BRITAIN AT BAY

BY

SPENSER WILKINSON

New York

1909

TO MY CHILDREN

CONTENTS

CHAPTER

I. THE NATION AND THE PARTIES

II. DEFEAT

III. FORCE AND RIGHT

IV. ARBITRATION AND DISARMAMENT

V. THE NATIONALISATION OF WAR

VI. THE BALANCE OF POWER

VII. THE RISE OF GERMANY

VIII. NATIONHOOD NEGLECTED

IX. NEW CONDITIONS

X. DYNAMICS--THE QUESTION OF MIGHT

XI. POLICY--THE QUESTION OF RIGHT

XII. THE NATION

XIII. THE EFFECT OF THE NATIONALISATION OF WAR UPON LEADERSHIP

XIV. THE NEEDS OF THE NAVY

XV. ENGLAND'S MILITARY PROBLEM

XVI. TWO SYSTEMS CONTRASTED

XVII. A NATIONAL ARMY

XVIII. THE COST

XIX. ONE ARMY NOT TWO

XX. THE TRANSITION

XXI. THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH ARMIES ARE RAISED

XXII. THE CHAIN OF DUTY

Chapters XIV. To XX. Have appeared as articles in the _Morning Post_and are by kind permission reproduced without substantial change. 

I. 

THE NATION AND THE PARTIES

"I do not believe in the perfection of the British constitution as aninstrument of war ... It is evident that there is something in yourmachinery that is wrong. " These were the words of the late Marquis ofSalisbury, speaking as Prime Minister in his place in the House of Lordson the 30th of January 1900. They amounted to a declaration by theBritish Government that it could not govern, for the first business of aGovernment is to be able to defend the State of which it has charge, that is, to carry on war. Strange to say, the people of England wereundisturbed by so striking an admission of national failure. 

On the 16th of March 1909 came a new declaration from another PrimeMinister. Mr. Asquith, on the introduction of the Navy Estimates, explained to the House of Commons that the Government had been surprisedat the rate at which the new German navy was being constructed, and atthe rapid growth of Germany's power to build battleships. But it is thefirst duty of a Government to provide for national security and toprovide means to foresee. A Government that is surprised in a matterrelating to war is already half defeated. 

The creation of the German navy is the creation of means that could beused to challenge Great Britain's sea power and all that depends uponit. There has been no such challenge these hundred years, no challengeso formidable as that represented by the new German fleet these threehundred years. It brings with it a crisis in the national life ofEngland as great as has ever been known; yet this crisis finds theBritish nation divided, unready and uncertain what leadership it is toexpect. 

The dominant fact, the fact that controls all others, is that from nowonwards Great Britain has to face the stern reality of war, immediatelyby way of preparation and possibly at any moment by way of actualcollision. England is drifting into a quarrel with Germany which, if itcannot be settled, involves a struggle for the mastery with thestrongest nation that the world has yet seen--a nation that, under thepressure of necessity, has learnt to organise itself for war as forpeace; that sets its best minds to direct its preparations for war;that has an army of four million citizens, and that is of one mind inthe determination to make a navy that shall fear no antagonist. Aconflict of this kind is the test of nations, not only of their strengthbut also of their righteousness or right to be. It has two aspects. Itis first of all a quarrel and then a fight, and if we are to enter intoit without fear of destruction we must fulfil two conditions: in thequarrel we must be in the right, in the fight we must win. The twoconditions are inseparable. If there is a doubt about the justice of ourcause we shall be divided among ourselves, and it will be impossible forus to put forth the strength of a united nation. 

Have we really a quarrel with Germany? Is she doing us any wrong? Someof our people seem to think so, though I find it hard to say in what thewrong consists. Are we doing her any wrong? Some Germans seem to thinkso, and it behoves us, if we can, to find out what the German grievanceis. 

Suppose that there is a cause for quarrel, hidden at present but sooneror later to be revealed. What likelihood is there that we shall be ableto make good our case in arms, and to satisfy the world and posteritythat we deserved to win?

Germany can build fleets as fast as we can, and although we have a startthe race will not be easy for us; she has the finest school of war thatever existed, against which we have to set an Admiralty so muchmistrusted that at this moment a committee of the Cabinet is inquiringinto its efficiency. 

Is it not time for us to find the answer to the question raised by LordSalisbury nine years ago, to ascertain what it is that interferes withthe perfection of the British constitution as an instrument of war, andto set right what is wrong with our machinery?

The truth is that we have ceased to be a nation; we have forgottennationhood, and have become a conglomerate of classes, parties, factions, and sects. That is the disease. The remedy consists inreconstituting ourselves as a nation. 

What is a nation? The inhabitants of a country constituted as one bodyto secure their corporate being and well-being. The nation is all of us, and its government is trusteeship for us all in order to give us peaceand security, and in order that in peace and security we may make eachother's lives worth living by doing each the best work he can. Thenature of a nation may be seen by distinguishing it from the othernations outside and from the parties within. The mark of a nation issovereignty, which means, as regards other nations, the right and thepower to make peace with them or to carry on war against them, andwhich means, as regards those within, the right and the power to commandthem. 

A nation is a people constituted as a State, maintaining and supportinga Government which is at once the embodiment of right and the wielder offorce. If the right represented by the Government is challenged, eitherwithout or within, the Government asserts it by force, and in eithercase disposes, to any extent that may be required, of the property, thepersons, and the lives of its subjects. 

A party, according to the classical theory of the British constitution, is a body of men within the State who are agreed in regarding somemeasure or some principle as so vital to the State that, in order tosecure the adoption of the measure or the acceptance of the principle, they are willing to sink all differences of opinion on other matters, and to work together for the one purpose which they are agreed inregarding as fundamental. 

The theory of party government is based on the assumption that theremust always be some measure or some principle in regard to which thecitizens of the same country will differ so strongly as to subordinatetheir private convictions on other matters to their profound convictionsin regard to the one great question. It is a theory of permanent civilwar carried on through the forms of parliamentary debate and popularelection, and, indeed, the two traditional parties are the politicaldescendants of the two sides which in the seventeenth century wereactually engaged in civil war. For the ordinary purposes of the domesticlife of the country the system has its advantages, but they are coupledwith grave drawbacks. The party system destroys the sincerity of ourpolitical life, and introduces a dangerous dilettantism into theadministration of public business. 

A deliberative assembly like the House of Commons can reach a decisiononly by there being put from the chair a question to which the answermust be either Yes or No. It is evidently necessary to the sincerity ofsuch decisions that the answer given by each member shall in every casebe the expression of his conviction regarding the right answer to thequestion put. If every member in every division were to vote accordingto his own judgment and conscience upon the question put, there would bea perpetual circulation of members between the Ayes to the right and theNoes to the left. The party system prevents this. It obliges each memberon every important occasion to vote with his leaders and to follow theinstruction of the whips. In this way the division of opinion producedby some particular question or measure is, as far as possible, madepermanent and dominant, and the freedom of thought and of deliberationis confined within narrow limits. 

Thus there creeps into the system an element of insincerity which hasbeen enormously increased since the extension of the franchise and theconsequent organisation of parties in the country. Thirty or forty yearsago the caucus was established in all the constituencies, in each ofwhich was formed a party club, association, or committee, for thepurpose of securing at parliamentary elections the success of the partycandidate. The association, club, or committee consists, as regards itsactive or working portion, of a very small percentage of the voters evenof its own party, but it is affiliated to the central organisation andin practice it controls the choice of candidates. 

What is the result? That the affairs of the nation are entirely givenover to be disputed between the two organised parties, whose leaders arecompelled, in shaping their policy and in thinking about public affairs, to consider first and foremost the probable effect of what they will doand of what they will say upon the active members of the caucus of theirown party in the constituencies. The frame of mind of the members of thecaucus is that of men who regard the opposite caucus as the adversary. But the adversary of a nation can only be another nation. 

In this way the leaders of both parties, the men who fill the placeswhich, in a well-organised nation, would be assigned to statesmen, areplaced in it position in which statesmanship is almost impossible. Astatesman would be devoted solely to the nation. He would think first, second, and third of the nation. Security would be his prime object, andupon that basis he would aim at the elevation of the characters and ofthe lives of the whole population. But our leaders cannot possibly thinkfirst, second, and third of the nation. They have to think at least asmuch of the next election and of the opinions of their supporters. Inthis way their attention is diverted from that observation of othernations which is essential for the maintenance of security. Moreover, they are obliged to dwell on subjects directly intelligible to andappreciable by the voters in the constituencies, and are therebyhindered from giving either the time or the attention which they wouldlike to any of those problems of statesmanship which require close andarduous study for their solution. The wonder is in these conditions thatthey do their work so well, and maintain undiminished the reputation ofEnglish public men for integrity and ability. 

Yet what at the present moment is the principle about which parties aredivided? Is there any measure or any principle at issue which is reallyvital to Great Britain? Is there anything in dispute between the partieswhich would not be abandoned and forgotten at the first shot fired in awar between England and a great continental nation? I am convinced thatthat first shot must cause the scales to fall from men's eyes; that itmust make every one realise that our divisions are comparative triflesand that for years we have been wasting time over them. But if we waitfor the shock of war to arouse us to a sense of reality and to estimateour party differences at their true value, it will be too late. We shallwring our hands in vain over our past blindness and the insight we shallthen have obtained will avail us nothing. 

The party system has another consequence which will not stand scrutinyin the light of reality; it is dilettantism in the conduct of thenation's principal business. Some of the chief branches of the executivework of government are the provinces of special arts and sciences, eachof which to master requires the work of a lifetime. Of such a kind arethe art of carrying on war, whether by sea or land, the art ofconducting foreign relations, which involves a knowledge of all theother great States and their policies, and the direction of theeducational system, which cannot possibly be properly conducted exceptby an experienced educator. But the system gives the direction of eachof these branches to one of the political leaders forming the Cabinet orgoverning committee, and the practice is to consider as disqualifiedfrom membership of that committee any man who has given his life eitherto war, to foreign policy, or to education. Yet by its efficiency inthese matters the nation must stand or fall. By all means let us bechary of lightly making changes in the constitution or in thearrangements of government. But, if the security and continued existenceof the nation are in question, must we not scrutinise our methods ofgovernment with a view to make sure that they accord with the necessaryconditions of success in a national struggle for existence?

I am well aware that the train of thought to which I have tried to giveexpression is unpopular, and that most people think that anymodification of the traditional party system is impracticable. But thequestion is not whether the system is popular; it is whether it willenable the country to stand in the hour of trial. If the system isinefficient and fails to enable the nation to carry on with success thefunctions necessary for its preservation and if at the same time it isimpracticable to change it, then nothing can avert ruin from thiscountry. Yet I believe that a very large number of my countrymen are infact thinking each for himself the thoughts which I am trying toexpress. They are perhaps not the active members of the caucus of eitherparty, but they are men who, if they see the need, will not shrink fromexertions or from sacrifices which they believe to be useful ornecessary to the country. It is to them that the following pages are anappeal. I appeal with some confidence because what I shall try to showto be necessary is not so much a change of institutions as a change ofspirit; not a new constitution but a return to a true way of looking atpublic and private life. My contention is that the future of Englanddepends entirely upon the restoration of duty, of which the nation isthe symbol, to its proper place in our lives. 

II. 

DEFEAT

Great Britain is drifting unintentionally and half unconsciously into awar with the German Empire, a State which has a population of sixtymillions and is better organised for war than any State has ever been inmodern times. For such a conflict, which may come about to-morrow, andunless a great change takes place must come about in the near future, Great Britain is not prepared. 

The food of our people and the raw material of their industries come tothis country by sea, and the articles here produced go by sea to theirpurchasers abroad. Every transaction carries with it a certain profitwhich makes it possible. If the exporter and the manufacturer whosupplies him can make no profit they cannot continue their operations, and the men who work for them must lose their employment. 

Suppose Great Britain to be to-morrow at war with one or more of theGreat Powers of Europe. All the sailing vessels and slow steamers willstop running lest they should be taken by hostile cruisers. The faststeamers will have to pay war rates of insurance and to charge extrafreights. Steamers ready to leave foreign ports for this country willwait for instructions and for news. On the outbreak of war, therefore, this over-sea traffic must be greatly diminished in volume and carriedon with enormously increased difficulties. The supply of food would beconsiderably reduced and the certainty of the arrival of any particularcargo would have disappeared. The price of food must therefore rapidlyand greatly rise, and that alone would immediately impose very greathardships on the whole of the working class, of which a considerablepart would be driven across the line which separates modern comfort fromthe starvation margin. The diminution in the supply of the raw materialsof manufacture would be much greater and more immediate. Something likehalf the manufacturers of Great Britain must close their works for wantof materials. But will the other half be able to carry on? Foreignorders they cannot possibly execute, because there can be no certaintyof the delivery of the goods; and even if they could, the price at whichthey could deliver them with a profit would be much higher than it is inpeace. For with a diminished supply the price of raw material must goup, the cost of marine insurance must be added, together with the extrawages necessary to enable the workmen to live with food at an enhancedprice. 

Thus the effect of the greater difficulty of sea communication must beto destroy the margin of profit which enables the British capitalist tocarry on his works, while the effect of all these causes taken togetheron the credit system upon which our whole domestic economy reposes willperhaps be understood by business men. Even if this state of thingsshould last only a few months, it certainly involves the transfer toneutrals of all trade that is by possibility transferable. Foreigncountries will give their orders for cotton, woollen, and iron goods tothe United States, France, Switzerland, and Austro-Hungary, and at theconclusion of peace the British firms that before supplied them, if theyhave not in the meantime become bankrupt, will find that their customershave formed new connections. 

The shrinkage of credit would bring a multitude of commercial failures;the diminution of trade and the cessation of manufactures a great manymore. The unemployed would be counted by the million, and would have tobe kept at the public expense or starve. 

If in the midst of these misfortunes, caused by the mere fact of war, should come the news of defeat at sea, still more serious consequencesmust follow. After defeat at sea all regular and secure communicationbetween Great Britain, her Colonies, and India comes to an end. With theterrible blow to Britain's reputation which defeat at sea must bring, what will be the position of the 100, 000 British in India who for acentury have governed a population of nearly 300, 000, 000? What can theColonies do to help Great Britain under such conditions? For the commandof the sea nothing, and even if each of them had a first-rate army, whatwould be the use of those armies to this country in her hour of need?They cannot be brought to Europe unless the British navy commands thesea. 

These are some of the material consequences of defeat. But what of itsspiritual consequences? We have brought up our children in the pride ofa great nation, and taught them of an Empire on which the sun neversets. What shall we say to them in the hour of defeat and after thetreaty of peace imposed by the victor? They will say: "Find us work andwe will earn our bread and in due time win back the greatness that hasbeen lost. " But how are they to earn their bread? In this country halfthe employers will have been ruined by the war. The other half will havelost heavily, and much of the wealth even of the very rich will havegone to keep alive the innumerable multitude of starving unemployed. These will be advised after the war to emigrate. To what country?Englishmen, after defeat, will everywhere be at a discount. Words willnot describe, and the imagination cannot realise, the suffering of adefeated nation living on an island which for fifty years has notproduced food enough for its population. 

The material and spiritual results of defeat can easily be recognised byany one who takes the trouble to think about the question, though onlyexperience either at first hand or supplied by history can enable a manfully to grasp its terrible nature. But a word must be said on thesocial and political consequences inseparable from the wreck of a Statewhose Government has been unable to fulfil its prime function, that ofproviding security for the national life. All experience shows that insuch cases men do not take their troubles calmly. They are filled withpassion. Their feelings find vent in the actions to which their previouscurrents of thought tended. The working class, long accustomed by itsleaders to regard the capitalists as a class with interests and aimsopposed to its own, will hardly be able in the stress of unemploymentand of famine to change its way of thinking. The mass of the workmen, following leaders whose judgment may not perhaps be of the soundest butwho will undoubtedly sincerely believe that the doctrines with whichthey have grown up are true, may assail the existing social order andlay the blame of their misfortunes upon the class which has hitherto hadthe government of the country in its hands and has supplied the leadersof both political parties. The indignation which would inspire thismovement would not be altogether without justification, for it cannot bedenied that both political parties have for many years regardedpreparation for war and all that belongs to it as a minor matter, subordinate to the really far less important questions relying uponwhich each side has sought to win sufficient votes to secure a partymajority. 

Why do I discuss the hypothesis of British defeat rather than that ofBritish victory? Because it is the invariable practice of the masters ofwar to consider first the disagreeable possibilities and to makeprovision for them. But also because, according to every one of thetests which can be applied, the probability of defeat for Great Britainin the present state of Europe is exceedingly great. Rarely has a Stateunready for conflict been able to stand against a nation organised forwar. The last of a long series of examples was the war between Russiaand Japan, in which the vast resources of a great Empire were exhaustedin the struggle with a State so small as to seem a pigmy in comparisonwith her giant adversary. On the 10th of February 1904, the day when thenews reached England that the Russo-Japanese war had begun, I gave asfollows my reasons for thinking that Japan would win:--

"The hypothesis of a considerable Japanese success, at any rate atfirst, is considered rather than its opposite, because Japan has atpresent all the marks of a nation likely to do great things in war. Itis not merely that she has transformed her government and her education, has introduced military institutions on the German model, especiallycompulsory training and that vivifying institution, a general staff. Thepresent quarrel arises from the deliberate policy of Russia, pursuingaims that are incompatible with every Japanese tradition and everyJapanese hope. The whole Japanese nation has for years been burning withthe sense of wrongs inflicted by Russia, and into this war, as into thepreparation for it, the whole people throws itself, mind, soul, andbody. This is the condition which produces great strategical plans andextreme energy in their execution. The Japanese forces are wellorganised, armed, and equipped. They are intelligently led and followwith intelligence. 

"Of Russia there is hardly evidence to show that the cause for which sheis fighting has touched the imaginations or the feelings of more than asmall fraction of the population. It is the war of a bureaucracy, andRussia may easily fail to develop either great leading, though herofficers are instructed, or intelligent following of the leaders by therank and file. But the Russian troops are brave and have always needed agood deal of beating. "

Substitute Great Britain for Russia and Germany for Japan in thisforecast, which has been proved true, and every word holds good excepttwo. We now know that Russia's policy was not deliberate; that herGovernment bungled into the war without knowing what it was doing. Injust the same way British Governments have drifted blindly into thepresent difficult relations with Germany. Those in England who wouldpush the country into a war with Germany are indeed not a bureaucracy, they are merely a fraction of one of the parties, and do not representthe mass of our people, who have no desire for such a war, and are solittle aware of its possibility that they have never even taken thetrouble to find out why it may come. A larger section of the other partyis steeped in the belief that force, violence, and war are wicked inthemselves, and ought therefore not to be thought about. It is aprejudice which, unless removed, may ruin this country, and there is noway of dissipating it except that of patient argument based uponobservation of the world we live in. That way I shall attempt to followin the next chapter. 

III. 

FORCE AND RIGHT

"Ye have heard that it hath been said, An eye for an eye, anda tooth for a tooth: but I say unto you, That ye resist not evil: butwhosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the otheralso. And if any man will sue thee at the law, and take away thycoat, let him have thy cloke also. And whosoever shall compel theeto go a mile, go with him twain. Give to him that asketh thee, andfrom him that would borrow of thee turn not thou away. Ye haveheard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbour, andhate thine enemy: but I say unto you, Love your enemies. "(Matt. V. 38-44). 

If there are any among us who adopt these words as the governing rule oftheir lives they will certainly cause no difficulty to the State in itsmilitary policy whatever that may be, and will find their natural placeseven in time of war to the public good. If the whole population were oftheir way of thinking and acting there would be no need to discuss war. An invader would not be resisted. His troops would be hospitablyentertained and treated with affection. No opposition would be made tothe change of Government which he would introduce, and the taxes whichhe imposed would be cheerfully paid. But there would be no State, exceptthat created by the invader; and the problem of conduct for thoseliving the life described would arise when the State so set up issuedits ordinances requiring every able-bodied man to become a competentsoldier. 

There are those who believe, or fancy they believe, that the words Ihave quoted involve the principle that the use of force or of violencebetween man and man, or between nation and nation, is wicked. To the manwho thinks it right to submit to any violence or to be killed ratherthan to use violence in resistance, I have no reply to make. The worldcannot conquer him and fear has no hold upon him. But even he can carryout his doctrine only to the extent of allowing himself to beill-treated, as I will now convince him. Many years ago the people ofSouth Lancashire were horrified by the facts reported in a trial formurder. In a village on the outskirts of Bolton lived a young woman, much liked and respected as a teacher in one of the Board schools. Onher way home from school she was accustomed to follow a footpath througha lonely wood, and here one evening her body was found. She had beenstrangled by a ruffian who had thought in this lonely place to have hiswicked will of her. She had resisted successfully and he had killed herin the struggle. Fortunately the murderer was caught and the factsascertained from circumstantial evidence were confirmed by hisconfession. Now, the question I have to ask of the man who takes hisstand on the passage I have quoted from the Gospel is: "What would havebeen your duty if you had been walking through that wood and come uponthe girl struggling with the man who killed her?" This is a crucialinstance which, I submit, utterly destroys the doctrine that the use ofviolence is in itself wrong. The right or wrong is not in the employmentof force but simply in the purpose for which it is used. What the caseestablishes, I think, is that to use violence in resistance to violentwrong is not only right but necessary. 

The employment of force for the maintenance of right is the foundationof all civilised human life, for it is the fundamental function of theState, and apart from the State there is no civilisation, no life worthliving. The first business of the State is to protect the communityagainst violent interference from outside. This it does by requiringfrom its subjects whatever personal service and whatever sacrifice ofproperty and of time may be necessary; and resistance to these demands, as well as to any injunctions whatever laid by the State upon itssubjects, is unconditionally suppressed by force. The mark of the Stateis sovereignty, or the identification of force and right, and themeasure of the perfection of the State is furnished by the completenessof this identification. In the present condition of English politicalthought it may be worth while to dwell for a few moments upon thebeneficent nature of this dual action of the State. 

