 

[Footnote 51: Hamilton's Logic, p. 58. ]

III. The third hypothesis affirms _that the phenomenon of religion hasits foundation in_ FEELING--_the feeling of dependence and ofobligation_; and that to which the mind, by spontaneous intuition ofinstinctive faith, traces that dependence and obligation we call God. 

This, with some slight modification in each case, consequent upon thedifferences in their philosophic systems, is the theory of Jacobi, Schleiermacher, Nitzsch, Mansel, and probably Hamilton. Its fundamentalposition is, that we can not gain truth with absolute certainty eitherfrom sense or reason, and, consequently, the only valid source of realknowledge is _feeling--faith, intuition_, or, as it is called by some, _inspiration_. 

There have been those, in all ages, who have made all knowledge ofinvisible, supersensuous, divine things, to rest upon an internal_feeling_, or immediate, inward vision. The Oriental Mystics, theNeo-Platonists, the Mystics of the Greek and Latin Church, the GermanMystics of the 14th century, the Theosophists of the Reformation, theQuietists of France, the Quakers, have all appealed to some _special_faculty, distinct from the understanding and reason, for the immediatecognition of invisible and spiritual existences. By some, that specialfaculty was regarded as an "interior eye" which was illuminated by the"Universal Light;" by others, as a peculiar sensibility of the soul--a_feeling_ in whose perfect calm and utter quiescence the Divinity wasmirrored; or which, in an ecstatic state, rose to a communion with, andfinal absorption in the Infinite. 

Jacobi was the first, in modern times, to give the "faith-philosophy, "as it is now designated, a definite form. He assumes the position thatall knowledge, of whatever kind, must ultimately rest upon intuition orfaith. As it regards sensible objects, the understanding finds theimpression from which all our knowledge of the external flows, readyformed. The process of sensation is a mystery; we know nothing of ituntil it is past, and the feeling it produces is present. Our knowledgeof matter, therefore, rests upon faith in these intuitions. We can notdoubt that the feeling has an objective cause. In every act ofperception there is something actual and present, which can not bereferred to a mere subjective law of thought. We are also conscious ofanother class of feelings which correlate us with a supersensuous world, and these feelings, also, must have their cause in some objectivereality. Just as sensation gives us an immediate knowledge of anexternal world, so there is an internal sense which gives us animmediate knowledge of a spiritual world--God, the soul, freedom, immortality. Our knowledge of the invisible world, like our knowledge ofthe visible world, is grounded upon faith in our intuitions. Allphilosophic knowledge is thus based upon _belief_, which Jacobi regardsas a fact of our inward sensibility--a sort of knowledge produced by animmediate _feeling_ of the soul--a direct apprehension, without proof, of the True, the Supersensuous, the Eternal. 

Jacobi prepared the way for, and was soon eclipsed by the deservedlygreater name of Schleiermacher. His fundamental position was that truthin Theology could not be obtained by reason, but by a feeling, _insight_, or intuition, which in its lowest form he called_God-consciousness_, and in its highest form, _Christian-consciousness. _The God-consciousness, in its original form, is the _feeling ofdependence_ on the Infinite. The Christian consciousness is the perfectunion of the human consciousness with the Divine, through the mediationof Christ, or what we would call a Christian experience of communionwith God. 

Rightly to understand the position of Schleiermacher we must takeaccount of his doctrine of _self_-consciousness. "In allself-consciousness, " says he, "there are two elements, a Being ein Seyn, and a Somehow-having-become (Irgendweigewordenseyn). The last, however, presupposes, for every self-consciousness, besides the ego, yetsomething else from whence the certainty of the same[self-consciousness] exists, and without which self-consciousness wouldnot be just this. "[52] Every determinate mode of the sensibilitysupposes an _object_, and a _relation_ between the subject and theobject, the subjective feeling deriving its determinations from theobject. External sensation, the feeling, say of extension andresistance, gives world-consciousness. Internal sensation, the _feelingof dependence_, gives God consciousness. And it is only by the presenceof world consciousness and God-consciousness that self consciousness canbe what it is. 

We have, then, in our self-consciousness a _feeling of directdependence_, and that to which our minds instinctively trace thatdependence we call God. "By means of the religious feeling, the PrimalCause is revealed in us, as in perception, the things external, arerevealed in us. "[53] The _felt_, therefore, is not only the firstreligious sense, but the ruling, abiding, and perfect form of thereligious spirit; whatever lays any claim to religion must maintain itsground and principle in _feeling_, upon which it depends for itsdevelopment; and the sum-total of the forces constituting religiouslife, inasmuch as it is a _life_, is based upon immediateself-consciousness. [54]

[Footnote 52: Glaubenslehre, ch. I. § 4. ]

[Footnote 53: Dialectic, p. 430. ]

[Footnote 54: Nitzsch, "System of Doctrine, " p. 23. ]

The doctrine of Schleiermacher is somewhat modified by Mansel, in his"_Limits of Religious Thought_. " He maintains, with Schleiermacher, thatreligion is grounded in _feeling_, and that the _felt_ is the firstintimation or presentiment of the Divine. Man "_feels_ within him theconsciousness of a Supreme Being, and the instinct to worship, before hecan argue from effects to causes, or estimate the traces of wisdom andbenevolence scattered through the creation. "[55] He also agrees withSchleiermacher in regarding the _feeling of dependence_ as _a_ state ofthe sensibility, out of which reflection builds up the edifice ofReligious Consciousness, but he does not, with Schleiermacher, regard itas pre-eminently _the_ basis of religious consciousness. "The mereconsciousness of dependence does not, of itself, exhibit the characterof the Being on whom we depend. It is as consistent with superstition aswith religion; with the belief in a malevolent, as in a benevolentDeity. "[56] To the feeling of dependence he has added the _consciousnessof moral obligation_, which he imagines supplies the deficiency. By thisconsciousness of moral obligation "we are compelled to assume theexistence of a moral Deity, and to regard the absolute standard of rightand wrong as constituted by the nature of that Deity. "[57] "To these twofacts of the inner consciousness the feeling of dependence, andconsciousness of moral obligation may be traced, as to their sources, the two great outward acts by which religion, in its various forms, hasbeen manifested among men--_Prayer_, by which they seek to win God'sblessing upon the future, and _Expiation_, by which they strive to atonefor the offenses of the past. The feeling of dependence is the instinctwhich urges us to pray. It is the feeling that our existence and welfareare in the hands of a superior power; not an inexorable fate, not animmutable law; but a Being having at least so far the attribute ofpersonality that he can show favor or severity to those who aredependent upon Him, and can be regarded by them with feelings of hopeand fear, and reverence and gratitude. "[58] The feeling of moralobligation--"the law written in the heart"--leads man to recognize aLawgiver. "Man can be a law unto himself only on the supposition that hereflects in himself the law of God. "[59] The conclusion from the wholeis, there must be an _object_ answering to this consciousness: theremust be a God to explain these facts of the soul. 

[Footnote 55: Mansel, "Limits of Religious Thought, " p. 115. ]

[Footnote 56: Id. , ib. , p. 120. ]

[Footnote 57: Id. , ib. , p. 122. ]

[Footnote 58: Id. , ib. , pp. 119, 120. ]

[Footnote 59: Id. , ib. , p. 122. ]

This "philosophy of feeling, " or of faith generated by feeling, has aninterest and a significance which has not been adequately recognized bywriters on natural theology. Feeling, sentiment, enthusiasm, have alwaysplayed an important part in the history of religion. Indeed it must beconceded that religion is a _right state of feeling towardsGod_--religion is _piety_. A philosophy of the religious emotion is, therefore, demanded in order to the full interpretation of the religiousphenomena of the world. 

But the notion that internal feeling, a peculiar determination of thesensibility, is the source of religious ideas:--that God can be knownimmediately by feeling without the mediation of the truth that manifestsGod; that he can be _felt_ as the qualities of matter can be felt; andthat this affection of the inward sense can reveal the character andperfections of God, is an unphilosophical and groundless assumption. Toassert, with Nitzsch, that "feeling has reason, and is reason, and thatthe sensible and felt God-consciousness generates out of itselffundamental conceptions, " is to confound the most fundamentalpsychological distinctions, and arbitrarily bend the recognizedclassifications of mental science to the necessities of a theory. Indeed, we are informed that it is "by means of an _independent_psychology, and conformably to it, " that Schleiermacher illustrates his"philosophy of feeling. "[60] But all psychology must be based upon theobservation and classification of mental phenomena, as revealed inconsciousness, and not constructed in an "independent" and à priorimethod. The most careful psychological analysis has resolved the wholecomplex phenomena of mind into thought, feeling, and volition. [61] Theseorders of phenomena are radically and essentially distinct. They differnot simply in degree but in kind, and it is only by an utter disregardof the facts of consciousness that they can be confounded. Feeling isnot reason, nor can it by any logical dexterity be transformed intoreason. 

[Footnote 60: Nitzsch, "System of Doctrine, " p. 21. ]

[Footnote 61: Kant, "Critique of Judg. , " ch. Xxii. ; Cousin, "Hist, ofPhilos. , " vol. Ii. P. 399; Hamilton, vol. I. P. 183, Eng. Ed. ]

The question as to the relative order of cognition and feeling, that is, as to whether feeling is the first or original form of the religiousconsciousness, or whether feeling be not consequent upon some idea orcognition of God, is one which can not be determined on empiricalgrounds. We are precluded from all scrutiny of the incipient stages ofmental development in the individual mind and in collective humanity. Ifwe attempt to trace the early history of the soul, its beginnings arelost in a period of blank unconsciousness, beyond all scrutiny of memoryor imagination. If we attempt the inquiry on the wider field ofuniversal consciousness, the first unfoldings of mind in humanity arelost in the border-land of mystery, of which history furnishes noauthentic records. All dogmatic affirmation must, therefore, beunjustifiable. The assertion that religious feeling precedes allcognition, --that "the consciousness of dependence on a Supreme Being, and the instinct of worship" are developed _first_ in the mind, beforethe reason is exercised, is utterly groundless. The more probabledoctrine is that all the primary faculties enter into spontaneous action_simultaneously_--the reason with the senses, the feelings with thereason, the judgment with both the senses and the reason, and that fromtheir primary and simultaneous action arises the complex result, calledconsciousness, or conjoint knowledge. [62] There can be no clear anddistinct consciousness without the cognition of a _self_ and a_not-self_ in mutual relation and opposition. Now the knowledge of theself--the personal ego--is an intuition of reason; the knowledge of thenot-self is an intuition of sense. All knowledge is possible only undercondition of plurality, difference, and relation. [63] Now the judgmentis "the Faculty of Relations, " or of comparison; and the affirmation"_this_ is not _that_" is an act of judgment; to know is, consequently, to judge. [64] Self-consciousness must, therefore, be regarded as asynthesis of sense, reason, and judgment, and not a mere self-feeling(cœnæsthesis). 

[Footnote 62: Cousin, "Hist. Of Philos. , " vol. I. P. 357; vol. Ii. P. 337. ]

[Footnote 63: Id. , ib. , vol. I. P. 88. ]

[Footnote 64: Hamilton, "Metaphys. , " p. 277]

A profound analysis will further lead to the conclusion that if ideas ofreason are not chronologically antecedent to sensation, they are, atleast, the logical antecedents of all cognition. The mere feeling ofresistance can not give the notion of without the à priori idea ofspace. The feeling of movement of change, can not give the cognition ofevent without the rational idea of time or duration. Simpleconsciousness can not generate the idea of personality, or selfhood, without the rational idea of identity or unity. And so the mere "feelingof dependence, " of finiteness and imperfection, can not give the idea ofGod, without the rational à priori idea of the Infinite, the Perfect, the Unconditioned Cause. Sensation is not knowledge, and never canbecome knowledge, without the intervention of reason, and a concentratedself feeling can not rise essentially above animal life until it has, through the mediation of reason, attained the idea of the existence of aSupreme Being ruling over nature and man. 

Mere feeling is essentially blind. In its _pathological_ form, it mayindicate a want, and even develop an unconscious appetency, but it cannot, itself, reveal an _object_, any more than the feeling of hunger canreveal the actual presence, or determine the character and fitness, ofany food. An undefinable fear, a mysterious presentiment, an instinctiveyearning, a hunger of the soul, these are all irrational emotions whichcan never rise to the dignity of knowledge. An object must be conjuredby the imagination, or conceived by the understanding, or intuitivelyapprehended by the reason, before the feeling can have any significance. 

Regarded in its _moral_ form, as "the feeling of obligation, " it canhave no real meaning unless a "law of duty" be known and recognized. Feeling, alone, can not reveal what duty is. When that which is right, and just, and good is revealed to the mind, then the sense of obligationmay urge man to the performance of duty. But the right, the just, thegood, are ideas which are apprehended by the reason, and, consequently, our moral sentiments are the result of the harmonious and livingrelation between the reason and the sensibilities. 

Mr. Mansel asserts the inadequacy of Schleiermacher's "feeling ofdependence" to reveal the character of the Being on whom we depend. Hehas therefore supplemented his doctrine by the "feeling of moralobligation, " which he thinks "compels us to _assume_ the existence of amoral Deity. " We think his "fact of religious intuition" is asinadequate as Schleiermacher's to explain the whole phenomena ofreligion. In neither instance does feeling supply the actual knowledgeof God. The feeling of dependence may indicate that there is a Power orBeing upon whom we depend for existence and well-being, and which Poweror Being "we call God. " The feeling of obligation certainly indicatesthe existence of a Being to whom we are accountable, and which Being Mr. Mansel calls a "moral Deity. " But in both instances the character, andeven the existence of God is "_assumed_" and we are entitled to ask onwhat ground it is assumed. It will not be asserted that feeling alonegenerates the idea, or that the feeling is transformed into idea withoutthe intervention of thought and reflection. Is there, then, a _logical_connection between the feeling of dependence and of obligation, and theidea of the Uncreated Mind, the Infinite First Cause, the RighteousGovernor of the world. Or is there a fixed and changeless co-relationbetween _the feeling_ and the _idea_, so that when the feeling ispresent, the idea also necessarily arises in the mind? This latteropinion seems to be the doctrine of Mansel. We accept it as thestatement of a fact of consciousness, but we can not regard it as anaccount of the genesis of the idea of God in the human mind. The idea ofGod as the First Cause, the Infinite Mind, the Perfect Being, thepersonal Lord and Lawgiver, the creator, sustainer, and ruler of theworld, is not a simple, primitive intuition of the mind. It ismanifestly a complex, concrete idea, and, as such, can not be developedin consciousness, by the operation of a single faculty of the mind, in asimple, undivided act. It originates in the spontaneous operation of thewhole mind. It is a necessary deduction from the facts of the universe, and the primitive intuitions of the reason, --a logical inference fromthe facts of sense, consciousness, and reason. A philosophy of religionwhich regards the feelings as supreme, and which brands the decisions ofreason as uncertain, and well-nigh valueless, necessarily degeneratesinto mysticism--a mysticism "which pretends to elevate man directly toGod, and does not see that, in depriving reason of its power, it reallydeprives man of that which enables him to know God, and puts him in ajust communication with God by the intermediary of eternal and infinitetruth. "[65]

[Footnote 65: Cousin, "True, Beautiful, and Good, " p. 110. ]

The religious sentiments in all minds, and in all ages, have resultedfrom the union of _thought_ and _feeling_--the living and harmoniousrelation of reason and sensibility; and a philosophy which disregardseither is inadequate to the explanation of the phenomena. 

IV. The fourth hypothesis is, _that religion has had its outbirth in thespontaneous apperceptions of_ REASON; that is, in the necessary, àpriori ideas of the infinite, the perfect, the unconditioned Cause, theEternal Being, which are evoked into consciousness in presence of thechangeful, contingent phenomena of the world. 

This will at once be recognized by the intelligent reader as thedoctrine of Cousin, by whom _pure reason_ is regarded as the grandfaculty or organ of religion. 

Religion, in the estimation of Cousin, is grounded on _cognition_ ratherthan upon feeling. It is the knowledge of God, and the knowledge of dutyin its relation to God and to human happiness; and as reason is thegeneral faculty of all knowing, it must be the faculty of religion. "Inits most elevated point of view, religion is the relation of absolutetruth to absolute Being, " and as absolute truth is apprehended by thereason alone, reason "is the veridical and religious part of the natureof man. "[66] By "reason, " however, as we shall see presently, Cousindoes not mean the discursive or reflective reason, but the spontaneousor intuitive reason. That act of the mind by which we attain toreligious knowledge is not a _process of reasoning_, but a pureappreciation, an instinctive and involuntary movement of the soul. 

[Footnote 66: Henry's Cousin, p. 510. ]

The especial function of reason, therefore, is to reveal to us theinvisible, the supersensuous, the Divine. "It was bestowed upon us forthis very purpose of going, without any circuit of reasoning, from thevisible to the invisible, from the finite to the infinite, from theimperfect to the perfect, and from necessary and eternal truths, to theeternal and necessary principle" that is God. [67] Reason is thus, as itwere, the bridge between consciousness and being; it rests, at the sametime, on both; it descends from God, and approaches man; it makes itsappearance in consciousness as a guest which brings intelligence ofanother world of real Being which lies beyond the world of sense. 

Reason does not, however, attain to the Absolute Being directly andimmediately, without any intervening medium. To assert this would be tofall into the error of Plotinus, and the Alexandrian Mystics. Reason isthe offspring of God, a ray of the Eternal Reason, but it is not to beidentified with God. Reason attains to the Absolute Being indirectly, and by the interposition of truth. Absolute truth is an attribute and amanifestation of God. "Truth is incomprehensible without God, and God isincomprehensible without truth. Truth is placed between humanintelligence, and the supreme intelligence as a kind of mediator. "[68]Incapable of contemplating God face to face, reason adores God in thetruth which represents and manifests Him. 

[Footnote 67: Cousin, "True, Beautiful, and Good, " p. 103. ]

[Footnote 68: Id. , ib. , p. 99. ]

Absolute truth is thus a revelation of God, made by God to the reason ofman, and as it is a light which illuminates every man, and isperpetually perceived by all men, it is a universal and perpetualrevelation of God to man. The mind of man is "the offspring of God, "and, as such, must have some resemblance to, and some correlation withGod. Now that which constitutes the image of God in man must be found inthe reason which is correlated with, and capable of perceiving the truthwhich manifests God, just as the eye is correlated to the light whichmanifests the external world. Absolute truth is, therefore, the solemedium of bringing the human mind into communion with God; and humanreason, in becoming united to absolute truth, becomes united to God inhis manifestation in spirit and in truth. The supreme law, and highestdestination of man, is to become united to God by seeking a fullconsciousness of, and loving and practising the Truth. [69]

[Footnote 69: Henry's Cousin, p. 511, 512. ]

It will at once be obvious that the grand crucial questions by whichthis philosophy of religion is to be tested are--

1st. _How will Cousin prove to us that human reason is in possession ofuniversal and necessary principles or absolute truths?_ and, 2d. _How are these principles shown to be absolute? how far do theseprinciples of reason possess absolute authority?_

The answer of Cousin to the first question is that we prove reason to bein possession of universal and necessary principles by the analysis ofthe contents of consciousness, that is, by psychological analysis. Thephenomena of consciousness, in their primitive condition, arenecessarily complex, concrete, and particular. All our primary ideas arecomplex ideas, for the evident reason that all, or nearly all, ourfaculties enter at once into exercise; their simultaneous action givingus, at the same time, a certain number of ideas connected with eachother, and forming a whole. For example, the idea of the exterior world, which is given us so quickly, is a complex idea, which contains a numberof ideas. There is the idea of the secondary qualities of exteriorobjects; there is the idea of the primary qualities; there is the ideaof the permanent reality of something to which you refer thesequalities, to wit, matter; there is the idea of space which containsbodies; there is the idea of time in which movements are effected. Allthese ideas are acquired simultaneously, or nearly simultaneously, andtogether form one complex idea. 

The application of analysis to this complex phenomenon clearly revealsthat there are simple ideas, beliefs, principles in the mind which cannot have been derived from sense and experience, which sense andexperience do not account for, and which are the suggestions of reasonalone: the idea of the _Infinite_, the _Perfect_, the _Eternal_; thetrue, the beautiful, the good; the principle of causality, of substance, of unity, of intentionality; the principle of duty, of obligation, ofaccountability, of retribution. These principles, in their natural andregular development, carry us beyond the limits of consciousness, andreveal to us a world of real being beyond the world of sense. They carryus up to an absolute Being, the fountain of all existence--a living, personal, righteous God--the author, the sustainer, and ruler of theuniverse. 

The proof that these principles are absolute, and possessed of absoluteauthority, is drawn, first, from the _impersonality of reason_, or, rather, the impersonality of the ideas, principles, or truths of reason. 

It is not we who create these ideas, neither can we change them at ourpleasure. We are conscious that the will, in all its various efforts, isenstamped with the impress of our personality. Our volitions are ourown. So, also, our desires are our own, our emotions are our own. Butthis is not the same with our rational ideas or principles. The ideas ofsubstance, of cause, of unity, of intentionality do not belong to oneperson any more than to another; they belong to mind as mind, they arerevealed in the universal intelligence of the race. Absolute truth hasno element of personality about it. Man may say "my reason, " but givehim credit for never having dared to say "_my_ truth. " So far fromrational ideas being individual, their peculiar characteristic is thatthey are opposed to individuality, that is, they are universal andnecessary. Instead of being circumscribed within the limits ofexperience, they surpass and govern it; they are universal in the midstof particular phenomena; necessary, although mingled with thingscontingent; and absolute, even when appearing within us the relative andfinite beings that we are. [70] Necessary, universal, absolute truth is adirect emanation from God. "Such being the case, the decision of reasonwithin its own peculiar province possesses an authority almost divine. If we are led astray by it, we must be led astray by a light fromheaven. "[71]

[Footnote 70: Cousin, "True, Beautiful, and Good, " p. 40. ]

[Footnote 71: Id. , "Lectures, " vol. Ii. P. 32. ]

The second proof is derived from _the distinction between thespontaneous and reflective movements of reason_. 

Reflection is voluntary, spontaneity is involuntary; reflection ispersonal, spontaneity is impersonal; reflection is analytic, spontaneityis synthetic; reflection begins with doubt, spontaneity withaffirmation; reflection belongs to certain ones, spontaneity belongs toall; reflection produces science, spontaneity gives truth. Reflection isa process, more or less tardy, in the individual and in the race. Itsometimes engenders error and skepticism, sometimes convictions that, from being rational, are only the more profound. It constructs systems, it creates artificial logic, and all those formulas which we now use bythe force of habit, as if they were natural to us. But spontaneousintuition is the true logic of nature, --instant, direct, and infallible. It is a primitive affirmation which implies no negation, and thereforeyields positive knowledge. To reflect is to return to that which was. Itis, by the aid of memory, to return to the past, and to render itpresent to the eye of consciousness. Reflection, therefore, createsnothing; it supposes an anterior operation of the mind in which therenecessarily must be as many terms as are discovered by reflection. Before all reflection there comes spontaneity--a spontaneity of theintellect, which seizes truth at once, without traversing doubt anderror. "We thus attain to a judgment free from all reflection, to anaffirmation without any mixture of negation, to an immediate intuition, the legitimate daughter of the natural energy of thought, like theinspiration of the poet, the instinct of the hero, the enthusiasm of theprophet. " Such is the first act of knowing, and in this first act themind passes from _idea to being_ without ever suspecting the depth ofthe chasm it has passed. It passes by means of the power which is in it, and is not astonished at what it has done. It is subsequently astonishedwhen by reflection it returns to the analysis of the results, and, bythe aid of the liberty with which it is endowed, to do the opposite ofwhat it has done, to deny what it has affirmed. "Hence comes the strifebetween sophism and common sense, between false science and naturaltruth, between good and bad philosophy, both of which come from freereflection. "[72]

It is this spontaneity of thought which gives birth to _religion. _ Theinstinctive thought which darts through the world, even to God, isnatural religion. "All thought implies a spontaneous faith in God, andthere is no such thing as natural atheism. Doubt and skepticism maymingle with reflective thought, but beneath reflection there is stillspontaneity. When the scholar has denied the existence of God, listen tothe man, interrogate him, take him unawares, and you will see that allhis words envelop the idea of God, and that faith in God is, without hisrecognition, at the bottom, in his heart. "[73]

Religion, then, in the system of Cousin, does not begin with reflection, with science, but with _faith_. There is, however, this difference to benoted between the theory of the "faith-philosophers" (Jacobi, Schleiermacher, etc. ) and the theory of Cousin. With them, faith isgrounded on sensation or _feeling_; with him, it is grounded on_reason_. "Faith, whatever may be its form, whatever may be its object, common or sublime, can be nothing else than the _consent of reason_. That is the foundation of faith. "[74]

[Footnote 72: Cousin, "True, Beautiful, and Good, " p. 106. ]

[Footnote 73: "Hist. Of Philos. , " vol. I. P. 137. ]

[Footnote 74: Ibid. , vol. I. P. 90. ]

Religion is, therefore, with Cousin, at bottom, pure Theism. He thinks, however, that "true theism is not a dead religion that forgets preciselythe fundamental attributes of God. " It recognizes God as creator, preserver, and governor; it celebrates a providence; it adores aperfect, holy, righteous, benevolent God. It holds the principle ofduty, of obligation, of moral desert. It not only perceives the divinecharacter, but feels its relation to God. The revelation of theInfinite, by reason, moves the feelings, and passes into sentiment, producing reverence, and love, and gratitude. And it creates worship, which recalls man to God a thousand times more forcibly than the order, harmony, and beauty of the universe can do. 

The spontaneous action of reason, in its greatest energy, is_inspiration_. "Inspiration, daughter of the soul and heaven, speaksfrom on high with an absolute authority. It commands faith; so all itswords are hymns, and its natural language is poetry. " "Thus, in thecradle of civilization, he who possessed in a higher degree than hisfellows the gift of inspiration, passed for the confidant and theinterpreter of God. He is so for others, because he is so for himself;and he is so, in fact, in a philosophic sense. Behold the sacred originof prophecies, of pontificates, and of modes of worship. "[75]

[Footnote 75: "Hist. Of Philos. , " vol. I. P. 129. ]

As an account of the genesis of the idea of God in the humanintelligence, the doctrine of Cousin must be regarded as eminentlylogical, adequate, and satisfactory. As a theory of the origin ofreligion, as a philosophy which shall explain all the phenomena ofreligion, it must be pronounced defective, and, in some of its aspects, erroneous. 

First, it does not take proper account of that _living force_ which hasin all ages developed so much energy, and wrought such vast results inthe history of religion, viz. , the _power of the heart_. Cousindiscourses eloquently on the spontaneous, instinctive movements of thereason, but he overlooks, in a great measure, the instinctive movementsof the heart. He does not duly estimate the feeling of reverence and awewhich rises spontaneously in presence of the vastness and grandeur ofthe universe, and of the power and glory of which the created universeis a symbol and shadow. He disregards that sense of an overshadowingPresence which, at least in seasons of tenderness and deep sensibility, seems to compass us about, and lay its hand upon us. He scarcelyrecognizes the deep consciousness of imperfection and weakness, andutter dependence, which prompts man to seek for and implore the aid of aSuperior Being; and, above all, he takes no proper account of the senseof guilt and the conscious need of expiation. His theory, therefore, cannot adequately explain the universal prevalence of sacrifices, penances, and prayers. In short, it does not meet and answer to the deep longingsof the human heart, the wants, sufferings, fears, and hopes of man. 

Cousin claims that the universal reason of man is illuminated by thelight of God. It is quite pertinent to ask, Why may not the universalheart of humanity be touched and moved by the spirit of God? If theideas of reason be a revelation from God, may not the instinctivefeelings of the heart be an inspiration of God? May not God come near tothe heart of man and awaken a mysterious presentiment of an invisiblePresence, and an instinctive longing to come nearer to Him? May he notdraw men towards himself by sweet, persuasive influences, and raise manto a conscious fellowship? Is not God indeed the _great want_ of thehuman heart?

Secondly, Cousin does not give due importance to the influence ofrevealed truth as given in the sacred Scriptures, and of the positiveinstitutions of religion, as a divine economy, supernaturally originatedin the world. He grants, indeed, that "a primitive revelation throwslight upon the cradle of human civilization, " and that "all antiquetraditions refer to an age in which man, at his departure from the handof God, received from him immediately all lights, and all truths. "[76]He also believes that "the Mosaic religion, by its developments, ismingled with the history of all the surrounding people of Egypt, ofAssyria, of Persia, and of Greece and Rome. "[77] Christianity, however, is regarded as "the summing and crown of the two great religious systemswhich reigned by turn in the East and in Greece"--the maturity ofEthnicism and Judaism; a development rather than a new creation. Theexplanation which he offers of the phenomena of inspiration opens thedoor to religious skepticism. Those who were termed seers, prophets, inspired teachers of ancient times, were simply men who resignedthemselves wholly to their intellectual instincts, and thus gazed upontruth in its pure and perfect form. They did not reason, they did notreflect, they made no pretensions to philosophy they received truthspontaneously as it flowed in upon them from heaven. [78] This immediatereception of Divine light was nothing more than the _natural_ play ofspontaneous reason nothing more than what has existed to a greater orless degree in every man of great genius; nothing more than may nowexist in any mind which resigns itself to its own unreflectiveapperceptions. Thus revelation, in its proper sense, loses all itspeculiar value, and Christianity is robbed of its pre-eminent authority. The extremes of Mysticism and Rationalism here meet on the same ground, and Plotinus and Cousin are at one. 

[Footnote 76: "Hist. Of Philos. , " vol. I. P. 148. ]

[Footnote 77: Ibid. , vol. I. P. 216. ]

[Footnote 78: Morell, "Hist. Of Philos. , " p. 661. ]

V. The fifth hypothesis offered in explanation of the religiousphenomena of the world is that they had their origin _in_ EXTERNALREVELATION, _to which reason is related as a purely passive organ, andEthnicism as a feeble relic_. 

This is the theory of the school of "dogmatic theologians, " of which theablest and most familiar presentation is found in the "TheologicalInstitutes" of R. Watson. [79] He claims that all our religious knowledgeis derived from _oral revelation alone_, and that all the forms ofreligion and modes of worship which have prevailed in the heathen worldhave been perversions and corruptions of the one true religion firsttaught to the earliest families of men by God himself. All the ideas ofGod, duty, immortality, and future retribution which are now possessed, or have ever been possessed by the heathen nations, are only broken andscattered rays of the primitive traditions descending from the family ofNoah, and revived by subsequent intercourses with the Hebrew race; andall the modes of religious worship--prayers, lustrations, sacrifices--that have obtained in the world, are but feeble relics, faint reminiscences of the primitive worship divinely instituted amongthe first families of men. "The first man received the knowledge of Godby sensible converse with him, and that doctrine was transmitted, withthe confirmation of successive manifestations, to the early ancestors ofall nations. "[80] This belief in the existence of a Supreme Being waspreserved among the Jews by continual manifestations of the presence ofJehovah. "The intercourses between the Jews and the states of Syria andBabylon, on the one hand, and Egypt on the other, powers which rose togreat eminence and influence in the ancient world, was maintained forages. Their frequent dispersions and captivities would tend to preservein part, and in part to revive, the knowledge of the once common anduniversal faith. "[81] And the Greek sages who resorted for instructionto the Chaldean philosophic schools derived from thence their knowledgeof the theological system of the Jews. [82] Among the heathen nationsthis primitive revelation was corrupted by philosophic speculation, asin India and China, Greece and Rome; and in some cases it was entirelyobliterated by ignorance, superstition, and vice, as among theHottentots of Africa and the aboriginal tribes of New South Wales, who"have no idea of one Supreme Creator. "[83]

[Footnote 79: We might have referred the reader to Ellis's "Knowledge ofDivine Things from Revelation, not from Reason or Nature;" Leland's"Necessity of Revelation;" and Horsley's "Dissertations, " etc. ; but aswe are not aware of their having been reprinted in this country, weselect the "Institutes" of Watson as the best presentation of the viewsof "the dogmatic theologians" accessible to American readers. ]

[Footnote 80: Watson, "Theol. Inst, " vol. I. P. 270. ]

[Footnote 81: Id. Ib. , vol. I. P. 31. ]

[Footnote 82: See ch. V. And vi. , "On the Origin of those Truths whichare found in the Writings and Religious Systems of the Heathen. "]

[Footnote 83: Ibid. , vol. I. P. 274. ]

The same course of reasoning is pursued in regard to the idea of duty, and the knowledge of right and wrong. "A direct communication of theDivine Will was made to the primogenitors of our race, " and to thissource _alone_ we are indebted for all correct ideas of right and wrong. "Whatever is found pure in morals, in ancient or modern writers, may betraced to _indirect_ revelation. "[84] Verbal instruction--tradition orscripture--thus becomes the source of all our moral ideas. The doctrineof immortality, and of a future retribution, [85] the practice ofsacrifice--precatory and expiatory, are also ascribed to the samesource. [86] Thus the only medium by which religious truth can possiblybecome known to the masses of mankind is _tradition_. The ultimatefoundation on which the religious faith and the religious practices ofuniversal humanity have rested, with the exception of the Jews, and thefavored few to whom the Gospel has come, is uncertain, precarious, andeasily corrupted tradition. 

[Footnote 84: Watson, "Theol. Inst. , " vol. Ii. P. 470. ]

[Footnote 85: Id. Ib. , vol. I. P. 11. ]

[Footnote 86: Id. Ib. , vol. I. P. 26. ]

The improbability, inadequacy, and incompleteness of this theory will beobvious from the following considerations:

1. It is highly improbable that truths so important and vital to man, soessential to the well-being of the human race, so necessary to theperfect development of humanity as are the ideas of God, duty, andimmortality, should rest on so precarious and uncertain a basis astradition is admitted, even by Mr. Watson, to be. 

The human mind needs the idea of God to satisfy its deep moralnecessities, and to harmonize all its powers. The perfection of humanitycan never be secured, the destination of humanity can never be achieved, the purpose of God in the existence of humanity can never beaccomplished, without the idea of God, and of the relation of man toGod, being present to the human mind. Society needs the idea of aSupreme Ruler as the foundation of law and government, and as the basisof social order. Without it, these can not be, or be conserved. Intellectual creatureship, social order, human progress, areinconceivable and impossible without the idea of God, and ofaccountability to God. Now that truths so fundamental should, to themasses of men, rest on tradition _alone_, is incredible. Is there noknown and accessible God to the outlying millions of our race who, inconsequence of the circumstances of birth and education, which arebeyond their control, have had no access to an oral revelation, andamong whom the dim shadowy rays of an ancient tradition have long agoexpired? Are the eight hundred millions of our race upon whom the lightof Christianity has not shone unvisited by the common Father of ourrace? Has the universal Father left his "own offspring" without a singlenative power of recognizing the existence of the Divine Parent, andabandoned them to solitary and dreary orphanage? Could not he who gaveto matter its properties and laws, --the properties and laws throughwhose operation he is working out his own purposes in the realm ofnature, --could not he have also given to mind ideas and principleswhich, logically developed, would lead to recognition of a God, and ofour duty to God, and, by these ideas and principles, have wrought outhis sublime purposes in the realm of mind? Could not he who gave to manthe appetency for food, and implanted in his nature the social instinctsto preserve his physical being, have implanted in his heart a "feelingafter God, " and an instinct to worship God in order to the conservationof his spiritual being? How otherwise can we affirm the responsibilityand accountability of all the race before God? Those theologians who areso earnest in the assertion that God has not endowed man with the nativepower of attaining the knowledge of God can not, on any principle ofequity, show how the heathen are "without excuse" when, in involuntaryignorance of God, they "worship the creature instead of the Creator, "and violate a law of duty of which they have no possible means to attainthe barest knowledge. 

2. This theory is utterly inadequate to the explanation of the_universality_ of religious rites, and especially of religious ideas. 

Take, for example, the idea of God. As a matter of fact we affirm, inopposition to Watson, the universality of this idea. The idea of God isconnatural to the human mind. Wherever human reason has had its normaland healthy development[87], this idea has arisen spontaneously andnecessarily. There has not been found a race of men who were utterlydestitute of some knowledge of a Supreme Being. All the instancesalleged have, on further and more accurate inquiry, been foundincorrect. The tendency of the last century, arbitrarily to quadrate allthe facts of religious history with the prevalent sensationalphilosophy, had its influence upon the minds of the first missionariesto India, China, Africa, Australia, and the islands of the Pacific. They_expected_ to find that the heathen had no knowledge of a Supreme Being, and before they had mastered the idioms of their language, or becomefamiliar with their mythological and cosmological systems, they reportedthem as _utterly ignorant of God_, destitute of the idea and even thename of a Supreme Being. These mistaken and hasty conclusions have, however, been corrected by a more intimate acquaintance with the people, their languages and religions. Even in the absence of any betterinformation, we should be constrained to doubt the accuracy of theauthorities quoted by Mr. Watson in relation to Hindooism, when by one(Ward) we are told that the Hindoo "believes in a God destitute of_intelligence_" and by another (Moore) that "Brahm is the one eternal_Mind_, the self-existent, incomprehensible Spirit". Learned andtrustworthy critics, Asiatic as well as European, however, confidentlyaffirm that "the ground of the Brahminical faith is Monotheistic;" itrecognizes "an Absolute and Supreme Being" as the source of all thatexists. [88] Eugene Burnouf, M. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, Kœppen, andindeed nearly all who have written on the subject of Buddhism, haveshown that the metaphysical doctrines of Buddha were borrowed from theearlier systems of the Brahminic philosophy. "Buddha. " we are told, is"_pure intelligence_" "_clear light_", "_perfect wisdom_;" the same asBrahm. This is surely Theism in its highest conception. [89] In regard tothe peoples of South Africa, Dr. Livingstone assures us "there is noneed for beginning to tell even the most degraded of these people of theexistence of a God, or of a future state--the facts being universallyadmitted. .. . On questioning intelligent men among the Backwains as totheir former knowledge of good and evil, of God, and of a future state, they have scouted the idea of any of them ever having been without atolerably clear conception on all these subjects. "[90] And so far fromthe New Hollanders having no idea of a Supreme Being, we are assured byE. Stone Parker, the protector of the aborigines of New Holland, theyhave a clear and well-defined idea of a "_Great Spirit_, " the maker ofall things. 

[Footnote 87: Watson, "Theol. Inst. , " vol. I. P. 46. ]

[Footnote 88: Maurice, "Religions of the World, " p. 59: _Edin. Review_, 1862, art "Recent Researches on Buddhism. " See also Müller's"Chips from a German Workshop, " vol. I. Ch. I. To vi. ]

[Footnote 89: "It has been said that Buddha and Kapila were bothatheists, and that Buddha borrowed his atheism from Kapila. But atheismis an indefinite term, and may mean very different things. In one senseevery Indian philosopher was an atheist, for they all perceived that thegods of the populace could not claim the attributes that belong to aSupreme Being. But all the important philosophical systems of theBrahmans admit, in some form or another, the existence of an Absoluteand Supreme Being, the source of all that exists, or seems toexist. "--Müller, "Chips from a German Workshop, " vol. I. Pp. 224, 5. 

Buddha, which means "intelligence, " "clear light, " "perfect wisdom, " wasnot only the name of the founder of the religion of Eastern Asia, butAdi Buddha was the name of the Absolute, Eternal Intelligence. --Maurice, "Religions of the World, " p. 102. ]

[Footnote 90: "Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa, " p. 158. ]

Now had the idea of God rested _solely_ on tradition, it were the mostnatural probability that it might be lost, nay, _must_ be lost, amongstthose races of men who were geographically and chronologically farremoved from the primitive cradle of humanity in the East. The peoplewho, in their migrations, had wandered to the remotest parts of theearth, and had become isolated from the rest of mankind, might, afterthe lapse of ages, be expected to lose the idea of God, if it were not aspontaneous and native intuition of the mind, --a necessity of thought. Afact of history must be presumed to stick to the mind with much greatertenacity than a purely rational idea which has no visible symbol in thesensible world, and yet, even in regard to the events of history, thepersistence and pertinacity of tradition is exceedingly feeble. TheSouth Sea Islanders know not from whence, or at what time, theirancestors came. There are monuments in Tonga and Fiji of which thepresent inhabitants can give no account. How, then, can a pure, abstractidea which can have no sensible representation, no visible image, retainits hold upon the memory of humanity for thousands of years? The Fijianmay not remember whence his immediate ancestors came, but he knows thatthe race came originally from the hands of the Creator. He can not tellwho built the monuments of solid masonry which are found in hisisland-home, but he can tell who reared the everlasting hills and builtthe universe. He may not know who reigned in Vewa a hundred years ago, but he knows who now reigns, and has always reigned, over the wholeearth. "The idea of a God is familiar to the Fijian, and the existenceof an invisible superhuman power controlling and influencing nature, andall earthly things, is fully recognized by him. "[91] The idea of God isa common fact of human consciousness, and tradition alone is manifestlyinadequate to account for its _universality_. 

[Footnote 91: "Fiji and the Fijians, " p. 215. ]

3. A verbal revelation would be inadequate to convey the knowledge ofGod to an intelligence "_purely passive_" and utterly unfurnished withany _à priori_ ideas or necessary laws of cognition and thought. 

Of course it is not denied that important verbal communications relatingto the character of God, and the duties we owe to God, were given to thefirst human pair, more clear and definite, it may be, than any knowledgeattained by Socrates and Plato through their dialectic processes, andthat these oral revelations were successively repeated and enlarged tothe patriarchs and prophets of the Old Testament church. Andfurthermore, that some rays of light proceeding from this pure fountainof truth were diffused, and are still lingering among the heathennations, we have no desire, and no need to deny. 

All this, however, supposes, at least, a natural power and aptitude forthe knowledge of God, and some configuration and correlation of thehuman intelligence to the Divine. "We have no knowledge of a dynamicinfluence, spiritual or natural, without a dynamic reaction. " Matter cannot be moved and controlled by forces and laws, unless it haveproperties which correlate it with those forces and laws. And mind cannot be determined from without to any specific form of cognition, unlessit have active powers of apprehension and conception which are governedby uniform laws. The "material" of thought may be supplied from without, but the "form" is determined by the necessary laws of our inward being. All our cognition of the external world is conditioned by the _à priori_ideas of time and space, and all our thinking is governed by theprinciples of causality and substance, and the law of "sufficientreason. " The mind itself supplies an element of knowledge in all ourcognitions. Man can not be taught the knowledge of God if he be notnaturally possessed of a presentiment, or an apperception of a God, asthe cause and reason of the universe. "If education be not alreadypreceded by an innate consciousness of God, as an operativepredisposition, there would be nothing for education and culture to actupon. "[92] A mere verbal revelation can not communicate the knowledge ofGod, if man have not already the idea of a God in his mind. A name is amere empty sign, a meaningless symbol, without a mental image of theobject which it represents, or an innate perception, or an abstractconception of the mind, of which the word is the sign. The mental imageor the abstract conception must, therefore, precede the name; cognitionmust be anterior to, and give the meaning of language. [93] The childknows a thing even before it can speak its name. And, universally, wemust know the _thing_ in itself, or image it by analogies andresemblances to some other thing we do know, before the name can haveany meaning for us. As to purely rational ideas and abstractconceptions, --as space, cause, the infinite, the perfect, --language cannever convey these to the mind, nor can the mind ever attain them byexperience if they are not an original, connate part of our mentalequipment and furniture. The mere verbal affirmation "there is a God"made to one who has no idea of a God, would be meaningless andunintelligible. What notion can a man form of "the First Cause" if theprinciple of causality is not inherent in his mind? What conception canhe form of "the Infinite Mind" if the infinite be not a primitiveintuition? How can he conceive of "a Righteous Governor" if he have noidea of right, no sense of obligation, no apprehension of a retribution?Words are empty sounds without ideas, and God is a mere name if the mindhas no apperception of a God. 

[Footnote 92: Nitzsch, "System of Christian Doctrine, " p. 10. ]

[Footnote 93: "Ideas must pre-exist their sensible signs. " See DeBoismont on "Hallucination, " etc. , p. Iii. ]

It may be affirmed that, preceding or accompanying the announcement ofthe Divine Name, there was given to the first human pair, and to theearly fathers of our race, some visible manifestation of the presence ofGod, and some supernatural display of divine power. What, then, was thecharacter of these early manifestations, and were they adequate toconvey the proper idea of God? Did God first reveal himself in humanform, and if so, how could their conception of God advance beyond a rudeanthropomorphism? Did he reveal his presence in a vast columnar cloud ora pillar of fire? How could such an image convey any conception of theintelligence, the omnipresence, the eternity of God? Nay, can theinfinite and eternal Mind be represented by any visible manifestation?Can the human mind conceive an image of God? The knowledge of God, it isclear, can not be conveyed by any sensible sign or symbol if man has noprior rational idea of God as the Infinite and the Perfect Being. 

If the facts of order, and design, and special adaptation which crowdthe universe, and the _à priori_ ideas of an unconditioned Cause and aninfinite Intelligence which arise in the mind in presence of thesefacts, are inadequate to produce the logical conviction that it is thework of an intelligent mind, how can any preternatural display of_power_ produce a rational conviction that God exists? "If the universecould come by chance or fate, surely all the lesser phenomena, termedmiraculous, might occur so too. "[94] If we find ourselves standing amidan eternal series of events, may not miracles be a part of that series?Or if all things are the result of necessary and unchangeable laws, maynot miracles also result from some natural or psychological law of whichwe are yet in ignorance? Let it be granted that man is _not_ soconstituted that, by the necessary laws of his intelligence, he mustaffirm that facts of order having a commencement in time prove mind; letit be granted that man has _no_ intuitive belief in the Infinite andPerfect--in short, no idea of God; how, then, could a marvellous displayof _power_, a new, peculiar, and startling phenomenon which even seemedto transcend nature, prove to him the existence of an infinite_intelligence_--a personal God? The proof would be simply inadequate, because not the right kind of proof. Power does not indicateintelligence, force does not imply personality. 

[Footnote 94: Morell, "Hist. Of Philos. " p. 737. ]

Miracles, in short, were never intended to prove the existence of God. The foundation of this truth had already been laid in the constitutionand laws of the human mind, and miracles were designed to convince usthat He of whose existence we had a prior certainty, spoke to us by HisMessenger, and in this way attested his credentials. To the man who hasa rational belief in the existence of God this evidence of a divinemission is at once appropriate and conclusive. "Master, we know thou arta teacher sent from God; for no man can do the works which thou doest, except God be with him. " The Christian missionary does not commence hisinstruction to the heathen, who have an imperfect, or even erroneousconception of "the Great Spirit, " by narrating the miracles of Christ, or quoting the testimony of the Divine Book he carries along with him. He points to the heavens and the earth, and says, "There is a Being whomade all these things, and Jehovah is his name; I have come to you witha message from Him!" Or he need scarce do even so much; for already theheathen, in view of the order and beauty which pervades the universe, has been constrained, by the laws of his own intelligence, to believe inand offer worship to the "Ἄγνωστος Θεος"--the unseen andincomprehensible God; and pointing to their altars, he may announce withPaul, "this God _whom ye worship_, though ignorantly, him declare I untoyou!"

The results of our study of the various hypotheses which have beenoffered in explanation of the religious phenomena of the world may besummed up as follows: The first and second theories we have rejected asutterly false. Instead of being faithful to and adequately explainingthe facts, they pervert, and maltreat, and distort the facts ofreligious history. The last three each contain a precious element oftruth which must not be undervalued, and which can not be omitted in anexplanation which can be pronounced complete. Each theory, taken byitself, is incomplete and inadequate. The third hypothesis overrates_feeling_; the fourth, _reason_; the fifth, _verbal instruction_. Thefirst extreme is Mysticism, the second is Rationalism, the last isDogmatism. Reason, feeling, and faith in testimony must be combined, andmutually condition each other. No purely rationalistic hypothesis willmeet and satisfy the wants and yearnings of the heart. No theory basedon feeling alone can satisfy the demands of the human intellect. And, finally, an hypothesis which bases all religion upon historicaltestimony and outward fact, and despises and tramples upon theintuitions of the reason and the instincts of the heart can nevercommand the general faith of mankind. Religion embraces andconditionates the whole sphere of life--thought, feeling, faith, andaction; it must therefore be grounded in the entire spiritual nature ofman. 

Our criticism of opposite theories has thus prepared the way for, andobviated the necessity of an extended discussion of the hypothesis wenow advance. 

_The universal phenomenon of religion has originated in the à prioriapperceptions of reason, and the natural instinctive feelings of theheart, which, from age to age, have been vitalized, unfolded, andperfected by supernatural communications and testamentary revelations_. 

There are universal facts of religious history which can only beexplained on the first principle of this hypothesis; there are specialfacts which can only be explained on the latter principle. The universalprevalence of the idea of God, and the feeling of obligation to obey andworship God, belong to the first order of facts; the general prevalenceof expiatory sacrifices, of the rite of circumcision, and the observanceof sacred and holy days, belong to the latter. To the last class offacts the observance of the Christian Sabbath, and the rites of Baptismand the Lord's Supper may be added. 

The history of all religions clearly attests that there are two ordersof principles--the _natural_ and the _positive_, and, in some measure, two authorities of religious life which are intimately related withoutnegativing each other. The characteristic of the natural is that it is_intrinsic_, of the positive, that it is _extrinsic_. In all ages menhave sought the authority of the positive in that which is immediately_beyond_ and above man--in some "voice of the Divinity" toning down thestream of ages, or speaking through a prophet or oracle, or written insome inspired and sacred book. They have sought for the authority of thenatural in that which is immediately _within_ man--the voice of theDivinity speaking in the conscience and heart of man. A careful study ofthe history of religion will show a reciprocal relation between the two, and indicate their common source. 

We expect to find that our hypothesis will be abundantly sustained bythe study of the _Religion of the Athenians_. 

CHAPTER III. 

THE RELIGION OF THE ATHENIANS. 

"All things which I behold bear witness to your carefulness in religion(δεισιδαιμονεστέρους). For as I passed through your city, and beheld theobjects of your worship, I found amongst them an altar with thisinscription--'TO THE UNKNOWN GOD. ' Whom therefore ye worship. .. . "--ST. PAUL. 

Through one of those remarkable counter-strokes of Divine Providence bywhich the evil designs of men are overruled, and made to subserve thepurposes of God, the Apostle Paul was brought to Athens. He walkedbeneath its stately porticoes, he entered its solemn temples, he stoodbefore its glorious statuary, he viewed its beautiful altars--alldevoted to pagan worship. And "his spirit was stirred within him, " hewas moved with indignation "when he saw the city full of images of thegods. "[95] At the very entrance of the city he met the evidence of thispeculiar tendency of the Athenians to multiply the objects of theirdevotion; for here at the gateway stands an image of Neptune, seated onhorseback, and brandishing the trident. Passing through the gate, hisattention would be immediately arrested by the sculptured forms ofMinerva, Jupiter, Apollo, Mercury, and the Muses, standing near asanctuary of Bacchus. A long street is now before him, with temples, statues, and altars crowded on either hand. Walking to the end of thisstreet, and turning to the right, he entered the Agora, a public squaresurrounded with porticoes and temples, which were adorned with statuaryand paintings in honor of the gods of Grecian mythology. Amid theplane-trees planted by the hand of Cimon are the statues of the deifiedheroes of Athens, Hercules and Theseus, and the whole series of theEponymi, together with the memorials of the older divinities; Mercurieswhich gave the name to the streets on which they were placed; statuesdedicated to Apollo as patron of the city and her deliverer from theplague; and in the centre of all the altar of the Twelve Gods. 

[Footnote 95: Lange's Commentary, Acts xvii. 16. ]

Standing in the market-place, and looking up to the Areopagus, Paulwould see the temple of Mars, from whom the hill derived its name. Andturning toward the Acropolis, he would behold, closing the longperspective, a series of little sanctuaries on the very ledges of therocks, shrines of Bacchus and Æsculapius, Venus, Earth, and Ceres, ending with the lovely form of the Temple of Unwinged Victory, whichglittered in front of the Propylæa. 

If the apostle entered the "fivefold gates, " and ascended the flight ofstone steps to the platform of the Acropolis, he would find the wholearea one grand composition of architecture and statuary dedicated to theworship of the gods. Here stood the Parthenon, the Virgin House, theglorious temple which was erected during the proudest days of Athenianglory, an entire offering to Minerva, the tutelary divinity of Athens. Within was the colossal statue of the goddess wrought in ivory and gold. Outside the temple there stood another statue of Minerva, cast from thebrazen spoils of Marathon; and near by yet another brazen Pallas, whichwas called by pre-eminence "the Beautiful. "

Indeed, to whatever part of Athens the apostle wandered, he would meetthe evidences of their "carefulness in religion, " for every public placeand every public building was a sanctuary of some god. The Metroum, orrecord-house, was a temple to the mother of the gods. The council-househeld statues of Apollo and Jupiter, with an altar to Vesta. The theatreat the base of the Acropolis was consecrated to Bacchus. The Pnyx wasdedicated to Jupiter on high. And as if, in this direction, the Atticimagination knew no bounds, abstractions were deified; altars wereerected to Fame, to Energy, to Modesty, and even to Pity, and theseabstractions were honored and worshipped as gods. 

The impression made upon the mind of Paul was, that the city wasliterally "full of idols, " or images of the gods. This impression issustained by the testimony of numerous Greek and Roman writers. Pausanias declares that Athens "had more images than all the rest ofGreece;" and Petronius, the Roman satirist, says, "it was easier to finda god in Athens than a man. "[96]

[Footnote 96: See Conybeare and Howson's "Life and Epistles of St. Paul;" also, art. "Athens, " in _Encyclopædia Britannica_, whence ouraccount of the "sacred objects" in Athens is chiefly gathered. ]

No wonder, then, that as Paul wandered amid these scenes "his spirit wasstirred in him. " He burned with holy zeal to maintain the honor of thetrue and only God, whom now he saw dishonored on every side. He wasfilled with compassion for those Athenians who, notwithstanding theirintellectual greatness, had changed the glory of God into an image madein the likeness of corruptible man, and who really worshipped thecreature _more_ than the Creator. The images intended to symbolize theinvisible perfections of God were usurping the place of God, andreceiving the worship due alone to him. We may presume the apostle wasnot insensible to the beauties of Grecian art. The sublime architectureof the Propylæa and the Parthenon, the magnificent sculpture of Phidiasand Praxiteles, could not fail to excite his wonder. But he rememberedthat those superb temples and this glorious statuary were the creationof the pagan spirit, and devoted to polytheistic worship. The glory ofthe supreme God was obscured by all this symbolism. The creatures formedby God, the symbols of his power and presence in nature, the ministersof his providence and moral government, were receiving the honor due tohim. Over all this scene of material beauty and æsthetic perfectionthere rose in dark and hideous proportions the errors and delusions andsins against the living God which Polytheism nurtured, and unable anylonger to restrain himself, he commenced to "reason" with the crowds ofAthenians who stood beneath the shadows of the plane-trees, or loungedbeneath the porticoes that surrounded the Agora. Among these groups ofidlers were mingled the disciples of Zeno and Epicurus, who"encountered" Paul. The nature of these "disputations" may be easilyconjectured, The opinions of these philosophers are even now familiarlyknown: they are, in one form or another, current in the literature ofmodern times. Materialism and Pantheism still "encounter" Christianity. The apostle asserted the personal being and spirituality of one supremeand only God, who has in divers ways revealed himself to man, andtherefore may be "known. " He proclaimed that Jesus is the fullest andmost perfect revelation of God--the _only_ "manifestation of God in theflesh. " He pointed to his "resurrection" as the proof of his superhumancharacter and mission to the world. Some of his hearers were disposed totreat him with contempt; they represented him as an ignorant "babbler, "who had picked up a few scraps of learning, and who now sought to palmthem off as a "new" philosophy. But most of them regarded him with thatpeculiar Attic curiosity which was always anxious to be hearing some"new thing. " So they led him away from the tumult of the market-place tothe top of Mars' Hill, where, in its serene atmosphere, they might hearhim more carefully, and said, "May we hear what this new doctrine iswhereof thou speakest?"

Surrounded by these men of thoughtful, philosophic mind--men who haddeeply pondered the great problem of existence, who had earnestlyinquired after the "first principles of things;" men who had reasonedhigh of creation, fate, and providence; of right and wrong; ofconscience, law, and retribution; and had formed strong and decidedopinions on all these questions--he delivered his discourse on the_being_, the _providence_, the _spirituality_, and the _moralgovernment_ of God. 

This grand theme was suggested by an inscription he had observed on oneof the altars of the city, which was dedicated "To the Unknown God. " "Yemen of Athens! every thing which I behold bears witness to your_carefulness in religion_. For as I passed by and beheld your sacredobjects I found an altar with this inscription, 'To the Unknown God;'whom, therefore, ye worship, though ye know him not [adequately], Himdeclare I unto you. " Starting from this point, the manifest carefulnessof the Athenians in religion, and accepting this inscription as theevidence that they had some presentiment, some native intuition, somedim conception of the one true and living God, he strives to lead themto a deeper knowledge of Him. It is here conceded by the apostle thatthe Athenians were a _religious people_. The observations he had madeduring his short stay in Athens enabled him to bear witness that theAthenians were "a God-fearing people, "[97] and he felt that fairness andcandor demanded that this trait should receive from him an amplerecognition and a full acknowledgment. Accordingly he commences bysaying in gentle terms, well fitted to conciliate his audience, "Allthings which I behold bear witness to your carefulness in religion. " Irecognize you as most devout; ye appear to me to be a God-fearingpeople, [98] for as I passed by and beheld your sacred objects I found analtar with this inscription, "To the Unknown God, " whom therefore yeworship. 

[Footnote 97: Lange's Commentary, _in loco_. ]

[Footnote 98: "Ως before δεισιδ. --so imports. I recognize you assuch. "--Lange's Commentary. ]

The assertion that the Athenians were "a religious people" will, to manyof our readers, appear a strange and startling utterance, which has init more of novelty than truth. Nay, some will be shocked to hear theApostle Paul described as complimenting these Athenians--these paganworshippers--on their "carefulness in religion. " We have been so longaccustomed to use the word "heathen" as an opprobriousepithet--expressing, indeed, the utmost extremes of ignorance, andbarbarism, and cruelty, that it has become difficult for us to believethat in a heathen there can be any good. 

From our childhood we have read in our English Bibles, Ye men of Athens, I perceive in all things ye are _too superstitious_ and we can scarcelytolerate another version, even if it can be shown that it approachesnearer to the actual language employed by Paul. We must, therefore, askthe patience and candor of the reader, while we endeavor to show, on theauthority of Paul's words, that the Athenians were a "religious people, "and that all our notions to the contrary are founded on prejudice andmisapprehension. 

First, then, let us commence even with our English version: "Ye men ofAthens, I perceive that in all things ye are _too superstitious_. " Andwhat now is the meaning of the word "superstition?" It is true, we nowuse it only in an evil sense, to express a belief in the agency ofinvisible, capricious, malignant powers, which fills the mind with fearand terror, and sees in every unexplained phenomenon of nature an omen, or prognostic, of some future evil. But this is not its proper andoriginal meaning. Superstition is from the Latin _superstitio_, whichmeans a superabundance of religion, [99] an extreme exactitude inreligious observance. And this is precisely the sense in which thecorresponding Greek term is used by the Apostle Paul. Δεισιδαιμονίαproperly means "reverence for the gods. " "It is used, " says Barnes, "inthe classic writers, in a good sense, to denote piety towards the gods, or suitable fear and reverence for them. " "The word, " says Lechler, "is, without doubt, to be understood here in a good sense; although it seemsto have been intentionally chosen, in order to indicate the conceptionof _fear_(δειδω), which predominated in the religion of the apostle'shearers. "[100] This reading is sustained by the ablest critics andscholars of modern times. Bengel reads the sentence, "I perceive that yeare _very religious_"[101] Cudworth translates it thus: "Ye are everyway _more than ordinarily religious. "[102]_ Conybeare and Howson readthe text as we have already given it, "All things which I behold bearwitness to your _carefulness in religion_. "[103] Lechler reads "verydevout;"[104] Alford, "carrying your _religious reverence veryfar_;"[105] and Albert Barnes, [106] "I perceive ye are greatly devotedto _reverence for religion_. "[107] Whoever, therefore, will giveattention to the actual words of the apostle, and search for their realmeaning, must be convinced he opens his address by complimenting theAthenians on their being more than ordinarily religious. 

[Footnote 99: Nitzsch, "System of Christ. Doctrine, " p. 33. ]

[Footnote 100: Lange's Commentary, _in loco_. ]

[Footnote 101: "Gnomon of the New Testament. "]

[Footnote 102: "Intellectual System, " vol. I. P. 626. ]

[Footnote 103: "Life and Epistles of St. Paul, " vol. I. P. 378. ]

[Footnote 104: Lange's Commentary. ]

[Footnote 105: Greek Test. ]

[Footnote 106: Notes on Acts. ]

[Footnote 107: Also Clarke's Comment. , _in loco_. ]

Nor are we for a moment to suppose the apostle is here dealing in hollowcompliments, or having recourse to a "pious fraud. " Such a course wouldhave been altogether out of character with Paul, and to suppose himcapable of pursuing such a course is to do him great injustice. If "tothe Jews he became as a Jew, " it was because he recognized in Judaismthe same fundamental truths which underlie the Christian system. And ifhere he seems to become, in any sense, at one with "heathenism, " that hemight gain the heathen to the faith of Christ, it was because he foundin heathenism some elements of truth akin to Christianity, and a stateof feeling favorable to an inquiry into the truths he had to present. Hebeheld in Athens an altar reared to the God _he_ worshipped, and itafforded him some pleasure to find that God was not totally forgotten, and his worship totally neglected, by the Athenians. The God whom theyknew imperfectly, "_Him_" said he, "I declare unto you;" I now desire tomake him more fully known. The worship of "the Unknown God" was arecognition of the being of a God whose nature transcends all humanthought, a God who is ineffable; who, as Plato said, "is hard to bediscovered, and having discovered him, to make him known to all, impossible. "[108] It is the confession of a _want_ of knowledge, theexpression of a _desire_ to know, the acknowledgment of the _duty_ ofworshipping him. Underlying all the forms of idol-worship the eye ofPaul recognized an influential Theism. Deep down in the pagan heart hediscovered a "feeling after God"--a yearning for a deeper knowledge ofthe "unknown, " the invisible, the incomprehensible, which he could notdespise or disregard. The mysterious _sentiments_ of fear, of reverence, of conscious dependence on a supernatural power and presenceovershadowing man, which were expressed in the symbolism of the "sacredobjects" which Paul saw everywhere in Athens, commanded his respect. Andhe alludes to their "devotions, " not in the language of reproach orcensure, but as furnishing to his own mind the evidence of the strengthof their _religious instincts_, and the proof of the existence in theirhearts of that _native apprehension_ of the supernatural, the divine, which dwells alike in all human souls. 

[Footnote 108: Timæus, ch. Ix. ]

The case of the Athenians has, therefore, a peculiar interest to everythoughtful mind. It confirms the belief that religion is a necessity toevery human mind, a want of every human heart. [109] Without religion, the nature of man can never be properly developed; the noblest part ofman--the divine, the spiritual element which dwells in man, as "theoffspring of God"--must remain utterly dwarfed. The spirit, the personalbeing, the rational nature, is religious, and Atheism is the vain andthe wicked attempt to be something less than man. If the spiritualnature of man has its normal and healthy development, he must become aworshipper. This is attested by the universal history of man. We lookdown the long-drawn aisles of antiquity, and everywhere we behold thesmoking altar, the ascending incense, the prostrate form, the attitudeof devotion. Athens, with her four thousand deities--Rome, with hercrowded Pantheon of gods--Egypt, with her degradingsuperstitions--Hindostan, with her horrid and revolting rites--allattest that the religious principle is deeply seated in the nature ofman. And we are sure religion can never be robbed of her supremacy, shecan never be dethroned in the hearts of men. It were easier to satisfythe cravings of hunger by logical syllogisms, than to satisfy theyearnings of the human heart without religion. The attempt of Xerxes tobind the rushing floods of the Hellespont in chains was not more futilenor more impotent than the attempt of skepticism to repress theuniversal tendency to worship, so peculiar and so natural to man inevery age and clime. 

[Footnote 109: The indispensable necessity for a religion of some kindto satisfy the emotional nature of man is tacitly confessed by theatheist Comte in the publication of his "Catechism of PositiveReligion. "]

The unwillingness of many to recognize a religious element in theAthenian mind is further accounted for by their misconception of themeaning of the word "religion. " We are all too much accustomed to regardreligion as a mere system of dogmatic teaching. We use the terms"Christian religion, " "Jewish religion, " "Mohammedan religion, " ascomprehending simply the characteristic doctrines by which each isdistinguished; whereas religion is a mode of thought, and feeling, andaction, determined by the consciousness of our relation to and ourdependence upon God. It does not appropriate to itself any specificdepartment of our mental powers and susceptibilities, but it conditionsthe entire functions and circle of our spiritual life. It is not simplya mode of conceiving God in thought, nor simply a mode of venerating Godin the affections, nor yet simply a mode of worshipping God in outwardand formal acts, but it comprehends the whole. Religion (_religere_, respect, awe, reverence) regulates our thoughts, feelings, and actstowards God. "It is a reference and a relationship of our finiteconsciousness to the Creator and Sustainer and Governor of theuniverse. " It is such a consciousness of the Divine as shall awaken inthe heart of man the sentiments of reverence, fear, and gratitudetowards God; such a sense of dependence as shall prompt man to pray, andlead him to perform external acts of worship. 

Religion does not, therefore, consist exclusively in knowledge, howevercorrect; and yet it must be preceded and accompanied by some intuitivecognition of a Supreme Being, and some conception of him as a free moralpersonality. But the religious sentiments, which belong rather to theheart than to the understanding of man--the consciousness of dependence, the sense of obligation, the feeling of reverence, the instinct to pray, the appetency to worship--these may all exist and be largely developedin a human mind even when, as in the case of the Athenians, there is avery imperfect knowledge of the real character of God. 

Regarding this, then, as the generic conception of religion, namely, _that it is a mode of thought and feeling and action determined by ourconsciousness of dependence on a Supreme Being_, we claim that theapostle was perfectly right in complimenting the Athenians on their"more than ordinary religiousness, " for, 1. They had, in some degree at least, that faith in the being andprovidence of God which precedes and accompanies all religion. 

They had erected an altar to the unseen, the unsearchable, theincomprehensible, the unknown God. And this "unknown God" whom theAthenians "worshipped" was the true God, the God whom Paul worshipped, and whom he desired more fully to reveal to them; "_Him_ declare I untoyou. " The Athenians had, therefore, some knowledge of the true God, somedim recognition, at least, of his being, and some conception, howeverimperfect, of his character. The Deity to whom the Athenians reared thisaltar is called "the unknown God, " because he is unseen by all humaneyes and incomprehensible to human thought. There is a sense in which toPaul, as well as to the Athenians--to the Christian as well as to thepagan--to the philosopher as well as to the peasant--God is "_theunknown_, " and in which he must forever remain the incomprehensible. This has been confessed by all thoughtful minds in every age. It wasconfessed by Plato. To his mind God is "the ineffable, " the unspeakable. Zophar, the friend of Job, asks, "Canst thou by searching find out God?Canst thou find out the Almighty to perfection?" This knowledge is "highas heaven; what canst thou do? deeper than hell; what canst thou know?"Does not Wesley teach us to sing, "Hail, Father, whose creating call Unnumbered worlds attend; Jehovah, comprehending all, Whom none can comprehend?"

To his mind, as well as to the mind of the Athenian, God was "the greatunseen, unknown. " "Beyond the universe and man, " says Cousin, "thereremains in God something unknown, impenetrable, incomprehensible. Hence, in the immeasurable spaces of the universe, and beneath all theprofundities of the human soul, God escapes us in this inexhaustibleinfinitude, whence he is able to draw without limit new worlds, newbeings, new manifestations. God is therefore to us_incomprehensible_. "[110] And without making ourselves in the leastresponsible for Hamilton's "negative" doctrine of the Infinite, or evenresponsible for the full import of his words, we may quote hisremarkable utterances on this subject: "The Divinity is in partconcealed and in part revealed. He is at once known and unknown. But thelast and highest consecration of all true religion must be an altar 'tothe unknown God. ' In this consummation nature and religion, Paganism andChristianity, are at one. "[111]

[Footnote 110: "Lectures, " vol. I. P. 104. ]

[Footnote 111: "Discussions on Philosophy, " p. 23. ]

When, therefore, the apostle affirms that while the Athenians worshippedthe God whom he proclaimed they "knew him not, " we can not understandhim as saying they were destitute of all faith in the being of God, andof all ideas of his real character. Because for him to have assertedthey had _no_ knowledge of God would not only have been contrary to allthe facts of the case, but also an utter contradiction of all hissettled convictions and his recorded opinions. There is not in moderntimes a more earnest asserter of the doctrine that the human mind has anintuitive cognition of God, and that the external world reveals God toman. There is a passage in his letter to the Romans which is justlyentitled to stand at the head of all discourses on "natural theology, "Rom. I. 19-21. Speaking of the heathen world, who had not been favored, as the Jews, with a verbal revelation, he says, "That which may be knownof God is manifest _in_ them, " that is, in the constitution and laws oftheir spiritual nature, "for God hath showed it unto them" in the voiceof reason and of conscience, so that in the instincts of our hearts, inthe elements of our moral nature, in the ideas and laws of our reason, we are taught the being of a God. These are the subjective teachings ofthe human soul. 

Not only is the being of God revealed to man in the constitution andlaws of his rational and moral nature, but God is also manifested to usobjectively in the realm of things around us; therefore Paul adds, "Theinvisible things of him, even his eternal power and Godhead, from thecreation are clearly seen, being understood by the things that aremade. " The world of sense, therefore, discloses the being andperfections of God. The invisible attributes of God are made apparent bythe things that are visible. Forth out of nature, as the product of theDivine Mind, the supernatural shines. The forces, laws, and harmonies ofthe universe are indices of the presence of a presiding and informingIntelligence. The creation itself is an example of God's coming forthout of the mysterious depths of his own eternal and invisible being, andmaking himself apparent to man. There, on the pages of the volume ofnature, we may read, in the marvellous language of symbol, the grandconceptions, the glorious thoughts, the ideals of beauty which dwell inthe uncreated Mind, These two sources of knowledge--the subjectiveteachings of God in the human soul, and the objective manifestations ofGod in the visible universe--harmonize, and, together, fill up thecomplement of our natural idea of God. They are two hemispheres ofthought, which together form one full-orbed fountain of light, and oughtnever to be separated in our philosophy. And, inasmuch as this divinelight shines on all human minds, and these works of God are seen by allhuman eyes, the apostle argues that the heathen world "is withoutexcuse, because, knowing God (γνόντες τὸν Θεόν) they did not glorify himas God, neither were thankful; but in their reasonings they went astrayafter vanities, and their hearts, being void of wisdom, were filled withdarkness. Calling themselves wise, they were turned into fools, andchanged the glory of the imperishable God for idols graven in thelikeness of perishable man, or of birds, and beasts, and creepingthings, . .. And they bartered the truth of God for lies, and reverencedand worshipped the things made rather than the Maker, who is blessedforever. Amen. "[112]

[Footnote 112: Rom. I. 21-25, Conybeare and Howson's translation. ]

The brief and elliptical report of Paul's address on Mars' Hill musttherefore, in all fairness, be interpreted in the light of his morecarefully elaborated statements in the Epistle to the Romans. And whenPaul intimates that the Athenians "knew not God, " we can not understandhim as saying they had _no_ knowledge, but that their knowledge wasimperfect. They did not know God as Creator, Father, and Ruler; aboveall, they did not know him as a pardoning God and a sanctifying Spirit. They had not that knowledge of God which purifies the heart, and changesthe character, and gives its possessor eternal life. 

The apostle clearly and unequivocally recognizes this truth, that theidea of God is connatural to the human mind; that in fact there is notto be found a race of men upon the face of the globe utterly destituteof some idea of a Supreme Being. Wherever human reason has had itsnormal and healthful development, it has spontaneously and necessarilyled the human mind to the recognition of a God. The Athenians were noexception to this general law. They believed in the existence of onesupreme and eternal Mind, invisible, incomprehensible, infeffable--"theunknown God. "

2. The Athenians had also that consciousness of dependence upon Godwhich is the foundation of all the primary religious emotions. 

When the apostle affirmed that "in God we live, and move, and have ourbeing, " he uttered the sentiments of many, if not all, of his hearers, and in support of that affirmation he could quote the words of their ownpoets, for we are also his offspring; [113] and, as his offspring, wehave a derived and a dependent being. Indeed, this consciousness ofdependence is analogous to the feeling which is awakened in the heart ofa child when its parent is first manifested to its opening mind as thegiver of those things which it immediately needs, as its continualprotector, and as the preserver of its life. The moment a man becomesconscious of his own personality, that moment he becomes conscious ofsome relation to another personality, to which he is subject, and onwhich he depends. [114]

[Footnote 113:

 "Jove's presence fills all space, upholds this ball; All need his aid; his power sustains us all, _For we his offspring are_. " Aratus, "The Phænomena, " book v. P. 5. 

Aratus was a poet of Cilicia, Paul's native province. He flourished B. C. 277. 

 "Great and divine Father, whose names are many, But who art one and the same unchangeable, almighty power; O thou supreme Author of nature! That governest by a single unerring law! Hail King! For thou art able, to enforce obedience from all frail mortals, _Because we are all thine offspring, _ The image and the echo only of thy eternal voice. " Cleanthes, "Hymn to Jupiter. "

Cleanthes was the pupil of Zeno, and his successor as chief of the Stoicphilosophers. ]

[Footnote 114: "As soon as a man becomes conscious of himself, as soonas he perceives himself as distinct from other persons and things, he atthe same moment becomes conscious of a higher self, a higher power, without which he feels that neither he nor any thing else would have anylife or reality. We are so fashioned that as soon as we awake we feel onall sides our dependence on something else; and all nations join in someway or another in the words of the Psalmist, 'It is He that made us, notwe ourselves. ' This is the first _sense_ of the Godhead, the _sensusnuminis_, as it has well been called; for it is a _sensus_, an immediateperception, not the result of reasoning or generalization, but anintuition as irresistible as the impressions of our senses. .. . This_sensus numinis_, or, as we may call it in more homely language, _faith_, is the source of all religion; it is that without which noreligion, whether true or false, is possible. "--Max Müller, "Science ofLanguage, " Second Series, p. 455. ]

A little reflection will convince us that this is the necessary order inwhich human consciousness is developed. 

There are at least two fundamental and radical tendencies in humanpersonality, namely, to _know_ and to _act_. If we would conceive ofthem as they exist in the innermost sphere of selfhood, we mustdistinguish the first as _self-consciousness_, and the second as_self-determination_. These are unquestionably the two factors of humanpersonality. 

If we consider the first of these factors more closely, we shalldiscover that self-consciousness exists under limitations andconditions. Man can not become clearly conscious of _self_ withoutdistinguishing himself from the outer world of sensation, nor withoutdistinguishing self and the world from another being upon whom theydepend as the ultimate substance and cause. Mere _cœnœesthesis_ is notconsciousness. Common feeling is unquestionably found among the lowestforms of animal life, the protozoa; but it can never rise to a clearconsciousness of personality until it can distinguish itself fromsensation, and acquire a presentiment of a divine power, on which selfand the outer world depend. The _Ego_ does not exist for itself, can notperceive itself, but by distinguishing itself from the ceaseless flowand change of sensation, and by this act of distinguishing, the _Ego_takes place in consciousness. And the _Ego_ can not perceive itself, norcognize sensation as a state or affection of the _Ego_ except by theintervention of the reason, which supplies the two great fundamentallaws of causality and substance. The facts of consciousness thuscomprehend three elements--self, nature, and God. The determinate being, the _Ego_, is never an absolutely independent being, but is always insome way or other codetermined by another; it can not, therefore, be anabsolutely original and independent, but must in some way or another bea _derived_ and _conditioned_ existence. 

Now that which limits and conditions human self-consciousness can not bemere _nature_, because nature can not give what it does not possess; itcan not produce what is _toto genere_ different from itself. Self-consciousness can not arise out of unconsciousness. This newbeginning is beyond the power of nature. Personal power, the creativeprinciple of all new beginnings, is alone adequate to its production. If, then, self-consciousness exists in man, it necessarily presupposesan absolutely _original_, therefore _unconditioned, self-consciousness_. Human self-consciousness, in its temporal actualization, of coursepresupposes a nature-basis upon which it elevates itself; but it is onlypossible on the ground that an eternal self-conscious Mind ordained andrules over all the processes of nature, and implants the divine spark ofthe personal spirit with the corporeal frame, to realize itself in thelight-flame of human self-consciousness. The original light of thedivine self-consciousness is eternally and absolutely first and beforeall. "Thus, in the depths of our own self-consciousness, as itsconcealed background, the God-consciousness reveals itself to us. Thisdescent into our inmost being is at the same time an ascent to God. Every deep reflection on ourselves breaks through the mere crust ofworld-consciousness, which separates us from the inmost truth of ourexistence, and leads us up to Him in whom we live and move andare. "[115]

[Footnote 115: Müller, "Christian Doctrine of Sin, " vol. I. P. 81. ]

Self-determination, equally with self-consciousness, exists in us undermanifold _limitations_. Self-determination is limited by physical, corporeal, and mental conditions, so that there is "an impassableboundary line drawn around the area of volitional freedom. " But the mostfundamental and original limitation is that of _duty_. Theself-determining power of man is not only circumscribed by necessaryconditions, but also by the _moral law_ in the consciousness of man. Self-determination alone does not suffice for the full conception ofresponsible freedom; it only becomes, _will_, properly by its being anintelligent and conscious determination; that is, the rational subjectis able previously to recognize "the right, " and present before his mindthat which he _ought_ to do, that which he is morally bound to realizeand actualize by his own self-determination and choice. Accordingly wefind in our inmost being a _sense of obligation_ to obey the moral lawas revealed in the conscience. As we can not become conscious of selfwithout also becoming conscious of God, so we can not become properlyconscious of self-determination until we have recognized in theconscience a law for the movements of the will. 

Now this moral law, as revealed in the conscience, is not a mereautonomy--a simple subjective law having no relation to a personallawgiver out of and above man. Every admonition of conscience directlyexcites the consciousness of a God to whom man is accountable. Theuniversal consciousness of our race, as revealed in history, has alwaysassociated the phenomena of conscience with the idea of a personal Powerabove man, to whom he is subject and upon whom he depends. In every age, the voice of conscience has been regarded as the voice of God, so thatwhen it has filled man with guilty apprehensions, he has had recourse tosacrifices, and penances, and prayers to expatiate his wrath. 

It is clear, then, that if man has _duties_ there must he aself-conscious Will by whom these duties are imposed, for only a realwill can be legislative. If man has a _sense of obligation_, there mustbe a supreme authority by which he is obliged. If he is _responsible_, there must be a being to whom he is accountable. [116] It can not be saidthat he is accountable to himself, for by that supposition the idea ofduty is obliterated, and "right" becomes identical with mere interest orpleasure. It can not be said that he is simply responsible tosociety--to mere conventions of human opinions and humangovernments--for then "_right_" becomes a mere creature of humanlegislation, and "_justice_" is nothing but the arbitrary will of thestrong who tyrannize over the weak. Might constitutes right. Againstsuch hypotheses the human mind, however, instinctively revolts. Mankindfeel, universally, that there is an authority beyond all humangovernments, and a higher law above all human laws, from whence alltheir powers are derived. That higher law is the Law of God, thatsupreme authority is the God of Justice. To this eternally just God, innocence, under oppression and wrong, has made its proud appeal, likethat of Prometheus to the elements, to the witnessing clouds, to comingages, and has been sustained and comforted. And to that higher law theweak have confidently appealed against the unrighteous enactments of thestrong, and have finally conquered. The last and inmost ground of allobligation is thus the conscious relation of the moral creature to God. The sense of absolute dependence upon a Supreme Being compels man, evenwhile conscious of subjective freedom, to recognize at the same time hisobligation to determine himself in harmony with the will of Him "in whomwe live, and move, and are. "

[Footnote 116: "The thought of God will wake up a terrible monitor whosename is Judge. "--Kant. ]

This feeling of dependence, and this consequent sense of obligation, lieat the very foundation of all religion. They lead the mind towards God, and anchor it in the Divine. They prompt man to pray, and inspire himwith an instinctive confidence in the efficacy of prayer. So that prayeris natural to man, and necessary to man. Never yet has the travellerfound a people on earth without prayer. Races of men have been foundwithout houses, without raiment, without arts and sciences, but neverwithout prayer any more than without speech. Plutarch wrote, eighteencenturies ago, If you go through all the world, you may find citieswithout walls, without letters, without rulers, without money, withouttheatres, but never without temples and gods, or without _prayers_, oaths, prophecies, and sacrifices, used to obtain blessings andbenefits, or to avert curses and calamities. [117] The naturalness ofprayer is admitted even by the modern unbeliever. Gerrit Smith says, "Let us who believe that the religion of reason calls for the religionof nature, remember that the flow of prayer is just as natural as theflow of water; the prayerless man has become an unnatural man. "[118] Isman in sorrow or in danger, his most natural and spontaneous refuge isin prayer. The suffering, bewildered, terror-stricken soul turns towardsGod. "Nature in an agony is no atheist; the soul that knows not where tofly, flies to God. " And in the hour of deliverance and joy, a feeling ofgratitude pervades the soul--and gratitude, too, not to some blindnature-force, to some unconscious and impersonal power, but gratitude toGod. The soul's natural and appropriate language in the hour ofdeliverance is thanksgiving and praise. 

[Footnote 117: "Against Kalotes, " ch. Xxxi. ]

[Footnote 118: "Religion of Reason. "]

This universal tendency to recognize a superior Power upon whom we aredependent, and by whose hand our well-being and our destinies areabsolutely controlled, has revealed itself even amid the mostcomplicated forms of polytheistic worship. Amid the even and undisturbedflow of every-day life they might be satisfied with the worship ofsubordinate deities, but in the midst of sudden and unexpectedcalamities, and of terrible catastrophes, then they cried to the SupremeGod. [119] "When alarmed by an earthquake, " says Aulus Gellius, "theancient Romans were accustomed to pray, not to some one of the godsindividually, but to God in general, _as to the Unknown_. "[120]

[Footnote 119: "At critical moments, when the deepest feelings of thehuman heart are stirred, the old Greeks and Romans seem suddenly to havedropped all mythological ideas, and to have fallen back on the universallanguage of true religion. "--Max Müller, "Science of Language. " p. 436. ]

[Footnote 120: Tholuck, "Nature and Influence of Heathenism, " p. 23. ]

"Thus also Minutius Felix says, 'When they stretch out their hands toheaven they mention only God; and these forms of speech, _He is great_, and _God is true_, and _If God grant_(which are the natural language ofthe vulgar), are a plain confession of the truth of Christianity. ' Andalso Lactantius testifies, 'When they swear, and when they wish, andwhen they give thanks, they name not many gods, but God only; the truth, by a secret force of nature, thus breaking forth from them whether theywill or no;' and again he says, 'They fly to God; aid is desired of God;they pray that God would help them; and when one is reduced to extremenecessity, he begs for God's sake, and by his divine power aloneimplores the mercy of men. '"[121] The account which is given by DiogenesLaertius[122] of the erection of altars bearing the inscription "to theunknown God, " clearly shows that they had their origin in this generalsentiment of dependence on a higher Power. "The Athenians beingafflicted with pestilence invited Epimenides to lustrate their city. Themethod adopted by him was to carry several sheep to the Areopagus, whence they were left to wander as they pleased, under the observationof persons sent to attend them. As each sheep lay down it was sacrificedto _the propitious God_. By this ceremony it is said the city wasrelieved; but as it was still unknown what deity was propitious, analtar was erected _to the unknown God_ on every spot where a sheep hadbeen sacrificed. "[123]

[Footnote 121: Cudworth, vol. I. P. 300. ]

[Footnote 122: "Lives of Philosophers, " book i. , Epimenides. ]

[Footnote 123: See Townsend's "Chronological Arrangement of NewTestament, " note 19, part xii. ; Doddridge's "Exposition;" and Barnes's"Notes on Acts. "]

"The unknown God" was their deliverer from the plague. And the erectionof an altar to him was a confession of their absolute dependence uponhim, of their obligation to worship him, as well as of their need of adeeper knowledge of him. The gods who were known and named were not ableto deliver them in times of calamity, and they were compelled to lookbeyond the existing forms of Grecian mythology for relief. Beyond allthe gods of the Olympus there was "one God over all, " the Father of godsand men, the Creator of all the subordinate local deities, upon whomeven these created gods were dependent, upon whom man was absolutelydependent, and therefore in times of deepest need, of severestsuffering, of extremest peril, then they cried to the living, supreme, eternal God. [124]

[Footnote 124: "The men and women of the Iliad and Odyssey arehabitually religious. The language of religion is often on theirtongues, as it is ever on the lips of every body in the East at thisday. The thought of the gods, and of their providence and government ofthe world, is a familiar thought. They seem to have an abidingconviction of their _dependence_ on the gods. The results of all actionsdepend on the will of the gods; _it lies on their knees_ (θεῶν ἐνγούνασι κεἶται, Od. I. 267), is the often repeated and significantexpression of their feeling of dependence. "--Tyler, "Theology of GreekPoets, " p. 165. ]

3. The Athenians developed in a high degree those religious emotionswhich always accompany the consciousness of dependence on a SupremeBeing. 

The first emotional element of all religion is _fear_. This isunquestionably true, whether religion be considered from a Christian ora heathen stand-point. "The _fear_ of the Lord is the beginning ofwisdom. " Associated with, perhaps preceding, all definite ideas of God, there exists in the human mind certain feelings of _awe_, and_reverence_, and _fear_ which arise spontaneously in presence of thevastness, and grandeur, and magnificence of the universe, and of thepower and glory of which the created universe is but the symbol andshadow. There is the felt apprehension that, beyond and back of thevisible and the tangible, there is a _personal, living Power_, which isthe foundation of all, and which fashions all, and fills all with itslight and life; that "the universe is the living vesture in which theInvisible has robed his mysterious loveliness. " There is the feeling ofan _overshadowing Presence_ which "compasseth man behind and before, andlays its hand upon him. "

This wonderful presentiment of an invisible power and presence pervadingand informing all nature is beautifully described by Wordsworth in hishistory of the development of the Scottish herdsman's mind:

 So the foundations of his mind were laid In such communion, not from terror free. While yet a child, and long before his time, Had he perceived the presence and the power Of greatness; and deep feelings had impressed So vividly great objects, that they lay Upon his mind like substances, whose presence Perplexed the bodily sense. . .. In the after-day Of boyhood, many an hour in caves forlorn, And 'mid the hollow depths of naked crags, He sat, and even in their fixed lineaments, Or from the power of a peculiar eye, Or by creative feeling overborne, Or by predominance of thought oppressed, Even in their fixed and steady lineaments He traced an ebbing and a flowing mind. .. . Such was the Boy, --but for the growing Youth, What soul was his, when, from the naked top Of some bold headland, he beheld the sun Rise up, and bathe the world in light! He looked: Ocean and earth, the solid frame of earth And ocean's liquid mass, in gladness lay Beneath him; far and wide the clouds were touched. And in their silent faces could he read Unutterable love. Sound needed none, Nor any voice of joy; his spirit drank The spectacle: sensation, soul, and form All melted into him; they swallowed up His animal being; in them did he live, And by them did he live; they were his life, In such access of mind, in such high hour Of visitation from the living God. [125]

But it may be said this is all mere poetry; to which we answer, in thewords of Aristotle, "Poetry is a thing more philosophical and weightierthan history. "[126] The true poet is the interpreter of nature. His soulis in the fullest sympathy with the grand ideas which nature symbolizes, and he "deciphers the universe as the autobiography of the InfiniteSpirit. " Spontaneous feeling is a kind of inspiration. 

It is true that all minds may not be developed in precisely the samemanner as Wordsworth's herdsman's, because the development of everyindividual mind is modified in some measure by exterior conditions. Menmay contemplate nature from different points of view. Some may beimpressed with one aspect of nature, some with another. But none willfail to recognize a mysterious _presence_ and invisible _power_ beneathall the fleeting and changeful phenomena of the universe. "And sometimesthere are moments of tenderness, of sorrow, and of vague mystery whichbring the feeling of the Infinite Presence close to the humanheart. "[127]

[Footnote 125: "The Wanderer. "]

[Footnote 126: Poet, ch. Ix. ]

[Footnote 127: Robertson. ]

Now we hold that _this feeling and sentiment of the Divine_--thesupernatural--exists in every mind. It may be, it undoubtedly is, somewhat modified in its manifestations by the circumstances in whichmen are placed, and the degree of culture they have enjoyed. The AfricanFetichist, in his moral and intellectual debasement, conceives asupernatural power enshrined in every object of nature. The rude Fijianregards with dread, and even terror, the Being who darts the lightningsand wields the thunderbolts. The Indian "sees God in clouds, and hearshim in the wind. " The Scottish "herdsman" on the lonely mountain-top"feels the presence and the power of greatness, " and "in its fixed andsteady lineaments he sees an ebbing and a flowing mind. " Thephilosopher[128] lifts his eyes to "the starry heavens" in all the depthof their concave, and with all their constellations of glory moving onin solemn grandeur, and, to his mind, these immeasurable regions seem"filled with the splendors of the Deity, and crowded with the monumentsof his power;" or he turns his eye to "the Moral Law within, " and hehears the voice of an intelligent and a righteous God. In all thesecases we have a revelation of the sentiment of the Divine, which dwellsalike in all human minds. In the Athenians this sentiment was developedin a high degree. The serene heaven which Greece enjoyed, and which wasthe best-loved roof of its inhabitants, the brilliant sun, the mountainscenery of unsurpassed grandeur, the deep blue sea, an image of theinfinite, these poured all their fullness on the Athenian mind, andfurnished the most favorable conditions for the development of thereligious sentiments. The people of Athens spent most of their time inthe open air in communion with nature, and in the cheerful and temperateenjoyment of existence. To recognize the Deity in the living powers ofnature, and especially in man, as the highest sensible manifestation ofthe Divine, was the peculiar prerogative of the Grecian mind. And herein Athens, art also vied with nature to deepen the religious sentiments. It raised the mind to ideal conceptions of a beauty and a sublimitywhich transcended all mere nature-forms, and by images, of supernaturalgrandeur and loveliness presented to the Athenians symbolicrepresentations of the separate attributes and operations of theinvisible God. The plastic art of Greece was designed to expressreligious ideas, and was consecrated by religious feeling. Thus thefacts of the case are strikingly in harmony with the words of theApostle: "All things which I behold bear witness to your carefulness inreligion, " your "reverence for the Deity, " your "fear of God. "[129] "Thesacred objects" in Athens, and especially "the altar to the UnknownGod, " were all regarded by Paul as evidences of their instinctive faithin the invisible, the supernatural, the divine. 

[Footnote 128: Kant, in "Critique of Practical Reason. "]

[Footnote 129: See Parkhurst's Lexicon, under _Δεισιδαιμονία_, whichSuidas explains by εὐλάβεια περὶ τὸ θεῖον--_reverence for the Divine_, and Hesychius by Φυβυθέια--_fear of God_. Also, Josephus, Antiq. , bookx. Ch. Iii, § 2: "Manasseh, after his repentance and reformation, stroveto behave himself (τῇ δεισιδαιμονία χρῆσθαί) in the _most religiousmanner_ towards God. " Also see A. Clarke on Acts xvii. ]

Along with this sentiment of the Divine there is also associated, in allhuman minds, an _instinctive yearning_ after the Invisible; not a merefeeling of curiosity to pierce the mystery of being and of life, butwhat Paul designates "a feeling after God, " which prompts man to seekafter a deeper knowledge, and a more immediate consciousness. To attainthis deeper knowledge--this more conscious realization of the being andthe presence of God, has been the effort of all philosophy and allreligion in all ages. The Hindoo Yogis proposes to withdraw into hisinmost self, and by a complete suspension of all his active powers tobecome absorbed and swallowed up in the Infinite. [130] Plato and hisfollowers sought by an immediate abstraction to apprehend "theunchangeable and permanent Being, " and, by a loving contemplation, tobecome "assimilated to the Deity, " and in this way to attain theimmediate consciousness of God. The Neo-Platonic mystic sought byasceticism and self-mortification to prepare himself for divinecommunings. He would contemplate the divine perfections in himself; andin an _ecstatic_ state, wherein all individuality vanishes, he wouldrealize a union, or identity, with the Divine Essence. [131] While theuniversal Church of God, indeed, has in her purest days always taughtthat man may, by inward purity and a believing love, be rendered capableof spiritually apprehending, and consciously feeling, the presence ofGod. Some may be disposed to pronounce this as all mere mysticism. Weanswer, The living internal energy of religion is always _mystical_, itis grounded in _feeling_--a "_sensus numinis_" common to humanity. It isthe mysterious sentiment of the Divine; it is the prolepsis of the humanspirit reaching out towards the Infinite; the living susceptibility ofour spiritual nature stretching after the powers and influences of thehigher world. It is upon this inner instinct of the supernatural thatall religion rests. I do not say every religious idea, but whatever ispositive, practical, powerful, durable, and popular. Everywhere, in allclimates, in all epochs of history, and in all degrees of civilization, man is animated by the sentiment--I would rather say, thepresentiment--that the world in which he lives, the order of things inthe midst of which he moves, the facts which regularly and constantlysucceed each other, are not _all_. In vain he daily makes discoveriesand conquests in this vast universe; in vain he observes and learnedlyverifies the general laws which govern it; _his thought is not inclosedin the world surrendered to his science_; the spectacle of it does notsuffice his soul, it is raised beyond it; it searches after and catchesglimpses of something beyond it; it aspires higher both for the universeand itself; it aims at another destiny, another master. 

[Footnote 130: Vaughan, "Hours with the Mystics, " vol. I. P. 44. ]

[Footnote 131: Id. Ib. , vol. I. P. 65. ]

 "'Par delà tous ces cieux le Dieu des cieux réside. '"[132]

So Voltaire has said, and the God who is beyond the skies is not naturepersonified, but a supernatural Personality. It is to this highestPersonality that all religions address themselves. It is to bring maninto communion with Him that they exist. [133]

[Footnote 132: "Beyond all these heavens the God of the heavensresides. "]

[Footnote 133: Guizot, "L'Eglise et la Societé Chretiennes" en 1861. ]

4. The Athenians had that deep consciousness of sin and guilt, and ofconsequent liability to punishment, which confesses the need ofexpiation by piacular sacrifices. 

Every man feels himself to be an accountable being, and he is consciousthat in wrong-doing he is deserving of blame and of punishment. Deepwithin the soul of the transgressor is the consciousness that he is aguilty man, and he is haunted with the perpetual apprehension of aretribution which, like the spectre of evil omen, crosses his everypath, and meets him at every turn. 

 "'Tis guilt alone, Like brain-sick frenzy in its feverish mode, Fills the light air with visionary terrors, And shapeless forms of fear. "

Man does not possess this consciousness of guilt so much as it holdspossession of him. It pursues the fugitive from justice, and it layshold on the man who has resisted or escaped the hand of the executioner. The sense of guilt is a power over and above man; a power so wonderfulthat it often compels the most reckless criminal to deliver himself up, with the confession of his deed, to the sword of justice, when afalsehood would have easily protected him. Man is only able bypersevering, ever-repeated efforts at self-induration, against theremonstrances of conscience, to withdraw himself from its power. Hissuccess is, however, but very partial; for sometimes, in the moments ofhis greatest security, the reproaches of conscience break in upon himlike a flood, and sweep away all his refuge of lies. "The evilconscience is the divine bond which binds the created spirit, even indeep apostasy, to its Original. In the consciousness of guilt there isrevealed the essential relation of our spirit to God, althoughmisunderstood by man until he has something higher than his evilconscience. The trouble and anguish which the remonstrances of thisconsciousness excite--the inward unrest which sometimes seizes the slaveof sin--are proofs that he has not quite broken away from God. "[134]

[Footnote 134: Müller, "Christian Doctrine of Sin, " vol. I. Pp. 225, 226. ]

In Grecian mythology there was a very distinct recognition of the powerof conscience, and a reference of its authority to the Divinity, together with the idea of retribution. Nemesis was regarded as theimpersonation of the upbraidings of conscience, of the natural dread ofpunishment that springs up in the human heart after the commission ofsin. And as the feeling of remorse may be considered as the consequenceof the displeasure and vengeance of an offended God, Nemesis came to beregarded as the goddess of retribution, relentlessly pursuing the guiltyuntil she has driven them into irretrievable woe and ruin. The Erinyesor Eumenides are the deities whose business it is to punish, in hades, the crimes committed upon earth. When an aggravated crime has excitedtheir displeasure they manifest their greatest power in the disquietudeof conscience. 

Along with this deep consciousness of guilt, and this fear ofretribution which haunts the guilty mind, there has also rested upon theheart of universal humanity a deep and abiding conviction that_something must be done to expiate the guilt of sin_--some restitutionmust be made, some suffering must be endured, [135] some sacrificeoffered to atone for past misdeeds. Hence it is that men in all ageshave had recourse to penances and prayers, to self-inflicted torturesand costly sacrifices to appease a righteous anger which their sins hadexcited, and avert an impending punishment. That sacrifice to atone forsin has prevailed universally--that it has been practised "_sem-per, ubique, et ab omnibus, _" always, in all places, and by all men--will notbe denied by the candid and competent inquirer. The evidence which hasbeen collected from ancient history by Grotius and Magee, and theadditional evidence from contemporaneous history, which is being nowfurnished by the researches of ethnologists and Christian missionaries, is conclusive. No intelligent man can doubt the fact. Sacrificialofferings have prevailed in every nation and in every age. "Almost theentire worship of the pagan nations consisted in rites of deprecation. Fear of the Divine displeasure seems to have been the leading feature oftheir religious impressions; and in the diversity, the costliness, thecruelty of their sacrifices they sought to appease gods to whose wraththey felt themselves exposed, from a consciousness of sin, unrelieved byany information as to the means of escaping its effects. "[136]

[Footnote 135: Punishment is the penalty due to sin; or, to use thefavorite expression of Homer, not unusual in the Scriptures also, it isthe payment of a debt incurred by sin. When he is punished, the criminalis said to pay off or pay back (άποτίνειν) his crimes; in other words, to expiate or atone for them (Iliad, iv. 161, 162), σύν τε μεγάλω ἀπέτισαν σίν σφῇσιν κεφαλῇσι γυναιξί τε καὶ τεκέεσσιν. 

That is, they shall pay off, pay back, atone, etc. , for their treacherywith a great price, with their lives, and their wives andchildren. --Tyler, "Theology of Greek Poets, " p. 194. ]

[Footnote 136: Magee, "On the Atonement, " No. V. P. 30. ]

It must be known to every one at all acquainted with Greek mythologythat the idea of _expiation_--atonement--was a fundamental idea of theirreligion. Independent of any historical research, a very slight glanceat the Greek and Roman classics, especially the poets, who were thetheologians of that age, can leave little doubt upon this head. [137]Their language everywhere announces the notion of _propitiation_, and, particularly the Latin, furnishes the terms which are still employed intheology. We need only mention the words ἱλασμός, ἱλάσκομαι, λύτρον, περίψημα, as examples from the Greek, and _placare, propitiare, expiare, piaculum_, from the Latin. All these indicate that the notion ofexpiation was interwoven into the very modes of thought and framework ofthe language of the ancient Greeks. 

[Footnote 137: In Homer the doctrine is expressly taught that the godsmay, and sometimes do, remit the penalty, when duly propitiated byprayers and sacrifices accompanied by suitable reparations ("Iliad, " ix. 497 sqq. ). "We have a practical illustration of this doctrine in thefirst book of the Iliad, where Apollo averts the pestilence from thearmy, when the daughter of his priest is returned without ransom, and a_sacrifice_ (ἑλατόμβη) is sent to the altar of the god at sacredChrysa. .. . Apollo hearkens to the intercession of his priest, acceptsthe sacred hecatomb, is delighted with the accompanying songs andlibations, and sends back the embassy with a favoring breeze, and afavorable answer to the army, who meanwhile had been _purifying_(ἀπελυμαίνοντο) themselves, and offering unblemished hecatombs of bullsand goats on the shore of the sea which washes the place of theirencampment. "

"The object of the propitiatory embassy to Apollo is thus stated byUlysses: Agamemnon, king of men, has sent me to bring back thy daughterChryses, and to offer a sacred hecatomb for (ὑπέρ) the Greeks, that wemay _propitiate_ (ιλασόμεσθα) the king, who now sends woes and manygroans upon the Argives" (442 sqq. ). --Tyler, "Theology of Greek Poets, "pp. 196, 197. ]

We do not deem it needful to discuss at length the question which hasbeen so earnestly debated among theologians, as to whether the idea ofexpiation be a primitive and necessary idea of the human mind, orwhether the practice of piacular sacrifices came into the post-diluvianworld with Noah, as a positive institution of a primitive religion thenfirst directly instituted by God. On either hypothesis the practice ofexpiatory rites derives its authority from God; in the latter case, byan outward and verbal revelation, in the former by an inward andintuitive revelation. 

This much, however, must be conceded on all hands, that there arecertain fundamental intuitions, universal and necessary, which underliethe almost universal practice of expiatory sacrifice, namely, _theuniversal consciousness of guilt, and the universal conviction thatsomething must be done to expiate guilt_, to compensate for wrong, andto atone for past misdeeds. But _how_ that expiation can be effected, how that atonement can be made, is a question which reason does not seemcompetent to answer. That personal sin can be atoned for by vicarioussuffering, that national guilt can be expiated and national punishmentaverted by animal sacrifices, or even by human sacrifices, is repugnantto rather than conformable with natural reason. There exists nodiscernible connection between the one and the other. We may supposethat eucharistic, penitential, and even deprecatory sacrifices may haveoriginated in the light of nature and reason, but we are unable toaccount for the practice of piacular sacrifices for substitutionalatonement, on the same principle. The ethical principle, that one's ownsins are not transferable either in their guilt or punishment, is soobviously just that we feel it must have been as clear to the mind ofthe Greek who brought his victim to be offered to Zeus, as it is to thephilosophic mind of to-day. [138] The knowledge that the Divinedispleasure can be averted by sacrifice is not, by Plato, grounded uponany intuition of reason, as is the existence of God, the idea of thetrue, the just, and good, but on "tradition, "[139] and the"interpretations" of Apollo. "To the Delphian Apollo there remains thegreatest, noblest, and most important of legal institutions--theerection of temples, sacrifices, and other services to the gods, . .. Andwhat other services should be gone through with a view to their_propitiation_. Such things as these, indeed, _we neither knowourselves, nor in founding the State would we intrust them to others_, if we be wise;. .. The god of the country is the natural interpreter toall men about such matters. "[140]

[Footnote 138: "He that hath done the deed, to suffer for it--thus criesa proverb thrice hallowed by age. "--Æschylus, "Choëph, " 311. ]

[Footnote 139: "Laws, " book vi. Ch. Xv. ]

[Footnote 140: "Republic, " book iv. Ch. V. ]

The origin of expiatory sacrifices can not, we think, be explainedexcept on the principle of a primitive revelation and a positiveappointment of God. They can not be understood except as adivinely-appointed symbolism, in which there is exhibited a confessionof personal guilt and desert of punishment; an intimation and a hopethat God will be propitious and merciful; and a typical promise andprophecy of a future Redeemer from sin, who shall "put away sin by thesacrifice of himself. " This sacred rite was instituted in connectionwith the _protevangelium_ given to our first parents; it was diffusedamong the nations by tradition, and has been kept alive as a general, and, indeed, almost universal observance, by that deep sense of sin, andconsciousness of guilt, and personal urgency of the need of areconciliation, which are so clearly displayed in Grecian mythology. 

The legitimate inference we find ourselves entitled to draw from thewords of Paul, when fairly interpreted in the light of the pastreligious history of the world, is, that the Athenians were a religiouspeople; that is, _they were, however unknowing, believers in andworshippers of the One Supreme God_. 

CHAPTER IV. 

THE RELIGION OF THE ATHENIANS: ITS MYTHOLOGICAL AND SYMBOLICAL ASPECTS. 

"That there is one Supreme Deity, both philosophers and poets, and eventhe vulgar worshippers of the gods themselves frequently acknowledge;which because the assertors of gods well understood, they affirm thesegods of theirs to preside over the several parts of the world, yet sothat there is only one chief governor. Whence it follows, that all theirother gods can be no other than ministers and officers which onegreatest God, who is omnipotent, hath variously appointed, andconstituted so as to serve his command. "--LACTANTIUS. 

The conclusion reached in the previous chapter that the Athenians werebelievers in and worshippers of the One Supreme God, has been challengedwith some considerable show of reason and force, on the ground that theywere _Polytheists_ and _Idolaters_. 

An objection which presents itself so immediately on the very face ofthe sacred narrative, and which is sustained by the unanimous voice ofhistory, is entitled to the fullest consideration. And as the interestsof truth are infinitely more precious than the maintenance of anytheory, however plausible, we are constrained to accord to thisobjection the fullest weight, and give to it the most impartialconsideration. We can not do otherwise than at once admit that theAthenians were _Polytheists_--they worshipped "many gods" besides "theunknown God. " It is equally true that they were _Idolaters_--theyworshipped images or statues of the gods, which images were also, by aneasy metonymy, called "gods. "

But surely no one supposes that this is all that can be said upon thesubject, and that, after such admissions, the discussion must be closed. On the contrary, we have, as yet, scarce caught a glimpse of the realcharacter and genius of Grecian polytheistic worship, and we have notmade the first approach towards a philosophy of Grecian mythology. 

The assumption that the heathen regarded the images "graven by art anddevice of man" as the real creators of the world and man, or as havingany control over the destinies of men, sinks at once under the weight ofits own absurdity. Such hypothesis is repudiated with scorn andindignation by the heathens themselves. Cotta, in _Cicero_, declaresexplicitly: "though it be common and familiar language amongst us tocall corn Ceres, and wine Bacchus, yet who can think any one so mad asto take that to be really a god that he feeds upon?"[141] And _Plutarch_condemns the whole practice of giving the names of gods and goddesses toinanimate objects, as absurd, impious, and atheistical: "they who givethe names of gods to senseless matter and inanimate things, and such asare destroyed by men in the using, beget most wicked and atheisticalopinions in the minds of men, since it can not be conceived how thesethings should be gods, for nothing that is inanimate is a god. "[142] Andso also the Hindoo, the Buddhist, the American Indian, the Fijian ofto-day, repel the notion that their visible images are real gods, orthat they worship them instead of the unseen God. 

