CAVALRY IN FUTURE WARS

 By HIS EXCELLENCY LIEUT. -GENERAL FREDERICK VON BERNHARDI

 Commander of the Seventh Division of the German Army

 Translated by CHARLES SYDNEY GOLDMAN

 Author of 'With General French and the Cavalry in South Africa' Editor of 'The Empire and the Century'

 With an Introduction by

 LIEUT. -GENERAL SIR JOHN FRENCH K. C. M. G. , K. C. B. , G. C. V. O. 

 LONDON JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W. 1909

 _First Edition, October, 1906_ _Second Edition, April, 1909_

PREFACE

I ventured to express the opinion in my book, 'With General French andthe Cavalry in South Africa, ' that if a high ideal of the duties andpossibilities of Cavalry is set before our officers, and the means ofinstruction and training are placed within their reach, we shallpossess in our next great War a force which, if led by men of thestamp of General Sir John French, will prove to the world that the dayof Cavalry is far indeed from being past. 

In other words, I am convinced that, with good leadership and theright material in men, which the South African War has shown wepossess, all that we need to perfect our system is a properrecognition of the changed conditions of modern Warfare, and a resolveto break with the old and adapt ourselves to the new situation. 

Reforms such as this would necessitate must affect all arms of theService, but no branch more than the Cavalry, whose task in futurewill be more difficult, yet whose compensation lies in thepossibilities of successes possessing greater significance than anyhitherto attained. 

The South African War has roused the Cavalry into a renewal ofactivity, and has caused their leaders to encourage the study ofCavalry literature likely to develop the capacity of the officer forwriting on these special subjects. 

As a step in that direction, I gave whatever little co-operation Icould to the formation of the _Cavalry Journal_, in the hope that itmay be conducive to the creation of a class of literature in which ourService is peculiarly deficient. 

It is of the first importance to realize the conditions that arerevolutionizing the conduct of Modern Warfare. 

Such knowledge can alone enable us to appreciate the task which isgiven to the Cavalry, and to estimate the increased difficulties oftheir function. As their range of activity has become restricted incertain directions, their sphere of usefulness in others has largelyincreased. 

The want of an up-to-date work dealing with these facts has, Ibelieve, been supplied by the recent publication of General vonBernhardi's book, 'Our Cavalry in Future Wars, ' translated in thefollowing pages with the object of making it more generally known inthis country. 

Not only is the contribution valuable as having been written by asoldier of experience in the field, who has imbued his work with thedash and fire of the spirit of Cavalry, but it also reveals a profoundinsight into the modern conditions of War and the heightened demandsexacted from Cavalry training. The author lays continual emphasis onthe fact that Cavalry trained and organized on his lines shouldproduce in the early stages of a War effects so decisive as toinfluence and even determine the succeeding phases of the campaign. 

General von Bernhardi has the gift of close and searching reasoning, and the ability to present his views in a vivid and trenchant form, as convincing as the writings of the late Colonel Henderson. 

His opening chapter deals with the conception of the conduct of War inthe sense of to-day, and he proceeds to analyze the functions of theCavalry as modified by the changes which have occurred. 

In lively detail he explains the difficulties which in future willconfront all Cavalry operations, and the sacrifices that will beexacted from this Arm. 

Serious study and untiring perseverance must be claimed from theindividual in order to equip himself mentally and physically for thetask of overcoming these obstacles, while Bernhardi shows inconvincing argument the brilliant opportunities of success. 

Although the opportunity of tactical action on the battle-field mayhave somewhat suffered, Bernhardi sees in the strategical handling ofthe Arm its chief possibilities, and here he includes reconnaissanceand operations against the enemy's rearward communications and pursuitof a defeated Army. 

He considers cohesion and mobility to be essential to insure superiorstriking power by shock and fire action at the decisive point, andemphasizes this principle again and again as the means of attaining ahigh fighting efficiency. 

In the chapters on Tactical Leading in Mounted Combats and TacticalConduct of Dismounted Action, General von Bernhardi deals with themerits of shock and fire action, and the enhanced importance of thelatter as an accessory to, though never as a substitute for, shock, and he defines the respective dispositions for dismounted action whenserving an offensive or defensive purpose. 

At the same time, he avers that success must depend upon the abilityof the leader to realize the situation, on his qualities of decision, and on his capacity to maintain a correct balance between theapplication respectively of shock and fire action. 

The qualifications which General von Bernhardi expects in the Cavalryleader and those under him go to prove the scientific character of theprofession, which demands a standard of extreme efficiency. 

Successful Cavalry leading will only be possible when the machinery ofthe instrument employed is technically perfected down to the minutestdetail, and this can only be attained by a very elaborate and thoroughtraining. 

The book should commend itself particularly to those critics who, drawing conclusions from the South African War, contend that theunited offensive action of man and horse, culminating in the charge, can no longer avail, and that the future lies with the mountedriflemen, trained only to dismounted action. General von Bernhardimakes it clear that the theatre of War in South Africa does not assistus with any complete object-lessons from which to evolve a change oftactical principles, inasmuch as the conditions were entirelyabnormal, and in European Warfare are unlikely to recur. 

It must be remembered that after the first few weeks of 1900 theCavalry in South Africa as an effective force had practically ceasedto exist, and that its offensive action was greatly hampered by thestrategical plan of campaign which we adopted subsequently to theoccupation of Bloemfontein. 

All that might be deduced from the defensive tactics of a mountedforce, such as the Boers put into the field, during this period, isthat, possessing greater mobility, they were able to hold up, duringshort intervals, Cavalry whose capacity for mounted action waspractically destroyed by the 'want of condition' of their horses. 

Acting strategically as they did at Colesberg, in the relief ofKimberley, and in the operations leading up to Paardeberg, resultswere obtained which affected the whole subsequent conduct of the War. From then onwards, with the Cavalry acting tactically on the enemy'sflank, the Boer Army withdrew practically on Pretoria, and no decisivetactical result was obtained. 

If that was the object which the Superior Command had in view, theCavalry carried out that purpose with remarkable distinction. 

It is, however, conceivable that their strategical employment in rearof the Boer Army might have produced a situation compelling the Boersto fight a pitched battle or to surrender. 

If the Cavalry failed to achieve more, it was not from any want ofopportunity which the theatre of War presented, but because their truerôle was rarely assigned to them. 

That the Boers were able at a later period to develop a vigorousscheme of action was largely owing to our conception of a plan ofcampaign which made the occupation of small capitals rather than thedestruction of the enemy's Army the strategic objective. 

Had the Boers understood the Art of War and taken advantage of theopenings which their superior mobility gave them, or had they beenpossessed of a body of Cavalry capable of mounted action, say atMagersfontein, they might repeatedly have wrought confusion in ourranks. 

Although the Boer War was of an exceptional nature, and of a characterunlikely to be met with again, it furnishes some useful object-lessonswhich exemplify the importance of preparedness in peace for the suddenoutbreak of War, so that the Army may take the field in such force andso disposed as to compel decisive action on the part of the enemy inthe first stages of the War, and be in a position to inflict acrushing defeat rather than a series of light blows, which latter tendto disperse rather than destroy the enemy's forces. 

The War further shows how highly mobile forces, such as those of theBoers, can withdraw from a combat to avoid defeat, and by scatteringto elude pursuit, and then, by reassembling where least expected, canstrike a sudden blow at the enemy's weakest point. That they failed toaccomplish more was due to their ignorance of the higher Art of War. 

To this neglect of the strategic advantage which mobility gives wemust add the many lost tactical opportunities of converting a Britishreverse into a decisive defeat. The Boers did all that could beexpected of Mounted Infantry, but were powerless to crown victory asonly the dash of Cavalry can do. 

If we take into account the many opportunities which the Boers gavefor successful strategic and tactical employment to men trained tofight on horseback, we arrive at the conclusion that the Boer War maynevertheless, if studied carefully and intelligently, teach us theindispensability of Cavalry in the rôle so clearly described inGeneral von Bernhardi's instructive work. 

In conclusion, I must express my thanks to His Excellency General vonBernhardi for his courtesy towards me in concurring in the idea of anEnglish translation, and to General Sir John French for his valuableintroductory comments. 

I also wish to express to Colonel F. N. Maude my best thanks for hisfriendly co-operation, which gave me the advantage of his expertinterpretation of German technicalities. 

 C. S. GOLDMAN. 

 34, QUEEN ANNE'S GATE, WESTMINSTER, _September, 1906_. 

AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

When, in the Spring of 1899, I published the first edition of thiswork, I ventured to express the hope that it might incite others bothto thought and exertion, and might further prove of practicalassistance to many. 

I think I may claim without undue immodesty that this wish of mine hasin many directions been fulfilled. Of the demands, however, which Iput forward concerning the organization and equipment of the Cavalry, none have as yet been put into execution, but much wholesome spadework has been accomplished, and the necessity of reforms, togetherwith due recognition of their importance, has everywhere made furtherprogress. It is to be hoped that the next few years will bring thefulfilment of some of these our most earnest desires. 

The principles of training and of tactics which I have advanced andendeavoured to establish have found very general acceptance throughoutthe Arm, and have helped to clear up difficulties, although, as indeedwas to be expected, they have encountered opposition from severalquarters. 

This result of my labours has encouraged me in the preparation of thisnew edition to make use of all the latest experience, to bring outwith additional clearness essential points, and to add much newmaterial. 

I trust that in this manner I have materially increased the practicalvalue of the work, and hope that in its new form it will continue toexert its silent influence, winning new supporters for my views, andhelping to gain for the splendid Arm to which I belong the placewhich, in the interest of the whole Army, it deserves. 

 THE AUTHOR. 

 STRAZBURG, IN THE WINTER OF 1902. 

AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

It would be difficult for a layman to form even an approximateconception of the amount of work annually accomplished in the GermanArmy. 

The very vivid consciousness stirring everywhere as to the magnitudeof the demands the not far distant future may make upon us, and theknowledge that the means with which we are compelled to work arecertainly not always in agreement with our ideals, incite us to strainevery nerve to make the most of what we have; and I believe I am notfar wrong in asserting that it is the Cavalry Arm which, underpressure of circumstances, responds to these demands with the greatestavidity. This is, in fact, but the necessary consequence of themany-sidedness of our duties. 

Whether, however, the end and aim of all our exertions is everywhereattained must remain an open question. 

In every long period of peace there lurks the danger that methods oftraining may deviate after false ideals, lose themselves in the cultof imposing appearances, and in the clash of individual opinions failto distinguish the essential--_i. E. _, what is really practicable underthe conditions of active service. 

This danger is all the more imminent when the characters and forms ofWarfare itself are constantly changing; hence, ever new demands haveto be made upon the troops themselves, and the exact bearing of eachof these is not easily to be appreciated in the humdrum surroundingsof our peace-time duties. 

It seems, therefore, a most pressing necessity at the present moment, when changes in social conditions and constant technical progress areexerting on the external phenomena and conditions of Warfare a steadypressure in the direction of modification, that we should compare ourpeace training with the requirements likely to be made upon us in timeof War. Thus we can note where further adjustments between the two arenecessary and can be usefully made. 

In this process of analysis it will not suffice to take each changingfactor independently, following it out to its utmost ramifications, but rather we must endeavour to take a general view of the whole, andbalance the variables one against the other. 

The man who concentrates his attention only on one detail easily loseshis grasp of relative values, and runs the risk of failing 'to see thewood for the trees, ' and only the mind trained to contemplate eachfactor in its relation to the whole, and with a clear idea of theultimate purpose for which this whole is intended, will be able toavoid this pitfall; for only an intellect thus prepared cansuccessfully harmonize the whole with its part, and, while keeping theessentials clearly before its eyes, treat the unessential as itdeserves. 

It is in order to bring out this point of view that the followingpages have been undertaken. 

As I endeavoured to arrive at a thoroughly clear comprehension of themany conflicting interests involved in the training of men and horses, as I tried to decide how to apportion both time and means to eachindividual branch of their education, and to see how far thetraditions of the past could be harmonized with the requirements ofthe future, or where and how they need further development andsimplification, I found myself compelled at every turn to go back andseek my ideal standard in the demands which War itself must make uponall Arms. 

Thus my work must be considered as an attempt to represent in broadoutlines the conditions of the coming War, and from these to deducelogically the requirements a rational system of organization andtraining must satisfy. 

Those who hold different opinions as to the tasks which will beentrusted to our particular Arm will naturally come to otherconclusions as to the values to be assigned to peace education, and Ido not wish to present my opinions as absolutely final, although Ihave done my utmost to treat my subject-matter objectively and withoutprejudice. 

Meanwhile, the problems I have submitted for investigation are notonly of military interest, but of the utmost military importance, andit has, therefore, seemed to me well worth while to discuss them fromevery point of view. 

Further, because these investigations owe their origin to thepractical need I experienced during the course of my service to clearup the many points I have dwelt on, I have considered it a duty tomake them accessible to all those who have at heart the development inour Cavalry of a thoroughly sound spirit in full harmony with thenecessities of our present times. 

 THE AUTHOR. 

 BERLIN, _March, 1899_. 

CONTENTS

 Page

 INTRODUCTION xxi

 PART I

 EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY AND ESSENTIALS OF LEADERSHIP

 Chapter

 I. THE MODERN CONDITIONS OF WAR, AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE EMPLOYMENT AND USEFULNESS OF CAVALRY 3

 II. DUTIES AT THE BEGINNING AND DURING THE COURSE OF THE WAR 19

 III. STRATEGICAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE CAVALRY 38

 IV. INCREASED IMPORTANCE OF DISMOUNTED ACTION 49

 V. THE TACTICAL LEADING IN MOUNTED COMBATS 62

 VI. TACTICAL CONDUCT OF DISMOUNTED ACTIONS 90

 VII. STRATEGICAL EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY 104

 VIII. PATROLS--TRANSMISSION OF REPORTS--CYCLISTS 132

 PART II

 ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING

 I. NUMBERS 151

 II. RIDING, FEEDING, AND TRAINING 184

 III. THE TRAINING FOR MOUNTED COMBAT 213

 IV. TRAINING FOR DISMOUNTED FIGHTING 247

 V. FIELD-SERVICE TRAINING AND MANOEUVRES 265

 VI. THE HIGHER EDUCATION OF OUR OFFICERS 286

 CONCLUSION 294

 INDEX 298

INTRODUCTION

General von Bernhardi's work, 'Cavalry in Future Wars' (translatedfrom the German by Mr. C. S. Goldman), is a most valuable addition tomodern Cavalry literature, and appears at an opportune moment tocounteract and dispel some misleading conclusions which have beendrawn by certain writers (both English and foreign) from reportedoperations in the late Manchurian War. 

One or two distinguished foreign soldiers who have publicly commentedupon that campaign have said that what is termed the 'Cavalry spirit'is opposed to the idea of dismounted action. They hold that theCavalry disdain to dismount, and they see in riding the end instead ofthe means. They consider that events in the Far East teach us that wemust render our Cavalry less devoted to 'manoeuvres' and to'tournaments, ' in order to enable them to fit themselves to take partin modern fighting; that the times have come when the methods ofWarfare should be changed; and that the Cavalry must determine todefeat the enemy by dismounted action entirely. 

I cannot speak with any certainty as to what has happened in EuropeanArmies, but as regards the British Cavalry, I am absolutely convincedthat the Cavalry spirit is and may be encouraged to the utmost withoutin the least degree prejudicing either training in dismounted dutiesor the acquirement of such tactical knowledge on the part of leadersas will enable them to discern when and where to resort to dismountedmethods. 

How, I ask, can the Cavalry perform its rôle in war until the enemy'sCavalry is defeated and paralyzed? I challenge any Cavalry officer, British or foreign, to deny the principle that Cavalry, acting as suchagainst its own Arm, can never attain complete success unless it isproficient in shock tactics. 

Cavalry soldiers must of course learn to be expert rifle shots, butthe attainment of this desirable object will be brought no nearer byignoring the horse, the sword, or the lance. On the contrary, the'élan' and dash which perfection in Cavalry manoeuvre imparts to largebodies of horsemen will be of inestimable value in their employment asmounted riflemen when the field is laid open to their enterprise inthis rôle by the defeat of the hostile Cavalry. 

That the Cavalry on both sides in the recent War did not distinguishthemselves or their Arm is an undoubted fact, but the reason is quiteapparent. On the Japanese side they were indifferently mounted, theriding was not good, and they were very inferior in numbers, and hencewere only enabled to fulfil generally the rôle of Divisional Cavalry, which they appear to have done very well. The cause of failure on theRussian side is to be found in the fact that for years they have beentrained on _exactly the same principles_ which these writers nowadvocate. They were devoid of real Cavalry training, they thought ofnothing but getting off their horses and shooting; hence theylamentably failed in enterprises which demanded, before all, a displayof the highest form of Cavalry spirit. 

The author of this book is an eminent soldier, possessing an intimateknowledge of practical fighting, gained chiefly in one of the greatestWars of modern times--the Franco-German Campaign of 1870-1871. 

His opinions are entitled to profound respect, and demand closeattention and consideration. The General has treated his subject andmarshalled his arguments and statements in so logical and intelligenta manner, and the principles he deduces seem so sound and appropriate, that the conclusions he arrives at appear to me unanswerable. 

In the exhaustive and capable summary of the work of Cavalry in War, General von Bernhardi seems to follow very closely the line of thoughtwhich has in recent years occupied the brains of many practicalCavalry soldiers in this country. He appeals strongly to ourintellectual sympathy when he first of all discusses the strategicalemployment of Cavalry in all its bearings, and afterwards proceeds tounfold his views as to the rôle of the Cavalry Arm, first when theenemy's Cavalry has been driven from the field, and secondly inconjunction with the other Arms. Personally, I have never known the'Case for the Cavalry' stated more clearly and intelligently. 

In recommending the study of the book to all British soldiers, I woulddraw particular attention to the author's constant and repeatedreferences to the necessity of first seeking out and fighting thehostile Cavalry and driving them from the field--in other words, tothe immediate and complete attainment of the moral superiority. 

In support of his opinions, he reminds us forcibly that the importantresults gained by the German Cavalry in the 1870-1871 campaign weredue to the absence of opposition on the part of the French Cavalrymore than to anything else, and he contends that in future Wars, wherethe Cavalry on either side have been properly trained as such, thissupremacy will have to be fought for, and will involve an enormousincrease in the difficulty with which the Cavalry Arm will carry outits rôle. He scoffs at the idea held by so many 'amateurs' that'Cavalry duels' are superfluous. 

Only those who have led Cavalry on active service in the field, andhave been charged with their training in peace-time, can realize tothe full the absolute soundness of the conclusions at which Generalvon Bernhardi has arrived, and it is much to be feared that themischievous teaching which scoffs at 'manoeuvres, ' 'tournaments, ' andthe 'Cavalry spirit, ' proceeds almost entirely from the pens and fromthe brains of men who have no practical knowledge of the handling ofthe Cavalry Arm. 

The great value of this book to the British Cavalry officer of to-dayseems to me to lie in the fact that this particular vein of thoughtand argument pervades it throughout. 

The General tells us, with the soundest arguments and the mostpositive proofs, that 'the brilliant field of enterprise which is opento the Cavalry soldier in his rôle as a mounted rifleman can only beattained by him when he has overthrown the enemy's Cavalry. '

The author, having unmistakably insisted upon the preliminaryoverthrow of the enemy's Cavalry, proceeds to vindicate the idea thatthe Cavalry spirit is in any degree opposed to the idea of dismountedaction when necessary. On the contrary, he declares emphatically thatthe Cavalry fight is only a means to an end, and that the hostileCavalry once disposed of by means of horse and cold steel alone, abrilliant rôle lies open to that Arm by reason of their possession ofan efficient firearm, in the use of which the cavalryman has receiveda thorough training. 

The great difficulty, he tells us, lies in the necessity ofdiscovering a Leader who possesses the 'power of holding the balancecorrectly between fire power and shock, and in the training for theformer never to allow troops to lose confidence in the latter. ''Whether, ' says the General, 'it be in the working out of somestrategical design, or in joining hands with the other Arms to obtainby united fire action some common purpose, a balance of judgment andabsence of prejudice is implied which is of the rarest occurrence innormal natures. '

In dwelling so persistently upon the necessity for Cavalry beingtrained to the highest possible pitch to meet the enemy's Cavalry, Ido not wish to be misunderstood. I agree absolutely with the author inthe principle he lays down that the Cavalry fight is only a means toan end, but it is the most important means, and I have thought itright to comment upon this because it is a principle which in thiscountry, since the South African War, we have been very much inclinedto overlook. To place a force of Cavalry in the field in support of agreat Army which is deficient in the power to overcome the opposingCavalry is to act like one who would despatch a squadron ofwar-vessels badly armed, badly trained, and ill found, to blockade adistant coast-line defended by a powerful fleet. What is the navalfight in the open sea but a means to an end? It would be as sensibleto dwell on the inutility and waste of a duel between hostile fleetsas to lay down the principle that the 'Cavalry battle' in no wayaffects the mutual situation of hostile armies. 

But the 'end' in view which General von Bernhardi has so clearly laiddown must never be lost sight of. 

Whilst the conditions of modern War have rendered the service ofreconnaissance far more difficult, the same causes lend themselves toa much easier deception of the enemy by means of feints, etc. Cavalry, when working with the other Arms, can render valuable service in thisway, and also in bringing rapid support to a main or counter attack. 

Another most important point must be noticed. I allude to theincreasing tendency of umpires and superior officers to insist onCavalry at manoeuvres and elsewhere being _ultra-cautious_. They tryto inculcate such a respect for Infantry fire that Cavalry is taughtto shirk exposure, and the moment Infantry come within sight, squadrons are made either to retire altogether, or dismount and shoot, regardless of what the 'Cavalry value' of the ground happens to be. 

I have no hesitation in saying that immense harm is done to the warefficiency of Cavalry by decisions of this kind, which disregardaltogether the human factor in the problem. We ought the more to be onour guard against false teaching of this nature, seeing that there aremany grave warnings to be found in history of the inevitableconsequences of thus placing the weapon above the men. 

After the war of 1866 the great von Moltke made the following reportto the King of Prussia:--

'Our Cavalry failed, perhaps not so much in actual capacity as in_self-confidence_. All its initiative had been destroyed at manoeuvres, where criticism and blame had become almost synonymous, and it thereforeshirked independent bold action, and kept far in rear, and as much aspossible out of sight' (Moltke's 'Taktisch-Strategische Aufsätze, 'Berlin, 1900). 

By like methods in peace training prior to the War with Turkey suchtimidity had been developed in the Russian Cavalry that, in the wordsof General Baykow, Cavalry commanders showed a marked disinclinationto undertake operations which were well within their powers, but whichmight bring them in contact with the Turkish Infantry, and so run riskof suffering loss. 

History is full of similar instances of how _not_ to train Cavalry, and I hold most strongly that the Arm must be educated up to areadiness _to act_, to come to close quarters in co-operation with theother Arms, and to risk casualties, as Infantry has often done beforewithout losing its 'battle' value. 

To sum up, training with a view to self-sacrifice during peaceexercises is essential for the success of all Arms in War, butespecially so for Cavalry. 

With remarkable perspicuity and telling conviction, General vonBernhardi has dealt in an exhaustive manner with every subjectdemanding a Cavalry soldier's study and thought. I am convinced thathe who thoroughly masters the contents of his book will feel no doubtand will entertain no misapprehension as to the vast rôle his Arm iscalled upon to fulfil in War, and he will realize how, in masteringthe great essentials of which it treats, he will himself be assistingin the best possible manner to maintain the prestige and glory of thegreat Service to which he belongs. 

I

EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY AND ESSENTIALS OF LEADERSHIP

CHAPTER I

THE MODERN CONDITIONS OF WAR, AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE EMPLOYMENTAND USEFULNESS OF CAVALRY

The Art of War has undergone a momentous change; indeed, it has beenrevolutionized since the Franco-German War. Every condition thataffects the conduct of warlike operations seems changed in almostevery particular. Arms of precision have reached a degree ofperfection which compels us to take into account possibilities whichdid not exist a few years ago, and for which the experience of thepast can offer no scale of comparison. The all but universalintroduction of Compulsory Service, and the consequent reduction inlength of time spent by the soldier with the colours, have changed thecharacter of almost all European Armies. 

All the most typical factors in the standing Armies of former daysdisappear more or less on the issue of the order to mobilize. Newgroupings of units are formed from the first outbreak of hostilities, and the fact that these bodies are put together only on mobilization, together with the reduction in the period of service which has beenvery generally accepted, tend to depreciate the average value of thetroops, whilst at the same time the 'masses' have risen tounimaginable dimensions. This '_folie des nombres_, ' against whichcertain French Authorities have warned us, is a very stern reality. 

Experience has shown that the mere preparation for War, penetratingyear by year more deeply into the very heart of nations, must infuture unchain, from the first moment that the Armies of the Continentcome into collision, all the horrors of a racial conflict, in which, from the first, the interests of every individual are involved. 

The enormous development of railway communication has changed allconditions of strategical operations. Whilst the power of the railwayto move masses since 1871 has increased, owing to the development bothin the number and condition of the great trunk lines, the Armiesthemselves have become dependent on the railways in an ever-increasingdegree. Further developments in Steam and Electricity will probablymake these rearward communications both more necessary and at the sametime more susceptible to injury. Thus all strategical conditionsappear modified. Masses necessitate, even in the richest theatre ofWar, the return to the magazine system; hence the lines ofcommunication are acquiring increased importance, and simultaneouslygreat vulnerability. 

On the other hand, the increased power of the weapons in use offersgreater advantages to the local defence. The prospects of success inthe direct frontal attack of strong positions have diminishedenormously. The assailant, therefore, no longer able to succeed byfrontal attack, is compelled to endeavour to work round the enemy'sflanks, and thus exercise pressure upon his communications. Hisendeavour must be, as Frederick the Great would have said, 'to compelhis opponent to fight outside of his chosen position. '

This increased importance of the communications, which in alreadyexhausted districts will make itself particularly felt, will compelthe defenders to take greater measures for their protection. 

All these conditions taken together must of necessity increase theimportance of strategy in the Wars of the future to an extent which, in my opinion, no sufficient conception has as yet been made. Thisfinal conclusion at least we must recognise, however much we maystruggle against it (partly as a consequence of our somewhat one-sidedexperiences in 1870, and partly through the increased difficulty ofall operations due to the increased masses and the more concentratedsusceptibility of the railway communication): that the decisivefactors in the next War must be 'superiority in the strategicdirection of the troops, together with the increased efficiency theyhave attained and their endurance. '[1]

 [Footnote 1: The contrary view to this was largely held by a certain school in Germany, whose views the author is here endeavouring to combat. ]

To meet this drastic revolution in all these conditions, the pressureof which has compelled the artillery into new lines of development andforced the infantry to change their whole constitution (whether totheir advantage or not may remain an open question), no changes at allcommensurate to their importance have as yet been initiated in theCavalry. 

Artillery and Infantry now have behind them the nation, from whichthey can draw inexhaustible reserves of trained men for their constantreplenishment. The Cavalry alone remains a specialized service, because, owing to the peculiar circumstances of its existence, it canscarcely count on having the wastage of War made good by equallywell-trained men and horses; still less is its complete replacement incase of disaster to be hoped for. In spite of this, we have torecognise the fact that the proportion the Cavalry bears in allEuropean Armies to the ever-increasing numerical proportion of theother Arms has steadily receded. The Peace establishments show thisclearly. Thus, taking the Germans' figures for 1870, we had:

 1870. 

 463 Battalions. 460 Squadrons. 251 Batteries. 15-3/4 Pioneer Battalions. 

 1902. 

 625 Battalions (including 18 of 'Rifles'). 486 Squadrons (including 16 squadrons of Mounted Rifles). 562 Batteries. 38 Battalions Heavy Artillery. 28 Pioneer Battalions. 

This ratio to the disadvantage of the Cavalry is even more apparent onmobilization for War, owing to the many Reserve and Landwehrformations of Infantry and Artillery, in comparison with which the fewnew units provided by the Cavalry are relatively unimportant. Considering the mobilized Army as a whole, the Cavalry formsnumerically an almost insignificant factor. 

There remains yet another point of view to be considered. Undoubtedlythere has been in the Cavalry a most active spirit of reform. On thebasis of the experience derived from the great Wars of the last fortyyears (in the list I include the American War of Secession), changesin armament and equipment have taken place in every direction, moreparticularly with regard to armament. The necessity and possibilityof strategical reconnaissance by independent bodies of Cavalry havebeen fully recognised. 

The conviction also has been arrived at that only when supplied with auseful firearm and an adequate allowance of Horse Artillery will such'masses' prove adequate for the accomplishment of this special task. With the same object in view, the means have been granted to them withwhich to destroy telegraphs and railways, to bridge rivers, and soforth. The conviction also has been gained that the Cavalry require tobe so familiarized with tactical formations for their employment in'mass' that they shall have become a second nature to them if they areto fight with a reasonable prospect of success. But all that has beendone in these directions still remains insufficient. On the one hand, the improvements introduced have not taken into account the decisivechanges in the general conditions which only the last few years havebrought about. On the other, we must not forget that neither thePrussian Cavalry in 1870 in France nor the Russians against the Turksin 1877-1878 had even approximately equal Cavalry to oppose them. Eventhe great results achieved alternately by the Cavalry on both sidesduring the American Civil War were obtained in general underconditions which can no longer be anticipated, for at the moment ofcollision neither encountered, as a rule, either equal quality ornumbers sufficient to develop their full power of attack. 

The very important data obtained during the campaign of 1899-1900 inSouth Africa as to the employment of dismounted action by Cavalry werealso not then before us. One could only, therefore, reason fromone-sided experiences, which can no longer be recognised as generallysufficient for our purpose. In future the mere possibility of resultssuch as in 1870-1871 we so often gained owing to the absence of anyserious opposition on the part of the opposing Cavalry, will nowadayshave to be obstinately fought for, not without considerable loss; andit needs no special proof to show what an enormous increase in thedifficulty of our task this involves, and how, as a consequence, allthe conditions of our future action must be modified. 

Thus, the Cavalry stands face to face with new conditions, and seesitself everywhere confronted--on the battle-field and in the widerfield of strategical operations--with new problems, towards thesolution of which the history of the past furnishes only very generalindications. 

If we mean to maintain our position as an effective Arm, and satisfythe demands that of necessity must be made upon us by these newconditions, _we must break_ with many experiences of the past, andwork out for ourselves principles of action which must be deducedessentially from the probable requirements of the future. 

Each epoch-making War makes new demands upon us and prescribes newtasks, and he only will reap the palm of success who is able to meetthem, because, with wise prevision, he has prepared himself to solvetheir difficulties in peace. 

If we wish to make an approximately correct picture of the future thatawaits us, we must first face the question, What will be the influencethat the changed conditions in the Art of War considered as a wholemust exercise on the possible scope of action of our Arm?

From the answer to this we can deduce the demands on the Cavalry inparticular, and these demands give us a means for determining thelimits of its employment, its consequent organization, and thetraining best suited to enable it to meet these requirements. 

If we summarize all the conditions which have modified the conduct ofWar and contrast with them what Cavalry, from the very nature of itsbeing, is capable of performing, it would appear at first sight as ifevery form of action of the mounted Arm has been impeded and renderedmore difficult in the highest degree; more particularly is this thecase when opposed to the increased power of modern arms. Certainly, the impact of a modern bullet may at times produce less immediateeffect than formerly. Cases have occurred in which serious wounds didnot place the individual out of action immediately, and we maytherefore anticipate that many horses will not be stopped in thecharge, despite severe injuries. But this drawback the Infantry canmeet by opening fire sooner. To the Artillery this does not apply;and, in any case, this objection is not of such importance as toneutralize in any way the other advantages conferred by modernweapons. 

Owing to the fact that the extent of the danger zone has been veryconsiderably increased, and that within these zones the amount of firewhich has to be faced in a given time has been intensified to a degreewhich formerly could hardly have been dreamt of, it has ceased to bepossible to ride straight at the front of an unshaken enemy. 

Thus, essentially the Cavalry has been driven out of its former placeof honour on the battle-fields of the plains, and has been compelledto seek the assistance of the cover the ground affords in order tocarry its own power of destruction into immediate contact with itsenemy, and only under most exceptionally favourable conditions will itstill be possible to deliver a charge direct across the open. 

Further, as far as the Infantry are concerned, it will be quite theexception to encounter them in closed bodies; generally we shall haveto ride against extended lines, which offer a most unfavourable targetfor our purpose. 

The difficulties both of observation and reconnaissance have also beenmaterially increased, for, on the one hand, the increased range of thefirearm compels one to keep further away from the enemy, thus makingit more difficult to judge with accuracy his strength and positions;on the other, the use of smokeless powder, which no longer reveals theposition of the firing line, renders a more thorough searching of theground even more indispensable than formerly. 

The possible participation of the civilian inhabitants of the invadedNation in the War will hamper most severely all forms of Cavalryaction other than on the battle-field. In intersected districts itmay, indeed, suffice to paralyze completely the execution of allpatrolling duties; and thus the offensive finds itself confronted by anew and permanent element of danger and delay, whose gravity we mayestimate by the events which occurred in the latter portion of theFranco-German War, and we may be quite certain that in future all suchexperiences will be very much intensified. 

Lastly, the fall in the numerical proportion of the Cavalry to theother Arms is all to our disadvantage. The greater numbers of thelatter cover larger areas, and whether to cover these or toreconnoitre them, it will be necessary to embrace far larger spaces, notwithstanding our relatively smaller numbers--_i. E. _, on each squaremile we shall only be able to employ, on an average, a largely reducednumber of patrols, etc. 

Tactically this want of numbers again affects us. If the necessity tointervene arises, not only have we better firearms against us, butrelatively a larger number of troops. Each tactical advantage securedwill thus exercise far less effect than formerly upon our opponent, since the fraction of the enemy's force ridden down represents asmaller proportion of his whole Army. 

If an Infantry Brigade, one of a force of ten Army Corps, isannihilated, the effect is not nearly so far-reaching as if thisBrigade formed part of an Army of two or even three Corps. 

If in these changed relations there are obviously factors whichmaterially limit the tactical importance of Cavalry, and which mustmake the solution of their strategical tasks far more difficult, onthe other side we find opportunities in the probable phenomena of afuture War which, though less obvious, nevertheless on investigationlead us to the conclusion that the importance of the Arm is evengreater than formerly, opening for it a wider sphere of activity, andeven on the battle-field revealing new chances of success. 

Let us consider these opportunities more closely. The greater thepitch of nervous tension to which men are wrought up in battle, thegreater the pitch of excitement reached, the more decisive will be thereaction when the flood-tide of defeat overwhelms them. 

Now that all European States are straining every nerve to employenormous masses of men from the first moment of hostilities, in orderthus to gain an advantage whilst their enemy is still concentrating, and when we further consider how these exertions must increase thestrain throughout the nation to the very utmost, it must be apparentthat the first great decision of Arms must be of overwhelmingimportance. Not only the troops directly concerned, but the 'masses'behind them, find themselves for the moment involved in theconsequences of victory or defeat. Hence the reaction in eitherdirection, owing to the lower average quality of the troops, theirgreater numbers, the increased difficulties of moving them, and thesusceptibility to congestion of their rearward communications, must befar greater and far more disastrous than hitherto under similartactical conditions. 

The more important it is to secure a favourable decision, the moredifficult with growing masses to divert an operation once commenced, to give it a new direction or assign it a new objective, the lesspossible it becomes to alter dispositions which may have been issuedon false premises; hence again _the greater grows the value ofthorough and active reconnoitring_. 

If this holds good, more especially for the first great collision, itremains also a guiding principle for all future operations; for, onthe one side, it is probable that even in its later stages the Warwill be conducted with comparatively great masses; on the other, as wehave seen, _the importance of the strategical element hasunquestionably grown_; hence the _value of efficient reconnaissance_has been proportionably intensified. 

In similar measure the importance of screening has also developed. Inproportion as the assailant is compelled to resort to turningmovements and surprises, the defender is obliged to have recourse totimely changes of front and unexpected counter-attacks; hence forboth timely reconnaissance of the enemy's, as well as for trustworthyscreening of one's own operations, the extended employment of themounted Arms has become imperative. In other words, althoughreconnaissance and screening for strategical purposes by the Cavalryhave been rendered more difficult by the conditions we must expect tomeet in the future, on the other hand, they have gained enormously inimportance. And it is not in this direction alone that the value ofthe Arm has increased, but it has also had a new and important fieldof activity thrown open to it owing to the increased susceptibilitythe rearward communications of the enemy and his railways havedeveloped. 

As a consequence of the increased liability to interruption of thesecommunications, and also of the far more serious confusion to whichany such interruption can give rise, it has become far more difficultthan in the past to execute offensive flanking operations, changes offront, or counter-attacks, all of which are movements which thepractical strategist must bear in mind. On paper and on the map suchundertakings appear to present no more elements of friction thanformerly, but on the ground itself those who have once seen masses ofseveral corps all huddled together know that things are verydifferent. All such movements nowadays are tied to the railway-lines, and these, again, are congested by the flow of food and ammunition, which must at all costs be maintained. Fresh units also of troops maybe coming up to the front, whose arrival is of the last importance inthe plans of the generalissimo, and a single broken viaduct may throwconfusion into the whole design. 

In a densely-populated and fruitful district the resulting failure ofsupply may be endured, but it is very different when in apoverty-stricken district the supply of a whole Army depends onperhaps a single line of railway. 

Thus the Cavalry sees itself confronted by a task in the solution ofwhich it can achieve results of _decisive importance_ in a newdirection, for the following reasons: The relative importance of theArm during actual operations having been materially increased, theperiod of concentration preceding actual collision (notwithstandingthe fact that the actual effectiveness of Cavalry in the face ofmodern firearms has been decreased) offers opportunities which undercertain conditions promise higher results than formerly. 

If every delay in the march which may be caused by the action ofCavalry against the flanking lines of advance of an Army concentratingfor battle is detrimental, how much greater would be thedisorganization resulting from similar operations after defeat! Veryrarely in such a case would it be possible to retire eccentrically bythe same roads which were used for advance. The beaten troopsgenerally drift back quite involuntarily in the direction into whichthey have been compelled by the results of the tactical decision. Thewider the original front, the greater the masses of the troopsconcerned (which are now not only in a demoralized condition, but arecompelled, under pressure of pursuit, to change their communicationsinto new directions, and for this purpose to disentangle the columnsdrawn in for the concentration) and the greater the certainty thatconditions must arise which will give to an active Cavalry an evenricher opportunity of harvest than was formerly open to them. 

This will in future be all the more the case when troops of lowerquality, and therefore more liable to become shaken and dispirited, have to be employed. Reserve formations--Landwehr and the like--whichunder favourable conditions might render excellent service, when oncebeaten, without officers, weary and hungry, lose all cohesion, when, with baggage, wounded, and stragglers, they are driven back overcrowded roads; and then, no matter how well they are armed, they arean easy prey to a pursuing Cavalry. 

The man who throws his rifle away or shoots in the air will not findsalvation either in clip-loading or smokeless powder against the lancein the hands of a relentless pursuing Cavalry. 

The same holds good for the fight itself. We cannot attack eveninferior Infantry as long as it only keeps the muzzles of its riflesdown and shoots straight; but once it is morally broken and surprised, then the greatest results are still to be achieved even on an openbattle-field. That, at least, the campaign of 1870-1871 sufficientlyproved, although the Cavalry were so seldom allowed the opportunity toreap the ripe harvest our strategy and the action of the other Armshad so abundantly prepared for them. 

A further point in our favour is to be found in the fact that theincreased power of modern Artillery fire has rendered the defence ofvillages and woods practically an impossibility. The Infantry are thuscompelled to seek open but rolling ground, and it is precisely suchground which favours the concealed approach and sudden attack of theCavalry; but surprise is the very essence of successful Cavalryaction. 

If we bring together all these points of view which have been hithertoonly indicated, we find, on the one hand, the absolute fighting valueof the Cavalry has considerably diminished, and that in modern War theconditions of Cavalry employment will in every direction be renderedmore difficult; on the other hand, the strategical importance of theArm, as well as the scope of the duties which it may be called upon tofulfil, have increased very decidedly, and very important newopportunities for successes have been thrown open to it. 

We cannot sufficiently insist upon the cumulative effects which allthese general changes in the nature of War have exercised upon theCavalry Arm; for not only has public opinion taken up the oppositeview, but even in the Army itself these positive views have notreceived the attention they deserve. 

The exploits of our Cavalry in 1870-1871 have been universallyadmired, without, however, being appreciated at their true relativevalue. On the other hand, reasoning from the mechanical perfection ofthe firearm, the conclusion has been reached that, as against Infantryand Artillery, the Cavalry can no longer hope to achieve any resultsof importance. It has been shown that in 1870-1871 the German Cavalrypossessed a great numerical superiority over its adversary--that, infact, numerous regiments during the whole War either never came intoaction at all or at least never had the opportunity to exhibit theirfull value in other fields of employment, and hence it has beenconcluded that an increase or organic reform of what they are pleasedto consider a somewhat antiquated Cavalry is quite superfluous. 

An attempt on the part of the Imperial Government to introduce anincrease of establishments had to give way to more importantconsiderations. In fact, practically the German Cavalry in number andorganization remains to-day the same as in 1870. 

But the duties which in future will fall to the Cavalry are sowide-reaching, and for the conduct of the War are often of suchdecisive importance, that on the manner of their execution theultimate results of a campaign must very materially depend. 

If the Cavalry is not in a condition to prove equal to these duties, we shall find ourselves confronted with a situation of the gravestdanger. Hence it becomes unconditionally necessary to apply thereforming hand where important deficiencies and practicalinsufficiencies can be recognised. In order to apply the lever ofreform at once to the best advantage, we must be quite clear in ourown minds in which part of the conduct of War the importance of theCavalry will principally be felt. Only from the recognition of thedemands which will there be made upon it can we conclude in whatdirection its further evolution can be initiated. 

We must, therefore, get a clear conception of the probable demands tobe made upon the Arm in each individual phase of a future War, testthem with a view to their relative importance towards the result as awhole, and then endeavour to recognise on which factors the success ineach individual phase principally depends. 

In the first place stands naturally the demands which will be made onthe Cavalry during the early periods after the declaration ofhostilities--that is, during mobilization and concentration. Theserequire all the more attention because, as we have seen, it isparticularly these introductory stages of future War which will be ofparticular importance, and because it is precisely in these verypoints that opinion is as yet not united. 

Then we must follow the employment of the Arm in the further course ofoperations, and endeavour to determine in what direction the mostimportant results are to be obtained. 

CHAPTER II

DUTIES AT THE BEGINNING AND DURING THE COURSE OF THE WAR

The importance which attaches to the first tactical decisions, thefact that their success is mainly determined by the uninterruptedexecution of the railway deployment, the safe arrival of the troopsand war material in the appointed zones of concentration, theconsideration that the continuance of the operation after the firstbattle--retreat or pursuit--is mainly conditioned by the uninterruptedaction of the rearward communications, make it indubitable that it isof the utmost importance to disturb the corresponding operations ofthe enemy, and thus place one's own Army from the very beginning in aposition of material and strategic advantage. 

Since the Cavalry is not only able to cover great distances withoverwhelming rapidity, but also, owing to its special character as astanding branch of the Army, is always ready to march and operate, whilst the other portions of the Army are still occupied with theirmobilization, the opinion has been freely expressed that it would beadvantageous to utilize this period required for the mobilization andrailway transport of the other Arms for Cavalry raids, either intothe zone of concentration, or against the communications of the enemy. Russia has for this very purpose concentrated upon the German andAustrian frontiers enormous Cavalry forces, supported by lightinfantry. France also keeps a numerous Cavalry practically on a warfooting on the frontiers of Lorraine. 

On the outbreak of War these masses are ready at the shortest noticeto ride over our frontiers, to break up our railways, to seize ourhorses and depots, to destroy our magazines, and to carry terror andconsternation into our zone of assembly. 

It cannot be denied that in such manner by no means inconsiderabledamage could be caused, and hence one must earnestly consider, first, what chances of success such enterprises offer, and next, whether therelative magnitude of the probable results are proportionate to theprobable losses they must necessarily entail. 

Cool and objective consideration of such ideas must, in my opinion, lead us to negative such undertakings--on our side, at any rate. Inthe first place, the enemy will always be in a position, by suitableorganization of his frontier guards and the situation selected for thefront of his strategic deployment, to withdraw himself eitheraltogether from the radius of action of the Cavalry, or at leastrender its advance both difficult and dangerous. The danger will bethe greater the more it has been possible to provide for the armamentand organization of the population in the frontier provinces. Wherethe conditions on the side of the defender are not unusuallyunfavourable--as, for instance, in wide open districts--or where thereis a want of troops in strategically unimportant provinces, then evenif the invading masses break in on the very first day of mobilization, they will find railways, defiles, river-crossings already defended byinfantry or popular levies. If they come upon an insurgent populationthey will find great difficulties both in reconnaissance andsubsistence. 

At every step they advance, the numbers of the opponent will beconstantly increasing, while their own strength diminishes. Thedefiles will be occupied between their several columns, and they mustguard themselves in every direction. Their trains and baggage get intoconfusion, and supply becomes all the more difficult the more rapidlythey advance, because the waggons cannot keep up with their movement, and there is no time for requisitioning. Field batteries and lines ofinfantry occupy the more important positions, the enemy's Cavalryappears on the flanks, and man and horse break down at length underthe severity of the strain. Retreat becomes inevitable, and if theyever get back at all, they can only reach their own Army after heavylosses and with broken force. The damage which they can do to theenemy remains small in proportion to his total power, even though itis locally not inconsiderable. At the best one may hope to destroysome railway not too far from the frontier, interrupt some telegraphlines of communication, and disperse or capture some ammunitiondepots, magazines, or snap up some convoys of reserve men and horses. But the enemy has already taken these possibilities into account; theywill soon be overcome, and his arrangements in general will be hardlydisturbed. 

If, on the other hand, the Cavalry is accompanied by infantry, it willbe even more hampered in its movements than by its own trains, andwill soon have to decide whether it should make its movementsdependent on those of its escort, thereby renouncing all hopes offurther results, or whether it should abandon the infantry to itsfate. Certain defiles in the vicinity of the frontier, which thecombined forces were able in advancing to occupy, the infantry maywell succeed in keeping open; but if it attempts to follow the tracksof its own Cavalry, there can be no doubt it would be exposed toinevitable destruction. 

This applies equally to the cyclist--at least, as far as the machinehas as yet been developed; for though one cannot deny the greatadvantage which its mobility under certain circumstances offers, yetit remains too dependent on roads and weather to insure that freedomand certainty of movement which in such undertakings in conjunctionwith Cavalry are unconditionally necessary. 

The attempt to break up communications by well-mounted officerspatrols boldly pushed forward in advance would seem to offer even lesschances of securing permanent results. They, too, will find thecountry obstructed by the armed population, or by troops in the act ofconcentration. Even weak detachments or patrols along the railwaywould suffice to effectively resist them; they can depend for successonly on their rapidity and cunning. But most rivers are unfordable, and in the woods patrols can hardly venture, because every tree mayshelter a man with a rifle. Once they leave the roads, their pacediminishes; they easily lose their direction; nowhere can they obtainsecurity for rest and food, even if they are fortunate enough inprocuring any. If, in spite of all this, they do happen to succeed inblowing up a railway or cutting a telegraph, the effect isinfinitesimal. 

The patrol itself will find its chances of escape decreasing in exactproportion to the distance it has penetrated into the enemy's country. 

The greater the number of the patrols employed, the more irreplaceablewill the inevitable loss become; for it will always be the bestofficers, the men who put most energy and determination into theexecution of their instructions, who are the most likely to fallvictims to their courage and audacity. 

Premature advance of the Cavalry during mobilization and concentrationcan only procure information of little or no importance, for theexisting railways, the direction of the frontiers, and the peace-timedistribution of the troops reveal all this to the General Staffbeforehand. These, together with the secret service, politicalconditions obtaining at the moment, and press intelligence, willenable one to forecast with some degree of precision the generalsituation. 

Now, the Cavalry can hardly expect to attain more--indeed, it isdoubtful whether they would succeed even in confirming what is alreadyknown, for the difficulties to be overcome, as we have seen, arenumerous, and nowhere can one find completed situations from which tomake reliable deductions. At most they can determine that certainplaces are already occupied, and that the traffic on certain lines isconsiderable, things that one knew _a priori_, which, therefore, arenot worth any serious sacrifice. Moreover, it is exceedingly doubtfulwhether, at such an early period, when conditions are changing fromday to day, such information has any practical value. 

Of course, it is not intended to maintain that one should not from thevery first moment after the declaration of War keep a sharp look-outupon the enemy, work up to him, and seek to determine as much asrapidity and daring can succeed, with any probability of success, inattaining--that goes without saying. Particular value will alwaysattach to the taking of prisoners, whose regimental numbers enable usto check the accuracy of our existing information. But against this wemust emphasize all the more forcibly that in this first period ofhostilities an inundation of the enemy's zone of concentration withmasses or by far-flung lines of patrols is not only not expedient, butabsolutely detrimental, since the certain cost of such undertakingsstands in no reasonable proportion to the probably negative, or atmost insignificant, result to be expected. Further, our ownconcentration has already been so prepared in peace that it must becarried out with clock-like regularity, even should the results of thereconnaissance disclose that the conditions on the side of the enemywere not quite those that we had originally expected. 

Even the mere transference backwards of the line of strategicdeployment, which in 1870 could still be carried out without seriousdifficulties or drawbacks, could nowadays, in view of the high tensioninduced by modern conditions, only be executed with extraordinarydifficulty, whilst lateral displacement of such numbers is quiteinconceivable. For even if the railway organization would suffice forthe execution of such a design, the many other preparations in thezone of concentration can neither be moved nor improvised. 

Summarizing the whole question, the conclusion, I think, must be, thatonly that Army which has at its disposal a great preponderance ofCavalry could allow itself the luxury of such premature commitment ofits mounted forces. 

In general, the difficulties of replacing the losses of the Cavalrywith material of equal quality are so great that only the mostimportant reasons could justify any such attempts. Hence the sidewhich is weaker in Cavalry will meet the circumstances best by keepingback its horsemen, and not sacrificing its officers for infinitesimal, and probably unattainable, advantages. It will be better merely towork up to the enemy as close as may be possible without seriouslosses, allow the enemy's mounted forces to wreck themselves againstthe opposing infantry and armed population, and only then to put inits Cavalry for decisive action when the opponent has already wastedhis best elements in the pursuit of insignificant advantages. Afterall, it is only then, when the strategical concentration commences, after railway movement is completed, that reconnaissance becomes bothpossible and important. 

Circumstances can, of course, arise in which, already during the firstperiod of operations, exhaustive independent activity may be demandedfrom the Cavalry, as, for instance, when one has reason to believethat the enemy has changed his previously-selected zone ofconcentration, or, as when in 1870 on the German side, it becomesnecessary to take steps to protect the frontier districts against theenemy's raids. In the first case the attempts to discover, by theemployment of Cavalry, the changed dispositions of the enemy arecertainly permissible. The patrols must then go forward until they cansettle the decisive questions, and strong detachments must be pushedout so close behind them that the patrols and their followingsquadrons can find a safe retreat, and insure the transmission of theintelligence they have collected. 