Within its jurisdiction the State maintains order and law and in thisway makes life worth living for its subjects. Order and law are thenecessary conditions of men's normal activities, of their industry, oftheir ownership of whatever the State allows them to possess--foroutside of the State there is no ownership--of their leisure and oftheir freedom to enjoy it. The State is even the basis of men'scharacters, for it sets up and establishes a minimum standard ofconduct. Certain acts are defined as unlawful and punished as crimes. Other acts, though not criminal, are yet so far subject to thedisapproval of the courts that the man who does them may have tocompensate those who suffer injury or damage in consequence of them. These standards have a dual origin, in legislation and precedent. Legislation is a formal expression of the agreement of the communityupon the definition of crimes, and common law has been produced by thedecisions of the courts in actions between man and man. Every case triedin a civil court is a conflict between two parties, a struggle forjustice, the judgment being justice applied to the particular case. Thegrowth of English law has been through an endless series of conflicts, and the law of to-day may be described as a line passing through aseries of points representing an infinite number of judgments, each thedecision of a conflict in court. For seven hundred years, with hardly aninterruption, every judgment of a court has been sustained by the forceof the State. The law thus produced, expressed in legislation andinterpreted by the courts, is the foundation of all English conduct andcharacter. Upon the basis thus laid there takes place a perpetualevolution of higher standards. In the intercourse of a settled andundisturbed community and of the many societies which it contains, arisea number of standards of behaviour which each man catches as it were byinfection from the persons with whom he habitually associates and towhich he is obliged to conform, because if his conduct falls below themhis companions will have nothing to do with him. Every class of societyhas its notions of what constitutes proper conduct and constrains itsmembers to carry on their lives, so far as they are open to inspection, according to these notions. The standards tend constantly to improve. Men form an ideal of behaviour by observing the conduct of the best oftheir class, and in proportion as this ideal gains acceptance, findthemselves driven to adopt it for fear of the social ostracism which isthe modern equivalent of excommunication. Little by little what was atfirst a rarely attained ideal becomes a part of good manners. Itestablished itself as custom and finally becomes part of the law. 

Thus the State, in co-operation with the whole community, becomes theeducator of its people. Standards of conduct are formed slowly in thebest minds and exist at first merely in what Plato would have called"the intellectual sphere, " or in what would have been called at a laterdate in Palestine the "kingdom of heaven. " But the strongest impulse ofmankind is to realise its ideals. Its fervent prayer, which once utteredcan never cease, is "on earth as it is in heaven, " and the idealsdeveloped in man's spiritual life gradually take shape in laws andbecome prohibitions and injunctions backed by the forces of the State. 

The State, however, is not an abstraction. For English people it meansthe United Kingdom; and if an Englishman wants to realise what he owesto his country let him look back through its history and see how allthat he values in the character of the men he most admires and all thatis best in himself has gradually been created and realised through theceaseless effort of his forefathers, carried on continuously from thetime when the first Englishman crossed the North Sea until the presentday. Other nations have their types of conduct, perhaps as good as ourown, but Englishmen value, and rightly value, the ideals particularlyassociated with the life of their own country. Perhaps two of thecommonest expressions convey peculiarly English views of character. Wetalk of "fair play" as the essence of just dealing between man and man. It is a conception we have developed from the national games. Wedescribe ideal conduct as that of a gentleman. It is a condensation ofthe best part of English history, and a search for a definition of thefunction of Great Britain in the moral economy of the world will hardlyfind a better answer than that it is to stamp upon every subject of theKing the character implied in these two expressions. Suppose the BritishState to be overthrown or to drop from its place among the great Powersof the world, these ideals of character would be discredited and theirplace would be taken by others. 

The justification of the constraint exercised by the State upon its owncitizens is the necessity for security, the obligation of self-defence, which arises from the fact that outside the State there are otherStates, each endowed like itself with sovereignty, each of themmaintaining by force its conception of right. The power of the Stateover its own subjects is thus in the last resort a consequence of theexistence of other States. Upon the competition between them rests theorder of the world. It is a competition extending to every sphere oflife and in its acute form takes the shape of war, a struggle forexistence, for the mastery or for right. 

IV. 

ARBITRATION AND DISARMAMENT

To some people the place of war in the economy of nations appears to beunsatisfactory. They think war wicked and a world where it exists out ofjoint. Accordingly they devote themselves to suggestions for theabolition of war and for the discovery of some substitute for it. Twotheories are common; the first, that arbitration can in every case be asubstitute for war, the second that the hopes of peace would beincreased by some general agreement for disarmament. 

The idea of those who regard arbitration as a universal substitute forwar appears to be that the relations between States can be put upon abasis resembling that of the relations between citizens in a settled andcivilised country like our own. In Great Britain we are accustomed to avariety of means for settling disagreements between persons. There arethe law courts, there are the cases in which recourse is had, with thesanction of the law courts, to the inquiry and decision of anarbitrator, and in all our sports we are accustomed to the presence ofan umpire whose duty it is impartially to see that the rules of thegame are observed and immediately to decide all points that mightotherwise be doubtful. 

The work of an umpire who sees that the rules of the game are observedis based upon the consent of the players of both sides. Without thatconsent there could be no game, and the consent will be found to bebased upon the fact that all the players are brought up with similartraditions and with like views of the nature of the game. Where thisunity does not exist, difficulties constantly arise, as is notoriouslythe case in international sports. The attempt has been made, withconstantly increasing success, to mitigate the evils of war by thecreation of institutions in some way analogous to that of the umpire ina game. The Declaration of London, recently published, is an agreementbetween the principal Powers to accept a series of rules concerningmaritime war, to be administered by an International Prize Court. 

The function of an arbitrator, usually to decide questions of fact andto assess compensation for inconvenience, most commonly theinconvenience occasioned to a private person by some necessary act ofthe State, also rests upon the consent of the parties, though in thiscase the consent is usually imposed upon them by the State through somelegislative enactment or through the decision of a court. The action ofa court of law, on the other hand, does not rest upon the consent of theparties. In a civil action the defendant may be and very often isunwilling to take any part in the proceedings. But he has no choice, and, whether he likes it or not, is bound by the decision of the court. For the court is the State acting in its judicial capacity with a viewto insure that justice shall be done. The plaintiff alleges that thedefendant has done him some wrong either by breach of contract orotherwise, and the verdict or judgment determines whether or not this isthe case, and, if it is, what compensation is due. The judgment oncegiven, the whole power of the State will be used to secure itsexecution. 

The business of a criminal court is the punishment of offenders whom itis the function of the State to discover, to bring to trial, and, whenconvicted, to punish. The prisoner's consent is not asked, and thejudgment of the court is supported by the whole power of the State. 

In the international sphere there is no parallel to the action either ofa civil or of a criminal court. Civil and criminal jurisdiction areattributes of sovereignty, and over two independent States there is nosovereign power. If, therefore, it is desired to institute between twoStates a situation analogous to that by which the subjects of a singleGovernment are amenable to judicial tribunals, the proper way is tobring the two States under one sovereignty. This can be effected, and isconstantly effected, by one of two methods. Either the two Statesfederate and form a united State, or one of them conquers and annexesthe other. The former process has been seen in modern times in theformation of the United States of America: the latter formed thesubstance of the history of civilisation during the first threecenturies before Christ, when the Roman State successively conquered, annexed, and absorbed all the other then existing States surrounding thebasin of the Mediterranean. 

The history of no State justifies the belief that order and justice cansuccessfully be maintained merely by the action of umpires and ofarbitrators. Every State worth the name has had to rely upon civil andcriminal courts and upon law enforced by its authority, that is, upon aseries of principles of right expressed in legislation and upon anorganisation of force for the purpose of carrying those principles intopractical effect. 

It appears, then, that so far from the experience of States justifyingthe view that it is wrong to employ force, the truth is that right orlaw, unless supported by force, is ineffective, that the objection inprinciple to any use of force involves anarchy, or the cessation of theState, and that the wish to substitute judicial tribunals for war as ameans of settling disputes between State and State is a wish toamalgamate under a single Government all those States which are tobenefit by the substitution. 

The reasonable attitude with regard to arbitration is to accept itwhenever the other side will accept it. But if the adversary refusesarbitration and insists upon using force, what course is open to anyState but that of resisting force by force?

Arbitration has from the earliest times been preferred in most of thosecases to which it was applicable, that is, in cases in which there was abasis of common view or common tradition sufficient to make agreementpracticable. But wherever there has been a marked divergence of idealsor a different standard of right, there has been a tendency for eachside to feel that to submit its conscience or its convictions of right, its sense of what is most sacred in life, to an outside judgment wouldinvolve a kind of moral suicide. In such cases every nation repudiatesarbitration and prefers to be a martyr, in case of need, to its sense ofjustice. It is at least an open question whether the disappearance ofthis feeling would be a mark of progress or of degeneration. At any rateit is practically certain that the period when it will have disappearedcannot at present be foreseen. 

The abolition of war, therefore, involves the abolition of independentStates and their amalgamation into one. There are many who have hopedfor this ideal, expressed by Tennyson when he dreamed of

"The Parliament of man, the Federation of the world. "

That it is the ultimate destiny of mankind to be united under a singleGovernment seems probable enough, but it is rash to assume that thatresult will be reached either by a process of peaceful negotiation, orby the spread of the imperfect methods of modern democratic government. The German Empire, with its population of sixty millions, educated bythe State, disciplined by the State, relying on the State, and commandedby the State, is as potent in comparison with the less disciplined andless organised communities which surround it as was, in the thirdcentury before Christ, the Roman State in comparison with the disunitedmultitude of Greek cities, the commercial oligarchy of Carthage, and thehalf-civilised tribes of Gaul and Spain. Unless the other States ofEurope can rouse themselves to a discipline as sound and to anorganisation as subtle as those of Prussia and to the perception of acommon purpose in the maintenance of their independence, the union ofEurope under a single Government is more likely to be brought about bythe conquering hand of Germany than by the extension of democraticinstitutions and of sentimental good understandings. 

Proposals for disarmament stand on an entirely different footing fromproposals to agree to arbitration. The State that disarms renounces tothe extent of its disarmament the power to protect itself. Upon whatother power is it suggested that it should rely? In the last analysisthe suggestion amounts to a proposal for the abolition of the State, orits abandonment of its claim to represent the right. Those who proposeagreements for disarmament imagine that the suggestion if adopted wouldlead to the establishment of peace. Have they considered the naturalhistory of peace as one of the phenomena of the globe which we inhabit?The only peace of any value is that between civilised nations. It restseither upon the absence of dispute between them or upon an equilibriumof forces. During the last few centuries there has usually been at theend of a great European war a great European congress which hasregulated for the time being the matters which were in dispute, and thetreaty thus negotiated has remained for a long time the basis of therelations between the Powers. It is always a compromise, but acompromise more or less acceptable to all parties, in which theyacquiesce until some change either by growth or decay makes theconditions irksome. Then comes a moment when one or more of the Statesis dissatisfied and wishes for a change. When that has happened thedissatisfied State attempts to bring about the change which it desires, but if the forces with which its wish is likely to be opposed are verygreat it may long acquiesce in a state of things most distasteful to it. Let there be a change in the balance of forces and the discontentedState will seize the opportunity, will assert itself, and if resistedwill use its forces to overcome opposition. A proposal for disarmamentmust necessarily be based upon the assumption that there is to be nochange in the system, that the _status quo_ is everywhere to bepreserved. This amounts to a guarantee of the decaying and inefficientStates against those which are growing and are more efficient. Such anarrangement would not tend to promote the welfare of mankind and willnot be accepted by those nations that have confidence in their ownfuture. That such a proposal should have been announced by a BritishGovernment is evidence not of the strength of Great Britain, not of ahealthy condition of national life, but of inability to appreciate thechanges which have been produced during the last century in theconditions of Europe and the consequent alteration in Great Britain'srelative position among the great Powers. It was long ago remarked bythe German historian Bernhardi that Great Britain was the first countryin Europe to revive in the modern world the conception of the State. Thefeudal conception identified the State with the monarch. The Englishrevolution of 1688 was an identification of the State with the Nation. But the nationalisation of the State, of which the example was set in1688 by Great Britain, was carried out much more thoroughly by France inthe period that followed the revolution of 1789; and in the greatconflict which ensued between France and the European States theprincipal continental opponents of France were compelled to follow herexample, and, in a far greater degree than has ever happened in England, to nationalise the State. It is to that struggle that we must turn if weare to understand the present condition of Europe and the relations ofGreat Britain to the European Powers. 

V. 

THE NATIONALISATION OF WAR

The transformation of society of which the French Revolution was themost striking symptom produced a corresponding change in the characterof war. 

By the Revolution the French people constituted itself the State, andthe process was accompanied by so much passion and so much violence thatit shortly involved the reconstituted nation in a quarrel with itsneighbours the Germanic Empire and Prussia, which rapidly developed intoa war between France and almost all the rest of Europe. The Revolutionweakened and demoralised the French army and disorganised the navy, which it deprived of almost all its experienced officers. When the warbegan the regular army was supplemented by a great levy of volunteers. The mixed force thus formed, in spite of early successes, was unable tostand against the well-disciplined armies of Austria and Prussia, and asthe war continued, while the French troops gained solidity andexperience, their numbers had to be increased by a levy _en masse_ or acompulsory drafting of all the men of a certain age into the army. Inthis way the army and the nation were identified as they had never beenin modern Europe before, and in the fifth year of the war a leader wasfound in the person of General Bonaparte, who had imbued himself withthe principles of the art of war, as they had been expounded by the beststrategists of the old French army, and who had thus thought out withunprecedented lucidity the method of conducting campaigns. His masteryof the art of generalship was revealed by his success in 1796, and asthe conflict with Europe continued, he became the leader and eventuallythe master of France. Under his impulse and guidance the French army, superior to them in numbers, organisation, and tactical skill, crushedone after another the more old-fashioned and smaller armies of the greatcontinental Powers, with the result that the defeated armies, under theinfluence of national resentment after disaster, attempted to reorganisethemselves upon the French model. The new Austrian army undertook itsrevenge too soon and was defeated in 1809; but the Prussian endeavourcontinued and bore fruit, after the French disasters in Russia of 1812, in the national rising in which Prussia, supported by Russia and Austriaand assisted by the British operations in the Peninsula, overthrew theFrench Empire in 1814. 

After the definitive peace, deferred by the hundred days, but finallyforced upon France on the field of Waterloo, the Prussian Governmentcontinued to foster the school of war which it had founded in the periodof humiliation. Prussian officers trained in that school tried to learnthe lessons of the long period of war which they had passed through. What they discovered was that war between nations, as distinct from warbetween dynasties or royal houses, was a struggle for existence in whicheach adversary risked everything and in which success was to be expectedonly from the complete prostration of the enemy. In the long run, theysaid to themselves, the only defence consists in striking your adversaryto the ground. That being the case, a nation must go into war, if warshould become inevitable, with the maximum force which it can possiblyproduce, represented by its whole manhood of military age, thoroughlytrained, organised, and equipped. The Prussian Government adhered tothese ideas, to which full effect was given in 1866, when the Prussianarmy, reorganised in 1860, crushed in ten days the army of Austria, andin 1870 when, in a month from the first shot fired, it defeated one halfof the French army at Gravelotte and captured the other half at Sedan. These events proved to all continental nations the necessity of adoptingthe system of the nation in arms and giving to their whole malepopulation, up to the limits of possibility, the training and theorganisation necessary for success in war. 

The principle that war is a struggle for existence, and that the onlyeffective defence consists in the destruction of the adversary's force, received during the age of Napoleon an even more absolute demonstrationat sea than was possible on land. Great Britain, whether she would orno, was drawn into the European conflict. The neglect of the army and ofthe art of war into which, during the eighteenth century, herGovernments had for the most part fallen, made it impracticable for herto take the decisive part which she had played in the days of WilliamIII. And of Marlborough in the struggle against the French army; hercontributions to the land war were for the most part misdirected andfutile. Her expeditions to Dunkirk, to Holland, and to Hanoverembarrassed rather than materially assisted the cause of her allies. Buther navy, favourably handicapped by the breakdown, due to theRevolution, of the French navy, eventually produced in the person ofNelson a leader who, like Napoleon, had made it the business of his lifeto understand the art of war. His victories, like Napoleon's, weredecisive, and when he fell at Trafalgar the navies of continentalEurope, which one after another had been pressed into the service ofFrance, had all been destroyed. 

Then were revealed the prodigious consequences of complete victory atsea, which were more immediate, more decisive, more far-reaching, moreirrevocable than on land. The sea became during the continuance of thewar the territory of Great Britain, the open highway along which herships could pass, while it was closed to the ships of her adversaries. Across that secure sea a small army was sent to Spain to assist thenational and heroic, though miserably organised, resistance made by theSpanish people against the French attempt at conquest. The BritishGovernment had at last found the right direction for such military forceas it possessed. Sir John Moore's army brought Napoleon with a greatforce into the field, but it was able to retire to its own territory, the sea. The army under Wellington, handled with splendid judgment, hadto wait long for its opportunity, which came when Napoleon with theGrand Army had plunged into the vast expanse of Russia. Wellington, marching from victory to victory, was then able to produce upon thegeneral course of the war an effect out of all proportion to thestrength of the force which he commanded or of that which directlyopposed him. 

While France was engaged in her great continental struggle England wasreaping, all over the world, the fruits of her naval victories. Of thecolonies of her enemies she took as many as she wanted, though at thepeace she returned most of them to their former owners. Of the world'strade she obtained something like a monopoly. The nineteenth century sawthe British colonies grow up into so many nations and the Britishadministration of India become a great empire. These developments arenow seen to have been possible only through the security due to the factthat Great Britain, during the first half of the nineteenth century, hadthe only navy worth considering in the world, and that during the secondhalf its strength greatly preponderated over that of any of the newnavies which had been built or were building. No wonder that when in1888 the American observer, Captain Mahan, published his volume "TheInfluence of Sea Power upon History, " other nations besides the Britishread from that book the lesson that victory at sea carried with it aprosperity, an influence, and a greatness obtainable by no other means. It was natural for Englishmen to draw the moral which was slumbering inthe national consciousness that England's independence, her empire, andher greatness depended upon her sea power. But it was equally naturalthat other nations should draw a different moral and should askthemselves why this tremendous prize, the primacy of nations and thefirst place in the world, should for ever belong to the inhabitants ofa small island, a mere appendage to the continent of Europe. 

This question we must try to answer. But before entering upon thatinquiry I will ask the reader to note the great lesson of the age ofNapoleon and of Nelson. It produced a change in the character of war, which enlarged itself from a mere dispute between Governments and becamea struggle between nations. The instrument used was no longer a smallstanding army, but the able-bodied male population in arms. GreatBritain indeed still retained her standing army, but for the time shethrew her resources without stint into her navy and its success wasdecisive. 

VI. 

THE BALANCE OF POWER

We have seen what a splendid prize was the result of British victory atsea, supplemented by British assistance to other Powers on land, acentury ago. We have now to ask ourselves first of all how it came aboutthat Great Britain was able to win it, and afterwards whether it wasawarded once for all or was merely a challenge cup to be held only solong as there should be no competitor. 

The answer to the first question is a matter of history. England waspeculiarly favoured by fortune or by fate in the great struggles throughwhich, during a period of three hundred years, she asserted andincreased her superiority at sea until a century ago it becamesupremacy. She rarely had to fight alone. Her first adversary was Spain. In the conflict with Spain she had the assistance of the DutchProvinces. When the Dutch were strong enough to become her maritimerivals she had for a time the co-operation of France. Then came a longperiod during which France was her antagonist. At the beginning of thisepoch William III. Accepted the British crown in order to be able to usethe strength of England to defend his native country, Holland. His workwas taken up by Marlborough, whose first great victory was won inco-operation with the Imperial commander, Prince Eugene. From that timeon, each of the principal wars was a European war in which France wasfighting both by sea and land, her armies being engaged againstcontinental foes, while Great Britain could devote her energies almostexclusively to her navy. In the Seven Years' War it was the Prussianarmy which won the victories on land, while small British forces wereenabled by the help of the navy to win an Empire from France in Canada, and to lay the foundations of the British Empire in India. In the war ofAmerican Independence, Great Britain for once stood alone, but this wasthe one conflict which contributed little or nothing towardsestablishing the ascendency of the British navy. Great Britain failed ofher object because that ascendency was incomplete. Then came the wars ofthe French Revolution and Empire in which the British navy was thepartner of the Austrian, Prussian, Russian, and Spanish armies. 

These are the facts which we have to explain. We have to find out how itwas that so many continental nations, whether they liked it or not, found themselves, in fighting their own battles, helping to bring aboutthe British predominance at sea. It must be remembered that land warfareinvolves much heavier sacrifices of life than warfare at sea, and thatthough Great Britain no doubt spent great sums of money not merely inmaintaining her navy but also in subsidising her allies, she could wellafford to do so because the prosperity of her over-sea trade, due to hernaval success, made her the richest country in Europe. The other nationsthat were her allies might not unnaturally feel that they had toiled andthat Great Britain had gathered the increase. What is the explanation ofa co-operation of which in the long run it might seem that one partnerhas had the principal benefit?

If two nations carry on a serious war on the same side, it may beassumed that each of them is fighting for some cause which it holds tobe vital, and that some sort of common interest binds the alliestogether. The most vital interest of any nation is its own independence, and while that is in question it conceives of its struggle as one ofself-defence. The explanation of Great Britain's having had allies inthe past may therefore be that the independence of Great Britain wasthreatened by the same danger which threatened the independence of otherPowers. This theory is made more probable by the fact that England'sgreat struggles--that of Queen Elizabeth against Spain, that of WilliamIII. And Marlborough against Louis XIV. , and of Pitt againstNapoleon--were, each one of them, against an adversary whose power wasso great as to overshadow the Continent and to threaten it with anascendency which, had it not been checked, might have developed into auniversal monarchy. It seems, therefore, that in the main England, indefending her own interests, was consciously or unconsciously thechampion of the independence of nations against the predominance of anyone of their number. The effect of Great Britain's self-defence was tofacilitate the self-defence of other nations, and thus to preserve toEurope its character of a community of independent States as opposed tothat which it might have acquired, if there had been no England, of asingle Empire, governed from a single capital. 

This is, however, only half of the answer we want. It explains to someextent why England could find other nations co-operating with her, andreveals the general nature of the cause which they maintained in common. But let us remember the distinction between a quarrel in which the mainthing is to be in the right, and a fight in which the main thing is towin. The explanation just sketched is a justification of England'spolicy, an attempt to show that in the main she had right on her side. That is only part of the reason why she had allies. The other part isthat she was strong and could help them. 

She had three modes of action. She used her navy to destroy the hostilenavy or navies and to obtain control of the seaways. Then she used thatcontrol partly to destroy the seaborne trade of her enemies, and partlyto send armies across the sea to attack her enemies' armies. It wasbecause she could employ these three modes of warfare, and because twoof them were not available for other Powers, that her influence on thecourse of events was so great. 

The question of moral justification is more or less speculative. I havetreated it here on a hypothesis which is not new, though since Ipropounded it many years ago it has met with little adverse criticism. But the question of force is one of hard fact; it is fundamental. IfEngland had not been able to win her battles at sea and to help herallies by her war against trade and by her ubiquitous if small armies, there would have been no need for hypotheses by which to justify orexplain her policy; she would have long ago lost all importance and allinterest except to antiquarians. Our object is to find out how she maynow justify her existence, and enough has been said to make it clearthat if she is to do that she must not only have a cause good enough togain the sympathy of other Powers, but force enough to give themconfidence in what she can do to help herself and them. 