[Footnote 141: Cudworth's "Intell. System, " vol. Ii. P. 257, Eng. Ed. ]

[Footnote 142: Quoted in Cudworth's "Intell. System, " vol. Ii. P. 258, Eng. Ed. ]

And furthermore, that even the invisible divinities which these imageswere designed to represent, were each independent, self-existent beings, and that the stories which are told concerning them by Homer and Hesiodwere received in a literal sense, is equally improbable. The earliestphilosophers knew as well as we know, that the Deity, in order to beDeity, must be either _perfect_ or nothing--that he must be _one_, notmany--without parts and passions; and they were scandalized and shockedby the religious fables of the ancient mythology as much as we are. _Xenophanes_, who lived, as we know, before Pythagoras, accuses Homerand Hesiod of having ascribed to the gods every thing that isdisgraceful amongst men, as stealing, adultery, and deceit. He remarks"that men seem to have created their gods, and to have given them theirown mind, and voice, and figure. " He himself declares that "God is_one, _ the greatest amongst gods and men, neither in form nor in thoughtlike unto men. " He calls the battles of the Titans and the Giants, andthe Centaurs, "the inventions of former generations, " and he demandsthat God shall be praised in holy songs and nobler strains. [143]Diogenes Laertius relates the following of _Pythagoras_, "that when hedescended to the shades below, he saw the soul of Hesiod bound to apillar of brass and gnashing his teeth; and that of Homer, as suspendedon a tree, and surrounded by serpents; as a punishment for the thingsthey had said of the gods. "[144] These poets, who had corruptedtheology, _Plato_ proposes to exclude from his ideal Republic; or ifpermitted at all, they must be subjected to a rigid expurgation. "Weshall, " says he, "have to repudiate a large part of those fables whichare now in vogue; and, especially, of what I call the greaterfables, --the stories which Hesiod and Homer tell us. In these storiesthere is a fault which deserves the gravest condemnation; namely, whenan author gives a _bad representation of gods and heroes_. We mustcondemn such a poet, as we should condemn a painter, whose pictures bearno resemblance to the objects which he tries to imitate. For instance, the poet Hesiod related an ugly story when he told how Uranus acted, andhow Kronos had his revenge upon him. They are offensive stories, andmust not be repeated in our cities. Not yet is it proper to say, in anycase, --what is indeed untrue--that gods wage war against gods, andintrigue and fight among themselves. Stories like the chaining of Junoby her son Vulcan, and the flinging of Vulcan out of heaven for tryingto take his mother's part when his father was beating her, and all otherbattles of the gods which are found in Homer, must be refused admissioninto our state, _whether they are allegorical or not_. For a child cannot discriminate between what is allegorical and what is not; andwhatever is adopted, as a matter of belief, in childhood, has a tendencyto become fixed and indelible; and therefore we ought to esteem it as ofthe greatest importance that the fables which children first hear shouldbe adapted, as far as possible, to promote virtue. "[145]

[Footnote 143: Max Muller, "Science of Language, " pp. 405, 406. ]

[Footnote 144: "Lives, " bk. Viii. Ch. Xix. P. 347. ]

[Footnote 145: "Republic, " bk. Ii. Ch. Xvii. ]

If, then, poetic and allegorical representations of divine things are tobe permitted in the ideal republic, then the founders of the state areto prescribe "the moulds in which the poets are to cast their fictions. "

"Now what are these moulds to be in the case of _Theology?_ They may bedescribed as follows: It is right always to represent God as he reallyis, whether the poet describe him in an epic, or a lyric, or a dramaticpoem. Now God is, beyond all else, _good in reality_, and therefore soto be represented. But nothing that is good is hurtful. That which isgood hurts not; does no evil; is the cause of no evil. That which isgood is beneficial; is the cause of good. And, therefore, that which isgood is not the cause of _all_ which is and happens, but only of thatwhich is as it should be. .. . The good things we must ascribe to God, whilst we must seek elsewhere, and not in him, the causes of evilthings. "

We must, then, express our disapprobation of Homer, or any other poet, who is guilty of such a foolish blunder as to tell us (Iliad, xxiv. 660)that:

 'Fast by the threshold of Jove's court are placed Two casks--one stored with evil, one with good:'

and that he for whom the Thunderer mingles both--

 'He leads a life checkered with good and ill. '

But as for the man to whom he gives the bitter cup unmixed--

 'He walks The blessed earth unbless'd, go where he will. '

And if any one asserts that the violation of oaths and treaties by theact of Pandarus was brought about by Athené and Zeus (Iliad, ii. 60), weshould refuse our approbation. Nor can we allow it to be said that thestrife and trial of strength between tween the gods (Iliad, xx. ) wasinstigated by Themis and Zeus. .. . Such language can not be used withoutirreverence; it is both injurious to us, and contradictory initself. [146]

Inasmuch as God is perfect to the utmost in beauty and goodness, _heabides ever the same_, and without any variation in his form. Then letno poet tell us that (Odyss. Xvii. 582)

 'In similitude of strangers oft The Gods, who can with ease all shapes assume, Repair to populous cities. '

And let no one slander Proteus and Thetis, or introduce in tragedies, orany other poems, Hera transformed into the guise of a princesscollecting

 'Alms for the life-giving children of Inachus, river of Argos, '

not to mention many other falsehoods which we must interdict. [147]

"When a poet holds such language concerning the gods, we shall be angrywith him, and refuse him a chorus. Neither shall we allow our teachersto use his writings for the instruction of the young, if we would haveour guards grow up to be as god-like and god-fearing as it is possiblefor men to be. "[148]

We are thus constrained by the statements of the heathens themselves, aswell as by the dictates of common sense, to look beyond the externaldrapery and the material forms of Polytheism for some deeper and truermeaning that shall be more in harmony with the facts of the universalreligious consciousness of our race. The religion of ancient Greececonsisted in something more than the fables of Jupiter and Juno, ofApollo and Minerva, of Venus and Bacchus. "Through the rank andpoisonous vegetation of mythic phraseology, we may always catch aglimpse of an original stem round which it creeps and winds itself, andwithout which it can not enjoy that parasitical existence which has beenmistaken for independent vitality. "[149]

[Footnote 146: "Republic, " bk. Ii. Ch. Xix. ]

[Footnote 147: "Republic, " bk. Ii. Ch. Xx. Much more to the same effectmay be seen in ch. Ii. ]

[Footnote 148: "Republic, " bk. Ii. Ch. Xxi. ]

[Footnote 149: Max Müller, "Science of Language, " 2d series, p. 433. ]

It is an obvious truth, attested by the voice of universal consciousnessas revealed in history, that the human mind can never rest satisfiedwithin the sphere of sensible phenomena. Man is impelled by an inwardnecessity to pass, in thought, beyond the boundary-line of sense, andinquire after causes and entities which his reason assures him must liebeneath all sensible appearances. He must and will interpret natureaccording to the forms of his own personality, or according to thefundamental ideas of his own reason. In the childlike subjectivity ofthe undisciplined mind he will either transfer to nature the phenomenaof his own personality, regarding the world as a living organism whichhas within it an informing soul, and thus attain a _pantheistic_conception of the universe; or else he will fix upon some extraordinaryand inexplicable phenomenon of nature, and, investing it with_super_natural significance, will rise from thence to a religious and_theocratic_ conception of nature as a whole. An intelligence--a mind_within_ nature, and inseparable from nature, or else _above_ nature andgoverning nature, is, for man, an inevitable thought. 

It is equally obvious that humanity can never relegate itself from asupernatural origin, neither can it ever absolve itself from a permanentcorrelation with the Divine. Man feels within him an instinctivenobility. He did not arise out of the bosom of nature; in somemysterious way he has descended from an eternal mind, he is "theoffspring of God. " And furthermore, a theocratic conception of nature, associated with a pre-eminent regard for certain apparently supernaturalexperiences in the history of humanity, becomes the foundation ofgovernments, of civil authority, and of laws. Society can not be foundedwithout the aid of the Deity, and a commonwealth can only be organizedby Divine interposition. "A Ceres must appear and sow the fields withcorn. " And a Numa or a Lycurgus must be heralded by the oracle as

 "Dear to Jove, and all who sit in the halls of the Olympus. "

He must be a "descendant of Zeus, " appointed by the gods to rule, andone who will "prove himself a god. " These divinely-appointed rulers wereregarded as the ministers of God, the visible representatives of theunseen Power which really governs all. The divine government must alsohave its invisible agents--its Nemesis, and Themis, and Diké, theministers of law, of justice, and of retribution; and its Jupiter, andJuno, and Neptune, and Pluto, ruling, with delegated powers, in theheavens, the air, the sea, and the nethermost regions. So that, in fact, there exists no nation, no commonwealth, no history without a Theophany, and along with it certain sacred legends detailing the origin of thepeople, the government, the country itself, and the world at large. Thisis especially true of India, Egypt, Greece, and Rome. Their primitivehistory is eminently _mythological_. 

Grecian polytheism can not be otherwise regarded than as apoetico-historical religion of _myth_ and _symbol_ which is under-laidby a natural Theism; a parasitical growth which winds itself around theoriginal stem of instinctive faith in a supernatural Power and Presencewhich pervades the universe. The myths are oral traditions, floatingdown from that dim; twilight of _poetic_ history, which separates realhistory, with its fixed chronology, from the unmeasured and unrecordedeternity--faint echoes from that mystic border-land which divides thenatural from the supernatural, and in which they seem to have beenmarvellously commingled. They are the lingering memories of thosemanifestations of God to men, in which he or his celestial ministerscame into visible intercourse with our race; the reality of which isattested by sacred history. In all these myths there is a theogonic andcosmogonic element. They tell of the generation of the celestial andaërial divinities--the subordinate agents and ministers of the Divinegovernment. They attempt an explanation of the genesis of the visibleuniverse, the origin of humanity, and the development of human society. In the presence of history, the substance of these myths is preserved by_symbols_, that is, by means of natural or artificial, real or strikingobjects, which, by some analogy or arbitrary association, shall suggestthe _idea_ to the mind. These symbols were designed to represent theinvisible attributes and operations of the Deity; the powers thatvitalize nature, that control the elements, that preside over cities, that protect the nations: indeed, all the agencies of the physical andmoral government of God. Beneath all the pagan legends of gods, andunderlying all the elaborate mechanism of pagan worship, there areunquestionably philosophical ideas, and theological conceptions, andreligious sentiments, which give as meaning, and even a mournfulgrandeur to the whole. 

Whilst the pagan polytheistic worship is, under one aspect, to beregarded as a departure from God, inasmuch as it takes away the honordue to God alone, and transfers it to the creature; still, under anotheraspect, we can not fail to recognize in it the effort of the human mindto fill up the chasm that seemed, to the undisciplined mind, to separateGod and man--and to bridge the gulf between the visible and theinvisible, the finite and the infinite. It was unquestionably an attemptto bring God nearer to the sense and comprehension of man. It had itsorigin in that instinctive yearning after the supernatural, the Divine, which dwells in all human hearts, and which has revealed itself in allphilosophies, mysticisms, and religions. [150] This longing wasstimulated by the contemplation of the living beauty and grandeur of thevisible universe, which, to the lively fancy and deep feeling of theGreeks, seemed as the living vesture of the Infinite Mind, --the templeof the eternal Deity. In this visible universe the Divinity was partlyrevealed, and partly concealed. The unity of the all-pervadingIntelligence was veiled beneath an apparent diversity of power, and amanifoldness of operations. They caught some glimpses of this universalpresence in nature, but were more immediately and vividly impressed bythe several manifestations of the divine perfections and divineoperations, as so many separate rays of the Divinity, or so manysubordinate agents and functionaries employed to execute the will andcarry out the purposes of the Supreme Mind. [151] That unseen, incomprehensible Power and Presence was perceived in the sublimity ofthe deep blue sky, the energy of the vitalizing sun, the surging of thesea, the rushing wind, the roaring thunder, the ripening corn, and theclustering vine. To these separate manifestations of the Deity they gave_personal names_, as Jupiter to the heavens, Juno to the air, Neptune tothe sea, Ceres to the corn, and Bacchus to the vine. These personalsdenoted, not the things themselves, but the invisible, divine powerssupposed to preside over those several departments of nature. By a kindof prosopopœia "they spake of the things in nature, and parts of theworld, as persons--and consequently as so many gods and goddesses--yetso as the intelligent might easily understand their meaning, _that thesewere in reality nothing else but so many names and notions of that oneNumen, --divine force and power which runs through all the world, multiformly displaying itself. _"[152] "Their various deities were butdifferent names, different conceptions, of that Incomprehensible Beingwhich no _thought_ can reach, and no _language_ express. "[153] Havinggiven to these several manifestations of the Divinity personal names, they now sought to represent them to the eye of sense by _visibleforms_, as the symbols or images of the perfections of the unseen, theincomprehensible, the unknown God. And as the Greeks regarded man as thefirst and noblest among the phenomena of nature, they selected the humanform as the highest sensible manifestation of God, the purest symbol ofthe Divinity. Grecian polytheism was thus a species of _mythicalanthropomorphism_. 

[Footnote 150: The original constitution of man is such that he "seeksafter" God Acts xvii. 27. "All men yearn after the gods" (Homer, "Odyss. " iii. 48). ]

[Footnote 151: "Heathenism springs directly from this, that the mindlays undue stress upon the bare letter in the book of creation; that itseparates and individualizes its objects as far as possible; that itplaces the sense of the individual part, in opposition to the sense ofthe whole, --to the _analogia fidei_ or _spiritus_ which alone givesunity to the book of nature, while it dilutes and renders as transitoryas possible the sense of the universal in the whole. .. . And as it laidgreat stress upon the letter in the book of nature, it fell intopolytheism. The particular symbol of the divine, or of the Godhead, became a myth of some special deity. "--Lange's "Bible-work, " Genesis, p. 23. ]

[Footnote 152: Cudworth, "Intellect. System, " vol. I. P. 308. ]

[Footnote 153: Max Müller, "Science of Language, " p. 431. ]

A philosophy of Grecian mythology, such as we have outlined in thepreceding paragraphs, is, in our judgment, perfectly consistent with theviews announced by Paul in his address to the Athenians. He intimatesthat the Athenians "thought that the Godhead was _like unto_ (ἐ ναιὄμοιον)--to be imaged or represented by human art--by gold, and silver, and precious stone graven by art, and device of man;" that is, theythought the perfections of God could be represented to the eye by animage, or symbol. The views of Paul are still more articulatelyexpressed in Romans, i. 23, 25: "They changed the glory of theincorruptible God into the _similitude of an image_ of corruptibleman, . .. . And they worshipped and served the thing made, παρά--_rather_than, or _more_ than the Creator. " Here, then, the apostle intimates, first, that the heathen _knew_ God, [154] and that they worshipped God. They worshipped the creature besides or even more than God, but stillthey also worshipped God. And, secondly, they represented theperfections of God by an image, and under this, as a "_likeness_" orsymbol, they indirectly worshipped God. Their religious system was, then, even to the eye of Paul, a _symbolic_ worship--that is, theobjects of their devotion were the _ὁμοιώματα_--the similitudes, thelikenesses, the images of the perfections of the invisible God. 

[Footnote 154: Verse 21. ]

It is at once conceded by us, that the "sensus numinis, " the naturalintuition of a Supreme Mind, whose power and presence are revealed innature, can not maintain itself, as an influential, and vivifying, andregulative belief amongst men, without the continual supernaturalinterposition of God; that is, without a succession of Divinerevelations. And further, we grant that, instead of this symbolic modeof worship deepening and vitalizing the sense of God as a living powerand presence, there is great danger that the symbol shall at lengthunconsciously take the place of God, and be worshipped instead of Him. From the purest form of symbolism which prevailed in the earliest ages, there may be an inevitable descent to the rudest form of false worship, with its accompanying darkness, and abominations, and crimes; but, atthe same time, let us do justice to the religions of the ancientworld--the childhood stammerings of religious life--which were somethingmore than the inventions of designing men, or the mere creations ofhuman fancy; they were, in the words of Paul, "a _seeking after God_, ifhaply they might feel after him, and find him, who is not far from anyone of us. " It can not be denied that the more thoughtful andintelligent Greeks regarded the visible objects of their devotion asmere symbols of the perfections and operations of the unseen God, and ofthe invisible powers and subordinate agencies which are employed by himin his providential and moral government of the world. And whateverthere was of misapprehension and of "ignorance" in the popular mind, wehave the assurance of Paul that it was "_overlooked_" by God. 

The views here presented will, we venture to believe, be found most inharmony with a true philosophy of the human mind; with the religiousphenomena of the world; and, as we shall subsequently see, with thewritings of those poets and philosophers who may be fairly regarded asrepresenting the sentiments and opinions of the ancient world. At thesame time, we have no desire to conceal the fact that this wholequestion as to the origin, and character, and philosophy of themythology and symbolism of the religions of the ancient world has been asubject of earnest controversy from Patristic times down to the presenthour, and that even to-day there exists a wide diversity of opinionamong philosophers, as well as theologians. 

The principal theories offered may be classed as the _ethical_, the_physical_, and the _historical_, according to the different objects theframers of the myths are supposed to have had in view. Some haveregarded the myths as invented by the priests and wise men of old forthe improvement and government of society, as designed to give authorityto laws, and maintain social order. [155] Others have regarded them asintended to be allegorical interpretations of physical phenomena--thepoetic embodiment of the natural philosophy of the primitive races ofmen;[156] whilst others have looked upon them as historical legends, having a substratum of fact, and, when stripped of the supernatural andmiraculous drapery which accompanies fable, as containing the history ofprimitive times. [157] Some of the latter class have imagined they couldrecognize in Grecian mythology traces of sacred personages, as well asprofane; in fact, a dimmed image of the patriarchal traditions which arepreserved in the Old Testament scriptures. [158]

It is beyond our design to discuss all the various theories presented, or even to give a history of opinions entertained. [159] We are fullyconvinced that the hypothesis we have presented in the preceding pages, viz. , _that Grecian mythology was a grand symbolic representation of theDivine as manifested in nature and providence_, is the only hypothesiswhich meets and harmonizes all the facts of the case. This is the theoryof Plato, of Cudworth, Baumgarten, Max Müller, and many otherdistinguished scholars. 

[Footnote 155: Empedocles, Metrodorus. ]

[Footnote 156: Aristotle. ]

[Footnote 157: Hecatæus, Herodotus, some of the early Fathers, Niebuhr, J. H. Voss, Arnold. ]

[Footnote 158: Bochart, G. J. Vossius, Faber, Gladstone. ]

[Footnote 159: To the English reader who desires an extended andaccurate acquaintance with the classic and patristic literature of thisdeeply interesting subject, we commend the careful study of Cudworth's"Intellectual System of the Universe, " especially ch. Iv. The style ofCudworth is perplexingly involved, and his great work is unmethodical inits arrangement and discussion. Nevertheless, the patient andpersevering student will be amply rewarded for his pains. A work of moreprofound research into the doctrine of antiquity concerning God, andinto the real import of the religious systems of the ancient world, is, probably, not extant in any language. ]

There are two fundamental propositions laid down by Cudworth whichconstitute the basis of this hypothesis. 

1. _No well-authenticated instance can be furnished from among the GreekPolytheists of one who taught the existence of a multiplicity ofindependenty uncreated, self-existent deities; they almost universally__believed in the existence of_ ONE SUPREME, UNCREATED, ETERNAL GOD, "_The Maker of all things_"--"_the Father of gods and men_, "--"_the soleMonarch and Ruler of the world_. "

2. _The Greek Polytheists taught a plurality of_"GENERATED DEITIES, "_who owe their existence to the power and will of the Supreme God, whoare by Him invested with delegated powers, and who, as the agents of hisuniversal providence, preside over different departments of the createduniverse_. 

The evidence presented by Cudworth in support of his theses is so variedand so voluminous, that it defies all attempts at condensation. Hisvolumes exhibit an extent of reading, of patient research, and of variedlearning, which is truly amazing. The discussion of these propositionsinvolves, in fact, nothing less than a complete and exhaustive survey ofthe entire field of ancient literature, a careful study of the Greek andLatin poets, of the Oriental, Greek, and Alexandrian philosophers, and areview of the statements and criticisms of Rabbinical and Patristicwriters in regard to the religions of the pagan world. An adequateconception of the varied and weighty evidence which is collected by ourauthor from these fields, in support of his views, could only beconveyed by transcribing to our pages the larger portion of hismemorable _fourth_ chapter. But inasmuch as Grecian polytheism is, infact, the culmination of all the mythological systems of the ancientworld, the fully-developed flower and ripened fruit of the cosmical andtheological conceptions of the childhood-condition of humanity, wepropose to epitomize the results of his inquiry as to the _theological_, opinions of the Greeks, supplying additional confirmation of his viewsfrom other sources. 

And first, he proves most conclusively that Orpheus, Homer, andHesiod, [160] who are usually designated "the theologians" of Greece, butwho were in fact the depravers and corrupters of pagan theology, do notteach the existence of a multitude of _unmade, self-existent, andindependent deities_. Even they believed in the existence of _one_uncreated and eternal mind, _one Supreme God_, anterior and superior toall the gods of their mythology. They had some intuition, someapperception of the _Divine_, even before they had attached to it asacred name. The gods of their mythology had all, save one, a temporalorigin; they were generated of Chaos and Night, by an active principlecalled _Love_. "One might suspect, " says Aristotle, that Hesiod, and ifthere be any other who made _love_ or _desire_ a principle of things, aimed at these very things (viz. , the designation of the efficient causeof the world); for Parmenides, describing the generation of theuniverse, says:

 'First of all the gods planned he _love_;'

and further, Hesiod:

 'First of all was Chaos, afterwards Earth, With her spacious bosom, And _Love_, who is pre-eminent among all the immortals;'

as intimating here that in entities there should exist some _cause_ thatwill impart motion, and hold bodies in union together. But how, inregard to these, one ought to distribute them, as to the order ofpriority, can be decided afterwards. [161]

[Footnote 160: We do not concern ourselves with the chronologicalantecedence of these ancient Greek poets. It is of little consequence tous whether Homer preceded Orpheus, or Orpheus Homer. They were not thereal creators of the mythology of ancient Greece. The myths were aspontaneous growth of the earliest human thought even before theseparation of the Aryan family into its varied branches. 

The study of Comparative Mythology, as well as of Comparative Language, assures us that the myths had an origin much earlier than the times ofHomer and Orpheus. They floated down from ages on the tide of oraltradition before they were systematized, embellished, and committed towriting by Homer, and Orpheus, and Hesiod. And between the systems ofthese three poets a perceptible difference is recognizable, whichreflects the changes that verbal recitations necessarily andimperceptibly undergo. ]

[Footnote 161: "Metaphysics, " bk. I. Ch. Iv. ]

Now whether this "first principle, " called "_Love_, " "the cause ofmotion and of union" in the universe, was regarded as a personal Being, and whether, as the ancient scholiast taught, Hesiod's love was "theheavenly Love, which is also God, that other love that was born of Venusbeing junior, " is just now of no moment to the argument. The moreimportant inference is, that amongst the gods of Pagan theology but_one_ is self-existent, or else none are. Because the Hesiodian gods, which are, in fact, all the gods of the Greek mythology, "were eitherall of them derived from chaos, love itself likewise being generated outof it; or else love was supposed to be distinct from chaos, and theactive principle of the universe, from whence, together with chaos, allthe theogony and cosmogony was derived. "[162] Hence it is evident thepoets did not teach the existence of a multiplicity of unmade, self-existent, independent deities. 

[Footnote 162: "Cudworth, " vol. I. P. 287. ]

The careful reader of Cudworth will also learn another truth of theutmost importance in this connection, viz. , _that the theogony of theGreek poets was, in fact, a cosmogony_, the generation of the godsbeing, in reality, the generation of the heavens, the sun, the moon, thestars, and all the various powers and phenomena of nature. This is dimlyshadowed forth in the very names which are given to some of thesedivinities. Thus Helios is the sun, Selena is the moon, Zeus thesky--the deep blue heaven, Eos the dawn, and Ersē the dew. It isrendered still more evident by the opening lines of Hesiod's"Theogonia, " in which he invokes the muses:

 "Hail ye daughters of Jupiter! Grant a delightsome song. Tell of the race of immortal gods, always existing, Who are the offspring of the earth, of the starry sky, And of the gloomy night, whom also the ocean nourisheth. Tell how the gods and the earth at first were made, And the rivers, and the mighty deep, boiling with waves, And the glowing stars, and the broad heavens above, And the gods, givers of good, born of these. "

Where we see plainly that the generation of the gods is the generationof the earth, the heaven, the stars, the seas, the rivers, and otherthings produced by them. "But immediately after invocation of the Musesthe poet begins with Chaos, and Tartara, and Love, as the firstprinciples, and then proceeds to the production of the earth and ofnight out of chaos; of the ether and of day, from night; of the starryheavens, mountains, and seas. All which generation of gods is reallynothing but a poetic description of the cosmogonia; as through thesequel of the poem all seems to be physiology veiled under fiction andallegory. .. . Hesiod's gods are thus not only the animated parts of theworld, but also the other things of nature personified and deified, orabusively called gods and goddesses. "[163] The same is true both of theOrphic and Homeric gods. "Their generation of the gods is the same withthe generation or creation of the world, both of them having, in allprobability, derived it from the Mosaic cabala, or tradition. "[164]

But in spite of all this mythological obscuration, the belief in oneSupreme God is here and there most clearly recognizable. "That Zeus wasoriginally to the Greeks the Supreme God, the true God--nay, at sometime their only God--can be perceived in spite of the haze whichmythology has raised around his name. "[165] True, they sometimes usedthe word "Zeus" in a physical sense to denote the deep expanse ofheaven, and sometimes in a historic sense, to designate a hero ordeified man said to have been born in Crete. It is also true that theHomeric Zeus is full of contradictions. He is "all-seeing, " yet he ischeated; he is "omnipotent, " yet he is defied; he is "eternal, " yet hehas a father; he is "just, " yet he is guilty of crime. Now, as Müllervery justly remarks, these contradictions may teach us a lesson. If allthe conceptions of Zeus had sprung from one origin, these contradictionscould not have existed. If Zeus had simply and only meant the SupremeGod, he could not have been the son of Kronos (Time). If, on the otherhand, Zeus had been a mere mythological personage, as Eos, the dawn, andHelios, the sun, he could never have been addressed as he is addressedin the famous prayer of Achilles (Iliad, bk. Xxi. ). [166]

[Footnote 163: Cudworth, vol. I. Pp. 321, 332. ]

[Footnote 164: Id. , ib. , vol. I. P. 478. ]

[Footnote 165: Max Müller, "Science of Language, " p. 457. ]

[Footnote 166: Id. , ib. , p. 458. ]

In Homer there is a perpetual blending of the natural and thesupernatural, the human and divine. The _Iliad_ is an incongruous medleyof theology, physics, and history. In its gorgeous scenicrepresentations, nature, humanity, and deity are mingled in inextricableconfusion. The gods are sometimes supernatural and superhumanpersonages; sometimes the things and powers of nature personified; andsometimes they are deified men. And yet there are passages, even inHomer, which clearly distinguish Zeus from all the other divinities, andmark him out as the Supreme. He is "the highest, first of Gods" (bk. Xix. 284); "most great, most glorious Jove" (bk. Ii. 474). He is "theuniversal Lord" (bk. Xi. 229); "of mortals and immortals king supreme, "(bk. Xii. 263); "over all the immortal gods he reigns in unapproachedpre-eminence of power" (bk. Xv. 125). He is "the King of kings" (bk. Viii. 35), whose "will is sovereign" (bk. Iv. 65), and his "powerinvincible" (bk. Viii. 35). He is the "eternal Father" (bk. Viii. 77). He "excels in wisdom gods and men; all human things from him proceed"(bk. Xiii. 708-10); "the Lord of counsel" (bk. I. 208), "the all-seeingJove" (bk. Xiii. 824). Indeed the mere expression "Father of gods andmen" (bk. I. 639), so often applied to Zeus, and him _alone_, is proofsufficient that, in spite of all the legendary stories of gods andheroes, the idea of Zeus as the Supreme God, the maker of the world, theFather of gods and men, the monarch and ruler of the world, was notobliterated from the Greek mind. [167]

[Footnote 167: "In the order of legendary chronology Zeus comes afterKronos and Uranos, but in the order of Grecian conception Zeus is theprominent person, and Kronos and Uranos are inferior and introductoryprecursors, set up in order to be overthrown, and to serve as mementosof the powers of their conqueror. To Homer and Hesiod, as well as to theGreeks universally, Zeus is the great, the predominant God, 'the Fatherof gods and men, ' whose power none of the gods can hope to resist, oreven deliberately think of questioning. All the other gods have theirspecific potency, and peculiar sphere of action and duty, with whichZeus does not usually interfere; but it is he who maintains thelineaments of a providential government, as well over the phenomena ofOlympus as over the earth. "--Grote, "Hist. Of Greece, " vol. I. P. 3. 

Zeus is not only lord of heaven but likewise the ruler of the lowerworld, and the master of the sea. --Welcher, "Griechische Götterlehre, "vol. I. P. 164. The Zeus of the Greek poets is unquestionably the god ofwhom Paul declared: In him we live and move, and have our being, ascertain of your own poets have also said--

 "'For we are his offspring. '"

Now whether this be a quotation from Aratus or Cleanthes, the languageof the poets is, "We are the offspring of Zeus;" consequently the Zeusof the poets and the God of Christianity are the same God. 

"The father of gods and men in Homer is, of course, the Universal Fatherof the Scriptures. "--Tyler, "Theology of Greek Poets, " p. 171. ]

"When Homer introduces Eumaios, the swineherd, speaking of this life andthe higher powers that rule it, he knows only of just gods 'who hatecruel deeds, but honor justice and the righteous works of men' (Od. Xiv. 83). His whole life is built up on a complete trust in the divinegovernment of the world without any artificial helps, as the Erinys, theNemesis, or Moira. 'Eat, ' says the swineherd, 'and enjoy what is here, for _God_[168] will grant one thing, but another he will refuse, whatever he will in his mind, for he can do all things' (Od. Xiv. 444;x. 306). This surely is religion, and it is religion untainted bymythology. Again, the prayer of the female slave, grinding corn in thehouse of Ulysses is religious in the truest sense--'Father Zeus, thouwho rulest over gods and men, surely thou hast just thundered in thestarry sky, and there is no cloud anywhere. Thou showest this as a signto some one. Fulfill now, even to me, miserable wretch, the prayer whichI now offer'" (Od. Xx. 141-150). [169]

[Footnote 168: No sound reason can be assigned for translating _θεός_ by"_a_ god" as some have proposed, rather than "_God_. " But even if itwere translated "a god, " this god must certainly be understood as Zeus. Plato tells us that Zeus is the most appropriate name for God. "For inreality the name Zeus is, as it were, a sentence; and persons dividingit in two parts, some of us make use of one part, and some of another;for some call him Ζήν, and some Δίς. But these parts, collected togetherinto one, exhibit the nature of the God;. .. For there is no one who ismore the cause of living, both to us and everything else, than he who isthe ruler and king of all. It follows, therefore, that this god isrightly named, through whom _life_ is present in all livingbeings. "--Cratylus, § 28. 

Θεός was usually employed, says Cudworth, to designate _God_ by way ofpre-eminence, θεοί to designate inferior divinities. ]

[Footnote 169: Müller, "Science of Language, " p. 434. ]

The Greek tragedians were the great religious instructors of theAthenian people. "Greek tragedy grew up in connection with religiousworship, and constituted not only a popular but a sacred element in thefestivals of the gods. .. . In short, strange as it may sound to modernears, the Greek stage was, more nearly than any thing else, the Greekpulpit. [170] With a priesthood that offered sacrifice, but did notpreach, with few books of any kind, the people were, in a great measure, dependent on oral instruction for knowledge; and as they learned theirrights and duties as citizens from their orators, so they hung on thelips of the 'lofty, grave tragedians' for instruction touching theirorigin, duty, and destiny as mortal and immortal beings. .. . Greektragedy is essentially didactic, ethical, mythological, andreligious. "[171]

[Footnote 170: Pulpitum, a stage. ]

[Footnote 171: Tyler, "Theology of Greek Poets, " pp. 205, 206. ]

Now it is unquestionable that, with the tragedians, Zeus is the SupremeGod. Æschylus is pre-eminently the theological poet of Greece. The greatproblems which lie at the foundation of religious faith and practice arethe main staple of nearly all his tragedies. Homer, Hesiod, the sacredpoets, had looked at these questions in their purely poetic aspects. Thesubsequent philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, developed them more fullyby their didactic method. Æschylus stands on the dividing-line betweenthem, no less poetic than the former, scarcely less philosophical thanthe latter, but more intensely practical, personal, and _theological_than either. The character of the Supreme Divinity, as represented inhis tragedies, approaches more nearly to the Christian idea of God. Heis the Universal Father--Father of gods and men; the Universal Cause(παναίτιος, Agamem. 1485); the All-seer and All-doer (παντόπτης, πανεργέτης, ibid, and Sup. 139); the All-wise and All-controlling(παγκρατής, Sup. 813); the Just and the Executor of justice (δικηφόρος, Agamem. 525); true and incapable of falsehood (Prom. 1031);

 ψευδηγορεῖν γὰρ οὐκ ἐπίσταταί στόμα τὸ δίον, ἀλλὰ πᾶν ἔπος τελεῖ, --

holy (ἁγνός, Sup. 650); merciful (πρευμένης, ibid. 139); the Godespecially of the suppliant and the stranger (Supplices, passim); themost high and perfect One (τέλειον ὕψιστον, Eumen. 28); King of kings, of the happy, most happy, of the perfect, most perfect power, blessedZeus (Sup. 522). [172] Such are some of the titles by which Zeus is mostfrequently addressed; such the attributes commonly ascribed to him inÆschylus. 

Sophocles was the great master who carried Greek tragedy to its highestperfection. Only seven out of more than a hundred of his tragedies havecome down to us. There are passages cited by Justin Martyr, ClemensAlexandrinus, and others which are not found in those tragedies nowextant. The most famous and extensively quoted passage is given byCudworth. [173]

 Εἶς ταῖς ἀληθείαισιν, εἰς ἐστίν θεὸς, Ὂς οὐρανόν τ᾽ έτευξε καὶ γαῖαν μακρὰν, Πόντου τε χαροπὸν οἶδμα, κἀνέμων βίαν, κ. τ. λ. [174]

This "one only God" is Zeus, who is the God of justice, and reignssupreme:

 "Still in yon starry heaven supreme, Jove, all-beholding, all-directing, dwells-- To him commit thy vengeance. "--"Electra, " p. 174 sqq. 

This description of the unsleeping, undecaying power and dominion ofZeus is worthy of some Hebrew prophet--

 "Spurning the power of age, enthroned in might, Thou dwell'st mid heaven's broad light; This was in ages past thy firm decree, Is now, and shall forever be: That none of mortal race on earth shall know A life of joy serene, a course unmarked by woe. "

 "Antigone, " pp. 606-614. [175]

[Footnote 172: Tyler, "Theology of Greek Poets, " pp. 213, 214. ]

[Footnote 173: "Intellectual Syst. , " vol. I. P. 483. ]

[Footnote 174: "There is, in truth, one only God, who made heaven andearth, the sea, air, and winds, " etc. ]

[Footnote 175: "Theology of Greek Poets, " p. 322. ]

Whether we regard the poets as the principal theological teachers of theancient Greeks, or as the compilers, systematizers, and artisticembellishers of the theological traditions and myths which were afloatin the primitive Hellenic families, we can not resist the conclusionthat, for the masses of the people Zeus was the Supreme God, "the God ofgods" as Plato calls him. Whilst all other deities in Greece are more orless local and tribal gods, Zeus was known in every village and to everyclan. "He is at home on Ida, [176] on Olympus, at Dodona. [177] WhilePoseidon drew to himself the Æolian family, Apollo the Dorian, Athenethe Ionian, there was one powerful God for all the sons ofHellen--Dorians, Æolians, Ionians, Achæans, viz. , the PanhellenicZeus. "[178] Zeus was the name invoked in their solemn nuncupations ofvows--

 "O Zeus, father, O Zeus, king. "

In moments of deepest sorrow, of immediate urgency and need, of greateststress and danger, they had recourse to Zeus. 

 "Courage, courage, my child! There is still in heaven the great Zeus; He watches over all things, and he rules. Commit thy exceeding bitter griefs to him, And be not angry against thine enemies, Nor forget them. "[179]

[Footnote 176: "Iliad, " bk. Iii. 324. ]

[Footnote 177: Bk. Xvi. 268. ]

[Footnote 178: Müller, p. 452. ]

[Footnote 179: Sophocles, "Electra, " v. 188. ]

He was supplicated, as the God who reigns on high, in the prayer of theAthenian--

 "Rain, rain, O dear Zeus, on the land of the Athenians and on their fields. "

It has been urged that, as Zeus means the sky, therefore he is no morethan the deep concave of heaven personified and deified, and thatconsequently Zeus is not the true, the only God. This argument is onlyequalled in feebleness by that of the materialist, who argues that"spiritus" means simply breath, therefore the breath is the soul. Evenif the Greeks remembered that, originally, Zeus meant the sky, thatwould have no more perplexed their minds than the remembrance that"thymos"--mind--meant originally blast. "The fathers of Greek theologygave to that Supreme Intelligence, which they instinctively recognizedas above and ruling over the universe, the name of Zeus; but in doingso, they knew well that by Zeus they meant more than the sky. Theunfathomable depth, the everlasting calm of the ethereal sky was totheir minds an image of that Infinite Presence which overshadows all, and looks down on all. As the question perpetually recurred to theirminds, 'Where is he who abideth forever?' they lifted up their eyes, andsaw, as they thought, beyond sun, and moon, and stars, and all whichchanges, and will change, the clear blue sky, the boundless firmament ofheaven. That never changed, that was always the same. The clouds andstorms rolled far below it, and all the bustle of this noisy world; butthere the sky was still, as bright and calm as ever. The Almighty Fathermust be there, unchangeable in the unchangeable heaven; bright, andpure, and boundless like the heavens, and like the heavens, too, afaroff. "[180] So they named him after the sky, _Zeus_, the God who lives inthe clear heaven--the heavenly Father. 

[Footnote 180: Kingsley, "Good News from God, " p. 237, Am. Ed. ]

The high and brilliant sky has, in many languages and many religions, been regarded as the dwelling-place of God. Indeed, to all of us inChristian times "God is above;" he is "the God of heaven;" "his throneis in the heavens;" "he reigns on high. " Now, without doing any violenceto thought, the name of the abode might be transferred to him who dwellsin heaven. So that in our own language "heaven" may still be used as asynonym for "God. " The prodigal son is still represented as saying, Ihave sinned against "_heaven_. " And a Christian poet has taught us tosing--

 "High _heaven_, that heard my solemn vow, That vow renewed shall daily hear, " etc. 

Whenever, therefore, we find the name of heaven thus used to designatealso the Deity, we must bear in mind that those by whom it wasoriginally employed were simply transferring that name from an objectvisible to the eye of sense to another object perceived by the eye ofreason. They who at first called God "_Heaven_" had some conceptionwithin them they wished to name--the growing image of a God, and theyfixed upon the vastest, grandest, purest object in nature, the deep blueconcave of heaven, overshadowing all, and embracing all, as the symbolof the Deity. Those who at a later period called heaven "_God_" hadforgotten that they were predicating of heaven something more which wasvastly higher than the heaven. [181]

[Footnote 181: See "Science of Language, " p. 457. ]

Notwithstanding, then, that the instinctive, native faith of humanity inthe existence of one supreme God was overlaid and almost buried beneaththe rank and luxuriant vegetation of Grecian mythology, we can stillcatch glimpses here and there of the solid trunk of native faith, aroundwhich this parasitic growth of fancy is entwined. Above all thephantasmata of gods and goddesses who descended to the plains of Troy, and mingled in the din and strife of battle, we can recognize anovershadowing, all-embracing Power and Providence that dwells on high, which never descends into the battle-field, and is never seen by mortaleyes--_the Universal King and Father, --the "God of gods_. "

Besides the direct evidence, which is furnished by the poets andmythologists, of the presence of this universal faith in "_the heavenlyFather_, " there is also a large amount of collateral testimony that thisidea of one Supreme God was generally entertained by the Greek pagans, whether learned or unlearned. [182] Dio Chrysostomus says that "all thepoets call the first and greatest God the Father, universally, of allrational kind, as also the King thereof. Agreeably with which doctrineof the poets do mankind erect altars to Jupiter-King (Διὸς βασιλέως) andhesitate not to call him Father in their devotions" (Orat. Xxxvi. ). AndMaximus Tyrius declares that both the learned and the unlearnedthroughout the pagan world universally agree in this; that there is oneSupreme God, the Father of gods and men. "If, " says he, "there were ameeting called of all the several trades and professions, . .. And allwere required to declare their sense concerning God, do you think thatthe painter would say one thing, the sculptor another, the poet another, and the philosopher another? No; nor the Scythian neither, nor theGreek, nor the hyperborean. In regard to other things, we find menspeaking discordantly one to another, all men, as it were, differingfrom all men. .. Nevertheless, on this subject, you may find universallythroughout the world one agreeing law and opinion; _that there is oneGod, the King and Father of all, and many gods, the sons of God, co-reigners together with God_"(Diss. I. P. 450). 

[Footnote 182: Cudworth, vol. I. Pp. 593, 594. ]

From the poets we now pass to the philosophers. The former we haveregarded as reflecting the traditional beliefs of the unreasoningmultitude. The philosophers unquestionably represent the reflectivespirit, the speculative thought, of the educated classes of Greeksociety. Turning to the writings of the philosophers, we may thereforereasonably expect that, instead of the dim, undefined, and nebulous formin which the religious sentiment revealed itself amongst theunreflecting portions of the Greek populations, we shall find theirtheological ideas distinctly and articulately expressed, and that weshall consequently be able to determine their religious opinions withconsiderable accuracy. 

Now that Thales, Pythagoras, Xenophanes, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle were all believers in the existence ofone supreme, uncreated, eternal God, has been, we think, clearly shownby Cudworth. [183]

[Footnote 183: Vol. I. Pp. 491-554. ]

In subsequent chapters on "_the Philosophers of Athens_, " we shall entermore fully into the discussion of this question. Meantime we assumethat, with few exceptions, the Greek philosophers were "genuineTheists. "

The point, however, with which we are now concerned is, _that whilstthey believed in one supreme, uncreated, eternal God, they at the sametime recognized the existence of a plurality of generated deities whoowe their existence to the power and will of the Supreme God, and who, as the agents and ministers of His universal providence, preside overdifferent departments of the created universe_. They are at onceMonotheists and Polytheists--believers in "one God" and "many gods. "This is a peculiarity, an anomaly which challenges our attention, anddemands an explanation, if we would vindicate for these philosophers arational Theism. 

Now that there can be but one infinite and absolutely perfect Being--onesupreme, uncreated, eternal God--is self-evident; therefore amultiplicity of such gods is a contradiction and an impossibility. Theearly philosophers knew this as well as the modern. The Deity, in orderto be Deity, must be one and not many: must be perfect or nothing. If, therefore, we would do justice to these old Greeks, we must inquire whatexplanations they have offered in regard to "the many gods" of whichthey speak. We must ascertain whether they regarded these "gods" ascreated or uncreated beings, dependent or independent, temporal oreternal We must inquire in what sense the term "god" is applied to theselesser divinities, --whether it is not applied in an accommodated andtherefore allowable sense, as in the sacred Scriptures it is applied tokings and magistrates, and those who are appointed by God as theteachers and rulers of men. "_They are called gods_ to whom the word ofGod came. "[184] And if it shall be found that all the gods of which theyspeak, save _one_, are "generated deities"--dependent beings--creaturesand subjects of the one eternal King and Father, and that the name of"god" is applied to them in an accommodated sense, then we havevindicated for the old Greek philosophers a consistent and rationalTheism. In what relation, then, do the philosophers place "_the gods_"to the one Supreme Being?

_Thales_, one of the most ancient of the Greek philosophers, taught theexistence of a plurality of gods, as is evident from that saying of his, preserved by Diogenes Laertius, "The world has life, and is full ofgods. "[185] At the same time he asserts his belief in one supreme, uncreated Deity; "God is the oldest of all things, because he is unmade, or ungenerated. "[186] All the other gods must therefore have been"generated deities, " since there is but one unmade God, one only thathad "no beginning. "[187]

[Footnote 184: See John x. 35. ]

[Footnote 185: "Lives, " bk. I. ; see also Aristotle's "De Anima, " bk. I. Ch. Viii. πάντα θιῶν πληρη. ]

[Footnote 186: "Lives, " bk. I. ]

[Footnote 187: "Lives, " bk. I. ]

_Xenophanes_ was also an assertor of many gods, and one God; but his oneGod is unquestionably supreme. "There is one God, the greatest amongstgods and men;" or, "God is one, the greatest amongst gods and men. "[188]

_Empedocles_ also believed in one Supreme God, who "is wholly andperfectly mind, ineffable, holy, with rapid and swift-glancing thoughtpervading the whole world, " and from whom all things else arederived, --"all things that are upon the earth, and in the air and water, may be truly called the works of God, who ruleth over the world, out ofwhom, according to Empedocles, proceed all things, plants, men, beasts, and _gods_. "[189] The minor deities are therefore _made_ by God. It willnot be denied that _Socrates_ was a devout and earnest Theist. He taughtthat "there is a Being whose eye pierces throughout all nature, andwhose ear is open to every sound; extending through all time, extendedto all places; and whose bounty and care can know no other bounds thanthose fixed by his own creation. "[190] And yet he also recognized theexistence of a plurality of gods, and in his last moments expressed hisbelief that "it is lawful and right to pray to the gods that hisdeparture hence may be happy. "[191] We see, however, in his wordsaddressed to Euthydemus, a marked distinction between these subordinatedeities and "Him who raised this whole universe, and still upholds themighty frame, who perfected every part of it in beauty and in goodness, suffering none of these parts to decay through age, but renewing themdaily with unfading vigor;. .. Even he, _the Supreme God_, still holdshimself invisible, and it is only in his works that we are capable ofadmiring him. "[192]

[Footnote 188: Clem. Alex. , "Stromat. " bk. V. ]

[Footnote 189: Aristotle, "De Mundo, " ch. Vi. ]

[Footnote 190: Xenophon's "Memorabilia, " i. 4. ]

[Footnote 191: "Phædo, " § 152. ]

[Footnote 192: "Memorabilia, " iv. 3. ]

It were needless to attempt the proof that _Plato_ believed in oneSupreme God, and _only_ one. This one Being is, with him, "the firstGod;" "the greatest of the gods;" "the God over all;" "the solePrinciple of the universe. " He is "the Immutable;" "the All-perfect;""the eternal Being. " He is "the Architect of the world; "the Maker ofthe universe; the Father of gods and men; the sovereign Mind whichorders all things, and passes through all things; the sole Monarch andRuler of the world. [193]

And yet remarkable as these expressions are, sounding, as they do, solike the language of inspiration, [194] there can be no doubt that Platowas also a sincere believer in a plurality of gods, of which, indeed, any one may assure himself by reading the _tenth_ book of "the Laws. "

[Footnote 193: See chap. Xi. ]

[Footnote 194: Some writers have supposed that Plato must have hadaccess through some medium to "the Oracles of God. " See Butler, vol. Ii. P. 41. ]

And, now that we have in Plato the culmination of Grecian speculativethought, we may learn from him the mature and final judgment of theancients in regard to the gods of pagan mythology. We open the _Timæus_, and here we find his views most definitely expressed. After giving anaccount of the "generation" of the sun, and moon, and planets, which areby him designated as "visible gods, " he then proceeds "to speakconcerning the other divinities:" "We must on this subject assent tothose who in former times have spoken thereon; who were, as they said, the offspring of the gods, and who doubtless were well acquainted withtheir own ancestors. .. .. Let then the genealogy of the gods be, and beacknowledged to be, that which they deliver. Of Earth and Heaven thechildren were Oceanus and Tethys; and of these the children werePhorcys, and Kronos, and Rhea, and all that followed these; and fromthese were born Zeus and Hera, and those who are regarded as brothersand sisters of these, and others their offspring. 

"When, then, _all the gods were brought into existence_, both thosewhich move around in manifest courses [the stars and planets], and thosewhich appear when it pleases them [the mythological deities], theCreator of the Universe thus addressed them: 'Gods, and sons of gods, ofwhom I am the father and the author, produced by me, ye areindestructible because I will. .. . Now inasmuch as you have been_generated_, you are hence _not_ immortal, nor wholly indissoluble; yetyou shall never be dissolved nor become subject to the fatality ofdeath, because _so I have willed_. .. . Learn, therefore, my commands. Three races of mortals yet remain to be created. Unless these becreated, the universe will be imperfect, for it will not contain withinit every kind of animal. .. . In order that these mortal creatures may be, and that this world may be really a cosmos, do you apply yourselves tothe creation of animals, imitating the exercises of my power in_creating_ you. '"[195]

[Footnote 195: "Timæus, " ch. Xv. ]

Here, then, we see that Plato carefully distinguishes between the soleEternal Author of the universe, on one hand, and the "souls, " vital andintelligent, which he attaches to the heavenly orbs, and diffusesthrough all nature, on the other. These subordinate powers or agents areall created, "_generated_ deities, " who owe their continued existence tothe _will_ of God; and though intrusted with a sort of deputed creation, and a subsequent direction and government of created things, they arestill only the _servants_ and the _deputies_ of the Supreme Creator, andDirector, and Ruler of all things. These subordinate agents andministers employed in the creation and providential government of theworld appear, in the estimation of Plato, to have been needed--

1. _To satisfy the demands of the popular faith_, which presented itsfacts to be explained no less than those of external nature. Plato hadevidently a great veneration for antiquity, a peculiar regard for"tradition venerable through ancient report, " and "doctrines hoary withyears. "[196] He aspired after supernatural light and guidance; he longedfor some intercourse with, some communication from, the Deity. Andwhilst he found many things in the ancient legends which revolted hismoral sense, and which his reason rejected, yet the sentiment and thelesson which pervades the whole of Grecian mythology, viz. , that thegods are in ceaseless intercourse with the human race, and if men willdo right the gods will protect and help them, was one which commendeditself to his heart. 

[Footnote 196: Ibid. , ch. V. ]

2. These intermediate agents seem to have been demanded to _satisfy thedisposition and tendency which has revealed itself in all systems, ofinterposing some scale of ascent between the material creation and theinfinite Creator_. 

The mechanical theory of the universe has interposed its long series ofsecondary causes--the qualities, properties, laws, forces of nature; thevital theory which attaches a separate "soul" to the various parts ofnature as the cause and intelligent director of its movements. Of these"souls" or gods, there were different orders and degrees--deified men orheroes, aërial, terrestrial, and celestial divinities, ascending fromnature up to God. And this tendency to supply some scale of ascenttowards the Deity, or at least to people the vast territory which seemsto swell between the world and God, finds some countenance in "theangels and archangels, " "the thrones, and dominions, and principalities, and powers" of the Christian scriptures. [197]

3. These inferior ministers also seemed to Plato to _increase thestately grandeur and imperial majesty of the Divine government. _ Theyswell the retinue of the Deity in his grand "circuit through the highestarch of heaven. "[198] They wait to execute the Divine commands. They arethe agents of Divine providence, "the messengers of God" to men. 

[Footnote 197: "The gods of the Platonic system answer, in office andconception, to the angels of Christian Theology. "--Butler, vol. I. P. 225. ]

[Footnote 198: "Phædrus, " § 56, 7. ]

4. And, finally, the host of inferior deities interposed between thematerial sensible world and God seemed to Plato as _needful in order toexplain the apparent defects and disorders of sublunary affairs_. Platowas jealous of the Divine honor. "All good must be ascribed to God, andnothing but good. We must find evil, disorder, suffering, in some othercause. "[199] He therefore commits to the junior deities the task ofcreating animals, and of forming "the mortal part of man, " because themortal part is "possessed of certain dire and necessary passions. "[200]

[Footnote 199: "Republic, " bk. Ii. P. 18. ]

[Footnote 200: "Timæus, " xliv. ]

Aristotle seems to have regarded the popular polytheism of Greece as aperverted relic of a deeper and purer "Theology" which he conceives tohave been, in all probability, perfected in the distant past, and thencomparatively lost. He says--"The tradition has come down from veryancient times, being left in a mythical garb to succeeding generations, that these (the heavenly bodies) are gods, and that the Divinity_encompasses the whole of nature_. There have been made, however, tothese certain fabulous additions for the purpose of winning the beliefof the multitude, and thus securing their obedience to the laws, andtheir co-operation towards advancing the general welfare of the state. These additions have been to the effect that these gods were of the sameform as men, and even that some of them were in appearance similar tocertain others amongst the rest of the animal creation. The wise course, however, would be for the philosopher to disengage from these traditionsthe false element, and to embrace that which is true; and the truth liesin that portion of this ancient doctrine which regards the first anddeepest ground of all existence to be the _Divine_, and this he mayregard as a divine utterance. In all probability, every art, andscience, and philosophy has been over and over again discovered to thefarthest extent possible, and then again lost; and we may conceive theseopinions to have been preserved to us as a sort of fragment of theselost philosophers. We see, then, to some extent the relation of thepopular belief to these ancient opinions. "[201] This conception of adeep Divine ground of all existence (for the immateriality and unity ofwhich he elsewhere earnestly contends)[202] is thus regarded byAristotle as underlying the popular polytheism of Greece. 

[Footnote 201: "Metaph. , " xi. 8. ]

[Footnote 202: Bk. Xi. Ch. Ii. § 4. ]

The views of the educated and philosophic mind of Greece in regard tothe mythological deities may, in conclusion, be thus briefly stated--

I. _They are all created beings_--"GENERATED DEITIES, " _who aredependent on, and subject to, the will of one supreme God_. 

II. _They are the_ AGENTS _employed by God in the creation of, at leastsome parts of, the universe, and in the movement and direction of theentire cosmos; and they are also the_ MINISTERS _and_ MESSENGERS _ofthat universal providence which he exercises over the human race_. 

These subordinate deities are, 1. The greater parts of the visiblemundane system animated by intelligent souls, and called "_sensiblegods_"--the sun, the moon, the stars, and even the earth itself, andknown by the names Helios, Selena, Kronos, Hermes, etc. 

2. Some are _invisible powers_, having peculiar offices and functionsand presiding over special places provinces and departments of theuniverse;--one ruling in the heavens (Zeus), another in the air (Juno), another in the sea (Neptune), another in the subterranean regions(Pluto); one god presiding over learning and wisdom (Minerva), anotherover poetry, music, and religion (Apollo), another over justice andpolitical order (Themis), another over war (Mars), another over corn(Ceres), and another the vine (Bacchus). 

3. Others, again, are _ethereal_ and _aërial_ beings, who have theguardianship of individual persons and things, and are called _demons, genii_, and _lares_; superior indeed to men, but inferior to the godsabove named. 

"Wherefore, since there were no other gods among the Pagans besidesthose above enumerated, unless their images, statues, and symbols shouldbe accounted such (because they were also sometimes abusively called'gods'), which could not be supposed by them to have been unmade orwithout beginning, they being the workmanship of their own hands, weconclude, universally, that all that multiplicity of Pagan gods whichmake so great a show and noise was really either nothing but severalnames and notions of one supreme Deity, according to his differentmanifestations, gifts, and effects upon the world personated, or elsemany inferior understanding beings, generated or created by one supreme:so that one unmade, self-existent Deity, and no more, was acknowledgedby the more intelligent Pagans, and, consequently, the Pagan Polytheism(or idolatry) consisted not in worshipping a multiplicity of unmademinds, deities, and creators, self-existent from eternity, andindependent upon one Supreme, but in mingling and blending some way orother, unduly, creature-worship with the worship of the Creator. "[203]

[Footnote 203: Cudworth, "Intellectual System, " vol. I. P. 311. ]

That the heathen regard the one Supreme Being as the first and chiefobject of worship is evident from the apologies which they offered forworshipping, besides Him, many inferior divinities. 

1. They claimed to worship them _only_ as inferior beings, and thattherefore they were not guilty of giving them that honor which belongedto the Supreme. They claimed to worship the supreme God incomparablyabove all. 2. That this honor which is bestowed upon the inferiordivinities does ultimately redound to the supreme God, and aggrandizehis state and majesty, they being all his ministers and attendants. 3. That as demons are mediators between the celestial gods and men, sothose celestial gods are also mediators between men and the supreme God, and, as it were, convenient steps by which we ought with reverence toapproach him. 4. That demons or angels being appointed to preside overkingdoms, cities, and persons, and being many ways benefactors to us, thanks ought to be returned to them by sacrifice. 5. Lastly, that it cannot be thought that the Supreme Being will envy those inferior beingsthat worship or honor which is bestowed upon them; nor suspect that anyof these inferior deities will factiously go about to set up themselvesagainst the Supreme God. 

The Pagans, furthermore, apologized for worshipping God in images, statues, and symbols, on the ground that these were only scheticallyworshipped by them, the honor passing from them to the prototype. Andsince we live in bodies, and can scarcely, conceive of any thing withouthaving some image or phantasm, we may therefore be indulged in thisinfirmity of human nature (at least in the vulgar) to worship God undera corporeal image, as a means of preventing men from falling intoAtheism. 

To the Christian conscience the above reasons assigned furnish no realjustification of Polytheism and Idolatry; but they are certainly a tacitconfession of their belief in the one Supreme God, and their convictionthat, notwithstanding their idolatry, He only ought to be worshipped. The heathen polytheists are therefore justly condemned in Scripture, andpronounced to be "_inexcusable_. " They had the knowledge of the trueGod--" they _knew God_" and yet "they glorified him not as God. " "Theychanged the glory of the incorruptible God into a likeness ofcorruptible man. " And, finally, they ended in "worshipping and servingthe creature _more_ than the Creator. "[204]

[Footnote 204: Romans i. 21, 25. ]

It can not, then, with justice be denied that the Athenians had someknowledge of the true God, and some just and worthy conceptions of hischaracter. It is equally certain that a powerful and influentialreligious sentiment pervaded the Athenian mind. Their extreme"carefulness in religion" must be conceded by us, and, in some sense, commended by us, as it was by Paul in his address on Mars' Hill. At thesame time it must also be admitted and deplored that the purer theologyof primitive times was corrupted by offensive legends, and encrusted bypolluting myths, though not utterly defaced. [205] The Homeric gods werefor the most part idealized, human personalities, with all the passionsand weaknesses of humanity. They had their favorites and their enemies;sometimes they fought in one camp, sometimes in another. They weresusceptible of hatred, jealousy, sensual passion. It would be strangeindeed if their worshippers were not like unto them. The conduct of theHomeric heroes was, however, better than their creed. And there is thisstrange incongruity and inconsistency in the conduct of the Homericgods, --they punish mortals for crimes of which they themselves areguilty, and reward virtues in men which they do not themselves alwayspractise. "They punish with especial severity social and politicalcrimes, such as perjury (Iliad, iii. 279), oppression of the poor (Od. Xvii. 475), and unjust judgment in courts of justice (Iliad, xvi. 386). "Jupiter is the god of justice, and of the domestic hearth; he is theprotector of the exile, the avenger of the poor, and the vigilantguardian of hospitality. "And with all the imperfections of society, government, and religion, the poem presents a remarkable picture ofprimitive simplicity, chastity, justice, and practical piety, under thethree-fold influence of moral feeling, mutual respect, and fear of thedivine displeasure; such, at least, are the motives to which Telemachusmakes his appeal when he endeavors to rouse the assembled people ofIthaca to the performance of their duty (Od. Ii. 64). "[206]

[Footnote 205: "There was always a double current of religious ideas inGreece; one spiritualist, the other tainted with impurelegends. "--Pressensé. ]

[Footnote 206: Tyler, "Theology of Greek Poets, " pp. 167, 168;Pressensé, "Religion before Christ, " p. 77. ]

The influence of the religious dramas of Æschylus and Sophocles on theAthenian mind must not be overlooked. No writer of pagan antiquity madethe voice of conscience speak with the same power and authority thatÆschylus did. "Crime, " he says, "never dies without posterity. " "Bloodthat has been shed congeals on the ground, crying out for an avenger. "The old poet made himself the echo of what he called "the lyreless hymnof the Furies, " who, with him, represented severe Justice striking theguilty when his hour comes, and giving warning beforehand by the terrorswhich haunt him. His dramas are characterized by deep religious feeling. Reverence for the gods, the recognition of an inflexible moral order, resignation to the decisions of Heaven, an abiding presentiment of afuture state of reward and punishment, are strikingly predominant. 

Whilst Æschylus reveals to us the sombre, terror-stricken side ofconscience, Sophocles shows us the divine and luminous side. No one hasever spoken with nobler eloquence than he of moral obligation--of thisimmortal, inflexible law, in which dwells a God that never grows old--

 "Oh be the lot forever mine Unsullied to maintain, In act and word, with awe divine, What potent laws ordain. 

 "Laws spring from purer realms above: Their father is the Olympian Jove. Ne'er shall oblivion veil their front sublime, Th' indwelling god is great, nor fears the wastes of time. "[207]

The religious inspiration that animates Sophocles breaks out withincomparable beauty in the last words of Œdipus, when the old banishedking sees through the darkness of death a mysterious light dawn, whichillumines his blind eyes, and which brings to him the assurance of ablessed immortality. [208]

[Footnote 207: "Œdipus Tyran. , " pp. 863-872. ]

[Footnote 208: Pressensé, "Religion before Christ, " pp. 85-87. ]

Such a theology could not have been utterly powerless. The influence oftruth, in every measure and degree, must be salutary, and especially oftruth in relation to God, to duty, and to immortality. The religion ofthe Athenians must have had some wholesome and conserving influence ofthe social and political life of Athens. [209] Those who resign thegovernment of this lower world almost exclusively to Satan, may see, inthe religion of the Greeks, a simple creation of Satanic powers. But hewho believes that the entire progress of humanity has been under thecontrol and direction of a benignant Providence, must suppose that, inthe purposes of God, even Ethnicism has fulfilled some end, or it wouldnot have been permitted to live. God has "_never left himself without awitness_" in any nation under heaven. And some preparatory office hasbeen fulfilled by Heathenism which, at least, repealed the _want_, andprepared the mind for, the advent of Christianity. 

[Footnote 209: The practice, so common with some theological writers, ofdrawing dark pictures of heathenism, in which not one luminous spot isvisible, in order to exalt the revelations given to the Jews, isexceedingly unfortunate, and highly reprehensible. It is unfortunate, because the skeptical scholar knows that there were some elements oftruth and excellence, and even of grandeur, in the religion andcivilization of the republics of Greece and Rome; and it isreprehensible, because it is a one-sided and unjust procedure, in so faras it withholds part of the truth. This species of argument is atwo-edged sword which cuts both ways. The prevalence of murder, andslavery, and treachery, and polygamy, in Greece and Rome, is no more aproof that "the religions of the pagan nations were destructive ofmorality" (Watson, vol. I. P. 59), than the polygamy of the Hebrews, thefalsehoods and impositions of Mediaeval Christianity, the persecutionsand martyrdoms of Catholic Christianity, the oppressions and wrongs ofChristian England, and the slavery of Protestant America, are proofsthat the Christian religion is "destructive of morality. " What a fearfulpicture of the history of Christian nations might be drawn to-day, ifall the lines of light, and goodness, and charity were left out, and thecrimes, and wrongs, and cruelties of the Christian nations were aloneexhibited!

How much more convincing a proof of the truth of Christianity to find inthe religions of the ancient world a latent sympathy with, and anunconscious preparation for, the religion of Christ. "The history ofreligions of human origin is the most striking evidence of the agreementof revealed religion with the soul of man--for each of these forms ofworship is the expression of the wants of conscience, its eternal thirstfor pardon and restoration--rather let us say, its thirst forGod. "--Pressensé, p. 6. ]

The religion of the Athenians was unable to deliver them from the guiltof sin, redeem them from its power, and make them pure and holy. It gavethe Athenian no victory over himself, and, practically, brought him nonearer to the living God. But it awakened and educated the conscience, it developed more fully the sense of sin and guilt, and it made manconscious of his inability to save himself from sin and guilt; and "theday that humanity awakens to the want of something more than mereembellishment and culture, that day it feels the need of being saved andrestored from the consequences of sin" by a higher power. Æsthetic tastehad found its fullest gratification in Athens; poetry, sculpture, architecture, had been carried to the highest perfection; a noblecivilization had been reached; but "the need of something deeper andtruer was written on the very stones. " The highest consummation ofPaganism was an altar to "the unknown God, " the knowledge of whom itneeded, as the source of purity and peace. 

The strength and the weakness of Grecian mythology consisted in thecontradictory character of its divinities. It was a strange blending ofthe natural and the supernatural, the human and the divine. Zeus, theeternal Father, --the immortal King, whose will is sovereign, and whosepower is invincible, --the All-seeing Jove, has some of the weaknessesand passions of humanity. God and man are thus, in some mysterious way, united. And here that deepest longing of the human heart is met--theunconquerable desire to bring God nearer to the human apprehension, andcloser to the human heart. Hence the hold which Polytheism had upon theGrecian mind. But in this human aspect was also found its weakness, forwhen philosophic thought is brought into contact with, and permittedcritically to test mythology, it dethrones the false gods. The age ofspontaneous religious sentiment must necessarily be succeeded by the ageof reflective thought. Popular theological faiths must be placed in thehot crucible of dialectic analysis, that the false and the frivolous maybe separated from the pure and the true. The reason of man demands to besatisfied, as well as the heart. Faith in God must have a logical basis, it must be grounded on demonstration and proof. Or, at any rate, thequestion must be answered, _whether God is cognizable by human reason_?If this can be achieved, then a deeper foundation is laid in the mind ofhumanity, upon which Christianity can rear its higher and nobler truths. 

CHAPTER V. 

THE UNKNOWN GOD. 

"As I passed by, and beheld your sacred objects, I found an altar withthis inscription, _To the Unknown God_. "--ST. PAUL. 

"That which can be _known_ of God is manifested in their hearts, Godhimself having shown it to them" [the heathen nations]. --ST. PAUL. 

Having now reached our first landing-place, from whence we may surveythe fields that we have traversed, it may be well to set down indefinite propositions the results we have attained. We may then carrythem forward, as torches, to illuminate the path of future and stillprofounder inquiries. 

The principles we have assumed as the only adequate and legitimateinterpretation of the facts of religious history, and which an extendedstudy of the most fully-developed religious system of the ancient worldconfirms, may be thus announced:

I. A religious nature and destination appertain to man, so that thepurposes of his existence and the perfection of his being can only besecured in and through religion. 

II. The idea of God as the unconditioned Cause, the infinite Mind, thepersonal Lord and Lawgiver, and the consciousness of dependence upon andobligation to God, are the fundamental principles of all religion. 

III. Inasmuch as man is a religious being, the instincts and emotions ofhis nature constraining him to worship, there must also be implanted inhis rational nature some original _à priori_ ideas or laws of thoughtwhich furnish the necessary cognition of the object of worship; that is, some native, spontaneous cognition of God. 

A mere blind impulse would not be adequate to guide man to the true endand perfection of his being without rational ideas; a tendency orappetency, without a revealed object, would be the mockery and misery ofhis nature--an "ignis fatuus" perpetually alluring and forever deceivingman. 

That man has a native, spontaneous apperception of a God, in the trueimport of that sacred name, has been denied by men of totally oppositeschools and tendencies of thought--by the Idealist and the Materialist;by the Theologian and the Atheist. Though differing essentially in theirgeneral principles and method, they are agreed in asserting that God isabsolutely "_the unknown_;" and that, so far as reason and logic areconcerned, man can not attain to any knowledge of the first principlesand causes of the universe, and, consequently, can not determine whetherthe first principle or principles be intelligent or unintelligent, personal or impersonal, finite or infinite, one or many righteous ornon-righteous, evil or good. 

The various opponents of the doctrine that God can be cognized by humanreason may be classified as follows: I. _Those who assert that all humanknowledge is necessarily confined to the observation and classificationof phenomena in their orders of co-existence, succession, andresemblance_. Man has no faculty for cognizing substances, causes, forces, reasons, first principles--no power by which he can _know_ God. This class may be again subdivided into--

1. Those who limit all knowledge to the observation and classificationof _mental_ phenomena (_e. G_. , Idealists like J. S. Mill). 

2. Those who limit all knowledge to the observation and classificationof _material_ phenomena (_e. G_. , Materialists like Comte). 

II. _The second class comprises all who admit that philosophic knowledgeis the knowledge of effects as dependent on causes, and of qualities asinherent in substances; but at the same time assert that "all knowledgeis of the phenomenal_. " Philosophy can never attain to a positiveknowledge of the First Cause. Of existence, absolutely and in itself, weknow nothing. The infinite can not by us be comprehended, conceived, orthought. _Faith_ is the organ by which we apprehend what is beyondknowledge. We believe in the existence of God, but we can not _know_God. This class, also, may be again subdivided into--

1. Those who affirm that our idea of the Infinite First Cause isgrounded on an _intuitional_ or subjective faith, necessitated by an"impotence of thought"--that is, by a mental inability to conceive anabsolute limitation or an infinite illimitation, an absolutecommencement or an infinite non-commencement. Both contradictoryopposites are equally incomprehensible and inconceivable to us; and yet, though unable to view either as possible, we are forced by a higherlaw--the "Law of Excluded Middle"--to admit that one, and only one, isnecessary (_e. G_. , Hamilton and Mansel). 

2. Those who assert that our idea of God rests solely on an _historical_or objective faith in testimony--the testimony of Scripture, whichassures us that, in the course of history, God has manifested hisexistence in an objective manner to the senses, and given verbalcommunications of his character and will to men; human reason beingutterly incapacitated by the fall, and the consequent depravity of man, to attain any knowledge of the unity, spirituality, and righteousness ofGod (_e. G_. , Watson, and Dogmatic Theologians generally). 

It will thus be manifest that the great question, the central and vitalquestion which demands a thorough and searching consideration, is thefollowing, to wit: _Is God cognizable by human reason_? Can man attainto a positive cognition of God--can he _know_ God; or is all oursupposed knowledge "a learned ignorance, "[210] an unreasoning faith? Weventure to answer this question in the affirmative. Human reason is nowadequate to the cognition of God; it is able, with the fullestconfidence, to affirm the being of a God, and, in some degree, todetermine his character. The parties and schools above referred toanswer this question in the negative form. Whether Theologians orAtheists, they are singularly agreed in denying to human reason allpossibility of _knowing_ God. 

[Footnote 210: Hamilton's "Philosophy, " p. 512. ]

Before entering upon the discussion of the negative positions enumeratedin the above classification, it may be important we should state our ownposition explicitly, and exhibit what we regard as the true doctrine ofthe genesis of the idea of God in the human intelligence. The realquestion at issue will then stand out in clear relief, and precisionwill be given to the entire discussion. 

(i. ) _We hold that the idea of God is a common phenomenon of theuniversal human intelligence_. It is found in all minds where reason hashad its normal and healthy development; and no race of men has ever beenfound utterly destitute of the idea of God. The proof of this positionhas already been furnished in chap, ii. , [211] and needs not be re-statedhere. We have simply to remark that the appeal which is made by Lockeand others of the sensational school to the experiences of infants, idiots, the deaf and dumb, or, indeed, any cases wherein the properconditions for the normal development of reason are wanting, are utterlyirrelevant to the question. The acorn contains within itself therudimental germ of the future oak, but its mature and perfectdevelopment depends on the exterior conditions of moisture, light, andheat. By these exterior conditions it may be rendered luxuriant in itsgrowth, or it may be stunted in its growth. It may barely exist underone class of conditions; it may be distorted and perverted, or it mayperish utterly under another. And so in the idiotic mind the ideas ofreason may be wanting, or they may be imprisoned by impervious walls ofcerebral malformation. In the infant mind the development of reason isyet in an incipient stage. The idea of God is immanent to the infantthought, but the infant thought is not yet matured. The deaf and dumbare certainly not in that full and normal correlation to the world ofsense which is a necessary condition of the development of reason. Language, the great vehiculum and instrument of thought, is wanting, andreason can not develop itself without words. "Words without thought aredead sounds, _thoughts without words are nothing_. The word is thethought incarnate. "[212] Under proper and normal conditions, the idea ofGod is the natural and necessary form in which human thought must bedeveloped. And, with these explanations, we repeat our affirmation thatthe idea of God is a common phenomenon of the universal humanintelligence. 

[Footnote 211: Pp. 89, 90. ]

[Footnote 212: Müller, " Science of Language, " p. 384. ]

(ii. ) _We do not hold that the idea of God, in its completeness, is asimple, direct, and immediate intuition of the reason alone, independentof all experience, and all knowledge of the external world_. The idea ofGod is a complex idea, and not a simple idea. The affirmation, "Godexists, " is a _synthetic_ and _primitive_ judgment spontaneouslydeveloped in the mind, and developed, too, independent of all reflectivereasoning. It is a necessary deduction from the facts of the outer worldof nature and the primary intuitions of the inner world of reason--alogical deduction from the self-evident truths given in sense, consciousness, and reason. "We do not _perceive_ God, but we _conceive_Him upon the faith of this admirable world exposed to view, and upon theother world, more admirable still, which we bear in ourselves. "[213]Therefore we do not say that man is born with an "innate idea" of God, nor with the definite proposition, "there is a God, " written upon hissoul; but we do say that the mind is pregnant with certain naturalprinciples, and governed, in its development, by certain necessary lawsof thought, which determine it, by a _spontaneous logic_, to affirm thebeing of a God; and, furthermore, that this judgment may be called_innate_ in the sense, that it is the primitive, universal, andnecessary development of the human understanding which "is innate toitself and equal to itself in all men. "[214]

[Footnote 213: Cousin, "True, Beautiful and Good, " p. 102. ]

[Footnote 214: Leibnitz. ]

As the vital and rudimentary germ of the oak is contained in the acorn;as it is quickened and excited to activity by the external conditions ofmoisture, light, and heat, and is fully de developed under the fixed anddeterminative laws of vegetable life--so the germs of the idea of Godare present in the human mind as the intuitions of pure reason(_Rational Psychology_); these intuitions are excited to energy by ourexperiential and historical knowledge of the facts and laws of theuniverse (_Phenomenology_); and these facts and intuitions are developedinto form by the necessary laws of the intellect (_Nomology_, or_Primordial Logic_). 

The _logical demonstration_ of the being of God commences with theanalysis of thought. It asks, What are the ideas which exist in thehuman intelligence? What are their actual characteristics, and whattheir primitive characteristics? What is their origin, and what theirvalidity? Having, by this process, found that some of our ideas aresubjective, and some objective that some are derived from experience, and that some can not be derived from experience, but are inherent inthe very constitution of the mind itself, as _à priori_ ideas of reason;that these are characterized as self-evident, universal, and necessaryand that, as laws of thought, they govern the mind in all itsconceptions of the universe; it has formulated these necessaryjudgments, and presented them as distinct and articulate propositions. These _à priori_, necessary judgments constitute the major premise ofthe Theistic syllogism, and, in view of the facts of the universe, necessitate the affirmation of the existence of a God as the only validexplanation of the facts. 

The _natural_ or _chronological order_ in which the idea of God isdeveloped in the human intelligence, is the reverse process of thescientific or logical order, in which the demonstration of the being ofGod is presented by philosophy; the latter is _reflective_ and_analytic_, the former is _spontaneous_ and _synthetic. _ The naturalorder commences with the knowledge of the facts of the universe, material and mental, as revealed by sensation and experience. Inpresence of these facts of the universe, the _à priori_ ideas of power, cause, reason, and end are evoked into consciousness with greater orless distinctness; and the judgment, by a natural and spontaneous logic, free from all reflection, and consequently from all possibility oferror, affirms a necessary relation between the facts of experience andthe _à priori_ ideas of the reason. The result of this involuntary andalmost unconscious process of thought is that natural cognition of a Godfound, with greater or less clearness and definiteness, in all rationalminds. The _à posteriori_, or empirical knowledge of the phenomena ofthe universe, in their relations to time and space, constitute the minorpremise of the Theistic syllogism. 

The Theistic argument is, therefore, necessarily composed of bothexperiential and _à priori_ elements. An _à posteriori_ element existsas a condition of the logical demonstration The rational _à priori_element is, however, the logical basis, the only valid foundation of theTheistic demonstration. The facts of the universe alone would never leadman to the recognition of a God, if the reason, in presence of thesefacts, did not enounce certain necessary and universal principles whichare the logical antecedents, and adequate explanation of the facts. Ofwhat use would it be to point to the events and changes of the materialuniverse as proofs of the existence of a _First Cause, _ unless we takeaccount of the universal and necessary truth that "every change musthave an efficient cause;" that all phenomena are an indication of_power_; and that "there is an ultimate and sufficient reason why allthings exist, and are as they are, and not otherwise. " There would be nological force in enumerating the facts of order and special adaptationwhich literally crowd the universe, as proofs of the existence of an_Intelligent Creator_, if the mind did not affirm the necessaryprinciple that "facts of order, having a commencement in time, supposemind as their source and exponent. " There is no logical conclusivenessin the assertion of Paley, "that _experience_ teaches us that a designermust be a person, " because, as Hume justly remarks, our "experience" isnarrowed down to a mere point, "and can not be a rule for a universe;"but there is an infinitude of force in that dictum of reason, that"intelligence, self-consciousness, and self-determination necessarilyconstitute personality. " A multiplicity of different effects, of whichexperience does not always reveal the connection, would not conduct to asingle cause and to _one_ God, but rather to a plurality of causes and aplurality of gods, did not reason teach us that "all plurality impliesan ultimate indivisible unity, " and therefore there must be a _FirstCause_ of all causes, a _First Principle_ of all principles, _theSubstance_ of all substances, _the Being_ of all beings--_a God_ "ofwhom, in whom, and to whom are all things" (πάντα ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἐν τῷθεῷ, εἰς τὸν θεόν). 

The conclusion, therefore, is, that, as the idea of God is a complexidea, so there are necessarily a number of simple _à priori_ principles, and a variety of experiential facts conspiring to its development in thehuman intelligence. 

(iii. ) _The universe presents to the human mind an aggregation andhistory of phenomena which demands the idea of a God--a self-existent, intelligent, personal, righteous First Cause--as its adequateexplanation. _

The attempt of Positivism to confine all human knowledge to theobservation and classification of phenomena, and arrest and forecloseall inquiry as to causes, efficient, final, and ultimate, is simplyfutile and absurd. It were just as easy to arrest the course of the sunin mid-heaven as to prevent the human mind from seeking to pass beyondphenomena, and ascertain the ground, and reason, and cause of allphenomena. The history of speculative thought clearly attests that, inall ages, the inquiry after the Ultimate Cause and Reason of allexistence--the ἀρχή, or First Principle of all things--has been theinevitable and necessary tendency of the human mind; to resist which, skepticism and positivism have been utterly impotent. The firstphilosophers, of the Ionian school, had just as strong a faith in theexistence of a Supreme Reality--an Ultimate Cause--as Leibnitz andCousin. But when, by reflective thought, they attempted to render anaccount to themselves of this instinctive faith, they imagined that itsobject must be in some way appreciable to sense, and they sought it insome physical element, or under some visible and tangible shrine. Still, however imperfect and inadequate the method, and however unsatisfactorythe results, humanity has never lost its positive and ineradicableconfidence that the problem of existence could be solved. The resistlesstide of spontaneous and necessary thought has always borne the raceonward towards the recognition of a great First Cause; and thoughphilosophy may have erred, again and again, in tracing the logical orderof this inevitable thought, and exhibiting the necessary nexus betweenthe premises and conclusion, yet the human mind has never wavered in theconfidence which it has reposed in the natural logic of thought, and manhas never ceased to believe in a God. 

We readily grant that all our empirical knowledge is confined tophenomena in their orders of co-existence, succession, and resemblance. "To our objective perception and comparison nothing is given butqualities and changes; to our inductive generalization nothing but theshifting and grouping of these in time and space. " Were it, however, ourimmediate concern to discuss the question, we could easily show thatsensationalism has never succeeded in tracing the genetic origin of ourideas of space and time to observation and experience; and, without the_à priori_ idea of _space_, as the place of bodies, and of _time_, asthe condition of succession, we can not conceive of phenomena at all. If, therefore, we know any thing beyond phenomena and their mutualrelations; if we have any cognition of realities underlying phenomena, and of the relations of phenomena to their objective ground, it must begiven by some faculty distinct from sense-perception, and in someprocess distinct from inductive generalization. The knowledge of realBeing and real Power, of an ultimate Reason and a personal Will, isderived from the apperception of pure reason, which affirms thenecessary existence of a Supreme Reality--an Uncreated Being beyond allphenomena, which is the ground and reason of the existence--thecontemporaneousness and succession--the likeness and unlikeness, of allphenomena. 

The immediate presentation of phenomena to sensation is the _occasion_of the development in consciousness of these _à priori_ ideas of reason:the possession of these ideas or the immanence of these ideas, in thehuman intellect, constitutes the original _power_ to know externalphenomena. The ideas of space, time, power, law, reason, and end, arethe logical antecedents of the ideas of body, succession, event, consecution, order, and adaptation. The latter can not be conceived asdistinct notions without the former. The former will not be revealed inthought without the presentation to sense, of resistance, movement, change, uniformity, etc. All actual knowledge must, therefore, beimpure; that is, it must involve both _à priori_ and _à posteriori_elements; and between these elements there must be a necessary relation. 

This necessary relation between the _à priori_ and _à posteriori_elements of knowledge is not a mere subjective law of thought. It isboth a law of thought and a law of things. Between the _à posteriori_facts of the universe and the _à priori_ ideas of the reason there is anabsolute nexus, a universal and necessary correlation; so that thecognition of the latter is possible only on the cognition of the former;and the objective existence of the realities, represented by the ideasof reason, is the condition, _sine qua non_, of the existence of thephenomena presented to sense. If, in one indivisible act ofconsciousness, we immediately perceive extended matter exterior to ourpercipient mind, then Extension exists objectively; and if Extensionexists objectively, then Space, its _conditio sine qua non_, also existsobjectively. And if a definite body reveals to us the _Space_ in whichit is contained, if a succession of pulsations or movements exhibit theuniform _Time_ beneath, so do the changeful phenomena of the universedemand a living _Power_ behind, and the existing order and regularevolution of the universe presuppose _Thought_--prevision, andpredetermination, by an intelligent mind. 

If, then, the universe is a created effect, it must furnish someindications of the character of its cause. If, as Plato taught, theworld is a "created image" of the eternal archetypes which dwell in theuncreated Mind, and if the subjective ideas which dwell in the humanreason, as the offspring of God, are "copies" of the ideas of theInfinite Reason--if the universe be "the autobiography of the InfiniteSpirit which has also repeated itself in miniature within our finitespirit, " then may we decipher its symbols, and read its lessons straightoff. Then every approach towards a scientific comprehension andgeneralization of the facts of the universe must carry us upward towardsthe higher realities of reason. The more we can understand of Nature--ofher comprehensive laws, of her archetypal forms, of her far-reachingplan spread through the almost infinite ages, and stretching throughillimitable space--the more do we comprehend the divine Thought. Theinductive generalization of science gradually _ascends_ towards theuniversal; the pure, essential, _à priori_ reason, with its universaland necessary ideas, _descends_ from above to meet it. The generalconceptions of science are thus a kind of _ideœ umbratiles_--shadowyassimilations to those immutable ideas which dwell in essential reason, as possessed by the Supreme Intelligence, and which are participated inby rational man as the offspring and image of God. 

Without making any pretension to profound scientific accuracy, we offerthe following tentative classification of the facts of the universe, material and mental, which may be regarded as hints and adumbrations ofthe ultimate ground, and reason, and cause, of the universe. We shallventure to classify these facts as indicative of some fundamentalrelation; (i. ) to Permanent Being or Reality; (ii. ) to Reason andThought; (iii. ) to Moral Ideas and Ends. 

(i. ) _Facts of the universe which indicate some fundamental relation toPermanent Being or Reality_. 

1. _Qualitative_ Phenomena (properties, attributes, qualities)--thepredicates of a _subject_; which phenomena, being characterized bylikeness and unlikeness, are capable of comparison and classification, and thus of revealing something as to the nature of the _subject_. 

2. _Dynamical_ Phenomena (protension, movement, succession)--eventstranspiring in _time_, having beginning, succession, and end, whichpresent themselves to us as the expression of _power_, and throw backtheir distinctive characteristics on their _dynamic_ source. 

3. _Quantitative_ Phenomena (totality, multiplicity, relative unity)--amultiplicity of objects having relative and composite unity, whichsuggests some relation to an absolute and indivisible _unity_. 

4. _Statical_ Phenomena (extension, magnitude, divisibility)--bodiesco-existing in _space_ which are limited, conditioned, relative, dependent, and indicate some relation to that which is self-existent, unconditioned, and absolute. 

(ii. ) _Facts of the universe which indicate some fundamental relation toReason or Thought_. 

1. _Numerical and Geometrical Proportion_. --Definite proportion ofelements (Chemistry), symmetrical arrangement of parts(Crystallography), numerical and geometrical relation of the forms andmovements of the heavenly bodies (Spherical Astronomy), all of which arecapable of exact mathematical expression. 

2. _Archetypal Forms_. --The uniform succession of new existences, andthe progressive evolution of new orders and species, conformable tofixed and definite ideal archetypes, the indication of a comprehensive_plan_(Morphological Botany, Comparative Anatomy). 

3. _Teleology of Organs_. --The adaptation of organs to the fulfillmentof special functions, indicating _design_(Comparative Physiology). 

4. _Combination of Homotypes and Analogues_. --Diversified homologousforms made to fulfill analogous functions, or special purposes fulfilledwhilst maintaining a general plan, indicating _choice_ and_alternativity_. 

(iii. ) _Facts of the universe which indicate some fundamental relationto Moral Ideas and Ends_. 

1. _Ethical Distinctions_. --The universal tendency to discriminatebetween voluntary acts as right or wrong, indicating some relation to an_immutable moral standard of right_. 

2. _Sense of Obligation_. --The universal consciousness of dependence andobligation, indicating some relation to Supreme _Power_, an Absolute_Authority_. 

3. _Feeling of Responsibility_. --The universal consciousness ofliability to be required to give account for, and endure theconsequences of our action, indicating some relation to a Supreme_Judge_. 

4. _Retributive Issues_. --The pleasure and pain resulting from moralaction in this life, and the universal anticipation of pleasure or painin the future, as the consequence of present conduct, indicate an_absolute Justice_ ruling the world and man. 

Now, if the universe be a _created effect_, it must, in some degree atleast, reveal the character of its Author and cause. We are entitled toregard it as a created symbol and image of the Deity; it must bear theimpress of his _power_; it must reveal his infinite _presence_; it mustexpress his _thoughts_; it must embody and realize his _ideals_, so far, at least, as material symbols will permit. Just as we see the power andthought of man revealed in his works, his energy and skill, his idealand his taste expressed in his mechanical, artistic, and literarycreations, so we may see the mind and character of God displayed in hisworks. The skill and contrivance of Watts, and Fulton, and Stephensonwere exhibited in their mechanical productions. The pure, the intense, the visionary impersonation of the soul which the artist had conjured inhis own imagination was wrought out in Psyché. The colossal grandeur ofMichael Angelo's ideals, the ethereal and saintly elegance of Raphael'swere realized upon the canvas. So he who is familiar with the ideal ofthe sculptor or the painter can identify his creations even when theauthor's name is not affixed. And so the "eternal Power" of God is"clearly seen" in the mighty orbs which float in the illimitable space. The vastness of the universe shadows forth the infinity of God. Theindivisible unity of space and the ideal unity of the universe reflectthe unity of God. The material forms around us are symbols of divineideas, and the successive history of the universe is an expression ofthe divine thought; whilst the ethical ideas and sentiments inherent inthe human mind are a reflection of the moral character of God. 

The reader can not have failed to observe the form in which the Theisticargument is stated; "_if_ the finite universe is a created effect, itmust reveal something as to the nature of its cause: _if_ the existingorder and arrangement of the universe had a commencement in time, itmust have an ultimate and adequate cause. " The question, therefore, presents itself in a definite form: "_Is the universe finite orinfinite; had the order of the universe a beginning, or is it eternal_?"

It will be seen at a glance that this is the central and vital questionin the Theistic argument. If the order and arrangement of the universeis _eternal_, then that order is an inherent law of nature, and, aseternal, does not imply a cause _ab extra:_ if it is not eternal, thenthe ultimate cause of that order must be a power above and beyondnature. In the former case the minor premise of the Theistic syllogismis utterly invalidated; in the latter case it is abundantly sustained. 

Some Theistic writers--as Descartes, Pascal, Leibnitz, and Saisset--havemade the fatal admission that the universe is, in some sense, _infinite_and _eternal_. In making this admission they have unwittinglysurrendered the citadel of strength, and deprived the argument by whichthey would prove the being of a God of all its logical force. Thatargument is thus presented by Saisset: "The finite supposes theinfinite. Extension supposes first space, then immensity: durationsupposes first time, then eternity. A sudden and irresistible judgmentrefers this to the necessary, infinite, perfect being. "[215] But if "theworld is infinite and eternal, "[216] may not nature, or the totality ofall existence (τὺ πᾶν), be the necessary, infinite, and perfect Being?An infinite and eternal universe has the reason of its existence initself, and the existence of such a universe can never prove to us theexistence of an infinite and eternal God. 

[Footnote 215: "Modern Pantheism, " vol. Ii. P. 205. ]

[Footnote 216: Ibid, p. 123. ]

A closer examination of the statements and reasonings of Descartes, Pascal, and Leibnitz, as furnished by Saisset, will show that thesedistinguished mathematicans were misled by the false notion of"_mathematical_ infinitude. " Their infinite universe, after all, is notan "absolute, " but a "relative" infinite; that is, the indefinite. "Theuniverse must extend _indefinitely_ in time and space, in the infinitegreatness, and in the infinite littleness of its parts--in the infinitevariety of its species, of its forms, and of its degrees of existence. The finite can not express the infinite but by being _multiplied_infinitely. The finite, so far as it is finite, is not in any reasonablerelation, or in any intelligible proportion to the infinite. But thefinite, as _multiplied_ infinitely, [217] ages upon ages, spaces uponspaces, stars beyond stars, worlds beyond worlds, is a true expressionof the Infinite Being. Does it follow, because the universe has nolimits, --that it must therefore be eternal, immense, infinite as Godhimself? No; that is but a vain scruple, which springs from theimagination, and not from the reason. The imagination is alwaysconfounding what reason should ever distinguish, eternity and time, immensity and space, _relative_ infinity and _absolute_ infinity. TheCreator alone is eternal, immense, absolutely infinite. "[218]

[Footnote 217: "The infinite is distinct from the finite, andconsequently from the multiplication of the finite by itself; that is, from the _indefinite_. That which is not infinite, added as many timesas you please to itself, will not become infinite. "--Cousin, "Hist, ofPhilos. , " vol. Ii. P. 231. ]

[Footnote 218: Saisset, "Modern Pantheism, " vol. Ii. Pp. 127, 128. ]

The introduction of the idea of "the mathematical infinite" intometaphysical speculation, especially by Kant and Hamilton, with thedesign, it would seem, of transforming the idea of infinity into asensuous conception, has generated innumerable paralogisms whichdisfigure the pages of their philosophical writings. This procedure isgrounded in the common fallacy of supposing that _infinity_ and_quantity_ are compatible attributes, and susceptible of mathematicalsynthesis. This insidious and plausible error is ably refuted by awriter in the "North American Review. "[219] We can not do better thantransfer his argument to our pages in an abridged form. 

[Footnote 219: "The Conditioned and the Unconditioned, " No. CCV. Art. Iii. (1864). ]

Mathematics is conversant with quantities and quantitative relations. The conception of quantity, therefore, if rigorously analyzed, willindicate _à priori_ the natural and impassable boundaries of thescience; while a subsequent examination of the quantities calledinfinite in the mathematical sense, and of the algebraic symbol ofinfinity, will be seen to verify the results of this _à priori_analysis. 

Quantity is that attribute of things in virtue of which they aresusceptible of exact mensuration. The question _how much_, or _how many_(_quantus_), implies the answer, _so much_, or _so many_ (_tantus_); butthe answer is possible only through reference to some standard ofmagnitude or multitude arbitrarily assumed. Every object, therefore, ofwhich quantity, in the mathematical sense, is predicable, must be by itsessential nature _mensurable. _ Now mensurability implies the existenceof actual, definite limits, since without them there could be no fixedrelation between the given object and the standard of measurement, and, consequently, no possibility of exact mensuration. In fact, sincequantification is the object of all mathematical operations, mathematicsmay be not inaptly defined as _the science of the determinations oflimits_. It is evident, therefore, that the terms _quantity_ and_finitude_ express the same attribute, namely, _limitation_--the formerrelatively, the latter absolutely; for quantity is limitation consideredwith relation to some standard of measurement, and finitude islimitation considered simply in itself. The sphere of quantity, therefore, is absolutely identical with the sphere of the finite; andthe phrase _infinite quantity_, if strictly construed, is acontradiction in terms. 

The result thus attained by considering abstract quantity iscorroborated by considering concrete and discrete quantities. Suchexpressions as _infinite sphere, radius, parallelogram, line, _ and soforth, are self-contradictory. A sphere is limited by its own periphery, and a radius by the centre and circumference of its circle. Aparallelogram of infinite altitude is impossible, because the limit ofits altitude is assigned in the side which must be parallel to its basein order to constitute it a parallelogram. In brief, all figuration islimitation. The contradiction in the term _infinite line_ is not quiteso obvious, but can readily be made apparent. Objectively, a line isonly the termination of a surface, and a surface the termination of asolid; hence a line can not exist apart from an extended quantity, noran infinite line apart from an infinite quantity. But as this term hasjust been shown to be self-contradictory, an infinite line can not existobjectively at all. Again, every line is extension in one dimension;hence a mathematical quantity, hence mensurable, hence finite; you musttherefore, deny that a line is a quantity, or else affirm that it isfinite. 

The same conclusion is forced upon us, if from geometry we turn toarithmetic. The phrases _infinite number, infinite series, infiniteprocess_, and so forth, are all contradictory when literally construed. Number is a relation among separate unities or integers, which, considered objectively as independent of our cognitive powers, mustconstitute an exact sum; and this exactitude, or synthetic totality, islimitation. If considered subjectively in the mode of its cognition, anumber is infinite only in the sense that it is beyond the power of ourimagination or conception, which is an abuse of the term. In either casethe totality is fixed; that is, finite. So, too, of _series_ and_process_. Since every series involves a succession of terms or numbers, and every process a succession of steps or stages, the notion of seriesand process plainly involves that of _number_, and must be rigorouslydissociated from the idea of infinity. At any one step, at any one term, the number attained is determinate, hence finite. The fact that, by thelaw of the series or of the process, _we_ may continue the operation _aslong as we please_, does not justify the application of the terminfinite to the operation itself; if any thing is infinite, it is thewill which continues the operation, which is absurd if said of humanwills. 

Consequently, the attribute of infinity is not predicable either of'diminution without limit, ' 'augmentation without limit, ' or 'endlessapproximation to a fixed limit, ' for these mathematical processescontinue only as we continue them, consist of steps successivelyaccomplished, and are limited by the very fact of this serialincompletion. 

"We can not forbear pointing out an important application of theseresults to the Critical Philosophy. Kant bases each of his famous fourantinomies on the demand of pure reason for unconditioned totality in aregressive series of conditions. This, he says, must be realized eitherin an absolute first of the series, conditioning all the other members, but itself unconditioned, or else in the absolute infinity of the serieswithout a first; but reason is utterly unable, on account of mutualcontradiction, to decide in which of the two alternatives theunconditioned is found. By the principles we have laid down, however, the problem is solved. The absolute infinity of a series is acontradiction _in adjecto_. As every number, although immeasurably andinconceivably great, is impossible unless _unity_ is given as its basis, so every series, being itself a number, is impossible unless a _firstterm_ is given as a commencement. Through a first term alone is theunconditioned possible; that is, if it does not exist in a first term, it can not exist at all; of the two alternatives, therefore, onealtogether disappears, and reason is freed from the dilemma of acompulsory yet impossible decision. Even if it should be allowed thatthe series has no first term, but has originated _ab œterno_, it mustalways at each instant have a _last term_; the series, as a whole, cannot be infinite, and hence can not, as Kant claims it can, realize inits wholeness unconditioned totality. Since countless terms foreverremain unreached, the series is forever limited by them. Kant himselfadmits that it _can never be completed_, and is only potentiallyinfinite; actually, therefore, by his own admission, it is finite. But alast term implies a first, as absolutely as one end of a string impliesthe other; the only possibility of an unconditioned lies in Kant's firstalternative, and if, as he maintains Reason must demand it, she can nothesitate in her decisions. That _number is a limitation_ is no newtruth, and that every series involves number is self-evident; and it issurprising that so radical a criticism on Kant's system should neverhave suggested itself to his opponents. Even the so-called _moments_ oftime can not be regarded as constituting a real series, for a series cannot be real except through its divisibility into members whereas time isindivisible, and its partition into moments is a conventional fiction. Exterior limitability and interior divisibility result equally from thepossibility of discontinuity. Exterior illimitability and interiorindivisibility are simple phases of the same attribute of _necessarycontinuity_ contemplated under different aspects. From this principleflows another upon which it is impossible to lay too much stress, namely; _illimitability and indivisibility, infinity and unity, reciprocally necessitate each other_. Hence the Quantitative Infinitesmust be also Units, and the division of space and time, implyingabsolute contradiction, is not even cogitable as an hypothesis. [220]

"The word _infinite_, therefore, in mathematical usage, as applied to_process_ and to _quantity_, has a two-fold signification. An infiniteprocess is one which we can continue _as long as we please_, but whichexists solely in our continuance of it. [221] An infinite quantity is onewhich exceeds our powers of mensuration or of conception, but which, nevertheless, has bounds and limits in itself. [222] Hence thepossibility of relation among infinite quantities, and of differentorders of infinities. If the words _infinite, infinity, infinitesimal_, should be banished from mathematical treatises and replaced by the words_indefinite, indefinity, _ and _indefinitesimal_, mathematics wouldsuffer no loss, while, by removing a perpetual source of confusion, metaphysics would get great gain. "

[Footnote 220: By the application of these principles the writer in the"North American Review" completely dissolves the antinomies by whichHamilton seeks to sustain his "Philosophy of the Conditioned. " See"North American Review, " 1864, pp. 432-437. ]

[Footnote 221: De Morgan, "Diff. And Integ. Calc. " p. 9. ]

[Footnote 222: Id. , ib. , p. 25. ]

The above must be regarded as a complete refutation of the positiontaken by _Hume_, to wit, that the idea of nature eternally existing in astate of order, without a cause other than the eternally inherent lawsof nature, is no more self-contradictory than the idea of aneternally-existing and infinite mind, who originated this order--a Godexisting without a cause. The eternal and infinite Mind is indivisibleand illimitable; nature, in its totality, as well as in its individualparts, has interior divisibility, and exterior limitability. Theinfinity of God is not a _quantitative_, but a _qualitative_ infinity. The miscalled eternity and infinity of nature is an _indefinite_extension and protension in time and space, and, as _quantitative_, mustnecessarily be limited and measurable, therefore _finite_. 

The universe of sense-perception and sensuous imagination is aphenomenal universe, a genesis, a perpetual becoming, an entrance intoexistence, and an exit thence; the Theist is, therefore, perfectlyjustified in regarding it as disqualified for _self-existence_, and inpassing behind it for the Supreme Entity that needs no cause. Phenomenademand causation, entities dispense with it. No one asks for a cause ofthe _space_ which contains the universe, or of the Eternity on the bosomof which it floats. Everywhere the line is necessarily drawn upon thesame principle; that entities _may_ have self-existence, phenomena_must_ have a cause. [223]

[Footnote 223: "Science, Nescience, and Faith, " in Martineau's "Essays, "p. 206. ]

IV. _Psychological analysis clearly attests that in the phenomena ofconsciousness there are found elements or principles which, in theirregular and normal development, transcend the limits of consciousness, and attain to the knowledge of Absolute Being, Absolute Reason, AbsoluteGood_, i. E. , GOD. 

The analysis of thought clearly reveals that the mind of man is inpossession of ideas, notions, beliefs, principles (as _e. G. _, the ideaof space, duration, cause, substance, unity, infinity), which are notderived from sensation and experience, and which can not be drawn out ofsensation and experience by any process of generalization. These ideashave this incontestable peculiarity, as distinguished from all thephenomena of sensation, that, whilst the latter are particular, contingent, and relative, the former are _universal_, _necessary_, and_absolute_. As an example, and a proof of the reality and validity ofthis distinction, take the ideas of _body_ and of _space_, the formerunquestionably derived from experience, the latter supplied by reasonalone. "I ask you, can not you conceive this book to be destroyed?Without doubt you can. And can not you conceive the whole world to bedestroyed, and no matter whatever in existence? You can. For you, constituted as you are, the supposition of the non-existence of bodiesimplies no contradiction. And what do we call the idea of a thing whichwe can conceive of as non-existing? We call it a _contingent_ and_relative_ idea. But if you can conceive this book to be destroyed, allbodies destroyed, can you suppose space to be destroyed? You can not. Itis in the power of man's thought to conceive the non-existence ofbodies; it is not in the power of man's thought to conceive thenon-existence of space. The idea of space is thus a _necessary_ and_absolute_ idea. "[224]

[Footnote 224: Cousin's "Hist. Of Philos. , " vol. Ii. P. 214. ]

Take, again, the ideas of _event_ and _cause_. The idea of an event is a_contingent_ idea; it is the idea of something which might or might nothave happened. There is no impossibility or contradiction in eithersupposition. The idea of cause is a _necessary_ idea. An event beinggiven, the idea of cause is necessarily implied. An uncaused event is animpossible conception. The idea of cause is also a _universal_ ideaextending to all events, actual or conceivable, and affirmed by allminds. It is a rational fact, attested by universal consciousness, thatwe can not think of an event transpiring without a cause; of a thingbeing the author of its own existence; of something generated by and outof nothing. _Ex nihilo nihil_ is a universal law of thought and ofthings. This universal "law of causality" is clearly distinguishablefrom a _general_ truth reached by induction. For example, it is a verygeneral truth that, during twenty-four hours, day is succeeded by night. But this is not a necessary truth, neither is it a universal truth. Itdoes not extend to all known lands, as, for example, to Nova Zembla. Itdoes not hold true of the other planets. Nor does it extend to allpossible lands. We can easily conceive of lands plunged in eternalnight, or rolling in eternal day. With another system of worlds, one canconceive other physics, but one can not conceive other metaphysics. Itis impossible to imagine a world in which the law of causality does notreign. Here, then, we have one absolute principle (among others whichmay be enumerated), the existence and reality of which is revealed, notby sensation, but by reason--a principle which transcends the limits ofexperience, and which, in its regular and logical development, attainsthe knowledge of the Absolute Cause--the First Cause of all causes--God. 

Thus it is evident that the human mind is in possession of two distinctorders of primitive cognitions, --one, contingent, relative, andphenomenal; the other universal, necessary, and absolute. These twodistinct orders of cognition presuppose the existence in man of twodistinct faculties or organs of knowledge--_sensation_, external andinternal, which perceives the contingent, relative, and phenomenal, and_reason_, which apprehends the universal, necessary, and absolute. Theknowledge which is derived from sensation and experience is called_empirical_ knowledge, or knowledge _à posteriori_, because subsequentto, and consequent upon, the exercise of the faculties of observation. The knowledge derived from reason is called _transcendental_ knowledge, or knowledge _à priori_, because it furnishes laws to, and governs theexercise of the faculties of observation and thought, and is not theresult of their exercise. The sensibility brings the mind into relationwith the _physical_ world, the reason puts mind in communication withthe _intelligible_ world--the sphere of _à priori_ principles, ofnecessary and absolute truths, which depend upon neither the world northe conscious self, and which reveal to man the existence of the soul, nature, and God. Every distinct fact of consciousness is thus at once_psychological_ and _ontological_, and contains these three fundamentalideas, which we can not go beyond, or cancel by any possibleanalysis--the _soul_, with its faculties; _matter_, with its qualities;_God_, with his perfections. 

We do not profess to be able to give a clear explication and completeenumeration of all the ideas of reason, and of the necessary anduniversal principles or axioms which are grounded on these ideas. Thisis still the grand desideratum of metaphysical science. Its achievementwill give us a primordial logic, which shall be as exact in itsprocedure and as certain in its conclusions as the mathematicalsciences. Meantime, it may be affirmed that philosophic analysis, in theperson of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and Cousin, has succeeded indisengaging such _à priori_ ideas, and formulating such principles andlaws of thought, as lead infallibly to the cognition of the _AbsoluteBeing_, the _Absolute Reason_, the _Absolute Good_, that is, GOD. 

It would carry us too far beyond our present design were we to exhibit, in each instance, the process of _immediate abstraction_ by which thecontingent and relative element of knowledge is eliminated, and thenecessary and absolute principle is disengaged. We shall simply statethe method, and show its application by a single illustration. 

There are unquestionably _two_ sorts of abstraction: 1. "_Comparative_abstraction, operating upon several real objects, and seizing theirresemblances in order to form an abstract idea, which is collective andmediate; collective, because different individuals concur in itsformation; mediate, because it requires several intermediateoperations. " This is the method of the physical sciences, whichcomprises comparison, abstraction, and generalization. The result inthis process is the attainment of a _general_ truth. 2. "_Immediate_abstraction, not comparative; operating not upon several concretes, butupon a single one, eliminating and neglecting its individual andvariable part, and disengaging the absolute part, which it raises atonce to its pure form. " The parts to be eliminated in a concretecognition are, first, the quality of the object, and the circumstancesunder which the absolute unfolds itself; and secondly, the quality ofthe subject, which perceives but does not constitute it. The phenomenaof the me and the not-me being eliminated, the absolute remains. This isthe process of rational psychology, and the result obtained is a_universal_ and _necessary_ truth. 

"Let us take, as an example, the principle of cause. To be able to saythat the event I see must have a cause, it is not indispensable to haveseen several events succeed each other. The principle which compels meto pronounce this judgment is already complete in the first as in thelast event; it can not change in respect to its object, it can notchange in itself; it neither increases nor decreases with the greater orless number of applications. The only difference that it is subject toin regard to us is that we apply it, whether we remark it or not, whether we disengage it or not from its particular application. Thequestion is not to eliminate the particularity of the phenomenon whereinit appears to us, whether it be the fall of a leaf or the murder of aman, in order immediately to conceive, in a general and abstract manner, the necessity of a cause for every event that begins to exist. Here itis not because I am the same, or have been affected in the same mannerin several different cases, that I have come to this general andabstract conception. A leaf falls; at the same moment I think, Ibelieve, I declare that this falling of the leaf must have a cause. Aman has been killed; at the same instant I believe, I proclaim that thisdeath must have a cause. Each one of these facts contains particular andvariable circumstances, and something universal and necessary, to wit, both of them can not but have a cause. Now I am perfectly able todisengage the universal from the particular in regard to the first factas well as in regard to the second fact, for the universal is in thefirst quite as well as in the second. In fact, if the principle ofcausality is not universal in the first fact, neither will it be in thesecond, nor in the third, nor in the thousandth; for a thousandth is notnearer than the first to the infinite--to absolute universality. It isthe same, and still more evidently, with _necessity_. Pay particularattention to this point; if necessity is not in the first fact, it cannot be in any; for necessity can not be formed little by little, and bysuccessive increments. If, on the first murder I see, I do not exclaimthat this murder had necessarily a cause, at the thousandth murder, although it shall be proved that all the others had causes, I shall havethe right to think that this murder has, very probably, also a cause, but I shall never have the right to say that it _necessarily_ had acause. But when universality and necessity are already in a single case, that case is sufficient to entitle me to deduce them from it, "[225] andwe may add, also, to affirm them of every other event that maytranspire. 