In such enterprises tactical collision with the enemy's Cavalry andhis frontier troops might ensue. It may therefore be necessary tosupport our squadrons by Infantry and Artillery. 

But in every case we must be careful to keep within the limits whichare conditioned by the purpose of the undertaking, and not allowourselves to be involved in desperate and doubtful enterprises. 

In the next case the duties of the Cavalry are merely defensive. Allthat then matters is to rob small bodies of the enemy of theiropportunities, to block the traffic across the frontier, and to workround their patrols with our own forces; but in no case are they toattempt to obtain positive advantages by force, or to hazard importantdecisions against a superior enemy. Wherever possible every effortshould be made to supplement the troops assigned to this defensiveattitude by the armed population, or even to replace them by suchlevies altogether. The fortification and defence of villages andisolated farms, occupation of railways and watercourses, and, aboveall, the defence of woods which might favour the concealed advance ofthe enemy's patrols, can well be left to the care of these improvisedformations. 

Hostile attempts can be generally met by dismounted fire action inwell-chosen strong defensive country, possibly supported bydetachments of Infantry, Artillery, and 'Landsturm. ' If the enemy'ssuperiority is great, then one must retire until the equilibrium ofthe forces is re-established, the strategical necessity compels us tofight, or, finally, the tactical situation gives good promise ofsuccess. 

One must, however, always keep this clearly before one's mind: thatthe essence of all Cavalry action in the opening stage of the War liesneither in this purely defensive attitude, nor in the offensiveenterprises previously alluded to, by which the concentration of theenemy would be disturbed or other material successes might beachieved, but that the decisive purpose only begins when important andpossible tasks can be given to the Cavalry--_i. E. _, when the mainbodies of the enemy become ready for operations. 

Then it becomes our duty to screen not only the advance of our owntroops and to secure to our Infantry the advantages of being able toadvance undisturbed, but the climax of all these duties will bereached _in the far more important duty_, in the now indispensabletask, of securing the _widest possible sphere of intelligence_. 

Whereas, during the period of railway concentration the front of theenemy was conditioned by the ends of the lines employed in bringing upthe troops, who in turn spread themselves out to utilize the resourcesof the country (hence generally our patrols, if sent out, would comein contact all along the threatened frontier or the enemy's line ofdetrainment, with defended villages, etc. ), the troops will now bedrawn into closer cantonments, or bivouacs, and group themselvestogether into clearly-defined masses. 

There will therefore now arise between separate portions of his Armyand their lines of advance, spaces unoccupied by troops into which ourCavalry can penetrate. The heads and flanks of his columns can now bedetermined, and the direction in which they are marching, thusascertained, becomes of essential importance. 

Now is the time when the Cavalry must put in its full strength todiscover the strength and direction of the enemy's movements, and thefact of this concentration provides the Cavalry with the opportunitiesnecessary to solve the problem before it. 

Of course, immediately after detraining, troops will have to march tothe districts to which they are assigned for convenience of supply, and this will lead to the formation of temporary groupings, which itwill be advisable, if possible, for us to observe. But it must not beoverlooked that observations during this period may easily lead tofalse conclusions, as such movements serve only secondary purposes orintroductory measures, and seldom justify any conclusions bearing uponthe design of the ultimate operations. These latter only develop aftera certain degree of concentration has been attained, and hence theessence of the whole question resolves itself into this--that theCavalry should not be put in until shortly before the strategicalconcentration begins. 

From the results now obtained the success of the whole campaign mayentirely depend. At this climax no secondary consideration must beallowed to distract attention from the principal object. Even thedesirability of screening the movements of one's own Army, in so faras this duty is not fulfilled by the reconnaissance itself, must giveway to the attainment of the principal object in view, which is_intelligence_, not _security_. 

This point requires to be more particularly insisted upon, becausefundamentally different arrangements are necessary to fulfil these twopurposes. Anyone who attempted to entrust both the provision ofintelligence and the protection of the troops to one and the same bodyof men would in the vast majority of cases fail to secure eitherpurpose as long as the enemy's mounted forces still held the field. 

To secure information--_i. E. _, intelligence--requires concentration offorce. The reconnoitring Cavalry must beat their opponents out of thefield in order to obtain opportunities for discovering what is goingon behind the enemy's protective screen. To accomplish this, theCavalry must endeavour to work round the adversary's flanks, and mayin consequence have to leave the front of its own Army entirelyuncovered. The protection of this Army, on the other hand, requires awide extension of front and consequent subdivision of force, the exactopposite of the concentration the provision of intelligenceimperatively calls for. 

Naturally this view encounters opposition. Some contend that the wholetriumph of the Art consists in solving both problems simultaneously. They reason that it is superfluous to seek an encounter with theenemy's Cavalry. Cavalry duels only lead to the mutual destruction ofboth parties. They maintain that one ought to advance, in theinterests both of security and screening, on a certain breadth offront. If, then, circumstances compel one to fight, one mustconcentrate quickly, and after the combat gain again the necessarydegree of extension to cover the front of the Army. They would leavereconnaissance to be carried out by rapidly advancing patrols, whichevade those of the enemy, find cover in the ground, gain advantageouspoints of observation on the flanks and in rear of the opponent, thusobtaining their objects in spite of the enemy. 

I hold it to be a grave error of judgment to believe that anysystematic application of this line of action will give sufficientresults. 

Advantages in war must be fought for; they cannot be filched. 

Was it not difficult enough in 1870-1871 to obtain reliableinformation, although we had no true Cavalry opponent against us, andstill more difficult to get that news through to Headquarters in time?How much more difficult, therefore, will it not be in the future, whenwe can no longer count on controlling unconditionally the countrybetween the two Armies, and the enemy's Cavalry hold the field as wellas we!

Who will then guarantee that our patrols will really penetrate theenemy's screen; above all, that their reports will get back throughthe district controlled by the enemy's Cavalry in time enough to be ofuse to Headquarters in forming its decisions? If the patrols arecompelled to elude those of the enemy, to seek for intersectedcountry, and to make detours, one cannot count on the requisiterapidity; and the greater the total numbers brought together in modernWar, the greater the distances become which have to be reckoned with. 

If from the very necessity of finding the shortest way and securingcommunications with one's own Headquarters it becomes necessary tobeat the enemy's Cavalry out of the field to clear up the situationsufficiently, the need of fighting is brought home to one with all thegreater force, because any other line of action leaves the enemychances at least as good as our own, which can never be the objectiveof any form of military action, and ultimately fighting becomescompulsory if, in addition to reconnaissance, one attempts to carryout screen duties at the same time. It stands to reason that theenemy's Cavalry can only be prevented from seeing by actually drivingthem off the ground and depriving them of the power of breakingthrough our own screen. That a numerically and materially inferiorCavalry does well to avoid action goes without saying, butfundamentally the duty of the Cavalry must be to seek to bring aboutcollision with that of the enemy, so that from the very beginning itsecures command of the ground between the two armies, and that theactual and moral superiority in the whole zone of operations betweenthe two armies is obtained from the outset for our own Cavalry. 

The victory of the 'masses' intensifies and invigorates the sense ofsuperiority in the individual combatant, and this sense of individualsuperiority is essential if the patrols are to carry through theirduties in the true Cavalry spirit. 

On the one hand, they are only able to solve their tasks both ofscreening and of reconnaissance by actually defeating the enemy'spatrols; on the other hand, the moral factor tells heavily in thescale. 

How can one expect courage and determination or audacity from men whohave always been taught to avoid their opponent and only fight whenthey are actually compelled?

The man who leaves these psychic factors out of account will alwaysfind himself mistaken in War. 

That in certain cases it may be useful to push forward officers asstealthy patrols, with instruction to avoid being drawn into anaction, as far as time and opportunity will allow, goes withoutsaying; but nevertheless stress must be laid upon the point thatalready in the period which is in general taken up with the encounterwith the enemy's Cavalry, no opportunity should be lost of keeping theprincipal masses of the enemy's Army under direct observation, andthat therefore it is necessary from the very commencement of theadvance to send out officers patrols for this special purpose. 

These patrols will derive their best support from a tactical victoryobtained over the enemy's Cavalry, which is manoeuvring in their rear. 

Thus the fact remains that we must fight to reconnoitre and fight toscreen, and that only a systematic division of the two spheres ofaction can give us the freedom necessary to insure the adoption of theproper form at the right time and place. 

A victory of the reconnoitring Cavalry by shattering the strength ofthe enemy's horsemen must always result, both directly and indirectly, in the advantage of our screening force. 

The whole consideration, therefore, leads me to the conclusion thatthe chief task for the Cavalry consists in obtaining a victory overthe enemy's Cavalry in that direction which is of decisive importancefor the further prosecution of reconnaissance as soon after thebeginning of the great operations as possible. 

That it cannot be our object to seek the opponent's horsemen in thedirection which they themselves have selected--merely to beatthem--need scarcely be insisted upon. That would be to take the lawfrom the enemy and allow one's self to be diverted from the principaldirection in which reconnaissance is desirable. 

Time and direction of the advance must rather be so chosen that theycompel the enemy to move to meet us. At the same time our effort mustbe to appear with numerical superiority, in order to be certain ofvictory. 

In what concerns the Cavalry in the further course of the War, thenecessity both of screening and reconnoitring recurs again and again;and in many cases even after the enemy has been beaten out of thefield, these objects will still only be obtained by fighting. Suchcases will occur in the duties of screening and security when theenemy still possesses enough offensive power to attempt areconnaissance, with the threat of attack combined, and we ourselvesare engaged in a similar manner; also in all such cases in whichturning movements entail too much delay, or are rendered impossible bythe extension of the enemy's front; or, again, when the enemy on theirpart renew offensive operations. 

The necessity of breaking through the line of Infantry outposts inorder to discover the whereabouts of the enemy's principal masses andthe direction of their movements will also from time to time arise, and it may become necessary to suppress rapidly and thoroughlyattempts at armed resistance by the civilian population. 

Further, our Cavalry will be called on for attempts against theenemy's communications, the strategical importance of which has beenalready discussed, and these will be all the more important in caseswhere the district we are fighting over is too poor to supply theenemy's forces, or where operations have assumed a stationarycharacter, as before Fredericksburg, Paris, and Plevna, and it becomesdesirable to hinder the use of the railways for the transport oftroops or evacuation of supplies. 

Lastly, the Cavalry may be called on to occupy wide stretches ofcountry and exploit their resources, to nip in their very inceptionthe formation of fresh bodies of armed defenders, or on the defensive, to secure our own communications or districts against undertakings byflying columns of the enemy. 

Such undertakings, particularly when they lead in rear of the enemy'sArmies, will frequently assume the character of 'raids' in which theessential purpose is to cover great distances rapidly, often with thesacrifice of all communications with one's own forces, to appearsuddenly at previously selected positions, and after completion ofone's immediate object to disappear suddenly, before the enemy canbring overwhelming numbers against the assailant. 

The success of such undertakings will depend, on the one hand, on therapidity with which the opportunities secured by such surprise areutilized, and, on the other, on the available fighting power, whichmust suffice to break down all opposition with certainty and speed. 

Their execution, however, will always encounter many difficulties, particularly when a hostile population has to be dealt with; but toconsider them on this account as impracticable seems to me all themore impossible, because to my mind they embody an absolutelyindispensable element of future operations. 

If it is feasible to enter upon them with fresh horses, and to makeadequate provision for supply without delaying the rapidity ofmovement, either by utilizing the resources of the country, by takingsuitably organized columns with one, or by living on stores capturedfrom the enemy himself, then such 'raids' will succeed and exercisemost far-reaching consequences. 

In my opinion all these conditions can be satisfied. We can preserveour horses by exercising greater moderation in the pursuit ofnon-essentials; difficulties of supply can be solved by suitablepreparations even in an enemy's country, and when working in our own, the sympathetic and persistent support of our own population willlevel all obstacles; but in all cases we must never leave out of sightthe cardinal point that only the concentration of sufficient force atthe right time and place can guarantee the final result. 

Our conduct, however, will be different when our purpose is solelydefensive, or when we have to occupy districts which the enemy doesnot seek to defend. In such cases, as also when our object is only theconcealment of our own designs, a dispersion of force may benecessary, if only in order to occupy important defiles and defensivesections of the ground, or for the occupation of the most importantcentres of population in the enemy's country. From such tasks, however, it should be the business of the Supreme Command to preserveus, in order that the whole Cavalry strength should be retained intactfor offensive purposes more in harmony with its whole character andthe spirit of the Arm. 

For these, if great results are to be attained, it requires in thegenerality of cases concentration in time and space. 

With the execution of these strategical missions, which so far alonehave attracted our attention, the duties of the Cavalry Arm are by nomeans exhausted. 

Nowadays, as formerly, it will still find work to its hands on thebattle-field itself, and this work will be all the more important inproportion as the quality of the forces therein encountered is on alower level (_e. G. _, new formations, Militia, etc. ). In any case, however, great results on the battle-field can only be expected fromthe employment of numerically formidable 'Masses. ' This is conditionedby the very fact of the numbers which we must in future expect to seeengaged. 

The portion of the enemy's forces affected by the results of asuccessful charge must be a sufficient part of the whole which, at agiven time and place, is concerned in the task of endeavouring tosecure a decision. 

Other factors also deserve consideration--above all, the increasedrange of modern firearms. If the front of the attacking Cavalry is toonarrow, it will not only have to face the fire of the troopsimmediately in its front, but it will be the focus of the fire fromall sides. 

If the formation for attack does not supply a sufficient sequence ofsuccessive efforts, then in many cases it can have no hope ofpermanent result, for an onslaught by a single line will not havestrength enough to pierce the fire zone, and will be shot to piecesbefore it can reach the enemy. [2]

 [Footnote 2: The same point also arises both in pursuit and in the covering of a retreat, two of our most important duties; for though, as already pointed out, the conditions of the present day offer to the Arm the opportunities of the richest harvests, it will only be able to utilize them when employed with concentrated force. ]

The masses to be encountered are numerically so considerable thatsingle squadrons, regiments, or brigades, hardly count in the scale ofa great decision. Partial results they may, indeed, attain, but tobring about the defeat of a whole Army, or even of an importantfraction of it, to reap the fruits of such a victory or cover a greatretreat, numbers alone can avail. 

How many units to employ under any given circumstances it is, ofcourse, impossible to lay down beforehand; but the essence of thematter is that the limit of force to be thus employed is far in excessof what any existing tactical unit can supply. 

If, after this short survey of the many fields of action open tohorsemen in the future, we ask the decisive question, Which tasks inthe future will need to be most carefully kept in mind in theorganization and training of this Arm in peace time? we shall not beable to conceal from ourselves that it is in the strategical handlingof the Cavalry that by far the greatest possibilities lie. Chargeseven of numerically considerable bodies on the battle-field can onlylead to success under very special conditions, and even for theprotection of a retreat our rôle can only be a subordinate one. Butfor reconnaissance and screening, for operations against the enemy'scommunications, for the pursuit of a beaten enemy, and all similaroperations of warfare, the Cavalry is, and remains, the principal Arm. Here no other can take its place, for none possesses the requisitemobility and independence. 

At the same time, it is in these fields that its power isall-important to the Supreme Command. Battles, under pressure ofnecessity, can be fought without Cavalry at all, and the results evenpartially utilized; but it is impossible to issue suitable orderswithout knowledge of the enemy's operations, and equally impossible toact against an enemy's flanks and rear with Infantry alone. 

It is in these directions that the future of Cavalry lies, and it isto fit ourselves for the tasks that we should bend all our energy inpeace. 

CHAPTER III

STRATEGICAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE CAVALRY

We have seen in the previous chapter that the principal duties whichcan fall to the lot of Cavalry in modern War will require itsemployment in considerable force; hence it follows that the greatesteconomy in the use of detachments for secondary purposes must bepractised. 

This leads us to the consideration of the question in what manner wecan group our available means to meet these requirements in the bestpossible way. 

Primarily we must start from this axiom--that no portion of the Armycan do without Cavalry altogether; hence it follows that we mustmaintain both Divisional and independent Cavalry. 

The former remains permanently attached to each portion of the Armywhose composition, by reason of this addition of Cavalry, permits ofindependent action. The latter is set aside for the great strategicalmissions that may be assigned to that Arm, for execution. The questionnow arises, In what proportion is this distribution to take place?

The greater number of Infantry Divisions can, in my opinion, meet alldemands upon them with a very small allotment of mounted men, as longas they are acting in combination with the rest of the Army. 

The circulation of intelligence and orders within the columns andtheir outposts can generally be entrusted to cyclists. Whereindependent Cavalry is deployed to cover the front of an army, thefield of activity for the Divisional Cavalry in actual outpost dutiesand reconnaissance is of necessity very much limited. All they arereally required to accomplish is to maintain the connection with theformer, and for this duty the cyclist detachments above referred towill generally suffice. 

There remains, therefore, for the Divisional Cavalry only the servicewith the most advanced sections of the Infantry outposts (orderlyduties with the Infantry piquets in cases where the ground precludesthe use of the cycle), duties connected with requisitioning; andreconnaissance only during those periods in which the mass of theindependent Cavalry has been drawn away towards the wings of the Armyto clear its front for battle, carrying messages during the combat, and actual reconnaissance during the progress of the engagementitself. All these requirements can, I think, be met with a very smallamount of force, all the more so because reconnaissance under fire inmodern War seems to me practically impossible, and can generally onlybe initiated by those Divisions which form the wings of the Army, buteven then their field would be a very limited one. 

Modern firearms compel us to remain at such a distance from the enemythat observation is rendered much more difficult, and the distances tobe traversed are so great that before any reports from the wings canget round to the position of Headquarters, and suitable orders basedon these reports can reach their destination, the whole situation mayhave changed again and again. We have only to remember the caseswhich occurred in the last War (1870). 

In the majority of these instances it was quite impossible thatCavalry patrols could have sent timely information of what was goingon within the limits of the enemy's positions, and in the future thedifficulties will be even greater. 

In no case, however, can such information during the progress of anaction be obtained by the actual employment of the fighting power ofthe Divisional Cavalry. 

If it is to be done at all, then a few well-led officers patrols willsuffice, and therefore no considerable numerical strength in theDivisional Cavalry is required. The lines of approach of the enemy andpoints on which his wings are resting must certainly be kept underobservation, but this observation cannot in principle be initiated bythe Infantry Divisions, but it is the province of the ArmyHeadquarters to provide, for it will be precisely the wings and theflanks which the enemy will himself seek to protect by the massing ofhis own Cavalry. 

If the prospect of achieving anything by observation during the combatthrough the action of the Divisional Cavalry may be considered aswell-nigh impossible, then any tactical action may also be consideredas precluded, unless it takes place in combination with theindependent Cavalry. 

Occasions may certainly even nowadays occur in which a few squadronsmay achieve results by taking part in a combat between the other Arms, but such cases are too few and unimportant to be taken into account ina distribution of the Cavalry as a matter of organization. 

In Armies deprived of the screen of independent Cavalry the want ofDivisional Cavalry will certainly be more markedly felt even in thoseArmy Corps which form the flanks of Armies, and in the cases ofdetached expeditions, and in similar exceptional circumstances. In allthese instances more Cavalry must be sent up to the outposts, and itwill have both to screen and reconnoitre. 

The demands on its fighting efficiency can, under such circumstances, become of importance, and in these smaller operations, reconnaissanceduring action is more possible than with extended battle-fronts. Butto demand for the Divisional Cavalry on these grounds a largerproportion of sabres, and thus to paralyze a great portion of the Armby its inclusion in the long columns of march of the whole Army, isnot justifiable. The scale on which we must decide the apportionmentof Divisional Cavalry must depend on the fact that the Infantry doesnot generally operate in small detachments, but works in large masses, and it is the necessities of these large masses which fix thestandard. 

To apportion to single columns or Divisions for particularcircumstances an increased force of Cavalry, to be taken from theavailable mass of independent Cavalry Divisions, ought not in generalto occasion unusual friction; but it is most difficult and troublesometo take away from the Infantry the squadrons definitely assigned to itby peace-time organization, and unite these in independent CavalryCommands. 

We must not allow ourselves to be misled in this matter by thepractice followed in peace manoeuvres. Even the largest concentrationof troops for these purposes is, in proportion to the masses to beemployed in our future War, on a most limited scale. 

Our smaller Brigade and Divisional manoeuvres are restricted withinlimits which can only be considered nowadays as exceptional. They areonly too well adapted to give rise to entirely false conceptions as tothe true character of the Cavalry service in these great struggles fornational survival, unless we keep steadily in mind that they applyonly to exceptional circumstances. 

We must, therefore, lay down as a principle that as much Cavalry aspossible is to be organized for strategical independence, and aslittle as is expedient retained for the Infantry Divisions. 

My opinion is that, if we make fullest use of the bicycle, and, withthis object in view, reorganize our system of conveying orders andintelligence, then two well-trained and effective squadrons shouldamply suffice for the ordinary duties with an Infantry Division. 

As to the allotment of the independent Cavalry Divisions, it followsfrom all that has been said above, that to divide them in equalproportions among the several Armies, according to their numericalstrength, can only be considered as an obstacle to the fullutilization of their potential fighting capacity. It would be betterto arrange this distribution at the beginning of each War, inaccordance with the conditions which the situation imposes. Where itappears expedient, we should not hesitate to form Divisions ofdifferent strength, and to group several of these to constituteCavalry Corps, even to unite several of such Corps for employment in aparticular strategical direction--_i. E. _, in a particular portion ofthe theatre of operation--whilst leaving only individual brigades, oreven regiments, to those fractions of the Army which for the momentcan best dispense with Cavalry support. 

Of course, an Army taking the field with a great superiority ofCavalry can afford to deal less sparingly with it for secondarypurposes; on the other hand, the numerically weaker side is driven tothe utmost economy of its forces, and the utmost energy in itsemployment at the decisive moment. It will therefore be essential forthe latter to concentrate at the commencement of the campaign the bulkof its Cavalry upon the decisive line of operations--that is to say, on that line on which, from the general strategical situation, one canexpect to penetrate into the chief district of concentration of theenemy's Armies, and hence to find out what it is of the greatestimportance for us to know, or, on the other hand, when it is to ourinterests to conceal our own operations, and hence to beat the enemy'sCavalry as thoroughly as possible wherever it shows itself. On theremaining portion of the front we must endeavour to employ as littleCavalry as possible, and to supplement it in the duties of security byInfantry, whilst leaving reconnaissance to be dealt with by patrols. If we thus gain the victory on the principal line, the results willsoon be apparent in a reduction of pressure on the adjacent sectionsof the front, and then the Cavalry will find its opportunity forincreased activity in offensive enterprises. For, once the enemy'shorsemen are beaten, either he will concentrate his remaining Cavalry, from every direction, towards the threatened points, or the victorwill be in a position to utilize the superiority he has acquired tosupport any portion of his force which may have got into temporarydifficulties. 

If, thus, it is the necessity of beating the enemy's Cavalry out ofthe field at the very commencement of the campaign which compels theconcentration of important numbers in the decisive direction, itfollows naturally that this point of view must be fully considered inthe plan of strategical deployment. 

In the further stages of Cavalry activity--_i. E. _, after it hasdefeated the mass of the enemy's Cavalry--the tasks which can confrontthe Arm make the employment of considerable forces essential, unless, as so often happened in 1870, its operations are to be interferedwith, if not altogether stopped, by weak Infantry detachments, or evenby an insurgent population. Against this concentration of large massesof Cavalry many objections will naturally be raised; hence we mustconsider how these are to be met, and whether, as a fact, they are ofsufficient importance to cause us to surrender the advantages theyoffer. 

First comes the difficulty of feeding large numbers. But militaryhistory, from the time of Frederick the Great and Napoleon down to theAmerican Civil War, the unusual conditions of which latter must not beleft out of account, show conclusively that it was possible to keepmasses of 5, 000 men and more together, and in full mobility, even inpoor and almost roadless districts. 

If it was possible then, how much more will it be so now, with ourmodern means of communication, if proper arrangements are made inadvance!

It has been further objected that the rapid circulation of informationfrom the front to Army Headquarters will be jeopardized by theinsertion of an additional collecting station--viz. , the CorpsCommand, between the two ends of the chain. But this fear can be shownto be groundless, for in any case where at all large bodies ofCavalry are sent out in advance, the service of intelligence must beorganized in such a manner that all really important information willbe transmitted direct to Headquarters, as well as through the usualchannels. Since this is already necessary with Cavalry Divisions, there can be no objection to applying it to yet higher commands. 

More important than this question of intelligence is the considerationthat the command of Cavalry 'Masses' which exceed more than thepresent Division of six regiments involves exceptional difficulties, and this must be granted to a certain extent as long as the questionis limited to the actual tactical handling (execution of manoeuvres)of the Division on the battle-field. 

It is, in fact, no longer possible to handle a force of sixregiments according to any set scheme, such as that known as the'Dreitreffentaktik'--at any rate, not in hilly or difficult country. Thetransition from one formation to another, the deployment of the wholeunit for attack, or the interchange of the duties between the separatelines, are certainly hardly possible on ground over which it isdifficult to manoeuvre. It appears, however, to me that the conduct ofgreat Cavalry 'Masses' by ordinary drill methods is not necessary tomeet the condition of modern warfare. 

When once the Cavalry Corps Commander grasps the idea of handling theunits at his disposal as the Infantry Corps Commander handles hisDivisions, sending in first one Division, and then, according tocircumstances, reinforcing it or prolonging the fighting line bydrawing on the second one, or by employing the Divisions side by side, assigning to each a definite share in the attainment of the purpose, which he himself keeps steadily in view, there seems no reason whythe leadership of such bodies should not be perfectly practicable. Indeed, one may safely say that the result will be all the morecertain of attainment the more the final responsibility isconcentrated on the one head; for there is obviously a greaterpossibility of a single mind pursuing consistently a given purposethan of two or more Divisional Commanders following out the same ideaindependently along the same lines. 

If, then, when the Corps is united for tactical action, themaintenance of a single Command is quite conceivable, this will be allthe more the case in matters of Strategy. It is not so much a questionthen of handling the corps as a closed unit, for instance, on a singleroad, but of assigning within a certain sphere a united impulse to theconstituent parts of the Command in such directions that in all casesthey should reach the ground in force superior to anything the enemycan oppose to them. According to circumstances, different tasks may beassigned to the several Divisions. They may march on different roads, some of them extended, some closed, the only condition being that theyall pursue a common strategic purpose, assigned to them by the CorpsCommander, according to the same fundamental principles, and areprevented by this higher control from flying out in eccentricdirections. 

Objections based on the alleged difficulties of the conduct of suchmasses are therefore untenable. On the contrary, the demand must bemade on the Chief Command that, always in accordance with thestrategical situation, it must clearly determine what it requires ofthe Cavalry, and group them in a suitable manner and in sufficientnumerical strength under a single Leader, even if in the meanwhilethere may be a deficiency of the Arm at less important points. Thisfundamental principle must be adhered to at all costs if fulladvantages are to be derived from the employment of our Arm, for withnone other can the consequences of a dispersal of force exact moreterrible retribution than with the Cavalry. 

Nevertheless, though the principle must be held inviolate, itsapplication must not degenerate into hide-bound rigidity. 'Strategy isfounded on a system of expedients' (Moltke), and hence expediencyremains always our highest ideal. 

The essential point, however, is that our organization must be made soelastic that we can alter the strength of our units to meet thevarying circumstances which may confront us, so that forces may notremain unutilized in one place whilst they may be most urgentlyrequired at another. 

It is no way essential that the units combined for the expresspurposes apparent at the commencement of the campaign should remainintact throughout the War. One should be able to detach from orreinforce them, as circumstances require; break up Corps andDivisions, to reform them elsewhere; and employ their Leaders andStaff first with one, then with the other. 

As an example of what I have just said, I would cite the manner inwhich the German Headquarters Command dealt with the Armies during thewar of 1870-1871. According to the demands of the moment, theindividual Corps or Divisions were grouped in manifold proportions toconstitute such units, and the adaptability of this organizationproved sufficient to cope with every eventuality. 

As an almost ideal type we can take the manner in which Napoleondealt with his Cavalry Corps for the same purpose. At one moment hisbodies of horsemen unite into Divisions and Corps; at another theydissolve into independent Brigades or regiments, operating singly, only once more to be united into formidable 'Masses, ' as circumstancesdictate. Here we see no rigid adherence to any rules, nothing pedanticin the method of employment, and the leader and troops deftly adaptthemselves to the ever-changing conditions. 

This is the ideal to which we Germans should strive to attain, and allthe more so in proportion as we are threatened by superior numbers. 

CHAPTER IV

INCREASED IMPORTANCE OF DISMOUNTED ACTION

If the changed conditions of modern war have brought about newconditions and demands which require to be considered in thestrategical combinations of the Cavalry, I believe that a similarinfluence must make itself felt in the field of tactics. Whereasformerly the _arme blanche_ was recognized as the principal method bywhich the Cavalry made its inherent fighting power felt, theemployment of dismounted action nowadays has gained in importance tosuch an extent that the whole character of our activity appearscompletely changed. 

Although hitherto the general conception has been that Cavalry shouldonly make use of the carbine for defence, nowadays its employment inattack must be recognized as of the utmost importance. 

Undoubtedly, however, it is, and must remain even to-day, the chiefaim of every leader in whose veins flows the hot Cavalry blood toseize his opportunities wherever they offer themselves, and, aboveall, to attack the enemy's Cavalry wherever and whenever accessiblewith cold steel; but we cannot conceal from ourselves the fact thatnowadays numerous problems will present themselves to the Cavalrywhich can only be solved by fire action. 

In the first place, the opportunity will often arise for the weakerside to avoid an encounter in the open field, and, with the help ofits firearm, at least to attempt behind defiles, or strong positions, to defy the enemy's superior forces. In such cases the assailant alsowill be compelled to have recourse to his carbine. 

Further considerations reveal that in future, quite apart fromencounter with the enemy's Cavalry, our own horsemen will find tasksbefore them which will make appeal to the rifle inevitable. 

The enemy will cover his railways, and important depots by troops ofthe second and third class. Reinforced by the resisting power ofpopular levies, they will block woods, river crossings, and defiles. Even the guards of their Convoys will be amply provided withfar-ranging firearms. 

In the pursuit of an enemy's beaten Cavalry we shall happen uponInfantry detachments sent out to cover their retreat, or upon defileswhich have been occupied for a similar purpose. Importantcommunications will be held by strong detachments of cyclist Infantry, who will find in woods and villages protection and favourableopportunities to use their weapons. 

All these means of resistance lie beyond the field of mounted action, but they must be overcome if success is to crown our efforts. 

Already in reconnaissances, particularly in those directed against theenemy's communications, we shall meet with these impediments, and thesame will be the case when we come to the strategical pursuit, or theprotection of a retreat. [3] In the pursuit the main object is to keepthe beaten enemy on the run, to give him neither peace nor rest untilcomplete exhaustion sets in. But for the mass of the Cavalry the ideaof a purely frontal pursuit should not be encouraged, for Cavalry, even when supported by several batteries, can easily be held up by anyrearguard position in which a few intact troops remain. 

 [Footnote 3: Compare 'Cavalry Regulations, ' § 376. ]

The frontal pursuit must in such cases be left to the other Arms, onlyto be taken up again when the last resistance of the enemy is broken, and the exhaustion of our own Infantry and Horse Artillery rendersfurther effort on their part impossible. 

On the other hand, all energy must be devoted to the initiation of apursuit on parallel lines, in order that we may appear unexpectedlyand repeatedly against the flanks of the enemy's columns, with theultimate intention of anticipating him at some point on the line ofhis retreat, such as a defile, thus bringing him between two fires ina sheerly desperate position. 

Man and horse must in these cases be driven to the utmost limit oftheir powers of endurance. 

It is evident that in such situations the principal rôle falls to thefirearm, for only in the fire fight is it possible to break off anattack without loss, in order to appear again at some other point andrecommence the engagement. In case of anticipating an enemy at adefile, the rifle will be practically the only weapon that can findemployment. 

What can be achieved in this direction is best illustrated bySheridan's Cavalry, whose successful flanking operations against thelines of communication of General Lee's heroic Army brought about thecapitulation of Clover Hill. 

The charge will only then secure a greater result than dismountedaction, when the tactical cohesion of the enemy has been dissolved, andhis fire power utterly broken; that is to say, generally it will be ofgreater service in tactical than in strategical pursuits--unless, indeed, as at Waterloo, the defeat has led to the complete and permanentdissolution of the enemy's fighting power. 

Further, in the endeavour to support the rearguard of a defeated Armyin retreat it will be necessary, as soon as we have got rid of thepursuing Cavalry, to take to the rifle, because with the sword alonewe cannot hope to make any impression upon the Infantry and Artilleryof the victor. 

In such cases we must strive to attack with the firearm against theflanks of the pursuing columns, in order to draw off their attentionfrom our beaten main body. 

Cases may frequently arise when we in turn can hold up the pursuit atdefiles and other positions by a purely frontal defence. 

In such circumstances a fresh and intact Cavalry, which has notallowed itself to be dispirited or demoralized, may render invaluableservices to the beaten Infantry, and enable them, together with thecolumns and the whole supply organization of the Army, to effect anorderly withdrawal without being molested by the enemy, thus affordingto its commander an opportunity of restoring the lost cohesion andtactical order. It will only be the rifle of the Cavalry which willgain for our hard-pressed comrades what is most needed--_i. E. _, time. 

The idea is often put forward that Cavalry should not involve itselfin an obstinate fight on foot, that it should act only by shortsurprise attacks, and that it possesses in its mobility the infalliblemeans of circumventing points of resistance. This conception, whichrestricts the functions of Cavalry within their narrowest limits, seems to me entirely untenable. It is essentially indefensible when itis a matter of gaining time or of carrying a given position, such as adefensible post on the lines of communication, a convoy marching underescort, the destruction of a defended railway, or in any similarundertaking. It will be impossible to work round such positions--atleast when engaged on the greater operations of War--both on accountof the widths of the fronts occupied and the possibility ofinterfering with the sphere of operations of the neighbouringdetachments. Often, indeed, the nature of the ground will precludesuch attempts, and the experience of 1870-1871 should suffice to showhow rarely such a circumvention can hope to succeed. But even whereneither the strategic situation nor our immediate purpose compels usto fight, it is not always advisable or expedient to attempt to evadethe opportunity. For every evasion leaves the front of our own Armyclear, gives the enemy the very opportunity he is looking for toreconnoitre the position of our main bodies, uncovers our owncommunications (_i. E. _, our own Cavalry trains and baggage), exposesour flank to the enemy, and thus offers him many chances of obtainingtactical results. 

Again, these attempts at circumvention lead easily to a loss ofdirection, which in certain cases might endanger the success of ourwhole operations; and, finally, the amount of time required by suchoutflanking attempts may not be justified by the possible results. Insuch cases it might on the whole be better to attack direct, forturning movements mean always a postponement of the tactical decision, and hence are always a disadvantage to the attacking side. 

The theory that Cavalry, thanks to its mobility, can always ride roundand turn the positions it encounters breaks down in practice beforethe tactical and strategical demands upon the Arm, partly by reason ofthe local conditions, and partly because of the consideration whichhas to be given to time, to the endurance of the horses, and theposition of the following columns. 

The same applies to another theory with which one tries to explainaway the necessity of dismounted combats. It is maintained that thefire power of the Horse Artillery will suffice to clear the road forthe Cavalry; hence the latter will rarely be placed in a positionwhich will require energetic dismounted action on their part. Thisassumption involves, in my opinion, an altogether overrated estimateof the power of Artillery. The same reasoning would lead us logicallyto the false conclusion that even Infantry do not require theirrifles. One must demand from every reliable body of troops that theywill not allow themselves to be driven out of a covered position byArtillery alone. All previous War experience testifies to theimpossibility of achieving such results against even moderateInfantry, and it is only with such that we are here dealing. The factthat in 1870-1871 the Artillery often did succeed in driving a weakand demoralized enemy out of localities the possession of which was ofno material consequence to him cannot be considered as to the point. Certainly the effect of modern guns is greater than anything of whichwe have had experience, and will act upon the defender withcorrespondingly greater intensity; but, on the other hand, it must beinsisted upon that the assailant's Artillery will have to act underthe increased effect of the defender's fire power, and the latterwill choose different terrain, and utilize it far better than in thepast. The actual assault remains necessary now, as ever, to bringabout the final decision. 

Anyone who has had to conduct staff rides and similar operations oflarge bodies of independent Cavalry, and has endeavoured to carrythese out in the spirit of actual warfare, can hardly have failed tonotice the tendency which displays itself with all leaders to take todismounted action, and will have realized that one has far morefrequently to check rather than encourage this tendency; but he willalso come to the conclusion, perhaps, that this desire is well foundedon existing conditions, and that even a determined Cavalry will haveto make use of their firearms almost every day; indeed, withoutadequate employment of their carbines they are no longer able to carryout the most important of their incumbent duties. 

Hence, if the use of the rifle is thus shown by instances taken fromthe most divergent directions to be of absolute necessity, theconclusion follows that even in the battle itself, that point on whichall military action is focussed, it can hardly fail to find both itsopportunities and its full justification. 

In this direction the horsemen of Stuart and Sheridan have set us abrilliant example, taking part on foot in regular pitched battles(Stuart at Fredericksburg, and Sheridan at Five Forks), and deciding, rifle in hand, the fate of numerous engagements, in order immediatelyafterwards to mount and pursue the enemy by a succession of vehementcharges (Stuart at Brandy Station). 

The South African War also has shown us what can be done by a mountedforce supplied with a reliable firearm. The Boers fought exclusivelyas Cavalry (_sic_), supported by Artillery, and some of the mostcelebrated British Infantry regiments suffered defeat at their handsas long as the numerical proportion was not altogether toounfavourable to the assailants. 

Even in dismounted attack, particularly in the later period of thewar, they often attained very considerable successes, and thus provedincontrovertibly that the double rôle of Cavalry on foot and onhorseback is thoroughly practical; for even the charge itself of thesesame Boers often achieved brilliant results, although they werelacking in any kind of tactical training for this particularresult. [4]

 [Footnote 4: I venture to differ from the author. The Boers did not fight as Cavalry. Their whole tactics were those of Mounted Infantry. They did on one or two occasions bring about a decision by rifle fire from their horses, but I can recall no instance where they actually charged--_i. E. _, endeavoured to decide the action by shock. --C. S. G. ]

Certainly weapons and numbers have altered materially since the daysof the American Civil War, and the experiences of South Africa, largely conditioned by the peculiar topographical conditions and theout-of-door habits and sporting instincts of the Boers, cannot betransferred to European circumstance without important modifications. But even in Europe the Cavalry retain, thanks to their mobility, theirpower of opening fire in a manner calculated to create the greatestdegree of surprise against the flanks and rear of the enemy as soon asthey make up their minds to cut themselves adrift from their own Army, and get in rear of the enemy's troops. Such enterprises offer the bestguarantee of producing a great moral result. The history of theFranco-German War demonstrated this possibility. What might not ourCavalry have achieved in 1870-1871 against the undisciplined forces ofthe Republic had they been provided with a good firearm, and sought ofa set purpose for such opportunities?

It would take us too far to produce the numerous proofs from the pagesof our War records; only, as an example, I should like to quote theBattle of Bapaume. In this instance the 7th Cavalry Brigade belongingto the 3rd Cavalry Division lay on the flank--in fact, almost in rearof--the enemy's Army, without being able to come to the help of thehard-pressed 15th Division. Had they on that occasion been able to actby fire, by surprise, and with determination against the rear of theFrench Army of the North, the results must have been invaluable. 

In future, beyond doubt, we shall have to deal with much larger massesof the enemy than formerly, and against them one must make up for wantof numbers by an enormous expenditure of ammunition, and furtherendeavour to reinforce our fire power by repeating-rifles. We mustalso aim at intensifying the effect of our fire power by attackingonly at decisive points. On the other hand, it must be admitted, thatin the magnitude of the masses themselves there lies the germ ofweakness, and in our future wars we can hardly expect to find Infantryas firmly welded together as in the Armies of the past. I therefore byno means hold the opinion that dismounted Cavalry can achieve nothingagainst Infantry, or that their chances are limited to only veryfavourable opportunities. 

It is, of course, true that the Infantry receive a more thoroughmusketry training, particularly at long ranges, and that theireducation in the use of the ground, as well as in fire control, inpeace is naturally better than with the Cavalry. 

But the results obtained by the Cavalry in the field practices are byno means so much behind those of the Infantry that any superiority ofthe latter on the battle-field need be expected. A better firearm forthe Cavalry is unquestionably a necessity, for the inferiority of thecarbine compared with the infantry rifle is undoubtedly a source ofweakness; but, on the other hand, we must insist that the Cavalrypossesses sources of strength peculiar to its whole organization whichrender it materially superior to the Infantry. 

I have already pointed out that modern Infantry, when mobilized, cannot be considered like the Cavalry as a standing force--that is tosay, that the latter possess much greater tactical and moral cohesion. 

Let us look at this question a little more closely. 

A squadron at War strength can dismount, after due deduction made ofthe horse-holders, seventy carbines. These seventy men, if the annualcontingent is equally divided throughout the squadron, will consistpretty uniformly of men belonging to all three terms of their service, and will not include more than eight reserve men, so that there willbe at most twenty recruits amongst them, whilst the remainder willconsist half of men in their third year and half of men in theirsecond year; but these seventy men are led by three officers, generally all on the active list, who in turn are supported by eightnon-commissioned officers and one trumpeter, who also mostly belong tothe active list. 

Against this a section of Infantry which, when raised to War strength, is about seventy-five strong, consists of about forty men on theactive list, of whom half are recruits, the other half men in theirsecond year of service, and of thirty-five reservists. 

It possesses, therefore, at the outside twenty trained coloursoldiers, and these are led in most cases by a Reserve or Landwehrofficer, supported by at most seven non-commissioned officers, of whomfour on an average will belong to the Reserve. This Infantry will, asa rule, under normal peace-time conditions, as experience teaches us, shoot very well; but it is scarcely necessary to discuss in which bodywe shall find greater cohesion, or on which one is more likely to beable to depend in cases where moral qualities and fire discipline areall essential, and it is these qualities which primarily condition thenumber of hits in the firing line. I should only like to add, apartfrom all other considerations, that the direct influence of theLeaders in the Cavalry and their knowledge of their men is much morehighly developed than in the Infantry. It must also be remembered thatthere are generally much fewer skulkers in the mounted arms, partlybecause of their longer period of service and closer supervision, andpartly because everybody endeavours not to be separated from hishorse, and finds in his presence with the men of his detachment thebest guarantee of getting back to it. In view of these considerations, I think that our Cavalry can safely claim that they can engage thebest existing Continental Infantry with reasonable prospects ofsuccess, and against inferior foot soldiers may always preserve itssense of superiority. 

Granted this much, then, the scope of our activity is enormouslyincreased. 

We can now approach tasks which hitherto had to be regarded asimpossible, because the conviction existed that on the appearance ofthe enemy's Infantry the rôle of Cavalry _ipso facto_ came to an end, unless, indeed, an opportunity could be found for the Cavalry tocharge. For now we are in a position, in harmony with the whole spiritof the Arm, to lay principal stress upon the offensive, even whenfighting on foot. We can carry through even serious engagements, withchances of success which no longer depend on the favour of specialcircumstances. 

Confident in our own strength, we can apply tactical compulsion whereformerly we could only trust to cunning, rapidity, or luck. I hold itto be an altogether antiquated standpoint to assume that Cavalry onfoot can only attack with hope of success when it can approach onhorseback near to its enemy, suddenly deploy against him in the mostdecisive directions, and generally is in a position to utilize anyspecial advantages offered by local circumstances. 

The campaign of 1870-1871 shows that in most cases in which theCavalry had to take to its firearms it was acting on the offensive, and was compelled to attack the enemy--exactly like the Infantry--inthe most diverse situations, and to shoot its way up to him. Undermodern conditions it is clear this necessity will be even moreapparent, and it would be to deprive the Cavalry again of theindependence secured for it by the addition of the rifle to itsequipment if one were to limit its power of attack on foot only toexceptionally favourable circumstances. The Cavalry must, in fact, beable to attack on foot exactly like Infantry when the situationimperatively demands it; but if it is to be handled in this spirit, then it will require to be very strongly provided with Artillery. 

If it is already considered almost impossible for Infantry to turnwell-covered defenders out of their position without Artillerysupport, the same naturally applies to the Cavalry. In fact, a strongArtillery will be all the more necessary, for the attack with Cavalryshould be carried through with the utmost rapidity, and when acting onthe defensive its purpose is to gain the greatest amount of time. Against this must be borne in mind that the Infantry should notwithout necessity be deprived of its due share of Artillery, but Ithink the two views can be readily united. As long as the Cavalry'Masses' are out in front of the Armies we can safely give them asmany horse batteries as they require, and the same is the case after avictory or after a lost battle. In the decisive battle itself thisArtillery reinforcement to the Cavalry must not be expendedeccentrically, and must be utilized to the utmost in the most decisivedirection on the battle-field itself. Here, too, a certain elasticityof organization is most desirable, and a strict adherence to aprearranged order of battle can only act most prejudicially. 

CHAPTER V

THE TACTICAL LEADING IN MOUNTED COMBATS

Having admitted that dismounted action has increased considerably inimportance, particularly on the offensive, it nevertheless remains thefact that the combat with cold steel remains the chief _raison d'être_of the Cavalry, and when the principles have to be consideredaccording to which troops have to be employed upon the battle-field, the actual collision of Cavalry 'Masses' remains the predominantfactor. 

The task of the Leader must be to transmit the mechanical powerinherent in the troops in the form of momentum upon the enemy. Wherehe, with a clear purpose before him, acts with daring and thoroughcomprehension, it is in his power to intensify this momentum manytimes over; and this holds true with the Cavalry to a greater degreethan with any other Arm, for with the horsemen the personal impressionconveyed by the appearance and bearing of the Leader reacts on themass as in no other case. This reaction is further accentuated by thefact that the excitement of motion on horseback, inherent in theperformance of Cavalry duties, contains something electrifying, kindling to the imagination and exciting to the nerves, whichcommunicates its influence to the Leader, and thus in turn supportshim. 

On the other hand, the evils of an indifferent Command make themselvesnowhere more apparent than with Cavalry. In this Arm every impulseworks itself out relentlessly down to the last consequence. Mistakesonce made can rarely be remedied. This is the necessary consequence ofthe short time interval to which their activity is limited, therapidity of their movements, and the irresistible momentum with whicha Cavalry charge once launched presses on with ever-increasingmomentum to its final decision. 

Whilst thus with the Cavalry the influence of the Command is the mostimportant factor of success, any deficiency in which can rarely bemade good by the excellence of the troops themselves, it is preciselywith this Arm that it is the least frequently found; for admittedlythere is nothing more difficult on the battle-field than correctdisposition and execution at the head of a great body of horsemen. 

Several factors unite to explain this circumstance. In the firstplace, only the shortest moment of time is available forconsideration, and then this rapid consideration and decision have tobe given under the most unfavourable external conditions, at thefullest speed of one's horse, or in the maddening confusion of themêlée. Further, in most, cases it will be quite impossible for theLeader of a Cavalry 'Mass' to take in with accuracy the strength anddispositions of the enemy. The more extended radius of action ofmodern firearms and the greater distance between the contending forcesthereby conditioned must in the future render this much more difficultthan in the past. Very rarely will it be possible for the Leadereither to alter or cancel an order once given in consequence ofinformation subsequently received. Even of the ground itself, theimportance of which is so much greater for the Cavalry than for anyother Arm, it will be impossible for the Leader to form for himselfany actual picture. Either it is already in possession of the enemyand of his patrols, or at least in their sphere of action, or itcannot be readily grasped from a single standpoint, and the rapidityof movement allows no time to reconnoitre it sufficiently. Constantreference to maps, even when available, is impossible, and the best ofthese do not reveal exhaustively the actual nature of the ground to betraversed. The orders must therefore be based on a generalconsideration of the circumstances, for the Leader cannot gauge witheven approximate accuracy the strength of his enemy from theresistance he encounters, like his more fortunate comrade of theInfantry. His only remaining means of influencing the course of theaction lie in his intact reserves. 

For subordinates, indeed, the case is even worse, for they will rarelyfind existing conditions in accordance with the conception on whichtheir orders were issued, and will seldom have time to refer toHeadquarters for further instructions. 

It must, therefore, be apparent that only the most exceptional Cavalrytraining, combined with high executive talent, can suffice tocompensate for all these difficulties. Really successful leading willonly be assured to the Cavalry General when the machinery he sets inmotion is technically finished down to the last detail. 

In the first place, the least that can be demanded is that theobservation of the enemy and distribution of orders are so organizedthat the system works with absolute certainty. On the former dependsthe correct choice of the moment of attack; on the latter that thetroops are employed in the required direction. 

The place of the responsible Leader until the moment of the charge is, therefore, well out to the front, in a position from which he can bestoverlook the situation as a whole. Even the Leaders of independentunits, if possible down to the Regimental Commanders, should remainclose to him, and try to see the situation through his eyes. Thegreatest fault of all is to stick too close to your troops. 

Every Cavalry officer must carry his map in his head as well as in hishand, particularly during the engagement. Every Leader must keepbefore his mind the hang of the ground, the lie of the roads, thepeculiarities of the battle-field, with the chances it affords him. Any defects he must try to make good by reconnaissance. Every possibleconsequence of the collision must have been thought out beforehand. 

Never should the Chief Commander take part in the charge personallyuntil he puts in his last reserve, and even then only when he is clearof all responsibility, which by that time will generally be the case. In all circumstances he must be in a position to rally his troopsafter they have dispersed themselves in a mêlée, and to take measureseither to exploit the success, or, in case of reverse, to avert itsworst consequences. This does not apply only to the Chief Commander. 

Here I would enter a particular protest against the opinion one hearsfar too frequently emitted, that the place of every Cavalry Leader inthe charge is always in front of his command. This only holds goodwhen units charge as parts of a higher organization, or where smallerbodies--_e. G. _, squadrons, regiments, or brigades--attack as a whole, with no rearward lines or supports to be controlled, or furtherresponsibilities arising out of the charge have to be considered. Butthis does not relieve the Commander from the necessity of setting apersonal example in moments of wavering, or when it appears better, after cool reflection, to risk everything, to carry the men forward tothe extreme limit of effort, rather than to reserve himself forsubsequent emergencies. 

In all other cases the Commander, and his Staff, must avoid becomingentangled in the confusion of a fight in which he must lose all viewand control over his men, and at best could achieve nothing more thanany other equally brave and determined trooper. It is, on thecontrary, his first duty to move in such a direction that he may atall times be ready to influence with rapidity and decision themechanism of his command as a whole. 

