AVIATION IN PEACE AND WAR

 BY

 Major-General Sir F. H. SYKES G. B. E. , K. C. B. , C. M. G. LATE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF AND CONTROLLER-GENERAL OF CIVIL AVIATION

 LONDON EDWARD ARNOLD & CO. 1922 [_All rights reserved_]

Transcriber's Note:

 Minor typographical errors have been corrected without note, whilst more significant amendments have been listed at the end of the text. The oe ligature is represented by [oe]. 

CONTENTS

 PAGE INTRODUCTION 7

 CHAPTER I. PRE-WAR 9

 Early Thoughts on Flight. The Invention of the Balloon. First Experiments in Gliders and Aeroplanes. The Wright Brothers and their Successors in Europe. The First Airships. The Beginnings of Aviation in England. The Inception and Development of Aircraft as Part of the Forces of the Crown: the Balloon Factory; the Air Battalion; the Royal Flying Corps, the Military Wing, the Naval Wing. Tactics and the Machine. Conclusions. 

 CHAPTER II. WAR 44

 General Remarks on War Development. Co-operation with the Army: Reconnaissance; Photography; Wireless; Bombing; Contact Patrol; Fighting. Co-operation with the Navy: Coast Defence, Patrol and Convoy Work; Fleet Assistance, Reconnaissance, Spotting for Ships' Guns; Bombing; Torpedo Attack. Home Defence: Night Flying and Night Fighting. The Machine and Engine. Tactics and the Strategic Air Offensive. Organization. 

 CHAPTER III. PEACE 96

 The Future of Aerial Defence. Civil Aviation: as a Factor in National Security; as an Instrument of Imperial Progress; Financial and Economic Problems; Weather Conditions and Night Flying; Organization; the Machine and Engine. Air Services: British, Continental and Imperial. 

 CONCLUSION 131

INTRODUCTION

Since the earliest communities of human beings first struggled forsupremacy and protection, the principles of warfare have remainedunchanged. New methods have been evolved and adopted with the progressof science, but no discovery, save perhaps that of gunpowder, has doneso much in so short a time to revolutionize the conduct of war asaviation, the youngest, yet destined perhaps to be the most effectivefighting-arm. Yet to-day we are only on the threshold of our knowledge, and, striking as was the impetus given to every branch of aeronauticsduring the four years of war, its future power can only dimly be seen. 

We may indeed feel anxious about this great addition of aviation to thedestructive power of modern scientific warfare. Bearing its terrors inmind, we may even impotently seek to check its advance, but the appealof flying is too deep, its elimination is now impossible, and grantedthat war is inevitable, it must be accepted for good or ill. Fortunately, although with the other great scientific additions, chemical warfare and the submarine, its potentialities for destructionare very great, yet aircraft, unlike the submarine, can be utilized notonly in the conduct of war but in the interests of peace, and it ishere that we can guide and strengthen it for good. Just as the navalsupremacy of Britain was won because commercially we were the greatestseafaring people in the world, so will air supremacy be achieved by thatcountry which, making aviation a part of its everyday life, becomes anairfaring community. 

Our nation as a whole has been educated, owing to its geographicalsituation and by tradition, to interest itself in the broader aspects ofmarine policy and development. It requires to take the same interest inaviation, a comparatively new subject, unhampered to a great extent bypreconceived notions and therefore offering greater scope for individualthought. 

The following sketch[1] has been written in the hope that some of thosewho read it may be inspired to study aviation in one or other of itsbranches, whether from the historical, technical, strategical, orcommercial point of view. Any opinions expressed are, of course, my ownand not official. 

[1] First written and delivered as the Lees-Knowles Lectures atCambridge University in February and March, 1921. 

I propose first briefly to trace the history of aviation from itsbeginnings to the outbreak of war; next to describe the evolution ofaircraft and of air strategy during the war; and last to estimate thepresent position and to look into the future. 

CHAPTER I

PRE-WAR

EARLY THOUGHTS ON FLIGHT. 

The story of the growth of aviation may be likened to that of thediscovery and opening up of a new continent. A myth arises, whence noone can tell, of the existence of a new land across the seas. Eventuallythis land is found without any realization of the importance of thediscovery. Then comes the period of colonization and increasingknowledge. But the interior remains unexplored. So, in the case ofaviation, man was long convinced, for no scientific reason, that flightwas possible. With the first ascent by balloon came the imagined masteryof the air; later, the invention of flight that can be controlled atwill. To-day we are still in the stage of colonization. The futureresources of the air remain hidden from our view. 

The Daedalean myth and the ancient conception of the winged angelic hostshow how the human mind has long been fascinated by the idea of flight, but the first design of an apparatus to lift man into the air, aparachute-like contrivance, was only reached at the end of the fifteenthcentury in one of Leonardo da Vinci's manuscripts. About the same timelived the first of the long line of daring practical aviators, withoutwhom success would never have been achieved, one John Damian, aphysician of the Court of James IV of Scotland, who "took in hand to flywith wings, and to that effect caused make a pair of wings of feathers, which being fastened upon him, he flew off the castle wall of Stirling, but shortly he fell to the ground and brake his thigh-bone. "

Nearly 250 years later the aeronaut had not made much progress, for weread of the Marquis de Bacqueville in 1742 attaching to his arms andlegs planes of his own design and launching himself from his house inthe attempt to fly across the Seine, into which, regrettably, he fell. 

Meanwhile the seventeenth-century philosophers had been theorizing. In1638 John Wilkins, the founder of the Royal Society, published a bookentitled _Daedalus, or Mechanical Motions_. A few years later JohnGlanville wrote in _Scepsis Scientifica_ "to them that come after us itmay be as ordinary to buy a pair of wings to fly into remotest regions, as now a pair of boots to ride a journey, " the sceptic proving a truerprophet than the enthusiast. By 1680 Giovanni Borelli had reached theconclusion, in his book _De Volatu_, that it was impossible that manshould ever achieve flight by his own strength. Nor was he more likelyto do so in the first aerial ship, designed in 1670 by Francesco Lana, which was to be buoyed up in the air by being suspended from fourglobes, made of thin copper sheeting, each of them about 25 feet indiameter. From these globes the air was to be exhausted, so that each, being lighter than the atmosphere, would support the weight of two orthree men. A hundred years elapsed before Dr. Joseph Black of theUniversity of Edinburgh made the first practical suggestion, that aballoon inflated with hydrogen would rise. 

THE INVENTION OF THE BALLOON. 

It was in 1783 that Montgolfier conceived the idea of utilizing thelifting power of hot air and invited the Assembly of Vivarais to watchan exhibition of his invention, when a balloon, 10 feet incircumference, rose to a height of 6, 000 feet in under ten minutes. Thiswas followed by a demonstration before Louis XVI at Versailles, when aballoon carrying a sheep, a cock, and a duck, rose 1, 500 feet anddescended safely. And on November 21st of the same year Pilatre deRozier, accompanied by the Marquis d'Arlande, made the first humanascent, in the "Reveillon, " travelling 5 miles over Paris in twentyminutes. 

England, it is not surprising to learn, was behind with the invention, but on November 25th, 1783, Count Francesco Zambeccari sent up fromMoorfields a small oilskin hydrogen balloon which fell at Petworth; andin August of 1784 James Tytler ascended at Edinburgh in a fire balloon, thus achieving the first ascent in Great Britain. In the same yearLunardi came to London and ballooning became the rage. It was anEnglishman, Dr. Jefferies, who accompanied Blanchard in the firstcross-Channel flight on January 7th, 1785. Fashionable society soonturned to pursuits other than watching balloon ascents, however, andthe joys of the air were confined to a few adventurous spirits, such asGreen and Holland, who first substituted coal gas for hydrogen and in1836 made a voyage of 500 miles from Vauxhall Gardens to Weilburg inNassau, and James Glaisher, who in the middle of the century began tomake meteorological observations from balloons, claiming on oneoccasion, in 1862, to have reached the great height of 7 miles. 

FIRST EXPERIMENTS IN GLIDERS AND AEROPLANES. 

The world seemed content to have achieved the balloon, but there were afew men who realized that the air had not been conquered, and whobelieved that success could only be attained by the scientific study andpractice of gliding. Prominent among these, Sir George Cayley, in 1809, published a paper on the Navigation of the Air, and forecasted themodern aeroplane, and the action of the air on wings. In 1848 Henson andStringfellow, the latter being the inventive genius, designed andproduced a small model aeroplane--the first power-driven machine whichactually flew. It is now in the Smithsonian Institute at Washington. Ofgreater practical value were the gliding experiments by Otto Lilienthal, of Berlin, and Percy Pilcher, an Englishman, at the end of the lastcentury. Both these men met their death in the cause of aviation. Another step forward was made by Laurence Hargrave, an Australian, whoinvented the box and soaring kite and eighteen machines which flew. 

From the theoretical point of view, Professor Langley, an American, reached in his _Experiments in Aerodynamics_ the important conclusionthat weight could best be countered by speed. From theory Langley turnedto practice and in 1896 designed a steam-driven machine which flewthree-quarters of a mile without an operator. Seven years later, at theend of 1903, he produced a new machine fitted with a 52 horse-powerengine weighing less than 5 lb. Per horse-power; but this machine wasseverely damaged ten days before Wilbur Wright made his first flight ina controlled power-driven aeroplane. 

THE WRIGHT BROTHERS AND THEIR SUCCESSORS IN EUROPE. 

The Wright brothers directed their whole attention to aviation in 1899. By 1902, as the result of many experiments, they had invented a gliderwith a horizontal vane in front, a vertical vane behind, and a devicefor "warping" the wings. Their longest glide was 622-1/4 feet. This wasfollowed by the construction of a machine weighing 600 lb. , includingthe operator and an 8 horse-power engine, which on December 17th, 1903, realized the dreams of centuries. 

After an increasing number of experiments, a machine built in 1905 flew24-1/4 miles at a speed of 38 miles an hour. It is interesting to recallthat the new invention was refused once by the United States and threetimes by the British Government. 

It was not until September 13th, 1906, that Ellehammer, a Danishengineer, made the first free flight in Europe, his machine flying 42metres at a height of a metre and a half. About the same time reportsof the Wrights' successes began to reach Europe and were quicklyappreciated by the French. 

Space forbids that I should enter into the achievements of the earlyFrench aviators, among whom the names of Ferber, Bleriot and Farman willalways rank high in the story of human faith, courage and determination. It is a record of rapid advance. Farman made a circuit flight of 1kilometre in 1908, and flew from Chalons to Rheims, a distance of 27kilometres, in twenty minutes. Bleriot crossed the Channel in amonoplane of his own design in forty minutes. French designers improvedthe control system, and French machines became famous. The records ofthe Rheims meeting of 1909 serve to illustrate the progress made duringthe first phase of aviation. Latham won the altitude prize by flying toa height of over 500 feet. Farman the prize for the flight of longestduration by remaining more than three hours in the air, and thepassenger carrying prize by carrying two passengers round a 10-kilometrecourse in 10-1/2 minutes. The Gnome rotary engine was first used withsuccess at this meeting. 

Before turning to the pioneer efforts in England and the pre-warorganization of our air forces, some account of the development of thelighter-than-air dirigible is desirable. 

THE FIRST AIRSHIPS. 

The earliest conception of an airship is to be found in GeneralMeusnier's design in 1784 for an egg-shaped balloon driven by threescrew propellers, worked, of course, by hand. The chief interest in hisdesign, though it never materialized, lies in the fact that it providedfor a double envelope and was the precursor of the ballonet. The firstman-carrying airship was built by Henri Giffard in 1852. It had acapacity of 87, 000 cu. Feet, a length of 144 feet, a 3 horse-powerengine, and a speed of 6 miles an hour. A gas engine was first usedtwenty years later in an Austrian dirigible, giving a speed of 3 milesan hour. About the same time much useful work was accomplished by Dupuyde Lome, whose dirigible, with a propeller driven by man power, gave aspeed of 5-1/2 miles an hour. Twelve years later, in 1884, two FrenchArmy officers, Captain Kubs and Captain Renard, constructed the firstsuccessful power-driven lighter-than-air craft fitted with an 8-1/2horse-power electric motor, which may be regarded as the progenitor ofall subsequent non-rigid airships. In 1901 Santos Dumont flew round theEiffel Tower, travelling 6-3/4 miles in 1-1/2 hours, and in 1903 theflight of the "Lebaudy, " covering a distance of 40 miles at a speed of20 miles an hour, led the French military authorities to take up thequestion of airships. 

What the French initiated, the Germans, concentrating withcharacteristic thoroughness on the development of the rigid as opposedto the non-rigid airship, improved. In 1896 Wolfert's rigid airshipattained a speed of 9 miles an hour and in 1900 the first Zeppelin waslaunched. Whatever we may think of the German methods of using theirairships during the war, we cannot but admire the courage anddetermination of Count Zeppelin, who, in spite of many mishaps, succeeded in producing the finest airships in the world and inspiringthe German people with a faith in the air which they have never lost. From 1905 onwards development was rapid. In 1907 Zeppelin voyaged instages from Friedrichshaven to Frankfort, a distance of 200 miles in7-1/2 hours. Popular enthusiasm is illustrated by the fact that within afew months the same airship made four hundred trips, carrying 8, 551passengers and covering 29, 430 miles. Other airships showed similarrecords. Between 1909 and 1913 eighteen of the Parseval type were built, and 1912 saw the construction of the first Schutte-Lanz, designedexpressly for naval and military purposes. If France at this period ledthe world in aeroplane design, Germany was undeniably ahead in airshipdevelopment. 

In Great Britain, in 1905, we had one very small airship, designed andconstructed by Willows. 

THE BEGINNINGS OF AVIATION IN ENGLAND. 

Though the names of Pilcher, Dunne, Howard Wright, and Rolls testify tothe fact that the science of aviation had its followers in England atthe beginning of this century, flying came comparatively late, and thereal interest of the movement centres round the early efforts ofmilitary aviation from 1912 onwards. Nevertheless this country could illhave dispensed with the experiments of that small and courageous band ofaviators, among whom Dickson and Cody were prominent. By 1908 Cody hadbuilt an aeroplane and was making experimental flights at Aldershot. In1907, A. V. Roe, working under great difficulties, constructed and flewhis first machine, a triplane fitted with an 8-10 horse-power twincylinder Jap bicycle engine, the first tractor type machine produced byany country, and a very important contribution to the science of flight. In 1910 and 1911 we find de Havilland, Frank Maclean and the ShortBrothers, Ogilvie, Professor Huntingdon, Sopwith and the BristolCompany, starting on the design and construction of machines, of whichthe names have since become famous. At the same time certain centres ofaviation came into existence, such as Brooklands, where I well rememberbeginning to fly in August, 1910, Hendon, Larkhill and Eastchurch, destined to be the centre of naval aviation. It is significant, however, of the slow progress made that by November 1st, 1910, only twenty-twopilot's certificates had been issued, and it was Conneau, a French navalofficer, who in 1911 won the so-called "Circuit of Britain, " i. E. Aflight from Brooklands and back via Edinburgh, Glasgow, Exeter andBrighton. Cody and Valentine were the only British competitors tocomplete the full course. 

In May 1911 a demonstration was organized by the owners of the HendonAerodrome to which a large number of Cabinet Ministers, members ofparliament, and army and navy officers were invited. The War Officeco-operated by arranging for a small force of horse, foot and guns to besecretly disposed in a specified area some miles distant and bydetailing two officers, of whom I was one, to test what could be done tofind and report them by air. I remember that I had a special mapprepared, the first used in this, and I think any country, for theaeroplane reconnaissance of troops. After a sufficiently exciting trip, and with the troops successfully marked on the map, Hubert, my Frenchpilot, and I, returned and made our report to General Murray, theDirector of Military Training. It was a very interesting flight; theweather good; our height about 1, 500 feet; the machine a 50 horse-powerGnome "box-kite" Henri Farman, which at one period of our 35 mile anhour return journey elected to point itself skywards for an unpleasantsecond or two and fly "cabré"; I can see Hubert now anxiously forcinghis front elevator downwards and shouting to me to lean forward in orderto help to bring the nose to a more comfortable bearing!

Many pages could be filled with the difficulties and exploits of thefirst British aviators, but enough has been said to show that, comparedwith that of aeroplanes in France and of airships in Germany, development in this country started late, progressed slowly and excitedlittle public interest. The work of the pioneers was, however, not invain, since it opened the eyes of our military authorities to the valueof aviation and led to the formation of that small but highly efficientflying corps which during the war expanded into an organization withoutrival. Let us now turn to the inception of the air forces of the Crownand the position with regard to these and to air tactics at the outbreakof war. 

THE INCEPTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF AIRCRAFT AS PART OF THE FORCES OF THECROWN. 

Nations have tended to regard flight as a prerogative of war. A balloonschool was formed in the early days of the French revolutionary wars;the French victory at Fleurus in 1794 was ascribed to balloonreconnaissance; balloons were used by the Federal Army in the AmericanCivil War, and during the Siege of Paris Gambetta effected his escape byballoon in 1871. 

_The Balloon Factory. _

In England experiments were begun at Woolwich Arsenal in 1878, and in1883 a Balloon Factory, a Depôt and a School of Instruction wereestablished at Chatham. The expedition to Bechuanaland in 1884, underthe command of Sir Charles Warren, was accompanied by a detachment ofthree balloons, and the following year balloons co-operated with theSudan Expeditionary Force, when Major Elsdale carried out somephotographic experiments from the air. 

In 1890 a balloon section was introduced into the Army as a unit of theRoyal Engineers, and not long afterwards, the Balloon Factory wasestablished at South Farnborough, where in 1912 it was transformed intothe Royal Aircraft Factory. Four balloon sections took part in the SouthAfrican War and were used during the Siege of Ladysmith, atMagersfontein and Paardeburg. Colonel Lynch, who served in the BoerArmy, stated at a lecture delivered in Paris after the war that "theBoers took a dislike to balloons. All other instruments of war were attheir command; they had artillery superior for the most part to, andbetter served than, that of the English; they had telegraphic andheliographic apparatus; but the balloons were the symbol of a scientificsuperiority of the English which seriously disquieted them. "

I went through a course in ballooning during leave from West Africa in1904 and remember that partly owing to the energy of Colonel Capper, partly to the impetus given by the South African War, and partly to thegrowing interest in all things aeronautical throughout the civilizedworld, it was noticeable that the activities of the Balloon Factory wereincreasing in many directions. Although the spherical balloon had beenimproved, its disabilities were recognized and experiments were madewith elongated balloons, man-flying kites, air photography, signallingdevices, observation of artillery fire, mechanical apparatus for haulingdown balloons, and petrol motors. A grant for a dirigible balloon wasobtained in 1903, though it was not until 1907, the year in which Codybegan the construction of his aeroplane at Farnborough, and CharlesRolls his experiments, that the airship "Nulli Secundus" made her firstflight. She was about 120 feet long and 30 feet in diameter, and wasdriven by a 40 horse-power engine at a speed of 30 miles an hour. OnOctober 5th this airship flew to London in an hour and a half, circledround St. Paul's, man[oe]uvred over Buckingham Palace, and descended atthe Crystal Palace. In the same year, be it remembered, a Zeppelin hadmade a trip of 200 miles from Friedrichshaven to Frankfort. The "NulliSecundus" was followed in 1910 by the "Beta" and the "Gamma. "

Meanwhile an Advisory Committee for Aeronautics had been appointed, andthe National Physical Laboratory had organized a department atTeddington for the investigation of aeronautical problems inco-operation with the Balloon Factory. 

_The Air Battalion. _

In 1911 the authorities could no longer close their eyes, especially ata time when rumours of war were rife, to the rapid development ofheavier-than-air craft on the Continent. So far, as we have seen, theaeroplane had been regarded in England as little more than the playthingof a few adventurous but foolhardy spirits. A certain amount ofexperience in piloting and handling aeroplanes had been gained by ahandful of Army officers, but the machines used either belonged to theofficers themselves, to civilians, or to aviation firms. I was at thattime a general staff officer in the Directorate of Military Operationsunder General Wilson, now Field Marshal and late Chief of the ImperialGeneral Staff, and was the only officer in the War Office who hadlearned to fly. It appeared very important that a study of the militarypossibilities of aviation should be made. The prime rôle of cavalry, reconnaissance, seemed to have passed from it. In addition to my normalduties, I visited France, Germany and Italy, collected information onforeign activities, wrote reports, and tried to create a knowledge ofthe possible effect of future military aeronautics and to urge theformation of a flying corps. 

