ARMAGEDDON--AND AFTER

 BY

 W. L. COURTNEY, M. A. , LL. D. 

 LONDON

 CHAPMAN & HALL, LTD. 

 1914

 DEDICATED

 WITH ALL HUMILITY AND ADMIRATION

 TO

 THE YOUNG IDEALISTS OF ALL COUNTRIES

WHO WILL NOT ALLOW THE DREAMS OF THEIR

 YOUTH TO BE TARNISHED BY THE

 EXPERIENCES OF AN

 OUTWORN AGE

PREFACE

I dedicate this little book to the young idealists of this and othercountries, for several reasons. They must, obviously, be young, becausetheir older contemporaries, with a large amount of experience of earlierconditions, will hardly have the courage to deal with the novel data. Itake it that, after the conclusion of the present war, there will come anuneasy period of exhaustion and anxiety when we shall be told that thosewho hold military power in their hands are alone qualified to act assaviours of society. That conclusion, as I understand the matter, youngidealists will strenuously oppose. They will be quite aware that all theconservative elements will be against them; they will appreciate also theeagerness with which a large number of people will point out that thesafest way is to leave matters more or less alone, and to allow thesituation to be controlled by soldiers and diplomatists. Of course thereis obvious truth in the assertion that the immediate settlement of peaceconditions must, to a large extent, be left in the hands of those whobrought the war to a successful conclusion. But the relief from pressinganxiety when this horrible strife is over, and the feeling of gratitude tothose who have delivered us must not be allowed to gild and consecrate, asit were, systems proved effete and policies which intelligent menrecognise as bankrupt. The moment of deliverance will be too unique andtoo splendid to be left in the hands of men who have grown, if notcynical, at all events a little weary of the notorious defects ofhumanity, and who are, perhaps naturally, tempted to allow Europeanprogress to fall back into the old well-worn ruts. It is the young men whomust take the matter in hand, with their ardent hopes and their keenimagination, and only so far as they believe in the possibility of a greatamelioration will they have any chance of doing yeoman service forhumanity. 

The dawn of a new era must be plenarily accepted as a wonderfulopportunity for reform. If viewed in any other spirit, the splendours ofthe morning will soon give way before the obstinate clouds hanging on thehorizon. In some fashion or other it must be acknowledged that oldermethods of dealing with international affairs have been tried and foundwanting. It must be admitted that the ancient principles helped to bringabout the tremendous catastrophe in which we are at present involved, andthat a thorough re-organisation is required if the new Europe is to startunder better auspices. That is why I appeal to the younger idealists, because they are not likely to be deterred by inveterate prejudices; theywill be only too eager to examine things with a fresh intelligence oftheir own. Somehow or other we must get rid of the absurd idea that thenations of Europe are always on the look out to do each other an injury. We have to establish the doctrines of Right on a proper basis, anddethrone that ugly phantom of Might, which is the object of Potsdamworship. International law must be built up with its proper sanctions; andvirtues, which are Christian and humane, must find their proper place inthe ordinary dealings of states with one another. Much clever dialecticswill probably be employed in order to prove that idealistic dreams arevain. Young men will not be afraid of such arguments; they will not bedeterred by purely logical difficulties. Let us remember that this war hasbeen waged in order to make war for the future impossible. If that be thepresiding idea of men's minds, they will keep their reforming coursesteadily directed towards ideal ends, patiently working for thereconstruction of Europe and a better lot for humanity at large. 

Once more let me repeat that it is only young idealists who are sufficientfor these things. They may call themselves democrats, or socialists, orfuturists, or merely reformers. The name is unimportant: the main point isthat they must thoroughly examine their creed in the light of their finesthopes and aspirations. They will not be the slaves of any formulæ, andthey will hold out their right hands to every man--whatever may be thelabel he puts on his theories--who is striving in single-minded devotionfor a millennial peace. The new era will have to be of a spiritual, ethical type. Coarser forms of materialism, whether in thought or life, will have to be banished, because the scales have at last dropped from oureyes, and we intend to regard a human being no longer as a thing ofluxury, or wealth, or greedy passions, but as the possessor of a livingsoul. 

W. L. C. 

_November 10, 1914. _

 * * * * *

I wish to acknowledge my obligation to Mr. H. N. Brailsford's _The War ofSteel and Gold_ (Bell). I do not pretend to agree with all that Mr. Brailsford says: but I have found his book always interesting, andsometimes inspiring. 

CONTENTS

 PAGE

CHAPTER IPROBLEMS OF THE FUTURE 1

CHAPTER IILESSONS OF THE PAST 32

CHAPTER IIISOME SUGGESTED REFORMS 63

ARMAGEDDON--AND AFTER

CHAPTER I

PROBLEMS OF THE FUTURE

The newspapers have lately been making large quotations from the poems ofMr. Rudyard Kipling. They might, if they had been so minded, have laidunder similar contribution the Revelation of St. John the Divine. There, too, with all the imagery usual in Apocalyptic literature, is to be founda description of vague and confused fighting, when most of the Kings ofthe earth come together to fight a last and desperate battle. The SevenAngels go forth, each armed with a vial, the first poisoning the earth, the second the sea, the third the rivers and fountains of waters, thefourth the sun. Then out of the mouth of the dragon, of the beast, and ofthe Antichrist come the lying spirits which persuade the Kings of theearth to gather all the people for that great day of God Almighty "into aplace called in the Hebrew tongue Armageddon. " Translated into ourlanguage the account might very well serve for the modern assemblage oftroops in which nearly all the kingdoms of the earth have to play theirpart, with few, and not very important, exceptions. It is almost absurd tospeak of the events of the past three months as though they were merelyincidents in a great and important campaign. There is nothing in historylike them so far as we are aware. In the clash of the two great Europeanorganisations--the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente--we have allthose wild features of universal chaos which the writer of the Apocalypsesaw with prophetic eye as ushering in the great day of the Lord, andpaving the way for a New Heaven and a New Earth. 