If he falls, then his Staff Officer or Adjutant assumes theresponsibility of the command until such time as the next senior canbe notified of the circumstance. In no case may the continuity ofaction be interrupted by wasting time in looking for his successor. 

When the Cavalry is working in combination with the other Arms thepoint of observation of its Commander must be connected with thelatter by suitable relays, and officers must be sent out into thosesections of the ground which cannot be overlooked from the positionthe Leader has selected. 

Combat and security patrols must be sent out in all directions fromwhich the enemy's reserves or fresh bodies of his troops mightapproach, and even towards our own rear the ground must bereconnoitred as far as possible by officers, who report the result oftheir operations, not only to the superior Leader, but to the Brigadeand Regimental Commanders. It will also be advisable to keep theofficers of the other Arms, particularly of the reserves, as wellinformed as possible about the nature of the ground and the observedmovements of the enemy's forces, so that these may always act withfull knowledge of the circumstances. A General Staff Officer should beentrusted with the maintenance of communications with ArmyHeadquarters itself. 

As the crisis approaches the troops must be drawn in nearer to thepoint of collision. As soon as the attack has been determined on, theLeader will be well advised to take up a position on the flank of histroops from which he will be able to overlook the whole field ofaction and keep the enemy well in view. From this point, havingpreviously instructed his subordinates as to the situation and purposeof the coming combat, and having sent them back to their troops, hewill despatch executive orders to the several échelons concerned. Theline of attack must be defined with particular care, and a point ofsight visible from a considerable distance must, if possible, beassigned to them. No room for doubt must be left open as to whichtroop it is which is responsible for the direction. 

But even with the finest system for reconnaissance and transmission oforders it will be impossible to guarantee the combined action of large'Masses' for a common purpose, and to put them into the fight, in athoroughly practical and not parade-ground fashion, unless goodobservation, able leading, and circulation of orders are combinedwith two other most important factors:

First comes the utmost possible independence of the subordinateleaders, down to the limit of the Squadron Commander. Only when thesecan help one out in cases where an order fails to arrive, or where thecircumstances compel a deviation from the letter of the orderreceived, or where these can only be indicated by word of mouth, signs, bugle-calls, or even by riding in the required direction, canthere be any guarantee that all will combine intelligently for thecommon purpose. 

This independence must never be allowed to degenerate into selfishwilfulness; the actual situation, as encountered on the ground itself;must never be considered from the subordinate's point of view only, but rather must always be solved in the spirit of the originalconception formed in the Leader's mind. 

In the second place, the Leader requires tactical means and forms ofevolution which combine, with elementary simplicity and clearness, thegreatest possible degree of adaptability. Nowhere else so much as withthe Cavalry does the maxim hold good that 'In War only the simplesecures success. '[5]

 [Footnote 5: Clausewitz, 'Im Krieg ist aller Einfach, aber, das Einfache ist schwer. ']

The prescribed orders must not place a strain on the memory of theLeader or troops, and must operate practically mechanically. Even themost far-reaching movements should never require either detailedinstructions or commands. 

The application of the word of command should be limited to thoseunits which it can actually control--namely, the squadron. 

The use of bugle-calls must be restricted to the utmost, and only bepermitted in circumstances where no possibility of misunderstandingcan arise--a danger not easily excluded where large bodies are actingtogether. 

Even the use of signs can only be relied on in a limited degree. Indust and closed country of course they cannot be seen. 

On the other hand, all movements depending on verbally transmittedcommands must be executed without loss of the spirit of uniformity. 

In practice this is the only form for the communication of orderswhich can be depended on to act with any degree of certainty under allcircumstances. 

The Regulations must insure the possibility that, no matter under whatconditions, the unit can be formed without many words or commands intothe most diverse fighting formations in any required direction, eitherfrom column of route, rendezvous formation, or even from the mêlée. Fundamental principles of action against the different Arms must belaid down so definitely that complicated orders in each particularcase will not be required. 

The rapid change from one fighting form to another must be absolutelyguaranteed, and equally so the possibility for each unit to assumethat formation in depth called for by the circumstances of the combat, without recourse to complicated orders and movements. [6]

 [Footnote 6: The Regimental Commander, therefore, requires his Adjutant and an Orderly Officer, so as to be able to transmit simultaneously his order to both wings of his regiment. ]

If these requirements are to be fulfilled, then only such elementarymovements must be prescribed and regulated as can be executed underall circumstances, as laid down in the Regulations. 

These matters being settled, then tactical regulations should lay downno fixed evolutions, but should confine themselves essentially toforms and principles of action, which should be treated with theutmost clearness and precision. 

It is hardly necessary to adduce elaborate proof to show that ourexisting Regulations by no means meet these requirements in all theirsections. 

Above all, the movements and deployments laid down for the Regimentare far too formal, based too much on accurate intervals and fixedprescriptions for the movements of the individual squadrons to besuitable for use on the ground which Cavalry must nowadays be preparedto traverse, or to be executed, exactly as laid down, in face of theenemy. Such evolutions are only possible on the drill-ground, wherebugle-sounds and words of command can still be heard, and are far toocomplicated for practical use. 

For instance, let us take the case of deployment to the front out ofany 'deep' formation--columns of fours, half troops, or the like, which obviously cannot always be executed before the enemy preciselyin the manner prescribed, because all must depend on the spaceavailable and the distance which separates us from the enemy. The headof the column must suit its movements to these conditions, and in turnthe following sections must conform to the movements of the head;greater freedom of choice must, therefore, be left to the latter. 

On the other hand, there are evolutions of the utmost importance beforethe enemy for which the book gives no guidance whatever--_e. G. _, therapid passage from the double column into squadron columns, either tothe front or flank. 

Even for the larger units all the prescriptions are by no meansadapted to the requirements of active service. For instance, therelief of lines ('Treffen Wechsel') is an operation of no use excepton the drill-ground, and is never attempted even in manoeuvres--atleast, personally I know no instance of its ever being tried, exceptas a matter of drill. 

That a certain measure of justification may be found for this andsimilar formations, I do not wish to dispute. 

They certainly possess great educational value as a means to theacquisition of the requisite discipline and cohesion, and they arealso well adapted for movements beyond the danger zone, when itbecomes necessary to steady the troops by the most absolute insistenceon accuracy of movement and precision of drill; and that such cases doarise no one who has had experience of War will for one momentdispute. [7] Hence, even if one may hold the opinion that the samepurpose may be equally well served by less complicated means betteradapted to practical requirements, one can nevertheless subscribeunconditionally to the soundness of the principle involved. But foractual purposes of combat we require simpler forms and more freedom intheir application, and in so far as the Regulations tend towards thisend they show a very considerable degree of improvement; for thesquadron, Section 330 provides the necessary amount of independence, and Sections 331 and 333 give sufficient freedom to the Regiment, subject only to the limitations referred to above. Section 346 inparticular and Section 348 are also of fundamental importance for thehigher commands. [8] Indeed, I hold the former as the most importantconcession contained in the whole book, for it practically initiates anew phase in the whole course of our drill evolution, by marking thecommencement of the breach with the old doctrine of the Three-Linesystem ('Drei Treffen Taktik'). It is true that it still lays chiefimportance on this method, but it no longer regards it as the oneroyal road to success. Thus we enter on a path on which the Infantryalready long ago preceded us, and which, _mutatis mutandis_, offersalso for the Cavalry similar great and undeniable advantages. It issafe to predict that Section 346 will prove the starting-point, bysheer pressure of natural conditions, of a fresh series of developmentin our Cavalry Tactics. 

 [Footnote 7: Rauch's Brigade of the 6th Cavalry Division at Vionville, under von Schmidt, August 16, 1870. ]

 [Footnote 8: Section 346 reads: 'The above general principles applying to the conduct and relations between the several "Lines" must not be allowed to lead to the adoption of any stereotyped form of attack. The Division Commander has full authority to employ his brigades as he thinks best for the attainment of the purpose in view. ']

Thanks to these prescriptions, the Commander has now a free hand toarrange his units (Brigades or Regiments) side by side, and to givethem the amount of depth that he considers necessary. Hence thecommands remain immeasurably more in the hands of their leaders thanwas formerly the case--a point of particular importance on groundwhere the view is restricted; and every unit Commander can also formhis own reserves, so that reinforcements from the rear will alwaysjoin their own Regiment (or Brigade), and thus the intermixture of thedifferent commands will be prevented as much as possible; and what again this will be towards rapid rallying after the confusion of anencounter will be obvious to every reader. 

Finally, and perhaps this is of even greater importance, a far highermeasure of initiative will be given to the subordinate leaders thanwas conceivable under the old scheme ('Treffen Taktik'). 

These advantages can hardly be over-estimated. There remain, however, yet two other directions in which this paragraph may lead to yet moreimportant consequences. 

In the first place, it secures for the Commander himself an immensesimplification of the whole mechanism he is called on to control--forhe has no longer to occupy his mind with the fundamental conception ofthe 'Treffen'--_i. E. _, Three-Line System. [9]

 [Footnote 9: The 'Drei Treffen Taktik' owes its origin to the study of the Wars of Frederick the Great, and claims to have again brought to life the fundamental principles to which our Cavalry successes in those days were due. Against this view I would point out that Frederick's Cavalry were always formed in two Lines under one common command. Besides these two Lines ('Treffen') there was generally, but by no means always, a 'Reserve'--constituted usually of Hussars only--who, if I do not err, are only once spoken of as a 'Treffen' (Line). This Reserve, however, was under a special Commander, and was quite independent of the two 'Treffen' proper above referred to. Now, no one would venture to suggest that Frederick's Infantry fought habitually in three Lines ('Drei Treffen'), although a Reserve was frequently held back in third Line, exactly as with the Cavalry. The truth really is that the modern idea of the 'Drei Treffen Taktik' has actually nothing in common with the methods of employment of Frederick's days at all. ]

The term 'Treffen' (Lines), in the true spirit of Frederick theGreat's day, defines the relation between a leading Line and one ormore following Lines, which succeed one another in due sequence. Thetactical evolution of the last few years has, however, led to thisresult--that this definition is no longer in harmony with the modernconception attaching to the word 'Treffen. ' According to the existingregulations and practice, the second or third Line, or both together, may just as well form the fighting Line as the one which ismomentarily called the first. The latter may equally be used for aflank attack or, under a change of circumstances, form the Reserve. 

The supporting squadrons, as defined in the new Regulations, or thesecond or third Line in the attack against Infantry or Artillery, arenowadays the only ones to which the original conception of the'Treffen' applies. 

Whilst at present the designation of particular Brigades, etc. , asfirst, second, or third 'Treffen' (Lines), has practically no bearingon their use in action, but only assigns them a temporary place duringthe particular manoeuvre, we have had to invent, to express the actualconception of the 'Treffen, ' or Line--which, after all, one cannot dowithout--all sorts of designations, such as supporting squadrons, formations according to depth, waves, and so forth. Hence the word'Treffen' has introduced a complication which finds no justificationin the true spirit of the matter. These disadvantages, of course, areleast evident when the Division is brought into action from a previousposition of assembly; but they are very apparent indeed when it is aquestion of uniting a Division which has previously been acting inseparate detachments upon the field of battle itself. Then we comeface to face with the difficulty--in fact, almost impossibility--ofadopting the modern idea of the 'Three Lines. '

On the line of march a Division is divided into Advance guard andMain body, and if moving on several roads, then into a number of suchconstituent parts (two to each road). From this state of subdivisionthere result a number of Tactical units which it is practicallyimpossible to fit into the 'Three-Line' formation without incurringgreat loss of time, and possibly the loss of one's opportunity. Hence, from the retention of this 'Three-Line' idea, we arrive at a tacticaldilemma which must react detrimentally on the handling of the wholeArm, as long as the Leaders are compelled by Regulations to assumetheir 'Three-Line formation' before they can fight at all. It is fromthis contradiction that Section 346 releases us. 

Of equal importance is a further possibility which the wording of thesame paragraph throws open to us. It allows, in fact, the Cavalry, nomatter in what tactical connection it may find itself, to fight alwaysin accordance with the same principles. 

As long as we adhered to the 'Three-Line system, ' this, if notimpossible, was at least practically inexpedient, for the Regulationstook cognizance only of a Division composed of three Brigades of equalstrength, were founded on this idea, and did not allow of adaptationto any other distribution of force which might have to be employed. 

It has already been pointed out in Chapter III. That they do not applyto a Corps made up of several Divisions, and the same holds good ofDivisions of other than strictly normal composition. Everywhere, incases such as referred to above, the subdivision into Lines('Treffen') in the spirit of the Regulations would very soon lead toeven worse disruption of the units than already happens with normalDivisions of three Brigades. The want of proportion between thenumber of the Lines and the columns from which they have to be formedwould be more glaring then than nowadays, when the number of Brigadeshappen to be the same as the number of Lines; with the larger unitsthe difficulty of uniform speed and control would be a factor. 

Now, Section 346 helps us over all these difficulties bydisembarrassing us of all stereotyped formations based upon numbersalone, and leaves the Commander free to choose in what proportion andin what order he will divide and move these masses. 

Under modern conditions this latitude is indispensable, for the amountof force to be applied depends on what is known about the enemy; butthe special shape the attack itself assumes, and more particularly itsbreadth of front, will be determined by the width of front the enemyopposes and the nature of the ground it has to move over; whilst as todepth, this must be decided by our estimate of the quality of theadversary's force, hence his shock power and the amount of hispossible reserves. 

The consideration of all these conditions may, in proportion to thenumbers in hand, lead us to employ whole Brigades, Divisions, Corps, or portions of these units, arranged in the most varied succession toone another. Whether we should attack by 'Wings' or by 'Lines' mustdepend on the circumstances of the movement, the order in which thetroops reach the field, and the nature of the country to be traversed;and generally the preference will have to be given to the 'WingAttack, ' for the reasons we have above developed. 

This 'Wing Attack' will, therefore, always have to be employed whentime is available to form up the troops systematically for action, orwhen the lines of approach of the units lead naturally to theadoption of the formation. 'Lines' only then, when it is absolutelynecessary to deliver an attack from column of route as rapidly aspossible, and hence the time is lacking for a more systematicformation. Such cases can, for instance, arise in the deployment atthe issue of a defile, or in bringing up troops from Assemblyformation through the intervals of a crowded battle-field, or underanalogous conditions; but even in these cases a foreseeing commandwill endeavour to facilitate the execution of the 'Wing Attack' by thechoice of some such formation as the 'double column, ' which admits ofdeployment to either hand. 

Thus we see that our Regulations at least give to the Leader thepossibility of choosing the best and most suitable formations for theexecution of his purpose, but the latter also must be sufficientlymaster of his art to know which to select. 

Further, it is the duty of the Leader, in the case of mutual encounterbetween manoeuvring bodies of the Arm, to choose the momentarily mostfavourable form of attack with reference to his own line of approach. It is not easy to lay down in general terms in what manner this can bebest insured, for the circumstances of the operations themselves andthe nature of the ground are capable of influencing the decision intoo many ways. One can only lay down certain general principles whichmay form a basis in the appreciation of each situation as it happensto arise. 

In the first place, one must select one's own base of attack in such adirection that the following blow will force the enemy to retire inwhat will be for him the most disadvantageous direction, and, conversely, for one's own purposes the best. 

But, naturally, in making this choice the tactical advantages orotherwise of the ground must not be overlooked or left to the enemy, for the tactical victory is the necessary preliminary to furtherresults. Further, we should always endeavour to secure the advantageof the 'outer lines' so as to act concentrically upon the enemy. Inthis position, if beaten, his lines of retreat cross one another, andto avoid this predicament he will be compelled to endeavour tomanoeuvre across our front, always a most dangerous undertaking. 

On the other hand, if our attack fails, we have still the advantage ofeccentric retreat, which compels the adversary to divide his forces, and thus opens to us the opportunity of further tactical success if wecan concentrate our own men with sufficient rapidity, whilst at theworst we run no risk of seeing our own troops entangled with oneanother. 

It should be our constant endeavour to gain these positions on the'outer lines' by previous strategical operations, in order to avoidthe danger of being compelled at the last moment to initiate wideflanking movements in face of the enemy. Again, a further advantageaccrues if we can rest one flank on inaccessible or difficult ground. This flank at least will be secure, so we can spare troops from it tostrengthen the other, and thus, perhaps, act with decisive effect. 

Finally, when it is presumable that we shall have to deal withconsiderable numerical superiority, we should direct all our effortsto throwing the whole weight of our charge against the enemy's flank, so as to compel him at the last moment to change his front to meet theblow. The opportunity for such action will arise in cases in which, thanks to our previous strategic direction, we can succeed in unitingthe mass of our forces more rapidly than our opponent is able to do, and this may often be the case where the ground favours our advanceand conceals the direction of our march. 

Generally, it may be laid down that a simultaneous attack directedagainst the enemy's front and flank is justified when we have theadvantage of a considerable numerical superiority, or when ouropponent retains for too long a faulty distribution of his forces; butin all other cases a blow with united force against his flank willgive the most far-reaching consequences, as it brings immediatepressure against the adversary's line of retreat, and compels him toemploy his own forces in succession, not in a concentrated effort. Hence this form of attack gives the chance of a success even to aforce in a numerical minority, as it will often afford it theopportunity of beating the enemy in detail, whereas against aconcentrated mass there would be no hope of success at all. 

It will be evident that for the execution of such an attack the formslaid down in the Regulations to be observed in the transition fromrendezvous to attack formations are--one is almost tempted towrite--about as unfavourable as they well can be. It is true theyafford, as already pointed out, the possibility of presenting the samefighting formation in succession to any required point of the compass, an advantage which has no practical importance in warfare; but againstthis they increase the difficulties of deployment for attack to thefront to the utmost. If it is necessary, for instance, to send thefirst Line at the enemy's flank, because at the moment that happens tobe the shortest way, the front of one of the following Brigades is atonce masked, and the latter hampered in its movements. Or if it isdesirable to employ one of the rearward Brigades for a flank movementor any similar purposes, then either the leading 'Line' must bechecked until the others have gained the required position, or it iscertain that these latter will arrive too late to co-operate. 

Further, the forms prescribed by the Regulations render it moredifficult to make use of such assistance as the nature of the groundmay offer us. 

Plainly, it is very much more to our advantage in the conduct ofoffensive operations to bring up those units which one has at one'sdisposal--with the sole exception of a Reserve, which is not to bekept too weak, at deploying intervals on the same alignment--informations which adapt themselves well to the ground, and insure rapiddeployment to the front, with the necessary depth in the supportsfollowing. For this purpose I recommend primarily the 'double column'either in Brigades or in Regiments. 

This arrangement of the troops satisfies all practical conditions, andinsures, above all, the possibility of bringing all forcessimultaneously into action, and of carrying out offensive flankingoperations; further, it makes it easier for the Commander to takeadvantage of such support as the ground affords, and to mass his chiefstrength on one wing; and, finally, it gives us the shortest line ofattack upon the enemy, and makes it easier to avoid the use of innerlines. It unites thus all the advantages of the regulation 'Line'('Treffen') formation, and avoids its many serious disadvantages;hence it should be employed fundamentally wherever possible. 

Turning now to the employment of Cavalry on the battle-field, thefirst condition which has to be satisfied is to assign to the 'Masses'their proper place in the line of battle. They must not only be athand when wanted, but also at the spot which promises the mostfavourable tactical chances and the greatest prospect of decisiveresults. Further, they must be able to recognise the right moment totake part in the combat. 

With reference to the first point, I should, above all, like to callattention to the writings of General von Schlichting. [10]

 [Footnote 10: 'Tactical and Strategical Principles of the Present Day, ' part i. , chap, vii. , B. ]

Theoretically, the Cavalry 'Mass' is best united on that wing of thebattle front which is not supported, but destined for furthermanoeuvres, hence on which the Arm will enjoy freedom of movement asfar as the ground allows. Naturally, it will not always be possible toassign them such a place, but their position will result generallyfrom the course of the previous manoeuvring. 

Either the Cavalry must clear the front of the Army in preparation forthe battle, in which case it is not always a matter of free choice inwhich direction one has to clear off, nor can the Cavalry Commanderfrom his standpoint always determine which wing of the battle frontwill have to manoeuvre; or it must close in from a flank for thedecision, in which case the nearest wing is their natural destination. But they must always endeavour--and here I differ from General vonSchlichting--to range themselves forwards and sidewards of their ownArmy. It will only be in cases where it is necessary to keep them inrear of the general alignment--as, for instance, it is proposed touse them as a last resort in the interests of the other Arms, as atMars la Tour--or where the battle front itself is broken up by thenature of the ground or the grouping of the forces in such manner thatthe whole engagement is divided into a series of individual actions, as may often be the case in future Wars, that this rule must bedeparted from. 

Such dispositions are always less favourable because they imply in acertain degree defensive action, whereas when placed forward in theframework of the battle the offensive element of the Arm finds itsfullest opportunity. 

That the desire to occupy such positions must not become stereotypedgoes without saying; it must always be conditioned by the general andparticular circumstances of the moment. 

The course of events may, indeed, require us to take up a position tothe flank and rear of the Army, but fundamentally, forwards and to theflank, remains the most desirable disposition. In this position theCavalry 'Masses' are best prepared to act against the enemy's flank, and can best combine the fire of their own Artillery concentricallywith that of the guns and Infantry of the main body without losingtheir tactical connection, and thus divert the forces of the enemyinto eccentric operations. Here they occupy the most suitable positionto initiate without loss of time a parallel pursuit of the enemy, orto counter his attempts at pursuit; and here also they are best placedto accept the inevitable challenge of the enemy's Cavalry. 

General von Schlichting considers these combats as generallysuperfluous--a kind of family concern which affects the rivalCavalries only--having no connection with the ultimate decisionbetween the two armies. [11]

 [Footnote 11: See 'Tactical and Strategical Principles of the Future, ' p. 83. The view that Cavalry which has delivered one charge in the day is useless for the rest of the operations, I cannot accept. It finds no support in the facts of Military history--on the contrary, the most complete refutation. ]

I cannot share this opinion, which seems to me to be based mainly onpeace-time experiences, in which the opposing Cavalry forces generallyneutralize one another. In actual War, however, victory more usuallyopens the path to other and proportionately more far-reaching results. I hold, therefore, not only that such Cavalry duels are essential, butthat the opportunity for engaging in them should be sought out fromthe first; for it is only the defeat of the enemy's horse which canopen the door for further successful action against his other troops;otherwise the two Cavalries mutually paralyze one another, as at Marsla Tour. 

If in practice it has often happened that this Cavalry deadlock hassupervened, and the result of their encounter has remained unimportanton the decision of the day, this result, in my opinion, has alwaysbeen due to a reluctance on one or the other sides to press the combatto its utmost limitations, as in the above-mentioned instance of Marsla Tour, or because the victorious side has retained neither force norcohesion sufficient to act against the enemy's flanks, as at Chotusitzand at Prague. 

Matters, however, will be very different when the Cavalry is reallyadequate to its duties--when it not only beats the enemy out of thefield, but remains, as at Roszbach and Soor, fit for further effortsin pursuit. 

To reach this ideal we must strain every fibre of our being, and neverrest satisfied, as on the plateau of Ville sur Yron (Mars la Tour), with half results as long as a single trooper remains fit to gallopand handle his lance. The last man and the last breath of his horsemust be risked, and he who is not willing to stake his soul is no true'Cavalry Soldier. '

If we have successfully achieved this first result--_i. E. _, victoryover the enemy's horsemen--then the next step is to secure rapidrallying and the pursuit of the beaten enemy till they are finallydriven from the field; and whilst detachments follow up, the mainforce of our Cavalry must wheel in upon the flank and rear of theenemy's Army, ready to act with all vigour and determination to bringabout the final decision when and where the opportunity offers. 

That we failed in the campaigns of 1866 and 1870 to obtain thiscrowning purpose of the Arm is no evidence in itself that the ideal isinaccessible, only proof that neither our training nor comprehensionof our duties was on a level with the requirements of the time. 

It is certainly possible that our opponent may seek to withdraw hishorsemen from the Duel to save their strength for the protection ofhis threatened flanks; but the consideration remains that by suchconduct he voluntarily renounces the best sphere of his ownactivity--a degree of renunciation on his part hardly to beexpected--and precisely because its action to avert defeat may proveof essential consequence, it is our part, in accordance with theoffensive spirit of the Arm, to seek him out and destroy his forcesbefore such opportunity arrives. 

For this purpose, again, the position to the front and flank is mostsuitable. The constant threat upon the enemy's communications itimplies cannot be disregarded, and will compel him to find means torid himself of such embarrassment. 

Having, therefore, made it clear where the Cavalry should seek itsposition on the battle-field, the next step is to settle how it shouldbe formed. In this direction General von Schlichting has reached themost practicable solution in laying down that a position in which eachDivision retains full space for deployment and room to manoeuvre forthe common purpose is theoretically the ideal, and this would stillapply to Divisions united to form a Corps. 

It is, indeed, evident that it is far easier to unite troops foraction towards the front than, under the circumstances of thebattle-field, to deploy them outwards from a common centre. Thislatter operation will be all the more difficult in proportion as thetroops themselves have been brought forward to the front to meet acoming crisis. The danger then is ever present that, by the necessityof gaining room for deployment, [12] the opportunity to strike will belost, or that the endeavour to seize the opportunity will lead to thetroops being put in without order and in confusion. 

 [Footnote 12: The 6th Cavalry Division at Vionville, August 16, 1870. ]

The fundamental principle, therefore, follows that troops, whetherCorps, Divisions, or Brigades, should be grouped on the battle-field, preserving always their full deploying intervals. 

Of course, local conditions must be taken into account, above allthings the necessity of finding cover both from view and fire in theshape of the ground. In practice, therefore, it is only the actualfacts as one finds them which can decide as to the best formation tobe assumed, but it must always be of advantage to be perfectly clearin one's own mind as to which disposition to adopt and theconsequences which must follow from one's choice. 

The chief difficulty always remains--viz. , the chance of seizing theopportunity. In the Battle of Mars la Tour our Cavalry failed to solvethe problem, and in the subsequent course of the War--particularlyagainst the forces of the Republic--it might often have obtained farbetter results had it possessed a clearer conception of its missionand better tactical training, as, for instance, in the action atCoulmiers, where we missed a grand opportunity. 

The more difficult it becomes, with every increment in the range offirearms, to recognise our opportunities, the more essential is itthat we should take the field with a thorough knowledge of ourtactical power and its limitations, and it is above all thingsnecessary that we should keep well up to the front, and not shirk even_heavy punishment_ if by so doing we can best secure opportunities forgreat results. 

If this end is to be obtained, then every Cavalry Commander requiresto have a complete grasp of the nature of the Infantry combat. He mustbe able to estimate with as equal certainty as an Infantry General thegeneral course of an engagement, the consumption of reserves, and thegradual moral degradation of the enemy's foot soldiers. 

At any moment he must be able to grasp in his mind the whole balanceof forces in conflict on any point of the battle-field, so as to beable to decide whether the employment of his own command at anyparticular point and time is justified by the general situation ofaffairs. 

It is, and always must be, the moments of great crises which give theCavalry the best opportunities. 

Since attempts to ride through the zone controlled and swept byeffective Infantry fire may be looked on as synonymous withself-destruction, only such moments must be chosen for a charge duringwhich the enemy is prevented from bringing his full fire power to bearagainst the assailants. These, however, only occur--except alwayswhere the nature of the ground allows of a thorough surpriseaction--when the moral disintegration of the enemy's Infantry is suchthat, under the impression of the threatening Cavalry attack, they areno longer under control, or when they are so completely taken up withtheir own fire action that it is impossible for them to concernthemselves with the coming danger. Where such opportunities arise theymust be seized with lightning-like decision and be exploited with theutmost energy. On the other hand, one should never allow one's self tobe induced to undertake charges in which the probable losses bear noreasonable proportion to the possible results. Such conduct could onlylead to the purposeless sacrifice of men and horses, just as happenedto the French Cavalry at Woerth and Sedan. 

We can always take as an example the wise restraint exercised by vonSeidlitz at Zorndorf, who, in spite of the Royal Command, refused toattack because he did not consider that the right moment had arrived. 

The Leader must always keep before his eyes the demands which eitherpursuit or retreat may make on his horses. One should never sacrifice, to secure results of secondary consideration, means that can be usedto better purposes at other times and other places, for the callswhich may be made upon Cavalry after the battle are quite exceptionalin their nature. 

When, after long marches, hours of fighting, and heavy losses, theexhausted victor bivouacs on the hard-won field, when the day isdrawing to its close and the shadows are spreading far across thepastures, then the real work of the Cavalry begins; then, withoutdrawing rein, the horsemen must press forward to intercept the enemy'sretreat, attack him anywhere where he least expects it, and harry himto utter exhaustion and dispersal (see Book I. , Chap. IV. , 1. 4); or itmust, under the difficult conditions of a retreat at night, sacrificeitself in charges or in protracted fire action in every direction inwhich the pursuing Army can threaten danger to the retreating columns. In such situations they must be prepared to hold suitable positions bythe hour, without thought for their own retreat, without any knowledgeof the general situation, and without any connection with theremainder of their forces. Threatened in flank and rear, and yetunshaken by the general collapse, by the flight and panic of theircomrades, they must hold their own, relying on their own strength andself-reliance. These are the conditions which make the highest demandsboth on the material and moral excellence of the men, as well as onthe indomitable energy and skill of the Cavalry Leader, and to fewmortals is it given to prove equal to such contingencies; hence onemust prepare one's self beforehand for such situations. 

Primarily one must remember to give opportunities to both men andhorses to feed, water, and rest even during the progress of thebattle. One must endeavour, even while the fight is still raging, tobecome perfectly clear in one's own mind as to the possible lines ofretreat, and the probable ulterior operations. One must try toimpress upon one's memory the lie of the roads according to the map, and the important defiles and positions which might be favourableeither to pursuit or retreat, in order to be able to act at the rightmoment, without loss of time or hesitation, in full cognizance of thecircumstances of the case. _Nothing helps a decision more than acomplete intellectual command of the situation. _

Hence we see that the leading of Cavalry has been renderedimmeasurably more difficult by a whole series of externalconsiderations, as we have shown at the beginning of the chapter; thatat every moment the highest demands will be made on the intellectualperception, the boldness and strength of character of the Leader, ifon the battle-field of the future he is to handle the Arm with anyprospect of success; and that the best Cavalry under moderncircumstances must fail if their Leaders prove unequal to their task. 

CHAPTER VI

TACTICAL CONDUCT OF DISMOUNTED ACTIONS

If, in the shock between mounted men, the genius of the Leader is theprincipal factor of success, nevertheless, the successful conduct of adismounted combat and of all the variations this form of action mayassume make almost equal demands upon his capacity. For the timelyrecognition of opportunities which can only be turned to account byrecourse to fire power, the transition from one form of action toanother, the skilful and systematic arrangement of a dismountedengagement, require such a complete command of the situation and suchcertainty of military judgment and decision of character that thecombination will be almost as rarely found. 

Moreover, in the power of holding the balance correctly between firepower and shock, and in the training for the former never to allow thetroops to lose confidence in the latter, lies the real essence of theCavalry spirit. This, whether it be in the working out of some greatstrategical design, or in joining hands with the other Arms to obtainby united fire action some common purpose, implies a balance ofjudgment and absence of prejudice of the rarest occurrence in normalnatures. 

The essential point which differentiates the action of Cavalryfighting on foot and of Infantry engaged in the same operation is thedependence of the former on their horses; and to arrange that underall circumstances of the combat the relation of the men on foot totheir means of locomotion shall be suitably maintained is at once themost important and the most difficult task that falls to the lot ofthe Leader. 

Primarily we have to decide whether we intend to fight with mobile orimmobile horses, [13] and in every case the question arises how theconditions of the moment, whether in attack or defence, can best bedealt with. 

 [Footnote 13: When only three men in four dismount the horses are said to be 'mobile. ' When the proportion is greater the horses become 'immobile. ']

Turning first to the attack, as the most important form of action, consideration leads to the following conclusions: If the advance ismade with 'mobile' detachments, then in case of success the horses canbe led forward after us. It is then easy to remount, and continue theprosecution of our ultimate purpose. If, on the other hand, we fightwith 'immobile' detachments, one cannot at once pursue one's successeswith the same body of troops with which such success has been won. Either the position which has been captured must be retained for someconsiderable period, or we must go back to where the horses were left, at the cost of considerable loss of time, and at the risk ofintervening circumstances robbing us of further opportunity. Neitheroperation commends itself to the true Cavalry spirit. 

On the whole, in attack the difficulty is best met by working with'mobile' detachments, and the requisite number of rifles in thefighting line can then be provided by dismounting men from a largernumber of units--Squadrons, Regiments, or Brigades. 

From this principle one should only deviate when, owing to theproximity of the enemy's Cavalry or other circumstances, it isabsolutely indispensable to keep a strong mounted reserve at hand, orwhen it can be foreseen that the number of rifles available, if the'mobile' form is preferred, will obviously not be sufficient for theappointed task; for it must never be forgotten that the rapidattainment of fire superiority must be striven for under allcircumstances. 

If we turn to the consideration of the Defensive, our conclusion mustbe the exact converse. 

The maintenance of fire superiority now becomes the primary objective, and since, in case of success, a general advance is precluded by thevery conditions which compelled us to adopt the defensive rôle in thefirst instance, and further, owing to the conditions which surround adefensive combat generally, particularly the nature of the ground, itis usually practicable to bring the led horses closer up to the firingline, which remains stationary, and does not, as in the attack, constantly increase the distance between the two, it will be wiser toadopt the 'immobile' detachment as a fundamental proposition. 

This gives us the further advantage of being able to retain a largermounted reserve in hand for the initiation of a possible pursuit, andone should only depart from this principle when special circumstancesmake it appear desirable to advance rapidly after the decision of thefire fight, and the ground compels us to leave the led horses farbehind the actual shooting line of the position. 

Next to this question of 'mobile' or 'immobile' detachments, theCommander must decide how far away from the actual field of action heshould dismount his men. 

Fundamentally, the idea must hold good that one must ride up as closeas possible to the line to be held or the position from whence theadvance is to be made; and the limit to the mounted approach is onlyset by the necessity of retaining cover, at least from sight, for theled horses, and time enough, in the event of failure, to insure thatthe men can remount before fire can be brought upon them, even from adistance. The possibilities of becoming exposed to the indirect fireof Artillery must not be left out of consideration altogether in thesolution of this question. 

Hence, it can only happen very rarely, and then only underexceptionally favourable topographical conditions, that a suitableposition for the led horses can be found in immediate proximity to theactual line of action. 

We may, however, be less particular when, in fairly favourablecountry, it is advisable to engage, without the intention of courtinga decision, our object being only to annoy the enemy by sudden fire, disappearing again as soon as he retaliates, or when one is reasonablycertain of success, as against inferior or badly shaken troops. 

But when such favourable conditions are not present, and a tacticalrepulse is always possible, then the place for the led horses can onlybe found so far to the rear that the enemy cannot take us under firewhilst in the act of remounting, and circumstances render itimprobable that this emergency can arise before we have succeeded inbreaking off fighting contact with the enemy. 

The Commander, therefore, who decides to undertake a serious fireaction must be perfectly clear in his own mind that by the act ofdismounting he has severed his connection with his horses for a veryconsiderable time; for if the enemy's resistance proves more obstinatethan originally anticipated, and it becomes clear that the originalpurpose is not to be attained with the available means, theexpectation that after once engaging the enemy the fight can be brokenoff and the horses remounted will in most cases prove entirelyillusory. 

Since this operation of discontinuing a fire combat is most difficultto carry through, even for Infantry, the dangers are immensely greaterfor mounted men, owing to the added complication of their led horses. Only the passivity of the enemy, or unusually favourable topographicalconditions, as in South Africa, can alter the general soundness ofthis conclusion; and it is entirely impracticable to escape theseconsequences by any attempt to lay down a limit and distance beyondwhich the fight is not to be prosecuted, in the hope that by so doingwe can safely break off a combat once commenced. Generally it must beaccepted, as laid down in Cavalry Regulations, Sections 362 and 364, that a fire action once accepted must be carried out to the end, unless the arrival of fresh troops on the flanks makes itsinterruption possible. 

One must never, therefore, in reliance on this possibility ofwithdrawal, allow one's self to be led into the mistake of keeping theled horses too close at hand; but the resolution to engage in adismounted action must always involve measures which fully recognisethe serious possibilities such decision entails, and must be on ascale which will insure the necessary vigour of execution. 

Hence, since in all cases in which a serious dismounted combat isabsolutely necessary it is essential that the horses should be left inthe greatest attainable security, the place for them should beselected in such a manner that they are protected against possibleturning movements by the enemy--that is to say, behind suitableshelter provided by the ground, or behind defiles that can be easilydefended. In cases in which these conditions cannot be complied with, which in practice will often arise, their security must be providedfor by a sufficient reserve of mounted men, particularly when theenemy's Cavalry is in the vicinity, for 'immobile' detachments arepractically at the mercy of every mounted patrol; and as a furtherprecaution it will be well to spread around them a sufficient web ofreconnoitring and security patrols, and to arrange for the support ofone's own batteries. 

The covering of the led horses, however, is not the only duty of themounted reserve: the protection of the Artillery also devolves uponit, and generally it must be ready to meet any of the demands forwhich Reserves are usually set aside. Hence it will have to providenot only for the safety of its own side and all pertaining thereto, but it must also threaten the enemy's flanks, undertake turningmovements, reinforce, if necessary, the fighting lines, pursue theenemy, or cover the possible withdrawal of its own dismountedcombatants; and, further on the offensive, it is its special missionto hold the conquered ground when the dismounted detachments arecalled off to remount, and to continue to carry on the originalmission, interrupted by the combat, until relieved by the men who inthe meanwhile have regained their horses, and again assumed the rôleof mounted combatants. 

The first point the Commander will therefore have to decide is, howstrong it will be necessary to make his mounted reserve if it is tosuffice to meet all these requirements, and then whether, with theremainder of the men in hand, he has any prospect of successfullycarrying out his immediate purpose. From this it will depend whetherhe determines to fight or to reach his object by other means. Ingeneral, the Reserve can be reduced in proportion to the weakness ofthe enemy's Cavalry, and to the depth of the zone of security hispatrols have been able to secure for him. 

Having by this line of reasoning determined the number of men he canafford to employ on foot, he must next make up his mind as to theirtactical distribution. 

In this case there can be no doubt that the method of employment by'Wings' must commend itself even more than in cases involving onlymounted combat, for, quite apart from all the many admitted advantagesof this form, in no other way is it possible to guarantee that thedismounted men can safely and rapidly regain their horses. 

The 'Line' system would involve endless confusion and loss of time insorting them out amongst their respective commands. 

As regards the general considerations of width of front and depth, thesame principles apply as in the case of Infantry. In the defence togain time is the main object, and the problem to be solved is tosecure at one and the same moment both fire superiority and asufficient reserve to meet all possible emergencies. A skilfulutilization of the ground, previous ascertainment of the ranges, ampleammunition and sound fire discipline, will, as with the Infantry, bethe best means of attaining one's object. 

Special conditions only arise in the defence of villages where thehorses can be brought under cover close to the men, and here it seemsto be necessary to distinguish between several possibilities, all ofwhich require different treatment. 

If the place is to be obstinately defended, then the horses must bekept on the side away from the enemy, or in the centre of thebuildings, the defence of the boundaries be suitably arranged, and themen told off to their several sections. The exits must be barricaded, and the approaches entangled with wire. 

A strong inlying piquet, to act eventually as a reserve, must beplaced in a central position. 

If, however, the place is to be given up when seriously attacked, andresistance is only to be sufficient to cover withdrawal, then thehorses should be kept saddled up in the stables, etc. , andarrangements made to withdraw them rapidly without exciting attention. 

In the first case, as against Infantry or mounted Cavalry only, onecan count on holding one's own without serious losses for aconsiderable time; but the matter becomes very different if theenemy's Artillery is also to be reckoned with, for modern shell firewill soon involve the destruction of all the horses, and one must beprepared to find retreat practically impossible once one has allowedone's self to be committed to an engagement of this nature. Hence suchpositions should only be occupied and defended when it is safe tocount on support from following troops, or when it is improbable thatthe enemy will be able to bring Artillery into action. Such situationsmay frequently arise in the advanced lines of a concentration zone, inwhich the villages nearest the enemy form part of the general systemof security. 

In all other cases, and particularly as regards the advancedsquadrons, it will be better to take up 'Alarm' quarters, and the moreunexpectedly the enemy can attack us the more stringent must be theprecautions we adopt. 

If we decide to retire, a portion of the men will be detached to takethe horses out of the village, or to have them drawn up in readinessfor mounting behind the position selected, and meanwhile the remainderof the garrison must compensate for their diminution in numbers by agreater expenditure of ammunition, thus holding the enemy till all isready, and then slipping rapidly back to their horses. Withoutlosses--amounting, perhaps, to the sacrifice of the last coveringparty--such withdrawal can hardly hope to succeed; but previoussystematic arrangements give the best chance of success, and the sameprevision will be equally necessary, even if the place is to be heldat all costs, for the situation may always change, and a retreatbecome advisable. 

At night, however, the aspect of affairs changes; then any attempt atwithdrawal is to be deprecated, and, as a matter of principle, mustnot be contemplated. Even if the enemy breaks into the place bysurprise, it is still better to fight him on the spot rather than torisk the certain destruction of the whole detachment by retreat. Asuccessful resistance is in such cases all the more probable, sincein the darkness the use of the enemy's Artillery is practicallyprecluded--at any rate, can attain but little result. Only thesquadrons far out in advance, and thus liable to be surrounded on allsides and captured before help can arrive, will have to be preparedfor a night withdrawal before the assailants can close in around them. 

As to the principles to be observed in such cases, there should be noroom for doubt. Everyone should know what he has to do when the casearises. 

Turning now to the consideration of the conduct to be observed inattack, it is clear that here also the same fundamental ideas apply aswith the Infantry. Dismounted Cavalry must be prepared to work theirway up to decisive distances, to break down from this limit theenemy's resistance, and finally to carry the position by storm. Hencethe fighting line has need of constant reinforcements to give thenecessary forward impulse, and hence we require the same distributionin regard to 'depth. '

Nevertheless, it would be a great mistake to adopt on this point anystereotyped formation. It must not be overlooked that the essence ofsuch Cavalry attacks is rapidity of execution. Hence in all caseswhere this necessity for rapidity arises the endeavour must be made tobring from the very first as many rifles into the firing line aspossible, and it follows that the greater the fire power thus obtainedthe less the need for subsequent reinforcement. 

If we try to picture to ourselves the conditions under which thesedismounted Cavalry attacks can occur, it is evident that only in themost unusual instances will the necessity arise of launching themagainst wide fronts of dense lines of unbroken Infantry; on the otherhand, we shall often be called upon to capture isolated villages, etc. , such as posts on the line of communication, railway-stations, and important defiles, and in all such cases it will always bepossible to combine attacks simultaneously against both flanks, frontand rear. Thanks to its mobility, the Cavalry is exceptionally wellsuited to the performance of such undertakings, because it can combineboth attack and surprise to the best advantage. 

If, thanks to this possibility, it is practicable to diminish theweight of the front attack, it follows, again, that lessdepth--_i. E. _, fewer successive reinforcements--will require to beprovided; but these can only be suppressed altogether when the objectaimed at does not imply the actual maintenance of the position to beassaulted, but our purpose is only to reach a point from whence tooverwhelm the enemy with fire, previous to riding him down by ourclosed squadrons, or to break off the action again and retire as soonas a counter-attack develops. These are cases which will often presentthemselves: either when in pursuit it is desirable to strikeunexpectedly at the enemy's columns, or during a battle, when it isfeasible to molest and disturb his reserves. 

In the above paragraphs I have put together the chief points to beconsidered in the action of dismounted Cavalry when actingunsupported; it remains now to consider the rôle assigned to the HorseArtillery allotted to it, if only to bring out those parts which, inmy opinion, lie beyond its proper field. 

If we admit that in general, as between two great Cavalry masses inactual collision, the guns can play an important part, I must yetinsist that the measure of this importance should not be overdrawn;for it is only when the former are confined to a defensiveattitude--for instance, when they are still under cover or behindsheltering folds of the ground, or when moving in a widely-extendedscreen to mislead the enemy and tempt him into fire-swept ground, inorder to fall upon him when he has ventured into the trap--that muchis to be expected from their co-operation. 

But as soon as the Cavalry begins to advance, the part the Artilleryhas to play drops into the background. Then the guns become simply animpediment, because, since they generally require a special escort, they subtract from the total force available for the actual shock, andalways act more or less as a pivot, which hampers the free movement ofthe Cavalry. 

On the contrary, the Cavalry must never allow itself to be influencedin its movements by the position of its own Artillery. The latter mustadapt itself unconditionally to the movements of the former, and mustendeavour to conform to its evolutions, so as not only to co-operatewith it, but, if possible, to dispense with a special escort. 

It must, therefore, be the endeavour of the Artillery to keep well outin front of the Cavalry, so as to take the enemy under fire, andanticipate his batteries by coming into action first. The latter is amost important point, for it is the essential duty of the enemy'sgunners to divert and beat down the fire which we endeavour to bringagainst their horsemen. 

If we can only succeed in unlimbering first, they are bound to acceptthe law from us, and are thereby prevented either of availingthemselves of the advantages of the ground or of conforming to thetactical intentions of their Leader. 

The best position for Artillery must always be behind some shelteringroll of the ground, where it requires none, or at the most a weak, escort; and this desideratum will be best fulfilled when it is on theinner--that is, the supported--flank of its Cavalry, because in thisposition it can presumably remain in action longest, and hampers themovements of its own force least. Similarly, in pursuit or in coveringa retreat its sphere of activity is distinctly limited. Its action canonly then become effective when the actual tactical pursuit--_i. E. _, with cold steel--ceases, the combatants have disentangled themselves, and the strategic pursuit sets in. 

The mobility of the target must naturally influence the fire effect tobe expected from the guns, as it increases the difficulty of'ranging, ' and limits the possible duration of action to a fewmoments. 

The batteries will only then be able to turn their fire on the enemy'sCavalry when the latter show themselves in considerable masses movingat the slower paces. But when the Cavalry sweep forward at full speed, the most they can do will be to take some stretch of ground throughwhich the opposing Cavalry must pass, and on which there is still timeto range, and then turn on shrapnel fire to its utmost intensity. 

But even for this the opportunity will only then arise when either ourown Cavalry holds back, the enemy's Artillery does not require ourfull attention and fire power, or, finally, if our own guns are notattacked by the enemy's Cavalry. 

In view of all these considerations, it follows that it is impossibleto assign a decisive importance to the participation of a few HorseBatteries in the actual shock of the opposing squadrons. Nevertheless, one should always do one's best to use to the utmost such Artillerypower as is available, and particularly if there is any doubt as tothe strength of the enemy, and we have reason to suspect that hepossesses a marked numerical superiority. 

The chief rôle of the Artillery must always remain the support ofdismounted action of Cavalry in attack and defence; in the battle, protected by their own horsemen, to strike against the enemy's flankand rear, shell his columns on the march, to drive him out ofweakly-defended places or defiles, and in all similar circumstances, such as war always develops afresh, to inflict upon him the utmostpossible damage. 

In all these cases the batteries can choose their own positions andthe nature of their fire with absolute freedom, according to thefundamental principles of their own Arm; they have time to pick uptheir own range, and to insure results by the duration of theiraction. 

CHAPTER VII

STRATEGICAL EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY

The attempt has often been made to advance formal principles and rulesfor the strategical, as well as tactical employment of the Arm, whichwill give a more or less safe foundation on which to base the groupingand employment of the available forces. 

Some regard a Cavalry Division as normally deployed when two brigadesmarch on separate roads in first line, with the third following behindthe centre in Reserve. Others want to see all brigades on one front, side by side; whilst yet others wish to see two brigades on one road, whilst the third pursues the same objective on a country lane. 

Even our Cavalry Regulations--which on this subject actually venturesto trespass on strategical ground--lays down (see Section 318) that'in Reconnaissance the mass of the Division must be kept togetheruntil the enemy's Cavalry has been beaten out of the field. '

I hold all these attempts which only hamper the free strategicemployment of the Arm as not only mistaken, but contrary to the veryessence of our being, and for the same reason I hold them even to bedetrimental, because they are calculated to produce thoroughly falseviews as to the conditions and demands with which in practicalwarfare we are confronted. All these regulations fall to the groundthe moment they have to be applied to strategical units of variabledimensions. Further, as I have developed above, the tasks which mayfall to us are of such different natures that they cannot possibly beall solved by the same formulae. 

The strength of the enemy must naturally exercise decisive importanceon the whole character of our action and the distribution of ourforces. The lie of the roads and the nature of the country alsoexercise their influence on our decision. 

To this must be added the fact that, in view of the many strategicalnecessities of a great Army, the Headquarters cannot always be in aposition to allot to the Cavalry a clearly-defined task either ofreconnaissance or security, attack or defence; thus higherconsiderations may prevent the massing of the Cavalry on a single roador any other similar simple distribution. More often than not one willhave to suggest the simultaneous attainment of the most variedobjectives, and the Cavalry Leader will be lucky if he is not calledupon to solve problems of the most heterogeneous nature, things whichin their execution mutually exclude one another. 

Hence one can only lay down the most general principles to govern thestrategical employment of the Arm, and to meet this difficulty itbecomes all the more important to develop the capacity for enduranceof the troops to the utmost, so that they can successfully deal withthese many variable demands. 

As to how far the independent Cavalry should be thrust out in front ofthe following columns of the Army, all that can be laid down is, thatthe wider the fronts and the deeper the Army--hence the longer timethe Army will take to deploy, concentrate, change its position, orexecute any similar operation depending on the reports of theCavalry--the further that Cavalry must gain ground to the front. 

As to the principles governing the formal arrangement of the troops incontradiction to all attempts to lay down stereotyped formations, allthat can be said is that every strategical operation, if for no otherreason than to allow of reconnaissance and secure safety, requires acertain extension in breadth; but the combat itself demandsconcentration. 

It follows from the above that the Cavalry Commander must in everyinitial case weigh in his own mind how much the existing circumstancesmay allow him to extend, and, on the other hand, how closely theycompel him to keep concentrated, and he will only be able to reconcilethe dilemma when he is actually clear in his own mind as to thetactical and strategical results his conduct in either case willinvolve. 

If the essence of his duty is to secure and to screen, then, as statedabove, extension and subdivision of his command naturally follows. Butone must keep clearly before one's own eyes that any concentration fora combat jeopardizes the performances of these tasks, for theconcentration for combat necessitates the uncovering of the front, which it is the very object of the enemy to bring about and takeadvantage of. Further, the wider the front, the less becomes thepossibility of timely tactical concentration; hence, under suchconditions, one would generally have to renounce the temptation toengage in combat with a positive object, and content one's self withkeeping the enemy at a distance, for this purpose availing one's selfto the utmost of the advantages the ground may confer, and suchsupport as the reinforced Horse Artillery and mobile Infantry (invehicles) can afford. 