We are now ready to examine the second question, whether or no GreatBritain's position, won a century ago, is liable to challenge. 

VII. 

THE RISE OF GERMANY

The great event of the nineteenth century in the history of Europe isthe union of Germany into a Federal State. The secret of Prussia'ssuccess in accomplishing that union and in leading the federation socreated, has been the organisation of the national energies by afar-seeing Government, a process begun as a means of self-defenceagainst the French domination of the period between 1806 and 1812. ThePrussian statesmen of those days were not content merely to reorganisethe army on the basis of universal service. They organised the wholenation. They swept away an ancient system of land tenure in order tomake the peasants free and prosperous. They established a system ofpublic education far in advance of anything possessed by any othernation. They especially devoted themselves to fostering industry, manufacture, and commerce. The result of this systematic direction ofthe national energies by a Government of experts, continuously supportedby the patient and methodical diligence of the people, has been aconstant and remarkable advance of the national prosperity, a wonderfuldevelopment of the national resources, and an enormous addition to thenational strength. For the last forty years it has been the settledpolicy of the German Government that her organised military forcesshould be strong enough in case of need to confront two enemies at once, one on either frontier. Feeling themselves thus stronger than any otherEuropean state, the Germans have watched with admiration the growth ofthe British Colonies and of British trade. It is natural that theyshould think that Germany too might expect to have colonies and a greatmaritime trade. But wherever in the world German travellers have gone, wherever German traders have settled, wherever the German Government hasthought of working for a site for a colony, everywhere they have metBritish influence, British trade, the British flag. 

In this way has been brought home to them as to no other people thetremendous influence of sea-power. Their historians have recalled tothem the successive attempts which have been made in past times byGerman States to create a navy and to obtain colonies, attempts which toour own people are quite unknown, because they never, except in the caseof the Hanseatic League, attained to such importance as to figure in thegeneral history of Europe. In the period between 1815 and 1870, whenthe desire for national unity was expressed by a host of German writers, there were not wanting pleas for the creation of a German navy. Severalattempts were made in those days to construct either a Prussian or aGerman fleet; but the time was not ripe and these attempts came tonothing. The constitution of the Empire, promulgated in 1871, embodiedthe principle that there should be a German navy, of which the Emperorshould be commander-in-chief, and to the creation of that navy the mostassiduous labour has been devoted. The plan pursued was in the firstinstance to train a body of officers who should thoroughly understandthe sea and maritime warfare, and for this purpose the few ships whichwere first built were sent on long voyages by way of training the crewsand of giving the officers that self-reliance and initiative which werethought to be the characteristic mark of the officers of the Britishnavy. In due time was founded the naval college of Kiel, designed on alarge scale to be a great school of naval thought and of naval war. Thehistory of maritime wars was diligently studied, _especially_ ofcourse the history of the British navy. The professors and lecturersmade it their business to explore the workings of Nelson's mind just asGerman military professors had made themselves pupils of Napoleon. Andnot until a clear and consistent theory of naval war had been elaboratedand made the common property of all the officers of the navy was theattempt made to expand the fleet to a scale thought to be proportionateto the position of Germany among the nations. When it was at lengthdetermined that that constructive effort should be made, the plan wasthought out and embodied in a law regulating the construction for anumber of years of a fleet of predetermined size and composition to beused for a purpose defined in the law itself. The object was to have afleet of sufficient strength and of suitable formation to be able tohold its own in case of need even against the greatest maritime Power. In other words, Germany thought that if her prosperity continued and hersuperiority in organisation over other continental nations continued toincrease, she might find England's policy backed by England's navalpower an obstacle in the way of her natural ambition. After all, no onecan be surprised if the Germans think Germany as well entitled as _anyother_ State to cherish the ambition of being the first nation in theworld. 

It has for a century been the rational practice of the German Governmentthat its chief strategist should at all times keep ready designs foroperations in case of war against any reasonably possible adversary. Such a set of designs would naturally include a plan of operation forthe case of a conflict with Great Britain, and no doubt, every timethat plan of operations was re-examined and revised, light would bethrown upon the difficulties of a struggle with a great maritime Powerand upon the means by which those difficulties might be overcome. TheBritish navy is so strong that, unless it were mismanaged, the Germannavy ought to have no chance of overcoming it. Yet Germany cannot but beanxious, in case of war, to protect herself against the consequences ofmaritime blockade, and of the effort of a superior British navy to closethe sea to German merchantmen. Accordingly, the law which regulates thenaval shipbuilding of the German Empire lays down in its preamblethat--"Germany must possess a battle-fleet so strong that a war with herwould, even for the greatest naval Power, be accompanied with suchdangers as would render that Power's position doubtful. " In other words, a war with Great Britain must find the German navy too strong for theBritish navy to be able to confine it to its harbours, and to maintain, in spite of it, complete command of the seas which border the Germancoast. As German strategists continuously accept the doctrine that thefirst object of a fleet in war is the destruction of the enemy's fleetwith a view to the consequent command of the sea, the German Navy Act isequivalent to the declaration of an intention in case of conflict tochallenge the British navy for the mastery. This is the answer to thequestion asked at the beginning of the last chapter, whether the commandof the sea is a permanent prize or a challenge cup. Germany at any rateregards it as a challenge cup, and has resolved to be qualified, ifoccasion should arise, to make trial of her capacity to win it. 

VIII. 

NATIONHOOD NEGLECTED

What has been the effect upon Great Britain of the rise of Germany? Isthere any cause of quarrel between the two peoples and the two States?That Germany has given herself a strong military organisation is nocrime. On the contrary, she was obliged to do it, she could not haveexisted without it. The foundations of her army were laid when she wassuffering all the agonies of conquest and oppression. Only by atremendous effort, at the cost of sacrifices to which England'sexperience offers no analogy, was she able to free herself from theover-lordship of Napoleon. King William I. Expanded and reorganised hisarmy because he had passed through the bitter humiliation of seeing hiscountry impotent and humbled by a combination of Austria and Russia. Whether Bismarck's diplomacy was less honourable than that of theadversaries with whom he had to deal is a question to which differentanswers may be given. But in a large view of history it is irrelevant, for beyond all doubt the settlements effected through the war of 1866and 1870 were sound settlements and left the German nation and Europein a healthier condition than that which preceded them. The unity ofGermany was won by the blood of her people, who were and are rightlyresolved to remain strong enough and ready to defend it, come what may. It is not for Englishmen, who have talked for twenty years of aTwo-Power standard for their navy, to reproach Germany for maintainingher army at a similar standard. Had she not done so the peace of Europewould not have been preserved, nor is it possible on any ground of rightor justice to cavil at Germany's purpose to be able in case of need todefend herself at sea. The German Admiral Rosendahl, discussing theBritish and German navies and the proposals for disarmament, wrote inthe _Deutsche Revue_ for June 1909:--

"If England claims and thinks permanently necessary for her an absolutesupremacy at sea that is her affair, and no sensible man will reproachher for it; but it is quite a different thing for a Great Power like theGerman Empire, by an international treaty supposed to be binding for alltime, expressly to recognise and accept this in principle. Assuredly wedo not wish to enter into a building competition with England on afooting of equality.... But a political agreement on the basis of theunconditional superiority of the British Fleet would be equivalent toan abandonment of our national dignity, and though we do not, speakingbroadly, wish to dispute England's predominance at sea, yet we do meanin case of war to be or to become the masters on our own coasts. "

There is not a word in this passage which can give just cause of offenceto England or to Englishmen. 

That there has been and still is a good deal of mutual ill-feeling bothin Germany and in England cannot be denied. Rivalry between nations isalways accompanied by feeling which is all the stronger when it isinstinctive and therefore, though not unintelligible, apt to beirrational. But what in this case is really at the bottom of it? Therehave no doubt been a number of matters that have been discussed betweenthe two Governments, and though they have for the most part beensettled, the manner in which they have been raised and pressed by GermanGovernments has caused them to be regarded by British Ministers, and toa less extent by the British people, as sources of annoyance, as so manydiplomatic "pin-pricks. " The manners of German diplomacy are not suave. Suavity is no more part of the Bismarckian tradition than exactitude. But after all, the manners of the diplomatists of any country are amatter rather for the nation whose honour they concern than for thenations to which they have given offence. They only partially accountfor the deep feeling which has grown up between Great Britain andGermany. 

The truth is that England is disturbed by the rise of Germany, which herpeople, in spite of abundant warnings, did not foresee and have notappreciated until the moment when they find themselves outstripped inthe race by a people whom they have been accustomed to regard withsomething of the superiority with which the prosperous and polisheddweller in a capital looks upon his country cousin from the farm. 

Fifty years ago Germany in English estimation did not count. The namewas no more than a geographical expression. Great Britain was the onegreat Power. She alone had colonies and India. She as good asmonopolised the world's shipping and the world's trade. As compared withother countries she was immeasurably rich and prosperous. Her populationduring the long peace, interrupted only by the Crimean War and theIndian Mutiny, had multiplied beyond men's wildest dreams. Hermanufacturers were amassing fortunes, her industry had no rival. TheVictorian age was thought of as the beginning of a wonderful new era, inwhich, among the nations, England was first and the rest nowhere. Thetemporary effort of the French to create a modern navy disturbed thesense of security which existed and gave rise to the Volunteer movement, which was felt to be a marvellous display of patriotism. 

There were attempts to show that British self-complacency was notaltogether justified. The warnings of those who looked below the surfacewere read and admired. Few writers were more popular than Carlyle, Ruskin, and Matthew Arnold. But all three held aloof from the current ofpublic life which flowed in the traditional party channels. There was noeffort to revive the conception of the nation as the organised state towhich every citizen is bound, the source and centre of all men's duties. Accordingly every man devoted himself to his own affairs, of which thefirst was to make money and the second to enjoy life; those who wererich enough finding their amusement in Parliament, which was regarded asthe most interesting club in London, and in its debates, of which thecharm, for those who take part in them, lies in the fact that forsuccess not knowledge of a subject, but fluency, readiness, and wit arerequired. 

The great events taking place in the world, the wars in Bohemia, inFrance, and in Turkey, added a certain, interest to English life becausethey furnished to the newspapers matter more exciting than any novelistcould produce, and in this way gratified the taste for sensation whichhad been acquired both by rich and poor. That these events meantanything in particular to the British nation was not likely to berealised while that nation was, in fact, non-existent, and had resolveditself into forty million individuals, each of them living for his ownends, slightly enlarged to include his family, his literary orscientific society, perhaps his cricket club, and on Sunday morning hischurch or chapel. There was also a widespread interest in "politics, " bywhich was meant the particular fads cherished by one's own caucus to theexclusion of the nation's affairs, it being more or less understood thatthe army, the navy, and foreign policy were not to be made politicalquestions. 

While forty million English people have thus been spending their livesself-centred, content to make their living, to enjoy life, and to behavekindly to their fellows, there has grown up in Germany a nation, apeople of sixty millions, who believe that they belong together, thattheir country has the first call on them, whose children go to schoolbecause the Government that represents the nation bids them, who go fortwo years to the army or the navy to learn war, because they know thatif the nation has to fight it can do so only by their fighting for it. Their Government thinks it is its business to be always improving theorganisation of its sixty millions for security, for knowledge, forinstruction, for agriculture, for industry, for navigation. Thus afterforty years of common effort for a common good Germany finds itself thefirst nation in Europe, more than holding its own in every department oflife, and eagerly surveying the world in search of opportunities. 

The Englishman, while he has been living his own life and, as I think, improving in many respects, has at the same time been admiring theBritish Empire, and discovering with pride that a number of new nationshave grown up in distant places, formed of people whose fathers orgrandfathers emigrated from Great Britain. He remembers from his schoollessons or reads in the newspapers of the greatness of England in pastcenturies, and naturally feels that with such a past and with so greatan Empire existing to-day, his country should be a very great Power. Butas he discovers what the actual performance of Germany is, and becomesacquainted with the results of her efforts in science, education, trade, and industry, and the way in which the influence of the GermanGovernment predominates in the affairs of Europe, he is puzzled andindignant, and feels that in some way Great Britain has been surpassedand outdone. 

The state of the world which he thought existed, in which England wasthe first nation and the rest nowhere, has completely changed while hehas been attending to his private business, his "politics, " and hiscricket, and he finds the true state of the world to be that, while inindustry England has hard work to hold her own against her chief rival, she has already been passed in education and in science, that her army, good as it is, is so small as scarcely to count, and that even her navycannot keep its place without a great and unexpected effort. 

Yet fifty years ago England had on her side all the advantages but one. She was forgetting nationhood while Germany was reviving it. The Britishpeople, instead of organising themselves as one body, the nation, haveorganised themselves into two bodies, the two "political" parties. England's one chance lies in recovering the unity that has been lost, which she must do by restoring the nation to its due place in men'shearts and lives. To find out how that is to be done we must once morelook at Europe and at England's relations to Europe. 

IX. 

NEW CONDITIONS

It has been seen how, as a result of the struggle with Napoleon, England, from 1805 onwards, was the only sea power remaining in Europe, and indeed, with the exception of the United States, the only sea powerin the world. One of the results was that she had for many years themonopoly of the whole ocean, not merely for the purposes of war, butalso for the purposes of trade. The British mercantile marine continuedthrough the greater part of the nineteenth century to increase itspreponderance over all others, and this remarkable, and probably quiteexceptional, growth was greatly favoured by the Civil War in America, during which the mercantile marine of the United States received fromthe action of the Confederate cruisers a damage from which it has neverrecovered. 

In the years immediately following 1805, Great Britain in self-defence, or as a means of continuing the war against France, in regard to whichher resources for operations on land were limited, had recourse to theoperations of blockade, by which the sea was closed, as far as possible, to enemy merchantmen while Great Britain prohibited neutral ships fromcarrying enemy goods. Napoleon replied by the attempt to exclude Britishgoods from the Continent altogether, and indeed the pressure produced byGreat Britain's blockades compelled Napoleon further to extend hisdomination on the Continent. Thus the other continental States foundthemselves between the devil and the deep sea. They had to submit to thedomination of Napoleon on land and to the complete ascendency of GreatBritain on the waters which surrounded their coasts. The British claimsto supremacy at sea were unanimously resented by all the continentalStates, which all suffered from them, but in all cases the nationalresentment against French invasion or French occupation of territory wasgreater than the resentment against the invisible pressure exercised bythe British navy. In the wars of liberation, though Great Britain wasthe welcome ally of all the States that were fighting against France, the pressure of British sea power was none the less disagreeable and, inthe years of peace which followed, the British monopoly of sea power, ofsea-carriage, of manufacturing industry, and of international trade wereequally disliked by almost all the nations of Europe. Protective dutieswere regarded as the means of fostering national industries and ofsheltering them against the overpowering competition of Britishmanufactures. The British claim to the dominion of the sea was regardedas unfounded in right, and was in principle as strongly denounced as hadbeen the territorial domination of France. The mistress of the seas wasregarded as a tyrant, whom it would be desirable, if it were possible, to depose, and there were many who thought that as the result of aconflict in which the final success had been gained by the co-operationof a number of States acting together, the gains of Great Britain which, as time went on, were seen to be growing into a world-wide empire, hadbeen out of proportion to the services she had rendered to the commoncause. 

Meantime during the century which has elapsed since the last great war, there has been a complete change in the conditions of intercoursebetween nations at sea and of maritime warfare. It has come aboutgradually, almost imperceptibly, so that it could hardly be appreciatedbefore the close of the nineteenth century. But it is vital to GreatBritain that her people should understand the nature of thetransformation. 

The first thing to be observed is that the British monopoly of shippingand of oversea trade has disappeared. Great Britain still has by far thelargest mercantile marine and by far the greatest share in the world'ssea traffic, but she no longer stands alone. Germany, the United States, France, Norway, Italy, and Japan all have great fleets of merchantships and do an enormous, some of them a rapidly increasing, seabornetrade. A large number of the principal States import the raw material ofmanufacture and carry on import and export on a large scale. The railwaysystem connects all the great manufacturing centres, even those whichlie far inland, with the great ports to and from which the lines ofsteamers ply. The industrial life of every nation is more than everdependent upon its communications with and by the sea, and every nationhas become more sensitive than ever to any disturbance of its maritimetrade. The preponderance of the British navy is therefore a subject ofanxiety in every State which regards as possible a conflict of its owninterests with those of Great Britain. This is one of the reasons whycontinental States have during the last quarter of a century beendisposed to increase their fleets and their naval expenditure. 

In the Declaration of Paris, renewed and extended by the Declaration ofLondon, the maritime States have agreed that in any future war enemygoods in a neutral ship are to be safe from capture unless the ship isrunning a blockade, which must be effective. Whether Great Britain waswell or ill advised in accepting this rule is a question which it is nowuseless to discuss, for the decision cannot be recalled, and the rulemust be regarded as established beyond controversy. Its effect isgreatly to diminish the pressure which a victorious navy can bring tobear upon a hostile State. It deprives Great Britain of one of the mostpotent weapons which she employed in the last great war. To-day it wouldbe impracticable even for a victorious navy to cut off a continentalState from seaborne traffic. The ports of that State might be blockadedand its merchant ships would be liable to capture, but the victoriousnavy could not interfere with the traffic carried by neutral ships toneutral ports. Accordingly, Great Britain could not now, even in theevent of naval victory being hers, exercise upon an enemy the pressurewhich she formerly exercised through the medium of the neutral States. Any continental State, even if its coasts were effectively blockaded, could still, with increased difficulty, obtain supplies both of rawmaterial and of food by the land routes through the territory of itsneutral neighbours. But Great Britain herself, as an insular State, would not, in case of naval defeat, have this advantage. A decisivedefeat of the British navy might be followed by an attempt on the partof the enemy to blockade the coasts of Great Britain, though that wouldno doubt be difficult, for a very large force would be required tomaintain an effective blockade of the whole coast-line. 

It is conceivable that an enemy might attempt in spite of theDeclaration of London to treat as contraband food destined for thecivil population and this course ought to be anticipated, but in themilitary weakness of Great Britain an enemy whose navy had gained theupper hand would almost certainly prefer to undertake the speedierprocess of bringing the war to an end by landing an army in GreatBritain. A landing on a coast so extensive as that of this island canwith difficulty be prevented by forces on land, because troops cannot bemoved as quickly as ships. 

The war in the Far East has shown how strong such an army might be, andhow great a military effort would be needed to crush it. The proper wayto render an island secure, is by a navy strong enough to obtain in warthe control of the surrounding sea, and a navy unable to perform thatfunction cannot be regarded as a guarantee of security. 

The immediate effects of naval victory can hardly ever again be sofar-reaching as they were a century ago in the epoch of masts and sails. At that time there were no foreign navies, except in European waters, and in the Atlantic waters of the United States. When, therefore, theBritish navy had crushed its European adversaries, its ships could actwithout serious opposition upon any sea and any coast in the world. To-day, the radius of action of a victorious fleet is restricted by thenecessity of a supply of coal, and therefore by the secure possessionof coaling-stations at suitable intervals along any route by which thefleet proposes to move, or by the goodwill of neutrals in permitting itto coal at their depots. To-day, moreover, there are navies establishedeven in distant seas. In the Pacific, for example, are the fleets ofJapan and of the United States, and these, in their home waters, willprobably be too strong to be opposed by European navies acting at a vastdistance from their bases. 

It seems likely, therefore, that neither Great Britain nor any otherState will in future enjoy that monopoly of sea power which was grantedto Great Britain by the circumstances of her victories in the last greatwar. What I have called the great prize has in fact ceased to exist, andeven if an adversary were to challenge the British navy, the reward ofhis success would not be a naval supremacy of anything like the kind orextent which peculiar conditions made it possible for Great Britain toenjoy during the nineteenth century. It would be a supremacy limited andreduced by the existence of the new navies that have sprung up. 

From these considerations a very important conclusion must be drawn. Inthe first place, enough victory at sea is in case of war asindispensable to Great Britain as ever, for it remains the fundamentalcondition of her security, yet its results can hardly in future be asgreat as they were in the past, and in particular it may perhaps notagain enable her to exert upon continental States the same effectivepressure which it formerly rendered possible. 

In order, therefore, to bring pressure upon a continental adversary, Great Britain is more than ever in need of the co-operation of acontinental ally. A navy alone cannot produce the effect which it oncedid upon the course of a land war, and its success will not suffice togive confidence to the ally. Nothing but an army able to take its partin a continental struggle will, in modern conditions, suffice to makeGreat Britain the effective ally of a continental State, and in theabsence of such an army Great Britain will continue to be, as she isto-day, without continental allies. 

A second conclusion is that our people, while straining every nerve inpeace to ensure to their navy the best chances of victory in war, mustcarefully avoid the conception of a dominion of the sea, although, infact, such a dominion actually existed during a great part of thenineteenth century. The new conditions which have grown up during thepast thirty years have made this ideal as much a thing of the past asthe mediæval conception of a Roman Empire in Europe to whose titularhead all kings were subordinate. 

X. 

DYNAMICS--THE QUESTION OF MIGHT

If there is a chance of a conflict in which Great Britain is to beengaged, her people must take thought in time how they may have on theirside both right and might. It is hard to see how otherwise they canexpect the contest to be decided in their favour. 

As I have said before, in the quarrel you must be in the right and inthe fight you must win. The quarrel is the domain of policy, the fightthat of strategy or dynamics. Policy and strategy are in realityinextricably interwoven one with another, for right and might resemble, more than is commonly supposed, two aspects of the same thing. But it isconvenient in the attempt to understand any complicated subject toexamine its aspects separately. 

I propose, therefore, in considering the present situation of GreatBritain and her relations to the rest of the world, to treat first ofthe question of force, to assume that a quarrel may arise, and toascertain what are the conditions in which Great Britain can expect towin, and then to enter into the question of right, in order to find outwhat light can be thrown upon the necessary aims and methods of Britishpolicy by the conclusions which will have been reached as to the use offorce. 

The nationalisation of States, which is the fundamental fact of modernhistory, affects both policy and strategy. If the State is a nation, thepopulation associated as one body, then the force which it can use incase of conflict represents the sum of the energies of the wholepopulation, and this force cannot and will not be used except as theexpression of the will of the whole population. The policy of such aState means its collective will, the consciousness of its wholepopulation of a purpose, mission, or duty which it must fulfil, withwhich it is identified, and which, therefore, it cannot abandon. Only incase this national purpose meets with resistance will a people organisedas a State enter into a quarrel, and if such a quarrel has to be foughtout the nation's resources will be expended upon it without limitation. 