[Footnote 225: Cousin, "True, Beautiful, and Good, " pp. 57, 58. ]

The following _schema_ will exhibit the generally accepted results ofthis method of analysis applied to the phenomena of thought:

(i. ) _Universal and necessary principles, or primitive judgments fromwhence is derived the cognition of Absolute Being_. 

1. _The principle of Substance_; thus enounced--"every quality supposesa _subject_ or real being. "

2. _The principle of Causality_; "every thing that begins to be supposesa _power_ adequate to its production, _i. E. _, an efficient cause. "

3. _The principle of Unity_; "all differentiation and plurality supposesan incomposite unity; all diversity, an ultimate and indivisibleidentity. "

4. _The principle of the Unconditioned_; "the finite supposes theinfinite, the dependent supposes the self-existent, the temporalsupposes the eternal. "

(ii. ) _Universal and necessary principles, or primitive judgments, fromwhich is derived the cognition of the Absolute Reason_. 

1. _The principle of Ideality_; thus enounced, "facts of order--definiteproportion, symmetrical arrangement, numerical relation, geometricalform--having a commencement in time, present themselves to us as theexpression of _Ideas_, and refer us to _Mind_ as their analogon, andexponent, and source. "

2. _The principle of Consecution_; "the uniform succession andprogressive evolution of new existences, according to fixed definitearchetypes, suppose a unity of _thought_--a comprehensive _plan_embracing all existence. "

3. _The principle of Intentionality or Final Cause_; "every meanssupposes an _end_ contemplated, and a choice and adaptation of means tosecure the _end_. "

4. _The principle of Personality_; "intelligent purpose and voluntarychoice imply a personal agent. "

(iii. ) _Universal and necessary principles, or primitive judgments, fromwhence is derived the cognition of the Absolute Good_. 

1. _The principle of Moral Law_; thus enounced, "the action of avoluntary agent necessarily characterized as _right_ or _wrong_, supposes an immutable and universal standard of right--an absolute moralLaw. "

2. _The principle of Moral Obligation_; "the feeling of obligation toobey a law of duty supposes a _Lawgiver_ by whose authority we areobliged. "

3. _The principle of Moral Desert_; "the feeling of personalaccountability and of moral desert supposes a _judge_ to whom we mustgive account, and who shall determine our award. "

4. _The pnnciple of Retribution_; "retributive issues in this life, andthe existence in all minds of an impersonal justice which demands that, in the final issue, every being shall receive his just deserts, supposea being of _absolute justice_ who shall render to every man according tohis works. "

A more profound and exhaustive analysis may perhaps resolve all theseprimitive judgments into one universal principle or law, which Leibnitzhas designated "_The principle or law of sufficient reason_, " and whichis thus enounced--there must be an ultimate and sufficient reason whyany thing exists, and why it is, rather than otherwise; that is, if anything begins to be, something else must be supposed as the adequateground, and reason, and cause of its existence; or again, to state thelaw in view of our present discussion, "_if the finite universe, withits existing order and arrangement, had a beginning, there must be anultimate and sufficient reason why it exists, and why it is as it is, rather than otherwise_. " In view of one particular class of phenomena, or special order of facts, this "principle of sufficient reason" may bevaried in the form of its statement, and denominated "the principle ofsubstance, " "the principle of causality, " "the principle ofintentionality, " etc. ; and, it may be, these are but specific judgmentsunder the one fundamental and generic law of thought which constitutesthe _major_ premise of every Theistic syllogism. 

These fundamental principles, primitive judgments, axioms, or necessaryand determinate forms of thought, exist potentially or germinally in allhuman minds; they are spontaneously developed in presence of thephenomena of the universe, material and mental; they govern the originalmovement of the mind, even when not appearing in consciousness in theirpure and abstract form; and they compel us to affirm _a permanent being_or _reality_ behind all phenomena--a _power_ adequate to the productionof change, back of all events; a _personal Mind_, as the explanation ofall the facts of order, and uniform succession, and regular evolution;and a _personal Lawgiver_ and _Righteous Judge_ as the ultimate groundand reason of all the phenomena of the moral world; in short, to affirm_an Unconditioned Cause of all finite and secondary causes; a FirstPrinciple of all principles; an Ultimate Reason of all reasons; animmutable Uncreated Justice, the living light of conscience; a Kingimmortal, eternal, invisible, the only wise God, the ruler of the worldand man_. 

Our position, then, is, that the idea of God is revealed to man in thenatural and spontaneous development of his intelligence, and that theexistence of a Supreme Reality corresponding to, and represented by thisidea, is rationally and logically demonstrable, and therefore justlyentitled to take rank as part of our legitimate, valid, and positive_knowledge_. 

And now from this position, which we regard as impregnable, we shall beprepared more deliberately and intelligibly to contemplate the variousassaults which are openly or covertly made upon the doctrine that _Godis cognizable by human reason_. 

CHAPTER VI. 

THE UNKNOWN GOD (_continued_). 

IS GOD COGNIZABLE BY REASON?

"The abnegation of reason is not the evidence of faith, but theconfession of despair. "--LIGHTFOOT. 

At the outset of this inquiry we attempted a hasty grouping of thevarious parties and schools which are arrayed against the doctrine thatGod is cognizable by human reason, and in general terms we sought toindicate the ground they occupy. 

Viewed from a philosophical stand-point, we found one party marshalledunder the standard of Idealism; another of Materialism and, again, another of Natural Realism. Regarded in their theological aspects, someare positive Atheists; others, strange to say, are earnest Theists;whilst others occupy a position of mere Indifferentism. Yet, notwithstanding the remarkable diversity, and even antagonism of theirphilosophical and theological opinions, they are all agreed in denyingto reason any valid cognition of God. 

The survey of Natural Theism we have completed in the previous chapterwill enable us still further to indicate the exact points against whichtheir attacks are directed, and also to estimate the character and forceof the weapons employed. With or without design, they are, each in theirway, assailing one or other of the principles upon which we rest ourdemonstration of the being of God. As we proceed, we shall find thatMill and the Constructive Idealists are really engaged in undermining"the _principle of substance_;" their doctrine is a virtual denial ofall objective realities answering to our subjective ideas of matter, mind, and God. The assaults of Comte and the Materialists of his schoolare mainly directed against "_the principle of causality_" and "_theprinciple of intentionality_;" they would deny to man all knowledge ofcauses, efficient and final. The attacks of Hamilton and his school aredirected against "the _principle of the unconditioned_, " his philosophyof the conditioned is a plausible attempt to deprive man of all power tothink the Infinite and Perfect, to conceive the Unconditioned andUltimate Cause; whilst the Dogmatic Theologians are borrowing, andrecklessly brandishing, the weapons of all these antagonists, and, inaddition to all this, are endeavoring to show the insufficiency of "_theprinciple of unity_" and the weakness and invalidity of "the _moralprinciples_, " which are regarded by us as relating man to a MoralPersonality, and as indicating to him the existence of a righteous God, the ruler of the world. It is necessary, therefore, that we shouldconcentrate our attention yet more specifically on these separate linesof attack, and attempt a minuter examination of the positions assumed byeach, and of the arguments by which they are seeking, directly orindirectly, to invalidate the fundamental principles of Natural Theism. 

(i. ) _We commence with the Idealistic School_, of which John Stuart Millmust be regarded as the ablest living representative. 

The doctrine of this school is that all our knowledge is necessarilyconfined to _mental_ phenomena; that is, "to _feelings_ or states ofconsciousness, " and "the succession and co-existence, the likeness andunlikeness between these feelings or states of consciousness. "[226] Allour general notions, all our abstract ideas, are generated out of thesefeelings[227] by "_inseparable association_, " which registers theirinter-relations of recurrence, co-existence, and resemblance. Theresults of this inseparable association constitute at once the sum totaland the absolute limit of all possible cognition. 

[Footnote 226: J. S. Mill, "Logic, " vol. I. P. 83 (English edition). ]

[Footnote 227: In the language of Mill, every thing of which we areconscious is called "feeling. " "Feeling, in the proper sense of theterm, is a genus of which Sensation, Emotion, and Thought are thesubordinate species. "--"Logic, " bk. I. Ch. Iii. § 3. ]

It is admitted by Mill that one _apparent_ element in this total resultis the general conviction that our own existence is really distinct fromthe external world, and that the personal _ego_ has an essentialidentity distinct from the fleeting phenomena of sensation. But thispersuasion is treated by him as a mere illusion--a leap beyond theoriginal datum for which we have no authority. Of a real substance orsubstratum called Mind, of a real substance or substratum called Matter, underlying the series of feelings--"the thread of consciousness"--we doknow and can know nothing; and in affirming the existence of suchsubstrata we are making a supposition we can not possibly verify. Theultimate datum of speculative philosophy is not "_I think_, " but simply"_Thoughts or feelings are_. " The belief in a permanent subject orsubstance, called matter, as the ground and plexus of physicalphenomena, and of a permanent subject or substance, called mind, as theground and plexus of mental phenomena, is not a primitive and originalintuition οf reason. It is simply through the action of the principle ofassociation among the ultimate phenomena, called feelings, that this(erroneous) separation of the phenomena into two orders oraggregates--one called mind or self; the other matter, or notself--takes place; and without this curdling or associating process nosuch notion or belief could have been generated. "The principle ofsubstance, " as an ultimate law of thought, is, therefore, to be regardedas a transcendental dream. 

But now that the notion of _mind_ or _self_, and of _matter_ or not_self_, do exist as common convictions of our race, what is philosophyto make of them? After a great many qualifications and explanations, Mr. Mill has, in his "Logic, " summed up his doctrine of ConstructiveIdealism in the following words: "As body is the mysterious _something_which excites the mind to feel, so mind is the mysterious _something_which feels and thinks. "[228] But what is this "mysterious something?"Is it a reality, an entity, a subject; or is it a shadow, an illusion, adream? In his "Examination of Sir Wm. Hamilton's Philosophy, " where itmay be presumed, we have his maturest opinions, Mr. Mill, in still moreabstract and idealistic phraseology, attempts an answer. Here he definesmatter as "_a permanent possibility of sensation_, "[229] and mind as "_apermanent possibility of feeling_. "[230] And "the belief in thesepermanent possibilities, " he assures us, "includes all that is essentialor characteristic in the belief in substance. "[231] "If I am asked, "says he, "whether I believe in matter, I ask whether the questioneraccepts this definition of it. If he does, I believe in matter: and sodo all Berkeleians. In any other sense than this, I do not. But I affirmwith confidence that this conception of matter includes the wholemeaning attached to it by the common world, apart from philosophical, and sometimes from theological theories. The reliance of mankind on thereal existence of visible and tangible objects, means reliance on thereality and permanence of possibilities of visual and tactualsensations, when no sensations are actually experienced. "[232]"Sensations, " however, let it be borne in mind, are but a subordinatespecies of the genus feeling. [233] They are "states ofconsciousness"--phenomena of mind, not of matter; and we are stillwithin the impassable boundary of ideal phenomena; we have yet nocognition of an external world. The sole cosmical conception, for us, isstill a succession of sensations, or states of consciousness. This isthe one phenomenon which we can not transcend in knowledge, do what wewill; all else is hypothesis and illusion. The _non-ego_, after all, then, may be but a mode in which the mind represents to itself thepossible modifications of the _ego_. 

[Footnote 228: "Logic, " bk. I, ch. Iii. § 8. ]

[Footnote 229: "Examination of Sir Wm. Hamilton's Philosophy, " vol. I. P. 243. ]

[Footnote 230: Ibid. , vol. I. P. 253. ]

[Footnote 231: Ibid. , vol. I. P. 246. ]

[Footnote 232: Ibid. , vol. I. Pp. 243, 244. ]

[Footnote 233: "Logic, " bk. I. Ch. Iii. § 3. ]

And now that matter, as a real existence, has disappeared under Mr. Mill's analysis, what shall be said of mind or self? Is there anypermanent subject or real entity underlying the phenomena of feeling? Infeeling, is there a personal self that feels, thinks, and wills? Itwould seem not. Mind, as well as matter, resolves itself into a "seriesof feelings, " varying and fugitive from moment to moment, in a sea ofpossibilities of feeling. "My mind, " says Mill, "is but a series offeelings, or, as it has been called, a thread of consciousness, howeversupplemented by believed possibilities of consciousness, which are not, though they might be, realized. "[234]

[Footnote 234: "Examination of Sir Wm. Hamilton's Philosophy, " vol. I. P. 254. ]

The ultimate fact of the phenomenal world, then, in the philosophy ofMill, is neither matter nor mind, but feelings or states ofconsciousness associated together by the relations, amongst themselves, of recurrence, co-existence, and resemblance. The existence of self, except as "a series of feelings;" the existence of any thing other thanself, except as a feigned unknown cause of sensation, is rigorouslydenied. Mr. Mill does not content himself with saying that we areignorant of the _nature_ of matter and mind, but he asserts we areignorant of the _existence_ of matter and mind as real entities. 

The bearing of this doctrine of Idealism upon Theism and Theology willbe instantly apparent to the reader. If I am necessarily ignorant of theexistence of the external world, and of the personal _ego_, or realself, I must be equally ignorant of the existence of God. If one is amere supposition, an illusion, so the other must be. Mr. Mill, however, is one of those courteous and affable writers who are always conscious, as it were, of the presence of their readers, and extremely careful notto shock their feelings or prejudices; besides, he has too muchconscious self-respect to avow himself an atheist. As a speculativephilosopher, he would rather regard Theism and Theology as "openquestions, " and he satisfies himself with saying, if you believe in theexistence of God, or in Christianity, I do not interfere with you. "As atheory, " he tells us that his doctrine leaves the evidence of theexistence of God exactly as it was before. Supposing me to believe thatthe Divine mind is simply the series of the Divine thoughts and feelingsprolonged through eternity, that would be, at any rate, believing God'sexistence to be _as real as my own_[235]. And as for evidence, theargument of Paley's 'Natural Theology, ' or, for that matter, of his'Evidences of Christianity, ' would stand exactly as it does. 

The design argument is drawn from the analogies of human experience. From the relation which human works bear to human thoughts and feelings, it infers a corresponding relation between works more or less similar, but superhuman, and superhuman thoughts and feelings. _If_ it provethese, nobody but a metaphysician needs care whether or not it proves amysterious _substratum_ for them. [236] The argument from design, itseems to us, however, would have no validity if there be no externalworld offering marks of design. If the external world is only a mode offeeling, a series of mental states, then our notion of the DivineExistence may be only "an association of feelings"--a mode of Self. Andif we have no positive knowledge of a real self as existing, and God'sexistence is no more "real than our own, " then the Divine existencestands on a very dubious and uncertain foundation. It can have no verysecure hold upon the human mind, and certainly has no claim to beregarded as a fundamental and necessary belief. That it has a veryprecarious hold upon the mind of Mr. Mill, is evident from the followingpassage in his article on "_Later Speculations of A. Comte_. "[237] "Weventure to think that a religion may exist without a belief in a God, and that a religion without a God may be, even to Christians, aninstructive and profitable object of contemplation. "

And now let us close Mr. Mill's book, and, introverting our mental gaze, interrogate _consciousness_, the verdict of which, even Mr. Mill assuresus, is admitted on all hands to be a decision without appeal. [238]

[Footnote 235: "Examination of Sir Wm. Hamilton's Philosophy, " vol. I. P. 254. ]

[Footnote 236: "Examination of Sir Wm. Hamilton's Philosophy, " vol. I. P. 259. ]

[Footnote 237: Westminster Review, July, 1835 (American edition), p. 3. ]

[Footnote 238: "Examination of Sir Wm. Hamilton's Philosophy, " vol. I. P. 161. ]

1. We have an ineradicable, and, as it would seem, an intuitive faith inthe real existence of an external world distinct from our sensations, and also of a personal self, which we call "I, " "myself, " as distinctfrom "my sensations, " and "my feelings. " We find, also, that this isconfessedly the common belief of mankind. There have been a fewphilosophers who have affected to treat this belief as a "mereprejudice, " an "illusion;" but they have never been able, practically, so to regard and treat it. Their language, just as plainly as thelanguage of the common people, betrays their instinctive faith in anouter world, and proves their utter inability to emancipate themselvesfrom this "prejudice, " if such it may please them to call it. In view ofthis acknowledged fact, we ask--Does the term "_permanent possibility ofsensations_" exhaust all that is contained in this conception of anexternal world? This evening I _remember_ that at noonday I beheld thesun, and experienced a sensation of warmth whilst exposing myself to hisrays; and I _expect_ that to-morrow, under the same conditions, I shallexperience the same sensations. I now _remember_ that last evening Iextinguished my light and attempted to leave my study, but, coming incontact with the closed door, experienced a sense of resistance to mymuscular effort, by a solid and extended body exterior to myself; and I_expect_ that this evening, under the same circumstances, I shallexperience the same sensations. Now, does a belief in "a permanentpossibility of sensations" explain all these experiences? does itaccount for that immediate knowledge of an _external_ object which I hadon looking at the sun, or that presentative knowledge of _resistance_and _extension_, and of an extended, resisting _substance_, I had whenin contact with the door of my study? Mr. Mill very confidently affirmsthat this belief includes all; and this phrase expresses all the meaningattached to extended "matter" and resisting "substance" by the commonworld. [239] We as confidently affirm that it does no such thing; and as"the common world" must be supposed to understand the language ofconsciousness as well as the philosopher, we are perfectly willing toleave the decision of that question to the common consciousness of ourrace. If all men do not believe in a permanent _reality_--a substancewhich is external to themselves, a substance which offers resistance totheir muscular effort, and which produces in them the sensations ofsolidity, extension, resistance, etc. --they believe nothing and knownothing at all about the matter. 

[Footnote 239: "Examination of Sir Wm. Hamilton's Philosophy, " vol. I. P. 243. ]

Still less does the phrase "_a permanent possibility of feelings"_exhaust all our conception of a personal self. Recurring to theexperiences of yesterday, I _remember_ the feelings I experienced onbeholding the sun, and also on pressing against the closed door, and Iconfidently _expect_ the recurrence, under the same circumstances, ofthe same feelings. Does the belief in "a permanent possibility offeelings" explain the act of memory by which I recall the past event, and the act of prevision by which I anticipate the recurrence of thelike experience in the future? Who or what is the "I" that remembers andthe "I" that anticipates? The "ego, " the personal mind, is, according toMill, a mere "series of feelings, " or, more correctly, a flash of"_present_ feelings" on "a background of possibilities of presentfeelings. "[240] If, then, there be no permanent substance or realitywhich is the subject of the present feeling, which receives and retainsthe impress of the past feeling, and which anticipates the recurrence oflike feelings in the future, how can the _past_ be recalled, howdistinguished from the present? and how, without a knowledge of the pastas distinguished from the present, can the _future_ be forecast? Mr. Mill feels the pressure of this difficulty, and frankly acknowledges it. He admits that, on the hypothesis that mind is simply "a series offeelings, " the phenomena of memory and expectation are "inexplicable"and "incomprehensible. "[241] He is, therefore, under the necessity ofcompleting his definition of mind by adding that it is a series offeelings which "_is aware of itself as a series_;" and, still further, of supplementing this definition by the conjecture that "_somethingwhich has ceased to exist, or is not yet in existence, can still, in amanner, be present_. "[242] Now he who can understand how a series offeelings can flow on in time, and from moment to moment drop out of thepresent into non-existence, and yet be _present_ and _conscious ofitself as a series_, may be accorded the honor of understanding Mr. Mill's definition of mind or self, and may be permitted to rank himselfas a distinguished disciple of the Idealist school; for ourselves, weacknowledge we are destitute of the capacity to do the one, and of allambition to be the other. And he who can conceive how the _past_ feelingof yesterday and the _possible_ feeling of to-morrow can be in anymanner _present_ to-day; or, in other words, how any thing which hasceased to exist, or which never had an existence, can _now_ exist, maybe permitted to believe that a thing can be and not be at the samemoment, that a part is greater than the whole, and that two and two makefive; but we are not ashamed to confess our inability to believe acontradiction. To our understanding, "possibilities of feeling" are notactualities. They may or may not be realized, and until realized inconsciousness, they have no real being. If there be no other backgroundof mental phenomena save mere "possibilities of feeling, " then presentfeelings are the only existences, the only reality, and a loss ofimmediate consciousness, as in narcosis and coma, is the loss of allpersonality, all self-hood, and of all real being. 

[Footnote 240: "Exam. Of Hamilton, " vol. I. P. 260. ]

[Footnote 241: Ibid, p. 262. ]

[Footnote 242: Ibid. ]

2. What, then, is the verdict of consciousness as to the existence of apermanent substance, an abiding existence which is the subject of allthe varying phenomena? Of what are we really conscious when we say "Ithink, " "I feel, " "I will?" Are we simply conscious of thought, feeling, and volition, or of a self, a person, which thinks, feels, and wills?The man who honestly and unreservedly accepts the testimony ofconsciousness in all its integrity must answer at once, _we have animmediate consciousness, not merely of the phenomena of mind, but of apersonal self as passively or actively related to the phenomena_. We areconscious not merely of the act of volition, but of a self, a power, producing the volition. We are conscious not merely of feeling, but of abeing who is the subject of the feeling. We are conscious not simply ofthought, but of a real entity that thinks. "It is clearly a flatcontradiction to maintain that I am not immediately conscious of myself, but only of my sensations or volitions. Who, then, is that _I_ that isconscious, and how can I be conscious of such states as _mine?_"[243]

[Footnote 243: Mansel, "Prolegomena Logica, " p. 122, and note E, p. 281. ]

The testimony of consciousness, then, is indubitable that we have adirect, immediate cognition of _self_--I know myself as a distinctlyexisting being. This permanent self, to which I refer the earlier andlater stages of consciousness, the past as well as the present feeling, and which I know abides the same under all phenomenal changes, constitutes my personal identity. It is this abiding self which unitesthe past and the present, and, from the present stretches onward to thefuture. We know self immediately, as existing, as in active operation, and as having permanence--or, in other words, as a "_substance_. " Thisone immediately presented substance, myself, may be regarded asfurnishing a positive basis for that other notion of substance, which isrepresentatively thought, as the subject of all sensible qualities. 

3. We may now inquire what is the testimony of consciousness as to theexistence of the extra-mental world? Are we conscious of perceivingexternal objects immediately and in themselves, or only mediatelythrough some vicarious image or representative idea to which wefictitiously ascribe an objective reality?

The answer of common sense is that we are immediately conscious, inperception, of an _ego_ and a _non-ego_ known together, and known incontrast to each other; we are conscious of a perceiving subject, and ofan external reality, as the object perceived. [244] To state thisdoctrine of natural realism still more explicitly we add, that we areconscious of the immediate perception of certain essential attributes ofmatter objectively existing. Of these primary qualities, which areimmediately perceived as real and objectively existing, we mention_extension_ in space and _resistance_ to muscular effort, with which isindissolubly associated the idea of _externality_. It is true thatextension and resistance are only qualities, but it is equally true thatthey are qualities of something, and of something which is external toourselves. Let any one attempt to conceive of extension withoutsomething which is extended, or of resistance apart from something whichoffers resistance, and he will be convinced that we can never knowqualities without knowing substance, just as we can not know substancewithout knowing qualities. This, indeed, is admitted by Mr. Mill. [245]And if this be admitted, it must certainly be absurd to speak ofsubstance as something "unknown. " Substance is known just as much asquality is known, no less and no more. 

[Footnote 244: Hamilton, "Lectures, " vol. 1. P. 288. ]

[Footnote 245: "Logic, " bk. I. Ch. Iii. § 6. ]

We remark, in conclusion, that if the testimony of consciousness is notaccepted in all its integrity, we are necessarily involved in theNihilism of Hume and Fichte; the phenomena of mind and matter are, onanalysis, resolved into an absolute nothingness--"a play of phantasms ina void. "[246]

(ii. ) We turn, secondly, to the _Materialistic School_ as represented byAug. Comte. 

The doctrine of this school is that all knowledge is limited to_material_ phenomena--that is, to appearances _perceptible to sense_. Wedo not know the essence of any object, nor the real mode of procedure ofany event, but simply its relations to other events, as similar ordissimilar, co-existent or successive. These relations are constant;under the same conditions, they are always the same. The constantresemblances which link phenomena together, and the constant sequenceswhich unite them, as antecedent and consequent, are termed _laws_. Thelaws of phenomena are all we know respecting them. Their essentialnature and their ultimate causes, _efficient_ or _final_, are unknownand inscrutable to us. [247]

[Footnote 246: Masson, "Recent British Philos. , " p. 62. ]

[Footnote 247: See art. "Positive Philos. Of A. Comte, " _WestminsterReview_, April, 1865, p. 162, Am. Ed. ]

It is not our intention to review the system of philosophy propounded byAug. Comte; we are now chiefly concerned with his denial of allcausation. 

1. _As to Efficient Causes_. --Had Comte contented himself with theassertion that causes lie beyond the field of sensible observation, andthat inductive science can not carry us beyond the relations ofco-existence and succession among phenomena, he would have stated animportant truth, but certainly not a new truth. It had already beenannounced by distinguished mental philosophers, as, for example, M. DeBiran and Victor Cousin. [248] The senses give us only the succession ofone phenomenon to another. I hold a piece of wax to the fire and itmelts. Here my senses inform me of two successive phenomena--theproximity of fire and the melting of wax. It is now agreed among allschools of philosophy that this is all the knowledge the senses canpossibly supply. The observation of a great number of like cases assuresus that this relation is uniform. The highest scientific generalizationdoes not carry us one step beyond this fact. Induction, therefore, givesus no access to causes beyond phenomena. Still, this does not justifyComte in the assertion that causes are to us absolutely _unknown_. Thequestion would still arise whether we have not some faculty ofknowledge, distinct from sensation, which is adequate to furnish a validcognition of cause. It does not by any means follow that, because theidea of causation is not given as a "physical quæsitum" at the end of aprocess of scientific generalization, it should not be a "metaphysicaldatum" posited at the very beginning of scientific inquiry, as theindispensable condition of our being able to cognize phenomena at all, and as the law under which all thought, and all conception of the systemof nature, is alone possible. 

[Footnote 248: "It is now universally admitted that we have noperception of the causal nexus in the material world. "--Hamilton, "Discussions, " p. 522. ]

Now we affirm that the human mind has just as direct, immediate, andpositive knowledge of _cause_ as it has of _effect. _ The idea of cause, the intuition _power_, is given in the immediate consciousness of _mindas determining its own_ operations. Our first, and, in fact, our onlypresentation of power or cause, is that of _self as willing_. In everyact of volition I am fully conscious that it is in my power to form aresolution or to refrain from it, to determine on this course of actionor that; and this constitutes the immediate presentative knowledge ofpower. [249] The will is a power, a power in action, a productive power, and, consequently, a cause. This doctrine is stated with remarkableclearness and accuracy by Cousin: "If we seek the notion of cause in theaction of one ball upon another, as was previously done by Hume, or inthe action of the hand upon the ball, or the primary muscles upon theextremities, or even in the action of the will upon the muscles, as wasdone by M. Maine de Biran, we shall find it in none of these cases, noteven in the last; for it is possible there should be a paralysis of themuscles which deprives the will of power over them, makes itunproductive, incapable of being a cause, and, consequently, ofsuggesting the notion of one. But what no paralysis can prevent is theaction of the will upon itself, the production of a resolution; that isto say, the act of causation entirely mental, the primitive type of allcausality, of which all external movements are only symbols more or lessimperfect. The first cause for us, is, therefore, the _will_, of whichthe first effect is volition. This is at once the highest and the purestsource of the notion of cause, which thus becomes identical with that ofpersonality. And it is the taking possession, so to speak, of the cause, as revealed in will and personality, which is the condition for us ofthe ulterior or simultaneous conception of external, impersonalcauses. "[250]

[Footnote 249: "It is our _immediate consciousness of effort_, when weexert force to put matter in motion, or to oppose and neutralize force, which gives us this internal conviction of _power_ and _causation_, sofar as it refers to the material world, and compels us to believe thatwhenever we see material objects put in motion from a state of rest, ordeflected from their rectilinear paths and changed in their velocitiesif already in motion, it is in consequence of such an _effort_ somehowexerted. "--Herschel's "Outlines of Astronomy, " p. 234; see Mansel's"Prolegomena, " p. 133. ]

[Footnote 250: "Philosophical Fragments, " Preface to first edition. ]

Thus much for the origin of the idea of cause. We have the same directintuitive knowledge of cause that we have of effect; but we have not yetrendered a full and adequate account of the _principle of causality_. Wehave simply attained the notion of our personal causality, and we cannot arbitrarily substitute our personal causality for all the causes ofthe universe, and erect our own experience as a law of the entireuniverse. We have, however, already seen (Chap. V. ) that the belief inexterior causation is _necessary_ and _universal_. When a change takesplace, when a new phenomenon presents itself to our senses, we can notavoid the conviction that it must have a cause. We can not even expressin language the relations of phenomena in time and space, withoutspeaking of causes. And there is not a rational being on the face of theglobe--a child, a savage, or a philosopher--who does not instinctivelyand spontaneously affirm that every movement, every change, every newexistence, _must_ have a cause. Now what account can philosophy renderof this universal belief? One answer, and only one, is possible. The_reason_ of man (that power of which Comte takes no account) is in fixedand changeless relation to the principle of causation, just as _sense_is in fixed and changeless relation to exterior phenomena, so that wecan not know the external world, can not think or speak of phenomenalexistence, except as _effects_. In the expressive and forcible languageof Jas. Martineau: "By an irresistible law of thought _all phenomenapresent themselves to us as the expression of power_, and refer us to acausal ground whence they issue. This dynamic source we neither see, norhear, nor feel; it is given in _thought_, supplied by the spontaneousactivity of mind as the correlative prefix to the phenomenaobserved. "[251] Unless, then, we are prepared to deny the validity ofall our rational intuitions, we can not avoid accepting "this subjectivepostulate as a valid law for objective nature. " If the intuitions of ourreason are pronounced deceptive and mendacious, so also must theintuitions of the senses be pronounced illusory and false. Our wholeintellectual constitution is built up on false and erroneous principles, and all knowledge of whatever kind must perish by "the contagion ofuncertainty. "

[Footnote 251: "Essays, " p. 47. ]

Comte, however, is determined to treat the idea of causation as anillusion, whether under its psychological form, as _will_, or under itsscientific form, as _force_. He feels that Theology is inevitable if wepermit the inquiry into causes;[252] and he is more anxious thattheology should perish than that truth should prevail. The human willmust, therefore, be robbed of all semblance of freedom, lest it shouldsuggest the idea of a Supreme Will governing nature; and human action, like all other phenomena, must be reduced to uniform and necessary law. All feelings, ideas, and principles guaranteed to us by consciousnessare to be cast out of the account. Psychology, resting onself-observation, is pronounced a delusion. The immediate consciousnessof freedom is a dream. Such a procedure, to say the least of it, ishighly unphilosophical; to say the truth about it, it is obviouslydishonest. Every fact of human nature, just as much as every fact ofphysical nature, must be accepted in all its integrity, or all must bealike rejected. The phenomena of mind can no more be disregarded thanthe phenomena of matter. Rational intuitions, necessary and universalbeliefs, can no more be ignored than the uniform facts ofsense-perception, without rendering a system of knowledge necessarilyincomplete, and a system of truth utterly impossible. Every one truth isconnected with every other truth in the universe. And yet Comte demandsthat a large class of facts, the most immediate and direct of all ourcognitions, shall be rejected because they are not in harmony with thefundamental assumption of the positive philosophy that all knowledge isconfined to _phenomena perceptible to sense_. Now it were just as easyto cast the Alps into the Mediterranean as to obliterate from the humanintelligence the primary cognitions of immediate consciousness, or torelegate the human reason from the necessary laws of thought. Comtehimself can not emancipate his own mind from a belief in the validity ofthe testimony of consciousness. How can he know himself as distinct fromnature, as a living person, as the same being he was ten years ago, oreven yesterday, except by an appeal to consciousness? Despite hisearnestly-avowed opinions as to the inutility and fallaciousness of allpsychological inquiries, he is compelled to admit that "the phenomena oflife" are "_known by immediate consciousness_. "[253] Now the knowledgeof our personal freedom rests on precisely the same grounds as theknowledge of our personal existence. The same "immediate consciousness"which attests that I exist, attests also, with equal distinctness anddirectness, that I am self-determined and free. 

[Footnote 252: "The _inevitable tendency_ of our intelligence is towardsa philosophy radically theological, so often as we seek to penetrate, onwhatever pretext, into the intimate nature of phenomena" (vol. Iv. P. 664). ]

[Footnote 253: "Positive Philos, " vol. Ii. P. 648. ]

In common with most atheistical writers, Comte is involved in the fatalcontradiction of at one time assuming, and at another of denying thefreedom of the will, to serve the exigencies of his theory. To provethat the order of the universe can not be the product of a SupremeIntelligence, he assumes that the products of mind must be characterizedby freedom and variety--the phenomena of mind must not be subject touniform and necessary laws; and inasmuch as the phenomena presented byexternal nature are subject to uniform and changeless laws, they can notbe the product of mind. "Look at the whole frame of things, " says he;"how can it be the product of mind--of a supernatural Will? Is it notsubject to regular laws, and do we not actually obtain _prevision_ ofits phenomena? If it were the product of mind, its order would bevariable and free. " Here, then, it is admitted that _freedom is anessential characteristic of mind_. And this admission is no doubt athoughtless, unconscious betrayal of the innate belief of all minds inthe freedom of the will. But when Comte comes to deal with this freedomas an objective question of philosophy, when he directs his attention tothe only will of which we have a direct and immediate knowledge, hedenies freedom and variety, and asserts in the most arbitrary mannerthat the movements of the mind, like all the phenomena of nature, mustbe subject to uniform, changeless, and necessary laws. And if we havenot yet been able to reduce the movements of mind, like the movements ofthe planets, to statistics, and have not already obtained accurateprevision of its successions or sequences as we have of physicalphenomena, it is simply the consequence of our inattention to, orignorance of, all the facts. We answer, there are no facts so directlyand intuitively known as the facts of consciousness; and, therefore, anargument based upon our supposed ignorance of these facts is not likelyto have much weight against our immediate consciousness of personalfreedom. There is not any thing we know so immediately, so certainly, sopositively, as this fact--_we are free_. 

The word "force, " representing as it does a subtile menial conception, and not a phenomenon of sense, must also be banished from the domains ofPositive Science as an intruder, lest its presence should lend anycountenance to the idea of causation. "Forces in mechanics are only_movements_, produced, or tending to be produced. " In order to "cancelaltogether the old metaphysical notion of force, " another form ofexpression is demanded. It is claimed that all we do know or canpossibly know is the successions of phenomena in time. What, then, isthe term which henceforth, in our dynamics, shall take the place of"force?" Is it "Time-succession?" Then let any one attempt to expressthe various forms and intensities of movement and change presented tothe senses (as _e. G. _, the phenomena of heat, electricity, galvanism, magnetism, muscular and nervous action, etc. ) in terms ofTime-succession, and he will at once become conscious of the utterhopelessness of physics, without the hyperphysical idea of force, torender itself intelligible. [254] What account can be rendered ofplanetary motion if the terms "centrifugal force" and "centripetalforce" are abandoned? "From the two great conditions of every Newtoniansolution, viz. , projectile impulse and centripetal tendency, eject theidea of _force_, and what remains? The entire conception is simply madeup of this, and has not the faintest existence without it. It is uselessto give it notice to quit, and pretend that it is gone when you haveonly put a new name upon the door. We must not call it 'attraction, 'lest there should seem to be a _power_ within; we are to speak of itonly as 'gravitation, ' because that is only 'weight, ' which is nothingbut a 'fact, ' as if it were not a fact that holds a power, a truedynamic affair, which no imagination can chop into incoherentsuccessions. [255] Nor is the evasion more successful when we try thephrase, 'tendency of bodies to mutual approach. ' The approach itself maybe called a phenomenon; but the 'tendency' is no phenomenon, and can notbe attributed by us to the bodies without regarding them as theresidence of force. And what are we to say of the _projectile impulse_in the case of the planets? Is that also a phenomenon? Who witnessed andreported it? Is it not evident that the whole scheme of physicalastronomy is a resolution of observed facts into dynamic equivalents, and that the hypothesis posits for its calculations not phenomena, butproper forces? Its logic is this: _If_ an impulse of certain intensitywere given, and _if_ such and such mutual attractions were constantlypresent, then the sort of motions which we observe in the bodies of oursystem _would follow_. So, however, they also would _if_ willed by anOmnipotent Intelligence. "[256] It is thus clearly evident that humanscience is unable to offer any explanation of the existing order of theuniverse except in terms expressive of Power or Force; that, in fact, all explanations are utterly unintelligible without the idea ofcausation. The language of universal rational intuition is, "allphenomena are the expression of power;" the language of science is, "every law implies a force. "

[Footnote 254: See Grote's "Essay on Correlation of Physical Forces, "pp. 18-20; and Martineau's "Essays, " p. 135. ]

[Footnote 255: "Gravity is a real _power_ of whose agency we have dailyexperience. "--Herschel, "Outlines of Astronomy, " p. 236. ]

[Footnote 256: Martineau's "Essays, " p. 56. ]

It is furthermore worthy of being noted that, in the modern doctrine ofthe Correlation and Conservation of Forces, science is inevitablyapproaching the idea that all kinds of force are but forms ormanifestations of some _one_ central force issuing from some _one_fountain-head of power. Dr. Carpenter, perhaps the greatest livingphysiologist, teaches that "the form of force _which may be taken as thetype of all the rest_" is the consciousness of living effort involition. [257] All force, then, is of one type, and that type is mind;in its last analysis external causation may be resolved into Divineenergy. Sir John Herschel does not hesitate to say that "it isreasonable to regard the force of gravitation as the direct or indirectresult of a consciousness or will exerted somewhere. "[258] The humbleChristian may, therefore, feel himself amply justified in stillbelieving that "power belongs to God;" that it is through the Divineenergy "all things are, and are upheld;" and that "in God we live, andmove, and have our being;" he is the Great First Cause, theFountain-head of all power. 

[Footnote 257: "Human Physiology, " p. 542. ]

[Footnote 258: "Outlines of Astronomy, " p. 234. ]

2. _As to Final Causes_--that is, reasons, purposes, or ends _for_ whichthings exist--these, we are told by Comte, are all "disproved" byPositive Science, which rigidly limits us to "the history of _what is_, "and forbids all inquiry into reasons _why it is_. The question whetherthere be any intelligent purpose in the order and arrangement of theuniverse, is not a subject of scientific inquiry at all; and whenever ithas been permitted to obtrude itself, it has thrown a false light overthe facts, and led the inquirer astray. 

The discoveries of modern astronomy are specially instanced by Comte ascompletely overthrowing the notion of any conscious design orintelligent purpose in the universe. The order and stability of thesolar system are found to be the _necessary_ consequences ofgravitation, and are adequately explained without any reference topurposes or ends to be fulfilled in the disposition and arrangement ofthe heavenly bodies. "With persons unused to the study of the celestialbodies, though very likely informed on other parts of naturalphilosophy, astronomy has still the reputation of being a scienceeminently religious, as if the famous words, 'The heavens declare theglory of God, had lost none of their truth. .. No science has given moreterrible shocks to the doctrine of _final causes_ than astronomy. [259]The simple knowledge of the movement of the earth must have destroyedthe original and real foundation of this doctrine--the idea of theuniverse subordinated to the earth, and consequently to man. Besides, the accurate exploration of the solar system could not fail to dispelthat blind and unlimited admiration which the general order of natureinspires, by showing in the most sensible manner, and in a great numberof different respects, that the orbs were certainly not disposed in themost advantageous manner, and that science permits us easily to conceivea better arrangement, by the development of true celestial mechanism, since Newton. All the theological philosophy, even the most perfect, hasbeen henceforth deprived of its principal intellectual function, themost regular order being thus consigned as necessarily established andmaintained in our world, and even in the whole universe, _by the simplemutual gravity of its several parts_. "[260]

The task of "conceiving a better arrangement" of the celestial orbs, andimproving the system of the universe generally, we shall leave to thosewho imagine themselves possessed of that omniscience which comprehendsall the facts and relations of the actual universe, and foreknows allthe details and relations of all possible universes so accurately as tobe able to pronounce upon their relative "advantages. " The arrogance ofthese critics is certainly in startling and ludicrous contrast with theaffected modesty which, on other occasions, restrains them from"imputing any intentions to nature. " It is quite enough for our purposeto know that the tracing of evidences of _design_ in those parts ofnature accessible to our observation is an essentially different thingfrom the construction of a scheme of _optimism_ on _à priori_ groundswhich shall embrace a universe the larger portion of which is virtuallybeyond the field of observation. We are conscious of possessing somerational data and some mental equipment for the former task, but for thelatter we feel utterly incompetent. [261]

[Footnote 259: In a foot-note Comte adds: "Nowadays, to mindsfamiliarized betimes with the true astronomical philosophy, the heavensdeclare no other glory than that of Hipparchus, Kepler, Newton, and allthose who have contributed to the ascertainment of their laws. " It seemsremarkable that the great men who _ascertained_ these laws did not seethat the saying of the Psalmist was emptied of all meaning by theirdiscoveries. No persons seem to have been more willing than these verymen named to ascribe all the glory to Him who _established_ these laws. Kepler says: "The astronomer, to whom God has given to see more clearlywith his inward eye, from what he has discovered, both can and willglorify God;" and Newton says: "This beautiful system of sun, planets, comets could have its origin in no other way than by the purpose andcommand of an intelligent and powerful Being. We admire him on accountof his perfections, we venerate and worship him on account of hisgovernment. "--Whewell's "Astronomy and Physics, " pp. 197, 198. ]

[Footnote 260: "Positive Philosophy, " vol. Ii. Pp. 36-38; Tulloch, "Theism, " p. 115. ]

[Footnote 261: Chalmers's "Institutes of Theology, " vol. I. Pp. 117, 118. ]

The only plausible argument in the above quotation from Comte is, thatthe whole phenomena of the solar system are adequately explained by thelaw of gravitation, without the intervention of any intelligent purpose. Let it be borne in mind that it is a fundamental principle of thePositive philosophy that all human knowledge is necessarily confined tophenomena _perceptible to sense_, and that the fast and highestachievement of human science is to observe and record "the invariablerelations of resemblance and succession among phenomena. " We can notpossibly know any thing of even the existence of "causes" or "forces"lying back of phenomena, nor of "reasons" or "purposes" determining therelations of phenomena. The "law of gravitation" must, therefore, besimply the statement of a fact, the expression of an observed order ofphenomena. But the simple statement of a fact is no _explanation_ of thefact. The formal expression of an observed order of succession amongphenomena is no _explanation_ of that order. For what do we mean by anexplanation? Is it not a "making plain" to the understanding? It is, inshort, a complete answer to the questions _how_ is it so? and _why_ isit so? Now, if Comte denies to himself and to us all knowledge ofefficient and final causation, if we are in utter ignorance of "forces"operating in nature, and of "reasons" for which things exist in nature, he can not answer either question, and consequently nothing isexplained. 

Practically, however, Comte regards gravitation as a force. The order ofthe solar system has been established and is still maintained by themutual gravity of its several parts. We shall not stop here to note theinconsistency of his denying to us the knowledge of, even the existenceof, force, and yet at the same time assuming to treat gravitation as aforce really adequate to the explanation of the _how_ and _why_ of thephenomena of the universe, without any reference to a supernatural willor an intelligent mind. The question with which we are immediatelyconcerned is whether gravitation _alone_ is adequate to the explanationof the phenomena of the heavens? A review _in extenso_ of Comte's answerto this question would lead us into all the inextricable mazes of thenebular hypothesis, and involve us in a more extended discussion thanour space permits and our limited scientific knowledge justifies. Forthe masses of the people the whole question of cosmical developmentresolves itself into "a balancing of authorities;" they are not in aposition to verify the reasonings for and against this theory by actualobservation of astral phenomena, and the application of mathematicalcalculus; they are, therefore, guided by balancing in their own mindsthe statements of the distinguished astronomers who, by the unitedsuffrages of the scientific world, are regarded as "authorities. " Forus, at present, it is enough that the nebular hypothesis is rejected bysome of the greatest astronomers that have lived. We need only mentionthe names of Sir William Herschel, Sir John Herschel, Prof. Nichol, EarlRosse, Sir David Brewster, and Prof. Whewell. 

But if we grant that the nebular hypothesis is entitled to take rank asan established theory of the development of the solar system, it by nomeans proves that the solar system was formed without the interventionof intelligence and design. On this point we shall content ourselveswith quoting the words of one whose encyclopædian knowledge wasconfessedly equal to that of Comte, and who in candor and accuracy wascertainly his superior. Prof. Whewell, in his "Astronomy and Physics, "says: "This hypothesis by no means proves that the solar system wasformed without the intervention of intelligence and design. It onlytransfers our view of the skill exercised and the means employed toanother part of the work; for how came the sun and its atmosphere tohave such materials, such motions, such a constitution, and theseconsequences followed from their primordial condition? How came theparent vapor thus to be capable of coherence, separation, contraction, solidification? How came the laws of its motion, attraction, repulsion, condensation, to be so fixed as to lead to a beautiful and harmonioussystem in the end? How came it to be neither too fluid nor tootenacious, to contract neither too quickly nor too slowly for thesuccessive formation of the several planetary bodies? How came thatsubstance, which at one time was a luminous vapor, to be at a subsequentperiod solids and fluids of many various kinds? What but design andintelligence prepared and tempered this previously-existing element, sothat it should, by its natural changes, produce such an orderlysystem"?[262] "_The laws of motion alone will not produce the regularitywhich we admire in the motion of the heavenly bodies_. There must be anoriginal adjustment of the system on which these laws are to act; aselection of the arbitrary quantities which they are to involve; aprimitive cause which shall dispose the elements in due relation to eachother, in order that regular recurrence may accompany constant change, and that perpetual motion may be combined with perpetualstability. "[263]

[Footnote 262: "Astronomy and Physics, " p. 109. ]

[Footnote 263: Chalmers's "Institutes of Theology, " vol. I. P. 119. ]

The harmony of the solar system in all its phenomena does not dependupon the operation of any _one_ law, but from the special adjustment ofseveral laws. There are certain agents operating throughout the entiresystem which have different properties, and which require specialadjustment to each other, in order to their beneficial operation. 1st. There is _Gravitation, _ prevailing apparently through all space. But itdoes not prevail alone. It is a force whose function is to balance otherforces of which we know little, except that these, again, are needed tobalance the force of gravitation. Each force, if left to itself, wouldbe the destruction of the universe. Were it not for the force ofgravitation, the centrifugal forces which impel the planets would flingthem off into space. Were it not for these centrifugal forces, the forceof gravitation would dash them against the sun. The ultimate fact ofastronomical science, therefore, is not the law of gravitation, but the_adjustment_ between this law and other laws, so as to produce andmaintain the existing order. [264] 2d. There is _Light_, flowing fromnumberless luminaries; and _Heat_, radiating everywhere from the warmerto the colder regions; and there are a number of adjustments needed inorder to the beneficial operation of these agents. Suppose we grant thatby merely mechanical causes the sun became the centre of our system, howdid it become also the _source of its vivifying influences_? "How wasthe fire deposited on this hearth? How was the candle placed on thiscandlestick?" 3d. There is an all-pervading _Ether_, through which lightis transmitted, which offers resistance to the movement of the planetaryand cometary bodies, and tends to a dissipation of mechanical energy, and which needs to be counter-balanced by well-adjusted arrangements tosecure the stability of the solar system. All this balancing of oppositeproperties and forces carries our minds upward towards Him who holds thebalances in his hands, and to a Supreme Intelligence on whoseadjustments and collocations the harmony and stability of the universedepends. [265]

[Footnote 264: Duke of Argyll, "Reign of Law, " pp. 91, 92. ]

[Footnote 265: M'Cosh, "Typical Forms and Special Ends, " ch. Xiii. ]

The recognition of all teleology of organs in vegetable and animalphysiology is also persistently repudiated by this school. When Cuvierspeaks of the combination of organs in such order as to adapt the animalto the part which it has to play in nature, Geoffroy Saint Hilairereplies, "I know nothing of animals which have to play a part innature. " "I have read, concerning fishes, that, because they live in amedium which resists more than air, their motive forces are calculatedso as to give them the power of progression under these circumstances. By this mode of reasoning, you would say of a man who makes use ofcrutches, that he was originally destined to the misfortune of having aleg paralyzed or amputated. [266] "With a modesty which savors ofaffectation, he says, "I ascribe no intentions to God, for I mistrustthe feeble powers of my reason. I observe facts merely, and go nofarther. I only pretend to the character of the historian of _what is_. ""I can not make Nature an intelligent being who does nothing in vain, who acts by the shortest mode, who does all for the best. "[267] All thesupposed consorting of means to ends which has hitherto been regarded asevidencing Intelligence is simply the result of "the elective affinitiesof organic elements" and "the differentiation of organs" consequentmainly upon exterior conditions. "_Functions are a result, not an end_. The animal undergoes the kind of life that his organs impose, andsubmits to the imperfections of his organization. The naturalist studiesthe play of his apparatus, and if he has the right of admiring most ofits parts, he has likewise that of showing the imperfection of otherparts, and the practical uselessness of those which fulfill nofunctions. "[268] And it is further claimed that there are a great manystructures which are clearly useless; that is, they fulfill no purposeat all. Thus there are monkeys, which have no thumbs for use, but onlyrudimental thumb-bones hid beneath the skin; the wingless bird of NewZealand (Apteryx) has wing-bones similarly developed, which serve nopurpose; young whalebone whales are born with teeth that never cut thegums, and are afterwards absorbed; and some sheep have horns turnedabout their ears which fulfill no end. And inasmuch as there are someorganisms in nature which serve no purpose of utility, it is arguedthere is no design in nature; things are _used_ because there areantecedent conditions favorable for _use_, but that use is not the _end_for which the organ exists. The true naturalist will never say, "Birdshave wings given them _in order_ to fly;" he will rather say, "Birds fly_because_ they have wings. " The doctrine of final causes must, therefore, be abandoned. 

[Footnote 266: Whewell, "History of Inductive Sciences, " vol. Ii. P. 486. ]

[Footnote 267: Id. , ib. , vol. Ii. P. 490. ]

[Footnote 268: Martin's "Organic Unity in Animals and Vegetables, " in M. Q. Review, January, 1863. ]

It is hardly worth while to reply to the lame argument of Geoffroy, which needs a "crutch" for its support. The very illustration, undignified and irrelevant as it is, tells altogether against itsauthor. For, first, the crutch is certainly a _contrivance_ designed forlocomotion; secondly, the length and strength and lightness of thecrutch are all matters of calculation and _adjustment_; and, thirdly, all the adaptations of the crutch are well-considered, in order toenable the lame man to walk; the function of the crutch is the finalcause of its creation. This crutch is clearly out of place in Geoffroy'sargument, and utterly breaks down. It is in its place in theteleological argument, and stands well, though it may not behave as wellas the living limb. The understanding of a child can perceive that thedesign-argument does not assert that men were intended to have amputatedlimbs, but that crutches are designed for those whose limbs areparalyzed or amputated. 

The existence of useless members, of rudimentary and abortive limbs, does seem, at first sight, to be unfavorable to the idea of supremacy ofpurpose and all-pervading design. It should be remarked, however, thatthis is an argument based upon our ignorance, and not upon ourknowledge. It does not by any means follow that because we havediscovered no reasons for their existence, therefore there are noreasons. Science, in enlarging its conquests of nature, is perpetuallydiscovering the usefulness of arrangements of which our fathers wereignorant, and the reasons of things which to their minds, wereconcealed; and it ill becomes the men who so far "mistrust their ownfeeble powers" as to be afraid of ascribing any intention to God ornature, to dogmatically affirm there is no purpose in the existence ofany thing. And then we may ask, what right have these men to set up theidea of "utility" as the only standard to which the Creator mustconform? How came they to know that God is a mere "utilitarian;" or, ifthey do not believe in God, that nature is a miserable "Benthamite?" Whymay not the idea of beauty, of symmetry, of order, be a standard for theuniverse, as much as the idea of utility, or mere subordination to somepractical end? May not conformity to one grand and comprehensive plan, sweeping over all nature, be perfectly compatible with the adaptation ofindividual existences to the fulfillment of special ends? In civilarchitecture we have conformity to a general plan; we have embellishmentand ornament, and we have adaptation to a special purpose, all combined;why may not these all be combined in the architecture of the universe?The presence of any one of these is sufficient to prove design, for mereornament or beauty is itself a purpose, an object, and an end. Theconcurrence of all these is an overwhelming evidence of design. Whereverfound, they are universally recognized as the product of intelligence;they address themselves at once to the intelligence of man, and theyplace him in immediate relation to and in deepest sympathy with theIntelligence which gave them birth. He that formed the eye of man tosee, and the heart of man to admire beauty, shall He not delight in it?He that gave the hand of man its cunning to create beauty, shall He nothimself work for it? And if man can and does combine both "ornament" and"use" in one and the same implement or machine, why should not theCreator of the world do the same? "When the savage carves the handle ofhis war-club, the immediate purpose of his carving is to give his ownhand a firmer hold. But any shapeless scratches would be enough forthis. When he carves it in an elaborate pattern, he does so for the loveof ornament, and to satisfy the sense of beauty. " And so "the harmonies, on which all beauty depends, are so connected in nature that _use_ and_ornament_ may often both arise out of the same conditions. "[269]

[Footnote 269: Duke of Argyll, "Reign of Law, " p. 203. ]

The "true naturalist, " therefore, recognizes two great principlespervading the universe--_a principle of order_--a unity of plan, and _aprinciple of special adaptation_, by which each object, thoughconstructed upon a general plan, is at the same time accommodated to theplace it has to occupy and the purpose it has to serve. In other words, there is _homology of structure_ and _analogy of function_, conformityto _archetypal forms_ and _Teleology of organs_, in wonderfulcombination. Now, in the Materialistic school, it has been the prevalentpractice to set up the unity of plan in animal structures, in oppositionto the principle of Final Causes: Morphology has been opposed toTeleology. But in nature there is no such opposition; on the contrary, there is a beautiful co-ordination. The same bones, in differentanimals, are made subservient to the widest possible diversity offunctions. The same limbs are converted into fins, paddles, wings, legs, and arms. "No comparative anatomist has the slightest hesitation inadmitting that the pectoral fin of a fish, the wing of a bird, thepaddle of the dolphin, the fore-leg of a deer, the wing of a bat, andthe arm of a man, are the same organs, notwithstanding that their formsare so varied, and the uses to which they are applied so unlike eachother. "[270] All these are homologous in structure--they are formedafter an ideal archetype or model, but that model or type is variouslymodified to adapt the animal to the sphere of life in which it isdestined to move, and the organ itself to the functions it has toperform, whether swimming, flying, walking, or burrowing, or that variedmanipulation of which the human hand is capable. These variedmodifications of the vertebrated type, for special purposes, areunmistakable examples of final causation. Whilst the silent members, therudimental limbs instanced by Oken, Martins, and others--as fulfillingno purpose, and serving no end, exist in conformity to an idealarchetype on which the bony skeletons of all vertebrated animals areformed, [271] and which has never been departed from since time began. This type, or model, or plan, is, however, itself an evidence of_design_ as much as the plan of a house. For to what standard are wereferring when we say that two limbs are morphologically the same? Is itnot an _ideal_ plan, a _mental_ pattern, a metaphysical conception? Nowan _ideal_ implies a mind which preconceived the idea, and in whichalone it really exists. It is only as "an _order of Divine thought_"that the doctrine of animal homologies is at all intelligible; andHomology is, therefore, the science which traces the outward embodimentof a Divine Idea. [272] The principle of intentionality or finalcausation, then, is not in any sense invalidated by the discovery of "aunity of plan" sweeping through the entire universe. 

[Footnote 270: Carpenter's "Comparative Physiology, " p. 37. ]

[Footnote 271: Agassiz, "Essay on Classification, " p. 10. ]

[Footnote 272: Whewell's "History of Inductive Sciences, " vol. I. P. 644; "The Reign of Law, " p. 208; Agassiz, "Essay on Classification, " pp. 9-11. ]

We conclude that we are justly entitled to regard "the principle ofintentionality" as a primary and necessary law of thought, under whichwe can not avoid conceiving and describing the facts of theuniverse--_the special adaptation of means to ends necessarily impliesmind_. Whenever and wherever we observe the adaptation of an organism tothe fulfillment of a special end, we can not avoid conceiving of that_end_ as foreseen and premeditated, the _means_ as selected and adjustedwith a view to that end, and creative energy put forth to secure theend--all which is the work of intelligence and will. [273] And we can notdescribe these facts of nature, so as to render that accountintelligible to other minds, without using such terms as "contrivance, ""purpose, " "adaptation, " "design. " A striking illustration of this maybe found in Darwin's volume "On the Fertilization of Orchids. " We selectfrom his volume with all the more pleasure because he is one of thewriters who enjoins "caution in ascribing intentions to nature. " In onesentence he says: "The _Labellum_ is developed into a long nectary, _inorder_ to attract _Lepidoptera_; and we shall presently give reasons forsuspecting the nectar is _purposely_ so lodged that it can be suckedonly slowly, _in order_ to give time for the curious chemical quality ofthe viscid matter settling hard and dry" (p. 29). Of one particularstructure he says: "This _contrivance_ of the guiding ridges may becompared to the little instrument sometimes used for guiding a threadinto the eye of a needle. " The notion that every organism has a use orpurpose seems to have guided him in his discoveries. "The strangeposition of the _Labellum_, perched on the summit of the column, oughtto have shown me that here was the place for experiment. I ought to havescorned the notion that the _Labellum_ was thus placed _for no goodpurpose_. I neglected this plain guide, and for a long time completelyfailed to understand the flower" (p. 262). [274]

[Footnote 273: Carpenter's "Principles of Comparative Physiology, " p. 723. ]

[Footnote 274: Edinburgh Review, October, 1862; article, "TheSupernatural. "]

So that the assumption of final causes has not, as Bacon affirms, "ledmen astray" and "prejudiced further discovery;" on the contrary, it hashad a large share in every discovery in anatomy and physiology, zoologyand botany. The use of every organ has been discovered by starting fromthe assumption _that it must have some use_. The belief in a creativepurpose led Harvey to discover the circulation of the blood. He says:"When I took notice that the valves in the veins of so many parts of thebody were so placed that they gave a free passage to the blood towardsthe heart, but opposed the passage of the venal blood the contrary way, I was incited to imagine that so provident a cause as Nature has notplaced so many valves _without design_, and no design seemed moreprobable than the circulation of the blood. "[275] The wonderfuldiscoveries in Zoology which have immortalized the name of Cuvier weremade under the guidance of this principle. He proceeds on thesupposition not only that animal forms have _some_ plan, _some_ purpose, but that they have an intelligible plan, a discoverable purpose. At theoutset of his "_Règne Animal_" he says: "Zoology has a principle ofreasoning which is peculiar to it, and which it employs to advantage onmany occasions; that is, the principle of the conditions of existence, commonly called final causes. "[276] The application of this principleenabled him to understand and arrange the structures of animals withastonishing clearness and completeness of order; and to restore theforms of extinct animals which are found in the rocks, in a manner whichexcited universal admiration, and has commanded universal assent. Indeed, as Professor Whewell remarks, at the conclusion of his "Historyof the Inductive Sciences, " "those who have been discoverers in sciencehave generally had minds, the disposition of which was to believe in an_intelligent Maker_ of the universe, and that the scientificspeculations which produced an opposite tendency were generally thosewhich, though they might deal familiarly with known physical truths, andconjecture boldly with regard to unknown, do not add to the number ofsolid generalizations. "[277]

[Footnote 275: "History of Inductive Science, " vol. Ii. P. 449. ]

[Footnote 276: "History of Inductive Science, " vol. Ii. P. 2, Eng. Ed. ]

[Footnote 277: Ibid. , vol. Ii. P. 491. A list of the "great discoverers"is given in his "Astronomy and Physics, " bk. Iii. Ch. V. ]

CHAPTER VII. 

THE UNKNOWN GOD (_continued_). 

IS GOD COGNIZABLE BY REASON? (_continued_). 

 "The faith which can not stand unless buttressed by contradictions is built upon the sand. The profoundest faith is faith in the unity of truth. If there is found any conflict in the results of a right reason, no appeal to practical interests, or traditionary authority, or intuitional or theological faith, can stay the flood of skepticism. "--ABBOT. 

In the previous chapter we have considered the answers to this questionwhich are given by the Idealistic and Materialistic schools; it devolvesupon us now to review (iii. ) the position of the school of _NaturalRealism_ or _Natural Dualism_, at the head of which stands Sir WilliamHamilton. 

It is admitted by this school that philosophic knowledge is "theknowledge of effects as dependent on their causes, "[278] and "ofqualities as inherent in substances. "[279]

[Footnote 278: "Lectures on Metaphysics, " vol. I. P. 58. ]

[Footnote 279: Ibid. , vol. I. P. 138. ]

1. _As to Events and Causes_. --"Events do not occur isolated, apart, bythemselves; they occur and are conceived by us only in connection. Ourobservation affords us no example of a phenomenon which is not aneffect; nay, our thought can not even realize to itself the possibilityof a phenomenon without a cause. By the necessity we are under ofthinking some cause for every phenomenon, and by our original ignoranceof what particular causes belong to what particular effects, it isrendered impossible for us to acquiesce in the mere knowledge of thefact of the phenomenon; on the contrary, we are determined, we arenecessitated to regard each phenomenon as _only partially known until wediscover the causes_ on which it depends for its existence. [280]Philosophic knowledge is thus, in its widest acceptation, the knowledgeof effects as dependent on causes. Now what does this imply? In thefirst place, as every cause to which we can ascend is only an effect, itfollows that it is the scope, that is, the aim, of philosophy to traceup the series of effects and causes until we arrive at _causes which arenot in themselves effects_, "[281]--that is, to ultimate and finalcauses. And then, finally, "Philosophy, as the knowledge of effects intheir causes, necessarily tends, not towards a plurality of ultimate orfinal causes, but towards _one_ alone. "[282]

[Footnote 280: Ibid. , vol. I. P. 56. ]

[Footnote 281: "Lectures on Metaphysics, " vol. I. P. 58. ]

[Footnote 282: Ibid. , vol. I. P. 60. ]

2. _As to Qualities and Substance, or Phenomena and Reality_. --Asphenomena appear only in conjunction, we are compelled, by theconstitution of our nature, to think them conjoined in and by something;and as they are phenomena, we can not think them phenomena of nothing, but must regard them as properties or qualities of something. [283] Nowthat which manifests its qualities--in other words, that in which theappearing causes inhere, that to which they belong--is called their_subject_, or _substance_, or _substratum_. [284] The subject of onegrand series of phenomena (as, _e. G. _, extension, solidity, figure, etc. ) is called _matter_, or _material substance_. The subject of theother grand series of phenomena (as, _e. G. _, thought, feeling, volition, etc. ) is termed _mind_, or _mental substance_. We may, therefore, lay itdown as an undisputed truth that consciousness gives, as an ultimatefact, a primitive duality--a knowledge of the _ego_ in relation andcontrast to the _non-ego_, and a knowledge of the _non-ego_ in relationand contrast to the _ego_[285] Natural Dualism thus establishes theexistence of two worlds of _mind_ and _matter_ on the immediateknowledge we possess of both series of phenomena; whilst the CosmotheticIdealists discredit the veracity of consciousness as to our immediateknowledge of material phenomena, and, consequently, our _immediateknowledge of the existence of matter_. [286]

[Footnote 283: Ibid. , vol. I. P. 137. ]

[Footnote 284: Ibid. , vol. I. P. 137. ]

[Footnote 285: Ibid. , vol. I. P. 292. ]

[Footnote 286: Ibid. , vol. I. Pp. 292, 295. ]

The obvious doctrine of the above quotations is, that we have animmediate knowledge of the "_existence_ of matter" as well as of "the_phenomena_ of matter;" that is, we know "_substance_" as immediatelyand directly as we know "_qualities_. " Phenomena are known only asinherent in substance; substance is known only as manifesting itsqualities. We never know qualities without knowing substance, and we cannever know substance without knowing qualities. Both are known in oneconcrete act; substance is known quite as much as quality; quality isknown no more than substance. That we have a direct, immediate, presentative "face to face" knowledge of matter and mind in every act ofconsciousness is asserted again and again by Hamilton, in his"Philosophy of Perception. "[287] In the course of the discussion hestarts the question, "_Is the knowledge of mind and matter equallyimmediate?_" His answer to this question may be condensed in thefollowing sentences. In regard to the immediate knowledge of _mind_there is no difficulty; it is admitted to be direct and immediate. Theproblem, therefore, exclusively regards the intuitive perception of thequalities of _matter_. Now, says Hamilton, "if we interrogateconsciousness concerning the point in question, the response iscategorical and clear. In the simplest act of perception I am consciousof _myself_ as a perceiving _subject_, and of an external _reality_ asthe object perceived; and I am conscious of both existences in the sameindivisible amount of intuition. "[288] Again he says, "I have frequentlyasserted that in perception we are conscious of the external object, immediately and _in itself_. " "If, then, the veracity of consciousnessbe unconditionally admitted--_if the intuitive knowledge of matter andmind_, and the consequent reality of their antithesis, be taken astruths, " the doctrine of Natural Realism is established, and, "withoutany hypothesis or demonstration, the _reality of mind_ and the _realityof matter_. "[289]

[Footnote 287: Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton, part ii. ]

[Footnote 288: Ibid. , p. 181. ]

[Footnote 289: Ibid. , pp. 34, 182. ]

Now, after these explicit statements that we have an intuitive knowledgeof matter and mind--a direct and immediate consciousness of self as areal, "self-subsisting entity, " and a knowledge of "an external reality, immediately and _in itself_, " it seems unaccountably strange thatHamilton should assert "_that all human knowledge, consequently allhuman philosophy, is only of the Relative or Phenomenal_;"[290] and that"_of existence absolutely and in itself we know nothing_. "[291] Whilstteaching that the proper sphere and aim of philosophy is to tracesecondary causes up to ultimate or first causes, and that it_necessarily tends_ towards one First and Ultimate Cause, he at the sametime asserts that "first causes do not lie within the reach ofphilosophy, "[292] and that it can never attain to the knowledge of theFirst Cause. [293] "The Infinite God can not, by us, be comprehended, conceived, or thought. "[294] God, as First Cause, as infinite, asunconditioned, as eternal, is to us absolutely "_The Unknown_. " Thescience of Real Being--of Being _in se_--of self-subsisting entities, isdeclared to be impossible. All science is only of the phenomenal, theconditioned, the relative. Ontology is a delusive dream. Thus, afterpages of explanations and qualifications, of affirmations and denials, we find Hamilton virtually assuming the same position as Comte andMill--_all human knowledge is necessarily confined to phenomena_. 

[Footnote 290: "Lectures on Metaphysics, " vol. I. P. 136]

[Footnote 291: Ibid. , vol. I. P. 138. ]

[Footnote 292: Ibid. , vol. I. P. 58. ]

[Footnote 293: Ibid. , vol. I. P. 60. ]

[Footnote 294: Ibid. , vol. Ii. P. 375. ]

It has been supposed that the chief glory of Sir William Hamilton restedupon his able exposition and defense of the doctrine of Natural Realism. There are, however, indications in his writings that he regarded "thePhilosophy of the Conditioned" as his grand achievement. The Law of theConditioned had "not been generalized by any previous philosopher;" and, in laying down that law, he felt that he had made a new and importantcontribution to speculative thought. 

The principles upon which this philosophy is based are:

1. _The Relativity of all Human Knowledge. _--Existence is not cognizedabsolutely and in itself, but only under special modes which are relatedto our faculties, and, in fact, determined by these facultiesthemselves. All knowledge, therefore, is _relative_--that is, it is ofphenomena only, and of phenomena "under modifications determined by ourown faculties. " Now, as the Absolute is that which exists out of allrelation either to phenomena or to our faculties of knowledge, it cannot possibly be _known_. 

2. _The Conditionality of all Thinking_. --Thought necessarily supposesconditions. "To think is to condition; and conditional limitation is thefundamental law of the possibility of thought. As the eagle can notout-soar the atmosphere in which he floats, and by which alone he issupported, so the mind can not transcend the sphere of limitation withinand through which the possibility of thought is realized. Thought isonly of the conditioned, because, as we have said, to think is tocondition. "[295] Now the Infinite is the unlimited, the unconditioned, and as such can not possibly be _thought_. 

3. _The notion of the Infinite--the Absolute, as entertained by man, isa mere "negation of thought. _"--By this Hamilton does not mean that theidea of the Infinite is a negative idea. "The Infinite and the Absoluteare _only_ the names of two counter _imbecilities_ of the humanmind"[296]--that is, a mental inability to conceive an absolutelimitation, or an infinite illimitation; an absolute commencement, or aninfinite non-commencement. In other words, of the absolute and infinitewe have no conception at all, and, consequently, no knowledge. [297]

The grand law which Hamilton generalizes from the above is, "_that theconceivable is in every relation bounded by the inconceivable_. " Or, again, "The conditioned or the thinkable lies between two extremes orpoles; and these extremes or poles are each of them unconditioned, eachof them inconceivable, each of them exclusive or contradictory of theother. "[298] This is the celebrated "Law of the Conditioned. "

[Footnote 295: "Discussions, " p. 21. ]

[Footnote 296: Ibid. , p. 28. ]

[Footnote 297: "Lectures on Metaphysics, " vol. Ii. Pp. 368, 373. ]

[Footnote 298: Ibid. , vol. Ii. P. 373. ]

In attempting a brief criticism of "the Philosophy of the Conditioned, "we may commence by inquiring:

I. _What is the real import and significance of the doctrine "that allhuman knowledge is only of the relative or phenomenal_?"

Hamilton calls this "the great axiom" of philosophy. That we maydistinctly comprehend its meaning, and understand its bearing on thesubject under discussion, we must ascertain the sense in which he usesthe words "_phenomenal_" and "_relative. _" The importance of an exactterminology is fully appreciated by our author; and accordingly, inthree Lectures (VIII. , IX. , X. ), he has given a full explication of theterms most commonly employed in philosophic discussions. Here the word"_phenomenon_" is set down as the necessary "_correlative_" of the word"_subject_" or "_substance_. " "These terms can not be explained apart, for each is correlative of the other, each can be comprehended only inand through its correlative. The term '_subject_' is used to denote theunknown (?) basis which lies under the various _phenomena_ or propertiesof which we become aware, whether in our external or internalexperience. "[299] "The term '_relative_' is _opposed_ to the term'_absolute_;' therefore, in saying that we know only the relative, Ivirtually assert that we know nothing absolutely, that is, _in and foritself, and without relation to us and our faculties_. "[300] Now, in thephilosophy of Sir William Hamilton, "the absolute" is defined as "thatwhich is aloof from relation"--"that which is out of all relation. "[301]The _absolute_ can not, therefore, be "_the correlative_" of theconditioned--can not stand in any relation to the phenomenal. The_subject, _ however, is the necessary correlative of the phenomenal, and, consequently, the subject and the absolute are not identical. Furthermore, Hamilton tells us the subject _may be comprehended_ in andthrough its correlative--the phenomenon; but the absolute, being alooffrom all relation, can not be comprehended or conceived at all. "Thesubject" and "the absolute" are, therefore, not synonymous terms; and, if they are not synonymous, then their antithetical terms, "phenomenal"and "relative, " can not be synonymous. 

[Footnote 299: "Lectures on Metaphysics, " vol. I. P. 148. ]

[Footnote 300: Ibid. , vol. I. P. 137. ]

[Footnote 301: "Discussions, " p. 21. ]

It is manifest, however, that Hamilton does employ these terms assynonymous, and this we apprehend is the first false step in hisphilosophy of the conditioned. "All our knowledge is of the relative_or_ phenomenal. " Throughout the whole of Lectures VIII. And IX. , inwhich he explains the doctrine of the relativity of human knowledge, these terms are used as precisely analogous. Now, in opposition to this, we maintain that the relative is not always the phenomenal. A thing maybe "in relation" and yet not be a phenomenon. "The subject or substance"may be, and really is, on the admission of Hamilton himself, _correlated_ to the phenomenon. The ego, "the conscious _subject_"[302]as a "_self-subsisting entity_" is necessarily related to the phenomenaof thought, feeling, etc. ; but no one would repudiate the idea that theconscious subject is a mere phenomenon, or "series of phenomena, " withmore indignation than Hamilton. Notwithstanding the contradictoryassertion, "that the _subject_ is unknown, " he still teaches, with equalpositiveness, "that in every act of perception I am conscious of self, as a perceiving _subject. "_ And still more explicitly he says: "Asclearly as I am conscious of existing, so clearly am I conscious, atevery moment of my existence, that the conscious Ego is not itself amere modification [a phenomenon], nor a series of modifications[phenomena], but that it is itself different from all its modifications, and a _self-subsisting entity_. "[303] Again: "Thought is possible onlyin and through the consciousness of Self. The Self, the I, is recognizedin every act of intelligence as the _subject_ to which the act belongs. It is I that perceive, I that imagine, I that remember, etc. ; thesespecial modes are all only the phenomena of the I. "[304] We are, therefore, conscious of the _subject_ in the most immediate, and direct, and intuitive manner, and the subject of which we are conscious can notbe "_unknown_. " We regret that so distinguished a philosophy should dealin such palpable contradictions; but it is the inevitable consequence ofviolating that fundamental principle of philosophy on which Hamilton sofrequently and earnestly insists, viz. , "that the testimony ofconsciousness must be accepted in all its integrity". 

[Footnote 302: Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton (edited by O. W. Wight), p. 181. ]

[Footnote 303: "Lectures on Metaphysics, " vol. I. P. 373. ]

[Footnote 304: Ibid. , vol. I. P. 166. ]

It is thus obvious that, with proper qualifications, we may admit _therelativity of human knowledge_, and yet at the same time reject thedoctrine of Hamilton, _that all human knowledge is only of thephenomenal_. 

"The relativity of human knowledge, " like most other phrases into whichthe word "relative" enters, is vague, and admits of a variety ofmeanings. If by this phrase is meant "that we can not know objectsexcept as related to our faculties, or as our faculties are related tothem, " we accept the statement, but regard it as a mere truism leadingto no consequences, and hardly worth stating in words. It is simplyanother way of saying that, in order to an object's being known, it mustcome within the range of our intellectual vision, and that we can onlyknow as much as we are capable of knowing. Or, if by this phrase ismeant "that we can only know things by and through the phenomena theypresent, " we admit this also, for we can no more know substances apartfrom their properties, than we can know qualities apart from thesubstances in which they inhere. Substances can be known only in andthrough their phenomena. Take away the properties, and the thing has nolonger any existence. Eliminate extension, form, density, etc. , frommatter, and what have you left? "The thing in itself, " apart from itsqualities, is nothing. Or, again, if by the relativity of knowledge ismeant "that all consciousness, all thought are relative, " we accept thisstatement also. To conceive, to reflect, to know, is to deal withdifference and relation; the relation of subject and object; therelation of objects among themselves; the relation of phenomena toreality, of becoming to being. The reason of man is unquestionablycorrelated to that which is beyond phenomena; it is able to apprehendthe necessary relation between phenomena and being, extension and space, succession and time, event and cause, the finite and the infinite. Wemay thus admit the _relative character of human thought_, and at thesame time deny that it is an ontological disqualification. [305]

It is not, however, in any of these precise forms that Hamilton holdsthe doctrine of the relativity of knowledge. He assumes a middle placebetween Reid and Kant, and endeavors to blend the subjective idealism ofthe latter with the realism of the former. "He identifies the_phenomenon_ of the German with the _quality_ of the Britishphilosophy, "[306] and asserts, as a regulative law of thought, that thequality implies the substance, and the phenomenon the noumenon, butmakes the substratum or noumenon (the object in itself) unknown andunknowable. The "phenomenon" of Kant was, however, something essentiallydifferent from the "quality" of Reid. In the philosophy of Kant, _phenomenon_ means an object as we envisage or represent it toourselves, in opposition to the _noumenon_, or a thing as it is initself. The phenomenon is composed, in part, of subjective elementssupplied by the mind itself; as regards intuition, the forms of spaceand time; as regards thought, the categories of Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality. To perceive a thing in itself would be toperceive it neither in space nor in time. To think a thing in itselfwould be not to think it under any of the categories. The phenomenal isthus the product of the inherent laws of our own constitution, and, assuch, is the sum and limit of all our knowledge. [307]

[Footnote 305: Martineau's "Essays, " p. 234. ]

[Footnote 306: M'Cosh's "Defense of Fundamental Truth, " p. 106. ]

[Footnote 307: Mansel's "Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant, " pp. 21, 22. ]

This, in its main features, is evidently the doctrine propounded byHamilton. The special modes in which existence is cognizable" arepresented to, and known by, the mind _under modifications determined bythe faculties themselves_. "[308] This doctrine he illustrates by thefollowing supposition: "Suppose the total object of consciousness inperception is=12; and suppose that the external reality contributes 6, the material sense 3, and the mind 3; this may enable you to form somerude conjecture of the nature of the object of perception. "[309] Theconclusion at which Hamilton arrives, therefore, is that things are notknown to us as they exist, but simply as they appear, and as our mindsare capable of perceiving them. 

[Footnote 308: Hamilton's "Lectures on Metaphysics, " vol. I. P. 148. ]

[Footnote 309: Hamilton's "Lectures on Metaphysics, " vol. Ii. P. 129;and also vol. I. P. 147. ]

Let us test the validity of this majestic deliverance. No man isjustified in making this assertion unless, 1. He knows things as theyexist; 2. He knows things not only as they exist but as they appear; 3. He is able to compare things as they exist with the same things as theyappear. Now, inasmuch as Sir William Hamilton affirms we do not knowthings as they exist, but only as they appear, how can he know thatthere is any difference between things as they exist and as they appear?What is this "_thing in itself_" about which Hamilton has so much tosay, and yet about which he professes to know nothing? We readilyunderstand what is meant by the _thing_; it is the object as existing--asubstance manifesting certain characteristic qualities. But what ismeant by _in itself_? There can be no _in itself_ besides or beyond the_thing_. If Hamilton means that "the thing itself" is the thing apartfrom all relation, and devoid of all properties or qualities, we do notacknowledge any such thing. A thing apart from all relation, and devoidof all qualities, is simply pure nothing, if such a solecism may bepermitted. With such a definition of Being _in se_, the logic of Hegelis invincible, "Being and Nothing are identical. "

And now, if "the thing in itself" be, as Hamilton says it is, absolutely_unknown_, how can he affirm or deny any thing in regard to it? By whatright does he prejudge a hidden reality, and give or refuse itspredicates; as, for example, that it is conditioned or unconditioned, inrelation or aloof from relation, finite or infinite? Is it not plainthat, in declaring a thing in its inmost nature or essence to beinscrutable, it is assumed to be partially _known_? And it is obvious, notwithstanding some unguarded expressions to the contrary, thatHamilton does regard "the thing in itself" as partially known. "Theexternal reality" is, at least, six elements out of twelve in the "totalobject of consciousness. "[310] The primary qualities of matter are knownas in the things themselves; "they develop themselves with rigidnecessity out of the simple datum of _substance occupying space_. "[311]"The Primary Qualities are apprehended as they are in bodies"--"they arethe attributes of _body as body_, " and as such "are known immediately inthemselves, "[312] as well as mediately by their effects upon us. So thatwe not only know by direct consciousness certain properties of things asthey exist in things themselves, but we can also deduce them in an _àpriori_ manner. "The bare notion of matter being given, the PrimaryQualities may be deduced _à priori_; they being, in fact, onlyevolutions of the conditions which that notion necessarily implies. " If, then, we know the qualities of things as "in the things themselves, ""the things themselves" must also be, at least, partially known; andHamilton can not consistently assert the relativity of _all_ knowledge. Even if it be granted that our cognitions of objects are only in partdependent on the objects themselves, and in part on elements superaddedby our organism, or by our minds, it can not warrant the assertion thatall our knowledge, but only the part so added, is relative. "Theadmixture of the relative element not only does not take away theabsolute character of the remainder, but does not even (if our author isright) prevent us from recognizing it. The confusion, according to him, is not inextricable. It is for us 'to analyze and distinguish whatelements, ' in an 'act of knowledge, ' are contributed by the object, andwhat by the organs or by the mind. "[313]

[Footnote 310: "Lectures on Metaphysics, " vol. Ii. P. 129. ]

[Footnote 311: Philosophy of Sir Wm. Hamilton, p. 357]

[Footnote 312: Ibid. , pp. 377, 378. ]

[Footnote 313: Mill's "Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy, " vol. I. P. 44. ]

Admitting the relative character of human thought as a psychologicalfact, Mr. Martineau has conclusively shown that this law, instead ofvisiting us with disability to transcend phenomena, _operates as arevelation of what exists beyond_. "The finite body cut out before ourvisual perception, or embraced by the hands, lies as an island in theemptiness around, and without comparative reference to this can not berepresented: the same experience which gives us the definite objectgives us also the infinite space; and both terms--the limited appearanceand the unlimited ground--are apprehended with equal certitude andclearness, and furnished with names equally susceptible of distinct usein predication and reasoning. The transient successions, for instance, the strokes of a clock, which we count, present themselves to us asdotted out upon a line of permanent duration; of which, without them, weshould have no apprehension, but which as their condition, isunreservedly known. "[314]

"What we have said with regard to space and time applies equally tο thecase of Causation. Here, too, the finite offered to perceptionintroduces to an Infinite supplied by thought. As a definite bodyreveals also the space around, and an interrupted succession exhibitsthe uniform time beneath, so does the passing phenomenon demand foritself a power beneath. The space, and time, and power, not being partof the thing perceived, but its conditions, are guaranteed to us, therefore, on the warrant, not of sense, but of intellect. "[315]

"We conclude, then, on reviewing these examples of Space, and Time, andCausation, that ontological ideas introducing us to certain fixedentities belong no less to our knowledge than scientific ideas ofphenomenal disposition and succession. "[316] In these instances ofrelation between a phenomenon given in perception and an entity as alogical condition, the correlatives are on a perfect equality ofintellectual validity, and the relative character of human thought isnot an ontological disqualification, but a cognitive power. 

[Footnote 314: "Essays, " pp. 193, 194. ]

[Footnote 315: Ibid. , p. 197. ]

[Footnote 316: Ibid. , p. 195. ]

There is a thread of fallacy running through the whole of Hamilton'sreasonings, consequent upon a false definition of the Absolute at theoutset. The Absolute is defined as _that which exists in and by itself, aloof from and out of all relation_. An absolute, as thus defined, doesnot and can not exist; it is a pure abstraction, and, in fact, a purenon-entity. "The Absolute expresses perfect independence both in beingand in action, and is applicable to God as self-existent. "[317] It maymean the absence of all _necessary_ relation, but it does not mean theabsence of _all_ relation. If God can not _voluntarily_ call a finiteexistence into being, and thus stand in the relation of cause, He iscertainly under the severest limitation. But surely that is not a limitwhich substitutes choice for necessity. To be unable to know God out ofall relation--that is, apart from his attributes, apart from his createduniverse, is not felt by us to be any privation at all. A God withoutattributes, and out of all relations, is for us no God at all. God as abeing of unlimited perfection, as infinitely wise and good, as theunconditioned cause of all finite being, and, consequently, asvoluntarily related to nature and humanity, we can and do know; this isthe living and true God. The God of a false philosophy is not the trueGod; the pure abstractions of Hegel and Hamilton are negations, and notrealities. 

2. We proceed to consider the second fundamental principle of Hamilton'sphilosophy of the conditioned, viz. , that "conditional limitation is thefundamental law of the possibility of thought, " and that thoughtnecessarily imposes conditions on its object. 

"Thought, " says Hamilton, "can not transcend consciousness:consciousness is only possible under the antithesis of a subject and anobject known only in correlation, and _mutually limiting eachother_"[318] Thought necessarily supposes conditions; "to think issimply to condition, " that is, to predicate limits; and as the infiniteis the unlimited, it can not be thought. The very attempt to think theinfinite renders it finite; therefore there can be no infinite _inthought_, and, consequently, the infinite can not be known. 

[Footnote 317: Calderwood's "Philosophy of the Infinite, " p. 179. ]

[Footnote 318: "Discussions, " p. 21. ]

If by "the infinite in thought" is here meant the infinite compassed orcontained in thought, we readily grant that the finite can not containthe infinite; it is a simple truism which no one has ever been sofoolish as to deny. Even Cousin is not so unwise as to assert theabsolutely comprehensibility of God. "In order absolutely to comprehendthe Infinite, it is necessary to have an infinite power ofcomprehension, and this is not granted to us. "[319] A finite mind cannot have "an infinite thought. " But it by no means follows that, becausewe can not have infinite thought, we can have no clear and definitethought of or concerning the Infinite. We have a precise and definiteidea of infinitude; we can define the idea; we can set it apart withoutdanger of being confounded with another, and we can reason concerningit. There is nothing we more certainly and intuitively know than thatspace is infinite, and yet we can not comprehend or grasp within thecompass of our thought the infinite space. We can not form an _image_ ofinfinite space, can not traverse it in perception, or represent it byany combination of numbers; but we can have the _thought_ of it as anidea of Reason, and can argue concerning it with precision andaccuracy. [320] Hamilton has an idea of the Infinite; he defines it; hereasons concerning it; he says "we must believe in the infinity of God. "But how can he define the Infinite unless he possesses some knowledge, however limited, of the infinite Being? How can he believe in theinfinity of God if he has no definite idea of infinitude? He can notreason about, can not affirm or deny any thing concerning, that of whichhe knows absolutely nothing. 

[Footnote 319: "Lectures on History of Philosophy, " vol. I. P. 104. ]

[Footnote 320: "To form an _image_ of any infinitude--be it of time orspace [or power]; to go mentally through it by successive steps ofrepresentation--is indeed impossible; not less so than to traverse it inour finite perception and experience. But to have the _thought_ of it asan idea of the reason, not of the phantasy, and assign that thought aconstituent place in valid beliefs and consistent reasonings, appears tous as not only possible, but inevitable. "--Martineau's "Essays, " p. 205. ]

The grand logical barrier which Hamilton perpetually interposes to allpossible cognition of God _as infinite_ is, that to think is tocondition--to limit; and as the Infinite is the unconditioned, theunlimited, therefore "the Infinite can not be _thought_. " We grant atonce that all human thought is limited and finite, but, at the sametime, we emphatically deny that the limitation of our thought imposesany conditions or limits upon the object of thought. No such affirmationcan be consistently made, except on the Hegelian hypothesis that"Thought and Being are identical;" and this is a maxim which Hamiltonhimself repudiates. Our thought does not create, neither does it imposeconditions upon, any thing. 

There is a lurking sophism in the whole phraseology of Hamilton inregard to this subject. He is perpetually talking about "thinking athing"--"thinking the Infinite. " Now we do not think a thing, but wethink _of_ or _concerning_ a thing. We do not think a man, neither doesour thought impose any conditions upon the man, so that he must be asour thought conceives or represents him; but our thought is of the man, concerning or about the man, and is only so far true and valid as itconforms to the objective reality. And so we do not "think theInfinite;" that is, our thought neither contains nor conditions theInfinite Being, but our thoughts are _about_ the Infinite One; and if wedo not think of Him as a being of infinite perfection, our thought isneither worthy, nor just, nor true. [321]

[Footnote 321: Calderwood's "Philosophy of the Infinite, " pp. 255, 256. ]

But we are told the law of all thought and of all being isdetermination; consequently, negation of some quality or somepotentiality; whereas the Infinite is "_the One and the All_" (τὸ Ἕν καὶΠῦν), [322] or, as Dr. Mansel, the disciple and annotator of Hamilton, affirms, "the sum of all reality, " and "the sum of all possible modes ofbeing. "[323] The Infinite, as thus defined, must include in itself allbeing, and all modes of being, actual and possible, not even exceptingevil. And this, let it be observed, Dr. Mansel has the hardihood toaffirm. "If the Absolute and the Infinite is an object of humanconception at all, this, and none other, is the conceptionrequired. "[324] "The Infinite Whole, " as thus defined, can not bethought, and therefore it is argued the Infinite God can not be known. Such a doctrine shocks our moral sense, and we shrink from the thoughtof an Infinite which includes evil. There is certainly a moralimpropriety, if not a logical impossibility, in such a conception ofGod. 

[Footnote 322: Hamilton's "Lectures on Metaphysics, " Appendix, vol. Ii. P. 531. ]

[Footnote 323: "Limits of Religious Thought, " p. 76. ]

[Footnote 324: Ibid. ]

The fallacy of this reasoning consists in confounding a _supposed_Quantitative Infinite with _the_ Qualitative Infinite--the totality ofexistence with the infinitely perfect One. "Qualitative infinity is asecondary predicate; that is, the attribute of an attribute, and isexpressed by the adverb _infinitely_ rather than the adjective_infinite_. For instance, it is a strict use of language to say, thatspace is infinite, but it is an elliptical use of language to say, Godis infinite. Precision of language would require us to say, God isinfinitely good, wise, and great; or God is good, and his goodness isinfinite. The distinction may seem trivial, but it is based upon animportant difference between the infinity of space and time on the onehand, and the infinity of God on the other. Neither philosophy northeology can afford to disregard the difference. Quantitative Infinityis illimitation by _quantity_. Qualitative Infinity is illimitation by_degree_. Quantity and degree alike imply finitude, and are categoriesof the finite alone. The danger of arguing from the former kind ofinfinitude to the latter can not be overstated. God alone possessesQualitative Infinity, which is strictly synonymous with _absoluteperfection_; and the neglect of the distinction between this andQuantitative Infinity, leads irresistibly to pantheistic andmaterialistic notions. Spinozism is possible only by the elevation of'infinite extension' to the dignity of a divine attribute. Dr. SamuelClarke's identification of God's immensity with space has been shown byMartin to ultimate in Pantheism. From ratiocinations concerning theincomprehensibility of infinite space and time, Hamilton and Mansel passat once to conclusions concerning the incomprehensibility of God. Theinconsequence of all such arguments is absolute; and if philosophytolerates the transference of spatial or temporal analogies to thenature of God, she must reconcile herself to the negation of hispersonality and spirituality. "[325] An Infinite Being, quite remote fromthe notion of _quantity_, may and does exist; which, on the one hand, does not include finite existence, and, on the other hand, does notrender the finite impossible to thought. Without contradiction they maycoexist, and be correlated. 

The thought will have already suggested itself to the mind of the readerthat for Hamilton to assert that the Infinite, as thus defined (the Oneand the All), is absolutely unknown, is certainly the greatestabsurdity, for in that case nothing can be known. This Infinite must beat least partially known, or all human knowledge is reduced to zero. Tothe all-inclusive Infinite every thing affirmative belongs, not only tobe, but to be known. To claim it for being, yet deny it to thought, isthus impossible. The Infinite, which includes all real existence, iscertainly possible to cognition. 

The whole argument as regards the conditionating nature of all thoughtis condensed into four words by Spinoza--"_Omnis determinatio estnegatio_;" all determination is negation. Nothing can be more arbitraryor more fallacious than this principle. It arises from the confusion oftwo things essentially different--_the limits of a being_, and _itsdeterminate and distinguishing characteristics_. The limit of a being isits imperfection; the determination of a being is its perfection. Theless a thing is determined, the more it sinks in the scale of being; themost determinate being is the most perfect being. "In this sense God isthe only being absolutely determined. For there must be somethingindetermined in all finite beings, since they have all imperfect powerswhich tend towards their development after an indefinite manner. Godalone, the complete Being in whom all powers are actualized, escapes byHis own perfection from all progress, and development, andindetermination. "[326]

[Footnote 325: North American Review, October, 1864, article, "TheConditioned and the Unconditioned, " pp. 422, 423. See also Young's"Province of Reason, " p. 72; and Calderwood's "Philosophy of theInfinite, " p. 183. ]

[Footnote 326: Saisset, "Modern Pantheism, " vol. Ii. P. 71. ]

All real being must be determined; only pure Nothing can beundetermined. _Determination_ is, however, one thing; and _limitation_is essentially another thing. "Even space and time, though cognizedsolely by negative characteristics, are determined in so far asdifferentiated from the existences they contain; but thisdifferentiation involves no limitation of their infinity. " If alldistinction is determination, and if all determination is negation, thatis (as here used), limitation, then the infinite, as distinguished fromthe finite, loses its own infinity, and either becomes identical withthe finite, or else vanishes into pure nothing. If Hamilton will persistin affirming that all determination is limitation, he has no otheralternatives but to accept the doctrine of Absolute Nihilism, or ofAbsolute Identity. If the Absolute is the indeterminate--that is, noattributes, no consciousness, no relations--it is pure non-being. If theInfinite is "the One and All, " then there is but one substance, oneabsolute entity. 

Herbert Spencer professes to be carrying out, a step farther, thedoctrine put into shape by Hamilton and Mansel, viz. , "the philosophy ofthe Unconditioned. " In other words, he carries that doctrine forward toits rigidly logical consequences, and utters the last word whichHamilton and Mansel dare not utter--"Apprehensible by us there is noGod. " The Ultimate Reality is absolutely unknown; it can not beapprehended by the human intellect, and it can not present itself to theintellect at all. This Ultimate Reality can not be _intelligent_, because to think is to condition, and the Absolute is the unconditioned;can not be _conscious_, because all consciousness is of plurality anddifference, and the Absolute is one; can not be _personal_, becausepersonality is determination or limitation, and the Infinite is theillimitable. It is "audacious, " "irreverent, " "impious, " to apply any ofthese predicates to it; to regard it as Mind, or speak of it asRighteous. [327] The ultimate goal of the philosophy of the Unconditionedis a purely subjective Atheism. 

[Footnote 327: "First Principles, " pp. 111, 112. ]

And yet of this Primary Existence--inscrutable, and absolutelyunknown--Spencer knows something; knows as much as he pleases to know. He knows that this "ultimate of ultimates is _Force_, "[328] an"_Omnipresent Power_, "[329] is "_One_" and "_Eternal_. "[330] He knowsalso that it can not be intelligent, self-conscious, and apersonality. [331] This is a great deal to affirm and deny of anexistence "absolutely unknown. " May we not be permitted to affirm ofthis hidden and unknown something that it is _conscious Mind_, especially as Mind is admitted to be the only analogon of Power; and"the _force_ by which we produce change, and which serves to symbolizethe causes of changes in general, is the final disclosure ofanalysis. "[332]

[Footnote 328: "First Principles, " p. 235. ]

[Footnote 329: Ibid. , p. 99. ]

[Footnote 330: Ibid. , p. 81. ]

[Footnote 331: Ibid. , pp. 108-112. ]

[Footnote 332: Ibid. , p. 235. ]

3. We advance to the review of the third fundamental principle ofHamilton's philosophy of the Unconditioned, viz. , that the termsinfinite and absolute are names for a "mere negation of thought"--a"mental impotence" to think, or, in other words, the absence of all theconditions under which thought is possible. 

This principle is based upon a distinction between "positive" and"negative" thought, which is made with an air of wonderful precision andaccuracy in "the Alphabet of Human Thought. "[333] "Thinking is_positive_ when existence is predicated of an object. " "Thinking is_negative_ when existence is not attributed to an object. " "Negativethinking, " therefore, is not the thinking of an object as devoid of thisor that particular attribute, but as devoid of all attributes, and thusof all existence; that is, it is "the negation of allthought"--_nothing_. "When we think a thing, that is done by conceivingit as possessed of certain modes of being or qualities, _and the sum ofthese qualities constitutes its concept or notion_. " "When we perform anact of negative thought, this is done by thinking _something_ as _not_existing in this or that determinate mode; and when we think it asexisting in no determinate mode, _we cease to think at all--it becomes anothing_. "[334] Now the Infinite, according to Hamilton, can not bethought in any determinate mode; therefore we do not think it at all, and therefore it is for us "a logical Non-entity. "

[Footnote 333: "Discussions, " Appendix I. P. 567. ]

[Footnote 334: "Logic, " pp. 54, 55. ]

It is barely conceivable that Hamilton might imagine himself possessedof this singular power of "performing an act of negative thought"--thatis, of thinking and not thinking at once, or of "thinking something"that "becomes nothing;" we are not conscious of any such power. To thinkwithout an object of thought, or to think of something without anyqualities, or to think "something" which in the act of thought meltsaway into "nothing, " is an absurdity and a contradiction. We can notthink about nothing. All thought must have an object, and every objectmust have some predicate. Even space has some predicates--asreceptivity, unity, and infinity. Thought can only be realized bythinking something existing, and existing in a determinate manner; andwhen we cease to think something having predicates, we cease to think atall. This is emphatically asserted by Hamilton himself. [335] "Negativethinking" is, therefore, a meaningless phrase, a contradiction in terms;it is no thought at all. We are cautioned, however, against regarding"the negation of thought" as "a negation of all mental ability. " It is, we are told, "an attempt to think, and a failure in the attempt. " Anattempt to think about _what_? Surely it must be about some object, andan object which is _known_ by some sign, else there can be no thought. Let any one make the attempt to think without something to think about, and he will find that both the process and the result are blanknothingness. All thought, therefore, as Calderwood has amply shown, is, must be, _positive_. "Thought is nothing else than the comparison ofobjects known; and as knowledge is always positive, so must our thoughtbe. All knowledge implies an object _known_; and so all thought involvesan object about which we think, and must, therefore, be positive--thatis, it must embrace within itself the conception of certain qualities asbelonging to the object. "[336]

[Footnote 335: "Logic, " p. 55. ]

[Footnote 336: "Philosophy of the Infinite, " p. 272. ]

The conclusion of Hamilton's reasoning in regard to "negative thinking"is, that we can form no notion of the Infinite Being. We have nopositive idea of such a Being. We can think of him only by "the thinkingaway of every characteristic" which can be conceived, and thus "ceasingto think at all. " We can only form a "negative concept, " which, we aretold, "is in fact no concept at all. " We can form only a "negativenotion, " which, we are informed, "is only the negation of a notion. "This is the impenetrable abyss of total gloom and emptiness into whichthe philosophy of the conditions leads us at last. [337]

[Footnote 337: Whilst Spencer accepts the general doctrine of Hamilton, that the Ultimate Reality is inscrutable, he argues earnestly againsthis assertion that the Absolute is a "mere negation of thought. "

"Every one of the arguments by which the relativity of our knowledge isdemonstrated distinctly postulates the _positive existence_ of somethingbeyond the relative. To say we can not know the Absolute is, byimplication, to affirm there _is_ an Absolute. In the very denial of ourpower to learn _what_ the Absolute is, there lies hidden the assumption_that_ it is; and the making of this assumption proves that the Absolutehas been present to the mind, not as nothing, but as _something_. And sowith every step in the reasoning by which the doctrine is upheld, theNoumenon, everywhere named as the antithesis of the Phenomenon, isthroughout thought as actuality. It is rigorously impossible to conceivethat our knowledge is a knowledge of appearances only, without, at thesame time, conceiving a Reality of which these are appearances, forappearances without reality are unthinkable. 

"Truly to represent or realize in thought any one of the propositions ofwhich the argument consists, the unconditioned must be represented as_positive_, and not negative. How, then, can it be a legitimateconclusion from the argument that our consciousness of it is negative?An argument, the very construction of which assigns to a certain term acertain meaning, but which ends in showing that this term has nomeaning, is simply an elaborate suicide. Clearly, then, the verydemonstration that a definite consciousness [comprehension] of theAbsolute is impossible, unavoidably presupposes an indefiniteconsciousness of it [an apprehension]. "--"First Principles, " p. 88. ]

Still we have the word _infinite_, and we have _the notion_ which theword expresses. This, at least, is spared to us by Sir William Hamilton. He who says we have no such notion asks the question _how we have it?_Here it may be asked, how have we, then, the word infinite? How have wethe notion which this word expresses? The answer to this question iscontained in the distinction of positive and negative thought. 

We have a positive concept of a thing when we think of it by thequalities of which it is the complement. But as the attribution ofqualities is an affirmation, as affirmation and negation are relatives, and as relatives _are known only in and through each other_, we can not, therefore, have a _consciousness_ of the affirmation of any qualitywithout having, at the same time, the _correlative consciousness_ of itsnegation. Now the one consciousness is a positive, the otherconsciousness is a negative notion; and as all language is the reflex ofthought, the positive and negative notions are expressed by positive andnegative names. Thus it is with the Infinite. [338] Now let us carefullyscrutinize the above deliverance. We are told that "relatives are knownonly in and through each other;" that is, such relatives as _finite_ and_infinite_ are known necessarily in the same act of thought. Theknowledge of one is as necessary as the knowledge of the other. We cannot have a consciousness of the one without the correlativeconsciousness of the other. "For, " says Hamilton, "a relation is, intruth, a thought, one and indivisible; and while the thinking a relation_necessarily involves the thought of its two terms, _, so it is, withequal necessity, itself involved in the thought of either. " If, then, weare _conscious_ of the two terms of the relation in the same "one andindivisible" mental act--if we can not have "the consciousness of theone without the consciousness of the other"--if space and position, timeand succession, substance and quality, infinite and finite, are given tous in pairs, then 'the _knowledge of one is as necessary as theknowledge of the other, _' and they must stand or fall together. Thefinite is known no more positively than the infinite; the infinite isknown as positively as the finite. The one can not be taken and theother left. The infinite, discharged from all relation to the finite, could never come into apprehension; and the finite, discharged of allrelation to the infinite, is incognizable too. "There can be noobjection to call the one 'positive' and the other 'negative, ' providedit be understood that _each_ is so with regard to the other, and thatthe relation is convertible; the finite, for instance, being thenegative of the infinite, not less than the infinite of thefinite. "[339]

[Footnote 338: _Logic, _ p. 73. ]

[Footnote 339: Martineau's "Essays, " p. 237. ]

To say that the finite is comprehensible in and by itself, and theinfinite is incomprehensible in and by itself, is to make an assertionutterly at variance both with psychology and logic. The finite is nomore comprehensible _in itself_ than the infinite. "Relatives are knownonly in and through each other. "[340] "The conception of one term of arelation necessarily implies that of the other, it being the very natureof a relative to be thinkable only through the conjunct thought of itscorrelative. " We comprehend nothing more completely than the infinite;"for the idea of illimitation is as clear, precise, and intelligible asthe idea of limitability, which is its basis. The propositions "A is X""A is not X, " are equally comprehensible; the conceptions A and X are inboth cases positive data of experience, while the affirmation andnegation consist solely in the copulative or disjunctive nature of thepredication. Consequently, if X is comprehensible, so is not--X; if thefinite is comprehensible, so is the infinite. "[341]

Whilst denying that the infinite can by us be _known_, Hamilton tells ushe is "far from denying that it is, must, and ought to be_believed_. "[342] "We must believe in the infinity of God. ""Faith--belief--is the organ by which we apprehend what is beyondknowledge. "[343] We heartily assent to the doctrine that the InfiniteBeing is the object of faith, but we earnestly deny that the InfiniteBeing is not an object of knowledge. May not knowledge be grounded uponfaith, and does not faith imply knowledge? Can we not obtain knowledgethrough faith? Is not the belief in the Infinite Being implied in ourknowledge of finite existence? If so, then God as the infinite andperfect, God as the unconditioned Cause, is not absolutely "theunknown. "

[Footnote 340: Hamilton's "Logic, " p. 73. ]

[Footnote 341: North American Review, October, 1864, article"Conditioned and the Unconditioned, " pp. 441, 442. ]

[Footnote 342: Letter to Calderwood, Appendix, vol. Ii. P. 530. ]

[Footnote 343: "Lectures on Metaphysics, " vol. Ii. P. 374. ]

A full exposition of Sir William Hamilton's views of _Faith_ in itsconnection with Philosophy would have been deeply interesting to us, andit would have filled up a gap in the interpretation of his system. Thequestion naturally presents itself, how would he have discriminatedbetween faith and knowledge, so as to assign to each its province? Ifour notion of the Infinite Being rests entirely upon faith, then uponwhat ultimate ground does faith itself rest? On the authority ofScripture, of the Church, or of reason? The only explicit statement ofhis view which has fallen in our way is a note in his edition ofReid. [344] "We _know_ what rests upon reason; we _believe_ what restsupon authority. But reason itself must rest at last upon authority; forthe original data of reason do not rest upon reason, but are necessarilyaccepted by reason on the authority of what is beyond itself. These dataare, therefore, in rigid propriety, Beliefs or Trusts. Thus it is that, in the last resort, we must, per force, philosophically admit thatbelief is the primary condition of reason, and not reason the ultimateground of belief. "

[Footnote 344: P. 760; also Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton, p. 61. ]

Here we have, first, an attempted distinction between faith andknowledge. "We _know_ what rests upon reason;" that is, whatever weobtain by deduction or induction, whatever is capable of explication andproof, is _knowledge_. "We _believe_ what rests upon authority;" thatis, whatever we obtain by intellectual intuition or pure apperception, and is incapable of explication and of proof, is "a _belief or trust_. "These instinctive beliefs, which are, as it were, the first principlesupon which all knowledge rests, are, however, indiscriminately called byHamilton "cognitions, " "beliefs, " "judgments. " He declares mostexplicitly "that the principles of our knowledge must themselves be_knowledges_;"[345] and these first principles, which are "the primarycondition of reason, " are elsewhere called "_à priori cognitions_;" also"native, pure, or transcendental _knowledge_, " in contradistinction to"_à posteriori cognitions_, " or that knowledge which is obtained in theexercise of reason. [346] All this confusion results from an attempt toput asunder what God has joined together. As Clemens of Alexandria hassaid, "Neither is faith without knowledge, nor knowledge without faith. "All faith implies knowledge, and all knowledge implies faith. They aremingled in the one operation of the human mind, by which we apprehendfirst principles or ultimate truths. These have their light and darkside, as Hamilton has remarked. They afford enough light to show _that_they are and must be, and thus communicate knowledge; they furnish nolight to show _how_ they are and _why_ they are, and under that aspectdemand the exercise of faith. There must, therefore, first be something_known_ before there can be any _faith_. [347]

[Footnote 345: Ibid. , p. 69. ]

[Footnote 346: "Lectures on Metaphysics, " vol. Ii. P. 26. ]

[Footnote 347: M'Cosh, "Intuitions, " pp. 197, 198; Calderwood, "Philosophy of the Infinite, " p. 24. ]

And now we seem to have penetrated to the centre of Hamilton'sphilosophy, and the vital point may be touched by one crucial question, _Upon what ultimate ground does faith itself rest?_ Hamilton says, "webelieve what rests upon _authority_. " But what is that authority? I. Itis not the authority of Divine Revelation, because beliefs are called"instinctive, " "native, " "innate, " "common, " "catholic, "[348] all whichterms seem to indicate that this "authority" lies within the sphere ofthe human mind; at any rate, this faith does not rest on the authorityof Scripture. Neither is it the authority of Reason. "The original dataof reason [the first principles of knowledge] do not rest upon theauthority of reason, but _on the authority of what is beyond itself_. "The question thus recurs, what is this ultimate ground beyond reasonupon which faith rests? Does it rest upon any thing, or nothing?