In 1911 the Air Battalion of the Royal Engineers, consisting ofHeadquarters, No. 1 Company (Airships) and No. 2 Company (Aeroplanes), was formed and superseded the Balloon School. The creation of No. 2Company, stationed at Larkhill, marked the first formation of a Britishmilitary unit composed entirely of heavier-than-air aircraft. The sameyear witnessed the inception of the B. E. , F. E. And S. E. Type machines inthe Balloon Factory, but the total of our machines, both for naval andmilitary requirements, amounted to something less than twelve aeroplanesand two small airships; and the mishaps suffered by the militarymachines on their flight from Larkhill to Cambridge, to take part inArmy Man[oe]uvres, were significant of their unreliability. 

_The Royal Flying Corps. _

In view, therefore, of the reports received of the progress abroad, theAir Battalion was clearly insufficient to meet the demands which mightbe made upon it in the event of war; and at the end of 1911 the PrimeMinister instructed a standing Sub-Committee of the Committee ofImperial Defence to consider the future development of air navigationfor naval and military purposes. As a result of their deliberations theCommittee recommended the creation of a British Air Service to beregarded as one and designated the Royal Flying Corps; the division ofthe Corps into a Naval Wing, a Military Wing, and a Central FlyingSchool; the maintenance of the closest possible collaboration betweenthe Corps, the Advisory Committee for Aeronautics and the Aircraft (lateBalloon) Factory; and the appointment of a permanent ConsultativeCommittee, named the Air Committee, to deal with all aeronauticalquestions affecting both the Admiralty and the War Office. 

Consequent upon these recommendations, a Technical Sub-Committee wasformed, consisting of Brig. -General Henderson, Major MacInnes of thedirectorate of Military Training at the War Office, a splendid officer, who died during the war, and myself, to draft the new scheme. Theobjects kept in view in framing our peace organization were to suit itto war conditions, as far as they could be foreseen, to base it on anefficient self-contained unit, and, while allowing for the widedifferences between naval and military requirements, to ensure themaximum co-operation between the two branches of the Service. Successbeyond expectation was achieved in the first two objects, but, as willbe seen, the naval and military branches tended for unforeseen but goodreasons to diverge, until they joined hands again in 1918 as the RoyalAir Force. The bases of the military organization were, a headquarters, the squadron, and the flying depôt. These proved their value during thewar and have remained the units of our air forces to this day. TheMilitary Wing was to form a single and complete organization and containa headquarters, seven aeroplane squadrons, each to consist of twelveactive machines and six in reserve, one airship and kite squadron, and aflying depôt. All pilots, whether of the Naval or the Military Wing, were eventually to graduate at the Central Flying School, whence theycould join either the Naval Wing at Eastchurch or one of the MilitarySquadrons. In time of war each branch of the Service was to form areserve for the other if required. 

_The Military Wing. _

In accordance with this scheme I received instructions to organize, recruit, train and command the Military Wing of the Royal Flying Corps. The functions of the Military Wing were quite clear: it was to meet theair requirements of the Expeditionary Force primarily for reconnaissancepurposes, but its organization was framed so that it could easily beexpanded and the scope of its duties widened. Headquarters wereestablished at Farnborough on May 13th, 1912: Barrington-Kennett, anofficer of the Grenadier Guards who had been attached to the AirBattalion, was appointed, and made the best of all possible adjutants;and the nucleus of the Corps, consisting at first of the cadres of anairship squadron under Edward Maitland, of two aeroplane squadrons underBurke and Brooke-Popham, and a flying depôt (later the aircraft park)under Carden, who was a little later greatly assisted in the complexmatter of technical stores by Beatty, came into existence. At the sametime the construction of the Central Flying School was started atUpavon, under Captain G. Payne, R. N. With regard to the other squadronsprovided for, the nucleus of No. 4 Squadron was formed the same year, and that of No. 5 Squadron the following year, of Nos. 6 and 7Squadrons in 1914, while No. 8 Squadron was not started until after theoutbreak of war. 

Records of the progress and growth of the Corps were left at Farnboroughwhen the Headquarters and four squadrons went to France in August, 1914, and have been lost. This is particularly unfortunate because withoutthem it will be difficult for the historian of the Corps adequately todescribe the beginnings and to assess the value of the work then carriedout. 

The task of forming the new service, which was to do much to assist theArmy in saving England, was begun. The time was very short. A greatenergy had to be brought to the work. As with all things new, it had tocontend with apathy and opposition on all sides. There was no precedentto help. The organization of the Corps to its smallest detail oftechnical stores, supply and transport had to be thought out. The typeof machine required; the method of obtaining it from a strugglingindustry; its use and maintenance; the personnel, its training andequipment; these, and a thousand other aspects of the question, requiredthe employment of a large staff of experts. But the experts did notexist and the duties were carried out almost entirely at Farnborough, where in addition time had to be found to compile the official trainingand other text books and regulations required for an entirely new arm. 

In addition to the innumerable problems inherent in the organization, growth and training of the Military Wing, the two years between itsinception and the outbreak of war were strenuously applied to solvingthe problems of air tactics and strategy. Until the South African Warthe British Army had been drilled under the influence of stereotypedPrussian ideas. Perhaps the South African War led too far in an oppositedirection, but it taught us one thing, which was to prove of suchimportance in 1914--the value of mobility; and we realized in aircraftthe advent of the most mobile arm the world has yet seen. 

All was new. A new Corps. A new element in which to work. New conditionsin peace akin to those in war. And there had to be developed a newspirit, combining the discipline of the old Army, the technical skill ofthe Navy, and the initiative, energy and dash inseparable from flying. There were the inevitable accidents, but training had to be done. Weexisted for war and war alone would show whether we had thought andworked without respite aright. We had to prove our value to the otherarms, many of the leaders of which, owing to a long period of peace, found difficulty in differentiating between the normal usages of peaceand war and in understanding the right use of aircraft. Somehow or othertime was found during 1912, 1913 and 1914 to write to reviews, tolecture at army and other centres of training, to attend Staff rides, and to endeavour in every way possible to learn how best to work in withthe army commands and to teach those commands the usefulness andlimitations of aircraft. 

As Ruskin wrote:

 "Man is the engine whose motive power is the soul and the largest quantity of work will not be done by this curious engine for pay, or under pressure, or by the help of any kind of fuel which may be supplied by the cauldron. It will be done only when the will or spirit of the creature is brought to its own greatest strength by its own proper fuel, namely the affection. "

I was intensely proud of my command and often thought of the time when, as I had been promised, I should, in the event of war, command it in thefield. We worked at white heat believing that war was coming soon;believing that our efforts would have a real effect on the result; anddetermined that the new arm should rank second to none among the forcesof the Crown. _Esprit de Corps_ was of vital importance, but as officersand non-commissioned officers were drawn from every branch and everyregiment of the army this was no easy matter and was only achieved bythe splendid example and precept of such men as Herbert, Becke, Longcroft, Chinnery and Barrington-Kennett. We selected our motto: "PerArdua ad Astra. " It was in this atmosphere that the Military Wing grewin peace. It was in this atmosphere that the soul was formed which laterunder the great strain of war impelled our pilots forward cheerfully toface every duty and every danger in the true spirit of manliness andfearless confidence. 

As in framing the original scheme on paper, so in giving it life it wasour aim to organize the Corps, so that, whatever its future strength, itwould be sound and efficient, and its continuity of growth effectedwithout even temporary dislocation or waste. The tactical unit of theMilitary Wing--the squadron, consisting of three flights, each of fourmachines with two in reserve--had the advantage that it was ofsufficient size to act independently, while it was not too unwieldy fora single command. It was equally suitable for independent orco-operative action, and the full complement of seven squadrons would, in addition to a reserve, furnish one squadron for each division of anArmy Expeditionary force of the size then contemplated, though nodefinite allotment of aeroplanes to the lower commands was at firstintended. The French and Germans, on the other hand, were building uptheir organizations with smaller units, with the result that they foundeven greater difficulties than ourselves in obtaining sufficientexperienced officers to command them. It is probable that the consequentlack of concentration, knowledge and determination to stick to soundprinciples of action was one of the causes underlying the non-success ofthe German air service in the opening phases of the war. 

According to the system employed squadrons were formed, organized, equipped, and a certain amount of preliminary training carried out, atFarnborough, when on completion the squadron moved to one of thestations which I had established or was forming at Netheravon, Montrose, Gosport, Dover, and Orfordness, Netheravon being the largest. Thisdispersion of squadrons did not affect the entity and cohesion, underWing headquarters at Farnborough, of the Corps as a whole. No. 3Squadron, one of the original two referred to, removed to Netheravonfrom Larkhill in June. 

Similarly, and in order to avoid congestion at Farnborough, to foster aspirit of self-support and to enable air operations to be carried outwith troops in Scotland, No. 2 Squadron was sent to Montrose. Five ofits machines flew all the way, and it became one of the principles oftraining that machines should fly whenever a move was ordered. Thus in1913 six machines from this squadron were flown from Montrose toLimerick--a great feat then--to take part in the Irish Commandman[oe]uvres, the crossing of the Irish Channel being successfullycarried out both ways by all machines. Another flight of an experimentalnature was made by Longcroft, with myself as passenger, from Farnboroughto Montrose in a single day with only one landing. 

The unavoidable and never-relaxing strain inherent in the daily andhourly use of an instrument, in the design, maintenance and improvementof which we could only grope our way, was very great. In peace beforethe war, as later in the war, the only variation to strain lay inperiods of increased strain. 

At Headquarters, in addition to the normal duties of command andco-ordination, and the supply of all technical stores to squadrons, there was carried out all recruiting, and I also formed a specializedflight for the study of technical problems, such as the use of wirelessfrom aircraft. The bulk of experimental work was originally undertakenby the Royal Aircraft Factory, under the Superintendent, Mr. O'Gorman, who always helped us in every way possible, but by 1913 I felt itnecessary to enlarge the duties of the special flight and anExperimental Section was formed at Wing Headquarters at Farnboroughwith an officer, Musgrave, in charge. In addition, for each squadron anofficer was appointed Squadron Officer for Experiments, thus ensuringthe diffusion of information throughout the Corps, and affording theopportunity to each unit of carrying out the experiments best suited tothe material and apparatus at its command. Similarly other individualofficers were detailed in each squadron on a co-ordinated scheme, forsuch duties as Officer-in-charge of Stores, Workshops, MechanicalTransport, Meteorology, etc. 

The formation at Farnborough of the Line of Communications R. F. C. Workshop or Flying Depôt--later known as the Aircraft Park--completedthe organization of the Military Wing. 

I was very anxious as early as possible to prove the structure as aunified self-supporting, mobile and easily handled flying corps as faras it had gone, and in June, 1914, this was done by the concentration incamp at Netheravon of the entire Military Wing, comprising Headquartersand Headquarters Flight, the four completed squadrons and the nucleus ofNo. 6 Squadron, the Aircraft Park and a detachment of the Kite Section. Mobilization, a very difficult process when it came, would have beenalmost impossible had the concentration not taken place. The object ofthe camp was a month's combined training to test personnel, both in theair and on the ground, and the handling of aircraft and transport bothby day and night. Endeavours were made to solve by means of lectures, discussions and committees the problems connected with mobilization, technical and military training, observation, wireless telegraphy, signals, night flying, photography, bomb-dropping, workshops, stores, meteorology, transport, shifting of camp and aerodrome, supply andmaintenance of units in the field, etc. --in fact the whole organizationessential to the efficiency and cohesion of a Flying Corps, underconditions as similar as possible to those expected on active service. Very valuable experience was obtained from the work carried out. Thenecessarily wide gaps in our knowledge were brought home in moreconcrete form. It was also evident that the force was very small. Butwithin three months it was proved under the strain of war that theorganization and training had been laid down on sound principles. 

_The Naval Wing. _

As in the case of the Army, it was to airships that the Navy firstturned its attention, and the birth of naval aviation may be said todate from July 21st, 1908, when Admiral Bacon submitted proposals forthe construction of a rigid airship, the ill-fated "Mayfly" which wasdestroyed on her preliminary trials. The Admiralty thereupon decided todiscontinue the construction of airships, the development of which wasleft to the Army until May, 1914, when it was decided that allairships--that is No. 1 Squadron of the Military Wing--should be takenover by the Naval Wing. This was partly the result of a report by twoNaval Officers, who visited France, Austria and Germany, as was thepurchase of two vessels of the Parseval and Astra Torres types, and asmall non-rigid from Willows. The construction of a number of otherairships was ordered, but for various reasons was delayed or nevercompleted up to the outbreak of war. 

Although at first sight the functions of the Naval Wing--coast defenceand work with the Fleet--seemed hardly more difficult to perform thanthose of the Military Wing, in practice, as I was to find later frompersonal experience when in command of the R. N. A. S. At Gallipoli, theywere more complicated, while the slowness of the Admiralty in evolving aclear scheme of employment and a definite objective made itself felt. Before the war the achievements of the Naval Wing were due rather toindividual effort than to a definite policy of organized expansion. Itwas the pilot and the machine rather than the organization whichdeveloped. 

As already stated, Eastchurch was chosen by the Short Brothers for theirexperiments in aeroplanes in 1909, but it was not until 1911 that theAdmiralty bought two machines and established the first Naval FlyingSchool at that place. The same year Commander O. Swann purchased fromMessrs. A. V. Roe a 35 horse-power biplane and began to carry outexperiments with different types of floats, as a result of which atwin-float seaplane was produced--the first to rise off the water inthis country. 

For some time seaplanes were in a very experimental stage and at bestcould only rise from, and alight on, calm water, though it isinteresting to note that as far back as 1911 the employment of seaplanesfor torpedo attack, which I think will be one of the most importantdevelopments of aircraft in the future, engaged the attention of theNavy, and a Sopwith seaplane carrying a 14-inch torpedo made its firstflight at Calshot in 1913. For this reason, therefore, it appeared thatprincipally aeroplanes and airships would have to be employed from shorebases for coast defence and that "carrier" ships would be necessary toenable seaplanes to work with the Fleet. 

The first stations set up were Eastchurch, Isle of Grain, Calshot, Felixstowe, Yarmouth, Cromarty and Kingsnorth, from which at theoutbreak of war an organized coastal patrol was established. 

From the outset the Naval Wing, assisted by its large percentage ofskilled technical personnel, paid great attention to experimental workof all sorts. Thus in 1912 the detection of submarines by aircraft wastaken up, in 1913 valuable results were obtained from bomb-dropping, anda large number of experiments in wireless, machine gunnery and fightingcarried out. In addition, efforts were made to extend the power, rangeand capacity of engine and machine. 

The second Naval problem, that of co-operation with the Fleet, involvedthe flight of aircraft from ships and the design of aircraft carriers. In 1911 an aeroplane for the first time took off successfully from thedeck of a cruiser at anchor, and the following year an aeroplane flewfrom H. M. S. "Hibernia, " while under weigh, but it was not until afterthe outbreak of war that alighting on decks was successfullyaccomplished. The first ship to be fitted up as a parent ship forseaplanes was the "Hermes" in 1913. 

These specialized technical requirements and developments explain whythe Naval Wing and the Royal Naval Air Service tended towardsindividualism rather than cohesion. While the Military Wing, or RoyalFlying Corps, progressed further as an organized fighting force, theRoyal Naval Air Service, amongst the 100 odd aeroplanes and seaplanes oncharge which were mainly of the Short, Sopwith, Avro, Farman and Wrighttypes, possessed in 1914 the more powerful engines and a number ofaeroplanes fitted with wireless and machine guns, while theirbomb-dropping arrangements were also in a more advanced stage ofdevelopment. 

An Air Department was formed at the Admiralty in 1912 to deal with allquestions relating to naval aircraft. Naval officers were trained fromthe beginning at Eastchurch rather than at the Central Flying School, and in 1913 the appointment of an Inspecting Captain for Aircraft, witha Central Air Office at Sheerness as his headquarters, accentuated agrowing tendency for the Naval Wing to work on independent lines. 

The Naval Wing grew rapidly and in the middle of 1914 was reorganized asthe Royal Naval Air Service, comprising the Air Department of theAdmiralty, the Central Air Office, the Royal Naval Flying School, theRoyal Naval Air Stations, and all aircraft, seaplane ships and balloonsemployed for naval purposes. This placed the naval air force on aself-supporting basis and the entity of the Royal Flying Corps as awhole, as originally provided for, was lost. 

TACTICS AND THE MACHINE. 

The value of the application of flying to war requires littledemonstration. The most important attributes of generalship are quickappreciation of a situation and quick decision. To the ordinaryCommander the absence of information is paralysing. In the nineteenthcentury the mass of cavalry was the special instrument of informationand to obtain it contact with the enemy's main forces had to beeffected. It thus acted as a shield and also tried to provide theinformation necessary to enable the infantry to take the offensive. 

Aviation, by the wide field of observation it commands, by the speedwith which it can collect and transmit information, to a great extentlifts the fog of war and enables a general to act on knowledge wherebefore he acted largely on deduction. Information once obtained, itsmobile and far-reaching offensive power introduces the element ofsurprise, and permits of lightning strokes against the enemy's vitalpoints. 

Before the war reconnaissance was regarded as the principal duty of theaircraft of the Military Wing. This was due to two reasons, first, theobvious one that aircraft possessed advantages shared by no other armfor obtaining information quickly and over wide areas and reporting toHeadquarters, and second, that experiment had proved the difficulty ofloading aeroplanes with offensive weapons, such as bombs or machineguns, without impairing speed and climb. 

The following statement, which I drafted and which was issued by theGeneral Staff before the Army Man[oe]uvres of 1912, summarizes theposition:--

 "As regards strategical reconnaissance, " it says, "a General is probably now justified in requiring a well-trained flyer, flying a modern aeroplane, to reconnoitre some 70 miles out and return 70 miles. This would be done at a speed of, say, 60 miles an hour in ordinary weather over ordinary country. Thus within four hours, allowing a wide margin, a report as to the approximate strength, formation and direction of movement of the enemy, if he is within a 70-mile radius, should be in the hands of the Commander. "

To those imbued with a knowledge of military history this new method ofascertaining the enemy's movements might well seem revolutionary. 

Let us take two instances illustrating what aircraft, with a radius oflittle over 100 miles, might have done in previous campaigns. For theoperations which terminated in the capitulation of Ulm in 1805 Napoleonconcentrated two army corps at Würzburg and five along the left bank ofthe Rhine between Mannheim and Strasburg, his main body of cavalry underMurat being at the latter place. The Austrian Army under Mack was behindthe Iller between Ulm and Memmingen, and expected the French to advancethrough the defiles of the Black Forest, where Napoleon did actuallymake a feint with his cavalry. Napoleon, however, crossing the Rhine onSeptember 26th, 1805, moved east, and it was not until October 2nd, whenthe French Army had reached the line Ansbach, Langenburg, Hall andLudwigsburg, and his envelopment was far advanced, that Mack realizedthat the main French advance was coming from the north. Aeroplanes ofthe type we possessed in 1914 could have reconnoitred the whole ofNapoleon's preliminary position, could have detected his line ofadvance, especially as it was concentrated on a very narrow front, andcould have brought back the information to the Austrian Headquarterswithin a few hours. 

Aircraft would have been of even greater value on August 16th, 1870, atthe Battle of Rezonville, where neither the French nor the Germans wereaware of the other's movements. On the 14th a battle had been foughteast of Metz which had resulted in the French retreat. On the morning ofthe 16th Moltke thought the French had retired west by the Metz-Verdunroad and those to the north of it, and consequently he directed his leftwing due west towards the Meuse to head off the French, sending hisright army towards Rezonville to harass their rearguard. The Frenchretreat, however, had been slow and two corps were still at Rezonville, while three corps and the reserve cavalry were within easy reach, some130, 000 men in all. At 9 in the morning the German 3rd Corps, unaidedand far from support, attacked a position within reach of the wholeFrench Army, believing it had to deal with a rearguard only. Bazaine, onthe other hand, thinking that he was faced by the German main army, remained on the defensive, and lost the opportunity of defeating indetail first the 3rd and then the 10th German Corps. A few aeroplanesoperating on a radius of 30 miles would have disclosed between daybreakand 10 a. M. The true position to either commander. Neither the Germannor the French cavalry, though both were engaged, obtained any reliableinformation. 