A COLOSSAL UPHEAVAL

It is a colossal upheaval. But what sort of New Heaven and New Earth is itlikely to usher in? This is a question which it is hardly too early todiscuss, for it makes a vast difference, to us English in especial, if, fighting for what we deem to be a just cause, we can look forward to anissue in the long run beneficial to ourselves and the world. We know thecharacter of the desperate conflict which has yet to be accomplishedbefore our eyes. Everything points to a long stern war, which cannot becompleted in a single campaign. Every one knows that Lord Kitchener issupposed to have prophesied a war of three years, and we can hardly ignorethe opinion of so good a judge. If we ask why, the obvious answer is thatevery nation engaged is not fighting for mere victory in battle, nor yetfor extension of territory; but for something more important than these. They fight for the triumph of their respective ideas, and it will make thegreatest difference to Europe and the world which of the ideas iseventually conqueror. Supposing the German invasion of France ends infailure; that, clearly, will not finish the war. Supposing even thatBerlin is taken by the Russians, we cannot affirm that so great an eventwill necessarily complete the campaign. The whole of Germany will have tobe invaded and subdued, and that is a process which will take a very longtime even under the most favourable auspices. Or take the oppositehypothesis. Let us suppose that the Germans capture Paris, and manage byforced marches to defend their country against the Muscovite incursion. Even so, nothing is accomplished of a lasting character. France will go onfighting as she did after 1870, and we shall be found at her side. Or, assuming the worst hypothesis of all, that France lies prostrate under theheel of her German conqueror, does any one suppose that Great Britainwill desist from fighting? We know perfectly well that, with the aid ofour Fleet, we shall still be in a position to defy the German invader andmake use of our enormous reserves to wear out even Teutonic obstinacy. Thegreat sign and seal of this battle to the death is the recent covenantentered into by the three members of the Triple Entente. [1] They havedeclared in the most formal fashion, over the signatures of their threerepresentatives, Sir Edward Grey, M. Paul Cambon, and Count Benckendorff, that they will not make a separate peace, that they will continue to actin unison, and fight, not as three nations, but as one. Perhaps one of theleast expected results of the present conjuncture is that the TripleEntente, which was supposed to possess less cohesive efficiency than therival organisation, has proved, on the contrary, the stronger of the two. The Triple Alliance is not true to its name. Italy, the third andunwilling member, still preserves her neutrality, and declares that herinterests are not immediately involved. 

[1] Subsequently joined by Japan. 

NEVER AGAIN!

In order to attempt to discover the vast changes that are likely to comeas a direct consequence of the present Armageddon, it is necessary torefer in brief retrospect to some of the main causes and features of thegreat European war. Meanwhile, I think the general feeling amongst allthoughtful men is best expressed in the phrase, "Never again. " Never againmust we have to face the possibility of such a world-wide catastrophe. Never again must it be possible for the pursuit of merely selfishinterests to work such colossal havoc. Never again must we have war as theonly solution of national differences. Never again must all the arts ofpeace be suspended while Europe rings to the tramp of armed millions. Never again must spiritual, moral, artistic culture be submerged under awave of barbarism. Never again must the Ruler of this Universe beaddressed as the "God of battles. " Never again shall a new Wordsworth hail"carnage" as "God's daughter. " The illogicality of it all is too patent. That everything which we respect and revere in the way of science orthought, or culture, or music, or poetry, or drama, should be cast intothe melting-pot to satisfy dynastic ambition is a thing too puerile aswell as too appalling to be even considered. And the horror of it all issomething more than our nerves will stand. The best brains and intellectsof Europe, the brightest and most promising youths, all the manhoodeverywhere in Europe to be shrivelled and consumed in a holocaust likethis--it is such a reign of the Devil and Antichrist on earth that it mustbe banished in perpetuity if civilisation and progress are to endure. Never again!

UNEXPECTED WAR

How did we get into such a stupid and appalling calamity? Let us think fora moment. I do not suppose it would be wrong to say that no one everexpected war in our days. Take up any of the recent books. With theexception of the fiery martial pamphlets of Germany, the work of a von derGoltz or a Treitschke, or a Bernhardi, we shall find a general consensusof opinion that war on a large scale was impossible because too ruinous, that the very size of the European armaments made war impracticable. Orelse, to take the extreme case of Mr. Norman Angell, the entanglements ofmodern finance were said to have put war out of count as an absurdity. Wewere a little too hasty in our judgments. It is clear that a singledetermined man, if he is powerful enough, may embroil Europe. Howeverdestructive modern armaments may be, and however costly a campaign mayprove, yet there are men who will face the cost and confront thewholesale destruction of life that modern warfare entails. How pitiful itis, how strange also, to look back upon the solemn asseveration of theKaiser and the Tsar, not so many months ago (Port Baltic, July 1912), thatthe division of Europe into the two great confederations known as theTriple Alliance and the Triple Entente provided a safeguard againsthostilities! We were constantly assured that diplomats were working for aBalance of Power, such an equilibrium of rival forces that the totalresult would be stability and peace. Arbitration, too, was considered bymany as the panacea, to say nothing of the Hague Palace of Peace. And nowwe discover that nations may possibly refer to arbitration points of smallimportance in their quarrels, but that the greater things which aresupposed to touch national honour and the preservation of national lifeare tacitly, if not formally, exempted from the category of arbitrabledisputes. Diplomacy, Arbitration, Palaces of Peace seem equally useless. 