[Footnote 348: Philosophy of Sir Wm. Hamilton, pp. 68, 69. ]

The answer to this question is given in the so-called "Law of theConditioned, " which is thus laid down: "_All that is conceivable inthought lies between two extremes, which, as contradictory of eachother, can not both be true, but of which, as mutual contradictories, one must_. " For example, we conceive _space_, but we can not conceive itas absolutely bounded or infinitely unbounded. We can conceive _time_, but we can not conceive it as having an absolute commencement or aninfinite non-commencement. We can conceive of _degree_, but we can notconceive it as absolutely limited or as infinitely unlimited. We canconceive of _existence_, but not as an absolute part or an infinitewhole. Therefore, "the Conditioned is that which is alone conceivable orcogitable; the Unconditioned, that which is inconceivable orincogitable. The conditioned, or the thinkable, lies between twoextremes or poles; and each of these extremes or poles areunconditioned, each of them inconceivable, each of them exclusive orcontradictory of the other. Of these two repugnant opposites, the one isthat of Unconditional or Absolute Limitation; the other that ofUnconditional or Infinite Illimitation, or, more simply, the Absoluteand the Infinite; the term _absolute_ expressing that which is finishedor complete, the term _infinite_ that which can not be terminated orconcluded. "[349]

"The conditioned is the mean between two extremes--two inconditionates, exclusive of each other, neither of which _can be conceived aspossible_, but of which, on the principle of contradiction, and excludedmiddle, _one must be admitted as necessary_. We are thus warned fromrecognizing the domain of our knowledge as necessarily co-extensive withthe horizon of our faith. And by a _wonderful revelation_, we are thus, in the very consciousness of our inability to conceive aught above therelative and the finite, _inspired with a belief in_ the existence ofsomething unconditioned beyond the sphere of all comprehensiblereality. "[350] Here, then, we have found the ultimate ground of ourfaith in the Infinite God. It is built upon a "mental imbecility, " andbuttressed up by "contradictions!"[351]

[Footnote 349: "Lectures on Metaphysics, " vol. Ii. Pp. 368, 374. WithHamilton, the Unconditioned is a genus, of which the Infinite andAbsolute are species. ]

[Footnote 350: "Discussions on Philosophy, " p. 22. ]

[Footnote 351: The warmest admirers of Sir William Hamilton hesitate toapply the doctrine of the unconditioned to Cause and Free-will. See"Mansel's Prolegom. , " Note C, p. 265. ]

Such a faith, however, is built upon the clouds, and the whole structureof this philosophy is "a castle in the air"--an attempt to organizeNescience into Science, and evoke something out of nothing. To pretendto believe in that respecting which I can form no notion is in realitynot to believe at all. The nature which compels me to believe in theInfinite must supply me some object upon which my belief can take hold. We can not believe in contradictions. Our faith must be a rationalbelief--a faith in the ultimate harmony and unity of all truth, in theveracity and integrity of human reason as the organ of truth; and, aboveall, a faith in the veracity of God, who is the author and illuminatorof our mental constitution. "We can not suppose that we are createdcapable of intelligence in order to be made victims of delusion--thatGod is a deceiver, and the root of our nature a lie. "[352] We close ourreview of Hamilton by remarking:

[Footnote 352: Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton, p. 21. ]

1. "The Law of the Conditioned, " as enounced by Hamilton, iscontradictory. It predicates contradiction of two extremes, which areasserted to be equally incomprehensible and incognizable. If they areutterly incognizable, how does Hamilton _know_ that they arecontradictory? The mutual _relation_ of two objects is said to be known, but the objects themselves are absolutely unknown. But how can we knowany relation except by an act of comparison, and how can we compare twoobjects so as to affirm their relation, if the objects are absolutelyunknown? "The Infinite is defined as Unconditional Illimitation; theAbsolute as Conditional Limitation. Yet almost in the same breath we aretold that each is utterly inconceivable, each the mere negation ofthought. On the one hand, we are told they _differ_; on the other, weare told they do _not differ_. Now which does Hamilton mean? If heinsist upon the definitions as yielding a ground of conceivabledifference, he must abandon the inconceivability; but if he insist uponthe inconceivability, he must abandon the definition as sheer verbiage, devoid of all conceivable meaning. There is no possible escape from thisdilemma. Further, two negations can never contradict; for contradictionis the asserting and the denying of the same proposition; two denialscan not conflict. If Illimitation is negative, Limitation, itscontradictory, is positive, whether conditional or unconditional. Inbrief, if the Infinite and Absolute are wholly incomprehensible, theyare not distinguishable; but if they are distinguishable, they are notwholly incomprehensible. If they are indistinguishable, they are to usidentical; and identity precludes contradiction. But if they aredistinguishable, distinction is made by difference, which involvespositive cognition; hence one, at least, must be conceivable. Itfollows, therefore, by inexorable logic, that either the contradictionor the inconceivability must be abandoned. "[353]

[Footnote 353: North American Review, October, 1864, pp. 407, 408. ]

2. "The Law of the Conditioned, " as a ground of faith in the InfiniteBeing, is utterly void, meaningless, and ineffectual. Let us re-state itin Hamilton's own words: "The conditioned is the _mean_ between twoextremes, two inconditionates exclusive of each other, neither of which_can be conceived as possible_, but of which, on the principle ofContradiction and Excluded Middle, _one must be admitted as necessary_. "It is scarcely needful to explain to the intelligent reader the abovelogical principles; that they may, however, be clearly before the mindin this connection, we state that the principle of Contradiction isthis: "A thing can not at the same time be and not be; _A is_, _A isnot_, are propositions which can not both be true at once. " Theprinciple of Excluded Middle is this: "A thing either is or is not--_Aeither is or is not B_; there is no _medium_. "[354] Now, to mention thelaw of Excluded Middle and two contradictories with a _mean_ betweenthem, in the same sentence, is really astounding. "If the twocontradictory extremes are equally incogitable, yet include a cogitablemean, why insist upon the necessity of accepting either extreme? Thisnecessity of accepting one of the contradictories is wholly based uponthe supposed impossibility of a _mean_; if a mean exists, _that_ may betrue, and both contradictories together false. But if a mean between twocontradictories be both impossible and absurd, Hamilton's 'conditioned'entirely vanishes. "[355] If both contradictories are equally unknown andequally unthinkable, we can not discover _why_, on his principles, weare bound to believe _either_. 

[Footnote 354: Hamilton's "Logic, " pp. 58, 59; "Metaphysics, " vol. Ii. P. 368. ]

[Footnote 355: North British Review, October, 1864, pp. 415, 416. ]

3. The whole of this confusion in thought and expression results fromthe habit of confounding the sensuous imagination with the non-sensuousreason, and the consequent co-ordination of an imageable conception withan abstract idea. The objects of sense and the sensuous imagination maybe characterized as extension, limitation, figure, position, etc. ; theobjects of the non-sensuous reason may be characterized as universality, eternity, infinity. I can form an _image_ of an extended and figuredobject, but I can not form an _image_ of space, time, or God; neither, indeed, can I form an image of Goodness, Justice, or Truth. But I canhave a clear and precise idea of space, and time, and God, as I can ofJustice, Goodness, and Truth. There are many things which I can mostsurely _know_ that I can not possibly _comprehend_, if to comprehend isto form a mental image of a thing. There is nothing which I morecertainly know than that space is infinite, and eternity unbeginning andendless; but I can not comprehend the infinity of space or theillimitability of eternity. I know that God is, that he is a being ofinfinite perfection, but I can not throw my thoughts around andcomprehend the infinity of God. 

(iv. ) We come, lastly, to consider the position of the _DogmaticTheologians_. [356] In their zeal to demonstrate the necessity of DivineRevelation, and to vindicate for it the honor of supplying to us all ourknowledge of God, they assail every fundamental principle of reason, often by the very weapons which are supplied by an Atheisticalphilosophy. As a succinct presentation of the views of this school, weselect the "_Theological Institutes_" of R. Watson. 

[Footnote 356: Ellis, Leland, Locke, and Horsley, whose writings areextensively quoted in Watson's "Institutes of Theology" (reprinted byCarlton & Lanahan, New York). ]

1st. The invalidity of "_the principle of causality_" is asserted bythis author. "We allow that the argument which proves that the _effects_with which we are surrounded have been _caused_, and thus leads us upthrough a chain of subordinate causes to one First Cause, has asimplicity, an obviousness, and a force which, when we are previouslyfurnished with the idea of God, makes it, at first sight, difficult toconceive that men, under any degree of cultivation, should be inadequateto it; yet if ever the human mind commenced such an inquiry at all, itis highly probable that it would rest in the notion of an _eternalsuccession of causes and effects_, rather than acquire the ideas ofcreation, in the proper sense, and of a Supreme Creator. "[357] "We feelthat our reason rests with full satisfaction in the doctrine that allthings are created by one eternal and self-existent Being; but the Greekphilosophers held that matter was eternally co-existent with God. Thiswas the opinion of Plato, who has been called the Moses ofphilosophy. "[358]

For a defense of "the principle of causality" we must refer the readerto our remarks on the philosophy of Comte. We shall now only remark onone or two peculiarities in the above statement which betray an uttermisapprehension of the nature of the argument. We need scarcely directattention to the unfortunate and, indeed, absurd phrase, "an eternalsuccession of causes and effects. " An "eternal succession" is a_contradictio in adjecto_, and as such inconceivable and unthinkable. Nohuman mind can "rest" in any such thing, because an eternal successionis no rest at all. All "succession" is finite and temporal, capable ofnumeration, and therefore can not be eternal. [359] Again, in attainingthe conception of a First Cause the human mind does not pass up "througha chain of subordinate causes, " either definite or indefinite, "to oneFirst Cause. "

[Footnote 357: Watson's "Institutes of Theology, " vol. I. P. 273. ]

[Footnote 358: Id. , ib. , vol. I. P. 21. ]

[Footnote 359: See _ante_, pp. 181, 182, ch. V. ]

Let us re-state the principle of causality as a universal and necessarylaw of thought. "_All phenomena present themselves to us as theexpression of_ POWER, and refer us to a causal ground whence theyissue. " That "power" is intuitively and spontaneously apprehended by thehuman mind as Supreme and Ultimate--"the causal ground" is a personalGod. All the phenomena of nature present themselves to us as "effects, "and we know nothing of "subordinate causes" except as modes of theDivine Efficiency. [360] The principle of causality compels us to thinkcausation behind nature, and under causation to think of Volition. "Other forces we have no sort of ground for believing; or, except byartifices of abstraction, even power of conceiving. The dynamic idea iseither this or nothing; and the logical alternative assuredly is thatnature is either a mere Time-march of phenomena or an expression ofMind. "[361] The true doctrine of philosophy, of science, and ofrevelation is not simply that God did create "in the beginning, " butthat he still creates. All the operations of Nature are the operationsof the Divine Mind. "Thou takest away their breath, they die, and returnto their dust. Thou sendest forth thy spirit, they are created; and thourenewest the face of the earth. "[362]

[Footnote 360: The modern doctrine of the Correlation and Homogenity ofall Forces clearly proves that they are not many, but _one_--"a dynamicself-identity masked by transmigration. "--Martineau's "Essays, " pp. 134-144. ]

[Footnote 361: Martineau's "Essays, " pp. 140, 141. ]

[Footnote 362: Psalm civ. ]

The assertion that Plato taught "the eternity of matter, " and thatconsequently he did not arrive at the idea of a Supreme and UltimateCause, is incapable of proof. The term ὕλη=matter does not occur in thewritings of Plato, or, indeed, of any of his predecessors, and ispeculiarly Aristotelian. The ground of the world of sense is called byPlato "the receptacle" (ὑποδοχή), "the nurse" (τιθήνη) of all that isproduced, and was apparently identified, in his mind, with _purespace_--a logical rather than a physical entity--the mere negativecondition and medium of Divine manifestation. He never regards it as a"cause, " or ascribes to it any efficiency. We grant that he places thisvery indefinite something (ὁποιονοῦν τι) out of the sphere of temporalorigination; but it must be borne in mind that he speaks of "creation ineternity" as well as of "creation in time;" and of time itself, thoughcreated, as "an eternal image of the generating Father. "[363] This onething, at any rate, can not be denied, that Plato recognizes creation inits fullest sense as the act of God. 

The admission that something has always existed besides the Deity, as amere logical condition of the exercise of divine power (_e. G. _, space), would not invalidate the argument for the existence of God. The proof ofthe Divine Existence, as Chalmers has shown, does not rest on theexistence of matter, but on the orderly arrangement of matter; and thegrand question of Theism is not whether the _matter of the world_, butwhether the _present order of the world_ had a commencement. [364]

2d. Doubt is cast by our author upon the validity of "_the principle ofthe Unconditioned or the Infinite_. " "Supposing it were conceded thatsome faint glimmering of this great truth [the existence of a FirstCause] might, by induction, have been discovered by contemplative minds, by what means could they have _demonstrated_ to themselves that he iseternal, self-existent, immortal, and independent?"[365] "Between thingsvisible and invisible, time and eternity, beings finite and beingsinfinite, objects of sense and objects of faith, _the connection is notperceptible_ to human observation. Though we push our researches, therefore, to the extreme point whither the light of nature can carryus, they will in the end be abruptly terminated, and we must stop shortat an immeasurable distance between the creature and the Creator. "[366]

[Footnote 363: Plato, "Timæus, " § xiv. ]

[Footnote 364: Chalmers's "Natural Theology, " bk. I. Ch. V. ; alsoMahan's "Natural Theology, " pp. 21-23. ]

[Footnote 365: Watson's "Institutes of Theol. , " vol. I. P. 274. ]

[Footnote 366: Id. , ib. , vol. I. P. 273. ]

To this assertion that the connection of things visible and thingsinvisible, finite and infinite, objects of sense and objects of faith, is utterly imperceptible to human thought, we might reply by quoting thewords of that Sacred Book whose supreme authority our author is seeking, by this argument, to establish. "The _invisible_ things of God, even hiseternal power and god-head, from the creation, are clearly _seen_, being_understood by the things which are made_. " We may also point to thefact that in every age and in every land the human mind hasspontaneously and instinctively recognized the existence of an invisiblePower and Presence pervading nature and controlling the destinies ofman, and that religious worship--prayer, and praise, andsacrifice--offered to that unseen yet omnipresent Power is an universalfact of human nature. The recognition of an _immediate_ and a_necessary_ "connection" between the visible and the invisible, theobjects of sense and the objects of faith, is one of the most obviousfacts of consciousness--of universal consciousness as revealed inhistory, and of individual consciousness as developed in every rationalmind. 

That this connection is "not perceptible to human observation, " if bythis our author means "not perceptible to sense, " we readily admit. Noone ever asserted it was perceptible to human observation. We say thatthis connection is perceptible to human _reason_, and is revealed inevery attempt to think about, and seek an explanation of, the phenomenalworld. The Phenomenal and the Real, Genesis and Being, Space andExtension, Succession and Duration, Time and Eternity, the Finite andthe Infinite, are correlatives which are given in one and the sameindivisible act of thought. "The conception of one term of a relationnecessarily implies that of the other; it being the very nature of acorrelative to be thinkable only through the conjunct thought of itscorrelative; for a relation is, in truth, a thought one and indivisible;and whilst the thinking of one relation necessarily involves the thoughtof its two terms, so it is, with equal necessity, itself involved in thethought of either. "[367] Finite, dependent, contingent, temporalexistence, therefore, necessarily supposes infinite, self-existent, independent, eternal Being; the Conditioned and Relative implies theUnconditioned and Absolute--one is known only in and through the other. But inasmuch as the unconditioned is cognized solely _à priori_, and theconditioned solely _à posteriori_, the recognition by the human mind oftheir necessary correlation becomes the bridge whereby the chasm betweenthe subjective and the objective may be spanned, and whereby Thought maybe brought face to face with Existence. 

[Footnote 367: Hamilton's "Metaphysics, " vol. Ii. Pp. 536, 537. ]

The reverence which, from boyhood, we have entertained for thedistinguished author of the "Institutes" restrains us from speaking inadequate terms of reprobation of the statement that "the _First Cause_"may be known, and yet not conceived "as eternal, self-existent, immortal, and independent". Surely that which is the ground and reasonof all existence must have the ground and reason of its own existence initself. That which is _first_ in the order of existence, and in thelogical order of thought, can have nothing prior to itself. If thesupposed First Cause is not necessarily self-existent and independent, it is not the _first_; if it has a dependent existence, there must be aprior being on which it depends. If the First Cause is not eternal, thenprior to this Ultimate Cause there was nothingness and vacuity, and purenothing, by its own act, became something. But "_Ex nihilo nihil_" is auniversal law of thought. To ask the question whether the First Cause beself-existent and eternal, is, in effect, to ask the question "who madeGod?" and this is not the question of an adult theologian, but of alittle child. Surely Mr. Watson must have penned the above passagewithout any reflection on its real import[368]. 

[Footnote 368: In an article on "the Impending Revolution in Anglo-SaxonTheology" Methodist Quarterly Review, (July, 1863), Dr. Warren seems totake it for granted that the "aiteological" and "teleological" argumentsfor the existence of God are utterly invalidated by the Dynamical theoryof matter. "Once admit that _real power_ can and does reside in matter, and all these reasonings fail. If inherent forces of matter arecompetent to the production of all the innumerable miracles of movementin the natural world, what is there in the natural world which they cannot produce. If all _the exertions of power_ in the universe can beaccounted for without resort to something back of, and superior to, nature, what is there which can force the mind to such a resort?" (p. 463). "Having granted that _power_, or _self-activity_, is a naturalattribute of all matter, what right have we to deny it _intelligence_?"(p. 465). "_Self-moving matter must have thought and design_" (p. 469). 

It is not our intention to offer an extended criticism of the abovepositions in this note. We shall discuss "the Dynamical theory" morefully in a subsequent work. If the theory apparently accepted by Dr. Warren be true, that "_the ultimate atoms of matter are as uniformlyefficient as minds_, and that we have the same ground to regard theforce exerted by the one _innate_ and _natural_ as that exerted by theother" (p. 464), then we grant that the conclusions of Dr. Warren, asabove stated, are unavoidable. We proceed one step farther, and boldlyassert that the existence of God is, on this hypothesis, incapable ofproof, and the only logical position Dr. Warren can occupy is that ofspiritualistic Pantheism. 

Dr. Warren asserts that "the Dynamical theory of matter" is nowgenerally accepted by "Anglo-Saxon _naturalists_. " "One can scarcelyopen a scientific treatise without observing the altered stand-point"(p. 160). We confess that we are disappointed with Dr. Warren'streatment of this simple question of fact. On so fundamental an issue, the Doctor ought to have given the name of at least _one_ "naturalist"who asserts that "the ultimate atoms of matter are as uniformlyefficient as minds. " Leibnitz, Morrell, Ulrici, Hickok, the authoritiesquoted by him, are metaphysicians and idealists of the extremest school. At present we shall, therefore, content ourselves with a general denialof this wholesale statement of Dr. Warren; and we shall sustain thatdenial by a selection from the many authorities we shall hereafterpresent. "No particle of matter possesses within itself the power ofchanging its existing state of motion or of rest. Matter has nospontaneous power either of rest or motion, but is equally susceptibleto each as it may be acted on by _external_ causes" (Silliman's"Principles of Physics, " p. 13). The above proposition is "a truth onwhich the whole science of mechanical philosophy ultimately depends"(Encyclopædia Britannica, art. "Dynamics, " vol. Viii. P. 326). "Amaterial substance existing alone in the universe could not produce anyeffects. There is not, so far as we know, a self-acting materialsubstance in the universe" (M'Cosh, "Divine Government, Physical andMoral, " p. 78). "Perhaps the only true indication of matter is_inertia_. " "The cause of gravitation is _not resident_ in the particlesof matter merely, " but also "_in all space_" (Dr. Faraday on"Conservation of Force, " in "Correlation and Conservation of Force. " (p. 368). He also quotes with approbation the words of Newton, "That gravityshould be innate, inherent, and essential to matter, is so great anabsurdity, that I believe no man who has in philosophic matters acompetent faculty of thinking can ever fall into it" p. 368). "The'force of gravity' is an improper expression" (p. 340). "Forces aretransformable, indestructible, and, _in contradistinction from matter_, imponderable" (p. 346). "The first cause of things is Deity" (Dr. Mayer, in "Correlation and Conservation of Force, " p. 341). "Although the word_cause_ may be used in a secondary and subordinate sense, as meaningantecedent forces, yet in an abstract sense it is totally inapplicable;we can not predicate of any physical agent that it is abstractedly thecause of another" (p. 15). "Causation is the _will_, " "creation is theact, of God" Grove on "Correlation of Physical Forces, " (p. 199). "Between gravity and motion it is impossible to establish the equationrequired for a rightly-conceived _causal_ relation" ("Correlation andConservation of Force, " p. 253). See also Herschel's "Outlines ofAstronomy, " p. 234. 

It certainly must have required a wonderful effort of imagination on thepart of Dr. Warren to transform "weight" and "density, " mere passiveaffections of matter, into self-activity, intelligence, thought, anddesign. Weight or density are merely relative terms. Supposing oneparticle or mass of matter to exist alone, and there can be noattractive or gravitating force. There must be a cause of gravity whichis distinct from matter. ]

3d. The validity of "_the principle of unity_" is also discredited byWatson. "If, however, it were conceded that some glimmerings of thisgreat truth, the existence of a First Cause, might, by induction, havebeen discovered, by what means could they have demonstrated tothemselves that the great collection of bodies which we call the worldhad but _one_ Creator. "[369]

[Footnote 369: "Institutes of Theology, " vol. I. P. 275. ]

We might answer directly, and at once, that the oneness or unity of Godis necessarily contained in "the very notion of a First Cause"--a_first_ cause is not many causes, but _one_. By a First Cause we do not, however, understand the first of a numerical series, but an ἀρχή--aprinciple, itself unbeginning, which is the source of all beginning. Ourcategorical answer, therefore, must be that the unity of God is asublime deliverance of reason--God is one God. It is a first principleof reason that all differentiation and plurality supposes an incompositeunity, all diversity implies an indivisible identity. The sensuousperception of a plurality of parts supposes the rational idea of anabsolute unity, which has no parts, as its necessary correlative. Forexample, extension is a congeries of indefinitesimal parts; thecontinuity of matter, as _empirically_ known by us, is never absolute. Space is absolutely continuous, incapable of division into integralparts, illimitable, and, as _rationally_ known by us, an absolute unity. The cognition of limited extension, which is the subject of quantitativemeasurement, involves the conception of unlimited space, which is thenegation of all plurality and complexity of parts. And so the cognitionof a phenomenal universe in which we see only difference, plurality, andchange, implies the existence of a Being who is absolutely unchangeable, identical, and one. 

This law of thought lies at the basis of that universal desire of unity, and that universal effort to reduce all our knowledge to unity, whichhas revealed itself in the history of philosophy, and also of inductivescience. "Reason, intellect, νοῦς, concatenating thoughts and objectsinto system, and tending upward from particular facts to general laws, from general laws to universal principles, is never satisfied in itsascent till it comprehends all laws in a single formula, and consummatesall conditional knowledge in the unity of unconditional existence. " "Thehistory of philosophy is only the history of this tendency, andphilosophers have borne ample testimony to its reality. 'The mind, ' saysAnaxagoras, 'only knows when it subdues its objects, when it reduces themany to the one. ' 'The end of philosophy, ' says Plato, 'is the intuitionof unity. ' 'All knowledge, ' say the Platonists, 'is the gathering upinto one, and the indivisible apprehension of this unity by the knowingmind. '"[370]

[Footnote 370: Hamilton's "Metaphysics, " vol. I. Pp. 68, 69. ]

This law has been the guiding principle of the Inductive Sciences, andhas led to some of its most important discoveries. The unity which hasbeen attained in physical science is not, however, the absolute unity ofa material substratum, but a unity of _Will_ and of _Thought_. The latediscovery of the monogenesis, reciprocal convertibility, andindestructibility of all Forces in nature, leads us upward towards therecognition of one Omnipresent and Omnipotent Will, which, like a mightytide, sweeps through the universe and effects all its changes. Theuniversal prevalence of the same physical laws and numerical relationsthroughout all space, and of the same archetypal forms and teleology oforgans throughout all past time, reveals to us a Unity of Thought whichgrasps the entire details of the universe in one comprehensiveplan. [371] The positive _à priori_ intuitions of reason and the _àposteriori_ inductions of science equally attest _that God is one_. 

[Footnote 371: We refer with pleasure to the articles of Dr. Winchell, in the North-western Christian Advocate, in which the _à posteriori_proof of "the Unity of God" is forcibly exhibited, and take occasion toexpress the hope they will soon be presented to the public in a morepermanent form. ]

4th. By denying that man has any intuitive cognitions of right andwrong, or any native and original feeling of obligation, Mr. Watsoninvalidates "the moral argument" for the existence of a Righteous God. 

"As far as man's reason has applied itself to the discovery of truth or_duty_ it has generally gone astray. "[372] "Questions of morals do not, for the most part, lie level to the minds of the populace. "[373] "Theirconclusions have no _authority_, and place them under no_obligation_. "[374] And, indeed, man without a revelation "is without_moral control_, without _principles of justice_, except such as may beslowly elaborated from those relations which concern the grosserinterests of life, without _conscience_, without hope or fear in anotherlife. "[375]

[Footnote 372: "Institutes of Theology, " vol. Ii. P. 470. ]

[Footnote 373: Ibid. , vol. I. P. 15. ]

[Footnote 374: Ibid. , vol. I. P. 228. ]

[Footnote 375: Ibid. , vol. Ii. P. 271. ]

Now we shall not occupy our space in the elaboration of the propositionthat the universal consciousness of our race, as revealed in humanhistory, languages, legislations, and sentiments, bears testimony to thefact that the ideas of right, duty, and responsibility are native to thehuman mind; we shall simply make our appeal to those Sacred Writingswhose verdict must be final with all theologians. That the fundamentalprinciples of the moral law do exist, subjectively, in all human mindsis distinctly affirmed by Paul, in a passage which deserves to beregarded as the chief corner-stone of moral science. "The Gentiles(ἔθνη, heathen), which have not the written law, do by the guidance ofnature (reason or conscience) the works enjoined by the revealed law;these, having no written law, are a law unto themselves; who showplainly the works of the law written on their hearts, their consciencebearing witness, and also their reasonings one with another, when theyaccuse, or else excuse, each other. "[376] To deny this is to relegatethe heathen from all responsibility. For Mr. Watson admits "that thewill of a superior is not in justice binding unless it be in some modesufficiently declared. " Now in the righteous adjudgments of revelationthe heathen are "without excuse. " The will of God must, therefore, be"sufficiently declared" to constitute them accountable. Who will presumeto say that the shadowy, uncertain, variable, easily and unavoidablycorrupted medium of tradition running through forty muddy centuries is a"sufficient declaration of the will of God?" The law is "written on theheart" of every man, or all men are not accountable. 

[Footnote 376: Romans, ch. Ii. Ver. 14-15. ]

Now this "law written within the heart" immediately and naturallysuggests the idea of a Lawgiver who is over us. This felt presence ofConscience, approving or condemning our conduct, suggests, as with thespeed of the lightning-flash, the notion of a Judge who will finallycall us to account. This "accusing or excusing of each other, " thisrecognition of good or ill desert, points us to, and constrains us torecognize, a future Retribution; so that some hope or fear of anotherlife has been in all ages a universal phenomenon of humanity. 

It is affirmed, however, that whilst this capacity to know God may havebeen an original endowment of human nature, yet, in consequence of thefall, "the understanding and reason are weakened by the deterioration ofhis whole intellectual nature. "[377] "Without some degree of education, man is _wholly_ the creature of appetite. Labor, feasting, and sleepingdivide his time, and wholly occupy his thoughts. "[378]

[Footnote 377: "Institutes of Theology, " vol. I. P. 15. ]

[Footnote 378: Ibid. , vol. I. P. 271. ]

We reverently and believingly accept the teaching of Scripture as to thedepravity of man. We acknowledge that "the understanding is darkened" bysin. At the same time, we earnestly maintain that the Scriptures do notteach that the fundamental laws of mind, the first principles of reason, are utterly traversed and obliterated by sin, so that man is not able torecognize the existence of God, and feel his obligation to Him. "_Thoughthey_(the heathen) _knew God_ (διότι γνόντες), they did not glorify himas God, neither were thankful, but became vain in their imagination, andtheir foolish hearts were darkened. They changed the truth of God into alie, and worshipped and served the creature _more_ than the Creator. ""And as they did not _approve of holding God with acknowledgment_, Goddelivered them over to an unapproving mind, to work those things whichare not suitable. " After drawing a fearful picture of the darkness anddepravity of the heathen, the Apostle adds, "Who, _though they_ KNOW_the law of God_, that they who practise such things are worthy ofdeath, not only do them, but even are well pleased with those whopractise them. "[379] The obvious and direct teaching of this passage isthat the heathen, in the midst of their depravity and idolatry, are notutterly ignorant of God; "they _know_ God"--"they _know_ the law of God"--"they worship Him, " though they worship the creature _more than_ Him. They know God, and are unwilling to "acknowledge God. " "They know therighteousness of God, " and are "haters of God" on account of his purity;and their worshipping of idols does not proceed from ignorance of God, from an intellectual inability to know God, but from "corruption ofheart, " and a voluntary choice of, and a "pleasure" in, the sinfulpractices accompanying idol worship. Therefore, argues the Apostle, theyare "without excuse. " The whole drift and aim of the argument of Paulis, not to show that the heathen were, by their depravity, incapacitatedto know God, but that because they knew God and knew his righteous law, therefore their depravity and licentiousness was "inexcusable. "

[Footnote 379: Romans, ch. I. Ver. 23-32. ]

We conclude our review of opposing schools by the re-affirmation of ourposition, _that God is cognizable by human reason. _ The human mind, under the guidance of necessary laws of thought, is able, from the factsof the universe, to affirm the existence of God, and to attain somevalid knowledge of his character and will. Every attempt to solve thegreat problem of existence, to offer an explanation of the phenomenalworld, or to explore the fundamental idea of reason, when fairly andfully conducted, has resulted in the recognition of a Supreme_Intelligence_, a personal _Mind_ and _Will_, as the ground, and reason, and cause of all existence. A survey of the history of Greek Philosophywill abundantly sustain this position, and to this we shall, insubsequent chapters, invite the reader's attention. 

CHAPTER VIII. 

THE PHILOSOPHERS OF ATHENS. 

PRE-SOCRATIC SCHOOL. 

SENSATIONAL:THALES--ANAXIMENES--HERACLITUS--ANAXIMANDER--LEUCIPPUS--DEMOCRITUS. 

 "Then certain philosophers of the Epicureans and of the Stoics encountered Paul. "--Acts xvii. 18. 

 "Plato affirms that this is the most just cause of the creation of the world, that works which are good should be wrought by the God who is good; whether he had read these things in the Bible, or whether by his penetrating genius he beheld _the invisible things of God as understood by the things which are made_"--ST. AUGUSTINE, "De Civ. Dei, " lib. Xi. Ch. 21. 

Of all the monuments of the greatness of Athens which have survived thechanges and the wastes of time, the most perfect and the most enduringis her philosophy. The Propylæa, the Parthenon, and the Erechtheum, those peerless gems of Grecian architecture, are now in ruins. Themagnificent sculpture of Phidias, which adorned the pediment, and outercornice, and inner frieze of these temples, and the unrivalled statuaryof gods and heroes which crowded the platform of the Acropolis, makingit an earthly Olympus, are now no more, save a few broken fragmentswhich have been carried to other lands, and, in their exile, tell themournful story of the departed grandeur of their ancient home. Thebrazen statue of Minerva, cast from the spoils of Marathon, which rosein giant grandeur above the buildings of the Acropolis, and the flashingof whose helmet plumes was seen by the mariner as soon as he had roundedthe Sunian promontory; and that other brazen Pallas, called, bypre-eminence, "the Beautiful;" and the enormous Colossus of ivory and ofgold, "the Immortal Maid"--the protecting goddess of theParthenon--these have perished. But whilst the fingers of time havecrumbled the Pentelic marble, and the glorious statuary has been brokento pieces by vandal hands, and the gold and brass have been melted inthe crucibles of needy monarchs and converted into vulgar money, thephilosophic _thought_ of Athens, which culminated in the dialectic ofPlato, still survives. Not one of all the vessels, freighted withimmortal thought, which Plato launched upon the stream of time, hasfoundered. And after the vast critical movement of European thoughtduring the past two centuries, in which all philosophic systems havebeen subjected to the severest scrutiny, the _method_ of Plato stillpreserves, if not its exclusive authority unquestioned, at least itsintellectual pre-eminence unshaken. "Platonism is immortal, because itsprinciples are immortal in the human intellect and heart. "[380]

[Footnote 380: Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy, " vol. Ii. P. 9. ]

Philosophy is, then, the world-enduring monument of the greatness andthe glory of Athens. Whilst Greece will be forever memorable as "thecountry of wisdom and of wise men, " Athens will always be pre-eminentlymemorable as the University of Greece. This was the home of Socrates, and Plato, and Aristotle--the three imperial names which, for twentycenturies, reigned supreme in the world of philosophic thought. Hereschools of philosophy were founded to which students were attracted fromevery part of the civilized world, and by which an impulse and adirection was given to human thought in every land and in every age. Standing on the Acropolis at Athens, and looking over the city and theopen country, the Apostle would see these _places_ which are inseparablyassociated with the names of the men who have always been recognized asthe great teachers of the pagan world, and who have also exerted apowerful influence upon Christian minds of every age. "In oppositedirections he would see the suburbs where Plato and Aristotle, the twopupils of Socrates, held their illustrious schools. The streamless bedof the Ilissus passes between the Acropolis and Hymettus in asouth-westerly direction, until it vanishes in the low ground whichseparates the city from the Piræus. " Looking towards the upper part ofthis channel, Paul would see gardens of plane-trees and thickets ofangus-castus, "with other torrent-loving shrubs of Greece. " Near thebase of Lycabettus was a sacred inclosure which Pericles had ornamentedwith fountains. Here stood a statue of Apollo Lycius, which gave thename to the _Lyceum_. Here, among the plane-trees, Aristotle _walked_, and, as he walked, taught his disciples. Hence the name Peripatetics(the Walkers), which has always designated the disciples of theStagirite philosopher. 

On the opposite side of the city, the most beautiful of the Atheniansuburbs, we have the scene of Plato's teaching. Beyond the outerCeramicus, which was crowded with the sepulchres of those Athenians whohad fallen in battle, and were buried at the public expense, the eye ofPaul would rest on the favored stream of the Cephisus, flowing towardsthe west. On the banks of this stream the _Academy_ was situated. Awall, built at great expense by Hipparchus, surrounded it, and Cimonplanted long avenues of trees and erected fountains. Beneath theplane-trees which shaded the numerous walks there assembled themaster-spirits of the age. This was the favorite resort of poets andphilosophers. Here the divine spirit of Plato poured forth its sublimestspeculations in streams of matchless eloquence; and here he founded aschool which was destined to exert a powerful and perennial influence onhuman minds and hearts in all coming time. 

Looking down from the Acropolis upon the Agora, Paul would distinguish acloister or colonnade. This is the Stoa Pœcile, or "Painted Porch, " socalled because its walls were decorated with fresco paintings of thelegendary wars of Greece, and the more glorious struggle at Marathon. Itwas here that Zeno first opened that celebrated school which thencereceived the name of _Stoic_. The site of the _garden_ where Epicurustaught is now unknown. It was no doubt within the city walls, and notfar distant from the Agora. It was well known in the time of Cicero, whovisited Athens as a student little more than a century before theApostle. It could not have been forgotten in the time of Paul. In this"tranquil garden, " in the society of his friends, Epicurus passed a lifeof speculation and of pleasure. His disciples were called, after him, the Epicureans. [381]

[Footnote 381: See Conybeare and Howson's "Life and Epistles of St. Paul, " vol. I. , Lewes's "Biographical History of Philosophy;" andEncyclopædia Britannica, article, "Athens, " from whence our materialsfor the description of these "places" are mainly derived. ]

Here, then, in Athens the Apostle was brought into immediate contactwith all the phases of philosophic thought which had appeared in theancient world. "Amongst those who sauntered beneath the cool shadows ofthe plane-trees in the Agora, and gathered in knots under the porticoes, eagerly discussing the questions of the day, were the philosophers, inthe garb of their several sects, ready for any new question on whichthey might exercise their subtlety or display their rhetoric. " If therewere any in that motley group who cherished the principles and retainedthe spirit of the true Platonic school, we may presume they felt aninward intellectual sympathy with the doctrine enounced by Paul. WithPlato, "philosophy was only another name for _religion_: philosophy isthe love of perfect Wisdom; perfect Wisdom and perfect Goodness areidentical: the perfect Good is God himself; philosophy is the love ofGod. "[382] He confessed the need of divine assistance to attain "thegood, " and of divine interposition to deliver men from moral ruin. [383]Like Socrates, he longed for a supernatural--a divine light to guidehim, and he acknowledged his need thereof continually. [384] He was oneof those who, in heathen lands, waited for "the desire of nations;" and, had he lived in Christian times, no doubt his "spirit of faith" wouldhave joyfully "embraced the Saviour in all the completeness of hisrevelation and advent. "[385] And in so far as the spirit of Platosurvived among his disciples, we may be sure they were not among thenumber who "mocked, " and ridiculed, and opposed the "new doctrine"proclaimed by Paul. It was "the philosophers of the Epicureans and ofthe Stoics who _encountered_ Paul. " The leading tenets of both thesesects were diametrically opposed to the doctrines of Christianity. Theruling spirit of each was alien from the spirit of Christ. The haughty_pride_ of the Stoic, the Epicurean abandonment to _pleasure_, placedthem in direct antagonism to him who proclaimed the crucified and risenChrist to be "_the wisdom_ of God. "

[Footnote 382: Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy, " vol. Ii. P. 61. ]

[Footnote 383: "Republic, " bk. Vi. Ch. Vi. Vii. ]

[Footnote 384: Butler's "Lectures, " vol. I. P. 362. ]

[Footnote 385: Wheedon on "The Will, " p. 352; also Butler's "Lectures, "vol. Ii. P. 252]

If, however, we would justly appreciate the relation of pagan philosophyto Christian truth, we must note that, when Paul arrived in Athens, theage of Athenian glory had passed away. Not only had her nationalgreatness waned, and her national spirit degenerated, but herintellectual power exhibited unmistakable signs of exhaustion, andweakness, and decay. If philosophy had borne any fruit, of course thatfruit remained. If, in the palmy days of Athenian greatness, any fieldof human inquiry had been successfully explored; if human reason hadachieved any conquests; if any thing true and good had been obtained, that must endure as an heir-loom for all coming time; and if thosecenturies of agonizing wrestlings with nature, and of ceaselessquestioning of the human heart, had yielded no results, then, at least, the _lesson_ of their failure and defeat remained for the instruction offuture generations. Either the problems they sought to solve were provedto be insoluble, or their methods of solution were found to beinadequate; for here the mightiest minds had grappled with the greatproblems of being and of destiny. Here vigorous intellects had struggledto pierce the darkness which hangs alike over the beginning and the endof human existence. Here profoundly earnest men had questioned nature, reason, antiquity, oracles, in the hope they might learn something ofthat invisible world of _real_ being which they instinctively felt mustlie beneath the world of fleeting forms and ever-changing appearances. Here philosophy had directed her course towards every point in thecompass of thought, and touched every _accessible_ point. The sun ofhuman reason had reached its zenith, and illuminated every field thatlay within the reach of human ken. And this sublime era of Greekphilosophy is of inestimable value to us who live in Christian times, because _it is an exhaustive effort of human reason to solve the problemof being_, and in its history we have a record of the power and weaknessof the human mind, at once on the grandest scale and in the fairestcharacters. [386]

[Footnote 386: See article "Philosophy, " in Smith's "Dictionary of theBible. "]

These preliminary considerations will have prepared the way for, andawakened in our minds a profound interest in, the inquiry--1st. Whatpermanent _results_ has Greek philosophy bequeathed to the world? 2d. Inwhat manner did Greek philosophy fulfill for Christianity a_propœdeutic_ office?

It will at once be obvious, even to those who are least conversant withour theme, that it would be fruitless to attempt the answer to theseimportant questions before we have made a careful survey of the entirehistory of philosophic thought in Greece. We must have a clear anddefinite conception of the problems they sought to solve, and we mustcomprehend their methods of inquiry, before we can hope to appreciatethe results they reached, or determine whether they did arrive at anydefinite and valuable conclusions. It will, therefore, devolve upon usto present a brief and yet comprehensive epitome of the history ofGrecian speculative thought. 

"_Philosophy_, " says Cousin, "_is reflection_, and nothing else thanreflection, in a vast form"--"Reflection elevated to the rank andauthority of a _method_. " It is the mind looking back upon its ownsensations, perceptions, cognitions, ideas, and from thence to the_causes_ of these sensations, cognitions, and ideas. It is thoughtpassing beyond the simple perceptions of things, beyond the merespontaneous operations of the mind in the cognition of things to seekthe _ground_, and _reason_, and _law_ of things. It is the effort ofreason to solve the great problem of "Being and Becoming, " of appearanceand reality, of the changeful and the permanent. Beneath the endlessdiversity of the universe, of existence and action, there must be aprinciple of unity; below all fleeting appearances there must be apermanent substance; beyond this everlasting flow and change, thisbeginning and ending of finite existence, there must be an _eternalbeing_, the source and cause of all we see and know, _What is thatprinciple of unity, that permanent substance_, or principle, or being?

This fundamental question has assumed three separate forms or aspects inthe history of philosophy. These forms have been determined by theobjective phenomena which most immediately arrested and engaged theattention of men. If external nature has been the chief object ofattention, then the problem of philosophy has been, _What is theἀρχή--_the beginning; what are the first principles_--the elements fromwhich, the ideas or laws according to which, the efficient cause orenergy by which, and the reason or end for which the universe exists?_During this period reflective thought was a PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE. If thephenomena of mind--the opinions, beliefs, judgments of men--are thechief object of attention, then the problem of philosophy has been, _What are the fundamental Ideas which are unchangeable and permanentamid all the diversities of human opinions, connecting appearance withreality, and constituting a ground of certain knowledge or absolutetruth?_ Reflective thought is now a PHILOSOPHY OF IDEAS. Then, lastly, if the practical activities of life and the means of well-being be thegrand object of attention, then the problem of philosophy has been, _What is the ultimate standard by which, amid all the diversities ofhuman conduct, we may determine what is right and good in individual, social, and political life?_ And now reflective thought is a PHILOSOPHYOF LIFE. These are the grand problems with which philosophy has grappledever since the dawn of reflection. They all appear in Greek philosophy, and have a marked chronology. As systems they succeed each other, justas rigorously as the phenomena of Greek civilization. 

The Greek schools of philosophy have been classified from various pointsof view. In view of their geographical relations, they have been dividedinto the _Ionian_, the _Italian_, the _Eleatic_, the _Athenian_, and the_Alexandrian_. In view of their prevailing spirit and tendency, theyhave been classified by Cousin as the Sensational, the Idealistic, theSkeptical, and the Mystical. The most natural and obvious method is thatwhich (regarding Socrates as the father of Greek philosophy in thetruest sense) arranges all schools from the Socratic stand point, andtherefore in the chronological order of development:

 I. THE PRE-SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. II. THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. III. THE POST-SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. 

The history of philosophy is thus divided into three grand epochs. Thefirst reaching from Thales to the time of Socrates (B. C. 639-469): thesecond from the birth of Socrates to the death of Aristotle (B. C. 469-322); the third from the death of Aristotle to the Christian era(B. C. 322, A. D. 1). Greek philosophy during the first period was almostexclusively a philosophy of nature; during the second period, aphilosophy of mind; during the last period, a philosophy of life. Nature, man, and society complete the circle of thought. Successivesystems, of course, overlap each other, both in the order of time and assubjects of human speculation; and the results of one epoch of thoughtare transmitted to and appropriated by another; but, in a general sense, the order of succession has been very much as here indicated. Settingaside minor schools and merely incidental discussions, and fixing ourattention on the general aspects of each historic period, we shalldiscover that the first period was eminently _Physical_, the second_Psychological_, the last _Ethical_. Every stage of progress whichreason, on _à priori_ grounds, would suggest as the natural order ofthought, or of which the development of an individual mind would furnishan analogy, had a corresponding realization in the development ofGrecian thought from the time of Thales to the Christian era. "Thought, "says Cousin, "in the first trial of its strength is drawn without. " Thefirst object which engages the attention of the child is the outerworld. He asks the "_how_" and "_why_" of all he sees. His reason urgeshim to seek an explanation of the universe. So it was in the _childhood_of philosophy. The first essays of human thought were, almost withoutexception, discourses περὶ φύσεως (De rerum natura), of the nature ofthings. Then the rebound of baffled reason from the impenetrablebulwarks of the universe drove the mind back upon itself. If the youthcan not interpret nature, he can at least "know himself, " and findwithin himself the ground and reason of all existence. There are"_ideas_" in the human mind which are copies of those "_archetypalideas_" which dwell in the Creative Mind, and after which the universewas built. If by "analysis" and "definition" these universal notions canbe distinguished from that which is particular and contingent in theaggregate of human knowledge, then so much of eternal truth has beenattained. The achievements of philosophic thought in this direction, during the Socratic age, have marked it as the most brilliant period inthe history of philosophy--the period of its _youthful_ vigor. Deeplyimmersed in the practical concerns and conflicts of public life, _manhood_ is mainly occupied with questions of personal duty, andindividual and social well-being. And so, during the hopeless turmoil ofcivil disturbance which marked the decline of national greatness inGrecian history, philosophy was chiefly occupied with questions ofpersonal interest and personal happiness. The poetic enthusiasm withwhich a nobler age had longed for _truth_, and sought it as the highestgood, has all disappeared, and now one sect seeks refuge from the stormsand agitations of the age in Stoical indifference, the other inEpicurean effeminacy. 

If now we have succeeded in presenting the real problem of philosophy, it will at once be obvious that the inquiry was not, in any propersense, _theological_. Speculative thought, during the period we havemarked as the era of Greek philosophy, was not an inquiry concerning theexistence or nature of God, or concerning the relations of man to God, or the duties which man owes to God. These questions were all remittedto the _theologian_. There was a clear line of demarkation separatingthe domains of religion and philosophy. Religion rested solely onauthority, and appealed to the instinctive faith of the human heart. Shepermitted no encroachment upon her settled usages, and no questioning ofher ancient beliefs. Philosophy rested on reason alone. It was anindependent effort of thought to interpret nature, and attain thefundamental grounds of human knowledge--to find an ἀρχή--a firstprinciple, which, being assumed, should furnish a rational explanationof all existence. If philosophy reach the conclusion that the άρχή waswater, or air, or fire, or a chaotic mixture of all the elements oratoms, extended and self-moved, or monads, or τὸ πᾶν, or uncreated mind, and that conclusion harmonized with the ancient standards of religiousfaith--well; if not, philosophy must present some method ofconciliation. The conflicts of faith and reason; the stragglings oftraditional authority to maintain supremacy; the accommodations andconciliations attempted in those primitive times, would furnish achapter of peculiar interest, could it now be written. 

The poets who appeared in the dim twilight of Greciancivilization--Orpheus, Musæus, Homer, Hesiod--seem to have occupied thesame relation to the popular mind in Greece which the Bible now sustainsto Christian communities. [387] Not that we regard them as standing onequal ground of authority, or in any sense a revelation. But, in the eyeof the wondering Greek, they were invested with the highest sacrednessand the supremest authority. The high poetic inspiration which pervadedthem was a supernatural gift. Their sublime utterances were accepted asproceeding from a divine afflatus. They were the product of an age inwhich it was believed by all that the gods assumed a human form, [388]and held a real intercourse with gifted men. This universal faith isregarded by some as being a relic of still more distant times, a faintremembrance of the glory of patriarchal days. The more natural opinionis, that it was begotten of that universal longing of the human heartfor some knowledge of that unseen world of real being, which maninstinctively felt must lie beyond the world of fleeting change anddelusive appearances. It was a prolepsis of the soul, reaching upwardtowards its source and goal. The poet felt within him some nativeaffinities therewith, and longed for some stirring breath of heaven tosweep the harp-strings of the soul. He invoked the inspiration of theGoddess of Song, and waited for, no doubt believed in, some "deificimpulse" descending on him. And the people eagerly accepted hisutterance as the teaching of the gods. They were too eager for someknowledge from that unseen world to question their credentials. Orpheus, Hesiod, Homer, were the θεολόγοι--the theologians of that age. [389]

[Footnote 387: "Homer was, in a certain sense, the Bible of theGreeks. "--Whewell, "Platonic Dialogues, " p. 283. ]

[Footnote 388: The universality of this belief is asserted by Cicero:"Vetus opinio est, jam usque ab heroicis ducta temporibus, eaque etpopuli Romani et omnium gentium firmata consensu, versari quandem interhomines divinationem. "--Cicero, "De Divin. " bk. I. Ch. I. ]

[Footnote 389: Cicero. ]

These ancient poems, then, were the public documents of the religion ofGreece--the repositories of the national faith. And it is deserving ofespecial note that the philosopher was just as anxious to sustain hisspeculations by quoting the high traditional authority of the ancienttheologian, as the propounder of modern novelties is to sustain hisnotions by the authority of the Sacred Scriptures. Numerous examples ofthis solicitude will recur at once to the remembrance of the student ofPlato. All encroachments of philosophy upon the domains of religion werewatched as jealously in Athens in the sixth century before Christ, asthe encroachments of science upon the fields of theology were watched inRome in the seventeenth century after Christ. The court of the Areopaguswas as earnest, though not as fanatical and cruel, in the defense of theancient faith, as the court of the Inquisition was in the defense of thedogmas of the Romish Church. The people, also, as "the sacred wars" ofGreece attest, were ready quickly to repel every assault upon themajesty of their religion. And so philosophy even had its martyrs. Thetears of Pericles were needed to save Aspasia, because she was suspectedof philosophy. But neither his eloquence nor his tears could save hisfriend Anaxagoras, and he was ostracized. Aristotle had the greatestdifficulty to save his life. And Plato was twice imprisoned, and oncesold into slavery. [390]

[Footnote 390: Cousin's "Lectures on the History of Philosophy, " vol. I. P. 305. ]

It is unnecessary that we should, in this place, again attempt thedelineation of the theological opinions of the earlier periods ofGrecian civilization. That the ancient Greeks believed in _one SupremeGod_ has been conclusively proved by Cudworth. The argument of hisfourth chapter is incontrovertible. [391] However great the number of"generated gods" who crowded the Olympus, and composed the ghostly arrayof Greek mythology, they were all subordinate agents, "demiurges, "employed in the framing of the world and all material things, or elsethe ministers of the moral and providential government of the εἷς θεὸςἀγέντος--the one uncreated God. Beneath, or beyond the whole system ofpagan polytheism, we recognize a faith in an _Uncreated Mind_, theSource of all the intelligence, and order, and harmony which pervadesthe universe the Fountain of law and justice; the Ruler of the world;the Avenger of injured innocence; and the final Judge of men. Theimmortality of the soul and a state of future retribution were necessarycorollaries of this sublime faith. This primitive theology wasunquestionably the people's faith; the faith, also, of the philosopher, in his inmost heart, however far he might wander in speculative thought. The instinctive feeling of the human heart, the spontaneous intuitionsof the human reason, have led man, in every age, to recognize a God. Itis within the fields of speculative thought that skepticism has had itsbirth. Any thing like atheism has only made its appearance amid theefforts of human reason to explain the universe. The native sentimentsof the heart and the spontaneous movements of the reason have alwaysbeen towards faith, that is, towards "a religious movement of thesoul. "[392] Unbridled speculative thought, which turns towards the outerworld alone, and disregards "the voices of the soul, " tends towards_doubt_ and irreligion. But, as Cousin has said, "a completeextravagance, a total delusion (except in case of real derangement), isimpossible. " "Beneath reflection there is still spontaneity, when thescholar has denied the existence of a God; listen to the man, interrogate him unawares, and you will see that all his words betray theidea of a God, and that faith in a God is, without his recognition, atthe bottom of his heart. "[393]

[Footnote 391: "Intellectual System of the Universe;" see also ch. Iii. , "On the Religion of the Athenians. "]

[Footnote 392: Cousin's "Hist. Of Philos. , " vol. I. P. 22. ]

[Footnote 393: Id. , ib. , vol. I. P. 137. ]

Let us not, therefore, be too hasty in representing the earlyphilosophers as destitute of the idea of a God, because in the imperfectand fragmentary representations which are given us of the philosophicalopinions of Thales, and Anaximenes, and Heraclitus, and Diogenes ofApollonia, we find no explicit allusions to the _Uncreated Mind_ as thefirst principle and cause of all. A few sentences will comprehend thewhole of what remains of the opinions of the earliest philosophers, andthese were transmitted for ages by _oral_ tradition. To Plato andAristotle we are chiefly indebted for a stereotype of those scattered, fragmentary sentences which came to their hands through the dim anddistorting medium of more than two centuries. Surely no one imaginesthese few sentences contain and sum up the results of a lifetime ofearnest thought, or represent all the opinions and beliefs of theearliest philosophers! And should we find therein no recognition of apersonal God, would it not be most unfair and illogical to assert thatthey were utterly ignorant of a God, or wickedly denied his being? Ifthey say "there is no God, " then they are foolish Atheists; if they aresilent on that subject, we have a right to assume they were Theists, forit is most natural to believe in God. And yet it has been quitecustomary for Christian teachers, after the manner of some Patristicwriters, to deny to those early sages the smallest glimpse of underivedand independent knowledge of a Divine Being, in their zeal to assert forthe Sacred Scriptures the exclusive prerogative of revealing Him. 

Now in regard to the theological opinions of the Greek philosophers, weshall venture this general _lemma_--_the majority of them recognized an"incorporeal substance"_[394]_ an uncreated Intelligence, an ordering, governing Mind_. Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus, who wereMaterialists, are perhaps the only exceptions. Many of them werePantheists, in the higher form of Pantheism, which, though it associatesthe universe with its framer and mover, still makes "the movingprinciple" superior to that which is moved. The world was a livingorganism, "Whose body nature is, and God the soul. "

Unquestionably most on them recognized the existence of _two_ firstprinciples, substances essentially distinct, which had co-existed frometernity--an incorporeal Deity and matter. [395] We grant that the freeproduction of a universe by a creative fiat--the calling of matter intobeing by a simple act of omnipotence--is not elementary to human reason. The famous physical axiom of antiquity, "_De nihilo nihil, in nihilumposse reverti"_ under one aspect, may be regarded as the expression ofthe universal consciousness of a mental inability to conceive a creationout of nothing, or an annihilation. [396] "We can not conceive, either, on the one hand, nothing becoming something, or something becomingnothing, on the other hand. When God is said to create the universe outof nothing, we think this by supposing that he evolves the universe outof himself; and in like manner, we conceive annihilation only byconceiving the Creator to withdraw his creation from actuality intopower. "[397] "It is by _faith_ we understand the worlds were framed bythe _word of God_, so that things which are were not made from thingswhich do appear"--that is, from pre-existent matter. 

[Footnote 394: "Οὐσίαν ἀσώματον. "--Plato. ]

[Footnote 395: Cudworth's "Intellectual System, " vol. I. P. 269. ]

[Footnote 396: Mansell's "Limits of Religious Thought, " p. 100. ]

[Footnote 397: Sir William Hamilton's "Discussions on Philosophy, " p. 575. ]

Those writers[398] are, therefore, clearly in error who assert that theearliest question of Greek philosophy was, What is God? and that variousand discordant answers were given, Thales saying, water is God, Anaximenes, air; Heraclitus, fire; Pythagoras, numbers; and so on. Theidea of God is a native intuition of the mind. It springs upspontaneously from the depths of the human soul. The human mindnaturally recognizes God as an uncreated Mind, and recognizes itself as"the offspring of God. " And, therefore, it is simply impossible for itto acknowledge water, or air, or fire, or any material thing to be itsGod. Now they who reject this fundamental principle evidentlymisapprehend the real problem of early Grecian philosophic thought. Theexternal world, the material universe, was the first object of theirinquiry, and the method of their inquiry was, at the first stage, purelyphysical. Every object of sense had a beginning and an end; it rose outof something, and it fell back into something. Beneath this ceaselessflow and change there must be some permanent principle. What is thatστοιχεῖον--that first element? The changes in the universe seem to obeysome principle of law--they have an orderly succession. What is thatμορφή--that form, or ideal, or archetype, proper to each thing, andaccording to which all things are produced? These changes must beproduced by some efficient cause, some power or being which is itselfimmobile, and permanent, and eternal, and adequate to their production. What is that ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως--that first principle of movement Then, lastly, there must be an end for which all things exist--a good reasonwhy things are as they are, and not otherwise. What is that τὸ οὗ ἕνεκενκαῖ τὸ ἀγαθόν--that reason and good of all things? Now these are allἀρχαί or first principles of the universe. "Common to all firstprinciples, " says Aristotle, "is the being, the original, from which athing is, or is produced, or is known. "[399] First principles, therefore, include both elements and causes, and, under certain aspects, elements are also causes, in so far as they are that without which athing can not be produced. Hence that highest generalization byAristotle of all first principles; as--1. The Material Cause; 2. TheFormal Cause; 3. The Efficient Cause; 4. The Final Cause. The grandsubject of inquiry in ancient philosophy was not alone what is the final_element_ from which all things have been produced? nor yet what is the_efficient cause_ of the movement and the order of the universe? _butwhat are those First Principles which, being assumed, shall furnish arational explanation of all phenomena, of all becoming?_

[Footnote 398: As the writer of the article "Attica, " in theEncyclopædia Britannica. ]

[Footnote 399: "Metaphysics, " bk. Iv. Ch. I. P. 112 (Bohn's edition). ]

So much being premised, we proceed to consider the efforts and theresults of philosophic thought in

THE PRE-SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. 

"The first act in the drama of Grecian speculation was performed on thevaried theatre of the Grecian colonies--Asiatic, insular, and Italian, verging at length (in Anaxagoras) towards Athens. " During the progressof this drama two distinct schools of philosophy were developed, havingdistinct geographical provinces, one on the east, the other on the west, of the peninsula of Greece, and deriving their names from the localitiesin which they flourished. The earliest was the _Ionian;_ the latter wasthe _Italian_ school. 

It would be extremely difficult, at this remote period, to estimate theinfluence which geographical conditions and ethnical relations exertedin determining the course of philosophic thought in these schools. Unquestionably those conditions contributed somewhat towards fixingtheir individuality. At the same time, it must be granted that thedistinction in these two schools of philosophy is of a deeper characterthan can be represented or explained by geographical surroundings; it isa distinction reaching to the very foundation of their habits ofthought. These schools represent two distinct aspects of philosophicthought, two distinct methods in which the human mind has essayed tosolve the problem of the universe. 

The ante-Socratic schools were chiefly occupied with the study ofexternal nature. "Greek philosophy was, at its first appearance, aphilosophy of nature. " It was an effort of the reason to reach a "firstprinciple" which should explain the universe. This early attempt waspurely speculative. It sought to interpret all phenomena by_hypotheses_, that is, by suppositions, more or less plausible, suggested by physical analogies or by _à priori_ rational conceptions. 

Now there are two distinct aspects under which nature presents itself tothe observant mind. The first and most obvious is the _simple phenomena_as perceived by the senses. The second is the _relations_ of_phenomena_, cognized by the reason alone. Let phenomena, which areindeed the first objects of perception, continue to be the chief andalmost exclusive object of thought, and philosophy is on the highway ofpure physics. On the other hand, instead of stopping at phenomena, lettheir relations become the sole object of thought, and philosophy is nowon the road of purely mathematical or metaphysical abstraction. Thus twoschools of philosophy are developed, the one SENSATIONAL, the otherIDEALIST. Now these, it will be found, are the leading andcharacteristic tendencies of the two grand divisions of the pre-Socraticschools; the Ionian is _sensational_, the Italian is _idealist_. 

These two schools have again been the subject of a further subdivisionbased upon diverse habits of thought. The Ionian school sought toexplain the universe by _physical analogies. _ Of these there are twoclear and obvious divisions--analogies suggested by living organisms, and analogies suggested by mechanical arrangements. One class ofphilosophers in the Ionian school laid hold on the first analogy. Theyregarded the world as a living being, spontaneously evolving itself--avital organism whose successive developments and transformationsconstitute all visible phenomena. A second class laid hold on theanalogy suggested by mechanical arrangements. For them the universe wasa grand superstructure, built up from elemental particles, arranged andunited by some ab-extra power or force, or else aggregated by someinherent mutual affinity. Thus we have two sects of the Ionian school;the first, _Dynamical_ or vital; the second, _Mechanical_. [400]

[Footnote 400: Ritter's "Ancient Philosophy, " vol. I. Pp. 191, 192. ]

The Italian school sought to explain the universe by rationalconceptions and _à priori_ ideas. Now to those who seek, by simplereflection, to investigate the relations of the external world thismarked distinction will present itself: some are relations _between_sensible phenomena--relations of time, of place, of number, ofproportion, and of harmony; others are relations _of_ phenomena toessential being--relations of qualities to substance, of becoming tobeing, of the finite to the infinite. The former constituted the fieldof Pythagorean the latter of Eleatic contemplation. The Pythagoreanssought to explain the universe by numbers, forms, and harmonies; theEleatics by the _à priori_ ideas of unity, substance, Being _in se_, theInfinite. Thus were constituted a _Mathematical_ and a _Metaphysical_sect in the Italian school. The pre-Socratic schools may, therefore, betabulated in the following order:

 I. IONIAN (Sensational), (1. ) PHYSICAL {Dynamical or Vital. {Mechanical. 

 II. Italian (Idealist), {(2. ) MATHEMATICAL Pythagoreans. {(3. ) METAPHYSICAL Eleatics. 

I. _The Ionian or Physical School. _--We have premised that thephilosophers of this school attempted the explanation of the universe byphysical analogies. 

One class of these early speculators, the _Dynamical_, or vitaltheorists, proceeded on the supposition of a living energy infolded innature, which in its spontaneous development continuously undergoesalteration both of quality and form. This imperfect analogy is the firsthypothesis of childhood. The child personifies the stone that hurts him, and his first impulse is to resent the injury as though he imagined itto be endowed with consciousness, and to be acting with design. Thechildhood of superstition (whose genius is multiplicity) personifieseach individual existence--a rude Fetichism, which imagines asupernatural power and presence enshrined in every object of nature, inevery plant, and stock, and stone. The childhood of philosophy (whosegenius is unity) personifies the universe. It regards the earth as onevast organism, animated by one soul, and this soul of the world as a"created god. "[401] The first efforts of philosophy were, therefore, simply an attempt to explain the universe in harmony with the populartheological beliefs. The cosmogonies of the early speculators in theIonian school were an elaboration of the ancient theogonies, but stillan elaboration conducted under the guidance of that law of thought whichconstrains man to seek for _unity_, and reduce the many to the one. 

Therefore, in attempting to construct a theory of the universe theycommenced by postulating an ἀρχή--a first principle or element out ofwhich, by a _vital_ process, all else should be produced. "Accordingly, whatever seemed the most subtle or pliable, as well as _universal_element in the mass of the visible world, was marked as the seminalprinciple whose successive developments and transformations produced allthe rest. "[402] With this seminal principle the living, _animating_principle seems to have been associated--in some instances perhapsconfounded, and in most instances called by the same name. And havingpursued this analogy so far, we shall find the _most decided andconclusive_ evidence of a tendency to regard the soul of man as similar, in its nature, to the soul which animates the world. 

[Footnote 401: Plato's "Laws, " bk. X. Ch. I. ; "Timæus, " ch. Xii. ]

[Footnote 402: Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy, " vol. 1. P. 292. ]

_Thales of Miletus_(B. C. 636-542) was the first to lead the way in theperilous inquiry after an ἀρχή, or first principle, which should furnisha rational explanation of the universe. Following, as it would seem, thegenealogy of Hesiod, he supposed _water_ to be the primal element out ofwhich all material things were produced. Aristotle supposes he wasimpressed with this idea from observing that all things are nourished bymoisture; warmth itself, he declared, proceeded from moisture; the seedsof all things are moist; water, when condensed, becomes earth. 

Thus convinced of the universal presence of water, he declared it to bethe first principle of things. [403]

And now, from this brief statement of the Thalean physics, are we toconclude that he recognized only a _material_ cause of the universe?Such is the impression we receive from the reading of the First Book ofAristotle's Metaphysics. His evident purpose is to prove that the firstphilosophers of the Ionian school did not recognize an _efficient_cause. In his opinion, they were decidedly materialistic. Now toquestion the authority of Aristotle may appear to many an act ofpresumption. But Aristotle was not infallible; and nothing is morecertain than that in more than one instance he does great injustice tohis predecessors. [404] To him, unquestionably, belongs the honor ofhaving made a complete and exhaustive classification of causes, butthere certainly does appear something more than vanity in the assumptionthat he, of all the Greek philosophers, was the only one who recognizedthem all. His sagacious classification was simply a resumè of the laborsof his predecessors. His "principles" or "causes" were incipient in thethought of the first speculators in philosophy. Their accuratedefinition and clearer presentation was the work of ages of analyticthought. The phrases "efficient, " "formal, " "final" cause, are, wegrant, peculiar to Aristotle; the ideas were equally the possession ofhis predecessors. 

[Footnote 403: Aristotle's "Metaphysics, " bk. I. Ch. Iii. ]

[Footnote 404: Lewes's "Biographical History of Philosophy, " p. 77;Cousin's "The True, the Beautiful, and the Good, " p. 77. ]

The evidence, we think, is conclusive that, with this primal element(water), Thales associated a formative principle of motion; to the"material" he added the "efficient" cause. A strong presumption in favorof this opinion is grounded on the psychological views of Thales. Theauthor of "De Placitis Philosophorum" associates him with Pythagoras andPlato, in teaching that the soul is incorporeal, making it naturallyself-active, and an intelligent substance. [405] And it is admitted byAristotle (rather unwillingly, we grant, but his testimony is all themore valuable on that account) that, in his time, the opinion that thesoul is a principle, ἀεικίνητον--ever moving, or essentiallyself-active, was currently ascribed to Thales. "If we may rely on thenotices of Thales, he too would seem to have conceived the soul as a_moving principle_. "[406] Extending this idea, that the soul is a movingprinciple, he held that all motion in the universe was due to thepresence of a living soul. "He is reported to have said that theloadstone possessed a soul because it could move iron. "[407] And hetaught that "the world itself is _animated_, and full of gods. "[408]"Some think that _soul_ and _life_ is mingled with the whole universe;and thence, perhaps, was that [opinion] of Thales that all things arefull of gods, "[409] portions, as Aristotle said, of the universal soul. These views are quite in harmony with the theology which makes the Deitythe moving energy of the universe--the energy which wrought thesuccessive transformations of the primitive aqueous element. They alsofurnish a strong corroboration of the positive statement ofCicero--"Aquam, dixit Thales, esse initium rerum, Deum autem eam mentemquæ ex aqua cuncta fingeret. " Thales said that water is the firstprinciple of things, but God was that mind which formed all things outof water;[410] as also that still more remarkable saying of Thales, recorded by Diogenes Laertius; "God is the most ancient of all things, for he had no birth; the world is the most beautiful of all things, forit is the workmanship of God. "[411] We are aware that some historians ofphilosophy reject the statement of Cicero, because, say they, "it doesviolence to the chronology of speculation. "[412] Following Hegel, theyassert that Thales could have no conception of God as Intelligence, since that is a conception of a more advanced philosophy. Such anopinion may be naturally expected from the philosopher who places God, not at the commencement, but at the _end_ of things, God becomingconscious and intelligent in humanity. If, then, Hegel teaches that Godhimself has had a progressive development, it is no wonder he shouldassert that the idea of God has also had an historic development, the_last_ term of which is an _intelligent God_. But he who believes thatthe idea of God as the infinite and the perfect is native to the humanmind, and that God stands at the beginning of the entire system ofthings, will feel there is a strong _à priori_ ground for the beliefthat Thales recognized the existence of an _intelligent God whofashioned the universe_. 

[Footnote 405: Cudworth's "Intellectual System, " vol. I. P. 71. ]

[Footnote 406: Aristotle, "De Anima, " i. 2, 17. ]

[Footnote 407: Id. , ib. , i. 2, 17. ]

[Footnote 408: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers, " p. 18(Bohn's ed. ). ]

[Footnote 409: Aristotle, "De Anima, " i. 17. ]

[Footnote 410: "De Natura Deor. , " bk. I. Ch. X. ]

[Footnote 411: "Lives, " etc. , p. 19. ]

[Footnote 412: Lewes's "Hist. Philos. , " p. 4. ]

_Anaximenes of Miletus_ (B. C. 529-480) we place next to Thales in theconsecutive history of thought. It has been usual to rank Anaximandernext to the founder of the Ionian School. The entire complexion of hissystem is, however, unlike that of a pupil of Thales. And we think acareful consideration of his views will justify our placing him at thehead of the Mechanical or Atomic division of the Ionian school. Anaximenes is the historical successor of Thales; he was unquestionablya vitalist. He took up the speculation where Thales had left it, and hecarried it a step forward in its development. [413]

Pursuing the same method as Thales, he was not, however, satisfied withthe conclusion he had reached. Water was not to Anaximenes the mostsignificant, neither was it the most universal element. But air seemeduniversally present. "The earth was a broad leaf resting upon it. Allthings were produced from it; all things were resolved into it. When hebreathed he drew in a part of this universal life. All things arenourished by air. "[414] Was not, therefore, _air_ the ἀρχή, or primalelement of things?

[Footnote 413: Ritter's "History of Ancient Philosophy, " vol. I. P. 203. ]

[Footnote 414: Lewes's "Biographical History of Philosophy, " p. 7. ]

This brief notice of the physical speculations of Anaximenes is all thathas survived of his opinions. We search in vain for some intimations ofhis theological views. On this merely negative ground, some writers haveunjustly charged him with Atheism. Were we to venture a conjecture, wewould rather say that there are indications of a tendency to Pantheismin that form of it which associates God necessarily with the universe, but does not utterly confound them. His fixing upon "_air_" as theprimal element, seems an effort to reconcile, in some apparentlyintermediate substance, the opposite qualities of corporeal andspiritual natures. Air is invisible, impalpable, all-penetrating, andyet in some manner appreciable to sense. May not the vitaltransformations of this element have produced all the rest? The writerof the Article on Anaximenes in the Encyclopædia Britannica tells us (onwhat ancient authorities he saith not) that "he asserted this air wasGod, since the divine power resides in it and agitates it. "

Some indications of the views of Anaximenes may perhaps be gathered fromthe teachings of Diogenes of Apollonia (B. C. 520-490, ) who was thedisciple, and is generally regarded as the commentator and expounder ofthe views of Anaximenes. The air of Diogenes was a soul; therefore itwas _living_, and not only living, but conscious and _intelligent_. "Itknows much, " says he; "for without _reason_ it would be impossible forall to be arranged duly and proportionately; and whatever objects weconsider will be found to be so arranged and ordered in the best andmost beautiful manner. "[415] Here we have a distinct recognition of thefundamental axiom that _mind is the only valid explanation of the orderand harmony which pervades the universe_. With Diogenes the firstprinciple is a "divine air, " which is vital, conscious, and intelligent, which spontaneously evolves itself, and which, by its ceaselesstransformations, produces all phenomena. The soul of man is a detachedportion of this divine element; his body is developed or evolvedtherefrom. The theology of Diogenes, and, as we believe, of his master, Anaximenes also, was a species of Materialistic Pantheism. 

[Footnote 415: Lewes's "Biographical History of Philosophy, " p. 8;Ritter's "History of Ancient Philosophy, " vol. I. P. 214. ]

_Heraclitus of Ephesus_(B. C. 503-420) comes next in the order ofspeculative thought. In his philosophy, _fire_ is the ἀρχή, or firstprinciple; but not fire in the usual acceptation of that term. TheHeraclitean "fire" is not flame, which is only an intensity of fire, buta warm, dry vapor--an _ether_, which may be illustrated, perhaps, by the"caloric" of modern chemistry. This "_ether_" was the primal element outof which the universe was formed; it was also a vital power or principlewhich animated the universe, and, in fact, the _cause_ of all itssuccessive phenomenal changes. "The world, " he said, "was neither madeby the gods nor men, and it was, and is, and ever shall be, an_ever-living fire_, in due proportion self-enkindled, and in due measureself-extinguished. "[416] The universe is thus reduced to "an eternalfire, " whose ceaseless energy is manifested openly in the work ofdissolution, and yet secretly, but universally, in the work ofrenovation. The phenomena of the universe are explained by Heraclitus as"the concurrence of opposite tendencies and efforts in the motions ofthis ever-living fire, out of which results the most beautiful harmony. This harmony of the world is one of conflicting impulses, like the lyreand the bow. The strife between opposite tendencies is the parent of allthings. All life is change, and change is strife. "[417]

[Footnote 416: Ritter's "History of Ancient Philosophy, " vol. I. P. 235. ]

[Footnote 417: Lewes's "Biographical History of Philosophy, " p. 70;Ritter's "History of Ancient Philosophy, " vol. I. P. 244. ]

Heraclitus was the first to proclaim the doctrine of the perpetualfluxion of the universe (τὸ ῥέον, τὸ γιγνόμενον--Unrest andDevelopment), the endless changes of matter, and the mutability andperishability of all individual things. This restless, changing flow ofthings, which never _are_, but always are _becoming_, he pronounced tobe the _One_ and the _All_. 

From this statement of the physical theory of Heraclitus we mightnaturally infer that he was a Hylopathean Atheist. Such an hypothesiswould not, however, be truthful or legitimate. On a more carefulexamination, his system will be found to stand half-way between thematerialistic and the spiritual conception of the Author of theuniverse, and marks, indeed, a transition from the one to the other. Heraclitus unquestionably held that all substance is material, for aphilosopher who proclaims, as he did, that the senses are the onlysource of knowledge, must necessarily attach himself to a materialelement as the primary one. And yet he seems to have _spiritualized_matter. "The moving unit of Heraclitus--the Becoming--is as immaterialas the resting unit of the Eleatics--the Being. "[418] The Heraclitean"_fire_" is endowed with _spiritual_ attributes. "Aristotle calls itψυχή--soul, and says that it is ἀσωματώτατον, or absolutely incorporeal("De Anima, " i. 2. 16). It is, in effect, the common ground of thephenomena both of mind and matter it is not only the animating, but alsothe intelligent and regulating principle of the universe; the ΞυνὸςΛόγος, or universal Word or Reason, which it behooves all men tofollow. "[419] The psychology of Heraclitus throws additional light uponhis theological opinions. With him human intelligence is a detachedportion of the Universal Reason. "Inhaling, " said he, "through thebreath the Universal Ether, which is Divine Reason, we becomeconscious. " The errors and imperfections of humanity are consequently tobe ascribed to a deficiency of the Divine Reason in man. Whilst, therefore, the theory of Heraclitus seems to materialize mind, it may, with equal fairness, be said to spiritualize matter. 

[Footnote 418: Zeller's "History of Greek Philosophy, " vol. I. P. 57. ]

[Footnote 419: Butler's "Lectures, " vol. I. P. 297, note. ]

The general inference, therefore, from all that remains of the doctrineof Heraclitus is that he was a Materialistic Pantheist. His God was aliving, rational, intelligent Ether--a soul pervading the universe. Theform of the universe, its ever-changing phenomena, were a necessaryemanation from, or a perpetual transformation of, this universal soul. 

With Heraclitus we close our survey of that sect of the physical schoolwhich regarded the world as a living organism. 

The second subdivision of the physical school, _the Mechanical_ or_Atomist theorists_, attempted the explanation of the universe byanalogies derived from mechanical collocations, arrangements, andmovements. The universe was regarded by them as a vast superstructurebuilt up from elemental particles, aggregated by some inherent force ormutual affinity. 

_Anaximander of Miletus_ (born B. C. 610) we place at the head of theMechanical sect of the Ionian school; first, on the authority ofAristotle, who intimates that the philosophic dogmata of Anaximander"resemble those of Democritus, " who was certainly an Atomist; and, secondly, because we can clearly trace a genetic connection between theopinions of Democritus and Leucippus and those of Anaximander. 

The ἀρχή, or first principle of Anaximander, was τὸ ἄπειρον, _theboundless, the illimitable, the infinite_. Some historians of philosophyhave imagined that the infinite of Anaximander was the "unlimited all, "and have therefore placed him at the head of the Italian or "idealisticschool. " These writers are manifestly in error. Anaximander wasunquestionably a sensationalist. Whatever his "infinite" may be found tobe, one thing is clear, it was not a "metaphysical infinite"--it did notinclude infinite power, much less infinite mind. 

The testimony of Aristotle is conclusive that by "the infinite"Anaximander understood the multitude of primary, material particles. Hecalls it "a μῖγμα, or mixture of elements. "[420] It was, in fact, a_chaos_--an original state in which the primary elements existed in achaotic combination without _limitation_ or division. He assumed acertain "_prima materia_, " which was neither air, nor water, nor fire, but a "mixture" of all, to be the first principle of the universe. Theaccount of the opinions of Anaximander which is given by Plutarch ("DePlacita, " etc. ) is a further confirmation of our interpretation of hisinfinite. "Anaximander, the Milesian, affirmed the infinite to be thefirst principle, and that all things are generated out of it, andcorrupted again into it. _His infinite is nothing else but matter. _""Whence, " says Cudworth, "we conclude that Anaximander's infinite wasnothing else but an infinite chaos of matter, in which were actually orpotentially contained all manner of qualities, by the fortuitoussecretion and segregation of which he supposed infinite worlds to besuccessively generated and corrupted. So that we may easily guess whenceLeucippus and Democritus had their infinite worlds, and perceive hownear akin these two Atheistic hypotheses were. "[421] The reader, whosecuriosity may lead him to consult the authorities collected by Cudworth(pp. 185-188), will find in the doctrine of Anaximander a rudeanticipation of the modern theories of "spontaneous generation" and "thetransmutation of species. " In the fragments of Anaximander that remainwe find no recognition of an ordering Mind, and his philosophy is thedawn of a Materialistic school. 

[Footnote 420: Aristotle's "Metaphysics, " bk. Xi. Ch. Ii. ]

[Footnote 421: Cudworth's "Intellectual System, " vol. I. Pp. 186, 187. ]

_Leucippus of Miletus_ (B. C. 500-400) appears, in the order ofspeculation, as the successor of Anaximander. _Atoms_ and _space_ are, in his philosophy, the ἀρχαί, or first principles of all things. "Leucippus (and his companion, Democritus) assert that the plenum andthe vacuum [_i. E. _, body and space] are the first principles, whereofone is the Ens, the other Non-ens; the differences of the body, whichare only figure, order, and position, are the causes of allothers. "[422]

[Footnote 422: Aristotle's "Metaphysics, " p. 21 (Bohn's edition). ]

He also taught that the elements, and the worlds derived from them, are_infinite_. He describes the manner in which the worlds are produced asfollows: "Many bodies of various kinds and shapes are borne byamputation from the infinite [_i. E. _, the chaotic μῖγμα of Anaximander]into a vast vacuum, and then they, being collected together, produce avortex; according to which, they, dashing against each other, andwhirling about in every direction, are separated in such a way that likeattaches itself to like; bodies are thus, without ceasing, unitedaccording to the impulse given by the vortex, and in this way the earthwas produced. "[423] Thus, through a boundless void, atoms infinite innumber and endlessly diversified in form are eternally wandering; and, by their aggregation, infinite worlds are successively produced. Theseatoms are governed in their movements by a dark negation ofintelligence, designated "Fate, " and all traces of a Supreme Minddisappear in his philosophy. It is a system of pure materialism, which, in fact, is Atheism. 

[Footnote 423: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives, " p. 389. ]

_Democritus of Abdera_ (B. C. 460-357), the companion of Leucippus, alsotaught "that _atoms_ and the _vacuum_ were the beginning of theuniverse. "[424] These atoms, he taught, were infinite in number, homogeneous, extended, and possessed of those primary qualities ofmatter which are necessarily involved in extension in space--as size, figure, situation, divisibility, and mobility. From the combination ofthese atoms all other existences are produced; fire, air, earth, andwater; sun, moon, and stars; plants, animals, and men; the soul itselfis an aggregation of round, moving atoms. And "motion, which is thecause of the production of every thing, he calls _necessity_. "[425]Atoms are thus the only real existences; these, without any pre-existentmind, or intelligence, were the original of all things. 

[Footnote 424: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives, " p. 395. ]

[Footnote 425: Id, ib. , p. 394. ]

The psychological opinions of Democritus were as decidedly materialisticas his physical theories. All knowledge is derived from sensation. It isonly by material impact that we can know the external world, and everysense is, in reality, a kind of touch. Material images are beingcontinually thrown off from the surface of external objects which comeinto actual contact with the organs of sense. The primary qualities ofmatter, that is, those which are involved in extension in space, are theonly objects of real knowledge; the secondary qualities of matter, assoftness, hardness, sweetness, bitterness, and the like, are butmodifications of the human sensibilities. "The sweet exists only inform--the bitter in form, hot in form, color in form; but in causalreality only atoms and space exist. The sensible things which aresupposed by opinion to exist have no real existence, but atoms and spacealone exist. "[426]

[Footnote 426: Lewes's "Biographical History of Philosophy, " p. 96. Thewords of Democritus, as reported by Sextus Empiricus. ]

Thus by Democritus was laid the basis of a system of absolutematerialism, which was elaborated and completed by Epicurus, and hasbeen transmitted to our times. It has undergone some slightmodifications, adapting it to the progress of physical science; but itis to-day substantially the theory of Democritus. In Democritus we havethe culmination of the mechanical theory of the Ionian or Physicalschool. In physics and psychology it terminated in pure materialism. Intheology it ends in positive Atheism. 

The fundamental error of all the philosophers of the physical school wasthe assumption, tacitly or avowedly, that sense-perception is the onlysource of knowledge. This was the fruitful source of all their erroneousconclusions, the parent of all their materialistic tendencies. This ledthem continually to seek an ἀρχή, or first principle of the universe, which should, under some form, be appreciable to _sense_; andconsequently the course of thought tended naturally towards materialism. 

Thales was unquestionably a dualist. Instructed by traditionalintimations, or more probably guided by the spontaneous apperceptions ofreason, he recognized, with more or less distinctness, an incorporealDeity as the moving, animating, and organizing cause of the universe. The idea of God is a truth so self-evident as to need no demonstration. The human mind does not attain to the idea of a God as the lastconsequence of a series of antecedent principles. It comes at once, byan inherent and necessary movement of thought, to the recognition of Godas the First Principle of all principles. But when, instead ofhearkening to the simple and spontaneous intuitions of the mind, manturns to the world of sense, and loses himself in discursive thought, the conviction of a personal God becomes obscured. Then, amid theendlessly diversified phenomena of the universe, he seeks for a cause ororigin which in some form shall be appreciable to sense. The mere studyof material phenomena, scientifically or unscientifically conducted, will never yield the sense of the living God. Nature must beinterpreted, can only be interpreted in the light of certain _à priori_principles of reason, or we can never "ascend from nature up to nature'sGod. " Within the circle of mere sense-perception, the dim andundeveloped consciousness of God will be confounded with the universe. Thus, in Anaximenes, God is partially confounded with "air, " whichbecomes a symbol; then a vehicle of the informing mind; and the resultis a semi-pantheism. In Heraclitus, the "ether" is, at first, asemi-symbol of the Deity; at length, God is utterly confounded with thisether, or "rational fire, " and the result is a definite _materialisticpantheism_. And, finally, when this feeling or dim consciousness of God, which dwells in all human souls, is not only disregarded, but pronouncedto be an illusion--a phantasy; when all the analogies which intelligencesuggests are disregarded, and a purely mechanical theory of the universeis adopted, the result is the utter negation of an Intelligent Cause, that is, _absolute Atheism_, as in Leucippus and Democritus. 

CHAPTER IX. 

THE PHILOSOPHERS OF ATHENS _(continued_). 

PRE-SOCRATIC SCHOOL _(continued_). 

IDEALIST: PYTHAGORAS--XENOPHANES--PARMENIDES--ZENO. NATURAL REALIST:ANAXAGORAS. 

SOCRATIC SCHOOL. 

SOCRATES. 

In the previous chapter we commenced our inquiry with the assumptionthat, in the absence of the true inductive method of philosophy whichobserves, and classifies, and generalizes facts, and thence attains ageneral principle or law, two only methods were possible to the earlyspeculators who sought an explanation of the universe--1st, That ofreasoning from physical analogies; or, 2d, That of deduction fromrational conceptions, or _à priori_ ideas. 

Accordingly we found that one class of speculators fixed their attentionsolely on the mere phenomena of nature, and endeavored, amid sensiblethings, to find a _single_ element which, being more subtile, andpliable, and universally diffused, could be regarded as the ground andoriginal of all the rest, and from which, by a vital transformation, orby a mechanical combination and arrangement of parts, all the restshould be evolved. The other class passed beyond the simple phenomena, and considered only the abstract _relations_ of phenomena amongthemselves, or the relations of phenomena to the necessary and universalideas of the reason, and supposed that, in these relations, they hadfound an explanation of the universe. The former was the Ionian orSensation school; the latter was the Italian or Idealist school. 

We have traced the method according to which the Ionian schoolproceeded, and estimated the results attained. We now come to considerthe method and results of

THE ITALIAN OR IDEALIST SCHOOL. 

This school we have found to be naturally subdivided into--1st, The_Mathematical_ sect, which attempted the explanation of the universe bythe abstract conceptions of number, proportion, order, and harmony; and, 2d, The _Metaphysical_ school, which attempted the interpretation of theuniverse according to the _à priori_ ideas of unity, of Being _in se_, of the Infinite, and the Absolute. 

_Pythagoras of Samos_(born B. C. 605) was the founder of the Mathematicalschool. 

We are conscious of the difficulties which are to be encountered by thestudent who seeks to attain a definite comprehension of the realopinions of Pythagoras. The genuineness of many of those writings whichwere once supposed to represent his views, is now questioned. "Moderncriticism has clearly shown that the works ascribed to Timæus andArchytas are spurious; and the treatise of Ocellus Lucanus on 'TheNature of the All' can not have been written by a Pythagorean. "[427] Theonly writers who can be regarded as at all reliable are Plato andAristotle; and the opinions they represent are not so much those ofPythagoras as "the Pythagoreans. " This is at once accounted for by thefact that Pythagoras taught in secret, and did not commit his opinionsto writing. His disciples, therefore, represent the _tendency_ ratherthan the actual tenets of his system; these were no doubt modified bythe mental habits and tastes of his successors. 

[Footnote 427: Lewes's "Biographical History of Philosophy, " p. 24. ]

We may safely assume that the proposition from which Pythagoras startedwas the fundamental idea of all Greek speculation--_that beneath thefleeting forms and successive changes of the universe there is somepermanent principle of unity_[428] The Ionian school sought thatprinciple in some common physical element; Pythagoras sought, not for"elements, " but for "relations, " and through these relations forultimate laws indicating primal forces. 

[Footnote 428: See Plato, "Timæus, " ch. Ix. P. 331 (Bohn's edition);Aristotle's "Metaphysics, " bk. V. Ch. Iii. ]

Aristotle affirms that Pythagoras taught "that _numbers_ are the firstprinciples of all entities, " and, "as it were, a _material_ cause ofthings, "[429] or, in other words, "that numbers are substances thatinvolve a separate subsistence, and are primary causes ofentities. "[430]

[Footnote 429: Aristotle's "Metaphysics, " bk. I. Ch. V. ]

[Footnote 430: Id. , ib. , bk. Xii. Ch. Vi. ]

Are we then required to accept the dictum of Aristotle as final anddecisive? Did Pythagoras really teach that numbers are realentities--the _substance_ and cause of all other existences? The readermay be aware that this is a point upon which the historians ofphilosophy are not agreed. Ritter is decidedly of opinion that thePythagorean formula "can only be taken symbolically. "[431] Lewes insistsit must be understood literally. [432] On a careful review of all thearguments, we are constrained to regard the conclusion of Ritter as mostreasonable. The hypothesis "that numbers are real entities" doesviolence to every principle of common sense. This alone constitutes astrong _à priori_ presumption that Pythagoras did not entertain soglaring an absurdity. The man who contributed so much towards perfectingthe mathematical sciences, who played so conspicuous a part in thedevelopment of ancient philosophy, and who exerted so powerful adetermining influence on the entire current of speculative thought, didnot obtain his ascendency over the intellectual manhood of Greece by theutterance of such enigmas. And further, in interpreting the philosophicopinions of the ancients, we must be guided by this fundamentalcanon--"The human mind has, under the necessary operation of its ownlaws, been compelled to entertain the same fundamental ideas, and thehuman heart to cherish the same feelings in all ages. " Now if a carefulphilosophic criticism can not render the _reported_ opinions of anancient teacher into the universal language of the reason and heart ofhumanity, we must conclude either that his opinions were misunderstoodand misrepresented by some of his successors, or else that he stands inutter isolation, both from the present and the past. His doctrine has, then, no relation to the successions of thought, and no place in thehistory of philosophy. Nay, more, such a doctrine has in it no elementof vitality, no germ of eternal truth, and must speedily perish. Now itis well known that the teaching of Pythagoras awakened the deepestintellectual sympathy of his age; that his doctrine exerted a powerfulinfluence on the mind of Plato, and, through him, upon succeeding ages;and that, in some of its aspects, it now survives, and is moreinfluential to-day than in any previous age; but this element ofimmutable and eternal truth was certainly not contained in the inane andempty formula, "that numbers are real existences, the causes of allother existences!" If the fame of Pythagoras had rested on such "airynothings, " it would have melted away before the time of Plato. 

[Footnote 431: "History of Ancient Philosophy, " vol. I. P. 359. ]

[Footnote 432: "Biographical History of Philosophy, " p. 38. ]

We grant there is considerable force in the argument of Lewes. He urges, with some pertinence, the unquestionable fact that Aristotle asserts, again and again, that the Pythagoreans taught "that numbers are theprinciples and substance of things as well as the causes of theirmodifications;" and he argues that we are not justified in rejecting theauthority of Aristotle, unless better evidence can be produced. 

So far, however, as the authority of Aristotle is concerned, even Leweshimself charges him, in more than one instance, with strangelymisrepresenting the opinions of his predecessors. [433] Aristotle isevidently wanting in that impartiality which ought to characterize thehistorian of philosophy, and, sometimes, we are compelled to questionhis integrity. Indeed, throughout his "Metaphysics" he exhibits theegotism and vanity of one who imagines that he alone, of all men, hasthe full vision of the truth. In Books I. And XII. He uniformlyassociates the "_numbers_" of Pythagoras with the "_forms_" and"_ideas_" of Plato. He asserts that Plato identifies "forms" and"numbers, " and regards them as real entities--substances, and causes ofall other things. "_Forms are numbers_[434]. .. So Plato affirmed, similar with the Pythagoreans; and the dogma that numbers are causes toother things--of their substance-_he, in like manner, asserted withthem_. "[435] And then, finally, he employs the _same_ arguments inrefuting the doctrines of both. 

[Footnote 433: "Aristotle uniformly speaks disparagingly of Anaxagoras"(Lewes's "Biographical History of Philosophy"). He represents him asemploying mind (νοῦς) simply as "a _machine_" for the production of theworld;--"when he finds himself in perplexity as to the cause of itsbeing necessarily an orderly system, he then drags it (mind) in by forceto his assistance" "Metaphysics, " (bk. I. Ch. Iv. ). But he is evidentlyinconsistent with himself, for in "De Anima" (bk. I. Ch. Ii. ) he tellsus that "Anaxagoras saith that mind is at once a _cause of motion_ inthe whole universe, and also of _well_ and _fit_. " We may further ask, is not the idea of fitness--of the good and the befitting--the finalcause, even according to Aristotle?

He also totally misrepresents Plato's doctrine of "Ideas. " "Plato'sIdeas, " he says, "are substantial existences--real beings"("Metaphysics, " bk. I. Ch. Ix. ). Whereas, as we shall subsequently show, "they are objects of pure conception for human reason, and they areattributes of the Divine Reason. It is there they substantially exist. "(Cousin, "History of Philosophy, " vol. I. P. 415). It is also pertinentto inquire, what is the difference between the "formal cause" ofAristotle and the archetypal ideas of Plato? and is not Plato's τὸἀγαθόν the "final cause?" Yet Aristotle is forever congratulatinghimself that he alone has properly treated the "formal" and the "finalcause!"]

[Footnote 434: This, however, was not the doctrine of Plato. He does notsay "forms are numbers. " He says: "God formed things as they first aroseaccording to forms _and_ numbers. " See "Timaeus, " ch. Xiv. And xxvii. ]

[Footnote 435: Aristotle's "Metaphysics, " bk. I. Ch. Vi. ]

Now the writings of Plato are all extant to-day, and accessible in anexcellent English translation to any of our readers. Cousin hasshown, [436] most conclusively (and we can verify his conclusions forourselves), that Aristotle has totally misrepresented Plato. And if, inthe same connection, and in the course of the same argument, and inregard to the same subjects, he misrepresents Plato, it is most probablehe also misrepresents Pythagoras. 

[Footnote 436: "The True, the Beautiful, and the Good, " pp. 77-81. ]

It is, however, a matter of the deepest interest for us to find theevidence gleaming out here and there, on the pages of Aristotle, that hehad some knowledge of the fact that the Pythagorean numbers wereregarded as _symbols_. The "numbers" of Pythagoras are, in the mind ofAristotle, clearly identified with the "forms" of Plato. Now, in ChapterVI. Of the First Book he says that Plato taught that these "forms" wereπαραδείγματα--models, patterns, exemplars after which created thingswere framed. The numbers of Pythagoras, then, are also models andexemplars. This also is admitted by Aristotle. The Pythagoreans indeedaffirm that entities subsist by an _imitation_ (μίμησις) ofnumbers. [437] Now if ideas, forms, numbers, were the models or paradigmsafter which "the Operator" formed all things, surely it can not belogical to say they were the "material" out of which all things wereframed, much less the "efficient cause" of things. The most legitimateconclusion we can draw, even from the statements of Aristotle, is thatthe Pythagoreans regarded numbers as the best expression orrepresentation of those laws of proportion, and order, and harmony, which seemed, to their eyes, to pervade the universe. Their doctrine wasa faint glimpse of that grand discovery of modern science--that all thehigher laws of nature assume the form of a precise quantitativestatement. 

[Footnote 437: Aristotle's "Metaphysics, " bk. I. Ch. Vi. ]

The fact seems to be this, the Pythagoreans busied themselves chieflywith what Aristotle designates "the _formal_ cause, " and gave littleattention to the inquiry concerning "the _material_ cause. " This isadmitted by Aristotle. Concerning fire, or earth, or the other bodies ofsuch kind, they have declared nothing whatsoever, inasmuch as affirming, in my opinion, nothing that is peculiar concerning _sensible_natures. [438] They looked, as we have previously remarked, to therelations of phenomena, and having discovered certain "numericalsimilitudes, " they imagined they had attained an universal principle, orlaw. "If all the essential properties and attributes of things werefully represented by the relations of numbers, the philosophy whichsupplied such an explanation of the universe might well be excused fromexplaining, also, that existence of objects, which is distinct from theexistence of all their qualities and properties. The Pythagoreandoctrine of numbers might have been combined with the doctrine of atoms, and the combination might have led to results worthy of notice. But, sofar as we are aware, no such combination was attempted, and perhaps weof the present day are only just beginning to perceive, through thedisclosures of chemistry and crystallography, the importance of such aninquiry. "[439]

[Footnote 4398: Id. , ib. , bk. I. Ch. Ix. ]

[Footnote 439: Whewell's "History of Inductive Sciences, " vol. I. P. 78. ]

These preliminary considerations will have cleared and prepared the wayfor a fuller presentation of the philosophic system of Pythagoras. Themost comprehensive and satisfactory exposition of his "method" is thatgiven by Wm Archer Butler in his "_Lectures on Ancient Philosophy_, " andwe feel we can not do better than condense his pages. [440]

[Footnote 440: Lecture VI. Vol. I. ]

Pythagoras had long devoted his intellectual adoration to the lofty ideaof _order_, which seemed to reveal itself to his mind, as the presidinggenius of the serene and silent world. He had, from his youth, dweltwith delight upon the eternal relations of space, and determinate form, and number, in which the very idea of _proportion_ seems to find itsfirst and immediate development, and without the latter of which(number), all proportion is absolutely inconceivable. To this ardentgenius, whose inventive energies were daily adding new and surprisingcontributions to the sum of discoverable relations, it at length beganto appear as if the whole secret of the universe was hidden in thesemysterious correspondences. 

In making this extensive generalization, Pythagoras may, on his knownprinciples, be supposed to have reasoned as follows: The mind of manperceives the relations of an eternal _order_ in the proportions ofspace, and form, and number. That mind is, no doubt, a portion of thesoul which animates and governs the universe; for on what othersupposition shall we account for its internal principle of activity--thevery principle which characterizes the prime mover, and can scarce beascribed to an inferior nature? And on what other supposition are we toexplain the identity which subsists between the principles of order, authenticated by the reason and the facts of order which are found toexist in the forms and multiplicities around us, and independent of us?Can this sameness be other than the sameness of the internal andexternal principles of a common nature? The proportions of the universeinhere in its divine soul; they are indeed its very essence, or atleast, its attributes. The ideas or principles of Order which areimplanted in the human reason, must inhere in the Divine Reason, andmust be reflected in the visible world, which is its product. Man, then, can boldly affirm the necessary harmony of the world, because he has inhis own mind a revelation which declares that the world, in its realstructure, must be the image and copy of that divine _proportion_ whichhe inwardly adores. [441]

[Footnote 441: It is an opinion which goes as far back as the time ofPlato, and even Pythagoras, and has ever since been widely entertained, that beauty of _form_ consists in some sort of _proportion_ or _harmony_which may admit of a mathematical expression; and later and morescientific research is altogether in its favor. It is now establishedthat complementary colors, that is, colors which when combined make upthe full beam, are felt to be beautiful when seen simultaneously; thatis, the mind is made to delight in the unities of nature. At the basisof music there are certain fixed ratios; and in poetry, of everydescription, there are measures, and correspondencies. Pythagoras hasoften been ridiculed for his doctrine of "the music of the spheres;" andprobably his doctrine was somewhat fanciful, but later science showsthat there is a harmony in all nature--in its forms, in its forces, andin its motions. The highest unorganized and all organized objects takedefinite forms which are regulated by mathematical laws. The forces ofnature can be estimated in numbers, and light and heat go inundulations, whilst the movements of the great bodies in nature admit ofa precise quantitative expression. The harmonies of nature in respect ofcolor, of number, of form, and of time are forcibly exhibited in"Typical Forms and Special Ends in Creation, " by M'Cosh. ]

Again, the world is assuredly _perfect_, as being the sensible image andcopy of the Divinity, the outward and multiple development of theEternal Unity. It must, therefore, when thoroughly known and properlyinterpreted, answer to all which we can conceive as perfect; that is, itmust be regulated by laws, of which we have the highest principles inthose first and elementary properties of numbers which stand next to_unity_. "The world is then, through all its departments, _a livingarithmetic in its development, a realized geometry in its repose_. " Itis a κόσμος (for the word is purely Pythagorean)--the expression of_harmony_, the manifestation, to sense, of everlasting _order_. 

Though Pythagoras found in geometry the fitting initiative for abstractspeculation, it is remarkable that he himself preferred to constitutethe science of Numbers as the true representative of the laws of theuniverse. The reason appears to be this: that though geometry speaksindeed of eternal truths, yet when the notion of symmetry and proportionis introduced, it is often necessary to insist, in preference, upon theproperties of numbers. Hence, though the universe displays the geometryof its Constructor or Animator, yet nature was eminently defined as theμίμησις τῶν ἀριθμῶν--the imitation of numbers. 

The key to all the Pythagorean dogmas, then, seems to be the generalformula of _unity in multiplicity_:--unity either evolving itself intomultiplicity, or unity discovered as pervading multiplicity. Theprinciple of all things, the same principle which in this philosophy, asin others, was customarily called _Deity_, is the primitive unit fromwhich all proceeds in the accordant relations of the universal scheme. Into the sensible world of multitude, the all-pervading Unity hasinfused his own ineffable nature; he has impressed his own image uponthat world which is to represent him in the sphere of sense and man. What, then, is that which is at once single and multiple, identical anddiversified--which we perceive as the combination of a thousandelements, yet as the expression of a single spirit--which is a chaos tothe sense, a cosmos to the reason? What is it butharmony--proportion--the one governing the many, the many lost in theone? The world is therefore a _harmony_ in innumerable degrees, from themost complicated to the most simple: it is now a Triad, combining theMonad and the Duad, and partaking of the nature of both; now a Tetrad, the form of perfection; now a Decad, which, in combining the fourformer, involves, in its mystic nature, all the possible accordances ofthe universe. [442]

The psychology of the Pythagoreans was greatly modified by theirphysical, and still more, by their moral tenets. The soul was ἀριθμὸςἑαυτὸν κινῶν--a self-moving number or Monad, the copy (as we have seen)of that Infinite Monad which unfolds from its own incomprehensibleessence all the relations of the universe. This soul has three elements, Reason (νοῦς), Intelligence (φρήν), and Passion (θυμός). The two last, man has in common with brutes, the first is his grand and peculiarcharacteristic. It has, hence, been argued that Pythagoras could nothave held the doctrine of "transmigration. " This clear separation of manfrom the brute, by this signal endowment of reason, which issempiternal, seems a refutation of those who charge him with thedoctrine. 

In the department of morals, the legislator of Crotona found hisappropriate sphere. In his use of numerical notation, moral good wasessential unity--evil, essential plurality and division. In the fixedtruths of mathematical abstractions he found the exemplars of social andpersonal virtue. The rule or law of all morality is resemblance to God;that is, the return of number to its root, to unity, [443] and virtue isthus a harmony. 

[Footnote 442: That is, 1+2+3+4=10. There are intimations that thePythagoreans regarded the Monad as God, the Duad as matter, the Triad asthe complex phenomena of the world, the Tetrad as the completeness ofall its relations, the Decad as the cosmos, or harmonious whole. ]

[Footnote 443: Aristotle, "Nichomachian Ethics, " bk. I. Ch. Vi. ]

Thus have we, in Pythagoras, the dawn of an _Idealist_ school; formathematics are founded upon abstractions, and there is consequently anintimate connection between mathematics and idealism. The relations ofspace, and number, and determinate form, are, like the relations ofcause and effect, of phenomena and substance, perceptible _only inthought_; and the mind which has been disciplined to abstract thought bythe study of mathematics, is prepared and disposed for purelymetaphysical studies. "The looking into mathematical learning is a kindof prelude to the contemplation of real being. "[444] Therefore Platoinscribed over the door of his academy, "Let none but Geometriciansenter here. " To the mind thus disciplined in abstract thinking, theconceptions and ideas of reason have equal authority, sometimes evensuperior authority, to the perceptions of sense. 

[Footnote 444: Alcinous, "Introduction to the Doctrines of Plato, " ch. Vii. ]

Now if the testimony of both reason and sense, as given inconsciousness, is accepted as of equal authority, and each faculty isregarded as, within its own sphere, a source of real, valid knowledge, then a consistent and harmonious system of _Natural Realism_ or _NaturalDualism_ will be the result. If the testimony of sense is questioned anddistrusted, and the mind is denied any immediate knowledge of thesensible world, and yet the existence of an external world is maintainedby various hypotheses and reasonings, the consequence will be a speciesof _Hypothetical Dualism_ or _Cosmothetic Idealism_. But if theaffirmations of reason, as to the unity of the cosmos, are aloneaccepted, and the evidence of the senses, as to the variety andmultiplicity of the world, is entirely disregarded, then we have asystem of _Absolute Idealism_. Pythagoras regarded the harmony whichpervades the diversified phenomena of the outer world as a manifestationof the unity of its eternal principle, or as the perpetual evolution ofthat unity, and the consequent _tendency_ of his system was todepreciate the _sensible_. Following out this tendency, the Eleaticsfirst neglected, and finally denied the variety of the universe--deniedthe real existence of the external world, and asserted an absolute_metaphysical_ unity. 

_Xenophanes of Colophon_, in Ionia (B. C. 616-516), was the founder ofthis celebrated school of Elea. He left Ionia, and arrived in Italyabout the same time as Pythagoras, bringing with him to Italy his Ioniantendencies; he there amalgamated them with Pythagorean speculations. 

Pythagoras had succeeded in fixing the attention of his countrymen onthe harmony which pervades the material world, and had taught them toregard that harmony as the manifestation of the intelligence, and unity, and perfection of its eternal principle. Struck with this idea ofharmony and of unity, Xenophanes, who was a poet, a rhapsodist, andtherefore by native tendency, rather than by intellectual discipline, anIdealist, begins already to attach more importance to _unity_ thanmultiplicity in his philosophy of nature. He regards the testimony ofreason as of more authority than the testimony of sense; "and he holdsbadly enough the balance between the unity of the Pythagoreans and thevariety which Heraclitus and the Ionians had alone considered. "[445]

We are not, however, to suppose that Xenophanes denied entirely theexistence of _plurality_. "The great Rhapsodist of Truth" was guided bythe spontaneous intuitions of his mind (which seemed to partake of thecharacter of an inspiration), to a clearer vision of the truth than werehis successors of the same school by their discursive reasonings. "TheOne" of Xenophanes was clearly distinguished from the outward universe(τὰ πολλά) on the one hand, and from the "_non-ens_" on the other. Itwas his disciple, Parmenides, who imagined the logical necessity ofidentifying plurality with the "_non-ens_" and thus denying allimmediate cognition of the phenomenal world. The compactness and logicalcoherence of the system of Parmenides seems to have had a peculiar charmfor the Grecian mind, and to have diverted the eyes of antiquity fromthe views of the more earnest and devout Xenophanes, whose opinions weretoo often confounded with those of his successors of the Eleatic school. "Accordingly we find that Xenophanes has obtained credit for much thatis, exclusively, the property of Parmenides and Zeno, in particular fordenying plurality, and for identifying God with the universe. "[446]

[Footnote 445: Cousin, "History of Philosophy, " vol. I. P. 440. ]

[Footnote 446: See note by editor, W. H. Thompson, M. A. , on pages 331, 332 of Butler's "Lectures, " vol. I. His authorities are "Fragments ofXenophanes" and the treatise "De Melisso, Xenophane, et Gorgia, " byAristotle. ]

In theology, Xenophanes was unquestionably a _Theist_. He had a profoundand earnest conviction of the existence of a God, and he ridiculed withsarcastic force, the anthropomorphic absurdities of the popularreligion. This one God, he taught, was self-existent, eternal, andinfinite; supreme in power, in goodness, and intelligence. [447] Thesecharacteristics are ascribed to the Deity in the sublime words withwhich he opens his philosophic poem--

 "There is one God, of all beings, divine and human, the greatest: Neither in body alike unto mortals, neither in mind. "

He has no parts, no organs, as men have, being

 "All sight, all ear, all intelligence; Wholly exempt from toil, he sways all things by _thought_ and _will_. "[448]

Xenophanes also taught that God is "uncreated" or "uncaused, " and thathe is "excellent" as well as "all-powerful. "[449] And yet, regardless ofthese explicit utterances, Lewes cautions his readers against supposingthat, by the "one God, " Xenophanes meant a Personal God; and he assertsthat his Monotheism was Pantheism. A doctrine, however, which ascribesto the Divine Being moral as well as intellectual supremacy, whichacknowledges an outward world distinct from Him, and which representsHim as causing the changes in that universe by the acts of anintelligent volition, can only by a strange perversion of language becalled pantheism. 