When the width of extension becomes very great it will be an absolutemistake to keep back reserves, since by doing so the actual front isweakened, whilst there is no guarantee that the reserve can arrive intime at the threatened point. 

Further, the wider the front becomes, the greater the difficulty ofstrategical change of direction. 

A similar extension of front as that above indicated in this resume of'Security' duties may also become advisable when engaged on'Reconnaissance'--for instance, when lengthy obstacles, such aswatercourses, mountains, etc. , only traversable at bridges, dams, ordefiles, have to be surmounted. 

In such cases, especially when resistance is to be anticipated, itwill rarely be possible to count on being able to surmount theobstacle in one single column, since even unimportant forces undersuch circumstances can oppose a very protracted defence, andneutralize a large numerical superiority. When these difficulties aremet with, it will be necessary even in reconnaissance to divide one'sforce into several columns, as then there is always the chance ofsuccessfully piercing the enemy's front at some one point, and thencerolling up his resistance all along the line. 

Even in open country conditions may be encountered that render thesubdivision of one's forces over a considerable extent of frontdesirable--_i. E. _, when it is necessary to find the enemy, and fix thefact of his presence in certain specific districts. As an example, the conduct of the Cavalry after the Battle of Gravelotte (August 18, 1870), when it became imperative to ascertain whether MacMahon's Armywas marching to the north-eastward or not. 

Here it was indispensable to sweep out a wide area. To attempt suchtasks with patrols alone is unadvisable, for these always require acertain tactical support behind them, by which they can be eitherreinforced or relieved. 

Still, the point must never be lost sight of, that, since the enemywill also seek to screen his operations, a decisive collision maybecome necessary at any moment to tear his screen asunder. Hence itwill be better, in opposition to the principles laid down for'security' only, to keep one's principal force in groups or masses, possessing considerable striking force, and to march in such mannerthat a certain degree of concentration is always attainable whilemeeting the necessity for extension in breadth by smallerreconnoitring patrols. 

Against an opponent whose general whereabouts has been ascertained, whom one is determined at any price to beat, in order then toreconnoitre, one's troops must be kept in hand, so that their completeconcentration is assured in all cases, and only to divide them to thedegree rendered indispensable by the general direction of the roadsand the nature of the ground to be traversed. The same conditions alsohold good where surprise is the essence of the undertaking. In thiscase it may even be advisable to suppress one's own dispositions forsecurity, and accept the risk of being taken at a disadvantage ratherthan run the risk of having one's intentions prematurely disclosed. 

Tactically the greater concentration guarantees tactical success, andstrategically it allows greater freedom of movement and changes ofdirection to meet altered conditions; but one must never lose sight ofthe technical drawbacks such closer concentration entails. 

The zone of reconnaissance is naturally always of less breadth thanwith divided columns; hence the possibility of screening the march oftroops in the rear is diminished, the risk of being turned isincreased, and the possibility of delivering a stroke in the air isnot inconsiderable. 

If the enemy wishes to evade us, we have scarcely any means of holdinghim until our main force can arrive; and finally, this condition ofclose concentration by no means guarantees always and everywhereeither superior readiness for action or a more favourable deployment. Cases can arise in which strategic dispersion will prepare the way fortactical encounter even better than the concentrated advance; and thisis particularly so when, to attain the object of our mission, a wideturning movement is necessary, for this will generally be best broughtabout by previous strategic dispositions; whilst the deployment of amass from a defile or its retreat may be entirely prevented ifattempted in a single column. 

Hence every principle has its limitations, and circumstances willalways arise which defy all stereotyped formations. Thus, even for'screening' and 'security' cases can arise under which concentrationis justified, even where the nature of the ground does notimperatively dictate it, as when, for instance, the insufficiency ofone's own force excludes any distribution in breadth, and compels oneto combine all efforts for the defence of decisive points. And it isprecisely on the defensive that it may be of advantage to deal a blowwith the concentrated strength. Equally on the strategic offensive, dispersion may be necessary, as when the enemy retreats eccentrically;or if it is necessary to occupy districts of considerable size tobreak down the resistance of the hostile population, or to interruptrailway communication over a considerable area. 

Finally, all principles fall to the ground where the enemy's Cavalryis finally beaten out of the field, or by a succession of mistakes hegives openings which we can seize with advantage. Thus our conductalways remains dependent on the topographical nature of the country, on our own purpose and the opposition of the enemy, and only one lawgoverns all cases--namely, expediency. The greater art of leading willnaturally be required when the necessity arises to operate with moreor less widely-separated columns. In all such cases everything dependson the endurance of one's troops. The principal difficulty in the wayof execution lies in harmonizing and maintaining the movements of theseparate detachments. 

If one has to deal with Infantry only, then, since their rate of marchis almost always the same, it is easy to calculate approximately wherethe several columns may be found; but it is quite different when onecomes to deal with Cavalry, where the different Leaders may adopt verydifferent rates of movement, or may have such variations forced uponthem by other circumstances, and hence one has always to deal withquite indeterminable factors. This difficulty can never be altogethereliminated; one can only counteract it by laying down from the veryfirst instructions for the advance of the several columns, accordingto time and space, from which no deviation is to be permitted withoutsufficient reasons, and organizing the circulation of orders andintelligence in such a manner that it will work with certainty. Thesetwo precautions supplement one another. If one can calculateapproximately where the several detachments are to be found at a giventime, then reports can be sent by the shortest way, and will reachtheir destination without delay. 

It will be decidedly advisable that all detachments should report toHeadquarters, and if possible to all adjacent columns, withoutdistinct instructions, and at certain time intervals, both as to theiradvance, their bearing in relation to adjacent columns, as also anynews they may have obtained about the enemy. 

Nothing is more important to the Cavalry Leader than to be constantlyinformed as to the general situation of the units he controls; but itis equally important that the several groups should know what ishappening to one another, for only then can they act in the spirit andin combination with the whole. 

This is all the more essential because, owing to the rapidity of allmovements, and to the great extension which has often to be given tothe front, it is impossible for the higher Command to interfere ingood time, or to obtain information from its subordinates in anyemergency that may suddenly arise. The results, then, depend entirelyon the independent judgment of the man on the spot, and suitableaction can only be obtained when the latter is kept fully informed asto the nature of the general situation. 

We should, therefore, avoid as far as possible the despatch of ordersto individual Commanders without at the same time informing theircomrades of the bearing of such instructions. 

Wherever possible in strategical operations, the orders should becomprehensive, and should be circulated simultaneously to allsubordinates. Where it is impossible to convey an order simultaneouslyto all, those not immediately concerned in their execution should beinformed of its issue as soon as possible. Certainly, this methodrequires a large number of gallopers, orderlies, and so forth; butthis apparent waste of energy will in the end prove the best economy, because the troops will thereby be spared many unnecessary movements. 

However great the endeavour may be to diminish the difficulties of theunited action of separated bodies in the combat itself, the issue ofthe Cavalry fight is decided so rapidly that its consequences musthave begun to show themselves before either the adjacent columns orHeadquarters have learnt of its commencement. We must, therefore, beclear in our own minds that successful combination of separated bodiesin action can generally only be effected when the opponent is eitherstationary, in which case one can time one's movements against him, orwhen, by a protracted defence at other points, the more distant bodieshave time and opportunity to reach the field. 

Even when the approach of the opponent's forces has been discovered intime, it will be difficult to calculate with any degree of precisionthe exact point at which collision will occur, as the marching rate ofthe enemy's Cavalry must always remain an uncertain factor. Hence itwill not suffice to evade the enemy's advance until the adjacentcolumns can unite, as one cannot assign to them any definite point ofconcentration where the distance between the columns is at allconsiderable. Any attempt to concentrate strategically against anenemy in movement without at some point fighting to gain time must bedismissed as illusory. In all these cases one must not hesitate totake to the rifle, and to utilize all available means of defence. 

Similarly, when advancing in separated columns, it will be well toadvance from one defensive section to another in rushes, and not to gobeyond any one of these until fairly assured that one can reach thenext without encountering the enemy's Cavalry. 

If one should have the misfortune of being surprised in a districtwhich affords no points of support, then one must retire to the nextbest one in order to give the adjacent columns time to swing inagainst the enemy's flanks. The sound of the guns will be indicationenough to these to hasten their pace. 

The more important it is, therefore, to march to the sound of the gunsin order to save time, the more careful must one be in opening firewithout sufficient cause. On the one hand, the side which wishes toattract support will not be satisfied with a few rounds, but willendeavour by continuous and heavy firing to make the danger of hissituation evident; on the other, the adjacent columns will only thenbe justified in approaching if they are convinced that it is not amere matter of local and transitory advantage. The Cavalry Commandermust keep, therefore, a firm hand over his guns, and never allow theseto come into action without express sanction, except in extremenecessity. Generally, the batteries should always march with theadvance or the rear guard in order to break down rapidly any minorresistance, and to make the fullest use of such short opportunities asmay arise for the utilization of their full power. 

The application of these principles is, of course, much simpler whenit is possible to keep the several columns close together on aconvenient group of roads, all running fairly near to one another. Thedisadvantages which then arise make less demand on the skill of theLeader, but more on the necessarily cramped form of the dispositionwhich, as we have above pointed out, he is compelled to adopt. 

For every operation, in fact, except the direct attack, there is acertain degree of extension, which favours the immediate purpose themost, and this depends on the shape and nature of the ground; but onehas always to resist the temptation to dispersion which arises, particularly when it is necessary to keep in mind the solution ofseveral possible problems. Only very occasionally will it be expedientto divide one's troops to meet every emergency. 

The General must use his judgment to decide where the chief weight ofhis mission lies, the principal characteristics he must impress uponhis operations, and how the subsidiary purposes can be best servedwithout applying half-purposes to the primary object. It is theseconsiderations--the reduction of the complicated to the simple--whichcreate the chief difficulties which weigh upon the mind of the Leader. The capacity of coming to a correct decision in every special case isa mark of the intellectually capable Commander, and of itself gives acertain guarantee of its success by rendering possible theconcentration of the force upon the decisive point; but it will notalone suffice to insure success. Boldness and energy of character isthe final determining cause of successful results. 

Above all, every Cavalry leader must be inspired by the determinationto keep the initiative under all circumstances, and never torelinquish it to his opponent. The initiative alone guaranteessuccesses, often in a degree which one was hardly entitled to expect, for it forces the enemy to accept the law from our hands, disturbs hisstrategical combination, compels him to fight before his troops areunited, and often gives to the numerically weaker the opportunity ofestablishing a relative local superiority. One must, therefore, endeavour to introduce as much of the initiative and offensive elementas circumstances will permit even in the execution of defensivemissions. 

A Leader must never allow himself to be hindered in an advance, or bedriven into an attitude of expectation by the passive opposition ofthe enemy's Cavalry, as so often happens in peace. 

In all such cases, when a direct frontal attack holds out no prospectof success, he must immediately initiate a wide turning movementoutside the effective range of the enemy's Artillery, and sacrificewithout hesitation his own line of retreat. Victory restores at oncethe original line of advance, and the outflanking movement threatensalso the enemy's retreat. 

It is never permissible to wait until driven into action by superiorcommands, but one must always endeavour to reap, on one's owninitiative, the utmost possibilities the situation holds out. 

In this way we shall save the troops excessive exertions andpurposeless riding about, for since the Headquarters can never graspthe situation as rapidly or as thoroughly as the General actually onthe spot, it follows that their orders will generally arrive toolate. Hence they often lag behind events, and call for excessiveexertions, night and forced marches if the purpose is to be attained. The records of the Campaign of 1870-1871 give innumerable instances ofthese facts, based on experience. Finally, resolutions should never bemade dependent on circumstances which may happen in the future, butmust always be based on something positive, which must be followed upwith all conceivable energy and circumspection. This most necessarycircumspection on the part of the Leader demands a clearness ofexpression in the issue of orders which must never leave thesubordinate officers and troops in doubt, and should always reflect aclear and determined purpose. 

It is, however, equally necessary that the superior Leader musthimself be clear as to how he means to carry out his purpose, has alsoconsidered all other possibilities, and has made his arrangements insuch a manner that, if necessary, he can give his operations adifferent direction. This must be particularly the case where successdepends on cunning surprise. As concerns the first point, this willrequire the more thorough consideration, because it is mostparticularly difficult to change the strategic direction of a largebody of Cavalry when once it has been launched forward on a broadfront. In such a case the whole carefully-elaborated network ofpatrols would be left, so to speak, hanging in the air. To divert itsideways into a new direction is generally impracticable; it would, infact, in most cases be impossible to transmit to all the advanceddetachments the news of the change in the dispositions. 

A new system of patrols will, therefore, be absolutely necessary tosave both energy and time, and the necessity for instituting this newservice will be particularly detrimental to our whole operations, because the information from the new direction will generally arrivetoo late to be of service. 

It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that the Cavalry Leadershould not only reconnoitre in the direction prescribed by the higherCommand for its particular purpose, but should also scoutindependently in every direction, and inform himself of all thecircumstances in the whole district over which he is operating; ifnecessary, organize for himself an intelligence system. [14]

 [Footnote 14: I here call attention to the instructions of Frederick the Great on this subject, as well as to the circumspection with which General J. E. B. Stuart prepared for his own undertakings. ]

In short, he must exercise such prevision that he can never be overtakenby circumstances; and in every case in which action is called for in anew, and, perhaps, unexpected direction, he should be prepared to meetthe emergency. In this way he will save himself much time and energy, but it will facilitate his very difficult task essentially if he isalways kept informed in sufficient time of the views and possibleintention of the Chief Command; for unless this condition is compliedwith, it will be impossible to insure that the whole energy of the Armwill be directed to the carrying out of its reconnoitring functions inconformity with the views entertained at Headquarters. It must becharacterized as one of the most suicidal errors when the superiorCommand conceals its purposes from its executive organs. Diffusedactivity, waste of energy, misunderstandings, and confusion would be theinevitable consequences, and military history--not the least that of1870-1871--gives a long rôle of illustrative examples. 

As regards all those operations which depend on surprise, thecircumspection of the Leader becomes the decisive factor. Everythingmust be thought out beforehand, and carefully considered. The verysoul and being of the Leader must be grasped by the men under hisCommand, and the utmost energy in the execution of his design bedemanded from every individual. As a general rule, smaller bodies, which can conceal themselves behind features of the ground, and hardlyrequire a service of security, can act quite differently to largerones, which cannot conceal their presence and always require a certaindegree of precaution for reconnaissance and security. Above all, mobility is the essence of the whole situation, and darkness willserve as a most important contributor to success. 

On main roads, where it is impossible to lose one's way, darkness canbe used for forced marches to advantage if beforehand we are clearabout the conditions on the side of the enemy, and hence can act witha certain degree of confidence. 

One factor must never be left out of consideration--viz. , that undermodern conditions the difficulties of action by surprise have beenenormously increased, and the enemy is under certain circumstancesenabled to paralyze the tactical results of surprise. This factorarises from the existence of railways and telegraphs, and it will actmost detrimentally against us when moving in the enemy's country, where both arrangements favour our opponents. Telegraphs carry thenews of the appearance of Cavalry far and wide beyond the points wherethey have been seen by the enemy's troops, and the railways forwardsupports to the threatened districts. 

It is, therefore, of particular importance to destroy by means ofadvanced patrols both telegraphs and railways all over the district onwhich one hopes to act by surprise, and to repeat such activedestruction again and again. In such enterprises there is a wide fieldfor slimness and craftiness--qualities which might very well becombined in greater undertakings. 

Sudden changes in the line of advance behind the screen of advancedtroops, unexpected concentration of separate columns at decisivepoints, separation and surprise reunions of one's forces, dissemination of false news, feints on points of subsidiary importanceto distract the attention of the enemy--all these things can lead tothe deception of the enemy, and in one's own country they will bematerially supported by a friendly population; but timely and accurateinformation of all the circumstances of the enemy remains always amost necessary condition. 

If the importance of these measures is particularly striking in thesecases where we are dealing with surprises, ambushes, and so forth, they form also in every other type of Cavalry action one of theprincipal foundations of success, for they alone insure timelyresolutions and the consequent initiation of the movements necessaryto bring about concentration and separation. 

The Cavalry Commander must, therefore, always choose his position whenon the march, with the troops in immediate contact with the enemy; orif his troops are quartered in the neighbouring villages, thenimmediately behind the advanced line of cantonments, so that wheneverpossible he can see with his own eyes and base his decisions onfirst-hand evidence, where he can receive all reports as soon aspossible, and make his dispositions in good time. Otherwise it willonly too frequently happen that his orders and dispositions will dragbehind events, and disorder and defeat will be the consequence. 

This personal supervision of matters in his front is also necessary toenable him to come to a correct decision as to his line of action, whereas a Commander of all Arms can better decide by the map, becausehis troops are less dependent on the ground than Independent Cavalry, move more slowly, and hence are more accessible to subsequent orders. But even the utmost energy in the Leader will not alone suffice tolead things into their proper lines without the most successful andrapid reconnaissance. Hence the practical organization of the systemof reconnaissance remains the essential task of all strategicalCavalry leadership; but it requires to be supplemented by an equallypractical system of security. 

On the two subjects so much has already been written that it isimpossible to find anything new to say about them. Only one point hasnot been brought out sufficiently--namely, that both security andreconnaissance, in so far as both depend on patrols, will only thenwork successfully when they are based on a thoroughly systematizedmethod of procedure. The subject is of such importance that I haveconsidered it necessary to devote a short chapter to it (Book I. , Chap. VIII. ). 

If reconnaissance--apart from the fact that the roads must be clearedfor it in the first instance by the defeat of the enemy'sCavalry--lies exclusively in the hands of the patrols, neverthelesssecurity depends on the arrangement and activity of the otherbranches, such as advance guards, rear guards, flanking detachments, and outposts, and the conduct of these depends, again, on thoroughsystematization. 

When on the move, safety lies in the distance that separates the mainbody from the advanced detachments, and it is scarcely necessary topoint out that only systematic arrangements can guarantee thenecessary time for the exploration of the ground and the enemy whichis requisite for safety. 

Threatened flanks require special detachments, moving on the samelevel and at sufficient distance, and their co-operation will beinsured by a careful regulation of the mutual rate of march. 

A uniform rate of advance in the whole mechanism is an essentialcondition of complete security. Hence every means must be exhausteddown to the smallest detail. It will not be necessary to assign minorflanking detachments for the duration of a whole march. During such aperiod it is practically impossible to retain their relation to themain body without keeping them within sight, which in most cases isquite impracticable, for circumstances may suddenly check the mainbody, or necessitate a change of direction. To advise the flankingdetachments of such occurrences will generally be impossible, or atany rate very difficult, if one has permanently detached them, andtherefore has no certainty of finding them at any particular point. Hence it is advisable to work them always in sections--that is to say, when they have reached certain points to withdraw them to the mainbody, and send out reliefs for the next section. 

But in order that the security should never for one instant berelaxed, these fresh reliefs should always be sent out at some littledistance before the point at which the former detachment is to bedrawn in. 

Almost more important than security at night is security duringprolonged periods of rest. In that case the arrangements must be madenot only in accordance with tactical requirements, but the fact mustbe taken into account that horses, in order to remain permanentlyuseful, require quite a different nature of rest than is needed bymen. 

It is most desirable that as many horses as possible should every daybe brought under shelter and unsaddled, and all bivouacking should beavoided as far as practicable. 

The readiness for action from a purely tactical point of viewcertainly suffers, but as rest at night is an absolute necessity forthe horses, one has to make the best of the matter and minimize thisdisadvantage as much as possible by suitable arrangements. 

Against this view it is often urged that Cavalry used to bivouac muchmore frequently in former wars, and nevertheless remained fit forservice, hence they ought to be able to do the same to-day. I considerthis an entirely wrong deduction. In the first place, the demands uponthe troops in former days were generally much less than at present. The periods of crisis in which great exertions had to be made by themwere on the whole less frequent, and the subsequent intervals for restand recuperation were usually longer. 

Considering the average marches of the Napoleonic Cavalry as a whole, they cannot be considered particularly great, and still less was thisthe case under Frederick the Great, although under both Generals wefind instances of great individual exertion. 

Moreover, the horses in those days were much less well bred, and thecommoner cold-blooded strain can stand bivouacs, cold and wet, muchbetter than our present high-bred material, although the latter standheat and exertion very much better. The leadership must adapt itselfto these conditions. Where circumstances allow the bulk of the horsesto take shelter behind the Infantry outposts, the most must be made ofthe opportunity, and only the more distant patrolling service be leftto the Cavalry. Outpost service makes far less demands on the Infantrysoldier than on the Cavalry horse, for the former is allowed to sleepwhen on piquet, the Cavalry horse cannot. 

The Cavalry soldier certainly gains an advantage here over themuch-harassed Infantry man, for naturally the man derives advantagefrom the care bestowed on the horse; but I hold this point is of fartoo trifling a nature to take into consideration when the matteraffects such a necessary and important factor of strength of the wholeArmy. Further, this advantage is more apparent than real, and is onlyintended to give us the means, while sparing the material in onedirection, to make greater demands on it in another. When in criticalmoments bold and wide-sweeping movements on the enemy's flanks andrear become necessary, where our object is to keep the enemy'smovements under constant observation while screening our own; where, finally, on the close of a battle we must pursue the enemyrelentlessly, or sacrifice ourselves to cover and protect the wearyand retreating Infantry, then the Cavalry which has been properlynursed will be capable of exertions far beyond what could be expectedof troops less thoughtfully managed. These exertions can then beunconditionally demanded, and will repay a hundredfold, bothtactically and strategically, the care bestowed in easier days. 

Only rarely, however, will cases arise in which Cavalry can availthemselves of the shelter of the Infantry, for the essence of allCavalry activity lies in the future in its independent undertakings. If we were to apply to them the same principles as to theInfantry--that is to say, make a principle of bivouacking the outpostsand exposing them daily to the effects of the weather--this wouldresult in a steady drain upon the horses, which would lead to seriousdeterioration in their endurance. Hence the question of bringing themunder cover does not apply merely to the mass of the forces, but mustbe extended to the whole system of outposts, and wherever practicablethe greatest possible number of horses must be placed under shelter infull and complete security. This security must be sought for by theincreased depth assigned to the outpost system. Even after avictorious advance one must not hesitate, under certain circumstances, to withdraw the troops in order to obtain the necessary distancesbetween the enemy and the advance guard, as also between the advanceguard and the main body. Slightly increased distance to be coverednext day is nothing as compared to the advantage of greater security. It will be particularly desirable to make the most of all positionsthe ground may afford, which, being traversable at only certainpoints, hinders the approach of the enemy--such as rivers, which canonly be crossed at the bridges, woods in which movement is confined tothe roads, marshes, and so forth. Behind these one can generally gointo cantonments without anxiety, and they offer the further advantagethat they can generally be held by small forces of dismounted men. Hence the horses can generally be sent back and brought under shelterat a distance, and in case of alarm can be saddled up and be madeready by men detailed for that purpose. 

Where such positions are not available, one must either go backfurther, or, if not altogether too near to the enemy, make the mostadvanced cantonments serve the purpose of the line of security. 

Every evening these localities must be hastily prepared for defence, with the determination, in case of attack, of defending them carbinein hand, and without bringing out the horses until the support cancome up from the rearward cantonments. 

The details of such defence I have already discussed elsewhere. 

This method of defence, however, must be supplemented by a suitablesystem of observation sent out towards the enemy. Even detachments faradvanced towards the enemy may, under favourable circumstances, findtemporary cover in villages, and every such period of rest is ofadvantage for the horse. 

The Cavalry, however, which, in full confidence of its firearms andthe alertness of its patrols, can venture to go into cantonments, andthus save its horses from bivouacking, will very soon assert itssuperiority over an enemy which seeks for safety by remainingconstantly under arms, and thus dissipates its inherent energy. 

This tendency towards cantonments must not be allowed to becomestereotyped. Occasions will constantly arise when the Cavalry mustremain in immediate touch with the enemy; then it will be compellednot only to bivouac, but will have to stand to its horses, ready tomount at a moment's notice. Such occasions will only arise incritical situations necessarily of short duration, and the conditionsboth of the weather and the ground must be taken into carefulconsideration in making the arrangements for the outposts. 

Thus it is evident that it is not possible to lay down fixed rules ofconduct either for operations or for the outposts, but all must beleft to the capacity of the Leader and the adaptability of his men. Onthis capacity depends in the last resort the greater or less strategicvalue of the Arm. Its foundation can only be laid in peace, and willdepend on thorough and successful training, together with suitablepreparation of the whole organization for War. To both points I willrecur in the second part of this work. Here I would only insist thatnaturally the collective strategic employment of the Arm must take athoroughly different form in proportion as the troops are renderedmore or less independent by their equipment, the leaders of all ranksare qualified to act on their own responsibility, and mobility is nothampered by difficulties in the provisioning of man and horse, and inthe supply of ammunition. In the one case the Leader can act withcourage and daring in the true Cavalry spirit; in the other he willfeel himself hampered at every step, will not be able to act with thenecessary degree of self-confidence, and will have to renounce themost promising undertakings because the inefficiency of his troopsleaves him no alternative. However great his genius, no Leader cancompensate for want of efficiency in his command; but it is the dutyof such leader to maintain and increase the endurance inherent in hismaterial to the utmost limits of its capacity. 

In this connection a well-thought-out system of saving and caring forone's horses occupies the first position, for this is the bed-rockfoundation of all subsequent developments. We have seen of what immenseimportance in this respect the sheltering and arrangements for theoutposts may be. But there are other factors to be considered--aboveall, a rational arrangement of the marches. In the first instance, it isa mistake to believe that Cavalry in the long-run can out-stay andout-march the Infantry--that, in other words, the Cavalry horse canendure greater hardships than well-trained Infantry. For a few days thatmay well be so, but for continuous exertion it is by no means proved. 

The German Cavalry horse is much more dependent on a sufficiency offood than the man; the nature of his load, together with the rapidityof movement, and hence the greater intensity of the exertions demandedof him, attack the animal in a far greater degree than the moreuniform march performance of the men, who, moreover, are susceptibleto moral influences, capable of greatly increasing their powers;finally, sore backs and lameness in long-continued exertions decimatethe ranks of the horses to a much greater degree than a well-trainedand equipped Infantry suffers from similar causes. 

In normal conditions demands should not be made upon the Cavalry whichwould be justified only in moments of a crisis. We must endeavour toreduce the daily performance to the lowest limit that our purposeallows. Only in exceptional instances should one move off at such anearly hour as to interfere materially with the night rest of thehorses. Unfortunately, there are still officers who will not beconvinced that it is the horse which most requires rest, and who arenever satisfied unless they keep the Cavalry night after night ontheir legs, although in darkness they are useless either forreconnaissance or for fighting. 

Further, in War games and Staff rides it is a custom to make demandswhich in practice are absolutely impossible, mostly by superiorofficers who have never ridden 100 kilometres (66 miles) in a singleday. 

An average of twenty to twenty-five miles a day is in practice a veryconsiderable performance. To demand much more of them, day in and dayout, is impracticable. On the march itself a suitable change of paceis very necessary. 

To trot hour after hour is the most fruitful source of ruin to ourhorseflesh. Where it becomes necessary it is usually due to the wantof care on the part of the Leader. Much may be done to spare thehorses if we never march with considerable numbers on a single roadwithout absolute necessity; and when this is not to be avoided, thenwe must seek to maintain an even pace throughout the column by theintercalation of suitable distances between the several bodies;otherwise there is a continuous hurrying up or checking of therearward detachments, which strains the horses to the very utmost. 

One must always arrange for the halts necessary for the horses, waterthem whenever opportunity offers, and never continue a movement to thecomplete exhaustion of the animals. Well-timed periods of restincrease the collective power of endurance of the horses mostmaterially, and as the training improves, the demands made upon themcan gradually be raised. 

To bring this greater improvement into harmony with the militaryrequirements of the situation, next in importance to an intelligentexecution of a rational marching system comes a wise economy of forceswith regard to the performance of detached duties and patrolling. Itis particularly with the Divisional Cavalry that the lavish assignmentof orderlies and messengers to the leaders of the other Arms and tothe Infantry outposts has to be kept in check, and it must be insistedupon that the men thus allotted should be returned punctually to theircommands, and not be employed in duties for which they are notintended. 

Thus one finds Generals who use their messengers as patrols even whenspecial patrols have been entrusted with this duty; others who keepthe detachments assigned to the outposts long after the outpoststhemselves have been relieved. In all these things there is atremendous waste of energy, which must be all the more injurious thesmaller the proportion of Cavalry which can be detailed to theInfantry Divisions. 

It is a special duty of every Cavalry Commander to resist thistendency to the utmost of his power. 

Apart from the regulation of the marching column and the economy offorces above referred to, a rational treatment of the rearwardcommunications, particularly with the Independent Cavalry, will go farto maintain the troops in efficiency, and is also from the strategicpoint of view an important part of the Leader's duty. The dailydespatch of numerous requisitioning detachments to great distancesweakens and diminishes the troops to an inadmissible degree, unless itis managed with a wise foresight and on a rational system; often ongreat marches it will be altogether impossible. Then the horses mustmanage with what they find at their halting-places for the night. Inthe case of great concentration this will be altogether insufficient. Short rations reduce the horses very rapidly and only too thoroughly. It is, therefore, necessary in all independent operations of greatCavalry 'Masses' to take with one an organized and mobile supplytrain, and, where circumstances require, to arrange for its defence. 

The timely arrival of the supply waggons, the rational utilization ofthe resources of the district, the contiguous replenishment of themoving supply reserves, are matters which cannot be left entirely tothe Army Service Corps, but the Cavalry General must himself overlookthe whole matter, and keep the general control in his own hands. Forthese arrangements must be regulated from the strategic point of viewsince the power of operating at all depends essentially upon them. Ofcourse, the Supreme Command must lend assistance also. 

In general, it will be advisable to carry with one a five to six days'ration of corn if one is to be prepared for all emergencies. That, atleast, was the practical teaching of the War of 1870-1871. But onemust add, the further the Cavalry is separated from the masses of theArmy, and the more it renounces its communications with the latter, the greater must be the bulk of supply it takes with it; and thecloser these supplies have to be kept to the troops, the more thoroughmust be the arrangements for their protection. The latter will be ofparticular importance when operating on a narrow front which favoursan enemy's outflanking endeavours, whereas wider fronts of themselvesgive a certain degree of security to the rearward communications. 

If we are entirely cut off from our home resources, then we mustselect some point to be occupied on the flank or in the rear of theenemy's Army, and there arrange a supply centre of our own, and makeit the point of departure for separate operations. 

All means are, then, proper to accumulate in such places a sufficientforage reserve, for the subsistence of the horses is the mostimportant task which falls upon the Commander. A delay in thisdirection can wreck the most brilliant undertakings--jeopardize theresult even of the best executed ones. Theory does not attachsufficient importance to the point here involved. 

Thus we see that the tasks of the independent Cavalry Leader are bothmany-sided and responsible. He can only then prove equal to them whenall subordinates on whom he has to count support him with the utmostgoodwill and reliability. 

With this necessity a new demand is made upon him--namely, to raisethe spirit of the men he commands in such a manner that they will beequal to the highest requirements. Only a bold, self-confident, andactive man, who everywhere sets the best example, will be able in thismanner to inspire and stimulate his command. The sum of the stimulatedindividual performances brings with it also increased opportunities ofsuccess. 

Hence the last and greatest demand for the successful conduct of aCavalry Mass remains always the man who will inspire and stimulate thetroops under him, and thus lead them to victory. 

CHAPTER VIII

PATROLS--TRANSMISSION OF REPORTS--CYCLISTS

I have already, in a former section, insisted on the fundamentalproposition that reconnaissance and security are two diametricallyopposite conceptions, and cannot on a large scale be confided to oneand the same body of troops. This conflict of purpose becomes mostevident when we come to the service of patrols in the field. 

Reconnoitring patrols regulate their movements on those of the enemy. They must keep touch with and follow him, quite irrespective of themovement of their own side, often being compelled to creep afterhim--_i. E. _, to utilize intersected ground in order to avoid thenecessity of fighting. 

Security patrols, on the other hand, flanking detachments, piquets, vedettes, and the like, have to choose their position with referenceto the force it is their purpose to cover, and with which they mustremain in communication. It is their duty to attack and beat off theenemy's patrols, as far as their strength will allow them, to preventthese latter gaining an insight into the conditions of the marching orresting troops whose safety they are intended to secure. 

If they were to attempt to follow up their enemy to find out hisposition--_i. E. _, to reconnoitre--they would lose their connectionwith their own troops, and endanger the security of the latter byrelinquishing the special object they are set apart to provide for. 

Hence it is absolutely necessary that the two systems should be keptseparate one from the other, and that each patrol should know clearlyand distinctly for which of the two purposes it is specificallyintended. Only then can the troops in rear rely on being keptthoroughly informed, and at the same time secure from the possibleattempts of the enemy. 

The more clear and precise the mission, the more can the patrols berelied on to execute it; but this, of course, does not exclude thenecessity for them to keep their eyes open for other things, and toreport all they may notice. 

Such a systematic arrangement brings other advantages in its train. Iteffects a marked economy of one's available forces, for being certainthat every mission will be settled by a special party detailed for thatpurpose, it ceases to be necessary to keep on despatching fresh patrolsagain and again in the same direction, a practice most detrimental tothe troops, which is constantly followed in peace-time; and it can neverhappen that a body is surprised by the enemy because its scouts areabsent reconnoitring, or that it fails to receive information becauseits patrols are busy with security. If, therefore, all patrols thusnaturally fall into one of these two groups--reconnoitring and securitypatrols--there is still another line of distinction to be observedbetween these patrols themselves, arising from the nature of the taskswhich the circumstances impose upon them. 

It is impossible to lay down any distinct rules in this matter--forWar will always present new and changing problems--but broadly twopoints of view must be kept in sight, which require fundamentallydifferent treatment, and are conditioned by our distance from theenemy. 

If the opposing forces are still engaged in preliminary approaches oneto the other, and separated by wide stretches of country, theprocedure will be altogether distinct from that to be adopted when theoutposts mutually confront one another. 

Between the two extremes there are innumerable intermediate degrees, to which one's conduct must be adapted without losing sight of theguiding points involved. 

Let us take first the period of approach, and consider thereconnoitring problem from this aspect, taking into consideration thebroad requirements of modern War. 

It will be apparent at once that there is here a double purpose to befulfilled--viz. , to ascertain the whereabouts and direction ofmovement of the elements of the enemy's main fighting force, theprimary object of all reconnaissance; and, secondly, to find theenemy's preceding Cavalry screen, whose purpose it is, on the onehand, to prevent our object, and, on the other hand, to conceal theirown main body. This cavalry we shall have to defeat, but we cannotafford to await this event, but must initiate our own reconnaissancebefore the decision, and endeavour to carry this through, even if thelatter prove unfavourable to us. 

Hence it follows that our patrols must be systematically divided fromthe first into strategical and tactical patrols, according as towhether they are intended to find the enemy's main army or to beat hisCavalry. 

The former must not allow themselves to be held up by the enemy'sCavalry, but must endeavour to ride through the opposingscreen--straight for the heads of the enemy's marching columns. Theymust, therefore, avoid all fighting, and act by cunning and stealth, and hence their conduct should be entrusted always to officers. Theywill be directed against the probable lines of the enemy's approach, as determined by the general strategic situation, and will further begiven all possible information as to the known whereabouts of theenemy, together with the intentions of their own Superior Command, inorder that they may be in a position to distinguish between importantand unimportant details, and adapt their action accordingly. 

That the position of heads of columns in time and place, their depths, the flanks of the enemy's positions, extent of his outposts, districtsin which troops are quartered, the appearance of new uniforms, indicating the presence of regiments believed to be elsewhere, etc. , should all be carefully determined, forms part of their normalinstructions; but, in spite of that, it is very desirable to directtheir attention very particularly to all such points as are at themoment of preponderating consequence. They must also be kept wellinformed as to the mission of their neighbouring patrols, so thatunder all circumstances the systematic subdivision of their severaltasks can be maintained intact. 

For these patrols one must choose the best mounted officers and menand horses, since long distances must be covered under difficultcircumstances, and it would be well to allot to each a competentnon-commissioned officer, who can carry through the task if hisCommander is killed or taken prisoner. If possible, they should alsobe supplied with a concentrated horse-ration, so as to be as far aspossible independent of the resources of the country. (See Part II. , Section I. )

As to the strength of these patrols, it will be necessary to keepwithin very narrow limits, because if they are large it is difficultfor them to escape observation; on the other hand, a certain degree ofstrength is necessary, because one cannot, of course, count on beingable to send back one's information by single messengers. Since it isa prime condition of the problem that a district thoroughly commandedby the enemy must be ridden through, the safe return of a singlemessenger can never be guaranteed; hence the Commander will either beobliged to send his reports in duplicate or triplicate, or in the lastresort fight his way through with them himself. Hence it will beadvisable to compose each party of two or three patrols, each of threemen, assigning a smart lance-corporal to each. 

One officer, one non-commissioned officer, two lance-corporals, andfive men must, therefore, be considered as a fairly normal type. 

The Commander can then despatch two reports, and the third he mustbring in himself, and must well consider how long it will be safe tocontinue his observation, and what it is of real importance for hissuperiors to know. 

But he must never allow himself to be hurried into the despatch ofunimportant information. He must always keep before his mind theessential strategical elements of the whole situation. It seems to mealtogether wrong to send off such patrols with general instructions tokeep in touch with the enemy, a common manoeuvre practice. Sincethese latter generally last only a few days, there is not muchdifficulty in maintaining such a system, particularly when informationis sent by single messengers. But in War everything is very different. One would very soon have got through all one's officers and still notbe well informed. The patrols must, therefore, be told to returnwithin a certain time limit, and their reliefs, who are to be fullyinstructed as far as the information available goes, must bedespatched before this time limit is expired. Even then we shall soonexhaust the available supply of officers who will have been driven tothe limit of their endurance in purely strategic missions, and in theend we shall have to fall back upon Non-commissioned Officers fortactical observation. 

This tactical reconnaissance will, in the first place, devote itsattention to the enemy's Cavalry. The patrols assigned to these dutieswill attack the enemy wherever they meet him, to find out what isgoing on, and as soon as possible establish a moral superiority overthem. 

But even they cannot remain permanently in touch with the enemy, because they, too, must send in their information by messenger, theirstrength thus rapidly diminishing, and they, in turn, will requirerelief. 

If permanent observation of a yet distant enemy is necessary, we mustturn to other means. It will, then, be as well to send out wholereconnoitring squadrons or troops (F. D. O. , [15] 128) towards the enemy, and through them maintain a permanent tactical observation. 

 [Footnote 15: Feld Dienst Ordnung. ]

These serve as a patrol reserve and collecting station forinformation, remaining day and night in touch with the enemy, and, ofcourse, will also require periodical reliefs. 

It goes without saying that, in addition to these squadrons, singlepatrols may be despatched in important directions from the main bodyof the Cavalry, whose duty it will be to report to the latter direct. 

These, again, must send off their reports by several men, whilst thosedespatched from the patrols sent out by the reconnoitring squadronswill often, owing to the shorter distance and the nearness of thesupport, be able to avail themselves of the despatch riders. Ingeneral, it cannot be insisted upon too much that the despatch rider, so very popular in peace, can only be very occasionally employed inWar in the interval before the enemy's Cavalry is completely beatenout of the field. In peace a man is always riding in his own country;if he himself has not a map, he has at least been instructed from amap, and every civilian will help him out. Even if he stumbles upagainst an enemy's patrol they will generally let him pass unnoticed;but it is quite different in War. Here even a patrol leader has rarelygot a map. The despatch rider rides across thoroughly unknowndistricts, coming in contact with a foreign, perhaps hostile, population; he cannot make himself understood, if, indeed, he is notobliged to avoid them. The enemy's patrols are also everywhere, and ifanything happens to his horse the message does not arrive. Further, the enormously increased distances to be traversed in modern War haveto be taken into account, and these alone render the despatch ofsingle horsemen a very doubtful undertaking. We must, therefore, recognise that the conveyance of reports by individual despatch ridersis only possible under very limited conditions, and within thedistricts fully controlled by one's own troops, and that even in one'sown country reconnoitring patrols sent out to a great distance canonly be very occasionally employed. 

Here we come upon an increased difficulty in the whole system ofintelligence, and yet all reconnaissance is useless unless the returnof information works without a hitch. We must, therefore, endeavour toregulate it accordingly. 

Above all, the connection between the reconnoitring squadrons and themain body by relays must be very carefully assured, and their strengthmust be proportionate to the number of the enemy's patrols moving inthe district. In these cases a co-operation between Cavalry andcyclists will be of service, whilst within the radius which wecompletely command the whole rearward intelligence service, so far asit can move upon roads, must be left as much as possible to cyclists. 

_Fundamentally, no Cavalry soldier should be allowed to ride to therear without pressing circumstances. _ This is an absolute necessity ifwe are to spare our valuable and almost irreplaceable horses. Towardsthese safe lines of communication all reports must be directed, inorder to be forwarded with the utmost rapidity by fresh horses orcyclists. 

If these main roads do not run as far as the reconnoitring squadrons, in order to allow of the patrols making use of them without longdetours, then further collecting stations, protected by other troops, must be interpolated. (F. D. O. , 273. )

Occasionally the Cavalry Telegraph equipment may be of assistance, butwe must not expect too much from it in periods of rapid movement, because since its application depends upon a number of favourablecircumstances, its value in such changing conditions is more or lessillusory. 

Results obtained in manoeuvres, in my opinion, convey no correctexperience in this matter. 

Another point, however, must be specially brought out--namely, thenecessity, not only of sending back information through the properchannels, but also of forwarding all important news direct to theprincipal Commander of the Cavalry or to the Army Headquarters. It isof the utmost importance that the Headquarters in each theatre of theWar should receive information about the enemy simultaneously withtheir subordinates, so that they always remain in the position todispose of their troops according to their own ideas, and do not findthemselves bound by instructions previously issued by theirsubordinates. It is precisely this evil which made itself felt in1870-1871. Very often the most important information never reachedHeadquarters at all, and hence no action could be taken upon it. 

The fault lay chiefly in the fact that the subordinates, not beinginformed as to the connection of events, did not perceive theimportance of the information, and therefore did not forward it on, and partly because the telegraph wires were overburdened by theprivate messages of distinguished persons who had nothing whatever todo with the conduct of operations. 

The control of the wires for purely military purposes must, therefore, be maintained with rigid severity, and information to Headquarters orArmy Commands must have precedence over all other business. 

If collecting stations for information are not available, thequestion arises, Which groups should be Authorized to report direct toHeadquarters? In my opinion this cannot be determined by the strengthof the troops concerned, but must always depend on the strategicsituation. Generally it may be laid down that the lie of the roadsmust decide. 

Those detachments entrusted with the reconnaissance of a single lineof road will report direct any important information gained withintheir own sphere if no stronger body should be moving along the sameline, and this reporting body may, therefore, according tocircumstances, be a patrol, a regiment, or a brigade. It is desirablefrom this point of view that all Cavalry officers down to patrolleaders should be kept so thoroughly informed as to the generalsituation that they may judge of the importance of the informationobtained, and hence know where to send the information they havesecured. 

As the opposing Cavalries first, then the larger bodies of the Army, approach one another the situation changes. The reconnoitringsquadrons clear the front and turn their attention to the enemy'sflanks. The advanced squadrons are withdrawn, and the larger Cavalrybodies drawn off towards the wings of the Army, and seek shelterbehind the Infantry columns, if they have been defeated in the Cavalryduel, or turn against flank and rear of the enemy's Army if they havebeen victorious. In front of the Armies reconnaissance now falls tothe Divisional Cavalry. Here the strategical and tactical dutiescoincide. What the conduct of the Independent Cavalry will be mustdepend on whether it is still held in check by the enemy or not. Ifthe latter have been finally beaten out of the field so that one has afree hand, then the strategic patrols will direct their attention tothe enemy's rearward communications, and will seek to determine theapproach of his reserves, but tactical reconnaissance will be directedagainst his flanks. 

The principles governing our conduct remain the same, only thereconnoitring and advanced squadrons now act primarily as supports tothe strategic patrols. If, however, a decision between the twoCavalries has not been finally arrived at, one will now endeavour tobring it about, and for this purpose unite all available forces, leaving meanwhile the reconnaissance to strong patrols, who in thisperiod of the combat must never avoid those of the enemy, for now ourobject is to get information quickly, and the time for circumventionand evasion is at an end. 

When the first battle has been decided, there follows either pursuitor retreat--operations in which the tactical reconnaissance cannot forone moment be omitted. Then by degrees, as the defeated side succeedsin disembarrassing itself of its pursuers, things revert to normalconditions again. The two Armies are separated by a certain area indepth, and a new series of operations commences, in which, as before, reconnaissance is required. 

Matters are somewhat different as regards security. Here also ingeneral a distinction must be drawn between safety obtained by bodiesdetached in advance and that derived from piquets, etc. , immediatelyat hand. But too much importance cannot be laid upon the principlethat, as above pointed out, reconnaissance alone cannot suffice toinsure safety; the reconnoitring detachments must rather always befollowed by a line of security troops, so that as a general typethree lines of patrols result--viz. , strategical patrols far inadvance, tactical patrols, and security patrols, which latter, whenthe main body is halted, become the standing outposts. 

Coming next to the measures of security necessary for IndependentCavalry when in movement, the tactical reconnoitring patrols, bysending in early information of the enemy, will make a far-spread lineof security patrols unnecessary. In general, the ordinary point of theadvance guard and flankers will suffice. For the latter the same holdsgood which has been said in the previous section on the subject offlanking detachments altogether--viz. , that they must be worked bysections, and arranged in a proper system of reliefs. 

If the necessity arises to screen, as well as to secure--_i. E. _, tohide absolutely our movements from the enemy--then all roads leadingtowards him and the section of the ground comprised between them mustbe occupied in such manner that the enemy cannot find intervals atwhich to break through, and this will be best attained by a system oflocal patrols, tied to definite beats. These patrols must fight theenemy wherever he appears, and must, therefore, be given sufficientstrength and be followed by small supports duly allotted to eachsection of the whole front. 

When the main body is stationary, the conditions are different, because the troops require a certain time to turn out; therefore moreprecautions are necessary, and the end can be best attained by placingthe patrols further to the front. Hence we arrive at a double systemof security--the first line formed by outpost squadrons, withofficers, non-commissioned officers, and small patrols, to which acertain district to be ridden over will be assigned, and which mustmaintain a systematic connection by patrols between its separateparts, to insure absolutely the control of the ground around them; andthe second, formed of far advanced posts of observation at suitablepoints--road crossings, defiles, etc. --from whence they can detect atthe earliest moment any approach of the enemy. These are indispensableat night, when reconnaissance is always more or less liable to breakdown, for darkness interferes with sight, and the horses require rest. Their importance also increases naturally with the vicinity of theenemy, and the consequent greater risk of surprise. In the case of thelarger bodies, whole squadrons (see F. D. O. , No. 272) must be detachedfor this purpose, and communication with them assured by strong relaylines. These strong advanced detachments can, under favourablecircumstances, get shelter in villages, so that the horses at leastobtain better rest and care for a few hours, and the same appliesnaturally to the reconnoitring squadrons. In all such instances theguiding idea must be to evacuate the village the moment the enemyappears, and evade collision with him. How this is to be managed hasbeen already explained (Book I. , Chap. VI. ). Accurate knowledge ofwhere all the roads lead to, the barricading of those running towardsthe enemy's position, and extreme alertness on the part of thepatrols, are in such cases all-important. 

Above all, the Commander must be confident in the steadiness andcoolness of his men. 

As to the immediate security of the Army itself, this depends in thefirst place on the Divisional Cavalry, but during the advance theIndependent Cavalry on the front and flanks guarantees this securityso thoroughly that the former can confine themselves to the mostelementary precautions, which must include primarily the maintenanceof connection with the latter for this purpose. Then they will notonly have to provide for security in the most thorough manner, butwill also have to reconnoitre, and for this purpose follow the samerules which we have laid down for the Independent Cavalry. If theenemy's horse prove overpowering, then they will use their power ofdefence to the utmost, and seek to increase it by cyclists belongingto the Infantry, Maxims, and Artillery, in order to beat off the enemywith loss, and to clear the path for the reconnoitring patrols. 

Speaking generally, the system I propose is in harmony with thespirit, if not with the letter, of our Field Service Regulations, inwhich the systematic distinction between reconnoitring and security, as also between strategic and tactical patrols, is, in my opinion, notsufficiently defined. The essential point which necessitates thisdistinction has not been grasped with sufficient precision. If we areto follow literally the wording of the Field Service Regulations, andnot the spirit which pervades it, which disregards all stereotypedformations and keeps always the practical in view, then it would beimpossible to carry out screening operations on the scale which theconditions of modern War will render indispensable. Sufficient stresshas not been laid on the necessary systematizing of the wholeprocedure. Finally, too, much weight has been laid upon the employmentof the despatch rider (_Meldereiter_), although the experience of1870-1871 has sufficiently shown that this system was unreliable. Irecall as an instance the pursuit of Vinoy's Corps (after Sedan), inwhich case the most important report was entrusted to a despatchrider, who only reached his destination twenty-four hours after hewas despatched, and by that time it was too late to take any action onthe information he conveyed. 

The Field Service Regulations should also contain detailedinstructions as to the employment of cyclists with the Cavalry, forthe rapid development of this mode of locomotion has rendered thisabsolutely indispensable. But the point must be brought out that theuse of a cyclist is always only conditional, as it depends on theweather, the roads, and the country. On heavy, steep, and stony roads, on which the tyres are only too apt to be punctured, the cyclists areobliged to dismount; against a head wind they can only make progresswith difficulty. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that for thetransmission of reports from the advanced lines, as well as forcommunication between separated bodies of troops within the districtcontrolled by our Cavalry, they are of inestimable service. Grantedthat in particularly unfavourable weather and bad roads they must besupplemented by Cavalry, they, nevertheless, on the whole, make itpossible to expedite materially the delivery of despatches. This is ofall the greater importance because in case of War the German Armieswill be relatively weak in Cavalry, and under certain circumstancesthey will have to fight against a great numerical superiority. 

Even though the principal use of the cyclists lies in the transmissionof information in which they can help the Divisional Cavalry mostmaterially, nevertheless one must not base too sanguine hopes on theiractivity. 

The reason is that because of their wheels they are tied to the roads, and in consequence they can neither reconnoitre nor provide forsecurity independently. If for these purposes Cavalry patrols areattached to them, the chief advantage of their greater mobility issacrificed, but without such supports in difficult country they aretolerably helpless against surprise attacks. If one further takes intoaccount that a hill takes off from their speed to such a degree that ahorseman can easily catch them up, one must admit that they afford nosufficient guarantee for the fulfilment of independent missionsoutside of the country which our own Cavalry commands. In suchdistricts they can only be employed on relays, as already pointed out. Here the duty of providing safety can best be fulfilled by theCavalry, because it is not a question of rapid advance, but only ofthe protection of stationary posts and certain defined road stretches. But for the defence of these posts, and for the transmission ofintelligence, the cyclists will do even better service than thehorsemen, because they can cover the ground faster, and when fightingare not hampered by their horses. Their employment here is all themore desirable because the relay service makes enormous demands uponthe Cavalry. That was proved up to the hilt in the War of 1870-1871;the complaints under this head repeat themselves over and over again, as the records of the Campaign abundantly testify. 