The problem as to how far aircraft would reduce the value of cavalry waswidely discussed before the war. It was seen that by day aircraft couldobtain quicker and more accurate information, but that cavalry retainedtheir power of night reconnaissance, of mobile offensive action and ofpinning the enemy to his ground by fighting. This was found to be soduring the retreat, when, in addition to the direct value of aircraftfor long-distance reconnaissance, an indirect asset of great importancelay in the release of the cavalry for battle action in assistance of theinfantry. The question has become more acute since the offensive actionof aircraft against ground targets has developed, but although we mustnever forget the splendid work of the mounted arm during the Retreatfrom Mons, and in March, 1918, factors have arisen tending to make theuse of cavalry a problem of extreme difficulty in European wars, and itis possible that, in addition to their reconnaissance functions, aircraft will supersede the shock tactics and delaying action ofcavalry, though this may be modified if, the sabre being a thing of thepast, cavalry are converted into mounted machine gunners. 

Air tactics and training were, therefore, chiefly studied from the pointof view of reconnaissance. In addition to the possibility of being shotat by other aircraft, an important consideration was vulnerability fromthe ground. Before the war reconnaissances were carried out at heightsvarying from 2, 000 to 6, 000 feet, but it was generally considered thatthe aeroplane was safe from fire from the ground at heights above 3, 000feet. 

Serious difficulties affecting the mobility of aircraft were the meansof providing a regular supply of fuel and the selection of landinggrounds when moving camp, which had to be close enough behind the frontline as not to entail waste of time in flying out and back over friendlyterritory. This was later brought home to us in a very acute form duringthe Retreat from Mons. 

As machines improved, increasing attention was paid to bettering theirpower of reconnaissance by air photography, their value in co-operationwith artillery by wireless equipment, their offensive action by bombdropping and their offence and defence by armament. 

The value of a correct initiative and the aeroplane's rôle as anoffensive weapon were fully appreciated and brought out in the TrainingManual of the Royal Flying Corps which we compiled at Farnborough, andwhich was published early in 1914 by the War Office. It says:--

 "It is probable that one phase of the struggle for the command of the air will resolve itself into a series of combats between individual aeroplanes, or pairs of aeroplanes. If the pilots of one side can succeed in obtaining victory in a succession of such combats, they will establish a moral ascendancy over the surviving pilots of the enemy, and be left free to carry out their duties of reconnaissance. The actual tactics must depend on the types of the aeroplanes engaged, the object of the pilot being to obtain for his passenger the free use of his own weapon while denying to the enemy the use of his. To disable the pilot of the opposing aeroplane will be the first object. In the case of fast reconnaissance aeroplanes it will often be advisable to avoid fighting, in order to carry out a mission or to deliver information; but it must be borne in mind that this will be sometimes impossible, and that, as in every other class of fighting, a fixed determination to attack and win will be the surest road to victory. "

Speaking generally, the evolution of the machine, as apart from theengine, which hung behind, followed upon the evolution of air tactics. As soon as experience, often hard won at the cost of a valuable life, opened up new fields of activity for aircraft, the designer andconstructor evolved new designs to meet the new requirements. It was nosmall achievement in this period to have solved the problem of inherentstability, both in theory and practice, so successfully, that from theaerodynamic standpoint our machines in 1914 compare favourably withthose in use at the end of the war. 

In dealing with the evolution of the machine during the three yearsprior to the war there are three landmarks: in the autumn of 1911 thefew machines belonging to the Air Battalion failed to reach theirdestination for Army Man[oe]uvres; in May, 1912, the Royal Flying Corpswas formed and experiments with a view to meeting military requirementswere for the first time energetically and methodically prosecuted; andin August, 1914, four squadrons flew to France with machines which hadattained a high degree of stability and were not inferior to any ofthose possessed by other countries. When it is remembered in what ashort time these machines were evolved, it is not surprising thatattention had been chiefly confined to the problem of the 'plane andstability, the engine and speed and reliability. Wireless, bombing, photography, night flying and machine gunnery had been discussed andexperimented with, but no progress was made comparable to that effectedunder war conditions. 

Machines and engines before the war were chiefly French. It isinteresting to note those with which No. 3 Squadron, one of the first tobe formed, commenced its career in May, 1912. They consisted of one 50horse-power Gnome Nieuport, one Deperdussin, which by the way wasprivately owned, one Gnome Bristol, two Gnome Bleriot monoplanes, oneAvro and one Bristol box-kite biplane. By September, 1912, the Squadronpossessed fourteen monoplanes, but in that month, owing to the number ofaccidents incurred by them, the use of monoplanes was temporarilyforbidden, and it was not until April, 1913, that the Squadron was fullyequipped with B. E. And Maurice Farman biplanes organized in flights. 

These types formed the backbone of the Military Wing, which alsoincluded Codys, Breguets, Avros, and, later, Sopwiths. The B. E. 2c wasproduced by the Royal Aircraft Factory in the autumn of 1913 anddemonstrated its high degree of stability by flying from Aldershot toFroyle and from Froyle to Fleet, distances of 6-3/4 and 8 milesrespectively, without the use of ailerons or elevators. The progressmade is illustrated by the fact that at the Army Man[oe]uvres of 1913twelve machines covered 4, 545 miles on reconnaissance and 3, 210 miles onother flights, accurate observations being made from a height of 6, 000feet, without serious mishap. 

In 1913 I recommended the gradual substitution of B. E. 's for Farmans onthe ground of the all-round efficiency and superior fighting qualitiesof the former, and to secure the advantage of standardization, but itwas objected by the War Office that the Farmans were the only machinesthat could mount weapons in front--an objection which was not met untilfiring through the airscrew was introduced--and that the slower Farmansoffered greater advantages for observation, an idea which was longprevalent. As a result, a compromise was effected, and two squadronswere equipped with B. E. 's and two with homogeneous flights of Farmans, Bleriots and Avros. 

At the outbreak of war the most successful machines possessed by theMilitary Wing were the B. E. 2 tractor with a 70 horse-power Renaultengine, a speed of 73 miles an hour, and a climb of 3, 000 feet in nineminutes; and a Henri Farman pusher with a speed of 60 miles an hour, anda climb of 3, 000 feet in fourteen minutes. A special study was beingmade in 1914 of the best methods of ensuring clear observation of theground, and partly in this connection staggered planes were introduced, culminating in the B. E. 2c's, which were not, however, available forservice in any numbers until 1915. 

To sum up, the technical development of aircraft has taken place, andwill continue side by side with the evolution of the uses to whichaircraft can be put. While due attention was paid to problems connectedwith the anticipated duties of aircraft ancillary to that ofreconnaissance, owing to the short space of time between the formationof the Royal Flying Corps and the outbreak of war, to the difficultiesconnected with the engine, and to causes inseparable from peaceconditions, development had been more or less confined to evolving astable and reliable machine with a good field of view. 

CONCLUSIONS. 

The foregoing outline of the development of aviation from the earliesttimes up to the war--a story of human endeavour and achievement in theair with its attendant dangers and difficulties--is not without value inendeavouring to assess that which has since occurred. 

At the beginning of the year 1912 the Royal Flying Corps did not exist. At the beginning of the Great War, in 1914, England found herself withan air service which, though much smaller than those of Germany orFrance, was so excellently manned and organized, trained and equipped, that it placed her at a bound in the front rank of aviation. 

The machine was stable, but the engine still unequal to the tasks laidupon it. Civil Aviation practically did not exist. 

I shall now describe the extension of air duties under war conditions;the increasing value of aircraft for general action and air tactics andtheir development and far-reaching effect as the right hand of strategy. This resulted in the expansion of our flying corps from a total of 1, 844officers and men, and seven squadrons with some 150 machines fit for waruse, to a total of nearly 300, 000 officers and men, and 201 squadronsand 22, 000 machines in use at the end of the war, and in the evolutionof the machine to a point where we can regard it, not only as a weaponof war, but as a new method of transport for commercial purposes inpeace. 

CHAPTER II

WAR

GENERAL REMARKS ON WAR DEVELOPMENT. 

In dealing with the story of the beginnings of aviation and theevolution of aircraft up to the war, we have seen that though its growthwas infinitesimal compared with that which came with the impetus of war, the air service took definite and practical shape more rapidly than hadup to that time any other arm of the Army or Navy in peace. 

In 1914 we had reached a point where we possessed a small but mobile andefficient flying force, equipped and trained essentially forreconnaissance. Although experiments had been made, little had beenachieved in the use of wireless from aircraft, air photography, bombdropping, armament or the development of air fighting. As with the Armyand Navy, war quickened and expanded all the attributes of airoperations in a way which could not have been foreseen before thestruggle occurred; and, as it would have been impossible for the Armyand Navy to build up their war organization without the foundation ofthe pre-war service, so it was the splendid quality of the originalRoyal Flying Corps that made this expansion possible. 

Before the war the Royal Flying Corps was considerably smaller than theair services of either France or Germany, and to attain even thestrength with which the Military Wing left England the bulk of thetrained officers and men, and almost all the machines fit for service, had to be taken. When I started to raise the Corps, in May, 1912, theWar Office estimated that its organization, (of a headquarters and sevenaeroplane and one airship squadrons) would take at least four years;instead, there had been little more than two. Even at the risk ofleaving insufficient personnel and material behind to form and train newsquadrons, I recommended that four complete squadrons (including thewireless machines which had to be thrown in to make up the numbers)should be sent overseas to help the British Expeditionary Force inbearing the brunt of the terrific blow that was to come. It was a veryserious matter that so little could be left with which to carry on inEngland, but we considered it essential to dispatch at once to Franceevery available machine and pilot, because both political and militaryauthorities were of opinion that for economic and financial reasons awar with a great European power could not last more than a few months. Another reason was that those of us who had been at the Staff Collegeduring the few years before the war, or who had recently served on theGeneral Staff at the War Office, believed that the weight of the Germanattack would be made through Belgium, where, owing to the enclosednature of the country, cavalry would be at a disadvantage, and werealized therefore, and urged, the great effect which the air wouldhave from the commencement of operations--a view which was not widelyheld, especially among senior officers in the Army. We also felt thenecessity of using our maximum air strength from the outset, so as toprove its supreme importance as quickly and practically as possible. Itrequired the Retreat from Mons before even G. H. Q. As a whole wouldaccept the fact, though Colonel Macdonogh, the head of the intelligencesection, was our firm ally. The iron of confidence, both to used anduser, had to be welded with the first great blows on the anvil of war. For these reasons it was vital that every available trained pilot andsuitable machine should be employed with the Army, even at the danger ofserious initial depletion at Home. The smooth progress of expansion waslargely attributable alike to the strength of the pre-war spirit, organization and training, [2] and to the results actual and moralobtained by the first four squadrons during the Retreat and thefollowing weeks of the war under centralized control. The Frenchdistributed their "Escadrilles, " which were approximately of the size ofour "flight, " from the beginning, and it is probable that one cause offailure in the German air service during the same period lay in theinitial dispersion of units and lack of unified control by the highercommand. The British Expeditionary Force having been saved during theRetreat, Paris having been saved at the Marne, the great German armyhaving made a retirement, a lengthy war of position having becomeobvious, confidence in the air service, both within and without, havingbeen established, the centralized system necessarily adopted up to thattime could be relaxed, and we were able to send home officers and menwith greatly increased experience to help build up the many newsquadrons which would be required to co-operate with the new armies. 

[2] On October 17, 1914, Sir J. French wrote: "Such efficiency as theR. F. C. May have shown in the field is, in my opinion, principally due toorganization and training. "

Gradually, as the numbers in the field permitted, increased duties wereundertaken. The Army, though it did not do so at first, yet came tounderstand the immense importance to itself of air reconnaissance. Somuch so indeed that our machines and pilots were generally many too fewto attempt more than the absolute essentials, and calls were often madeupon them which were beyond their strength to meet. An ironic contrastto this was supplied, however, at the evacuation of the Dardanelles, where I was commanding the air service (the R. N. A. S. ), and was asked tobe careful not to do too much air work. This at a time when throughstress and strain and loss we had, I think, a total of five machinesleft able to take the air!

Observation was, and remains, the prime purpose for which the RoyalFlying Corps was formed. 1914 was a year of reconnaissance, but with theadvent of trench warfare at the Battle of the Aisne, the first attemptswere made to extend its scope by the use of wireless for artilleryco-operation, and by air photography, both of which developed rapidly. Headway was also being made with bombing. Then machines carrying outtheir special duties had to be protected, while it became necessary toprevent hostile machines from effecting similar functions, with theresult that 1915 saw the beginnings of systematic air fighting. 

In 1915 the easily man[oe]uvrable Fokker, with its machine-gunsynchronizing gear for firing through the propeller, gave the Germans atemporary lead, but by the Battle of the Somme this was outclassed andin 1916 our air superiority became marked. The Royal Flying Corps was bythat time organized into Brigades and Wings, one Wing operating witheach Army for fighting and distant reconnaissance, and one Wing witheach Corps for short reconnaissance and such specialized work asartillery co-operation and contact patrols. Both types of machine tookpart in bombing operations. 

There is generally perhaps a tendency, when reviewing the army and aireffort in the war, to deal almost entirely with the Western Front and toforget the prodigious work done in many other theatres. 

In 1915 the Royal Naval Air Service carried out all air work with theArmy and Navy in the Gallipoli campaign and showed how a single airforce could effect really important co-operation with both services. Inaddition to the normal duties of co-operation with the Army and theFleet, and in spite of the difficulties of transport, supply andworkshop arrangements, photographs were taken from the air of thegreater part of the Peninsula, and the original inaccurate mapscorrected therefrom; frequent bombing raids were carried out againstobjectives on the Peninsula, the Turkish lines of communications, andeven Constantinople itself. In this campaign, too, torpedoes were usedfor the first time by aircraft and three ships were destroyed in theDardanelles by this means. The distance from the hub of affairs, a lineof supply about 6, 000 miles in length, sickness and the climatic andgeographical conditions rendered maintenance very difficult. Sand anddust driven in clouds by high winds greatly shortened the working lifeof engines. The heat during the summer caused the rapid deterioration ofmachines, while long oversea flights entailed loss from forced landings. There are many aspects of the deepest interest to be brought out when acomplete history of the Campaign in Gallipoli comes to be written. It istrue that the Allies would have lost all if they had been defeated inthe west, and that the call of the Armies for more and more men andmunitions for that theatre was insistent; it is equally true, however, that in France there could be nothing but batter and counter-batter, andthe only remaining point where strategic principles could be brought tobear was at the Dardanelles. But what is more relevant to the subject ofthese pages is that when in future years the story of Helles and Anzacand Suvla is weighed, it will, I think, appear that had the necessaryair service been built up from the beginning and sustained, the Army andNavy could have forced the Straits and taken Constantinople. Iinsistently urged the dependence of the naval and military forces uponair assistance and the necessity for carrying out a strong aerialoffensive, especially by bombing, for which the local conditionsgoverning the enemy operations on the Peninsula offered exceptionaladvantages. 

From the autumn of 1915 onwards Egypt became the centre of training andexpansion for operations in the Middle East and, as the organizationdeveloped, a brigade was formed with Wings in Macedonia, Sinai and atraining Wing, which by 1918 had become a training brigade, in Egypt. The work of the Wing sent to Sinai in 1916, and expanded in 1917 into abrigade, is well summarized in the following extract from a telegramreceived from Egypt on October 3rd, 1918:--

 "Before operations commenced our mastery of the air was complete and this was maintained throughout, enabling the cavalry turning movement to be completely protected and concealed. Enemy retreating columns were so effectively machine gunned and bombed by offensive machines that in all three cases the surviving personnel abandoned their vehicles and consequently upset all plans of retirement. An enemy column thus abandoned was seven miles in length. "

The Wings in Macedonia and Mesopotamia, though they could not beat therecord of the Palestine Brigade, gained a marked supremacy over theenemy. Air operations in East Africa were originally carried out by theRoyal Naval Air Service with seaplanes, which in 1915 were brought up tothe strength of two squadrons and replaced by aeroplanes under theorders of the military forces, their duties being carried out under thedifficult conditions of bush warfare. Valuable work was also done by theRoyal Flying Corps squadrons which were sent out to operate in thesouth. 

In addition to these major operations, air forces were used in theexpeditions on the Indian frontier, against Darfur and in the vicinityof Aden. Five squadrons were sent to Italy after the Italian retreatfrom the Isonzo and took a prominent part in the final Austrian defeat;a Royal Air Force contingent was sent to Russia to operate fromArchangel; and material assistance was given to France and the otherAllies, but especially to the United States in the training andequipment of her air forces. 

At the beginning of 1918 the Royal Flying Corps and the Royal Naval AirForce were amalgamated and the Royal Air Force came into existence, andduring the year achieved a supremacy more complete than that at any timesince the Somme. 

The following description gives a vivid idea of air activity at thefront in 1918:--

 "All day long there were 'dog fights' waged at heights up to three or four miles above the shell-torn battlefields of France, whilst the low-flying aeroplanes were attacking suitable targets from the height of a few dozen feet. Passing backwards and forwards went the reconnaissance machines and the bombers, and along the whole front observers were sending out by wireless to the artillery the point of impact of their shells. Such was the picture of the air on any fine day at the time. "

1918, however, saw not only the accumulative effect of the tacticalco-operation of aircraft with our armies in the field, but also theformation of the Independent Air Force and the carrying out of thestrategic air offensive against centres of war industry in the interiorof Germany. 

A vast organization was also required at Home to meet the rapidexpansion of units in the Field and to supply reinforcements. Thus atthe Armistice there were 199 training squadrons, the pupils underinstruction including cadets numbered 30, 000, and during the war some22, 000 graduated as efficient for active service. At the beginning ofthe war pilots were sent overseas with only 11 hours' flying experience. This was much too little and there is no doubt that increased trainingwould have ensured fewer casualties. Fortunately, however, the length oftraining was increased in the latter part of the war and a remarkableadvance in training was made possible by the use of an entirely new andextraordinarily efficient system of instruction evolved by Smith-Barry. 

The war demonstrated the beginnings of what air power meant, though inNovember, 1918, it was still in its infancy. Before many years theability to make war successfully, or even at all, will depend upon airpower. 

Let us now briefly survey the development of the several duties ofaircraft, the evolution of machines and progress in tactics, strategyand the organization of our Air Forces during the war. 

I had recognized the great difficulty of mobilizing with the clockworkprecision of older units and, in the belief that war was coming, hadordered a provisional mobilization of the Corps some days before it wasactually declared. Thanks to this step and to the work done at ourConcentration Camp at Netheravon in June, 1914, the greater part of theRoyal Flying Corps was enabled to concentrate without hitch at ouraerodrome at Dover, and the machines flew via Calais to Amiens on August13th. 

CO-OPERATION WITH THE ARMY. 

_Reconnaissance. _

In the event of France and England declaring war concurrently againstGermany, the strategic plan agreed to by the British and French generalstaffs before the war had been that the British Expeditionary Forceshould be moved to the Le Cateau, Maubeuge, Mons, area and take up aline on the left flank of the French Army near Mons. But England hadwithheld her declaration until three days after the French, and onlanding in France the first words I heard said by a Frenchman were:"Oui, l'armée anglaise arrive mais on a manqué le premier plan. " It wasnot until after the arrival of G. H. Q. At Amiens on August 14th that, although late, it was decided that the advanced line should be taken up. The Royal Flying Corps moved by air and road to an existing aerodromeoutside the antique defences of Maubeuge 12 miles from Mons on the 16th. On the 19th the first reconnaissance was carried out, and the entirecountry over which the German armies were advancing, as far as Brusselsand Louvain, was kept under observation. One of the best reconnaissancesever made was that of August 21st, which discovered the 2nd German Corpsmoving from Brussels through Ninhove and Grammont. 

From Maubeuge we had to retire on the 24th to Le Cateau, on the 25th toSt. Quentin, on the 26th to La Fère, on the 28th to Compiègne, on the30th to Senlis, on the 31st to Juilly, on September 2nd to Serris, onthe 3rd to Touquin, on the 4th to Melun, where we were thankful at lastto get orders again to advance on the 7th to Touquin, and on the 9th toCoulommiers, reaching Fère-en-Tardennois on the 12th for the Battle ofthe Aisne. 

Of the many recollections of the early days one which will remainlongest in my mind is the terrible sadness of the flocks of refugees, ofthe poor people we left behind. And the glare of villages burning by thehand of the Boche. It was indeed war. 

Valuable reconnaissances were made during the whole Retreat from Mons tothe Marne in spite of the tremendous difficulties involved by constantmovement, transport, and the selection of new landing grounds, but, inthe words of Sir John French, "It was the timely warning aircraft gavewhich chiefly enabled me to make speedy dispositions to avert danger anddisaster. There can be no doubt indeed that even then the presence andco-operation of aircraft saved the very frequent use of cavalry patrolsand detailed supports. " The Royal Flying Corps was an important factorin helping the British Expeditionary Force to escape von Kluck's nearlysuccessful efforts to secure another and a British Sedan. 