PROXIMATE AND ULTIMATE CAUSES

In attempting to understand how Europe has (to use Lord Rosebery's phrase)"rattled into barbarism" in the uncompromising fashion which we seebefore our eyes, we must distinguish between recent operative causes andthose more slowly evolving antecedent conditions which play aconsiderable, though not necessarily an obvious part in the result. Recentoperative causes are such things as the murder of the Archduke FranzFerdinand at Serajevo, the consequent Austrian ultimatum to Servia, thehasty and intemperate action of the Kaiser in forcing war, and--from amore general point of view--the particular form of militarism prevalent inGermany. Ulterior antecedent conditions are to be found in the changinghistory of European States and their mutual relations in the last quarterof a century; the ambition of Germany to create an Imperial fleet; theambition of Germany to have "a place in the sun" and become a largecolonial power; the formation of a Triple Entente following on theformation of a Triple Alliance; the rivalry between Teuton and Slav; andthe mutations of diplomacy and _Real-politik_. It is not always possibleto keep the two sets of causes, the recent and the ulterior, separate, forthey naturally tend either to overlap or to interpenetrate one another. German Militarism, for instance, is only a specific form of the generalambition of Germany, and the Austrian desire to avenge herself on Serviais a part of her secular animosity towards Slavdom and its protector, Russia. Nor yet, when we are considering the present _débâcle_ ofcivilisation, need we interest ourselves overmuch in the immediateoccasions and circumstances of the huge quarrel. We want to know not howEurope flared into war, but why. Our object is so to understand thepresent imbroglio as to prevent, if we can, the possibility for the futureof any similar world-wide catastrophe. 

EUROPEAN DICTATORS

Let us fix our attention on one or two salient points. Europe has oftenbeen accustomed to watch with anxiety the rise of some potent arbiter ofher destinies who seems to arrogate to himself a large personal dominion. There was Philip II. There was Louis XIV. There was Napoleon a hundredyears ago. Then, a mere shadow of his great ancestor, there was NapoleonIII. Then, after the Franco-German war, there was Bismarck. Now it isKaiser Wilhelm II. The emergence of some ambitious personality naturallymakes Europe suspicious and watchful, and leads to the formation ofleagues and confederations against him. The only thing, however, whichseems to have any power of real resistance to the potential tyrant is notthe manoeuvring of diplomats, but the steady growth of democracy inEurope, which, in virtue of its character and principles, steadily objectsto the despotism of any given individual, and the arbitrary designs of apersonal will. We had hoped that the spread of democracies in all Europeannations would progressively render dynastic wars an impossibility. Thepeoples would cry out, we hoped, against being butchered to make a holidayfor any latter-day Cæsar. But democracy is a slow growth, and exists invery varying degrees of strength in different parts of our continent. Evidently it has not yet discovered its own power. We have sadly torecognise that its range of influence and the new spirit which it seeks tointroduce into the world are as yet impotent against the personalascendancy of a monarch and the old conceptions of high politics. Europeandemocracy is still too vague, too dispersed, too unorganised, to preventthe breaking out of a bloody international conflict. 

THE PERSONAL FACTOR

Europe then has still to reckon with the personal factor--with all itsvagaries and its desolating ambitions. Let us see how this has worked inthe case before us. In 1888 the present German Emperor ascended thethrone. Two years afterwards, in March 1890, the Pilot wasdropped--Bismarck resigned. The change was something more than a meresubstitution of men like Caprivi and Hohenlohe for the Iron Chancellor. There was involved a radical alteration in policy. The Germany which wasthe ideal of Bismarck's dreams was an exceedingly prosperousself-contained country, which should flourish mainly because it developedits internal industries as well as paid attention to its agriculture, andsecured its somewhat perilous position in the centre of Europe by skilfuldiplomatic means of sowing dissension amongst its neighbours. ThusBismarck discouraged colonial extensions. He thought they might weakenGermany. On the other hand, he encouraged French colonial policy, becausehe thought it would divert the French from their preoccupation with theidea of _revanche_. He played, more or less successfully, with England, sometimes tempting her with plausible suggestions that she should join theTeutonic Empires on the Continent, sometimes thwarting her aims by sowingdissensions between her and her nearest neighbour, France. But there wasone empire which, certainly, Bismarck dreaded not so much because she wasactually of much importance, but because she might be. That empire wasRussia. The last thing in the world Bismarck desired was precisely thatapproximation between France and Russia which ended in the strangephenomenon of an offensive and defensive alliance between a westernrepublic and a semi-eastern despotic empire. 