Besides, on these relay duties the cyclists can be tactically employedin the district which our Cavalry by its patrols commands, for therapid occupation of far-advanced posts which neither Cavalry norInfantry can reach with sufficient celerity and in adequate force; forthe defence of defiles lying to our rear, which must be kept open tosecure the retreat of the Cavalry; for the support of IndependentCavalry on outpost duty, particularly at night; and for other similarpurposes. To satisfy all these conditions, these cyclist detachmentsrequire a sufficient tactical training, but in times of peace one seesin this respect feats performed whose impracticability in War areglaringly apparent. For instance, men keep their cycles with themright up in the firing line, and when they want to retreat or breakoff the fight they try to mount under fire. As they are generally tiedto the roads, they then file off to the flanks. I have, indeed, oftenseen Cyclist detachments lay down their cycles in the front of theposition, and then advance to mount them again in the teeth of theenemy's fire. All these kind of things are absurd. The cycles must betreated like the led horses of the Cavalry--that is to say, the menmust dismount under cover, then move up to the firing line, and thenmove back to cover in order to mount again. The position must, moreover, be so chosen as to enable them to move off without exposingthemselves. All these points, which in practice are rendereddifficult, diminish very materially the usefulness of cyclists, andtake away from them, above all, their power of offence; and in allmissions entrusted to them these limitations must be carefully kept inmind. 

II

ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING

CHAPTER I

NUMBERS

ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING

When we take into consideration the conditions of modern Warfare, as Ihave endeavoured in the foregoing pages to develop them--the numericalstrength of modern Armies; the numerous formations of Artillery andInfantry set on foot on the outbreak of hostilities; the area offuture theatres of operations--when, further, we consider how manyimportant tasks await the Cavalry from the moment when the first shotis fired, and how the most important of these, as I have endeavouredto establish, can only be dealt with satisfactorily by the employmentof Cavalry 'Masses, ' the conviction must force itself home to everymind that our German Cavalry is numerically inadequate to meet eventhe principal demands the future must make upon it. 

If, further, we reflect that, owing to causes which it would be out ofplace to deal with in these pages at length, it is precisely upon ourCavalry that the rôle of fighting against crushing numericalsuperiority must devolve, this conviction must give rise to thegravest anxiety, more especially when it is remembered that thedifficulty of securing a supply of reinforcements adequate for theperformance of our duties is greater with the Cavalry than with anyother Arm. A few days' training at a pinch will turn out an Infantrysoldier or gunner, whose presence need not necessarily be eitherdangerous or even detrimental to the efficiency of his company orbattery. An unbroken horse or a bad rider may create confusion in theranks of the steadiest squadron. 

The danger is still further aggravated by the fact that a rapidreduction in their available numbers is certain to take place, owingto the increased demands which the future must make upon the enduranceof our horsemen, and presumably also the heavier losses they will becalled upon to suffer in action, both of which must be intensified inproportion as their numerical inadequacy for the tasks incurring onthem increases. Germany is certainly comparatively well supplied withhorses; but owing to the demands of the aforesaid new formations, which must be set on foot immediately on the declaration ofhostilities, upon the complement of animals fit for War purposeswithin our own frontiers, the country will be practically denuded, andonly those horses still too young or those too old for the field willbe left behind. 

Even among those classified as 'fit for War' but few are fit forCavalry purposes. Riding horses good enough for the Infantry andTrain--even for the Artillery--may, no doubt, be found; but equal tothe requirements made on the Cavalry horse there are but few indeed, and even this number is diminishing yearly. As regards the supply fromforeign sources, this must depend on the political situation--i. E. , onconditions which lie beyond our control. Even when these conditionsare favourable, horses cannot be usefully drafted into the rankswithout prolonged training and breaking to fit them for their newduties. Hence the conclusion is inevitable that the numerical strengthof our Cavalry, already, as I have shown, so inadequate, must fall offvery rapidly at the commencement of a campaign, because its rapidreinforcement with satisfactory material is, under the circumstances, quite out of the question. 

From this conclusion there is no escape; and in view of the increasedimportance I have above assigned to the due performance of all Cavalryduties, its recognition carries with it, as its corollary, theabsolute need for the numerical augmentation of this branch of theservice. 

The enormous mechanism of our modern Armies can only work normally andsuccessfully when its constituent 'power factors'--_i. E. _, the threeArms--have been apportioned with due regard to the work to beaccomplished. If driving-power fails any one portion, the danger liesnear that at some critical moment the whole apparatus will suffer insympathy, and fail to respond to the strain it is called upon toendure. 

The question of this increase in the Cavalry has, indeed, often beforebeen raised, but never with the weight of concentrated conviction thesituation, in my opinion, deserves. For the most part, only expedientsto avoid the bitter necessity of a serious augmentation have beensuggested. Thus it has been proposed to form new regiments of foursquadrons each by taking away from the existing ones their fifthsquadron, and the suggestion has been supported by an appeal to thefact that in War-time only four squadrons per regiment take the field. 

No expert, however, can fail to agree with Lieutenant-General vonPelet-Narbonne, who maintains in his 'Cavalry Regiments of FourSquadrons' (_Kreuz Zeitung_, January 17, 1899) that such a measurewould entail the ruin of our Cavalry, and would destroy with one blowall that the reorganizations of 1859 and 1860 have done for the Warefficiency of our regiments by entailing a depreciation of the valueof the squadrons at the very moment when called on to move out andface the enemy. 

Thus he writes: 405 squadrons are in Peace retained on the lowerestablishment of 133, or the middle one of 137. Their numbers are 170of the former, 235 of the latter, and the War strength averages 150per squadron. To attain this figure those on the lower establishmentneed 17 horses, those on the middle 13. 

With no fifth squadron to draw upon for horses, as at present, thesevacancies would have to be filled by 'augmentation horses'--_i. E. _, animals straight from the country, thoroughly raw and unaccustomed towork under the rider, often also of inferior quality. But these 13 to17 horses per squadron by no means exhaust the situation. The fieldsquadrons must leave their youngest remounts--say 15 in number--stilltoo young and unbroken, behind them; for the experiences of the lastWar proved abundantly that where this precaution was neglected thegreater part of them broke down under the hardships of the Campaign. Taking even the most favourable time of year for mobilization--viz. , in May--then out of the 15 young remounts of good material, and withcareful choice, not more than 8 will be found fit for the ranks; theremainder will have to be left behind with the 'Depot' squadron, tobe sent on afterwards. Any other procedure would only lead to theuseless sacrifice of these valuable young animals. The places of thehorses thus left behind will, therefore, also have to be filled byaugmentation horses, thus bringing the number of these up to 24 and 20respectively. 

Then we still have to provide for the wants of the Depot squadron, which has to train the recruits, and for these a further number oftrained horses, averaging 32, must be left behind, or another 8 fromeach squadron; and, finally, another 2 per squadron will be requiredfor Staff orderlies and Staff guard duties. 

According to this calculation, the Field squadron would have to moveout with from 34 to 30 augmentation horses (the sixty squadrons on thehigher establishment with 27). 

The matter, however, presents a totally different appearance when inpeace five squadrons are in existence, of which one remains behind asa depot. Taking away the 35 horses for recruits, and following ourprevious calculation of 7 young remounts, there would remain on thelower establishment 91 efficient horses to be divided amongst theother four squadrons, or 23 each, so that these would take the fieldwith only 11, 7, or 4 'augmentation horses, ' according to therespective peace establishments of the regiments. With these numbersthe squadron suffers no reduction of its efficiency, for these few canalways be employed--in the squadron carts, etc. --at any rate, need notbe in the ranks. 

These figures, worked out in the spring of 1899, are stillsubstantially correct, and it appears to me General von Pelet-Narbonnedeals too leniently with this proposal for forming the fifth squadronsinto new regiments, because many of the calls made on the squadronsare even heavier than he assumes; besides, there are always in everysquadron some inefficient or sick horses, which will presently have tobe cast. Further, I consider it impracticable to take eight remountsinto the field, for these young animals are by no means equal to thedemands which modern conditions must make upon them from the veryfirst days of mobilization. 

Hence the number of augmentation horses will be considerably increasedabove General von Pelet's estimate, but he is unquestionably correctin his opinion that a large number of these untrained animals willexercise a more detrimental influence under existing conditions thanformerly, when, after completed mobilization, the squadrons often hada considerable time in hand to weld into cohesion their constituentelements. Nowadays the regiments will be rapidly forwarded to thefront by rail, and from the very commencement of hostilities thefullest demands will be made on their efficiency. Unbroken horses, andothers not trained to the long gallops and trots of to-day, cannotpossibly carry weights of from 230 to 240 pounds for many hours a daystraight across country. After a very short spell most of theaugmentation horses would be useless, and their presence would onlyhave brought confusion and unsteadiness into the ranks of theirsquadrons. 

These disadvantages might indeed be partially mitigated if thesquadrons were raised in Peace to their full War establishment andsomewhat above it--say to 160 horses. But, on the one hand, this wouldmean a not inconsiderable increase in the Cavalry; on the other, ourPeace conditions would be difficult to adapt to such an organization. Without going closer into these details, it will be sufficient topoint out that all our barracks and riding-schools are designed forfive squadrons; and further, that we do not need numerically strongerregiments, but a greater number, in order to satisfy all requirements. 

Hence, if it is admitted that swamping our squadrons with thirty ormore augmentation horses must diminish most seriously the efficiencyof our Cavalry, then it follows that a still further increase in theirnumber will make matters still worse. Such proposals have no doubtbeen made, and it certainly would be convenient if our Cavalry couldthus easily on mobilization be increased by one-third to one-half itsstrength; but after what has been said, above all such suggestionsmust be seen to be impracticable, for squadrons which consisted, forinstance, of one-half augmentation horses would be simply useless forWar purposes. A proceeding, therefore, which brought such results inits train would imply no increase of the Arm, but rather thedestruction of the existing standard of Peace-time efficiency. 

Even as Divisional Cavalry such squadrons would be useless, for theserequire good individual horsemanship even more than those of theIndependent Division for the performance of their special duties, andthe necessary standard can never be attained with untrained horses. 

All who put forward proposals of this nature are labouring under thedominion of a fundamental fallacy. They overlook the fact I haveexplained in the foregoing section, that Cavalry by its very naturecan never be other than a highly-specialized Arm, and hence that thesystem adopted by the Infantry of raising the cadres to War strengthby the absorption of reserve men is for the Cavalry fundamentallyimpossible. For in the Infantry the ranks are filled by the additionof trained men; in the Cavalry they must be completed with untrainedhorses, and the untrained horses break down under service conditionsmuch more rapidly than the men. 

Our experience in 1870-1871 was conclusive on this point. Alreadytowards the end of August--_i. E. _, in less than six weeks from theoutbreak of the War--the greater part of the augmentation horses werequite useless for field purposes. If one looks up the reports in theWar Archives, everywhere this complaint about the untrained animals isrecurrent. 

From all the above-mentioned circumstances it must be clear that anumerical increase in the Cavalry is most urgently called for, and inmy opinion it would be best if this indispensable increase, the needfor which is becoming apparent even to public opinion, were graftedupon the existing five-squadron system, which at least guarantees acertain amount of preparation of the augmentation horses, withoutentailing the reduction of the squadrons below the minimum standardnecessary for efficiency. I would, however, be willing to support anyother method which would give a sensible increase in the Cavalrystrength of our Peace establishment, and only protest against anyscheme which would seek to swell out the ranks or create new units onmobilization; for all these are mere self-delusion, increasing, nodoubt, the numbers on paper, but in reality striking at the efficiencyof the Arm in the most vital manner. 

If, then, at the moment there may be conditions outside my ken whichrender a measure of the nature I have indicated impracticable, wemust, nevertheless, not close our eyes to the fact that, after therecent reorganization of the Artillery, the creation of an adequatenumber of Cavalry regiments in the nearest future is an absolutenecessity, and that in the meanwhile any such palliative as a recourseto the cadre system must be absolutely rejected. 

As an indispensable complement of the proposal to form new regiments, so that we shall not be compelled to fall back on an inferior class ofhorse to meet their requirements, and at the same time to insure asfar as possible a supply of suitable remounts to replace our losses inWar, further encouragement of horse-breeding operations in our ownterritories is most urgently called for. This can only be attained bya further reasonable increase in the price paid for remounts. [16]

 [Footnote 16: In passing, I may note that some portions of Lorraine are amongst the richest in horseflesh in all Germany. Here, by the introduction of suitable stallions, an excellent Artillery horse might be bred; but nothing is being done in this direction. ]

Such a measure must form a preliminary to the coming increase of theArm, and the sooner it is undertaken the better will be the result. 

These points of view cannot be insisted upon too vehemently, sinceeven in Military circles they have not everywhere received theconsideration they deserve, and it is most necessary that publicopinion, which finds its ultimate expression within the walls of theReichstag, should receive adequate instruction as to the vitalinterests involved. 

In any case, the difficulties attending any adequate increase of ourCavalry must not be underrated, and we must remain prepared to facethe strain of a European Campaign with a strength inadequate for thedifficult and most momentous problems we shall be called on toface--problems which, according to the measure of success or thereverse attending their solution, will exercise the most far-reachingconsequences on the whole course of the War. 

Under all circumstances we shall have to endeavour to attain at leastthat measure of success which the Army Headquarters unconditionallyrequire to render possible their own effective operations. 

Superior energy and skill in the conduct of our operations, concentration of our forces, increased care for the maintenance bothof the moral and material in our Commands, increased boldness in ourundertakings, together with wise moderation in the choice of ourobjectives, must all help to compensate for our numerical weakness, and while consciously leaving on one side everything not directlyconducive to our immediate purpose, we must seek to appear at thepsychological moment, and from the decisive direction, with forces inhand, and by the energetic use of the relative and local superioritysuch concentration confers, to gain and keep an advantage to the endof the campaign. The higher, however, the demands which, with thispurpose in view, we are compelled to make on the moral, physical, andmaterial strength of the troops, the more we are justified indemanding that, at least as regards organization and training, theyshall be equal to all demands modern conditions may impose upon them. If in these points we have no sufficient security guaranteeing thehighest possible performances, it would be impossible to count even onthe most necessary results in time of War. 

The question, then, arises whether from these points of view ourGerman Cavalry is equal to the maximum strain it may be called on toendure. 

As concerns our organization, there is a widespread demand that thosecommands which form the basis of our War organization--_i. E. _, theCavalry Divisions--should exist already in Peace as concrete units;and in support of this it is urged that men and leaders must know eachother mutually if the full effect of their combined power is to berealized in War. It is also held that if once these Divisions weredefinitely formed, then as a consequence of their existence they wouldmore frequently be brought together for manoeuvres on a large scale, to the benefit of the tactical training of all concerned. 

It appears to me that the real centre of gravity in this question oforganization lies less in this permanent constitution of the Divisionin Peace than people generally imagine. 

The requirement that leaders and men should know one another I cannotaccept as an indispensable condition of War-time efficiency. Howeverdesirable it may appear that such a relation should exist, it is onewhich has never been, and never can be, guaranteed in War. Thepracticable ideal rather consists in this, that the principles inaccordance with which the commands are handled should be so thoroughlyflesh and blood of both leaders and led, that under all circumstancesa sufficient result is secure. To reach this ideal is the true purposeof our training. 

In the permanent existence of Divisions it seems to me there is greatdanger that such a guarantee for their successful employment would besacrificed. 

We have seen that the demands likely to be made on the Cavalry requirewidely different arrangement of the disposable forces; that thisrequirement increases in importance as the Arm falls numericallybeneath the needs of the situation, and that only a most adaptableorganization can deal adequately with the emergencies this numericalinsufficiency may entail. Hence it is to be feared that a permanentconstitution in Divisions might lose this requisite adaptability, and, however highly we may appreciate the advantages of a firmly welded Warorganization, one should never allow the form to interfere with thepractical application of the means--_i. E. _, never allow the troops tobecome so rigid as to hamper their employment in the field. But thisis just what would happen if the Divisions were maintained on apermanent War footing. 

Every application of Cavalry Masses requires a certain measure ofdrill control, because it depends always on the movement of closedbodies of troops, and if the Cavalry Divisions are constantly drilledtogether under the same Leader in Peace, there is at least a verygreat risk that this certain degree of drill control, which werecognise as indispensable, will degenerate into hard-and-fastprescription, since the Leader has always the same number of units athis disposal, and will thus by degrees habituate himself to considerthese as invariable quantities in the solution of every tacticalproblem. 

Our experiences with the Regulations for 1876 show that this danger isby no means imaginary, for by the constant practice of the so-called'Three-Line Tactics' we had already progressed far on the downwardpath which leads to tactical destruction. If the 'Form' would not fitthe conditions, so much the worse for the conditions. Fortunately, thanks to subsequent changes, we have shed the worst of thesetendencies, and are on the high-road towards freer and more adaptabletactical formations, but to me it seems that any attempt to fetterthis progress by the adoption of a more or less rigid organization canonly result in evil for the whole Arm. Rather should we lay down as afixed principle that all Cavalry units must be able both to move andfight according to the same tactical principles, no matter in whatorder these units may be grouped together. 

The question now arises whether our present formation of six regimentsto a Division is really equal to all demands which may be made uponit; whether, in fact, in view of the strategical requirements it maybe called on to fulfil, and the degree of resistance to theirexecution it is likely to encounter, six regiments will provenumerically equal to their task. 

Considered in relation to the enormous Armies of the present day, andthe still greater possibilities a general call to arms of a wholenation may involve, six regiments represent a very small actual factorof strength. If they should have to take the field for an independentmission, it would not even be possible to keep them all together. Theprotection of the flanks, and of the necessary baggage and supplytrains, the far-reaching reconnaissances, and the need for extendedrequisitions, all unite to compel the creation of detachments, whichin the aggregate must make considerable inroads on the total strength. Then there is the inevitable tale of losses on the march, thenecessity for subdivision of one's forces for the passage or theturning of defiles; in fact, the demands are so many that the truefighting body of the Division--_i. E. _, the squadrons available for theultimate decisive shock--is represented by a very small fraction ofits original forces. If a complete Division can place only 3, 600sabres in the field, or, dismounted, from 1, 680 to 3, 000 rifles, according to the number of horse-holders required--figures which evenwithout the above-mentioned detachments are quite inconsiderable inrelation to what even an inconsiderable Infantry opponent can bringinto action--what prospect of success is there for the weakenedIndependent Division in the execution of quite minor operations, wheneven in 1870-1871, not once, but frequently, the main body of ourCavalry Divisions shrank often to six or seven weak squadrons. 

It is chiefly the consequences of our, on the whole, satisfactoryexperiences in the above Campaign which have led us to accept theexisting Division of six regiments as a satisfactory solution of thisproblem of strength; but we forget that in those days we had noCavalry opponent to encounter, and that our sphere of action, owing tothe want on our side of an adequate equipment of firearms, was smallindeed in comparison with what we must expect in the future. We areencouraged in our illusion by the fact that in our Peace manoeuvresthe strength of the opposing forces is generally nearly equal, andalso because the actual demands War will make upon the Arm are stillin these exercises very imperfectly realized, and from the nature ofthe case cannot receive full recognition. Further, there is the factthat our possible opponents have adopted the same organization, andlast, but not least, there remains the view that every tactical unitof the Cavalry must not only be capable of being strategicallyemployed as a whole, but must also be in point of size within thecontrol of its Leader as a tactical unit. 

Our unfortunate experiences with larger formations in 1866 are oftencited in favour of our present system, the point being ignored that itwas not the size of these bodies, but the faulty methods in whichthey were employed, both strategically and tactically, that led to ourdisappointment. 

I think, therefore, that unprejudiced consideration must come to theconclusion that our Divisions as they now exist are too weak for themany and most decisive operations they will be called on to undertake. The absolute necessity to secure the victory over the enemy's Cavalryat the decisive point under all circumstances, and at the same time toretain a sufficient force in hand to reap all the consequences of thatvictory, will, I am convinced, lead to a materially greaterconcentration of power in the single unit. 

If from this point of view the permanent constitution of CavalryDivisions cannot be upheld, it follows that even less is to be saidfor the formation of still stronger units in Peace-time, for thismeasure would entail in even greater degree the very same strategicaland tactical limitations we have noted in the case of the Divisions, and still further cramp the necessary adaptability of the organizationto meet the conditions of our Peace-time training. At the same time, it is clear that it is of the utmost importance that the formation ofthese stronger formations, Corps, or Divisions of greater numericalstrength, the necessity for which can be recognised in advance, shouldbe arranged for in the mobilization plans, and not built up afterwardsby the mere combination of existing Divisions. 

For such bodies cannot be improvised altogether. In order to developtheir full efficiency they require a carefully selected and amplestaff of men who can be trusted to pull well together, and who have attheir disposal all the auxiliary services necessary for greaterindependent operations. For these both trains and columns are needed, which must be larger than those of two or even three single Divisions;for, on the one hand, the greater size of the Corps entails closerconcentration of its units, thus making heavier demands on theprovision columns; and, on the other, the Corps must be capable ofcarrying out longer and more obstinate engagements than a singleDivision. 

It is, therefore, most essential that the several Staffs required forthe Corps to be created in War-time should be thoroughly trained so asto insure their working together, and the trains and columns necessaryto complete these units should be held ready for them in time ofPeace. [17]

 [Footnote 17: In a report addressed to H. M. The King in 1868 by General von Moltke on the experiences deduced from the events of 1866, it is proposed that there should be at Army Headquarters the Staff of a Cavalry Corps Command, together with its necessary Administrative services, always ready for the field. As Field Marshal he returns to the idea in another place, adding, 'particularly when we have found the right "Murat" to lead it' (Moltke's 'Militarische Werke, ' II. , Second Part, First Group, B). ]

To hand over the functions of Corps Commander to the senior of the twoor three Divisional Commanders would hardly be an adequate means ofsecuring satisfactory results even for a single day of battle; stillless could it suffice in the case of an independent strategicoperation. On the other hand, it is not at all essential that theCorps thus formed at the outset of operations should be retainedintact throughout their whole period. One can make detachments fromthem, or reinforce them according to circumstances, and thus attainthat very flexibility of organization which I have endeavoured toprove to be an absolutely indispensable factor to meet the conditionsof our times. 

It appears to me also that the same advantage which it is hoped torealize by the creation of permanent Divisions can be reached by otherroads, and with still better results. 

I would divide the whole territory of the German Empire into a numberof territorial districts, and call them Cavalry Inspections, orCorps--the name is immaterial--each to comprise about twentyregiments, and subdivide these again into sub-Inspections (_i. E. _, Divisions and Brigades), and thus obtain, not only the foundations andthe Staffs for a practical War formation, but for a systematicpreparation of the Arm in time of Peace. The Inspections would detailannually the necessary squadrons on a War strength for manoeuvres ofthe three Arms, according to a changing roster, and hold specialCavalry manoeuvres in a manner I propose to develop hereafter. 

We should thus, from the point of view of organization, gain theadvantage of having the cadres for both Corps and Divisions ready intime of Peace, without being bound once for all to a hard-and-faststrength for the Division. 

It may be objected that it would be illogical to separate the Cavalryfrom the Army Corps and Divisional Commands at the very moment that wehave assigned the whole of the Artillery to the Infantry Divisions, but for the latter Arm the conditions are quite different. It alwaysfights in combination with the other Arms; by itself it cannot fightat all. 

The Cavalry, on the other hand, as regards its principal masses, isquite independent, and only occasionally in moments of crisisintervenes in the action of the other Arms, even then still as anindependent unit. The connection with the remainder of the Army wouldbe sufficiently secured by its participation in the annual manoeuvresof the three Arms, and, as at present, Cavalry Brigade Commanderswould still have to be employed in the arrangement of the Brigademanoeuvres. The participation of the Cavalry Regiments in the GarrisonField Service exercises would remain matter of arrangement between therespective Commands, but definite rules would have to be drawn up tosecure their effective co-operation. 

The necessary trains for the Inspections and Divisions would be keptready in time of Peace, and, whether Horse Artillery--possibly alsoMaxim guns--should be permanently allotted to them or otherwise, mightremain open for further discussion, though there is undoubtedly muchto be urged in favour of the suggestion. 

In this manner I believe an organization could be created which wouldmeet all reasonable requirements. Certain new Staffs, fully equippedwith both General Staff Officers and those necessary for thecontemplated trains, etc. , would be of course necessary, for in caseof War such creations cannot be improvised to work together withoutmost detrimental friction for any units, and least of all for thosewhich from the first moment of hostilities will be called on fordecisive action, and thus have less time and opportunity to shake downinto their new duties. 

A practical Peace Organization, such as in fact we do not at presentpossess, is a necessity of the first importance. But 'Mobility' in theArm itself remains the prime condition of efficiency in itsstrategical activity, which, as we have seen above, must henceforwardbe considered the most important sphere of its duties. 

To secure this mobility is, therefore, our unconditional duty, and itis in this direction in particular that, in my opinion, our Cavalry isas yet hardly sufficiently prepared for the tasks that await it. 

Strategical 'mobility' certainly depends in the first place on theexcellence of the horse supply and the suitable 'training' both of manand horse; but the tactical independence of the troops themselves, andthe means of maintaining them in condition--_i. E. _, conditions ofsupply--are at least of equal importance. Owing to our experiences inthe French Campaign, where food and fodder were generally abundant, sufficient attention has not been given universally to this factor. Had we been compelled to undergo the same hardships as the Russians in1877-1878, our views would doubtless have been very different. 

The amount of forage that even under most favourable circumstances canbe carried on the horses is very small. To count on finding even thatamount always in the country through which we may have to operatewould be more than imprudent. Even in 1870-1871 we could not alwaysfind what we needed in spite of the very favourable agriculturalconditions, and with the enormous Armies of the present day we shallprobably find the country even more exhausted of supplies thanformerly, particularly in the latter phases of the struggle, exceptwhen one has the good-fortune to fall upon rich stretches of thecountry which by chance may have escaped the devastation of previousoperations. 

We may also be called on to work in sparsely settled districts with alarge export trade in corn, in which at times stocks may sink verylow. In short, unless we wish to be hampered at every step of ourmovements by the necessity for wide-reaching foraging expeditions, weshall have to rely upon our magazines and the supplies which can betransmitted from them to the front through the agency of our supplycolumns. The carrying capacity and mobility of the latter, therefore, condition inexorably the degree of mobility in strategical operationswhich, under all circumstances, the Cavalry can be counted on todevelop. Whoever relies on more will lay himself open to most bitterdisappointments exactly at the decisive moments. 

The supply trains must, therefore, be able to march at least as fastas the troops themselves, for only on this condition is there anyguarantee that even under difficult circumstances the necessarysupplies will be forthcoming; yet though experience most abundantlydemonstrates the difficulties of maintaining the supplies of theInfantry in spite of the fact that, as a rule, their columns can coverthe ground faster than the men can march, there appears to be a tacitassumption that with the Cavalry the trains will always arrive intime, although they move far slower than the troops they follow andsupply. 

There was, indeed, a certain amount of justification for this idea inthe days when Cavalry were more or less tied to the movements of therest of the Army; but nowadays, when Cavalry operates independently, and must cover long distances in the shortest time, it has becomesimply preposterous. 

We have only to consider that we have now to reckon with average dailymarches of from twenty-five to thirty miles, and that a beaten orevading force may have to retrace the same distance, perhaps even onthe very same day, at a much faster rate than that at which itadvanced, to perceive its absurdity. What chance would there be forwaggons which could not go out of a walk, and cannot reverse on theroad itself, which check at every hill, and sink to the axles in mudor sand? How can strategically independent Cavalry provide for thesecurity of its baggage when it must often be left some days' marchesbehind? And yet it is precisely when operating against an activeopposing Cavalry or an insurgent population that protection for thebaggage becomes most indispensable. Again, how are such trains to becleared away from the front when the main bodies of the two armies areclosing on one another for battle? or how, after it is decided, canthey be brought forward again to follow their Cavalry in pursuit, andconvey to it the supplies which in such moments it will most need, andon whose prompt arrival its striking radius will depend? How, withinsufficient mobility, will they maintain the connection between thecombatants in front and the standing magazines, or even with themovable supply depots following behind the marching Army?

Here we come upon one of the most difficult problems of the day, andit cannot be insisted on too strongly that its solution during Peaceis an indispensable condition of the efficiency of the Arm in War. TheCavalry trains must be organized in such a manner that they will beable to march at least as fast as the Cavalry itself, and be adequatein number to carry from five to six days' corn. Only when this demandhas been complied with will it be possible to count on the attainmentof the strategical independence at which we aim, and to attempt allthat this implies with less would only lead to the complete breakdownof the Arm, which, as we have already seen, under existing conditions, can never be efficiently replaced during the same Campaign. 

It is not alone with the splendid chaussées of France that we mustreckon, but with the sand roads of East and West Prussia, the swampsof Poland and Russia, and so forth, on all of which the same degree ofmobility must be developed, for the speed of the Cavalry itself ispractically independent of the nature of the roads. Without goingfurther into the detailed measures necessary to attain this ideal, theimportance of which must be evident to every practical soldier. Iwould call attention to only one fundamental consideration: the desireto curtail the length of supply columns by concentrating the loads, with the object of lessening the congestion of the roads anddiminishing the time needed to bring their contents to the troops, issound as long as it attains its object, fatal everywhere else. [18]

 [Footnote 18: Generally defeats its own object; the heavy load destroys the roads, causes breakdowns and delays, etc. ]

Now, the Cavalry Masses move under different conditions to the rest ofthe Army. Either they are in the front of or on the flanks; in thelatter case, they have roads at their own disposal, in the former, being generally some days' march in advance, they clear the front whencollision is imminent by moving to the flanks, and only quiteexceptionally retire through the advancing columns, and in all casesthey must be able to get off the roads quickly. The depth of thesecolumns is comparatively unimportant. 

Hence, from the strategical relations of the Cavalry Masses to therest of the Army there arises no particular reason to endeavour toshorten their trains. If the heavy baggage of a Cavalry Division istwo and a half or five kilometres in length it is tolerablyimmaterial, but it is imperative, as we have seen, that they should beable to move and get out of the way. Hence, it is not the number ofwaggons which concerns us, but their individual lightness andmobility, so that on all roads they can follow their units at a trot, and only in the case of Divisional Cavalry can the other point of viewbe admitted. 

The possibility must also not be overlooked that it may not always bepractical for Cavalry masses to fill up their supply columns directfrom the Army reserves; and to meet this, second échelons of waggonswill be required, in every degree as mobile as the first, and soorganized as to require a minimum escort for their safety. 

For such escorts Cavalry Reservists and men of the Landwehr exist inadequate numbers, and armed with a useful carbine and mounted onhorses, only as a means of locomotion, they will answer their purposewell enough. 

No matter, however, how ample the supply of these columns may be, orhow mobile, circumstances will still arise during periods of greatconcentration in which it will be impossible to bring up supplywaggons in sufficient numbers. In these cases we require an emergencyhorse ration, which within a small compass contains great nourishment. 

Too much cannot be expected from such a ration; for instance, itcannot be bulky enough to fill the animal's stomach. All that isnecessary is that it should be willingly eaten by the horses, keepwell, and be easily carried. It should contain about three times thenutritive qualities, weight for weight, of oats, and should suffice tokeep horses in condition for three or four days in succession. Thesedemands are fairly satisfied by a food manufactured by Marck atDarmstadt. It should be always carried in the field and replenished asconsumed, and with it even the most advanced patrols might be madeindependent of requisitions, a matter which appears to me of thegreatest importance. 

The fundamental condition of mobility being thus satisfied, the nextstep will be to insure the technical and tactical independence of theunits under all circumstances which can be reasonably foreseen. 

In this direction much has been done, and materials for thedestruction of railways, folding pontoons, and a field telegraph, nowform part of our equipment. The opportunities for the use of thelatter in the course of rapid movements--_i. E. _, just in the mostimportant sphere of our activities--seem to me highly problematical, as I have already pointed out; and the waggons which transport thebridging equipment are too heavy to be always at hand when mostneeded. Essentially, it seems only fitted to facilitate the progressof smaller bodies of troops, and would hardly suffice to secure rapidand safe passage of Cavalry Masses with all their attendant trainsover the rivers for which we ought to be prepared. For such purposesthey would only suffice if all the boats of a whole Division wereunited into one bridging train. 

Nevertheless, the collapsible boats are a most useful concession, andthey would be still more so if the load was more suitably subdivided;as it is, the weight of the whole waggon ties us too much to the maderoads. For the Divisional Cavalry, which always moves in closeconnection with the Infantry, and in need can always fall back uponthe Divisional Bridge Train, it has no particular value, and it wouldtherefore be better if, in War-time, all the collapsible boatequipment were handed over to the independent Cavalry Divisions, andtheir bridging equipment thus augmented. 

More important, however, than this collapsible boat question is thematter of the pioneer detachments to be assigned to the CavalryDivisions which require further equipment. A waggon of bridgingmaterial just sufficient to cross smaller ditches and watercourses, which can neither be jumped nor scrambled over, but which require onlyone, or at most two, bays, would be invaluable, for it is just theselittle hindrances, whose importance cannot be measured or deduced fromthe map, which may bring most important Cavalry undertakingsunexpectedly to a check, particularly when in an enemy's country allthe culverts, etc. , have been destroyed. In the days of Frederick theGreat such bridging equipment was often assigned to the Cavalrymarching at the head of the Columns, in order to help them oversimilar obstacles. 

Given, however, that all has been done to attain the degree ofcollective mobility we require, a point of equal importance is thatthe troops should be adequately provided with all they require fortheir tactical action. In this respect, it cannot be too much insistedupon that carbine ammunition should be placed in the very first line;our present allowance is altogether insufficient. 

The importance of dismounted action, as we have already seen, hasenormously increased. Almost daily, under certain conditions, we shallhave to have recourse to our firearms, and often be obliged to expendvery considerable quantities of ammunition to attain the object wefight for. The replenishment of this consumption is far more difficultin our case than with the Infantry, particularly in operationspartaking of the nature of raids, in which our communications arelikely to be interrupted. These conditions require first of all aconsiderable increase in the number of rounds carried on the man'sperson, and also in the number of Small Arm Ammunition waggonsattached to the units, and the regulations for the replenishment ofthese require also corresponding development. 

Further, it must be pointed out with all possible insistence that thepresent equipment of the trooper is thoroughly impracticable. That thecarbine should be carried on the horse and the sword on the man isopposed to common sense, for the latter is only of use when mounted, the former only on foot. The sword should, therefore, be attached tothe saddle, the carbine to the man, as is, in fact, the practice ofall races of born horsemen. A practicable method of attachment iscertainly capable of being devised; it is probably only the questionof expense that stands in the way of its solution. The consequences, however, of the existing attachment to the saddle are that the weaponmust be shorter than that of the Infantry soldier, and hence has alesser range; but it is precisely the Cavalry that requires to be ableto obtain good results at long ranges. Even against Infantry it mustalways be in a position to obtain decisive results in the shortesttime. To obtain these ends it needs a weapon at least equal, ifpossible superior, to that of the Infantry; and instead it has onlythe carbine, a weapon of most restricted range, and most inadequatelysighted. It is required of Cavalry that it should break off anengagement when the enemy approaches within 700 metres (DrillRegulations, No. 562), and all the training the man gets in Peace isat 600 metres at target practice, and only quite occasionally, if atall, at greater distances at field practice. 

I consider it most important that the Cavalry should be supplied witha weapon which admits of accurate practice at long ranges, and forwhich the greatest number of rounds can be carried. This would entail, on the one hand, an increase in the length of the weapon carried; onthe other, a reduction in calibre, which should be made as small aspossible. We might thus safely go down to a 6-millimetre bore, andincrease the ammunition accordingly. The desire to retain the samecartridge as the Infantry, to facilitate mutual assistance inammunition supply on occasions, seems to me of quite secondaryimportance. As long as the Cavalry were still tied to the Infantry onthe line of march this consideration had indeed some weight; but nowthat it moves far in front of, or on the flanks of, the Infantrycolumns, and has its own arrangements for ammunition supply, the caseis quite different. The point nowadays is to make sure of that degreeof effect which is unconditionally necessary to our purpose, and forthis we require a weapon specially adapted to our particular need. 

Our method of carrying our cartridges in the pouch attached to thecross-belt is also impracticable. The bandoliers of the Boers would beundoubtedly preferable, and could at the same time be made use of tosecure the carbine on the back. 

It is also a matter for serious consideration whether cycledetachments should not be attached to the Cavalry, [19] and I think Iam not going too far in estimating fifteen to twenty cyclists perregiment as a suitable number to perform the many duties which mayfall to their lot. On the advantages they confer I have already dwelt(Book I. , Chap. VIII. ), and further, I would advocate the addition ofportable or wheelable Maxims to the Cavalry to add to their firepower. The latest patterns of this weapon are capable of easytransportation, and can come into action very rapidly. Naturally suchheavy batteries as we now possess should be avoided. As regards thislatter weapon, one should not think of it primarily as destined totake part in the real Cavalry duel; one should do nothing in thisdirection to rob the horsemen of their confidence in themselves byteaching them to lean on the firearm for support. Even the effect ofthe Artillery in this respect is not always and everywhereadvantageous. One is too much inclined to make the action of theCavalry depend on the effect of the guns, and thus to sacrifice theinitiative when opposed to an enemy's horse. Nor would there be manyopportunities in practice for the Maxims to render support to thecharge. In the introductory phases of an engagement--_i. E. _, when theenemy is still at a considerable distance--they promise littleresults, and in the moments when the 'Masses' are sent forward to theattack, they would get in the way and hinder their freedom ofmovement. On the other hand, they would be of great use in cases whereit is necessary to overcome or parry an Infantry opponent, and in thebattle, or in pursuit, when the Cavalry succeed in getting in on theflanks or rear of the enemy's chief masses, they might proveinvaluable. Here, where reserves, columns, and trains all formsuitable targets, they would not only add materially to the strikingpower of the Cavalry, but increase its radius of action verymaterially. 

 [Footnote 19: The wheel should be so low that the man could use his rifle without dismounting, and, if possible, it should be 'transportable' (?'folding'). ]

By their side the Artillery will always maintain its high importancefor the fight against localities, woods, and defiles, and with thisArm the German Cavalry is, in my opinion, sufficiently supplied;only--and this is of the greatest importance--more adequate steps toinsure ammunition supply are essential in the case of the IndependentCavalry Masses. Here, too, we shall have to reckon with far higherconsumption than in 1870-1871, and the greater distances will make itimpossible to replenish from the general Reserves of the Army. TheCavalry, therefore, require sufficient ammunition columns of its veryown. 

The nature of Cavalry operations indicate yet anotherrequirement--namely, batteries so organized that to every brigade oftwo regiments one battery of four pieces should be assigned. Many willbe the occasions in our strategical operations on which guns will berequired, and in most of these it is more a question of having _some_Artillery at hand rather than of the development of superior firepower--_i. E. _, a few shells into a village at the right time may beall that is needed for our purpose. Further, in operating on severalroads it can seldom be foretold with exactness on which road the needmay first arise. 

Under these conditions it is of the greatest importance to be able, ifnecessary, to assign a battery to each brigade, and at the same timenot to allow the half of the whole available Artillery to escape fromcontrol. [20]

 [Footnote 20: With stronger Divisions, a corresponding increase in Artillery must, of course, be made. ]

Further, these small batteries are both handier and more mobile inthemselves; they are, therefore, better suited to Cavalryrequirements, and at the same time the power of concentration whensuch is required is fully retained. 

The advantage of this proposed division seems, therefore, to mesufficiently clear to need no further recommendation. [21]

 [Footnote 21: King William I. Had already suggested the formation of batteries of four guns for the Cavalry in 1869--in a marginal note on the report of Moltke's of 1868--already referred to in the note on p. 166 above. ]

This organization of the Artillery requires, however, to besupplemented by the introduction of a true quick-firing gun, even ifit is necessary to reduce the calibre somewhat to keep down theweight. For it is particularly with the Cavalry, and especially in theCavalry duel, when the opportunities for Artillery action are oftencompressed into a very few moments, and yet a great effect must beattained, that a gun without recoil and a great rapidity of loading ismost urgently required. If the Cavalry is thus equipped with all thatthe conditions of War demand and modern technical skill can supply, then it will find in these--at least in part--compensation for itsnumerical weakness on condition that at the same time it also succeedsin raising its training to a corresponding height. 

It cannot be denied that in this direction all ranks have worked withmost devoted and admirable industry, and that new points of view, newmethods, and new aims towards which to strive have been opened up. But, on the whole, this question of the training of our Cavalry isstill based upon the ideas of a period which lies behind us. There hasbeen no conscious breach with the past, even in those very fieldswherein the developments and demands of modern times have broughtabout a complete disturbance of all military relations. 

That a method of training which does not take into account thephenomena of modern Warfare, and follow them even to their furthermostconsequences, can never give satisfactory results, needs nodemonstration. But a method free from these objections we have tofind. In its training our Cavalry _must_ excel all others if it wouldmaintain its position on the field of battle, and it can do so, for itpossesses by far the best material both in men and horses of anycountry in the Continent of Europe. There are only two essentialswhich we must bear in mind. First, we must be absolutely clear as tothose points in which our system is behind the requirements of thetime, and what objectives we must now pursue. Secondly, beingsatisfied as to the above, that we should take the straightest waywhich leads towards them, not hesitating to break with traditionwherever it hinders our advance. 

If we now consider in the spirit of this first requirement theseparate branches of Cavalry work which our training must embrace, thevery first point which attracts attention is the vastly increaseddemands on the endurance of our horseflesh that will now be made, farexceeding what was required in our last Wars. Increase of endurance isthus an unconditional necessity. 

Further, it is perfectly clear that in the combat of Cavalry againstCavalry, the decision will depend on the action of the great tacticalunits, and that with regard to dismounted fighting, a completerevolution in the conditions has occurred. In future this will tendevermore to come to the front, and both points of view must be kept inmind in our training. 

Finally, it is evident that the centre of gravity of these two factorsis no longer in the same position. As long as decisive results in thecombat itself were expected from the Cavalry, it was quite right andexpedient to train them to meet this special requirement. But now, when it is clear that the combat is only a means to an end--that endbeing the possibility opened up by successful fighting to reconnoitre, screen, or break the enemy's communications--this change in theconditions must be taken into account in the process of our education. 

Of course this is not to be understood in the sense that we can affordto neglect the training for the actual combat: the defeat of theenemy's Cavalry remains now, as always, the necessary condition of allsubsequent activity; but the Arm must be taught to understand thatvictory in combat is only the first link in the chain of operations, and to extend its outlook beyond the point of actual collision, and toappreciate the tasks which are the consequence of success. 

To this end we must undergo a preparation of a quite differentcharacter, for nowadays, freed from the chains which formerly bound usto conform to the action of the other Arms, we appear within theframework of the Great Armies indeed, but operating in independent'Masses, ' and this change in conditions extends its influence even tothe smallest reconnoitring patrol. 

In this new field our training must seek to follow the demands of War. It must accustom the troops to the greatness of their mission bothwith regard to time and space, attain higher results with theindividual, raise the education of its officers above the sphere ofthe technicalities special to the Arm, and give them a wider horizonof general military conditions. 

In what way we can reach these new ideals, in the best and mostpractical manner, I propose to investigate in the following chapters, and need only point out here that it is not my object to discuss everydetail of military education, but rather to bring out the essentials, and lay stress on those questions which, in my opinion, compel us tostrike out new ways to find our objective. 

CHAPTER II

RIDING, FEEDING, AND TRAINING

When we discuss the training of the Cavalry, the first point whichnaturally occurs to us is the question of 'horsemanship'--_i. E. _, thebreaking-in of the horses and the teaching of equitation to the men. Horsemanship is so absolutely the bed-rock of all Cavalryperformances, that the advantages of improved methods of breaking andof equitation must bear fruit in every branch of their activity. Aboveall, they exercise the most enduring influence both on theconservation and endurance of the horses themselves. 

Anglomaniacs and faddists, who, in spite of many a healthy impulsethey have imparted, have nevertheless exercised, and still seek toexercise, an influence the reverse of favourable upon our Cavalry, maintain that for certain purposes one can obtain better results withhorses broken by one of their short-cuts to the object, and then'trained' in the sense that racehorses and hunters are prepared fortheir work, than with those who have been gradually brought forward bythe methods in use in our Cavalry schools, and at the same time securethe advantage of 'unconditional obedience' in the horse, a resultwhich they allege cannot be always counted on with our existingmethods. 

On the other hand, the fact remains that our recruits, in the shorttime available for their education, can only be well and quicklytaught on well-trained pliable horses. That such horses, withsufficient exercise, go better and more safely across country thanthose brought forward by more hasty methods, is sufficiently proved bythe fact that all our steeplechase riders in the Army take thegreatest pains to prepare their horses thoroughly (by school methodsunderstood), because experience shows that this preparation alonegives them a chance against the more highly-priced animals with whichthey are called on to compete. Only this thorough training guaranteesgood individual riding, and insures the 'pliability' which alone makesit possible to correct disobedience rapidly should it arise. And, further, there can be no question that this prolonged preparationimproves the endurance of the horse--on that point at least experienceleaves no room for doubt. The thoroughly broken horse, which moves ineasy balance, with all its muscle thoroughly well and equallydeveloped, not only saves its forelegs and joints, and supports thespinal arch better, but trots easier, and hence for longer periodswith less fatigue, than the unpliable animal, who stiffens itselfagainst the rider's load, and thus expends its power uselessly, andthe rider himself is far less shaken about under the former, a pointby no means to be neglected. 

The recognition of these facts has at length led us to break with theAnglomania of former years, and the tendency towards improvedpreparation has become more evident, whilst the centrifugal strivingsof individuals no longer find acceptance. On the other hand, it seemsto me beyond a doubt that the objects which we wish to obtain fromour Military school of horsemanship could in many respects be reachedmore directly and better than is at present the case. 

In conformity with the whole essence of modern War, the individualtraining of both man and horse must form the foundation of our wholeeducation--that is to say, steadiness in the movement of closed bodiesmust be the consequence of individual horsemanship. Only in this waycan the bodily, intellectual, and moral qualities of both man andhorse be brought into useful activity, and in this way only can weconquer the gregarious instincts of the horses and develop in theirriders the individuality which modern conditions absolutely demand. 

More stress requires to be laid on riding with one hand only and witharms (_i. E. _, drawn swords), for the bit, with or without a feeling onthe bridoon, is in War the only practical method of direction; and theuse of his weapons when mounted must have become second nature to theman if they are not to be a constant impediment to him in the controlof his horse. Finally, independent riding across country must beencouraged by every conceivable means. 

To attain all this will only be possible if we succeed in overcomingthe preliminary steps of the man's education--_i. E. _, the elementarytraining of man and horse--more rapidly than has hitherto been thecase, and thus gain time for the true practical preparation for thefield. If from this standpoint we look at our present system, it willsoon be clear where to apply the lever. 

First, it should be possible, with the better bred and staunchermaterial we now receive, to make more rapid progress in the first yearthan has hitherto been generally the case. By the increased demandsand the greater freedom in the choice of means allowed us by the newRegulations as compared with the conditions formerly prevalent, considerable changes have been made; the point now is, in what mannerto derive the fullest advantage from this greater freedom for thepractical curtailment of the periods previously allotted for eachstage in the training. 

But prudence is necessary in this direction. That the Englishthoroughbred, for instance, develops better under work in its earlyyears, admits of no doubt whatever; but there is room to questionwhether this experience can be transferred without modification to ourpresent Remounts, although many of them have a strong strain ofEnglish blood. Our Prussian horses, for instance, only reach theirfull development between the seventh and eighth years; it would, therefore, be a mistake to attempt to force them up to the fulldemands made on a Cavalry horse before that age. This slowness ofgrowth must always be considered, and the animals be saved as much aspossible; but there is still room to unite with this necessaryconcession increased demands on the degree of training. 

Without any detriment to their efficiency, the young remounts can betaken in hand immediately on joining their regiments, instead ofwaiting till the conclusion of the manoeuvres, as is still a commonpractice. It seems feasible, also, to begin with the gallop earlierthan was formerly the custom; and, finally, it is by no meansabsolutely necessary to go back to the bridoon again at thecommencement of their second year's training. [22] One can well go onwith riding on the bit at the point where the course was interruptedby the manoeuvres. 

 [Footnote 22: Under the new Regulations this is now left to the discretion of the Regimental Commander. ]

All these measures together produce quite a remarkable saving of time, and there cannot well be any doubt that in this way, as far asconcerns the riding education of the horse alone--_i. E. _, withoutarms--the same standard of progress can be reached by Christmas of thesecond year as was formerly often only reached at the end of thesecond winter. 

If from this foundation we go on to specific training of thecharger--still working, of course, concurrently at the gymnastic sideof his training also--to accustoming him to the curb, then by the endof February the remount ought easily to be ready to be placed in theranks. 

Side by side with this increase of rapidity in his training, we bothcan and must make the individual training the foundation of his wholeeducation, so that from the very first the horse learns to go aloneand with safety in all kinds of ground. 

The very first lessons to accustom him to both saddle and rider arebetter given on the lunging rein than when led by an older horse, fornothing teaches the bad habit of 'sticking' more than this lastpractice. And since now the first months of training fall in thesummer, we can avail ourselves of the fine weather to send out theyoung horses in charge of trustworthy riders, some of whom must beleft behind even during the manoeuvres, to go singly or in smallgroups under suitable supervision, which can easily be arranged, outinto the country, if possible into woods and fairly difficult ground, to habituate them to minor obstacles and the objects one meets with, instead of, as formerly, keeping them in the school or manège, andmaking them into 'stickers' first, only to have the trouble ofbreaking them of the habit, often after many a hard tussle, afterwards. 

All through their subsequent training they must constantly be sent outsingly into the country, and even in the school itself they should beexercised as little as possible in squads one behind the other. 

It goes without saying that only the best horsemen should be trustedwith the young horses, for bad habits developed at the beginning oftheir instruction are of all the most difficult to correct hereafter, and may ruin the result of all one's trouble. 

That in this way we can meet the requirements of the service much morerapidly than by existing methods cannot be open to question and may betaken as practically settled, and similar considerations apply to therecruits. 

The system laid down in the regulations does not go directly enough tothe purpose, a consequence, no doubt, of the fact that we have nowbetter horses on which to instruct them than at the time theseinstructions were evolved. 

If one begins as soon as possible with the gallop and individualriding--if necessary on the lunge--and allows the recruit as soon ashe has acquired anything approaching a firm seat to practise the aidsfor the leg and the side paces--passage and shoulder-in--one willattain quite different results than from riding only on straight linesand practising closing in the ranks. The practice in the use of thelegs makes the men more independent and individual, compels them totrust to their seat, and not to hang on by the reins. 