[Footnote 447: Lewes's "Biographical History of Philosophy, " p. 38;Ritter's "History of Ancient Philosophy, " vol. I. Pp. 428, 429. ]

[Footnote 448: Ritter's "History of Ancient Philosophy, " vol. I. Pp. 432, 434. ]

[Footnote 449: Butler's "Lectures, " vol. I. P. 331, note; Ritter's"History of Ancient Philosophy, " vol. I. P. 428. ]

_Parmenides of Elea_ (born B. C. 536) was the philosopher who framed thepsychological opinions of the Idealist school into a precise andcomprehensive system. He was the first carefully to distinguish between_Truth_ (ἀλήθειαν) and _Opinion_ (δοξαν)--between ideas obtained throughthe reason and the simple perceptions of sense. Assuming that reason andsense are the only sources of knowledge, he held that they furnish themind with two distinct classes of cognitions--one variable, fleeting, and uncertain; the other immutable, necessary, and eternal. Sense isdependent on the variable organization of the individual, and thereforeits evidence is changeable, uncertain, and nothing but a mere"_seeming_. " Reason is the same in all individuals, and therefore itsevidence is constant, real, and true. Philosophy is, therefore, dividedinto two branches--_Physics_ and _Metaphysics_; one, a science ofabsolute knowledge; the other, a science of mere appearances. The firstscience, Physics, is pronounced illusory and uncertain; the latter, Metaphysics, is infallible and immutable. [450]

Proceeding on these principles, he rejects the dualistic system of theuniverse, and boldly declared that all essences are fundamentally_one_--that, in fact, there is no real plurality, and that all thediversity which "appears" is merely presented under a peculiar aestheticor sensible law. The senses, it is true, teach us that there are "manythings, " but reason affirms that, at bottom, there exists only "theone. " Whatever, therefore, manifests itself in the field of sense ismerely illusory--the mental representation of a phenomenal world, whichto experience seems diversified, but which reason can not possibly admitto be other than "immovable" and "one. " There is but one Being in theuniverse, eternal, immovable, absolute; and of this unconditioned beingall phenomenal existences, whether material or mental, are but theattributes and modes. Hence the two great maxims of the Eleatic school, derived from Parmenides--τὰ πάντα ἕν, "_The All is One_" and τὸ αὐτὸνοεῖν τε καὶ εἶναι (Idem est cogitare atque esse), "_Thought and Beingare identical. _" The last remarkable dictum is the fundamental principleof the modern pantheistic doctrine of "absolute identity" as taught bySchelling and Hegel. [451]

[Footnote 450: Ritter's "History of Ancient Philosophy, " vol. I. Pp. 447, 451. ]

[Footnote 451: Id. , ib. , vol. I. Pp. 450, 455. ]

Lewes asserts that "Parmenides did not, with Xenophanes, call 'the One'God; he called it Being. [452] In support of this statement he, however, cites no ancient authorities. We are therefore justified in rejectinghis opinion, and receiving the testimony of Simplicius, "the onlyauthority for the fragments of the Eleatics, "[453] and who had a copy ofthe philosophic poems of Parmenides. He assures us that Parmenides andXenophanes "affirmed that '_the One, _' or unity, was the first Principleof all, . .. . They meaning by this One _that highest or supreme God_, asbeing the cause of unity to all things. .. . It remaineth, therefore, thatthat _Intelligence_ which is the cause of all things, and therefore ofmind and understanding also, in which all things are comprehended inunity, was Parmenides' one Ens or Being. [454] Parmenides was, therefore, a spiritualistic or idealistic Pantheist. 

_Zeno of Elea_ (born B. C. 500) was the logician of the Eleatic school. He was, says Diogenes Laertius, "the inventor of Dialectics. "[455] Logichenceforth becomes the ὄργανον[456]--organon of the Eleatics. 

[Footnote 452: "Biographical History of Philosophy, " p. 50. ]

[Footnote 453: Encyclopædia Britannica, article "Simplicius. "]

[Footnote 454: Cudworth's "Intellectual System, " vol. I. P. 511. ]

[Footnote 455: "Lives, " p. 387 (Bohn's edition). ]

[Footnote 456: Plato in "Parmen. "]

This organon, however, Zeno used very imperfectly. In his hands it wassimply the "reductio ad absurdum" of opposing opinions as the means ofsustaining the tenets of his own sect. Parmenides had asserted, on _àpriori_ grounds, the existence of "the One. " Zeno would prove by hisdialectic the non-existence of "the many. " His grand position was thatall phenomena, all that appears to sense, is but a _modification_ of theabsolute One. And he displays a vast amount of dialectic subtilty in theeffort to prove that all "appearances" are unreal, and that all movementand change is a mere "seeming"--not a reality. What men call motion isonly a name given to a series of conditions, each of which, consideredseparately, is rest. "Rest is force resistant; motion is forcetriumphant. "[457] The famous puzzle of "Achilles and the Tortoise, " bywhich he endeavored to prove the unreality of motion, has been renderedfamiliar to the English reader. [458]

[Footnote 457: Lewes's "Biographical History of Philosophy, " p. 60. ]

[Footnote 458: Ritter's "History of Ancient Philosophy, " vol. I. Pp. 475, 476. ]

Aristotle assures us that Zeno, "by his one Ens, which neither was movednor movable, meaneth God. " And he also informs us that "Zeno endeavoredto demonstrate that there is but one God, from the idea which all menhave of him, as that which is the best, supremest, most powerful of all, or an absolutely perfect being" ("De Xenophane, Zenone, etGorgia"). [459]

With Zeno we close our survey of the second grand line of independentinquiry by which philosophy sought to solve the problem of the universe. The reader will be struck with the resemblance which subsists betweenthe history of its development and that of the modern Idealist school. Pythagoras was the Descartes, Parmenides the Spinoza, and Zeno the Hegelof the Italian school. 

In this survey of the speculations of the pre-Socratic schools ofphilosophy, we have followed the course of two opposite streams ofthought which had their common origin in one fundamental principle orlaw of the human mind--the _intuition of unity_--"or the desire tocomprehend all the facts of the universe in a single formula, andconsummate all conditional knowledge in the unity of unconditionedexistence. " The history of this tendency is, in fact, the history of allphilosophy. "The end of all philosophy, " says Plato, "is the intuitionof unity. " "All knowledge, " said the Platonists, "is the gathering upinto one. "[460]

[Footnote 459: Cudworth's "Intellectual System, " vol. I. P. 518. ]

[Footnote 460: Hamilton's "Metaphysics, " vol. I. Pp. 67-70 (Englishedition). ]

Starting from this fundamental idea, _that, beneath the endless flux andchange of the visible universe, there must be a permanent principle ofunity_, we have seen developed two opposite schools of speculativethought. As the traveller, standing on the ridges of the Andes, may seethe head-waters of the great South American rivers mingling in one, sothe student of philosophy, standing on the elevated plane of analyticthought, may discover, in this fundamental principle, the common sourceof the two great systems of speculative thought which divided theancient world. Here are the head-waters of the sensational and theidealist schools. The Ionian school started its course of inquiry in thedirection of _sense_; it occupied itself solely with the phenomena ofthe external world, and it sought this principle of unity in a_physical_ element. The Italian school started its course of inquiry inthe direction of _reason_; it occupied itself chiefly with rationalconceptions or _à priori_ ideas, and it sought this principle of unityin purely _metaphysical_ being. And just as the Amazon and La Platasweep on, in opposite directions, until they reach the extremities ofthe continent, so these two opposite streams of thought rush onward, bythe force of a logical necessity, until they terminate in the twoUnitarian systems of _Absolute Materialism_ and _Absolute Idealism_, and, in their theological aspects, in a pantheism which, on the onehand, identifies God with matter, or, on the other hand, swallows up theuniverse in God. 

The radical error of both these systems is at once apparent. Thetestimony of the primary faculties of the mind was not regarded as each, within its sphere, final and decisive. The duality of consciousness wasnot accepted in all its integrity; one school rejected the testimony ofreason, the other denied the veracity of the senses, and both preparedthe way for the _skepticism_ of the Sophists. 

We must not, however, lose sight of the fact that there were somephilosophers of the pre-Socratic school, as Anaxagoras and Empedocles, who recognized the partial and exclusive character of both thesesystems, and sought, by a method which Cousin would designate asEclecticism, to combine the element of truth contained in each. 

_Anaxagoras of Clazomencœ_ (B. C. 500-428) added to the Ionian philosophyof a material element or elements the Italian idea of a _spirit_distinct from, and independent of the world, which has within itself theprinciple of a spontaneous activity--Νοῦς αὐτοκρατής, and which is thefirst cause of motion in the universe--ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως. [461]

[Footnote 461: Cousin, "History of Philosophy, " vol. I. P. 411. ]

In his physical theory, Anaxagoras was an Atomist. Instead of oneelement, he declared that the elements or first principles werenumerous, or even infinite. No point in space is unoccupied by theseatoms, which are infinitely divisible. He imagined that, in nature, there are as many kinds of principles as there are species of compoundbodies, and that the peculiar form of the primary particles of which anybody is composed is the same with the qualities of the compound bodyitself. This was the celebrated doctrine of _Homœomeria_, of whichLucretius furnishes a luminous account in his philosophic poem "DeNatura Rerum"--

 "That bone from bones Minute, and embryon; nerve from nerves arise; And blood from blood, by countless drops increased. Gold, too, from golden atoms, earths concrete, From earths extreme; from fiery matters, fire; And lymph from limpen dews. And thus throughout From primal kinds that kinds perpetual spring. "[462]

These primary particles were regarded by Anaxagoras as eternal; becausehe held the dogma, peculiar to all the Ionians, that nothing can bereally created or annihilated (de nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil possereverti). But he saw, nevertheless, that the simple existence of"_inert_" matter, even from eternity, could not explain the motion andthe harmony of the material world. Hence he saw the necessity of anotherpower--_the power of Intelligence_. "All things were in chaos; then cameIntelligence and introduced Order. "[463]

Anaxagoras, unlike the pantheistic speculators of the Ionian school, rigidly separated the Supreme Intelligence from the material universe. The Νοῦς of Anaxagoras is a principle, infinite, independent(αὺτοκρατές), omnipresent (ἐν παντὶ παντὸς μοίοα ἔνον), the subtilestand purest of things (λεπτότατον πάντων χρημάτων καὶ καθαρώτατον); andincapable of mixture with aught besides; it is also omniscient (πάνταἔγνω), and unchangeable (πᾶς ὁμοῖός ἐστι). --Simplicius, in "Arist. Phys. " i. 33. [464]

[Footnote 462: Good's translation, bk. I. P. 325. ]

[Footnote 463: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives, " p. 59. ]

[Footnote 464: Butler's "Lectures on Philosophy, " vol. I. P. 305, note. ]

Thus did Anaxagoras bridge the chasm between the Ionian and the Italianschools. He accepted both doctrines with some modifications. He believedin the real existence of the phenomenal world, and he also believed inthe real existence of "The Infinite Mind, " whose Intelligence andOmnipotence were manifested in the laws and relations which pervade theworld. He proclaimed the existence of the Infinite Intelligence ("theONE"), who was the Architect and Governor of the Infinite Matter ("theMANY"). 

On the question as to the origin and certainty of human knowledge, Anaxagoras differed both from the Ionians and the Eleatics. Neither thesense alone, nor the reason alone, were for him a ground of certitude. He held that reason (λόγος) was the regulative faculty of the mind, asthe Νοῦς, or Supreme Intelligence, was the regulative power of theuniverse. And he admitted that the senses were veracious in theirreports; but they reported only in regard to phenomena. The senses, then, perceive _phenomena_, but it is the reason alone which recognizes_noumena_, that is, the reason perceives being in and through phenomena, substance in and through qualities; an anticipation of the fundamentalprinciple of modern psychology--"_that every power or substance inexistence is knowable to us, so far only, as we know its phenomena_. "Thus, again, does he bridge the chasm that separates between theSensationalist and the Idealist. The Ionians relied solely on theintuitions of sense; the Eleatics accepted only the apperceptions ofpure reason; he accepted the testimony of both, and in the synthesis ofsubject and object--the union of an element supplied by sensation, andan element supplied by reason, he found real, certain knowledge. 

The harmony which the doctrine of Anaxagoras introduced into thephilosophy of Athens, soon attracted attention and multiplied disciples. He was teaching when Socrates arrived in Athens, and the latter attendedhis school. The influence which the doctrine of Anaxagoras exerted uponthe mind of Socrates (leading him to recognize Intelligence as the causeof order and special adaptation in the universe), [465] and also upon thecourse of philosophy in the Socratic schools, is the most enduringmemorial of his name. [466]

[Footnote 465: "Phaedo, " § 105. ]

[Footnote 466: Aristotle's "Metaphysics, " bk. I. Ch. Iii. ]

We have devoted a much larger space than we originally designed to theante-Socratic schools--quite out of proportion, indeed, with that weshall be able to appropriate to their successors. But inasmuch as allthe great primary problems of thought, which are subsequently discussedby Plato and Aristotle, were started, and received, at least, typicalanswers in those schools, we can not hope to understand Plato, orAristotle, or even Epicurus, or Zeno of Cittium, unless we have firstmastered the doctrines of Heraclitus, Pythagoras, Parmenides, andAnaxagoras. [467] The attention we have bestowed on these early thinkerswill, therefore, have been a valuable preparatory discipline for thestudy of

II. THE SOCRATIC SCHOOL. 

The first cycle of philosophy was now complete. That form of Grecianspeculative thought which, during the first period of its development, was a philosophy of nature, had reached its maturity; it had sought "thefirst principles of all things" in the study of external nature, and hadsignally failed. In this pursuit of first principles as the basis of atrue and certain knowledge of the system of the universe, the twoleading schools had been carried to opposite poles of thought. One hadasserted that _experience_ alone, the other, that _reason_ alone was thesole criterion of truth. As the last consequence of this imperfectmethod, Leucippus had denied the existence of "the one, " and Zeno haddenied the existence of "the many. " The Ionian school, in Democritus, had landed in Materialism; the Italian, in Parmenides, had ended inPantheism; and, as the necessary result of this partial and defectivemethod of inquiry, which ended in doubt and contradiction, a spirit ofgeneral skepticism was generated in the Athenian mind. If doubt be castupon the veracity of the primary cognitive faculties of the mind, theflood-gates of universal skepticism are opened. If the senses arepronounced to be mendacious and illusory in their reports regardingexternal phenomena, and if the intuitions of the reason, in regard tothe ground and cause of phenomena, are delusive, then we have no groundof certitude. If one faculty is unveracious and unreliable, how can wedetermine that the other is not equally so? There is, then, no suchthing as universal and necessary truth. Truth is variable and uncertain, as the variable opinion of each individual. 

[Footnote 467: Maurice's "Ancient Philosophy, " p. 114; Butler's"Lectures on Ancient Philosophy, " vol. Ii. Pp. 87, 88. ]

The Sophists, who belonged to no particular school, laid hold on theelements of skepticism contained in both the pre-Socratic schools ofphilosophy, and they declared that "the σοφία" was not onlyunattainable, but that no relative degree of it was possible for thehuman faculties. [468] Protagoras of Abdera accepted the doctrine ofHeraclitus, that thought is identical with sensation, and limited by it;he therefore declared that there is no criterion of truth, and _Man isthe measure of all things_. [469] Sextus Empiricus gives thepsychological opinions of Protagoras with remarkable explicitness. "Matter is in a perpetual flux, whilst it undergoes augmentations andlosses; the senses also are modified according to the age anddisposition of the body. He said, also, that the reason of all phenomenaresides in matter as substrata, so that matter, in itself, might bewhatever it appeared to each. But men have different perceptions atdifferent periods, according to the changes in the things perceived. .. . Man is, therefore, the criterion of that which exists; all that isperceived by him exists; _that which is perceived by no man does notexist_. "[470] These conclusions were rigidly and fearlessly applied toethics and political science. If there is no Eternal Truth, there can beno Immutable Right. The distinction of right and wrong is solely amatter of human opinion and conventional usage. [471] "That which_appears_ just and honorable to each city, is so for _that city_, solong as the opinion prevails. "[472]

[Footnote 468: Encyclopædia Britannica, article "Sophist. "]

[Footnote 469: Plato's "Theætetus" (άνθρωπος--"the individual is themeasure of all things"), vol. I. P. 381 (Bohn's edition). ]

[Footnote 470: Lewes's "Biographical History of Philosophy, " p. 117. ]

[Footnote 471: "Gorgias, " § 85-89. ]

[Footnote 472: Plato's "Theætetus, " § 65-75. ]

There were others who laid hold on the weapons which Zeno had preparedto their hands. He had asserted that all the objects of sense were merephantoms--delusive and transitory. By the subtilties of dialecticquibbling, he had attempted to prove that "change" meant "permanence, "and "motion" meant "rest. "[473] Words may, therefore, have the mostopposite and contradictory meanings; and all language and all opinionmay, by such a process, be rendered uncertain. One opinion is, consequently, for the individual, just as good as another; and allopinions are equally true and untrue. It was nevertheless desirable, forthe good of society, that there should be some agreement, and that, fora time at least, certain opinions should prevail; and if philosophy hadfailed to secure this agreement, rhetoric, at least, was effectual; and, with the Sophist, rhetoric was "the art of making the worst appear thebetter reason. " All wisdom was now confined to a species of "wordjugglery, " which in Athens was dignified as "the art of disputation. "

[Footnote 473: "And do we not know that the Eleatic Palamedes (Zeno)spoke by art in such a manner that the same things appeared to besimilar and dissimilar, one and many, at rest and inmotion?"--"Phædrus, " § 97. ]

SOCRATES (B. C. 469-399), the grand central figure in the group ofancient philosophers, arrived in Athens in the midst of this generalskepticism. He had an invincible faith in truth. "He made her themistress of his soul, and with patient labor, and unwearied energy, didhis great and noble soul toil after perfect communion with her. " He wasdisappointed and dissatisfied with the results that had been reached bythe methods of his predecessors, and he was convinced that by thesemethods the problem of the universe could not be solved. He thereforeturned away from physical inquiries, and devoted his whole attention tothe study of the human mind, its fundamental beliefs, ideas, and laws. If he can not penetrate the mysteries of the outer world, he will turnhis attention to the world within. He will "know himself, " and findwithin himself the reason, and ground, and law of all existence. Therehe discovered certain truths which can not possibly be questioned. Hefelt he had within his own heart a faithful monitor--a _conscience_, which he regarded as the voice of God. [474] He believed "he had a divineteacher with him at all times. Though he did not possess wisdom, thisteacher could put him on the road to seek it, could preserve him fromdelusions which might turn him out of the way, could keep his mind fixedupon the end for which he ought to act and live. "[475] In himself, therefore, he sought that ground of certitude which should save him fromthe prevailing skepticism of his times. The Delphic inscription, Γνῶθισεαντόν, "_know thyself_" becomes henceforth the fundamental maxim ofphilosophy. 

[Footnote 474: The Dæmon of Socrates has been the subject of muchdiscussion among learned men. The notion, once generally received, thathis _δαίμων_ was "a familiar genius, " is now regarded as an explodederror. "Nowhere does Socrates, in Plato or Xenophon, speak of _a_ geniusor demon, but always of a _dœmoniac something (το δαιμόνιον_, or_δαιμόνιν τι_), or of a _sign_, a _voice_, a _divine sign_, a _divinevoice_" (Lewes's "Biographical History of Philosophy, " p. 166). "Socrates always speaks of a _divine or supernatural somewhat_ ('divinumquiddam, ' as Cicero has it), the nature of which he does not attempt todivine, and to which he never attributes personality" (Butler's"Lectures on Ancient Philosophy, " vol. I. P. 357). The scholar need notto be informed that _το δαιμόνιον_, in classic literature, means thedivine Essence (Lat. _numen_), to which are attributed events beyondman's power, yet not to be assigned to any special god. ]

[Footnote 475: Maurice's "Ancient Philosophy, " p. 124. ]

Truth has a rational, _à priori_ foundation in the constitution of thehuman mind. There are _ideas_ connatural to the human reason which arethe copies of those archetypal ideas which belong to the Eternal Reason. The grand problem of philosophy, therefore, now is--_What are thesefundamental_ IDEAS _which are unchangeable and permanent, amid all thediversifies of human opinion, connecting appearance with reality, andconstituting a ground of certain knowledge or absolute truth_? Socratesmay not have held the doctrine of ideas as exhibited by Plato, but hecertainly believed that there were germs of truth latent in the humanmind--principles which governed, unconsciously, the processes ofthought, and that these could be developed by reflection and byquestioning. These were embryonate in the womb of reason, coming to thebirth, but needing the "maieutic" or "obstetric" art, that they might bebrought forth. [476] He would, therefore, become the accoucheur of ideas, and deliver minds of that secret truth which lay in their mentalconstitution. And thus _Psychology_ becomes the basis of all legitimatemetaphysics. 

[Footnote 476: Plato's "Theætetus, " § 22. ]

By the general consent of antiquity, as well as by the concurrentjudgment of all modern historians of philosophy, Socrates is regarded ashaving effected a complete revolution in philosophic thought, and, byuniversal consent, he is placed at the commencement of a new era inphilosophy. Schleiermacher has said, "the service which Socratesrendered tο philosophy consisted not so much in the truths arrived at_as in the_ METHOD _by which truth is sought_. " As Bacon inaugurated anew method in physical inquiry, so Socrates inaugurated a new method inmetaphysical inquiry. 

What, then, was this _new method_? It was no other than the _inductive_method applied to the facts of consciousness. This method is thusdefined by Aristotle: "Induction is the process from particulars togenerals;" that is, it is the process of discovering laws from facts, causes from effects, being from phenomena. But how is this process ofinduction conducted? By observing and enumerating the real facts whichare presented in consciousness, by noting their relations of resemblanceor difference, and by classifying these facts by the aid of theserelations. In other words, it is _analysis_ applied to the phenomena ofmind. [477] Now Socrates gave this method of psychological analysis toGreek philosophy. There are two things of which Socrates must justly beregarded as the author, --the _inductive reasoning_ and _abstractdefinition_. [478] We readily grant that Socrates employed this methodimperfectly, for methods are the last things perfected in science; butstill, the Socratic movement was a vast movement in the right direction. 

[Footnote 477: Cousin's "Lectures on the History of Philosophy, " vol. I. P. 30. ]

[Footnote 478: Aristotle's "Metaphysics, " vol. Xii. Ch. Iv. P. 359(Bohn's edition). ]

In what are usually regarded as the purely Socratic dialogues, [479]Plato evidently designs to exhibit this method of Socrates. They proceedcontinually on the firm conviction that there is a standard or criterionof truth in the reason of man, and that, by _reflection_, man canapprehend and recognize the truth. To awaken this power of reflection;to compel men to analyze their language and their thoughts; to lead themfrom the particular and the contingent, to the universal and thenecessary; and to teach them to test their opinions by the inwardstandard of truth, was the aim of Socrates. These dialogues are apicture of the conversations of Socrates. They are literally aneducation of the thinking faculty. Their purpose is to discipline men tothink for themselves, rather than to furnish opinions for them. In manyof these dialogues Socrates affirms nothing. After producing manyarguments, and examining a question on all sides, he leaves itundetermined. At the close of the dialogue he is as far from adeclaration of opinions as at the commencement. His grand effort, likethat of Bacon's, is to furnish men a correct method of inquiry, ratherthan to apply that method and give them results. 

[Footnote 479: "Laches, " "Charmides, " "Lysis, " "The Rivals, " "First andSecond Alcibiades, " "Theages, " "Clitophon. " See Whewell's translation, vol. I. ]

We must not, however, from thence conclude that Socrates did not himselfattain any definite conclusions, or reach any specific and valuableresults. When, in reply to his friends who reported the answer of theoracle of Delphi, that "Socrates was the wisest of men, " he said, "hesupposed the oracle declared him wise _because he knew nothing_, " he didnot mean that true knowledge was unattainable, for his whole life hadbeen spent in efforts to attain it. He simply indicates the dispositionof mind which is most befitting and most helpful to the seeker aftertruth. He must be conscious of his own ignorance. He must not exalthimself. He must not put his own conceits in the way of the thing hewould know. He must have an open eye, a single purpose, an honest mind, to prepare him to receive light when it comes. And that there is light, that there is a source whence light comes, he avowed in every word andact. 

Socrates unquestionably believed in one Supreme God, the immaterial, infinite Governor of all. He cherished that instinctive, spontaneousfaith in God and his Providence which is the universal faith of thehuman heart. He saw this faith revealed in the religious sentiments ofall nations, and in the tendency to worship so universallycharacteristic of humanity. [480] He appealed to the consciousness ofabsolute dependence--the persuasion, wrought by God in the minds of allmen, that "He is able to make men happy or miserable, " and theconsequent sense of obligation which teaches man he ought to obey God. And he regarded with some degree of affectionate tenderness the commonsentiment of his countrymen, that the Divine Government was conductedthrough the ministry of subordinate deities or generated gods. But hesought earnestly to prevent the presence of these subordinate agentsfrom intercepting the clear view of the Supreme God. 

The faith of Socrates was not, however, grounded on mere feeling andsentiment. He endeavored to place the knowledge of God on a rationalbasis. We can not read the arguments he employed without being convincedthat he anticipated all the subsequent writers on Natural Theology inhis treatment of the argument from _special ends_ or _final causes_. Weventure to abridge the account which is given by Xenophon of theconversation with Aristodemus:[481]

[Footnote 480: "Memorabilia, " bk. I. Ch. Iv. § 16. ]

[Footnote 481: Ibid. , bk. I. Ch. Iv. ]

"I will now relate the manner in which I once heard Socrates discoursingwith Aristodemus concerning the Deity; for, observing that he neverprayed nor sacrificed to the gods, but, on the contrary, ridiculed thosewho did, he said to him:

"'Tell me, Aristodemus, is there any man you admire on account of hismerits? Aristodemus having answered, 'Many, --'Name some of them, I prayyou, ' said Socrates. 'I admire, ' said Aristodemus, 'Homer for his Epicpoetry, Melanippides for his dithyrambics, Sophocles for his tragedy, Polycletus for statuary, and Zeuxis for painting. '

"'But which seemed to you most worthy of admiration, Aristodemus--theartist who forms images void of motion and intelligence, or one who hasskill to produce animals that are endued, not only with activity, butunderstanding?'

"'The latter, there can be no doubt, ' replied Aristodemus, 'provided theproduction was not the effect of chance, but of wisdom and contrivance. '

"'But since there are many things, some of which we can easily see theuse of, while we can not say of others to what purpose they areproduced, which of these, Aristodemus, do you suppose the work ofwisdom?'

"'It would seem the most reasonable to affirm it of those whose fitnessand utility are so evidently apparent, ' answered Aristodemus. 

"'But it is evidently apparent that He who, at the beginning, made man, endued him with senses because they were good for him; eyes wherewith tobehold what is visible, and ears to hear whatever was heard; for, say, Aristodemus, to what purpose should odor be prepared, if the sense ofsmelling had been denied or why the distinction of bitter or sweet, ofsavory or unsavory, unless a palate had been likewise given, conveniently placed to arbitrate between them and proclaim thedifference? Is not that Providence, Aristodemus, in a most eminentmanner conspicuous, which, because the eye of a man is so delicate inits contexture, hath therefore prepared eyelids like doors whereby tosecure it, which extend of themselves whenever it is needful, and againclose when sleep approaches? Are not these eyelids provided, as it were, with a fence on the edge of them to keep off the wind and guard the eye?Even the eyebrow itself is not without its office, but, as a penthouse, is prepared to turn off the sweat, which falling from the forehead mightenter and annoy that no less tender than astonishing part of us. Is itnot to be admired that the ears should take in sounds of every sort, andyet are not too much filled with them? That the fore teeth of the animalshould be formed in such a manner as is evidently best for cutting, andthose on the side for grinding it to pieces? That the mouth, throughwhich this food is conveyed, should be placed so near the nose and eyesas to prevent the passing unnoticed whatever is unfit fornourishment?. .. And canst thou still doubt, Aristodemus, whether a_disposition of parts like this should be a work of chance, or of wisdomand contrivance_?'

"'I have no longer any doubt, ' replied Aristodemus; 'and, indeed, themore I consider it, the more evident it appears to me that man must bethe masterpiece of some great Artificer, carrying along with it infinitemarks of the love and favor of Him who hath thus formed it. '

"'But, further (unless thou desirest to ask me questions), seeing, Aristodemus, thou thyself art conscious of reason and intelligence, supposest thou there is no intelligence elsewhere? Thou knowest thy bodyto be a small part of that wide-extended earth thou everywherebeholdest; the moisture contained in it thou also knowest to be aportion of that mighty mass of waters whereof seas themselves are but apart, while the rest of the elements contribute out of their abundanceto thy formation. It is the _soul_, then, alone, that intellectual partof us, which is come to thee by some lucky chance, from I know notwhere. If so, there is no intelligence elsewhere; and we must be forcedto confess that this stupendous universe, with all the various bodiescontained therein--equally amazing, whether we consider their magnitudeor number, whatever their use, whatever their order--all have beenproduced by chance, not by intelligence!'

"'It is with difficulty that I can suppose otherwise, ' returnedAristodemus; 'for I behold none of those gods whom you speak of asframing and governing the world; whereas I see the artists when at theirwork here among us. '

"'Neither yet seest thou thy soul, Aristodemus, which, however, mostassuredly governs thy body; although it may well seem, by thy manner oftalking, that it is chance and not reason which governs thee. '

"'I do not despise the gods, ' said Aristodemus; 'on the contrary, Iconceive so highly of their excellency, as to suppose they stand in noneed of me or of my services. '

"'Thou mistakest the matter, ' Aristodemus, 'the great magnificence theyhave shown in their care of thee, so much the more honor and servicethou owest them. '

"'Be assured, ' said Aristodemus, 'if I once could persuade myself thegods take care of man, I should want no monitor to remind me of myduty. '

"'And canst thou doubt, Aristodemus, if the gods take care of man? Hathnot the glorious privilege of walking upright been alone bestowed onhim, whereby he may with the better advantage survey what is around him, contemplate with more ease those splendid objects which are above, andavoid the numerous ills and inconveniences which would otherwise befallhim? Other animals, indeed, they have provided with feet; but to manthey have also given hands, with which he can form many things for use, and make himself happier than creatures of any other kind. A tongue hathbeen bestowed on every other animal; but what animal, except man, haththe power of forming words with it whereby to explain his thoughts andmake them intelligible to others? But it is not with respect to the bodyalone that the gods have shown themselves bountiful to man. Their mostexcellent gift is that of a soul they have infused into him, which sofar surpasses what is elsewhere to be found; for by what animal exceptman is even the existence of the gods discovered, who have produced andstill uphold in such regular order this beautiful and stupendous frameof the universe? What other creature is to be found that can serve andadore them?. .. In thee, Aristodemus, has been joined to a wonderful soula body no less wonderful; and sayest thou, after this, the gods take nothought for me? What wouldst thou, then, more to convince thee of theircare?'

"'I would they should send and inform me, ' said Aristodemus, 'whatthings I ought or ought not to do, in like manner as thou sayest theyfrequently do to thee. '"

In reply, Socrates shows that the revelations of God which are made innature, in history, in consciousness, and by oracles, are made _for_ allmen and _to_ all men. He then concludes with these remarkable words:"As, therefore, amongst men we make best trial of the affection andgratitude of our neighbor by showing him kindness, and make discovery ofhis wisdom by consulting him in our distress, do thou, in like manner, behave towards the gods; and if thou wouldst experience what theirwisdom and their love, render thyself deserving of some of those divinesecrets which may not be penetrated by man, and are imparted to thosealone who consult, who adore, and who obey the Deity. Then shalt thou, my Aristodemus, understand _there is a Being whose eye passes throughall nature, and whose ear is open to every sound; extended to allplaces, extending through all time; and whose bounty and care can knowno other bounds than those fixed by his own creation_". [482]

[Footnote 482: Lewes's translation, in "Biog. History of Philosophy, "pp. 160-165. ]

Socrates was no less earnest in his belief in the immortality of thesoul, and a state of future retribution. He had reverently listened tothe intuitions of his own soul--the instinctive longings and aspirationsof his own heart, as a revelation from God. He felt that all the powersand susceptibilities of his inward nature were in conscious adaptationto the idea of immortality, and that its realization was the appropriatedestiny of man. He was convinced that a future life was needed to avengethe wrongs and reverse the unjust judgments of the present life;[483]needed that virtue may receive its meet reward, and the course ofProvidence may have its amplest vindication. He saw this faith reflectedin the universal convictions of mankind, and the "common traditions" ofall ages. [484] No one refers more frequently than Socrates to the grandold mythologic stories which express this faith; to Minos, andRhadamanthus, and Æacus, and Triptolemus, who are "real judges, " andwho, in "the Place of Departed Spirits, administer _justice_. "[485] Hebelieved that in that future state the pursuit of wisdom would be hischief employment, and he anticipated the pleasure of mingling in thesociety of the wise, and good, and great of every age. 

[Footnote 483: "Apology, " § 32, p. 329 (Whewell's edition). ]

[Footnote 484: Ibid. ]

[Footnote 485: "Apology, " p. 330. ]

Whilst, then, Socrates was not the first to teach the doctrine ofimmortality, because no one could be said to have first _discovered_ itany more than to have first discovered the existence of a God, he wascertainly the first to place it upon a philosophic basis. The Phædopresents the doctrine and the _reasoning_ by which Socrates had elevatedhis mind above the fear of death. Some of the arguments may be purelyPlatonic, the argument especially grounded on "ideas;" still, as awhole, it must be regarded as a tolerably correct presentation of themanner in which Socrates would prove the immortality of the soul. 

In _Ethics_, Socrates was pre-eminently himself. The systematicresolution of the whole theory of society into the elementary principleof natural law, was peculiar to him. _Justice_ was the cardinalprinciple which must lie at the foundation of all good government. Theword σοφια--_wisdom_--included all excellency in personal morals, whether as manifested (reflectively) in the conduct of one's self, or(socially) towards others. And _Happiness_, in its purity andperfection, can only be found in virtuous action. [486]

[Footnote 486: Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy, " vol. I. Pp. 360, 361. ]

Socrates left nothing behind him that could with propriety be called a_school_. His chief glory is that he inaugurated a new _method_ ofinquiry, which, in Plato and Aristotle, we shall see applied. He gave anew and vital impulse to human thought, which endured for ages; "and heleft, as an inheritance for humanity, the example of a heroic lifedevoted wholly to the pursuit of truth, and crowned with martyrdom. "

CHAPTER X. 

THE PHILOSOPHERS OF ATHENS (_continued_). 

THE SOCRATIC SCHOOL (_continued_). 

PLATO. 

We have seen that the advent of Socrates marks a new era in the historyof speculative thought. Greek philosophy, which at first was aphilosophy of nature, now changes its direction, its character, and itsmethod, and becomes a philosophy of mind. This, of course, does not meanthat now it had mind alone for its object; on the contrary, it tended, as indeed philosophy must always tend, to the conception of a rationalideal or _intellectual system of the universe_. It started from thephenomena of mind, began with the study of human thought, and it madethe knowledge of mind, of its ideas and laws, the basis of a higherphilosophy, which should interpret all nature. In other words, itproceeded from psychology, through dialectics, to ontology. [487]

[Footnote 487: Cousin's "Lectures on the History of Philosophy, " vol. I. P. 413. ]

This new movement we have designated in general terms as the _SocraticSchool_. Not that we are to suppose that, in any technical sense, Socrates founded _a_ school. The Academy, the Lyceum, the Stoa, and theGarden, were each the chosen resort of distinct philosophic sects, thelocality of separate schools; but Athens itself, the whole city, was thescene of the studies, the conversations, and the labors of Socrates. Hewandered through the streets absorbed in thought. Sometimes he stoodstill for hours lost in profoundest meditation; at other times he mightbe seen in the market-place, surrounded by a crowd of Athenians, eagerlydiscussing the great questions of the day. 

Socrates, then, was not, in the usual sense of the word, a teacher. Heis not to be found in the Stoa or the Grove, with official aspect, expounding a system of doctrine. He is "the garrulous oddity" of thestreets, putting the most searching and perplexing questions to everybystander, and making every man conscious of his ignorance. He deliveredno lectures; he simply talked. He wrote no books; he only argued: andwhat is usually styled his school must be understood as embracing thosewho attended him in public as listeners and admirers, and who caught hisspirit, adopted his philosophic _method_, and, in after life, elaboratedand systematized the ideas they had gathered from him. 

Among the regular or the occasional hearers of Socrates were many whowere little addicted to philosophic speculation. Some were warriors, asNicias and Laches; some statesmen, as Critias and Critobulus; some werepoliticians, in the worst sense of that word, as Glaucon; and some wereyoung men of fashion, as Euthydemus and Alcibiades. These were all alikedelighted with his inimitable irony, his versatility of genius, hischarming modes of conversation, his adroitness of reply; and they werecompelled to confess the wisdom and justness of his opinions, and toadmire the purity and goodness of his life. The magic power which hewielded, even over men of dissolute character, is strikingly depicted byAlcibiades in his speech at "the Banquet. "[488] Of these listeners, however, we can not now speak. Our business is with those only whoimbibed his philosophic spirit, and became the future teachers ofphilosophy. And even of those who, as Euclid of Megara, and Antisthenesthe Cynic, and Aristippus of Cyrenaica, borrowed somewhat from thedialectic of Socrates, we shall say nothing. They left no lastingimpression upon the current of philosophic thought, because theirsystems were too partial, and narrow, and fragmentary. It is in Platoand Aristotle that the true development of the Socratic philosophy is tobe sought, and in Plato chiefly, as the disciple and friend of Socrates. 

[Footnote 488: "Banquet, " §§ 39, 40. ]

Plato (B. C. 430-347) was pre-eminently the pupil of Socrates. He came toSocrates when he was but twenty years of age, and remained with him tothe day of his death. 

Diogenes Laertius reports the story of Socrates having dreamed he foundan unfledged cygnet on his knee. In a few moments it became winged andflew away, uttering a sweet sound. The next day a young man came to himwho was said to reckon Solon among his near ancestors, and who looked, through him, to Codrus and the god Poseidon. That young man was Plato, and Socrates pronounced him to be the bird he had seen in hisdream. [489]

[Footnote 489: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers, " bk. Iii. Ch. Vii. ]

Some have supposed that this old tradition intimates that Plato departedfrom the method of his master--he became fledged and flew away into theair. But we know that Plato did not desert his master whilst he wasliving, and there is no evidence that he abandoned his method after hewas dead. He was the best expounder and the most rigid observer of theSocratic "organon. " The influence of Socrates upon the philosophy ofPlato is everywhere discernible. Plato had been taught by Socrates, thatbeyond the world of sense there is a world of eternal truth, seen by theeye of reason alone. He had also learned from him that the eye of reasonis purified and strengthened by _reflection_, and that to reflect is toobserve, and analyze, and define, and classify the facts ofconsciousness. Self-reflection, then, he had been taught to regard asthe key of real knowledge. By a completer induction, a more careful andexact analysis, and a more accurate definition, he carried thisphilosophic method forward towards maturity. He sought to solve theproblem of _being_ by the principles revealed in his own consciousness, and in the _ultimate ideas of the reason_ to find the foundation of allreal knowledge, of all truth, and of all certitude. 

Plato was admirably fitted for these sublime investigations by thepossession of those moral qualities which were so prominent in thecharacter of his master. He had that same deep seriousness of spirit, that earnestness and rectitude of purpose, that longing after truth, that inward sympathy with, and reverence for justice, and purity, andgoodness, which dwelt in the heart of Socrates, and which constrainedhim to believe in their reality and permanence. He could not endure thethought that all ideas of right were arbitrary and factitious, that allknowledge was unreal, that truth was a delusion, and certainty a dream. The world of sense might be fleeting and delusive, but the voice ofreason and conscience would not mislead the upright man. The opinions ofindividual men might vary, but the universal consciousness of the racecould not prevaricate. However conflicting the opinions of menconcerning beautiful things, right actions, and good sentiments, Platowas persuaded there are ideas of Order, and Right, and Good, which areuniversal, unchangeable, and eternal. Untruth, injustice, and wrong mayendure for a day or two, perhaps for a century or two, but they can notalways last; they must perish. The _just_ thing and the _true_ thing arethe only enduring things; these are eternal. Plato had a sublimeconviction that his mission was to draw the Athenian mind away from thefleeting, the transitory, and the uncertain, and lead them to thecontemplation of an Eternal Truth, an Eternal Justice, an EternalBeauty, all proceeding from and united in an Eternal Being--the ultimateἀγαθόν--_the Supremely Good_. The knowledge of this "Supreme Good" heregarded as the highest science. [490]

[Footnote 490: "Republic, " bk. Vi. Ch. Xvi. P. 193. ]

Added to these moral qualifications, Plato had the further qualificationof a comprehensive knowledge of all that had been achieved by hispredecessors. In this regard he had enjoyed advantages superior to thoseof Socrates. Socrates was deficient in erudition, properly so called. Hehad studied men rather than books. His wisdom consisted in an extensive_observation_, the results of which he had generalized with more or lessaccuracy. A complete philosophic method demands not only a knowledge ofcontemporaneous opinions and modes of thought, but also a knowledge ofthe succession and development of thought in past ages. Its instrumentis not simply psychological analysis, but also historical analysis as acounterproof. [491] And this erudition Plato supplied. He studiedcarefully the doctrines of the Ionian, Italian, and Eleatic schools. Cratylus gave him special instruction in the theories ofHeraclitus. [492] He secured an intimate acquaintance with the loftyspeculations of Pythagoras, under Archytas of Tarentum, and in thewritings of Philolaus, whose books he is said to have purchased. Hestudied the principles of Parmenides under Hermogenes, [493] and he morethan once speaks of Parmenides in terms of admiration, as one whom hehad early learned to reverence. [494] He studied mathematics underTheodoras, the most eminent geometrician of his day. He travelled inSouthern Italy, in Sicily, and, in search of a deeper wisdom, he pursuedhis course to Egypt. [495] Enriched by the fruits of all previousspeculations, he returned to Athens, and devoted the remainder of hislife to the development of a comprehensive system "which was to combine, to conciliate, and to supersede them all. "[496] The knowledge he hadderived from travel, from books, from oral instruction, he fused andblended with his own speculations, whilst the Socratic spirit mellowedthe whole, and gave to it a unity and scientific completeness which hasexcited the admiration and wonder of succeeding ages. [497]

[Footnote 491: Cousin's "Lectures on the History of Philosophy, " vol. I. P. 31. ]

[Footnote 492: Aristotle's "Metaphysics, " bk. I. Ch. Vi. ]

[Footnote 493: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers, " bk. Iii. Ch. Viii. P. 115. ]

[Footnote 494: See especially "Theætetus, " § 101. ]

[Footnote 495: Ritter's "History of Ancient Philosophy, " vol. Ii. P. 147. ]

[Footnote 496: Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy, " vol. Ii. P. 22. ]

[Footnote 497: Encyclopædia Britannica, article "Plato. "]

The question as to _the nature, the sources, and the validity of humanknowledge_ had attracted general attention previous to the time ofSocrates and Plato. As the results of this protracted controversy, theopinions of philosophers had finally crystallized in two well-definedand opposite theories of knowledge. 

1. That which reduced all knowledge to the accidental and passivelyreceptive quality of the organs of sense and which asserted, as itsfundamental maxim, that "_Science consists in_αἴσθησις--_sensation_. "[498]

This doctrine had its foundation in the physical philosophy ofHeraclitus. He had taught that all things are in a perpetual flux andchange. "Motion gives the appearance of existence and of generation. ""Nothing _is_, but is always a _becoming"_[499] Material substances areperpetually losing their identity, and there is no permanent essence orbeing to be found. Hence Protagoras inferred that truth must vary withthe ever-varying sensations of the individual. "Man (the individual) isthe measure of all things. " Knowledge is a purely relative thing, andevery man's opinion is truth for him. [500] The law of right, asexemplified in the dominion of a party, is the law of the strongest;fluctuating with the accidents of power, and never attaining a permanentbeing. "Whatever a city enacts as appearing just to itself, this also isjust to the city that enacts it, so long as it continues in force. "[501]"The just, then, is nothing else but that which is expedient for thestrongest. "[502]

[Footnote 498: "Theætetus, " § 23. ]

[Footnote 499: Ibid. , §§ 25, 26. ]

[Footnote 500: Ibid. , §§ 39, 87. ]

[Footnote 501: Ibid. , § 87. ]

[Footnote 502: "Republic, " bk. I. Ch. Xii. ]

2. The second theory is that which denies the existence (except asphantasms, images, or mere illusions of the mind) of the whole ofsensible phenomena, and refers all knowledge to the _rationalapperception of unity_ (τὸ ἔν) _or the One_. 

This was the doctrine of the later Eleatics. The world of sense was, toParmenides and Zeno, a blank negation, the _non ens_. The identity ofthought and existence was the fundamental principle of their philosophy. 

 "Thought is the same thing as the cause of thought; For without the thing in which it is announced, You can not find the thought; for there is nothing, nor shall be, Except the existing. "[503]

[Footnote 503: Parmenides, quoted in Lewes's "Biog. History ofPhilosophy, " p. 54. ]

This theory, therefore, denied to man any valid knowledge of theexternal world. 

It will at once be apparent to the intelligent reader that the directand natural result of both these theories[504] of knowledge was atendency to universal skepticism. A spirit of utter indifference totruth and righteousness was the prevailing spirit of Athenian society. That spirit is strikingly exhibited in the speech of Callicles, "theshrewd man of the world, " in "Gorgias" (§85, 86). Is this new to ourears?" My dear Socrates, you talk of _law_. Now the laws, in myjudgment, are just the work of the weakest and most numerous; in framingthem they never thought but of themselves and their own interests; theynever approve or censure except in reference to _this. _ Hence it is thatthe cant arises that tyranny is improper and unjust, and to struggle foreminence, guilt. Unable to rise themselves, of course they would wish topreach liberty and equality. But nature proclaims the law of thestronger. .. . We surround our children from their infancy withpreposterous prejudices about liberty and justice. The man of sensetramples on such impositions, and shows what Nature's justice is. .. . Iconfess, Socrates, philosophy is a highly amusing study--in moderation, and for boys. But protracted too long, it becomes a perfect plague. Yourphilosopher is a complete novice in the life _comme il faut_. .. . I likevery well to see a child babble and stammer; there is even a grace aboutit when it becomes his age. But to see a man continue the prattle of thechild, is absurd. Just so with your philosophy. " The consequence of thisprevalent spirit of universal skepticism was a general laxity of morals. The Aleibiades, of the "_Symposium_, " is the ideal representative of theyoung aristocracy of Athens. Such was the condition of societygenerally, and such the degeneracy of even the Government itself, thatPlato impressively declares "that God alone could save the young men ofhis age from ruin. "[505]

[Footnote 504: Between these two extreme theories there were offeredtwo, apparently less extravagant, accounts of the nature and limits ofhuman knowledge--one declaring that "_Science_(real knowledge) _consistsin right opinion_" (δόξα ἀληθής), but having no further basis in thereason of man ("Theæstetus, " § 108); and the other affirming that"_Science is right opinion with logical explication or definition_"(μετὰ λόχου), ("Theætetus, " § 139). A close examination will, however, convince us that these are but modifications of the sensational theory. The latter forcibly remind us of the system of Locke, who adds"reflection" to "sensation, " but still maintains that all on "simpleideas" are obtained from without, and that these are the only materialupon which reflection can be exercised. Thus the human mind has nocriterion of truth within itself, no elements of knowledge which areconnatural and inborn. ]

[Footnote 505: "Republic, " bk. Vi. Ch. Vii. ]

Therefore the grand, the vital, the most urgent question for his times, as indeed for all times, was, _What is Truth? What is Right_? In themidst of all this variableness and uncertainty of human opinion, isthere no ground of certainty? Amid all the fluctuations and changesaround us and within us, is there nothing that is immutable andpermanent? Have we no ultimate standard of Right? Is there no criterionof Truth? Plato believed most confidently there was such a criterion andstandard. He had learned from Socrates, his master, to cherish anunwavering faith in the existence of an Eternal Truth, an Eternal Order, an Eternal Good, the knowledge of which is essential to the perfectionand happiness of man, and which knowledge must therefore be presumed tobe attainable by man. Henceforth, therefore, the ceaseless effort ofPlato's life is to attain a standard (κριτήριον)[506]--a CRITERION OFTRUTH. 

[Footnote 506: "Theætetus, " § 89. ]

At the outset of his philosophic studies, Plato had derived fromSocrates an important principle, which became the guide of all hissubsequent inquiries. He had learned from him that the criterion oftruth must be no longer sought amid the ever-changing phenomena of the"sensible world. " This had been attempted by the philosophers of theIonian school, and ended in failure and defeat. It must therefore besought in the metaphenomenal--the "intelligible world;" that is, it mustbe sought in the apperceptions of the reason, and not in opinionsfounded on sensation. In other words, he must look _within_. Here, byreflection, he could recognize, dimly and imperfectly at first, butincreasing gradually in clearness and distinctness, two classes ofcognitions, having essentially distinct and opposite characteristics. Hefound one class that was complex (σνγκεγυμένον), changeable (θάτερον), contingent and relative (τὰ προς τι σχέσιν ἔχοντα); the other, simple(κεχωρισμένον), unchangeable (ἀκίνητον), constant (ταὐτόν), permanent(τὸ ὂν ἀει), and absolute (ἀνυπόθετον = ἁπλοῦν). One class that may bequestioned, the other admitting of no question, because self-evident andnecessary, and therefore compelling belief. One class grounded onsense-perception, the other conceived by reason alone. But whilst thereason recognizes, it does not create them. They are not particular andindividual, but universal. They belong not to the man, but to the race. 

He found, then, that there are in all minds certain "principles" whichare fundamental--principles which lie at the basis of all our cognitionsof the objective world, and which, as "mental laws, " determine all ourforms of thought; and principles, too, which have this marvellous andundeniable character, that they are encountered in the most commonexperiences, and, at the same time, instead of being circumscribedwithin the limits of experience, transcend and govern it--principleswhich are _universal_ in the midst of particular phenomena--_necessary, _though mingled with things contingent--to our eyes _infinite_ and_absolute_, even when appearing in us the relative and finite beingsthat we are. [507] These first or fundamental principles Plato calledIDEAS (ἰδέαι). 

[Footnote 507: Cousin's "The True, the Beautiful, and the Good, " p. 40. ]

In attempting to present to the reader an adequate representation of thePlatonic Ideas, we shall be under the necessity of anticipating some ofthe results of his Dialectical method before we have expounded thatmethod. And, further, in order that it may be properly appreciated bythe modern student, we shall avail ourselves of the lights which modernpsychology, faithful to the method of Plato, has thrown upon thesubject. Whilst, however, we admit that modern psychology has succeededin giving more definiteness and precision to the "doctrine of Ideas, " weshall find that all that is fundamentally valuable and true was presentto the mind of Plato. Whatever superiority the "Spiritual" philosophy ofto-day may have over the philosophy of past ages, it has attained thatsuperiority by its adherence to the principles and method of Plato. 

In order to the completeness of our preliminary exposition of thePlatonic doctrine of Ideas, we shall conditionally assume, as a naturaland legitimate hypothesis, the doctrine so earnestly asserted by Plato, that the visible universe, at least in its present form, is an _effect_which must have had a _cause_, [508] and that the Order, and Beauty, andExcellence of the universe are the result of the presence and operationof a "regulating Intelligence"--a _Supreme Mind_. [509] Now that, anterior to the creation of the universe, there must have existed in theEternal Mind certain fundamental principles of Order, Right, and Good, will not be denied. Every conceivable _form_, every possible _relation_, every principle of _right_, must have been eternally present to theDivine thought. As pure intelligence, the Deity must have always beenself-conscious--must have known himself as substance and cause, as theInfinite and Perfect. If then the Divine Energy is put forth in creativeacts, that energy must obey those eternal principles of Order, Right, and Good. If the Deity operate at all, he must operate rightly, wisely, and well. The created universe must be an _image_, in the sphere ofsense, of the ideas which inhere in the reason of the great First Cause. 

[Footnote 508: "Timæus, " ch. Ix. ]

[Footnote 509: "Phædo, " § 105. ]

"Let us declare, " says Plato, "with what _motive_ the Creator hathformed nature and the universe. He was _good_, and in the good no mannerof envy can, on any subject, possibly subsist. Exempt from envy, he hadwished that all things should, as far as possible, _resemblehimself_. .. . It was not, and is not to be allowed for the Supremely Goodto do any thing except what is most _excellent_ (κάλλιστον)--most_fair_, most _beautiful_. "[510] Therefore, argues Plato, "inasmuch asthe world is the most beautiful of things, and its artificer the best ofcauses, it is evident that the Creator and Father of the universe lookedto the _Eternal Model_(παράδειγμα), pattern, or plan, "[511] which lay inhis own mind. And thus this one, only-generated universe, is the _image_(εἰκών) of that God who is the object of the intellect, the greatest, the best, and the most perfect Being. [512]

[Footnote 510: "Timæus, " ch. X. ]

[Footnote 511: Ibid. , ch. Ix. ]

[Footnote 512: "Timæus, " ch. Lxxiii. ]

And then, furthermore, if this Supreme Intelligence, this Eternal Mind, shall create another _mind_, it must, in a still higher degree, resemblehim. Inasmuch as it is a rational nature, it must, in a peculiar sense, partake of the Divine characteristics. "The soul, " says Plato, "is thatwhich most partakes of the _Divine_"[513] The soul must, therefore, havenative _ideas_ and sentiments which correlate it with the Divineoriginal. The ideas of substance and cause, of unity and identity, ofthe infinite and perfect, must be mirrored there. As it is the"offspring of God, "[514] it must bear some traces and lineaments of itsDivine parentage. That soul must be configured and correlated to thoseprinciples of Order, Right, and Good which dwell in the Eternal Mind. And because it has within itself the same ideas and laws, according towhich the great Architect built the universe, therefore it is capable ofknowing, and, in some degree, of comprehending, the intellectual systemof the universe. It apprehends the external world by a light which thereason supplies. It interprets nature according to principles and lawswhich God has inwrought within the very essence of the soul. "That whichimparts truth to knowable things, and gives the knower his power ofknowing truth, is the _idea of the good_, and you are to conceive ofthis as the source of knowledge and of truth. "[515]

[Footnote 513: "Laws, " bk. V. Ch. I. ]

[Footnote 514: Ibid. , bk. X. ]

[Footnote 515: "Republic, " bk. Vi. Ch. Xviii. ]

And now we are prepared to form a clear conception of the Platonicdoctrine of Ideas. Viewed in their relation to the Eternal Reason, asgiving the primordial thought and law of all being, these principles aresimply εἴδη αὐτὰ καθ᾽ αὑτά--_ideas in themselves_--the essentialqualities or attributes of Him who is the supreme and ultimate Cause ofall existence. When regarded as before the Divine imagination, givingdefinite forms and relations, they are the τύποι, the παραδείγματα--_thetypes_, _models, patterns, ideals_ according to which the universe wasfashioned. Contemplated in their actual embodiment in the laws, andtypical forms of the material world, they are εἰκόνες--_images_ of theeternal perfections of God. The world of sense pictures the world ofreason by a participation (μέθεξις) of the ideas. And viewed asinterwoven in the very texture and framework of the soul, they areὁμοιώματα--copies of the Divine Ideas which are the primordial laws ofknowing, thinking, and reasoning. Ideas are thus the nexus of relationbetween God and the visible universe, and between the human and theDivine reason. [516] There is something divine in the world, and in thehuman soul, namely, _the eternal laws and reasons of things_, mingledwith the endless diversity and change of sensible phenomena. These ideasare "the light of the intelligible world;" they render the invisibleworld of real Being perceptible to the reason of man. "Light is theoffspring of the Good, which the Good has produced in his own likeness. Light in the visible world is what the _idea of the Good_ is in theintelligible world. And this offspring of the Good--light--has the samerelation to vision and visible things which the Good has to intellectand intelligible things. "[517]

[Footnote 516: "Now, Idea is, as regards God, a mental operation by him(the notions of God, eternal and perfect in themselves); as regards us, the first things perceptible by mind; as regards Matter, a standard; butas regards the world, perceptible by sense, a pattern; but as consideredwith reference to itself, an existence. "--Alcinous, "Introduction to theDoctrines of Plato, " p. 261. 

"What general notions are to our minds, he (Plato) held, ideas are tothe Supreme Reason (νοῦς βασιλευς); they are the eternal thoughts of theDivine Intellect, and we attain truth when our thoughts conform withHis--when our general notions are in conformity with theideas. "--Thompson, "Laws of Thought, " p. 119. ]

[Footnote 517: "Republic, " bk. Vi. Ch. Xix. ]

_Science_ is, then, according to Plato, _the knowledge of universal, necessary, unchangeable, and eternal ideas_. The simple cognition of theconcrete phenomena of the universe is not regarded by him as _real_knowledge. "Science, or real knowledge, belongs to _Being_, andignorance to _non_-Being. " Whilst that which is conversant only "withthat which partakes of both--of being and non-being--and which can notbe said either to be or not to be"--that which is perpetually"becoming, " but never "really is, " is "simply _opinion_, and not realknowledge. "[518] And those only are "philosophers" who have a knowledgeof the _really-existing_, in opposition to the mere seeming; of the_always-existing_, in opposition to the transitory; and of that whichexists _permanently_, in opposition to that which waxes and wanes--isdeveloped and destroyed alternately. "Those who recognize many beautifulthings, but who can not see the Beautiful itself, and can not evenfollow those who would lead them to it, they _opine_, but do not _know_. And the same may be said of those who recognize right actions, but donot recognize an absolute righteousness. And so of other ideas. But theywho look at these ideas--permanent and unchangeable ideas--these men_really know_. "[519] Those are the true philosophers alone who love thesight of truth, and who have attained to the vision of the eternalorder, and righteousness, and beauty, and goodness in the Eternal Being. And the means by which the soul is raised to this vision of real Being(τὸ ὄντως ὄν) is THE SCIENCE OF REAL KNOWLEDGE. 

Plato, in the "Theætetus, " puts this question by the interlocutorSocrates, "What is Science (᾽Επιστήμη) or positive knowledge?"[520]Theætetus essays a variety of answers, such as, "Science is sensation, ""Science is right judgment or opinion, " "Science is right opinion withlogical definition. " These, in the estimation of the Platonic Socrates, are all unsatisfactory and inadequate. But after you have toiled to theend of this remarkable discussion, in which Socrates demolishes all thethen received theories of knowledge, he gives you no answer of his own. He abruptly closes the discussion by naïvely remarking that, at anyrate, Theætetus will learn that he does not understand the subject; andthe ground is now cleared for an original investigation. 

[Footnote 518: "Republic, " bk. V. Ch. Xx. ]

[Footnote 519: Ibid. , bk. V. Ch. Xxii. ]

[Footnote 520: "Theætetus, " § 10. ]

This investigation is resumed in the "Republic. " This greatest work ofPlato's was designed not only to exhibit a scheme of Polity, and presenta system of Ethics, but also, at least in its digressions, to propound asystem of Metaphysics more complete and solid than had yet appeared. Thediscussion as to the _powers_ or _faculties_ by which we obtainknowledge, the _method_ or _process_ by which real knowledge isattained, and the ultimate _objects_ or _ontological grounds_ of allreal knowledge, commences at § 18, book v. , and extends to the end ofbook vii. 

That we may reach a comprehensive view of this "sublimest of sciences, "we shall find it necessary to consider--

1st. _What are the powers or faculties by which we obtain knowledge, andwhat are the limits and degrees of human knowledge?_

2d. _What is the method in which, or the processes and laws according towhich, the mind operates in obtaining knowledge?_

3d. _What are the ultimate results attained by this method? what are theobjective and ontological grounds of all real knowledge?_

The answer to the first question will give the PLATONIC PSYCHOLOGY; theanswer to the second will exhibit the PLATONIC DIALECTIC; the answer tothe last will reveal the PLATONIC ONTOLOGY. 

I. PLATONIC PSYCHOLOGY. 

Every successful inquiry as to the reality and validity of humanknowledge must commence by clearly determining, by rigid analysis, whatare the actual phenomena presented in consciousness, what are the powersor faculties supposed by these phenomena, and what reliance are we toplace upon the testimony of these faculties? And, especially, if it beasserted that there is a science of absolute Reality, of ultimate andessential Being, then the most important and vital question is, By whatpower do we cognize real Being? through what faculty do we obtain theknowledge of that which absolutely _is_? If by sensation we only obtainthe knowledge of the fleeting and the transitory, "_the becoming_" howdo we attain to the knowledge of the unchangeable and permanent, "the_Being_?" Have we a faculty of universal, necessary, and eternalprinciples? Have we a faculty, an interior eye which beholds "_theintelligible_, " ideal, spiritual world, as the eye of sense beholds thevisible or "_sensible world_?"[521]

Plato commences this inquiry by first defining his understanding of theword δύναμις--_power_ or _faculty_. "We will say _faculties_ (δυνάμεις)are a certain kind of real existences by which we can do whatever we areable (_e. G. _, to know), as there are powers by which every thing doeswhat it does: the eye has a _power_ of seeing; the ear has a _power_ ofhearing. But these powers (of which I now speak) have no color or figureto which I can so refer that I can distinguish one power from another. _In order to make such distinction, I must look at the power itself, andsee what it is, and what it does. In that way I discern the power ofeach thing, and that is the same power which produces the same effect, and that is a different power which produces a different effect_. "[522]That which is employed about, and accomplishes one and the same purpose, this Plato calls a _faculty_. 

[Footnote 521: "Republic, " bk. Vi. Ch. Xviii. ]

[Footnote 522: Ibid. , bk. V. Ch. Xxi. ]

We have seen that our first conceptions (_i. E. _, first in the order oftime) are of the mingled, the concrete (τὸ συγκεχυμένον), "themultiplicity of things to which the multitude ascribe beauty, etc. [523]The mind "contemplates what is great and small, not as distinct fromeach other, but as confused. [524] Prior to the discipline of_reflection_, men are curious about mere sights and sounds, lovebeautiful voices, beautiful colors, beautiful forms, but theirintelligence can not see, can not embrace, the essential nature of theBeautiful itself. [525] Man's condition previous to the education ofphilosophy is vividly presented in Plato's simile of the cave. [526] Hebeholds only the images and shadows of the ectypal world, which are butdim and distant adumbrations of the real and archetypal world. 

Primarily nothing is given in the abstract (τὸ κεγωρισμένον), but everything in the concrete. The primary faculties of the mind enter intoaction spontaneously and simultaneously; all our primary notions areconsequently synthetic. When reflection is applied to this primarytotality of consciousness, that is, when we analyze our notions, we findthem composed of diverse and opposite elements, some of which arevariable, contingent, individual, and relative, others are permanent, unchangeable, universal, necessary, and absolute. Now these elements, sodiverse, so opposite, can not have been obtained from the same source;they must be supplied by separate powers. "Can any man with common sensereduce under one what _is infallible_, and what is _notinfallible?_"[527] Can that which is "_perpetually becoming_" beapprehended by the same faculty as that which "_always is?_"[528] Mostassuredly not. 

[Footnote 523: Ibid. , bk. V. Ch. Xxii. ]

[Footnote 524: Ibid. , bk. Vii. Ch. Viii. ]

[Footnote 525: Ibid. , bk. V. Ch. Xx. ]

[Footnote 526: Ibid. , bk. Vii. Ch. I. , ii. ]

[Footnote 527: "Republic, " bk. V. Ch. Xxi. ]

[Footnote 528: Ibid. , bk. V. Ch. Xxii. ; also "Timæus, " § 9. ]

These primitive intuitions--the simple perceptions of sense, and the _àpriori_ intuitions of the reason, which constitute the elements of allour complex notions, have essentially _diverse objects_--the sensible orectypal world, seen by the eye and touched by the hand, which Platocalls δοξαστήν--_the subject of opinion_; and the noetic or archetypalworld, perceived by reason, and which he calls διανοητικήν--_the subjectof rational intuition or science_. "It is plain, " therefore, arguesPlato, "that _opinion_ is a different thing from _science_. They must, therefore, have a different _faculty_ in reference to a differentobject--science as regards that which _is_, so as to know the nature ofreal _being_--opinion as regards that which can not be said absolutelyto be, or not to be. That which is known and that which is opined cannot possibly be the same, . .. Since they are naturally faculties ofdifferent things, and both of them are faculties--_opinion_ and_science_, and each of them different from the other. "[529] Here thenare two grand divisions of the mental powers--a faculty of apprehendinguniversal and necessary Truth, of intuitively beholding absoluteReality, and a faculty of perceiving sensible objects, and of judgingaccording to appearance. 

[Footnote 529: Ibid. , bk. V. Ch. Xxi. , xxii. ]

According to the scheme of Plato, these two general divisions of themental powers are capable of a further subdivision. He says: Considerthat there are two kinds of things, the _intelligible_ and the_visible_; two different regions, the intelligible world and thesensible world. Now take a line divided into two equal segments torepresent these two regions, and again divide each segment in the sameratio--both that of the visible and that of the intelligible species. The parts of each segment are to represent differences of clearness andindistinctness. In the visible world the parts are _things_ and_images_. By _images_ I mean shadows, [530] reflections in water and inpolished bodies, and all such like representations; and by _things_ Imean that of which images are resemblances, as animals, plants, andthings made by man. 

You allow that this difference corresponds to the difference of_knowledge_ and _opinion_; and the _opinionable_ is to the _knowable_ asthe _image_ to the _reality_. [531]

[Footnote 530: As in the simile of the cave ("Republic, " bk. Vii. Ch. I. And ii. ). ]

[Footnote 531: The analogy between the "images produced by reflectionsin water and on polished surfaces" and "the images of external objectsproduced in the mind by sensation" is more fully presented in the"Timæus, " ch. 19. 

The eye is a light-bearer, "made of that part of elemental fire whichdoes not burn, but sheds a mild light, like the light of day. .. . Whenthe light of the day meets the light which beams from the eye, thenlight meets like, and make a homogeneous body; the external lightmeeting the internal light, in the direction in which the eye looks. Andby this homogeneity like feels like; and if this beam touches anyobject, or any object touches it, it transmits the motions through thebody to the soul, and produces that sensation which we call _seeing_. .. . And if (in sleep) some of the strong motions remain in some part of theframe, they produce within us likenesses of external objects, . .. Andthus give rise to dreams. .. . As to the images produced by mirrors and bysmooth surfaces, they are now easily explained, for all such phenomenaresult from the mutual affinity of the external and internal fires. Thelight that proceeds from the face (as an object of vision), and thelight that proceeds from the eye, become one continuous ray on thesmooth surface. "]

Now we have to divide the segment which represents intelligible thingsin this way: The one part represents the knowledge which the mind getsby using things as images--the other; that which it has by dealing withthe ideas themselves; the one part that which it gets by reasoningdownward from principles--the other, the principles themselves; the onepart, truth which depends on hypotheses--the other, unhypothetical orabsolute truth. 

Thus, to explain a problem in geometry, the geometers make certainhypotheses (namely, definitions and postulates) about numbers andangles, and the like, and reason from them--giving no reason for theirassumptions, but taking them as evident to all; and, reasoning fromthem, they prove the propositions which they have in view. And in suchreasonings, they use visible figures or diagrams--to reason about asquare, for instance, with its diagonals; but these reasonings are notreally about these visible figures, but about the mental figures, andwhich they conceive in thought. 

The diagrams which they draw, being visible, are the images of thoughtswhich the geometer has in his mind, and these images he uses in hisreasoning. There may be images of these images--shadows and reflectionsin water, as of other visible things; but still these diagrams are onlyimages of conceptions. 

This, then, is _one_ kind of intelligible things: _conceptions_--forinstance, geometrical conceptions of figures. But in dealing with thesethe mind depends upon assumptions, and does not ascend to firstprinciples. It does not ascend above these assumptions, but uses imagesborrowed from a lower region (the visible world), these images beingchosen so as to be as distinct as may be. 

Now the _other_ kind of intelligible things is this: that which the_Reason_ includes, in virtue of its power of reasoning, when it regardsthe assumptions of the sciences as (what they are) assumptions only, anduses them as occasions and starting-points, that from these it mayascend to the _Absolute_, which does not depend upon assumption, theorigin of scientific truth. 

_The reason takes hold of this first principle of truth_, and availingitself of all the connections and relations of this principle, itproceeds to the conclusion--using no sensible image in doing this, butcontemplates the _idea alone_; and with these ideas the process begins, goes on, and terminates. 

"I apprehend, " said Glaucon, "but not very clearly, for the matter issomewhat abstruse. _You wish to prove that the knowledge which by thereason, in an intuitive manner, we may acquire of real existence andintelligible things is of a higher degree of certainty than theknowledge which belongs to what are commonly called the Sciences_. Suchsciences, you say, have certain assumptions for their basis; and theseassumptions are by the student of such sciences apprehended not bysense, but by a mental operation--by conception. 

"But inasmuch as such students ascend no higher than assumptions, and donot go to the first principles of truth, they do not seem to have trueknowledge, intellectual insight, intuitive reason, on the subjects oftheir reasonings, though the subjects are intelligible things. And youcall this habit and practice of the geometers and others by the name ofJUDGMENT (διάνοια), not reason, or insight, or intuition--takingjudgment to be something between opinion, on the one side, and intuitivereason, on the other. 

"You have explained it well, " said I. "And now consider these four kindsof things we have spoken of, as corresponding to four affections (orfaculties) of the mind. INTUITIVE REASON (νόησις), the highest; JUDGMENT(διάνοια)(or _discursive reason_), the next; the third, BELIEF (πίστις);and the fourth, CONJECTURE, or _guess_ (εὶκασία); and arrange them inorder, so that they may be held to have more or less certainty, as theirobjects have more or less truth. "[532] The completeness, and evenaccuracy of this classification of all the objects of human cognition, and of the corresponding mental powers, will be seen at once by studyingthe diagram proposed by Plato, as figured on the opposite page. 

[Footnote 532: "Republic, " bk. Vi. Ch. Xx. And xxi. ]

PLATONIC SCHEME OF THE OBJECTS OF COGNITION, AND THE RELATIVE MENTAL POWERS___________________________________________________________________________ | | | VISIBLE WORLD | INTELLIGIBLE WORLD | (the object of Opinion--δόξα). |(the object of Knowledge or | | Science--ίπυττήμη). |_________________________________|____________________________ | | | | | Things. | Images. | Intuitions. | Conceptions. ____________|________________|________________|______________|_____________

And may be thus further expanded:___________________________________________________________________________ | | | VISIBLE WORLD. | INTELLIGIBLE WORLD. ____________|_________________________________|____________________________ | | | | | Things | Images | Ideas | ConceptionsOBJECT | | | | | ζὼα. κ. τ. λ. | ικονες. | ιδεαί. | δυενοήματα. ____________|________________|________________|_____________|______________ | | | | | Belief. | Conjecture. | Intuition. |Demonstration. PROCESS | | | | | πιοτις. | ειkασια. | νόησις. | ίπισιηιη. ____________|________________|________________|_____________|______________ | | | | | SENSATION. | PHANTASY. | INTUITIVE | DISCURSIVEFACULTY | | | REASON. | REASON. | αiσθησις. | ϕαντασία. | νούς. | λόγος. ____________|________________|________________|_____________|______________ | | | |MODERN | SENSE. | IMAGINATION. | REASON. | JUDGMENT. NOMENCLATURE|Presentative |Representative |Regulative | Logical | Faculty. | Faculty | Faculty. | Faculty. ____________|________________|________________|_____________|______________ | | | MEMORY. | REMINISCENCE | μνημη. | αναμησις. | The Conservative Faculty-- | The Reproductive Faculty-- | "the preserver of sensation" |"the recollection of the | (σωτηρια αισιν, σεως. ) [533] | things which the soul | | saw (in Eternity) when | | journeying in the train of | | the Deity. "[534] |[Footnote 533: "Philebus, " § 67] | [Footnote 534: Phædrus, | | § 62. ]____________|_________________________________|____________________________

The foregoing diagram, borrowed from Whewell, with some modificationsand additions we have ventured to make, exhibits a perfect view of thePlatonic scheme of the _cognitive powers_--the faculties by which themind attains to different degrees of knowledge, "having more or lesscertainty, as their objects have more or less truth. "[535]

1st. SENSATION (αἴσθησις). --This term is employed by Plato to denote thepassive mental states or affections which are produced within us byexternal objects through the medium of the vital organization, and alsothe cognition or vital perception or consciousness[536] which the mindhas of these mental states. 

2d. PHANTASY (φαντασία). --This term is employed to describe the powerwhich the mind possesses of imagining or representing whatever has oncebeen the object of sensation. This may be done involuntarily as "indreams, disease, and hallucination, "[537] or voluntarily, as inreminiscence. Φαντάσματα are the images, the life-pictures (ζωγράφημα)of sensible things which are present to the mind, even when no externalobject is present to the sense. 

[Footnote 535: "Republic, " bk. Vii. Ch. Xix. ]

[Footnote 536: "In Greek philosophy there was no term for'consciousness' until the decline of philosophy, and in the latter agesof the language. Plato and Aristotle, to say nothing of otherphilosophers, had no special term to express the knowledge which themind has of the operation of its own faculties, though this, of course, was necessarily a frequent matter of consideration. Intellect wassupposed by them to be cognizant of its own operations. .. . In his'Theætetus' Plato accords to sense the power of perceiving that itperceives. "--Hamilton's "Metaphysics, " vol. I. P. 198 (Eng. Ed. ). ]

[Footnote 537: "Theætetus, " § 39. ]

The conjoint action of these two powers results in what Plato calls_opinion_ (δόξα). "Opinion is the complication of memory and sensation. For when we meet for the first time with a thing perceptible by a sense, and a sensation is produced by it, and from this sensation a memory, andwe subsequently meet again with the same thing perceived by a sense, wecombine the memory previously brought into action with the sensationproduced a second time, and we say within ourselves [this is] Socrates, or a horse, or fire, or whatever thing there may be of such a kind. Nowthis is called _opinion_, through our combining the recollection broughtpreviously into action with the sensation recently produced. And whenthese, placed along each other, agree, a true opinion is produced; butwhen they swerve from each other, a false one. "[538] The δόξα of Plato, therefore answers to the experience, or the _empirical knowledge_ ofmodern philosophy, which is concerned only with appearances (phenomena), and not with absolute realities, and can not be elevated to the dignityof _science_ or real knowledge. 

We are not from hence to infer that Plato intended to deny all realitywhatever to the objects of sensible experience. These transitoryphenomena were not real existences, but they were _images_ of realexistences. The world itself is but the image, in the sphere of sense, of those ideas of Order, and Proportion, and Harmony, which dwell in theDivine Intellect, and are mirrored in the soul of man. "Time itself is amoving image of Eternity. "[539] But inasmuch as the immediate object ofsense-perception is a representative image generated in the vitalorganism, and all empirical cognitions are mere "conjectures" (εἰκασίαι)founded on representative images, they need to be certified by a higherfaculty, which immediately apprehends real Being (τὸ ὄν). Of things, asthey are in themselves, the senses give us no knowledge; all that insensation we are conscious of is certain affections of the mind (πάθος);the existence of self, or the perceiving subject, and a somethingexternal to self, a perceived object, are revealed to us, not by thesenses, but by the reason. 

[Footnote 538: Alcinous, "Introduction to the Doctrine of Plato, " p. 247. ]

[Footnote 539: "Timæus, " § 14. ]

3d. JUDGMENT (διάνοια, λόγος), _the Discursive Faculty, or the Facultyof Relations_. --According to Plato, this faculty proceeds on theassumption of certain principles as true, without inquiring into theirvalidity, and reasons, by deduction, to the conclusions whichnecessarily flow from these principles. These assumptions Plato callshypotheses (ὑποθέσεις). But by hypotheses he does not mean baselessassumptions--"mere theories--"but things self-evident and "obvious toall;"[540] as for example, the postulates and definitions of Geometry. "After laying down hypotheses of the odd and even, and three kinds ofangles [right, acute, and obtuse], and figures [as the triangle, square, circle, and the like], he _proceeds on them as known, and gives nofurther reason about them_, and reasons downward from theseprinciples, "[541] affirming certain judgments as consequences deducibletherefrom. 

[Footnote 540: "Republic, " bk. Vi. Ch. Xx. ]

[Footnote 541: Ibid. , bk. Vi. Ch. Xx. ]

All judgments are therefore founded on _relations_. To judge is tocompare two terms. "Every judgment has three parts: the subject, ornotion about which the judgment is; the predicate, or notion with whichthe subject is compared; and the copula, or nexus, which expresses theconnection or relation between them. [542] Every act of affirmativejudgment asserts the agreement of the predicate and subject; every actof negative judgment asserts the predicate and subject do not agree. Alljudgment is thus an attempt to reduce to unity two cognitions, andreasoning (λογίζεσθαι) is simply the extension of this process. When welook at two straight lines of equal length, we do not merely think ofthem separately as _this_ straight line, and _that_ straight line, butthey are immediately connected together by a comparison which takesplace in the mind. We perceive that these two lines are alike; they areof equal length, and they are both straight; and the connection which isperceived as existing between them is a _relation of sameness oridentity. _[543] When we observe any change occurring in nature, as, forexample, the melting of wax in the presence of heat, the mind recognizesa causal efficiency in the fire to produce that change, and the relationnow apprehended is a _relation of cause and effect_[544] But thefundamental principles, the necessary ideas which lie at the basis ofall the judgments (as the ideas of space and time, of unity andidentity, of substance and cause, of the infinite and perfect) are notgiven by the judgment, but by the "highest faculty"--"the _IntuitiveReason_, [545] which is, for us, the source of all unhypothetical andabsolute knowledge. 

[Footnote 542: Thompson's "Laws of Thought, " p. 134. ]

[Footnote 543: "Phædo, " §§ 50-57, 62. ]

[Footnote 544: "Timæus, " ch. Ix. ; "Sophocles, " § 109. ]

[Footnote 545: "Republic, " bk. Vi. Ch. Xxi. ]

The knowledge, therefore, which is furnished by the Discursive Reason, Plato does not regard as "real Science. " "It is something betweenOpinion on the one hand, and Intuition on the other. "[546]

[Footnote 546: Ibid. , bk. Vi. Ch. Xxi. ]

4th. REASON (νοῦς)--_Intuitive Reason_, is the organ of self-evident, necessary, and universal Truth. In an immediate, direct, and intuitivemanner, it takes hold on truth with absolute certainty. The reason, through the medium of _ideas_, holds communion with the world of realBeing. These ideas are the _light_ which reveals the world of unseenrealities, as the sun reveals the world of sensible forms. "_The idea ofthe good_ is the _sun_ of the Intelligible World; it sheds on objectsthe light of truth, and gives to the soul that knows, the power ofknowing. "[547] Under this light, the eye of reason apprehends theeternal world of being as truly, yes more truly, than the eye of senseapprehends the world of phenomena. This power the rational soulpossesses by virtue of its having a nature kindred, or even homogeneouswith the Divinity. It was "generated by the Divine Father, " and, likehim, it is in a certain sense "_eternal_. "[548] Not that we are tounderstand Plato as teaching that the rational soul had an independentand underived existence; it was created or "generated" in eternity, [549]and even now, in its incorporate state, is not amenable to theconditions of time and space, but, in a peculiar sense, dwells ineternity; and therefore is capable of beholding eternal realities, andcoming into communion with absolute beauty, and goodness, andtruth--that is, with God, the _Absolute Being_. 

[Footnote 547: Ibid. , bk. Vi. Ch. Xix. ; see also ch. Xviii. ]

[Footnote 548: The reader must familiarize himself with the Platonicnotion of _"eternity" as a fixed state out of time existingcontemporaneous with one in time_, to appreciate the doctrine of Platoas stated above. If we regard his idea of eternity as merely anindefinite extension of time, with a past, a present, and a future, wecan offer no rational interpretation of his doctrine of the eternalnature of the rational essence of the soul. An eternal nature"generated" in a "past" or "present" time is a contradiction. But thatwas not Plato's conception of "eternity, " as the reader will discover onperusing the "Timæus" (ch. Xiv. ). "God resolved to create a moving imageof eternity, and out of that eternity which reposes in its own_unchangeable unity_ he framed an eternal image moving according tonumerical succession, which we call _Time_. Nothing can be moreinaccurate than to apply the terms, _past, present, future_, to realBeing, which is immovable. Past and future are expressions only suitableto generation which proceeds through time. " Time reposes on the bosom ofeternity, as all bodies are in space. ]

[Footnote 549: "Timæus, " ch. Xvi. , and "Phædrus, " where the soul ispronounced ἀρχὴ δὲ ἁγένητον. ]

Thus the soul (ψυχή) as a composite nature is on one side linked to theeternal world, its essence being generated of that ineffable elementwhich constitutes the real, the immutable, and the permanent. It is abeam of the eternal Sun, a spark of the Divinity, an emanation from God. On the other side it is linked to the phenomenal or sensible world, itsemotive part[550] being formed of that which is relative and phenomenal. The soul of man thus stands midway between the eternal and thecontingent, the real and the phenomenal, and as such, it is the mediatorbetween, and the interpreter of, both. 

[Footnote 550: Θυμειδές, the seat of the nobler--ἐπιθυμητικόν, the seatof the baser passions. ]

In the allegory of the "Chariot and Winged Steeds"[551] Plato representsthe lower or inferior part of man's nature as dragging the soul down tothe earth, and subjecting it to the slavery and debasement of corporealconditions. Out of these conditions there arise numerous evils thatdisorder the mind and becloud the reason, for evil is inherent to thecondition of finite and multiform being into which we have "fallen byour own fault. " The present earthly life is a fall and a punishment. Thesoul is now dwelling in "the grave we call the body. " In its incorporatestate, and previous to the discipline of education, the rational elementis "asleep. " "Life is more of a dream than a reality. " Men are utterlythe slaves of sense, the sport of phantoms and illusions. We nowresemble those "captives chained in a subterraneous cave, " so poeticallydescribed in the seventh book of the "Republic;" their backs are turnedto the light, and consequently they see but the shadows of the objectswhich pass behind them, and they "attribute to these shadows a perfectreality. " Their sojourn upon earth is thus a dark imprisonment in thebody, a dreamy exile from their proper home. "Nevertheless these palefugitive shadows suffice to revive in us the reminiscence of that higherworld we once inhabited, if we have not absolutely given the reins tothe impetuous untamed horse which in Platonic symbolism represents theemotive sensuous nature of man. " The soul has some dim and shadowyrecollection of its ante-natal state of bliss, and some instinctive andproleptic yearnings for its return. 

[Footnote 551: "Phædrus, " § 54-62. ]

 "Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting; The soul that rises with us, our life's star, Has had elsewhere its setting, And cometh from afar, Not in entire forgetfulness, And not in utter nakedness, But trailing clouds of glory, do we come From God, who is our home. "[552]

[Footnote 552: Wordsworth, "Ode on the Intimations of Immortality, " vol. V. ]

Exiled from the true home of the spirit, imprisoned in the body, disordered by passion, and beclouded by sense, the soul has yet longingsafter that state of perfect knowledge, and purity, and bliss, in whichit was first created. Its affinities are still on high. It yearns for ahigher and nobler form of life. It essays to rise, but its eye isdarkened by sense, its wings are besmeared by passion and lust; it is"borne downward, until at length it falls upon and attaches itself tothat which is material and sensual, " and it flounders and grovels stillamid the objects of sense. 

And now, with all that seriousness and earnestness of spirit which ispeculiarly Christian, Plato asks how the soul may be delivered from theillusions of sense, the distempering influence of the body, and thedisturbances of passion, which becloud its vision of the real, the good, and the true?

Plato believed and hoped this could be accomplished by _philosophy_. This he regarded as a grand intellectual discipline for the purificationof the soul. By this it was to be disenthralled from the bondage ofsense[553] and raised into the empyrean of pure thought "where truth andreality shine forth. " All souls have the faculty of knowing, but it isonly by reflection, and self-knowledge, and intellectual discipline, that the soul can be raised to the vision of eternal truth, goodness, and beauty--that is, to the vision of God. And this intellectualdiscipline was the _Platonic Dialectic_. 

[Footnote 553: Not, however, fully in this life. The consummation of theintellectual struggle into "the intelligible world" is death. Theintellectual discipline was therefore μελέτη θανατου, _a preparation fordeath_. ]

CHAPTER XI. 

THE PHILOSOPHERS OF ATHENS (_continued_. )

THE SOCRATIC SCHOOL (_continued_). 

PLATO. 

II. THE PLATONIC DIALECTIC. 

The Platonic Dialectic is the Science of Eternal and ImmutablePrinciples, and the _method_ (ὄργανον) by which these first principlesare brought forward into the clear light of consciousness. The studentof Plato will have discovered that he makes no distinction between logicand metaphysics. These are closely united in the one science to which hegives the name of "_Dialectic_" and which was at once the science of theideas and laws of the Reason, and of the mental process by which theknowledge of Real Being is attained, and a ground of absolute certaintyis found. This science has, in modern times, been called _Primordial_ or_Transcendental Logic_. 

We have seen that Plato taught that the human reason is originally inpossession of fundamental and necessary ideas--the copies of thearchetypal ideas which dwell in the eternal Reason; and that these ideasare the primordial laws of thought--that is, they are the laws underwhich we conceive of all objective things, and reason concerning allexistence. These ideas, he held, are not derived from sensation, neitherare they generalizations from experience, but they are inborn andconnatural. And, further, he entertained the belief, more, however, as areasonable hypothesis[554] than as a demonstrable truth, that thesestandard principles were acquired by the soul in a pre-existent state inwhich it stood face to face with ideas of eternal order, beauty, goodness, and truth. [555] "Journeying with the Deity, " the soulcontemplated justice, wisdom, science--not that science which isconcerned with change, and which appears under a different manifestationin different objects, which we choose to call beings; but such scienceas is in that which alone is indeed _being_. [556] Ideas, therefore, belong to, and inhere in, that portion of the soul which is properlyοὐσία--_essence_ or _being_; which had an existence anterior to time, and even now has no relation to time, because it is now ineternity--that is, in a sphere of being to which past, present, andfuture can have no relation. [557]

[Footnote 554: Within "the εἰκότων μύθων ἰδέα--the category ofprobability. "--"Phædo. "]

[Footnote 555: "Phædo, " § 50-56. ]

[Footnote 556: "Phædrus, " § 58. ]

[Footnote 557: See note on p. 349. ]

All knowledge of truth and reality is, therefore, according to Plato, aREMINISCENCE (ἀνάμνησις)--a recovery of partially forgotten ideas whichthe soul possessed in another state of existence; and the _dialectic_ ofPlato is simply the effort, by apt _interrogation_, to lead the mind to"_recollect_"[558] the truth which has been formerly perceived by it, and is even now in the memory though not in consciousness. Anillustration of this method is attempted in the "_Meno_" where Platointroduces Socrates as making an experiment on the mind of an uneducatedperson. Socrates puts a series of questions to a slave of Meno, and atlength elicits from the youth a right enunciation of a geometricaltruth. Socrates then points triumphantly to this instance, and bids Menoobserve that he had not taught the youth any thing, but simplyinterrogated him as to his opinions, whilst the youth had recalled theknowledge previously existing in his own mind. [559]

[Footnote 558: "To learn is to recover our own previous knowledge, andthis is properly to _recollect. _"--"Phædo" § 55. ]

[Footnote 559: "Meno, " § 16-20. "Now for a person to recover knowledgehimself through himself, is not this to _recollect_. "]

Now whilst we readily grant that the instance given in the "_Meno_" doesnot sustain the inference of Plato that "the boy" had learnt thesegeometrical truths "in eternity, " and that they had simply been broughtforward into the view of his consciousness by the "questioning" ofSocrates, yet it certainly does prove that _there are ideas orprinciples in the human reason which are not derived from without--whichare anterior to all experience, and for the development of which, experience furnishes the occasion, but is not the origin and source_. Bya kind of lofty inspiration, he caught sight of that most importantdoctrine of modern philosophy, so clearly and logically presented byKant, _that the Reason is the source of a pure_ à priori _knowledge_--aknowledge native to, and potentially in the mind, antecedent to allexperience, and which is simply brought out into the field ofconsciousness by experience conditions. Around this greatest of allmetaphysical truths Plato threw a gorgeous mythic dress, and presentedit under the most picturesque imagery. [560] But, when divested of therich coloring which the glowing imagination of Plato threw over it, itis but a vivid presentation of the cardinal truth that _there are ideasin the mind which have not been derived from without_, and which, therefore, the mind brought with it into the present sphere of being. The validity and value of this fundamental doctrine, even as presentedby Plato, is unaffected by any speculations in which he may haveindulged, as to the pre-existence of the soul. He simply regarded thisdoctrine of pre-existence as highly probable--a plausible explanation ofthe facts. That there are ideas, innate and connatural to the humanmind, he clung to as the most vital, most precious, most certain of alltruths; and to lead man to the recognitions of these ideas, to bringthem within the field of consciousness, was, in his judgment, the greatbusiness of philosophy. 

And this was the grand aim of his _Dialectic_--to elicit, to bring tolight the truths which are already in the mind--"a μαίευσις" a kind ofintellectual midwifery[561]--a delivering of the mind of the ideas withwhich it was pregnant. 

[Footnote 560: As in the "Phædo, " §§ 48-57; "Phædrus, " §§ 52-64;"Republic, " bk. X. ]

[Footnote 561: "Theætetus, " §§ 17-20. ]

It is thus, at first sight, obvious that it was a higher and morecomprehensive science than the art of deduction. For it was directed tothe discovery and establishment of First Principles. Its sole object wasthe discovery of truth. His dialectic was an _analytical_ and _inductivemethod_. "In Dialectic Science, " says _Alcinous_, "there is a dividingand a defining, and an analyzing, and, moreover, that which is inductiveand syllogistic. "[562] Even _Bacon_, who is usually styled "the Fatherof the Inductive method, " and who, too often, speaks disparagingly ofPlato, is constrained to admit that he followed the inductive method. "An induction such as will be of advantage for the invention anddemonstration of Arts and Sciences must distinguish the essential natureof things (naturam) by proper rejections and exclusions, and then afteras many of these negatives as are sufficient, by comprising, above all(super), the positives. Up to this time this had not been done, nor evenattempted, _except by Plato alone, who, in order to attain hisdefinitions and ideas, has used, to a certain extent, the method ofInduction_. "[563]

[Footnote 562: "Introduction to the Doctrines of Plato, " vol. Vi. P. 249. "The Platonic Method was the method of induction. "--Cousin's"History of Philosophy, " vol. I. P. 307. ]

[Footnote 563: "Novum Organum, " vol. I. P. 105. ]

The process of investigation adopted by Plato thus corresponds with theinductive method of modern times, with this simple difference, thatBacon conducted science into the world of _matter_, whilst Platodirected it to the world of _mind_. The dialectic of Plato aimed at thediscovery of the "laws of thought;" the modern inductive philosophy aimsat the discovery of the "laws of nature. " The latter concerns itselfchiefly with the inquiry after the "causes" of material phenomena; theformer concerned itself with the inquiry after the "first principles" ofall knowledge and of all existence. Both processes are, therefore, carried on by _interrogation_. The analysis which seeks for a law ofnature proceeds by the interrogation of nature. The analysis of Platoproceeds by the interrogation of mind, in order to discover thefundamental _ideas_ which lie at the basis of all cognition, whichdetermine all our processes of thought, and which, in their finalanalysis, reveal the REAL BEING, which is the ground and explanation ofall existence. 

Now the fact that such an inquiry has originated in the human mind, andthat it can not rest satisfied without some solution, is conclusiveevidence that the mind has an instinctive belief, a prolepticanticipation, that such knowledge can be attained. There mustunquestionably be some mental initiative which is the _motive_ and_guide_ to all philosophical inquiry. We must have some well-groundedconviction, some _à priori_ belief, some pre-cognition "ad intentionemejus quod quæritur, "[564] which determines the direction of ourthinking. The mind does not go to work aimlessly; it asks a specificquestion; it demands the "_whence_" and the "_why_" of that which is. Neither does it go to work unfurnished with any guiding principles. Thatwhich impels the mind to a determinate act of thinking is the possessionof a _knowledge_ which is different from, and independent of, theprocess of thinking itself. "A rational anticipation is, then, theground of the _prudens quæstio_--"the forethought query, which, in fact, is the prior half of the knowledge sought. "[565] If the mind inquireafter "laws, " and "causes, " and "reasons, " and "grounds, "--the firstprinciples of all knowledge and of all existence, --"it must have the _àpriori_ ideas of "law, " and "cause, " and "reason, " and "being _in se"_which, though dimly revealed to the mind previous to the discipline ofreflection, are yet unconsciously governing its spontaneous modes ofthought. The whole process of induction has, then, some rational groundto proceed upon--some principles deeper than science, and more certainthan demonstration, which reason contains within itself, and whichinduction "draws out" into clearer light. 

[Footnote 564: Bacon. ]

[Footnote 565: Coleridge, vol. Ii. P. 413. ]

Now this mental initiative of every process of induction is theintuitive and necessary conviction _that there must be a sufficientreason why every thing exists, and why it is as it is, and nototherwise_;[566] or in other words, if any thing begins to be, something else must be supposed[567] as the ground, and reason, and cause, and law of its existence. This "_law of sufficient_ (or _determinant)reason_"[568] is the fundamental principle of all metaphysical inquiry. It is contained, at least in a negative form, in that famous maxim ofancient philosophy, "_De nihilo nihil_"--"Ἀδύνατον γίνεσθαί τι ἐκμηδενὸς προϋπάρχοντος. " "It is impossible for a real entity to be madeor generated from nothing pre-existing;" or in other words, "nothing canbe made or produced without an efficient cause. "[569] This principle isalso distinctly announced by Plato: "Whatever is generated, isnecessarily generated from a certain αἰτίαν"--_ground, reason_, or_cause_; "for it is wholly impossible that any thing should be generatedwithout a cause. "[570]

[Footnote 566: "Phædo, " § 103. ]

[Footnote 567: _Suppono_, to place under as a support, to take as aground. ]

[Footnote 568: This generic principle, viewed under different relations, gives--

1st. _The principle of Substance_--every quality supposes a subject orreal being. 

2d. _The principle of Causality_--every thing which begins to be musthave a cause. 

3d. _The principle of Law_--every phenomenon must obey some uniform law. 

4th. _The principle of Final Cause_--every means supposes an end, everyexistence has a purpose or reason why. 

5th. _The principle of Unity_--all plurality supposes a unity as itsbasis and ground. ]

[Footnote 569: Cudworth's "Intellectual System, " vol. Ii. P. 161. ]

[Footnote 570: "Timæus, " ch. Ix. ]

The first business of Plato's dialectic is to demonstrate that theground and reason of all existence can not be found in the mere objectsof sense, nor in any opinions or judgments founded upon sensation. Principles are only so far "first principles" as they are permanent andunchangeable, depending on neither time, nor place, nor circumstances. But the objects of sense are in ceaseless flux and change; they are"_always becoming_;" they can not be said to have any "_real being_. "They are not to-day what they were yesterday, and they will never againbe what they are now; consequently all opinions founded on merephenomena are equally fluctuating and uncertain. Setting out, therefore, from the assumption of the fallaciousness of "_opinion_" it examined thevarious hypotheses which had been bequeathed by previous schools ofphilosophy, or were now offered by contemporaneous speculators, andshowed they were utterly inadequate to the solution of the problem. Thisscrutiny consisted in searching for the ground of "contradiction"[571]with regard to each opinion founded on sensation, and showing thatopposite views were equally tenable. It inquired on what ground theseopinions were maintained, and what consequences flowed therefrom, and itshowed that the grounds upon which "opinion" was founded, and theconclusions which were drawn from it, were contradictory, andconsequently untrue. [572] "They, " the Dialecticians, "examined theopinions of men as if they were error; and bringing them together by areasoning process to the same point, they placed them by the side ofeach other: and by so placing, they showed that _the opinions are at oneand the same time contrary to themselves, about the same things, withreference to the same circumstances, and according to the samepremises_. "[573] And inasmuch as the same attribute can not, at the sametime, be affirmed and denied of the same subject, [574] therefore a thingcan not be at once "changeable" and "unchangeable, " "movable" and"immovable, " "generated" and "eternal. "[575] The objects of sense, however generalized and classified, can only give the contingent, therelative, and the finite; therefore the permanent ground and sufficientreason of all phenomenal existence can not be found in opinions andjudgments founded upon sensation. 

[Footnote 571: "The Dialectitian is one who syllogistically infers thecontradictions implied in popular opinions. "--Aristotle, "Sophist, " §§1, 2. ]

[Footnote 572: "Republic, " bk. Vi. Ch. Xiii. ]

[Footnote 573: "Sophist, " § 33; "Republic, " bk. Iv. Ch. Xii. ]

[Footnote 574: See the "Phædo, " § 119, and "Republic, " bk. Iv. Ch. Xiii. , where the Law of Non-contradiction is announced. ]

[Footnote 575 "Parmenides, " § 3. ]

The dialectic process thus consisted almost entirely of_refutation_, [576] or what both he and Aristotle denominated _elenchus_(ἔλεγχος)--a process of reasoning by which the contradictory of a givenproposition is inferred. "When refutation had done its utmost, and allthe points of difficulty and objection had been fully brought out, thedialectic method had accomplished its purpose; and the affirmation whichremained, after this discussion, might be regarded as setting forth thetruth of the question under consideration;"[577] or in other words, _when a system of error is destroyed by refutation, the contradictoryopposite principle, with its logical developments, must be accepted asan established truth_. 

[Footnote 576: Confutation is the greatest and chiefest ofpurification. --"Sophist, " § 34. ]

[Footnote 577: Article "Plato, " Encyclopædia Britannica. ]

By the application of this method, Plato had not only exposed theinsufficiency and self-contradiction of all results obtained by a mere_à posteriori_ generalization of the simple facts of experience, but hedemonstrated, as a consequence, that we are in possession of someelements of knowledge which have not been derived from sensation; thatthere are, in all minds, certain notions, principles, or ideas, whichhave been furnished by a higher faculty than sense; and that thesenotions, principles, or ideas, transcend the limits of experience, andreveal the knowledge of _real being_--τὸ ὄντως ὄν--_Being in se_. 

To determine what these principles or ideas are, Plato now addresseshimself to the _analysis of thought_. "It is the glory of Plato to haveborne the light of analysis into the most obscure and inmost region; hesearched out what, in this totality which forms consciousness, is theprovince of reason; what comes from it, and not from the imagination andthe senses--from within, and not from without. "[578] Now to analyze isto decompose, that is, to divide, and to define, in order to see betterthat which really is. The chief logical instruments of the dialecticmethod are, therefore, _Division_ and _Definition_. "The being able to_divide_ according to genera, and not to consider the same species asdifferent, nor a different as the same, "[579] and "to see under oneaspect, and bring together under one general idea, many things scatteredin various places, that, by _defining_ each, a person may make it clearwhat the subject is, " is, according to Plato, "dialectical. "[580]

[Footnote 578: Cousin's "Lectures on the History of Philosophy, " vol. I. P. 328. ]

[Footnote 579: "Sophist, " § 83. ]

[Footnote 580: "Phædrus, " §§ 109, 111. ]

We have already seen that, in his first efforts at applying reflectionto the concrete phenomena of consciousness, Plato had recognized twodistinct classes of cognitions, marked by characteristics essentiallyopposite;--one of "_sensible_" objects having a definite outline, limit, and figure, and capable of being imaged and represented to the mind in adeterminate form--the other of "_intelligible_" objects, which can notbe outlined or represented in the memory or the imagination by anyfigures or images, and are, therefore, the objects of purely rationalconception. He found, also, that we arrive at one class of cognitions"_mediately_" through images generated in the vital organism, or by sometestimony, definition, or explication of others; whilst we arrive at theother class "_immediately_" by simple intuition, or rationalapperception. The mind stands face to face with the object, and gazesdirectly upon it. The reality of that object is revealed in its ownlight, and we find it impossible to refuse our assent--that is, it is_self-evident_. One class consisted of _contingent_ ideas--that is, their objects are conceived as existing, with the possibility, withoutany contradiction, of conceiving of their non-existence; the otherconsisted of _necessary_ ideas--their objects are conceived as existingwith the absolute impossibility of conceiving of their non-existence. Thus we can conceive of this book, this table, this earth, as notexisting, but we can not conceive the non-existence of space. We canconceive of succession in time as not existing, but we can not, inthought, annihilate duration. We can imagine this or that particularthing not to have been, but we can not conceive of the extinction ofBeing in itself. He further observed, that one class of our cognitionsare _conditional_ ideas; the existence of their objects is conceivedonly on the supposition of some antecedent existence, as for example, the idea of qualities, phenomena, events; whilst the other class ofcognitions are _unconditional_ and _absolute_--we can conceive of theirobjects as existing independently and unconditionally--existing whetherany thing else does or does not exist, as space, duration, the infinite, Being _in se_. And, finally, whilst some ideas appear in us as_particular_ and _individual_, determined and modified by our ownpersonality and liberty, there are others which are, in the fullestsense, _universal_. They are not the creations of our own minds, andthey can not be changed by our own volitions. They depend upon neithertimes, nor places, nor circumstances; they are common to all minds, inall times, and in all places. These ideas are the witnesses in ourinmost being that there is something beyond us, and above us; and beyondand above all the contingent and fugitive phenomena around us. Beneathall changes there is a _permanent_ being. Beyond all finite andconditional existance there is something _unconditional_ and _absolute_. Having determined that there are truths which are independent of our ownminds--truths which are not individual, but universal--truths whichwould be truths even if our minds did not perceive them, we are ledonward to a _super-sensual_ and super-natural ground, on which theyrest. 

To reach this objective reality on which the ideas of reason repose, isthe grand effort of Plato's dialectic. He seeks, by a rigid analysis, clearly to _separate_, and accurately to _define_ the _à priori_conceptions of reason. And it was only when he had eliminated everyelement which is particular, contingent, and relative, and had definedthe results in precise and accurate language, that he regarded theprocess as complete. The ideas which are self-evident, universal, andnecessary, were then clearly disengaged, and raised to their pure andabsolute form. "You call the man dialectical who requires a reason ofthe essence or being of each thing. As the dialectical man can definethe essence of every thing, so can he of the good. He can _define_ theidea of the good, _separating_ it from all others--follow it through allwindings, as in a battle, resolved to mark it, not according to opinion, but according to science. "[581]

[Footnote 581: "Republic, " bk. Vii. Ch. Xiv. ]

_Abstraction_ is thus the process, the instrument of the Platonicdialectic. It is important, however, that we should distinguish betweenthe method of _comparative_ abstraction, as employed in physicalinquiry, and that _immediate_ abstraction, which is the specialinstrument of philosophy. The former proceeds by comparison andgeneralization, the latter by simple separation. The one yields acontingent general principle as the result of the comparison of a numberof individual cases, the other gives an universal and necessaryprinciple by the analysis of a single concrete fact. As an illustrationwe may instance "the principle of causality. " To enable us to affirm"that every event must have a cause, " we do not need to compare andgeneralize a great number of events. "The principle which compels us topronounce the judgment is already complete in the first as in the lastevent; it can change in regard to its object, it can not change initself; it neither increases nor decreases with the greater or lessnumber of applications. "[582] In the presence of a single event, theuniversality and necessity of this principle of causality is recognizedwith just as much clearness and certainty as in the presence of amillion events, however carefully generalized. 

[Footnote 582: Cousin's "The True, the Beautiful, and the Good, " pp. 57, 58. ]

Abstraction, then, it will be seen, creates nothing; neither does it addany new element to the store of actual cognitions already possessed byall human minds. It simply brings forward into a clearer and moredefinite recognition, that which necessarily belongs to the mind as partof its latent furniture, and which, as a law of thought, has alwaysunconsciously governed all its spontaneous movements. As a process ofrational inquiry, it was needful to bring the mind into intelligible andconscious communion with the world of _Ideas_. These ideas are partiallyrevealed in the sensible world, all things being formed, as Platobelieved, according to ideas as models and exemplars, of which sensibleobjects are the copies. They are more fully manifested in theconstitution of the human mind which, by virtue of its kindred naturewith the original essence or being, must know them intuitively andimmediately. And they are brought out fully by the dialectic process, which disengages them from all that is individual and phenomenal, andsets them forth in their pure and absolute form. 

But whilst Plato has certainly exhibited the true method ofinvestigation by which the ideas of reason are to be separated from allconcrete phenomena and set clearly before the mind, he has not attempteda complete enumeration of the ideas of reason; indeed, such anenumeration is still the grand desideratum of philosophy. We can notfail, however, in the careful study of his writings, to recognize thegrand Triad of Absolute Ideas--ideas which Cousin, after Plato, has sofully exhibited, viz. , the _True_, the _Beautiful_, and the _Good_. 

PLATONIC SCHEME OF IDEAS

I. _The idea of_ ABSOLUTE TRUTH or REALITY (τὸ ἀληθές--τὸ ὄν)--theground and efficient cause of all existence, and by participating inwhich all phenomenal existence has only so far a reality, sensiblethings being merely shadows and resemblances of ideas. This idea isdeveloped in the human intelligence in its relation with the phenomenalworld; as, 1. _The idea of_ SUBSTANCE (οὐσία)--the ground of all phenomena, "thebeing or essence of all things, " the permanent reality. --"Timæeus, " ch. Ix. And xii. ; "Republic, " bk. Vii. Ch. Xiv. ; "Phædo, "§§ 63-67, 73. 

2. _The idea of_ CAUSE (αἰτία)--the power or efficiency by which thingsthat "become, " or begin to be, are generated or produced. --"Timæus, " ch. Ix. ; "Sophist, " § 109; "Philebus, " §§ 45, 46. 

3. _The idea of_ IDENTITY (αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον)--that which "does not change, ""is always the same, simple and uniform, incomposite andindissoluble, "--that which constitutes personality orself-hood. --"Phædo, " §§ 61-75; "Timæus, " ch. Ix. ; "Republic, " bk. Ii. Ch. Xix. And xx. 