KAISER WILHELM

Kaiser Wilhelm II had very different ideals for Germany, and in manypoints he simply reversed the policy of Bismarck. He began to develop theGerman colonial empire, and in order that it might be protected he did allin his power to encourage the formation of a large German navy. He evenallowed himself to say that "the future of Germany was on the sea. " It waspart of that peculiar form of personal autocracy which the Kaiserintroduced that he should from time to time invent phrases suggestive ofdifferent principles of his policy. Side by side with the assertion thatGermany's future was on the sea, we have the phrases "Germany wants herplace in the sun" and that the "drag" of Teutonic development is "towardsthe East. " The reality and imminence of "a yellow peril" was another ofhis devices for stimulating the efforts of his countrymen. Thus the newpolicy was expansion, evolution as a world-power, colonisation; and eachin turn brought him up against the older arrangement of European Powers. His colonial policy, especially in Africa, led to collisions with bothFrance and Great Britain. The building of the fleet, the Kiel Canal, andother details of maritime policy naturally made England very suspicious, while the steady drag towards the East rendered wholly unavoidable theconflict between Teutonism and the Slav races. Germany looked, undoubtedly, towards Asia Minor, and for this reason made great advancesto and many professions of friendship for the Ottoman Empire. Turkey, indeed, in several phrases was declared to be "the natural ally" ofGermany in the Near East. And if we ask why, the answer nowadays isobvious. Not only was Turkey to lend herself to the encouragement ofGerman commercial enterprise in Asia Minor, but she was, in the judgmentof the Emperor, the one power which could in time of trouble make herselfespecially obnoxious to Great Britain. She could encourage revolt inEgypt, and still more, through the influence of Mahommedanism, stir updisaffection in India. [2]

[2] Turkey has now joined Germany. 

AN AGGRESSIVE POLICY

And now let us watch this policy in action in recent events. In 1897Germany demanded reparation from China for the recent murder of two Germanmissionaries. Troops were landed at Kiao-chau Bay, a large pecuniaryindemnity of about £35, 000 was refused, and Kiao-chau itself with theadjacent territory was ceded to Germany. That was a significantdemonstration of the Emperor's determination to make his country aworld-power, so that, as was stated afterwards, nothing should occur inthe whole world in which Germany would not have her say. Meanwhile, inEurope itself event after event occurred to prove the persistent characterof German aggressiveness. On March 31, 1905, the German Emperor landed atTangier, in order to aid the Sultan of Morocco in his demand for aConference of the Powers to check the military dispositions of France. M. Delcassé, France's Foreign Minister, demurred to this proposal, assertingthat a Conference was wholly unnecessary. Thereupon Prince Bülow usedmenacing language, and Delcassé resigned in June 1905. The Conference ofAlgeçiras was held in January 1906, in which Austria proved herself "abrilliant second" to Germany. Two years afterwards, in 1908, came stillfurther proofs of Germany's ambition. Austria annexed Bosnia andHerzegovina. Russia immediately protested; so did most of the other GreatPowers. But Germany at once took up the Austrian cause, and stood "inshining armour" side by side with her ally. Inasmuch as Russia was, in1908, only just recovering from the effects of her disastrous war withJapan, and was therefore in no condition to take the offensive, the TripleAlliance gained a distinct victory. Three years later occurred anotherstriking event. In July 1911 the world was startled by the news that theGerman gunboat _Panther_, joined shortly afterwards by the cruiser_Berlin_, had been sent to Agadir. Clearly Berlin intended to reopen thewhole Moroccan question, and the tension between the Powers was for sometime acute. Nor did Mr. Lloyd George make it much better by a fiery speechat the Mansion House on July 21, which considerably fluttered theContinental dovecots. The immediate problem, however, was solved by thecession of about one hundred thousand square miles of territory in theCongo basin by France to Germany in compensation for German acquiescencein the French protectorate over Morocco. I need not, perhaps, refer toother more recent events. One point, however, must not be omitted. Theissue of the Balkan wars in 1912 caused a distinct disappointment to bothGermany and Austria. Turkey's defeat lessened the importance of theOttoman Empire as an ally. Austria had to curb her desires in thedirection of Salonica. And the enemies who had prevented the realisationof wide Teutonic schemes were Servia and her protector, Russia. From thistime onwards Austria waited for an opportunity to avenge herself onServia, while Germany, in close union with her ally, began to study thesituation in relation to the Great Northern Empire in an eminentlybellicose spirit. 

MILITARISM

Now that we have the proper standpoint from which to watch the generaltendency of events like these, we can form some estimate of the nature ofGerman ambition and the results of the personal ascendancy of the Kaiser. We speak vaguely of militarism. Fortunately, we have a very valuabledocument to enable us to understand what precisely German militarismsignifies. General von Bernhardi's _Germany and the Next War_ is one ofthe most interesting, as well as most suggestive, of books, intended toillustrate the spirit of German ambition. Bernhardi writes like asoldier. Such philosophy as he possesses he has taken from Nietzsche. Hisapplications of history come from Treitschke. He has persuaded himselfthat the main object of human life is war, and the higher the nation themore persistently must it pursue preparations for war. Hence the best menin the State are the fighting men. Ethics and religion, so far as theydeprecate fighting and plead for peace, are absolutely pernicious. Culturedoes not mean, as we hoped and thought, the best development of scientificand artistic enlightenment, but merely an all-absorbing will-power, anall-devouring ambition to be on the top and to crush every one else. Theassumption throughout is that the German is the highest specimen ofhumanity. Germany is especially qualified to be the leader, and the onlyway in which it can become the leader is to have such overwhelmingmilitary power that no one has any chance of resisting. Moreover, allmethods are justified in the sacred cause of German culture--duplicity, violence, the deliberate sowing of dissensions between possible rivals, incitements of Asiatics to rise against Europeans. All means are to beadopted to win the ultimate great victory, and, of course, when thestruggle comes there must be no misplaced leniency to any of the inferiorraces who interpose between Germany and her legitimate place in thesun. [3] The ideal is almost too naïve and too ferocious to be conceived byordinary minds. Yet here it all stands in black and white. According toBernhardi's volume German militarism means at least two things. First thesuppression of every other nationality except the German; second thesuppression of the whole civilian element in the population under the heelof the German drill-sergeant. Is it any wonder that the recent war hasbeen conducted by Berlin with such appalling barbarism and ferocity?