The chief fact in regard to the present condition of Europe appears tobe the very great excess in the military strength of Germany over thatof any other Power. It is due in part to the large population of theGerman Empire, and in part to the splendid national organisation whichhas been given to it. It cannot be asserted either that Germany was notentitled to become united, or that she was not entitled to organiseherself as efficiently as possible both for peace and for war. But theresult is that Germany has a preponderance as great if not greater thanthat of Spain in the time of Philip II. , or of France either under LouisXIV. Or under Napoleon. Every nation, no doubt, has a right to makeitself as strong as it can, and to exercise as much influence as it canon the affairs of the world. To do these things is the mission andbusiness of a nation. But the question arises, what are the limits tothe power of a single nation? The answer appears to be that the onlylimits are those set by the power of other nations. This is the theoryof the balance of power of which the object is to preserve to Europe itscharacter of a community of independent States rather than that of asingle empire in which one State predominates. 

Without attributing to Germany any wrong purpose or any design ofinjustice it must be evident that her very great strength must give herin case of dispute, always possible between independent States, acorresponding advantage against any other Power whose views or whoseintentions should not coincide with hers. It is the obvious possibilityof such dispute that makes it incumbent upon Great Britain to prepareherself in case of disagreement to enter into a discussion with Germanyupon equal terms. 

Only upon such preparation can Great Britain base the hope either ofaverting a quarrel with Germany, or in case a quarrel should arise andcannot be made up by mutual agreement, of settling it by the arbitramentof war upon terms accordant with the British conception of right. GreatBritain therefore must give herself a national organisation for war andmust make preparation for war the nation's first business until areasonable security has been attained. 

The question is, what weapons are now available for Great Britain incase of a disagreement with Germany leading to conflict? In the oldwars, as we have seen, she had three modes of action. She used her navyto obtain control of the sea-ways, and then she used that control partlyto destroy the sea-borne trade of her enemies, and partly to send armiesacross the sea to attack her enemies' armies. By the combination ofthese three modes of operation she was strong enough to give valuablehelp to other Powers, and therefore she had allies whose assistance wasas useful to her as hers to them. To-day, as we have seen, the sameconditions no longer exist. The British navy may indeed hope to obtaincontrol of the sea-ways, but the law of maritime war, as it has beensettled by the Declarations of Paris and of London, makes itimpracticable for Great Britain to use a naval victory, even if she winsit, in such a way as to be able commercially to throttle a hostilePower, while the British military forces available for employment on theContinent are so small as hardly to count in the balance. The result isthat Great Britain's power of action against a possible enemy is greatlyreduced, partly in consequence of changes in the laws of war, butperhaps still more in consequence of the fact that while other Powersare organised for war as nations, England in regard to war is still inthe condition of the eighteenth century, relying upon a small standingarmy, a purely professional navy, and a large half-trained force, calledTerritorial, neither ready for war nor available outside the UnitedKingdom. 

There is a school of politicians who imagine that Great Britain'sweakness can be supplemented from other parts of the British Empire. That is an idea which ought not to be received without the most carefulexamination and in my judgment must, except within narrow limits, berejected. 

In a war between Great Britain and a continental State or combinationthe assistance which Great Britain could possibly receive from theKing's dominions beyond the sea is necessarily limited. Such a war mustin the first place be a naval contest, towards which the most that thecolonies can contribute consists in such additions to Great Britain'snaval strength as they may have given during the preceding period ofpeace. What taken together they may do in this way would no doubt makean appreciable difference in the balance of forces between the twocontending navies; but in the actual struggle the colonies would belittle more than spectators, except in so far as their ports would offera certain number of secure bases for the cruisers upon which GreatBritain must rely for the protection of her sea-borne trade. Even if allthe colonies possessed first-rate armies, the help which those armiescould give would not be equal to that obtainable from a single Europeanally. For a war against a European adversary Great Britain must relyupon her own resources, and upon such assistance as she might obtain ifit were felt by other Powers on the Continent not only that the cause inwhich she was fighting was vital to them and therefore called for theirco-operation, but also that in the struggle Great Britain's assistancewould be likely to turn the scale in their favour. 

Can we expect that history will repeat itself, and that once more incase of conflict Great Britain will have the assistance of continentalallies? That depends chiefly on their faith in her power to help them. One condition of such an alliance undoubtedly exists--the desire ofother nations for it. The predominance of Germany on the Continentrests like a nightmare upon more than one of the other States. It isincreased by the alliance of Austria, another great military empire--anempire, moreover, not without a fine naval tradition, and, as is provedby the recent announcement of the intention of the Austrian Governmentto build four "Dreadnoughts, " resolved to revive that tradition. 

Against the combination of Germany and Austria, Russia, which has hardlybegun to recover from the prostration of her defeat by Japan, ishelpless; while France, with a population much smaller than that ofGermany, can hardly look forward to a renewal single-handed of thestruggle which ended for her so disastrously forty years ago. Theposition of Italy is more doubtful, for the sympathies of her people arenot attracted by Austria; they look with anxiety upon the Austrianpolicy of expansion towards the Aegean and along the shore of theAdriatic. The estrangement from France which followed upon the Frenchoccupation of Tunis appears to have passed away, and it seems possiblethat if there were a chance of success Italy might be glad to emancipateherself from German and Austrian influence. But even if Germany's policywere such that Russia, France, and Italy were each and all of themdesirous to oppose it, and to assert a will and a policy of their owndistinct from that of the German Government, it is very doubtful whethertheir strength is sufficient to justify them in an armed conflict, especially as their hypothetical adversaries have a central positionwith all its advantages. From a military point of view the strength ofthe central position consists in the power which it gives to its holderto keep one opponent in check with a part of his forces while he throwsthe bulk of them into a decisive blow against another. 

This is the situation of to-day on the Continent of Europe. It cannot bechanged unless there is thrown into the scale of the possible opponentsof German policy a weight or a force that would restore the equality ofthe two parties. The British navy, however perfect it may be assumed tobe, does not in itself constitute such a force. Nor could the Britisharmy on its present footing restore the balance. A small standing armyable to give its allies assistance, officially estimated at a strengthof 160, 000 men, will not suffice to turn the scale in a conflict inwhich the troops available for each of the great Powers are counted nolonger by the hundred thousand but by the million. But if Great Britainwere so organised that she could utilise for the purpose of war thewhole of her national resources, if she had in addition to the navyindispensable for her security an army equal in efficiency to the bestthat can be found in Europe and in numbers to that maintained by Italy, which though the fifth Power on the Continent is most nearly her equalin territory and population, the equilibrium could be restored, andeither the peace of Europe would be maintained, or in case of freshconflict there would be a reasonable prospect of the recurrence of whathas happened in the past, the maintenance, against a threateneddomination, of the independence of the European States. 

The position here set forth is grave enough to demand the closeattention of the British nation, for it means that England might at anytime be called upon to enter into a contest, likely enough to take theform of a struggle for existence, against the greatest military empirein the world, supported by another military empire which is itself inthe front rank of great Powers, while the other European States would belooking on comparatively helpless. 

But this is by no means a full statement of the case. The other Powersmight not find it possible to maintain an attitude of neutrality. It ismuch more probable that they would have to choose between one side andthe other; and that if they do not consider Great Britain strong enoughto help them they may find it their interest, and indeed may becompelled, to take the side of Great Britain's adversaries. In that caseGreat Britain would have to carry on a struggle for existence againstthe combined forces of the Continent. 

That even in this extreme form the contest would be hopeless, I for oneam unwilling to admit. If Great Britain were organised for war and ableto throw her whole energies into it, she might be so strong that heroverthrow even by united Europe would by no means be a foregoneconclusion. But the determined preparation which would make her readyfor the extreme contingency is the best and perhaps the only means ofpreventing its occurrence. 

XI. 

POLICY--THE QUESTION OF RIGHT

I have now given reasons for my belief that in case of conflict GreatBritain, owing to her lack of organisation for war, would be in aposition of some peril. She has not created for herself the means ofmaking good by force a cause with which she may be identified but whichmay be disputed, and her weakness renders it improbable that she wouldhave allies. There remains the second question whether, in the absenceof might, she would at least have right on her side. That depends uponthe nature of the quarrel. A good cause ought to unite her own people, and only in behalf of a good cause could she expect other nations to beon her side. From this point of view must be considered the relationsbetween Great Britain and Germany, and in the first place the aims ofGerman policy. 

A nation of which the army consists of four million able-bodied citizensdoes not go to war lightly. The German ideal, since the foundation ofthe Empire, has been rather that held up for Great Britain by LordRosebery in the words:

"Peace secured, not by humiliation, but by preponderance. "

The first object after the defeat of France in 1870 was security, andthis was sought not merely by strengthening the army and improving itstraining but also by obtaining the alliance of neighbouring Powers. Inthe first period the attempt was made to keep on good terms, not onlywith Austria, but with Russia. When in 1876 disturbances began in theBalkan Peninsula, Germany, while giving Austria her support, exertedherself to prevent a breach between Austria and Russia, and after theRusso-Turkish war acted as mediator between Russia on one side andAustria and Great Britain on the other, so that without a fresh war theEuropean treaty of Berlin was substituted for the Russo-Turkish Treatyof San Stefano. 

After 1878 Russia became estranged from Germany, whereupon Germany, in1879, made a defensive alliance with Austria, to which at a later dateItaly became a party. This triple alliance served for a quarter of acentury to maintain the peace against the danger of a Franco-Russiancombination until the defeat of Russia in Manchuria and consequentcollapse of Russia's military power removed that danger. 

Shortly before this event the British agreement with the FrenchGovernment had been negotiated by Lord Lansdowne. The French were veryanxious to bring Morocco into the sphere of French influence, and tothis the British Government saw no objection, but in the preamble to theagreement, as well as in its text, by way of declaration that GreatBritain had no objection to this portion of the policy of France, wordswere used which might seem to imply that Great Britain had some specialrights in regard to Morocco. 

The second article of the Declaration of April 8, 1904, contains thefollowing clause:

"The Government of the French Republic declare that they have nointention of altering the political status of Morocco. His BritannicMajesty's Government, for their part, recognise that it appertains toFrance, more particularly as a Power whose dominions are conterminousfor a great distance with Morocco, to preserve order in that country, and to provide assistance for the purpose of all administrative, economic, financial, and military reforms which it may require. "

This clause seems to be open to the interpretation that Great Britainassumes a right to determine what nation of Europe is best entitled toexercise a protectorate over Morocco. That would involve some Britishsuperiority over other Powers, or at any rate that Great Britain had aspecial right over Morocco, a sort of suzerainty of which she coulddispose at will. Germany disliked both this claim and the idea thatFrance was to obtain special influence in Morocco. She was herselfanxious for oversea possessions and spheres of influence, and appears tohave thought that if Morocco was to become a European protectorate sheought to have a voice in any settlement. The terms in which the Englishconsent to the French design was expressed were construed by theGerman's as involving, on the part of Great Britain, just that kind ofsupremacy in regard to oversea affairs which they had for so many yearsbeen learning to dislike. At any rate, when the moment convenient to hercame, Germany put her veto upon the arrangements which had been made andrequired that they should be submitted to a European Conference. Francewas not prepared to renew the struggle for existence over Morocco, whileGermany appeared not unwilling to assert her will even by force. Accordingly Germany had her way. 

The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary againafforded an opportunity for the exercise of Germany's preponderance. In1878 the Treaty of Berlin had authorised Austria-Hungary to occupy andadminister the two provinces without limitation of time, and Bosnia andHerzegovina have since then practically been Austrian provinces, for themale population has been subject to compulsory service in the Austrianarmy and the soldiers have taken the oath of allegiance to the Emperor. It is not clear that any of the great Powers had other than a formalobjection to the annexation, the objection, namely, that it was notconsistent with the letter of the Treaty of Berlin. The BritishGovernment pointed out that, by international agreement to whichAustria-Hungary is a party, a European Treaty is not to be modifiedwithout the consent of all the signatory Powers, and that this consenthad not been asked by Austria-Hungary. The British view was endorsedboth by France and Russia, and these three Powers were in favour of aEuropean Conference for the purpose of revising the clause of the Treatyof Berlin, and apparently also of giving some concessions to Servia andMontenegro, the two small States which, for reasons altogetherdisconnected with the formal aspect of the case, resented theannexation. Neither of the Western Powers had any such interest in thematter as to make it in the least probable that they would in any casebe prepared to support their view by force, while Austria, by mobilisingher army, showed that she was ready to do so, and there was no doubtthat she was assured, in case of need, of Germany's support. The RussianMinister of Foreign Affairs publicly explained to his countrymen thatRussia was not in a condition to carry on a war. Accordingly in themoment of crisis the Russian Government withdrew its opposition toAustro-Hungarian policy, and thus once more was revealed the effect upona political decision of the military strength, readiness, anddetermination of the two central Powers. 

A good deal of feeling was aroused, at any rate in Great Britain, by thedisclosure in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as in theearlier case of Morocco, of Germany's policy, and in the laternegotiation of her determination to support Austria-Hungary by force. Yet he would be a rash man who, on now looking back, would assert thatin either case a British Government would have been justified in armedopposition to Germany's policy. 

The bearing of Germany and Austria-Hungary in these negotiations, endingas they did at the time when the debate on the Navy Estimates disclosedto the British public the serious nature of the competition in navalshipbuilding between Germany and Great Britain, was to a large class inthis country a startling revelation of the too easily forgotten factthat a nation does not get its way by asking for it, but by being ableand ready to assert its will by force of arms in case of need. There isno reason to believe that the German Government has any intention toenter into a war except for the maintenance of rights or interests heldto be vital for Germany, but it is always possible that Germany may holdvital some right or interest which another nation may be not quite readyto admit. In that case it behoves the other nation very carefully toscrutinise the German claims and its own way of regarding them, and tobe quite sure, before entering into a dispute, that its own views areright and Germany's views wrong, as well as that it has the means, incase of conflict, of carrying on with success a war against the GermanEmpire. 

If then England is to enter into a quarrel with Germany or any otherState, let her people take care that it arises from no obscure issueabout which they may disagree among themselves, but from some palpablewrong done by the other Power, some wrong which calls upon them toresist it with all their might. 

The case alleged against Germany is that she is too strong, so strong inherself that no Power in Europe can stand up against her, and so sure ofthe assistance of her ally, Austria, to say nothing of the other ally, Italy, that there is at this moment no combination that will venture tooppose the Triple Alliance. In other words, Germany is thought to haveacquired an ascendency in Europe which she may at any moment attempt toconvert into supremacy. Great Britain is thought of, at any rate by herown people, as the traditional opponent of any such supremacy on theContinent, so that if she were strong enough it might be her function tobe the chief antagonist of a German ascendency or supremacy, though thedoubt whether she is strong enough prevents her from fulfilling thisrole. 

But there is another side to the case. The opinion has long beenexpressed by German writers and is very widespread in Germany that it isGreat Britain that claims an ascendency or supremacy, and that Germanyin opposing that supremacy is making herself the champion of theEuropean cause of the independence of States. This German idea wasplainly expressed twenty-five years ago by the German historian WilhelmMüller, who wrote in a review of the year 1884: "England was theopponent of all the maritime Powers of Europe. She had for decadesassumed at sea the same dictatorial attitude as France had maintainedupon land under Louis XIV. And Napoleon I. The years 1870-1871 broke theFrench spell; the year 1884 has shown England that the times of hermaritime imperialism also are over, and that if she does not renounce itof her own free will, an 1870 will come for the English spell too. It istrue, England need not fear any single maritime Power, but only acoalition of them all; and hitherto she has done all she can to call upsuch a coalition. " The language which Englishmen naturally use indiscussing their country's naval strength might seem to lend itself tothe German interpretation. For example, on the 10th March 1908, thePrime Minister, Mr. Asquith, expressing an opinion in which he thoughtboth parties concurred, said: "We must maintain the unassailablesupremacy of this country at sea. " Here, at any rate, is the word"supremacy" at which the Germans take umbrage, and which our own peopleregard as objectionable if applied to the position of any Power on theContinent. 

I will not repeat here the analysis which I published many years ago ofthe dealings between the German and British Governments during theperiod when German colonial enterprise was beginning; nor thedemonstration that in those negotiations the British Government actedwith perfect fairness, but was grossly misrepresented to the Germanpublic. The important thing for the people of Great Britain tounderstand to-day is not the inner diplomatic history of that andsubsequent periods, but the impression which is current in Germany withregard to the whole of these transactions. 

The Germans think that Great Britain lays claim to a special position inregard to the ocean, in the nature of a suzerainty over the waters ofthe globe, and over those of its coasts which are not the possessionsof some strong civilised Power. What they have perceived in the lastquarter of a century has been that, somehow or other, they care not how, whenever there has been a German attempt in the way of what is calledcolonial expansion, it has led to friction with Great Britain. Accordingly they have the impression that Great Britain is opposed toany such German expansion, and in this way, as they are anxious fordominions beyond the sea and for the spread of their trade into everyquarter of the globe, they have come to regard Great Britain as theadversary. This German feeling found vent during the South African War, and the expressions at that time freely used in the German newspapers, as well as by German writers whose works were less ephemeral, could notbut deeply offend the national consciousness, to any nothing of thepride of the people of this country. In this way the sympathy which usedto exist between the two peoples has been lost and they have come toregard each other with suspicion, which has not been without its effecton the relations between the two Governments and upon the course ofEuropean diplomacy. This is the origin of the rivalry, and it is to theresentment which has been diligently cultivated in Germany against thesupposed British claim to supremacy at sea that is attributable thegreat popularity among the people of Germany of the movement in favourof the expansion of the German navy. Since 1884 the people of Germanyhave been taught to regard with suspicion every item of British policy, and naturally enough this auspicious attitude has found its counterpartamong the people of this country. The result has been that theagreements by which England has disposed of a number of disagreementswith France and with Russia have been regarded in Germany as inspired bythe wish to prepare a coalition against that country, and, in view ofthe past history of Great Britain, this interpretation can hardly bepronounced unnatural. 

Any cause for which Great Britain would fight ought to be intelligibleto other nations, first of all to those of Europe, but also to thenations outside of Europe, at any rate to the United States and Japan, for if we were fighting for something in regard to which there was nosympathy with us, or which led other nations to sympathise with ouradversary, we should be hampered by grave misgivings and might findourselves alone in a hostile world. 

Accordingly it cannot be sound policy for Great Britain to assert forherself a supremacy or ascendency of the kind which is resented, notonly by Germany, but by every other continental State, and indeed byevery maritime State in the world. It ought to be made clear to all theworld that in fact, whatever may have been the language used in Englishdiscussions, Great Britain makes no claim to suzerainty over the sea, orover territories bordering on the sea, not forming parts of the BritishEmpire; that, while she is determined to maintain a navy that can incase of war secure the "command" of the sea against her enemies, sheregards the sea, in peace, and in war except for her enemies, as thecommon property of all nations, the open road forming the great highwayof mankind. 

We have but to reflect on the past to perceive that the idea of adominion of the sea must necessarily unite other nations against us. What in the sixteenth century was the nature of the dispute betweenEngland and Spain? The British popular consciousness to-day rememberstwo causes, of which one was religious antagonism, and the other theclaim set up by Spain and rejected by England to a monopoly of America, carrying with it an exclusive right to navigation in the WesternAtlantic and to a monopoly of the trade of the Spanish dominions beyondthe sea. That is a chapter of history which at the present time deservesa place in the meditations of Englishmen. 

I may now try to condense into a single view the general survey of theconditions of Europe which I have attempted from the two points of viewof strategy and of policy, of force and of right. Germany has such apreponderance of military force that no continental State can stand upagainst her. There is, therefore, on the Continent no nation independentof German influence or pressure. Great Britain, so long as she maintainsthe superiority of her navy over that of Germany or over those ofGermany and her allies, is not amenable to constraint by Germany, buther military weakness prevents her exerting any appreciable counterpressure upon Germany. 

The moment the German navy has become strong enough to confront that ofGreat Britain without risk of destruction, British influence in Europewill be at an end, and the Continent will have to follow the directiongiven by German policy. That is a consummation to be desired neither inthe interest of the development of the European nations nor in that ofGreat Britain. It means the prevalence of one national ideal instead ofthe growth side by side of a number of types. It means also theexclusion of British ideals from European life. 

Great Britain has in the past been a powerful contributor to the freedevelopment of the European nations, and therefore to the preservationin Europe of variety of national growth. I believe that she is nowcalled upon to renew that service. The method open to her lies in suchaction as may relieve the other European States from the overwhelmingpressure which, in case of the disappearance of England from theEuropean community, would be put upon them by Germany. It seems probablethat in default of right action she will be compelled to maintain hernational ideals against Europe united under German guidance. The actionrequired consists on the one hand in the perfecting of the British navy, and on the other of the military organisation of the British people onthe principle, already explained, of the nationalisation of war. 

XII. 

THE NATION

The conclusion to which a review of England's position and of the stateof Europe points, is that while there is no visible cause of quarrelbetween Great Britain and Germany, yet there is between them a rivalrysuch as is inevitable between a State that has long held something likethe first place in the world and a State that feels entitled in virtueof the number of its people, their character and training, their workand their corporate organisation, to aspire to the first place. TheGerman nation by the mere fact of its growth challenges England for theprimacy. It could not be otherwise. But the challenge is no wrong doneto England, and the idea that it ought to be resented is unworthy ofBritish traditions. It must be cheerfully accepted. If the Germans arebetter men than we are they deserve to take our place. If we mean tohold our own we must set about it in the right way--by proving ourselvesbetter than the Germans. 

There ought to be no question of quarrel or of war. Men can be rivalswithout being enemies. It is the first lesson that an English boylearns at school. Quarrels arise, as a rule, from misunderstandings orfrom faults of temper, and England ought to avoid the frame of mindwhich would render her liable to take offence at trifles, while herpolicy ought to be simple enough to escape being misunderstood. 

In a competition between two nations the qualification for success is tobe the better nation. Germany's advantage is that her people have beenlearning for a whole century to subordinate their individual wishes andwelfare to that of the nation, while the people of Great Britain havebeen steeped in individualism until the consciousness of nationalexistence, of a common purpose and a common duty, has all but fadedaway. What has to be done is to restore the nation to its right place inmen's minds, and so to organise it that, like a trained athlete, it willbe capable of hard and prolonged effort. 

By the nation I mean the United Kingdom, the commonwealth of GreatBritain and Ireland, and I distinguish it from the Empire which is afederation of several nations. The nation thus defined has work to do, duties to perform as one nation among many, and the way out of thepresent difficulties will be found by attending to these duties. 

In the first place comes Britain's work in Europe, which to describehas been the purpose of the preceding chapters. It cannot be right forBritain, after the share she has taken in securing for Europe thefreedom that distinguishes a series of independent States existing sideby side from a single centralised Empire, to turn her back upon theContinent and to suppose that she exists only for the sake of her owncolonies and India. On the contrary it is only by playing her part inEurope that she can hope to carry through the organisation of her ownEmpire which she has in view. Her function as a European State is tomake her voice heard in the council of the European nations, so that noone State can dictate the decisions to be reached. In order to do thatshe must be strong enough to be able to say Aye and No without fear, andto give effective help in case of need to those other States which mayin a decision vote on the same side with her. 