4. _The idea of_ UNITY (τὸ ἕν)--one _mind_ or intelligence pervading theuniverse, the comprehensive conscious _thought_ or _plan_ which bindsall parts of the universe in one great whole (τὸ πᾶν)--the principle of_order_. --"Timæus, " ch. Xi. And xv. ; "Republic, " bk. Vi. Ch. Xiii. ;"Philebus, " §§ 50-51. 

5. _The idea of the_ INFINITE (τὸ ἄπειρον)--that which is unlimited andunconditioned, "has no parts, bounds, no beginning, nor middle, norend. "--"Parmenides, " §§ 22, 23. 

II. _The idea of_ ABSOLUTE BEAUTY (τὸ καλόν)--the formal cause of theuniverse, and by participation in which all created things have only sofar a real beauty. --"Timæus, " ch. Xi, "Greater Hippias, " §§ 17, 18;"Republic, " bk. V. Ch. 22. 

This idea is developed in the human intelligence in its relation to theorganic world; as:

 1. _The Idea of_ PROPORTION or SYMMETRY (συμμετρἰα)--the proper relation of parts to an organic whole resulting in a harmony (κόσμος), and which relation admits of mathematical expression. --"Timæus, " ch. Lxix. ; "Philebus, " § 155 ("Timæus, " ch. Xi. And xii. , where the relation of numerical proportions to material elements is expounded). 

 2. _The idea of_ DETERMINATE FORM (παράδειγμα ἀρχέτυπος)--the eternal models or archetypes according to which all things are framed, and which admit of geometrical representation. --"Timæus, " ch. Ix. ; "Phædo, " §112 ("Timæus, " ch. Xxviii. -xxxi. , where the relation of geometrical forms to material elements is exhibited). 

 3. _The idea of_ RHYTHM (ῥυθμός)--measured movement in time and space, resulting in melody and grace. --"Republic, " bk. Iii. Ch. Xi. And xii. ; "Philebus, " § 21. 

 4. _The idea of_ FITNESS or ADAPTATION (χρήσιοω)--effectiveness to some purpose or end. --"Greater Hippias, " § 35. 

 5. _The idea of_ PERFECTION (τελειότης)--that which is complete, "a structure which is whole and finished--of whole and perfect parts. "--"Timæus, " ch. Xi. , xii. , and xliii. 

III. _The idea of_ ABSOLUTE GOOD (τὸ ἀγαθόν)--the final _cause_ or_reason_ of all existence, the sun of the invisible world, that poursupon all things the revealing light of truth. 

The first Good[583] (_summum bonum_) is God the highest, and Mind orIntelligence (νοῦς), which renders man capable of knowing and resemblingGod. The second flows from the first, and are virtues of mind. They aregood by a participation of the chief good, and constitute in man alikeness or _resemblance_ to God. --"Phædo, " §§110-114; "Laws, " bk. I. Ch. Vi. , bk. Iv. Ch. Viii. ; "Theætetus, " §§ 84, 85; "Republic, " bk. Vi. Ch. Xix. , bk. Vii. Ch. Iii. , bk. X. Ch. Xii. [584]

[Footnote 583: "Let us declare, then, on what account the framingArtificer settled the formation of the universe. He was GOOD;" and beinggood, "he desired that all things should as much as possible resemblehimself. "--"Timæus, " ch. X. ]

[Footnote 584: "At the utmost bounds of the intellectual world is the_idea of the Good_, perceived with difficulty, but which, once seen, makes itself known as the cause of all that is beautiful and good; whichin the visible world produces light, and the orb that gives it; andwhich in the invisible world directly produces Truth andIntelligence. "--"Republic, " bk. Vii. Ch. Iii. ]

This idea is developed in the human intelligence in its relation to theworld of moral order; as, 1. _The idea of_ WISDOM or PRUDENCE (φρόνησις)--thoughtfulness, rightness of intention, following the guidance of reason, the rightdirection of the energy or will. --"Republic, " bk. Iv. Ch. Vii. , bk. Vi. Ch. Ii. 

2. _The idea of_ COURAGE or FORTITUDE (ἀνδρία)--zeal, energy, firmnessin the maintenance of honor and right, virtuous indignation againstwrong. --"Republic, " bk. Iv. Ch. Viii. ; "Laches;" "Meno, " § 24. 

3. _The idea of_ SELF-CONTROL or TEMPERANCE(σωφροσύνη)--sound-mindedness, moderation, dignity. --"Republic, " bk. Iv. Ch. Ix. ; "Meno, " § 24; "Phædo, " § 35. 

4. _The idea of_ JUSTICE (δικαιοσύνη)--the harmony or perfectproportional action of all the powers of the soul. --"Republic, " bk. I. Ch. Vi. , bk. Iv. Ch. X. -xii. , bk. Vi. Ch. Ii. And xvi. ; "Philebus, " §155; "Phædo, " § 54; "Theætetus, " §§ 84, 85. 

Plato's idea of Justice comprehends--

(1) EQUITY (ὶσότης)--the rendering to every man his due. --"Republic, "bk. I. Ch. Vi. 

(2. ) VERACITY (ἀλήθεια)--the utterance of what is true. --"Republic, " bk. I. Ch. V. , bk. Ii. Ch. Xx. , bk. Vi. Ch. Ii. 

(3. ) FAITHFULNESS (πιστὸτης)--the strict performance of atrust. --"Republic, " bk. I. Ch. V. , bk. Vi. Ch. Ii. 

(4. ) USEFULNESS (ώφέλτμον)--the answering of some valuableend. --"Republic, " bk. Ii. Ch. Xviii. , bk. Iv. Ch. Xviii. ; "Meno, " § 22. 

(5. ) BENEVOLENCE (εὔνοια)--seeking the well-being ofothers. --"Republic, " bk. I. Ch. Xvii. , bk. Ii. Ch. Xviii. 

(6. ) HOLINESS (ὁσιότης)--purity of mind, piety. --"Protagoras, " §§ 52-54;"Phædo, " § 32; "Theætetus, " § 84. 

The final effort of Plato's Dialectic was to ascend from these ideas ofAbsolute Truth, and Absolute Beauty, and Absolute Goodness to the_Absolute Being_, in whom they are all united, and from whom they allproceed. "He who possesses the true love of science is naturally carriedin his aspirations to the _real Being_; and his love, so far fromsuffering itself to be retarded by the multitude of things whose realityis only apparent, knows no repose until it have arrived at union withthe _essence_ of each object, by the part of the soul which is akin tothe permanent and essential; so that this divine conjunction havingproduced intelligence and truth, the knowledge of _being_ is won. "[585]

[Footnote 585: "Republic, " bk. Vi. Ch. V. ]

To the mind of Plato, there was in every thing, even the smallest andmost insignificant of sensible objects, a _reality_ just in so far as itparticipates in some archetypal form or idea. These archetypal forms orideas are the "_thoughts of God_"[586]--they are the plan according towhich he framed the universe. "The Creator and Father of the universelooked to an _eternal model_. .. . Being thus generated, the universe isframed according to principles that can be comprehended by reason andreflection. "[587] Plato, also, regarded all individual conceptions ofthe mind as hypothetical notions which have in them an _à priori_element--an idea which is unchangeable, universal, and necessary. Theseunchangeable, universal, and necessary ideas are copies of the DivineIdeas, which are, for man, the primordial laws of all cognition, and allreasoning. They are possessed by the soul "in virtue of its kindrednature to that which is permanent, unchangeable, and eternal. " He alsobelieved that every archetypal form, and every _à priori_ idea, has itsground and root in a higher idea, which is _unhypothetical_ and_absolute_--an idea which needs no other supposition for itsexplanation, and which is, itself, needful to the explanation of allexistence--even the idea of an _absolute_ and _perfect Being_, in whosemind the ideas of absolute truth, and beauty, and goodness inhere, andin whose eternity they can only be regarded as eternal. [588] Thus do the"ideas of reason" not only cast a bridge across the abyss that separatesthe sensible and the ideal world, but they also carry us beyond thelimits of our personal consciousness, and discover to us a realm of realBeing, which is the foundation, and cause, and explanation of thephenomenal world that appears around us and within us. 

[Footnote 586: Alcinous, "Doctrines of Plato, " p. 262. ]

[Footnote 587: "Timæus, " ch. Ix. ]

[Footnote 588: Maurice's "Ancient Philosophy, " p. 149. ]

This passage from psychology to ontology is not achieved _per saltum_, or effected by any arbitrary or unwarrantable assumption. There areprinciples revealed in the centre of our consciousness, whose regulardevelopment carry us beyond the limits of consciousness, and attain tothe knowledge of actual being. The absolute principles of _causality_and _substance_, of _intentionality_ and _unity_, unquestionably give usthe absolute Being. Indeed the absolute truth _that every idea supposesa being in which it resides_, and which is but another form of the lawor principle of substance, viz. , _that every quality supposes asubstance or being in which it inheres_, is adequate to carry us fromIdea to Being. "There is not a single cognition which does not suggestto us the notion of existence, and there is not an unconditional andabsolute truth which does not necessarily imply an absolute andunconditional Being. "[589]

[Footnote 589: Cousin's "Elements of Psychology, " p. 506. ]

This, then, is the dialectic of Plato. Instead of losing himself amidthe endless variety of particular phenomena, he would search forprinciples and laws, and from thence ascend to the great Legislator, the_First Principle of all Principles_. Instead of stopping at therelations of sensible objects to the general ideas with which they arecommingled, he will pass to their _eternal Paradigms_--from the justthing to the idea of absolute justice, from the particular good to theabsolute good, from beautiful things to the absolute beauty, and thenceto the ultimate reality--_the absolute Being_. By the realization of thelower idea, embodied in the forms of the visible universe and in thenecessary laws of thought, he sought to rise to the higher idea, in itspure and abstract form--the _Supreme Idea_, containing in itself allother ideas--the _One Intelligence_ which unites the universe in aharmonious whole. "The Dialectic faculty proceeds from hypothesis to anunhypothetical principle. .. . It uses hypotheses as steps, andstarting-points, in order to proceed from thence to the _absolute_. TheIntuitive Reason takes hold of the First Principle of the Universe, andavails itself of all the connections and relations of that principle. Itascends from idea to idea, until it has reached the Supreme Idea"--the_Absolute Good_--that is, _God_. [590]

[Footnote 590: "Republic, " bk. Vi. Ch. Xx. And xxi. ]

We are thus brought, in the course of our examination of the Platonicmethod, to the _results_ obtained by this method--or, in other words, to

III. THE PLATONIC ONTOLOGY. 

The grand object of all philosophic inquiry in ancient Greece was toattain to the knowledge of real Being--that Being which is permanent, unchangeable, and eternal. It had proceeded on the intuitive conviction, that beneath all the endless diversity of the universe there must be aprinciple of _unity_--below all fleeting appearances there must be apermanent _substance_--beyond all this everlasting flow and change, thisbeginning and end of finite existence, there must be an eternal Being, which is the _cause_, and which contains, in itself, the _reason_ of theorder, and harmony, and beauty, and excellency which pervades theuniverse. And it had perpetually asked what is this permanent, unchangeable, and eternal substance or being?

Plato had assiduously labored at the solution of this problem. Theobject of his dialectic was "to lead upward the soul to the knowledge ofreal being, "[591] and the conclusions to which he attained may be summedup as follows:

1st. _Beneath all_ SENSIBLE _phenomena there is an unchangeablesubject-matter, the mysterious substratum of the world of sense, whichhe calls the receptacle (ἱποδοχή) the nurse (τιθήνη) of all that isproduced_. [592]

It is this "substratum or physical groundwork" which gives a reality anddefiniteness to the evanescent phantoms of sense, for, in theirceaseless change, _they_ can not justify any title whatever. It alonecan be styled "_this_" or "_that_" (τόδε or τοῦτο); they rise no higherthan "_of such kind_" or "_of what kind or quality" (τοιοῦτον orὁποιονοῦν τι). [593] It is not earth, or air, or fire, or water, but "aninvisible _species_ and formless universal receiver, which, in the mostobscure way, receives the immanence of the intelligible. "[594] And inrelation to the other two principles (_i. E. _, ideas and objects ofsense), "it is _the mother_" to the father and the offspring. [595] Butperhaps the most remarkable passage is that in which he seems toidentify it with _pure space_, which, "itself imperishable, furnishes a_seat_ (ἕδραν) to all that is produced, not apprehensible by directperception, but caught by a certain spurious reasoning, scarcelyadmissible, but which we see as in a dream; gaining it by that judgmentwhich pronounces it necessary that all which is, be _somewhere_, andoccupy a _certain space_. "[596] This, it will be seen, approaches theCartesian doctrine, which resolves matter into _simple extension. [597]

[Footnote 591: "Republic, " bk. Vii. Ch. Xii. And xiii. ]

[Footnote 592: "Timæus, " ch. Xxii. ]

[Footnote 593: "Timæus, " ch. Xxiii. ]

[Footnote 594: Ibid. , ch. Xxiv. ]

[Footnote 595: Ibid. , ch. Xxiv. ]

[Footnote 596: Ibid. , ch. Xxvi. ]

[Footnote 597: Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy, " vol. Ii. P. 171. ]

It should, however, be distinctly noted that Plato does not use the wordὓλη--matter. This term is first employed by Aristotle to express "thesubstance which is the subject of all changes. "[598] The subject orsubstratum of which Plato speaks, would seem to be rather a logical thana material entity. It is the _condition or supposition_ necessary forthe production of a world of phenomena. It is thus the_transition-element_ between the real and the apparent, the eternal andthe contingent; and, lying thus on the border of both territories, wemust not be surprised that it can hardly be characterized by anydefinite attribute. [599] Still, this unknown recipient of forms or ideashas a _reality_; it has "an abiding nature, " "a constancy of existence;"and we are forbidden to call it by any name denoting quality, butpermitted to style it "_this_" and "_that_" (τόδε καὶ τοῦτο). [600]Beneath the perpetual changes of sensible phenomena there is, then, anunchangeable subject, which yet is neither the Deity, nor ideas, nor thesoul of man, which exists as the means and occasion of the manifestationof Divine Intelligence in the organization of the world. [601]

[Footnote 598: "Metaphysics, " bk. Vii. Ch. I. ]

[Footnote 599: Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy, " vol. Ii. P. 178. ]

[Footnote 600: "Timæus, " ch. Xxiii. ]

[Footnote 601: Ibid. , ch. Xiiii]

There has been much discussion as to whether Plato held that this"_Receptacle_" and "_Nurse_" of forms and ideas was eternal, orgenerated in time. Perhaps no one has more carefully studied thewritings of Plato than William Archer Butler, and his conclusions inregard to this subject are presented in the following words: "As, on theone hand, he maintained a strict system of dualism, and avoided, withouta single deviation, that seduction of pantheism to which so manyabstract speculators of his own school have fallen victims; so, on theother hand, it appears to me that he did not scruple to place thisprinciple, the opposite of the Divine intelligence, in a sphereindependent of temporal origination. .. . But we can scarcely enter intohis views, unless we ascertain his notions of the nature of _Time_itself. This was considered to have been created with the rest of thesensible world, to finish with it, if it ever finished--to be altogetherrelated to this phenomenal scene. [602] 'The generating Father determinedto create a moving image of eternity (αἰῶνος); and in disposing theheavens, he framed of this eternity, reposing in its own unchangeableunity, an eternal _image_, moving according to numerical succession, which he called _Time_. With the world arose days, nights, months, years, which all had no previous existence. The past and future are butforms of time, which we most erroneously transfer to the eternalsubstance (ἀίδιον οὐσίαν); we say it was, and is, and will be, whereaswe can only fitly say _it is_. Past and future are appropriate to thesuccessive nature of generated beings, for they bespeak motion; but theBeing eternally and immovably the same is subject neither to youth norage, nor to any accident of time; it neither was, nor hath been, norwill be, which are the attributes of fleeting sense--the circumstancesof time, imitating eternity in the shape of number and motion. Nor canany thing be more inaccurate than to apply the term _real being_ topast, or present, or future, or even to non-existence. Of this, however, we can not now speak fully. _Time_, then, was formed with the heavens, that, together created, they may together end, _if indeed an end be inthe purpose of the Creator_; and it is designed as closely as possibleto resemble the eternal nature, its exemplar. The model exists throughall eternity; the world has been, is, and will be through all_time_. '[603] In this ineffable eternity Plato places the Supreme Being, and the archetypal ideas of which the sensible world of time partakes. Whether he also includes under the same mode of existence the_subject-matter_ of the sensible world, it is not easy to pronounce; andit appears to me evident that he did not himself undertake to speak withassurance on this obscure problem. "[604] The creation of matter "out ofnothing" is an idea which, in all probability, did not occur to the mindof Plato. But that he regarded it as, in some sense, a _dependent_existence--as existing, like time, by "the purpose or will of theCreator"--perhaps as an eternal "generation" from the "eternalsubstance, " is also highly probable; for in the last analysis heevidently desires to embrace all things in some ultimate _unity_--atendency which it seems impossible for human reason to avoid. 

[Footnote 602: See _ante_, note 4, p. 349. ]

[Footnote 603: "Timæus, " ch. Xiv. ]

[Footnote 604: Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy, " vol. Ii. P. 171-175. ]

2d. _Beneath all mental phenomena there is a permanent subject orsubstratum which he designates_ THE IDENTICAL (τὸ αὐτό)--_the rationalelement of the soul--"the principle of self-activity" orself-determination_. [605]

There are three principles into which Plato analyzes the soul--theprinciple of the _Identical_, the _Diverse_, and the _IntermediateEssence_. [606] The first is indivisible and eternal, always existing in_sameness_, the very substance of _Intelligence_ itself, and of the samenature with the Divine. [607] The second is divisible and corporeal, answering to our notion of the passive _sensibilities_, and placing thesoul in relation with the visible world. The third is an intermediateessence, partaking of the natures of both, and constituting a mediumbetween the eternal and the mutable--the conscious _energy_ of the souldeveloped in the contingent world of time. Thus the soul is, on oneside, linked to the unchangeable and the eternal, being formed of thatineffable element which constitutes the _real_ or _immutable Being_, andon the other side, linked to the sensible and the contingent, beingformed of that element which is purely _relative_ and _contingent_. Thislast element of the soul is regarded by Plato as "mortal" and"corruptible, " the former element as "immortal" and "indestructible, "having its foundations laid in eternity. 

[Footnote 605: "Laws, " bk. X. Ch. Vi. And vii. ; "Phædrus, " § 51; "άρχὴκινήσεως. "]

[Footnote 606: "Timæus, " ch. Xii. ; ταὐτον, θάτερον, and οὐσία or τὸσνμμισγόμενον. ]

[Footnote 607: "Laws, " bk. V. Ch. I. ]

This doctrine of the eternity of the free and rational element of thesoul must, of course, appear strange and even repulsive to those who areunacquainted with the Platonic notion of eternity as a fixed state outof time, which has no past, present, or future, and is simply that which"always _is_"--an everlasting _now_. The soul, in its elements ofrationality and freedom, has existed anterior to time, because it nowexists in eternity. [608] In its actual manifestations and personalhistory it is to be contemplated as a "generated being, " having acommencement in time. 

Now, that the human soul, like the uncreated Deity, has always had adistinct, conscious, personal, independent being, does not appear to bethe doctrine of Plato. He teaches, most distinctly, that the "divine, "the immortal part, was created, or rather "generated, " in eternity. "TheDeity himself _formed the divine_, and he delivered over to hiscelestial offspring [the subordinate and generated gods] the task of_forming the mortal_. These subordinate deities, copying the example oftheir parent, and receiving from his hands the _immortal principle_ ofthe human soul, fashioned subsequently to this the mortal body, whichthey consigned to the soul as a vehicle, and in which they placedanother kind of soul, mortal, the seat of violent and fatalaffections. "[609] He also regarded the soul as having a derived anddependent existence. He draws a marked distinction between the divineand human forms of the "self-moving principle, " and makes itscontinuance dependent upon the will and wisdom of the Almighty Disposerand Parent, of whom it is "the first-born offspring. "[610]

[Footnote 608: See _ante_, note 4, p. 349, as to the Platonic notions of"Time" and "Eternity. "]

[Footnote 609: "Timaeus, " ch. Xliv. ]

[Footnote 610: See the elaborate exposition in "Laws, " bk. X. Ch. Xii. And xiii. ]

That portion of the soul which Plato regarded as "immortal" and "to beentitled divine, " is thus the "_offspring of God_"--a ray of theDivinity "generated" by, or emanating from, the Deity. He seems to haveconceived it as co-eternal with its ideal objects, in some mysteriousultimate _unity_. "The true foundation of the Platonic theory of theconstitution of the soul is this fundamental principle of hisphilosophy--the _oneness of truth and knowledge_. [611] This led himnaturally to derive the _rational_ element of the soul (that elementthat _knows_), that possesses the power of νόησις from the _real_element in things (the element that _is_)--the νοούμενον; and in theoriginal, the final, and, though imperfectly, the present state of thatrational element, he, doubtless, conceived it united with its object inan eternal conjunction, or even identity. But though intelligence andits correlative intelligibles were and are thus combined, the soul is_more_ than pure intelligence; it possesses an element of personalityand consciousness distinct to each individual, of which we have noreason to suppose, from any thing his writings contain, Plato ever meantto deprive it. "[612] On the contrary, he not only regarded it as havingnow, under temporal conditions, a distinct personal existence, but healso claimed for it a conscious, personal existence after death. He ismost earnest, and unequivocal, and consistent in his assertion of thedoctrine of the immortality of the soul. The arguments which humanreason can supply are exhibited with peculiar force and beauty in the"Phædo, " the "Phædrus, " and the tenth book of the "Republic. " The mostimportant of these arguments may be presented in a few words. 

[Footnote 611: See Grant's "Aristotle, " vol. I. Pp. 150, 151. ]

[Footnote 612: Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy, " vol. Ii. P. 209, note. ]

1. _The soul is immortal, because it is incorporeal_. There are twokinds of existences, one compounded, the other simple; the formersubject to change, the latter unchangeable; one perceptible to sense, the other comprehended by mind alone. The one is visible, the other isinvisible. When the soul employs the bodily senses, it wanders and isconfused; but when it abstracts itself from the body, it attains toknowledge which is stable, unchangeable, and immortal. The soul, therefore, being uncompounded, incorporeal, invisible, must beindissoluble--that is to say, immortal. [613]

[Footnote 613: "Phædo, " §§ 61-75. ]

2. _The soul is immortal, because it has an independent power ofself-motion_--that is, it has self-activity and self-determination. Noarrangement of matter, no configuration of body, can be conceived as theoriginator of free and voluntary movement. 

Now that which can not move itself, but derives its motion fromsomething else, may cease to move, and perish. "But that which isself-moved, never ceases to be active, and is also the cause of motionto all other things that are moved. " And "whatever is continually activeis immortal. " This "self-activity is, " says Plato, "the very essence andtrue notion of the soul. "[614] Being thus essentially _causative_, ittherefore partakes of the nature of a "principle, " and it is the natureof a principle to exclude its _contrary_. That which is essentiallyself-active can never cease to be active; that which is the cause ofmotion and of change, can not be extinguished by the change calleddeath. [615]

3. _The soul is immortal, because it possesses universal, necessary, andabsolute ideas_, which transcend all material conditions, and bespeak anorigin immeasurably above the body. No modifications of matter, howeverrefined, however elaborated, can give the Absolute, the Necessary, theEternal. But the soul has the ideas of absolute beauty, goodness, perfection, identity, and duration, and it possesses these ideas invirtue of its having a nature which is one, simple, identical, and insome sense, eternal. [616] If the soul can conceive an immortality, itcan not be less than immortal. If, by its very nature, "it has hopesthat will not be bounded by the grave, and desires and longings thatgrasp eternity, " its nature and its destiny must correspond. 

In the concluding sections of the "Phædo" he urges the doctrine withearnestness and feeling as the grand motive to a virtuous life, for "thereward is noble and the hope is great. "[617] And in the "Laws" heinsists upon the doctrine of a future state, in which men are to berewarded or punished as the most conclusive evidence that we are underthe moral government of God. [618]

[Footnote 614: "Phædrus, " §§ 51-53. ]

[Footnote 615: "Phædo, " §§ 112-128. ]

[Footnote 616: Ibid. , §§ 48-57, 110-115. ]

[Footnote 617: Ibid. , §§ 129-145. ]

[Footnote 618: The doctrine of Metempsychosis, or transmigration ofsouls, can scarcely be regarded as part of the philosophic system ofPlato. He seems to have accepted it as a venerable tradition, comingwithin the range of probability, rather than as a philosophic truth, andit is always presented by him in a highly mythical dress. Now of thesemythical representations he remarks in the "Phædo" (§ 145) that "no manin his senses would dream of insisting _that they correspond to thereality_, but that, the soul having been shown to be immortal, this, orsomething like this, is true of individual souls or their habitations. "If, as in the opinions of the ablest critics, "the Laws" is to be placedamongst the last and maturest of Plato's writings, the evidence isconclusive that whatever may have been his earlier opinions, he did notentertain the doctrine of "Metempsychosis" in his riper years. But when, on the one hand, the soul shall remain having an intercourse with divinevirtue, it becomes divine pre-eminently; and pre-eminently, after havingbeen conveyed to a _place_ entirely holy, it is changed for the better;but when it acts in a contrary manner, it has, under contrarycircumstances, placed its existence in some _unholy spot_. 

 _This is the judgment of the gods, who hold Olympus. _

"O thou young man, " [know] "that the person who has become more wicked, _departs to the more wicked souls;_ but he who has become better, to thebetter both in life and in all deaths, to do and suffer what is fittingfor the like. "--"Laws, " bk. X. Ch. Xii. And xiii. ]

4. _Beyond all finite existences and secondary causes, all laws, ideas, and principles, there is an_ INTELLIGENCE _or_ MIND, _the FirstPrinciple of all Principles, the Supreme Idea on which all other ideasare grounded; the Monarch and Lawgiver of the universe, the ultimateSubstance from which all other things derive their being and essence, the First and efficient Cause of all the order, and harmony, and beauty, and excellency, and goodness, which pervades the universe, who is calledby way of pre-eminence and excellence the Supreme Good_, THE GOD (ὁθεός), "_the God over all_, " (ὁ ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεός). 

_This_ SUPREME MIND, [619] Plato taught, is incorporeal, [620]unchangeable, [621] infinite, [622] absolutely perfect, [623] essentiallygood, [624] unoriginated, [625] and eternal. [626] He is "the Father, andArchitect, and Maker of the Universe, "[627] "the efficient Cause of allthings. "[628] "the Monarch and Ruler of the world, "[629] "the sovereignMind that orders all things, and pervades all things, "[630] "the solePrinciple of all things, "[631] and "the Measure of all things, "[632] Heis "the Beginning of all truth, "[633] "the Fountain of all law andjustice, "[634] "the Source of all order and beauty, "[635] "the Cause ofall good;"[636] in short, "he is the Beginning, the Middle, and End ofall things. "[637]

[Footnote 619: "Phædo, " §§ 105-107. ]

[Footnote 620: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives, " bk. Iii. Ch. 77. ]

[Footnote 621: "Republic, " bk. Ii. Ch. Xix. ; "Timæus, " ch. Ix. ]

[Footnote 622: "Apeleius, " bk. I. Ch. V. ]

[Footnote 623: "Republic, " bk. Ii. Ch. Xx. ]

[Footnote 624: "Timæus, " ch. X. ; "Republic, " bk. Ii. Ch. Xviii. ]

[Footnote 625: "Timæus, " ch. Ix. -x. ]

[Footnote 626: Ibid. , ch. Xii. ]

[Footnote 627: Ibid. , ch. Ix. ]

[Footnote 628: "Phædo, " § 105. ]

[Footnote 629: "Laws, " bk. X. Ch. Xii. ; "Republic, " bk. Vii. Ch. Iii. ;"Philebus, " § 50. ]

[Footnote 630: "Philebus, " §51. ]

[Footnote 631: "Republic, " bk. Vi. Ch. Xix. ]

[Footnote 632: "Laws, " bk. Iv. Ch. Viii. ]

[Footnote 633: "Republic, " bk. Ii. Ch. Xxi. ]

[Footnote 634: "Laws, " bk. Iv. Ch. Vii. ]

[Footnote 635: "Philebus, " § 51; "Timæus, " ch. X. ]

[Footnote 636: "Republic, " bk. Ii. Ch. Xviii. ; "Timæus, " ch. X. ]

[Footnote 637: "Laws, " bk. Iv, ch. Vii. ]

Beyond the sensible world, Plato conceived another world ofintelligibles or _ideas_. These ideas are not, however, distinct andindependent existences. "What general notions are to our own minds, ideas are to the Supreme Reason (νοῦς βασιλεύς); they are the _eternalthoughts_ of the Divine Intellect. "[638] Ideas are not substances, theyare qualities, and there must, therefore, be some ultimate substance orbeing to whom, as attributes, they belong. "It must not be believed, ashas been taught, that Plato gave to ideas a substantial existence. Whenthey are not objects of pure conception for human reason, they areattributes of the Divine Reason. It is there they substantiallyexist. "[639] These eternal laws and reasons of things indicate to us thecharacter of that Supreme Essence of essences, the Being of beings. Heis not the simple aggregate of all laws, but he is the Author, andSustainer, and Substance of all laws. At the utmost summit of theintellectual world of Ideas blazes, with an eternal splendor, the ideaof the _Supreme Good_ from which all others emanate. [640] This SupremeGood is "far beyond all existence in dignity and power, and it is thatfrom which all things else derive their being and essence. "[641] TheSupreme Good is not the truth, nor the intelligence; "it is the Fatherof it. " In the same manner as the sun, which is the visible image of thegood, reigns over the world, in that it illumes and vivifies it; so theSupreme Good, of which the sun is only the work, reigns over theintelligible world, in that it gives birth to it by virtue of itsinexhaustible fruitfulness. [642] _The Supreme Good is_ GOD _himself_, and he is designated "the good" because this term seems most fittinglyto express his essential character and essence. [643] It is towards thissuperlative perfection that the reason lifts itself; it is towards thisinfinite beauty the heart aspires. "Marvellous Beauty!" exclaims Plato;"eternal, uncreated, imperishable beauty, free from increase anddiminution. .. Beauty which has nothing sensible, nothing corporeal, ashands or face: which does not reside in any being different from itself, in the earth, or the heavens, or in any other thing, but which exists_eternally and absolutely in itself, and by itself;_ beauty of whichevery other beauty partakes, without their birth or destruction bringingto it the least increase or diminution. "[644] The absolute being--God, is the last reason, the ultimate foundation, the complete ideal of allbeauty. God is, _par excellent_, the Beautiful. 

[Footnote 638: Thompson's "Laws of Thought, " p. 119. ]

[Footnote 639: Cousin, "Lectures on the History of Philosophy, " vol. I. P. 415. "There is no quintessential metaphysics which can prevailagainst common sense, and if such be the Platonic theory of ideas, Aristotle was right in opposing it. But such a theory is only a chimerawhich Aristotle created for the purpose of combating it. "--"The True, the Beautiful, and the Good, " p. 77. ]

[Footnote 640: "Republic, " bk. Vii. Ch. Iii. ]

[Footnote 641: "Ibid. , " bk. Vi. Ch. Xviii. And xix. ]

[Footnote 642: "Republic, " bk. Vii. Ch. Iii. ]

[Footnote 642: Ritter's "History of Ancient Philosophy, " vol. Ii. P. 275. ]

[Footnote 644: "Banquet, " § 35. See Cousin, "The True, the Beautiful, and the Good, " Lecture IV. , also Lecture VII. Pp. 150-153; Denis, "Histoire des Théories et Ideés Morales dans l'Antiquité, " vol. I. P. 149. ]

God is therefore, with Plato, _the First Principle of all Principles;_the Divine energy or power is the _efficient cause_, the Divine beautythe _formal cause_, and the Divine goodness the _final cause_ of allexistence. 

_The eternal unity of the principles of Order, Goodness, and Truth, inan ultimate reality--the_ ETERNAL MIND, is thus the fundamentalprinciple which pervades the whole of the Platonic philosophy. And now, having attained this sublime elevation, he looks down from thence uponthe _sensible, the phenomenal world_, and upon _the temporal life ofman;_ and in the light of this great principle he attempts to explaintheir meaning and purpose. The results he attained in the former caseconstitute the Platonic _Physics_, in the latter, the Platonic _Ethics_. 

I. PLATONIC PHYSICS. 

Firmly believing in the absolute excellence of the Deity, and regardingthe Divine Goodness as the Final Cause of the universe, he pronouncesthe physical world to be an _image_ of the perfection of God. Anaxagoras, no doubt, prepared the way for this theory. Every one whohas read the "Phædo, " will remember the remarkable passage in whichSocrates gives utterance to the disappointment which he had experiencedwhen expecting from physical science an explanation of the universe. "When I was young, " he said--"it is not to be told how eager I was aboutphysical inquiries, and curious to know _how the universe came to be asit is_; and when I heard that Anaxagoras was teaching that all wasarranged by _mind_, I was delighted with the prospect of hearing such adoctrine unfolded; I thought to myself, if he teaches that mind madeevery thing to be as it is, he will explain _how it is_ BEST _for it tobe_, and show that so it is. " But Anaxagoras, it appears, lost sight ofthis principle, and descended to the explanation of the universe bymaterial causes. "Great was my hope, " says Socrates, "and equally greatmy disappointment. "[645]

[Footnote 645: "Phædo, " §§ 105, 106. ]

Plato accepted this suggestion of Anaxagoras with all his peculiarearnestness, and devoted himself to its fuller development. It were avain and profitless theory, which, whilst it assumed the existence of aSupreme Mind, did not represent that mind as operating in the universeby _design_, and as exhibiting his intelligence, and justice, andgoodness, as well as his power, in every thing. If it be granted thatthere is a Supreme Mind, then, argued Plato, he must be regarded as "themeasure of all things, " and all things must have been framed accordingto a plan or "model" which that mind supplied. Intelligence must beregarded as having a _purpose_, and as working towards an _end_, for itis this alone which distinguishes reason from unreason, and mind frommere unintelligent force. The only proper model which could be presentedto the Supreme Intelligence is "the eternal and unchangeable model"[646]which his own perfection supplies, "for he is the most excellent ofcauses. "[647] Thus God is not simply the maker of the universe, but themodel of the universe, because he designed that it should be an IMAGE, in the sphere of sense, of his own perfections--a revelation of hiseternal beauty, and wisdom, and goodness, and truth. "God was _good_, and being good, he desired that the universe should, as far as possible, _resemble_ himself. .. . Desiring that all things should be _good_, and, as far as might be, nothing evil, he took the fluctuating mass of thingsvisible, which had been in orderless confusion, and reduced it to_order_, considering this to be the _better_ state. Now it was and isutterly impossible for the supremely good to form any thing except thatwhich is _most excellent_ (κάλλιστον--most fair, most beautiful"). [648]The object at which the supreme mind aimed being that which is "_best_, "we must, in tracing his operations in the universe, always look for"_the best_" in every thing. [649] Starting out thus, upon the assumptionthat the goodness of God is the final cause of the universe, Platoevolved a system of _optimism_. 

The physical system of Plato being thus intended to illustrate aprinciple of optimism, the following results may be expected:

1. That it will mainly concern itself with _final causes_. The universebeing regarded chiefly, as indeed it is, an indication of the DivineIntelligence--every phenomenon will be contemplated in that light. Nature is the volume in which the Deity reveals his own perfections; itis therefore to be studied solely with this motive, that we may learnfrom thence the perfection of God. The _Timæus_ is a series of ingenioushypotheses designed to deepen and vivify our sense of the harmony, andsymmetry, and beauty of the universe, and, as a consequence, of thewisdom, and excellence, and goodness, of its Author. [650]

[Footnote 646: "Timæus, " ch. Ix. ]

[Footnote 647: Ibid. ]

[Footnote 648: Ibid. , ch. X. ]

[Footnote 649: Ibid. , ch. Xix. ]

[Footnote 650: "Being is related to Becoming (the Absolute to theContingent) as Truth is to Belief; consequently we must not marvelshould we find it impossible to arrive at any certain and conclusiveresults in our speculations upon the creation of the visible universeand its authors; it should be enough for us if the account we have togive be as probable as any other, remembering that we are but men, andtherefore bound to acquiesce in merely probable results, without lookingfor a higher degree of certainty than the subject admits of"--"Timæus, "ch. Ix. ]

Whatever physical truths were within the author's reach, took theirplace in the general array: the vacancies were filled up with the bestsuppositions admitted by the limited science of the time. [651] And it isworthy of remark that, whilst proceeding by this "high _à priori_ road, "he made some startling guesses at the truth, and anticipated some of thediscoveries of the modern inductive method, which proceeds simply by theobservation, comparison, and generalization of facts. Of these propheticanticipations we may instance that of the definite proportions ofchemistry, [652] the geometrical forms of crystallography, [653] thedoctrine of complementary colors, [654] and that grand principle that allthe highest laws of nature assume the form of a precise quantitativestatement. [655]

2. It may be expected that a system of physics raised on optimisticprinciples will be _mathematical_ rather than experimental. "Intended toembody conceptions of proportion and harmony, it will have recourse tothat department of science which deals with the proportions in space andnumber. Such applications of mathematical truths, not being raised onascertained facts, can only accidentally represent the real laws of thephysical system; they will, however, vivify the student's apprehensionof harmony in the same manner as a happy parable, though not founded inreal history, will enliven his perceptions of moral truth. "[656]

[Footnote 651: Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy, " vol. Ii. P. 157. ]

[Footnote 652: "Timæus, " ch. Xxxi. ]

[Footnote 653: Ibid. , ch. Xxvii. ]

[Footnote 654: Ibid. , ch. Xlii. ]

[Footnote 655: "It is Plato's merit to have discovered that the laws ofthe physical universe are resolvable into numerical relations, andtherefore capable of being represented by mathematicalformulæ. "--Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy, " vol. Ii. P. 163. ]

[Footnote 656: Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy, " vol. Ii. P. 163. ]

3. Another peculiarity of such a system will be an impatience of everymerely _mechanical_ theory of the operations of nature. 

"The psychology of Plato led him to recognize mind wherever there wasmotion, and hence not only to require a Deity as first mover of theuniverse, but also to conceive the propriety of separate and subordinateagents attached to each of its parts, as principles of motion, no lessthan intelligent directors. These agents were entitled '_gods_' by aneasy figure, discernible even in the sacred language, [657] and whichserved, besides, to accommodate philosophical hypotheses to the popularreligion. Plato, however, carefully distinguished between the sole, Eternal Author of the Universe, on the one hand, and that 'soul, ' vitaland intelligent, which he attaches to the world, as well as the spheralintelligences, on the other. These 'subordinate deities, ' thoughintrusted with a sort of deputed creation, were still only the deputiesof the Supreme Framer and Director of all. "[658] The "gods" of thePlatonic system are "subordinate divinities, " "generated gods, " broughtinto existence by the will and wisdom of the Eternal Father and Maker ofthe universe. [659] Even Jupiter, the governing divinity of the popularmythology, is a descendant from powers which are included in thecreation. [660] The offices they fulfill, and the relations they sustainto the Supreme Being, correspond to those of the "angels" of Christiantheology. They are the ministers of his providential government of theworld. [661]

[Footnote 657: Psalm lxxxii. I; John x. 34. ]

[Footnote 658: Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy, " vol. Ii. P. 164. ]

[Footnote 659: "Timæus, " ch. Xv. ]

[Footnote 660: Ibid. ]

[Footnote 661: "Laws, " bk. X. ]

The application of this fundamental conception of the Platonicsystem--_the eternal unity of the principles of Order, Goodness, andTruth in an ultimate reality, the Eternal Mind_--to the elucidation ofthe _temporal life_ of man, yields, as a result--

II. THE PLATONIC ETHICS. 

Believing firmly that there are unchangeable, necessary, and absoluteprinciples, which are the perfections of the Eternal Mind, Plato must, of course, have been a believer in an _immutable morality_. He held thatthere is a rightness, a justice, an equity, not arbitrarily constitutedby the Divine will or legislation, but founded in the nature of God, andtherefore eternal. The independence of the principles of morality uponthe mere will of the Supreme Governor is proclaimed in all hiswritings. [662] The Divine will is the fountain of efficiency, the Divinereason, the fountain of law. God is no more the creator of _virtue_ thanhe is the creator of _truth_. 

And inasmuch as man is a partaker of the Divine essence, and as theideas which dwell in the human reason are "copies" of those which dwellin the Divine reason, man may rise to the apprehension and recognitionof the immutable and eternal principles of righteousness, and "bycommunion with that which is Divine, and subject to the law of order, may become himself a subject of order, and divine, so far as it ispossible for man. "[663]

[Footnote 662: In "Euthyphron" especially. ]

[Footnote 663: "Republic, " bk. Vi. Ch. Xiii. ]

The attainment of this consummation is the grand purpose of the Platonicphilosophy. Its ultimate object is "_the purification of the soul_, " andits pervading spirit is the aspiration after perfection. The wholesystem of Plato has therefore an eminently _ethical_ character. It is aspeculative philosophy directed to a practical purpose. 

Philosophy is the _love of wisdom_. Now wisdom (σοφία) is expresslydeclared by Plato to belong alone to the Supreme Divinity, [664] whoalone can contemplate reality in a direct and immediate manner, and inwhom, as Plato seems often to intimate, knowledge and being coincide. Philosophy is the aspiration of the soul after this wisdom, this perfectand immutable truth, and in its realization it is a union with thePerfect Wisdom through the medium of a divine affection, the _love_ ofwhich Plato so often speaks. The eternal and unchangeable Essence whichis the proper object of philosophy is also endowed with _moral_attributes. He is not only "the Being, " but "the Good" (τὸ ἀγαθόν), andall in the system of the universe which can be the object of rationalcontemplation, is an emanation from that goodness. The love of truth istherefore the love of God, and the love of Good is the love of truth. Philosophy and morality are thus coincident. Philosophy is the love ofPerfect Wisdom; Perfect Wisdom and Perfect Goodness are identical; thePerfect Good is God; philosophy is the "_Love of God_. "[665] Ethicallyviewed, it is this one motive of _love_ for the Supreme Wisdom andGoodness, predominating over and purifying and assimilating every desireof the soul, and governing every movement of the man, raising man to aparticipation of and communion with Divinity, and restoring him to "the_likeness_ of God. " "This flight, " says Plato, "consists in resemblingGod (όμοίωσιϛ Θεῷ), and this resemblance is the becoming just and holywith wisdom. "[666] "This assimilation to God is the enfranchisement ofthe divine element of the soul. To approach to God as the substance oftruth is _Science_; as the substance of goodness in truth is _Wisdom_, and as the substance of Beauty in goodness and truth is _Love_. "[667]

The two great principles which can be clearly traced as pervading theethical system of Plato are--

1. _That no man is willingly evil_. [668]

2. _That every man is endued with the power of producing changes in hismoral character_[669]

[Footnote 664: "Phædrus, " § 145. ]

[Footnote 665: Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy, " vol. Ii. P. 61. ]

[Footnote 666: "Theætetus, " § 84. ]

[Footnote 667: Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy, " vol. Ii. P. 277. ]

[Footnote 668: "Timæsus, " ch. Xlviii. ]

[Footnote 669: "Laws, " bk. V. Ch. I. , bk. Ix. Ch. Vi. , bk. X. Ch. Xii. ]

The first of these principles is the counterpart ethical expression ofhis theory of _immutable Being_. The second is the counterpart of histheory of phenomenal change, or _mere Becoming_. 

The soul of man is framed after the pattern of the immutable ideas ofthe _just_, and the _true_, and the _good_, which dwell in the EternalMind--that is, it is made in the image of God. The soul in its ultimateessence is formed of "the immutable" and "the permanent. " The presenceof the ideas of the just, and the true, and the good in the reason ofman, constitute him a moral nature; and it is impossible that he cancease to be a moral being, for these ideas, having a permanent andimmutable being, can not be changed. All the passions and affections ofthe soul are merely phenomenal. They belong to the mortal, thetransitory life of man; they are in endless flow and change, and theyhave no permanent reality. As phenomena, they must, however, have someground; and Plato found that ground in the mysterious, instinctivelonging for the _good_ and the _true_ which dwells in the very essenceof the soul. These are the realities after which it strives, even whenpursuing pleasure, and honor, and wealth, and fame. All the restlessnessof human life is prompted by a longing for the _good_. But man does notclearly perceive what the _good_ really is. The rational element of thesoul has become clouded by passion and ignorance, and suffered aneclipse of its powers. Still, man longs for the good, and bears witness, by his restlessness and disquietude, that he instinctively desires it, and that he can find no rest and no satisfaction in any thing apart fromthe knowledge and the participation of the Supreme, the Absolute Good. 

This, then, is the meaning of the oft-repeated assertion of Plato "_thatno man is willingly evil_;" viz. , that no man deliberately chooses evilas evil. And Plato is, at the same time, careful to guard the doctrinefrom misconception. He readily grants that acts of wrong aredistinguished as voluntary and involuntary, without which there could beneither merit nor demerit, reward nor punishment. [670] But still heinsists that no man chooses evil in and by itself. He may choose itvoluntarily as a means, but he does not choose it as an end. Everyvolition, by its essential nature, pursues, at least, an _apparent_good; because the end of volition is not the immediate act, but theobject for the sake of which the act is undertaken. [671]

[Footnote 670: "Laws, " bk. Ix. Ch. Vi. ]

[Footnote 671: "Gorgias, " §§ 52, 53. ]

How is it, then, it may be asked, that men become evil? The answer ofPlato is, that the soul has in it a principle of change, in the power ofregulating the desires--in indulging them to excess, or moderating themaccording to the demands of reason. The circumstances in which the soulis placed, as connected with the sensible world by means of the body, present an occasion for the exercise of that power, the end of thistemporal connection being to establish a state of moral discipline andprobation. The humors and distempers of the body likewise deprave, disorder, and discompose the soul. [672] "Pleasures and pains are undulymagnified; the democracy of the passions prevails; and the ascendency ofreason is cast down. " Bad forms of civil government corrupt socialmanners, evil education effects the ruin of the soul. Thus the soul ischanged--is fallen from what it was when first it came from theCreator's hand. But the eternal Ideas are not utterly effaced, the imageof God is not entirely lost. The soul may yet be restored by remedialmeasures. It may be purified by knowledge, by truth, by expiations, bysufferings, and by prayers. The utmost, however, that man can hope to doin this life is insufficient to fully restore the image of God, anddeath must complete the final emancipation of the rational element fromthe bondage of the flesh. Life is thus a discipline and a preparationfor another state of being, and death the final entrance there. [673]

[Footnote 672: "Gorgias, " §§ 74-76. ]

[Footnote 673: "Phædo, " §§ 130, 131. ]

Independent of all other considerations, virtue is, therefore, to bepursued as the true good of the soul. Wisdom, Fortitude, Temperance, Justice, the four cardinal virtues of the Platonic system, are to becultivated as the means of securing the purification and perfection ofthe inner man. And the ordinary pleasures, "the lesser goods" of life, are only to be so far pursued as they are subservient to, and compatiblewith, the higher and holier duty of striving after "the resemblance toGod. "

CHAPTER XII. 

THE PHILOSOPHERS OF ATHENS (_continued_). 

THE SOCRATIC SCHOOL (_continued_). 

ARISTOTLE. 

Aristotle was born at Stagira, a Greek colony of Thrace, B. C. 384. Hisfather, Nicomachus, was a physician in the Court of Amyntas II. , King ofMacedonia, and is reported to have written several works on Medicine andNatural History. From his father, Aristotle seems to have inherited alove for the natural sciences, which was fostered by the circumstanceswhich surrounded him in early life, and which exerted a determininginfluence upon the studies of his riper years. 

Impelled by an insatiate desire for knowledge, he, at seventeen years ofage, repaired to Athens, the city of Plato and the university of theworld. Plato was then absent in Sicily; on his return Aristotle enteredhis school, became an ardent student of philosophy, and remained untilthe death of Plato, B. C. 348. He therefore listened to the instructionsof Plato for twenty years. 

The mental characteristics of the pupil and the teacher were strikinglydissimilar. Plato was poetic, ideal, and in some degree mystical. Aristotle was prosaic, systematic, and practical. Plato was intuitiveand synthetical. Aristotle was logical and analytical. It was thereforebut natural that, to the mind of Aristotle, there should appearsomething confused, irregular, and incomplete in the discourses of hismaster. There was a strange commingling of questions concerning thegrounds of morality, and statements concerning the nature of science; ofinquiries concerning "real being, " and speculations on the ordering of amodel Republic, in the same discourse. Ethics, politics, ontology, andtheology, are all comprised in his Dialectic, which is, in fact, the onegrand "science of the idea of the good. " Now to the mind of Aristotle itseemed better, and much more systematic, that these questions should beseparated, and referred to particular heads; and, above all, that theyshould be thoroughly discussed in an exact and settled terminology. Toarrange and classify all the objects of knowledge, to discuss themsystematically and, as far as possible, exhaustively, was evidently theambition, perhaps also the special function, of Aristotle. He wouldsurvey the entire field of human knowledge; he would study nature aswell as humanity, matter as well as mind, language as well as thought;he would define the proper limits of each department of study, andpresent a regular statement of the facts and principles of each science. And, in fact, he was the first who really separated the differentsciences and erected them into distinct systems, each resting upon itsown proper principles. He distributed philosophy into threebranches:--(i. ) _Theoretic_; (ii. ) _Efficient_; (iii. ) _Practical_. TheTheoretic he divided into--1. _Physics_; _2. Mathematics_; 3. _Theology_, or the Prime Philosophy--the science known in modern timesas Metaphysics. The Efficient embraces what we now term the arts, --1. _Logic; 2. Rhetoric_; 3. _Poetics_. The Practical comprises--_1. Ethics_; 2. _Politics_. On all these subjects he wrote separatetreatises. Thus, whilst Plato is the genius of abstraction, Aristotle iseminently the genius of classification. 

Such being the mental characteristics of the two men--their type of mindso opposite--we are prepared to expect that, in pursuing his inquiries, Aristotle would develop a different _Organon_ from that of Plato, andthat the teachings of Aristotle will give a new direction to philosophicthought. 

ARISTOTELIAN ORGANON. 

Plato made use of psychological and logical analysis in order to drawfrom the depth of consciousness certain fundamental ideas which areinherent in the mind--born with it, and not derived from sense orexperience. These ideas he designates "the intelligible species" (τὰνοουμενα γένη) as opposed to "the visible species"--the objects ofsense. Such ideas or principles being found, he uses them as"starting-points" from which he may pass beyond the sensible world andascend to "the absolute, " that is, to God. [674] Having thus, byimmediate abstraction, attained to universal and necessary ideas, hedescends to the outer world, and attempts by these ideas to construct anintellectual theory of the universe. [675]

Aristotle will reverse this process. He will commence with _sensation_, and proceed, by induction, from the known to the unknown. 

The repetition of sensations produces _recollection_, recollection_experience_, and experience produces _science_. [676] "Science and artresult unto men by means of experience. .. . " "Art comes into being when, from a number of experiences, one universal opinion is evolved, whichwill embrace all similar cases. For example, if you know that a certainremedy has cured Callias of a certain disease, and that the same remedyhas produced the same effect on Socrates and on several other persons, that is _Experience_; but to know that a certain remedy will cure allpersons attacked with that disease, is _Art_. Experience is a knowledgeof individual things (τῶν καθέκαστα); art is that of universals (τῶνκαθόλου). "[677]

[Footnote 674: "Republic, " bk. Vi. Ch. Xx. ]

[Footnote 675: "Timæus, " ch. Ix. ]

[Footnote 676: "Metaphysics, " bk. I. Ch. I. ]

[Footnote 677: Ibid. ]

Disregarding the Platonic notion of the unity of all Being in theabsolute idea, he fixed his immediate attention on the manifoldness ofthe phenomenal, and by a classification of all the objects of experiencehe sought to attain to "general notions. " Concentrating all hisattention on the individual, the contingent, the particular, he ascends, by induction, from the particular to the _general_; and then, by astrange paralogism, "the _universal_" is confounded with "the _general_"or, by a species of logical sleight-of-hand, the general is transmutedinto the universal. Thus "induction is the pathway from particulars touniversals. "[678] But how universal and necessary principles can beobtained by a generalization of limited experiences is not explained byAristotle. The experiences of a lifetime, the experiences of the wholerace, are finite and limited, and a generalization of these can onlygive the finite, the limited, and at most, the general, but not theuniversal. 

[Footnote 679: "Topics, " bk. I. Ch. Xii. ; "Ethics, " bk. Vi. Ch. Iii. ]

Aristotle admits, however, that there are ideas or principles in themind which can not be explained by experience, and we are thereforeentitled to an answer to the question--how are these obtained? "Sensibleexperience gives us what is _here_, _there_, _now_, in such and such amanner, but it is impossible for it to give what is _everywhere_ and _atall times_. "[680] He tells us further, that "science is a conception ofthe mind engaged in universals, and in those things which exist ofnecessity, and since there are _principles of things demonstrable and ofevery science_ (for science is joined with reason), it will be neitherscience, nor art, nor prudence, which discovers the principles ofscience;. .. It must therefore be (νοῦς) pure intellect, " or theintuitive reason. [681] He also characterizes these principles as_self-evident_. "First truths are those which obtain belief, not throughothers, but through themselves, as there is no necessity to investigatethe '_why_' in scientific principles, but each principle ought to becredible by itself. "[682] They are also _necessary_ and _eternal_. "Demonstrative science is from necessary principles, and those which are_per se_ inherent, are necessarily so in things. "[683] "We have all aconception of that which can not subsist otherwise than it does. .. . Theobject of science has a necessary existence, therefore it is _eternal_. For those things which exist in themselves, by necessity, are alleternal. "[684] But whilst Aristotle admits that there are "immutable andfirst principles, "[685] which are not derived from sense andexperience--"principles which are the foundation of all science anddemonstration, but which are themselves indemonstrable, "[686] becauseself-evident, necessary, and eternal; yet he furnishes no proper accountof their genesis and development in the human mind, neither does heattempt their enumeration. At one time he makes the intellect itselftheir source, at another he derives them from sense, experience, andinduction. This is the defect, if not the inconsistency, of hismethod. [687]

[Footnote 680: "Post. Analytic, " bk. I. Ch. Xxxi. ]

[Footnote 681: "Ethics, " bk. Vi. Ch. Vi. ]

[Footnote 682: "Topics, " bk. I. Ch. I. ]

[Footnote 683: "Post. Analytic, " bk. I. Ch. Vi. ]

[Footnote 684: "Ethics, " bk. Vi. Ch. Iii. ]

[Footnote 685: Ibid. , bk. Vi. Ch. Xi. ]

[Footnote 686: "Post. Analytic, " bk. I. Ch. Iii. ]

[Footnote 687: Hamilton attempts the following mode of reconciling thecontradictory positions of Aristotle:

"On the supposition of the mind virtually containing, antecedent to allexperience, certain universal principles of knowledge, in the form ofcertain necessities of thinking; still it is only by repeated andcomparative experiments that we compass the certainty; on the one hand, that such and such cognitions can not but be thought as necessary, native generalities; and, on the other, that such and such cognitionsmay or may not be thought, and are, therefore, as contingent, factitiousgeneralizations. To this process of experiment, analysis, andclassification, through which we attain to a scientific knowledge ofprinciples, it might be shown that Aristotle, not improperly, appliesthe term _Induction_. "--"Philosophy, " p. 88. ]

The human mind, he tells us, has two kinds of intelligence--the_passive_ intelligence (νοῦς παθητικός), which is the receptacle offorms (δεκτικὸν τοῦ εὶδους); and the _active_ intelligence (νοῦςποιητικός), which impresses the seal of thought upon the data furnishedby experience, and combines them into the unity of a single judgment, thus attaining "general notions. "[688] The passive intelligence (the"external perception" of modern psychology) perceives the individualforms which appear in the external world, and the active intelligence(the intellect proper) classifies and generalizes according to fixedlaws or principles inherent in itself; but of these fixed laws--πρῶτανοήματα--first thoughts, or _à priori_ ideas, he offers no properaccount; they are, at most, purely subjective. This, it would seem, was, in effect, a return to the doctrine of Protagoras and his school, "thatman--the individual--is the measure of all things. " The aspects underwhich objects present themselves in consciousness, constitute our onlyground of knowledge; we have no direct, intuitive knowledge of Being _inse_. The noetic faculty is simply a _regulative_ faculty; it furnishesthe laws under which we compare and judge, but it does not supply anyoriginal elements of knowledge. Individual things are the only realentities, [689] and "universals" have no separate existence apart fromindividuals in which they inhere as attributes or properties. They areconsequently pure mental conceptions, which are fixed and recalled bygeneral names. He thus substitutes a species of conceptual-nominalism inplace of the realism of Plato. It is true that "real being" (τὸ ὄν) iswith Aristotle a subject of metaphysical inquiry, but the proper, if notthe only subsistence, or οὐαία, is the form or abstract nature ofthings. "The essence or very nature of a thing is inherent in the _form_and _energy_"[690] The science of Metaphysics is strictly conversantabout these abstract intellectual forms just as Natural Philosophy isconversant about external objects, of which the senses give usinformation. Our knowledge of these intellectual forms is, however, founded upon "beliefs" rather than upon immediate intuition, and theobjective certainty of science, upon the subjective necessity ofbelieving, and not upon direct apperception. 

[Footnote 688: "On the Soul, " ch. Vi. ; "Ethics, " bk. Vi. Ch. I. ]

[Footnote 689: "Metaphysics, " bk. Vi. Ch. Xiii. ]

[Footnote 690: Ibid. , bk. Vii. Ch. Iii. ]

The points of contrast between the two methods may now be presented in afew sentences. Plato held that all our cognitions are reducible to twoelements--one derived from _sense_, the other from _pure reason_; oneelement particular, contingent, and relative, the other universal, necessary, and absolute. By an act of _immediate abstraction_ Plato willeliminate the particular, contingent, and relative phenomena, anddisengage the universal, necessary, and absolute _ideas_ which underlieand determine all phenomena. These ideas are the thoughts of the DivineMind, according to which all particular and individual existences aregenerated, and, as divine thoughts, they are real and permanentexistences. Thus by a process of immediate abstraction, he will risefrom particular and contingent phenomena to universal and necessaryprinciples, and from these to the First Principle of all principles, theFirst Cause of all causes--that is, to _God_. 

Aristotle, on the contrary, held that all of our knowledge begins with"the singular, " that is, with the particular and the relative, and isderived from sensation and experience. The "sensible object, " taken asit is without any sifting and probing, is the basis of science, andreason is simply the architect constructing science according to certain"forms" or laws inherent in mind. The object, then, of metaphysicalscience is to investigate those "universal notions" under which the mindconceives of and represents to itself external objects, and speculatesconcerning them. Aristotle, therefore, agrees with Plato in teaching"that science can only be a science of universals, "[691] and "thatsensation alone can not furnish us with scientific knowledge. "[692] How, then, does he propose to attain the knowledge of universal principles?How will he perform that feat which he calls "passing from the known tothe unknown?" The answer is, by _comparative abstraction_. The universalbeing constituted by a relation of the object to the thinking subject, that is, by a property recognized by the intelligence alone, in virtueof which it can be retained as an object of thought, and compared withother objects, he proposes to _compare, analyze, define, _ and _classify_the primary cognitions, and thus evoke into energy, and clearly presentthose principles or forms of the intelligence which he denominate"universals. " As yet, however, he has only attained to "generalnotions, " which are purely subjective, that is, to logical definitions, and these logical definitions are subsequently elevated to the dignityof "universal principles and causes" by a species of philosophiclegerdemain. Philosophy is thus stripped of its metaphysical character, and assumes a strictly _logical_ aspect. The key of the Aristotelianmethod is therefore the

ARISTOTELIAN LOGIC. 

Pure Logic is the science of the formal laws of thought. Its office isto ascertain the rules or conditions under which the mind, by its ownconstitution, reasons and discourses. The office of Applied Logic--oflogic as an art--is "to form and judge of conclusions, and, throughconclusions, to establish proof. The conclusions, however, arise frompropositions, and the propositions from conceptions. " It is chieflyunder the latter aspect that logic is treated by Aristotle. According tothis natural point of view he has divided the contents of the logicaland dialectic teaching in the different treatises of the _Organon_. 

[Footnote 691: "Ethics, " bk. Vi. Ch. Vi. ]

[Footnote 692: "Post. Analytic, " bk. I. Ch. Xxxi. ]

The first treatise is the "_Categories_" or "Predicaments"--a work whichtreats of the universal determinations of Being. It is a classificationof all our mental conceptions. As a matter of fact, the mind formsnotions or conceptions about those natures and essences of things whichpresent an outward image to the senses, or those, equally real, whichutter themselves to the mind. These may be defined and classified; theremay be general conceptions to which all particular conceptions arereferable. This classification has been attempted by Aristotle, and asthe result we have the ten "Categories" of _Substance, Quantity, Quality, Relation, Time, Place, Position, Possession, Action, Passion_. He does not pretend that this classification is complete, but he heldthese "Predicaments" to be the most universal expressions for thevarious relations of things, under some one of which every thing mightbe reduced. 

The second treatise, "_On Interpretation_, " investigates language as theexpression of thought; and inasmuch as a true or false thought must beexpressed by the union or separation of a subject and a predicate, hedeems it necessary to discuss the parts of speech--the general term andthe verb--and the modes of affirmation and denial. In this treatise hedevelops the nature and limitations of propositions, the meaning ofcontraries and contradictions, and the force of affirmations and denialsin _possible, contingent_, and _necessary_ matter. 

The third are the "_Analytics_, " which show how conclusions are to bereferred back to their principles, and arranged in the order of theirprecedence. 

The First or Prior Analytic presents the universal doctrine of theSyllogism, its principles and forms, and teaches how must reason, if wewould not violate the laws of our own mind. The theory of reasoning, generally, with a view to accurate demonstration, depends upon theconstruction of a perfect syllogism, which is defined as "a discourse inwhich, certain things being laid down, something else different from thepremises necessarily results, in consequence of their existence. "[693]Conclusions are, according to their own contents and end, either_Apodeictic_, which deal with necessary and demonstrable matter, or_Dialectic_, which deal with probable matter, or _Sophistical_, whichare imperfect in matter or form, and announced, deceptively, as correctconclusions, when they are not. The doctrine of Apodeictic conclusionsis given in the "_Posterior Analytic_, " that of Dialectic conclusions inthe "_Topics_, " and that of the Sophistical in the "_SophisticalElenchi_. "

Now, if Logic is of any value as an instrument for the discovery oftruth, the attainment of certitude, it must teach us not only how todeduce conclusions from premises, but it must certify to us the validityof the principles from whence we reason and this is attempted byAristotle in the Posterior Analytic. This treatise opens with thefollowing statement: All doctrine, and all intellectual discipline, arises from a prior or pre-existent knowledge. This is evident, if wesurvey them all; for both mathematical sciences, and also each of thearts, are obtained in this manner. The same holds true in the case ofreasonings, whether through [deductive] _Syllogism_ or through_Induction_, for both accomplish the instruction they afford frominformation previously known--the former (syllogistic reasoning)receiving it, as it were, from the traditions of the intelligent, thelatter (inductive reasoning) manifesting the universal through the lightof the singular. [694] Induction and Syllogism are thus the grandinstruments of logic. [695]

[Footnote 693: "Prior Analytic, " bk. I. Ch. I. ; "Topics, " bk. I. Ch. I. ]

[Footnote 694: "Post. Analytic, " bk. I. Ch. I. ]

[Footnote 695: "We believe all things through syllogism, or frominduction. "--"Prior Analytic, " bk. Ii. Ch. Xxiii. ]

Both these processes are based upon an _anterior_ knowledge. Demonstrative science must be from things true, first, immediate, moreknown than, prior to, and the causes of, the conclusion, for thus therewill be the appropriate first principles of whatever isdemonstrated. [696] The first principles of demonstration, the materialof thought, must, consequently, be supplied by some power or faculty ofthe mind other than that which is engaged in generalization anddeductive reasoning. Whence, then, is this "anterior knowledge" derived, and what tests or criteria have we of its validity?

1. In regard to deductive or syllogistic reasoning, the views ofAristotle are very distinctly expressed. 

Syllogistic reasoning "proceeds from generals to particulars. "[697] Thegeneral must therefore be supplied as the foundation of the deductivereasoning. Whence, then, is this knowledge of "the general" derived? Theanswer of Aristotle is that the universal major proposition, out ofwhich the conclusion of the syllogism is drawn, _is itself necessarilythe conclusion of a previous induction, and mediately or immediately aninference_--a collection from individual objects of sensation or ofself-consciousness. "Now, " says he, "demonstration is from universals, but induction from particulars. It is impossible, however, toinvestigate universals except through induction, since things which aresaid to be from abstraction will be known only by induction. "[698] It isthus clear that Aristotle makes _deduction necessarily dependent uponinduction_. He maintains that the highest or most universal principleswhich constitute the primary and immediate propositions of the formerare furnished by the latter. 

[Footnote 696: "Post. Analytic, " bk. I. Ch. Ii. ]

[Footnote 697: Ibid. , bk. I. Ch. Xviii. ; "Ethics, " bk. Vi. Ch. Iii. ]

[Footnote 698: "Post. Analytic, " bk. I. Ch. Xviii. ]

2. General principles being thus furnished by induction, we may nowinquire whence, according to Aristotle, are the materials for inductionderived? What is the character of that "anterior knowledge" which is thebasis of the inductive process?

Induction, says Aristotle, is "the progression from singulars touniversals. "[699] It is an illation of the universal from the singularas legitimated by the laws of thought. All knowledge, therefore, beginswith singulars--that is, with individual objects. And inasmuch as allknowledge begins with "individual objects, " and as the individual isconstantly regarded by Aristotle as the "object of sense, " it is claimedthat his doctrine is that all knowledge is derived from _sensation_, andthat science and art result to man (_solely_) by means of _experience. _He is thus placed at the head of the empirical school of philosophy, asPlato is placed at the head of the ideal school. 

[Footnote 699: "Post. Analytic, " bk. I. Ch. Xviii. ]

This classification, however, is based upon a very superficialacquaintance with the philosophy of Aristotle as a whole. The practice, so commonly resorted to, of determining the character of theAristotelian philosophy by the light of one or two passages quoted fromhis "Metaphysics, " is unjust both to Aristotle and to the history ofphilosophic thought. We can not expect to attain a correct understandingof the views of Aristotle concerning the sources and grounds of allknowledge without some attention to his psychology. A careful study ofhis writings will show that the terms "sensation" (αὶσθησις) and"experience" (ἐμπειρία) are employed in a much more comprehensive sensethan is usual in modern philosophic writings. 

"Sensation, " in its lowest form, is defined by Aristotle as "anexcitation of the soul through the body, "[700] and, in its higher form, as the excitation of the soul by any object of knowledge. In this latterform it is used by him as synonymous with "intuition, " and embraces allimmediate intuitive perceptions, whether of sense, consciousness, orreason. "The universe is derived from particulars, therefore we ought tohave a sensible perception (αὶσθησις) of these; and this is intellect(νοῦς). "[701] Intelligence proper, the faculty of first principles, is, in certain respects, a sense, because it is the source of a class oftruths which, like the perceptions of the senses, are immediatelyrevealed as facts to be received upon their own evidence. It thusanswers to the "sensus communis" of Cicero, and the "Common Sense" ofthe Scottish school. Under this aspect, "Sense is equal to or has theforce of Science. "[702] The term "Experience" is also used to denote, not merely the perception and remembrance of the impressions whichexternal objects make upon the mind, but as co-extensive with the wholecontents of consciousness--all that the mind _does_ of its own nativeenergy, as well as all that it _suffers_ from without. It is evidentlyused in the Posterior Analytic (bk. Ii. Ch. Xix. ) to describe the wholeprocess by which the knowledge of universals is obtained. "Fromexperience, or from every universal remaining in the soul, theprinciples of art and science arise. " The office of experience is "tofurnish the principles of every science"[703]--that is, to evoke theminto energy in the mind. 'Experience thus seems to be a thing almostsimilar to science and art. [704] In the most general sense, "sensation"would thus appear to be the immediate perception or intuition of factsand principles, and "experience" the operation of the mind upon thesefacts and principles, elaborating them into scientific form according toits own inherent laws. The "experience" of Aristotle is analogous to the"reflection" of Locke. 

[Footnote 700: "De Somn. , " bk. I. ]

[Footnote 701: "Ethics, " bk. Vi. Ch. Xi. ; see also ch. Vi. ]

[Footnote 702: "De Cen. Anim. "]

[Footnote 703: "Prior Analytic, " bk. I. Ch. Xix. ]

[Footnote 704: "Metaphysics, " bk. I. Ch. I. ]

So much being premised, we proceed to remark that there is a distinctionperpetually recurring in the writings of Aristotle between the elementsor first principles of knowledge which are "clearest in their ownnature" and those which "are clearest to our perception. "[705] Thecauses or principles of knowledge "are _prior_ and _more known_ to us intwo ways, for what is prior in nature is not the same as that which isprior to us, nor that which is more known (simply in itself) the same asthat which is more known to us. Now I call things prior and more knownto us, those which are _nearer to sense_; and things prior and moreknown simply in themselves, those which are _remote from sense_; andthose things are most remote which are especially _universal_, and thosenearest which are _singular_; and these are mutually opposed. "[706] Herewe have a distribution of the first or prior elements of knowledge intotwo fundamentally opposite classes. 

(i. ) _The immediate or intuitive perceptions of sense, _

(ii. ) _The immediate or intuitive apperceptions of pure reason, _

[Footnote 705: "Ethics, " bk. I. Ch. Iv. ; "Metaphysics, " bk. Ii. Ch. I. ;"Rhetoric, " bk. I. Ch. Ii. ; "Prior Analytic, " bk. Ii. Ch. Xxiii. ]

[Footnote 706: "Post. Analytic, " bk. I. Ch. Ii. ]

The objects of sense-perception are external, individual, "nearest tosense, " and occasionally or contingently present to sense. The objectsof the intellect are inward, universal, and the essential property ofthe soul. They are "remote from sense, " "prior by nature;" they are"forms" essentially inherent in the soul previous to experience; and itis the office of experience to bring them forward into the light ofconsciousness, or, in the language of Aristotle, "to evoke them frompotentiality into actuality. " And further, from the "prior" andimmediate intuitions of sense and intellect, all our secondary, ourscientific and practical knowledge is drawn by logical processes. 

The Aristotelian distribution of the intellectual faculties correspondsfully to this division of the objects of knowledge. The human intellectis divided by Aristotle into, 1. The Passive or Receptive Intellect (νοῦς παφητικός). --Its office isthe reception of sensible impressions or images (Φαντάσματα) and theirretention in the mind (μνήμη). These sensible forms or images areessentially immaterial. "Each sensoriurn (αἰσθητήρων) is receptive ofthe sensible quality _without the matter_, and hence when the sensiblesthemselves are absent, sensations and φαντασίκός remain. "[707]

[Footnote 707: "De Anima, " bk. Iii. Ch. Ii. ]

2. The Active or Creative Intellect (νοῦς ποιητικός). --This is the poweror faculty which, by its own inherent power, impresses "form" upon thematerial of thought supplied by sense-perception, exactly as the FirstCause combines it, in the universe, with the recipient matter. 

"It is necessary, " says Aristotle, "that these two modes should beopposed to each other, as matter is opposed to form, and to all thatgives form. The receptive reason, which is as matter, becomes all thingsby receiving their forms. The creative reason gives existence to allthings, as light calls color into being. The creative reason transcendsthe body, being capable of separation from it, and from all things; itis an everlasting existence, incapable of being mingled with matter, oraffected by it; prior, and subsequent to the individual mind. Thereceptive reason is necessary to individual thought, but it isperishable, and by its decay all memory, and therefore individuality, islost to the higher and immortal reason. "[708]

This "Active or Creative Intellect" is again further subdivided, byAristotle--

1. The _Scientific_ (έπιστημονικον) part--the "virtue, " faculty, or"habit of principles. " He also designates it as the "place ofprinciples, " and further defines it as the power "which apprehends thoseexistences whose principles can not be otherwise than they are"--thatis, self-evident, immutable, and necessary truths[709]--the _intuitivereason_. 

2. The _Reasoning_ (λογιστικόν) part--the power by which we drawconclusions from premises, and "contemplate contingent matter"[710]--the_discursive reason_. 

The correlatives _noetic_ and _dianoetic_, says Hamilton, would affordthe best philosophic designation of these two faculties; the knowledgeattained by the former is an "intuitive principle"--a truth at firsthand; that obtained by the latter is a "demonstrative proposition"--atruth at second hand. 

The preceding notices of the psychology of Aristotle will aid usmaterially in interpreting his remarks "_Upon the Method and Habitsnecessary to the ascertainment of Principles_. "[711]

[Footnote 708: "De Anima, " bk. Iii. Ch. V. ]

[Footnote 709: "Ethics, " bk. Vi. Ch. I. ]

[Footnote 710: Ibid. ]

[Footnote 711: "Post. Analytic, " bk. Ii, ch. Xix. , the concludingchapter of the Organon. ]

"That it is impossible to have scientific knowledge throughdemonstration without a knowledge of first immediate principles, hasbeen elucidated before. " This being established, he proceeds to explainhow that "knowledge of first, immediate principles" is developed in themind. 

1. The knowledge of first principles is attained by the _intuition ofsense_--the immediate perception of external objects, as the _exciting_or _occasional cause_ of their development in the mind. 

"Now there appears inherent in all animals an innate power called_sensible perception_ (αἴσθησις); but sense being inherent, in someanimals a permanency of the sensible object is engendered, but in othersit is not engendered. Those, therefore, wherein the sensible object doesnot remain have no knowledge without sensible perception, but others, when they perceive, retain one certain thing in the soul, . .. With some, _reason_ is produced from the permanency (of the sensible impression), [as in man], but in others it is not [as in the brute]. From sense, therefore, as we say, memory is produced, and from the repeatedremembrance of the same thing we get experience. .. . From experience, or_from every universal remaining in the soul_--the one besides the manywhich in all of them is _one_ and the _same_--the principles of art andscience arise. If experience is conversant with generation, theprinciples of art; if with being, the principles of science. .. . Let usagain explain: When one thing without difference abides, there is thenthe first universal (notion) [developed] in the soul; for the singularindeed is perceived by sense, _but sense is [also] of theuniversal_"--that is, the universal is immanent in the sensible objectas a property giving it "form. " "It is manifest, then, that primarythings become necessarily known by induction, for thus sensibleperception produces [develops or evokes] the _universal_. " 2. Theknowledge of first principles is attained by the _intuition of pureintellect_ (νοῦς)--that is, "_intellect itself is the principle ofscience_" or, in other words, intellect is the _efficient, essentialcause_ of the knowledge of first principles. 

"Of those habits which are about intellect by which we ascertain truth, _some[712] are always true_, but others[713] admit the false, as opinionand reasoning. But science and (pure) intellect are always true, and noother kind of knowledge, except intellect [intellectual intuition], ismore accurate than science. And since the principles of demonstrationare more known, and all science is connected with reason, there couldnot be a science of principles. But since nothing can be more true thanscience, except intellect, intellect will belong to principles. Fromthese [considerations] it is evident that, as demonstration is not theprinciple of demonstration, so neither is science the principle ofscience. If, then, we have no other true genus (of habit) besidesscience, _intellect will be the principle of science_; it will also bethe principle (or cause of the knowledge) of the principle. "

[Footnote 712: The "noetic. "]

[Footnote 713: The "dianætic. "]

The doctrine of Aristotle regarding "first principles" may perhaps besummed up as follows: All demonstrative science is based upon_universals_ "prior in nature"--that is, upon _à priori_, self-evident, necessary, and immutable principles. Our knowledge of these "first andimmediate principles" is dependent primarily on _intellect_ (νοῦς) orintuitive reason, and secondarily on sense, experience, and induction. Prior to experience, the intellect contains these principles in itselfpotentially, as "forms, " "laws, " "habitudes, " or "predicaments" ofthought; but they can not be "evoked into energy, " can not be revealedin consciousness, except on condition of experience, and they can onlybe scientifically developed by logical abstraction and definition. Theultimate ground of all truth and certainty is thus a mode of our ownmind, a subjective necessity of thinking, and truth is not in things, but in our own minds. [714] "Ultimate knowledge, as well as primaryknowledge, the most perfect knowledge which the philosopher can attain, as well as the point from which he starts, is still a proposition. Allknowledge seems to be included under two forms--knowledge _that_ it isso; knowledge _why_ it is so. Neither of these can, of course, includethe knowledge at which Plato is aiming--knowledge which is correlatedwith Being--a knowledge, not _about_ things or persons, but _of_them. "[715]

[Footnote 714: "Metaphysics, " bk. V. Ch. Iv. ]

[Footnote 715: Maurice's "Ancient Philosophy, " p. 190. ]

ARISTOTELIAN THEOLOGY

Theoretical philosophy, "the science which has truth for its end, " isdivided by Aristotle into Physics, Mathematics, and Theology, or theFirst Philosophy, now commonly known as "Metaphysics, " because it isbeyond or above physics, and is concerned with the primitive ground andcause of all things. [716]

In the former two we have now no immediate interest, but with Theology, as "the science of the Divine, "[717] the _First Moving Cause_, which isthe source of all other causes, and the original ground of all otherthings, we are specially concerned, inasmuch as our object is todetermine, if possible, whether Greek philosophy exerted any influenceupon Christian thought, and has bequeathed any valuable results to theTheology of modern times. 

"The Metaphysics" of Aristotle opens by an enumeration of "theprinciples or causes"[718] into which all existences can be resolved byphilosophical analysis. This enumeration is at present to be regarded asprovisional, and in part hypothetical--a verbal generalization of thedifferent principles which seem to be demanded to explain the existenceof a thing, or constitute it what it is. These he sets down as--

[Footnote 716: "Physics are concerned with things which have a principleof motion in themselves; mathematics speculate on permanent, but nottranscendental and self-existent things; and there is another scienceseparate from these two, which treats of that which is immutable andtranscendental, if indeed there exists such a substance, as we shallendeavor to show that there does. This transcendental and permanentsubstance, if it exist at all, must surely be the sphere of the_divine_--it must be the first and highest principle. Hence it followsthat there are three kinds of speculative science--Physics, Mathematics, and Theology. "--"Metaphysics, " bk. X. Ch. Vii. ]

[Footnote 717: "Metaphysics, " bk. I. Ch. Ii. ]

[Footnote 718: Αἴτιον--cause--is here used by Aristotle in the sense of"account of" or "reason why. "]

1. The Material Cause (τὴν ὕλην καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον)--the matter andsubject--that _out of_ which a given thing has been originated. "Fromthe analogy which this principle has to wood or stone, or any actualmatter out of which a work of nature or of art is produced, the name'material' is assigned to this class. " It does not always necessarilymean "matter" in the now common use of the term, but "antecedents--thatis, principles whose inherence and priority is implied in any existingthing, as, for example, the premises of a syllogism, which are thematerial cause of the conclusion. "[719] With Aristotle there is, therefore, "matter as an object of sense, " and "matter as an object ofthought. "

2. The Formal Cause (τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τό τι εἶναι)--the being or abstractessence of a thing--that primary nature on which all its propertiesdepend. To this Aristotle gave the name of εἶδος--the form or exemplar_according to_ which a thing is produced. 

3. The Moving or Efficient Cause (ὃθεν ἦ ἆρχη τῆς κινήσεως)--the originand principle of motion--that _by which_ a thing is produced. 

4. The Final Cause (τὸ οὗ ἕνεκεν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν)--the good end answeredby the existence of any thing--that for the sake of which_ any thing isproduced--the ἕνεκα τοῦ, or reason for it. [720] Thus, for instance, in ahouse, the wood out of which it is produced is the _matter (ὕλη), theidea or conception according to which it is produced is _the form_(εἶδος῏῏μορφή), the builder who erects the house is the _efficient_cause, and the reason for its production, or the end of its existence isthe _final_ cause. 

[Footnote 719: Encyclopædia Britannica, article "Aristotle;" "Post. Analytic, " bk. Ii. Ch. Xi. ]

[Footnote 720: "Metaphysics, " bk. I. Ch. Iii. ]

Causes are, therefore, the elements into which the mind resolves itsfirst rough conception of an object. That object is what it is, byreason of the matter out of which it sprang, the moving cause which gaveit birth, the idea or form which it realizes, and the end or objectwhich it attains. The knowledge of a thing implies knowing it from thesefour points of view--that is, knowing its four causes or principles. 

These four determinations of being are, on a further and closeranalysis, resolved into the fundamental antithesis of MATTER and FORM. 

"All things that are produced, " says Aristotle, [721] "are produced fromsomething (that is, from _matter_), by something (that is, _form_), andbecome something (the totality--τὸ σύνολον);" as, for example, a statue, a plant, a man. To every subject there belongs, therefore, first, _matter_ (ὕλη); secondly, _form_ (μορφή). The synthesis of these twoproduces and constitutes _substance_, or οὐσία. Matter and form are thusthe two grand causes or principles whence proceed all things. Theformative cause is, at the same time, the moving cause and the finalcause; for it is evidently the element of determination which impressesmovement upon matter whilst determining it; and it is also the end ofbeing, since being only really exists when it has passed from anindeterminate to a determinate state. 

[Footnote 721: "Metaphysics, " bk. Vi. Ch. Vii. ]

In proof that the εἶδος or form is an _efficient_ principle operating inevery object, which makes it, to our conception, what it is, Aristotlebrings forward the subject of generation or production. [722] There arethree modes of production--natural, artificial, and automatic. Innatural production we discern at once a matter; indeed Nature, in thelargest sense, may be defined as "that out of which things areproduced. " Now the result formed out of this matter or nature is a givensubstance--a vegetable, a beast, or a man. But what is the _producing_cause in each case? Clearly something akin to the result. A mangenerates a man, a plant produces another plant like to itself. Thereis, therefore, implied in the resulting thing a _productive force_distinct from matter, upon which it works. And this is the εἶδος, orform. Let us now consider artificial production. Here again the form isthe producing power. And this is in the soul. The art of the physicianis the εἶδος, which produces actual health; the plan of the architect isthe conception, which produces an actual house. Here, however, adistinction arises. In these artificial productions there is supposed aνόησις and a ποίησις. The νόησις is the previous conception which thearchitect forms in his own mind; the ποίησις is the actual creation ofthe house out of the given matter. In this case the conception is themoving cause of the production. The form of the statue in the mind ofthe artist is the motive or cause of the movement by which the statue isproduced; and health must be in the thought of the physician before itcan become the moving cause of the healing art. Moreover, that which istrue of artificial production or change is also true of spontaneousproduction. For example, a cure may take place by the application ofwarmth, and this result is accomplished by means of friction. Thiswarmth in the body is either itself a portion of health, or something isconsequent upon it which is like itself, which is a portion of health. Evidently this implies the previous presence either of nature or of anartificer. It is also clearly evident that this kind of generatinginfluence (the automatic) should combine with another. There must be aproductive power, and there must be something out of which it isproduced. In this case, then, there will be a ὕλη and an εἶδος. [723]

[Footnote 722: Ibid. ]

[Footnote 723: Maurice's "Ancient Philosophy, " pp. 205, 206. ]

From the above it appears that the _efficient_ cause is regarded byAristotle as identical with the _formal_ cause. So also the _final_cause--the end for the sake of which any thing exists--can hardly beseparated from the perfection of that thing, that is, from itsconception or form. The desire for the end gives the first impulse ofmotion; thus the final cause of any thing becomes identical with thegood of that thing. "The moving cause of the house is the builder, butthe moving cause of the builder is the end to be attained--that is, thehouse. " From such examples as these it would seem that thedeterminations of form and end are considered by Aristotle as one, in sofar as both are merged in the conception of _actuality_; for he regardedthe end of every thing to be its completed being--the perfectrealization of its idea or form. The only fundamental determinations, therefore, which can not be wholly resolved into each other are _matterand form_. [724]

[Footnote 724: Schwegler's "History of Philosophy, " pp. 120, 123. ]

The opposition of matter and form, with Aristotle, corresponds to theopposition between the element of _generality_ and the element of_particularity_. Matter is indeterminate; form is determinate. Matter, abstracted from form, in thought, is entirely without predicate anddistinction; form is that which enters into the definition of everysubject, and without which it could not be defined. Matter is capable ofthe widest diversity of forms, but is itself without form. Pure form is, in fact, that which is without matter, or, in other words, it is thepure conception of being. Matter is the necessary condition of theexistence of a thing; form is the essence of each thing, that in virtueof which substance is possible, and without which it is inconceivable. On the one side is passivity, possibility of existence, capacity ofaction; on the other side is activity, actuality, thought. The unity ofthese two in the realm of determined being constitutes every individualsubstance. The relation of matter and form, logically apprehended, isthus the relation of POTENTIALITY and ACTUALITY. 

This is a further and indeed a most important step in the Aristoteliantheology. Matter, as we have seen, after all, amounts to merely capacityfor action, and if we can not discover some productive power to developpotentiality into actuality, we look in vain for some explanation of thephenomena around us. The discovery, however, of energy (ἐνέργεια), as aprinciple of this description, is precisely what we wanted, and amomentary glance at the actual phenomena will show its perfect identitywith the εἶδος, or form. [725] "For instance, what is a calm? It isevenness in the surface of the sea. Here the sea is the subject, thatis, the matter in _capacity_, but the evenness is the _energy_ oractuality;. .. Energy is thus as form. "[726] The form (or idea) is thusan energy or actuality (ἐνέργεια); the matter is a capacity orpotentiality (δύναμις), requiring the co-operation of the energy toproduce a result. 

These terms, which are first employed by Aristotle in theirphilosophical signification, are characteristic of his whole system. Itis, therefore, important we should grasp their precise philosophicalimport; and this can only be done by considering them in the strictestrelation to each other. It is in this relation they are defined byAristotle. "Now ἐνέργεια is the existence of a thing not in the sense ofits potentially existing. The term _potentially_ we use, for instance, of the statue in the block, and of the half in the whole (since it maybe subtracted), and of a person knowing a thing, even when he is notthinking of it, but might be so; whereas ἐνέργεια is the opposite. Byapplying the various instances our meaning will be plain, and one mustnot seek a definition in each case, but rather grasp the conception ofthe analogy as a whole, --that it is as that which builds to that whichhas a capacity for building; as the waking to the sleeping; as thatwhich sees to that which has sight, but whose eyes are closed; as thedefinite form to the shapeless matter; as the complete to theunaccomplished. In this contrast, let the ἐνέργεια be set off as formingthe one side, and on the other let the potential stand. Things are saidto be in ἐνέργεια not always in like manner (except so far as there isan analogy, that as this thing is in this, and related to this, so isthat in that, or related to that); for sometimes it implies _motion_ asopposed to the _capacity of motion_, and sometimes _complete existence_opposed to _undeveloped matter_". [727] As the term δύναμις has thedouble meaning of "_possibility of existence_" as well as "_capacity ofaction_" so there is the double contrast of "_action_" as opposed to thecapacity of action; and "_actual existence_" opposed to possibleexistence or potentiality. To express accurately this latter antithesis, Aristotle introduced the term ἐντελέχεια[728]--entelechy, of which themost natural account is that it is a compound of ἐν τέλει ἔχειν--"beingin a state of perfection. "[729] This term, however, rarely occurs in the"Metaphysics, " whilst ἐνέργεια is everywhere employed, not only toexpress activity as opposed to passivity, but complete existence asopposed to undeveloped matter. 

[Footnote 725: "That which Aristotle calls 'form' is not to beconfounded with what we may perhaps call shape [or figure]; a handsevered from the arm, for instance, has still the outward shape of ahand, but, according to Aristotelian apprehension, it is only a hand nowas to matter, and not as to form; an actual hand, a hand as to form, isonly that which can do the proper work of a hand. "--Schwegler's "Historyof Philosophy, " p. 122. ]

[Footnote 726: "Metaphysics, " bk. Vii. Ch. Ii. ]

[Footnote 727: "Metaphysics, " bk. Viii. Ch. Vi. ]

[Footnote 728: "Entelechy indicates the perfected act, the completelyactual. "--Schw. ]

[Footnote 729: Grant's Aristotle's "Ethics, " vol. I. P. 184. ]

"In Physics δύναμις answers to the necessary conditions for theexistence of any thing before that thing exists. It thus corresponds toὕλη, both to the πρώτη ὕλη--the first matter, or matter devoid of allqualities, which is capable of becoming any definite substance, as, forexample, marble; and also to the ἐσχάτη ὕλη--or matter capable ofreceiving form, as marble the form of the statue. " Marble then existspotentially in the simple elements before it is marble. The statueexists potentially in the marble before it is carved. All objects ofthought exist, either purely in potentiality, or purely in actuality, orboth in potentiality and in actuality. This division makes an entirechain of all existence. At the one end is matter, the πρώτη ὕλη whichhas a merely potential existence, which is necessary as a condition, butwhich having no form and no qualities, is totally incapable of beingrealized by the mind. At the other end of the chain is pure form, whichis not at all matter, the absolute and the unconditioned, the eternalsubstance and energy without matter (οὐσία ἀίδιος καὶ ἐνέργεια ἄνευδυνάμεως), who can not be thought as non-existing--the self-existentGod. Between these two extremes is the whole row of creatures, which outof potentiality evermore spring into actual being. [730]

[Footnote 730: Id. , ib. , vol. I. P. 185. ]

The relation of actuality to potentiality is the subject of an extendedand elaborate discussion in book viii. , the general results of which maybe summed up in the following propositions:

1. _The relation of Actuality to Potentiality is as the Perfect to theImperfect_. --The progress from potentiality to actuality is motion orproduction (κίνησις or γένεσις). But this motion is transitional, and initself imperfect--it tends towards an end, but does not include the endin itself. But actuality, if it implies motion, has an end in itself andfor itself; it is a motion desirable for its own sake. [731] The relationof the potential to the actual Aristotle exhibits by the relation of theunfinished to the finished work, of the unemployed builder to the one atwork upon his building, of the seed-corn to the tree, of the man who hasthe capacity to think, to the man actually engaged in thought. [732]Potentially the seed-corn is the tree, but the grown-up tree is theactuality; the potential philosopher is he who is not at this moment ina philosophic condition; indeed, every thing is potential whichpossesses a principle of development, or of change. Actuality orentelechy, on the other hand, indicates the _perfect act_, the endgained, the completed actual; that activity in which the act and thecompleteness of the act fall together--as, for example, to see, tothink, where the acting and the completed act are one and the same. 

2. _The Relation of Actuality to Potentiality is a causal Relation_. --Athing which is endued with a simple capacity of being may neverthelessnot actually exist, and a thing may have a capacity of being and reallyexist. Since this is the case, there must ensue between non-being andreal being some such principle as _energy_, in order to account for thetransition or change. [733] Energy has here some analogy to motion, though it must not be confounded with motion. Now you can not predicateeither motion or energy of things which are not. The moment energy isadded to them they are. This transition from potentiality to actualitymust be through the medium of such principles as propension or _freewill_, because propension or free will possess in themselves the powerof originating motion in other things. [734]

[Footnote 731: "Metaphysics, " bk. Viii. Ch. Vi. ]

[Footnote 732: Ibid. , bk. Viii. Ch. Vi. ]

[Footnote 733: Ibid. , bk. Viii. Ch. Iii. ]

[Footnote 734: Ibid. , bk. Viii. Ch. V. ]

3. _The Relation of Actuality and Potentiality is a Relation ofPriority_. --Actuality, says Aristotle, is prior to potentiality in theorder of reason, in the order of substance, and also (though notinvariably) in the order of time. The first of all capacities is acapacity of energizing or assuming a state of activity; for example, aman who has the capacity of building is one who is skilled in building, and thus able to use his energy in the art of building. [735] The primaryenergizing power must precede that which receives the impression of it, Form being older than Matter. But if you take the case of any particularperson or thing, we say that its capacity of being that particularperson or thing precedes its being so actually. Yet, though this is thecase in each particular thing, there is always a foregone energypresumed in some other thing (as a prior seed, plant, man) to which itowes its existence. One pregnant thought presents itself in the courseof the discussion which has a direct bearing upon our subject. [Greek:Δὑναμιϛ] has been previously defined as "a principle of motion or changein another thing in so far forth as it is another thing"[736]--that is, it is fitted by nature to have motion imparted to it, and to communicatemotion to something else. But this motion wants a resting-place. Therecan be no infinite regression of causes. There is some primary [Greek:δύναμιϛ] presupposed in all others, which is the beginning of change. This is [Greek: Φύσις], or nature. But the first and original cause ofall motion and change still precedes and surpasses nature. The finalcause of all potentiality is energy or _actuality_. The one proposed isprior to the means through which the end is accomplished. A process ofactualization, a tendency towards completeness or perfection ([Greek:τέλοϛ]) presupposes an absolute actuality which is at once its beginningand end. "One energy is invariably antecedent to another in time, up tothat which is primarily and eternally the Moving Cause. "[737]

[Footnote 735: "Metaphysics, " bk. Viii. Ch. Viii. ]

[Footnote 736: Ibid. , bk. Iv. Ch. Xii. ]

[Footnote 737: Ibid. , bk. Viii. Ch. Viii. ]

And now having laid down these fundamental principles of metaphysicalscience, as preparatory to Theology, Aristotle proceeds to establish theconception of the Absolute or Divine Spirit _as the eternal, immutableSubstance, the immaterial Energy, the unchangeable Form of Forms, thefirst moving Cause_. 

I. _The Ontological Form of Proof_. --It is necessary to conceive aneternal and immutable substance--an actuality which is absolute andprior, both logically and chronologically, to all potentiality; for thatwhich is potential is simply contingent, it may just as easily not be asbe; that which exists only in capacity is temporal and corruptible, andmay cease to be. Matter we know subsists merely in capacity andpassivity, and without the operation of Energy, (ἐνέργεια), or theformative cause, would be to us as non-entity. The phenomena of theworld exhibits to us the presence of Energy, and energy presupposes theexistence of an eternal substance. Furthermore, matter and potentialityare convertible terms, therefore the primal Energy or Actuality must be_immaterial_. [738]

2. _The Cosmological Form of Proof_. --It is impossible that there shouldbe _motion_, genesis, or a chain of causes, except on the assumption ofa first Moving Cause, since that which exists only in capacity can not, of itself energize, and consequently without a principle of motion whichis essentially active, we have only a principle of immobility. Theprinciple "ex nihilo nihil" forbids us to assume that motion can ariseout of immobility, being out of non-being. "How can matter be put inmotion if nothing that subsists in energy exist, and is its cause?" Allbecoming, therefore, necessarily supposes that which has not become, that which is eternally self-active as the principle and cause of allmotion. There is no refuge from the notion that all things are "born ofnight and nothingness" except in this belief. [739]

[Footnote 738: "Metaphysics, " bk. Xi. Ch. Vi. ]

[Footnote 739: Ibid. , bk. Xi. Ch. Vii. , viii. ]

The existence of an eternal principle subsisting in energy is alsodemanded to explain the _order_ of the world. "For how, let me ask, willthere prevail _order_ on the supposition that there is no subsistence ofthat which is eternal, and which involves a separable existence, and ispermanent. "[740] "All things in nature are constituted in the bestpossible manner. "[741] All things strive after "the good. " "Theappearance of ends and means in nature is a proof of design. "[742] Nowan end or final cause presupposes intelligence, --implies a _mind_ to seeand desire it. That which is "fair, " "beautiful, " "good, " an "object ofdesire, " can only be perceived by Mind. The "final cause" must thereforesubsist in that which is prior and immovable and eternal; and _Mind_ is"that substance which subsists absolutely, and according toenergy. "[743] "The First Mover of all things, moves all things withoutbeing moved, being an eternal substance and energy; and he moves allthings as the object of reason and of desire, or love. "[744]

[Footnote 740: Ibid. , bk. X. Ch. Ii. ]

[Footnote 741: "Ethics, " bk. I. Ch. Ix. ]

[Footnote 742: "Nat. Ausc. , " bk. Ii. Ch. Viii. ]

[Footnote 743: "Metaphysics, " bk. Xi. Ch. Vii. ]

[Footnote 744: Ibid. ]

3. _The Moral Form of Proof_. --So far as the relation of potentialityand actuality is identical with the relation of matter and form, theargument for the existence of God may be thus presented: The conceptionof an absolute matter without form, involves the supposition of anabsolute form without matter. And since the conception of form resolvesitself into _motion_, _conception_, _purpose_ or _end_, so the EternalOne is the absolute principle of motion (the πρῶτον κινοῦν), theabsolute conception or pure intelligence (the pure τί ἦν εἶναι), and theabsolute ground, reason, or end of all being. All the other predicatesof the First Cause follow from the above principles with logicalnecessity. 

(i. ) _He is, of course, pure intellect_, because he is absolutelyimmaterial and free from nature. He is active intelligence, because hisessence is pure actuality. He is self-contemplating and self-consciousintelligence, because the divine thought can not attain its actuality inany thing extrinsic; it would depend on something else than self--somepotential existence for its actualization. Hence the famous definitionof the absolute as "the thought of thought" (νόησις νοήσεως). [745] "Andtherefore the first and actual perception by mind of Mind itself, dothsubsist in this way throughout all eternity. "[746]

[Footnote 745: Schwegler's "History of Philosophy, " p. 125. ]

[Footnote 746: "Metaphysics, " bk. Xi. Ch. Ix. ]

(ii. ) _He is also essential life_. "The principle of life is inherent inthe Deity, for the energy or active exercise of mind constitutes life, and God constitutes this energy; and essential energy belongs to God ashis best and everlasting life. Now our statement is this--that the Deityis a living being that is everlasting and most excellent in nature, sothat with the Deity life and duration are uninterrupted and eternal; forthis constitutes the essence of God. "[747]

(iii. ) _Unity belongs to him_, since multiplicity implies matter; andthe highest idea or form of the world must be absolutelyimmaterial. [748] The Divine nature is "devoid of parts and indivisible, for magnitude can not in any way involve this Divine nature; for Godimparts motion through infinite duration, and nothing finite--asmagnitude is--can be possessed of an infinite capacity. "[749]

(iv. ) _He is immovable and ever abideth the same_; since otherwise hecould not be the absolute mover, and the cause of all becoming, if hewere subject to change. [750] God is impassive and unalterable ([Greek:ἀπαθὴϛ καὶ ὰναλλοίωτον]); for all such notions as are involved inpassion or alteration are outside the sphere of the Divineexistence. [751]

[Footnote 747: "Metaphysics, " bk. Xi. Ch. Vii. ]

[Footnote 748: Ibid. ]

[Footnote 749: Ibid. ]

[Footnote 750: Ibid. , bk. Xi. Ch. Viii. ]

[Footnote 751: Ibid. , bk. Xi. Ch. Vii. ]

(v. ) _He is the ever-blessed God_. --"The life of God is of a kind withthose highest moods which, with us, last a brief space, it beingimpossible they should be permanent; whereas, with Him they arepermanent, since His ever-present consciousness is pleasure itself. Andit is because they are vivid states of consciousness, that waking, andperception, and thought, are the sweetest of all things. Now essentialperception is the perception of that which is most excellent, . .. And themind perceives itself by participating of its own object of perception;but it is a sort of coalescence of both that, in the Divine Mind, creates a regular identity between the two, so that with God both (thethinker and the thought, the subject and object) are the same. Inpossession of this prerogative, He subsists in the exercise of energy;and the contemplation of his own perfections is what, to God, must bemost agreeable and excellent. This condition of existence, after soexcellent a manner, is what is "so astonishing to us when we examineGod's nature, and the more we do so the more wonderful that natureappears to us. The mood of the Divine existence is essential energy, and, as such, it is a life that is most excellent, blessed, andeverlasting. [752]

[Footnote 752: "Metaphysics, " bk. Xi. Ch. Vii. ]

The theology of Aristotle may be summed up in the following sentencesselected from book xi. Of his "Metaphysics:"

"This motionless cause of motion is a necessary being; and, by virtue ofsuch necessity, is the all-perfect being. This all-pervading principlepenetrates heaven and all nature. It eternally possesses perfecthappiness; and its happiness is in action. This primal mover isimmaterial; for its essence is in energy. It is pure thought--thoughtthinking itself--the thought of thought. The activity of pureintelligence--such is the perfect, eternal life of God. This primalcause of change, this absolute perfection, moves the world by theuniversal desire for the absolute good, by the attraction exercised uponit by the Eternal Mind--the serene energy of Divine Intelligence. "

It can not be denied that, so far as it goes, this conception of theDeity is admirable, worthy, and just. Viewed from a Christianstand-point, we at once concede that it is essentially defective. Thereis no clear and distinct recognition of God as Creator and Governor ofthe universe; he is chiefly regarded as the Life of the universe--theIntellect, the Energy--that which gives excellence, and perfection, andgladness to the whole system of things. The Theology of Aristotle is, infact, metaphysical rather than practical. He does not contemplate theDeity as a moral Governor. Whilst Plato speaks of "being made like Godthrough becoming just and holy, " Aristotle asserts that "all moralvirtues are totally unworthy of being ascribed to God. "[753] He is notthe God of providence. He dwells alone, supremely indifferent to humancares, and interests, and sorrows. He takes no cognizance of individualmen, and holds no intercourse with man. The God of Aristotle is not abeing that meets and satisfies the wants of the human heart, howeverwell it may meet the demands of the reason. 

[Footnote 753: "Ethics, " bk. X. Ch. Viii. ]

Morality has no basis in the Divine nature, no eternal type in theperfections and government of God, and no supports and aids from above. The theology of Aristotle foreshadows the character of the

ARISTOTELIAN ETHICS. 

We do not find in Aristotle any distinct recognition of an eternal andimmutable morality, an absolute right, which has its foundation in thenature of God. Plato had taught that there was "an absolute Good, aboveand beyond all existence in dignity and power;" which is, in fact, "thecause of all existence and all knowledge, " and which is God; that allother things are good in proportion as they "partake of this absoluteGood;" and that all men are so far good as they "resemble God. " But withthis position Aristotle joins issue. After stating the doctrine of Platoin the following words--"Some have thought that, besides all thesemanifold goods upon earth, there is some _absolute good_, which is thecause to all these of their being good"--he proceeds to criticise thatidea, and concludes his argument by saying--"we must dismiss the idea atpresent, for if there is any one good, universal and generic, ortranscendental and absolute, it obviously can never be realized norpossessed by man; whereas something of this latter kind is what we areinquiring after. " He follows up these remarks by saying that "Perhapsthe knowledge of the idea may be regarded by some as useful, as apattern (παράδειγμα) by which to judge of relative good. " Against thishe argues that "There is no trace of the arts making use of any suchconception; the cobbler, the carpenter, the physician, and the general, all pursue their vocations without respect to the _absolute good_, noris it easy to see how they would be benefited by apprehending it. "[754]The good after which Aristotle would inquire is, therefore, a _relativegood_, since the knowledge of the absolute good can not possibly berealized. 

[Footnote 754: "Ethics, " bk. I. Ch. Vi. ]

Instead, therefore, of seeking to attain to "a transcendental andabsolute good "--a fundamental idea of right, which may be useful as aparadigm by which we may judge of relative good, he addresses himselfsolely to the question, "what is good for man"--what is the goodattainable in action? And having identified the Chief Good with thefinal and perfect end of all action, the great question of the _Ethics_is, "_What is the end of human action?_" (τί ἐστι τὸ τῶν πρακτῶντέλος). [755]

[Footnote 755: "Ethics, " bk. I. Ch. Xiii. ]

Now an end or final cause implies an intelligence--implies a mind toperceive and desire it. This is distinctly recognized by Aristotle. Thequestion, therefore, naturally arises--is that end fixed for man by ahigher intelligence, and does it exist for man both as an idea and as anideal? Can man, first, intellectually apprehend the idea, and thenconsciously strive after its realization? Is it the duty of man to aimat fulfilling the purposes of his Creator? To this it may be answeredthat Aristotle is not at all explicit as to God's moral government ofthe world. "Moral government, " in the now common acceptation of theterm, has no place in the system of Aristotle, and the idea of "duty" isscarcely recognized. He considers "the good" chiefly in relation to theconstitution and natural condition of man. "_It is_" says he, "_the endtowards which nature tends_. " As physical things strive unconsciouslyafter the end of their existence, so man strives after the goodattainable in life. Socrates had identified virtue and knowledge, he hadtaught that "virtue is a Science. " Aristotle contended that virtue is anart, like music and architecture, which must be attained by exercise. Itis not purely intellectual, it is the bloom of the physical, which hasbecome ethical. As the flower of the field, obeying the laws of itsorganization, springs up, blooms, and attains its own peculiarperfection, so there is an instinctive desire (ὄρεξις) in the soul whichat first unconsciously yearns after the good, and subsequently the goodis sought with full moral intent and insight. Aristotle assumes that thedesires or instincts of man are so framed as to imply the existence ofthis end (τέλος). [756] And he asserts that man can only realize it inthe sphere of his own proper functions, and in accordance with the lawsof his own proper nature and its harmonious development. [757] It is not, then, through instruction, or through the perfection of knowledge, thatman is to attain the good, but through exercise and habit (ἔθος). Bypractice of moral acts we become virtuous, just as by practice ofbuilding and of music, we become architects and musicians; for thehabit, which is the ground of moral character, is only a fruit ofoft-repeated moral acts. Hence it is by these three things--nature, habit, reason--that men become good. 

[Footnote 756: Ibid, bk. I. Ch. Ii. ]

[Footnote 757: "Ethics, " bk. I. Ch. Vii. ]

Aristotle's question, therefore, is, _What is the chief good for man asman_? not what is his chief good as a spiritual and an immortal being?or what is his chief good as a being related to and dependent upon God?And the conclusion at which he arrives is, that it is _the absolutesatisfaction of our whole nature_--that which men are agreed in calling_happiness_. This happiness, however, is not mere sensual pleasure. Thebrute shares this in common with man, therefore it can not constitutethe happiness of man. Human happiness must express the completeness ofrational existence. And inasmuch as intelligence is essential activity, as the soul is the _entelechy_ of the body, therefore the happiness ofman can not consist in a mere passive condition. It must, therefore, consist in _perfect activity_ in well-doing, and especially incontemplative thought, [758] or as Aristotle defines it--"_It is aperfect practical activity in a perfect life_. "[759] His conception ofthe chief good has thus two sides, one internal, that which exists inand for the consciousness--a "complete and perfect life, " the otherexternal and practical. The latter, however, is a means to the former. That complete and perfect life is the complete satisfaction andperfection of our rational nature. It is a state of peace which is thecrown of exertion. It is the realization of the divine in man, andconstitutes the absolute and all-sufficient happiness. [760] A goodaction is thus an End-in-itself (τέλειον τέλος) inasmuch as it securesthe _perfection_ of our nature; it is that for the sake of which ourmoral faculties before existed, hence bringing an inward pleasure andsatisfaction with it; something in which the mind can rest and fullyacquiesce; something which can be pronounced beautiful, fitting, honorable, and perfect. 