The reconnaissance resulting in the most valuable information of all, and, I think, during the whole of the war, was that of September 3rd, during the critical operations on the Marne, which formed one of thedecisive battles in the world's history, when von Kluck's turningmovement to the south-east against the French left was accuratelyreported and Marshal Joffre was enabled to make his dispositionsaccordingly. "The precision, exactitude and regularity of the newsbrought in, " he said in a message to the British Commander-in-Chief, "are evidence of the perfect training of pilots and observers. " Thereports of the German air service, on the other hand, would appear fromvon Kluck's movements to have been of no assistance to him. 

The system adopted from the first was for the pilot or observer, orboth, immediately on their return to bring their report to R. F. C. Headquarters, whence the Commander, or his staff officer, accompaniedthem to G. H. Q. , where the map was filled in in accordance with thereport. G. H. Q. Could then ask questions and obtain any furtherinformation which the observer could give, while R. F. C. Headquarterscould ascertain what further reports were most urgently required. Theform of the reports, which were ready printed, had been most carefullythought out at R. F. C. Headquarters in peace and experimented with at theConcentration Camp. 

The maps thus compiled at G. H. Q. From air reconnaissance reports betweenAugust 31st and September 3rd were of vital interest, though it wassometimes very difficult to get the information put on the map forprompt consideration. For instance, at Dammartin on the evening ofSeptember 1st, when it was thought that German cavalry were within a fewmiles, G. H. Q. Made a very hurried departure, and I was unable to findanyone to whom to give very important reports. 

It was at the Battle of the Marne that machines were for the first timeallotted to Army Corps for tactical work, while long-distancereconnaissance was carried out by other machines operating fromHeadquarters. Later on, this system was established as a part of ourpermanent organization, squadrons being allotted to, and reportingdirect to, Corps for tactical reconnaissance, artillery co-operation andcontact patrols, and to Armies for longer-distance reconnaissance andfighting. 

The last phase of the war of movement was the race for the Channel Portsand it devolved upon aircraft to observe the enemy's movements from hiscentre and left flank to meet the Allied movement to the coast, toobserve the movements of the four newly-formed corps which came intoaction at Ypres and to maintain liaison with the Belgian and Britishforces at Antwerp and Ostend. Information was very difficult to obtainand on one occasion I flew from the Aisne to Antwerp, under Sir JohnFrench's instructions, in order as far as possible to clear up thegeneral situation when our G. H. Q. Was in doubt as to whether Antwerp wascompletely surrounded or not. It was an interesting piece of work. Therewas a light drizzle, and the forest of Compiègne had to be flown over atabout 200 feet. The B. E. Could not make the distance without refilling, and although only a short halt was made at Amiens for the purpose, itwas too late to fly direct to Antwerp. Instead, a landing was made in avery sticky field under light plough, which was selected from the airabout 4 miles north of Bruges, to which town I rode on a borrowedbicycle. At Bruges there was great consternation and uncertainty as tothe position at Antwerp, but the Commander kindly placed a large opencar and its very energetic driver at my disposal to try and get through. After many difficulties we managed to find our way into Antwerp byabout midnight, and I was received by the Belgian Commander. Heexplained that though the Germans had broken through the South-Easternsector and his troops were very hard pressed (and pointing repeatedly toa piece of an 18-inch German shell in the corner of the room, he said, "Mais qu'est-ce qu'on peut faire avec ces choses-là!"), he hoped to beable to hold out for a time. After giving him General French's messageand obtaining as much information as possible, I managed to get clear ofAntwerp, reaching Bruges again at 3. 15 a. M. At 4 a. M. We set out andfound a very wet machine in a wetter field and after considerabledifficulty and flying through the top of the surrounding hedge, struggled into the upper air on the way back to Headquarters atFère-en-Tardennois. 

During the Battles of the Aisne and of Ypres strategical reconnaissancewas carried out by the few machines available at Headquarters. Shephard, the best reconnaissance officer I have ever known, who was killed later, used to fly his B. E. 2 without observer over the greater part of Belgiumtwo or three times a week and always brought in a long, closely packed, and extraordinarily valuable report. Tactical reconnaissance to a depthof 15 to 20 miles was done by units attached to Corps. 

After the Battle of the Aisne, which was the turning point in theevolution from the war of movement to trench warfare, purereconnaissance, though still the basis of air work, tended to become amatter of routine, while many new and specialized forms of it--such asair photography and artillery spotting by wireless--were developed. 

_Photography. _

Though experiments had been made in the problem of photography from theair before the war, principally by Fletcher, Hubbard and Laws, and itsvalue to survey was recognized, it had not become of practical utility. We only took one official camera with us to France on August 13th, 1914, and it was not until September 15th that the first attempt at airphotography was made, when five plates were exposed over positionsbehind the enemy's lines with very imperfect results. Its great value asan aid to observation in trench warfare was, however, very apparent, fresh brains were brought to the task, Moore-Brabazon, Campbell and Dr. Swan, and by the end of the year better success was obtained, thoughpositions even then had to be filled in by the observer with red ink. Experiments at home during 1915 led to a great improvement in lenses, and at the beginning of 1916 air photography was universal. At theBattle of the Somme new enemy positions were photographed as soon asthey were seen, and the camera did invaluable work in the reconnaissanceof the Hindenburg Line during the German retreat of 1917, and the takingof over a thousand photographs was a daily occurrence. On September 4th, 1917, a record of 1, 805 photographs was made. 

The development of air photography, very remarkable in itself, is evenmore so when it is remembered that the improvement in enemyanti-aircraft guns drove our machines to carry out their work ataltitudes increasing up to 20, 000 and even 22, 000 feet, at which heightsthe negatives had to be as distinct as those taken at 4, 000 in theearlier days of the war. 

At the beginning of the Dardanelles operations our apparatus consistedof one camera, a printing frame and a dark room lamp. The firstphotographs were taken by Butler in April, 1915, from a H. Farmanmachine at necessarily low altitudes. Butler was wounded in June and wassucceeded by Thomson, who alone made 900 exposures and sent in 3, 600prints. 

In addition to the assistance of air photography to reconnaissance, thewar gave it great impetus as the handmaid of survey and mapping. It was, in fact, the only means of mapping or correcting the maps of countryheld by the enemy, which in certain cases, as at Gallipoli and inPalestine, were very inaccurate. 

By the end of the war photographic processes and equipment had reached ahigh standard of excellence. There are still, however, certaindifficulties in regard to the production of accurate maps, which havenot been overcome, the most obvious being the necessity of an initialframework of fixed points and of contouring. The subject is consideredso important that an "Air Survey Committee, " consisting ofrepresentatives of the Air Ministry, the Geographical section of the WarOffice, the Ordnance Survey, the School of Military Engineering and theArtillery Survey School, has recently been formed. In addition, theSchool of Aeronautics of Cambridge University is studying the question. The Survey of India and the Survey of Egypt are also conductingexperiments. 

_Wireless. _

From the outset, part of the German scheme of tactics was to batter downresistance by means of superior weight of heavy armament, and with thebeginning of warfare of fixed position the observation and direction ofour artillery fire became as important as distant reconnaissance. Besides its immense value in increasing the effect of the batteries, ithad the indirect advantage of more closely binding the ties of mutualunderstanding between the air and ground troops, a point whichfortunately seems to have been misunderstood by the Germans. InSeptember, 1914, the first attempts were made to signal enemy movementsfrom the aeroplanes of a Headquarters Wireless Flight which had beenformed for the purpose, and this practice was continued with successthroughout the Battle of the Aisne. 

In the earliest stages artillery co-operation was also carried out bydropping coloured lights, but from the Battle of Ypres onwards, thoughfor some time very few wireless machines were available, this waseffected by wireless or signal lamps. In his dispatch on the Battle ofLoos, Sir John French wrote: "The work of observation for the guns fromaeroplanes has now become an important factor in artillery fire, and thepersonnel of the two arms work in closest co-operation. "

By the Battle of the Somme artillery co-operation had assumed very largedimensions. For instance, on September 15th, 1916, on the front of the4th Army alone, seventy hostile batteries were located, twenty-ninebeing silenced. Counter-battery work was so effective before theoffensive which opened on the Ypres front at the end of July, 1917, thatthe Germans withdrew their guns and the attack was delayed for threedays in order that their new positions might be located. 

Recognition marks on aeroplanes were at this time, and indeed throughoutthe war, a matter of great difficulty. It had been suggested before thewar that they would not be necessary, but the reverse was found to bethe case, as even with the distinctive marks which were adopted ourmachines were often fired at by British troops, and we shouldundoubtedly have lost very heavily if we had flown over our own lineswith false marks, as was suggested, or none. 

_Bombing. _

The bombing operations, which reached their climax in the raids onGerman industrial centres in 1918, arose from very primitive methodsused at the beginning of the war. During the retreat from Mons a fewhand grenades were carried experimentally in the pockets of pilots andobservers, or, in the case of the larger varieties, tied to theirbodies, and these were dropped over the side of the machine asopportunity occurred. At the Marne, for instance, small petrol bombs setfire to a transport park and scattered a mixed column of infantry andtransport. I think I am right in saying that the first German bombswere dropped on us--unsuccessfully--at Compiègne on August 29th, 1914. It was not, however, until the beginning of 1915 that special bombingraids were started by the Royal Flying Corps, one of the first places tobe attacked being the Ghistelles aerodrome in West Flanders. 

The most important bombing operations and raids into Germany in theearly days of the war were carried out by the Naval Air Service, unitsof which landed at Ostend on August 27th and operated with the RoyalNaval Division from Antwerp. They were subsequently withdrawn to Dunkirkto form the nucleus of an aircraft centre from which excellent work wasdone in attacking the bases established on or near the Belgian coastfrom which German submarines and airships conducted their operations. 

Just before the Germans entered Antwerp, the first raid was made againsta German town, one machine reaching Dusseldorf, when it descended from6, 000 to 400 feet and dropped three bombs on an airship shed. 

From the end of 1914 onwards the activities of the Royal Naval AirService in this theatre of operations continually increased, the chiefobjectives being the gun emplacements at Middelkerke and Blankenburghe, the submarine bases at Zeebrugge and Bruges, the minefield and dock ofOstend, the airship sheds near Brussels, and the dockyards at Antwerp. The first airship destroyed in the air was attacked over Ghent. 

An interesting experiment was the attempt by the R. N. A. S. At theDardanelles to sink the heavy wire anti-submarine net, which had beenstretched on buoys across the Straits at Nagara by the Turks, by meansof parachute bombs. 

To return to the Royal Flying Corps. During 1915 railway junctions werethe principal bombing objectives, and raids were carried out on anever-increasing scale, formations of fourteen to twenty machines takingpart. At the Battle of Neuve Chapelle for instance, the railwayjunctions at Menin, Courtrai and Douai were attacked. One officer of No. 5 Squadron, carrying one 100 lb. Bomb, arrived over Menin at 3, 500 feet, descended to 120 feet, and dropped his bomb on the railway line. Thefirst V. C. Of the Royal Flying Corps was obtained at the Second Battleof Ypres by Lieutenant W. B. Rhodes-Moorhouse, who in bombing Courtraicame down to three or four hundred feet, under heavy fire, but pilotedhis machine 35 miles back to Merville at the height of a few hundredfeet, and died a few days later from his wounds. 

One of the most instructive features of the Battle of Loos in September, 1915, was the definite co-ordination of bombing attacks with armyoperations. Many types of machines, belonging both to Army and CorpsSquadrons, carried bombs in order to destroy dumps, communications, cutoff reinforcements, and the like, while at the Somme bombing was carriedout by formations of Wings. In October, 1917, 113 tons, and for a periodof six days in March, 1918, 95 tons, of explosives were dropped. Thisillustrates the enormous progress of bombing which was so largelyresorted to in the later stages of the war. The hand grenades of 1914had become bombs weighing three-quarters of a ton: the pilot's pocket amechanically released rack: and aim, assisted by instruments, wasbecoming fairly accurate. 

Night bombing, necessitated by the fact that by day a large machineheavily laden with bombs was an easy prey to the fighting scout, cameinto prominence in 1916, increasing in intensity up to the end of thewar; and raids into Germany recommenced. Early in 1918 these raidsincluded the bombing of Maintz, Stuttgart, Coblentz, Cologne, and Metz. Machines sometimes dropped their bombs from heights of about 12, 000 feetand at other times descended to within 200 feet of their objectives. 

_Contact Patrol. _

Contact patrol, the name given to the direct co-operation of aircraftwith troops on the ground, was first extensively practised at the Battleof the Somme, though experiments in this direction had been made in1915, messages being dropped at the Battle of Neuve Chapelle atpre-arranged points. 

The main objects of contact patrols were to assist the telephone (whichwas frequently cut by shellfire), to keep the various headquartersinformed of the progress of their troops during the attack, so alsosaving them from the possibility of coming under the fire of their ownartillery, to report on enemy positions, to transmit messages from thetroops engaged to the headquarters of their units, to attack groundformations, and to co-operate with tanks. A system of red flares on thefloor of the trenches was used to mark the disposition of the troops, and aircraft communicated their information by means of signallinglamps, wireless and message-bags. 

During the German retreat of 1917 contact patrols attacked enemyfoundations from 100 feet and in some cases landed behind the enemylines to obtain information. The skill of low-flying pilots in takingcover by flying behind woods, houses, etc. , became increasinglyimportant. The fact that 62, 673 rounds of ammunition were fired from theair against enemy ground targets between November 20th and 26th, 1917, and 163, 567 between March 13th and 18th, 1918, indicates the rapiddevelopment of this form of aircraft action, the effect of which wasfrequently more deadly than bombing. 

Two of many protagonists of contact patrol were Pretyman and Bishop. Onone occasion the latter, in attacking an aerodrome at about 50 feet, riddled the officers' and men's quarters with bullets, put two or threemachines on the ground out of action, and three in succession as theygot into the air. Another interesting example of contact patrol workoccurred in 1917 when a pilot flew his machine at a low altitude overthe enemy trenches, and he and his observer attracted the attention ofthe Germans by firing their machine guns and Verey lights. The Germanswere so busy with the aeroplane that they had their backs turned to thefront line and our infantry were able to cross no-man's land without anyartillery preparation, take prisoners and bomb dug-outs. 

An article in the _Cologne Gazette_ showed what the Germans thought oflow "strafing. "

 "The operations" (i. E. Of June 7th, 1917), it says, "were prefaced by innumerable enemy airmen, who, at the beginning of the preparation for the attack, appeared like a swarm of locusts and swamped the front. They also work on cunningly calculated methods. Their habit is to work in three layers--one quite high, one in the middle, and the third quite low. The English who fly lowest show an immense insolence; they came down to 200 metres and shot at our troops with their machine guns, which are specially adapted to this purpose. "

Armour was first employed as a result of Shephard finding at Maubeuge abullet lodged in the seat of his leather suit. Thin sheets of steel wereat once cut out and placed in the wickerwork seats of aeroplanes. Thisprimitive protection developed into the armoured machine mentionedlater, which was about to make its appearance at the Armistice. 

I may mention here the "special duty" flights, which consisted inestablishing secret communication between our Intelligence Branch andagents in the territory occupied by the Germans. Agents, mostly Frenchand Belgian, were carried by aeroplane over the enemy lines and landedthere. This work was started in 1914. 

_Fighting. _

At the beginning of the war it became obvious that it was not only theduty of aircraft to obtain information but also to prevent enemyaircraft crossing our lines. In addition to the reconnaissance machine, and in order to make its work possible, a machine designed purely forfighting was required. In August, 1914, the aeroplane's armamentconsisted simply of rifle, or carbine, and revolver, but our pilotsnevertheless attacked hostile machines whenever the opportunityoccurred. The first German machine to fly over us was at Maubeuge onAugust 22nd, 1914, and, though fighting on an extensive scale did nottake place until 1916, as early as August 25th, 1914, there were threeencounters in the air in which two enemy machines were driven down. Oneinteresting report of an early fight is that between a B. E. And a Germanmachine on December 20th, 1914. 

 "A German aeroplane with one passenger and pilot being encountered over Poperinghe, we followed to Morbecque and then to Armentières. The passenger of the B. E. Fired 40 rounds from his rifle and the German passenger replied with some rounds from his revolver. The B. E. Crossed the bows of the German machine to permit the pilot to use his revolver. The German switched off and dived below the B. E. , and is believed to have landed somewhere north-west of Lille. "

Another instance of the early air combats was when Holt, single-handed, and armed only with a rifle, lashed to a strut of his machine, attackedten Germans near Dunkirk, causing them to drop their bombs in the fieldand make off to their own lines. 

We managed to bring down a number of German machines, mainly by riflefire (five had already been brought down by September 7th, 1914), butour great difficulty early in the war was to get the enemy into action, and, although during October and November, 1914, there was a certainamount of fighting, as a rule the German when attacked made for his ownlines and the protection of his anti-aircraft guns. This, thoughoffensive carried to the extent of wastefulness of life is equally bad, was a serious mistake in all ways from his point of view, entailing asit did a tendency for the confidence of the troops and the morale of theair service to be undermined from the outset. The error was rectified, but only temporarily, at the Somme. 

As the specialized duties of aircraft increased, the Corps machinesengaged in them needed protection and it was realized that the bestmethod of protection was the development of the air offensive. This wasrendered possible by the adaptation of the machine gun to the aeroplane. Early in 1915 the invention of the "synchronizing gear" enabled amachine gun to fire through the propeller, and by the end of 1915fighting in the air became the general rule. The first squadron, No. 24, composed purely of fighting machines, took its place on the WesternFront in February, 1916, and gradually Wings were attached to Armiessolely for fighting and the protection of Corps machines. During thelong months of the Battle of the Somme, for instance, when, though theRoyal Flying Corps dominated the air, the Germans put up a strenuousopposition, bombing machines were protected by fighting patrols information on the far side of the points attacked. The rapidity withwhich fighting in the air developed is shown by the fact that at the endof 1916 twenty new fighting squadrons were asked for on the WesternFront; the establishment was increased to twenty-four machines persquadron, and by the end of the war even night-fighting squadrons wereoperating with considerable success and, had the war continued, wouldhave proved a very important factor in air warfare. 

The development of aerobatics, air fighting, and formation tacticsbrought many airmen into prominence. For example Albert Ball, whoascribed his successes to keen application to aerial gunnery; J. B. McCudden, the first man to bring four hostile machines down in a day;and Trollope, who later on brought down six. Hawker met his deathfighting von Richthofen, who describes the fight in his book _The RedAir Fighter_ as follows:--

 "Soon I discovered that I was not fighting a beginner. He had not the slightest intention to break off the fight. .. . The gallant fellow was full of pluck, and when we had got down to 3, 000 feet he merrily waved to me as if to say, 'Well, how do you do?'. .. The circles which we made round one another were so narrow that their diameter was probably not more than 250 or 300 feet. .. . At that time his first bullets were flying round me, as up to then neither of us had been able to do any shooting. "

At 300 feet Hawker was compelled to fly in a zig-zag course to avoidbullets from the ground and this enabled Richthofen to dive on his tailfrom a distance of 150 feet. 

This indicates a heavy disadvantage under which our aircraft laboured inall their work on the Western Front. The prevailing westerly wind which, while it assisted the enemy in his homeward flight, made it verydifficult for a British machine, perhaps damaged by anti-aircraft fire, to make its way--still under fire--to its base. 

I cannot leave the subject of air fighting without giving one or twomore examples. One which comes to mind is that of five British machinesattacking twenty-five of the enemy. One of ours gliding down with itsengine stopped and being attacked by two Germans was saved by anotherBritish one attacking and driving off the two enemy. The result of thecombat was five German machines destroyed and four driven down out ofcontrol, whilst all of ours returned safely. Another example, that ofBarker who, whilst destroying an enemy two-seater, was wounded frombelow by another German machine and fell some distance in a spin. Recovering, he found himself surrounded by fifteen Fokkers, two of whichhe attacked indecisively but shot down a third in flames. Whilst doingthis he was again wounded, again fainted, again fell, again recoveredcontrol and again, being attacked by a large formation, shot down anenemy in flames. A bullet now shattered his left elbow and, fainting athird time, he fell several thousand feet, where he was again attacked, and thinking his machine had been set on fire he tried, as he thought ina final effort, to ram a Fokker, but instead drove it down on fire!Barker was by this time without the use of both legs and an arm. Divingto a few thousand feet of the ground he again found his retreat barredby eight of the enemy, but these he was able to shake off after shortbursts of fire and he returned a few feet above the ground to our lines. 