In her attitude towards the Powers of Europe and in her dealings withthem Great Britain is the representative of the daughter nations anddependencies that form her Empire, and her self-defence in Europe is thedefence of the whole Empire, at any rate against possible assaults fromany European Power. At the same time she is necessarily the centre andthe head of her own Empire. She must take the lead in its organisationand in the direction of its policy. If she is to fulfil these duties, on the one hand to Europe and on the other to the daughter nations andIndia, she must herself be organised on the principle of duty. AnEngland divided against herself, absorbed in the disputes of factionsand unconscious of a purpose, can neither lead nor defend her Empire, can play her proper part neither in Europe nor in the world. 

The great work to be done at home, corresponding to the ultimate purposeof national life, is that she should bring up her people to a higherstandard of human excellence, to a finer type than others. There areEnglish types well recognised. Fifty years ago the standard of Britishworkmanship was the acknowledged mark of excellence in the industrialworld, while it has been pointed out in an earlier chapter that theEnglish standards, of character displayed in conduct, described in oneaspect by the word "gentleman, " and in another by the expression"fair-play, " form the best part of the nation's inheritance. It is thebusiness of any British education worth thinking of to stamp thesehall-marks of character upon all her people. 

Nothing reveals in a more amazing light the extent to which in thiscountry the true meaning of our being a nation has been forgotten thanthe use that has been made in recent years of the term "nationaleducation. " The leaders of both parties have discussed the subject asthough any system of schools maintained at the public expense formed asystem of national education. But the diffusion of instruction is noteducation, and the fact that it is carried on at the public expense doesnot make it national. Education is training the child for his life tocome, and his life's value consists in the work which he will do. National education means bringing up every boy and girl to do his or herpart of the nation's work. A child who is going to do nothing will be ofno use to his country, and a bringing up that leaves him prepared to donothing is not an education but a perversion. A British nationaleducation ought to make every man a good workman, every man a gentleman, every man a servant of his country. 

My contention, then, is that this British nation has to perform certainspecific tasks, and that in order to be able to do her work she mustinsist that her people--every man, woman, and child--exist not forthemselves but for her. This is the principle of duty. It gives astandard of personal value, for evidently a man's use to his countryconsists in what he does for it, not in what he gets or has for himself, which, from the national point of view, is of no account except so faras it either enables him to carry on the work for which he is bestsuited or can be applied for the nation's benefit. 

How then in practice can the principle of duty be brought into ournational and our individual life? I think that the right way is that weshould join in doing those things which are evidently needed, and shouldpostpone other things about the necessity of which there may bedisagreement. I shall devote the rest of this volume to considering howthe nation is to prepare itself for the first duty laid upon it, that ofassuring its security and so making good its position as a member of theEuropean community. But before pursuing that inquiry I must reiterateonce more the principle which it is my main purpose to set before mycountrymen. 

The conception of the Nation is the clue to the solution of all theproblems with which the people of Great Britain are confronted. They arethose of foreign and imperial policy, of defence national and imperial, of education and of social life. 

Foreign and imperial policy include all affairs external to GreatBritain, the relations of Great Britain to Europe, to India, to theColonies, and to the Powers of Asia and America. In all these externalaffairs the question to be asked is, what is Britain's duty?

It is by the test of duty that Great Britain's attitude towards Germanyshould be tried. In what event would it be necessary and right to callon every British citizen to turn out and fight, ready to shed his bloodand ready to shoot down enemies? Evidently only in case of some greatand manifest wrong undertaken by Germany. As I am aware of no such wrongactually attempted, I think a conflict unnecessary. It is true I beganby pointing out the danger of drifting into a war with the GermanEmpire, but I wish to do what I can to prevent it, and to show that byright action the risk will be diminished. 

The greatest risk is due to fear--fear in this country of what Germanymay do, fear in Germany of what Great Britain may do. Fear is a badadviser. There are Englishmen who seem to think that as Germany isstrengthening her navy it would be wise to attack her while the Britishnavy is superior in numerical force. This suggestion must be franklydiscussed and dealt with. 

A war is a trial of strength. To begin it does not add to your force. Suppose for the sake of the argument that a war between England andGermany were "inevitable"--which is equivalent to the supposition thatone of the two Governments is bound to wrong the other--one of the twoGovernments must take the initiative. You take the initiative when youare the Power that wants something, in which case you naturally exertyourself to obtain it, while the adversary who merely says No to yourrequest, acts only in resistance. England wants nothing from Germany, sothat she is not called upon for an initiative. But the initiative, oroffensive, requires the stronger force, its object being to render theother side powerless for resistance to its will. The defensive admits ofa smaller force. A conflict between England and Germany must beprimarily a naval war, and Germany's naval forces are considerablyweaker than those of England. England has no political reason for theinitiative; Germany is debarred from it by the inferiority of her navy. If, therefore, Germany wants anything from England, she must wait totake the initiative until she has forces strong enough for theoffensive. But her forces, though not strong enough for the offensive, may be strong enough for the defensive. If, therefore, England shouldtake the initiative, she would in so doing give away the one advantageshe has. It may be Germany's interest to have a prompt decision. It canhardly be her interest to attack before she is ready. But if she reallywanted to pick a quarrel and get some advantage, it would exactly serveher purpose to be attacked at once, as that would give her the benefitof the defensive. The English "Jingoes, " then, are false guides, badstrategists, and worse, statesmen. 

Not only in the affairs of Europe, but in those of India, Egypt, andthe Colonies, and in all dealings with Asia, Africa, and America theline of British policy will be the line of the British nation's duty. 

If Britain is to follow this line two conditions must be fulfilled. Shemust have a leader to show the way and her people must walk in it withconfidence. 

The mark of a leader is the single eye. But the traditional system givesthe lead of the nation to the leader of one party chosen for his successin leading that party. He can never have a single eye; he serves twomasters. His party requires him to keep it in office, regarding theOpposition as the enemy. But his country requires him to guide a unitednation in the fulfilment of its mission in Europe and a united Empire inthe fulfilment of its mission in the world. A statesman who is to leadthe nation and the Empire must keep his eyes on Europe and on the world. A party leader who is to defeat the other party must keep his eyes onthe other party. No man can at the same time be looking out of thewindow and watching an opponent inside the house, and the traditionalsystem puts the Prime Minister in a painful dilemma. Either he neverlooks out of the window at all or he tries to look two ways at once. Party men seem to believe that if a Prime Minister were to look acrossthe sea instead of across the floor of the House of Commons hisGovernment would be upset. That may be the case so long as men ignorethe nation and so long as they acquiesce in the treasonable doctrinethat it is the business of the Opposition to oppose. But a statesman whowould take courage to lead the nation might perhaps find the Oppositionpowerless against him. 

The counterpart of leadership is following. A Government that shows theline of Britain's duty must be able to utilise the whole energies of herpeople for its performance. A duty laid upon the nation implies a dutylaid upon every man to do his share of the nation's work, to assist theGovernment by obedient service, the best of which he is capable. Itmeans a people trained every man to his task. 

A nation should be like a team in which every man has his place, hiswork to do, his mission or duty. There is no room in it either for theidler who consumes but renders no service, or for the unskilled man whobungles a task to which he has not been trained. A nation may becompared to a living creature. Consider the way in which natureorganises all things that live and grow. In the structure of a livingthing every part has its function, its work to do. There are nosuperfluous organs, and if any fails to do its work the creaturesickens and perhaps dies. 

Take the idea of the nation as I have tried to convey it and apply it asa measure or test to our customary way of thinking both of publicaffairs and of our own lives. Does it not reveal that we attach too muchimportance to having and to possessions--our own and other people's--andtoo little importance to doing, to service? When we ask what a man isworth, we think of what he owns. But the words ought to make us think ofwhat he is fit for and of what service he renders to the nation. Theonly value of what a man has springs from what he does with it. 

The idea of the nation leads to the right way of looking at thesematters, because it constrains every man to put himself and all that hehas at the service of the community. Thus it is the opposite ofsocialism, which merely turns upside down the current worship ofownership, and which thinks "having" so supremely important that itwould put "not having" in its place. The only cry I will adopt is"England for ever, " which means that we are here, every one of us, withall that we have and all that we can do, as members of a nation thatmust either serve the world or perish. 

But the idea of the nation carries us a long way further than I have yetshown. It bids us all try at the peril of England's fall to get thebest Government we can to lead us. We need a man to preside over thenation's counsels, to settle the line of Britain's duty in Europe and inher own Empire, and of her duty to her own people, to the millions whoare growing up ill fed, ill housed and ill trained, and yet who are partof the sovereign people. We need to give him as councillors men that aremasters of the tasks in which for the nation to fail means its ruin, thetasks of which I have enumerated those that are vital. Do we give him amaster of the history of the other nations to guide the nation'sdealings with them? Do we give him a master of war to educate admiralsand generals? Do we give him a master of the sciences to direct thepursuit of knowledge, and a master of character-building to supervisethe bringing up of boys and girls to be types of a noble life? It wouldserve the nation's turn to have such men. They are among us, and to findthem we should only have to look for them. It would be no harder than topick apples off a tree. But we never dream of looking for them. We havea wonderful plan of choosing our leaders, the plan which we call anelection. Five hundred men assemble in a hall and listen to a speechfrom a partisan, while five hundred others in a hall in the next streetare cheering a second partisan who declaims against the first. There isno test of either speaker, except that he must be rich enough to paythe expenses of an "election. " The voters do not even listen to bothpartisans in order to judge between them. Thus we choose our members ofParliament. Our Government is a committee of some twenty of them. Itsfirst business is to keep its authority against the other party, ofwhich in turn the chief function is to make out that everything theGovernment does is wrong. This is the only recognised plan for leadingthe nation. 

You may be shocked as you read this by the plainness of my words, butyou know them to be true, though you suppose that to insist on the factsis "impracticable" because you fancy that there is no way out of themarvellously absurd arrangements that exist. But there is a way out, though it is no royal road. It is this. Get the meaning of the nationinto your own head and then make a present to England of your partycreed. Ask yourself what is the one thing most needed now, and the onething most needed for the future. You will answer, because you know itto be true, that the one thing most needed now is to get the navy right. 

The one thing most needed for the future is to put the idea of thenation and the will to help England into every man's soul. That cannotbe done by writing or by talking, but only by setting every man whilehe is young to do something for his country. There is one way ofbringing that about. It is by making every citizen a soldier in anational army. The man who has learned to serve his country has learnedto love it. He is the true citizen, and of such a nation is composed. Great Britain needs a statesman to lead her and a policy at home andabroad. But such a policy must not be sought and cannot be found uponparty lines. The statesman who is to expound it to his countrymen andrepresent it to the world must be the leader not of one party but ofboth. In short, a statesman must be a nation leader, and the firstcondition of his existence is that there should be a nation for him tolead. 

XIII. 

THE EFFECT OF THE NATIONALISATION OF WAR UPON LEADERSHIP

The argument of the preceding chapters points to the conclusion that ifGreat Britain is to maintain her position as a great Power, probablyeven if she is to maintain her independence, and certainly if she is toretain the administration of India and the leadership of the nationsthat have grown out of her colonies, her statesmen and her people mustcombine to do three things:--

1. To adopt a policy having due relation to the condition and needs ofthe European Continent. 

2. To make the British navy the best possible instrument of navalwarfare. 

3. To make the British army strong enough to be able to turn the scalesin a continental war. 

What are for the navy and for the army the essentials of victory? Ifthere had never been any wars, no one would know what was essential tovictory. People would have their notions, no doubt, but these notionswould be guesses and could not be verified until the advent of a war, which might bring with it a good deal of disappointment to the peoplewho had guessed wrong. But there have already been wars enough to affordample material for deductions as to the causes and conditions ofsuccess. I propose to take the two best examples that can be found, onefor war at sea and the other for war on land, in order to show exactlythe way in which victory is attained. 

By victory, of course, I mean crushing the enemy. In a battle in whichneither side is crippled, and after which the fleets part to renew thestruggle after a short interval, one side or the other may consider thatit has had the honours of the day. It may have lost fewer ships than theenemy, or have taken more. It may have been able and willing to continuethe fight, though the enemy drew off, and its commander may be promotedor decorated for having maintained the credit of his country or of theservice to which he belongs. But such a battle is not victory either ina political or a strategical sense. It does not lead to theaccomplishment of the purpose of the war, which is to dictate conditionsof peace. That result can be obtained only by crushing the enemy's forceand so making him powerless to renew the contest. 

A general view of the wars of the eighteenth century between GreatBritain and France shows that, broadly speaking, there was no decisionuntil the end of the period. The nearest approach to it was when Hawkedestroyed the French fleet in Quiberon Bay. But this was hardly astand-up fight. The French fleet was running away, and Hawke'sachievement was that, in spite of the difficulties of weather on anextremely dangerous coast, he was able to consummate its destruction. The real decision was the work of Nelson, and its principal cause wasNelson himself. 

The British navy had discovered in its conflicts with the Dutch duringthe seventeenth century that the object of naval warfare was the commandof the sea, which must be won by breaking the enemy's force in battle. This was also perfectly understood by the Dutch admirals, and in thosewars was begun the development of the art of fighting battles withsailing vessels. A formation, the line of battle, in which one shipsails in the track of the ship before her, was found to be appropriateto the weapon used, the broadside of artillery; and a type of shipsuitable to this formation, the line-of-battle ship, established itself. These were the elements with which the British and French navies enteredinto their long eighteenth century struggle. The French, however, hadnot grasped the principle that the object of naval warfare was to obtainthe command of the sea. They did not consciously and primarily aim, asdid their British rivals, at the destruction of the enemy's fleet. Theywere more concerned with the preservation of their own fleet than withthe destruction of the enemy's, and were ready rather to accept battlethan to bring it about. The British admirals were eager for battle, buthad a difficulty in finding out how a decisive blow could be struck. Theorthodox and accepted doctrine of the British navy was that the Britishfleet should be brought alongside the enemy's fleet, the two lines ofbattleships being parallel to one another, so that each ship in theBritish fleet should engage a corresponding ship in the French fleet. Itwas a manoeuvre difficult of execution, because, in order to approachthe French, the British must in the first place turn each of their shipsat right angles to the line or obliquely to it, and then, when they werenear enough to fire, must turn again to the left (or right) in order torestore the line formation. And during this period of approach andturning they must be exposed to the broadsides of the French withoutbeing able to make full use of their own broadsides. Moreover, it wasnext to impossible in this way to bring up the whole line together. Besides being difficult, the manoeuvre had no promise of success. For iftwo fleets of equal numbers are in this way matched ship against ship, neither side has any advantage except what may be derived from thesuperior skill of its gunners. So long as these conditions prevailed, no great decisive victory of the kind for which we are seeking wasgained. It was during this period that Nelson received such training asthe navy could give him, and added to it the necessary finishing touchby never-ceasing effort to find out for himself the way in which hecould strike a decisive blow. His daring was always deliberate, neverrash, and this is the right frame of mind for a commander. "You may beassured, " he writes to Lord Hood, March 11, 1794, "I shall undertakenothing but what I have moral certainty of succeeding in. "

His fierce determination to get at the ultimate secrets of his trade ledhim to use every means that would help him to think out his problem, andamong these means was reading. In 1780 appeared Clerk's "Essay on NavalTactics. " Clerk pointed out the weakness of the method of fighting intwo parallel lines and suggested and discussed a number of plans bywhich one fleet with the bulk of its force could attack and destroy aportion of the other. This was the problem to which Nelson gave hismind--how to attack a part with the whole. On the 19th of August 1796 hewrites to the Duke of Clarence:--

"We are now 22 sail of the line, the combined fleet will be above 35sail of the line.... I will venture my life Sir John Jervis defeatsthem; I do not mean by a regular battle but by the skill of ourAdmiral, and the activity and spirit of our officers and seamen. Thiscountry is the most favourable possible for skill with an inferiorfleet; for the winds are so variable that some one time in the 24 hoursyou must be able to attack a part of a large fleet, and the other willbe becalmed, or have a contrary wind. "

His opportunity came in 1798, when in the battle of the Nile he crushedthe French Mediterranean Fleet. In a letter to Lord Howe, writtenJanuary 8, 1799, he described his plan in a sentence:--

"By attacking the enemy's van and centre, the wind blowing directlyalong their line, I was enabled to throw what force I pleased on a fewships. "

We know that Nelson's method of fighting had for months before thebattle been his constant preoccupation, and that he had lost noopportunity of explaining his ideas to his captains. Here are the wordsof Captain Berry's narrative:--

"It had been his practice during the whole of the cruise, whenever theweather and circumstances would permit, to have his captains on boardthe Vanguard, where he would fully develop to them his own ideas of thedifferent and best modes of attack, and such plans as he proposed toexecute upon falling in with the enemy, whatever their position orsituation might be, by day or by night. There was no possible positionin which they might be found that he did not take into his calculation, and for the most advantageous attack on which he had not digested andarranged the best possible disposition of the force which he commanded. "

The great final victory of Trafalgar was prepared in the same way, andthe various memoranda written in the period before the battle haverevealed to recent investigation the unwearying care which Nelsondevoted to finding out how best to concentrate his force upon thatportion of the enemy's fleet which it would be most difficult for theenemy to support with the remainder. 

Nelson's great merit, his personal contribution to his country'sinfluence, lay first and foremost in his having by intellectual effortsolved the tactical problem set to commanders by the conditions of thenaval weapon of his day, the fleet of line-of-battle ships; andsecondly, in his being possessed and inspired by the true strategicaldoctrine that the prime object of naval warfare is the destruction ofthe enemy's fleet, and therefore that the decisive point in the theatreof war is the point where the enemy's fleet can be found. It was theconviction with which he held this principle that enabled him incircumstances of the greatest difficulty to divine where to go to findthe enemy's fleet; which in 1798 led him persistently up and down theMediterranean till he had discovered the French squadron anchored atAboukir; which in 1805 took him from the Mediterranean to the WestIndies, and from the West Indies back to the Channel. 

So much for Nelson's share of the work. But Nelson could neither haveeducated himself nor made full use of his education if the navy of hisday had not been inspired with the will to fight and to conquer, withthe discipline that springs from that will, and had not obtained throughlong experience of war the high degree of skill in seamanship and ingunnery which made it the instrument its great commander required. Theseconditions of the navy in turn were products of the national spirit andof the will of the Government and people of Great Britain to devote tothe navy as much money, as many men, and as vigorous support as might benecessary to realise the national purpose. 

The efforts of this nature made by the country were neither perfect norcomplete. The Governments made mistakes, the Admiralty left much to bedesired both in organisation and in personnel. But the will was there. The best proof of the national determination is to be found in the besthated of all the institutions of that time, the press-gang, a brutal andnarrow-minded form of asserting the principle that a citizen's duty isto fight for his country. That the principle should take such a shapeis decisive evidence no doubt that society was badly organised, and thateducation, intellectual and moral, was on a low level, but also, andthis is the vital matter, that the nation well understood the nature ofthe struggle in which it was engaged and was firmly resolved not only tofight but to conquer. 

The causes of the success of the French armies in the period between1792 and 1809 were precisely analogous to those which have been analysedin the case of the British navy. The basis was the national will, expressed in the volunteers and the levy _en masse_. Upon this wassuperimposed the skill acquired by the army in several years ofincessant war, and the formal cause of the victories was Napoleon'sinsight into the art of command. The research of recent years hasrevealed the origin of Napoleon's mastery of the method of directing anarmy. He became an officer in 1785, at the age of sixteen. In 1793, as ayoung captain of artillery, he directed with remarkable insight anddetermination the operations by which the allied fleet was driven fromToulon. In 1794 he inspired and conducted, though still a subordinate, aseries of successful operations in the Maritime Alps. In 1796, ascommander-in-chief of the Army of Italy, he astonished Europe by themost brilliant campaign on record. For these achievements he hadprepared himself by assiduous study. As a young officer of artillery hereceived the best professional training then to be had in Europe, whileat the same time, by wide and careful reading, he gave himself a generaleducation. At some period before 1796, probably before 1794, he had readand thoroughly digested the remarkable treatise on the principles ofmountain war which had been left in manuscript by General Bourcet, anofficer who during the campaigns of half a century had assisted asQuartermaster-General a number of the best Generals of France. Napoleon's phenomenal power of concentration had enabled him toassimilate Bourcet's doctrine, which in his clear and vigorous mind tooknew and more perfect shape, so that from the beginning his operationsare conducted on a system which may be described as that of Bourcetraised to a higher power. 

The "Nelson touch" was acquired by the Admiral through years of effortto think out, to its last conclusion, a problem the nature of which hadnever been adequately grasped by his professional predecessors andcomrades, though it seems probable that he owed to Clerk the hint whichled him to the solution which he found. Napoleon was more fortunate ininheriting a strategical doctrine which he had but to appreciate toexpand and to apply. The success of both men is due to the habit of mindwhich clings tenaciously to the subject under investigation until it iscompletely cleared up. Each of them became, as a result of his thinking, the embodiment of a theory or system of the employment of force, the oneon sea and the other on land; and such an embodiment is absolutelynecessary for a nation in pursuit of victory. 

It seems natural to say that if England wants victory on sea or land, she must provide herself with a Nelson or a Napoleon. The statement isquite true, but it requires to be rightly interpreted. If it means thata nation must always choose a great man to command its navy or its armyit is an impossible maxim, because a great man cannot be recogniseduntil his power has been revealed in some kind of work. Moreover, to saythat Nelson and Napoleon won victories because they were great men is toinvert the order of nature and of truth. They are recognised as greatmen because of the mastery of their business which they manifested inaction. That mastery was due primarily to knowledge. Wordsworth hit themark when, in answer to the question "Who is the Happy Warrior?" hereplied that it was he--

"Who with a natural instinct to discernWhat knowledge can perform, is diligent to learn. "

The quality that made them both so valuable was that they knew the bestthat was known and thought in regard to the art of war. This is thequality which a nation must secure in those whom it entrusts with thedesign and the conduct of the operations of its fleets and its armies. 

There is a method for securing this, not by any means a new one, and notoriginally, as is commonly supposed, a German invention. It consists inproviding the army and the navy with a General Staff or Department forthe study, design, and direction of operations. In such a departmentBourcet, Napoleon's master, spent the best years of his life. In such adepartment Moltke was trained; over such a department he presided. Itscharacteristic is that it has one function, that of the study, design, and direction of the movements in fighting of a fleet or an army, andthat it has nothing whatever to do with the maintenance of an army, orwith its recruiting, discipline, or peace administration. Its functionsin peace are intellectual and educational, and in war it becomes thechannel of executive power. Bourcet described the head of such adepartment as "the soul of an army. " The British navy is without such adepartment. The army has borrowed the name, but has not maintained thespeciality of function which is essential. In armies other than theBritish, the Chief of the General Staff is occupied solely with tacticsand strategy, with the work of intellectual research by which Nelsonand Napoleon prepared their great achievements. His business is to bedesigning campaigns, to make up his mind at what point or points, incase of war, he will assemble his fleets or his armies for the firstmove, and what the nature of that move shall be. The second move it isimpossible for him to pre-arrange because it depends upon the result ofthe first. He will determine the second move when the time comes. Inorder that his work should be as well done as possible, care is takenthat the Chief of the Staff shall have nothing else to do. Not he butanother officer superintends the raising, organising, and discipliningof the forces. Thus he becomes the embodiment of a theory or system ofoperations, and with that theory or system he inspires as far aspossible all the admirals or generals and other officers who will haveto carry out his designs. 