[Footnote 758: "If it be true to say that happiness consists in doingwell, a life of action must be best both for the state and theindividual. But we need not, as some do, suppose that a life of actionimplies relation to others, or that those only are active thoughts whichare concerned with the results of action; but far rather we mustconsider those speculations and thoughts to be so which have their _endin themselves_, and which are for their own sake. "--"Politics, " bk. Vii. Ch. Iii. ]

[Footnote 759: "Ethics, " bk. I. Ch. X. ]

[Footnote 760: "Ethics, " bk. X. Ch. Viii. ]

From what has been already stated, it will be seen that the Aristotelianconception of _Virtue_ is not conformity to an absolute and immutablestandard of right. It is defined by him as _the observation of the rightmean (μεσότης) in action_--that is, the right mean relatively toourselves. "Virtue is a habit deliberately choosing, existing as a mean(μέσον) which refers to us, and is defined by reason, and as a prudentman would define it; and it is a mean between two evils, the oneconsisting in excess, the other in defect; and further, it is a mean, inthat one of these falls short of, and the other exceeds, what is rightboth in passions and actions; and that virtue both finds and chooses themean. "[761] The perfection of an action thus consists in its containingthe right degree--the true mean between too much, and too little. Thelaw of the μεσότης is illustrated by the following examples: Man has afixed relation to pleasure and pain. In relation to pain, the true meanis found in neither fearing it nor courting it, and this is _fortitude_. In relation to pleasure, the true mean stands between greediness andindifference; this is _temperance_. The true mean between prodigalityand narrowness is _liberality_; between simplicity and cunning is_prudence_; between suffering wrong and doing wrong is _justice_. Extending this law to certain qualifications of temper, speech, andmanners, you have the portrait of a graceful Grecian gentleman. Virtueis thus _proportion, grace, harmony, beauty in action_. 

[Footnote 761: Ibid, bk. Ii. Ch. Vi. ]

It will at once be seen that this classification has no stablefoundation. It furnishes no ultimate standard of right. The _mean_ is awavering line. It differs under different circumstances and relations, and in different times and places. That mean which is sufficient for oneindividual is insufficient for another. The virtue of a man, of a slave, and of a child, is respectively different. There are as many virtues asthere are circumstances in life; and as men are ever entering into newrelations, in which it is difficult to determine the correct method ofaction, the separate virtues can not be limited to any definite number. 

Imperfect as the ethical system of Aristotle may appear to us who livein Christian times, it must be admitted that his writings abound withjust and pure sentiments. His science of Ethics is a _discipline ofhuman character in order to human happiness_. And whilst it must beadmitted that it is directed solely to the improvement of man in thepresent life, he aims to build that improvement on pure and nobleprinciples, and seeks to elevate man to the highest perfection of whichhe could conceive. "And no greater praise can be given to a work ofheathen morality than to say, as may be said of the ethical writings ofAristotle, that they contain nothing which a Christian may dispensewith, no precept of life which is not an element of Christian character;and that they only fail in elevating the heart and the mind to objectswhich it needed Divine Wisdom to reveal. "[762]

[Footnote 762: Encyclopædia Britannica, article "Aristotle. "]

CHAPTER XIII. 

THE PHILOSOPHERS OF ATHENS _(continued)_

POST-SOCRATIC SCHOOL. 

EPICURUS AND ZENO. 

Philosophy, after the time of Aristotle, takes a new direction. In thepre-Socratic schools, we have seen it was mainly a philosophy of nature;in the Socratic school it was characterized as a philosophy of mind; andnow in the post-Socratic schools it becomes a philosophy of life--amoral philosophy. Instead of aiming at the knowledge of real Being--ofthe permanent, unchangeable, eternal principles which underlie allphenomena, it was now content to aim, chiefly, at individual happiness. The primary question now discussed, as of the most vital importance, is, What is the ultimate standard by which, amid all the diversities ofhuman conduct and opinion, we may determine what is right and good inindividual and social life?

This remarkable change in the course of philosophic inquiry was mainlydue--

1st. _To the altered circumstances of the times_. An age of civildisturbance and political intrigue succeeded the Alexandrian period. Thedifferent states of Greece lost their independence, and became graduallysubject to a foreign yoke. Handed over from one domination to another, in the struggles of Alexander's lieutenants, they endeavored toreconquer their independence by forming themselves into confederations, but were powerless to unite in the defense of a common cause. The Achæanand Etolian leagues were weakened by internal discords; and it was invain that Sparta tried to recover her ancient liberties. 

Divided amongst themselves, the smaller states invoked the aid ofdangerous allies--at one time appealing to Macedon, at another to Egypt. In this way they prepared for the total ruin of Greek liberty, which wasdestined to be extinguished by Rome. [763]

[Footnote 763: Pressensé, "Religions before Christ, " pp. 136-140. ]

During this period of hopeless turmoil and social disorder, all loftypursuits and all great principles were lost sight of and abandoned. Thephilosophic movement followed the downward course of society, and menbecame chiefly concerned for their personal interest and safety. Thewars of the Succession almost obliterated the idea of society, andphilosophy was mainly directed to the securing of personal happiness; itbecame, in fact, "the art of making one's self happy. " The sad reversesto which the Grecian mind had been subjected produced a feeling ofexhaustion and indifference, which soon reflected itself in thephilosophy of the age. 

2d. In connection with the altered circumstances of the age, we mustalso take account of _the apparent failure of the Socratic method tosolve the problem of Being_. 

The teaching of Aristotle had fostered the suspicion that the dialecticmethod was a failure, and thus prepared the way for a return tosensualism. He had taught that individuals alone have a real existence, and that the "essence" of things is not to be sought in the elements ofunity and generality, or in the _idea_, as Plato taught, but in theelements of diversity and speciality. And furthermore, in opposition toPlato, he had taught his disciples to attach themselves to sensation, asthe source of all knowledge. As the direct consequence of this teaching, we find his immediate successors, Dicearchus and Straton, deliberatelysetting aside "the god of philosophy, " affirming "that a _divinity_ wasunnecessary to the explanation of the existence and order of theuniverse. " Stimulated by the social degeneracy of the times, thecharacteristic skepticism of the Greek intellect bursts forth anew. Asthe skepticism of the Sophists marked the close of the first period ofphilosophy, so the skepticism of Pyrrhonism marked the close of thesecond. The new skepticism arrayed Aristotle against Plato as theearlier skeptics arrayed atomism against the doctrine of the Eleatics. They naturally said: "We have been seeking a long time; what have wegained? Have we obtained any thing certain and determinate? Plato sayswe have. But Aristotle and Plato do not agree. May not our opinion be asgood as theirs? What a diversity of opinions have been presented duringthe past three hundred years! One may be as good as another, or they maybe all alike untrue!" Timon and Pyrrhon declared that, of each thing, itmight be said to be, and not to be; and that, consequently, we shouldcease tormenting ourselves, and seek to obtain an _absolute calm_, whichthey dignified with the name of _ataraxie_. Beholding the overthrow anddisgrace of their country, surrounded by examples of pusillanimity andcorruption, and infected with the spirit of the times themselves, theywrote this maxim: "Nothing is infamous; nothing is in itself just; lawsand customs alone constitute what is justice and what is iniquity. "Having reached this extreme, nothing can be too absurd, and they cap theclimax by saying, "We assert nothing; no, not even that we assertnothing!"

And yet there must some function, undoubtedly, remain for the "wise man"(σοφός). 

Reason was given for some purpose. Philosophy must have some end. Andinasmuch as it is not to determine speculative questions, it must be todetermine practical questions. May it not teach men to _act_ rather thanto _think_? The philosopher, the schools, the disciples, survive thedarkening flood of skepticism. 

Three centuries before Christ, the Peripatetic and Platonic schools aresucceeded by two other schools, which inherit their importance, andwhich, in other forms, and by an under-current, perpetuate the disputesof the Peripatetics and Platonists, namely, the Epicureans and Stoics. With Aristotle and Plato, philosophy embraced in its circle nature, humanity, and God; but now, in the systems of Epicurus and Zeno, moralphilosophy is placed in the foreground, and assumes the chief, theovershadowing pre-eminence. The conduct of life--morality--is now thegrand subject of inquiry, and the great theme of discourse. 

In dealing with _morals_ two opposite methods of inquiry were possible:

1. _To judge of the quality of actions by their_ RESULTS. 

2. _To search for the quality of actions in the actions them selves_. 

Utility, which in its last analysis is _Pleasure_, is the test of right, in the first method; an assumed or discovered _Law of Nature_, in thesecond. If the world were perfect, and the balance of the humanfaculties undisturbed, it is evident that both systems would giveidentical results. As it is, there is a tendency to error on each side, which is fully developed in the rival schools of the Epicureans andStoics, who practically divided the suffrages of the mass of educatedmen until the coming of Christ. 

EPICUREANS. 

Epicurus was born B. C. 342, and died B. C. 270. He purchased a Gardenwithin the city, and commenced, at thirty-six years of age, to teachphilosophy. The Platonists had their academic Grove: the Aristotelianswalked in the Lyceum: the Stoics occupied the Porch: the Epicureans hadtheir Garden, where they lived a tranquil life, and seem to have had acommunity of goods. 

There is not one of all the various founders of the ancientphilosophical schools whose memory was cherished with so much venerationby his disciples as that of Epicurus. For several centuries after hisdeath, his portrait was treated by them with all the honors of a sacredrelic: it was carried about with them in their journeys, it was hung upin their schools, it was preserved with reverence in their privatechambers; his birthday was celebrated with sacrifices and otherreligious observances, and a special festival in his honor was heldevery month. 

So much honor having been paid to the memory of Epicurus, we naturallyexpect that his works would have been preserved with religious care. Hewas one of the most prolific of the ancient Greek writers. Diogenescalls him "a most voluminous writer, " and estimates the number of workscomposed by him at no less than three hundred, the principal of which heenumerates. [764] But out of all this prodigious collection, not a singlebook has reached us in a complete, or at least an independent form. Three letters, which contain some outlines of his philosophy, arepreserved by Diogenes, who has also embodied his "FundamentalMaxims"--forty-four propositions, containing a summary of his ethicalsystem. These, with part of his work "On Nature, " found during the lastcentury among the Greek MSS. Recovered at Herculaneum, constitute allthat has survived the general wreck. 

[Footnote 764: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers, " bk. X. Ch. Xvi. , xvii. ]

We are thus left to depend mainly on his disciples and successors forany general account of his system. And of the earliest and mostimmediate of these the writings have perished. [765] Our sole originalauthority is Diogenes Laertius, who was unquestionably an Epicurean. Thesketch of Epicurus which is given in his "Lives" is evidently a "laborof love. " Among all the systems of ancient philosophy described by him, there is none of whose general character he has given so skillful and soelaborate an analysis. And even as regards the particulars of thesystem, nothing could be more complete than Laertius's account of hisphysical speculations. Additional light is also furnished by thephilosophic poem of Lucretius "On the Nature of Things, " which waswritten to advocate the physical theory of Epicurus. These are the chiefsources of our information. 

[Footnote 765: Some fragments of the writings of Metrodorus, Phædrus, Polystratus, and Philodemus, have been found among the HerculaneanPapyri, and published in Europe, which are said to throw some additionallight on the doctrines of Epicurus. See article on "Herculanean Papyri, "in Edinburgh Review, October, 1862. ]

It is said of Epicurus that he loved to hearken to the stories of theindifference and apathy of Pyrrhon, and that, in these qualities, heaspired to imitate him. But Epicurus was not, like Pyrrhon, a skeptic;on the contrary, he was the most imperious dogmatist. No man ever showedso little respect for the opinions of his predecessors, or so muchconfidence in his own. He was fond of boasting that he had made his ownphilosophy--_he_ was a "self-taught" man! Now "Epicurus might beperfectly honest in saying he had read very little, and had worked outthe conclusions in his own mind, but he was a copyist, nevertheless; fewmen more entirely so. "[766] His psychology was certainly borrowed fromthe Ionian school. From thence he had derived his fundamental maxim, that "sensation is the source of all knowledge, and the standard of alltruth. " His physics were copied from Democritus. With both, "atoms arethe first principle of all things. " And in Ethics he had learned fromAristotle, that if an absolute good is not the end of a practical life, _happiness_ must be its end. [767] All that is fundamental in the systemof Epicurus was borrowed from his predecessors, and there is little thatcan be called new in his teaching. 

[Footnote 766: Maurice's "Ancient Philosophy, " p. 236. ]

[Footnote 767: "Ethics, " bk. I. Ch. Vi]

The grand object of philosophy, according to Epicurus, _is theattainment of a happy life_. "Philosophy, " says he, "is the power bywhich reason conducts men to happiness. " Truth is a merely relativething, a variable quantity; and therefore the pursuit of truth for itsown sake is superfluous and useless. There is no such thing as absolute, unchangeable right: no action is intrinsically right or wrong. "Wechoose the virtues, not on their own account, but for the sake ofpleasure, just as we seek the skill of the physician for the sake ofhealth. "[768] That which is nominally right in morals, that which isrelatively good in human conduct, is, therefore, to be determined by theeffects upon ourselves; that which is agreeable--pleasurable, is right;that which is disagreeable--painful, is wrong. "The virtues are connatewith living pleasantly. "[769] Pleasure (ἡδονή), then, is the great endto be sought in human action. "Pleasure is the chief good, the beginningand end of living happily. "[770]

[Footnote 768: "Fundamental Maxims, " preserved in Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers, " bk. X. Ch. Xxx. ]

[Footnote 769: "Epicurus to Menæceus, " in Diogenes Laertius, "Lives ofthe Philosophers, " bk. X. Ch. Xxvii. ]

[Footnote 770: Id. , ib. ]

The proof which Epicurus offers in support of his doctrine, "thatpleasure is the chief good, " is truly characteristic. "All animals fromthe moment of their birth are delighted with pleasure and offended withpain, by their natural instincts, and without the employment of reason. Therefore we, also, of our own inclination, flee from pain. "[771] "Allmen like pleasure and dislike pain; they naturally shun the latter andpursue the former. " "If happiness is present, we have every thing, andwhen it is absent, we do every thing with a view to possess it. "[772]Virtue thus consists in man's doing deliberately what the animals doinstinctively--that is, choose pleasure and avoid pain. 

[Footnote 771: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers, " bk. X. Ch. Xxix. ]

[Footnote 772: Id. , ib. , bk. X. Ch. Xxvii. ]

"Every kind of pleasure" is, in the estimation of Epicurus, "alikegood, " and alike proper. "If those things which make the pleasures ofdebauched men put an end to the fears of the mind, and to those whicharise about the heavenly bodies [supernatural powers], and death andpain, . .. We should have no pretense for blaming those who wholly devotethemselves to pleasure, and who never feel any pain, or grief (which isthe chief evil) from any quarter. "[773] Whilst, however, all pleasuresof the body, as well as the mind, are equal in dignity, and alike good, they differ in intensity, in duration, and, especially, in theirconsequences. He therefore divides pleasure into two classes; and inthis, as Cousin remarks, is found the only element of originality in hisphilosophy. These two kinds of pleasure are:

1. _The pleasure of movement, excitement, energy_ (ἡδονὴ ἐνκινήσει). [774] This is the most lively pleasure; it supposes thegreatest development of physical and mental power. "Joy and cheerfulnessare beheld in motion and energy. " But it is not the most enduringpleasure, and it is not the most perfect. It is accompanied byuneasiness; it "brings with it many perturbations, " and it yields somebitter fruits. 

[Footnote 773: "Fundamental Maxims, " No. 9, in Diogenes Laertius, "Livesof the Philosophers, " bk. X. Ch. Xxxi. ]

[Footnote 774: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers, " bk. X. Ch. Xxviii. ]

2. _The second kind of pleasure is the pleasure of repose, tranquillity, impassibility_ (ἡδονὴ καταστηματική). This is a state, a "condition, "rather than a motion. It is "the freedom of the body from pain, and thesoul from confusion. "[775] This is perfect and unmixed happiness--thehappiness of God; and he who attains it "will be like a god among men. ""The storm of the soul is at an end, and body and soul are perfected. "

Now, whilst "no pleasure is intrinsically bad, "[776] prudence(φρόνησις), or practical wisdom, would teach us to choose the highestand most perfect happiness. Morality is therefore the application ofreason to the conduct of life, and virtue is wisdom. The office ofreason is to "determine our choices"--to take account of the duration ofpleasures, to estimate their consequences, and to regard the happinessof a whole lifetime, and not the enjoyment of a single hour. Withoutwisdom men will choose the momentary excitements of passion, and followafter agitating pleasures, which are succeeded by pain; they willconsequently lose "tranquillity of mind. " "It is not possible, " saysEpicurus, "to live pleasantly without living prudently and honorably andjustly. "[777] The difference, then, between the philosopher and theordinary man is this--that while both seek pleasure, the former knowshow to forego certain indulgences which cause pain and vexationhereafter, whereas the ordinary man seeks only immediate enjoyment. Epicurus does not dispense with virtue, but he simply employs it as ameans to an end, namely, the securing of happiness. [778]

[Footnote 775: Id. , ib. ]

[Footnote 776: "Fundamental Maxims, " No. 7. ]

[Footnote 777: Ibid. , No. 5. ]

[Footnote 778: Pressensé, "Religions before Christ, " p. 141. ]

Social morality is, like private morality, founded upon _utility. _ Asnothing is intrinsically right or wrong in private life, so nothing isintrinsically just or unjust in social life. "Justice has no independentexistence: it results from mutual contracts, and establishes itselfwherever there is a mutual engagement to guard against doing orsustaining any injury. Injustice is not intrinsically bad; it has thischaracter only because there is joined with it the fear of not escapingthose who are appointed to punish actions marked with thischaracter. "[779] Society is thus a contract--an agreement to promoteeach other's happiness. And inasmuch as the happiness of the individualdepends in a great degree upon the general happiness, the essence of hisethical system, in its political aspects, is contained in inculcating"the greatest happiness of the greatest number. "

If you ask Epicurus what a man shall do when it is clearly his immediateinterest to violate the social contract, he would answer, that if yourgeneral interest is secured by always observing it, you must makemomentary sacrifices for the sake of future good. But "when, inconsequence of new circumstances, a thing which has been pronounced justdoes not any longer appear to agree with utility, the thing which wasjust. .. Ceases to be just the moment it ceases to be useful. "[780] Sothat self-interest is still the basis of all virtue. And if, by theperformance of duty, you are exposed to great suffering, and especiallyto death, you are perfectly justified in the violation of any and allcontracts. Such is the social morality of Epicurus. 

With coarse and energetic minds the doctrine of Epicurus wouldinevitably lead to the grossest sensuality and crime; with men whosetemperament was more apathetic, or whose tastes were more pure, it woulddevelop a refined selfishness--a perfect egoism, which Epicurus hasadorned with the name "tranquillity of mind--impassibility, "(ἀταραξία). [781]

[Footnote 779: "Fundamental Maxims, " Nos. 35, 36. ]

[Footnote 780: Ibid. , No. 41. ]

[Footnote 781: It is scarcely necessary to discuss the question whether, by making pleasure the standard of right, Epicurus intended to encouragewhat is usually called sensuality. He earnestly protested against anysuch unfavorable interpretation of his doctrine:--"When we say thatpleasure is a chief good, we are not speaking of the pleasures of thedebauched man, or those which lie in sensual enjoyment, as some thinkwho are ignorant, and who do not entertain our opinions, or elseinterpret them perversely; but we mean the freedom of the body frompain, and the soul from confusion" ("Epicurus to Menæceus, " in DiogenesLaertius, "Lives, " bk. X. Ch. Xxvii. ). The most obvious tendency of thisdoctrine is to extreme selfishness, rather than extreme sensuality--aselfishness which prefers one's own comfort and case to every otherconsideration. 

As to the personal character of Epicurus, opinions have been dividedboth in ancient and modern times. By some the garden has been called a"sty. " Epicurus has been branded as a libertine, and the name"Epicurean" has, in almost all languages, become the synonym ofsensualism. Diogenes Laertius repels all the imputations which are castupon the moral character of his favorite author, and ascribes them tothe malignity and falsehood of the Stoics. "The most modern criticismseems rather inclined to revert to the vulgar opinion respecting him, rejecting, certainly with good reason, the fanatical panegyrics of someFrench and English writers of the last century. Upon the whole, we areinclined to believe that Epicurus was an apathetic, decorous, formalman, who was able, without much difficulty, to cultivate a measured andeven habit of mind, who may have occasionally indulged in sensualgratifications to prove that he thought them lawful, but who generallypreferred, as a matter of taste, the exercises of the intellect to themore violent forms of self-indulgence. And this life, it seems to us, would be most consistent with his opinions. To avoid commotion, to makethe stream of life flow on as easily as possible, was clearly the aim ofhis philosophy. "--Maurice's "Ancient Philosophy, " p. 236. ]

To secure this highest kind of happiness--this pure impassivity, it wasnecessary to get rid of all superstitious fears of death, ofsupernatural beings, and of a future retribution. [782] The chief causesof man's misery are his illusions, his superstitions, and hisprejudices. "That which principally contributes to trouble the spirit ofmen, is the persuasion which they cherish that the stars are beingsimperishable and happy (_i. E. , _ that they are gods), and that then ourthoughts and actions are contrary to the will of those superior beings;they also, being deluded by these fables, apprehend an eternity ofevils, they fear the insensibility of death, as though that could affectthem. .. . " "The real freedom from this kind of trouble consists in beingemancipated from all these things. "[783] And this emancipation is to besecured by the study of philosophy--that is, of that philosophy whichexplains every thing on natural or physical principles, and excludes allsupernatural powers. 

[Footnote 782: Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things, " bk. I. 1. 100-118. ]

[Footnote 783: Epicurus to Herodotus, in Diogenes Laertius, "Lives ofthe Philosophers, " p. 453 (Bohn's edition). ]

That ignorance which occasions man's misery is two-fold, (i. ) _Ignoranceof the external world, which leads to superstition. _ All unexplainedphenomena are ascribed to unseen, supernatural powers; often tomalignant powers, which take pleasure in tormenting man; sometimes to aSupreme and Righteous Power, which rewards and punishes men for theirgood or evil conduct. Hence a knowledge of Physics, particularly thephysics which Democritus taught, was needful to deliver men from falsehopes and false fears. [784] (ii. ) _Ignorance of the nature of man, ofhis faculties, powers, and the sources and limits of his knowledge_, from whence arise illusions, prejudices, and errors. Hence the need ofPsychology to ascertain the real grounds of human knowledge, to explainthe origin of man's illusions, to exhibit the groundlessness of hisfears, and lead him to a just conception of the nature and end of hisexistence. 

[Footnote 784: "The study of physics contributes more than any thingelse to the tranquillity and happiness of life. "--Diogenes Laertius, "Lives, " bk. X. Ch. Xxiv. "For thus it is that _fear_ restrains all men, because they observe many things effected on the earth and in heaven, ofwhich effects they can by no means see the causes, and therefore thinkthat they are wrought by a _divine_ power. For which reasons, when wehave clearly seen that _nothing can be produced from nothing_, we shallhave a more accurate perception of that of which we are in search, andshall understand whence each individual thing is generated, and how allthings are done without the agency of the gods. "--Lucretius, "On theNature of Things, " bk. I. L. 145-150. ]

Physics and Psychology are thus the only studies which Epicurus wouldtolerate as "conducive to the happiness of man. " The pursuit of truthfor its own sake was useless. Dialectics, which distinguish the truefrom the false, the good from the bad, on _à priori_ grounds, must bebanished as an unnecessary toil, which yields no enjoyment. Theologymust be cancelled entirely, because it fosters superstitious fears. Theidea of God's taking knowledge of, disapproving, condemning, punishingthe evil conduct of men, is an unpleasant thought. Physics andPsychology are the most useful, because the most "agreeable, " the most"comfortable" sciences. 

EPICUREAN PHYSICS. 

In his physical theories Epicurus followed Leucippus and Democritus. Heexpounds these theories in his letters to Herodotus and Pythocles, whichare preserved in Diogenes Laertius. [785] We shall be guided mainly byhis own statements, and when his meaning is obscure, or his expositionis incomplete, we shall avail ourselves of the more elaborate statementsof Lucretius, [786] who is uniformly faithful to the doctrine ofEpicurus, and universally regarded as its best expounder. 

The fundamental principle of his philosophy is the ancient maxim--"_denihilo nihil, in nihilum nil fosse reverti_;" but instead of employingthis maxim in the sense in which it is used by Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and others, to prove there must be something self-existentand eternal, or in other words, "that nothing which once was not canever of itself come into being, " he uses it to disprove a divinecreation, and even presents the maxim in an altered form--viz. , "nothingis ever _divinely_ generated from nothing;"[787] and he thence concludesthat the world was by no means made for us by _divine_ power. [788]Nature is eternal. "The universal whole always was such as it now is, and always will be such. " "The universe also is infinite, for that whichis finite has a limit, but the universe has no limit. "[789]

[Footnote 785: "Lives of the Philosophers, " bk. X. ]

[Footnote 786: "De Natura Rerum. "]

[Footnote 787: Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things, " bk. I. ]

[Footnote 788: Ibid. ]

[Footnote 789: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers, " bk. X. Ch. Xxiv. ]

The two great principles of nature are a _vacuum_, and a _plenum. _ Theplenum is _body_, or tangible nature; the vacuum is _space_, orintangible nature. "We know by the evidences of the senses (which areour only rule of reasoning) that _bodies_ have a real existence, and weinfer from the evidence of the senses that the vacuum has a realexistence; for if space have no real existence, there would be nothingin which bodies can move, as we see they really do move. Let us add tothis reflection that one can not conceive, either in virtue ofperception, or of any analogy founded on perception, any general qualitypeculiar to all beings, which is not either an attribute, or anaccident, of the body or of the vacuum. "[790]

Of bodies some are "combinations"--concrete bodies--and some areprimordial "elements, " out of which combinations are formed. Theseprimordial elements, out of which the universe is generated, are"_atoms_" (ἄτομοι). These atoms are "the first principles" and "seeds"of all things. [791] They are "_infinite_ in number, " and, as their nameimplies, they are "_infrangible" "unchangeable_" and"_indestructible. "_[792] Matter is, therefore, not infinitely divisible;there must be a point at which division ends. [793]

The only qualities of atoms are _form_, _magnitude_, and _density. _ Allthe other sensible qualities of matter--the secondary qualities--ascolor, odor, sweetness, bitterness, etc. --are necessarily inherent inform. All secondary qualities are changeable, but the primary atoms areunchangeable; "for in the dissolution of combined bodies there must besomething _solid_ and _indestructible, _ of such a kind that it will notchange, either into what does not exist, or out of what does not exist, but the change results from a simple displacement of parts, which is themost usual case, or from an addition or subtraction of particles. "[794]

[Footnote 790: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers, " bk. X. Ch. Xxiv. ]

[Footnote 791: Id. , ib. , bk. X. Ch. Xxv. ]

[Footnote 792: Id. , ib. , bk. X. Ch. Xxiv. ]

[Footnote 793: Id. , ib. ; Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things, " bk. I. L. 616-620. ]

[Footnote 794: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers, " bk. X. Ch. Xxiv. ]

The atoms are not all of one _form_, but of different forms suited tothe production of different substances by combination; some are square, some triangular, some smooth and spherical, some are hooked with points. They are also diversified in _magnitude_ and _density_. The number oforiginal forms is "incalculably varied, " but not infinite. "Everyvariety of forms contains an infinitude of atoms, but there is not, forthat reason, an infinitude of forms; it is only the number of them whichis beyond computation. "[795] To assert that atoms are of every kind ofform, magnitude, and density, would be "to contradict the phenomena;"for experience teaches us that objects have a finite magnitude, andform necessarily supposes limitation. 

[Footnote 795: Id. , ib. ]

A variety of these primordial forms enter into the composition of allsensible objects, because sensible objects possess different qualities, and these diversified qualities can only result from the combination ofdifferent original forms. "The earth has, in itself, primary atoms fromwhich springs, rolling forth cool _water_, incessantly recruit theimmense sea; it has also atoms from which _fire_ arises. .. . Moreover, the earth contains atoms from which it can raise up rich _corn_ andcheerful _groves_ for the tribes of men. .. . " So that "no object innature is constituted of one kind of elements, and whatever possesses initself must numerous powers and energies, thus demonstrates that itcontains more numerous kinds of primary particles, "[796] or primordial"seeds of things. "

"The atoms are in a continual state of _motion_" and "have moved with_equal rapidity_ from all eternity, since it is evident the vacuum canoffer no resistance to the heaviest, any more than the lightest. " Theprimary and original movement of all atoms is _in straight lines, byvirtue of their own weight_. The vacuum separates all atoms one fromanother, at greater or less distances, and they preserve their ownpeculiar motion in the densest substances. [797]

[Footnote 796: Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things, " bk. I. L. 582-600. ]

[Footnote 797: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers, " bk. X. Ch. Xxiv. ; Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things, " bk. I. L. 80-92. ]

And now the grand crucial question arises--_How do atoms combine so asto form concrete bodies?_ If they move in straight lines, and with equalrapidity from all eternity, then they can never unite so as to formconcrete substances. They can only coalesce by deviating from a straightline. [798] How are they made to deviate from a straight line? Thisdeviation must be introduced _arbitrarily_, or by some _external cause_. And inasmuch as Epicurus admits of no causes "but space and matter, " andrejects all divine or supernatural interposition, the _new_ movementmust be purely arbitrary. They deviate _spontaneously, _ and of their ownaccord. "The system of nature immediately appears _as a free agent_, released from tyrant masters, to do every thing of itself spontaneously, without the help of the gods. "[799] The manner in which Lucretius provesthis doctrine is a good example of the petitio principii. He assumes, inopposition to the whole spirit and tendency of the Epicurean philosophy, that man has "a free will, " and then argues that if man who is nothingbut an aggregation of atoms, can "turn aside and alter his ownmovements, " the primary elements, of which his soul is composed, musthave some original spontaneity. "If all motion is connected anddependent, and a new movement perpetually arises from a former one in acertain order, and if the primary elements do not produce anycommencement of motion by deviating from the straight line to break thelaws of fate, so that cause may not follow cause in infinite succession, _whence comes this freedom of will_ to all animals in the world? whence, I say, is this liberty of action wrested from the fates, by means ofwhich we go wheresoever inclination leads each of us? whence is it thatwe ourselves turn aside, and alter our motions, not at any fixed time, nor in any fixed part of space, but just as our own minds prompt?. .. . Wherefore we must necessarily confess that the same is the case with theseeds of matter, and there is some other cause besides strokes andweight [resistance and density] from which this power [of free movement]is innate in them, since we see that _nothing is produced fromnothing_. "[800] Besides form, extension, and density, Epicurus has foundanother inherent or essential quality of matter or atoms, namely, "_spontaneous" motion. _

[Footnote 798: "At some time, though at no fixed and determinate time, and at some point, though at no fixed and determinate point, they turnaside from the right line, but only so far as you can call the leastpossible deviation. "--Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things, " bk. Ii. L. 216-222. ]

[Footnote 799: Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things" bk. Ii. 1. 1092-1096. ]

[Footnote 800: Id. , ib. , bk. Ii. L. 250-290. ]

By a slight "voluntary" deflection from the straight line, atoms are nowbrought into contact with each other; "they strike against each other, and by the percussion new movements and new complicationsarise"--"movements from high to low, from low to high, and horizontalmovements to and fro, in virtue of this reciprocal percussion. " Theatoms "jostling about, _of their own accord_, in infinite modes, wereoften brought together confusedly, irregularly, and to no purpose, butat length they _successfully coalesced_; at least, such of them as werethrown together suddenly became, in succession, the beginnings of greatthings--as earth, and air, and sea, and heaven. "[801]

[Footnote 801: Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things, " bk. Ii. L. 1051-1065. ]

And now Lucretius shall describe the formation of the different parts ofthe world according to the cosmogony of Epicurus. We quote from Good'stranslation:

 But from this boundless mass of matter first How heaven, and earth, and ocean, sun, and moon, Rose in nice order, now the muse shall tell. For never, doubtless, from result of thought, Or mutual compact, could primordial seeds First harmonize, or move with powers precise. But countless crowds in countless manners urged, From time eternal, by intrinsic weight And ceaseless repercussion, to combine In all the possibilities of forms, Of actions, and connections, and exert In every change some effort to create-- Reared the rude frame at length, abruptly reared, Which, when once gendered, must the basis prove Of things sublime; and whence eventual rose Heaven, earth, and ocean, and the tribes of sense. 

 Yet now nor sun on fiery wheel was seen Riding sublime, nor stars adorned the pole, Nor heaven, nor earth, nor air, nor ocean lived, Nor aught of prospect mortal sight surveyed; But one vast chaos, boisterous and confused. Yet order hence began; congenial parts Parts joined congenial; and the rising world Gradual evolved: its mighty members each From each divided, and matured complete From seeds appropriate; whose wild discortderst, Reared by their strange diversities of form, With ruthless war so broke their proper paths, Their motions, intervals, conjunctions, weights, And repercussions, nought of genial act Till now could follow, nor the seeds themselves E'en though conjoined in mutual bonds, co Thus air, secreted, rose o'er laboring earth; Secreted ocean flowed; and the pure fire, Secreted too, toward ether sprang sublime. 

 But first the seeds terrene, since ponderous most And most perplext, in close embraces clung, And towards the centre conglobating sunk. And as the bond grew firmer, ampler forth Pressed they the fluid essences that reared Sun, moon, and stars, and main, and heaven's high wall. For those of atoms lighter far consist, Subtiler, and more rotund than those of earth. Whence, from the pores terrene, with foremost haste Rushed the bright ether, towering high, and swift Streams of fire attracting as it flowed. 

 Then mounted, next, the base of sun and moon, 'Twixt earth and ether, in the midway air Rolling their orbs; for into neither these Could blend harmonious, since too light with earth To sink deprest, while yet too ponderous far To fly with ether toward the realms extreme: So 'twixt the two they hovered; _vital_ there Moving forever, parts of the vast whole; As move forever in the frame of man Some active organs, while some oft repose. [802]

[Footnote 802: Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things, " b. V. L. 431-498]

After explaining the origin and causes of the varied celestialphenomena, he proceeds to give an account of the production of plants, animals, and man:

 Once more return we to the world's pure prime, Her fields yet liquid, and the tribes survey First she put forth, and trusted to the winds. 

 And first the race she reared of verdant herbs, Glistening o'er every hill; the fields at large Shone with the verdant tincture, and the trees Felt the deep impulse, and with outstretched arms Broke from their bonds rejoicing. As the down Shoots from the winged nations, or from beasts Bristles or hair, so poured the new-born earth Plants, fruits, and herbage. Then, in order next, Raised she the sentient tribes, in various modes, By various powers distinguished: for not heaven Down dropped them, nor from ocean's briny waves Sprang they, terrestrial sole; whence, justly _Earth_ Claims the dear name of mother, since alone Flowed from herself whate'er the sight surveys. 

 E'en now oft rears she many a sentient tribe By showers and sunshine ushered into day. [803] Whence less stupendous tribes should then have risen More, and of ampler make, herself new-formed, In flower of youth, and _Ether_ all mature. [804]

 Of these birds first, of wing and plume diverse, Broke their light shells in spring-time: as in spring Still breaks the grasshopper his curious web, And seeks, spontaneous, foods and vital air. 

 Then rushed the ranks of mortals; for the soil, Exuberant then, with warmth and moisture teemed. So, o'er each scene appropriate, myriad wombs Shot, and expanded, to the genial sward By fibres fixt; and as, in ripened hour, Their liquid orbs the daring foetus broke Of breath impatient, nature here transformed Th' assenting earth, and taught her opening veins With juice to flow lacteal; as the fair Now with sweet milk o'erflows, whose raptured breast First hails the stranger-babe, since all absorbed Of nurture, to the genial tide converts. Earth fed the nursling, the warm ether clothed, And the soft downy grass his couch compressed. [805]

[Footnote 803: The doctrine of "spontaneous generations" is still moreexplicitly announced in book ii. "Manifest appearances compel us tobelieve that animals, though possessed of sense, are generated fromsenseless atoms. For you may observe living worms proceed from fouldung, when the earth, moistened with immoderate showers, has contracteda kind of putrescence; and you may see all other things changethemselves, similarly, into other things. "--Lucretius, "On the Nature ofThings, " bk. I. L. 867-880. ]

[Footnote 804: Ether is the father, earth the mother of all organizedbeing. --Id. , ib. , bk. I. L. 250-255. ]

[Footnote 805: Id. , ib. , bk. V. L. 795-836. ]

A state of pure savagism, or rather of mere animalism, was the primitivecondition of man. He wandered naked in the woods, feeding on acorns andwild fruits, and quenched his thirst at the "echoing waterfalls, " incompany with the wild beast. 

Through the remaining part of book v. Lucretius describes how speech wasinvented; how society originated, and governments were instituted; howcivilization commenced; and how religion arose out of ignorance ofnatural causes; how the arts of life were discovered, and how sciencesprang up. And all this, as he is careful to tell us, without any divineinstruction, or any assistance from the gods. 

Such are the physical theories of the Epicureans. The primordialelements of matter are infinite, eternal, and self-moved. After agesupon ages of chaotic strife, the universe at length arose out of an_infinite_ number of atoms, and a _finite_ number of forms, by afortuitous combination. Plants, animals, and man were spontaneouslygenerated from ether and earth. Languages, society, governments, artswere gradually developed. And all was achieved simply by blind, unconscious nature-forces, without any designing, presiding, andgoverning Intelligence--that is, without a God. 

The evil genius which presided over the method of Epicurus, andperverted all his processes of thought, is clearly apparent. The end ofhis philosophy was not the discovery of truth. He does not commence hisinquiry into the principles or causes which are adequate to theexplanation of the universe, with an unprejudiced mind. He everywheredevelops a malignant hostility to religion, and the avowed object of hisphysical theories is to rid the human mind of all fear of supernaturalpowers--that is, of all fear of God. [806] "The phenomena which menobserve to occur in the earth and the heavens, when, as often happens, they are perplexed with fearful thoughts, overawe their minds with adread of the gods, and humble and depress them to the earth. Forignorance of natural causes obliges them to refer all things to thepower of the divinities, and to resign the dominion of the world tothem; because of those effects they can by no means see the origin, andaccordingly suppose that they are produced by divine influence. "[807]

[Footnote 806: "Let us trample religion underfoot, that the victorygained over it may place us on an equality with heaven" (book i. ). SeeDiogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers, " bk. X. Ch. Xxiv. Pp. 453, 454 (Bohn's edition); Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things, " bk. I. L. 54-120. ]

[Footnote 807: Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things, " bk. Vi. L. 51-60. ]

To "expel these fancies from the mind" as "inconsistent with itstranquillity and opposed to human happiness, " is the end, and, asLucretius believes, the glory of the Epicurean philosophy. To accomplishthis, God must be placed at an infinite distance from the universe, andmust be represented as indifferent to every thing that transpires withinit. We "must beware of making the Deity interpose here, for that Beingwe ought to suppose _exempt from all occupation_, and perfectlyhappy, "[808]--that is, absolutely impassible. God did not make theworld, and he does not govern the world. There is no evidence of designor intelligence in its structure, and "such is the faultiness with whichit stands affected, that it can not be the work of a Divine power. "[809]

Epicurus is, then, an unmistakable Atheist. He did not admit a God inany rational sense. True, he _professed_ to believe in gods, butevidently in a very equivocal manner, and solely to escape the popularcondemnation. "They are not pure spirits, for there is no spirit in theatomic theory; they are not bodies, for where are the bodies that we maycall gods? In this embarrassment, Epicurus, compelled to acknowledgethat the human race believes in the existence of gods, addresses himselfto an old theory of Democritus--that is, he appeals to dreams. As indreams there are images that act upon and determine in us agreeable orpainful sensations, without proceeding from exterior bodies, so the godsare images similar to those of dreams, but greater, having the humanform; images which are not precisely bodies, and yet not deprived ofmateriality which are whatever you please, but which, in short, must beadmitted, since the human race believes in gods, and since theuniversality of the religious sentiment is a fact which demands acause. "[810]

[Footnote 808: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers, " bk. X. Ch. Xxv. ; Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things, " bk. I. L. 55-60. ]

[Footnote 809: Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things, " bk. V. L. 195-200. ]

[Footnote 810: Cousin's "Lectures on the History of Philosophy, " vol. I. P. 431. ]

It is needless to offer any criticism on the reasoning of Epicurus. Onefact will have obviously presented itself to the mind of the reflectingreader. He starts with atoms having form, magnitude, and density, andessays to construct a universe; but he is obliged to be continuallyintroducing, in addition, a "_nameless something_" which "remains insecret, " to help him out in the explanation of the phenomena. [811] Hemakes life to arise out of dead matter, sense out of senseless atoms, consciousness out of unconsciousness, reason out of unreason, without anadequate cause, and thus violates the fundamental principle from whichhe starts, "_that nothing can arise from nothing_. "

EPICUREAN PSYCHOLOGY. 

In the system of Epicurus, the soul is regarded as corporeal ormaterial, like the body; they form, together, one nature or substance. The soul is composed of atoms exceedingly diminutive, smooth, and round, and connected with or diffused through the veins, viscera, and nerves. The substance of the soul is not to be regarded as simple anduncompounded; its constituent parts are _aura_, heat, and air. These arenot sufficient, however, even in the judgment of Epicurus, to accountfor _sensation_; they are not adequate to generate sensible motives suchas revolve any thoughts in the mind. "A certain fourth nature, orsubstance, must, therefore, necessarily be added to these, _that iswholly without a name_; it is a substance, however, than which nothingexists more active or more subtile, nor is any thing more essentiallycomposed of small and smooth elementary particles; and it is thissubstance which first distributes sensible motions through themembers. "[812]

[Footnote 811: As, _e. G. _, Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things, " bk. Iii. L. 260-290. ]

[Footnote 812: Id. , ib. , bk. Iii. L. 237-250. ]

Epicurus is at great pains to prove that the soul is material; and itcan not be denied that he marshals his arguments with great skill. Modern materialism may have added additional illustrations, but it hascontributed no new lines of proof. The weapons are borrowed from the oldarsenal, and they are not wielded with any greater skill than they wereby Epicurus himself, I. The soul and the body act and react upon eachother; and mutual reaction can only take place between substances ofsimilar nature. "Such effects can only be produced by _touch_, and touchcan not take place without _body_. "[813] 2. The mind is producedtogether with the body, it grows up along with it, and waxes old at thesame time with it. [814] 3. The mind is diseased along with the body, "itloses its faculties by material causes, as intoxication, or by severeblows; and is sometimes, by a heavy lethargy, borne down into a deepeternal sleep. "[815] 4. The mind, like the body, is healed by medicines, which proves that it exists only as a mortal substance. [816] 5. The minddoes not always, and at the same time, continue _entire_ and_unimpaired_, some faculties decay before the others, "the substance ofthe soul is therefore divided. " On all these grounds the soul must bedeemed mortal; it is dissolved along with the body, and has no consciousexistence after death. 

[Footnote 813: Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things, " bk. Iii. L. 138-168. ]

[Footnote 814: Id. , ib. , bk. Iii. L. 444-460. ]

[Footnote 815: Id. , ib. , bk. Iii. L. 438-490. ]

[Footnote 816: Id. , ib. , bk. Iii. L. 500-520. ]

Such being the nature of the soul, inasmuch as it is material, all itsknowledge must be derived from sensation. The famous doctrine ofperception, as taught by Epicurus, is grounded upon this pre-suppositionthat the soul is corporeal. "The ειδωλα ἀπόῤῥοιαι--_imagines, simulacrarerum, etc_. , are, like pellicles, continually flying off from objects;and these material 'likenesses, ' diffusing themselves everywhere in theair, are propelled to the perceptive organs. " These images of thingscoming in contact with the senses produce _sensation_ (αἴσθησις). Asensation may be considered either as regards its object, or as regardshim who experiences it. As regards him who experiences it, it is simplya passive affection, an agreeable or disagreeable feeling, passion, orsentiment (τὸ πάθος). But along with sensation there is inseparablyassociated some knowledge of the object which excites sensation; and itis for this reason that Epicurus marked the intimate relation of thesetwo phenomena by giving them analogous names. Because the secondphenomenon is joined to the first, he calls it ἐπαίσθησις--_perception_. It is sensation viewed especially in regard to itsobject--_representative sensation_, or the "sensible idea" of modernphilosophy. It is from perception that we draw our general ideas by akind of prolepsis (πρόληψις) an anticipation or laying hold by reason ofthat which is implied in sensation. Now all sensations are alike true inso far as they are sensations, and error arises from false reasoningabout the testimony of sense. All knowledge is purely relative andcontingent, and there is no such thing as necessary and absolute truth. 

The system of Epicurus is thus a system of pure materialism, but not asystem of materialism drawn, as a logical consequence, from a carefuland unprejudiced study of the whole phenomena of mind. His openly avoweddesign is to deliver men from the fear of death, and rid them of allapprehension of a future retribution. "Did men but know that there was afixed limit to their woes, they would be able, in some measure, to defythe religious fictions and menaces of the poets; but now, since we mustfear eternal punishment at death, there is no mode, no means ofresisting them. "[817] To emancipate men from "these terrors of themind, " they must be taught "that the soul is mortal, and dissolves withthe body"--that "death is nothing to us, for that which is dissolved isdevoid of sensation, and that which is devoid of sensation is nothing tous. "[818] Starting with the fixed determination to prove that

 "Death is nothing, and naught after death, "

he will not permit any mental phenomena to suggest to him the idea of anincorporeal spiritual substance. Matter, under any form known toEpicurus, is confessedly insufficient to explain sensation and thought;a "nameless something" must be _supposed_. But may not "that principlewhich _lies entirely hid, and remains in secret_"[819]--and about whicheven Epicurus does not know any thing--be a spiritual, an _immaterial_principle? For aught that he knows it may as properly be called"_spirit_" as matter. May not _sensation_ and _cognition_ be the resultof the union of matter and spirit; and if so, may not their mutualaffections, their common sympathies, be the necessary conditions ofsensation and cognition in the present life? A reciprocal relationbetween body and mind appears in all mental phenomena. A certainproportion in this relation is called mental health. A deviation from itis termed disease. This proportion is by no means an equilibrium, butthe perfect adaptation of the body, without injury to its integrity, tothe purposes of the mind. And if this be so, all the arguments ofmaterialism fall to the ground. 

[Footnote 817: Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things, " bk. I. L. 100-118. ]

[Footnote 818: Diogenes Laertius, Maxim 2, in "Lives of thePhilosophers, " bk. X. Ch. Xxxi. ]

[Footnote 819: Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things, " bk. Iii. L. 275-280. ]

The concluding portion of the third book, in which Lucretius discourseson _death_, is a mournful picture of the condition of the heathen mindbefore Christianity "brought life and immortality fully to light. " Itcomes to us, like a voice from the grave of two thousand years, to provethey were "without hope. " To be delivered from the fear of futureretribution, they would sacrifice the hope of an immortal life. Toextintinguish guilt they would annihilate the soul. The only way inwhich Lucretius can console man in prospect of death is, by remindinghim that he will _escape the ills of life_. 

 "'But thy dear home shall never greet thee more! No more the best of wives!--thy babes beloved, Whose haste half-met thee, emulous to snatch The dulcet kiss that roused thy secret soul, Again shall never hasten!--nor thine arm, With deeds heroic, guard thy country's weal!-- Oh mournful, mournful fate!' thy friends exclaim! 'One envious hour of these invalued joys Robs thee forever!--But they add not here, '_It robs thee, too, of all desire of joy_'-- A truth, once uttered, that the mind would free From every dread and trouble. 'Thou art safe The sleep of death protects thee, _and secures From all the unnumbered woes of mortal life!_ While we, alas! the sacred urn around That holds thine ashes, shall insatiate weep, Nor time destroy the eternal grief we feel!' What, then, has death, if death be mere repose, And quiet only in a peaceful grave, -- What has it thus to mar this life of man?"[820]

[Footnote 820: Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things, " bk. Iii. L. 906-926. ]

This is all the comfort that Epicureanism can offer; and if "the wretchstill laments the approach of death, " she addresses him "with voicesevere"--

 "Vile coward! dry thine eyes-- Hence with thy snivelling sorrows, and depart!"

It is evident that such a system of philosophy outrages the purest andnoblest sentiments of humanity, and, in fact, condemns itself. It wasborn of selfishness and social degeneracy, and could perpetuate itselfonly in an age of corruption, because it inculcated the lawfulness ofsensuality and the impunity of injustice. Its existence at this preciseperiod in Grecian history forcibly illustrates the truth, that Atheismis a disease of the heart rather than the head. It seeks to set man freeto follow his own inclinations, by ridding him of all faith in aDivinity and in an immortal life, and thus exonerating him from allaccountability and all future retribution. But it failed to perceivethat, in the most effectual manner, it annihilated all real liberty, alltrue nobleness, and made of man an abject slave. 

STOICISM. 

The Stoical school was founded by Zeno of Citium, who flourished B. C. 290. He taught in the Stoa Poecile, or Painted Porch; and his disciplesthence derived the name of Stoics. Zeno was succeeded by Cleanthes (B. C. 260); and Cleanthes by Chrysippus (B. C. 240), whose vigorous intellectgave unity and completeness to the Stoical philosophy. He is reported tohave said to Cleanthes, --"Give me your doctrines, and I will find thedemonstrations. "[821]

[Footnote 821: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers, " bk. Vii. Ch. Vii. ]

None of the writings of the early Stoics, save a "Hymn to Jupiter, " byCleanthes, have survived. We are chiefly indebted to DiogenesLaertius[822] and Cicero[823] for an insight into their system. The Hymnof Cleanthes sheds some light on their Theology, and their moralprinciples are exhibited in "The Fragments" of Epictetus, and "The Lifeand Meditations" of Marcus Aurelius. 

[Footnote 822: "Lives of the Philosophers, " bk. Vii. ]

[Footnote 823: "De Fm. , " and "De Natura Deorum. "]

The philosophy of the Stoics, like that of the Epicureans, was mainly aphilosophy of life--that is, a _moral_ philosophy. The manner in whichthey approached the study of morals, and the principles upon which theygrounded morality, were, however, essentially different. 

The grand object of Epicurus was to make the current of life flow on ascomfortably as possible, without any distracting thoughts of the past orany disturbing visions of the future. He therefore starts with thisfundamental principle, that the true philosophy of life is to enjoyone's self--the aim of existence is to be happy. Whatever in a man'sbeliefs or conduct tends to secure happiness is _right_; whateverawakens uneasiness, apprehension, or fear, is _wrong_. And inasmuch asthe idea of a Divine Creator and Governor of the universe, and thebelief in a future life and retribution, are uncomfortable thoughts, exciting superstitious fears, they ought to be rejected. The Physics andthe Psychology of Epicurus are thus the natural outgrowth of hisMorality. 

Zeno was evidently a more earnest, serious, and thoughtful man. Hecherished a nobler ideal of life than to suppose "man must dovoluntarily, what the brute does instinctively--eschew pain, and seekpleasure. " He therefore seeks to ascertain whether there be not some"principle of nature, " or some law of nature, which determines what isright in human action--whether there be not some light under which, oncontemplating an action, we may at once pronounce upon its intrinsic_rightness_, or otherwise. This he believes he has found in the_universal reason_ which fashioned, and permeates, and vivifies theuniverse, and is the light and life of the human soul. The chief goodis, confessedly, to live according to nature; which is to live accordingto virtue, for nature leads us to that point. .. . For our individualnatures are all part of the universal nature; on which account, thechief good is to live in a manner corresponding to one's own nature, andto universal nature; doing none of those things which the common law ofmankind (the universal conscience of our race) forbids. _That common lawis identical with_ RIGHT REASON _which pervades every thing, being thesame with Jupiter_ (Ζεύς), _who is the regulator and chief manager ofall existing things_. [824] The foundation of the ethical system of theStoics is thus laid in their philosophy of nature--their Physiology andPsychology. If, therefore, we would apprehend the logical connection andunity of Stoicism, we must follow their order of thought--that is, wemust commence with their

PHYSIOLOGY. 

Diogenes Laertius tells us that the Stoics held "that there are twogeneral principles in the universe--the _passive_ principle (τὸ πάσχον), which is matter, an existence without any distinctive quality, and the_active_ principle (τὸ ποιοῦν), which is the reason existing in thepassive, that is to say, God. For that He, being eternal, and existingthroughout all matter, makes every thing. "[825] This Divine Reason, acting upon matter, originates the necessary and unchangeable laws whichgovern matter--laws which the Stoics called λόγοισπερματικοί--generating reasons or causes of things. The laws of theworld are, like eternal reason, necessary and immutable; hence theεἱμαρμένη--the _Destiny_ of the Stoics, which is also one of the namesof the Deity. [826] But by Destiny the Stoics could not understand ablind unconscious necessity; it is rather the highest reason in theuniverse. "Destiny (εἱμαρμένη) is a connected (εἰρομένη) cause ofthings, or the reason according to which the world is regulated. "[827]

[Footnote 824: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers, " bk. Vii. Ch. Liii. ]

[Footnote 825: Id. , ib. , bk. Vii. Ch. Lxviii. ]

[Footnote 826: "They teach that God is unity, and that he is calledMind, and _Fate_, and Jupiter. "--Id. , ib. , bk. Vii. Ch. Lxviii. ]

[Footnote 827: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers, " bk. Vii. Ch. Lxxiv. ]

These two principles are not, however, regarded by the Stoics as havinga distinct, separate, and independent existence. One is substance(οὐσία); the other is quality (ποῖος). The primordial matter is thepassive ground of all existence--the original substratum for the Divineactivity. The Divine Reason is the active or formative energy whichdwells within, and is essentially united to, the primary substance. TheStoics, therefore, regarded all existence as reducible, in its lastanalysis, to _one substance_, which on the side of its passivity andcapacity of change, they called _hyle_ (ὕλη);[828] and on the side ofits changeless energy and immutable order, they called God. Thecorporeal world--physical nature--is "a peculiar manifestation" of God, generated from his own substance, and, after certain periods, absorbedin himself. Thus God, considered in the evolution of His power, isnature. And nature, as attached to its immanent principle, is calledGod. [829] The fundamental doctrine of the Stoics was a spiritual, ideal, intellectual pantheism, of which the proper formula is, _All things areGod, but God is not all things_. 

[Footnote 828: Or "matter. " A good deal of misapprehension has arisenfrom confounding the intellectual ὕλη of Aristotle and the Stoics withthe gross physical "matter" of the modern physicist. By "matter" we nowunderstand that which is corporeal, tangible, sensible; whereas by ὕλη, Aristotle and the Stoics (who borrowed the term from him) understoodthat which is incorporeal, intangible, and inapprehensible to sense, --an"unknown something" which must necessarily be _supposed_ as thecondition of the existence of things. The _formal_ cause of Aristotle is"the substance and essence"--the primary nature of things, on which alltheir properties depend. The _material_ cause is "the matter or subject"through which the primary nature manifests itself. Unfortunately theterm "material" misleads the modern thinker. He is in danger ofsupposing the _hyle_ of Aristotle to be something sensible and physical, whereas it is an intellectual principle whose inherence is implied inany physical thing. It is something distinct from _body_, and has noneof those properties we are now accustomed to ascribe to matter. Body, corporeity, is the result of the union of "hyle" and "form. " Stobaeusthus expounds the doctrine of Aristotle: Form alone, separate frommatter (ὕλη) is _incorporeal_; so matter alone, separated from form, isnot _body_. But there is need of the joint concurrence of boththese--matter and form--to make the substance of body. Every individualsubstance is thus a totality of matter and form--a σίνολον. 

The Stoics taught that God is _oneliness_ (Diogenes Laertius, "Lives ofthe Philosophers, " bk. Vii. Ch. Lxviii. ); that he is _eternal_ and_immortal_ (bk. Vii. Ch. Lxxii. ); he could not, therefore, be corporeal, for "body _infinite, divisible, _ and _perishable_" (bk. Vii. Ch. Lxxvii. ). "All the parts of the world are perishable, for they changeone into another; therefore the world is perishable" (bk. Vii. Ch. Lxx. ). The Deity is not, therefore, absolutely identified with the worldby the Stoics. He permeates all things, creates and dissolves allthings, and is, therefore, _more_ than all things. The world is finite;God is infinite. ]

[Footnote 829: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers, " bk. Vii. Ch. Lxx. ]

Schwegler affirms that, in physics, the Stoics, for the most part, followed Heraclitus, and especially "carried out the proposition thatnothing incorporeal exists; every thing is essentially _corporeal_. " Thepantheism of Zeno is therefore "_materialistic. _"[830] This is not ajust representation of the views of the early Stoics, and can not besustained by a fair interpretation of their teaching. They say thatprinciples and elements differ from each other. Principles have nogeneration or beginning, and will have no end; but elements may bedestroyed. Also, that elements have bodies, and have forms, _butprinciples have no bodies, and no forms_. [831] Principles are, therefore, _incorporeal. _ Furthermore, Cicero tells us that they taughtthat the universal harmony of the world resulted from all things being"contained by one _Divine_ SPIRIT;"[832] and also, that reason in man is"nothing else but part of the _Divine_ SPIRIT merged into a humanbody. "[833] It thus seems evident that the Stoics made a distinctionbetween corruptible _elements_ (fire, air, earth, water) andincorruptible _principles_, by which and out of which elements weregenerated, and also between corporeal and incorporeal substances. 

[Footnote 830: Schwegler's "History of Philosophy, " p. 140. ]

[Footnote 831: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers, " bk. Vii. Ch. Lxviii. ]

[Footnote 832: "De Natura Deorum, " bk. Ii. Ch. Xiii. ]

[Footnote 833: Ibid, bk. Ii. Ch. Xxxi. ]

On a careful collation of the fragmentary remains of the early Stoics, we fancy we catch glimpses of the theory held by some modern pantheists, that the material elements, "having body and form, " are a vitaltransformation of the Divine substance; and that the forces ofnature--"the generating causes or reasons of things" (λόγοισπερματικοί)--are a conscious transmutation of the Divine energy. Thistheory is more than hinted in the following passages, which we slightlytranspose from the order in which they stand in Diogenes Laertius, without altering their meaning. "They teach that the Deity was in thebeginning by _himself_". .. . That "first of all, he made the fourelements, fire, water, air, and earth. " "The fire is the highest, andthat is called æther, in which, first of all, the sphere was generatedin which the fixed stars are set. .. ; after that the air; then the water;and the sediment, as it were, of all, is the earth, which is placed inthe centre of the rest. " "He turned into water the whole substance whichpervaded the air; and as the seed is contained in the product, so, too, He, being the seminal principle of the world, remained still inmoisture, making matter fit to be employed by himself in the productionof things which were to come after. "[834] The Deity thus draws theuniverse out of himself, transmuting the divine substance into body andform. "God is a being of a certain quality, having for his peculiarmanifestation universal substance. He is a being imperishable, and whonever had any generation, being the maker of the arrangement and orderthat we see; and who at certain periods of time _absorbs all substancein himself and then reproduces it from himself_. "[835] And now, in thelast analysis, it would seem as though every thing is resolved into_force_. God and the world are _power, and its manifestation_, and theseare ultimately one. "This identification of God and the world, accordingto which the Stoics regarded the whole formation of the universe as buta period in the development of God, renders their remaining doctrineconcerning the world very simple. Every thing in the world seemed to bepermeated by the Divine life, and was regarded as the flowing out ofthis most perfect life through certain channels, until it returns, in anecessary circle, back to itself. "[836]

[Footnote 834: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers, " bk. Vii. Ch. Lxviii. , lxix. ]

[Footnote 835: Id. , ib. , bk. Vii. Ch. Lxx. ]

[Footnote 836: Schwegler's "History of Philosophy, " p. 141. ]

The God of the Stoics is not, however, a mere principle of lifevitalizing nature, but an _intelligent_ principle directing nature; and, above all, a _moral_ principle, governing the human race. "God is aliving being, immortal, rational, perfect, and intellectual in hishappiness, unsusceptible of any kind of evil; having a foreknowledge ofthe world, and of all that is in the world. "[837] He is also thegracious Providence which cares for the individual as well as for thewhole; and he is the author of that natural law which commands the goodand prohibits the bad. "He made men to this end that they might behappy; as becomes his fatherly care of us, he placed our good and evilin those things which are in our own power. "[838] The Providence andFatherhood of God are strikingly presented in the "Hymn of Cleanthes" toJupiter--

[Footnote 837: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers, " bk. Vii. Ch. Lxxii. ]

[Footnote 838: Marcus Aurelius, bk. Iii. Ch. Xxiv. ]

 Most glorious of the immortal Powers above! O thou of many names! mysterious Jove: For evermore almighty! Nature's source! Thou governest all things in their order'd course! All hail to thee! since, innocent of blame, E'en mortal creatures may address thy name; For all that breathe, and creep the lowly earth, Echo thy being with reflected birth-- Thee will I sing, thy strength for aye resound: The universe, that rolls this globe around, Moves wheresoe'er thy plastic influence guides, And, ductile, owns the god whose arm presides. The lightnings are thy ministers of ire; The double-forked and ever-living fire; In thy unconquerable hands they glow, And at the flash all nature quakes below. Thus, thunder-armed, thou dost creation draw To one immense, inevitable law: And, with the various mass of breathing souls, Thy power is mingled, and thy spirit rolls. Dread genius of creation! all things bow To thee: the universal monarch thou!

 Nor aught is done without thy wise control, On earth, or sea, or round the ethereal pole, Save when the wicked, in their frenzy blind, Act o'er the follies of a senseless mind, Thou curb'st th' excess; confusion, to thy sight, Moves regular; th' unlovely scene is bright. Thy hand, educing good from evil, brings To one apt harmony the strife of things. One ever-during law still binds the whole, Though shunned, resisted, by the sinner's soul. Wretches! while still they course the glittering prize The law of God eludes their ears and eyes. Life, then, were virtue, did they thus obey; But wide from life's chief good they headlong stray. Now glory's arduous toils the breast inflame; Now avarice thirsts, insensible of shame; Now sloth unnerves them in voluptuous ease, And the sweet pleasures of the body please. With eager haste they rush the gulf within, And their whole souls are centred in their sin. But, oh, great Jove! by whom all good is given! Dweller with lightnings and the clouds of heaven! Save from their dreadful error lost mankind! Father! disperse these shadows of the mind! Give them thy pure and righteous law to know; Wherewith thy justice governs all below. Thus honored by the knowledge of thy way, Shall men that honor to thyself repay; And bid thy mighty works in praises ring, As well befits a mortal's lips to sing: More blest, nor men, nor heavenly powers can be, Than when their songs are of thy law and thee. [839]

[Footnote 839: Sir C. A. Elton's version, published in "Specimens ofAncient Poets, " edited by William Peters, A. M. , Christ Church, Oxford. ]

PSYCHOLOGY. 

As in the world there are two principles, the passive and the active, soin the understanding there are two elements: a passiveelement--_sensation_, and an active element--_reason_. 

All knowledge commences with the phenomena of sensation (αἴσθησις). Thisproduces in the soul an image (φαντασία), which corresponds to theexterior object, and which Chrysippus regarded as a modification of themind (ἀλλοίωσις). [840]

Associate with sensibility is thought--the faculty of general ideas--theὀρθὸς λόγος, or right reason, as the supreme power and the guiding lightof humanity. This active principle is of divine origin, "a part or shredof the Divinity. "

[Footnote 840: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers, " bk. Vii. Ch. Xxxiv. ]

This "right reason, " or "common reason, " is the source and criterion ofall truth; "for our individual natures are all parts of the universalnature, " and, therefore, all the dictates of "common reason" are"identical with that right reason which pervades every thing, being thesame with Jupiter, who is the regulator and chief manager of allthings. "

The fundamental canon of the logic of the Stoics, therefore, was that"what appears to all, that is to be believed, for it is apprehended bythe reason, which is common and Divine. "

It is needless to remark that the Stoics were compelled by theirphysiological theory to deny the proper immortality of the soul. Some ofthem seem to have supposed that it might, for a season, survive thedeath of the body, but its ultimate destination was absorption into theDivine essence. It must return to its original source. 

ETHICS. 

If reason be the great organizing and controlling law of the universe, then, to live conformable to reason is the great practical law of life. Accordingly, the fundamental ethical maxim of the Stoics is, "Liveconformably with nature--that is, with reason, or the will of theuniversal governor and manager of all things. "[841] Thus the chief good(εὐδαιμονία) is the conformity of man's actions to reason--that is, tothe will of God, "for nothing is well done without a reference toGod. "[842]

[Footnote 841: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers, " bk. Vii. Ch. Liii. ]

[Footnote 842: Marcus Aurelius, bk. Iii. § II. ]

It is obvious that this doctrine must lead to a social morality and ajurisprudence the very opposite of the Epicurean. If we must do thatwhich is good--that is, that which is reasonable, regardless of allconsequences, then it is not for the pleasurable or useful results whichflow from it that justice should be practised, but because of itsintrinsic excellence. Justice is constituted good, not by the law ofman, but by the law of God. The highest pleasure is to do right; "thisvery thing is the virtue of the happy man, and the perfect happiness oflife, when every thing is done according to a harmony of the genius ofeach individual to the will of the Universal Governor and Manager of allthings. "[843] Every thing which interferes with a purely rationalexistence is to be eschewed; the pleasures and pains of the body are tobe despised. To triumph over emotion, over suffering, over passion; togive the fullest ascendency to reason; to attain courage, moral energy, magnanimity, constancy, was to realize true manhood, nay, "to begodlike; for they have something in them which is, as it were, agod"[844]

The sublime heroism of the Stoic school is well expressed in the manlyprecept, "Ἀνεχοῦ"--_sustine_--endure. "Endure the sorrows engendered bythe bitter struggle between the passions support all the evils whichfortune shall send thee--calumny, betrayal, poverty, exile, irons, deathitself. " In Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius this spirit seems to risealmost to the grandeur of Christian resignation. "Dare to lift up thineeyes to God and say, 'Use me hereafter to whatsoever thou pleasest. Iagree, and am of the same mind with thee, indifferent to all things. Lead me whither thou pleasest. Let me act what part thou wilt, either ofa public or a private person, of a rich man or a beggar. '"[845] "Showthose qualities, " says Marcus Aurelius, "which God hath put in thypower--sincerity, gravity, endurance of labor, aversion to pleasure, contentment with thy portion and with few things, benevolence, frankness, no love of superfluity, freedom from trifling, magnanimity. "[846]

[Footnote 843: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers, " bk. Vii. Ch. Liii. ]

[Footnote 844: Id. , ib. , bk. Vii. Ch. Xliv. ]

[Footnote 845: Arrian, "Diss. Epict. , " bk. Ii. Ch. Xviii. ]

[Footnote 846: "I read to-day part of the 'Meditations of MarcusAntonius' [Aurelius]. What a strange emperor! And what a strangeheathen! Giving thanks to God for all the good things he enjoyed! Inparticular for his good inspirations, and for twice revealing to him, indreams, things wherby he was cured of (otherwise) incurable distempers. I make no doubt but this is one of the 'many' who shall come from theeast and the west, and sit down with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, ' whilethe 'children of the kingdom'--nominal Christians--are 'shutout. '"--Wesley's "Journal, " vol. I, p. 353. ]

Amid the fearful moral degeneracy of imperial Rome, Stoicism became therefuge of all noble spirits. But, in spite of its severity, and itsapparent triumph over the feelings, it brought no real freedom andpeace. "Stoical morality, strictly speaking, is, at bottom, only aslavish morality, excellent in Epictetus; admirable still, but uselessto the world, in Marcus Aurelius. " Pride takes the place of realdisinterestedness. It stands alone in haughty grandeur and solitaryisolation, tainted with an incurable egoism. Disheartened by itsmetaphysical impotence, which robs God of all personality, and man ofall hope of immortality; defeated in its struggle to obtain purity ofsoul, it sinks into despair, and often terminates, as in the case of itstwo first leaders, Zeno and Cleanthes, and the two Romans, Cato andSeneca, in self-murder. "Thus philosophy is only an apprenticeship ofdeath, and not of life; it tends to death by its image, _apathy_ and_ataraxy. _"[847]

[Footnote 847: Cousin's "Lectures on the History of Philosophy, " vol. I. P. 439. ]

CHAPTER XIV. 

THE PROPÆDEUTIC OFFICE OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 

"Philosophy, before the coming of the Lord, was necessary to the Greeksfor righteousness, and it now proved useful for godliness, being in somepart a preliminary discipline (προπαιδεία τις οὖσα) for those who reapthe fruits of faith through demonstration. Perhaps we may say it wasgiven to the Greeks with this special object; for philosophy was to theGreeks what the Law was to the Jews, 'a schoolmaster to bring them toChrist. '"--CLEMENS ALEXANDRINUS. 

Philosophy, says Cousin, is the effort of _reflection_--the attempt ofthe human mind to develop in systematic and logical form that which hasdimly revealed itself in the spontaneous thought of ages, and to accountto itself in some manner for its native and instinctive beliefs. We mayfurther add, it is the effort of the human mind to attain to truth andcertitude on purely rational grounds, uncontrolled by traditionalauthorities. The sublime era of Greek philosophy was, in fact, anindependent effort of human reason to solve the great problems ofexistence, of knowledge, and of duty. It was an attempt to explain thephenomenal history of the universe, to interpret the fundamental ideasand laws of human reason, to comprehend the utterances of conscience, and to ascertain what Ultimate and Supreme Reality underlies the worldof phenomena, of thought, and of moral feeling. [848] And it is thiswhich, for us, constitutes its especial value; that it was, as far aspossible, a result of simple reason; or, if at any time Faith assertedits authority, the distinction is clearly marked: If this inquiry wasfully, and honestly, and logically conducted, we are entitled to presumethat the results attain by this effort of speculative thought mustharmonize with the positive utterances of the Divine Logos--the EternalReason, whose revelations are embalmed and transmitted to us in the Wordof God. If the great truth that man is "the _offspring of God"_ and assuch "_the image and glory of God_" which is asserted, alike, by Pauland the poet-philosophers of Tarsus and Mysia, be admitted, then we mayexpect that the reason of man shall have some correlation with theDivine reason. The mind of man is the _chef-d'œuvre_ of Divine art. Itis fashioned after the model which the Divine nature supplies. "Let usmake man in _our_ image after _our_ likeness. " That image consists inἐπίγνωσις--_knowledge;_ δικαιοσύνη--_justice_; andὁσιότης--_benevolence. _ It is not merely the _capacity_ to know, to bejust, and to be beneficent; it is _actual_ knowledge, justice, andbenevolence. It supposes, first, that the fundamental ideas of the true, the just, and the good, are connate to the human mind; second, that thenative determination of the mind is towards the realization of theseideas in every mental state and every form of human activity; third, that there is a constitutional sympathy of reason with the ideas oftruth, and righteousness, and goodness, as they dwell in the reason ofGod. And though man be now fallen, there is still within his heart somevestige of his primal nature. There is still a sense of the divine, areligious aptitude, "a feeling after God, " and some longing to return toHim. There are still ideas in the reason, which, in their natural andlogical development compel him to recognize a God. There is within hisconscience a sense of duty, of obligation, and accountability to aSuperior Power--"a law of the mind, " thought opposed and antagonized bydepraved passions and appetites--"the law in the members. " There is yeta natural, constitutional sympathy of reason with the law of God--"itdelights in that law, " and consents "that it is good, " but it isoverborne and obstructed by passion. Man, even as unregenerate, "willsto do that which is good, " but "how to perform that which is good hefinds not, " and in the agony of his soul he exclaims, "Oh, wretched manthat I am, who shall deliver me!"[849]

[Footnote 848: Plato sought also to attain to the Ultimate Realityunderlying all æsthetic feeling--the Supreme Beauty as well as theSupreme Good. ]

[Footnote 849: Romans, ch. Vii. ]

The Author of nature is also the Author of revelation. The EternalFather of the Eternal Son, who is the grand medium of all God's directcommunications to our race--the revealer of God, is also "the Father ofthe spirits of all flesh. " That divine inbreathing which firstconstituted man "a living soul"--that "inspiration of the Almighty whichgiveth man understanding, " and still "teacheth him knowledge, " proceedsfrom the same Spirit as that which inspires the prophets and seers ofthe Old Testament Church, and the Apostles and teachers of the new. That"true light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world" shoneon the mind of Anaxagoras, and Socrates, and Plato, as well as on themind of Abraham and Rahab, Cornelius and the Syro-Phoenician woman, and, in a higher form, and with a clearer and richer effulgence, on the mindof Moses, Isaiah, Paul and John. It is not to be wondered at, then, if, in the teaching of Socrates and Plato, we should find a striking_harmony_ of sentiment, and even form of expression, with some parts ofthe Christian revelation. No short-sighted jealousy ought to impugn thehonesty of our judgment, if, in the speculations of Plato, we catchglimpses of a world of ideas not unlike that which Christianitydiscloses, and hear words not unfamiliar to those who spake as they weremoved by the Holy Ghost. 

If, then, there exists some correlation between Divine and human reason, and if the light which illuminates all minds in Christian and in heathenlands is the _same_ "true light, " though differing in degrees ofbrightness, it is most natural and reasonable to expect some connectionand some correspondence between the discoveries of philosophy and therevelations of the Sacred Oracles. 

Although Christianity is confessedly something which is above reason andnature--something communicated from above, and therefore in the fullestsense supernatural and superhuman, yet it must stand in _relation_ toreason and nature, and to their historic development; otherwise it couldnot operate on man at all. "We have no knowledge of a dynamic influence, spiritual or natural, without a dynamic reaction. " Matter can only bemoved by forces, and according to laws, as it has properties whichcorrelate it with these forces and laws. And mind can not be determinedfrom without to any specific form of cognition, unless it have powers ofapprehension and conception which are governed by uniform laws. If manis to be instructed by a verbal revelation, he must, at least, becapacitated for the reception of divine communication--must have a powerof forming supersensuous conceptions, and there must be some originalcommunity of thought and idea between the mind that teaches and the mindthat is taught. A revelation from an invisible God--a being "whom no manhas ever seen or ever can see" with the eye of sense--would have noaffinity for, and no power to affect and enlighten, a being who had nopresentiment of an invisible Power to which he is in some way related. Arevealed law promulgated from an unseen and utterly unknown Power wouldhave no constraining authority, if man had no idea of right, no sense ofduty, no feeling of obligation to a Supreme Being. If, therefore, religious instruction be not already preceded by an innate consciousnessof God, and of obligation to God, as an operative predisposition, therewould be nothing for revelation to act upon. Some relation between thereason which planned the universe, and which has expressed its thoughtsin the numerical relations and archetypal forms which are displayedtherein, and the reason of man, with its ideas of form and number, proportion and harmony, is necessarily supposed in the statement of Paulthat "the invisible things of God from the creation are seen. " Nature tous could be no symbol of the Divine Thought, if there were nocorrelation between the reason of man and the reason of God. Allrevelation, indeed, supposes some community of nature, some affinitiesof thought, some correlation of ideas, between the mind communicatingspiritual knowledge, and the mind to which the communication is made. Inapproaching man, it must traverse ground already occupied by man; itmust employ phrases already employed, and assume forms of thoughtalready familiar to man. It must address itself to some ideas, sentiments, and feelings already possessed by man. If religion is thegreat end and destination of man, then the nature of man must beconstituted for religion. Now religion, in its inmost nature, is acommunion, a fellowship with God. But no creature can be brought intothis communion "save one that is constitutionally related to God interms that admit of correspondence. " There must be intelligence offeredto his intelligence, sentiment to his sentiment, reason to his reason, thought to his thought. There must be implanted in the human mind somefundamental ideas and determinations grounded upon this fact, that thereal end and destination of man is for religion, so that when thathigher sphere of life and action is presented to man, by an outwardverbal revelation, there shall be a recognized harmony between the inneridea and determination, and the outer revelation. We can not doubt thatsuch a relation between human nature and reason, and Christianity, exists. We see evidences of this in the perpetual strivings of humanityto attain to some fuller and clearer apprehension of that Supreme Powerwhich is consciously near to human thought, and in the historicdevelopment of humanity towards those higher forms of thought andexistence which demand a revelation in order to their completion. Thisoriginal capacity, and this historical development, have unquestionablyprepared the way for the reception of Christianity. 

Christianity, then, must have some connection with the reason of man, and it must also have some relation to the progressive developments ofhuman thought in the ages which preceded the advent of Christ. Christianity did not break suddenly upon the world as a new commencementaltogether unconnected with the past, and wanting in all points ofsympathy and contact with the then present. It proceeded along lines ofthought which had been laid through ages of preparation; it clotheditself in forms of speech which had been moulded by centuries ofeducation, and it appropriated to itself a moral and intellectualculture which had been effected by long periods of severest discipline. It was, in fact, the consummation of the whole moral and religioushistory of the world. 

A revelation of new truths, presented in entirely new forms of thoughtand speech, would have defeated its own ends, and, practically, wouldhave been no revelation at all. The divine light, in passing throughsuch a medium, would have been darkened and obscured. The lens throughwhich the heavenly rays are to be transmitted must first be prepared andpolished. The intellectual eye itself must be gradually accustomed tothe light. Hence it is that all revelation has been _progressive_, commencing, in the infancy of our race, with images and symbolsaddressed to sense, and advancing, with the education of the race, toabstract conceptions and spiritual ideas. The first communications tothe patriarchs were always accompanied by some external, sensibleappearance; they were often made through some preternatural personage inhuman form. Subsequently, as human thought becomes assimilated to theDivine idea, God uses man as his organ, and communicates divineknowledge as an internal and spiritual gift. The theistic conception ofthe earliest times was therefore more or less anthropomorphic, in theprophetic age it was unquestionably more spiritual. The education ofHebraic, Mosaic, and prophetic ages had gradually developed a purertheism, and prepared the Jewish mind for that sublime announcement ofour Lord's--"God is a spirit, and they that worship him must worship inspirit. " For ages the Jews had worshipped in Samaria and Jerusalem, andthe inevitable tendency of thought was to localize the divine presence;but the gradual withdrawment from these localities of all visible tokensof Jehovah's presence, prepared the way for the Saviour's explicitdeclaration that "neither in this mountain of Samaria, nor yet atJerusalem, shall men worship the Father, " to the exclusion of any otherspot on earth; the real temple of the living God is now the heart ofman. The _Holiness_ of God was an idea too lofty for human thought tograsp at once. The light of God's ineffable purity was too bright anddazzling to burst at once on human eyes. Therefore it was graduallydisplayed. The election of a chosen seed in Abraham's race to a nearerapproach to God than the rest of pagan humanity; the announcement of theDecalogue at Sinai amidst awe-inspiring wonders; the separation of asingle tribe to the priestly office, who were dedicated to, and purifiedin an especial manner for the service of the tabernacle; thesanctification of the High-priest by sacrifice and lustration before hedared to enter "the holiest place"--the presence-chamber of Jehovah: andthen the direct and explicit teaching of the prophets--were alladvancing steps by which the Jewish mind was lifted up to the clearerapprehension of the holiness of God, the impurity of man, the distanceof man from God, and the need of Mediation. 

The ideas of _Redemption_ and _Salvation_--of atonement, expiation, pardon, adoption, and regeneration--are unique and _sui-generis_. Beforethese conceptions could be presented in the fullness and maturity of theChristian system, there was needed the culture and education of the agesof Mosaic ritualism, with its sacrificial system, its rights ofpurification, its priestly absolution, and its family of God. [850]Redemption itself, as an economy, is a development, and hasconsequently, a history--a history which had its commencement in thefirst Eden, and which shall have its consummation in the second Eden ofa regenerated world. It was germinally infolded in the first promise, gradually unfolded in successive types and prophecies, more fullydeveloped in the life, and sayings, and sufferings of the Son of God, and its ripened fruit is presented to the eye of faith in the closingscenic representations of the grand Apocalypse of John. "Judaism was notgiven as a perfect religion. Whatever may have been its superiority oversurrounding forms of worship, it was, notwithstanding, a provisionalform only. The consciousness that it was a preparatory, and not adefinite dispensation, is evident throughout. It points to an end beyonditself, suggests a grander thought than any in itself; its gloryprecisely consists in its constant looking forward to a glorious futuredestined to surpass it. "[851]

[Footnote 850: Romans, IX 4-6. ]

[Footnote 851: Pressensé, "Religions before Christ, " p. 202. ]

Thus the determinations which, through Redemption, fall to the lot ofhistory, as Nitzsch justly remarks, obey the emancipating law of_gradual progress_. [852] Christianity was preceded by ages ofpreparation, in which we have a gradual development of religious phrasesand ideas, of forms of social life and intellectual culture, and ofnational and political institutions most favorable to its advent and itspromulgation; and "in the fullness of time"--the maturity and fitness ofthe age--"God sent his own Son into the world. "

[Footnote 852: "System of Doctrine, " p. 73. ]

This work of preparation was not confined alone to Judaism. The divineplan of redemption comprehended all the race; its provisions are made inview of the wants of all the race; and we must therefore believe thatthe entire history of the race, previous to the coming of the Redeemer, was under a divine supervision, and directed towards the grand centre ofour world's history. Greek philosophy and Grecian civilization musttherefore have a place in the divine plan of history, and they muststand in an important relation to Christianity. He who "determined thetime of each nation's existence, and fixed the geographical boundariesof their habitation in order that they may seek the Lord, " can not havebeen unmindful of the Greek nation, and of its grandest age ofphilosophy. "The Father of the spirits of all flesh" could not beunconcerned in the moral and spiritual welfare of any of his children. He was as deeply interested in the Athenian as in the Hebrew. He is theGod of the Gentile as well as the Jew. His tender mercies are over allhis works. If the Hebrew race was selected to be the agent of hisprovidence in one special field, and if the Jewish theocracy was onegrand instrument of preparatory discipline, it was simply because, through these, God designed to bless all the nations of the earth. Andsurely no one will presume to say that a civilization and anintellectual culture which was second only to the Hebrew, and, in someof its aspects, even in advance of the Hebrew, was not determined andsupervised by Divine Providence, and made subservient to the educationand development of the whole race. The grand results of Hebrewcivilization were appropriated and assimilated by Christianity, andremain to this day. And no one can deny that the same is true of Greekcivilization. Through a kind of historic preparation the heathen worldwas made ready for Christ, as a soil is prepared to receive the seed, and some precious fruits of knowledge, of truth, and of righteousness, even, were largely matured, which have been reaped, and appropriated, and vitalized by the heaven-descended life of Christianity. 

The chief points of excellence in the civilization of the Greeks arestrikingly obvious, and may be readily presented. High perfection of theintellect and the imagination displaying itself in the various forms ofart, poetry, literature, and philosophy. A wonderful freedom andactivity of body and of mind, developed in trade, and colonization, inmilitary achievement, and in subtile dialectics. A striking love of thebeautiful, revealing itself in their sculpture and architecture, in thefree music of prosaic numbers, and the graceful movement and measure oftheir poetry. A quickness of perception, a dignity of demeanor, arefinement of taste, a delicacy of moral sense, and a high degree ofreverence for the divine in nature and humanity. And, in general, a ripeand all-pervading culture, which has made Athens a synonym for all thatis greatest and best in the genius of man; so that literature, in itsmost flourishing periods has rekindled its torch at her altars, and arthas looked back to the age of Pericles for her purest models. [853] Allthese enter into the very idea of Greek civilization. We can not resistthe conviction that, by a Divine Providence, it was made subservient tothe purpose of Redemption; it prepared the way for, and contributed to, the spread of the Gospel. 

[Footnote 853: In Lord Brougham's celebrated letter to the father of thehistorian Macaulay in regard to the education of the latter, we read:"If he would be a great orator, he must go at once to the fountain-head, and be familiar with every one of the great orations of Demosthenes. .. . I know from experience that nothing is half so successful in these times(bad though they be) as what has been formed on the Greek models. I usepoor illustrations in giving my own experience, but I do assure you thatboth in courts and Parliament, and even to mobs, I have never made somuch play (to use a very modern phrase) as when I was almost translatingfrom the Greek. I composed the peroration of my speech for the Queen, inthe Lords, after reading and repeating Demosthenes for three or fourweeks. "]

Its subserviency to this grand purpose is seen in the Greek tendency totrade and colonization. Their mental activity was accompanied by greatphysical freedom of movement. They displayed an inherent disposition toextensive emigration. "Without aiming at universal conquest, theydeveloped (if we may use the word) a remarkable catholicity ofcharacter, and a singular power of adaptation to those whom they calledBarbarians. In this respect they were strongly contrasted with theEgyptians, whose immemorial civilization was confined to the long valleywhich extended from the cataracts to the mouth of the Nile. The Hellenictribes, on the other hand, though they despised the foreigners, werenever unwilling to visit them and to cultivate their acquaintance. Atthe earliest period at which history enables us to discover them, we seethem moving about in their ships on the shores and among the islands oftheir native seas; and, three or four centuries before the Christianera, Asia Minor, beyond which the Persians had not been permitted toadvance, was bordered by a fringe of Greek colonies; and lower Italy, when the Roman Republic was just becoming conscious of its strength, hadreceived the name of Greece itself. To all these places they carriedtheir arts and literature, their philosophy, their mythology, and theiramusements. .. . They were gradually taking the place of the Phœnicians inthe empire of the Mediterranean. They were, indeed, less exclusivelymercantile than those old discoverers. Their voyages were not so long. But their influence on general civilization was greater and morepermanent. The earliest ideas of scientific navigation and geography aredue to the Greeks. The later Greek travellers, Pausanias and Strabo, areour best sources of information on the topography of St. Paul'sjourneys. 

"With this view of the Hellenic character before us, we are prepared toappreciate the vast results of Alexander's conquests. He took the meshesof the net of Greek civilization which were lying in disorder on theedge of the Asiatic shore, and spread them over all the countries hetraversed in his wonderful campaigns. The East and the West weresuddenly brought together. Separate tribes were united under a commongovernment. New cities were built as the centres of political life. Newlines of communication were opened as the channels of commercialactivity. The new culture penetrated the mountain ranges of Pisidia andLycaonia. The Tigris and Euphrates became Greek rivers. The language ofAthens was heard among the Jewish colonies of Babylonia, and a GrecianBabylon was built by the conqueror in Egypt, and called by his name. 

"The empire of Alexander was divided, but the effects of his campaignsand policy did not cease. The influence of these fresh elements ofsocial life was rather increased by being brought into independentaction within the sphere of distinct kingdoms. Our attention isparticularly directed to two of the monarchical lines which descendedfrom Alexander's generals--the Ptolemies, or the Greek kings of Egypt, and the Seleucidæ, or the Greek kings of Syria. Their respectivecapitals, Alexandria and Antioch, became the metropolitan centres ofcommercial and civilized life in the East. "[854] Antioch was for agesthe home of science and philosophy. Here the religious opinions of theEast and the West were blended and mutually modified. Here it wasdiscovered by the heathen mind that a new religion had appeared, and anew revelation had been given. [855] In Alexandria all nations wereinvited to exchange their commodities and, with equal freedom, theiropinions. The representatives of all religions met here. "Beside theTemple of Jupiter there rose the white marble Temple of Serapis, andclose at hand stood the synagogue of the Jews. " The Alexandrian librarycontained all the treasures of ancient culture, and even a copy of theHebrew Scriptures. 

[Footnote 854: Conybeare and Howson, "Life and Epistles of St. Paul, "vol. I. Pp. 8-10. ]

[Footnote 855: Acts, xi. 26. ]

The spread of the Greek _language_ was one of the most importantservices which the cities of Antioch and Alexandria rendered toChristianity. The Greek tongue is intimately connected with the wholesystem of Christian doctrine. 

This language, which, in symmetry of structure, in flexibility andcompass of expression, in exactness and precision, in grace andelegance, exceeds every other language, became the language of theology. Next in importance to the inspiration which communicates the superhumanthought, must be the gradual development of the language in which thethought can clothe itself. That development by which the Greek languagebecame the adequate vehicle of Divine thought, the perfect medium of themature revelation of truth contained in the Christian Scriptures, mustbe regarded as the subject of a Divine providence. Christianity waitedfor that development, and it awaited Christianity. "The Greek tonguebecame to the Christian more than it had been to the Roman or the Jew. The mother-tongue of Ignatius at Antioch was that in which Philocomposed his treatises at Alexandria, and which Cicero spoke at Athens. It is difficult to state in a few words the important relation whichAlexandria, more especially, was destined to bear to the whole ChristianChurch. " In that city, the Old Testament was translated into Greek;there the writings of Plato were diligently studied; there Philo, thePlatonizing Jew, had sought to blend into one system the teachings ofthe Old Testament theology and the dialectic speculations of Plato. Numenius learns of Philo, and Plotinus of Numenius, and the ecstasy ofPlotinus is the development of Philo's intuitions. A _theologicallanguage_ by this means was developed, rich in the phrases of variousschools, and suited to convey the spiritual revelation of Christianideas to all the world. "It was not an accident that the New Testamentwas written in Greek, the language which can best express the highestthoughts and worthiest feelings of the intellect and heart, and which isadapted to be the instrument of education for all nations; nor was it anaccident that the composition of these books and the promulgation of theGospels were delayed till the instruction of our Lord, and the writingsof his Apostles could be expressed in the dialect [of Athens and] ofAlexandria. "[856] This must be ascribed to the foreordination of Himwho, in the history of nations and of civilizations, "worketh all thingsaccording to the counsel of his own will. "

[Footnote 856: Conybeare and Howson, "Life and Epistles of St. Paul, "vol. I. P. 10. ]

Now it is the doctrine of the best philologists that language is a_growth_. Gradually, and by combined efforts of successive generations, it has been brought to the perfection which we so much admire in theidioms of the Bible, the poetry of Homer, Dante, and Shakspeare, and theprose compositions of Demosthenes, Cicero, Johnson, and Macaulay. Thematerial or root-element of language may have been the product of mentalinstinct, or perhaps the immediate gift of God by revelation; but theformal element must have been the creation of thought, and the result ofrational combination. Language is really the incarnation of thought;consequently the growth of a language, its affluence, comprehension, andfullness must depend on the vigor and activity of thought, and theacquisition of general ideas. Language is thus the best index ofintellectual progress, the best standard of the intellectual attainmentof an age or nation. The language of barbaric tribes is exceedinglysimple and meagre; the paucity of general terms clearly indicating theabsence of all attempts at classification and all speculative thought. Whilst the language of educated peoples is characterized by greatfullness and affluence of terms, especially such as are expressive ofgeneral notions and abstract ideas. All grammar, all philology, allscientific nomenclature are thus, in fact, _psychological deposits_, which register the progressive advancement of human thought andknowledge in the world of mind, as the geological strata bear testimonyto the progressive development of the material world. "Language, " saysTrench, "is fossil poetry, fossil history, " and, we will add, fossilphilosophy. Many a single word is a concentrated poem. The record ofgreat social and national revolutions is embalmed in a single term. [857]And the history of an age of philosophic thought is sometimes condensedand deposited in one imperishable word. [858]

[Footnote 857: See Trench "On the Study of Words, " p. 20, where the word"frank" is given as an illustration. ]

[Footnote 858: For example, the κόσμος of the Pythagoreans, the εὶδη ofthe Platonists, and the ἀταραξία of the Stoics. ]

If, then, language is the creation of thought, the sensible vesture withwhich it clothes itself, and becomes, as it were, incarnate--if theperfection and efficiency of language depends on the maturity andclearness of thought, we conclude that the wonderful adequacy andfitness of the Greek language to be the vehicle of the Divine thought, the medium of the most perfect revelation of God to men, can only beexplained on the assumption that the ages of philosophic thought which, in Greece, preceded the advent of Christianity, were under the immediatesupervision of a providence, and, in some degree, illuminated by theSpirit of God. 

Greek philosophy must therefore have fulfilled a propædeutic office forChristianity. "As it had been intrusted to the Hebrews to preserve andtransmit the heaven-derived element of the Monotheistic religion, so itwas ordained that, among the Greeks, all seeds of human culture shouldunfold themselves in beautiful harmony, and then Christianity, taking upthe opposition between the divine and human, was to unite both in one, and show how it was necessary that both should co-operate to prepare forthe appearance of itself and the unfolding of what it contains. "[859]During the period of Greek philosophy which preceded the coming ofChrist, human reason, unfolding itself from beneath, had aspired afterthat knowledge of divine things which is from above. It had felt withinitself the deep-seated consciousness of God--the sporadic revelation ofHim "who is not far from any one of us"--the immanent thought of thatBeing "in whom we live and move and are, " and it had striven by analysisand definition to attain a more distinct and logical apprehension. Theheart of man had been stirred with "the feeling after God"--the longingfor a clearer sense of the divine, and had struggled to attain, byabstraction or by ecstasy, a more immediate communion with God. Man hadbeen conscious of an imperative obligation to conform to the will of thegreat Supreme, and he sought to interpret more clearly the utterances ofconscience as to what duty was. He had felt the sense of sin and guilt, and had endeavored to appease his conscience by expiatory offerings, andto deliver himself from the power of sin by intellectual culture andmoral discipline. And surely no one, at all familiar with the history ofthat interesting epoch in the development of humanity, will have thehardihood to assert that no steps were taken in the right direction, andno progress made towards the distant goal of human desire and hope. Thelanguage, the philosophy, the ideals of moral beauty and excellence, thenoble lives and nobler utterances of the men who stand forth in historyas the representatives of Greek civilization, all attest that theirnoble aspiration and effort did not end in ignominious failure and utterdefeat. It is true they fell greatly beneath the realization of eventheir own moral ideals, and they became painfully conscious of theirmoral weakness, as men do even in Christian times. They learned that, neither by intellectual abstraction, nor by ecstasy of feeling, couldthey lift themselves to a living, conscious fellowship with God. Thesense of guilt was unrelieved by expiations, penances, and prayers. Andwhilst some cultivated a proud indifference, a Stoical apathy, andothers sank down to Epicurean ease and pleasure, there was a noble fewwho longed and hoped with increasing ardor for a living Redeemer, apersonal Mediator, who should "stand between God and man and lay hishand on both. " Christ became in some dim consciousness "the Desire ofNations, " and the Moral Law became even to the Greek as well as the Jew"a school-master to lead them to Him. "

[Footnote 859: Neander's "Church History, " vol. I. P. 4. ]

The arrival of Paul at Athens, in the close of this brilliant period ofGreek philosophy, now assumes an aspect of deeper interest andprofounder significance. It was a grand climacteric in the life ofhumanity--an epoch in the moral and religious history of the world. Itmarked the consummation of a periodic dispensation, and it opened a newera in that wonderful progression through which an overruling Providenceis carrying the human race. As the coming of the Son of God to Judea inthe ripeness of events--"the fullness of time"--was the consummation ofthe Jewish dispensation, and the event for which the Jewish age had beena preparatory discipline, so the coming of a Christian teacher toAthens, in the person of "the Apostle of the Gentiles, " was the_terminus ad quem_ towards which all the phases in the past history ofphilosophic thought had looked, and for which they had prepared. Christianity was brought to Athens--brought into contact with Grecianphilosophy at the moment of its exhaustion--at the moment when, afterages of unwearied effort, it had become conscious of its weakness, andits comparative failure, and had abandoned many questions in despair. Greek philosophy had therefore its place in the plan of DivineProvidence. It had a mission to the world; that mission was nowfulfilled. If it had laid any foundation in the Athenian mind on whichthe Christian system could plant its higher truths--if it had raised upinto the clearer light of consciousness any of those _ideas_ imbedded inthe human reason which are germane to Christian truth--if it hadrevealed more fully the wants and instincts of the human heart, or if ithad attained the least knowledge of eternal truth and immutable right, upon this Christianity placed its _imprimatur_. And at those pointswhere human reason had been made conscious of its own inefficiency, andcompelled to own its weakness and its failure, Christianity shed aneffulgent and convincing light. 

Therefore the preparatory office of Greek religion and Greek philosophyis fully recognized by Paul in his address to the Athenians. He beginsby saying that the observations he had made enabled him to bear witnessthat the Athenians were indeed, in every respect, "a God-fearingpeople;"--that the God whom they knew so imperfectly as to designate Him"the Unknown, " but whom "they worshipped, " was the God he worshipped, and would now more fully declare to them. He assures them that theirpast history, and their present geographical position, had been theobject of Divine foreknowledge and determination. "He hath determinedbeforehand the times of each nation's existence, and fixed thegeographical boundaries of their habitation, " all with this specificdesign, that they might "seek after, " "feel after, " and "find the Lord, "who had never been far from any one of them. He admits that theirpoet-philosophers had risen to a lofty apprehension of "the Fatherhoodof God, " for they had taught that "we are all his offspring;" and heseems to have felt that in asserting the common brotherhood of our race, he would strike a chord of sympathy in the loftiest school of Gentilephilosophy. He thus "recognized the Spirit of God brooding over the faceof heathenism, and fructifying the spiritual element in the heart evenof the natural man. He feels that in these human principles there weresome faint adumbrations of the divine, and he looked for their firmerdelineation to the figure of that gracious Master, higher and holierthan man, whom he contemplated in his own imagination, and whom he wasabout to present to them. "[860]

[Footnote 860: Merivale's "Conversion of the Roman Empire, " p. 78. ]

This function of ancient philosophy is distinctly recognized by many ofthe greatest of the Fathers, as Justin, Clement, Origen, Augustine, andTheodoret. Justin Martyr believed that a ray of the Divine Logos shoneon the mind of the heathen, and that the human soul instinctively turnedtowards God as the plant turns towards the sun. "Every race of menparticipated in the Word. And they who lived with the Word wereChristians, even if they were held to be godless; as, for example, amongthe Greeks, Socrates and Heraclitus, and those like them. "[861] Clementtaught that "philosophy, before the coming of the Lord, was necessary tothe Greeks for righteousness; and now it proved useful for godliness, being a sort of preliminary discipline for those who reap the fruits offaith through demonstration. .. . Perhaps we may say that it was given tothe Greeks with this special object, for it brought the Greek nation toChrist as the Law brought the Hebrews. "[862] "Philosophy was given as apeculiar testament to the Greeks, as forming the basis of the Christianphilosophy. "[863] Referring to the words of Paul, Origen says, thetruths which philosophers taught were from God, for "God manifestedthese to them, and all things that have been nobly said. "[864] AndAugustine, whilst deprecating the extravagant claims made for the greatGentile teachers, allows "that some of them made great discoveries, sofar as they received help from heaven; whilst they erred as far as theywere hindered by human frailty. "[865] They had, as he elsewhereobserves, "a distant vision of the truth, and learnt, from the teachingof nature, what prophets learnt from the spirit. "[866] In addressing theGreeks, Theodoret says, "Obey your own philosophers; let them be yourinitiators; for they announced beforehand our doctrines. " He held that"in the depths of human nature there are characters inscribed by thehand of God. " And that "if the race of Abraham received the divine law, and the gift of prophecy, the God of the universe led other nations topiety by natural revelation, and the spectacle of nature. "[867]

[Footnote 861: "First Apology, " ch. Xlvi. ]

[Footnote 862: "Stromata, " bk. I. Ch. V. ]

[Footnote 863: "Stromata, " bk. Vi. Ch. Viii. ]

[Footnote 864: "Contra Celsum, " bk. Vi. Ch. Iii. ]

[Footnote 865: "De Civitate Dei, " bk. Ii. Ch. Vii. ]

[Footnote 866: Sermon lxviii. 3. ]

[Footnote 867: See Smith's "Bible Dictionary, " article "Philosophy;"Pressensé, "Religions before Christ, " p. II; Butler's "Lectures onAncient Philosophy, " vol. Ii. Pp. 28-40. ]

In attempting to account for this partial harmony between Philosophy andRevelation, we find the Patristic writers adopting different theories. They are generally agreed in maintaining some original connection, butthey differ as to its immediate source. Some of them maintained that theancient philosophers derived their purest light from the fountain ofDivine Revelation. The doctrines of the Old Testament Scriptures weretraditionally diffused throughout the West before the rise ofphilosophic speculation. If the theistic conceptions of Plato aresuperior to those of Homer it is accounted for by his (hypothetical)tour of inquiry among the Hebrew nation, as well as his Egyptianinvestigations. Others maintained that the similarity of views on thecharacter of the Supreme Being and the ultimate destination of humanitywhich is found in the writings of Plato and the teachings of the Bibleis the consequence of _immediate_ inspiration. Origen, Jerome, Eusebius, Clement, do not hesitate to affirm that Christ himself revealed his ownhigh prerogatives to the gifted Grecian. From this hypothesis, however, the facts of the case compel them to make some abatements. In themid-current of this divine revelation are found many acknowledgederrors, which it is impossible to ascribe to the celestial illuminator. Plato, then, was _partially_ inspired, and clouded the heavenly beamwith the remaining grossnesses of the natural sense. [868] Whilst athird, and more reasonable, hypothesis was maintained by others. Theyregarded man as "the offspring and image of the Deity, " and maintainedthere must be a correlation of the human and divine reason, and, consequently, of all discovered truth to God. Therefore they expected tofind some traces of connection and correspondence between Divine andhuman thought, and some kindred ideas in Philosophy and Revelation. "Ideas, " says St. Augustine, "are the primordial forms, as it were, theimmutable reason of things; they are not created, they are eternal, andalways the same: they are contained in the Divine intelligence andwithout being subject to birth and death, they are _types_ according towhich is formed every thing that is born and dies. " The copies of thesearchetypes are seen in nature, and are participated in by the reason ofman; and there may therefore be some community of idea between man andGod, and some relation between Philosophy and Christianity. 

[Footnote 868: Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy, " vol. Ii. P. 41. ]

The various attempts which have been made to trace the elevated theismand morality of Socrates and Plato to Jewish sources have signallyfailed. Justin Martyr and Tertullian claim that the ancient philosophers"borrowed from the Jewish prophets. " Pythagoras and Plato are supposedto have travelled in the East in quest of knowledge. [869] The latter isimagined to have had access to an existing Greek version of the OldTestament in Egypt, and a strange oversight in chronology brings himinto personal intercourse with the prophet Jeremiah. A sober andenlightened criticism is compelled to pronounce all these statements asmere exaggerations of later times. [870] They are obviously meresuppositions by which over-zealous Christians sought to maintain thesupremacy and authority of Scripture. The travels of Pythagoras arealtogether mythical, the mere invention of Alexandrian writers, whobelieved that all wisdom flowed from the East. [871] That Plato visitedEgypt at all, rests on the single authority of Strabo, who lived atleast four centuries after Plato; there is no trace in his own works ofEgyptian research. His pretended travels in Phœnicia, where he gainedfrom the Jews a knowledge of the true God, are more unreliable still. Plato lived in the fourth century before Christ (born B. C. 430), andthere is no good evidence of the existence of a Greek version of the OldTestament before that of "the Seventy" (Septuagint), made by order ofPtolemy Philadelphus, B. C. 270. Jeremiah, the prophet of Israel, livedtwo centuries before Plato; consequently any personal intercoursebetween the two was simply impossible. Greek philosophy wasunquestionably a development of Reason alone. [872]

[Footnote 869: Mr. Watson adopts this hypothesis to account for thetheistic opinions of the ancient philosophers of Greece. See "Institutesof Theology, " vol. I. Pp. 26-34. ]

[Footnote 870: Ritter's "History of Ancient Philosophy, " vol. Ii. P. 147. ]

[Footnote 871: Max Muller, "Science of Language, " p. 94. ]

[Footnote 872: See on this subject, Ritter's "History of AncientPhilosophy, " vol. I. Pp. 147, 148; Encyclopædia Britannica, article"Plato, " vol. Xvii. P. 787; Smith's "Bible Dictionary, " article"Philosophy;" and Thompson's "Laws of Thought, " p. 326. ]

Some of the ablest Christian scholars and divines of modern times, asCudworth, Neander, Trench, Pressensé, Merivale, Schaff, after the mostcareful and conscientious investigation, have come to this conclusion, that Greek philosophy fulfilled a preparatory mission for Christianity. The general conclusions they reached are forcibly presented in the wordsof Pressensé:

It would be difficult to overstate the importance of Greek philosophywhen viewed as a preparation to Christianity. Disinterested pursuit oftruth is always a great and noble task. The imperishable want of thehuman mind to go back to first principles, suffices to prove that thisprinciple is divine. We may abuse speculation; we may turn it into oneof the most powerful dissolvents of moral truths; and the defenders ofpositive creeds, alarmed by the attitude too often assumed byspeculation in the presence of religion, have condemned it asmischievous in itself, confounding in their unjust prejudice its use andits abuse. But, for all serious thinkers, philosophy is one of thehighest titles of nobility that humanity possesses: and when we considerits mission previous to Christianity, we feel convinced that it had itsplace in the Divine plan. It was not religion in itself that philosophy, through its noblest representatives, combated, but polytheism. Itdethroned the false gods. Adopting what was best in paganism, philosophyemployed it as an instrument to destroy paganism, and thus clear the wayfor definite religion. Above all, it effectually contributed to purifythe idea of Divinity, though this purification was but an approximation. If at times it caught glimpses of the highest spiritualism, yet it wasunable to protect itself against the return and reaction of Orientaldualism. In spite of this imperfection, which in its way served thecause of Christianity by demonstrating the necessity of revelation, menlike Socrates and Plato fulfilled amongst their people a really sublimemission. 

They were to the heathen world the great prophets of the humanconscience, which woke up at their call. And the awakening of the moralsense was at once the glory and ruin of philosophy; for conscience, oncearoused, could only be satisfied by One greater than they, and mustnecessarily reject all systems which proved themselves insufficient torealize the moral idea they had evoked. 