[3] _Germany and the Next War_, by F. Von Bernhardi. See especially Chap. V, "World-Power or Downfall. " Other works which may be consulted areProfessor J. A. Cramb's _Germany and England_ (esp. Pp. 111-112) andProfessor Usher's _Pan-Germanism_. 

THE EVILS OF AUTOCRACY

Our inquiry so far has led to two conclusions. We have discovered bybitter experience that a personal ascendancy, such as the German Emperorwields, is in the highest degree perilous to the interests of peace: andthat a militarism such as that which holds in its thrall the German Empireis an open menace to intellectual culture and to Christian ethics. But wemust not suppose that these conclusions are only true so far as they applyto the Teutonic race, and that the same phenomena observed elsewhere arecomparatively innocuous. Alas! autocracy in any and every country seems tobe inimical to the best and highest of social needs, and militarism, wherever found, is the enemy of pacific social development. Let us take afew instances at haphazard of the danger of the personal factor inEuropean politics. There is hardly a person to be found nowadays whodefends the Crimean war, or indeed thinks that it was in any senseinevitable. Yet if there was one man more than another whose personal willbrought it about, it was--not Lord Aberdeen who ought to have beenresponsible--but Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. "The great Eltchi, " as hewas called, was our Ambassador at Constantinople, a man of uncommonstrength of will, which, as is often the case with these powerful natures, not infrequently degenerated into sheer obstinacy. He had made up his mindthat England was to support Turkey and fight with Russia, and inasmuch asLouis Napoleon, for the sake of personal glory, had similar opinions, France as well as England was dragged into a costly and quite useless war. Napoleon III has already figured among those aspiring monarchs who wish"to sit in the chair of Europe. " It was his personal will once more whichsent the unhappy Maximilian to his death in Mexico, and his personaljealousy of Prussia which launched him in the fatal enterprise "à Berlin"in 1870. In the latter case we find another personal influence, still moresinister--that of the Empress Eugénie, whose capricious ambition andinterference in military matters directly led to the ruinous disaster ofSedan. The French people, who had to suffer, discovered it too late. "Quicquid delirant reges plectuntur Achivi. " Or take another more recentinstance. Who was responsible for the Russo-Japanese war? Not Kuropatkin, assuredly, nor yet the Russian Prime Minister, but certain of the GrandDukes and probably the Tsar himself, who were interested in the forests ofthe Yalu district and had no mind to lose the money they had invested in apurely financial operation. The truth is that modern Europe has no roomfor "prancing Pro-consuls, " and no longer takes stock in autocrats. Theyare, or ought to be, superannuated, out of date. To use an expressivecolloquialism they are "a back number. " The progress of the world demandsthe development of peoples; it has no use for mediæval monarchies likethat of Potsdam. One of the things we ought to banish for ever is thehorrible idea that whole nations can be massacred and civilisationindefinitely postponed to suit the individual caprice of a bragging andself-opinionated despot who calls himself God's elect. Now that we knowthe ruin he can cause, let us fight shy of the Superman, and the wholerange of ideas which he connotes. 

THE MILITARY CASTE

Militarism is another of our maladies. Here we must distinguish with somecare. A military spirit is one thing: militarism is another. It isprobable that no nation is worthy to survive which does not possess amilitary spirit, or, in other words, the instinct to defend itself and itsliberties against an aggressor. It is a virtue which is closely interfusedwith high moral qualities--self-respect, a proper pride, self-reliance--and is compatible with real modesty and sobriety of mind. But militarism has nothing ethical about it. It is not courage, but sheerpugnacity and quarrelsomeness, and as exemplified in our modern history itmeans the dominion of a clique, the reign of a few self-opinionatedofficials. That these individuals should possess only a limitedintelligence is almost inevitable. Existing for the purposes of war, theynaturally look at everything from an oblique and perverted point of view. They regard nations, not as peaceful communities of citizens, but asmaterial to be worked up into armies. Their assumption is that war, beingan indelible feature in the history of our common humanity, must beceaselessly prepared for by the piling up of huge armaments and weapons ofdestruction. Their invariable motto is that if you wish for peace you mustprepare for war--"si vis pacem, para bellum"--a notoriously falseapophthegm, because armaments are provocative, not soothing, and the manwho is a swash-buckler invites attack. It is needless to say thatthousands of military men do not belong to this category: no one dreadswar so much as the man who knows what it means. I am not speaking ofindividuals, I am speaking of a particular caste, military officials inthe abstract, if you like to put it so, who, because their business iswar, have not the slightest idea what the pacific social development of apeople really means. Militarism is simply a one-sided, partial point ofview, and to enforce that upon a nation is as though a man with apronounced squint were to be accepted as a man of normal vision. We haveseen what it involves in Germany. In a less offensive form, however, itexists in most states, and its root idea is usually that the civilian assuch belongs to a lower order of humanity, and is not so important to theState as the officer who discharges vague and for the most part uselessfunctions in the War Office. [4] It is a swollen, over-developed militarismthat has got us into the present mess, and one of our earliest concerns, when the storm is over, must be to put it into its proper place. Let himwho uses the sword perish by the sword. 