In the British system the Chief of the General Staff is the principalmilitary member of the Board which administers the army. Accordingly, only a fraction of his time can be given to thinking out the problems ofstrategy and tactics. At the Admiralty the principal naval member of theBoard is made responsible not only for the distribution and movements ofships--a definition which includes the whole domain of strategy andtactics--but also for the fighting and sea-going efficiency of thefleet, its organisation and mobilisation, a definition so wide that itincludes the greater part of the administration of the navy, especiallyas the same officer is held responsible for advice on all largequestions of naval policy and maritime warfare, as well as for thecontrol of the naval ordnance department. Thus in each case the veryconstitution of the office entrusted with the design of operationsprevents the officer at its head from concentrating himself upon thatvital duty. The result is that the intellectual life both of the armyand of the navy lags far behind that of their German rivals, andtherefore that there is every chance of both of them being beaten, notfor lack of courage or hard work, but by being opposed to an adversarywhose thinking has been better done by reason of the greaterconcentration of energy devoted to it. 

The first reform needed, at any rate in the navy, is a definition of thefunctions of the First Sea Lord which will confine his sphere to thedistribution and movement of ships and the strategical and tacticaltraining of officers, so as to compel him to become the embodiment orpersonification of the best possible theory or system of naval warfare. That definition adopted and enforced, there is no need to lay downregulations giving the strategist control over his colleagues whoadminister _matériel_ and _personnel_; they will of themselves always beanxious to hear his views as to the methods of fighting, and will beonly too glad to build ships with a view to their being used inaccordance with his design of victory. But until there is at theAdmiralty department devoted to designing victory and to nothing else, what possible guarantee can there be that ships will be built, or thenavy administered and organised in accordance with any design likely tolead to victory?

XIV. 

THE NEEDS OF THE NAVY

The doubt which, since the Prime Minister's statement on theintroduction of the Navy Estimates, has disturbed the public mind, isconcerned almost exclusively with the number of modern battleships inthe Royal Navy. The one object which the nation ought to have in view isvictory in the next war, and the question never to be forgotten is, whatis essential to victory? While it is probably true that if the disparityof numbers be too great a smaller fleet can hardly engage a larger onewith any prospect of success, it is possible to exaggerate theimportance both of numbers and of the size of ships. 

The most decisive victories at sea which are on record were those ofTsusima, of Trafalgar, and of the Nile. At Tsusima the numbers and sizeof the Japanese Fleet were not such as, before the battle, to giveforeign observers grounds for expecting a decisive victory by theJapanese. It was on the superior intellectual and moral qualities of theJapanese that those who expected them to win based their hopes, and thisview was justified by the event. At the battle of Trafalgar the BritishFleet numbered twenty-seven, the Franco-Spanish Fleet numberedthirty-three; at the battle of the Nile the numbers were equal--thirteenon each side. These figures seem to me sufficiently to prove thatsuperior numbers are not in battle the indispensable condition ofvictory. They certainly prove that the numerically inferior fleet mayvery well win. 

Writers on the art of war distinguish between tactics, the art ofwinning a battle, and strategy, the art of designing and conducting thewhole of the operations which constitute a campaign, of bringing aboutbattles in conditions favourable to one's own side and of making thebest use of such victories as may be won for contributing to the generalpurpose of the war, which is dictating peace on one's own terms. 

The decision of the questions, how many fleets to send out, what is tobe the strength and composition of each of them, and what the objectivesassigned to their several commanders is a strategical decision. It is afunction of the strategist at the Board of Admiralty, but the questionhow to handle any one of these fleets in the presence of the enemy so aseither to avoid or to bring about an action and so as to win the battle, if a battle be desirable, is a question for the admiral commanding theparticular fleet. 

Evidently the master art, because it dominates the whole war, is thatof strategy, and for that reason it must have a seat at the AdmiraltyBoard. 

As is well known, a large number of naval officers have for severalyears past been troubled with doubts as to the strategical competencedisplayed by the Board or Boards of Admiralty since 1904. The Board ofAdmiralty has also been criticised for other reasons, into some of whichit is not necessary to enter, but it is desirable to state precisely theconsiderations which tend to show that important decisions made by theAdmiralty have not been based upon sound strategical principles, andare, indeed, incompatible with them. 

When four or five years ago it was decided to transfer the centre ofgravity of the navy, as represented by fleets in commission, from theMediterranean to the Atlantic coasts of Europe, that was a sounddecision. But when the principal fleet in commission in home waters wasreduced in order to facilitate the creation of a so-called Home Fleet, made up of a number of ships stationed at different ports, and mannedfor the most part by nucleus crews, the Admiralty announced this measurein a very remarkable circular. The change clearly involved a reductionof the number of men at sea, and also a reduction in the number of shipswhich would be immediately available under war conditions. It wasfurther evident that the chief result of this measure would be areduction of expenditure, yet the circular boldly stated that the objectof the measure was to increase the power and readiness of the navy forinstant war. 

In any case, the decision announced revealed an ignorance of one of thefundamental conditions of naval warfare, which differentiates itcompletely from operations on land. A ship in commission carries onboard everything that is necessary for a fight. She can be made readyfor battle in a few minutes on the order to clear for action. No othermobilisation is necessary for a fleet in commission, and if a war shouldbreak out suddenly, as wars normally always do break out, whichever sideis able at once with its fleets already in commission to strike thefirst blow has the incalculable advantage of the initiative. 

A fleet divided between several ports and not fully manned is not afleet in commission; it is not ready, and its assembly as a fleetdepends on a contingency, which there is no means of guaranteeing, thatthe enemy shall not be able to prevent its assembly by moving a fleetimmediately to a point at sea from which it would be able to oppose byforce the union of the constituent parts of the divided and unreadyfleet. 

Later official descriptions of the Home Fleet explained that it was partof the Admiralty design that this fleet should offer the firstresistance to an enemy. The most careful examination of thesedescriptions leaves no room for doubt that the idea of the Admiralty wasthat one of its fleets should, in case of war, form a sort ofadvance-guard to the rest of the navy. But it is a fundamental truththat in naval war an advance-guard is absurd and impossible. In theoperations of armies, an advance-guard is both necessary and useful. Itsfunction is to delay the enemy's army until such time as thecommander-in-chief shall have assembled his own forces, which may be, tosome extent, scattered on the march. This delay is always possible onland, because the troops can make use of the ground, that is, of thepositions which it affords favourable for defence, and because by meansof those positions a small force can for a long time hold in check theadvance of a very much larger one. But at sea there are no positionsexcept those formed by narrow straits, estuaries, and shoals, where landand sea are more or less mixed up. The open sea is a uniform surfaceoffering no advantage whatever to either side. There is nothing in navalwarfare resembling the defence of a position on land, and the wholedifference between offence and defence at sea consists in the will ofone side to bring on an action and that of the other side to avoid orpostpone it. 

At sea a small force which endeavours by fighting to delay the movementof a large force exposes itself to destruction without any correspondinggain of time. Accordingly, at sea, there is no analogy to the action ofan advance-guard, and the mere fact that such an idea should find itsway into the official accounts of the Admiralty's views regarding theopening move of a possible war must discredit the strategy of theAdmiralty in the judgment of all who have paid any attention to thenature of naval war. 

The second requisite for victory, that is, for winning a battle againsta hostile fleet, is tactical superiority, or, as Nelson put it: "Theskill of our admirals and the activity and spirit of our officers andseamen. " The only way to obtain this is through the perpetual practiceof the admirals commanding fleets. An admiral, in order to make himselfa first-rate tactician, must not merely have deeply studied and ponderedthe subject, but must spend as much time as possible in exercising, as awhole, the fleet which he commands, in order not only by experimentalmanoeuvres thoroughly to satisfy himself as to the formation and mode ofattack which will be best suited to any conceivable circumstance inwhich he may find himself, but also to inculcate his ideas into hissubordinates; to inspire them with his own knowledge, and to give themthat training in working together which, in all those kinds ofactivities which require large numbers of men to work together, whetheron the cricket field, at football, in an army, or in a navy, constitutesthe advantage of a practised over a scratch team. 

If the practice is to make the fleet ready for war, it must be carriedout with the fleet in its war composition. All the different elements, battleships, cruisers, torpedo craft, and the rest, must be fullyrepresented, otherwise the admiral would be practising in peace with adifferent instrument from that with which he would need to operate inwar. 

The importance of this perpetual training ought to be self-evident. Itmay be well to remind the reader that it has also been historicallyproved. The great advantage which the British possessed over the Frenchnavy in the Wars of the Revolution and the Empire was that the Britishfleets were always at sea, whereas the French fleets, for yearsblockaded in their ports, were deficient in that practice which, in thenaval as in all other professions, makes perfect. One of the complaintsagainst the present Board of Admiralty is that it has not encouraged thetraining and exercise of fleets as complete units. 

Another point, in regard to which the recent practice of the Admiraltyis regarded with very grave doubts, not only by many naval officers, but also by many of those who, without being naval officers, take aserious interest in the navy, is that of naval construction. For severalyears the Admiralty neglected to build torpedo craft of the quality andin the quantity necessary for the most probable contingencies of war, while, at the same time, large sums of money were spent in buildingarmoured cruisers, vessels of a fighting power so great that an admiralwould hesitate to detach them from his fleet, lest he should beneedlessly weakened on the day of battle, yet not strong enough safelyto replace the battleships in the fighting line. The result has beenthat the admirals in command of fleets have for some time been anxiouslyasking to be better supplied with scouts or vessels of great speed, butnot of such fighting power that they could not be spared at a distancefrom the fleet even on the eve of an action. These two defects in theshipbuilding policy of the Admiralty make it probable that for someyears past the navy has not been constructed in accord with any fullythought-out design of operations; in other words, that the great object"victory" has been forgotten by the supreme authority. 

The doubt whether victory has been borne in mind is confirmed by what isknown of the design of the original _Dreadnought_. A battleship ought tobe constructed for battle, that is, for the purpose of destroying theenemy's fleet, for which purpose it will never be used alone, but inconjunction with a number of ships like itself forming the weapon of anadmiral in command. A battleship requires three qualities, in thefollowing order of importance:--

First, offensive power. A fleet exists in order to destroy the enemy, but it has no prospect of performing that function if its power ofdestruction is less than its enemy's. The chief weapon to-day, as in thepast, is artillery. Accordingly the first requisite of a fleet, asregards its material qualities, those produced by the constructor, isthe capacity to pour on to the enemy's fleet a heavier rain ofprojectiles than he can return. 

The second quality is the power of movement. The advantage of superiorspeed in a fleet--for the superior speed of an individual ship is oflittle importance--is that so long as it is preserved it enables theadmiral, within limits, to accept or decline battle according to his ownjudgment. This is a great strategical advantage. It may in someconditions enable an inferior fleet to postpone an action which might bedisastrous until it has effected a junction with another fleet belongingto its own side. 

The third quality is that the ships of a fleet should be strong enoughto offer to the enemy's projectiles a sufficient resistance to make itimprobable that they can be sunk before having inflicted their fairshare of damage on the adversary. 

There is always a difficulty in combining these qualities in a givenship, because as a ship weighs the quantity of water which shedisplaces, a ship of any given size has its weight given, and thedesigner cannot exceed that limit of weight. He must divide it betweenguns with their ammunition, engines with their coal, and armour. Everyton given to armour diminishes the tonnage possible for guns andengines, and, given a minimum for armour, every extra ton given toengines and coal reduces the possible weight of guns and ammunition. Inthe _Dreadnought_ a very great effort was made to obtain a considerableextra speed over that of all other battleships. This extra speed wasdefended on the ground that it would enable a fleet of _Dreadnoughts_ tofight a battle at long range, and with a view to such battle the_Dreadnought_ was provided only with guns of the heaviest calibre anddeprived of those guns of medium calibre with which earlier battleshipswere well provided. The theories thus embodied in the new class of shipswere both of them doubtful, and even dangerous. In the first place, itis in the highest degree injurious to the spirit and courage of the crewto have a ship which they know will be at a disadvantage if brought intoclose proximity with the enemy. Their great object ought to be to get asnear to the enemy as possible. The hypothesis that more damage will bedone by an armament exclusively of the largest guns is in the opinionof many of the best judges likely to be refuted. There is some reason tobelieve that a given tonnage, if devoted to guns of medium calibre, would yield a very much greater total damage to an enemy's ship than ifdevoted to a smaller number of guns of heavy calibre and firing muchless rapidly. 

There is, moreover, a widespread belief among naval officers of thehighest repute, among whom may be named the author of the "Influence ofSea Power upon History, " than whom no one has thought more profoundly onthe subject of naval war, that it is bad economy to concentrate in a fewvery large ships the power which might be more conveniently andeffectively employed if distributed in a great number of ships of moremoderate size. 

Surely, so long as naval opinion is divided about the tactical andstrategical wisdom of a new type of battleship, it is rash to continuebuilding battleships exclusively of that type, and it would be morereasonable to make an attempt to have naval opinion sifted andclarified, and thus to have a secure basis for a shipbuilding programme, than to hurry on an enormous expenditure upon what may after all proveto have been a series of doubtful experiments. 

All the questions above discussed seem to me to be more important thanthat of mere numbers of ships. Numbers are, however, of greatimportance in their proper place and for the proper reasons. The policyadopted and carried out by the British navy, at any rate during thelatter half of the war against the French Empire, was based on a knownsuperiority of force. The British fleet set out by blockading all theFrench fleets, that is, by taking stations near to the great Frenchharbours and there observing those harbours, so that no French fleetshould escape without being attacked. If this is to be the policy of theBritish navy in future it will require a preponderance of force of everykind over that of the enemy, and that preponderant force will have to befully employed from the very first day of the war. In other words, itmust be kept in commission during peace. But, in addition, it is alwaysdesirable to have a reserve of strength to meet the possibility that theopening of a war or one of its early subsequent stages may bring intoaction some additional unexpected adversary. There are thus two reasonsthat make for a fleet of great numerical strength. The first, that onlygreat superiority renders possible the strategy known as blockade, or, as I have ventured to call it, of "shadowing" the whole of the enemy'sforces. The second, that only great numerical strength renders itpossible to provide a reserve against unexpected contingencies. 

XV. 

ENGLAND'S MILITARY PROBLEM

After the close of the South African war, two Royal Commissions wereappointed. One of them, known as the War Commission, was in a generalway to inquire into and report upon the lessons of the war. This missionit could fulfil only very imperfectly, because its members feltprecluded from discussing the policy in which the war had its origin andincapable of reviewing the military conduct of the operations. This wasvery like reviewing the play of "Hamlet" without reference to thecharacters and actions either of Hamlet or of the King, for themainsprings which determine the course, character, and issue of any warare the policy out of which it arises and the conduct of the militaryoperations. The main fact which impressed itself on the members of theWar Commission was that the forces employed on the British side had beenvery much larger than had been expected at the beginning of the war, andthe moral which they drew was contained in the one sentence of theirreport which has remained in the public mind, to the effect that theGovernment ought to make provision for the expansion of the army beyondthe limit of the regular forces of the Crown. 

About the same time another Commission, under the chairmanship of theDuke of Norfolk, was appointed to inquire and report whether any, and, if any, what changes were required in order to secure that the Militiaand Volunteer forces should be maintained in a condition of militaryefficiency and at an adequate strength. The Norfolk Commissionrecommended certain changes which it thought would lead to a greatimprovement in the efficiency of both forces, while permitting them tomaintain the requisite numerical strength. With regard to the Volunteerforce, the report said:--

"The governing condition is that the Volunteer, whether an officer, non-commissioned officer, or private, earns his own living, and that ifdemands are made upon him which are inconsistent with his doing so hemust cease to be a Volunteer. No regulations can be carried out whichare incompatible with the civil employment of the Volunteers, who arefor the most part in permanent situations. Moreover, whatever may be thegoodwill and patriotism of employers, they cannot allow the Volunteersthey may employ more than a certain period of absence. Their power topermit their workmen to attend camp or other exercises is controlled bythe competition which exists in their trade. Those who permit Volunteersin their service to take holidays longer than are customary in theirtrade and district, are making in the public interest a sacrifice whichsome of them think excessive. "

The report further laid stress on the cardinal principle that noVolunteer, whatever his rank, should be put to expense on account of hisservice. Subject to this governing condition and to this cardinalprinciple, the Commission made recommendations from which it expected amarked improvement and the gradual attainment of a standard much inadvance of anything which until then had been reached. 

Most of these recommendations have been adopted, with modifications, inthe arrangements which have since been made for the Volunteers under thenew name "The Territorial Force. "

The Norfolk Commission felt no great confidence in the instructionsgiven it by the Government on the subject of the standard of efficiencyand of numerical strength. Accordingly the Commission added to itsreport the statement:--

"We cannot assert that, even if the measuresrecommended were fully carried out, these forceswould be equal to the task of defeating a moderncontinental army in the United Kingdom. "

The Commission's chief doubt was whether, under the conditionsinseparable at any rate from the volunteer system, any scheme oftraining would give to forces officered largely by men who are notprofessional soldiers the cohesion of armies that exact a progressivetwo-years' course from their soldiers and rely, except for expanding thesubaltern ranks on mobilisation, upon professional leaders. TheCommission then considered "Measures which may provide a Home DefenceArmy equal to the task of defeating an invader. " They were unable torecommend the adoption of the Swiss system, partly because the initialtraining was not, in their judgment, sufficient for the purpose, andpartly because they held that the modern method of extending thetraining to all classes, while shortening its duration, involves theemployment of instructors of the highest possible qualifications. TheCommission concluded by reporting that a Home Defence Army capable, inthe absence of the whole or the greater portion of the regular forces, of protecting this country against invasion can be raised and maintainedonly on the principle that it is the duty of every citizen of militaryage and sound physique to be trained for the national defence and totake part in it should emergency arise. 

The Norfolk Commission gave expression to two different views withoutattempting to reconcile them. On the one hand it laid down the mainlines along which the improvement of the militia and volunteers was tobe sought, and on the other hand it pointed out the advantages of theprinciple that it is the citizen's duty to be trained as a soldier andto fight in case of need. To go beyond this and to attempt either toreconcile the two currents of thought or to decide between them, wasimpossible for a Commission appointed to deal with only a fraction ofthe problem of national defence. The two sets of views, however, continue to exist side by side, and the nation yet has to do what theNorfolk Commission by its nature was debarred from doing. TheGovernment, represented in this matter by Mr. Haldane, is still in theposition of relying upon an improved militia and volunteer force. TheNational Service League, on the other hand, advocates the principle ofthe citizen's duty, though it couples with it a specific programmeborrowed from the Swiss system, the adoption of which was deprecated inthe Commission's Report. The public is somewhat puzzled by theappearance of opposition between what are thought of as two schools, andindeed Mr. Haldane in his speech introducing the Army Estimates on March4, 1909, described the territorial force as a safeguard againstuniversal service. 

The time has perhaps come when the attempt should be made to find apoint of view from which the two schools of thought can be seen in dueperspective, and from which, therefore, a definite solution of themilitary problem may be reached. 

By what principle must our choice between the two systems be determined?By the purpose in hand. The sole ultimate use of an army is to win thenation's battles, and if one system promises to fulfil that purposewhile the other system does not, we cannot hesitate. 

Great Britain requires an army as one of the instruments of success in amodern British war, and we have therefore to ascertain, in general, thenature of a modern war, and in particular the character of such wars asGreat Britain may have to wage. 

The distinguishing feature of the conflict between two modern greatStates is that it is a struggle for existence, or, at any rate, awrestle to a fall. The mark of the modern State is that it is identifiedwith the population which it comprises, and to such a State the name"nation" properly belongs. The French Revolution nationalised the Stateand in consequence nationalised war, and every modern continental Statehas so organized itself with a view to war that its army is equivalentto the nation in arms. 

The peculiar character of a British war is due to the insular characterof the British State. A conflict with a great continental Power mustbegin with a naval struggle, which will be carried on with the utmostenergy until one side or the other has established its predominance onthe sea. If in this struggle the British navy is successful, the effectwhich can be produced on a continental State by the victorious navy willnot be sufficient to cause the enemy to accept peace upon Britishconditions. For that purpose, it will be necessary to invade the enemy'sterritory and to put upon him the constraint of military defeat, andGreat Britain therefore requires an army strong enough either to effectthis operation or to encourage continental allies to join with it inmaking the attempt. 

In any British war, therefore, which is to be waged with prospect ofsuccess, Great Britain's battles must be fought and won on the enemy'sterritory and against an army raised and maintained on the modernnational principle. 

This is the decisive consideration affecting British military policy. 

In case of the defeat of the British navy a continental enemy would, undoubtedly, attempt the invasion and at least the temporary conquest ofGreat Britain. The army required to defeat him in the United Kingdomwould need to have the same strength and the same qualities as would berequired to defeat him in his own territory, though, if the invasion hadbeen preceded by naval defeat, it is very doubtful whether any militarysuccess in the United Kingdom would enable Great Britain to continueher resistance with much hope of ultimate success. 

For these reasons I cannot believe that Great Britain's needs are met bythe possession of any force the employment of which is, by theconditions of its service, limited to fighting in the United Kingdom. ABritish army, to be of any use, must be ready to go and win itscountry's battles in the theatre of war in which its country requiresvictories. That theatre of war will never be the United Kingdom unlessand until the navy has failed to perform its task, in which case it willprobably be too late to win battles in time to avert the nationaloverthrow which must be the enemy's aim. 

There are, however, certain subsidiary services for which any Britishmilitary system must make provision. 

These are:--

(1) Sufficient garrisons must be maintained during peace in India, inEgypt, for some time to come in South Africa, and in certain navalstations beyond the seas, viz. , Gibraltar, Malta, Ceylon, Hong Kong, Singapore, Mauritius, West Africa, Bermuda, and Jamaica. It is generallyagreed that the principle of compulsory service cannot be applied forthe maintenance of these garrisons, which must be composed ofprofessional paid soldiers. 