Though at the beginning our machines were rather better than either theFrench or German, it was the marked superiority of our pilots which gaveus the greatest advantage. We should have been superior even had themachines been exchanged. 

CO-OPERATION WITH THE NAVY. 

We have seen that the functions of co-operation with the Navy--Coastdefence and Fleet assistance--were very complicated, and that at theoutbreak of war the splendid pilots and excellent equipment of theR. N. A. S. Were not so highly organized and were wanting in cohesion, butthat the R. N. A. S. Had advanced further than the Royal Flying Corps inspecialized technical development. In the earlier part of the war, inaddition to its main duties, the R. N. A. S. Ventured in many directions, many of them of considerable value to the Army, as, for instance, atAntwerp. 

_Coast Defence, Patrol and Convoy Work. _

Immediately war broke out a system of coastal patrols was establishedbetween the Humber and the Thames Estuary and over the Channel--thelatter serving as an escort to the Expeditionary Force crossing toFrance. Patrols were at first, through limitations of equipment, mainlyconfined to the Home coast, but, as the war went on and machinesimproved, they were rapidly extended, especially in connection with thedetection and destruction of submarines; reconnaissances were carriedout over the enemy's shores, and in 1918 there were forty-three flightsof seaplanes, thirty flights of aeroplanes, together with flying boatsand airships, operating from, and communicating with, an ever-increasingnumber of shore stations. Not only was anti-submarine work carried outin the vicinity of the coast, but organized hunts were made forsubmarines, ships were convoyed on the high seas, shipping routes wereprotected, and action was taken to bar the passage of submarines throughnarrow channels. This was effected by an intensive system of combiningand interlocking patrols, and by maintaining, in close co-operation withsurface craft, a protective barrage across suitable stretches of water, such as the Straits of Dover. 

Airships from the beginning, when patrols operated from Kingsnorthduring the crossing of the Expeditionary Force to France, provedparticularly useful for escort, in addition to patrol work, andtwenty-seven small airships, known as the S. S. Type, were completed in1915. In 1916 the Coastal type with a longer range was designed andconstructed and new airship bases were established. 

_Fleet Assistance, Reconnaissance, Spotting for Ships' Guns. _

The successful use of Drachen kite-balloons borne in ships at theDardanelles led to their extensive development. Up to about May, 1915, when the vessels to which they were attached could stand in close toshore and overlook the enemy's positions from a distance of three orfour thousand yards, a large amount of spotting of great value wascarried out by these balloons for ships at Gallipoli, but when the Turksbrought long-range guns into position, kite-balloon vessels were obligedto lie out beyond 11, 000 yards and their services were renderedcomparatively slight for this purpose. From 1916, however, they weretowed by merchant auxiliaries and light cruisers to spot submarines, observers communicating with the patrol ship by means of telephone. Oneof the most wonderful sights I have ever seen was from the observer'sbasket of the kite-balloon let up from S. S. "Manica" in June, 1915. Wewere spotting for the guns of H. M. S. "Lord Nelson" bombarding Chanak. The sky and sea were a marvellous blue and visibility excellent, thepeninsula, where steady firing was going on all the time, lay below us, the Straits, with their ships and boats, the Asiatic shore graduallydisappearing in a golden haze, the Gulf of Xeros, the Marmora, andbehind one the islands of the Ægean affording a perfect background. Noone who was at the Dardanelles, however vivid the horrors and the heatand dust and flies, will forget the beauty of the scene, especially atsunset, and it was seen at its best from the basket of a kite-balloon. 

The ever-increasing assistance rendered by aircraft to surface vesselsin crippling Germany's submarine campaign is shown by the fact that in1915 ten submarines were attacked from the air and in 1918 126 weresighted and 93 attacked. Nor was the principle forgotten in counteringthe submarine menace that offence is the best defence, and among themany duties of R. N. A. S. Aircraft, based on Dunkirk from the early daysof the war, were anti-submarine patrols along the Belgian coast and thebombing of hostile submarine bases, such as Bruges. 

As in the case of the Army Corps observation machines, fighting scoutsbecame necessary for the protection of patrols and to counter theenemy's efforts at raids and sea reconnaissance, and the considerableamount of experiment in air fighting which the R. N. A. S. Had made beforethe war bore useful fruit. 

For the immediate protection of the Grand Fleet seaplane and aeroplanebases were established at Scapa Flow and Thurso at the beginning of thewar, but, owing to damage from a gale in November, 1914, aircraftoperations with the Fleet were carried out from the seaplane carrier"Campania. " The problem of using carriers with the Fleet had not beenseriously tackled before the war, and though experiments werestrenuously carried out, and there were fourteen carrier ships incommission in 1918, and a seaplane carrier operated with the BattleCruiser Squadron at Jutland, the use of aircraft in this way did notbecome very efficient. One of the chief difficulties was limitation insize, and consequently in radius of action, of aircraft employed fromcarriers or the decks of battleships. The total number of aeroplanes andseaplanes allotted to the Grand Fleet in 1918 was 350. 

Seaplane carriers occasionally co-operated with fighting ships. Forinstance in October, 1915, a fast carrier at the Dardanelles accompaniedships detailed for the bombardment of Dedeagatch, and her seaplanes notonly co-operated in spotting but also made a valuable reconnaissance ofthe Bulgarian coast and railway. But as a rule fighting andreconnaissance aircraft had mainly to work from shore bases. To assistin this direction, units were sent overseas to be nearer their sphereof action, as, for instance, the R. N. A. S. Squadrons stationed at Dunkirkwhich, besides general reconnaissance, helped the Navy to keep open theStraits of Dover, carried out bombing raids against German bases anddockyards, such as Ostend, Zeebrugge, and Bruges, and co-operated withmonitors in the bombardment of the Belgian coast. The development of along-range seaplane or flying boat was also taken in hand, though anefficient type was not produced until the last year of the war. 

As with the Army, an important part of naval aircraft duties wasspotting for gunfire; and likewise single-seater fighters were requiredfor the protection of our own aircraft, for preventing enemy aircraftreconnaissance, for attacking the enemy's fleet and protecting our own. The use of offensive patrols steadily increased during the war. 

_Bombing. _

I have already referred to bombing and mentioned the attack onDusseldorf as an instance of the work done. Bombing raids had alwaysbeen looked on with favour by the R. N. A. S. And were used throughout thewar as a means of countering hostile aircraft operations from bases inBelgium. One of the first successful raids was that against theFriedrichshaven Zeppelin works by three Avro machines, which flew 250miles over enemy country on November 21st, 1914. Another noteworthyexample was the attempted raid against Cuxhaven on Christmas Day, 1914, carried out by seaplanes, which were still in an experimental stage, and three carriers escorted by naval units. Powerful machines forbombing purposes were ordered and bombs of greatly increased size andgear for dropping them were designed. 

_Torpedo Attack. _

The impetus given to bombing helped forward another use of navalaircraft: torpedo attack. This is likely to develop in the future intoone of the most important uses of aircraft in naval operations, butduring the war it was never given an objective by the German fleet. InMay, 1915, two Sunbeam Short machines were embarked in the"Ben-my-Chree" for operations at Gallipoli, and it was in this theatrethat for the first time in history ships were sunk by torpedoes releasedfrom aircraft. I shall never forget the night when we steamed silentlyup the narrow Gulf of Xeros and lay waiting to release our seaplanes inthe still darkness of the early morning. The machines were lowerednoiselessly into the water, and, their engines started, flew across thenarrow neck of Bulair under fire from the old Turkish line; then, reaching the northern end of the Dardanelles at dawn, they descended low(one machine actually landed on the water and discharged its torpedo), sank their targets, and returned. In addition to the possibility ofsubmarine attack, the Gulf of Xeros is so narrow that our ship couldhave been hit by the cross fire of field guns. It was a very fineperformance and, although during many years I have spent anxious hourshoping for the distant purr of a safe returning machine, I have neverbeen happier than when after a long wait our seaplanes were againquickly raised on board. The only torpedo machine employed at the Battleof Jutland was a Sunbeam fitted with a 14-inch torpedo, and it was notuntil just before the Armistice that a squadron of torpedo aircraft wasready for operations with the Grand Fleet. 

The Germans also tried to develop the use of torpedo-carrying seaplanesand, as with their submarines, had the advantage over us of a vastnumber of targets close to hand in our North Sea and Channel shipping, but fortunately the British fighting scouts were able to destroy severalof their machines before they had done much damage. 

HOME DEFENCE. 

At the beginning of the war the R. N. A. S. Assumed responsibility for thedefence of Great Britain against attacks by hostile aircraft, and ascheme for the defence of London and other large towns was entrusted toan anti-aircraft section of the Admiralty Air Department. Its resources, however, consisting of a few unsuitable and widely scattered aeroplanes, some 1 pdr. Pom-poms with searchlights manned by a special corps, wereinadequate and it was fortunate that only three small daylight aeroplaneraids, mainly for reconnaissance, were made during 1914--the firstGerman machine to visit England dropping a bomb near Dover on December21st. 

_Night Flying and Night Fighting. _

In spite of continuous action by the R. N. A. S. Against German airshipbases in Belgium, there were in 1915 nineteen airship and eightaeroplane raids--one by night--over England, and, although the new andpowerful Zeppelin L. Z. 38, which attacked London on May 31st, wasdestroyed by an aeroplane counter-attack in its shed near Brussels, noreal counter measures were evolved until 1916, when Home Defence wastaken over by the War Office. During that year a Home Defence Squadronof B. E. 2c's, rapidly expanded to a Wing, was formed; and the systematictraining of night pilots, the standardization of night-flying equipmentand armament, and the lighting of aerodromes, was taken in hand. Acontinuous aeroplane and searchlight barrage with night landing groundswas gradually formed between Dover and the Forth; the wireless signalsemployed to assist Zeppelins in finding their way were intercepted, thusenabling our rapidly improving fighting machines to pick up and attackraiding airships; and the constant attacks to which airship sheds wereexposed in Belgium, caused their withdrawal to positions further inlandand increased their distance from England. During 1916 there weretwenty-two raids by airships, six of which were destroyed, the firstbeing brought down in September at Cuffley by Leefe Robinson. Thenceforward airship raids declined, the destruction of the majority ofthe largest and latest which raided England on October 19th, 1917, sealing their fate. 

On the other hand, aeroplane daylight and night raids on London, thefirst of which occurred in November, 1916, increased in number andstrength with the object, in addition to the destruction of material andcivilian _morale_, of forcing upon us the unsound retention at home of aconsiderable air defence force. The largest of these attacks was made byseventeen aeroplanes at midday on June 13th, 1917, but, the Zeppelindanger nullified, counter measures to meet the new menace were graduallyevolved. New squadrons were raised and the number of home defencesquadrons was raised to fourteen service and eight night trainingsquadrons; a Northern Home Defence Wing was formed at York; and the HomeDefence Group became the 6th Brigade. The first night aeroplane raidoccurred in September, and the systematic training of night-fightingpilots on scout machines was hurried on. Separate zones for aeroplanes, guns and searchlights--the latter provided with sound locators--formingan outer barrage, were instituted, and aprons, supported bykite-balloons, formed a protective barrage up to 8, 000 feet. A system ofwireless and ground telephonic communication was improvised for plottingthe course of attacking aircraft and thus enabling squadron commandersto concentrate machines at the point of attack. By 1918 thenight-fighting aeroplane, assisted by these means, had countered thenight-bombing aeroplane. At first, this had been the result of theretention of a large number of fighting aircraft and a completeorganization at home. 

Meanwhile, night fighting, especially the protection of night bombers byfighting machines, had become of paramount importance on the WesternFront. The chief feature of activity in September, 1918, was thesuccessful co-operation between searchlights in the forward areas andNo. 151 night-fighting squadron. This was the first night-fightingsquadron, trained by the 6th Brigade, to be sent to France. It wasproposed to send four more such squadrons and thus form a first line ofoffensive defence which would react on hostile raids over England. Thusonce again the old doctrine was gradually observed that offence is theonly true defence, and that purely defensive measures, howeverefficient, by keeping men and material from the vital point, arenecessarily expensive out of all proportion to their effectiveness. Boththe Germans and ourselves made the initial mistake of organizing largelocal defence systems partly to placate public opinion. During theGerman offensive of 1918 a further development of night fighting tookplace in the bombing and low strafing of enemy troops and unlightedtransport with the aid of flares. 

THE MACHINE AND ENGINE. 

Turning now to the machine and engine, the Military Trials held in 1912, when the Royal Flying Corps was started, represented the first organizedeffort to assist the evolution of service aeroplanes in this country anda brief comparison will be useful to show the performance of the averagemachines and engines of that date, at the beginning, and at the end ofthe war, and of civil machines of to-day. 

At the Military Competitions of 1912, of the eight types--Avro, B. E. , Bristol, Cody, Bleriot, Deperdussin, Hanriot, and M. Farman--the firstfour were British, though only the Avro had a British engine, and thelast four French, fitted with French engines. The average horse-powerwas about 83, the average maximum speed 67, and the minimum 50 miles perhour; the climb to 1, 000 feet was effected in 4-1/2 minutes with anaverage load of 640 lb. , which included pilot, fuel for four hours anduseful load. The loading per square foot was, for biplanes, about 4-1/2, and, for monoplanes, 6 lb. 

On the outbreak of war, and until the end of 1914, of the ten types inuse--Avro, B. E. , Bristol, Sopwith, Vickers, M. Farman, H. Farman, Caudron, Morane, and Voisin--five were British and five were French andall were fitted with French engines. The average horse-power was stillabout 83, but the average maximum speed had risen to 74, and the minimumhad fallen to 41 miles per hour. The load averaged 609 lb. 

A remarkable advance in machine and engine construction is shown byreferring to the tables for 1918. At the Armistice of the twelvetypes--Avro, Bristol Fighter, Sopwith Snipe, S. E. 5a, de Havilland 4 and9a, Vickers Vimy, Handley Page O/400 and V/1, 500, Fairey Seaplane 3c, F. 2 A. And F. 5--all were British and, except the de Havilland 9a, whichhad an American engine, were fitted with engines of British manufacture. The F. 2 A. , and F. 5, were twin-engined, while one, the Handley PageV/1, 500, was equipped with four engines. The average horse-power was perengine, 344, and per machine, 516; the average maximum speed 111, andthe minimum 53-1/2 miles per hour, the climb to 6, 500 feet was carriedout in 13 minutes and to 10, 000 feet in 24 minutes with an average load, including fuel for 5-1/2 hours, of 2, 742 lb. The average ceiling was15, 500 feet; the loading per square foot about 8 lb. 

The years following the Armistice have witnessed the conversion ofmilitary machines and the development of new designs for commercialpurposes. In 1921 there were thirteen types fitted with British engines:Avro, Bristol, de Havilland 4, 16 and 18, Vickers Vimy, Handley PageO/400 and W. 8, B. A. T. , Westland, Fairey, Supermarine and VickersAmphibians. No British machine had a foreign engine. The Vickers Vimy, Handley Page O/400 and W. 8, which had a passenger-carrying capacity of15, were twin-engined. The average horse-power was per engine, 387, andper machine, 474; the average maximum speed 114, and the minimum 49, miles per hour. With an average load of 2, 467 lb. , including fuel for4-1/2 hours, 19 minutes was required for a climb to 10, 000 feet. Theaverage loading per square foot was about 13 lb. , and the averageceiling 15, 793 feet. 

Before the war, in addition to the Royal Aircraft Factory, there wereonly eight firms engaged, on a very small scale, in the manufacture ofaircraft in England, and an aero engine industry hardly existed. Until1916, the greater proportion of our machines, and almost all ourengines, were French, and we were very dependent upon France for thereplacement of our heavy losses in material. By the end of the war thebulk of our material was of British design and construction, thoughthere was still a certain number of British built engines of Frenchdesign. One American engine--the Liberty--was also employed. The factthat in October, 1918, the Royal Air Force had 22, 171 machines and37, 702 engines on charge, and that during the ten months January toOctober the output of machines had been 26, 685 and of engines 29, 561, gives some idea of the enormous growth in production. 

In the first few months of the war it was not possible to progress farwith new inventions or improvements. Fortunately, our Aircraft Factoryhad evolved in the B. E. A machine of considerable stability which inthis respect compared favourably with German machines, and was welladapted to its work of reconnaissance. 

Technical progress during the war often unfortunately involved the lossof valuable lives, as for instance those of Professor Hopkinson andBusk, to both of whom heavy debts of gratitude are owed, but graduallyobstacle after obstacle, problem after problem, was successfully tackledby our designers and constructors. With a view to enlarging the field ofobservation, staggered planes were introduced in the B. E. 2c. Thismachine also proved that it was possible to calculate the degree ofstability and thus paved the way for the design of aeroplanes withindifference to stability and increased man[oe]uvrability for fightingpurposes, or with great inherent stability for bombing. During 1915 theB. E. 2c was used for all purposes, but the extra loading involved by theincreasing use of aeroplanes for bombing and fighting caused a decreasein the rate of speed and climb, and our aeroplanes were temporarilyinferior in fighting power to the Fokker. 

The necessity of preventing the enemy obtaining information soon led tothe development of air fighting. At the beginning of the war the solearmament of aeroplanes was the rifle or revolver. The machine gun soonfollowed, but its use in tractor machines was impracticable on accountof the danger of hitting the airscrew. The first "fighters" weretherefore two-seater pushers, such as the "Short-horn" Maurice Farmanswhich, though not designed for fighting, and too slow to chase enemyaircraft, were the first to be fitted with Lewis guns, and F. E. 's, thefirst machine designed specifically for fighting, with the machine-gunoperator in front of the pilot. These "pusher" fighters had an excellentfield of view and fire forwards, but suffered from lack of speed and alarge "blind" area to the rear. On the other hand, the single-seatertractors were potentially the superior fighters, and in order to protectthe blades of the airscrew the French were the first to use deflectorblades on them in tractor machines. 

Our early single-seater tractors were fitted with a Lewis gun fixed soas to fire over or at the side of the airscrew and actuated by a bowdenwire, the most efficient, though not the most numerous, fightingmachines at the end of 1915 being the Bristol Scouts. 

By the Summer of 1916, however, we had adapted the "synchronizing gear"to our machine guns, enabling them to be fired through the propeller;while aircraft engines developed much greater power and full allowancewas made for all equipment carried. From that time the development ofour single-seater fighters was steadily progressive. One of the first ofthese was the Sopwith "Pup, " which had a speed of 106-1/2 miles an hourat 6, 500 feet, climbed 10, 000 feet in just over 14 minutes, and couldattain a ceiling of 17, 500 feet. In 1917 appeared the Sopwith "Camel, " atypical example of this type, which was simple, stable, easilycontrollable and possessed two guns. It had a speed of 121 miles an hourat 10, 000 feet, to which height it could climb in under 10-1/2 minutes, and a ceiling of 23, 000 feet. The Martinsyde F. 4, embodying furtherimprovements, was not ready in time for active service. 

While the single-seater tractor was developing for purely offensiveaction, the two-seater fighter, of which the field of view, man[oe]uvrability and general performance were being improved, retainedits utility as a reconnaissance machine. In 1916 the "pusher" type wassuperseded by the Sopwith "1-1/2 Strutter" armed with a synchronizedVickers gun, which for its 130 horse-power was never surpassed. Thepilot was close to the engine and had a good view of the ground, whilethe gunner was placed behind him with a rotary Lewis gun turret. Earlyin 1917 these qualities were further developed in the Bristol Fighter. 

With the advent of these improved types the B. E. 2c was relegated to thework of artillery co-operation, until superseded by the B. E. 2e. Towardsthe end of 1916 appeared the R. E. 8 with a Vickers synchronized gun anda Lewis gun, which after many vicissitudes became the standard machinefor artillery work. 

Systematic bombing was practised by nearly all types of machines, butreal accuracy was never obtained. Thus, the B. E. 2c was first used informations, but with a full load of bombs it could not carry anobserver, and its moderate speed left it an easy prey to hostilefighters. Early in 1916 appeared the Martinsyde single-seater bomberwith an endurance of 4-1/2 hours, and in 1917 the D. H. 4 which was muchused for day-bombing. The F. E. 2b pusher, discarded as a fightingmachine, became the principal night-bomber. 