The individual riding makes the man drive his horse forward by thepressure of his legs, which he is not compelled to do in the squad, where the horses follow one another almost automatically. The horses, too, are saved from becoming dull and heavy, as they are only too aptto do under the recruits of the old system. 

By Christmas the recruits can thus be brought forward as far andfarther than they now are by the time of the inspection on thebridoon, and can then go on to riding on the curb, so that by Februarythey should be able to ride the side paces, gallop and change, and allother school paces, without arms, and generally be so firm in thesaddle that they may be advanced to drilling with arms, and can begintheir real instruction as troopers. Of course, it is not to beexpected that these school paces should be ridden as yet in perfectform, but the men must understand what these lessons are intended for, and the effort to get the correct bend should be recognisable. And wemay add that to teach them to rely on their seat and not on theirhands suitable exercises with the lance may be introduced even at anearlier period. 

As regards the remainder of the squadron, the so-called 'Dressur'[23]detachment, it is hardly necessary to point out that one can ask of itat least all that can be attained by the remounts and therecruits--that is to say, that by the beginning of February the menand horses should reach the highest point of their purely ridingtraining. Of course, to achieve this they must not be put back everyautumn to the very ABC of their work--riding on the bridoon. They mustgo on with the curb, to which by this time they are accustomed, and inthe place of the bridoon work, individual riding must be encouragedas much as possible. 

 [Footnote 23: 'Dressur' literally means 'preparation. ' We use the term 'breaking-in. ' Note the difference. --TRANSLATOR. ]

Only those squads will require somewhat different treatment in whichthe best men of the second year are being trained on the best horsesfor the riding of the remounts in the following year. These men willcertainly require more bridoon work in the autumn, but even theseshould be sufficiently forward by Christmas-time to pass on to thebit, so that, in spite of the very high degree of perfection requiredfrom their horses, they can be dismissed the school by the middle ofFebruary. 

From the increased demands made on the individual training of man andhorse, it follows as a necessary consequence that a different kind ofinspection in equitation will be required to that hitherto in vogue. 

The presentation of closed detachments must be restricted as much aspossible, and all previous rehearsals of a special inspectionprogramme absolutely prohibited. Horse and rider, since they have beentrained individually, must be inspected and judged on their individualmerits, not otherwise. In this manner not only is it easier toappreciate difficulties, but good work also has a fairer chance ofsecuring recognition. It needs an expert to bring together the sum ofall the performances, and express a fair judgment on the total result. In any case, however, such a judgment will be nearer the truth becauseit is uninfluenced by 'eye-wash' and mere externals. 

Hence we arrive at the conclusion that in the manner we have aboveindicated the whole squadron can have completed its training inequitation by the middle of February. 

That many objections will have to be met and many difficultiesovercome before this end is attained goes without saying; but where inhuman affairs can it be said that this is not the case?

It may be urged that both for horses and men there is a distinctadvantage in beginning again every year with bridoon riding. 

The action of the rider is easier to control than on the bit, and ifonce the men take to holding on by the curb, the consequences are muchworse than with the former. On the other hand, also, it is easier forthe horses on the curb to assume a false bend or poise, or to refuseto go up to their bits, and thus deceive the instructor. Wrongapplication of the aids with the bit entail worse consequences on thehorses than with the bridoon; hence almost exclusive work on the bitrequires better teachers and lighter hands, and if one has few ofthese at one's disposal, undoubtedly a disadvantage will accrue. 

It may further be objected that for such a thorough extension of thecourse of individual riding as I have demanded there is neither time, school accommodation, nor teachers available, and it must be grantedthat the regulation allowance of three schools per regiment is, infact, insufficient for the attainment of the required standard by themethods I have in view. Nor will it suffice to allow each trainingdetachment only three-quarters of an hour in the school at a time. Detachments of average strength require daily one hour and a quarter, if the necessary skill in individual riding is to be acquired, andrecruit squads even longer. Further, it will not do to excluderecruits who begin early with the side paces and the gallop altogetherfrom the school; on the contrary, they require to attend it at leastonce or twice a week. 

But with only three schools per regiment, particularly in our northernprovinces, these requirements cannot be fulfilled. Four I consider asthe least number, and it would be still better if each squadron hadits own school, so that difficult animals and backward men could betaken individually, and work on the lunge and circle thoroughlycarried out. 

Still, all these obstacles can be overcome. With increased practice, comprehension of the management of the bit in military riding wouldgradually increase both with teacher and pupils, and work with thereins in both hands be usefully employed to facilitate the transitionfrom the bridoon to the bit and counteract the possible evils ofriding on the bit alone. 

The better training of the Remounts, which will be obtained by themeans I have indicated, will in course of time give us better, moreobedient, and more pliable horses, and better-trained recruits againwill give us a better choice of riders for the young remounts. 

Our instructional staff for equitation is thoroughly satisfactory. Inthis respect the Riding-School in Hanover has done excellent work. Wehave also amongst our senior non-commissioned officers some excellentinstructors. 

The necessary time for all my demands can very well be saved if wemake up our minds to leave out all superfluities in the daily routineof duty; and as regards the question of school accommodation, it iswell within the bounds of possibility for most regiments to providethemselves with a fourth school--eventually even with a fifth--out oftheir own financial resources. No investment could be moreremunerative. Certainly under circumstances red tape may stand in theway; but when his superiors will support the Regimental Commander, andsometimes without, one will generally find appreciative backing, evenfrom the War Office (_Intendantur_). 

If the drawbacks and difficulties in the way of the proposed changesare, as I have endeavoured to show, to be surmounted, on the otherhand, the advantages accruing therefrom are so enormous that theformer need not be taken into consideration at all. In the firstplace, as we have seen, better individual horsemanship and morepractice in riding on the bit are in themselves advantages which reactdirectly on the War efficiency of the whole squadron. Secondly, theearlier completion of the remount training is a direct gain, for, incase of mobilization, we shall be better able to place remounts in themobilized squadrons, leaving in exchange older horses behind, which isagain an advantage for the training of the recruits destined hereafterto join us at the front. I cannot too earnestly warn against thetaking of _all_ the old horses into the field. No man can foretell howgreat the losses will be, but that they will be great admits of nodoubt whatever. Nor is it at all certain that future Wars will be ofshort duration; on the contrary, they may drag on for a very longtime. Hence it is absolutely indispensable that suitable horses forrecruit training should be left behind, even if the marching outstrength per squadron should be reduced by a file or two--it cannot bemany in any case. For the rest, the quicker and better training of therecruits will be all to the good in case of War breaking out, as onewill be able to detail men for the field squadrons towards the closeof the winter season--_i. E. _, some weeks sooner than under the oldsystem; and finally the proposed procedure brings with it an enormousgain of time in the training of the whole arm. 

To begin with, we gain in winter the months from the middle ofFebruary to the beginning of the Drill Season (April). This time canbe devoted to direct training for the demands War must make upon us. We can practise again, and confirm the men in the fundamentalprinciple of dressing in motion, the exact squareness of the horses tothe alignment and rallying, with which one had already commenced inthe early months of winter, before being driven into the schools byfrost and snow; and, further, take advantage of fine days and similarcircumstances to practise men in taking jumps, scrambling, etc. , thedevelopment of the regulation drill gallop (fifteen miles an hour), whilst still maintaining the control and standard of equitation forwhich the school training is specially adapted. The winter exercisesin field service duties, which, as long as they are allowed constantlyto interrupt the formal lessons in equitation, do more harm than good, can be postponed to this period, when the recruits will now be able totake part in them--a point of essential importance in case War breaksout. Above all, the time thus saved must be devoted to individualriding and single combat. 

Our Regulations (Sections 129 and 324) lay special stress on thislatter point, and in most regiments it is constantly practised. Theresults, however, are sometimes questionable, and many SquadronCommanders are of opinion that such training can be overdone. Nor isthis view without foundation. If single combats are carried out in theregulation way on imperfectly broken horses, the horse is not onlyspoilt, but the rider also, and a clumsy rider will very soon make agood horse hard in the mouth and refractory. 

Now, since we have neither ideal horses nor riders at our disposal, there is much danger in overdoing these exercises, because the methodof their execution is often thoroughly unpractical. The combatantsride round one another in unnatural circles, one retreats, the otherpursues, and both tear at their horses' mouths to turn them sharplyabout, all things which, except the latter, they never do in action. 

Nor should we overlook the really imminent danger which lies inteaching the men to run away before an opponent. Few of them are'Horatios, ' and if, in fact, they once turn about, it is, to say theleast, highly problematical whether, in a real fight, they will everstop again. In the field matters are very different. If one has butone adversary, one tries to ride him down, and, if unsuccessful, thenafter one turn about both get locked together, turning only on thefore hand; and the man who turns a second time can only trust to thespeed of his horse--he has given up the fight. 

Such duels are rare indeed; in most engagements the man fights betweencrowds of his own comrades and the other side, in wild confusion, under clouds of dust. He must attack at one moment to the right, atthe next to the left, and guard himself. The essential here is not somuch the skilful use of the lance, as complete command over the horse, and the determination to _kill_, which must rise to the height of_fanaticism_. He who can twist and turn his horse by his weight alone, without dragging at its mouth, whose arm does not tire, and who canmake sure of striking what he aims at, even at speed, and with theenergy born of hatred, thinking only of destroying his enemy, never onretreating--he alone can hope to remain the conqueror; but such a onevery soon learns all that is practical in the use of sword or lance. 

The exercises in single combats, therefore, must be based mainly onpreparatory practice, intended to strengthen the arm, give command ofthe weapon, heighten the man's energy, and, above all, aim at securingthe most perfect harmony between man and horse by constant exercise inthose forms of individual riding which are really needed in the fight:the rapid turning about of the horse; serpentining between, andcutting and thrusting at, different objects in varying directions, asfar as possible without reins, and never according to a prescribedformula. 

The actual combats between squads should follow only when considerableexcellence in these preliminary exercises has been attained--_i. E. _, for recruits--about the end of the summer, before the manoeuvres; andthey should always be kept down to the lowest limits, and then onlycarried out in thoroughly practical form--_i. E. _, between squads, andnot larger detachments. I believe that in this way a far higherstandard will be reached, and with less damage to the horses than ispossible under existing conditions, in which one generally begins withsingle combats, man against man, at the very commencement of the drillseason. In any case, we shall at least obtain this advantage--that thework to be done in the latter will be materially reduced if theexercises I have suggested are begun already in the winter months. 

The more the men have learnt to ride with a light hand on the bit, thegreater command they possess over their lances--thanks to moreconstant practice--and the more thoroughly they have been grounded inthe principles of direction, pace, alignment, and rallying. Further, the more quietly the horses move--and even at rapid paces have learntto carry their heads not too high, with a firm bearing on thereins--the easier it will be for the Commander to drill his squadron, and to eliminate all the plunging and surging in movement which isfatal to all excellence in manoeuvring. 

The drill season can thus be cut down, and the time thus saved devotedto field service practices and riding across country, because thewhole system, thanks to this considerable saving of time it effects, enables one to extend the education of man and horse over the wholeyear instead of confining it to the winter months. 

Though every efficient squadron possesses a considerable number ofhorses that do not require six months' practice in 'shouldering in, 'and in 'collected paces, ' on the other hand, everyone has some horsesthat do urgently need 're-making, ' but which one has to entrust toinferior riders, because the better ones are all needed for theremounts and young horses. 

This is a consequence of the whole system in which the training of thehorses and of the men eventually react on one another. There will beremounts which need correction, and horses ridden by recruits to becured of acquired bad habits; and on my system there will now be timeand opportunity to hand these over, say from the beginning ofFebruary, to non-commissioned officers and the better riders, eitherby forming them in a special squad or entrusting them to individuals, and the process of re-making the horses can be continued throughoutthe whole summer, for now there will be ample time. 

On the importance of this latter point I would especially insist. Ifthis work of equitation ceases for the whole summer, and the difficulthorses are kept incessantly at drill and field service, it isinevitable that their defects will develop and become more firmlyfixed; hence one will never get a good average of well-broken horsesin the ranks. That some of them must always be taken for drill goeswithout saying; but the point is, that from February onwards, andthroughout the summer, they should be constantly taken in hand andcorrected by good riders. If this idea is applied with thoroughgoingenergy, particularly with the young horses--even if it entails atfirst a diminution in the number of files on parade--the number ofdifficult horses in the squadron will soon show a most encouragingdiminution. 

To all these advantages there comes yet another, to my mind even moreimportant. According to established custom, after the inspection inriding on the bit which forms the conclusion of the winter's training, the whole squadron is completely reformed before it begins the drills. The new exercises in unaccustomed surroundings are begun by the men onstrange horses, to which they have had no opportunity to accustomthemselves. This drawback can be obviated, if the squadron isdefinitely made up already in February--_i. E. _, after the close of thepurely equitation course. The men can now ride the same horses in theschool on the drill-ground, and in the country, which they are toretain throughout the summer, and the squadron will commence the drillseason with much steadier ranks than would otherwise be the case, particularly if its Commander understands how to make the most of allthe advantages his good methods and well-broken horses secure for himby changing them about individually as circumstances require. 

Much, no doubt, may be urged against this proposal, and the expertwill hardly need my assistance to recognise the difficulties thatawait him. But they can be overcome, and their advantages thussecured--and these seem to me the essential points--enormouslyoutweigh the minor troubles that follow in their train. 

I do not believe that either thorough or essential changes are neededin our Regulations to adapt them to the principles I have developed. All that is important is that we should definitely break with theroutine of the several courses and inspections. 

To constitute a framework, not with a view of developing a freshnetwork of red tape, I here submit an outline programme of thetime-table I suggest, so far as concerns the equitation and thetraining of the horses in their several periods. 

Commencement of Remount training, at the latest, the end of July. Itis worth consideration whether the young horses could not be sent tothe Regiments even earlier. 

Inspection of recruits on the bridoon, and of the Second Ride SecondClass shortly before Christmas. 

Inspection of the second year's remounts on the bit of the whole ofthe remount training squads, and of the recruits, concluding with thelatter and Second Ride Second Class about the middle of February. Thenconstitution of the squadron to meet the requirements of the comingdrill season. 

End of March, or beginning of April, bridoon inspection of the youngremounts, in which generally side-paces, collected canter, and thecanter and change, may be demanded. 

Inspection of the squadron in 'Military riding' (_i. E. _, with arms, and on the curb); preparatory exercises for single combat, thrustingat targets, regulation gallop, riding in the ranks, together with acareful investigation of the teaching received in the school. Inspection of all difficult horses. 

Shortly before the manoeuvres, inspection of the young remounts on thebit. Inspection of the second year remounts in 'rides' (at the sametime note their condition after the drill). Inspection of thedifficult horses. 

Inspection of single combats. 

If one tries, naturally with due regard to local and climaticvariations, to adapt the course of training to this plan ofinspection, and endeavours to arrange that every man, if only for afew minutes every day, should practise lance exercises to develop hishand and arm, that he should ride every day individually, and everydifficult horse should be taken in hand and corrected at once; thatthe principles of dressing, alignment, and of wheeling, are dailyimpressed on the men in the school, as I have already indicated; and, if further, wherever it is in any way possible, the men are exercisedin boldly riding across country--for which purpose funds to coverpossible damage to crops, etc. , must be provided by theauthorities--then I believe, and base my belief on the result of mypractical experience, that not only will a higher standard of trainingfor specifically military purposes be attained, but also aconsiderable improvement in equitation. 

It will be worth while here to add a few words on the methods oftraining the horses I recommend, for it is precisely on this point thatideas so often divide, and the most opposite views on this subject findtheir expression in current literature. To stir up all thesecontroversies is not my object, but I want to state quite generally thatit is under all circumstances a downright evil to try to follow out anytheoretical system to its logical development, whether the one selectedbe that of Captain Plinzner[24] or another's. We have neither such auniform type of horse nor sufficiently skilled riders as to be able toemploy the same method to all indiscriminately. 

 [Footnote 24: Captain Plinzner was Equerry to H. M. The Emperor, and is author of a well-known work on equitation. ]

We must exercise our powers of selection, and find the best method tomeet the idiosyncrasies of each man and each horse, always keeping inmind the aim to be obtained. What we want are horses that can usetheir back muscles, especially in the gallop, with pliable necks, light on the hand, able to turn easily, and safe across country (withspecial reference to rat-holes, etc. , not fences), that do not refuseto quit the ranks, and are not headstrong. To reach this aim with ourmaterial, our present riding instructions applied in their spirit, nottheir letter, are for the present, I think, a sufficiently firmfoundation. 

A higher standard of riding alone will not, however, suffice. We haveseen that modern War makes also increased demands on the endurance ofthe horses, and, in fact, in two directions: first, on their marchingpower, and secondly, on their capacity to execute the long gallops atthe regulation pace which are indispensable for the manoeuvring oflarge masses and of attacks against modern firearms. That a thoroughphysical preparation of the horse increases indirectly its endurancehas been already pointed out, and when exceptional exertions arecalled for, breeding plays a great part; but great as is the influenceof these two factors, the ultimate foundation on which the enduranceof our horses depends is the general 'condition' of the animal, andthis again is a consequence of the quality of his food and his'training, ' used here in the same sense as in a racing stable. I layspecial stress on this question of food, because great demands, bothin the way of covering long distances and on the drill ground, canonly be met without injury to the horses if they are supplied with asufficient quantity of nourishment, and our peace-time ration isundoubtedly too small to satisfy this condition. No regiment couldmaintain itself always at the high pitch of condition we haveundoubtedly attained if it did not have recourse to all manner ofexpedients to increase, at any rate for the time, the amount of theration. Of these expedients there are quite an imposing number, andsince, however desirable an increase of the ration may be, we are notlikely to obtain it, it seems to me well worth while to develop themto the utmost. 

How this is to be done will depend mainly on the local conditions ofeach garrison. The point is to make the most of the opportunities eachlocality offers, and as an example it may be of interest to give mypersonal experience on this head. 

Thanks to the confidence reposed in me by my General and to hisliberality, I was allowed to draw the equivalent of sixty rations ofoats per day and per squadron in cash, and to handle this money to thebest of my judgment. 

Since peas, beans, and white American maize--the yellow Hungarianquality is generally considered inferior--were ninepence to oneshilling cheaper per hundredweight than oats, I laid in a stock ofthem, and was able to give not only an increased weight of ration, butone of considerably greater nutritive value. Thus I gained the doubleadvantage, not only of not being compelled to stint the corn ration inwinter in order to save up for the harder work of the summers, but Iwas able to increase even the winter ration itself. This I consider anessential gain, for horses that after the winter season are well fedand in their full condition are equal to far higher exertions thanthose which have been kept low, and then fed up for perhaps a veryshort time before the increased strain is thrown upon them. 

The food was thus divided: After the manoeuvres, in cases where anincreased ration was required, American maize was issued, and theration improved by half a pound. From about Christmas-time onwardspeas and beans were served out, and the amount increased until midwaythrough the Squadron drills, after which it was kept at the same leveluntil the manoeuvres. In the end it amounted to the equivalent of 15pounds of oats, which can be considered as the normal scale for ourmedium and light Cavalry horses. The peas and beans were soaked fortwelve hours, the water being twice changed during this time toprevent their turning sour. 

During the manoeuvres, according to circumstances, I laid down atsuitable points in the district stores of forage, or gave the SquadronCommanders money with which to supply themselves locally, and thus wasable to keep up the increase in the ration during the greater part ofthis trying period. 

The experiment was continued for nearly two years, and its resultswere astonishingly satisfactory. Not only did the visible condition ofthe horses develop markedly, and maintain itself throughout thegreatest exertions, both during the manoeuvres and the Divisionalexercises, but in spite of increased performances the numbers ofbreakdowns and cases of lameness sensibly diminished; the paces werefresher; in short, the material improved most noticeably. Are notthese breakdowns, lameness, and dulness in the horses, in the greatmajority of cases but the consequences of over-exertion of the animalswhen in a low state of condition? The cases of colic, too, diminishedrather than increased, which speaks well for the harmlessness of thefoods employed, but may in part also have been due to the fact thatboth the bulk of the ration and the amount of exertion demanded wereonly gradually diminished after the manoeuvres. 

The experiment also showed that most horses would not touch the whitebeans at all, or only unwillingly, and the best proved to be eitherthe green Smyrna or brown Dutch beans, which for the same weight andnutritive value bulked bigger, for instance, than the peas, and werevery willingly eaten. Peas and beans as a ration alone were found notto answer, as the horse misses the mechanical action--irritation ofthe bowel and stomach--and requires also certain chemical constituentspresent in oats to assist digestion. Even with the proportion of oatsand beans actually used--seventy-six to seventy-eight oats to sixtybeans--it was found advisable to increase the 'Rauffutter' ration toreplace the missing oat-husks. But to provide this addition there wereample means, since the manure fund of the regiment, or of thesquadron, was available; and in spite of the increased ration itbecame possible to make savings which in a single year sufficed tobuild a spacious riding-school, and thus contributed in another wayto the training and general efficiency of the squadrons. 

In the third year the price of oats fell, and that of the other feedrose; hence, and for other reasons also, the conversion of the oatration into other more nourishing materials had to be abandoned, although it would still have been possible to maintain a considerableincrease in the nutritive value of the food issued. To keep the rationup to approximately the same level as in the preceding year, recoursehad to be had to other means. 

It was found by experiment that a couple of pounds of straw per horsecould easily be saved per day, and again ample funds for a supplementto the ration were available, a measure particularly applicable whenthe price of straw rules high. This year, too, as the expenditure onthe riding-school was closed, the manure fund was also available, andthe horses did nearly as well as before. 

I would not maintain that similar results are everywhere obtainable. The price of grains varies; the receipts from manure are everywheredifferent; in some garrisons peas and beans are difficult to obtain;the cost of transport also fluctuates. But all this is no reason whywe should not seize an advantage even if we cannot always retain it. Even a few years of more and better food bring about an improvement inthe horses, which lasts for a considerable time, and every effort, therefore, should be made to obtain these advantages offered by pricevariations whenever it is possible to do so. 

It is well to call attention to the fact that to accustom horses tothe most varied food--rye, barley, wheat, etc. --is part of theirindispensable training for War, where such foods are all they canget, as the experience of our last War sufficiently demonstrated. Tothis end it is necessary--and I wish particularly to insist upon thispoint--that our Regimental Commanders should have the utmost latitudeof action within certain fixed limits, and should not be dependent onthe consideration of the Commissariat, with its innumerableregulations and formal considerations. I consider the objectionsometimes urged against me that in the purchase of supplementary foodsby the Regimental Commander there would be an opening for fraud andspeculation on the part of under officials quite untenable, for aproper system of audit and check could be quite easily devised. 

The capacity of the Commander to manage affairs in a businesslikemanner can hardly be called in question, and his interest in thematter would grow in proportion to the degree of freedom allowed tohim. 

Next in importance to the question of food comes the preparation ofthe horses for efforts of long duration. That this preparation must gohand in hand with the food question is obvious, but apart from thisinterdependence, it is not possible to keep horses always up to thenecessary standard of endurance; for this training not only throwsheavy strains on the muscles, joints, and sinews, but on the nervoussystem of the animal, and in particular attacks the nerves of thestomach if maintained too long. If one wishes to preserve one'smaterial, the horses must be allowed from time to time a thoroughrest, during which their feeding must enable them to put on the degreeof fat which is requisite for health. 

The best time for this rest is about Christmas, during which one canreduce the work to the very minimum, and feed with 'Rastfutter' hay, maize, malt--dried brewer's--molasses, even potatoes; and also, afterreaching the highest points of the training for galloping, there mustbe a certain relaxation of the strain to give the nerves time torecuperate. 

Generally, the course of training must be conducted from thestandpoint of what War demands, and never allowed to assume thecharacteristics of the racing stable, for the purposes of the two areentirely distinct, and this is particularly the case with regard tothe gallop. 

It is precisely in this respect that the necessities of War are notalways seen with sufficient clearness. 

We obtain from our troops by means of most careful preparation quiteremarkable performances in galloping. I have myself seen wholeregiments cover 8, 800 yards (5 miles) at the regulation gallop, andthe horses at the end of it had still both strength and wind toincrease the pace. On such and similar performances we then base ourtactical exercises both for the Brigade and Division, and many horsesare sacrificed as a consequence. Now, I am the last man to suggestthat accurate drill at the gallop is not the crowning work of alltactical education, but it must be accomplished under War conditions, and it cannot be too persistently insisted on that all these tacticalpictures and the deductions founded thereon, which we attain in themanner indicated, have practically nothing to do with real War at all. 

In these peace exercises we usually ride with considerably less thanfield service weights, on specially selected and favourable ground, and on specially trained horses. All these conditions are wanting inWar. Then horses must carry their full marching-order kit, andgenerally they will be entirely lacking in specific training for thisfast kind of work. The ordinary pace on the march and patrol is themarching trot; only single patrols have now and again to gallop, thetroops as a whole only on the rare occasions when a charge hasactually to be delivered. Then, the carefully-selected conditions ofthe drill ground are generally lacking; and, finally, in all Warstrength squadrons there are always some augmentation horses andremounts, whose weaknesses must be taken into account if they are notto be broken down at the very beginning of operations, as too oftenhappened in 1870, in which case it would have been better to have leftthem behind from the first. Thus the galloping possibilities arereduced most considerably, and it is only with these reducedpossibilities that the Leader can safely reckon. 

That these conditions have a most important influence on tactics isapparent. The question is whether it is worth while to strain towardsfalse ideals, at a considerable cost in horseflesh, when in War theyare quite unattainable, and only serve to call up in men's minds falsepictures of the reality. 

To this I return an unqualified negative. Certainly, it isindisputable that the horses must be trained to gallop for longdistances and in suitable poise, and that men should learn to retain acorrect seat even in gallops of long duration; that they should havetheir horses under complete control, and learn to turn and check bythe use of the weight of their bodies; but these demands can only besatisfied by continuous practice under conditions which render controlover the poise both of man and horse comparatively easy tomaintain--that is to say, singly on the galloping track or in squads, and also as closed tactical units. 

Speaking generally, however, such exercises do not need to be extendedmaterially beyond the limit which can be attained by horses notspecifically trained to galloping under full marching order weights. 

This limit depends on the degree of breeding, the strength andcondition of the horses, and may be estimated at the most at two and ahalf miles for our Light Cavalry, and somewhat less for theCuirassiers. To exceed these distances seems both superfluous andinjurious, particularly when it goes so far as to risk permanentdepreciation of the material. 

It is far more important, in my opinion, to habituate the horses togallop with their full marching order weights, under serviceconditions, and in all kinds of ground; for nothing is more difficultthan to preserve the proper rates of movement and keep the ranksclosed under such circumstances, as experience even in the manoeuvresabundantly shows. 

The 'trot' tends always to get shorter, for the regulation pace isalready as much as Light Cavalry can manage on the Drill ground; andthe gallop, too, falls generally behind the prescribed rate, thereason being, in my opinion, that as a rule the distances demanded aretoo great, and that we do not drill with sufficient frequency in fullmarching order, partly to save wear and tear of the kit, but alsobecause with lighter weights we can undertake in the same time moreexercises, covering a greater area, than would otherwise be possiblewithout knocking up the horses. Much may be used in defence of thisprocedure from the point of view of the training of the Leaders, butthe dangers to the true training of the troops themselves for Warmust not be overlooked, and practice under full War service conditionsmust thus ever remain the keystone of our whole educational edifice. 

But it is not only the training in galloping which suffers from thispractice of riding light. The preparation of the horses as regardsendurance suffers equally, for patrols and long-distance rides aregenerally undertaken with stripped saddles; it is only for manoeuvresand the larger tactical exercises away from the garrison that marchingorder is carried. To me this system seems hardly rational. Rather, itwould appear to me, must such sudden increase in the weights on thehorses tend to break them down, and experience confirms this view, forthe first day's marches in the manoeuvres in marching order tire outthe horses to a quite disproportionate degree. 

We can never eliminate this evil altogether, for the attempt wouldentail either marching order all the year round, or the limitation ofpractical exercises to certain periods of the year only, both oreither of which would conflict on the one hand with the necessity ofsaving the horses as much as possible, on the other with the needs ofthe military training of the men; but a gradual increase in the loadscarried and distances covered seems well within the scope of apractical policy. 

The Company Commander, who wishes to get his men fit for marching, increases quite gradually and systematically the weight in the men'sknapsacks, till these are scarcely noticed as a hindrance by theirwearers, and similarly one could arrange in the Cavalry. In eachperiod we should begin with stripped saddles, progressing onwards tothe full kit; but the inspections of tactical units, and the finalinspection in individual combat, should fundamentally be taken in fullmarching order always, and horses should be prepared gradually for thefull weight carried in the manoeuvres. 

I believe such a system would not only bring about a considerableimprovement in the training for War both of men and horses, but wouldsecure us from many disappointments by insuring in the Leaders a trueidea of what may reasonably be expected from their commands in thefield. Naturally the demands made on them in the inspections mustundergo a corresponding diminution. 

Only by constantly keeping these points in view and combining them inharmonious progression will it be possible to attain the degree ofperfection in the elementary instruction of men and horses which canalone guarantee the highest results in practice. 

CHAPTER III

THE TRAINING FOR MOUNTED COMBAT

In the same manner as, in the previous chapter, I have endeavoured toshow that in many points in equitation, in the school of individualcombat, and in the 'training' both of man and horse, we can, byalterations of method, attain more directly to a possibly higherstandard in our performances than is at present achieved, I nowpropose to consider the tactical education of the troops as a whole, with a view to their best utilization in mounted engagements. 

According to the existing Regulations, the chief importance is stilllaid on the efficiency of the small and medium-sized combinations. Squadrons, Regiments, and Brigades are prepared with the utmost careand attention, but exercises of the larger bodies only take place moreor less exceptionally, and on a very restricted scale. The systematiceducation of the Cavalry does not, in fact, extend beyond the Brigade. 

That this state of affairs no longer responds to the changed nature ofWarfare follows from all that I have already said, and does notrequire to be insisted on. 

If in War the employment of 'Masses' has become the decisive element, our system of training must be correspondingly extended, so as toinsure the existence of the skill and power needed for theirsuccessful application. To this end all, even the most elementary, exercises must be permeated thoroughly by the idea of preparing thetroops for united action in adequate numbers; and the relativeimportance of the several periods of training, the allotment of timeto each step in the progression, as well as the exercises themselves, must all be dominated by the same idea. 

The foundation of all sound tactical training will remain now, asever, the school of the squadron. The cohesion of this unit and theease with which it can be moved is the first condition of its usefulemployment at the right time and place, and the importance ofthoroughness in this branch of training grows with every increment inthe total number to be handled. Even more attention, therefore, shouldbe given to squadron drill in the future than in the past. 

Next comes the question of regimental drill. Here, as we shallpresently see, the chief point is to develop the independence of theSquadron Commander and the tactical handiness of his unit; and as Iunderstand the problem, this calls for a more extended framework, within which the regiment must be prepared, than was formerly thecase. 

If, even under present conditions, it is scarcely possible in the fewdays allowed by the Field Service Regulations to train the squadronsup to the requirements of active service, even on a level drillground, it is obvious that in the future this difficulty will becomeintensified. It is a question, therefore, to be considered, whether itwould not be better to remove these time limitations altogether, andleave it to the Cavalry Commanders themselves to determineeverywhere, with regard to local conditions, how to make the best useof the total time available. Where considerable expense would beincurred in bringing in squadrons detached at a distance, the consentof the War Ministry would, of course, have to be obtained. 

Brigade drill, however, stands on quite a different footing; it forms, as it were, the preparatory school for the movement of 'Masses, ' inwhich the principle of the employment of the constituent parts of the'Mass, ' whether in 'Lines' or by 'Wings, ' has to be inculcated. But asone has now to deal with tactically thoroughly trained bodies, lesstime is required than for either squadron or regimental drill. 

On the other hand, it is most essential that the 'Mass' itself, consistingas it does of several Brigades, should be thoroughly drilled as aDivision or Corps, for it is with these units, and not with Brigades, that one has to deal in War, and their duties are so many-sided, andrequire for their due performance such thoroughly-trained Commanders, that perfection is not to be attained in a few days, which are not evenavailable every year. On this point, in my opinion, there is no room fordoubt, and hence it becomes absolutely essential that, if necessary, Brigade drill must be curtailed in order to give to all Brigades anannual opportunity of exercising, as part of the higher units. 

It might well be possible to allow a wider latitude to the BrigadeCommanders in regard to the choice of time for their specialexercises, in which they might be guided by the special circumstancesof the locality in which they are quartered, and by the advice oftheir superiors. 

For the exercise of the greater 'Masses, ' for which, under allcircumstances, troops have to be brought together from considerabledistances, a particular period must, of necessity, be fixed byregulations; but it must be borne in mind that these 'Masses' shouldnot always be formed of equal strength in Divisions of three Brigades, for the danger to the higher education which lies in always workingwith units of similar composition has already been sufficiently dwelton. The conditions of War absolutely demand that the higher CavalryLeaders should be equally at home in handling 'Masses' with certaintyand precision, no matter what their composition, and the troopsthemselves must learn to apply the principles on which efficiency inaction really depends under all and every circumstance. 

As regards the manner in which the several periods into which thetraining is divided should follow one another, the question ariseswhether the squadron, regimental, and brigade drill periods shouldfollow one another as a continuous whole, or whether they should gohand in hand with Field Service Exercises. 

This seems to me to need a specific reply, because, as a fact, it isdifferently answered in different Army Corps. 

Where the troops have to leave their garrisons in order to bequartered in the vicinity of the ground specially selected for thosepurposes, the question of expense must play an important part in thedecision; but the principle involved can hardly be affected by theseexceptional circumstances, for in by far the greater number of casesthe troops can find room to drill either within the district of theirown garrisons or on the manoeuvre grounds in the vicinity, and inthese latter the question of extra cost should hardly stand in the wayof an extension of the time allowance. Hence, if such an extension, due to the intercalation of Field Service practices, really does offeradvantages, one could decide in principle in favour of this solution, in spite of all other circumstances; but it still seems to me open todiscussion whether it is advisable to make the same principleapplicable in equal measure to all the time intervals. 

For the squadron drill, which begins with an entirely untrained troop, the conditions are obviously quite different to those in thesubsequent exercises, in which the point lies in the working togetherof units already finished and completed in themselves; and takingthese differences into account, we must first examine more especiallythe case of the squadron. 

At the beginning of its drill season, the exertions demanded arecomparatively slight. The distance covered either at the trot orgallop is only gradually increased, and the paces are at first keptsomewhat below the regulation limits--at least, from practicalexperience I should recommend that they should be, for the Instructorcan control and correct the precision of all movements, and theindividual conduct both of man and horse, better at the slower pacesthan when moving fast. Riders and horses accustom themselvesgradually, and hence more easily, to movement in closed bodies, and itis of decisive importance for the whole subsequent course of theirtraining that at the very beginning of the drills this harmony betweenman and horse under the new and unaccustomed conditions should besecured to the utmost possible degree. 

If this point of view be kept in mind, then I think the drills shouldbe continued daily, for, on the one hand, there is no risk ofovertiring the horses, and, on the other, the object is to weld themen into a cohesive whole, and impress on them the essentialprinciples of the elementary tactical evolutions, in order to makethem as soon as possible into a combatant unit. 

Towards the latter end of the squadron drills, however, the conditionschange. Now, it becomes necessary to drive into the whole body aproper appreciation of the several 'paces, ' to fit them for longgallops, and to train them for actual combat. At this period Iconsider it better to interpolate one or more Field Service days, partly because it is of practical moment to press on this side oftheir training as quick as possible, and, further, because the drillsnow begin to make very considerable demands upon the horses. TheseField Service days afford an opportunity to rest the horses, and thusto prevent small and inconsiderable injuries developing into severelameness and ultimate breakdowns. Further, a quiet ride in the countrygives those horses which have become nervously excited by theunaccustomed conditions of the drill ground a chance of cooling down, and thus saving themselves very materially; and this must certainly beconsidered as one of the most important functions of the Commander, whether in Peace or War, to keep his horses fresh on their legs, andready to turn out in good condition at whatever hour the call maysound. Of course, these precautions must not go so far as to endangerthe training for service of the squadron, but drill and manoeuvreresults at excessive cost of horseflesh must be absolutely condemned. 

If these reasons speak for an intercalation of Field Service exercisesbetween the drill days, I am further of opinion that the result whichwould be arrived at by this system would give a better standard ofthe drill efficiency of the unit for War than can be attained bycontinuous drill alone. 

With the latter, it is certainly much easier to secure unity, cohesion, and precision in the movements; but we must remember that inWar the emergency calling for drill performances may arise after weeksof marching, during which no drill has been practised at all, and ourPeace training must take into account such conditions, and accustomthe troops to execute with safety and cohesion such drill movement asmay be necessary without having practised them day for day. 

In still greater degree do these principles apply both to regimentaland brigade drills; since in these the demands on the horses areconstantly increasing, the need to give them opportunity for rest andrecovery becomes even more pronounced. 

Moreover, the purpose of these exercises is not so much to secure asingle representation of acquired skill in the exhibition of drillevolutions, but rather to develop and confirm in the men anever-increasing familiarity with the principles of their tacticalemployment, and this will only then be attained when, as far aspossible, these practices are continued during the whole summer, sothat the Grand Manoeuvres either in the Division or in the Corps formthe natural conclusion of the whole series. In the period of combinedmanoeuvres, it is, of course, impossible, in order to save the horses, to lengthen the fixed period allotted to them; but all the morenecessary, therefore, does it appear to spare them as much as possibleby the introduction of these Field Service days (exclusive of theordinary 'rest days') during the time of the drill exercises. In thecourse of the subsequent considerations, we shall see that not onlywill our horses gain thereby, but many other important objects of ourtraining be served as well. 

Turning now to the subject of these exercises themselves, it must belaid down generally that throughout a steady intensification of theexertions demanded must be maintained, and that the gallop is not tobe employed except when, under service conditions, its use would bepracticable. Further, whatever the Regulations prescribe must bepractised, no matter what the views of the Commanding Officer as totheir practicability or otherwise may be. This is absolutely essentialto secure a uniform standard of execution throughout the Arm. 

Nevertheless, it makes a very essential difference in what spirit theRegulations are approached, for the result will depend upon whichpoints in the training the chief stress is laid, and generally on thecharacter given to the exercises. 

In drilling the squadron this point is of less importance. Here, inaccordance with the spirit of the whole Arm, it is a matter of formaldrill, and nothing more. It is here that the foundation has to be laidfor smart, never-failing 'drill, ' for the unconditional cohesion ofthe squadron in itself, and for the certain interpretation of itsLeader's views, whether the latter makes use of commands, signals, ormerely rides in the required direction. 

Here the paces must be hammered into the troops till they becomemechanical habit, and the several forms of movement and attack bepractised, so that they can be executed in any direction, whether thesquadron has been told off or not. No matter how hasty the rally maybe, the troop must charge at the moment and without hesitation. 

The only difference that can arise here will be due to theindividuality of the Leader, and all are good which lead to therequired end, only the Regulations are not quite clear as topractising the charge, and the guiding points might be laid down withrather greater precision. 

In the charge against Cavalry cohesion is the first and dominatingcondition. It must be absolutely impossible for the horses to swerveeither to right or left. Accurate dressing and the maintenance of thetwo ranks come only in the second place. Against Infantry orArtillery, on the other hand, the essential is that every horse shouldhave room to gallop in his own form, so that no crowding or jostlingarises, thus giving the horses a chance of avoiding or jumping clearover falling men or animals. Hence, although on the level drill groundthe requirements of Regulations as regards dressing and themaintenance of the two well-defined lines must be attended to, onemust remember that it may be impossible to comply with these demandsacross country and be prepared in such cases to stick to the spirit, not to the letter, of the law. 

In both cases it will hardly be of advantage to lay too much stress ondressing and touch. Against Cavalry it is rather a case of jamming thefiles together by pressure from the flanks, and the men must hold as avital article of faith that only the closest knee-to-knee riding willguarantee either victory or their personal safety. Against Infantry, on the contrary, the files must be loosened, and every horse go in hisnormal stride, as in hunting; nor must anyone allow himself to besqueezed out of the ranks to the rear or remain behind as long as thestrength of his horse holds out. 

Utmost speed consistent with closely-locked files against Cavalry, anatural extended gallop against Infantry or Artillery--these are thetwo cardinal points to be observed in attacking. Maintenance ofdressing or of the ranks become positive evils if the above aresacrificed to either. There, in my opinion, should be the essentialsto guide the decision of superior officers in their criticisms. 

With these exceptions the lines for the squadron training are soclosely drawn that differences in practice can scarcely arise. Thematter, however, assumes quite a different aspect with the regiment, and still more with the higher units. 

Here it is not only a case of consolidating the cohesion of the troopsby the agency of the discipline of the drill ground, or of teachingthe forms of movement and of fighting, although, of course, thesepoints of view cannot be entirely disregarded; but the essential is toteach the methods of employment of the forms laid down in theRegulations for the combat. 

A regiment which can work through the Drill Book smoothly and withprecision is still far from being trained for battle, but at the mosthas merely laid the foundations on which such a training can besubsequently built up. The same applies to a Brigade or Division, eachof which has practised and made certain of the execution of suchmovements as passages of defiles, deployments, attacks, changes offront or of lines, and so forth. All these things are in themselvesnecessary and useful, but they make no great demands on the skill ofthe Leaders, only requiring an accurate knowledge of the book, and acertain degree of routine in the application of its prescriptions; butWar makes quite different demands on their ability, and it is for Warthat we have to be prepared. 

First of all, in the purely formal side of the training, stress mustespecially be laid on those forms of movement which can actually beapplied on the battle-field. 

Then, the troops must be exercised to apply these forms not only onthe drill ground, but over every kind of country. Further, thetactical judgment and independence of the Leaders of all ranks must, be thoroughly developed. They must not only learn to act onfundamentally sound principles, but to apply these principleseverywhere where circumstances require rapid decision, utilizing atonce the tactical advantages the ground may offer, and adaptingpractically the few forms which can be employed before the enemy inthe field instinctively; and, finally, opportunities must be grantedto the Commanders to practise the combination of locally separatedbodies to a single tactical purpose. 

In face of these requirements, it seems to me that our tacticaltraining remains far too elementary in character, and does not tendwith sufficient directness towards what is alone possible in War. 

The blame for this state of affairs rests by no means only on theshoulders of the troops, but is due to a variety of complex causeswhich are difficult to disentangle. In the first place comes thepassive resistance, that moment of inertia which custom and traditioneverywhere oppose to changes, and it is not to be expected that thetroops of their own initiative will be able to abandon the accustomedruts, when more especially the methods applied in our inspections arenot always of a nature to encourage such attempts. 

A further cause is to be found in the Regulations themselves. Thesegive no firm foothold for the decision of the question as to whatforms and movements really are practicable in War-time, and, probablyin the endeavours not to hamper too much the initiative of theLeaders, does not express the principle on which the conduct of thecombat is based with sufficient precision to preclude very differentopinions as to what these principles really are. Finally, the localconditions of many of our garrisons often create an almost insuperabledifficulty for the proper training of the troops over country. 

In face of these conditions, we must strike out new paths for ourguidance if we do not intend to remain behind the times altogether. 

We must first, however, be perfectly clear in our own minds as towhich of the Regulation forms are really practicable, and hencerequire increased attention. Then we must endeavour to formulate theguiding principles for the conduct of an engagement in a manner soclear and definite that they can easily be fixed in the memory, andthen work out the best way in which the troops can be thoroughlygrounded in their application. Finally, we must acquire a quitedistinct grasp of what can be practised over country, and from whatpoints of view such exercises are to be undertaken in order to makethem of direct utility in the solution of the problems modern Warfarewill set before us. 

To clear up the first point it will be best to sketch in its generaloutline the course in which events succeed one another in anengagement, and then to deduce the forms of movement which areessentially practical. 

Taking the case of Cavalry in combination with the other Arms, at thecommencement of the action we find the squadrons in 'rendezvous'formation under cover outside the immediate danger sphere, either onthe flanks or behind the general line of battle. 

When the moment to act arrives, they advance at a rapid pace, eitherin closed-up column of route or in any other dense formation whichpermits of ready deployment in the direction of their allotted target. Often in this movement they will have to overcome difficulties of theground--defiles and the like, of varying breadth. 

Arrived in the vicinity of the field of attack, they deploy into linesof squadron columns, form line to the front, and execute the charge. 

In such cases it may often become necessary to secure one's own flanksby forming protective échelons, or to endeavour to surround those ofthe enemy by corresponding offensive movements. 

In the case of Cavalry acting alone, it will often be necessary toform for action directly from column of route, and it will beessential to establish co-operation not only between the advance guardand the main body, but also between columns concentrating fromdifferent directions upon the field of coming action. 

It is at once evident that for these few manoeuvres few and simpleformations and movements will suffice, and that, in view of theexcitement of the battle-field, only such are, in fact, applicable. [25]

 [Footnote 25: As a measure of this excitement the following example may be useful. During the great Cavalry engagement on the plateau west of the Yron brook near Mars-la-Tour a squadron under most brilliant leadership galloped out in column of troops to threaten the enemy's flank. When, however, the order to wheel into line was given, the men were so excited that it was only with the utmost difficulty that its Captain succeeded in getting three troops to obey, whilst the leading one continued on in its original direction. The Squadron Commander was Rittmeister von Rosenberg, who afterwards became Inspector-General of Cavalry, and the above-mentioned incident was related by him personally to the author. ]

Hence it follows that all complicated movements and changes of lines, and similar formations occurring in the Regulations, may be classed inthe category of evolutions intended mainly for disciplinary purposes. On the other hand, we must practise, as thoroughly as practicable, long movements at a rapid pace in the closest formations formanoeuvre--_i. E. _, in double and Regimental Columns; changes ofdirection in these columns by shouldering, passage of defiles, deployments into fighting formations with simultaneous slightalterations in the line of advance; further, measures to secure one'sown flanks, or to threaten those of the enemy; deployments to thefront immediately out of column of route or after the passage ofdefiles; the combination of detachments arriving from differentdirections; and, finally, the charge itself under the most variedassumptions, the transition from the mêlée to pursuit, and rallying inorder to attack again in a new direction against a fresh enemy. Naturally, the most rapid deployments out of any and every formationagainst a suddenly appearing enemy must also be practised, for suchsurprises are always possible in War-time. 

To be avoided, on the other hand, as for the most part quiteimpracticable, are all movements of a dilatory nature for theformation of fronts of attack, as well as long movements of manoeuvresand considerable changes of front when already deployed into line. 

In all these exercises, as a general and fundamental principle, such agrouping of the available forces must be striven for that the unitscan be employed by 'Wings'; for, as I have endeavoured to point out, it is this form of employment which best satisfies the requirements ofthe combat and meets the needs of the Commander. 

For instance, under many circumstances the Regimental Column can beemployed as a practical tactical formation. Thus, if against Infantryor Artillery, it is desirable to attack in many following 'Lines. ' Theneed is at once satisfied if our advance is made in a number ofRegimental Columns, wheeled into line to a flank. For a flank attack, if the movement is initiated in a number of Regimental Columns formedto the front and following one another, forming line by a subsequentwheel. In both cases--in the latter after the wheel--one has only toinsure that the laterally adjacent squadrons move off together at'Treffen' (_i. E. _, Line) distance to have all one's Lines complete. Such a formation can secure its flanks with the greatest ease by theretention of closed units, or, by bringing up the rearward squadrons, can prolong its front to either flank. In any case it is preferable tothe triple column of troops, which makes all influence of the leaderimpossible, mixes all units in the charge, and hence would best beleft out of the Regulations altogether. Nevertheless, practice in theemployment of 'Treffen' (_i. E. _, 'Lines' as opposed to 'Wings') mustnot be entirely neglected, as under certain circumstances this formmay also become necessary. 

This tendency to group the available forces by 'Wings' in the largerunits from the Brigade upwards must also be extended downwards to theregiment, which represents the fundamental tactical unit of theCavalry, and those formations for manoeuvre which favour thearrangement of its constituent squadrons one behind theother--formations which, at the same time, are both handier andsusceptible of more convenient control--must be constantly practised. 

That Squadron Columns to the Front hardly meet these demands ideallycan scarcely be denied. They are unhandy, render all changes ofdirection materially more difficult, lose direction and distance veryeasily, and necessitate complex movements in order to arrange them onebehind the other. Already in Brigade formations these drawbacks areapparent, and in larger masses they prove most formidable. TheSquadron Column is, in fact, a formation derived exclusively with aview to 'Line' tactics, and for this reason alone they hamper allother demands. There is, however, no compelling reason why they shouldbe retained as the principal working formation for Cavalry, andtherefore as fundamentally beyond the reach of criticism. 

It seems to me that a formation which would group every two SquadronColumns as a unit would be far preferable. The Regimental Commanderwould then have only two units to direct, which would maintain theirmutual relations of distance and interval more easily than four, couldchange direction more readily, and form line quicker, and allow of afar easier transition to wing formations and other columns than ispossible at present. 

The Regulations certainly do not mention this formation specifically, but, on the other hand, this regimental double column offersadvantages for certain circumstances greater than can be found in anyof the forms it suggests. It allows in the simplest manner ofdeployment into 'Lines, ' either to the front or flank, the formationof échelons in any desired direction; it is very mobile, easilyconcealed in folds of the ground, and combines the advantages ofreduced depth both as a marching and as a manoeuvre formation. As thelatter, it is peculiarly adapted to the purposes of large units inclose country; for, as already pointed out, it is easy to conceal, andwhilst keeping the troops well in the hands of the RegimentalCommander, allows also of the most rapid deployments into 'Lines'either to the front or to the flank. It confers also the sameadvantages in brigade when the regiments are formed side by side, andis particularly applicable to flanking movements in which it isespecially desirable to be able at any moment to develop strongfighting power in the direction of the movement, and after the wheelinto line, to be formed in successive lines and protected on theuncovered flank. 

[Illustration: Double column. ]

It would take us too far at this point to compare in detail theadvantages and disadvantages of this or alternative formations. I onlydesire to indicate in what direction practical progress is possible, even in the domain of formal tactics, without exceeding the limitslaid down by Regulations, although it can only be most desirable thatchanges in the Regulations[26] themselves should be forthwithundertaken. I would, in conclusion, only bring forward one point whichseems to me of particular importance. 

 [Footnote 26: This formation has since been adopted, and is almost invariably employed. --TRANSLATOR. ]

The more this employment of Cavalry by 'Wings' gains ground, the moreapparent becomes the advantages of the use of the bugle-calls assignedto the several units, particularly of the regimental call; becausewhen it is used, the regiment or other unit remains as a closed body, unmixed with other units, and hence can be employed as a distincttactical entity, which is not so much the case when working in'Lines. '

These sounds are the only ones which never lead to confusion, if theyare employed not as cautions only, but as a call on which the unitmoves at once, whether in line or in column--preferably the latter--inthe direction from which the call is heard. With the call theCommander would have the means of collecting his men behind him, andleading them in the direction he desires, no matter in what degree oforder or the reverse they might be, without any verbal commands orinstructions. 