(2) Experience shows that a widespread Empire, like the British, requires from time to time expeditions for the maintenance of order onits borders against half civilised or savage tribes. This function wasdescribed in an essay on "Imperial Defence, " published by Sir CharlesDilke and the present writer in 1892 as "Imperial Police. "

It would not be fair, for the purpose of one of these small expeditions, arbitrarily to call upon a fraction of a force maintained on theprinciple of compulsion. Accordingly any system must provide a specialpaid reserve for the purpose of furnishing the men required for such anexpedition. 

An army able to strike a serious blow against a continental enemy in hisown territory would evidently be equally able to defeat an invading armyif the necessity should arise. Accordingly the military question forGreat Britain resolves itself into the provision of an army able tocarry on serious operations against a European enemy, together with themaintenance of such professional forces as are indispensable for thegarrisons of India, Egypt, and the over-sea stations enumerated aboveand for small wars. 

XVI. 

TWO SYSTEMS CONTRASTED

I proceed to describe a typical army of the national kind, and to showhow the system of such an army could be applied in the case of GreatBritain. 

The system of universal service has been established longer in Germanythan in any other State, and can best be explained by an account of itsworking in that country. In Germany every man becomes liable to militaryservice on his seventeenth birthday, and remains liable until he isturned forty-five. The German army, therefore, theoretically includesall German citizens between the ages of seventeen and forty-five, butthe liability is not enforced before the age of twenty nor after the ageof thirty-nine, except in case of some supreme emergency. Young menunder twenty, and men between thirty-nine and forty-five, belong to theLandsturm. They are subjected to no training, and would not be calledupon to fight except in the last extremity. Every year all the young menwho have reached their twentieth birthday are mustered and classified. Those who are not found strong enough for military service are dividedinto three grades, of which one is dismissed as unfit; a second isexcused from training and enrolled in the Landsturm; while a third, whose physical defects are minor and perhaps temporary, is told off to asupplementary reserve, of which some members receive a short training. Of those selected as fit for service a few thousand are told off to thenavy, the remainder pass into the army and join the colours. 

The soldiers thus obtained serve in the ranks of the army for two yearsif assigned to the infantry, field artillery, or engineers, and forthree years if assigned to the cavalry or horse artillery. At theexpiration of the two or three years they pass into the reserve of thestanding army, in which they remain until the age of twenty-seven, thatis, for five years in the case of the infantry and engineers, and forfour years in the case of the cavalry and horse artillery. Attwenty-seven all alike cease to belong to the standing army, and passinto the Landwehr, to which they continue to belong to the age ofthirty-nine. The necessity to serve for at least two years with thecolours is modified in the case of young men who have reached a certainstandard of education, and who engage to clothe, feed, equip, and in themounted arms to mount themselves. These men are called "one yearvolunteers, " and are allowed to pass into the reserve of the standingarmy at the expiration of one year with the colours. 

In the year 1906, 511, 000 young men were mustered, and of these 275, 000were passed into the standing army, 55, 000 of them being one yearvolunteers. The men in any year so passed into the army form an annualclass, and the standing army at any time is made up, in the infantry, oftwo annual classes, and in the cavalry and horse artillery of threeannual classes. In case of war, the army of first line would be made upby adding to the two or three annual classes already with the coloursthe four or five annual classes forming the reserve, that is, altogetherseven annual classes. Each of these classes would number, when it firstpassed into the army, about 275, 000; but as each class must lose everyyear a certain number of men by death, by diseases which cause physicalincapacity from service, and by emigration, the total army of first linemust fall short of the total of seven times 275, 000. It may probably betaken at a million and a half. In the second line come the twelve annualclasses of Landwehr, which will together furnish about the same numbersas the standing army. 

Behind the Landwehr comes the supplementary reserve, and behind thatagain the Landsturm, comprising the men who have been trained and arebetween the ages of thirty-nine and forty-five, the young men undertwenty, and all those who, from physical weakness, have been entirelyexempted from training. 

During their two or three years with the colours the men receive anallowance or pay of twopence halfpenny a day. Their service is not acontract but a public duty, and while performing it they are clothed, lodged, and fed by the State. When passed into the reserve they resumetheir normal civil occupation, except that for a year or two they arecalled up for a few weeks' training and manoeuvres during the autumn. 

In this way all German citizens, so far as they are physically fit, witha few exceptions, such as the only son and support of a widow, receive athorough training as soldiers, and Germany relies in case of warentirely and only upon her citizens thus turned into soldiers. 

The training is carried out by officers and non-commissioned officers, who together are the military schoolmasters of the nation, and, likeother proficient schoolmasters, are paid for their services by whichthey live. Broadly speaking, there are in Germany no professionalsoldiers except the officers and non-commissioned officers, from whom ahigh standard of capacity as instructors and trainers during peace andas leaders in war is demanded and obtained. 

The high degree of military proficiency which the German army hasacquired is due to the excellence of the training given by the officersand to the thoroughness with which, during a course of two or threeyears, that training can be imparted. The great numbers which can be putinto the field are due to the practice of passing the whole malepopulation, so far as it is physically qualified, through this training, so that the army in war represents the whole of the best manhood of thecountry between the ages of twenty and forty. 

The total of three millions which has been given above is that which wasmentioned by Prince Bismarck in a speech to the Reichstag in 1887. Theincrease of population since that date has considerably augmented thefigures for the present time, and the corresponding total to-dayslightly exceeds four millions. 

 * * * * *

The results of the British system are shown in the following table, which gives, from the Army Estimates, the numbers of the variousconstituents of the British army on the 1st of January 1909. There wereat that date in the United Kingdom:---

Regular forces ........................ 123, 250Army reserve .......................... 134, 110Special reserves ...................... 67, 780Militia ............................... 9, 158Territorial force ..................... 209, 977Officers' training corps .............. 416 ________

 Total in the United Kingdom ...... 544, 691

In Egypt and the Colonies:--

Regular forces ........................ 45, 002

The British troops in India are paid for by the Indian Government and donot appear in the British Army Estimates. Of the force maintained in theUnited Kingdom, it will be observed that it falls, roughly, into threecategories. 

In the first place come the first-rate troops which may be presumed tohave had a thorough training for war. This class embraces only theregulars and the army reserve, which together slightly exceed a quarterof a million. In the second class come the 68, 000 of the specialreserve, which, in so far as they have enjoyed the six months' traininglaid down in the recent reorganisation, could on a sanguine estimate beclassified as second-class troops, though in view of the fact that theirofficers are not professional and are for the most part very slightlytrained, that classification would be exceedingly sanguine. Next comesthe territorial force with a maximum annual training of a fortnight incamp, preceded by ten to twenty lessons and officered by men whoseprofessional training, though it far exceeds that of the rank and file, falls yet very much short of that given to the professional officers ofa first-rate continental army. The territorial force, by itsconstitution, is not available to fight England's battles except in theUnited Kingdom, where they can never be fought except in the event of adefeat of the navy. 

This heterogeneous tripartite army is exceedingly expensive, its costduring the current year being, according to the Estimates, very littleless than 29 millions, the cost of the personnel being 23-1/2 millions, that of _matériel_ being 4 millions, and that of administration 1/2millions. 

The British regular army cannot multiply soldiers as does the Germanarmy. It receives about 37, 000 recruits a year. But it sends away toIndia and the Colonies about 23, 000 each year and seldom receives themback before their eight years' colour service are over, when they passinto the first-class reserve. There pass into the reserve about 24, 000men a year, and as the normal term of reserve service is four years, itsnormal strength is about 96, 000 men. 

As the regular army contains only professional soldiers, who look, atany rate for a period of eight years, to soldiering as a living, and areprepared for six or seven years abroad, there is a limit to the supplyof recruits, who are usually under nineteen years of age, and to whomthe pay of a shilling a day is an attraction. Older men with prospectsof regular work expect wages much higher than that, and therefore do notenlist except when in difficulties. 

XVII. 

A NATIONAL ARMY

I propose to show that a well-trained homogeneous army of greatnumerical strength can be obtained on the principle of universal serviceat no greater cost than the present mixed force. The essentials of ascheme, based upon training the best manhood of the nation, are: first, that to be trained is a matter of duty not of pay; secondly, that everytrained man is bound, as a matter of duty, to serve with the army in anational war; thirdly, that the training must be long enough to bethorough, but no longer; fourthly, that the instructors shall be thebest possible, which implies that they must be paid professionalofficers and non-commissioned officers. 

I take the age at which the training should begin at the end of thetwentieth year, in order that, in case of war, the men in the ranks maybe the equals in strength and endurance of the men in the ranks of anyopposing army. The number of men who reach the age of twenty every yearin the United Kingdom exceeds 400, 000. Continental experience shows thatless than half of these would be rejected as not strong enough. Theannual class would therefore be about 200, 000. 

The principle of duty applies of course to the navy as well as to thearmy, and any man going to the navy will be exempt from army training. But it is doubtful whether the navy can be effectively manned on asystem of very short service such as is inevitable for a national army. The present personnel of the navy is maintained by so small a yearlycontingent of recruits that it will be covered by the excess of theannual class over the figure here assumed of 200, 000. The actual numberof men reaching the age of twenty is more than 400, 000, and the probablenumber out of 400, 000 who will be physically fit for service is at least213, 000. 

I assume that for the infantry and field artillery a year's trainingwould, with good instruction, be sufficient, and that even better andmore lasting results would be produced if the last two months of theyear were replaced by a fortnight of field manoeuvres in each of thefour summers following the first year. For the cavalry and horseartillery I believe that the training should be prolonged for a secondyear. 

The liability to rejoin the colours, in case of a national war, shouldcontinue to the end of the 27th year, and be followed by a period ofliability in the second line, Landwehr or Territorial Army. 

The first thing to be observed is the numerical strength of the armythus raised and trained. 

If we assume that any body of men loses each year, from death, disablement, and emigration, five per cent. Of its number, the annualclasses would be as follows:--

1st year, age 20-21 200, 000 (At the end of the2nd " " 21-22 170, 000 first year 20, 0003rd " " 23-24 161, 300 are to go abroad4th " " 24-25 153, 425 as explained below)5th " " 25-26 145, 7546th " " 26-27 138, 467 -------- Total on mobilisation 968, 946 ========

This gives an army of close upon a million men in first line in additionto the British forces in India, Egypt, and the colonial stations. 

If from the age of 27 to that of 31 the men were in the Landwehr, thatforce would be composed of four annual classes as follows:--

 7th year, age 27-28 131, 544 8th " " 28-29 124, 967 9th " " 29-30 118, 71910th " " 30-31 112, 784 -------- Total of Landwehr 488, 014 ========

There is no need to consider the further strength that would beavailable if the liability were prolonged to the age of 39, as it is inGermany. 

The liability thus enforced upon all men of sound physique is to fightin a national war, a conflict involving for England a struggle forexistence. But that does not and ought not to involve serving in thegarrison of Egypt or of India during peace, nor being called upon totake part in one of the small wars waged for the purpose of policing theEmpire or its borders. These functions must be performed byprofessional, i. E. Paid soldiers. 

The British army has 76, 000 men in India and 45, 000 in Egypt, SouthAfrica, and certain colonial stations. These forces are maintained bydrafts from the regular army at home, the drafts amounting in 1908 to12, 000 for India and 11, 000 for the Colonies. 

Out of every annual class of 200, 000 young men there will be a numberwho, after a year's training, will find soldiering to their taste, andwill wish to continue it. These should be given the option of engagingfor a term of eight years in the British forces in India, Egypt, or theColonies. There they would receive pay and have prospects of promotionto be non-commissioned officers, sergeants, warrant officers orcommissioned officers, and of renewing their engagement if they wishedeither for service abroad or as instructors in the army at home. Thesemen would leave for India, Egypt, or a colony at the end of their firstyear. I assume that 20, 000 would be required, because eight annualclasses of that strength, diminishing at the rate of five per cent. Perannum, give a total of 122, 545, and the eight annual classes wouldtherefore suffice to maintain the 121, 000 now in India, Egypt, and theColonies. Provision is thus made for the maintenance of the forces inIndia, Egypt, and the Colonies. 

There must also be provision for the small wars to which the Empire isliable. This would be made by engaging every year 20, 000 who hadfinished their first year's training to serve for pay, say 1s. A day, for a period say of six months, of the second year, and afterwards tojoin for five years the present first-class reserve at 6d. A day, withliability for small wars and expeditions. At the end of the five yearsthese men would merge in the general unpaid reserve of the army. Theymight during their second year's training be formed into a special corpsdevoting most of the time to field manoeuvres, in which supplementary orreserve officers could receive special instruction. 

It would be necessary also to keep with the colours for some monthsafter the first year's training a number of garrison artillery andengineers to provide for the security of fortresses during the periodbetween the time of sending home one annual class and the preliminarylessons of the next. These men would be paid. I allow 10, 000 men forthis purpose, and these, with the 20, 000 prolonging their training forthe paid reserve, and with the mounted troops undergoing the secondyear's training, would give during the winter months a garrison strengthat home of 50, 000 men. 

The mobilised army of a million men would require a great number ofextra officers, who should be men of the type of volunteer officersselected for good education and specially trained, after their firstyear's service, in order to qualify them as officers. Similar provisionmust be made for supplementary non-commissioned officers. 

XVIII. 

THE COST

It will probably be admitted that an army raised and trained on the planhere set forth would be far superior in war to the heterogeneous bodywhich figures in the Army Estimates at a total strength of 540, 000regulars, militia, and volunteers. Its cost would in no case be morethan that of the existing forces, and would probably be considerablyless. This is the point which requires to be proved. 

The 17th Appendix to the Army Estimates is a statement of the cost ofthe British army, arranged under the four headings of:--

1. Cost of personnel of regular army and army reserve £18, 279, 234

2. Cost of special reserves and territorial forces 5, 149, 843

3. Cost of armaments, works, stores, &c. 3, 949, 463

4. Cost of staff and administration 1, 414, 360 ___________ Making a total of £28, 792, 900 ===========

In the above table nearly a million is set down for the cost of certainlabour establishments and of certain instructional establishments, which may for the present purpose be neglected. Leaving them out, thepresent cost of the personnel of the Regular Army, apart from staff, is, £15, 942, 802. For this cost are maintained officers, non-commissionedofficers and men, numbering altogether 170, 000. 

The lowest pay given is that of 1s. A day to infantry privates, theprivates of the other arms receiving somewhat higher and thenon-commissioned officers very much higher rates of pay. 

If compulsory service were introduced into Great Britain, pay wouldbecome unnecessary for the private soldier; but he ought to be and wouldbe given a daily allowance of pocket-money, which probably ought not toexceed fourpence. The mounted troops would be paid at the rate of 1s. Aday during their second year's service. 

Assuming then that the private soldier received fourpence a day insteadof 1s. A day, and that the officers and non-commissioned officers werepaid as at present, the cost of the army would be reduced by an amountcorresponding to 8d. A day for 148, 980 privates. That amount is£1, 812, 590, the deduction of which would reduce the total cost to£14, 137, 212. At the same rate an army of 200, 000 privates and

20, 000 non-commissioned officers and men wouldcost . . . . . . . . £18, 295, 215

 Second year of 20, 000 mounted troops at £60 a year each . . . 1, 200, 000

 Add to this cost of first-class Reserve of 96, 000 at £10 7s. 6d. Each . . . . . . . 997, 600

 Cost of 30, 000 men for six months' extra training at the rate of £60 a year each . . . . . 900, 000

 Cost of extra training for supplementary officers and non-commissioned officers . . . . . . 500, 000 ----------- £21, 892, 815 Add to this the cost of the troops maintained in the Colonies and Egypt so far as charged to British Estimates . . . . £3, 401, 704 ----------- Total personnel . . . £25, 294, 519

 Matériel (allowing for additional outlay due to larger numbers) . . 4, 500, 000

 Staff and administration . . . 1, 500, 000 ------------ Total Cost of Army at Home and in the Colonies . . £31, 294, 519

This is slightly in excess of the present cost of the personnel of theArmy, but, whereas the present charge only provides for theheterogeneous force already described of 589, 000 men, the charges hereexplained provide for a short-service homogeneous army of one millionand a half, as well as for the 45, 000 troops permanently maintained inEgypt and the Colonies. 

The estimate just given is, however, extravagant. The British system hasinnumerable different rates of pay and extra allowances of all kinds, and is so full of anomalies that it is bound to be costly. Unfortunately, the Army Estimates are so put together that it isdifficult to draw from them any exact inferences as to the actual annualcost of a private soldier beyond his pay. 

The average annual cost, effective and non-effective, of an officer inthe cavalry, artillery, engineers, and infantry is £473, this sumcovering all the arrangements for pensions and retiring allowances. 

I propose in the following calculations to assume the average cost of anofficer to be £500 a year, a sum which would make it possible for theaverage combatant officer to be somewhat better paid than he is atpresent. 

The normal pay of a sergeant in the infantry of the line is 2s. 4d. Aday, or £42, 11s. 8d. A year. The Army Estimates do not give the cost ofa private soldier, but the statement is made that the average annualcost per head of 150, 000 warrant officers, non-commissioned officers, and men is £63, 6s. 7d. The warrant officers and non-commissionedofficers appear to be much more expensive than the private, and as theminimum pay of a private is £18, 5s. , the balance, £45, 1s. 7d. , isprobably much more than the cost of housing, clothing, feeding, andequipping the private, whose food, the most expensive item, certainlydoes not cost a shilling a day or £18 a year. 

I assume that the cost of maintaining a private soldier is covered by£36 a year, while his allowance of 4d. A day amounts to £6, 1s. 4d. Inorder to cover the extra allowances which may be made to corporals, buglers, and trumpeters, I assume the average cost of the rank and fileto be £45 a year. I also assume that the average cost of a sergeant doesnot exceed £100 a year, which allows from £40 to £50 for his pay and thebalance for his housing, clothing, equipment, and food. I add provisionsfor pensions for sergeants after twenty-five years' service. 

These figures lead to the following estimate:--

7000 officers at £500 £3, 500, 000

14, 000 sergeants at £100 1, 400, 000

Pension after twenty-five years for sergeants, £52 a year 396, 864

(An annual class of 14, 000, decreasing annually by 2-1/2 per cent. , would consist, after twenty-five years, of 7632) ------------ Carry forward £5, 296, 864

 Brought forward . . . £5, 296, 864

200, 000 privates at £45 a year . . 9, 000, 000

2nd year of 20, 000 mounted troops (cavalry and horse artillery at £60 a year each) 1, 200, 000

Six months' extra training for 30, 000 men with pay (total rate per man £60 a year) (20, 000 for paid reserve and 10, 000 fortress troops) . . . . 900, 000

First-class reserve . . . . 997, 600

Training supplementary officers and sergeants 500, 000 ------------ £17, 894, 464

Colonial troops . . . . . 3, 500, 000

 Total personnel . . . . £21, 394, 464 ------------

_Matériel_, allowing for additional cost due to larger numbers . . . . 4, 500, 000

Staff and administration . . . 1, 500, 000 ------------

Total cost of army at home and in the Colonies . . . . . £27, 394, 464 ============

The figures here given will, it is hoped, speak for themselves. Theyare, if anything, too high rather than too low. The number of officersis calculated on the basis of the present war establishments, which give5625 officers for 160, 500 of the other ranks. It does not include thosein Egypt and the Colonies. The cost of the officers is taken at a higheraverage rate than that of British officers of the combatant arms underthe present system, and, both for sergeants and for privates, ampleallowance appears to me to be made even on the basis of their presentcost. 

When it is considered that Germany maintains with the colours a force of600, 000 men at a cost of £29, 000, 000, that France maintains 550, 000 for£27, 000, 000, and that Italy maintains 221, 000 for £7, 500, 000, it cannotbe admitted that Great Britain would be unable to maintain 220, 000officers and men at an annual cost of £17, 500, 000, and the probabilityis that with effective administration this cost could be considerablyreduced. 

It may at first sight seem that the logical course would have been toassume two years' service in the infantry and three years' service inthe mounted arms, in accord with the German practice, but there areseveral reasons that appear to me to make such a proposal unnecessary. In the first place, Great Britain's principal weapon must always be hernavy, while Germany's principal weapon will always be her army, whichguarantees the integrity of her three frontiers and also guards heragainst invasion from oversea. Germany's navy comes only in the secondplace in any scheme for a German war, while in any scheme for a Britishwar the navy must come in the first place and the army in the second. 

The German practice for many years was to retain the bulk of the men forthree years with the colours. It was believed by the older generation ofsoldiers that any reduction of this period would compromise thatcohesion of the troops which is the characteristic mark of adisciplined army. But the views of the younger men prevailed and theperiod has been reduced by a third. The reduction of time has, however, placed a heavier responsibility upon the body of professionalinstructors. 

The actual practice of the British army proves that a recruit can befully trained and be made fit in every way to take his place in hiscompany by a six months' training, but in my opinion that is notsufficient preparation for war. The recruit when thoroughly taughtrequires a certain amount of experience in field operations ormanoeuvres. This he would obtain during the summer immediately followingupon the recruit training; for the three months of summer, or of summerand autumn, ought to be devoted almost entirely to field exercises andmanoeuvres. If the soldier is then called out for manoeuvres for afortnight in each of four subsequent years, or for a month in each oftwo subsequent years, I believe that the lessons he has learned ofoperations in the field will thereby be refreshed, renewed, anddigested, so as to give him sufficient experience and sufficientconfidence in himself, in his officers, and in the system to qualify himfor war at any moment during the next five or six years. The additionalthree months' manoeuvre training, beyond the mere recruit training, appears to me indispensable for an army that is to be able to take thefield with effect. But that this period should suffice, and that thewhole training should be given in nine or ten months of one year, followed by annual periods of manoeuvre, involves the employment of thebest methods by a body of officers steeped in the spirit of moderntactics and inspired by a general staff of the first order. 

The question what is the shortest period that will suffice to producecohesion belongs to educational psychology. How long does it take toform habits? How many repetitions of a lesson will bring a man into thecondition in which he responds automatically to certain calls upon him, as does a swimmer dropped into the water, a reporter in forming hisshorthand words, or a cyclist guiding and balancing his machine? In eachcase two processes are necessary. There is first the series ofprogressive lessons in which the movements are learned and mastereduntil the pupil can begin practice. Then follows a period of practicemore or less prolonged, without which the lessons learned do not becomepart of the man's nature; he retains the uncertainty of a beginner. Therecruit course of the British army is of four months. A first practiceperiod of six months followed by fresh practice periods of a month eachin two subsequent years or by four practice periods of a fortnight eachin four successive years are in the proposals here sketched assumed tobe sufficient. If they were proved inadequate I believe the right planof supplementing them would be rather by adding to the number andduration of the manoeuvre practices of the subsequent years than byprolonging the first period of continuous training. 

The following table shows the cost of two years' service calculated onthe same bases as have been assumed above. Two years' service would meanan army with the colours not of 200, 000 but of 390, 000 men. This wouldrequire double the number of officers and sergeants, and the annualestimates for personnel would be £34, 000, 000, and the total ArmyEstimates £41, 000, 000. There would also be a very great extraexpenditure upon barracks. 