It was comparatively late in the war before special bombing machineswere evolved. They were then divided into day-bombers and night-bombers, the D. H. 9 and 9a machines being typical of the former and the HandleyPage of 1917--a large twin-engine aeroplane, the first really effectivenight-bomber, of considerable carrying power but low performance--of thelatter. By November 8th, 1918, two super-Handley Pages were ready tostart to Berlin. They possessed a maximum range of 1, 100 miles, a crewof seven, four 350 horse-power Rolls-Royce engines, arranged in pairs, atractor and a pusher in tandem on either side of the machine, and, asthey would be compelled to fly both by night and day, a gun defencesystem. The D. H. 10a and the Vickers Vimy, for day and night bombingrespectively, were also being produced at the date of the Armistice. 

In the early days of the war an aeroplane had little to fear above4, 000 feet. With the improvement of the anti-aircraft gun there was, bythe end of the war, no immunity at 20, 000 feet. Very low flying forattack was, however, being rapidly developed, and would have proved ofgreat effect in 1919. The aeroplane used for this purpose was thesingle-seater fighter, and the Sopwith "Salamander, " with two guns, aspeed of 125 miles an hour, and 650 lb. Of armoured plates, was about tomake its appearance at the Armistice. 

I have previously mentioned how dependent the improvement of design andperformance of aircraft has been upon the less simple and tardierdevelopment of the engine. The invention of the light motor madeaviation possible, and development has synchronized with the evolutionof lighter, more powerful and more reliable engines. One of the mostdifficult problems still confronting us is the production of a cheap, high-powered and reliable engine, but the existence at the end of thewar of machines weighing 15 tons indicates the progress achieved, whileBritish engines of 600 horse-power are now in use, and one of 1, 000horse-power will shortly be available. 

TACTICS AND THE STRATEGIC AIR OFFENSIVE. 

During the war there were three concurrent movements in process: theratios of the various forms of air tactics were constantly changing, andthe components of our air forces varied in accordance with thedevelopment of reconnaissance, artillery co-operation, bombing andfighting. Secondly, their total strength was increasing rapidly; and, thirdly, it was increasing relatively faster than the Army or Navy. 

It was an evident and logical development and in accord with theshortage of national man power and the consequent tendency to areduction in the strength of the Army, that, the necessary uses ofaircraft with the Army and Navy being ensured, any available margin ofair power should be employed on an independent basis for definitestrategic purposes. The difficulty was to arrive at an agreement as tothe minimum tactical and grand tactical requirements of the Army andNavy. The British Army was not alone in asserting that there was nominimum and that it wanted every available airman, and agreed with theFrench that anything which it could temporarily spare should be lent tothe French Army. It was argued that the Armies could as easily andbetter arrange for strategic bombing. Fortunately in 1918, when I wasChief of the Air Staff, we managed to secure a margin and formed theIndependent Air Force in June of that year. It was, of course, understood that, in the event of either the British or French Armiesbeing hard put to it, the Independent Air Force could temporarily cometo their direct assistance and act in close co-operation with them. 

In 1915 in accordance with the old doctrine that offence is the bestdefence, the surest method of protecting specialized machines on thebattle front was found to be in the attack of enemy aircraft by fightingmachines. In 1918 it was decided that raids on the centres of German warindustry would not only cripple the enemy's output of materialessential to victory, but also relieve the pressure on the WesternFront, the vital point of the war. The Germans had had the sameintention in the many raids which started over Dover on December 21st, 1914. 

Long-range bombing had, however, been carried out spasmodically before1918. In addition to its taste for bombing in general, the Royal NavalAir Service were keenly bent from the outset on long-range bombing inparticular. The question of forming an Allied squadron to bomb Germanmunition factories was first raised in 1915 at one of the monthlymeetings between the French and British Aviation departments; and inFebruary, 1916, a small squadron of Sopwith "1-1/2 Strutters" was formedat Detling for the purpose of bombing Essen and Dusseldorf from England, but the Army in France, being short of machines, asked that they shouldbe sent to the front, and therefore the scheme did not mature; neither, for similar reasons, did one for the co-operation in 1916 of British andFrench bombing squadrons, operating from Luxeuil. 

It was not until October, 1917, that the first striking force, consisting of three squadrons, was formed under the Army with Ochey asits base. It was mainly used in raids against the ironworks in theAlsace-Lorraine Basin and the chemical industry in the neighbourhood ofMannheim. As I have said, a definite offensive policy by means of anindependent strategic force was later decided upon, and the"Independent" Air Force was brought into existence. It originallycomprised two day-bomber and two night-bomber squadrons. During thesummer additional squadrons were allotted to it, including D. H. 9's andHandley Pages. Day-bombing squadrons had to fight their way toobjectives in close formation, and the problems connected withnavigation, calculation of petrol supply, action of wind and ceiling, were all accentuated. Casualties were heavy, with the result that asquadron of Fighters, composed of Sopwith "Camels, " was incorporated forthe purpose of protection. Thus we see the beginnings of an air fleetanalogous to the naval fleet with its capital ships and protectivecraft. 

The main objectives were the centre of the chemical industry at Mannheimand Frankfort; the iron and steel works at Briey and Longwy and the SaarBasin; the machine shops in the Westphalian district and the magnetoworks at Stuttgart; the submarine bases at Wilhelmshaven, Bremerhaven, Cuxhaven, and Hamburg, and the accumulator factories at Hagen andBerlin. 

It will be seen from a map that three of the main industrial centreswere situated near the west frontier of Germany; and, therefore, oneportion of the striking force was based at Ochey, which lies within afew miles of the Saar Basin, within 180 miles of Essen, and within 150miles of Frankfurt. Another portion was based on Norfolk, where a groupof super-Handley Page machines were established for the specific purposeof attacking Berlin, a distance of 540 miles, and the naval bases within400 miles. It was obvious that though aircraft from England would haveto cover greater distances, they would not expose themselves to thestrong hostile defences in rear of the battle front. 

Three instances of the Independent Air Force's action may be cited. Onthe night of August 21st/22nd, two Handley Page machines dropped overone ton of bombs on Cologne Station, the raid occupying seven hours. Onthe night of August 25th/26th two Handley Pages attacked the BadischeAniline und Soda Fabrik of Mannheim; bombs were dropped from a height of200 feet, direct hits being obtained in every case; and the machinesthen remained over the town, which they swept with machine-gun fire. OnAugust 12th the first attack was made on Frankfurt by twelve D. H. 4day-bombers, every machine reaching the objective and returning safelyin spite of being attacked, over Mannheim and throughout the returnjourney, by some forty hostile fighters. 

During the five months of its existence the Independent Air Forcedropped 550 tons of bombs, 160 by day and 390 by night. Of these 200tons were dropped on aerodromes, largely by the short-distance F. E. 2b's, as a result of which, hostile attacks on Allied aerodromes becamepractically negligible. Theoretically, machines of the Independent AirForce should not have been utilized for attacking purely militaryobjectives in the Army zone, such as aerodromes, and their co-operationwith the Army for this purpose shows that their true rôle was either notappreciated or not favoured by the French and other Commands. 

There is ample testimony to the spirit of demoralization which pervadedthe civil population of the towns attacked. 

 "My eyes won't keep open whilst I am writing, " reads one captured letter. "In the night twice into the cellar and then again this morning. One feels as if one were no longer a human being. One air raid after another. In my opinion this is no longer war but murder. Finally, in time, one becomes horribly cold, and one is daily, nay, hourly, prepared for the worst. " "Yesterday afternoon, " says another, "it rained so much and was so cloudy that no one thought it was possible for them to come. It is horrible; one has no rest day or night. "

Although, for reasons into which it is not necessary to enter here, onlya comparatively small percentage of the efforts of the Independent Forcewere directed against the industrial targets for which the force hadbeen created, yet by the end of the war the strategic conception of airpower was bearing fruit, and the Air Ministry had in hand measures forbombing which would have gone far to shatter German munitionment. Thedefence measures forced upon the Germans within their own country werereacting on their offensive action at the front, which was at the sametime denuded of fighting aircraft at various points to meet the menaceof our strategic force at Ochey. 

ORGANIZATION. 

As in peace on a small, so in war on a large scale, the history of theorganization of aircraft, while we were fighting for our nationalexistence and competing with similar enemy expansion, is one ofcontinuous development, of decentralization of command and co-ordinationof duties. Headquarters, the Squadron and the Aircraft Park, asoriginally conceived in peace, though subject to variations in size, remained the basis of our organization. For instance, the originaleighteen machines of our squadron were increased to twenty-four forsingle-seater fighters and reduced to six in the case of thesuper-Handley Page bombers. The four squadrons originally operateddirectly under Headquarters, were soon allocated to Corps for tacticalreconnaissance and artillery co-operation, while a unit remained atHeadquarters for strategical and long-distance reconnaissance and a fewspecial duties. The next step was in November, 1914, when two Wings, composed originally of two, and later, of five squadrons each, wereformed, R. F. C. Headquarters retaining one squadron and the wirelessflight for G. H. Q. Requirements. The Wing Headquarters co-ordinated thework of the squadrons which were allocated to Army Corps. 

A further development, in 1916, was the formation for each of the threeArmies of a Brigade, consisting of two Wings and an Aircraft Park. One--the Corps Wing--carried out artillery co-operation and closereconnaissance (including photography) with Army Corps, the other--theArmy Wing--carried out more distant reconnaissance and fighting patrolsunder Army Headquarters. Our air superiority at the Battle of the Sommein 1916 led us to expect German counter-measures in 1917, and ourprogramme for the following winter contemplated a proportion of twofighting squadrons to each Corps Squadron. By 1917 there were fiveBritish Armies in France and Belgium and our air forces were increasedto provide a Brigade for each of the two new Armies. The Headquartersof the flying force in the field (except in the case of the IndependentAir Force, which was responsible to the Supreme War Council and the AirMinistry in London) remained attached to G. H. Q. Throughout the war. 

The main difficulty in the higher organization was the lack ofco-operation between the Royal Flying Corps and the Royal Naval AirService and their competition for the supply of men and machines--thedemands of both being urgent and insatiable. As a first step to overcomethis, an Air Board was formed in May, 1916, to discuss general airpolicy, especially the combined operation of the Naval and Military AirServices, to make recommendations on the types of machines required byeach, and to co-ordinate the supply of material. The Air Board was animprovement, but not a remedy, and, therefore, in 1917 it was decided toform an Air Ministry responsible for war aviation in all its branchesand to amalgamate the Naval and Military Air Services as the Royal AirForce. This was carried into effect early in 1918, with Lord Rothermereas Secretary of State for Air with a seat in the Cabinet, and the airbecame the third service of the Crown, with an independent Governmentdepartment permeated with a knowledge of air navigation, machinery, andweather, and closely allied to the industrial world for the initiation, guidance, and active supervision of research and experimental work. 

I will mention later some of the many arguments for and against theretention of an independent Air Ministry and autonomous Air Force inpeace. The amalgamation was certainly advantageous in war. It effectedthe correlation of a number of hitherto independent services accordingto a uniform policy and prevented overlapping by centralizingadministration. Under single control it was possible to carry out, on acarefully co-ordinated plan, recruiting and training, to supply men andmaterial, to organize air power according to the strategic situation ineach of the various theatres of war, and to form the correct ratiobetween the air forces in the field and the reserves in training athome. The difficulty was that the amalgamation had to be carried outduring the most intensive period of air effort, but by the end of thewar most of these objects had been attained without jeopardizing theclose co-operation with the Army and Navy. Co-operation with the Navaland General Staffs and with naval and military formations was, in fact, improved, independent action was beginning to bear fruit, and wepossessed an Air Force without rival. 

CHAPTER III

PEACE

THE FUTURE OF AERIAL DEFENCE. 

In the evolution of aviation during the war the conclusion has beenreached that the most remarkable lines of development at the Armisticewere in the direction of ground and night fighting, torpedo attack andlong-range bombing, exemplifying respectively the three spheres of airoperations--military co-operation, naval co-operation, and the strategicuse of aircraft. It must be remembered that this progress in tactics andstrategy, in the machine, and the airman's skill, was made in the shortperiod of four years, and that every war has started with a greatadvance in scientific knowledge, accumulated during peace, over thatobtaining at the close of the previous war. We may therefore assume, provided the danger is averted of a retrograde movement from recentscientific methods to pre-war conditions--sabres, bayonets, andguns--that by the outbreak of another war on a large scale, which wehope may never occur, the knowledge of Service aeronautics will haveincreased immeasurably since 1918, and may be, not a contributory, but adecisive factor in securing victory. 

The period since the Armistice has been employed in the reduction andconsolidation of the Royal Air Force. In England the cadre system hasbeen adopted, while abroad the greatest concentration of effort is aimedat, with Egypt, at present the most important strategic point in theImperial air system, as the centre of activity. Iraq is being handedover to the control of the Royal Air Force, whose share in the policingof overseas possessions is likely usefully to grow provided any tendencyto the concurrent building up of a large ground organization iswithstood. The advantages of aircraft for "garrison" duties lie, undersuitable geographical conditions, in their swift action and wide range, their economy, and, during disturbances their capacity for constantpressure against the enemy without fear of retaliation. One of the mainproblems is at present that of personnel. Service flying is restrictedto comparatively young men, and therefore the majority of officers canonly be commissioned for short periods. For this reason the experimentis being made of taking officers direct from civil life on shortengagements, and at the same time endeavouring to ensure, by technicaland general education, that the Royal Air Force shall not become ablind-alley occupation. 

Though it is difficult to foretell on what lines aircraft will developfor any one purpose, as in the past, the problem of militaryco-operation will perhaps be less complex than that of co-operation withthe Navy. It will probably consist of improvements along the linesalready indicated, such as increased range, speed, climb, man[oe]uvrability, offensive armament, armour, the assistance of tankand anti-tank action, and the utilization of gas. Fighting willundoubtedly take place at very high altitudes to keep the enemy'sfighting machines away from the zone of operations--necessitating thedevelopment of the single-seater so as to increase climb andman[oe]uvrability, and obtain, if possible, a speed of 200 miles an hourat 30, 000 feet. Cavalry, unless retained, as I think they should be, inthe form of mounted machine-gunners, will, I think, disappear inEuropean warfare, but infantry will remain, and it will be the object ofaircraft to assist their advance by reconnaissance, ground attack, artillery and tank co-operation, and the destruction of the enemy'ssupplies and communications. In this connection ground tactics and airtactics must develop _pari passu_ and commanders of Corps and Armiesmust work out during peace training the fullest schemes for the mostintimate co-operation between air and land forces. 

The future of naval co-operation is a difficult problem, more especiallyas there was no major naval engagement after Jutland in which aircraftcould be used, and consequently we have little to go on in estimatingtheir practical value in direct co-operation with the fleet. It isimpossible at present to judge between the conflicting opinions as tothe future of the capital ship, but it is certain that aviation willmaterially modify naval tactics and construction. Coast defence, reconnaissance, anti-submarine work, escort, and the bombing of enemybases, will doubtless continue and develop with ever-increasingmachinery and equipment; but torpedo attack by aircraft may reach apoint where the very existence of opposing fleets may be endangered. Itis already questionable whether a battleship could survive an attacklaunched by even a small force of this mobile arm. 

As was the case during the war, the action of aircraft at sea isrestricted by range, the difficulty being to find the mean between theopposing conditions of radius of flight and limitation in the size ofaircraft imposed by the deck-space of "carriers, " but there is reason tosuppose that on the one hand engines will be so improved as to afford asufficient radius of action to comparatively small aircraft, while, onthe other, devices will be found to economize deck-space. 

Fleets operating near the enemy's coast will be vulnerable from landaircraft bases, and thus close blockade will be rendered increasinglydifficult. The possibility of gas attack on enemy bases from the air inco-operation with submarines and of effecting a blockade by this meansmust be envisaged. 

Since the Armistice the operational work of the Royal Air Force onbehalf of the Navy has been conducted under the auspices of theAdmiralty. Improvements have been made in large flying boats andamphibians, especially with a view to facilitating their landing on"carriers" and the decks of battleships. There has also beenconsiderable progress in the construction and use of torpedo aircraft. 

The war lasted long enough to prove the effect of the strategicoffensive by air. In spite of the dictates of humanity, it cannot beeliminated. It is true that modern war is inimical to the progress ofmankind and brings only less suffering to the victors than to thevanquished. To ensure peace should therefore be our ideal. But a greatwar once joined is to-day a war of peoples. Not only armies in thefield, but men, women, and even children at home, are concentrated onthe single purpose of defeating the enemy, and armies, navies, and airforces are dependent upon the application to work, the output of warsupplies, and, above all, the morale of the civil population. Just asgas was used notwithstanding the Hague Convention, so air war, in spiteof any and every international agreement to the contrary, will becarried into the enemy's country, his industries will be destroyed, hisnerve centres shattered, his food supply disorganized, and the willpower of the nation as a whole shaken. Formidable as is the prospect ofthis type of air warfare, it will become still more terrible with theadvent of new scientific methods of life-destruction, such as chemicaland bacterial attack on great industrial and political centres. Variousproposals, such as the control of the air effort, service and civil, ofall countries by the League of Nations, and even the completeelimination of aviation, have been put forward as a means of avoidingthe horrors of aerial warfare and its appurtenances, but they areuntenable, and any power wishing and able to sweep them aside willundoubtedly do so. 

A future war, as I see it, will begin something after this manner, provided either side possesses large air forces. Huge day and nightbombers will assemble at the declaration of war to penetrate into theenemy's country for the attack of his centres of population, hismobilization zones, his arsenals, harbours, strategic railways, shippingand rolling stock. Corps and Army squadrons will concentrate information to accompany the armies to the front; reconnaissance andfighting patrols will scatter in all directions from coastal air basesto discover the enemy's concentrations and cover our own; the fleet, whatever its nature, will emerge with its complement of reconnaissanceand protective machines and torpedo aircraft for direct action againstthe enemy's fleet. A few fighting defence units will remain behind. 

But it must not be imagined that these functions will be carried outunopposed. Local battles in the air will occur between fighting machinesfor the protection of specialized machines, while the main air forces inlarge formations will concentrate independently to produce, if possible, a shattering blow on the enemy and obtain from the outset a supremacy inthe air comparable to our supremacy on the sea in the last war. 

In mobilization the time factor is all-important. Our national historyhas been one of extraordinary good fortune in this respect, but themargin allowable for luck is becoming very narrow and, whereas in 1914it was some twenty days between the declaration of war and the exchangeof the first shots, in the next war the air battle may be joined withinas many hours, and an air attack launched almost simultaneously with thedeclaration of war. In modern war the mobilization period tends toshorten, and every effort will be made towards its further reduction, since mobilizing armies are particularly vulnerable from air attack. 

CIVIL AVIATION AS A FACTOR IN NATIONAL SECURITY. 

The picture I have drawn may appear highly coloured for the reason thatno country is likely for some time to possess sufficiently large airforces to obtain a decisive victory, or at any rate an uncontestedsuperiority, at the outbreak of war. Though in air, as in every otherform of warfare, attack is more effective than defence, we cannot affordto keep our air forces up to war strength in peace any more than ourArmy or Navy. 

The problem, from a military point of view, is therefore to ensure anadequate reserve and to maintain our capacity for expansion to meetemergencies. The number of units maintained at war establishment shouldbe the absolute minimum for safety and of the type immediately requiredon mobilization, i. E. Long-range bombing and naval reconnaissancesquadrons. The remainder should be in cadre form. We can, of course, maintain a fixed number of machines and pilots in reserve for every oneon the active list, but, although some such system is necessary, on alarge scale it is open to many and serious objections. First of all, even on a cadre basis, it means keeping inactive at considerable cost anumber of machines which may never be used and which, however carefullystored, quickly deteriorate. Knowledge of aeronautics is still slenderand improvements are made so continuously that machines may becomeobsolete within a few months. Moreover, the growth of service aviationin peace must tend to become artificial and conventional rather thannatural, and this will react on design and construction, which will becramped, both technically and financially, within the limits imposed byservice requirements. 

It is obvious therefore that the capacity of the construction industryto expand cannot be fostered by service aviation alone; furthermore, inthe event of another war of attrition, expansion will be more essentialthan any amount of machine reserve power immediately available, and inthe event of a war of short duration that power will win which has thegreatest preponderance of machines, service or civil, fit to take theair. The asphyxiation of a large enemy city, if within range, can bedone by night-flying commercial machines, and it would require adefending force of great numerical superiority for its successfuldefence. 