[4] Thus it was the Military party in Bulgaria which drove her to thedisastrous second Balkan war, and the Military party in Austria whichinsisted on the ultimatum to Servia. 

DIPLOMACY

And I fear that there is another ancient piece of our internationalstrategy which has been found wanting. I approach with some hesitation thesubject of diplomacy, because it contains so many elements of value to astate, and has given so many opportunities for active and original minds. Its worst feature is that its operations have to be conducted in secret:its best is that it affords a fine exemplification of the way in which thehistory and fortunes of states are--to their advantage--dependent uponthe initiative of gifted and patriotic individuals. But if we look backover the history of recent years, we shall discover that diplomacy has notfulfilled its especial mission. According to a well-known cynical dictum adiplomatist is a man who is paid to lie for his country. And, indeed, itis one of the least gracious aspects of the diplomatic career that itseems necessarily to involve the use of a certain amount of chicanery andfalsehood, the object being to jockey opponents by means of skilful rusesinto a position in which they find themselves at a disadvantage. Clearly, however, there are better aims than these for diplomacy--one aim inparticular, which is the preservation of peace. A diplomat is supposed tohave failed if the result of his work leads to war. It is not his businessto bring about war. Any king or prime minister or general can do that, very often with conspicuous ease. A diplomat is a skilful statesmanversed in international politics, who makes the best provision he can forthe interests of his country, carefully steering it away from those rocksof angry hostility on which possibly his good ship may founder. 

BALANCE OF POWER

Now what has diplomacy done for us during the last few years? It hasformed certain understandings and alliances between different states; ithas tried to safeguard our position by creating sympathetic bonds withthose nations who are allied to us in policy. It has also attempted toproduce that kind of "Balance of Power" in Europe which on its own showingmakes for peace. This Balance of Power, so often and so mysteriouslyalluded to by the diplomatic world, has become a veritable fetish. Perhapsits supreme achievement was reached when two autocratic monarchs--the Tsarof Russia and the German Emperor--solemnly propounded a statement, as wehave seen, at Port Baltic that the Balance of Power, as distributedbetween the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente, had proved itselfvaluable in the interests of European peace. That was only two years ago, and the thing seems a mockery now. If we examine precisely what is meantby a Balance of Power, we shall see that it presupposes certain conditionsof animosity and attempts to neutralise them by the exhibition of superioror, at all events, equivalent forces. A Balance of Power in thecontinental system assumes, for all practical purposes, that the nationsof Europe are ready to fly at each other's throats, and that the only wayto deter them is to make them realise how extremely perilous to themselveswould be any such military enterprise. Can any one doubt that this is thereal meaning of the phrase? If we listen to the Delphic oracles ofdiplomacy on this subject of the Balance of Power, we shall understandthat in nine cases out of ten a man invoking this phrase means that hewants the Balance of Power to be favourable to himself. It is not so muchan exact equipoise that he desires, as a certain tendency of the scales todip in his direction. If Germany feels herself weak she not onlyassociates Austria and Italy with herself, but looks eastward to get theassistance of Turkey, or, perhaps, attempts--as it so happens without anysuccess--to create sympathy for herself in the United States of America. If, on the other hand, France feels herself in danger, she not only formsan alliance with Russia, but also an entente with England and, on theprinciple that the friends of one's friends ought to be accepted, producesa further entente between England and Russia. England, on her part, if forwhatever reason she feels that she is liable to attack, goes even so faras to make an alliance with an Asiatic nation--Japan--in order tosafeguard her Asiatic interests in India. Thus, when diplomatists invokethe necessity of a Balance of Power, they are really trying to work for apreponderance of power on their side. It is inevitable that this should beso. An exact Balance of Power must result in a stalemate. 

CHANGE OF POLICY

Observe what has happened to Great Britain during recent years. When shewas ruled by that extremely clear-headed though obstinate statesman, LordSalisbury, she remained, at his advice, outside the circle of continentalentanglements and rejoiced in what was known as a policy of "SplendidIsolation. " It was, of course, a selfish policy. It rested on soundgeographical grounds, because, making use of the fortunate accident thatGreat Britain is an island, it suggested that she could pursue her owncommercial career and, thanks to the English Channel, let the whole of therest of the world go hang. Such a position could not possibly last, partlybecause Great Britain is not only an island, but also an empire scatteredover the seven seas; partly because we could not remain alien from thosesocial and economic interests which necessarily link our career withcontinental nations. So we became part of the continental system, and itbecame necessary for us to choose friends and partners and mark off otherpeoples as our enemies. It might have been possible a certain number ofyears ago for us to join the Triple Alliance. At one time Prince Bülowseemed anxious that we should do so, and Mr. Chamberlain on our side wasby no means unwilling. But gradually we discovered that Germany wasintensely jealous of us as a colonial power and as a great sea-power, andfor this reason, as well as for others, we preferred to compose ourancient differences with France and promote an understanding betweenEnglish and French as the nearest of neighbours and the most convenient ofallies. Observe, however, that every step in the process was a challenge, and a challenge which the rival aimed at could not possibly ignore. Theconclusion of the French Entente Cordiale in 1904, the launching of the_Dreadnought_ in 1906, the formation of the Russian agreement in 1907, andcertain changes which we made in our own army were obviously intended aswarnings to Germany that we were dangerous people to attack. [5] Germanynaturally sought reprisals in her fashion, and gradually Europe wastransformed into a huge armed camp, divided into two powerfulorganisations which necessarily watched each other with no friendly gaze. 