"But to perish thus, and for such a cause, is a high honor to aphilosophy. It was this made the philosophy of Greece, like the Hebrewlaws, though in an inferior sense, a schoolmaster that led to JesusChrist, according to the expression of Clement of Alexandria. Viewed inthis light, it was a true gift of God, and had, too, the shadow of goodthings to come, awakening the presentiment and desire of them, though itcould not communicate them. Nor can we conceive a better way to preparefor the advent of Him who was to be 'the Desire of Nations' beforebecoming their Saviour. "[873]

[Footnote 873: "Religions before Christ, " pp. 101, 102. ]

In previous chapters we have endeavored to sketch the history of thedevelopment of metaphysical thought, of moral feeling and idea, and ofreligious sentiment and want, which characterized Grecian civilization. In now offering a brief _résumé_ of the history of that development, with the design of more fully exhibiting the preparatory office itfulfilled for Christianity, we shall assume that the mind of the readerhas already been furnished and disciplined by preparatory principles. Hecan scarce have failed to recognize that this development obeyed a_general law_, however modified by exterior and geographical conditions;the same law, in fact, which governs the development of all individualfinite minds, and which law may be formulated thus:--_All finite minddevelops itself, first, in instinctive determinations and spontaneousfaiths; then in rising doubt, and earnest questioning, and ill-directedinquiry; and, finally, in systematic philosophic thought, and rationalbelief_. These different stages succeed each other in the individualmind. There is, first, the simplicity and trust of childhood; secondly, the undirected and unsettled force of youth; and, thirdly, the wisdom ofmature age. And these different stages have also succeeded each other inthe universal mind of humanity. There has been, 1st. _The era ofspontaneous beliefs_--of popular and semi-conscious theism, morality, and religion, 2d. _The transitional age_--the age of doubt, of inquiry, and of ill-directed mental effort, ending in fruitless sophism, or inskepticism. 3d. _The philosophic or conscious age_--the age ofreflective consciousness, in which, by the analysis of thought, thefirst principles of knowledge are attained, the necessary laws ofthought are discovered, and man arrives at positive convictions, andrational beliefs. In the history of Grecian civilization, the first isthe Homeric age; the second is the pre-Socratic age, ending with theSophists; and the third is the grand Socratic period. History is thusthe development of the fundamental elements of humanity, according to anestablished law, and under conditions which are ordained and supervisedby the providence of God. "The unity of civilization is in the unity ofhuman nature; its varieties, in the variety of the elements ofhumanity, " which elements have been successively developed in the courseof history. All that is fundamental in human nature passes into themovement of civilization. "I say all that is fundamental; for it is theexcellency of history to take out, and throw away all that is notnecessary and essential. That which is individual shines for a day, andis extinguished forever, or stops at biography. " Nothing endures, exceptthat which is fundamental and true--that which is vital, and organizesitself, develops itself, and arrives at an historical existence. "Therefore as human nature is the matter and basis of history, historyis, so to speak, the judge of human nature, and historical analysis isthe counter-proof of psychological analysis. "[874]

[Footnote 874: Cousin's "Lectures on the History of Philosophy, " vol. I. P. 31. ] Nature, individual mind, and collective humanity, all obey thelaw of progressive development; otherwise there could be no history, forhistory is only of that which has movement and progress. Now, allprogress is from the indefinite to the definite, from the inorganic tothe organic and vital, from the instinctive to the rational, from a dim, nebulous self-feeling to a high reflective consciousness, from sensuousimages to abstract conceptions and spiritual ideas. This progressivedevelopment of nature and humanity has not been a series of creations_de novo_, without any relation, in matter or form, to that whichpreceded. All of the present was contained in embryonic infoldment inthe past, and the past has contributed its results to the present. [875]The present, both in nature, and history, and civilization, is, so tospeak, the aggregate and sum-total of the past. As the natural historyof the earth may now be read in the successive strata and deposits whichform its crust, so the history of humanity may be read in the successivedeposits of thought and language, of philosophy and art, which registerits gradual progression. As the paleontological remains imbedded in therocks present a succession of organic types which gradually improve inform and function, from the first sea-weed to the palm-tree, and fromthe protozoa to the highest vertebrate, so the history of ancientphilosophy presents a gradual progress in metaphysical, ethical, andtheistic conceptions, from the unreflective consciousness of the Homericage, to the high reflective consciousness of the Platonic period. And asall the successive forms of life in pre-Adamic ages were a preparationfor and a prophecy of the coming of man, so the advancing forms ofphilosophic thought, during the grand ages of Grecian civilization, werea preparation and a prophecy of the coming of the Son of God. 

[Footnote 875: The writer would not be understood as favoring the ideathat this development is simply the result of "natural law. " Theconnection between the past and the present is not a material, but a_mental_ connection. It is the bond of Creative Thought and Will givingto organic forces a foreseen direction towards the working out of agrand plan. See Agassiz, "Contributions to Natural History, " vol. I. Pp. 9, 10; Duke of Argyll, "Reign of Law, " ch. V. ]

We shall now endeavor to trace this process of gradual preparation forChristianity in the Greek mind--

(i. ) _In the field of_ THEISTIC _conceptions_. 

(ii. ) _In the department of_ ETHICAL _ideas and principles_. 

(iii. ) _In the region of_ RELIGIOUS _sentiment_. 

In the field of theistic conception the propædeutic office of Grecianphilosophy is seen--

I. _In the release of the popular mind from Polytheistic notion, and thepurifying and spiritualizing of the Theistic idea_. 

The idea of a Supreme Power, a living Personality, energizing in nature, and presiding over the affairs of men, is not the product of philosophy. It is the immanent, spontaneous thought of humanity. It has, therefore, existed in all ages, and revealed itself in all minds, even when it hasnot been presented to the understanding as a definite conception, andexpressed by human language in a logical form. It is the thought whichinstinctively arises in the opening reason of childhood, as the dim andshadowy consciousness of a living mind behind all the movement andchange of the universe. Then comes the period of doubt, of anxiousquestioning, and independent inquiry. The youth seeks to account tohimself for this peculiar sentiment. He turns his earnest gaze towardsnature, and through this living vesture of the infinite he seeks tocatch some glimpses of the living Soul. In some fact appreciable tosense, in some phenomenon he can see, or hear, or touch, he would faingrasp the cause and reason of all that is. But in this field of inquiryand by this method he finds only a "receding God, " who falls back as heapproaches, and is ever still beyond; and he sinks down in exhaustionand feebleness, the victim of doubt, perhaps despair. Still thesentiment of the Divine remains, a living force, in the centre of hismoral being. He turns his scrutinizing gaze within, and byself-reflection seeks for some rational ground for his instinctivefaith. There he finds some convictions he can not doubt, some ideas hecan not call in question, some thoughts he is compelled to think, somenecessary and universal principles which in their natural and logicaldevelopment ally him to an unseen world, and correlate and bind him fastto an invisible, but real God. The more his mind is disciplined byabstract thought, the clearer do these necessary and universalprinciples become, and the purer and more spiritual his ideas of God. God is now for him the First Principle of all principles, the FirstTruth of all truths; the Eternal Reason, the Immutable Righteousness, the Supreme Good. The normal and healthy development of reason, thematurity of thought, conduct to the recognition of the true God. 

And so it has been in the universal consciousness of our race asrevealed in history. There was first a period of spontaneous andunreflective Theism, in which man felt the consciousness of God, butcould not or did not attempt a rational explanation of his instinctivefaith. He saw God in clouds and heard Him in the wind. His smilenourished the corn, and cheered the vine. The lightnings were theflashes of his vengeful ire, and the thunder was his angry voice. Butthe unity of God was feebly grasped, the rays of the Divinity seemeddivided and scattered amidst the separate manifestations of power, andwisdom, and goodness, and retribution, which nature presented. Thenplastic art, to aid and impress the imagination, created its symbols ofthese separate powers and principles, chiefly in human form, and godswere multiplied. But all this polytheism still rested on a dimmonotheistic background, and all the gods were subordinated toZeus--"the Father of gods and men. " Humanity had still the sense of thedependence of all finite being on one great fountain-head ofIntelligence and Power, and all the "generated gods" were the subjectsand ministers of that One Supreme. This was the childhood of humanity sovividly represented in Homeric poetry. 

Then came a period of incipient reflection, and speculative thought, inwhich the attention of man is drawn outward to the study of nature, ofwhich he can yet only recognize himself as an integral part. He searchesfor some ἀρχή--some first principle, appreciable to sense, which in itsevolution shall furnish an explanation of the problem of existence. Hetries the hypothesis of "_water_" then of "_air_" then of "_fire_" asthe primal element, which either is itself, or in some way infoldswithin itself an informing Soul, and out of which, by vitaltransformation, all things else are produced. But here he failed to findan adequate explanation; his reason was not satisfied. Then he soughthis first principle in "_numbers_" as symbols, and, in some sense, asthe embodiment of the rational conceptions of order, proportion, andharmony, --God is the original _μονάς_--unity--One;--or else he sought itin purely abstract "_ideas_" as unity, infinity, identity, and allthings are the evolution of an eternal thought, one and identical, whichis God. And here again he fails. Then he supposes an unlimited_μῑγμα_--a chaotic mixture of elements existing from eternity, which wasseparated, combined, and organized by the energy of a Supreme Mind, the_νοῦς_ of Anaxagoras. But he holds not firmly to this great principle;"he recurs again to air, and ether, and water, as _causes_ for theordering of all things. "[876] And after repeated attempts and failures, he is disappointed in his inquiry, and falls a prey to doubt andskepticism. This was the early youth of our humanity, the period thatopens with Thales and ends with the Sophists. 

[Footnote 876: Thus Socrates complains of Anaxagoras. See "Phædo, " §108. ]

The problem of existence still waits for and demands a solution. Theheart of man, also, still cries out for the living God. The Socraticmaxim, "know thyself, " introverts the mental gaze, and self-reflectionnow becomes the method of philosophy. The Platonic analysis of thoughtreveals elements of knowledge which are not derived from the outerworld. There are universal and necessary principles revealed inconsciousness which, in their natural and logical development, transcendconsciousness, and furnish the cognition of a world of Real Being, beyond the world of sense. There are absolute truths which bridge thechasm between the seen and the unseen, the fleeting and the permanent, the finite and the infinite, the temporal and the eternal. There arenecessary laws of thought which are also found to be laws of things, andwhich correlate man to a living, personal, righteous Lord and Lawgiver. From absolute ideas Plato ascends to an _absolute Being_, the author ofall finite existence. From absolute truths to an _absolute Reason_, thefoundation and essence of all truth. From the principle of immutableright to an _absolutely righteous Being_. From the necessary idea of thegood to a being of _absolute Goodness_--that is, to _God_. This is thematurity of humanity, the ripening manhood of our race which wasattained in the Socratic age. 

The inevitable tendency of this effort of speculative thought, spreadover ages, and of the intellectual culture which necessarily resulted, was to undermine the old polytheistic religion, and to purify andelevate the theistic conception. The school of Elea rejected the grossanthropomorphism of the Homeric theology. Xenophanes, the founder of theschool, was a believer in

 "_ One God_, of all beings divine and human the greatest, Neither in body alike unto mortals, neither in ideas. "

And he repels with indignation the anthropomorphic representations ofthe Deity. 

"But men foolishly think that gods are born as men are, And have, too, a dress like their own, and their voice, and their figure:But if oxen and lions had hands like ours, and fingers, Then would horses like unto horses, and oxen to oxen, Paint and fashion their god-forms, and give to them bodiesOf like shape to their own, as they themselves too are fashioned. "[877]

Empedocles also wages uncompromising war against all representations ofthe Deity in human form--

 "For neither with head adjusted to limbs, like the human, Nor yet with two branches down from the shoulders outstretching, Neither with feet, nor swift-moving limbs, . .. . He is, wholly and perfectly, _mind_, ineffable, holy, With rapid and swift-glancing thought pervading the world. "[878]

[Footnote 877: Ritter's "History of Ancient Philosophy, " vol. I. Pp. 431, 432. ]

[Footnote 878: Ibid. , vol. I. Pp. 495, 496. ]

When speaking of the mythology of the older Greeks, Socrates maintains abecoming prudence; he is evidently desirous to avoid every thing whichwould tend to loosen the popular reverence for divine things. [879] Buthe was opposed to all anthropomorphic conceptions of the Deity. Hisfundamental position was that the Deity is the Supreme Reason, which isto be honored by men as the source of all existence and the end of allhuman endeavor. Notwithstanding his recognition of a number ofsubordinate divinities, he held that the Divine is one, because Reasonis one. He taught that the Supreme Being is the immaterial, infiniteGovernor of all;[880] that the world bears the stamp of hisintelligence, and attests it by irrefragable evidence;[881] and that heis the author and vindicator of all moral laws. [882] So that, inreality, he did more to overthrow polytheism than any of hispredecessors, and on that account was doomed to death. 

[Footnote 879: Xenophon, "Memorabilia, " bk. I. Ch. Iii. § 3. ]

[Footnote 880: Id. , ib. , bk. I. Ch. Iv. §§ 17, 18. ]

[Footnote 881: Id. , ib. , bk. I. Ch. I. § 19. ]

[Footnote 882: Ritter's "History of Ancient Philosophy, " vol. Ii. P. 63;Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy, " vol. I. P. 359. ]

It was, however, the matured dialectic of Plato which gave thedeath-blow to polytheism. "Plato, the poet-philosopher, sacrificed Homerhimself to monotheism. We may measure the energy of his conviction bythe greatness of the sacrifice. He could not pardon the syren whosesongs had fascinated Greece, the fresh brilliant poetry that hadinspired its religion. He crowned it with flowers, but banished it, because it had lowered the religious ideal of conscience. " He wassensible of the beauty of the Homeric fables, but he was also keenlyalive to their religious falsehood, and therefore he excluded the poetsfrom his ideal republic. In the education of youth, he would forbidparents and teachers repeating "the stories which Hesiod and Homer andthe other poets told us. " And after instancing a number of these stories"which deserve the gravest condemnation, " he enjoins that God must berepresented as he is in reality. "God, " says he, "is, beyond all else, good in reality, and therefore so to be represented;" "he can not doevil, or be the cause of evil;" "he is of simple essence, and can notchange, or be the subject of change;" "there is no imperfection in thebeauty or goodness of God;" "he is a God of truth, and can not lie;" "heis a being of perfect simplicity and truth in deed and word. "[883] Thereader can not fail to recognize the close resemblance between thelanguage of Plato and the language of inspiration. 

The theistic conception, in Plato, reaches the highest purity andspirituality. God is "_the Supreme Mind_, " "incorporeal, ""unchangeable, " "infinite, " "absolutely perfect, " "essentially good, ""unoriginated and eternal. " He is "the Father and Maker of the world, ""the efficient Cause of all things, " "the Monarch and Ruler of theworld, " "the Sovereign Mind that orders all things, " and "pervades allthings. " He is "the sole principle of all things, " "the beginning of alltruth, " "the fountain of all law and justice, " "the source of all orderand beauty;" in short, He is "the beginning, middle, and end of allthings. "[884]

[Footnote 883: "Republic, " bk. Ii. §§ 18-21. ]

[Footnote 884: See _ante_, ch. Xi. Pp. 377, 378, where the references toPlato's writings are given. ]

Aristotle continued the work of undermining polytheism. He defines Godas "the Eternal Reason"--the Supreme Mind. "He is the immovable cause ofall movement in the universe, the all-perfect principle. This principleor essence pervades all things. It eternally possesses perfecthappiness, and its happiness consists in energy. This primeval mover isimmaterial, for its essence is energy--it is pure thought, thoughtthinking itself--the thought of thought. "[885] Polytheism is thus sweptaway from the higher regions of the intelligence. "For several tocommand, " says he, "is not good, there should be but one chief. Atradition, handed down from the remotest antiguity, and transmittedunder the veil of fable, says that all the stars are gods, and that theDivinity embraces the whole of nature. And round this idea othermythical statements have been agglomerated, with a view to influencingthe vulgar, and for political and moral expediency; as for instance, they feigned that these gods have human shape, and are like certain ofthe animals; and other stories of the kind are added on. Now, if any onewill separate from all this the first point alone, namely, that theythought the first and deepest grounds of existence to be Divine, he mayconsider it a divine utterance. "[886] The popular polytheism, then, wasbut a perverted fragment of a deeper and purer "Theology. " This passageis a sort of obituary of polytheism. The ancient glory of paganism hadpassed away. Philosophy had exploded the old theology. Man had learnedenough to make him renounce the ancient religion, but not enough tofound a new faith that could satisfy both the intellect and the heart. "Wherefore we are not to be surprised that the grand philosophic periodshould be followed by one of incredulity and moral collapse, inaugurating the long and universal _decadence_ which was, perhaps, asnecessary to the work of preparation, as was the period of religious andphilosophic development. "

[Footnote 885: "Metaphysics, " bk. Xii. ]

[Footnote 886: "Metaphysics, " bk. Xi. Ch. Viii. § 19. ]

The preparatory office of Greek philosophy in the region of speculativethought is seen--

2. _In the development of the Theistic argument in a logicalform. _--Every form of the theistic proof which is now employed bywriters on natural theology to demonstrate the being of God wasapprehended, and logically presented, by one or other of the ancientphilosophers, excepting, perhaps, the "moral argument" drawn from thefacts of conscience. 

(I. ) _The_ ÆTIOLOGICAL _proof_, or the argument based upon the principleof causality, which may be presented in the following form:

 All genesis or becoming supposes a permanent and uncaused Being, adequate to the production of all phenomena. 

 The sensible universe is a perpetual genesis, a succession of appearances: it is "always becoming, and never really is. "

 Therefore, it must have its cause and origin in a permanent and unoriginated Being, adequate to its production. 

The major premise of this syllogism is a fundamental principle ofreason--a self-evident truth, an axiom of common sense, and as such hasbeen recognized from the very dawn of philosophy. [Greek: Ἀδύνατονγίνεσθαί τι ἐκ μηδενὸς προὔπάρχοντος]--_Ex nihilo nihil_--_Nothing whichonce was not, could ever of itself come into being_. Nothing can be madeor produced without an efficient cause, is the oldest maxim ofphilosophy. It is true that this maxim was abusively employed byDemocritus and Epicurus to disprove a Divine creation of any thing outof nothing, yet the great body of ancient philosophers, as Pythagoras, Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Plato, andAristotle, regarded it as the announcement of an universal conviction, that nothing can be produced without an efficient cause;--order can notbe generated out of chaos, life out of dead matter, consciousness out ofunconsciousness, reason out of unreason. A first principle of life, oforder, of reason, must have existed anterior to all manifestions oforder, of life, of intelligence, in the visible universe. It was clearlyin this sense that Cicero understood this great maxim of the ancientphilosophers of Greece. With him "_De nihilo nihil fit"_ is equivalentto "_Nihil sine causa_"--nothing exists without a cause. This isunquestionably the form in which that fundamental law of thought isstated by Plato: "Whatever is generated is necessarily generated from acertain cause, for it is wholly impossible that any thing should begenerated without a cause. "[887] And the efficient cause is defined as"a power whereby that which did not previously exist was afterwards madeto be. "[888] It is scarcely needful to remark that Aristotle, thescholar of Plato, frequently lays it down as a postulate of reason, "that we admit nothing without a cause. "[889] By an irresistible law ofthought, "_all phenomena present themselves to us as the expression ofpower_, and refer us to a causal ground whence they issue. "

[Footnote 887: "Timæus, " ch. Ix. ; also "Philebus, " § 45. ]

[Footnote 888: "Sophist, " § 109. ]

[Footnote 889: "Post. Analytic, " bk. Ii. Ch. Xvi. ; "Metaphysics, " bk. I. Ch. I. § 3. ]

The major premise of this syllogism is a fact of observation. 

To the eye of sense and sensible observation, to scientific inductioneven in its highest generalizations, the visible universe presentsnothing but a history and aggregation of phenomena--a succession ofappearances or effects having more or less resemblance. It is aceaseless flow and change, "a generation and corruption, " "a becoming, but never really _is_;" it is never in two successive moments the_same_. [890] All our cognitions of sameness, uniformity, causalconnection, permanent Being, real Power, are purely rational conceptions_given in thought_, supplied by the spontaneous intuition of reason asthe correlative prefix to the phenomena observed. [891]

[Footnote 890: "Timæus, " ch. Ix. ]

[Footnote 891: Ibid. ]

Therefore the ancient philosophers concluded justly, there must besomething [Greek: ἀγέννητον]--something which was never generated, something [Greek: αὐτοϕυής] and [Greek: αὐθυπόστατον]--self-originatedand self-existing, something [Greek: ταὐτόν] and [Greek:αἰώνιον]--immutable and eternal, the object of rationalapperception--which is the real ground and efficient cause of all thatappears. 

(2. ) The COSMOLOGICAL proof, or the argument based upon the principle oforder, and thus presented:

 Order, proportion, harmony, are the product and expression of Mind. 

 The created universe reveals order, proportion, and harmony. 

 Therefore, the created universe is the product of Mind. 

The fundamental law of thought which underlies this mode of proof wasclearly recognized by Pythagoras. All harmony and proportion andsymmetry is the result of _unity_ evolving itself in and pervading_multiplicity_. Mind or reason is unity and indivisibility; matter isdiverse and multiple. Mind is the determinating principle; matter isindeterminate and indefinite. Confused matter receives form, andproportion, and order, and symmetry, by the action and interpenetrationof the spiritual and indivisible element. In presence of facts of order, the human reason instinctively and necessarily affirms the presence andaction of Mind. 

"Pythagoras had long devoted his intellectual adoration to the loftyidea of Order. To his mind it seemed as the presiding genius of theserene and silent world. He had from his youth dwelt with delight uponthe eternal relations of space and number, in which the very idea ofproportion seems to find its first and immediate development, until atlength it seemed as if the whole secret of the universe was hidden inthese mysterious correspondences. The world, in all its departments, moral and material, is a living arithmetic in its development, arealized geometry in its repose; it is a '_cosmos_' (for the word isPythagorean), the expression of harmony, the manifestation to sense ofeverlasting order; and the science of _numbers_ is the truestrepresentation of its eternal laws. " Therefore, argued Pythagoras andthe Pythagoreans, as the reason of man can perceive the relations of aneternal order in the proportions of extension and number, the laws ofproportion, and symmetry, and harmony must inhere in a Divine reason, anintelligent soul, which moves and animates the universe. The harmoniesof the world which address themselves to the human mind must be theproduct of a Divine mind. The world, in its real structure, must be theimage and copy of that divine proportion which the mind of man adores. It is the sensible type of the Divinity, the outward and multipledevelopment of the Eternal Unity, the Eternal One--that is, God. 

The same argument is elaborated by Plato in his philosophy of beauty. God is with him the last reason, the ultimate foundation, the perfectideal of all beauty--of all the order, proportion, harmony, sublimity, and excellence which reigns in the physical, the intellectual, and themoral world. He is the "Eternal Beauty, unbegotten and imperishable, exempt from all decay as well as increase--the perfect--the DivineBeauty"[892] which is beheld by the pure mind in the celestial world. 

[Footnote 892: "Banquet, " § 35. ]

(3. ) The Teleological proof, or the argument based upon the principle ofintentionality or Final Cause, and is presented in the following form:

 The choice and adaptation of means to the accomplishment of special ends supposes an intelligent purpose, a Designing Mind. 

 In the universe we see such choice and adaptation of means to ends. 

 Therefore, the universe is the product of an intelligent, personal Cause. 

This is peculiarly the Socratic proof. He recognized the necessity andthe irresistibility of the conviction that the choice and adaptation ofmeans to ends is the effect of Purpose, the expression of Will. [893]There is an obviousness and a directness in this mode of argument whichis felt by every human mind. In the "Memorabilia" Xenophon has preserveda conversation of Socrates with Aristodemus in which he develops thisproof at great length. In reading the dialogue[894] in which Socratesinstances the adaptation of our organization to the external world, andthe examples of design in the human frame, we are forcibly reminded ofthe chapters of Paley, Whewell, and M'Cosh. Well might Aristodemusexclaim: "The more I consider it, the more it is evident to me that manmust be the masterpiece of some great Artificer, carrying along with itinfinite marks of the love and favor of Him who has thus formed it. " Theargument from Final Causes is pursued by Plato in the "Timæus;" and inAristotle, God is the Final Cause of all things. [895]

[Footnote 893: "Canst thou doubt, Aristodemus, whether a disposition ofparts like this (in the human body) should be the work of chance, or ofwisdom and contrivance?"--"Memorabilia, " bk. I. Ch. Iv. ]

[Footnote 894: "Memorabilia, " bk. I. Ch. Iv. ]

[Footnote 895: Aristotle clearly recognizes that an end or final causeimplies Intelligence. "The appearance of ends and means is a proof ofDesign. "--"Nat. Ausc. , " bk. Ii. Ch. Viii. ]

(4. ) The Ontological or Ideological proof, or the argument grounded onnecessary and absolute ideas, which may be thrown into the followingsyllogism:

 Every attribute or quality implies a subject, and absolute modes necessarily suppose an Absolute Being. Necessary and absolute truths or ideas are revealed in human reason as absolute modes. 

 Therefore universal, necessary, and absolute ideas are modes of the absolute subject--that is, God, the foundation and source of all truth. 

This is the Platonic proof. Plato recognized the principle of substance(οὐσία--ὑποκείμενον), and therefore he proceeds in the "Timæus" toinquire for the real ground of all existence; and in the "Republic, " forthe real ground of all truth and certitude. 

The universe consists of two parts, permanent existences and transientphenomena--being and genesis; the one eternally constant, the othermutable and subject to change; the former apprehended by the reason, thelatter perceived by sense. For each of these there must be a principle, subject, or substratum--a principle or subject-matter, which is theground or condition of the sensible world, and a principle or substance, which is the ground and reason of the intelligible world or world ofideas. The subject-matter, or ground of the sensible world, is "thereceptacle" and "nurse" of forms, an "invisible species and formlessreceiver (which is not earth, or air, or fire, or water) which receivesthe immanence of the intelligible. "[896] The subject or ground of theintelligible world is that in which ideal forms, or eternal archetypesinhere, and which impresses form upon the transitional element, andfashions the world after its own eternal models. This eternal andimmutable substance is God, who created the universe as a copy of theeternal archetypes--the everlasting thoughts which dwell in his infinitemind. 

[Footnote 896: "Timæus, " ch. Xxiv. ]

These copies of the eternal archetypes or models are perceived by thereason of man in virtue of its participation in the Ultimate Reason. Thereason of man is the organ of truth; by an innate and inalienable right, it grasps unseen and eternal realities. The essence of the soul is akinto that which is real, permanent, and eternal;--_It is the offspring andimage of God_; therefore it has a true communion with the realities ofthings, by virtue of this kindred and homogeneous nature. It can, therefore, ascend from the universal and necessary ideas, which areapprehended by the reason, to the absolute and supreme Idea, which isthe attribute and perfection of God. When the human mind hascontemplated any object of beauty, any fact of order, proportion, harmony, and excellency, it may rise to the notion of a quality commonto all objects of beauty--from a single beautiful body to two, from twoto all others; from beautiful bodies to beautiful sentiments, frombeautiful sentiments to beautiful thoughts, until, from thought tothought, we arrive at the highest thought, which has no other objectthan the perfect, absolute, _Divine Beauty_. [897] When a man has, fromthe contemplation of instances of virtue, risen to the notion of aquality common to all these instances, this quality becomes therepresentative of an ineffable something which, in the sphere ofimmutable reality, answers to the conception in his soul. "At theextreme limits of the intellectual world is the _Idea of the Good_, which is perceived with difficulty, but, in fine, can not be perceivedwithout concluding that it is the source of all that is beautiful andgood; that in the visible world it produces light, and the star whencelight directly comes; that in the invisible world it directly producestruth and intelligence. "[898] This _absolute Good is God_. 

[Footnote 897: "Banquet, " § 34. ]

[Footnote 898: "Republic, " bk. Vii. Ch. Iii. ]

The order in which these several methods of proof were developed, willat once present itself to the mind of the reader as the natural order ofthought. The first and most obvious aspect which nature presents to theopening mind is that of movement and change--a succession of phenomenasuggesting the idea of _power_. Secondly, a closer attention reveals aresemblance of phenomena among themselves, a uniformity of nature--anorder, proportion, and harmony pervading the _cosmos_, which suggest an_identity and unity of power and of reason_, pervading and controllingall things. Thirdly, a still closer inspection of nature reveals awonderful adaptation of means to the fulfillment of special ends, oforgans designed to fulfill specific functions, suggesting the idea of_purpose_, _contrivance_, and _choice_, and indicating that the powerwhich moves and determines the universe is a _personal_, _thinking_, and_voluntary_ agent. And fourthly, a profounder study of the nature ofthought, an analysis of personal consciousness, reveals that there arenecessary principles, ideas, and laws, which universally govern anddetermine thought to definite and immovable conceptions--as, forexample, the principles of causality, of substance, of identity orunity, of order, of intentionality; and that it is only under these lawsthat we can conceive the universe. By the law of substance we arecompelled to regard these ideas, which are not only laws of thought butalso of things, as inherent in a subject, or Being, who made all things, and whose ideas are reflected in the reason of man. Thus from universaland necessary ideas we rise to the _absolute Idea_, from immutableprinciples to a _First Principle of all principles_, a _First Thought_of all thoughts--that is, to _God_. This is the history of thedevelopment of thought in the individual, and in the race--_cause_, _order_, _design_, _idea_, _being_, GOD. 

CHAPTER XV. 

THE PROPÆDEUTIC OFFICE OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY _(continued)_. 

 "If we regard this sublime philosophy as a preparation for Christianity instead of seeking in it a substitute for the Gospel, we shall not need to overstate its grandeur in order to estimate its real value. "--Pressensé. 

 "Plato made me to know the true God. Jesus Christ showed me the way to Him. "--St. Augustine. 

The preparatory office of Grecian philosophy is also seen in _thedepartment of morals_. 

I. _In the awakening and enthronement of Conscience as a law of duty, and the elevation and purification of the Moral Idea_. 

The same law of evolution, which we have seen governing the history ofspeculative thought, may also be traced as determining the progress ofethical inquiry. In this department there are successive stages marked, both in the individual and the national mind. There is, first, thesimplicity and trust of childhood, submitting with unquestioning faithto prescribed and arbitrary laws; then the unsettled and ill-directedforce of youth, questioning the authority of laws, and asking reasonswhy this or that is obligatory; then the philosophic wisdom of riperyears, recognizing an inherent law of duty, which has an absoluterightness and an imperative obligation. There is first a dim and shadowyapprehension of some lines of moral distinction, and some consciousnessof obligation, but these rest mainly upon an outward law--the observedpractice of others, or the command of the parent as, in some sense, thecommand of God. Then, to attain to personal convictions, man passesthrough a stage of doubt; he asks for a ground of obligation, for anauthority that shall approve itself to his own judgment and reason. Atlast he arrives at some ultimate principles of right, some immutablestandard of duty; he recognizes an inward law of conscience, and itbecomes to him as the voice of God. He extends his analysis to history, and he finds that the universal conscience of the race has, in all ages, uttered the same behest. Should he live in Christian times, he discoversa wondrous harmony between the voice of God within the heart, and thevoice of God within the pages of inspiration. And now the convention ofpublic opinion, and the laws of the state, are revered and upheld byhim, just so far as they bear the imprimatur of reason and ofconscience--that is, of God. 

This history of the normal development of the individual mind has itscounterpart in the history of humanity. There is (1. ) _The age ofpopular and unconscious morality_; (2. ) _The transitional, skeptical, orsophistical age_; and (3. ) _The philosophic or conscious age ofmorality_. [899] In the "Republic" of Plato, we have these three erasrepresented by different persons, through the course of the dialogue. The question is started--what is Justice? and an answer is given fromthe stand-point of popular morality, by Polemarchus, who quotes thewords of the poet Simonides, "To give to each his due is just;"[900]

that is, justice is paying your debts. This doctrine being provedinadequate, an answer is given from the Sophistical point of view byThrasymachus, who defines justice as "the advantage of thestrongest"--that is, might is right, and right is might. [901] Thisanswer being sharply refuted, the way is opened for a more philosophicaccount, which is gradually evolved in book iv. , Glaucon and Adimantuspersonifying the practical understanding, which is gradually broughtinto harmony with philosophy, and Socrates the higher reason, as thepurely philosophic conception. Justice is found to be the rightproportion and harmonious development of all the elements of the soul, and the equal balance of all the interests of society, so as to secure awell-regulated and harmonious whole. 

[Footnote 899: Grant's "Aristotle's Ethics, " vol. I. P. 46. ]

[Footnote 900: "Republic, " bk. I. § 6. ]

[Footnote 901: Ibid. , bk. I. § 12. ]

The era of _popular and unconscious morality_ is represented by thetimes of Homer, Hesiod, the Gnomic poets, and "the Seven Wise Men ofGreece. "

This was an age of instinctive action, rather than reflection--of poetryand feeling, rather than analytic thought. The rules of life werepresented in maxims and proverbs, which do not rise above prudentialcounsels or empirical deductions. Morality was immediately associatedwith the religion of the state, and the will of the gods was the highestlaw for men. "Homer and Hesiod, and the Gnomic poets, constituted theeducational course, " to which may be added the saws and aphorisms of theSeven Wise Men, and we have before us the main sources of Greek views ofduty. When the question was asked--"What is right?" the answer was givenby a quotation from Homer, Hesiod, Simonides, and the like. The moralityof Homer "is concrete, not abstract; it expresses the conception of aheroic life, rather than a philosophic theory. It is mixed up with areligion which really consists in a celebration of the beauty of nature, and in a deification of the strong and brilliant qualities of humannature. It is a morality uninfluenced by a regard for a future life. Itclings with intense enjoyment and love to the present world, and thestate after death looms up in the distance as a cold and repugnantshadow. And yet it would often hold death preferable to disgrace. Thedistinction between a noble and ignoble life is strongly marked inHomer, and yet a sense of right and wrong about particular actions seemsfluctuating" and confused. [902] A sensuous conception of happiness isthe chief good, and mere temporal advantage the principal reward ofvirtue. We hear nothing of the approving smile of conscience, of inwardself-satisfaction, and peace, and harmony, resulting from the practiceof virtue. Justice, energy, temperance, chastity, are enjoined, becausethey secure temporal good. And yet, with all this imperfection, thepoets present "a remarkable picture of primitive simplicity, chastity, justice, and practical piety, under the three-fold influence of rightmoral feeling, mutual and fear of the divine displeasure. "[903]

[Footnote 902: Grant's "Aristotle's Ethics, " vol. I. P. 51. ]

[Footnote 903: Tyler, "Theology of the Greek Poets, " p. 167. ]

The _transitional, skeptical_, or _sophistical era_ begins withProtagoras. Poetry and proverbs had ceased to satisfy the reason of man. The awakening intellect had begun to call in question the old maxims and"wise saws, " to dispute the arbitrary authority of the poets, and evento arraign the institutions of society. It had already begun to seek forsome reasonable foundation of authority for the opinions, customs, laws, and institutions which had descended to them from the past, and to askwhy men were obliged to do this or that? The question whether there isat bottom any real difference between truth and error, right and wrong, was now fairly before the human mind. The ultimate standard of all truthand all right, was now the grand object of pursuit. These inquiries werenot, however, conducted by the Sophists with the best motives. They werenot always prompted by an earnest desire to know the truth, and anearnest purpose to embrace and do the right. They talked and argued formere effect--to display their dialectic subtilty, or their rhetoricalpower. They taught virtue for mere emolument and pay. They delighted, asCicero tells us, to plead the opposite sides of a cause with equaleffect. And they found exquisite pleasure in raising difficulties, maintaining paradoxes, and passing off mere tricks of oratory for solidproofs. This is the uniform representation of the sophistical spiritwhich is given by all the best writers who lived nearest to their times, and who are, therefore, to be presumed to have known them best. Grote[904] has made an elaborate defense of the Sophists; he chargesPlato with gross misrepresentation. His portraits of them are denouncedas mere caricatures, prompted by a spirit of antagonism; all antiquityis presumed to have been misled by him. No one, however, can readGrant's "Essay on the History of Moral Philosophy in Greece"[905]without feeling that his vindication of Plato is complete andunanswerable: "Plato never represents the Sophists as teaching a laxmorality to their disciples. He does not make sophistry to consist inholding wicked opinions; he represents them as only too orthodox ingeneral, [906] but capable of giving utterance to immoral paradoxes forthe sake of vanity. Sophistry rather tampers and trifles with the moralconvictions than directly attacks them. " The Sophists were wanting indeep conviction, in moral earnestness, in sincere love of truth, inreverence for goodness and purity, and therefore their trifling, insincere, and paradoxical teaching was unfavorable to goodness of life. The tendency of their method is forcibly depicted in the words of Plato:"There are certain dogmas relating to what is _just_ and _good_ in whichwe have been brought up from childhood--obeying and reverencing them. Other opinions recommending pleasure and license we resist, out ofrespect for the old hereditary maxims. Well, then, a question comes upconcerning what is right? He gives some answer such as he has beentaught, and straightway is refuted. He tries again, and is againrefuted. And, when this has happened pretty often, he is reduced to theopinion that _nothing is either right or wrong_; and in the same way ithappens about the just and the good, and all that before we have held inreverence. On this, he naturally abandons his allegiance to the oldprinciples and takes up with those he before resisted, and so, frombeing a good citizen, he becomes lawless. "[907] And, in point of fact, this was the theoretical landing-place of the Sophists. We do not saythey became practically "lawless" and antinomian, but they did arrive atthe settled opinion that right and wrong, truth and error, are solelymatter of private opinion and conventional usage. Man's own fluctuatingopinion is the measure and standard of all things. [908] They who "makethe laws, make them for their own advantage. "[909] There is no suchthing as Eternal Right. "That which _appears_ just and honorable to eachcity is so for that city, as long as the opinion prevails. "[910]

[Footnote 904: "History of Greece. "]

[Footnote 905: Aristotle's "Ethics, " vol. I. Ch. Ii. ]

[Footnote 906: "His teachings will be good counsels about a man's ownaffairs, how best to govern his family; and also about the affairs ofthe state, how most ably to administer and speak of stateaffairs. "--"Protag. , " § 26. ]

[Footnote 907: "Republic, " bk. Vii. Ch. Xvii. ]

[Footnote 908: "Theætetus, " § 23. ]

[Footnote 909: "Gorgias, " §§ 85-89. ]

[Footnote 910: "Theætetus, " §§ 65-75. ]

The age of the Sophists was a transitional period--a necessary, though, in itself considered, an unhappy stage in the progress of the humanmind; but it opened the way for, _The Socratic, philosophic_, or_conscious age of morals_. It has been said that "before Socrates therewas no morality in Greece, but only propriety of conduct. " If by this ismeant that prior to Socrates men simply followed the maxims of "theTheologians, "[911] and obeyed the laws of the state, without reflectionand inquiry as to the intrinsic character of the acts, and without anyanalysis and exact definition, so as to attain to principles of ultimateand absolute right, it must be accepted as true--there was no philosophyof morals. Socrates is therefore justly regarded as "the father of moralphilosophy. " Aristotle says that he confined himself chiefly to ethicalinquiries. He sought a determinate conception and an exact definition ofvirtue. As Xenophon has said of him, "he never ceased asking, What ispiety? what is impiety? what is noble? what is base? what is just? whatis unjust? what is temperance? what is madness?"[912] And thesequestions were not asked in the Sophistic spirit, as a dialecticexercise, or from idle curiosity. He was a perfect contrast to theSophists. They had slighted Truth, he made her the mistress of his soul. They had turned away from her, he longed for more perfect communion withher. They had deserted her for money and renown, he was faithful to herin poverty. [913] He wanted to know what piety was, that he might bepious. He desired to know what justice, temperance, nobility, couragewere, that he might cultivate and practise them. He wrote no books, delivered no lectures; he instituted no school; he simply conversed inthe shop, the market-place, the banquet-hall, and the prison. Thisphilosophy was not so much a _doctrine_ as a _life_. "What is remarkablein him is not the _system_ but the _man_. The memory he left behind himamongst his disciples, though idealized--the affection, blended withreverence, which they never ceased to feel for his person, beartestimony to the elevation of his character and his moral purity. Werecognize in him a Greek of Athens--one who had imbibed many dangerouserrors, and on whom the yoke of pagan custom still weighed; but his lifewas nevertheless a noble life; and it is to calumny we must haverecourse if we are to tarnish its beauty by odious insinuations, asLucian did, and as has been too frequently done, after him, byunskillful defenders of Christianity, [914] who imagine it is the gainerby all that degrades human nature. Born in a humble position, destituteof all the temporal advantages which the Greeks so passionately loved, Socrates exerted a kingship over minds. His dominion was the more realfor being less apparent. .. . His power consisted of three things: hisdevoted affection for his disciples, his disinterested love of truth, and the perfect harmony of his life and doctrine. .. . If he recommendedtemperance and sobriety, he also set the example; poorly clad, satisfiedwith little, he disdained all the delicacies of life. He possessed everyspecies of courage. On the field of battle he was intrepid, and stillmore intrepid when he resisted the caprices of the multitude whodemanded of him, when he was a senator, to commit the injustice ofsummoning ten generals before the tribunals. He also infringed theiniquitous orders of the thirty tyrants of Athens. The satires ofAristophanes neither moved nor irritated him. The same dauntlessfirmness he displayed when brought before his judges, charged withimpiety. 'If it is your wish to absolve me on condition that Ihenceforth be silent, I reply I love and honor you, but I ought ratherto obey the gods than you. Neither in the presence of judges nor of theenemy is it permitted me, or any other man, to use every sort of meansto escape death. It is not death but crime that it is difficult toavoid; crime moves faster than death. So I, old and heavy as I am, haveallowed myself to be overtaken by death, while my accusers, light andvigorous, have allowed themselves to be overtaken by the light-footedcrime. I go, then, to suffer death; they to suffer shame and iniquity. Iabide by my punishment, as they by theirs. All is according to order. 'It was the same fidelity to duty that made Socrates refuse to escapefrom prison, in order not to violate the laws of his country, to which, even though irritated, more respect is due than to a father. 'Let uswalk in the path, ' he says 'that God has traced for us. ' These lastwords show the profound religious sentiment which animated Socrates. .. . It is impossible not to feel that there was something divine in such alife crowned with such a death. "[914]

[Footnote 911: Homer, Hesiod, etc. ]

[Footnote 912: "Memorabilia, " bk. I. Ch. I. P. 16. ]

[Footnote 913: Lewes's "Biographical History of Philosophy, " p. 122. ]

[Footnote 914: Watson's "Institutes of Theology, " vol. I. P. 374. ]

[Footnote 915: Pressensé, "Religions before Christ, " pp. 109-111. ]

Socrates laid the foundation for conscious morality by placing theground of right and wrong in an eternal and unchangeable reason whichilluminates the reason and conscience of every man. He often assertedthat morality is a science which can not be taught. It depends mainlyupon principles which are discovered by an inward light. Accordingly heregarded it as the main business of education to "draw out" into thelight of consciousness the principles of right and justice which areinfolded within the conscience of man--to deliver the mind of the secrettruth which was striving towards the light of day. Therefore he calledhis method the "maieutic" or "obstetric" art. He felt there wassomething divine in all men (answering to his _τὸ δαιμόνιον_ or_δαιμόνιον τι_--a divine and supernatural something--a warning"voice"--a gnomic "sign"--a "law of God written on the heart"), which bya system of skillful interrogations he sought to elicit, so that eachmight hear for himself the voice of God, and, hearing, might obey. Thuswas he the "great prophet of the human conscience, " and a messenger ofGod to the heathen world, to prepare the way of the Lord. 

The morality of conscience was carried to its highest point by Plato. From the moment he became the disciple of Socrates he sympathized deeplywith the spirit and the method of his master. He had the same deepseriousness of spirit, that same earnestness of purpose, that sameinward reverence for justice, and purity, and goodness, which dwelt inthe heart of Socrates. A naturally noble nature, he loved truth with allthe glow and fervor of his young heart. He felt that if any thing gavemeaning and value to life, it must be the contemplation of absolutetruth, absolute beauty, and absolute Good. This absolute Good is God, who is the first principle of all ideas, the fountain of all the orderand proportion and beauty of the universe, the source of all the goodwhich exists in nature and in man. To practise goodness--to conform thecharacter to the eternal models of order, proportion, and excellence, isto resemble God. To aspire after perfection of moral being, to secureassimilation to God ([Greek: όμοίωσις θεῷ]) is the noble aspiration ofPlato's soul. 

When we read the "Gorgias, " the "Philebus, " and especially the"Republic, " with what noble joy are we filled on hearing the voice ofconscience, like a harp swept by a seraph's hand, uttering suchdeep-toned melodies! How does he drown the clamors of passion, thecalculations of mere expediency, the sophism of mere personal interestand utility. If he calls us to witness the triumph of the wicked in thefirst part of the "Republic, " it is in order that we may at the end ofthe book see the deceitfulness of their triumph. "As to the wicked, " hesays, "I maintain that even if they succeed at first in concealing whatthey are, most of them betray themselves at the end of their career. They are covered with opprobrium, and present evils are nothing comparedwith those that _await them in the other life_. As to the just man, whether in sickness or in poverty, these imaginary evils will turn tohis advantage in this life, _and after his death_; because theprovidence of the gods is necessarily attentive to the interests of himwho labors to become just, and to attain, by the practice of virtue, tothe most perfect resemblance to God which is possible to man. "[916] Herises above all "greatest happiness principles, " and asserts distinctlyin the "Gorgias" that it is better to suffer wrong than to dowrong. [917] "I maintain, " says he, "that what is most shameful is not tobe struck unjustly on the cheek, or to be wounded in the body; but thatto strike and wound me unjustly, to rob me, or reduce me to slavery--tocommit, in a word, any kind of injustice towards me, or what is mine--isa thing far worse and more odious for him who commits the injustice, than for me who suffer it. "[918] It is a great combat, he says, greaterthan we think, that wherein the issue is whether we shall be virtuous orwicked. Neither glory, nor riches, nor dignities, nor poetry, deservesthat we should neglect justice for them. The moral idea in Plato hassuch intense truth and force, that it has at times a striking analogywith the language of the Holy Scriptures. [919]

[Footnote 916: "Republic, " bk. X. Ch. Xii. ]

[Footnote 917: "Gorgias, " §§ 59-80. ]

[Footnote 918: Ibid. , § 137. ]

[Footnote 919: Pressensé, "Religions before Christ, " p. 129. ]

The obligation of moral rectitude is, by Plato, derived from theauthoritative utterances of conscience as the voice of God. We must doright because reason and conscience say it is right. In the "Euthyphron"he maintains that the moral quality of actions is not dependent on thearbitrary will of a Supreme Governor;--"an act is not holy because thegods love it, but the gods love it because it is holy. " The eternal lawof right dwells in the Eternal Reason of God, the idea of right in allhuman minds is a ray of that Eternal Reason; and the requirement of thedivine law that we shall do right is, and must be, in harmony with both. 

The present life is regarded by Plato as a state of probation anddiscipline, the future life as one of reward and punishment. [920]

[Footnote 920: "Republic, " bk. X. Ch. Xv. , xvi. ; "Laws, " bk. X. Ch. Xiii. ]

Plato was thus to the heathen world "the great apostle of the moralidea;" he followed up and completed the work of Socrates. "The voice ofGod, that still found a profound echo in man's heart, possessed in himan organ to which all Greece gave ear; and the austere revelation ofconscience this time embodied in language too harmonious not to enticeby the beauty of form, a nation of artists, they received it. The tablesof the eternal law, carved in purest marble and marvellously sculptured, were read by them. "

In Plato both the theistic conception and the moral idea seem to havetouched the zenith. The philosophy of Aristotle, considered as a whole, appears on one side to have passed the line of the great Hellenicperiod. If it did not inaugurate, it at least prepared the way for thedecline. It perfected logic, as the instrument of ratiocination, andgave it exactness and precision, Yet taken all in all, it was greatlyinferior to its predecessor. From the moral point of view it is adecided retrogression. The god of Aristotle is indifferent to virtue. Heis pure thought rather than moral perfection. He takes no cognizance ofman. Morality has no eternal basis, no divine type, and no futurereward. Therefore Aristotle's philosophy had little power over theconscience and heart. 

During the grand Platonic period human reason made its loftiest flight, it rose aloft and soared towards heaven, but alas! its wings, like thoseof Icarus, melted in the sun and it fell to earth again. Instead of waxit needed the strong "eagle pinions of faith" which revelation only cansupply. The decadence is strongly marked both in the Epicurean and Stoicschools. They both express the feeling of exhaustion, disappointment, and despair. The popular theology had lost its hold upon the publicmind. The gods no longer visited the earth. "The mysterious voice which, according to the poetic legend related by Plutarch, was heard out atsea--'Great Pan is dead'--rose up from every heart; the voice of anincredulous age proclaimed the coming end of paganism. The oracles weredumb. " There was no vision in the land. All faith in a beneficentoverruling Providence was lost, and the hope of immortality waswell-nigh gone. The doctrines of a resurrection and a judgment to come, were objects of derisive mockery. [921] Philosophy directed her attentionsolely to the problem of individual well-being on earth; it becamesimply a philosophy of life, and not, as with Plato, "a preparation fordeath. " The grosser minds sought refuge in the doctrines of Epicurus. They said, "Pleasure is the chief good, the end of life is to enjoyyourself;" to this end "dismiss the fear of gods, and, above all, thefear of death. " The nobler souls found an asylum with the Stoics. Theysaid, "Fata nos ducunt--The Fates lead us! Live conformable to reason. Endure and abstain!" Notwithstanding numerous and serious errors, theethical system of the Stoics was wonderfully pure. This must beconfessed by any one who reads the "Enchiridion" of Epictetus, and the"Meditations" of Aurelius. "The highest end of life is to contemplatetruth and to obey the Eternal Reason. God is to be reverenced above allthings, and universally submitted to. The noblest office of reason is tosubjugate passion and conduct to virtue. Virtue is the supreme good, which is to be pursued for its own sake, and not from fear or hope. Thatis sufficient for happiness which is seated only in the mind, andtherefore independent of external things. The consciousness ofwell-doing is reward enough without the applause of others. And no fearof loss, or pain, or even death, must be suffered to turn us aside fromtruth and virtue. "[922]

[Footnote 921: Acts xvii. 32. ]

[Footnote 922: Marcus Aurelius. ]

The preparatory office of Christianity in the field of ethics is furtherseen, II. _In the fact that, by an experiment conducted on the largest scale, it demonstrated the insufficiency of reason to elaborate a perfect idealof moral excellence, and develop the moral forces necessary to secureits realization_. 

We have seen that the moral idea in Socrates, Plato, Epictetus, MarcusAurelius, and Seneca rose to a sublime height, and that, under itsinfluence, they developed a noble and heroic character. At the same timeit must be conceded that their ethical system was marked by signalblemishes and radical defects. After all its excellence, it did not giveroundness, completeness, and symmetry to moral life. The elements whichreally purify and ennoble man, and lend grace and beauty to life, wereutterly wanting. Their systems were rather a discipline of the reasonthan a culture of the heart. The reason held in check the lower passionsand propensities of the nature but it did not evoke the softer, gentler, purer emotions of the soul. The cardinal virtues of the ancient ethicalsystems are Prudence, Justice, Temperance, and Courage, all which are inthe last analysis reduced to Wisdom. Humility, Meekness, Forgiveness ofinjuries, Love of even enemies, Universal Benevolence, RealPhilanthropy, the graces which give beauty to character and blesssociety, are scarcely known. It is true that in Epictetus and Seneca wehave some counsels to humility, to forbearance, and forgiveness; but itmust be borne in mind that Christianity was now in the air, exerting anindirect influence beyond the limits of the labors of the indefatigablemissionaries of the Cross. [923] By their predecessors, these qualitieswere disparaged rather than upheld. Resentment of injuries was applaudedas a virtue, and meekness was proclaimed a defect and a weakness. Theyknew nothing of a forgiving spirit, and were strangers to the charity"which endureth all things, hopeth all things, and never fails. " Theenlarged philanthrophy which overleaps the bounds of kindred andnationality, and embraces a common humanity in its compassionate regardsand benevolent efforts, was unknown. Socrates, the noblest of all theGrecians, was in no sense cosmopolitan in his feeling. His whole natureand character wore a Greek impress. He could scarce be tempted to gobeyond the gates of Athens, and his care was all for the Athenianpeople. He could not conceive an universal philanthropy. Plato, in hissolicitude to reduce his ideal state to a harmonious whole, answering tohis idea of Justice, sacrificed the individual. He superseded privateproperty, broke up the sacred relations of family and home, degradedwoman, and tolerated slavery. Selfishness was to be overcome, andpolitical order maintained, by a rigid communism. To harmonizeindividual rights and national interests, was the wisdom reserved forthe fishermen of Galilee. The whole method of Plato's "Politeia, "breathes the spirit of legalism in all its severity, untempered by thespirit of Love. This was the living force which was wanting to giveenergy to the ideals of the reason and conscience, to furnish highmotive to virtue, to prompt to deeds of heroic sacrifice and sufferingfor the good of others; and this could not be inspired by philosophy, nor constrained by legislation. This love must descend from above. "ThePlatonic love" was a mere intellectual appreciation of beauty, andorder, and proportion, and excellence. It was not the love of man as theoffspring and image of God, as the partaker of a common nature, and theheir of a common immortality. Such love was first revealed on earth bythe incarnate Son of God, and can only be attained by human hearts underthe inspiration of his teaching and life, and the renewing influence ofthe Holy Spirit. "Love is of God, and every one that loveth is born ofGod and knoweth God. " To "love our neighbor as ourself" is the goldenprecept of the Son of God, who is incarnate Love. The equality of allmen as "the offspring of God" had been nominally recognized by the Stoicphilosophers; its realization had been rendered possible to the popularthought by Roman conquest, law, and jurisprudence; these had preparedthe way for its fullest announcement and practical recognition by theworld. At this providential juncture St. Paul appears on Mars' Hill, andin the presence of the assembled philosophers proclaims, "_God hath madeof one blood all nations of men_. " A lofty ideal of moral excellence hadbeen attained by Plato--the conception of a high and inflexiblemorality, which contrasted most vividly with the depravity whichprevailed in Athenian society. The education "of the public assemblies, the courts, the theatres, or wherever the multitude gathered" wasunfavorable to virtue. And the inadequacy of all mere human teaching toresist this current of evil, and save the young men of the age fromruin, is touchingly and mournfully confessed by Plato. "There is not, there never was, there never will be a moral education possible that cancountervail the education of which these are the dispensers; that is, _human_ education: I except, with the proverb, that which is Divine. And, truly, any soul that in such governments escapes the common wreck, can only escape _by the special favor of heaven. "_[924] He affirms againand again that man can not by himself rise to purity and goodness. "Virtue is not natural to man, neither is it to be learned, but it comesto us by a divine influence. Virtue is the gift of God in those whopossess it. "[925] That "gift of God" was about to be bestowed, in allits fullness of power and blessing, "_through Jesus Christ our Lord_. "

[Footnote 923: Seneca lived in the second century; Epictetus, in thelatter part of the first century. ]

[Footnote 924: "Republic, " bk. Vi. Ch. Vi. , vii. ]

[Footnote 925: "Meno;" see conclusion. ]

In the department of _religious feeling_ and _sentiment_, thepropædeutic office of Greek philosophy is seen, in general, in therevealing of the immediate spiritual wants of the soul, and the distinctpresentation of the problem which Christianity alone can solve. 

I. _It awakened in man the sense of distance and estrangement from God, and the need of a Mediator--"a daysman betwixt us, that might lay hishand upon us both_"[926]

[Footnote 926: Job ix. 33. ]

During the period of unconscious and unreflective theism, the sentimentof the Divine was one of objective nearness and personal intimacy. Thegods interposed directly in the affairs of men, and held frequent andfamiliar intercourse with our race. They descend to the battle-field ofTroy, and mingle in the bloody strife. They grace the wedding-feast bytheir presence, and heighten the gladness with celestial music. Theyvisit the poor and the stranger, and sometimes clothe the old andshrivelled beggar with celestial beauty. They inspire their favoriteswith strength and courage, and fill their mouths with wisdom andeloquence. They manifest their presence by signs and wonders, by visionsand dreams, by auguries and prophetic voices. But more frequently thanall, they are seen in the ordinary phenomena of nature, the sunshine andstorm, the winds and tempests, the hail and rain. The natural is, infact, the supernatural, and all the changes of nature are the movementand action of the Divine. The feeling of dependence is immediate anduniversal, and worship is the natural and spontaneous act of man. 

But the period of reflection is inevitable. Man turns his inquiring gazetowards nature and desires, by an imperfect effort of physicalinduction, to reach "the first principle and cause of things. " Soon hediscovers the prevalence of uniformity in nature, the actions ofphysical properties and agencies, and he catches some glimpses of thereign of universal law. The natural tendency of this discovery isobvious in the weakening of his sense of dependence on the immediateagency of God. The Egyptians told Herodotus that, as their fields wereregularly irrigated by the waters of the Nile, they were less dependenton God than the Greeks, whose lands were watered by rains, and who mustperish if Jupiter did not send them showers. [927] As man advances in thefield of mere physical inquiry, God recedes; from the region ofexplained phenomena, he retires into the region of unexplainedphenomena--the border-land of mystery. The gods are driven from thewoods and streams, the winds and waves. Neptune does not absolutelycontrol the seas, nor Æolus the winds. The Divine becomes, no more aphysical ἀρχή--a nature-power, but a Supreme Mind, an ineffable Spirit, an invisible God, the Supreme Essence of Essences, the Supreme Idea ofIdeas (εἶδος αὐτὸ καθ᾿ αὑτό) apprehended by human reason alone, buthaving an independent, eternal, substantial, personal being. Through theinstrumentality of Platonism, the idea of God becomes clearer and purer. Man had learned that communion with the Divinity was something more thanan apotheosis of humanity, or a pantheistic absorption. He caughtglimpses of a higher and holier union. He had surrendered the ideal of anational communion with God, and of personal protection through afederal religion, and now was thrown back upon himself to find somechannel of personal approach to God. But alas! he could not find it. AGod so vastly elevated beyond human comprehension, who could only beapprehended by the most painful effort of abstract thought; a God soinfinitely removed from man by the purity and rectitude of hischaracter; a God who was all pure reason, seemed alien to all theyearnings and sympathies of the human heart; and such a God, dwelling inpure light, seemed inapproachable and inacessible to man. [928] Thepurifying of the religious idea had evoked a new ideal, and this idealwas painfully remote. By the energy of abstract thought man had strivento pierce the veil, and press into "the Holy of Holies, " to come intothe presence of God, and he had failed. And he had sought by moraldiscipline, by self-mortification, by inward purification, to raisehimself to that lofty plane of purity, where he might catch someglimpses of the vision of a holy God, and still he failed. Nay, more, hehad tried the power of prayer. Socrates, and Plato, and Cleanthes hadbowed the knee and moved the lips in prayer. The emperor Aurelius, andthe slave Epictetus had prayed, and prayer, no doubt, intensified theirlonging, and sharpened and agonized their desire, but it did not raisethem to a satisfying and holy _koinonia_ in the divine life. "It seemsto me"--said Plato--as Homer says of Minerva, that she removed the mistfrom before the eyes of Diomede, 'That he might clearly see 'twixt Gods and men. '

so must he, in the first place, remove from your soul the mist that nowdwells there, and then apply those things through which you will be ableto know[929] and rightly pray to God. 

[Footnote 927: Herodotus, vol. Ii. Bk. Ii. Ch. Xiii. P. 14 (Rawlinson'sedition). ]

[Footnote 928: "To discover the Maker and Father of the universe is ahard task;. .. . To make him known to all is impossible. "--"Timæus, " ch. Ix. ]

[Footnote 929: "Second Alcibiades, " § 23. ]

To develop this innate desire and "feeling after God" was the granddesign of providence in "fixing the times" of the Greek nation, and "theboundaries of their habitation. "[930] Man was brought, through a periodof discipline, to feel his need of a personal relation to God. He wasmade to long for a realizing sense of his presence--to desire above allthings a Father, a Counsellor, and a Friend--a living ear into which hemight groan his anguish, or hymn his joy; and a living heart that couldbeat towards him in compassion, and prompt immediate succor and aid. Theidea of a pure Spiritual Essence without form, and without emotion, pervading all, and transcending all, is too vague and abstract to yieldus comfort, and to exert over us any persuasive power. "Our moralweakness shrinks from it in trembling awe. The heart can not feed onsublimities. We can not make a home of cold magnificence; we can nottake immensity by the hand. "[931] Hence the need and the desire that Godshall condescendingly approach to man, and by some manifestation ofhimself in human form, and through the sensibilities of the human heart, commend himself to the heart of man--in other words, the need of an_Incarnation_. Thus did the education of our race, by the dispensationof philosophy, prepare the way for him who was consciously orunconsciously "_the Desire of Nations_, " and the deepening earnestnessand spiritual solicitude of the heathen world heralded the near approachof Him who was not only "the Hope of Israel" but "the Saviour of theworld. "

[Footnote 930: Acts xvii. 26, 27. ]

[Footnote 931: Caird. ]

The idea of an _Incarnation_ was not unfamiliar to human thought, it wasno new or strange idea to the heathen mind. The numberless metamorphosesof Grecian mythology, the incarnations of Brahm, the avatars of Vishnu, and the human form of Krishna had naturalized the thought. [932] So thatwhen the people of Lystra saw the apostles Paul and Barnabas exercisingsupernatural powers of healing, they said, "The gods have come down tous in the likeness of men!" and they called Barnabas Jupiter, and Paul, Mercurius. The idea in its more definite form may have been, and indeedwas, communicated to the world through the agency of the dispersed Jews. So that Virgil, the Roman poet, who was contemporary with Christ, seemsto re-echo the prophecy of Isaiah--

 The last age decreëd by the Fates is come, And a new frame of all things does begin; A holy progeny from heaven descends Auspicious in his birth, which puts an end To the iron age, and from which shall arise A golden age, most glorious to behold. 

[Footnote 932: Young's "Christ of History, " p. 248. ]

II. _Finally, Greek philosophy prepared the way for Christianity byawakening and deepening the consciousness of guilt, and the desire forRedemption_. 

The consciousness of sin, and the consequent need of expiation for sin, were gradually unfolded in the Greek mind. The idea of sin was at firstrevealed in a confused and indefinite feeling of some external, supernatural, and bewildering influence which man can not successfullyresist; but yet so in harmony with the sinner's inclination, that he cannot divest himself of all responsibility. "Homer has no word answeringin comprehensiveness or depth of meaning to the word _sin_, as it isused in the Bible. .. .. The noun _ἁμαρτία_ which is appropriated toexpress this idea in the Greek of the New Testament, does not occur inthe Homeric poems. .. .. The word which is most frequently employed toexpress wrong-doing of every kind is _ἄτη_, with its correspondingverb. .. .. The radical signification of the word seems to be abefooling--a depriving one of his senses and his reason, as byunseasonable sleep, and excess of wine, joined with the influence ofevil companions, and the power of destiny, or the deity. Hence, theGreek imagination, which impersonated every great power, very naturallyconceived of Ἄτη as a person, a sort of omnipresent and universal causeof folly and sin, of mischief and misery, who, though the daughter ofJupiter, yet once fooled or misled Jupiter himself, and thenceforth, cast down from heaven to earth, walks with light feet over the heads ofmen, and makes all things go wrong. Hence, too, when men come to theirsenses, and see what folly and wrong they have perpetrated, they castthe blame on Ἄτη, and so, ultimately, on Jupiter and the gods. "[933]

[Footnote 933: Tyler, "Theology of the Greek Poets, " pp. 174, 175. ]

 "Oft hath this matter been by Greeks discussed, And I their frequent censure have incurred: Yet was not I the cause; but Jove, and Fate, And gloomy Erinnys, who combined to throw A strong delusion o'er my mind, that day I robb'd Achilles of his lawful prize. What could I do? a Goddess all o'erruled, Daughter of Jove, dread Até, baleful power Misleading all; with light step she moves, Not on the earth, but o'er the heads of men. With blighting touch, and many hath caused to err. "[934]

And yet, though Agamemnon here attempts to shuffle off the guilt of histransgression upon Até, Jove, and Fate, yet at other times he confesseshis folly and wrong, and makes no attempt to cast the responsibility onthe gods. [935] Though misled by a "baleful power, " he was not compelled. Though tempted by an evil goddess, he yet followed his own sinfulpassions, and therefore he owns himself responsible. 

To satisfy the demands of divine justice, to show its hatred of sin, andto deter others from transgression, sin is punished. Punishment is thepenalty due to sin; in the language of Homer, it is the payment of adebt incurred by sin. When the transgressor is punished he is said to"pay off, " or "pay back" his crimes; in other words, to expatiate oratone for them. 

 "If not at once, Yet soon or late will Jove assert their claim, And heavy penalty the perjured pay With their own blood, their children's, and their wives'. "[936]

At the same time the belief is expressed that the gods may be, and oftenare, propitiated by prayers and sacrifices, and thus the penalty isremitted. 

 "The Gods themselves, in virtue, honor, strength, Excelling thee, may yet be mollified; For they when mortals have transgressed, or fail'd To do aright, by sacrifice and pray'r, Libations and burnt-off'rings, may be sooth'd. "[937]

[Footnote 934: "Iliad, " bk. Xix. L. 91-101 (Lord Derby's translation). ]

[Footnote 935: Ibid. , bk. Ix. L. 132-136. ]

[Footnote 936: Ibid. , bk. Iv. L. 185-188. ]

[Footnote 937: Ibid. , bk. Ix. L. 581-585. ]

Polytheism, then, as Dr. Schaff has remarked, had the voice ofconscience, and a sense, however obscure, of sin. It felt the need ofreconciliation with deity, and sought that reconciliation by prayer, penance, and sacrifice. [938]

The sense of the exceeding sinfulness of sin, and the absolute need ofexpiation, is determined with increasing clearness and definiteness inthe tragic poets. 

The first great law which the Tragedians recognize, as a law written onthe heart, is "that the sinner must suffer for his sins. " The connectionbetween sin and suffering is constantly recognized as a natural andnecessary connection, like that between sowing and reaping. 

 A haughty spirit, blossoming, bears a crop Of woe, and reaps a harvest of despair. [939]

"Lust and violence beget lust and violence, and vengeance too, at theappointed time. "[940] "Impiety multiplies and perpetuates itself. "[941]"The sinner pays the debt he contracted, ends the career that hebegins, "[942] "and drinks to the dregs the cup of cursing which hehimself had filled. "[943] Conscience is the instrument in the hands ofJustice and Vengeance by which the Most High inflicts punishment. Theretributions of sin are "wrought out by God. "

The consequences of great crimes, especially in high places, extend toevery person and every thing connected with them. "The country and thecountry's gods are polluted. "[944] "The army and the people share in thecurse. "[945] "The earth itself is polluted with the shedding ofblood, "[946] "and even the innocent and the virtuous who share theenterprises of the wicked may be involved in their ruin, as the piousman must sink with the ungodly when he embarks in the same ship. "[947]

[Footnote 938: Tyler, "Theology of the Greek Poets, " p. 258. ]

[Footnote 938: Æschylus, "Persæ, " l. 821. ]

[Footnote 940: "Agamemnon, " l. 763. ]

[Footnote 941: Ibid. , l. 788. ]

[Footnote 942: Ibid. , l. 1529. ]

[Footnote 943: Ibid. , l. 1397. ]

[Footnote 944: Ibid. , l. 1645. ]

[Footnote 945: "Persæ, " _passim. _]

[Footnote 946: "Sup. , " 265. ]

[Footnote 947: "Theb. , " p. 602. ]

The pollution and curse of sin, when once contracted by an individual, or entailed upon a family, will rest upon them and pursue them till thepolluted individual or the hated and accursed race is extinct, unless insome way the sin can be expiated, or some god interpose to arrest thepenalty. The criminal must die by the hand of justice, and even in Hadesvengeance will still pursue him. [948] Others may in time be washed awayby ablutions, worn away by exile and pilgrimage, and expiated byofferings of blood. [949] But great crimes can not be washed away; "Forwhat expiation is there for blood when once it has fallen on theground. "[950] Thus the law (_[Greek: νόμος]_)--for so it is expresslycalled--as from an Attic Sinai, rolls its reverberating thunders, andpronounces its curses upon sin, from act to act and from chorus tochorus of that grand trilogy--the "Agamemnon, " the "Choephoroe, " and the"Eumenides. "

[Footnote 948: "Sup. , " l. 227. ]

[Footnote 949: "Eum. , " l. 445 seq. ]

[Footnote 950: "Choeph. , " l. 47. ]

But after the law comes the gospel. First the controversy, then thereconciliation. A dim consciousness of sin and retribution as a fact, and of reconciliation as a _want_, seems to have revealed itself even inthe darkest periods of history. This consciousness underlies not a fewof the Greek tragedies. "The 'Prometheus Bound' was followed by the'Prometheus Unbound, ' reconciled and restored through the interventionof Jove's son. The 'Œdipus Tyrannus' of Sophocles was completed by the'Œdipus Colonus, ' where he dies in peace amid tokens of divine favor. And so the 'Agamemnon' and 'Choephoroe' reach their consummation only inthe 'Eumenides, ' where the Erinyes themselves are appeased, and theFuries become the gracious ones. This is not, however, without a specialdivine interposition, and then only after a severe struggle between thepowers that cry for justice and those that plead for mercy. "

The office and work which, in this trilogy, is assigned to Jove's son, Apollo, must strike every reader as at least a remarkable resemblance, if not a foreshadowing of the Christian doctrine of _reconciliation_. "This becomes yet more striking when we bring into view the relation inwhich this reconciling work stands to [Greek: Ζεὺς Σωτήρ], JupiterSaviour--[Greek: Ζεὺς τρίτος], Jupiter the third, who, in connectionwith Apollo and Athena, consummates the reconciliation. Not only isApollo a [Greek: Σωτήρ], a Saviour, who, having himself been exiled fromheaven among men, will pity the poor and needy;[951] not only doesAthena sympathize with the defendant at her tribunal, and, uniting theoffice of advocate and judge, persuade the avenging deities to beappeased;[952] but Zeus is the beginning and end of the whole process. Apollo appears as the advocate of Orestes only at her bidding;[953]Athena inclines to the side of the accused, as the offspring of thebrain of Zeus, and of like mind with him. "[954] Orestes, after hisacquittal, says that he obtained it

 "By means of Pallas and of Loxias And the third Saviour who doth all things sway. "[955]

Platonism reveals a still closer affinity with Christianity in itsdoctrine of sin, and its sense of the need of salvation. Plato issacredly jealous for the honor and purity of the divine character, andrejects with indignation every hypothesis which would make God theauthor of sin. "God, inasmuch as he is good, can not be the cause of allthings, as the common doctrine represents him to be. On the contrary, heis the author of only a small part of human affairs; of the larger parthe is not the author; for our evil things far outnumber our good things. The good things we must ascribe to God, whilst we must seek elsewhere, and not in him, the causes of evil. "[956] The doctrine of the poets, which would in some way charge on the gods the errors of men, he sternlyresists. We must express our disapprobation of Homer, or any other poet, if guilty of such foolish blunders about the gods as to tell us[957]

 'Fast by the threshold of Jove's court are placed Two casks, one stored with evil, one with good, '

And that he for whom the Thunderer mingles both

 'He leads a life checker'd with good and ill. '

[Footnote 951: "Sup. , " l. 214. ]

[Footnote 952: "Eum. , " l. 970. ]

[Footnote 953: Ibid. , l. 616. ]

[Footnote 954: Ibid. , l. 664, 737. ]

[Footnote 955: Tyler's "Theology of the Greek Poets, " especially ch. V. , from which the above materials are drawn. ]

[Footnote 956: "Republic, " bk. Ii. Ch. Xviii. ]

[Footnote 957: "Iliad, " xxiv. , l. 660. ]

Nor can we let our young people know that, in the words of Æschylus--

 "'When to destruction God will plague a house He plants among the members guilt and sin. '"[958]

Whatever in the writings of Homer and the tragic poets give countenanceto the notion that God is, in the remotest sense the author of sin, mustbe expunged. Here is clearly a great advance in ethical conceptions. 

The great defect in the ethical system of Plato was the identificationof evil with the inferior or corporeal nature of man--"the irascible andconcupiscible elements, " fashioned by the junior divinities. Therational and immortal part of man's nature, which is derived immediatelyfrom God--the Supreme Good, naturally chooses the good as its supremeend and destination. Hence he adopted the Socratic maxim "that no man iswillingly evil, " that is, no man deliberately chooses evil as evil, butonly as a _seeming_ good--he does not choose evil as an end, though hemay choose it voluntarily as a means. Plato manifests great solicitudeto guard this maxim from misconception and abuse. Man has, in hisjudgment, the power to act in harmony with his higher reason, orcontrary to reason; to obey the voice of conscience or the clamors ofpassion, and consequently he is the object of praise or blame, reward orpunishment. "When a man does not consider himself, but others, as thecause of his own sins, . .. . And even seeks to excuse himself from blame, he dishonors and injures his own soul; so, also, when contrary toreason. .. . He indulges in pleasure, he dishonors it by filling it withvice and remorse. "[959] The work and effort of life, the end of thisprobationary economy, is to make reason triumphant over passion, anddiscipline ourselves to a purer and nobler life. 

[Footnote 958: "Republic, " bk. Ii. Ch, xviii. , xix. ]

[Footnote 959: "Laws, " bk. V. Ch. I. ]

The obstacles to a virtuous life are, however, confessedly numberless, and, humanly speaking, insurmountable. To raise one's self above theclamor of passion, the power of evil, the bondage of the flesh, isacknowledged, in mournful language, to be a hopeless task. A cloud ofsadness shades the brow of Plato as he contemplates the fallen state ofman. In the "Phædrus" he describes, in gorgeous imagery, the purity, andbeauty, and felicity of the soul in its anterior and primeval state, when, charioteering through the highest arch of heaven in company withthe Deity, it contemplated the divine justice and beauty; but "thishappy life, " says he, "we forfeited by our transgression. " Allured bystrange affections, our souls forgot the sacred things that we were madeto contemplate and love--we _fell_. And now, in our fallen state, thesoul has lost its pristine beauty and excellence. It has become moredisfigured than was Glaucus, the seaman "whose primitive form was notrecognizable, so disfigured had he become by his long dwelling in thesea. "[960] To restore this lost image of the good, --to regain "thisprimitive form, " is not the work of man, but God. Man can not savehimself. "Virtue is not natural to man, neither is it to be learned, butit comes by a divine influence. _Virtue, is the gift of God_. "[961] Heneeds a discipline, "an education which is divine. " If he is saved fromthe common wreck, it must be "by the special favor of Heaven. "[962] Hemust be delivered from sin, if ever delivered, by the interposition ofGod. 

[Footnote 960: "Republic, " bk. X. Ch. Xi. ]

[Footnote 961: "Meno. "]

[Footnote 962: "Republic, " bk. Vi. Ch. Vi. , vii. ]

Plato was, in some way, able to discover the need of a Saviour, todesire a Saviour, but he could not predict his appearing. Hints areobscurely given of a Conqueror of sin, an Assuager of pain, an Averterof evil in this life, and of the impending retributions of the futurelife; but they are exceedingly indefinite and shadowy. In all instancesthey are rather the language of _desire_, than of hope. Platonismawakened in the heart of humanity a consciousness of sin and a profoundfeeling of want--the want of a Redeemer from sin, a spiritual, a divineRemedy for its moral malady--and it strove after some remedial power. But it was equally conscious of failure and defeat. It could enlightenthe reason, but it could only act imperfectly on the will. Platonic wasa striking counterpart to Pauline experience prior to the apostle'sdeliverance by the power and grace of Christ. It discovered that "theLaw is holy, and the commandment is holy, and just, and good. " Itrecognized that "it is spiritual, but man is carnal, the slave of sin. "It could say, "What I do I approve not; for I do not what I would, butwhat I hate. But if my will [my better judgment] is against what I do, Iconsent unto the Law that it is good. And now it is no more I that doit, but sin, that dwelleth in me. For I know that in me, that is, in myflesh, good abideth not, for to will is present with me, but the powerto do the right is absent: the good that I would, I do not; but the evilthat I would not, that I do. I consent gladly to the law of God in myinner man ['the rational and immortal nature'[963]]; but I behold a lawin my members ['the irascible and concupiscible nature'[964]] warringagainst the law of my mind (or reason), and bringing me into captivityto the law of sin which is in my members. _Oh wretched man that I am!who shall deliver me from the body of this death_?"[965] Paul was ableto say, "I thank God (that he hath now delivered me), through JesusChrist our Lord!" Platonism could only desire, and hope, and wait forthe coming of a Deliverer. 

[Footnote 963: Plato. ]

[Footnote 964: Ibid. ]

[Footnote 965: Romans, vii. ]

This consciousness of the need of supernatural light and help, and thisaspiration after a light supernatural and divine, which Plato inheritedfrom Socrates, constrained him to regard with toleration, and evenreverence, every apparent approach, every pretension, even, to a divineinspiration and guidance in the age in which he lived. "'The greatestblessings which men receive come through the operation of _phrensy_([Greek: μανία]--inspired exaltation), when phrensy is the gift of God. The prophetess of Delphi, and the priestess of Dodona, many are thebenefits which in their phrensies (moments of inspiration) they havebestowed upon Greece; but in their hours of self-possession, few ornone. And too long were it to speak of the Sibyl, and others, who, inspired and prophetic, have delivered utterances beneficial to thehearers. Indeed, this word phrenetic or maniac is no reproach; it isidentical with mantic--prophetic. [966] And often when diseases andplagues have fallen upon men for the sins of their forefathers, somephrensy too has broken forth, and in prophetic strain has pointed out aremedy, _showing how the sin might be expiated, and the gods appeased_(by prayers, and purifications, and atoning rites). .. . So many and yetmore great effects could I tell you of the phrensy which comes from thegods. "[967] Some have discerned in all this merely the food for a feebleridicule. They regard these sentiments as simply an evidence of thepower and prevalence of superstition clouding the loftiest intellects inancient times. By the more thoughtful and philosophic mind, however, they will be accepted as an indication of the imperishable and universalfaith of humanity in a supernatural and supersensuous world, and in thepossibility of some communication between heaven and earth. [968] Andabove all, it is a conclusive proof that Plato believed that theknowledge of _salvation_--of a remedy for sin, a method of expiation forsin, a means of deliverance from the power and punishment of sin, mustbe revealed from Heaven. 

[Footnote 966: [Greek: Mανία], phrensy; _[Greek: μάντις]_, aprophet--one who utters oracles in a state of divine phrensy; _[Greek:μαντική]_, the prophetic art. ]

[Footnote 967: "Phædrus, " § 47-50 (Whewell's translation). ]

[Footnote 968: "_Vetus opinio est_, jam usque ab heroicis ductatemporibus, eaque et populi Romani et _omnium gentium_ firmata consensu, versari quandem inter homines divinationem. "--Cicero, "De Divin. , " i. I. ]

Paul, then, found, even in that focus of Paganism, the city of Athens, religious aspirations tending towards Jesus Christ. A true philosophicmethod, notwithstanding its shortcomings and imperfections, concluded bydesiring and seeking "the Unknown God, " by demanding him from all formsof worship, from all schools of philosophy. The great work ofpreparation in the heathen world consisted in the developing of the_desire_ for salvation. It proved that God is the great want of everyhuman soul; that there is a profound affinity between conscience and theliving God; and that Tertullian was right when he wrote the "TestimoniumAnimæ naturaliter Christianæ. "[969] And when it was sufficientlydemonstrated that "the world by philosophy knew not God (as a RedeemingGod and Saviour), then it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching tosave them that believe. " This was all a dispensation of divineprovidence, which was determined by, or "in, the wisdom of God. "[970]

The history of the religions and philosophies of human origin thusbecomes to us a striking confirmation of the truth of Christianity. Itshows there is a wondrous harmony between the instinctive wants andyearnings of the human heart, as well as the necessary ideas and laws ofthe reason, and the fundamental principles of revealed religion. Thereis "a law written on the heart"--written by the finger of God, whichcorresponds to the laws written by the same finger on "tables of stone. "There are certain necessary and immutable principles and ideas infoldedin the reason of man, which harmonize with the revelations of theEternal Logos in the written word. [971] There are instinctive longings, mysterious yearnings of the human heart, to which that unveiling of theheart of God which is made in the teaching and life of the incarnate Godmost satisfyingly answers. Within the depths of the human spirit thereis an "oracle" which responds to the voice of "the living oracles ofGod. "

[Footnote 969: Pressensé, "Religions before Christ" (Introduction);Neander, "Church History, " vol. I. (Introduction). ]

[Footnote 970: I Corinthians, i. 21. ]

[Footnote 971: "The surmise of Plato, that the world of appearancesubsists in and by a higher world of Divine Thought, is confirmed byChristianity when it tells us of a Divine subsistence--that Eternal Wordby whom and in whom all things consist. "--Vaughan, "Hours with theMystics, " vol. I. P. 213. ]

Here, then, are two distinct and independent revelations--the unwrittenrevelation which God has made to all men in the constitution of thehuman mind, and the external written revelation which he has made in theperson and teaching of his Son. And these two are perfectly harmonious. We have here two great volumes--the volume of conscience, and the volumeof the New Testament. We open them, and find they announce the _same_truths--one in dim outline, the other in a full portraiture. There arethe same fundamental principles underlying both revelations. They bothbear the impress of _divinity_. The history of philosophy may have beenmarked by many errors of interpretation; so, also, has the history ofdogmatic theology. Men may have often misunderstood and misinterpretedthe dictates of conscience; so have theologians misunderstood andmisinterpreted the dictates of revelation. The perversions of conscienceand reason have been plead in defense of error and sin; and so, forages, have the perversions of Scripture been urged in defense ofslavery, oppression, falsehood, and wrong. Sometimes the misunderstoodutterances of conscience, of philosophy, and of science have beenarrayed against the incorrect interpretations of the Word of God. Butwhen both are better understood, and more justly conceived, they arefound in wondrous harmony. When the New Testament speaks to man of God, of duty, of immortality, and of retribution, man feels that itsteachings "commend themselves to his conscience" and reason. When itspeaks to him of redemption, of salvation, of eternal life andblessedness, he feels that it meets and answers all the wants andlongings of his heart. Thus does Christianity throw light upon theoriginal revelations of God in the human conscience, and answers all theyearnings of the human soul. So it is found in individual experiences, so it has been found in the history of humanity. As Leverrier and Adamswere enabled to affirm, from purely mathematical reasoning, that anotherplanet must exist beyond _Uranus_ which had never yet been seen by humaneyes, and then, afterwards, that affirmation was gloriously verified inthe discovery of _Neptune_ by the telescope of Galle; so the reasoningsof ancient philosophy, based on certain necessary laws of mind, enabledman to affirm the existence of a God, of the soul, of a futureretribution, and an eternal life beyond the grave; and, then, subsequently, these were brought fully into light, and verified by theGospel. 

We conclude in the words of Pressensé: "To isolate it from the past, would be to refuse to comprehend the nature of Christianity itself, andthe extent of its triumphs. Although the Gospel is not, as has beenaffirmed, the product of anterior civilizations--a mere compound ofGreek and Oriental elements--it is not the less certain that it bringsto the human mind the satisfaction vainly sought by it in the East as inthe West. _Omnia subito_ is not its device, but that of the Gnosticheresy. Better to say, with Clement of Alexandria and Origen, that thenight of paganism had its stars to light it, but that they called to theMorning-star which stood over Bethlehem. "

"If we regard philosophy as a preparation for Christianity, instead ofseeking in it a substitute for the Gospel, we shall not need tooverstate its grandeur in order to estimate its real value. "

CONTENTS. 

A. 

 Abstraction, comparative and immediate, 187-189; 362-364. 

 Æschylus, his conception of the Supreme Divinity, 146; his recognition of human guilt, and need of expiation, 515-517. 

 Ætiological proof of the existence of God, 487-489. 

 Anaxagoras, an Eclectic, 311; in his physical theory an Atomist, 312; taught that the Order of the universe can only be explained by Intelligence, 312; his psychology, 313; the teacher of Socrates, 313. 

 Anaximander, his first principle _the infinite_, 290; his infinite a chaos of primary elements, 290. 

 Anaximenes, a vitalist, 286; his first principle _air_, 287. 

 Aristotle, his opinion of the popular polytheism of Greece, 157; his classification of causes, 280, 404, 405; his misrepresentations of Pythagoras, 299; his classification of the sciences, 389; his Organon, 389-394; his Logic, 394-403; his Theology, 404-417; his Ethics, 417-421; his Categories, 395; his logical treatises, 396; on induction and deduction, 396-398; his psychology, 398, 401; on how the knowledge of first principles is attained, 394, 402, 403; on Matter and Form, 405-408; on Potentiality and Actuality, 408-412; his proof of the Divine existence, 412-415; on the chief good of man, 419, 420; his doctrine of the Mean, 420, 421; defect of his ethical system, 505. 

 [Archai], or first principles, the grand object of investigation in Greek Philosophy, 271, 274, 279, 280. 

 Athenians, criticism on Plutarch's sketch of their character, 45; their vivacity, 45; love of freedom, 46--and of country, 46; private life of, 47; intellectual character of, 48; inquisitive and analytic, 48; rare combinations of imagination and reasoning powers, 49; religion of, 98; the Athenians a religious people, 102; their faith in the being and providence of God, 107; their consciousness of dependence on God, 110, 116; their religious emotions, 117; their deep consciousness of sin and guilt, 122-124; their sense of the need of expiation, 124, 125; their religion exerted some wholesome moral influence, 162, 163. 

 Athens, topography of 27; the Agora, 28; its porticoes, 29; the Acropolis, 30; its temples, 31; the Areopagus, 33; sacred objects in, 98, 99; images of the gods, 99; localities of schools of philosophy in, 266-268. 

 Attica, geographical boundaries of, 26; a classic land, 34; its geographical and cosmical conditions providentially ordained for great moral ends, 34, 35; soil of, not favorable to agriculture, 40--necessitated industry and frugality, 41; the climate of, 41--its influence on the mental character of the people, 42. 

B. 

 Bacon, his assertion that the search after final causes had misled scientific inquirers, 222. 

C. 

 Categories of Aristotle, 395. 

 Causality, principle of, 189; assailed by the Materialists, 194--especially by Comte, 203-209; the intuition of _power_ a fact of immediate consciousness, 204; consciousness of _effort_ the type of all force, 211; Aristotle on Causality, 413; ætiological proof of existence of God, 487-489. 

 Cause, origin of the idea of, 204, 205. 

 Causes, Aristotle's classification of, 280, 404, 405. 

 Chief good of man, Aristotle on, 419, 420. 

 Cleanthes, his hymn to Jupiter, 452, 453. 

 Comte, his theory of the origin of religion, 57-65; his doctrine that all knowledge is confined to material phenomena, 203; denies all causation, both efficient and final, 203-214. 

 Conditioned, law of the, 227, 228; is contradictory, 250; as a ground of faith, meaningless and void, 251. 

 Cosmological proof of the existence of God, 489, 490. 

 Cousin, his theory that religion had its outbirth in the spontaneous apperceptions of reason, 78-84; criticism thereon, 84-86. 

 Criterion of truth, Plato's search after, 333, 334. 

 Cudworth, his interpretation of Grecian mythology, 139, 143. 

 Cuvier, on final causes, 216, 222. 

D. 

 Darwin, his inability to explain the facts of nature without recognizing design, 221, 222. 

 Democritus, taught that atoms and the vacuum are the beginning of all things, 292; an absolute materialist, 293. 

 Dependence, consciousness of, the foundation of primary religious emotions, 110-113. 

 Development, law of mental, 478; three successive stages clearly marked, in the individual, 478--in the universal mind of humanity, 479, 480; (1) in the field of Theistic conceptions, 481-494; (2) in the department of morals, 495-509; (3) in the department of religious sentiment, 509-522. 

 Dialectic of Plato, 353-369. 

 Dogmatic Theologians, assert that all our knowledge of God is derived from the teaching of the Scriptures, 86, 167; cast doubt upon the principle of causality, 253-255--upon the principle of the unconditioned, 255-257--upon the principle of unity, 258-261--and upon the immutable principles of morality, 261-263. 

 Dynamical or Vital school of ancient philosophers, 282-289. 

E. 

 Eclecticism of Anaxagoras, 311. 

 Emotions, the religious, 117-122; sentiment of the Divine exists in all minds, 119-121; also instinctive yearning after the Invisible, 121, 122. 

 Empedocles, a believer in one Supreme God, 153. 

 Epicurus, his theory of the origin of religion, 56, 57; his Ethics, 427-432; his Physics, 433-438; taught that pleasure is the chief end of life, 428--that ignorance of nature is the sole cause of unhappiness, 432--that Physics and Psychology are the only studies conducive to happiness, 432--that the universe is eternal and infinite, 433--that concrete bodies are combinations of atoms, 434--that atoms have spontaneity, 436, and some degree of freedom, 436, 437; the parts of the world self-formed, 437, 438; plants, animals, and man are spontaneously generated, 438; a state of savagism the primitive condition of man, 439; his Atheism, 441; his Psychology, 442-444; the soul material and mortal, 445, 446. 

 Eternity, Platonic notion of, 349 (_note_), 372, 373. 

 Eternity of Matter, how taught by Plato, 371-373; distinctly affirmed by Epicurus, 433. 

 Eternity of the Soul, Plato's doctrine of, 373-375. 

 Ethical ideas and principles, gradual development of, 495, 496; (1) the age of popular and unconscious morals, 497, 498; (2) the transitional or sophistical age, 498-500; (3) the philosophic or conscious age, 500-506. 

 Ethics of Plato, 383-387, 502-505; of Aristotle, 417-42l; of Epicurus, 427-432; of the Stoics, 454, 456. 

 Expiation for sin, the need of, 124; universally acknowledged, 124--especially in Grecian mythology, 125--and in the language of Greece and Rome, 125. 

F. 

 Facts of the universe, classification of, 175-177. 

 Fathers, the early, recognized the propædeutic office of Greek philosophy, 473-475. 

 Feeling, theories which ground all religion on, 70-74; its inadequacy, 74-78. 

 Final Causes, impossibility of interpreting nature without recognizing, 221, 222; the assumption of final causes a means of discovery, 222, 223; Cuvier on, 216, 222; argument of Socrates from, 320-324; Plato on, 380-382; Aristotle on, 405, 413, 414; teleological proof of the existence of God, 490, 491. 

 Force, the idea of, rejected by Comte, 207. 

 Forces, all of one type, and that type mind, 211. 

 Freedom, human, 19; exists under limitations, 20; both admitted and denied by Comte, 208, 209; of Will, as taught by Plato, 386, 387; admitted by Epicurus, 486. 

G. 

 Geoffrey St. Hilaire, his pretense of not ascribing any intentions to nature, 216, 217. 

 Geography and History, relations between, 14; opposite theories concerning, 15; theory of Buckle, 16--of Ritter, Guyot, and Coubin, 16; the relation one of adjustment and harmony, 16. 

 God, universality of idea of, 89; Athenians believed in one God, 107, 147, 148; idea of God a common phenomenon of human intelligence, 168, 169; the development of this idea dependent on experience conditions, 169-172; the phenomena of the universe demand a God for their explanation, 172-175: there are principles revealed in consciousness which necessitate the idea of God, 184-189; proofs of the existence of God employed by Aristotle, 412-416--by Socrates, 320-324; views of God entertained by the Stoics, 452, 453; logical proofs of the existence of God developed by Greek philosophy, 487-494; gradual development of Theistic conception, 481-487. 

 Gods of Grecian Mythology, how regarded by the philosophers, 151-157; views of Plato regarding them, 383. 

 Great men, represent the spirit of their age, 20; the creation of a providence interposing in history, 21. 

 Greece, its geographical relations favorable to free intercourse with the great historic nations, 35--to commerce, 36--to the diffusion of knowledge, 36--and to a high degree of civilization, 36; peculiar configuration of Greece conducive to activity and freedom, 36-38--and independence, 38; natural scenery, 43--its influence on imagination and taste, 44. 

 Greek Civilization, a preparation for Christianity, 465-468. 

 Greek Language, a providentially prepared vehicle for the perfect revelation of Christianity, 468-470. 

 Greek Philosophy, first a philosophy of Nature, 271, 281, 282; next a philosophy of Mind, 271, 316-318; lastly a philosophy of Life, 271, 422; prepared the way for Christianity, 457-522. 

 Greeks, the masses of the people believed in one Supreme God, 147, 148. 

 Guilt, consciousness of, a universal fact, 122, 123; recognized in Grecian mythology, 123, 124; awakened and deepened by philosophy, 513-518. 

H. 

 Hamilton, Sir W. , teaches that philosophic knowledge is the knowledge of effects as dependent on causes, 224, 225; and of qualities as inherent in substances, 225, 226; and yet asserts all human knowledge is necessarily confined to phenomena, 227; his doctrine of the relativity of all knowledge, 227, 229-236; his philosophy of the conditioned, 228; conditional limitation the law of all thought, 236-242; the Infinite a mere negation of thought, 242-246; asserts we must believe in the infinity of God, 246; takes refuge in faith, 247; faith grounded on the law of the conditioned, 243, 249--that is, on contradiction, 249, 250. 

 Hegel, his philosophy of religion, 65-70. 

 Heraclitus, his first principle _ether_, 288; change, the universal law of all existence, 288; a Materialistic Pantheist, 289. 

 Hesiod, on the generation of the gods, 142. 

 Homer, his conception of Zeus, 144, 145. 

 Homeric doctrine of sin, 513, 514. 

 Homeric theology, 143-145, 509, 510. 

 Humanity, fundamental ideas and laws of, 18; developed and modified by exterior conditions, 19; the most favorable conditions existed in Athens. 

I. 

 Idealism, furnishes no adequate explanation of the common belief in an external world, 193, 199--and of a personal self, 200-202; Cosmothetic Idealism, 305; absolute Idealism, 305. 

 Ideas, Platonic doctrine of, 334-337; Platonic scheme of, 364-367. 

 Images of the gods, how regarded by Cicero, 129--by Plutarch, 129; the heathens apologized for the use of images, 159. 

 Immortality of the soul, taught by Socrates, 324--and by Plato, 375, 376; denied by Epicurus, 444-446. 

 Incarnation, the idea of, not unfamiliar to heathen thought, 512. 

 Induction, the psychological method of Plato, 356, 357. 

 Induction and Deduction, Aristotle on, 397, 398. 

 Infinite, the, not a mere negation of thought, 242-244; known as the necessary correlative of the finite, 245; as comprehensible in itself, as the finite is comprehensible in itself, 246; in what sense known, 252. 

 Infinite Series, the phrase, when literally construed, a contradiction, 181, 182. 

 Infinity, qualitative and quantitative, 239; qualitative infinity possessed by God alone, 184, 239. 

 Intentionality, principle of, 190; denied by Materialists, 194; a first law of thought, 221-223; recognized by Socrates, 320-324. 

 Ionian School of Philosophy, a physical and sensational school, 281; subdivided into Mechanical and Dynamical, 282, 283. 

 Italian School of Philosophy, an Idealist school, 281; subdivided into the Mathematical and Metaphysical, 282, 296. 

J. 

 Jacobi, his faith-philosophy, 71. 

K. 

 Knowledge, Hamilton's doctrine of relativity of, 229-236; opposite theories of knowledge among ancient philosophers, 330, 331; the tendency of these theories, 332; Plato's theory of, 333, 334; Plato's science of real knowledge, 337, 338. 

 L. 

 Language, inadequate to convey the idea of God, 92-94; Greek language the best medium for the Christian revelation, 468-470. 

 Leucippus, his first principles _atoms_ and _space_, 291; a pure Materialist, 292. 

 Logic of Aristotle, 394-403. 

 Logical Treatises of Aristotle, 395, 396. 

 Lucretius, the expounder of the doctrines of Epicurus, 426, 427; his account of the origin of worlds, 437, 438; of plants, animals, and man, 438. 

M. 

 Mansel, bases religion on feeling of dependence, 72--and sense of obligation, 73. 

 Materialists deny the principle of causality, 194, 203--and of intentionality or final cause, 211-225; Anaximander, Leucippus, and Democritus belong to the materialistic school, 286-293: Epicurus a materialist, 442-446. 

 Mathematical Infinite, not absolute, 179, 180; capable of exact measurement, therefore limited, 180; infinite sphere, radius, line, etc. , self-contradictory, 180, 181. 

 Matter, did Plato teach the eternity of? 371-373; the doctrine of the Stoics concerning matter, 449 (_note_). 

 Matter and Form, Aristotle on, 405-408. 

 Mean, Aristotle's doctrine of the, 420. 

 Mediator, consciousness of the need of a, awakened by Greek philosophy, 509-513. 

 Metaphysical thought, law of its development, 478-480; three different stages in the individual mind, 478, 479; and in the universal consciousness of our race, 479. 

 Metempsychosis regarded by Plato as a mere hypothesis, 376 (_note_). 

 Mill, J. S. , his doctrine that all knowledge is confined to mental phenomena, 193; his definition of matter, 196; his views of personal identity, 196, 197; his theological opinions, 197. 

 Miracles, not designed to prove the existence of God, 95. 

 Moral principles, universal and immutable, which lead to the recognition of a God, 190; the Dogmatic Theologians seek to invalidate the argument therefrom, 261-263. 

 Mystics, base all religious knowledge on internal feeling, 70. 

 Mythology, philosophy of Greek, 134-139; Cudworth's interpretation of, 139-143; recognized the consciousness of guilt and need of expiation, 123-125. 

 N. 

 National Character, a complex result, 17; conjoint effect of moral and physical influences, 17; human freedom not to be disregarded in the study of, 20; influence of geographical surroundings, 23--of climate and natural scenery, on the pursuits and mental character of nations, 23--on creative art, 24--and literature of nations, 25. 

 Nations, individuality of, 22; determined mainly from without, 22. 

 Natural Realism, 305; Anaxagoras a natural realist, 311-313. 

 Nature, interpreted by man according to fundamental laws of his reason, 133. 

O. 

 Obligation, the sense of, lies at the foundation of religion, 115. 

 Ontological proof of the existence of God, 491-493. 

 Ontology, of Plato, 369-379; the subject-matter of the world of sense, 370-373; the permanent substratum of mental phenomena, 373-376; the first Principle of all principles--God, 377-379, 491-493. 

 Optimism of Plato, 382. 

 Order of the Universe, had it a beginning, or is it eternal? 178-184. 

 Order, principle of, pervades the universe, 220, 221; recognized by Pythagoras, 301; Cosmological proof of the existence of God, 489, 490. 

 P. 

 Parmenides, his theory of knowledge, 307-308; a spiritualistic Pantheist, 308, 309. 

 Paul, St. , at Athens, 14; his emotion when he saw the city full of idols, 100; the subject of his discourse, 101; brought into contact with all the phases of philosophic thought, 268, 269; his arrival at Athens an epoch in the moral history of the world, 472; he recognized the preparatory office of Greek philosophy, 473. 

 Philosophers of Athens, 101; believed in one supreme, uncreated, eternal God, 151-157; their views of the mythological deities, 158, 159; their apologies for images and image-worship, 159, 160. 

 Philosophic Schools, classification of, 271-273; Pre-Socratic 280-314; Socratic, 314-421; Post-Socratic, 422-456. 

 Philosophy, the world-enduring monument of the glory of Athens, 265, 260; defined, 270, 271; an inquiry after first causes and principles, 271, 457; not in any proper sense a theological inquiry, 273-277, 279; the love of wisdom, 384, 385. 

 Philosophy in its relation to Christianity, 268-270; sympathy of Platonism, 268; antagonism of Epicureanism and Stoicism, 269; the Propædeutic office of philosophy, 457-524--recognized by St. Paul, 473--and many of the early Fathers, 473-475; philosophy undermined Polytheism, and purified the Theistic idea, 481-487; developed the Theistic argument in a logical form, 487-494; it awakened Conscience and purified the Ethical idea, 495-506; demonstrated the insufficiency of reason to elaborate a perfect ideal of moral excellence, 506-509; awakened in man the sense of distance from God, and the need of a Mediator, 509-513; deepened the consciousness of sin, and the desire for a Redeemer, 513-522; the history of philosophy a confirmation of the truth of Christianity, 522-524. 

 Philosophy of Religion, 53; based on the correlation between Divine and human reason, 458-462. 

 Plato, condemns the poets for their unworthy representations of the gods, 130-132; his views of the gods of Grecian mythology, 154-157: the sympathy of his philosophy with Christianity, 268: followed the philosophic method of Socrates, 328; his moral qualifications for the study of philosophy, 328, 329; his literary qualifications, 329, 330; his search after a criterion of truth, 333, 334; his doctrine of Ideas, 334-337; his science of real knowledge, 337, 338; his answer to the question, What is Science? 338, 339; his Psychology 339-352; his scheme of the intellectual powers, 345; on the nature of the soul, 350; his dialectic, 353-369; his grand scheme of ideas, 364-367; his Ontology, 369-379; on the creation of time, 372; did he teach that matter is eternal? 371, 372; on the eternity of the rational element of the soul, 373-375; on the immortality of the soul, 375, 376; on God as the First Principle of all principles, 377-379; his Physics, 380-383; his Ethics, 383-387, 502-505; defects of his ethical system, 518; his philosophy not derived from Jewish sources, 476; felt the need of a superhuman deliverer from sin and guilt, 519-521. 

 Plutarch, his sketches of Athenian character, 44; criticism on, 45; on the universality of prayer and sacrifice, 115. 

 Poets, the Greek, believed in the existence of one uncreated Mind, 141; their theogony was a cosmogony, 142; the theologians of Greece, 274, 275. 

 Polytheism, Greek, a poetico-historical religion of myth and symbol, 134; its immoralities, 160, 161; undermined by Philosophy, 484-487. 

 Post-Socratic Schools, classification of, 425; a philosophy of life, 422-424. 

 Potentiality and Actuality, Aristotle on, 408-412. 

 Prayer, natural to man, 115. 

 Preparation for Christianity, not confined to Judaism alone, 464, 465; Greek civilization also prepared the way for Christ, 465-468; Greek language a providential development as the vehicle of a more perfect revelation, 468-470; Greek philosophy fulfilled a propædeutic office, 470-472. 

 Pre-Socratic Schools, classification of, 280-282; 295, 296. 

 Principles, _universal and necessary_, how attained by the method of Plato, 361-364, 390; how, by the method of Aristotle, 390-394, 402, 403. 

 Psychological analysis, logical demonstration of the existence of God begins with, 170; reveals principles which in their logical development attain to the knowledge of God, 184-189. 

 Psychology of Heraclitus, 289; of Pythagoras, 304; of Parmenides, 307, 308; of Anaxagoras, 313; of Protagoras, 315; of Socrates, 317, 318; of Plato, 339-352; of Aristotle, 392, 398-401; of Epicurus, 442-444; of the Stoics, 453, 454. 

 Pythagoras, his doctrine that numbers are the first principles of things, 297; how to be interpreted, 297-304; misrepresented by Aristotle, 298-300; psychology of, 304. 

R. 

 Reason, insufficiency of, to elaborate a perfect ideal of moral excellence, 505-509. 

 Redemption, desire of, awakened and defined by Greek philosophy, 513-521. 

 Relativity of all knowledge, Hamilton's doctrine of, 229-236. 

 Religion, the philosophy of, 53; defined 53, 106; universality of religious phenomena, 54; hypothesis offered in explanation of, 55; hypothesis of Epicurus and Comte, 56-65--of Hegel, 65-70--of Jacobi and Schleiermacher, 70-78--of Cousin, 78-86--of Dogmatic Theologians, 86-96--author's theory, 96, 97; religion of the Athenians, 98--its mythological and symbolic aspects, 128--exerted some wholesome influences, 161-163. 

 Reminiscence, Plato on, 354, 355. 

 Revelation, progressive, 462-464; harmony of the two revelations in the volume of conscience and the volume of the New Testament, 522-524. 

S. 

 Sacrifice, universal prevalence of, 115, 124; prompted by the universal consciousness of guilt, 126: expiatory sacrifices grounded on a primitive revelation, 127. 

 Schleiermacher, his theory that all religion is grounded on the feeling of absolute dependence, 71, 72. 

 Science, Plato's answer to the question, What is Science? 338, 339. 

 Self-determination, limited by idea of duty, 113; implies accountability, 114; recognizes a Lawgiver and Judge, 115. 

 Socrates, his desire for truth, 316; his dæmon, 317 _(note_); his philosophic method, 318, 319; a believer in one Supreme God, 320; his argument for the existence of God from final causes, 320-324; his belief in immortality and a future retribution, 324, 325; his Ethics, 325; the great prophet of the human conscience, 500-502. 

 Socratic School, 314. 

 Sophists, 315, 316; their skeptical tendency, 315; their defective ethics, 498, 499. 

 Sophocles, believed in one Supreme God, 147. 

 Soul, Plato on the nature of the, 350, 373; eternity of the rational element, 373-375. 

 Spencer, H. , carries the law of the Conditioned forward to its logical consequences, Atheism, 241, 242. 

 Stoical School, 446; its philosophy a moral philosophy, 447. 

 Stoics, their Physiology, 448-453; their Psychology, 453, 454; their Ethics, 454-456; their Theology, 452, 453. 

 Substance, principle of, 189; Idealism seeks to undermine it, 193; Reason affirms a permanent substance as the ground of all mental phenomena, 201--and of the phenomena of the sensible world, 202, 203. 

 Sufficient Reason, law of, recognized by Plato, 359. 

 Superstition, meaning of the term as used by Paul, 103. 

 T. 

 Teleological proof of the existence of God, 490, 491. 

 Thales, a believer in one uncreated God, 152; his first principles, 283; he regards _water_ as the material cause, 284; and God as the efficient cause, 285. 

 Theistic argument, in its logical form, 487-494. 

 Theistic conception, gradual development of, 481-484, Theological opinions of the early periods of Greek civilization, 150, 151; 276-278. 

 Theology of Aristotle, 404-417; identical with Metaphysics, 404, 416. 

 Theology of the Greek poets, 143-151; proposed reform of Poetry by Plato, 131, 132. 

 Thinking, conditionality of, 228; in what sense to be understood, 237; thought imposes no limits upon the object of thought, 237, 238. 

 Thought, negative and positive, 242, 243; negative thought an impossibility, 243; all thought must be positive, 243. 

 Time, Platonic notion of, 371, 372. 

 Tragedians, the Greek, were the public religious teachers of the Athenians, 145; their theology, 146, 147; influence of the religious dramas on the Athenian mind, 161-163; guiltiness of man, and need of reconciliation confessed by, 515-517. 

U. 

 Unconditioned, principle of, 189; assailed by Hamilton, 194. 

 Unity of God, 259; an affirmation of reason, 259-261; Xenophanes taught the unity of God, 307--also Parmenides, 309--and Plato, 377--and Aristotle, 415. 

 Unity, principle of, 189; attempt of Dogmatic Theologians to prove its insufficiency, 194, 258-261; recognized by Pythagoras, 296; his effort to reduce all the phenomena of nature to a Unity, 303, 304. 

 Universal and necessary Principles, classification of, 189, 190; these the foundation of our cognition of a God, 191; how attained according to Plato, 360-364; how by the method of Aristotle, 390-394, 402, 403. 

 Universe, the, is it finite or infinite? 178-184; Epicurus teaches that it is infinite, 433. 

 Unknown God, the true God, 104; God not absolutely unknown, 107-110; classification of opponents to the doctrine that God can be cognized by reason, 166-168; Idealist School of Mill, 194-203; Materialistic School of Comte, 203-223; Hamiltonian School, 224-252; School of Dogmatic Theologians, 252-263. 

W. 

 Watson, Richard, represents the views of Dogmatic Theologians 86; asserts that all our religious knowledge is derived from oral revelation, 86-88, 167; incompleteness and inadequacy of this theory, 88-96; in vindicating for the Scriptures the honor of revealing all our knowledge of God, he casts doubt upon the principle of Causality, 253-255--on the principle of the Unconditioned, 255-257--on the principle of Unity, 258-261--and on the immutable principles of Morality, 261-263. 

 Wordsworth, on the Sentiment of the Divine, 118. 

X. 

 Xenophanes, his attack on Polytheism, 130; his faith in one God, 153, 306, 307. 

Z. 

 Zeno of Citium, the founder of the Stoical School, 446; a Spiritualistic Pantheist, 450, 451. 

 Zeno of Elea, maintained the doctrine of Absolute Identity, 309. 

 Zeus, originally the Supreme and only God of the Greeks, 143; the Homeric Zeus, the Supreme God, 144, 145. 

THE END. 

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