Whether, therefore, from this point of view, or others, which I willmention later, another solution must be found, and this lies in thedevelopment of civil aviation. An analogy in the Navy and the MercantileMarine has long been apparent. "Sea power, " says Mahan, "is based upon aflourishing industry. " Substitute "air" for "sea" and the analogy isstill true. The Navy owed its origin to our mercantile enterprise andto-day it depends upon the Mercantile Marine for its reserve power ofmen and material. In the same way must air power be built up oncommercial air supremacy. If we accept Mahan, or the dictum of any othergreat naval or military historian or strategist, a service air force byitself is not air power, and after a brief if brilliant flash mustwither if reserves are not immediately at hand. A large commercial airfleet will provide, not only a reserve of men and machines, but it willkeep in existence an aircraft industry, with its designing andconstructional staffs, capable of quick and wide expansion in emergency;and such an industry will not be employed on the design of contrivancesfor use in a possible war, but on meeting the practical requirements ofeveryday air transport and navigation. 

Thus a natural, practical and healthy, as opposed to a stereotyped andartificial, growth will be ensured. Our naval supremacy is largelyattributable to the interest which the people as a whole havetraditionally taken in naval policy; in other words, to the fact that weare a seafaring nation. Similarly air supremacy can only be secured ifthe air-sense of the man in the street is fostered, and aviation is notconfined to military operations, but becomes a part of everyday life. Atthe present time commercial aviation is far too small to play the partof reservoir to the Royal Air Force--an object which must constitute oneof the principal claims for support of the nucleus already in existence. 

CIVIL AVIATION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF IMPERIAL PROGRESS. 

Civil aviation, however, has not only an indirect military, but, withits superiority in speed over other means of transport, a directcommercial utility. The nation which first substitutes aircraft forother means of transport will be more than half-way towards thesupremacy of the air. Moreover, as the Roman Empire was built upon itsroads and as the foundations of the British Empire have hitherto restedupon its shipping, as steam, the cable and wireless have each in turnbeen harnessed to the work of speeding up communications, so to-day, with the opening of a new era of Imperial co-operation and consultation, this new means of transport by air, with a speed hitherto undreamed of, must be utilized for communication and commerce between the variousportions of the Empire. 

A comparison of the French and British attitudes towards civil aviationclearly demonstrates the two policies I have mentioned. Both France andEngland grant subsidies--France the very much larger sum--but the greatdifference lies in the objects aimed at. French policy is fosteringcivil aviation as a part of its military policy and, a portion of thesubsidy being given to machines fulfilling service requirements, thereis a strong tendency for French civil aviation to be military air powercamouflaged. British policy, on the other hand, should aim at fosteringcivil aviation primarily as a commercial concern and believes that aircommerce is the basis of air power as a whole. We are prepared to facethe tendency of military and civil machines to diverge if thatdivergence is essential to the commercial machine. 

An alternative to the British policy of maintaining a small air forceand fostering commercial aviation as a reserve is the Canadian plan ofa small air force training school and a civil Government flying servicewith such objects as forest patrol, survey and coastguard duties, thework being carried out on repayment for Government departments, provincial governments and private corporations. The former method, allowing of independent commercial expansion, is better suited toBritish mentality and requirements, but its success will depend on agenuine endeavour to make commercial aviation the real and vital basisof our air power. Experience in commercial operation cannot be gained bythe exploitation of air routes or the carriage of mails or passengersunder Service auspices. It is only by running transport services, as faras possible under private management, that operational data can beobtained, economies effected, and the design of strictly commercialmachines improved. 

To sum up. Military air supremacy can best be assured by the intensivedevelopment of industrial air organization for commercial purposes. Theconception of civil aviation as the mainstay of air power as a whole isright. Service aviation is bound by technical and financial limits; itsscope confined to the requirements of war. Civil aviation, on the otherhand, opens out a prospect of productive expansion. The steady growth ofthe Continental services is already beginning to demonstrate theimportance of air transport. 

FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. 

The commercial exploitation of air transport is passing through a periodof experiment, and suffering in the general war reaction from theincapacity of the public to think of aviation except as a fightingservice. The machines hitherto used on the lines to and on the Continentare principally converted war machines, and to transform military intocommercial craft and to use them as such is of small assistance to civilaviation, which requires reliable, economic machines as one of the basicconditions of its financial success. The cost of running an airtransport service is considerable. Depreciation is one heavy item ofexpenditure. New machines must be evolved suitable to the requirementsof mail, passenger and freight transport, but, in the present state offinancial stringency, capital is not forthcoming for experiment unlessthere is every promise of a safe return. Then there are the expensesinvolved in general ground organization, maintenance, fuel, insurance, etc. The question is how can we carry on until the really economic typeof commercial machine is evolved. It will never be evolved unless thereis continuous flying and a continuous demand for new and improvedmachines for commercial work. To meet this in France, the Governmentcame forward with a liberal grant of subsidies which have now beenincreased and placed on a more favourable basis, permitting of a veryconsiderable reduction in the fares for transport by air. The BritishGovernment has also granted a subsidy for British firms operating on thecross-Channel routes, which it is hoped will place them before long on asound, self-supporting, commercial basis. Part of this subsidy isallocated to assist transport companies in obtaining the latest type ofcommercial machines on a hire purchase system. With a few servicesproperly supported by the State we shall pull through the experimentalperiod of civil aviation. 

The services to the Continent, although the distance is on the shortside for the merits of air transport to be properly demonstrated, effecta considerable saving in time, and it is certain that the amount ofmail, especially parcels, carried on these routes will continue toincrease and lead to the eventual adoption of normal rates for airpostage. An extension of the use of aircraft as the regular means ofcarrying mails will be of great assistance in the development of airtransport. Aircraft revolutionize the speed of intercommunication byletter, and banks and financial houses will gradually realize that largesavings can be made by utilizing air mails for the transaction ofbusiness. A difficulty lies in the fact that the area of the BritishIsles is not very favourable for an extensive air mail service, whichcan only operate by day, since by the existing means of transport mailsare carried during the out-of-business hours and can generally reachtheir destination in a night, while the distances to Paris and Brusselsare too short to afford outstanding advantage. 

Lastly, we require public support and a spirit of confidence in the air. This can only be secured by increased reliability, reduction of chargesand keeping the public informed of the progress made. It is the natureof man to distrust new departures. He disliked the introduction ofmechanical devices into the Lancashire weaving mills. He scoffed at thesteamship and railway. To-day he is inclined to treat as premature theserious exploitation of the air. In spite of the great decrease ofaccidents, in spite of the increased comfort of air travel, in spite ofincreased regularity, the average person is slow to realize that thecommunication of the busy man of the future will be by air. The majorityof the business world is too conservative to make general use of theopportunities offered by aircraft for the quick transmission of itscorrespondence, while, though speed must be paid for, the high fareshitherto charged have deterred the general public from substituting theaeroplane for the train or boat. The running costs represented by thesefares are being materially reduced as a more economic machine isevolved, and the reduction of fares which helps to place competitionwith foreign subsidized services and with the older forms of transporton more equal terms must for a time depend upon the assistance ofGovernment grants. 

WEATHER CONDITIONS AND NIGHT FLYING. 

The safety of the machine and the reliability of an air service largelydepend on accurate weather forecasts. In order to co-ordinate themeteorological work of the country as a whole, and for the specialassistance of aviation, the Meteorological Services of Great Britainhave been amalgamated under the Department of Civil Aviation, and, working in close co-operation with the Communications Branch of theDepartment, have made improvements in the rapid collection anddistribution of meteorological information for all purposes. Inaddition to the forecasts issued four times daily, collective reportsare issued hourly by wireless from the London terminal aerodrome atCroydon and copies are distributed to transport companies and othersconcerned. 

A feature of meteorology which is often overlooked is its economicvalue. By making use of a knowledge of the wind at different heights, aircraft can complete journeys more quickly than would otherwise bepossible, and thereby save their own fuel and their passengers' time. This will be specially useful in the tropics where the regularity of thesurface winds has its counterpart in the upper air, but even in Europetime-tables can be drawn up with due attention to the favourable andunfavourable effect of prevailing winds. The planning of airship routesin particular, must be considered in close connection with this aspectof weather conditions. 

To-day, however, the aeroplane may be considered as an "all-weather"craft, save for mist and fog--the enemies of all transport andparticularly to that of the air--to which unfortunately England isparticularly liable during the winter. Experiments have been carried outon the dispersal of fog, the illumination of aerodromes by fog-piercinglights, and instruments to record the exact position of the aeroplaneand its height above the ground, but success has not yet been achieved. 

Similar to the problems of flying and landing in mist and fog is that ofnight flying. Until night flying is practicable, only half the value ofthe aeroplane's speed is obtainable, since other transport services runcontinuously day and night. Further, as machines become rapidly obsoleteowing to technical progress, it is essential that they should be in usefor the greatest number of hours during their life. Much has been donein the lighting and marking of aerodromes and in the equipment ofaeroplanes with wireless telephone and direction-finding apparatus. 

It may here be mentioned that there are two methods of obtaining theposition of aircraft by means of wireless telegraphy, known asdirection-finding and position-finding. Direction-finding is effected bymeans of two coils set at right angles in the aircraft, by means ofwhich the bearing of a transmitting ground station with reference to theaircraft's compass can be taken. When two or more bearings on differentground stations, whose position is known, have been obtained, a "cut" or"fix" of the aircraft is obtained. The position-finding system consistsof two or more ground stations fitted with apparatus capable of takingbearings with respect to true north and connected by direct telephoneline. The aircraft calls up by wireless one of these stations, requestsher position and then makes a series of signals for about half a minute. The stations take the aircraft's bearings, plot its position, andtransmit the information to the aircraft. Wireless direction andposition-finding, as well as wireless telephony, have on severaloccasions proved their value to navigation, but in spite of instances ofsuccessful night flying, developments have not been such as to rendernight services practicable. 

Marine experience has been a valuable guide, but aerial illuminationhas entailed many new problems of its own--the distribution of lightthrough very wide angles, the installation of light and powerful lampsin aircraft, the elimination of shadows and the prevention of dazzle, the provision of apparatus to indicate the strength and direction of thewind, and the like. 

Very shortly the first organized and equipped night-flying route will beavailable; that between London and Lympne on the Continental airhighway. The Boulogne-Paris section will probably be ready a littlelater. There will be four lighthouses on the English section, of whichtwo will be automatic, requiring no attention for twelve months at atime. These, and many other, facilities will much assist the progressiveestablishment of services during the hours of darkness, and will providevaluable data for the establishment of other night-flying routes. Thereis no real difficulty given a reasonably clear atmosphere. 

ORGANIZATION. 

I have mentioned the broad lines on which the organization of the airservices was built up before and during the war. We have seen that theinitial foundations and framework remained and bore the great systematicstructural development which was gradually required. In August, 1914, there were some 240 officers, 1800 men and 200 machines; in November, 1918, 30, 000 officers, 170, 000 men, and 22, 000 machines, all of thembetter and of a higher performance than those of 1914. Our casualtiesduring the war were about 18, 000; air formations had been active insome fifteen theatres of operations; 8, 000 enemy machines and 300observation balloons had been destroyed; some three-quarters of amillion photographs taken over hostile country, and 12, 000, 000 roundshad been fired from the air at ground targets. At Home two organizationshad expanded independently from the same seed until, impeding oneanother's growth, their trunks had joined and a single and improved treewas the result. 

This is the only country where a unified air service has been adopted. In war the arrangement was successful. Against its continuance in peacethe Army and Navy urge that, with the best of wills, there is a greatdifference between having an integral branch of a service to work withother services and having to deal with an independent organization, andargue increased cost, duplication, competition and disjointed action. There is no doubt that the liaison of the General, Naval and Air Staffsmust be closened, and if co-operation with the senior services wasreally becoming less satisfactory, a return to the old system should beconsidered amongst other alternatives, but I do not think that it shouldbe so. It must also be remembered that, although air co-operation isvital to naval and military operations, it is fortunately unlikely thatthere will be another war for a long time and, meanwhile, the growingessential, independent strategic action would be irretrievably impairedby the reabsorption of the Air into the Army and Navy. 

On the other hand, even apart from supply, such a reversion would alsocause much duplication, e. G. Training. The solution and the correct andlogical outcome of the unification of the Air service is the closegrouping of the three arms in a Ministry of Defence, and this, even inface of the obvious practical difficulties, should be adopted andco-ordination thus increased step by step. Apart from Supply, some ofthe services in which this could be effected are the medical, education, chaplains, mobilization stores, transport, works and buildings, accounting, communications, ordnance and national factories. A modifiedscheme might also be studied in which, under a Ministry of Defence, theArmy and Navy each had tactical air units of seconded personnel forartillery co-operation, spotting and reconnaissance, and the AirMinistry dealt with supply, research, initial training and reserves, civil aviation and an independent air force. 

One of many good examples of the necessity of co-ordination is affordedby the position of the aircraft supply services at the beginning of thewar and their development. We have already seen that there were someeight private firms manufacturing aircraft in a small way and there waspractically speaking no engine industry at all. For the Royal FlyingCorps, the War Office had relied largely on the Royal Aircraft Factory, and, although the methods of control adopted had many advantages, therewas in them a tendency to retard private enterprise and development. TheAdmiralty, on the other hand, had assisted by dealing almost entirelywith firms for Royal Naval Air Service supply. The conditions in Francefortunately were very much better than those in this country, and forthe first year or two French factories helped us out with both machinesand engines. By the end of the war we had the largest and most efficientaircraft industry in the world. There were no less than seventy-sixgreat factories turning out vast numbers of complete aeroplanes, inaddition to thirty-three manufacturing complete engines and over 3, 000turning out spares and equipment. Such expansion is not possible withina few weeks, it took a long time to arrive at this position, and itcauses one very seriously to think what would have happened had Francenot been our ally, and points the moral which has been mentioned of thenecessity for a thriving aircraft and engine industry in peace. Duringthe war Germany also had a very large number of firms engaged on thiswork. 

THE MACHINE AND ENGINE. 

The general differences between service and civil requirements inaircraft fall under the headings of ceiling, load and speed. For servicepurposes very much higher ceiling and greater climb and speed arerequired and the design is much affected by the condensed nature of theload. For peace purposes, besides the primary advantage of speed whichthe air has over other forms of transport, regularity must be ensuredand the correct ratio between speed, duration and load-carrying powerdetermined. Great ceiling, man[oe]uvrability and climb are not required. 

However great the speed and load, there is no value in air transport, whether for passengers or mails or goods, unless it is safe and alsocompares favourably from an economic point of view with the oldermethods. Without these the public cannot be expected to utilize airtransport, nor is there any inducement to surrender mails and freightfor carriage by air. Every endeavour compatible with economy is made, asfar as the equipment of aerodromes and the organization of the routesare concerned, to render air navigation as safe as possible, yet, thoughboth safety and economy of running have been improved, much remains tobe done. Safety depends largely on engine reliability, fire preventionand the capacity of the machine to land in small spaces. 

Though neither roads nor rails have to be laid and aircraft possess thegreat advantages of mobility and point to point transit, the initiationand maintenance of an air service is a very complex and costly matter. The utilization of converted war machines is no longer sufficient andthose specially designed for commercial work are beginning to make theirappearance. Such are the Handley Page W. 8, the Vickers, the D. H. 18 and34, and the Bristol 10-seater. 

The first two are twin-engine and the last three single-engine machines. Opinions differ as to the relative advantages of the twin andsingle-engine type. The first and running costs of the single engine arelower, but the twin has greater power and carrying capacity, while mostpilots prefer to have a surplus of power over and above that requiredfor normal flight. For these reasons, and because of the psychologicaleffect on insurance companies and on passengers, the twin engine willprobably remain in use for large commercial machines, until long-livedand economic engines of more than 500 horse-power are available. On theother hand, where extra power is not required, the twin-engine is notsafer than the single-engine machine; no existing twin-engine commercialaeroplane can maintain its height and land safely with only one enginerunning. Experiments have been made, especially in Germany, on themulti-engined machine with all the engines in the fuselage, but itsadvantages have so far been counterbalanced by loss of efficiency due totransmission gearing and shaft drives to the propellers and thevibration and weight of the gearing. 

High-powered engines are very expensive to run and every effort hastherefore to be made by aerodynamic efficiency to carry more useful loadwith less horse-power. Improvement is being made in this direction; thusthe D. H. 18 carries eight passengers at 56 horse-power per passenger, theD. H. 32 is designed for the same number at 45 horse-power each, and theD. H. 34 for ten passengers at 45 horse-power each. 

The two best German commercial machines, the Junkers and the Fokker, have a comparatively low horse-power and a low fuel load, but greaterattention has been paid to the design of the machines, which aremonoplanes with cantilever wings, offering less resistance to the airthan our biplanes. One of the most difficult problems is to evolve ahigh-lift wing which does not impair the aircraft's speed in the air. For commercial machines we must aim at the largest possible commercialload, the smallest possible fuel load and, consequently, an engine whichuses fuel economically and, conversely, a lighter fuel. The developmentof the engine is receiving constant attention, as are also varioussafety devices, among which may be mentioned those guarding against fireand those varying the lift of wings so as to lower the landing speed andthus decrease the dangers attendant upon forced landings. 

In addition to the high initial cost of machines and engines, theirmaintenance also requires the greatest care. Detailed investigation mustbe made into all serious accidents. This is now compulsory under the newAir Navigation Act, and the fitness of pilots is ensured by periodicalmedical examination. 

Apart from the weather, the safety of an aircraft depends upon itsengine, and perhaps even more upon the installation and accessibility ofengines and their adjuncts, such as the petrol, oil, water and ignitionsystems. During the earlier stages of the war the average life of anengine before complete overhaul was necessary was, of stationaryengines, from 50 to 60 hours, and of rotary engines, about 15 hours. To-day these figures stand at 200 hours and upwards and from 50 to 60hours respectively. For commercial purposes this must be furtherincreased to 300-500 hours as a normal working period. 

There are two schools of thought with regard to the efficiency, reliability and the economy of engines. One school advocates using alight power plant per horse-power, run normally at about half itsmaximum; the other favours a plant of greater weight, more solidconstruction and greater efficiency, running at nearly its fullhorse-power. The former is more expensive in primary cost and upkeep, but allows a higher performance and provides reserve horse-power foremergency; the latter is cheaper, but involves a certain risk owing tolack of surplus power. We have hitherto shown a tendency to adopt theformer method, the Germans the latter. For commercial purposes acompromise will probably be found to be best. 

Apart from the initial outlay on "air stock, " the maintenance, overhead, fuel, insurance and depreciation charges are very heavy. These are muchaffected by such items as simplicity of design, strength against wearand tear, ease of assembly and interchangeability of parts, easilyremovable engines, increase in durability by the use of metalconstruction for parts of the machine and the propeller, the eliminationof rubber joints, substitution of air for water cooling, facilities forloading and unloading in a commercial machine, simple and efficientnavigational instruments and self-starter. Every improvement, howeversmall, will assist to reduce running costs. Then revenue must beincreased and the comfort of passengers, as, for instance, ventilation, warmth, luggage capacity and, more than all, a reduction of noise has tobe carefully considered or they will not travel a second time by air. Aneffective engine silencer is at last well on the way. It is obvious whata great advantage this attainment will be both for service and civilpurposes. Roughly speaking, a high-powered engine without a silencer isaudible at a distance of some seven miles and at a height of 13, 000 feetat night time, though these distances are reduced by about a third byday when normal ground noises exist. The bulk of noise is caused by theexhaust, the propeller and mechanical noises in the engine. 

I cannot leave this subject without emphasizing the value of research, both abstract and concrete. But, though it is the keystone of progress, its results must largely depend on the amount of flying done. It isclear that for economic reasons new designs can only thoroughly be triedout by commercial use, and therefore again that real progress isdependent on commercial activity. 

The advance of civil aviation is bound to be slower than was that of waraviation. But, as war experience improved old and evolved new types, sowill peace requirements and experience shape the type and design ofaircraft and engine best suited to its purposes. Although a good dealhas under the circumstances already been achieved in peace, much remainsto be done. Gradually, however, with a modicum of research, improvementsin the factors already mentioned and the reduction of initial cost andmaintenance expenses, air transport for mails, passengers and goods willtake its place as a normal commercial public utility service, and theincreased speed of communication will assist in the general developmentof trade. 

AIR SERVICES: BRITISH, CONTINENTAL AND IMPERIAL. 

International civil flying commenced officially on August 26th, 1919, and gradually expanded, both in the United Kingdom and on the Continent, especially during the summer of 1920. France, aided by considerablesubsidies, conducted services from Paris to London, Brussels andStrasburg, from Toulouse to Montpelier and across Spain to Casablanca inMorocco; Belgium, from Brussels to London and Paris; Holland, fromAmsterdam to London; Germany, in spite of the restrictions placed uponher, entered the field as a competitor and her aircraft flew regularlyfrom Berlin to Copenhagen and Bremen, and from Bremen to Amsterdam. Onthe American Continent, the United States Post Office ran mail servicesfrom New York to Washington, Chicago, and San Francisco, with extensionsfrom Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis, and St. Louis. 