[5] See _The War of Steel and Gold_, by H. N. Brailsford (Bell)--openingchapter on "The Balance of Power. "

BALANCE OR CONCERT?

I do not say that the course of events could possibly have been altered. When once we became part of the continental system, it was necessary forus to choose between friends and enemies. I only say that if diplomacycalls itself an agency for preventing war, it cannot be said to bealtogether successful. Its famous doctrine of a Balance of Power is inreality a mere phrase. If one combination be represented as X and theother as Y, and X increases itself up to X^2, it becomes necessary that Yshould similarly increase itself to Y^2, a process which, clearly, doesnot make for peace. I should imagine that the best of diplomatists arequite aware of this. Indeed, there seems reason to suppose that Sir EdwardGrey, owing to definite experience in the last two years, not onlydiscovered the uselessness of the principle of a Balance of Power, but didhis best to substitute something entirely different--the Concert ofEurope. All the negotiations he conducted during and after the two Balkanwars, his constant effort to summon London Conferences and other things, were intended to create a Concert of European Powers, discussing amongstthemselves the best measures to secure the peace of the world. Alas! thewhole of the fabric was destroyed, the fair prospects hopelessly cloudedover, by the intemperate ambition of the Kaiser, who, just because hebelieved that the Balance of Power was favourable to himself, that Russiawas unready, that France was involved in serious domestic trouble, thatEngland was on the brink of civil war, set fire to the magazine andengineered the present colossal explosion. 

CONTROL OF FOREIGN POLICY

One cannot feel sure that diplomacy as hitherto recognised will be able, or, indeed, ought to be able, to survive the shock. In this country, as inothers, diplomacy has been considered a highly specialised science, whichcan only be conducted by trained men and by methods of entire secrecy. Asa mere matter of fact, England has far less control over her foreignpolicy than any of the continental Powers. In Germany foreign affairs comebefore the Reichstag, in France they are surveyed by the Senate, inAmerica there is a special department of the Senate empowered to dealwith foreign concerns. In Great Britain there is nothing of the kind. Parliament has practically no control whatsoever over foreign affairs, itis not even consulted in the formation of treaties and arrangements withother nations. Nor yet has the Cabinet any real control, because it mustact together as a whole, and a determined criticism of a foreign secretarymeans the resignation of the Government. Fortunately, our diplomacy hasbeen left for the most part in very able hands. Nevertheless, it is surelya paradox that the English people should know so little about foreignaffairs as to be absolutely incapable of any control in questions thataffect their life or death. Democracy, though it is supposed to beincompetent to manage foreign relations, could hardly have made a worsemess of it than the highly-trained Chancelleries. When the new Europearises out of the ashes of the old, it is not very hazardous to prophesythat diplomacy, with its secret methods, its belief in phrases andabstract principles, and its assumption of a special professionalknowledge, will find the range of its powers and the sphere of itsauthority sensibly curtailed. 

CHAPTER II

LESSONS OF THE PAST

The problems that lie before us in the reconstitution of Europe are somany and so various that we can only hope to take a few separately, especially those which seem to throw most light on a possible future. Ihave used the phrase "reconstitution of Europe, " because I do not know howotherwise to characterise the general trend of the ideas germinating inmany men's minds as they survey the present crisis and its probableoutcome. Europe will have to be reconstituted in more respects than one. At the present moment, or rather before the present war broke out, it wasgoverned by phrases and conceptions which had become superannuated. Anuneasy equipoise between the Great Powers represented the highestculmination of our diplomatic efforts. Something must clearly besubstituted for this uneasy equipoise. It is not enough that aftertremendous efforts the relative balance of forces between great statesshould, on the whole, dissuade them from war. As a matter of fact, it hasnot done so. The underlying conception has been that nations are soardently bellicose that they require to be restrained from headlongconflicts by the doubtful and dangerous character of such military effortsas might be practicable. Hence Europe, as divided into armed camps, represents one of the old-fashioned ideas that we want to abolish. We wishto put in its stead something like a Concert of Europe. We have before oureyes a vague, but inspiring vision not of tremendous and rival armaments, but of a United States of Europe, each component element striving for thepublic weal, and for further advances in general cultivation and welfarerather than commercial prosperity. The last is a vital point, for it doesnot require much knowledge of modern history to discover that the race forcommercial advantage is exactly one of the reasons why Europe is at war atthe present moment. A vast increase in the commercial prosperity of anyone state means a frantic effort on the part of its rivals to pull downthis advantage. In some fashion, therefore, we have to substitute forendless competition the principle of co-operation, national welfare beingconstrued at the same time not in terms of overwhelming wealth, but ofthorough sanity and health in the body corporate. 