Used in this sense these sounds--but particularly the regimentalcall--might become the principal drill and manoeuvre calls for theCavalry. 

Thus it appears to me we could achieve a considerable reduction in theamount of practical drill necessary, and the change would tell all themore the more frequently the call was employed, until at last itbecame ingrained in the very flesh and blood of each man in the ranks. 

Unfortunately the Regulations do not allow their employment in thissense, but permit them only as cautionary sounds (Section 115, note);but even in this restricted sense they deserve most constant use indrilling, for they are always a means of preventing, in a measure, misapprehensions in the execution of other sounds. 

We come now to the second portion of our requirements--viz. , how toobtain clearness in the appreciation of tactical principles. Fortunately they are few in number, but it is absolutely indispensablethat every Cavalry Leader should most fully have mastered theirmeaning. No knowledge, however accurate, of the formal prescriptionsof the Regulations can in any way compensate for a deficiency in thisrespect. They are certainly not indicated as 'General Principles' inthe Regulations themselves, but may be read between the lines withmore or less precision from its several paragraphs. 

FOR CAVALRY VERSUS CAVALRY. 

1. The German Cavalry must always endeavour to attack first in orderto utilize to the utmost its superior 'moral, ' and to catch the enemyin the act of deployment. If an opening for such an attack is offered, then even the risks of a long preliminary gallop must be accepted(Section 339). 

2. The leading lines must _always_ be followed by supporting squadronsin adequate numbers (Section 843, and note also Section 346); that isto say, the enemy's Cavalry will always be attacked in two 'Lines, 'unless special circumstances compel departure from this prescription. 

3. One must always endeavour to keep the last closed Reserve in hand, because in the mêlée the impetus of the last closed body generallydecides. One must never, therefore, as long as one suspects that theenemy has still further Reserves in hand, engage a greater number ofsquadrons than he shows, in order to save up Reserves. 

4. Success must be looked for in the vehemence of the onslaught, notin superiority of numbers (Section 313). The greatest importance mustbe attached to cohesion; hence, unless necessary to surprise the enemyin the act of deployment, the 'gallop' should not be sounded too soon, or the 'charge' too late (Section 339). 

5. Outflanking detachments, or troops in the following lines, turnagainst the enemy's Reserves, or remain in reserve. They must never, except in most pressing circumstances, throw themselves into a mêléealready formed (Section 313). Following Lines must therefore not keeptoo close to the leading ones--a mistake often committed in peace--asotherwise they are committed to an attack in the same direction. Theyshould therefore keep so far to the rear that they can overlook theline of collisions, and move in full freedom wherever theirintervention is most called for. This important principle was alwaysobserved by Frederick the Great's Cavalry. 

6. One must always try to cover at least one flank by obstacles of theground or by one's own troops; but having satisfied this condition, then attack on the outer Lines, and endeavour to gain them by previousstrategical directions. 

7. Superfluous forces, which do not follow the front as supportingsquadrons, échelon themselves in general, forwards or backwards of theouter (unsupported) wing, to protect one's own flank and threatenthat of the enemy, also to be ready to engage the enemy's Reserves(Sections 323, 343, 345), or they are kept together as Reserves behindthe fighting line, if it is not possible to foresee in what directionthey may be required. They must not be too weak. 

8. Attempts to surround us made by the enemy are best met by a flankmovement on the original line without change of front (_cf. _ Section338). Defensive flanking cover, with the front turned outwards, givesthe worst conceivable direction for attack, since in case of failureone is thrown back across the line of retreat of one's main body. 

9. Being in 'rendezvous formation, ' the leading units are, ifpossible, sent off for offensive flank movements, as they have theshortest way to traverse. Such attacks only then promise success ifthey are unnoticed by the enemy--_i. E. _, can be executed under theconcealment of the ground--or if the enemy has neither time nor spaceto encounter them. The object of flank attacks is to induce the enemyto use up his rearward Reserves to oppose them, or to induce him toundertake manoeuvres before attacking. 

10. Those units which are to be committed to the attack simultaneouslymust never be arranged so that a part follows in échelonbackwards--they must always be disposed on the same alignment. 

11. In case of a mêlée, which threatens to terminate unsatisfactorily, the Reserves must be put in on a broad front and straight forward, notdirected against the flanks. For the longer the line of collision, theless effect do such flank attacks exercise; they are only too oftenmere blows in the air, and lead to waste of energy. 

12. Out of every victorious mêlée one must endeavour, as soon aspossible, to rally closed detachments (Section 326). For immediatepursuit only fractions of the available troops will be employed(Section 325). This pursuit, however, must be carried out with theutmost energy, and the complete expenditure of the horses' power--ifpossible, to the total extermination of the enemy. The forces employedmust be adequate for the attainment of this end. 

CAVALRY AGAINST INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY. 

1. The attack must be as concentric as possible, and from differentdirections, to compel the defender to scatter his fire. The units arealways to be employed by 'Wings. '

2. If possible, the defender must be surprised, and if Artillery, heshould be attacked from the flank. 

3. Where a wide zone of fire has to be ridden through, though evenagainst Artillery, successive 'Lines' must be employed, and the lessshaken the enemy appears to be the greater the number of such 'Lines'(Section 350). Artillery attacked frontally must be compelled by theleading 'Lines' to change both elevation and the nature of their fire. 

4. The result, however, depends less on the Form employed than on therapid seizure of momentarily favourable circumstances. 

5. Only _closed_ 'Lines' on a broad front can be relied on forsuccess. Where the squadrons each seek independently for an object ofattack, they generally miss it altogether, and to assign eachindividual squadron a special target will mostly be impossible, forthe attack will be launched from such a distance that separate objectsin the defender's lines will hardly be recognisable. Once within thezone of serious losses it will be obviously impossible to undertakethose changes of direction which one sees unhappily so constantly inpeace. One rides, in general, straight at a long fire line, andpenetrates through as far as one can. 

6. Such frontal attacks require, generally, reserves on both flanksfor security against possible disengaging efforts of the enemy'sCavalry. 

7. As the crisis of the engagement approaches, one must close well upon the fighting line, no matter whether one incurs loss or not, inorder to be at hand to take advantage of opportunities. 

8. Deployment, changes of direction and of front, are only possibleoutside the principal fire zone of the enemy. 

9. The distance between following lines varies according to the natureof the enemy's fire. 

To make these principles familiar to the troops must be one's constantcare from the commencement of the regimental drill season onwards. Atthe same time, the subordinate Leaders must learn to apply themindependently, even if no direct order reaches them, or if compelledto act on only the shortest indication of the Superior Commander(Sections 330, 333, 348), and this independence of the subordinatemust be the more practised the greater the size of the units (Section317). 

To attain this object, as soon as the troops have sufficient masteryof the purely mechanical part of their drill, it will be necessary toappend a series of exercises designed both to bring out the essentialsof these principles, and, at the same time, to develop the judgmentand independence of the junior officers. 

Such exercises must hence always be based on a well-defined tacticalsituation, from which it clearly appears whether the Cavalry is'Independent, ' or whether it is acting on the flank or behind themiddle of a fighting line; and the corresponding conditions on theenemy's side must also be readily deducible, and on such foundation, under constantly changing assumptions, as to strength and distance ofthe enemy, all such movements as changes from one tactical formationto another--flank attacks, deployment from column of route or afterthe passage of defiles--must be practised. In all these exercises thepoint at issue must be clearly and comprehensively expressed. When onehas attained a certain degree of security in the application of theseprinciples, these exercises must be repeated under conditions ofever-increasing difficulty. 

The order for deployment must be given whilst the troops are in rapidmotion. Observation, thought, and command when in full gallop have tobe learnt; they do not come naturally. The most various movements, without command or bugle-call, must be executed from a message broughtby a galloper. The troops will be practised against a suddenlyappearing enemy on simple warnings such as 'Against Cavalry, ' 'AgainstInfantry, ' or merely on the sound 'Alert, ' and pains must always betaken to see that the fundamentally right formation is adopted. Inthese exercises it must be left to the initiative of the subordinatesto judge the situation for themselves, and always move to their properplace in the prescribed formation by the shortest path. Of course, insuch movements the first principle is that the troops nearest theenemy furnish the first 'Line'; the remainder fall into their placesas flank coverers, supporting squadrons or reserve. 

If, in this manner, we succeed in imparting to the junior Leadersthorough clearness as to the principles of the game, and to make themboth quick and skilful in their appreciation of the situation, thenthe work of education on the drill ground is complete, and the troopsare ready for exercises over country. No pains must be spared toseparate the purely formal and ceremonial side of drill from thepractical field-training. The former keeps always, as I have indicatedin the first section, its full value for the creation of disciplineand alertness, but leads only too easily to a routine which hasnothing in common with the battle-field, and to that poverty-stricken'schematisimus' to which human nature so readily inclines. 

To the formal school of training, which I have hitherto only had inmind, a whole series of exercises must now be coupled, having fortheir purpose the application of the acquired forms and principlesunder all circumstances of the ground. But before we proceed to theirdetail consideration, we must answer the question how far the drillground only suffices for the purpose of training. Generally, one cansubscribe to General von Schlichting's principle--that forms andprinciples must be learnt in the drill book, but their application inaction only in the open country. Tactical exercises on the drillground, which have not for sole purposes to bring to expressioncertain formal principles, are always an evil, and mislead the troops. On the other hand, the principles of the tactical employment ofCavalry are particularly suited to representation on the drill groundbecause they are frequently of a purely formal nature. 

Keeping firmly to these established principles, then, to define thelimits of usefulness of the drill ground, we have only to answer thequestion within what tactical units this formal drilling is stillinstructive or possible. My opinion is that the Brigade marks thehighest limit, as within it all tactical principles find theirapplication, and it is the largest body which can still in any way behandled by drill methods only. In the Division, and still more in thehigher units, the strategical element preponderates so greatly thatanything approaching real drill is out of the question, and allmovements which they can execute are based on a complete command ofthese principles already. Of course, it is not intended to prohibitaltogether the formal working together of these masses at thebeginning in order to secure complete control and knowledge of themfor further instruction; but one must not delay over these formalmovements a moment longer than absolutely necessary, since the realcentre of gravity lies in the practical training, and no doubt must beallowed to exist as to which exercises are intended as purely drilland which as practical preparation for War. 

Nor would I have it implied that brigade and regimental trainingshould be entirely confined to the drill ground. On the contrary, theexercises over country are absolutely essential for practicaltraining, and form the keystone of the whole edifice; but it seems tome not merely permissible but desirable that a portion of theseexercises should be carried out on the drill ground in order toexpedite this portion of the work. But all the more energetically mustit be insisted on that the remainder of the programme--the greaterpart in regard to time--should be executed, as far as possible, invariable ground, and that all exercises of the larger formationsshould be confined to such ground as we shall have to work over inWar; not alone are they by far the most important for the highertactical education of the Arm, but they cannot be represented on drillgrounds at all; their whole essence is too entirely out of harmonywith the conditions of a level plain. 

That the degree of cultivation existing in the vicinity of thegarrisons may interfere seriously with these demands is obvious, andin the absence of the necessary spaces to work over we must fall backon the great training grounds (Truppenübungs Plätze); even thepossibilities of these are very soon exhausted. But this, at least, iscertain: that it is better to hold these exercises on these traininggrounds than to confine them exclusively to the drill field. Everyeffort must, therefore, be made to transfer all exercises of bodiesabove the regiment to the training grounds, on which one will alwaysfind some portion sufficiently suitable for the amount of drillrequired, and to extend the period of work on these grounds so that inall periods it will be possible to interpose between the drill days asufficient number of field service days, always supposing that thesetraining grounds offer sufficient diversity of contour, etc. , for ourpurposes. Where this is not the case, then, in spite of the expenseentailed by possible damage to crops, etc. , suitable ground will haveto be acquired. The extra cost of a few thousand pounds cannot beallowed to stand in the way of the adequate training of the Arm which, owing to its numerical strength, relatively small in comparison withthe magnitude of its tasks, is in the last resort dependent for itssuccess on its internal excellence alone. 

As concerns the nature of these exercises, with special reference tothe larger formations, first of all we must secure, by means of agraduated series, the certain co-operation of the constituent elementsand of their leaders. Next, it must be insisted on that, for thefurther actual practical training, as well as for the purely formaldrill, a systematic procedure should be the fundamental principle, sothat all who participate in them may become clearly aware of theconditions of Warfare, and the means of dealing with them. It isevident that these conditions must form the foundation of the requiredsystem. 

As in War these are constantly changing, there seems a certain degreeof contradiction in this demand; but in reality this is not the case, for no matter how the situation may vary, there will always be for itsproper criticism some one chief point which will characterize thewhole procedure, and thus be decisive for the systematic arrangementof these exercises. 

The latter can then be divided into two principal groups, according asto whether they are based on the assumption of a Cavalry force actingas an independent unit or in combination with the other Arms. Thegeneral conditions in both cases must be clearly brought out, and givethem the point of attachment for the further subdivision of theexercises. 

Thus, with regard to the first case:

Reconnaissance from a great distance. Deployment of one or morecolumns out of defiles or in open country. The land in the vicinity ofthe training ground can here be advantageously employed. It is notdesirable to place the heads of the separate columns at once on thescene of action, using these points as starting-points for theforthcoming exercise. One must give the columns longer marches, anddemand that--assisted by a properly-working mechanism for circulatinginformation and orders--they should arrive at the point of action atthe proper time, in spite of possible delays or interference on theroad. The enemy, whether skeleton or otherwise, must, of course, behandled so that collision occurs within the limits of the trainingground. 

Transition from the relations of advance (or rear) guard and main bodyto the order these assume on the battle-field. 

Attacks on a railway or hostile post. 

Government boundaries form no support for the flanks; these can onlybe considered as secure when protected by natural obstacles; hence, asa rule, measures must be taken to cover both flanks. 

Transition from the tactical to the strategical form after completionof an encounter; pursuit of the enemy with one fraction of the force, and continuation of the operation with the remainder; for the latter, only orders need be issued; but it is a matter of considerableimportance how this division of force rendered necessary by thetactical encounters is arranged. 

Retreat after a repulse, in one or several columns. 

Retirement through defiles. 

In the second case:

Selection of position on the battle-field in a proper relation to thefighting line, zone of danger, etc. , and reconnaissance to front andflanks. 

Advance from a position in reserve to attack on the enemy's Cavalryround one wing of an Army. 

Transition from a victorious charge against Cavalry to a furtherattack against the enemy's flank. 

Protection of the outer flank in either case. 

Retreat after defeat by the enemy's Cavalry to the protection of one'sown Army wing. 

Advance for frontal attack against the enemy's line of battle; passagethrough the intervals of one's own Artillery and Cavalry. Protectionof both flanks. Attack upon Infantry, Artillery, or both; disengaginga front attacked by Cavalry; combat against the latter. 

Flank attacks against retreating columns; ambushes at defiles. 

Of course, it is not intended in the above to lay down a hard-and-fastscheme of instruction, but only to indicate how the work to be donecan be systematically arranged, and brought under one point of view, so that the lessons they are intended to convey become impressed onthe mind. It is also evident that by the supposed conduct of theenemy, and the strength assigned to him, the utmost variation can bebrought about in the grouping and representation of the severalconditioning circumstances. In short, these exercises must be takendirect from the most diverse demands of War, and be based, as far aspossible, on an assumed general situation. They must never be allowedto descend to mere fighting on horseback backwards and forwards acrossthe training ground, and with often quite unnatural sequence of ideas, having no connection with the natural order of events. It is also mostdesirable that Infantry and additional Artillery should be madeavailable for their execution. 

How far the dismounted action of the Arm is to be represented in theseseries will be gone into in the next section; but in all cases, whether working mounted or on foot, the Leader must insist that thetroops are handled in accordance with tactical precepts suitablyapplied in every case to the special circumstances of the givensituation; and for this, even on the smallest training grounds, aproper utilization of the features of the country is essential. 

The desire to suit the formation to the ground; to carry out turningmovements under cover; to find support for the flanks in naturalobstacles, so that they cannot be surrounded; to choose the actualfield of encounter, so that every advantage of the ground, thedirection of the wind, of the sun, of covered approach, etc. , all fallto our advantage; to deal with defiles and passes on correctprinciples; to utilize suitably strong defensive positions--all thesemust be clearly brought to light, and in the 'Critique' these pointsmust be particularly borne in mind, for they are by no meansuniversally current in the Cavalry, which has a tendency always andeverywhere in peace to revert to the levellest ground obtainable. Ihave seen at Cavalry Division Exercises troops handled without theslightest regard to the nature of the country, and without the factattracting attention at the 'Critique'; but these are conditionswhich, thanks to the energetic action of the Inspector-General, we mayhope, are now everywhere overcome. 

It must, further, be brought out in the clearest possible manner underwhat conditions the employment of the units by 'Wings' is to berecommended, and under which others their employment in 'Lines'becomes necessary. The principles regulating this matter have alreadyreceived attention in Book I. , Chap. V. The freedom which, as we haveseen, is given us by Section 346 of the Regulations must be utilizedto the fullest extent, for it alone answers to the demands of themodern battle-field. [27]

 [Footnote 27: If, in the course of time, as I fully anticipate, the necessity should become apparent to give further expression in the form of Regulations to the point of view laid down in Section 346, it would certainly necessitate a complete rearrangement of the whole Regulations, out of which, in that case, other defects might then be eliminated. The following ideas might then be taken into consideration:

 1. Fundamental and formal separation of tactical prescription from instructions concerning the methods of training. 

 2. Simplification of the Regimental drill in the direction of conferring increased freedom of movements to the Squadrons and double Squadrons. Limitations in the application of Squadron Columns, and their partial replacement by more suitable formations. 

 3. More precise wording of the tactical principles, and their extension to prescriptions as to the use of 'Wing' or 'Line' formation. 

 4. Re-introduction of the true idea of 'Line tactics, ' limitation of the word 'Échelon' to troops overlapping the first line, of 'Reserve' for all held back behind it. 

 5. The preparation for all instructions for the movement and combat of masses larger than Brigades without reference to any fixed standard of strength. 

 6. More extended use of the different bugle sounds. 

 7. Extension of the instructions for dismounted action to cover the employment of several Squadrons, Regiments, or Brigades, and with especial stress on the decisive offensive. (See next section. )]

One last point requires further consideration, which is ofconsiderable importance for Cavalry exercises--viz. , the use ofskeleton enemies. 

In no Arm does the skeleton enemy replace an actual enemy less thanwith the Cavalry. 

If it rides the prescribed paces, then, as a consequence of the easeof movement and rapidity of deployment, it has an unfair advantage; ifit rides slowly or halts altogether as a target, it makes thingsaltogether too easy for the other side. Besides, it is a very mucheasier matter to judge a number of flags correctly than to estimatethe actual strength of a rapidly moving body of horse. 

Most movements in practice develop so quickly, and, owing to theground, the direction in which the dust drives, etc. , give suchchanging pictures, that it is most difficult to judge them accuratelywhen one's self is in rapid motion. 

Often the Cavalry Commanders must decide, at least in general, on theinstant, strength, tactical distribution, and direction of movement ofa rapidly approaching enemy almost hidden in dense dust clouds; in thesame instant he must make up his mind with reference to the conditionsdisclosed by the adversary and the nature of the ground, and issue hisorders clearly and intelligibly. The demand is such a great one thatboth the physical and mental sight even of a born Leader needsconstant practice against real objects in order to be in any way equalto it. Hence the necessity for bringing great Cavalry 'Masses'--atleast, Divisions--as frequently as possible together to manoeuvreagainst one another, and in such a manner that the strength of theopposing forces remains unknown, which, with a little management, caneasily be arranged. If one knows beforehand the precise number of theopposing forces, as with Divisions of uniform composition willgenerally be the case, the matter is very much simplified indeed, butin proportion it is less practical, a consideration which stillfurther supports our already formulated demand for Cavalry Divisionsdiffering as far as possible in their composition. 

Thus, it is clear that the field is wide indeed which opens itself forthe practical training of Cavalry as soon as one gets down to thebed-rock conditions which determine success in actual War, and freesone's self of all conventional suppositions. Whether we shall succeedin satisfying the new conditions which press upon us from every side, taking into consideration the excellence of our existing material, equal to the highest performances, will depend in the main on thesupport of the superior authorities. For the manner in which Cavalryare inspected decides how they practise and what they learn, just asthe way in which they are led determines what they can do. 

CHAPTER IV

TRAINING FOR DISMOUNTED FIGHTING

If in the previous pages it has been shown that increased attentionmust be devoted, in the training of our Cavalry for its mountedduties, to the changed conditions we shall encounter in modern War--ifit is to do justice to itself on the battle-fields of the future--itmust, on the other hand, be insisted on that the foundation availablefor such further effort is indeed an excellent one. Our squadrons are, in general, exceptionally well trained, capable of great endeavour, and well in the hands of their Commanders. 

It needs, therefore, in my opinion, but a slight change in thedirection, the practical consideration of certain new points, and, above all, a wider range of practice in the higher Commands, to attainthe very highest mark. 

With its dismounted action, however, it is a different matter. 

In spite of the increased importance this form of fighting hasacquired in modern War, our Cavalry has not as yet paid anything likethe amount of attention to the subject that it deserves. Almosteverywhere it is treated as of quite minor importance, and manyCavalrymen still close their eyes to the view that, without a trainingat once as thorough and earnest for dismounted action as thatbestowed on the Arm to fit it for its mounted duties, modern Cavalrywill hardly survive the trials it will encounter in the future. 

This idea rests on long-standing tradition, which is difficult toovercome. It is not so very long ago that on the rifle ranges someofficers caused volleys to be fired in order to get through theircartridges so as to get back to quarters the sooner; but mainly, it isup-borne and continued by the fact that in the Inspections thesuperior Commanders generally treat dismounted fighting as a matterhardly worth their serious consideration, or judge it byfalse--_i. E. _, too narrow--standards. Further, because in themanoeuvres, as in the principal Cavalry exercises generally, situations requiring dismounted action for their due solution hardlyever arise; and lastly, because of the manner in which the wholesubject is discussed in the Regulations themselves. 

The latter approach the question from a far narrower standpoint than Ipropose. They lay down quite openly that only under especiallyfavourable circumstances can Cavalry hope to obtain easy and minorresults from their carbine, fire, and that they are not in a positionto enter on and carry through obstinate encounters. 

They lay principal stress on the defensive, and practically excludethe combat of larger 'Masses' altogether from their horizon. [28] Infact, they consider only the minimum conditions which the Cavalry mustfulfil if it is not to fall into the background altogether. 

 [Footnote 28: Section 355, and note 357, 363, 365, 366. ]

The final consequences of modern development, hardly even thoseresulting from the experiences of 1870-1871, they have emphaticallynot yet even approached. 

Those who have studied the action of our Cavalry in that campaignthoroughly--as I myself had full opportunity of doing--will agree thatwe seldom had to have recourse to the carbine except on the offensive, as I have pointed out above, and only in the rarest cases did we needthem for defensive purposes; and though in future against overwhelmingforces this necessity may arise more frequently, still, as in 1870, this tendency towards a resolute offensive must always stand in theforeground. Nevertheless, the Regulations, in spite of all practicalexperience and theoretical considerations, lay down that in most casesfire action will be confined to the defensive (Cavalry Regulations, Section 357). 

It is quite natural that the troops themselves should not place theirideal higher than the Regulations require; all the more necessary, therefore, do I hold it to express with all emphasis that _ourtraining must go far beyond the limits prescribed for it officially_if we are in any degree to satisfy the demands that War will make uponus. But for these, I hold our Cavalry thoroughly capable (whentrained, understood), and even if they were not, one should neverbreathe such a suspicion to the men themselves. For should such animpression get abroad, one would dig at once the grave of initiative, daring, and resolution in the execution of all necessary undertakings. 

Keenness, the very life and soul of all Cavalry action, can only growwhere the troops believe themselves fully equal to all eventualities. The idea, therefore, that Cavalry, even when dismounted, is not equalto any Infantry, must never be allowed to show its head; rather, themen must be brought up in the conviction that, owing to their longerterm of service, absence of reservists, etc. , they are, unit for unit, more than a match for the best. Only when they feel this thoroughlywill they develop their utmost fighting value. But it is indispensablethat they should be thoroughly at home in all forms of the dismountedcombat, for only then will they feel confidence in the weapons theycarry. 

This ideal is as yet far from being attained in our service, and wemust break entirely with the existing training and enter on new pathsif it is in any way to be attained. 

For the tactical subdivision of the squadron, and the elementary formsof skirmishing action, the Regulations afford a sufficient foundation, but their application must be brought home to the men in a totallydifferent manner to that at present in use. 

A few weeks after their arrival--at latest the beginning ofNovember--the recruits must be taken out into the country andpractised in utilizing all the advantages it offers, both as a groupand in firing lines, and at the same time they must be taught with thecarbine, aiming, judging distance, etc. , always from the point of viewof making each man a practical independent shot, without anytheoretical mystification or pedantry. Soon after Christmas they mustbe sufficiently far advanced to commence practice on the range, whichmust be carried out with the utmost individual care. 

_A considerable increase in the amount of ammunition is essential_ tokeep the men constantly in practice, so that there are no long pausesbetween the days set aside for shooting, that these are divided overthe whole year, and that firing at long distances and under fieldconditions can be carried out on a greater scale than at present. Before the beginning of the squadron drills, the men must bethoroughly at home both in mounting and dismounting for fire action;with this object, vaulting exercises with horses in full kit must beespecially practised. They must also have progressed so far in theelementary preliminaries that tactical training of the dismountedsquadron can be proceeded with at once; but the individual exercisesmust be continued throughout the whole year if knowledge of them is topass over into the flesh and blood of the men. 

Special importance is to be attached to field firing, and for this inparticular far more ammunition must be provided. In this mostimportant respect Cavalry must be put on precisely the same footing asthe Infantry, and be able to practise at real service targets exactlylike the latter. But these exercises must not be begun until the menare thoroughly at home in judging distance and aiming, the classshooting is at an end, and the tactical training of the squadroncompleted. 

In aiming practices, low targets, representing men lying down, orwell-covered shooting lines at great distances, are to be preferred;but in field firing the targets should be so disposed as to make thetypical cases it is desired to represent, in which Cavalry willgenerally have to employ their firearms on service, sufficiently clearto the men's understanding--such, for instance, as the following:

1. Attack of an occupied position. --Fire opens according to ground at1, 100 to 1, 200 yards; gradual advances by rushes to decisivedistances, which, with modern weapons and in open country, may be putat 700 to 900 yards. Development of the principal fire effort at thisrange, and beating down of the enemy's return fire. After attainmentof the fire superiority, rapid advance by rushes, and in largerbodies. These rushes must be covered by the fire of those still lyingdown, until the point for the commencement of their assault isreached. Meanwhile, advance of the last Reserves, also by rushes, tothe last fire position to give the final impulse for assault; assault;pursuit by fire. The strongest development possible of concentric fireconsistent with the retention of adequate reserves to carry forwardthe fighting line. 

2. Defence of a position. --(_a_) Obstinate defence; object not to letthe assailant come too close; hence from 1, 100 yards a considerabledevelopment of fire power; continuation of the fight at decisiverange, and, according to the result, either pursuit by fire or rapidevacuation of the position with ultimate sacrifice of the rearguard tobe formed by the last reserve. (_b_) Defence without the intention ofstanding fast, either to gain time or compel the enemy to deploy. Hence, principal fire effort between 1, 000 and 1, 300 yards, and thengradual break-off of the fight before the enemy can approach tooclose. 

N. B. In practice a favourable position is essential. 

3. Surprise fire against marching columns or reserves whilstreconnoitring the enemy's approach, or whilst working round his flankand rear in the battle, or in pursuit without the intention ofcharging or defending one's self, mainly with the purpose of securinga momentary but considerable moral and material effect, thendisappearing and renewing the attempt from another place, hence sudden'Mass' fire from 1, 500 to not less than 1, 000 yards. At the sametime, it must be explained that with our present carbine even anominal effect can hardly be secured at the greater distances. Here Ihave anticipated the issue of a better weapon, an unconditionalnecessity for the Cavalry in any case. 

All these practices, however, will only then be of value when theofficers possess a far more thorough knowledge of musketry and thecapabilities of their weapon than is at present the case with us. Itmust therefore be insisted upon that, first our Regimental Commanders, and then the junior officers, should be ordered to attend the InfantrySchool of Musketry, in order that they may thoroughly master this newbranch of knowledge. 

It will be asserted that the time for such thorough training inmusketry cannot be found except at the cost of neglecting still moreimportant branches of our service. But from my practical experience Icannot assent to this view. There is ample time, if it is not wastedon unpractical affairs. 

Judging distance and the use of ground can be most thoroughly taughtduring field-service practices, whilst the troops are on piquet, orthe squadron at the reserve of the outposts, when the men who do notat the moment happen to be on patrol or vedette often lie about forhours doing nothing. We have then opportunities to take these mattersin hand in the most practical manner; particularly the former, onwhich shooting in the field so essentially depends, and whoseimportance is so little appreciated by our Cavalry. 

The duties in the afternoon can also be much reduced to save time forthe same purpose. For instance, let me call attention to the waste oftime involved by lengthy parades for lance exercise. No man can keepon at lance practice for an hour at a time. The consequence is thatmost of it is spent in standing easy, and therefore wasted. But theobject--viz. , of gradually strengthening the muscles of the arm andmaking the man handy with the weapon--can be equally well attained bya couple of parades for the purpose weekly. Perhaps still better, ifbefore every afternoon parade and every mounted duty throughout theyear the men are exercised with the lance for a few minutes only. Inthis manner the muscles of the arm will develop more rapidly and muchtime will be saved. Similarly, more can be gained by the method ofimparting the instruction pursued, if attention is restrained to thething that the man must know only, and everything superfluous, such asthe learning by heart of the names of every portion of the weapon andso forth--at any rate with the recruits--is left out, and at the sametime all such opportunities as occur in stable duty, on the march, inthe cleaning hour, etc. , are made the most of. 

Finally, speaking generally, not only is more time than is necessaryspent on squadron drill, but also more than is advantageous. If one isconstantly drilling for four weeks at a stretch, that is ample, andthen there is time for a considerable extension of our shootingtraining; and if the inspection of the squadron is postponed for anyparticular reason, then shooting and field-service days can beinterpolated, which in itself is a very good thing. 

If in these ways time for the elementary training for dismounted workand for shooting can be gained, it is still easier to arrange thingsfor the foot training of the squadron as a unit. During the drillperiod the pauses to rest the horses which must be granted to themcan be utilized, and in the field-service exercise the schemes mustoften be framed so as to afford practice in dismounted operations insuitable ground. For the technical training of the men it is ofparticular importance that they should be accustomed, with immobilehorses, to couple (? knee halter) them rapidly, and with mobile horsesin bringing them up or retiring them. 

These two essential practices receive far too little attention in theGerman Cavalry. The chief difficulty of the latter lies in the way inwhich the spare lances which the man cannot hold fast in his hand flybackwards and forwards when in rapid motion; and the ease with which alance can be jerked out of the shoe, and then trail on the ground cangive rise to the gravest disorder, not to mention danger. 

It is most desirable that something should be done to remove thisevil. The best, perhaps, would be to devise some arrangement by whicheach lance could be attached to its own horse. If that is possible, then the shoe must be made so deep that the lance cannot be thrownout. It is obvious that this problem will not be long in finding asolution as soon as attention is directed to its absolute necessity. 

The above will suffice to make it abundantly clear that as far asconcerns the thorough training of the squadron for dismounted purposesno serious difficulties exist. These only begin when we come to theemployment of larger forces, and principally because the Regulationsgive us no point of support for the purpose, whilst our Cavalryofficers themselves are in no way prepared for this branch of theirduties. For the employment of the tactical units and the fundamentalprinciples governing their use in action we are therefore compelled tolean on the Infantry Regulations. But how many of our Cavalry officersare sufficiently acquainted with these to employ them practically? Howis it to be expected that they should be, when nobody expects suchknowledge of them?

Hence to prepare for the training of the Leaders, officers of allranks should be encouraged, whenever time and opportunity offers, toattend the more important tactical exercises of the Infantry. It wouldbe better still if a sufficient number of Cavalry officers were to beattached--Lieutenants to Companies, senior officers to Battalions andRegiments--for suitable periods. But we must be quite clear in ourminds that in this way we have at most an expedient to meet a periodof transition, which will not suffice as a permanent remedy. 

It can never be considered otherwise than as a grave disadvantage whenone Arm is compelled to seek the instruction necessary for itspractical application in War from the Regulations and parade groundsof another, and more especially when, as in this case, the principlesof the Cavalry are by no means applicable without modification to theother. 

Actually, the peculiarities and the duties of Cavalry render manyvariations from Infantry practice essential which requireconsideration. For instance, the Infantry company is told off inthree, the dismounted squadron with mobile horses in two, withimmobile ones in three fractions, which are always very much weakerthan those of the Infantry, and, therefore, entail entirely differentmethods of husbanding their respective strengths. I can only considerit, therefore, as a most pressing need, and one which can no longerbe delayed, that the Cavalry Regulations should receive the necessaryexpansion to meet the different conditions, and that the practicaltraining of the men on foot should be carried on in the samesystematic way as their preparation for mounted duties. 

For these alterations in the Regulations the principles of the CompanyColumn tactics must, in my opinion, form the general groundwork. Adismounted squadron with immobile horses bring 125, with mobile onesabout 70, carbines in the line of fire; a regiment, therefore, from280 to 500--numbers, therefore, materially smaller than those of acompany or battalion respectively, and their power in action iscorrespondingly reduced. Nevertheless, it will be well, with regard tothe conditions of command, to treat the squadron tactically on thesame footing as the company, and within these limits the principlesgoverning extensions, depth and arrangement of the units for attack ordefence must be laid down clear and distinct in the Regulations. 

These principles must be formulated in general on the lines which indiscussing the question of tactical direction (Book I. , Chap. V. ) Ihave already attempted to develop. They must distinguish clearlybetween the cases of the detachment acting for itself alone or witheither or both flanks protected, and lay down what distribution offorce and apportionment of reserves is of decisive importance, and, therefore, requiring special instructions. 

The chief stress, in opposition to all previous prescriptions, mustnow be laid on the combat of the regiment and the brigade, as thoseunits whose employment will be principally called for in modern War, and the principle of the offensive must be steadily kept in view. Fights for localities and about defiles require especial attention, and further, the conditions must be laid down by Regulation in whichaction is to be engaged in with mobile or immobile horses, and howthese led horses are to be placed and protected. 

The present Regulations pass lightly over these questions, because, asI have pointed out, the standpoint from which they view the matter isfundamentally different. If, however, the increased importance ofdismounted action is granted, then these points call for decision, andhow they are to be dealt with as a matter of principle cannot be leftto the goodwill of the Leader. 

A very important defect in the Regulations lies in the uncertainty itallows to exist as to the subdivision of the dismounted squadron, andhow the skirmishers on dismounting are to form. 

According to Section 54 the squadron dismounted is divided into fourtroops of twelve files, or if the number of files does not suffice, into three troops. According to Section 87, eight to twelve men form agroup, two or three groups a troop. In Section 155 the skirmishers ofa troop when dismounted, with mobile horses, form one group. How many'troops' are to be formed is not indicated. 'The skirmishers fall in, in front of or by the side of the squadron, arranged as on horseback. 'When working with immobile detachments, then, according to Section156, the skirmishers form in front or by the side of the squadrons intwo ranks, and in how many groups or troops they are to be told off isnot specified. 

The confusion here cannot be explained away, and its consequences arefrequently manifested. It must be laid down once for all that withmobile horses the dismounted men of a squadron form one troop in fourgroups, or with immobile ones two troops, also of four groups, andthat they always form up in front of the squadrons, each troop inline, and one behind the other. Then everyone should know exactly whathe has to do. It is altogether a misfortune that the dismountedsquadron and the squadron on foot parade are two entirely differentthings. The latter is only required for ceremonial, and everythingrelating to it should be consigned to Part IV. Of the Regulations(ceremonial, etc. ); whilst the training of the squadron on foot shouldfrom the beginning be based on the needs of the squadron dismountedfor action. Then there would be unity and system in the matter. 

Turning now to the practical education in larger units, it isnecessary that the fundamental principles guiding the distribution ofthe men in attack or defence in the typical kinds of encounter shouldbe taught and practised on the drill ground. The correspondingpositions of the led horses must also be represented. As typicalsituations I would enumerate the following:

Attack on localities, with or without the tendency to outflank. 

Attack by surprise, or after preparation. 

Defence of a section or of a locality, with known direction of theenemy's advance, or when the flanks may be threatened. 

Obstinate defence and maintenance of an isolated locality. 

Keeping open the entrance of a defile, and its utilization for afurther offensive or retreat. 

Deployment for surprise fire action, in order to disappear againimmediately. 

Combined action of dismounted men with a mounted reserve, to ward offan attack or pursue a retreating enemy. 

In all these cases we require not only fundamentally differentmethods, but the methods themselves will be different according towhether the led horses are mobile or immobile, because in each casethe strength of the tactical units is an entirely different one. 

These more or less elementary exercises, after the squadroninspections, both mounted and on foot, have been concluded, must beprincipally carried out in the regiment, which also when dismountedremains the true tactical unit of the Cavalry; but they must becontinued by the brigade, in which the employment of the regimentsformed side by side--_i. E. _, by 'Wings'--must be represented undermost varying circumstances. 

It appears to me that in the present state of our training it isexactly these elementary exercises which are the most important, because more than any others they are adapted to make clear andcomprehensible the general conditions of successful fire employment. This comprehension, owing to the specifically Cavalry tendencies ofour training, is in general almost entirely lacking in our CavalryCommanders, so that in this direction the tactical education of ourofficers requires to be built up almost from the ground. 

For the rest, these exercises, like the corresponding ones whenmounted, form only the basis for the true practical training, which itis not possible to impart on a drill ground, and requires, as a firstcondition, natural country, with all its changing features. For thisreason it must be insisted on that a part of the regimental andbrigade drill season should be spent in the country and on wide openspaces, with great variety of topographical expression. Where such arenot to be had, then we must go to the troop training grounds; andhence the desire, above expressed, to extend as far as possible theperiod spent by the troops in the district or on these traininggrounds, and which I have based on the necessity for holding annualexercises for the higher units, in which all regiments should takepart, finds additional support. 

Of course, this does not preclude the necessity of utilizing thesurroundings of the garrisons to their utmost. 

As regards the arrangement and nature of these exercises, when workingon the drill ground they will have to be inserted between the pausesin mounted movements necessary to rest the horses, but they must neveron this account be allowed to be treated as of any less importance. When out in the country in larger and continuous movements, thisopportunity, from the nature of things, will not be available. 

But it is precisely on the larger movements, if possible of wholeDivisions, that the principal stress should be laid. In these thefight can be initiated under the most varied conditions, as aconsequence of the direction of approach, and after its executionfurther operations arising out of the resulting situation can be seton foot, which, as we have seen (Book I. , Chap. VI. ), will generallyentail the interaction of dismounted men with mounted reserves. 

Such exercises must naturally be laid out quite independently, andmust take rank in the programmes for Brigade and Divisional drills onan equal footing with the others. All Leaders must by degrees learnto control the whole of this section, and find themselves as much athome in every tactical situation on foot as if they were in thesaddle. 

Hence great importance must be laid on the capacity for exercisingindependent resolve in all ranks of the subordinate officers; but, above all, they must be made to acquire that relentless tendency to goforward which is the very soul of their service, and generally thebest adapted to its tactical requirements. Officers and men mustrealize that, once dismounted, victory alone can restore to them theirhorses. These latter must be so disposed that the impossibility ofmaking use of them to break off the engagement springs in the eyes ofevery man. Only in this way can one get clear ideas: so long as themen do not look on their action on foot as in itself somethingserious, but are thinking principally of how to get back to theirhorses, as long as the Leader himself makes his action dependent onthis possibility, for just so long will the men fail to put theirwhole soul into their work, and we shall obtain only partial results, with uncertain handling. 

This point of view must be constantly kept in mind throughout thetraining, and every effort be made to habituate the men to work up toit. But we shall only then succeed in breaking with the oldtraditions, and in fitting ourselves to meet the changed conditions ofWar, when the superior officers in their inspections attach _as muchimportance to the combat dismounted as they now do to the fight in thesaddle_, and submit the Leaders to an equally searching and practicalexamination in each. 

Amongst these changed conditions we must include the intelligentco-operation of the Artillery with the skirmishers, and also of themachine-guns, which latter may be expected to play a considerable partin defence, and also on occasions requiring the sudden development ofa great intensity of fire. It is in this connection that lies (BookI. , Chap. VI. ) the chief importance of the Horse Artillery batteries, and yet in peace they have practically no opportunity to makethemselves familiar with its peculiarities. 

Instead, we find in the great Cavalry manoeuvres the constantlyrecurring tendency to theatrical display. Batteries accompany theformal drill evolutions of the Divisions--a performance which, in myopinion, has not the slightest practical value, but only subjects thehorses to unnecessary exertion, and prevents the Leaders from devotingtheir attention to the really important elements of theirbusiness--the enemy and the nature of the ground. Against all suchmethods the sharpest protest should be entered. 

As long as formal evolutions are being practised, the Artillery has noplace on the drill ground; the Cavalry only require its services whenthe tactical training commences, and the batteries belong to theplaces they would occupy in War--_i. E. _, in the advance guard, orbefore the front. But, above all, they must be given opportunity toco-operate in the dismounted engagements, and not merely for their owntraining--though this, of course, is of importance--but principallyfor the education of the Cavalry officers, who must learn to employthe power of this Arm tactically, wait for its effect, and utilize it. 

That this object can only partially be obtained on the largerexercising grounds, and not at all on the drill grounds, issufficiently obvious, and it is only necessary to call to mind theattacks on villages, railway-stations, and the like, which are notusually found on such places to make the difficulty apparent. Thekeystone, therefore, for our purposes can only be found in the countryitself, or in manoeuvres, in which the application of every tacticalform develops naturally, and finds its justification in the generalscheme of operations, and in which the varying conditions are alwayscreating new situations, more or less practical in their nature. 

CHAPTER V

FIELD-SERVICE TRAINING AND MANOEUVRES

If in the above sections we have dealt almost exclusively with thetraining of the Cavalry for actual combat, the cause lies in thenature of things. Victory whether in the shock of 'Masses' or even inthe minor encounters of patrols, forms so much the foundation of everypossible success, whether strategical or otherwise, that training withthis end in view naturally comes first under our consideration. 

But as the chief importance of Cavalry no longer lies in itsapplication on the battle-field, but rather in the solution of thestrategical problems encountered in the progress of operations, so itstraining for battle is no longer the one aim and object, but only oneelement of its whole preparation for the field. Field service, itstrue duties in reconnaissance and strategic movements, must all betaken into account as factors of equal importance. 

I wish to bring this necessity most especially into the foreground, since hitherto, and particularly in view of the changed conditions ofmodern Warfare, it has not attracted anything approaching theattention it deserves. 

What do we practise in the field-service exercises and in themanoeuvres beyond the normal Cavalry versus Cavalry encounters?Principally, only formal outpost duties in combination with Infantry, the smallest incidents of War on the smallest scaled tacticalscouting, and the participation of small Cavalry bodies in theencounter between the combined Arms--all matters which nowadays comewithin the sphere of the Divisional Cavalry; and, indeed, only thenwhen the divisions to which they belong, or even smaller bodies, areoperating independently, for the daily routine of the DivisionalCavalry in the enormous Armies of the present day will be on a mostmodest scale. At most in the Army Corps manoeuvres we may get as faras the employment of Brigades, and perhaps to the shadowing of anenemy's line of advance. 

For the most important field of our enterprise, which is to be soughtin the activity of the Independent Cavalry, all this is of smallaccount. The real duties of Cavalry in War are only practised in peaceon the most confined scale, and often not at all. 

Long marches of endurance, independent outposts, attack and defence oflocalities, the forcing of defiles, passage of rivers, etc. , which areheld by an enemy's dismounted men, reconnaissances in the widestsense, undertakings against the enemy's communications, pursuit, protracted engagements covering retreats, marches with columns andconvoys, finally, the arrangement and execution of wide strategicmovements under practical conditions, with accurate computation oftime and space, the suitable employment of fighting power for theattainment of the strategical object, and the best strategicintroduction of the consciously sought-out combat, all within thelimits imposed by the magnitude of the masses handled, are matterswhich in future will form the principal sum of all Cavalry activity, but find no place in our scheme of education. 

Even the Imperial Manoeuvres do not meet the situation, because, inthe first place, only comparatively few regiments are annuallyaffected by them; and in the second, the forces are generally from theoutset in such close proximity with one another that it is only, perhaps, on the first day that a suitable situation for theirstrategic employment may be said to arise at all. 

Whilst in this manner our whole training is adopted for conditionswhich in future campaigns can only arise exceptionally, whilst itpractically ignores the true sphere of action of the Cavalry, we areworking in a vicious circle of forms and misrepresentations whichbelong to an extinct era of Warfare, and which have long since ceasedto have any but the smallest connection with the facts of sternreality. 

That things were no better in the period before the last Wars thenegative results obtained by our Cavalry in 1866 and 1870 sufficientlyprove. In no sphere of their action during these campaigns did theyobtain the results the Arm is really capable of--not because thematerial in the ranks was inferior, but simply and solely because inequipment and training they had lagged behind the requirements of thetime. These experiences should have been to us a serious warning notto fall into similar errors a second time; and yet at the presentthere is most serious danger that a future War may again find usregarding by far the most important branch of our duties from astandpoint which has long since passed away. 

The reasons for this state of affairs seem to me of a twofoldcharacter. In the first place, the tasks accruing to the Arm in War donot receive either amongst its own officers, still less amongst thoseof the rest of the Army, their proper appreciation, because in thisdirection guidance and instruction are alike lacking; in the second, because most serious difficulties lie in the way of a practicaladaptation of our training to modern conditions. 

In contradistinction to former times, the tasks which await theCavalry lie principally in the sphere of strategical operations, andhere is the root of our special difficulty. 

Great Armies, with their communications, reconnaissances and raidsunder really warlike conditions--that is to say, with their fullallowance of trains and baggage--extended retreats with beaten troops, and the consequent pursuit, can only with difficulty be represented inpeace, owing to their expense and the consideration necessary to beshown to local circumstances; but it is precisely in exercises of thisdescription, which might give a really working representation of theconditions we shall be called upon to deal with, that circumstancesleave us entirely deficient. 

Considering all these conditions, it must be recognised that an idealmethod of instruction is practically beyond the bounds of theattainable; but for that very reason, in my opinion, we must pursuewith all energy the practically possible, and for the unattainablefind the best substitute we can. 

The first point which strikes one, and which lies at the bottom of allCavalry undertakings, but in which no real education ever takes place, is the conduct of patrols, and particularly of those employed forreconnoitring purposes. 

Instruction in the matter is certainly universal, and in the writingof reports the non-commissioned officers have considerable practice, but no uniform or systematic method or fixed principle is observed, and the practical performances of the men are subject to no superiorcheck. It is left to the Leaders to apply practically their, for themost part, very nebulous, theoretical knowledge. The young officer inparticular is altogether left to his own devices; no one takes thetrouble to teach him what is essential, and yet he is expected toinstruct his inferiors. The consequences are what might beanticipated. The performances of the patrols in covering distances aregenerally most commendable, but their reports most deficient. Seldomis a clear distinction drawn between the essential and thenon-essential; the most trivial news is forwarded with the sameexpenditure of horses' power as matter of greatest moment; for mostpatrol Leaders find it very difficult, for want of an imaginationtrained by the study of military history, to think themselves into andsee the situation as it actually would be in War, and thus to act andride as the circumstances viewed in this light really require. Mostinformation, poor as it is, is thus obtained in an unpractical manner;and seldom is the degree of instruction realized which the situationaffords, namely, to observe keenly and clearly from a distant point, and to carry out the ride in the spirit of the general situation, witha proper calculation of time and space. In this branch of duty changeis imperative; the training for scouting must be made the foundationof the whole course, and carried through in a uniform manner. Everywhere it must be based on the conditions of a great War. 

How the scientific knowledge necessary for the officers, which formsthe basis of this instruction, is to be encouraged and imparted formsthe subject of this next section. Here we can only consider what canand must be done within the regiments and brigades, and the followingsuggestions seem to me to meet the difficulty. 

In the winter, as soon as the inspection 'on the curb' is over, theRegimental Commander with his Staff Officer and Squadron Commandersmust take the training in hand. He must begin with a definitestrategical situation, and from this as a basis, devise correspondingschemes for patrols, which can be worked out in the neighbourhood ofthe garrison, and then ride out with his officers exactly as inpractice the patrols would have to do. Arrived in the vicinity inwhich contact with the enemy would take place, he assumes what thepatrols would see, and lets the class form their own decisions, writetheir reports, and determine the manner of their further procedure. 

In these opportunities he can instil the true principles to befollowed, and demonstrate their practicability by all sorts ofexercises, until he is convinced that his hearers have completelyassimilated his standpoint and method of thought. Particularimportance must be attached to the point that the patrol leaders neverlose sight of the whole problem, and refer their observations alwaysto this standard, for it is only then that things appear in their trueimportance; further, it must always be borne in mind up to what timethe report must be in the hands of the Leader if it is to be of usefor the special operation. 

The best information may be valueless if, as in 1870 so oftenhappened, it arrives too late. This the patrol leader must keep inmind throughout his ride, and thence deduce the time at which hisreport must be despatched. He must also not only state clearly andprecisely what he has seen, but call attention to its probable bearingon the operations, and inform his superior as to any peculiarities ofthe ground that may influence his future conduct. The object of theride must be constantly in view, and the report not be overburdenedwith trivialities about the enemy's patrols and the like, which areoften in War of quite negligible importance. 

If the Commanding Officer chooses to take the whole of his officersout to these expeditions, he is, of course, free to do so. 

The Squadron Commanders now take their subordinates in hand and passon the instruction in the same spirit and manner, or hand over thematter to the senior lieutenant, if he has been thoroughly instructedfor the purpose. In this manner a good uniform system of patrolleading based on sound principles can be attained if the CommandingOfficer and his subordinates take all types of patrol duty into thesphere of their practical instruction. The Brigade Commander can usehis discretion in its supervision, and give any assistance he mayconsider necessary. 

For the practical training of the men, the foundation must, of course, be found in the squadron. But the teaching must start from constantlychanging standpoints, and must be systematically carried on in thehigher Commands, which is at present not the case. For though at timessuch exercises are carried out by the regiments, there is nosystematic progress, and no consequent development or representationof the most important elements, whilst higher up no attempt is evenmade to continue the instruction further. The influence of theBrigadier is confined in general to the detail education and drill, and though the Division is now and again drilled, it never 'operates'in the strategical sense. 