For reasons which I shall give, there were no internal services in theUnited Kingdom, but there were four companies operating air lines fromLondon to Paris, one of which held the contract for the carriage ofmails. There were also air mail services between London and Brussels andAmsterdam. The mileage flown and the number of passengers and the weightof goods carried were considerable, while the number of letters steadilyincreased, especially on the Amsterdam service; and an efficiency of 76per cent. , 94 per cent. , and 84 per cent. Was obtained on theLondon-Paris, London-Brussels, and London-Amsterdam servicesrespectively. 

It must be remembered that these results were obtained without anydirect assistance on the part of the State, such as was given by theFrench Government to air-transport companies in the form of subsidies. British economic policy is traditionally opposed to subsidies, believingthat enterprise can be healthily built up on private initiative. Therefore, until 1921 civil aviation had to content itself with theindirect assistance of the State, which consisted mainly in theadjustment of international flying; the laying-out and equipment ofaerodromes on the air routes; the provision of wireless communicationand meteorological information; research and the collection and issue ofgeneral information concerning aviation. 

This indirect assistance, however, proved inadequate to maintain theprogress achieved during 1920, and therefore the maintenance of airservices by means of temporary direct financial assistance had to bearranged. 

I have already pointed out the difficulty against which commercialaviation has to contend in regard to the geographical features andposition of the United Kingdom. Its comparatively small size, thepropinquity of industrial centres, our efficient day and night expressrailway services, especially those running north and south, lessen thevalue of aircraft's superior speed and militate against the operation ofsuccessful internal air services. Possible exceptions might includeamphibian services between London and Dublin, accelerating the deliveryof mails five or six hours; between Glasgow and Belfast, where the Clydeand the harbour of Belfast could be used as terminals; or between Londonand the Channel Islands. I may point out in parenthesis that thedevelopment of alighting stations on rivers passing through the centresof towns is important, as a great deal of time is at present wasted inreaching the aerodromes necessarily situated some miles outside largecentres of population. 

Our immediate opportunities of development near home are thereforeafforded by the air services to Paris, Brussels, and Amsterdam; but evenhere the saving in time is not great, and our position is unfavourablecompared to that of the United States, where the Post Office saves twodays in the delivery of mails by air between New York and San Francisco;or compared to that of Germany, where Berlin is within a 350-mile radiusof Copenhagen, Cologne, Munich, Warsaw, and Vienna, which is itself inan advantageous situation as the junction for a South European systemextending to the Balkan States and the Near East. 

The ultimate use of the air, however, is not exemplified by a fewpassengers flying daily between London and the Continent any more thanby a few squadrons of fighting craft. In a decade or two overheadtransit will become the main factor in the express delivery ofpassengers, mails, and goods. It is the one means left to the Empire ofspeeding up world-communication to an extent as yet unrealized. For theprice of a battleship a route to Australia could be organized, the valueof which would be beyond computation. 

The British Empire as a whole offers vast fields for expansion. InAfrica, Canada, and Australia are found the great distances suitable tothe operation of aircraft, the wide undeveloped areas through which airtransport may prove more economic than the construction of railways, andthe trans-oceanic routes over which travel by steamship has reached, and in many cases passed, its economic maximum speed. Air transport, careless whether the route be over land or sea, unhampered by foreignfrontiers, gives the Empire precisely those essential powers of direct, supple, and speedy intercommunication which ship and rail have alreadyshown us to be vital. 

Here again the geographical position of England presents a difficultproblem. England is divided from the rest of the Empire by a wideexpanse, either of ocean or foreign territory. Egypt, the starting-pointfor air routes to India, Australia, and South Africa, may be describedas the centre of a circle of which England is on the circumference; andit may be some years before an aeroplane can complete the journeybetween England and Egypt with only Malta as a stopping-place. 

The future of long-distance oceanic air routes may depend upon theairship. Lighter-than-air craft, mainly for reasons of cost andvulnerability, did not receive such an impetus from the war as did theaeroplane, but the modern airship has claims for use over distancesexceeding 1, 000 miles. It can fly by night with even greater ease thanby day; fog is no deterrent; engine trouble does not bring it down; andit can take advantage of prevailing winds. It would reduce the seajourney from England to Karachi from 22 to 5 days; from England toJohannesburg from 21 to 7 days; and from England to Perth from 32 to10-1/2 days. Its achievements have already been considerable. InNovember, 1917, the German L. 57 flew from Constantinople to East Africaand back--a distance of 4, 000 miles--in 96 hours; in June, 1919, theR. 34 flew from East Fortune to Danzig and back in 57 hours; and in Julyit crossed the Atlantic, was moored out in America for four days, andreturned, a total distance of 8, 000 miles, in the flying time of 108hours for the outward and 75 hours for the homeward journey. 

Before and during the war Germany gained wide experience in the design, construction, and handling of airships. It is probable that as soon asthe peace terms and financial position permit she will begin toestablish this form of transport on a commercial basis. In accordancewith the Peace Treaty, and the Ultimatum of the London Conference of1921, the construction of aircraft of all kinds is at present forbidden, but Germany is fostering airship development by the means left at herdisposal. Her scientists are probing the constructional problemsconnected with large airships, while efforts are being made, byfinancial and other assistance, to maintain her technical staffs andairship bases in existence. At the same time German commercial interestsare negotiating with foreign countries with a view to the development ofairships abroad, and plans are being discussed for an airship servicebetween Spain and Argentina. 

The United States, France, and Italy are all interesting themselves, either financially or constructionally, in the future of airshipdevelopment. 

In Great Britain we have made great strides, particularly in theconstruction of small types, and our practical air experience inlighter-than-air craft, during the war, is the greatest in the world. With a view to carrying out the experiments necessary further todemonstrate the capacity of airships for commercial long-distanceflights, a few months ago the Department of Civil Aviation took over allairship material surplus to service requirements. The main object was totest the practicability and value of mooring airships to a mast. Up tothe present, a principal factor militating against the economicoperation of airships has been the large and expensive personnelrequired for handling them on the ground, especially in stormy weather. The mooring-mast experiments have had considerable success and airshipshave been moored in high winds and over long periods with the assistanceof a very small personnel. 

The Government has decided, however, though recognizing theirpotentialities for speeding up communications between the variousDominions and the Mother Country, that the operation of airships cannotbe carried out by the State on account of the present financialposition. 

Recognizing the limitations of Home services and those to the Continent, it was for the purpose of directing attention to the Imperial aspect ofcivil aviation that the great demonstration flights were organized inwhich Alcock flew the Atlantic in a Vickers "Vimy, " Scott crossed to theUnited States and back in the R. 34, Ross-Smith flew from England toAustralia, and van Ryneveld from London to the Cape. 

These flights necessitated, too, considerable ground organization inlaying out aerodromes, as the following report on one in Africa vividlyillustrates: "If aerodromes are left unattended for one year, " it says, "practically all the work would have to be undertaken afresh, particularly in Rhodesia. The growth of vegetation is enormous, especially during the rains, and grass will grow to a height of elevenfeet in six months; and trees stumped two feet below the surface willthrow out suckers and replant themselves within a month after the rainshave started. .. . It is most important that rough drains should betraced. .. . I have just started planting Doub grass. This grass gives anideal surface for landing, kills other grasses, and possesses deepinterlacing roots which will bind the entire surface of the aerodromes, making it permanent and free from washaways and the formation ofsluits. "

The demonstration flights, however, showed what could, rather than whatshould, be done, and what we look for to-day is the inception ofpractical undertakings, however small, in the various portions of theEmpire. The most important of these is the service contemplated betweenEgypt and India; another instance is afforded by the West Indies, whichsuffer from the lack of inter-island communications, both for mails andpassengers, and this could be partially rectified by an air serviceemploying seaplanes or amphibians for the Leeward and Windward Islandsand the Bahamas, and between the Bahamas and the American Continent, where an American company is actually conducting a service. Anotherproject, given up owing to recent disturbances, was one for aflying-boat service on the Nile. Services are also being considered fromMalta to Italy, Geraldton to Derby in Western Australia, Sydney toAdelaide and Brisbane, and Melbourne to Hobart in Tasmania. Canadianactivity takes the form of work carried out by Government-owned civilmachines in connection with forest patrol, photographic survey, exploration, anti-smuggling patrols, etc. It would be a great advantageif railway and steamship companies seriously considered the value ofsupplementing their services by air. 

With regard to Government undertakings on the Imperial air routes, Maltais being equipped with an aerodrome, and a line of wireless stations hasbeen established between Egypt and India, but the organization of thisroute has been delayed owing to the recent disturbances in the MiddleEast, and the financial outlay involved in ground organization. As Ihave said, the air route on which we should first concentrate, over andabove the Continental services, is that between Egypt and India. Bothstrategically and commercially it is the most important in the Imperialsystem; it is a step towards Australia; it offers possibilities of thegreatest volume of traffic; it should be much simpler to control thanmany international routes, which inevitably have many complications;weather conditions are not unfavourable; and the time taken for thejourney by sea would be reduced by about one-half. If the shortcomingsin point of distance of the continental routes in reaping the fulladvantages of travel by air, and the importance of the best possiblecommunications for the Empire, are recognized, it is essential that apractical form of assistance should be given in the near future to theconduct of weekly or even bi-weekly services each way between Cairo andKarachi. Although it will not be a commercial proposition for some time, the Egypt-Karachi route, shortening as it will the delivery of mailsbetween England and India by two-thirds, and England and Australia byone-third, offers greater results than the various other schemes atpresent contemplated. There are, however, certain considerations whichwill have to be weighed before the immense amount of work necessary toits initiation as a commercial air route is begun. The French, forinstance, hope to push a trunk air route to India via Constantinople, and this line has the advantage of avoiding a long sea and desertcrossing. On the other hand, it will be a very difficult matter tonegotiate the mountains of Anatolia. 

If enterprises of this kind are successfully started, if each of ourself-governing Dominions and Colonies encourages civil aviation withinits own territory, and develops the air-sense of its people, eachportion of the Empire, by a process of natural expansion, and by thegradual extension of local air lines to merge with those from otherportions of the Empire, will assist in eventually forming a continuouschain of inter-Imperial air communication. Such a process of internaldevelopment, supported by close co-operation between the States of theImperial Commonwealth, is the best method of obtaining rapidity of airintercommunication and a system of Imperial air bases necessary to thestrategic security of the Empire. 

CONCLUSION

Within the necessarily narrow limits of this survey there has beentraced the history of aviation from the earliest days; the tremendousimpetus given to it by the war has been described, during the course ofwhich not only did air co-operation become essential to the Navy andArmy, but the importance of the Air Force as a separate arm, with itsown strategic action, steadily grew; the increasing preponderance whichaerial warfare will have in the future, and the horrors which it maybring, have been touched upon; and the possibilities of civil aviationin peace and war have been outlined. 

The conclusion has been reached that we cannot dispense with aviation, even if we would. We must consider it as a whole and lay down the broadprinciples on which it should be developed. The air (I write as one whoduring the last months of the war held the post of Chief of the AirStaff) materially helped, if it did not actually win, the fight. It hasgreatly complicated and increased the problems of defence. In future itsinfluence on these problems will be still greater. The air has noboundaries. Great Britain and the Empire are no longer protected by theseas. A correct assessment of their needs will entail a growing ratioof air force to Army and Navy, and air power will in itself depend onthe development of civil aviation. 

But though air action may be expected with justice to grow in proportionto that of the Army and Navy, and will certainly absorb certainfunctions of both, it would be unwise, at this early stage ofdevelopment, for air forces to attempt too much at a time--such as, forinstance, to garrison geographically unsuitable countries. 

A certain amount of reliance could also be placed on civil machinestemporarily borrowed for purely policing measures in uncivilizedcountries, or for the assistance of Government during civildisturbances; and for such purposes it should not be difficult to devisea scheme, especially when the State exercises a measure of controlthrough the grant of subsidies, for the obligatory enrolment of civilcommercial pilots in the reserve, and for periodical refresher coursesfor pilots, who are not actually in the service of companies, at civilaerodromes. Such systems are in force in France and Canada. In the eventof war the independent striking air force could thus count upon a largeproportion of civil reserve pilots and machines. 

Air, allied to chemistry and the submarine, will be a difficultcombination to withstand. The more its potential terrors are grasped, the less likely is war to be loosed upon the world, and it cannot berealized too clearly how much more easily than any other instrument ofwarfare aircraft and gas can be cheaply and secretly prepared by awould-be belligerent. Meanwhile, if civil aviation can be built up as aproductive organization to a position relative to that held by ourmercantile marine, we must understand that it will ensure air supremacybetter than a large unproductive outlay on armaments. And I am convincedthat, with public support, this can, and will, be done. Others will doit if we do not. But air power, although drawing its vitality from theexpansion of air commerce and the growth of the civil aircraft industry, must at the same time rely upon the nucleus of a highly trained andtechnical air force. Service aviation must be the spearhead, civilaviation the shaft, of our air effort. 

The present isolation of England in terms of air from the rest of theEmpire, and the geographical conditions already described, certainlyrender the national expansion of aviation, both external and internal, adifficult problem. It is clear that for this reason it must ratherdevelop on an Imperial basis. The Dominions have already startedvaluable civil air work and have appointed Air Boards. Whatever thepolitical settlement of Egypt may be, it is important that our airinterests at this "hub" of Imperial aviation should be safeguarded. Aircommunication between the various portions of the Empire may prove ofinestimable value in a future world war, and Dominion air forces may beable quickly to concentrate against enemy territory which is out of therange of aircraft operating from home. We have seen the value ofaircraft operating from land bases for naval patrol, anti-submarineaction, and direct attack on enemy shipping. With the increasing radiusof action of seaplanes and other naval aircraft, the Army and Navy maybe relieved of certain of their duties in coast defence and inprotecting Imperial trade routes. For these reasons, aircraft bases arerequired throughout the Empire, and it is the commercial development ofaviation which is the best means of ensuring their establishment. Itwill be for the Imperial authorities, while attending to localconditions and requirements, to co-ordinate as far as possible the aireffort of the Empire, so that in peace communications may be developedand in the event of war its full power may rapidly be utilized on aco-operative basis. 

Civil aviation is not, however, merely a method of amplifying serviceair power. It has a vast potential value of its own. Communicationsshape human destinies. The evolution of our civilization bears stronglythe marks of the systems which at various stages have made theintercourse of men and ideas possible. Its history is one of endeavourto extend the limits imposed upon human living and mobility in each ofthe great phases through which it has passed. 

There was the phase of the coracle and the roller-wheeled vehicle, stretching back into the roadless mists of unrecorded time; of roadswhich gradually linked the important areas of the Roman Empire; ofinland and coastal waterways; of ocean traffic, and its huge advancewith the discovery of steam-power, which brought England to the fore. 

With each phase the world shrinks smaller and the mists of the unknownrecede. The development of human mobility is the greatest marvel of thepresent age. We can hardly realize that it was only the other day, asthese things go--in 1819, just a hundred years before the same feat wasaccomplished by air-that the first sailing ship fitted with auxiliarysteam (and not until 1828 that a real steamship) crossed the Atlantic. 

Strain and competition are increasing. Trains vie with ships; motortransport with trains. Telephones, wireless, cables, and flying arespeeding up communications to a degree undreamed of a few years ago. Ifthe air is to be a prime factor in the world-phase to come, how will theBritish Empire be affected? Stretching from Great Britain to Australiaand the Pacific Ocean, the Empire depends more than any other politicaland commercial organization on the most modern and speedycommunications, and as each of its portions assumes greaterresponsibility there is greater need for co-operation, the distributionof information, and the personal contact of statesmen and business men. "The old order changeth, yielding place to new"; and in communicationsthe new order is air transport. 

Equally important is the international aspect. To-day we are deeplyconcerned with the maintenance of peace, and this can be achieved, notso much by the action of Governments, or the efforts of the League ofNations, as by the personal association of individuals of one nationwith those of another, and an increasing recognition of commoninterests. I conceive that civil aviation, by reducing the time factorof intercommunication, will tend to bring peoples into closer touchwith each other and will make for mutual understanding. The Peace Treatyprovided for an Air Convention for the international control of civilaviation. The Convention has been signed by all the Allied nations whichtook part in the war, and I hope other countries will shortly beincluded. As soon as the Convention has been ratified, the InternationalCommission of Air Navigation will be established, and for the first timethe world will see the international control of a great transportservice. I believe this will prove an important practical step towardsinternational co-operation and goodwill. 

We have no excuse for ignorance of the effects of Imperial andinternational co-operation. The war gave us an example of what theBritish Empire can do, provided its combined knowledge and effort isbrought to bear for one great purpose; and in no respect was this betterexemplified than in the utilization and scientific development ofaviation. The world-position of the Empire as a whole is still the best. Commerce and communications are its bonds, and, if we are so determined, it is in our power to shape the destinies of the future. 

A definite advance has been made since the Armistice and, if all goeswell, a very much greater one will be made during the next two or threeyears, and in ten years mercantile air services will be operating on aself-supporting basis. The science and concentration employed in the warmust be made to serve the requirements of peace. Readiness for, andsuccess in, war are vital when war is unavoidable, but in peace it iscivil and commercial activity which is vital. 

As in its infancy it seemed incredible to those responsible for thedirection of the older services that the air would be their mostvaluable partner; as, during the war, they grudged its logicaldevelopment to strike widely where they could not reach, and tried totether it closely to them, so now in peace the air is struggling toattain the apotheosis of communication. 

In the phase of world commerce of which we are on the threshold, science, brain-power, energy, and faith must, and increasingly will, beharnessed to the work of perfecting air communication so that humanmobility can be increased, knowledge interchanged, and the fruits ofproduction distributed throughout the world. 

As a soldier I have of course dwelt on the possibility of war in thefuture and of the part which aviation would play in it, but it would bea great mistake--though I think that mistake is constantly made--tosuppose that soldiers look forward with equanimity to the prospect ofwar. On the contrary, soldiers, more even than civilians, if this bepossible, realize the horrors of war and recognize that the great taskrests upon the statesmen of all nations, and upon humanity itself, oftaking whatever steps can be taken to prevent its recurrence. 

We may at least assume that another great war will not be allowed in ourgeneration. But war, in spite of its horrors, in spite of itsbereavements, is only too quickly forgotten. A comparatively few years, and those who have passed through its fire are no more. New wealth iscreated; new antagonisms arise; and a new generation remembers only theromantic stories and the martial deeds of its fathers, or, more fatally, organizes itself to avenge defeat. Then, once again, forgetful of theterrible lesson we have learned, the great nations of the world mayunsheathe the sword as the only solution to their problems. Our onlyhope lies in using the ensuing years to educate mankind to the principlethat war brings misery and impoverishment to all engaged in it, that inthe final victory it is not a question of which is left the strongest, but which is the least exhausted, and that national are as susceptibleas personal differences to discussion and arbitration. Above all, let usguard against the old mistake of competitive armaments. There is noreason, for instance, why, because France, our friend and ally, isadopting a policy of air armaments, we should blindly pile up aeroplaneagainst aeroplane, pilot against pilot, and thus provoke mutualsuspicion. 

The possibility of war remains, however, and I wish in conclusion toemphasize the fact that in my belief the security of this country in theevent of war will depend upon our strength in the air. The developmentof the offensive powers of aviation have already destroyed "the silverstreak" on which we relied in the past. When we remember that it is lessthan twenty years since the first successful aeroplane was flown, whenwe recall the almost miraculous development of the fighting powers ofaircraft during the four and a half years of war, and also the furtherdevelopments which were on the point of being utilized when the warended, it seems certain that from the point of view of war Britain hasceased to be an island. The "silver streak" would have been littleprotection but for our naval supremacy, and in the future our securitywill depend as much upon superiority in the air as it has depended inthe past upon our superiority at sea. And this superiority in the aircan only be attained in the same way in which we secured our supremacyat sea. That supremacy was not really gained by developing great navies. It was gained by our mercantile marine, which made the great naviespossible. Our future security can only be gained by the development ofcommercial aviation. 

_Printed in Great Britain by_ Butler & Tanner, _Frome and London_. 

Transcriber's Endnotes:

 Variant spellings, e. G. _Frankfort_ and _Frankfurt_, remain as printed. Significant amendments have been listed below:

 Page 67, 'Poperighe' amended to _Poperinghe_. 

 Page 117, 'Junker' amended to _Junkers_.