Estimate of Annual Cost for Two Years' Service. 

13, 650 officers at £500 a year £6, 825, 000

27, 300 sergeants at £100 2, 730, 000

Pension for sergeants' annual class of 27, 300, decreasing by 2-1/2 per cent. , gives after twenty-five years £12, 403; at £52 a year pension is 644, 956

390, 000 privates at £45 a year 17, 550, 000

Third year mounted troops, 20, 000 at £60 1, 200, 000

First-class reserve 997, 000

Training supplementary officers and sergeants 500, 000 ---------- Carry forward £30, 446, 956

 Brought forward £30, 446, 956

Colonial troops 3, 500, 000 ---------- Total personnel £33, 946, 956

_Matériel_, allowing for extra numbers 5, 000, 000

Staff and administration, allowing for extra numbers 2, 000, 000 ----------- £40, 946, 956 ===========

XIX. 

ONE ARMY NOT TWO

The training provided in the scheme which I have outlined could befacilitated at comparatively small cost by the adoption of certainpreparatory instruction to be given partly in the schools, and partly toyoung men between the ages of seventeen and twenty. 

It has never appeared to me desirable to add to the school curriculumany military subjects whatever, and I am convinced that no greatermistake could be made, seeing that schoolmasters are universally agreedthat the curriculum is already overloaded and requires to be lightened, and that the best preparation that the school can give for making a boylikely to be a good soldier when grown up, is to develop hisintelligence and physique as far as the conditions of school life admit. But if all school children were drilled in the evolutions of infantry inclose order, the evolutions being always precisely the same as thosepractised in the army, the army would receive its men already drilled, and would not need to spend much time in recapitulating thesepractices, which make no appreciable demand upon the time of schoolchildren. 

Again, there seems to be no doubt that boys between the ages ofseventeen and twenty can very well be taught to handle a rifle, and thetime required for such instruction and practice is so small that itwould in no way affect or interfere with the ordinary occupations of theboys, whatever their class in life. 

Every school of every grade ought, as a part of its ordinary geographylessons, to teach the pupils to understand, to read, and to use theordnance maps of Great Britain, and that this should be the case hasalready been recognised by the Board of Education. A soldier who canread such a map has thereby acquired a knowledge and a habit which areof the greatest value to him, both in manoeuvres and in the field. 

The best physical preparation which the schools can give their pupilsfor the military life, as well as for any other life, is a well-directedcourse of gymnastics and the habits of activity, order, initiative, anddiscipline derived from the practice of the national games. 

A national army is a school in which the young men of a nation areeducated by a body of specially trained teachers, the officers. Theeducation given for war consists in a special training of the will andof the intelligence. In order that it should be effective, the teachersor trainers must not merely be masters of the theory and practice of warand of its operations, but also proficient in the art of education. Thisconception of the officers' function fixes their true place in theState. Their duties require for their proper performance the best headsas well as the best-schooled wills that can be found, and impose uponthem a laborious life. There can be no good teacher who is not also astudent, and a national army requires from its officers a high standardnot only of character, but of intelligence and knowledge. It shouldoffer a career to the best talent. A national army must thereforeattract the picked men of the universities to become officers. Theattraction, to such men consists, chiefly, in their faith in the valueof the work to be done, and, to a less degree, in the prospect of anassured living. Adequate, though not necessarily high, pay must begiven, and there must be a probability of advancement in the careerproportionate to the devotion and talents given to the work. But theirwork must be relied upon by the nation, otherwise they cannot throwtheir energies into it with full conviction. 

This is the reason why, if there is to be a national army, it must bethe only regular army and the nation must rely upon nothing else. Tokeep a voluntary paid standing army side by side with a national armyraised upon the principle of universal duty is neither morally noreconomically sound. Either the nation will rely upon its school or itwill not. If the school is good enough to serve the nation's turn, asecond school on a different basis is needless; if a second school wererequired, that would mean that the first could not be trusted. 

There can be no doubt that in a national school of war the professionalofficers must be the instructors, otherwise the nation will not relyupon the young men trained. The 200, 000 passed through the school everyyear will be the nation's best. Therefore, so soon as the system hasbeen at work long enough to produce a force as large as the presenttotal, that is, after the third year, there will be no need to keep upthe establishment of 138, 000 paid privates, the special reserve, or thenow existing territorial force. There will be one homogeneous army, ofwhich a small annual contingent will, after each year's training, beenlisted for paid service in India, Egypt, and the oversea stations, anda second small contingent, with extra training, will pass into the paidreserve for service in small oversea expeditions. 

The professional officers and sergeants will, of course, beinterchangeable between the national army at home and its professionalbranches in India, Egypt, and the oversea stations, and the cadres ofthe battalions, batteries, and squadrons stationed outside the UnitedKingdom can from time to time be relieved by the cadres of thebattalions' from the training army at home. This relief of battalions ismade practicable by the national system. One of the first consequencesof the new mode of recruiting will be that all recruits will be taken onthe same given date, probably the 1st of January in each year, and, asthis will apply as well to the men who re-engage to serve abroad as toall others, so soon as the system is in full working order, the men ofany battalion abroad will belong to annual classes, and the engagementof each class will terminate on the same day. 

XX. 

THE TRANSITION

I have now explained the nature and working of a national army, andshown the kind of strength it will give and the probable maximum costwhich it will involve when adopted. 

The chief difficulty attendant upon its adoption lies in the period oftransition from the old order to the new. If Great Britain is to keepher place and do her duty in the world the change must be made; but thequestion arises, how is the gulf between one and the other to bebridged? War comes like a thief in the night, and it must not catch thiscountry unready. 

The complete readiness which the new system, when in full swing, willproduce, cannot be obtained immediately. All that can be done in thetransition period is to see that the number and quality of men availablefor mobilisation shall be at least as high as it is under the existingsystem. It may be worth while to explain how this result can be secured. 

Let us assume that the Act authorising the new system is passed during ayear, which may be called '00, and that it is to come into force on the1st January of the year '01. The Act would probably exempt from itsoperations the men at the date of its passing already serving in any ofthe existing forces, including the territorial army, and the discussionon the Bill would, no doubt, have the effect of filling the territorialarmy up to the limit of its establishment, 315, 000 men. 

On the 31st December '00 the available troops would therefore be:--

Regulars in the United Kingdom (present figure) 138, 000

Special reserve 67, 000

Army reserve (probably diminished from present strength) 120, 000

Territorial force 315, 000 --------Total 640, 000 ========

From the 1st January '01 recruiting on present conditions for all theseforces would cease. 

The regular army of 138, 000 would lose drafts to India and the Colonies 23, 000 and would have lost during '00 by waste at 5 per cent 6, 900 ------- 29, 000This would leave: ------- regular army under old conditions 108, 100

 and leave room for recruits under new conditions 91, 900 =======

The total available for mobilisation during the year '01 wouldtherefore be:--

Regulars 200, 000

Paid reserves (the present first-class reserve. I assume an arbitrary figure below the actual one) 120, 000

Special reserve (I assume a large waste and a loss from men whose time has expired) 50, 000

Territorial force 315, 000 Less 5 per cent 15, 700 ------- 299, 250 ------- 669, 250

On the 1st January '02 the regular army would be:--

Old engagement 108, 000 Less waste 5, 400Indian and Colonial reliefs 23, 000 ------- 79, 600

Recruits under new system 120, 400

Mounted troops serving second year 20, 000 --------Total of regulars 220, 000

New reserve 91, 900 Less 5 per cent. 4, 580 ------- 87, 320 87, 000

Paid reserve 120, 000

Special reserve, reduced by lapse of engagements 40, 000 --------Total liable for national war 467, 000

Add--Territorial force, reduced by 5 per cent waste (14, 962), and lapse of (78, 750) engagements 205, 538 -------- 672, 538 ========

In the year '03 there would be:--

Old regulars, 79, 600; less 5 per cent. Waste, 3, 950; less drafts for abroad, 23, 000-- leaves 52, 050, say 50, 000

Regulars, recruits under new conditions 150, 000

Mounted troops serving second year 20, 000

New reserve 197, 331

Paid reserve 120, 000

Special reserve 30, 000 --------- Total liable for national war 567, 334

 Territorial force 116, 512 --------- 683, 846 =========

In the year '04 there would be:--

Old regulars 50, 000 Less 5 per cent. 2, 500 ------- 47, 500

 Less drafts 23, 000 ------- 24, 500

New regulars 175, 500

Mounted troops, second year 20, 000 --------- 220, 000

New reserve 329, 000

Paid reserve 120, 000

Special reserve may now be dropped ---------Total liable for national war 669, 000

Territorial force 116, 512 Less 5 per cent. 5, 825 -------- 110, 687 Less 78, 750 -------- 31, 937 -------- 700, 937 ========

At the end of '04 the territorial force would come to an end and in '05there would be:--

(Old regulars, 24, 000, after waste just enough for drafts. )

New regulars 200, 000

Mounted troops, second year 20, 000

New reserve 478, 000 Less to paid reserve 20, 000 -------- 458, 000

Paid reserve 120, 000 --------Total, all liable for national war 798, 000 ========

In these tables I have taken the drafts for India and the Colonies fromthe old regulars. But they can just as well be taken from the newregulars. If need be the old regulars could, before the fourth year, bepassed into the paid reserve, and the full contingent of 200, 000 oneyear's men taken. 

The men of the special reserve and territorial force would on thetermination of their engagements pass into the second line reserve orLandwehr until the age of thirty-one or thirty-two. 

It will be seen that during the years of transition additional expensemust be incurred, as, until the change has been completed, some portionof the existing forces must be maintained side by side with the newnational army. It is partly in order to facilitate the operations of thetransition period that I have assumed a large addition to the number ofofficers. There will also be additional expense caused by the increaseof barrack accommodation needed when the establishment is raised from138, 000 privates to 200, 000, but this additional accommodation will notbe so great as it might at first sight appear, because it is reasonableto suppose that those young men who wish it, and whose parents wish it, will be allowed to live at home instead of in barracks, provided theyregularly attend all drills, parades, and classes. 

It has been necessary, in discussing the British military system, toconsider the arrangements for providing the garrisons of India, Egypt, and certain oversea stations during peace, and to make provision forsmall wars or imperial police; but I may point out that the system bywhich provision is made out of the resources of the United Kingdom alonefor these two military requirements of the Empire, is, in the presentconditions of the Empire, an anomaly. The new nations which have grownup in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand are anxious, above all things, to give reality to the bond between them and the mother country. Theirdesire is to render imperial service, and the proper way of giving themthe opportunity to do so is to call upon them to take their part inmaintaining the garrisons in India and Egypt and in the work of imperialpolice. How they should do it, it is for them to decide and arrange, butfor Englishmen at home to doubt for a moment either their will or theircapacity to take their proper share of the burden is to show an unworthydoubt of the sincerity of the daughter nations and of their attachmentto the mother country and the Empire. 

If Great Britain should be compelled to enter upon a struggle forexistence with one of the great European powers, the part which Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa could play in that struggle islimited and specific. For the conflict would, in the first instance, take the form of a naval war. To this the King's dominions beyond theseas can do little more than assist during peace by their contributions, either of ships, men, or money, in strengthening the British navy. Butduring the actual course of such a war, while it is doubtful whethereither Canada, Australia, or New Zealand could render much material helpin a European struggle, they could undoubtedly greatly contribute to thesecurity of India and Egypt by the despatch of contingents of their owntroops to reinforce the British garrisons maintained in those countries. This appears to me to be the direction to which their attention shouldturn, not only because it is the most effective way in which they canpromote the stability of the Empire, but also because it is the wayalong which they will most speedily reach a full appreciation of thenature of the Empire and its purpose in the world. 

XXI. 

THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH ARMIES ARE RAISED

I have now sketched the outlines of a national military systemapplicable to the case of Great Britain. It remains to show why such asystem is necessary. 

There are three main points in respect of each of which a choice has tobe made. They are the motive which induces men to become soldiers, thetime devoted to military education, and the nature of the liability toserve in war. The distinction which strikes the popular imagination isthat between voluntary and compulsory service. But it covers anotherdistinction hardly less important--that between paid and unpaidsoldiers. The volunteers between 1860 and 1878, or 1880, when pay beganto be introduced for attendance in camps, gave their time and theirattention with no external inducement whatever. They had no pay of anykind, and there was no constraint to induce them to join, or, having, joined, to continue in their corps. The regular soldier, on the otherhand, makes a contract with the State. He agrees in return for his pay, clothes, board and lodging to give his whole time for a specific numberof years to the soldier's life. 

The principle of a contract for pay is necessary in the case of aprofessional force maintained abroad for purposes of imperial police;but it is not possible on that principle to raise or maintain a nationalarmy. 

The principle of voluntary unpaid service appears to have a deeper moralfoundation than that of service by a contract of hiring. But if the timerequired is greater than is consistent with the men's giving a fullday's work to their industrial occupations the unpaid nature of theservice cannot be maintained, and the men must be paid for their time. The merit of the man's free gift of himself is thereby obscured. 

Wherein does that merit consist? If there is no merit in a man's makinghimself a soldier without other reward than that which consists in theeducation he receives, then the voluntary system has no special value. But if there is a merit, it must consist in the man's conferring abenefit upon, or rendering a service to, his country. In other words, the excellence of the unpaid voluntary system consists in its being anacceptance by those who serve under it of a duty towards the State. Theperformance of that duty raises their citizenship to a higher plane. Ifthat is the case it must be desirable, in the interest both of the Stateand of its citizens, that every citizen capable of the duty shouldperform it. But that is the principle upon which the national system isbased. The national system is therefore an extension of the spirit ofthe volunteer or unpaid voluntary system. 

The terms compulsory service and universal service are neither of themstrictly accurate. There is no means of making every adult male, withoutexception, a soldier, because not every boy that grows up has thenecessary physical qualification. Nor does the word compulsion give atrue picture. It suggests that, as a rule, men would not accept the dutyif they could evade it, which is not the case. The number of men whohave been volunteers since 1860 shows that the duty is widely accepted. Indeed, in a country of which the government is democratic, a dutycannot be imposed by law upon all citizens except with the concurrenceof the majority. But a duty recognised by the majority and prescribed bylaw will commend itself as necessary and right to all but a very few. Ifa popular vote were to be taken on the question whether or not it isevery citizen's duty to be trained as a soldier and to fight in case ofa national war, it is hardly conceivable that the principle would failto be affirmed by an overwhelming majority. 

The points as to which opinions are divided are the time and method oftraining and the nature of the liability to serve in war. 

There are, roughly speaking, three schemes of training to beconsidered--first, the old volunteer plan of weekly evening drills, withan annual camp training; secondly, the militia plan of three months'recruit training followed by a month's camp training in severalsubsequent years; and, lastly, the continental plan of a continuoustraining for one or more years followed by one or more periods of annualmanoeuvres. The choice between these three methods is the crucial pointof the whole discussion. It must be determined by the standard ofexcellence rendered necessary by the needs of the State. The evidencegiven to the Norfolk Commission convinced that body that neither thefirst nor the second plan will produce troops fit to meet on equal termsthose of a good modern army. Professional officers are practicallyunanimous in preferring the third method. 

The liability of the trained citizen to serve in war during his year inthe ranks and his years as a first-class reservist must be determined bythe military needs of the country. I have given the reasons why Ibelieve the need to be for an army that can strike a blow in acontinental war. 

I myself became a volunteer because I was convinced that it was acitizen's duty to train himself to bear arms in his country's cause. Ihave been for many years an ardent advocate of the volunteer system, because I believed, as I still believe, that a national army must be anarmy of citizen soldiers, and from the beginning I have looked for theefficiency of such an army mainly to the tactical skill and theeducating power of its officers. But experience and observation haveconvinced me that a national army, such as I have so long hoped for, cannot be produced merely by the individual zeal of its members, noreven by their devoted co-operation with one another. The spirit whichanimates them must animate the whole nation, if the right result is tobe produced. For it is evident that the effort of the volunteers, continued for half a century, to make themselves an army, has met withinsuperable obstacles in the social and industrial conditions of thecountry. The Norfolk Commission's Report made it quite clear that theconditions of civil employment render it impossible for the training ofvolunteers to be extended beyond the present narrow limits of time, andit is evident that those limits do not permit of a training sufficientfor the purpose, which is victory in war against the best troops thatanother nation can produce. 

Yet the officers and men of the volunteer force have not carried ontheir fifty years' work in vain. They have, little by little, educatedthe whole nation to think of war as a reality of life, they havediminished the prejudice which used to attach to the name of soldier, and they have enabled their countrymen to realise that to fight for hiscountry's cause is a part of every citizen's duty, for which he must beprepared by training. 

The adoption of this principle will have further results. So soon asevery able-bodied citizen is by law a soldier, the administration ofboth army and navy will be watched, criticised, and supported with anintelligence which will no longer tolerate dilettantism in authority. The citizen's interest in the State will begin to take a new aspect. Hewill discover the nature of the bond which unites him to hisfellow-citizens, and from this perception will spring that regenerationof the national life from which alone is to be expected the uplifting ofEngland. 

XXII. 

THE CHAIN OF DUTY

The reader who has accompanied me to this point will perhaps be willingto give me a few minutes more in which we may trace the differentthreads of the argument and see if we can twine them into a rope whichwill be of some use to us. 

We began by agreeing that the people of this country have not madeentirely satisfactory arrangements for a competitive struggle, at anyrate in its extreme form of war with another country, although suchconflict is possible at any time; and we observed that British politicalarrangements have been made rather with a view to the controversybetween parties at home than to united action in contest with a foreignstate. 

We then glanced at the probable consequences to the British people ofany serious war, and at the much more dreadful results of failure toobtain victory. We discussed the theories which lead some of ourcountrymen to be unwilling to consider the nature and conditions of war, and which make many of them imagine that war can be avoided either bytrusting to international arbitration or by international agreementsfor disarmament. We agreed that it was not safe to rely upon thesetheories. 

Examining the conditions of war as they were revealed in the greatstruggle which finished a hundred years ago, we saw that the only chanceof carrying on war with any prospect of success in modern times lies inthe nationalisation of the State, so that the Government can utilise inconflict all the resources of its land and its people. In the last warGreat Britain's national weapon was her navy, which she has forcenturies used as a means of maintaining the balance of power in Europe. The service she thus rendered to Europe had its reward in the monopolyof sea power which lasted through the nineteenth century. The greatevent of that century was the attainment by Germany of the unity thatmakes a nation and her consequent remarkable growth in wealth and power, resulting in a maritime ambition inconsistent with the position whichEngland held at sea during the nineteenth century and was disposed tothink eternal. 

Great Britain, in the security due to her victories at sea, was able todevelop her colonies into nations, and her East India Company into anEmpire. But that same security caused her to forget her nationalism, with the result that now her security itself is imperilled. During thisperiod, when the conception of the nation was in abeyance, some of theconditions of sea power have been modified, with the result that theBritish monopoly is at an end, while the possibility of a similarmonopoly has probably disappeared, so that the British navy, even ifsuccessful, could not now be used, as it was a hundred years ago, as ameans of entirely destroying the trade of an adversary. Accordingly, ifin a future war Britain is to find a continental ally, she must be ableto offer him the assistance, not merely of naval victory, but also of astrong army. Moreover, during the epoch in which Great Britain hasturned her back upon Europe the balance of power has been upset, andthere is no power and no combination able to stand up against Germany asthe head of the Triple Alliance. This is a position of great danger forEngland, because it is an open question whether in the absence of astrong British army any group of Powers, even in alliance with England, could afford to take up a quarrel against the combination of the centralStates. It thus appears that Great Britain, by neglecting the conditionsof her existence as a nation, has lost the strength in virtue of which, at previous crises in European history, she was the successful championof that independence of States which, in the present stage of humandevelopment, is the substance of freedom. 

Our consideration of the question of might showed that if Great Britainis to be strong enough to meet her responsibilities her people mustnationalise themselves, while our reflections on the question of rightshowed that only from such nationalisation is a sound policy to beexpected. In short, only in so far as her people have the unity ofspirit and of will that mark a nation can Great Britain be either strongor just. The idea of the nation implies a work to be done by the BritishState, which has to be on the watch against challenge from a continentalrival to Great Britain's right to the headship of her empire, and whichat the same time has to give to that empire the direction without whichit cannot remain united. Great Britain cannot do the work thus imposedupon her by her position and her history unless she has the co-operationof all her people. Thus the conception of the nation reveals itself inthe twofold shape of duties laid upon England and of duties consequentlylaid upon every Englishman. It means that England must either declineand fall or do a certain work in the world which is impossible for herunless she constrains all her people to devote themselves to herservice. It thus appears that England and her people can expect nofuture worth having except on the principle of duty made the mainspringboth of public and of private life. 

We attempted to apply the principles involved in the word nation to theobvious and urgent needs of the British State at the present time. 

Victory at sea being indispensable for Great Britain in case ofconflict, we inquired into the conditions of victory, and found in theparallel instances of Nelson and Napoleon that both by sea and land theresult of the nationalisation of war is to produce a leader who is thepersonification of a theory or system of operations. The history of therise of the German nation shows how the effort to make a nation producedthe necessary statesman, Bismarck. Nationalisation creates the rightleadership--that of the man who is master of his work. 

Reviewing the needs of the naval administration, we saw that what iswanted at the present time is rather proper organisation at theAdmiralty than an increase in mere material strength; while turning tothe army, we discovered that the only system on which can be producedthe army that Great Britain requires is that which makes everyable-bodied citizen a soldier. 

To make the citizen a soldier is to give him that sense of duty to thecountry and that consciousness of doing it, which, if spread through thewhole population, will convert it into what is required--a nation. Therefore to reform the army according to some such plan as has beenhere proposed is the first step in that national revival which is theone thing needful for England, and if that step be taken the rest willfollow of itself. Nationalisation will bring leadership, which in thepolitical sphere becomes statesmanship, and the right kind ofeducation, to give which is the highest ultimate function of nationalexistence. 

I have tried in these pages to develop an idea which has haunted me formany years. I think if the reader would extend to it even for a shorttime the hospitality of his mind he might be willing to make it hisconstant companion. For it seems to me to show the way towards thesolution of other problems than those which have here been directlydiscussed. I cannot but believe that if we could all accustom ourselvesto make some sacrifices for the sake of England, if only by giving a fewminutes every day to thinking about her and by trying to convinceourselves that those who are not of our party are yet perhaps animatedby the same love of their country as we ourselves, we might realise thatthe question of duty is answered more easily by performance than byspeculation. I suspect that the relations between the political parties, between capital and labour, between master and servant, between rich andpoor, between class and class would become simpler and better ifEnglishmen were to come to see how natural it is that they should spendtheir lives for England. 

THE END