As concerns the education of the squadron, this must from the verybeginning be rooted in modern conditions, which in the first placedemand the development in the man of the greatest possibleindividuality. War requires this, as well as the gift of grasp andresolution even in difficult situations, from every Cavalry soldier, from the highest to the lowest. The exercise, however, of suchqualities can only be demanded from men who bring with them at least acertain degree of comprehension for the nature of War, and it istherefore of the utmost importance that this comprehension should bedeveloped by suitable instruction. This is often sinned against, because sufficient attention is not paid to such instruction, and alsobecause we still work on out-of-date lines, and without anywell-defined principles. In my opinion the recruit must not beoverwhelmed with a whole mass of thoroughly unpractical knowledge. 

In this period of education one must limit the scope to only the mostimportant and necessary matters, but teach these so that the menunderstand them clearly and thoroughly. 

In the latter years one can build out systematically on thisfoundation. Thus I consider it quite unnecessary to harass the recruitwith long-winded explanations of the military virtues--loyalty, obedience, and courage--or with long lists of different salutes to begiven, the recipients of which never come within his ken. It is quitesuperfluous to teach them the different parts of the lock of thecarbine and their mutual interaction, all about stable duty and guardmounting. Even the theoretical instruction about the organization ofthe Army, treatment of sore backs, horse sickness, etc. , can bereduced to much smaller dimensions than at present. Stable work andguard duties, and so forth, a man learns much quicker and better fromdaily practice. On the other hand, the time gained by curtailing thesematters must be used most zealously to teach him what he absolutelymust know for War. That is to say, the simplest principles of FieldService, the composition of mixed detachments, practical shooting, andthe exterior treatment of the carbine. The instruction in FieldService, which interests us here the most, can, for the recruits, bekept down to very narrow limits. The principles to be observed inplacing pickets, vedettes, etc. , he can very well do without. On theother hand, he must know thoroughly those things which he will have todo himself--his duty on patrols, or as bearer of a message, ororderly, also the general connection of the military conditionsamongst which he will have to move or to notice amongst the enemy, such as organization of the troops, arrangement of the outposts, relation of the commands, plan and appearance of entrenchments, shelter trenches, gun epaulments, cover, etc. [29]

 [Footnote 29: Instruction with models helps the man quickest; it is very difficult for the recruit to form a mental picture of military things. ]

He must know, too, that if taken prisoner, he must give no correctanswers as to anything concerning his own Army. 

It is quite possible to awaken the intellectual faculties of the manand to develop them even within these narrow limits, for the moretersely the facts are stated, and the more thorough the instructions, the more is his thinking power stimulated, whereas a mass of materialto be absorbed merely confuses him. This intellectual pressure of theinstructor must not, of course, be limited solely to the lesson hour, but he must seize every possible opportunity to assert his influence. Especial attention is to be directed to habituate the men to carry intheir minds verbal messages for a considerable period, and then torepeat them clearly and concisely. It is of great assistance to theintellectual development of the men if they are compelled always toexpress themselves in grammatically complete sentences, instead of inbroken phrases; but I should consider it as a serious error to attemptto teach the recruit the neighbourhood of the garrison, both on themap and on the ground. For in this way one deprives the man of one ofhis few opportunities which occur to him during his whole service oflearning to find his way in unknown country, and thus to develop theinstinct of finding his way, which requires considerable practice. 

That this faculty is one of the most important in War-time for everyCavalry soldier can hardly be open to doubt. From the same point ofview I must enter a protest against the absurd misuse of maps inPeace-time. Of course, the men, and particularly the patrol leaders, must understand how to read a map and find their way by it, and allnon-commissioned officers and men out of their first year's servicemust be trained in so doing, but it is altogether impractical, andtherefore a bad preparation for war, if in the interests of bettermanoeuvre results maps are issued in uncounted numbers even on thelarger scales, so that not only every patrol leader, but everyorderly, can obtain one for a couple of pence. In War, andparticularly in an enemy's country, such extravagance in their issueis obviously out of the question. 

The education of the non-commissioned officers must also besystematically set in hand. They should be divided, according to theirintelligence and performances, in different groups--two will generallysuffice--and the abler men should not only receive instruction for thehigher branches of their duties, but must also be rationally taughthow to teach others. The non-commissioned officers' school must alsoreceive thorough attention; if it is not conducted seriously, itinvolves a scandalous waste of time, but if the men receive a reallyearnest and stimulating instruction, it helps most materially in theirintellectual development, and thus reacts most favourably on theirmilitary capacity. 

As concerns the practical exercises of the squadron, these must, asfar as possible, cut themselves free from the spirit of minor tactics, and work as directly as they can towards the requirements of War on agreat scale. The destruction of railways and bridges, service onrequisitioning duties, etc. , must naturally continue to be practised;for though in spirit they belong to minor tactics, they are alsorequired in great Wars. But, above all, one must break with the oldone-sided schemes of outpost squadron--officers and non-commissionedofficers, posts and vedettes--and the whole subject must be treated onwider lines more in accordance with the changing requirements ofactive service. The different purposes for which localities are heldand utilized in different manners, the use of woods, and waves of theground, must all be drawn most thoroughly into the scope of theexercises; and whilst still at squadron work the men must be madeclearly to understand the difference between mixed outposts and thoseof Independent Cavalry, and the chief importance of their wholetraining in this branch of their duty must be laid on the latter, which is even nowadays not yet sufficiently the case. Further, theremust be thorough training in duties of security and reconnoitring atnight, and in particular of the defence of cantonments againstnocturnal attacks. 

In general, it must be clearly understood that all squadron trainingcan only be elementary, and hence must be regarded as a stepping-stonetowards the whole field-service training. Where this is leftaltogether to the squadrons, the men never have the opportunity ofbecoming acquainted with the conditions of time and space which limittheir action when in large bodies. Continuous exercises also, alwaysin the same units, lead only too easily to empty repetition and manymisunderstandings. The Squadron Field Service training must, therefore, be limited in time, and as soon as it is completed it mustbe continued in the regiment, and where the conditions at allallow--_i. E. _, where the garrisons are not too far apart--it mustculminate in brigade work. 

The 'training'--_i. E. _, the condition of the horses-must by this timehave made such progress that marches of twenty to thirty miles for themain body are well within their power. Here a wide and profitablefield opens for the Brigade Commander, but it is important in everycase--security, screening, reconnaissance, raid, or surprise--to bringout systematically and clearly the essential difference of procedurerequired, so that all grades of Leaders learn to realize thefundamental distinction which exists between these various forms oftheir several duties. 

It is also equally important that in each Command operations inseveral detachments, the regulation of their marching speed, theircombined action in the fight, the proper working of the arrangementsfor collecting information or transmitting orders, should be practisedagain and again till certainty in their interaction is secured. 

It is further necessary to call attention to the necessity, in theinterests of a prudent economy of one's forces, to arrange the patrolservice systematically, not only as regards the sphere of actionallotted to each, but also as to the time of their departure. 

Thus, in the march of a single body, the duty of attending to itssecurity may be assigned to the troops themselves, whilst thereconnoitring task is allotted by the officer directing theoperations; or, in the case of separate bodies, that each receives itsown particular scouting mission, with which, then, the Directorrefrains from interfering. Otherwise it may easily happen that patrolsare despatched for the same purpose by different Commanders, with acorresponding waste of power and the risks of leaving gaps in thewhole line. 

The Commanders of mixed detachments should also make this need ofsystematic procedure clear to themselves, and either leave the wholeduty of reconnaissance in the hands of the Cavalry, or if they electto retain certain portions of the work in their own hands they shouldinform the Cavalry Commander of the fact, and not interfere afterwardswith his arrangements, or fail to keep him acquainted with themeasures they have themselves taken. 

The first course is correct in principle, and will always give thebest results when a competent Cavalry officer is kept sufficientlyacquainted with the views of his superior, and made personallyresponsible for results. 

Finally, as concerns practice in conjunction with the other Arms, these, too, must lead into different paths from those at presentpursued. Detachments of Infantry and Artillery need Cavalry forreconnaissance, security, and orderly duties; but for the Cavalryitself these exercises (of small bodies) have little importance, except in so far as they familiarize the men with the organization anddevelopment of the other Armies, and thus learn to form an opinionwhen viewing these from a distance. The combined action of Cavalrywith companies, battalions, and regiments has no importance at all, and is often the merest waste of time. It is much more important tosecure practice for the troops in judging the appearance ofconsiderable bodies of Infantry, either on the march or in position, and thence deducing their probable numerical strength. 

The former class of exercises will, therefore, be on as restricted ascale as possible, whilst more time is given to the former, and byarrangement with neighbouring garrisons opportunities can often bemade. In this way much can be done in the garrison and the Brigade tofurther the training of Cavalry for the work of a great War, althoughsuch exercises can in no way replace the actual manoeuvring of largebodies. 

It must rather be insisted on that the whole Field-Service training ofthe Arm can only be brought to its legitimate conclusion in thestrategical exercises of large and changing combinations of units. Even the manoeuvres, important as they undoubtedly are, can neverreplace them. They must, therefore, be placed on a footing of equalimportance with the great drill practices of the higher units, sincethe strategical value of the Arm to the supreme Commander of the Armydepends on its intelligent handling in this particular field, and itis here that the difficulties to be overcome are especially great. 

Again, system must be inculcated if clearness of apprehension of theseveral problems is to be produced. 

It will be of the utmost importance that baggage and, if possible, trains corresponding to the conditions on mobilization should beemployed, and that men and horses should be fed from their contents;otherwise we would only too easily drop into habits of under-estimatingthe difficulties with which in real War we shall have to contend. But toguard against this self-deception should be the end and object of allour efforts. 

It will, therefore, be necessary to calculate distance and the widthof areas to be swept over, with reference to modern conditions, andnot to work on the scale that sufficed us in France in 1870. Thetelegraph must also be taken into account, and it must be strictlyinsisted on that it is only to be used for such reports and in suchcases in which it would be available on service. It should, therefore, be laid down beforehand which side is to be considered as in anenemy's country. For the representation of following portions of theArmy, flag columns and peace garrisons may be employed, as this is ofthe utmost importance for the systematic practice of the patrolservice. 

The formation of territorial Cavalry Inspections and Sub-Inspections, already advocated above, would give the necessary foundation for ourpurposes. After finding the Divisional Cavalry necessary on a Warstrength, the remaining regiments in their several districts could beformed in Divisions and Corps of always varying composition in orderto carry out Independent Cavalry manoeuvres. 

To practise the participation of the other Arms, correspondingarrangements with the adjacent Corps Commanders could be made, so thattheir annual manoeuvres could work in with the Cavalry scheme, but thestrategic side should have the preference. Operations would not alwaysculminate in a great Cavalry engagement, but a skilful conduct of themanoeuvres in practical country would generally insure such encounterswithout too great a charge for agricultural compensation. 

I do not believe that such a scheme, though it would certainly mean acomplete break with established Routine, would materially increase thecost of the manoeuvres. The damage, now disseminated by the manyregiments without any corresponding gain to their efficiency, wouldnow be concentrated on the same district, but the gain to the Armitself, as well as for the whole Army, would be both decisive andepoch-making. 

Great though the importance and necessity of such an arrangement seemsto me, yet, as circumstances at present exist, one could hardly counton seeing it applied at once to the whole service, and meanwhile wemust search for expedients. 

From this point of view, also, we must strive to extend the periodallotted for the training of the larger Cavalry bodies to such adegree that Field-Service days can be interposed between the drilldays, in which at least the combined action of masses within thelimits of Field-Service exercises can be practised. 

The question then arises whether it would not be as well to sacrificea part of the tactical training of the Divisional Cavalry in theinterest of the proposed strategic manoeuvres, and whether theadvantages we anticipate from these latter might not, at any ratepartially, be attained in another manner. It seems to me that to acertain extent this may well be possible, if we can only make up ourminds to break with our existing arrangements regulating the presentexercises, and order a certain number of garrisons, detailed ingroups, to operate one against the other. If this grouping is carriedout without reference to Corps boundaries, and the exercises are somanaged that the troops need only spend one night out of quarters, during which they can bivouac, very great advantages at very smallcost would be derived, because, since in these operations it is not atall necessary to carry them through to their culmination in anengagement, but only to concentrate them for the purpose, whennecessary, in a practical manner, and to set all the machinery forreconnoitring, for transmission of orders, and reports, in operation, the damages to cultivation might be kept within very reasonablelimits. 

An example will help to make the idea clearer. If from the regimentsin Metz, Thionville, and St. Avoid on the one side, and of those inSaarburg, Saargemund, Saarbrucken on the other, two opposing forcesare constituted, it would be easy to draw up a general idea by whicheach element of the group considered as an independent Cavalry screencovering the advance of an Army had reached on a given night thepoints at which they are actually quartered. The distances of theplaces named one from another are such that they fairly represent apossible situation in War, and a single day's march might well bringthem into collision. Inexpensive bivouac places could easily be foundin the wooded districts of Lorraine or elsewhere, and the Infantry inthe respective garrisons might represent the heads of the followingArmies' columns without undue interference with their programme oftraining. If the Cavalry march out with four squadrons only perregiment, the fifth can find horses for a part of the train, the pointbeing not so much the number of such waggons provided as the serviceloading of those that are taken. In the afternoon and night precedingthe march, outposts could be established, and the service ofexploration commenced. Thus in two or three days a strategic exercisefor the Cavalry on a large scale could be arranged at a very low costand with very little difficulty. Such operations would naturally beconducted by the Inspectors-General of Cavalry, and, as the exampleshows, they could be generally, if not everywhere, easilyorganized. [30]

 [Footnote 30: Taking into account these and similar demands on the Inspectors-General, the question arises whether the time has not come to attach to them permanently officers of the General Staff. Every increase in the number of these officers employed in peace is a great advantage for War, because the War formations require far more Staff Officers to fill the new positions created on mobilization than are employed in peace--a very serious disadvantage. I consider it absolutely essential that each Inspector-General of Cavalry should be provided with a permanent Staff. ]

Since it is essential in all Cavalry exercises to take into accountthe numbers and distances with which we shall have to deal in futureWarfare, it would be a great gain to the Arm if in the manoeuvres, inwhich its action in combination with the other Arms should be taught, this point of view was brought more into the foreground. 

Of course it is not intended that the interests of the other Armsshould be sacrificed to those of the Cavalry; the question rather iswhether these interests are not identical even for the Infantry; theimportance of minor tactics has fallen very much into the background, and both Infantry and Artillery require far more practice in 'masses. 'Detachment warfare can for the most part be quite sufficientlypractised in the garrisons, but the opportunities for exercising thelarge units are far more difficult to find. 

I consider, therefore, that it would be of advantage to all Arms ifpresent Brigade manoeuvres, with all their superannuated customs, wereabolished in favour of more Divisional and Corps manoeuvres. TheCavalry, at any rate, would welcome the innovation, for from its pointof view these manoeuvres could be made far more practical, and itwould be easier to arrange schemes for the latter more in accordancewith reality. 

It is also most desirable that from time to time the Cavalry shouldhave opportunities of practising both pursuit and rearguard action ona grand scale. At present these only arise in the manoeuvres withmixed Arms, since in the Independent Cavalry manoeuvres they aredifficult of representation. 

The Director of the manoeuvres can also do much to make the operationsinstructive for the Cavalry, and also to stimulate the interests ofall engaged, if he takes care that the demands made upon the Cavalryare kept within reasonable limits. It constantly happens that patrolsare despatched at far too late an hour to make it possible for theirreports to arrive in time. Commanders, again, frequently wish to beinformed as to the exact position of every battalion on the otherside, although they generally know his total force with accuracy, orthey want to know the exact strength of the Garrison holding a certainvillage or locality, as if Cavalry could under any circumstancessupply such information; and if at night no sketch of the enemy'soutpost line has been handed in, the Cavalry are held to have failedin their duty. All these demands are, in my opinion, entirelyunpractical; in War one never has such precise information, and norational man dreams of wasting the strength of his Cavalry inendeavouring to secure such details. These things are mere remnants ofthe Paleolithic Age, and only justifiable as an extreme case whenperhaps planning a surprise. Further, it is thoroughly unpractical torequire under all circumstances complete information as to theprogress of an engagement. With modern weapons this is impossible, unless favoured by unusual topographical conditions. Not merely aresuch demands unpractical, but they exercise a most prejudicial effect, for too accurate and too detailed information gets the Generals intobad habits of command, and the Cavalry itself is well-nigh ruined. Certainly, when circumstances demand it, the men must not be afraid tokeep well up to the enemy, and bring back intelligence even out of thezone of his fire; but, generally, reliable observations are only madeout of range. The Cavalry must learn principally to judge the enemy'sarrangements from a distance; they must direct their attention to theessential only, and not waste their time in unnecessary side issues. If justice is to be done to these requirements, it is quite impossibleto collect all the information the Generals so frequently require. Thus they get in the habit of observing in an unpractical manner, andthe whole of this most important branch of their education suffersaccordingly. So much is this the case that nowadays the patrol leadersoften exchange mutual confidences to one another, as it is practicallyimpossible, owing to conditions of time and space, to obtain therequired information otherwise, and they consider it better to get itin this manner than to accustom their men to unpractical feats ofriding. 

Reconnaissance and its results can only be of value to the trainingwhen kept within the limits that the nature of things dictates. 

Whilst the constant presence of danger is the characteristic elementin which the faculties of observation have to work in War, it is theconstant pressure of uncertainty as to the exact movements of theenemy which equally characteristically forms the conditioning elementin which the intellectual activity of the Leaders has also to work, and neither one nor the other may be entirely ignored in ourPeace-time training. 

CHAPTER VI

THE HIGHER EDUCATION OF OUR OFFICERS

The consideration we have devoted in the foregoing chapters to thevarious fields for Cavalry action opened out by the changed conditionsof modern War have shown us what tremendous demands will be made uponthe leader of a great Cavalry 'Mass' in the future. He must be anabsolute master of the technical side of his own Arm. He must be readyto enter into the spirit of the widest strategical considerations ofthe Superior Command, and according to circumstances to act in harmonywith them on his own initiative. He must know the spirit, the methodsof fighting, and the peculiarities of the other Arms, so as to be ableto intervene at the right time and place in the action. He must withswift determination combine boldness with circumspection; and inaddition, he must not only be a bold horseman, but must possessinexhaustible activity of mind and body. 

If these are the demands modern War will make upon the higher leadersof the Arm, those which fall on the lower ranks have been intensifiedin similar fashion; for, quite apart from their bodily and mentalqualifications, they will need, for the solution of the variousproblems with which they will be confronted, an immensely increasedamount of military knowledge and executive ability. 

The amount of initiative which will be required in simple Cavalryengagements between the larger groups, and in strategic operations ofthe Arm, from subordinate leaders has been already discussed above, and it will be clear that only a thorough comprehension of the wholesituation will enable the individual to act opportunely when suchmoments may arrive. It is not merely a general military educationwhich will be required, but greatly increased endurance, boldness, and, above all, a wider understanding for the whole connection of thegreat operations, and the power of judging a military situation withaccuracy, which must prevail through all ranks, down to the leader ofan independent patrol. The whole method of observation and the resultsdeduced therefrom will assume quite a different form when managed byOfficers who have learnt to understand and to judge operations on alarge scale. Without such training only isolated facts will bereported--deductions will not be drawn. There will be nodiscrimination between important and unimportant details, and theOfficer himself will not be able to come to a correct decision as tothe direction in which to pursue his mission. But this is exactly whatit is most important that all Officers should be relied on to perform. They must understand how, from a given mass of observations, to deducethe strength, bearing, and condition of the enemy in general, todivine the probable connection of his operations, and hence todetermine the most important points and directions in which to followup any available clue. 

If an Officer comes upon an outpost or an occupied position, heshould be able from the indications on the spot and from his map todetermine where the flanks are likely to rest, and hence on what pointto direct his further advance. 

If he happens on troops at rest or on the march, he must be able todecide whether it is more important to follow or watch theirsubsequent movements, or to carry out his reconnaissance in some otherdirection. He must, in fact, judge what it is of the greatestimportance for the superior staff to know when his instructions inface of altered circumstances leave him in momentary uncertainty. 

Such illustrations could be extended indefinitely, but the sum of allpoints to the same conclusion--viz. , that a comprehensive militaryeducation, and at least a general grasp of the principles of theHigher Strategy, are essential for every reconnoitring Officer. Thehistory of previous campaigns points the same moral by innumerableexamples, and how much more frequent must such incidents be in thefuture. 

Let us take the case of the Battle of Gravelotte only--the point wasto determine whether the French were still clinging to the fortress orwere marching away from it. Not one of the patrols, however, whosedoings can still be traced, or whose reports are still in existence, seems to have possessed the comprehension of the situation which wouldhave enabled it to report on what it was of the utmost importance forthe Army Headquarters to know. None of them even noted the directionin which the troops they saw were moving--a matter of most vitalimportance--or estimated the strength of the several encampments, orreported the fact that certain roads were clear, although they wereall moving in the immediate vicinity, and might easily haveascertained these facts had they realized their importance. Thus, because they were uncorroborated, the most important observations ledto false conclusions. The point of transcendent consequence--theactual position of the French right flank--could not be determineduntil hours after the battle had been begun under an entiremisapprehension of the actual circumstances. Similar experiences haverepeated themselves times without number. 

When we now reflect upon the greatly increased importance of reliableinformation in Modern War, we cannot escape the conclusion that aproper training of our Cavalry Officers to meet their requirements isof vital importance. Their present-day education does not sufficientlyguarantee their competence. 

The knowledge of the military sciences acquired at the War schools ison a very modest scale, nor is it, indeed, the business of theseschools to give higher education in such subjects. Hence it is all themore deplorable that the higher intellectual training of our CavalryOfficers practically ceases after the War School, because thepractical day-to-day duties of their profession furnishes them withnothing which can replace the need for a higher theoretical training. Generally, their attention is absorbed by the smallest of details, which, though each is of immense importance to the efficiency of thewhole Arm, are not calculated to widen their intellectual horizon, andin the few great manoeuvres in which an Officer might find anopportunity of enlarging his knowledge, he finds himself lacking inthe foundation necessary to make full use of it. 

The usual course of instruction, in fact, is not adapted to the needsof the Cavalry Officer, who already in early youth may find himself insituations requiring adequate strategical knowledge for theirsolution; hence there is urgent need for the supreme militaryauthorities to concern themselves at once both with his theoreticaland practical education. 

The latter could best be provided for in connection with thedevelopment of the Field-Service training of the Troops already dealtwith above. The former--_i. E. _, the scientific side--could be mostadequately met by the creation of a 'Cavalry School' on the lines ofthe special Artillery and Engineer Schools which already provide forthe further education of the Officers of these Arms after they havespent a couple of years or more in responsible command of men in theirown units. 

If on the broader foundations of the military sciences--principallythose relating to the conduct of operations, to Strategy andTactics--thus supplied, the Regimental Commanders were to build up bypractical instruction, as above indicated, and the whole spirit of thetraining were modified in conformity with the views therein alreadyexpressed, then I consider that, with the admirable material amongstour Officers which already exists, and which for the most part needsonly opportunity to prove its value, most important results might beachieved. 

Such a school would be most fittingly affiliated to the existingSchool of Equitation in Hanover. The bright, attractive side ofCavalry life, as we there find it, would be a useful counterpoise tothe risk of too much theory, and the district lends itself admirablyto practical exercises in reconnaissances and endurance rides. 

So long as this most desirable reform remains only an ideal, we muststrive to do the utmost we can within the limits of our existingeducational system, for the need is urgent, and admits of no delay. 

We must devote increased attention to this portion of our officers'training from the very commencement of their career, and see that theyare so far initiated into the nature both of tactical and strategicalrelations that they may be able, on the one hand, to reconnoitre anenemy in the spirit of the intentions of the Supreme Command; on theother, that they are capable of commanding their units in any givenstrategical situation. 

All means must be strained towards the attainment of this purpose. 

One of the first stepping-stones in our progress must be the actualhorsemanship of the Officer himself. A man who under everycircumstance feels himself firm in the saddle does not need to exertforce to fight with or restrain his horse, and having learnt both howto think and command at a gallop, will lead Cavalry and reconnoitrebefore the enemy with far greater certainty and much better resultsthan one to whom these things are hardly second nature. 

Bold and determined horsemanship acts and reacts on all a man's othersoldierly characteristics, and forms thus a basis for further progressof the highest order, apart from the fact that it impresses the menmost favourably, and induces them to follow with greater confidence. 

Hence, even from the standpoint of the higher education, the standardof horsemanship can never be raised too high. Given this, and theremainder can be acquired in the practical day-to-day work of theunit, in the training of the men themselves, and in the exercises inField-Service duties, in manoeuvres and Cavalry exercises, alwaysprovided that these are all conducted in conformity with the spirit ofmodern operations. But since we have seen this practical duty, as atpresent carried on, nowhere meets the above conditions, we must find asupplement to it by recourse to systematic training in Field-Servicerides, War Games, and Staff Tours, for which, of course, the necessaryfunds must be provided. 

These exercises must be begun in the regiment, and continued througheach successive grade up to the 'Inspection, ' the sphere of each beingenlarged with the increase in the importance of the Command. 

But they will only then possess value and importance when based onconnected military situations arising from the operations of modernArmies, and afford opportunities to the participants for the solutionof problems far above their existing rank, for thus only can theirmental horizon be extended. Within the radius of action of his ownCommand each Officer is already in daily contact with all that it isnecessary for him to understand, and in minor tactical situations hehas abundant opportunities for training his faculties. It seems to me, therefore, mere waste of time to give him further employment withthese matters, and the attempt could only end in depriving them of allinterest. On the other hand, the Regimental Officer is seldom if everplaced in positions which would enable him to form any adequateconception of the execution and connection of the greater operations, to realize the importance of the action of the unit within theframework of the whole, or to notice how faults in details, apparentlytrivial in themselves, can mount up in the mass until they mayjeopardize the success of any given undertaking. 

The higher the intellectual pinnacle on which he is placed, the widerbecomes his horizon, and consequently his appreciation of the relativeimportance of each individual link in the chain. 

CONCLUSION

If now, at the conclusion of my investigations, we summarize the chiefresults arrived at, we find the following sequence of thought:

The value of Cavalry in relation to the other Arms has risenmaterially; as a consequence of the whole range of changes introducedinto the conduct of modern War--viz. , those due to changes in thecomposition of Armies, to railways, telegraphs, supply, weapons, etc. Its strategical tasks have increased in importance, and on thebattle-field new opportunities for successes have been disclosed. 

Mounted and dismounted action have now become functions of equalimportance. Great results--whether strategical or tactical--can onlybe obtained by the employment of 'Masses. '

The changing conditions of War demand increased mobility, bothorganic, strategic, and tactical. 

The difficulties of leadership, in consequence of these conditions, have increased very materially. On the other hand, the Cavalry hasremained in every respect relatively behind the other Arms, and hencewe stand face to face with a whole list of new requirements which itmust be the task of our peace-time preparation to satisfy, and ofwhich the following are the most important items:

Increase in the price paid for our remounts. 

Considerable increase in our numerical strength, if possible, on thelines of our existing and well-tried organization. 

Rearmament of our Cavalry with a 6-millimetre carbine, ballisticallyequal in all respects to the rifle of the Infantry. 

Considerable increase in the amount of ammunition carried both inpeace and War. 

Improvement in the whole equipment of man and horse. 

Formation of the horse batteries of four guns, with correspondingincrease in the number of batteries; introduction also of a truequick-firer. 

Supply of Maxim guns to the Cavalry. Organization of the whole of thesupply columns and pioneer detachments required to give the necessarystrategical mobility. 

Improvement in the method of training horses and men, bothindividually and for the purpose of securing better conditions in thehorses to stand the increased strain of modern operations. 

Complete reform of our course of training, both tactical and for fieldservice, to fit us for employment in 'Masses, ' and to meet the newstrategic requirements. The increased importance of fire-action mustbe taken into account. 

Further development of our Cavalry Regulations, which require not onlysimplification in many details, but the addition of sectionsdeveloping the principles of the employment by 'Wings' of the severalunits, an extension of the prescriptions for the use of fire-action, and more precise formulation of tactical principles. 

Rearrangement of the instructions relating to reconnaissance, security, and the forwarding of reports, in the field-serviceregulations, with due regard to the employment of cyclists wherepracticable. 

A more systematic, practical, and general education for our Officers;creation of a Cavalry School, in which War should be taught onscientific principles. 

Distribution of the whole Arm into independent territorial districts, to be termed 'Inspections' (Corps) and 'Sub-inspections' (Divisions), which are to be entirely independent of the existing Army Corps. 

Annual Cavalry Manoeuvres. 

Improvement of discipline 'to meet the demands of modern Warfare. 

This is a considerable list of extreme requirements put together in afew words, and I am well aware that they are not to be obtained by asingle stroke of the pen--indeed, it needs a considerable degree ofoptimism to believe that they are to be obtained at all; but I amequally conscious that sound evolution is only possible when theextremest purpose of our endeavours is clearly placed before ourminds, and if we have the courage to recognise openly how far we fallshort of the standard the pitiless reality of War demands. 

Do not let us delude ourselves with the idea that excellence is to beattained without exertion, or that the path of easy-going reforms, safeguarding always existing interests, will lead us to a certainvictory. 

Half-measures do more harm than good, and it will not be those raceswhich will survive in the great 'world struggle for existence' whichseek only for a harmonious development of all their living forces, butrather those which devote themselves with a single mind to theevolution of the utmost fighting power It is the triumph offorce--fighting power--which conditions the development of all othersocial interests. If we possess the 'force, ' the rest will follow. Whilst, however, we seek to develop by every means in our power theutmost strength of the nation, we must be quite clear in our own mindsas to the limits of the attainable. In War, no more than in any other'act of human intercourse, ' is the 'best' ever reached by mortalexecutants. But the palm of success beckons across the field ofdestiny to the race which strives towards the highest, and has madethe greatest sacrifices and dared the most to deserve it. 

In this sense it is the duty of each individual unit amongst us, unconcerned about results or consequences, to work with whole heartand mind in the cause we serve; and the more resistance to beencountered, the greater the obstacle to be overcome, the less may weshun the struggle, for here also the old truth holds good: _Per asperaad Astra_. 

INDEX

 Action, typical case of Cavalry, 225; example of Mars la Tour, 225 (footnote)

 Advance, time to be selected for, 32; rate of, 121; of enemy marks period for pushing forward, 27

 Advantages, in War, must be fought for, 29

 Ammunition, carbine, insufficiency of, 175, 179; increase in amount of, for practice, 250

 Ammunition columns, special, required for Cavalry, 179

 Armies, change of character of modern, 3

 Art of War, new conditions in, 3; their effect on Cavalry, 9; result of first engagement of overwhelming importance, 12

 Artillery, effect of modern, on defence of villages and woods, 15; power of, can be over-estimated, 54; support of dismounted Cavalry by, 60, 100; protection of, 95; Horse Artillery must adapt itself to Cavalry's action, 100; position for, 101; one battery per brigade recommended, 179; quick-firing guns wanted, 180; should be attacked from flank, 234; co-operation in Cavalry training, 263

 Attack, stereotyped forms of, prohibited, 72; on flank when advisable, 78; simultaneous, on front and flank, 79; 'mobile' or 'immobile' horses during, 91; by dismounted troops, 99; change of direction of, when permissible, 116; importance of vehemence of onslaught, 232; formation for, against Infantry and Artillery, 234; distribution and duties of dismounted men in, 259

 Baggage-train should be represented at manoeuvres, 279

 Bapaume, Battle of, 57

 Barley as forage, 206

 Battle-field, place of Cavalry in, 81, 84; case of Mars la Tour, 82; best formation for, 85; decided by circumstances of case, 82, 85; simple formations alone applicable on, 225; Mars la Tour, 225 (footnote)

 Beans as a ration, 205

 Bit and bridoon, merits of, 192, 197

 Bivouac, disadvantages of, 122, 125

 Breaking in. See 'Training'

 Bridging material, sufficient, needed to be carried to deal with small streams, etc. , 175

 Bridoon. See 'Bit'

 Brigade, highest unit for drill purposes, 238

 Bugle calls, when allowable, 69; value of, 230; regimental calls, 230; movements to be practised without, 236

 Cantonments, advantages of providing, 125

 Carbine, method of attachment, 176; improved pattern needed, 177

 Cartridges, method of carrying, 177

 Cavalry must be trained to act in 'mass, ' 7; during Wars of 1870 and 1877-1878, 7; experiences of the past insufficient, 8; proportion to other Arms, 10; importance of, greater than formerly, 11; new tasks for, 14; actual fighting value diminished, 16; best strategic value increased, 16; public opinion at fault, 16; exploits in 1870-1871 misjudged, 16; German organization of, requires reform, 17; clear conception of requirements during each phase needed, 17; advance during mobilization deprecated, 23; should not act till enemy's strategic concentration begins, 28; importance of superiority over enemy's Cavalry at commencement, 31; in what cases the principal Arm, 37; Divisional, 38; Independent, 38; fire action of, during battles, 55; greater tactical cohesion than Infantry, 58; scope of, enormously increased, 59; importance of good leadership, 63; place of, in line of battle, 81, 84; formation of, on battle-field, 85; factors determining strategic employment of, 126; difficulty of supplying reinforcements, 151; augmentation of German, necessary, 153; and not to be postponed till mobilization, 158; training of, requires reforming, 181 _et seq. _; Regulations require amendment to meet dismounted needs, 257; tasks for, in future War not properly appreciated, 268

 Change of formation during action, 69; from 'rendezvous' to 'attack, ' 79

 Charge, the, when preferable to fire action, 52; example of Waterloo, 52; position of Commander during, 65; choice of moment for, 87; cohesion during, 221; speed of, 221

 Chargers. See 'Horses'

 Chotusitz, Battle of, 83

 Civilians, possible participation in future Wars by, 10; armed resistance by, to be suppressed, 33

 Column, regimental, value of, for War, 227; squadron, disadvantages of, 228

 Combined action, factors essential to success of, 68

 Command of Cavalry masses exceeding six regiments, 45; must be under a single leader, 46; efficiency of, more important with Cavalry than Infantry, 63

 Commander, qualities needed in a good, 64, 286; place of, before and during charges, 65; when working with other Arms, 66; choice of formation to be left to, 72, 76, 77; must be informed of progress of Infantry combat, 86; qualities required in covering a retreat, 86; in dismounted action, 93; must decide as to extension in strategy, 106; and concentration in combat, 106; to be kept informed of general situation, 111, 117; must organize his own reconnaissance, 120; personal supervision of front by, 121; forage reserve to be formed by, 131; to arrange times for drill, 215; but not to deviate from Regulations, 220; importance of handling 'masses, ' 216. See also 'Leader'

 Commencement of War, essence of all Cavalry action during, 26; obtaining intelligence during, 27

 Communications, increased liability to interruption of, 13; greater opportunities for Cavalry to interfere with, 14; especially after victory, 14; to be maintained with Headquarters on field of battle, 67

 Comparison between Cavalry and Infantry, 59

 Concentration, question of disturbing enemy's communications during, 19; views of other Powers on this, 20; value of raids during, 20; premature commitment of Cavalry during, 24; reasons against sacrificing Cavalry during, 25; defensive duties during, 26; advantages of pushing forward during enemy's, 28; of force for raids, 35; of considerable masses, when essential, 44; for combat, 106, 108, 109

 Corn, amount of, to be carried by Cavalry, 130; author's experiment, 203

 Coulmiers, Battle of, 86

 'Critique' after field days, 243

 Cyclists, value of, in conjunction with Cavalry, 22, 147; circulation of intelligence by, 39; should enable Divisional Cavalry to be economized, 42; further Regulations required, 146; limitations of, 148; to be attached to Cavalry, 178

 Deception of enemy, means towards, 119

 Defects in horses, correction of, 199

 Defence of villages, 97

 Defensive duties at commencement of War, 26; combat, 92; 'immobile' detachments during, 92; action, breaking off a, 94; action, duties of dismounted men during, 259

 Despatch riders, 138, 145

 Detachments, economy in use of, 38; reports from, to Headquarters, 111; outflanking, during attack, 232

 Direction, change of, during action, 117

 Dismounted action, increased importance of, 49; when desirable in attack, 49; when inevitable, 50; Sheridan's Cavalry in, 51; during rearguard actions, 52; during general engagements, 55; examples of Fredericksburg and Five Forks, 55; in South African War, 56; Franco-German War, 57; 'mobile' and 'immobile' horses, 91; in defensive combat, 92, 93; tactical distribution of men in, 96; 'Wing' or 'Line' systems, 96; in defence of villages, 97 _et seq. _; in attack, 99; training for, 247; importance of, not sufficiently appreciated, 248 _et seq. _; not to be confined to the defensive, 249; recruits' course, 250; Regulations as to, require expansion, 257 _et seq. _; as important as fighting in the saddle, 262

 Dispersion of troops for raids, 35; for screening and security, 106, 109

 Divisional Cavalry defined, 38; duties of, 39; apportionment of, 41; as little as possible should be retained for Infantry Divisions, 42; reconnaissance duties of, 141; security duties of, 144

 Divisions of Cavalry, maintenance of, during peace, 161; present strength insufficient, 165; permanent creation of, not advisable, 167

 'Double-column' formation, when recommended, 80, 229

 'Drei Treffen Taktik, ' 73

 'Dressur' detachment, 190

 Drill, shortening of season for, 198; importance of Squadron and Regimental, 214 _et seq. _; merits of Brigade and Divisional, 215 _et seq. _; ceremonial to be separated from practical, 237; Brigade, the highest unit for formal, 238

 Education, military, for man and horse, 186; tactical, for troops generally, 213 _et seq. _; of recruits, 272; of non-commissioned ranks, 275; higher, of officers, 286 _et seq. _

 Efficiency of troops essential to good leadership, 126

 Enemy, advance of, marks period for pushing forward Cavalry, 27; Cavalry of, must be beaten off field to obtain information, 30; outposts of, to be broken through, 33; communications, of, to be attacked, 33

 Equipment for bridging and telegraphs, 174

 Equitation, Staff for, 193; proposed new procedure, 200; school of, in Hanover, 290

 Exercises to develop 'tactical principles, ' 236; of larger formations than Brigades, 239; 'field-service' exercises, 240 _et seq. _

 Expediency, the highest ideal of strategy, 47

 Extension of front when advisable, 107; in action when favourable, 240 _et seq. _

 Field-firing, increased importance of, 251; scheme for, 252

 'Field-service' exercises, 218; nature of, 240; ground for, 239;

 Cavalry acting independently, 240; Cavalry in combination with other Arms, 241; existing deficiencies in, 266

 Fire action often imperative nowadays, 47; occasions when it will decide the day, 50; General Lee's capitulation, 51; South African War, 56; Franco-German War, 57

 Firearms, increased range of, 36; better class of, needed by Cavalry, 58

 Flank attack, when advisable, 78, 79; after victory, 83; during charge, 233

 Flanks of enemy to be worked round to obtain information, 29

 Forage, reserve of, 131; amount to be carried on horses, 169; author's experiment, 203

 Force necessary to be employed in various circumstances, 36

 Formation for attack, 36; change of, during action, 69; latitude to be allowed to Commander, 76, 77; merits of 'double column, ' 80; 'mass' when suitable, 81; on battle-field, 85; of dismounted men in action, 96; in defence of villages, 96; in dismounted attack, 100; best, suitable for War, 226; to be avoided, 226; regimental column, 227

 Four-squadron regiments, 154

 Frederick the Great on length of marches, 122

 Front, extension and concentration of, 107

 Frontal attack against Infantry and Artillery, 235

 Galloping, exercises in, 209

 German Cavalry, numerically inadequate, 151; expedients for augmenting, 153; proposed territorial organization, 167

 Gravelotte, example of faulty reconnaissance reports, 288

 Ground, value of tactical advantage of, 78; acquisition of, for field-training, 239

 Halts on march, 128

 Headquarters, reports to be sent to, from detachments, 111

 Horsemanship, 184

 Horses, demands on, 87; 'mobile' or 'immobile, ' 91; position for led, 93 _et seq. _; protection of, 95; rest for, 122; security of, during rest, 122, 124; bivouac on march, 122; on outpost, 123; importance of care bestowed on, 123, 127; excessive demands on, 128; shortage of, in Germany, 152; 'augmentation, ' 155; 'untrained, ' of small use, 158; increased demands on, 181; training of, 185 _et seq. _; English thoroughbreds, 187; Prussian, 187; old, 194; food for, increase of, 203; endurance of, 202; feeding, author's experiment in, 203; galloping powers, 209; weight to be put on, 212

 Increase of German Cavalry needed, 158

 Independence, when to be given to subordinates, 68

 'Independent Cavalry' defined, 38; conditions which determine allotment of, 42; in what cases it should be concentrated on decisive lines, 43; security duties of, 144

 Individual superiority essential for patrols, 31

 Infantry, effect on Cavalry of extended zone of fire of, 9; difficult for Cavalry to encounter in close bodies, 10; when once broken offer great opportunity to Cavalry, 15; defence of villages and woods by, more difficult now, 15; compared with Cavalry, 59

 Initial success, great importance of, 12

 Initiative, value of, 115

 Inspections, new scheme of, for recruits and schools, 200; importance of thorough, 246

 Inspector-General of Cavalry, position of, 282 and footnote

 Intelligence indispensable at commencement of War, 27; spaces between enemy's columns to be penetrated to obtain, 27; when more important than security, 28; circulation of, 39; during progress of action, 40; experience of 1870, 40; to be transmitted direct to Headquarters, as well as through usual channel, 45

 Lance-exercises, 254; better attachment of, necessary, 255

 Leader, importance of-independence of, in combined action, 68, 76; more initiative to be given to, 73; to be careful about his horses, 87; duty when covering a retreat, 88; modern requirements in a good, 89, 90; to be kept informed of the general situation, 111, 117; clearness of intention, 116; must organize his own intelligence, 117; capacity of, 126; of great Cavalry masses, 286

 Led horses, 91; place for, 93, 94; in dismounted practice, 259

 Lines--three-line system, 73

 Locality, faculty of finding way in unknown, 274

 Lunging rein, 188

 Manoeuvres, Brigade and Divisional, little criterion of work in War, 42; trotting and galloping at, 210; weight to be carried at, 210; movements which are of use for War, 226; theatrical display in great Cavalry, 263; deficiencies in existing, 266; Imperial, 267; baggage train to be represented at, 279; limitations of telegraphs at, 279; of Brigades to be abolished in favour of Divisional and Corps, 283; limitation of demands on Cavalry at, 284

 Maps, misuse of, 274

 Marches, flanking detachments to, 121; length of, 122; endurance of horses on, 127; excessive lengths of, 128; average lengths of, 128; trotting and halts on, 128

 Mars la Tour, 82, 83, 86, 225 (footnote)

 'Mass' when suitable, 81, 82

 Masses, training of Cavalry in large, 214, 215; necessity for bringing Cavalry together frequently in, 245

 Maxim guns with Cavalry, 178

 Messengers, employment of, to be limited, 129

 Mobility, essential in surprise actions, 118; German Cavalry deficient in, 169; of supply waggons, 173

 Mounted Reserve, duties of, 95; strength of, 96

 Movements most suitable for battle-field, 226; to be avoided, 226; to be practised on simple warnings, 236

 Musketry, importance of knowledge of, by officers, 253; judging distances, 253

 Napoleon on length of Cavalry marches, 122

 Narbonne, General von Pelet, proposals of, 155

 Numbers alone can prevail in victory or in covering retreat, 36; give opportunities of dismounted action, 57

 Oats, 205

 Observation of masses of enemy's army by officers patrol, 31; during combat, 40

 Offensive against Infantry, Cavalry capable of taking the, 60

 Officers of Cavalry have better knowledge of their men than in Infantry, 59; importance of training of, 64; increased importance of knowledge of musketry, 253; to be attached to Infantry for instruction, 256; higher education of, 286 _et seq. _; training in horsemanship of, 291

 Officers patrols, when necessary, 31

 Orderlies to be limited, 128

 Orders, simplicity essential in, 68; how to be transmitted in the field, 69; by bugle call, 69; verbal, 69; to be circulated simultaneously to all subordinates, 112; importance of clearness in, 116

 Organization of German Cavalry unchanged, 17; requires reform, 17; must be elastic, 47; example of 1870, 47; also of Napoleon, 48; of German Cavalry to be by territorial districts, 167

 'Outer lines, ' advantages of, 78

 Outflanking tactics, when undesirable, 53; detachments, work of, during charge, 232

 Outposts, necessity for breaking through enemy's, 33; fixed rules for, impossible, 126

 Patrols, causes of possible danger in the future, 10; breaking up of enemy's communications by officers, 22; must ascertain changes in enemy's initial dispositions, 25; must protect frontier districts from raids, 25; must avoid becoming desperately involved, 26; superiority in individual patroller essential, 31; defeat of enemy's, necessary, 31; 'reconnoitring' distinct from 'security' patrols, 133; strength of, 136; duties of commander, 136; transmission of despatches by, 138; must report to Headquarters as well as through ordinary channel, 140; 'tactical, ' 143; 'security, ' 143; screening by, 144; Regulations need amendment, 145; training for scouting basis of all reconnaissance instruction, 269; suggestion as to instruction, 270

 Place on battle-field of Cavalry, 84, 85

 Prague, Battle of, 83

 'Principles, ' tactical, of Cavalry opposed to Cavalry, 231; of Cavalry opposed to Infantry and Artillery, 234

 Prisoners, value of capturing, during enemy's mobilization, 24

 Protection of main force, steps required differ from those for obtaining information, 29; opposite views held, 29

 Pursuit of beaten enemy imperative, 84; methods of, 51; dismounted action during, 51; Waterloo, 52; wars of 1866 and 1870, 84; duties during, 88; to be practised on a grand scale, 283

 Quick-firing guns, employment of 180

 Raids, value of, on outbreak of War, 20; to exploit enemy's resources, 34; indispensable element in future, 34; depend on rapidity and surprise, 34; and on concentration of force at night-time, 35; dispersion during, 35

 Rapidity essential in raids, 34; and in dismounted attack, 99

 Rations, emergency, for horses, 174; author's experiment with forage, 203 _et seq. _

 Rearguard actions, to be practised on a grand scale, 283

 Reconnaissance by independent bodies of Cavalry necessary, 7; rendered more difficult by range of modern firearms, 10; and by smokeless powder, 10; value of intensified, 12; must be a separate service from screening, 31; an exception to this, 41; advantage of defeating enemy's reconnoitrers, 31; under fire very difficult to effect, 39; on the battle-field, 66; cavalry leader must organize his own, 120; training for scouting the basis of instruction in, 269; knowledge of principles of 'higher strategy' essential, 288

 Reconnoitring patrols, 134 _et seq. _

 Recruits, training of, 188 _et seq. _, 273. See also 'Training'

 Regiment, the fundamental tactical unit, 228

 Regimental call, value of, 230 _et seq. _

 'Regimental column' formation, 227; merits of double, 229

 Regulations should not lay down fixed evolutions, 70; but only essential principles of action, 70; existing edition of, requires revision, 70, 79; importance of Section 346, 76; rearrangement recommended, 244; as to training of dismounted squadrons, 253

 Reinforcements, difficulty of supplying Cavalry, 151

 Remounts, supply of, in War, 159; English blood in, 187; training of, 187

 Reports in the field to be made to Headquarters and to adjacent columns, 11; transmission of, 138 _et seq. _

 Reserve forage, 131

 Reserve squadrons, position for, during attack, 232

 Reserve troops an easy prey to Cavalry when once beaten, 15

 Rest, importance of, to horses, 124, 125

 Retreat, advantages of 'outer lines' in, 78; duty of Cavalry covering a, 88

 Riding, cross-country, 186; individual, 189

 Riding School, 193 _et seq. _

 Roszbach, Battle of, 83

 Rushes, advancing by, 113

 Rye as forage, 206

 Schlichting, General von, writings of, 81; criticism of, 83; on application of drill-book principles, 237

 School, Riding, 192; War (see 'War School'); of Cavalry, 290

 Screening, importance of, 12; during absence of troops, 27; must give way to obtaining intelligence, 28; distinct from reconnoitring, 32; must be fought for, 33

 Security when secondary to obtaining intelligence, 28; during rest, 122; general advantages of, 124

 Sedan, Battle of, 87

 Seidlitz, Von, at Zorndorf, 87

 Simplicity essential to successful tactics, 68

 Single combat exercises, 195 _et seq. _

 Skeleton enemy, 244

 Soor, action of, 83

 Squadron School, the basis of tactical training, 214; drill, 217; tactical training of dismounted, 258; general education of, 272, 276; practical exercises for, 275

 'Squadron column, ' merits of, 228

 Staff required for Cavalry corps, 228

 Strategical handling of Cavalry, importance of, 37; fixed regulations inapplicable to, 105; general principles, 105

 Subdivision of force, 107

 Summary of opinions on Cavalry generally, 294

 Supply trains must march as fast as Cavalry, 171; length of, 172; mobility of, 173

 Supreme Commander, presence of Cavalry essential to success of, 37

 Surprise the essence of Cavalry actions, 16; indispensable in raids, 34; requirements for success in, 118

 System, the 'three-line, ' 74

 Tactical action by Divisional Cavalry precluded, 40; of Cavalry changed by new conditions, 49; 'Drei Treffen, ' 73; training for, too elementary, 223

 Tactical education for troops generally, 213 _et seq. _

 Tactical principles, Cavalry _v. _ Cavalry, 231 _et seq. _; Cavalry _v. _ Infantry and Artillery, 232 _et seq. _; exercises to develop the, 236

 Tactical and strategical principles of the future, 83

 Telegraph, control of, 140; limitations as to the use of, in Manoeuvres, 279

 'Three-line' system, 73

 Training, true purpose of, 161 of Cavalry Staff, 166; Von Moltke's proposals, 166; changes must be met by new methods, 181; of horses and men, 184 _et seq. _; length of period of, 188, 194; proposed programme for, 200; preparation for endurance, 207; War conditions essential to, 208; tactical, too elementary at present, 223; for dismounted fighting, 247 _et seq. _; some deficiencies in present, 217; of squadrons a stepping-stone to field service, 276

 Training grounds ('Truppenübungs Plätze'), 239

 Transmission of orders during action, 69

 'Treffen, ' definition of, 74

 Trotting on march, 128

 Turning movements, when imperative, 115

 Verbal orders, 69

 Villages, dismounted defence of, 97 _et seq. _; withdrawal from, 99

 Vionville, Battle of, 107

 Von-Rosenberg at Mars la Tour, 225 (footnote)

 Waggons, supply, pace of, 171

 War conditions essential to training, 208

 War School, extent of teaching at, 289; creation of school for Cavalry desirable, 290

 Weight to be carried by horses, 212

 Wheat as forage, 206

 'Wing attack, ' 76; best formation for requirements of combat, 227; in action against Infantry and Artillery, 234; freedom as to use of, 244

 Woerth, Battle of, 87

 Zone of fire, results of extension of, 9

 Zorndorf, Battle of, 87

THE END

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