NAKED STRENGTH

All this sounds shadowy and abstruse until it is translated into somethingconcrete and definite. What is it we want to dispossess and banish fromthe Europe of to-day? We have to find something to take the place of whatis called militarism. I dealt with the general features of militarism inmy last essay; I will therefore content myself with saying that militarismin Europe has meant two things above all. First, the worship of might, asexpressed in formidable armaments; next, the corresponding worship ofwealth to enable the burden of armaments to be borne with comparativeease. The worship of naked strength involves several deductions. Rightdisappears, or rather is translated in terms of might. Internationalmorality equally disappears. Individuals, it is true, seek to be governedby the consciousness of universal moral laws. But a nation, as such, hasno conscience, and is not bound to recognise the supremacy of anythinghigher than itself. Morality, though it may bind the individual, does notbind the State, or, as General von Bernhardi has expressed it, "politicalmorality differs from individual morality because there is no power abovethe State. " In similar fashion the worship of wealth carries numerousconsequences with it, which are well worthy of consideration. But the mainpoint, so far as it affects my present argument, is that it substitutesmaterialistic objects of endeavour for ethical and spiritual aims. Oncemore morality is defeated. The ideal is not the supremacy of good, but thesupremacy of that range and sphere of material efficiency that isprocurable by wealth. 

PUBLIC RIGHT

Let us try to be more concrete still, and in this context let us turn tosuch definite statements as are available of the views entertained by ourchief statesmen, politicians, and leaders of public opinion. I turn to thespeech which Mr. Asquith delivered on Friday evening, September 25, inDublin, as part of the crusade which he and others are undertaking for thegeneral enlightenment of the country. "I should like, " said Mr. Asquith, "to ask your attention and that of my fellow-countrymen to the end which, in this war, we ought to keep in view. Forty-four years ago, at the timeof the war of 1870, Mr. Gladstone used these words. He said: 'The greatesttriumph of our time will be the enthronement of the idea of public rightas the governing idea of European politics. ' Nearly fifty years havepassed. Little progress, it seems, has as yet been made towards that goodand beneficent change, but it seems to me to be now at this moment as gooda definition as we can have of our European policy--the idea of publicright. What does it mean when translated into concrete terms? It means, first and foremost, the clearing of the ground by the definite repudiationof militarism as the governing factor in the relation of states and of thefuture moulding of the European world. It means next that room must befound and kept for the independent existence and the free development ofthe smaller nationalities, each with a corporate consciousness of itsown.... And it means, finally, or it ought to mean, perhaps, by a slow andgradual process, the substitution for force, for the clash of competingambition, for groupings and alliances, of a real European partnershipbased on the recognition of equal right and established and enforced by acommon will. "[6]

Much the same language has been used by Sir Edward Grey and by Mr. WinstonChurchill. 

[6] _The Times_, September 26. 

A COMMON WILL

Observe that there are three points here. In the first place--if I do notmisapprehend Mr. Asquith's drift--in working for the abolition ofmilitarism, we are working for a great diminution in those armaments whichhave become a nightmare to the modern world. The second point is that wehave to help in every fashion small nationalities, or, in other words, that we have to see that countries like Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, theScandinavian countries, Greece and the Balkan States, and, perhaps, morespecially, the Slav nationalities shall have a free chance in Europe, shall "have their place in the sun, " and not be browbeaten and raided andoverwhelmed by their powerful neighbours. And the third point, perhapsmore important than all, is the creation of what Mr. Asquith calls a"European partnership based on the recognition of equal right andestablished and enforced by a common will. " We have to recognise thatthere is such a thing as public right; that there is such a thing asinternational morality, and that the United States of Europe have to keepas their ideal the affirmation of this public right, and to enforce it bya common will. That creation of a common will is at once the mostdifficult and the most imperative thing of all. Every one must be awarehow difficult it is. We know, for instance, how the common law is enforcedin any specified state, because it has a "sanction, " or, in other words, because those who break it can be punished. But the weakness for a longtime past of international law, from the time of Grotius onwards, is thatit apparently has no real sanction. How are we to punish an offendingstate? It can only be done by the gradual development of a publicconscience in Europe, and by means of definite agreements so that the restof the civilised world shall compel a recalcitrant member to abide by thecommon decrees. If only this common will of Europe ever came intoexistence, we should have solved most, if not all, our troubles. But thequestion is: How?

A HUNDRED YEARS AGO

It may be depressing, but it certainly is an instructive lesson to go backjust a hundred years ago, when the condition of Europe was in manyrespects similar to that which prevails now. The problems that unrolledthemselves before the nations afford useful points of comparison. Thegreat enemy was then Napoleon and France. Napoleon's views of empire wereprecisely of that universal predatory type which we have learnt toassociate with the Kaiser and the German Empire. The autocratic rule ofthe single personal will was weighing heavily on nearly every quarter ofthe globe. Then came a time when the principle of nationality, whichNapoleon had everywhere defied, gradually grew in strength until it wasable to shake off the yoke of the conqueror. In Germany, and Spain, andItaly the principle of nationality steadily grew, while in England therehad always been a steady opposition to the tyranny of Napoleon on theprecise ground that it interfered with the independent existence ofnations. The defeat of Napoleon, therefore, was hailed by our forefathersa hundred years ago as the dawn of a new era. Four great Powers--GreatBritain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia--had before them as their task thesettlement of Europe, one of the noblest tasks that could possibly beassigned to those who, having suffered under the old regime, were desirousto secure peace and base it on just and equitable foundations. There isthus an obvious parallelism between the conditions of affairs in 1815 andthose which will, as we hope, obtain if and when the German tyrant isdefeated and the nations of Europe commence their solemn task ofreconstituting Europe. Of course, we must not press the analogy too far. The dawn of a new era might have been welcomed in 1815, but the provisowas always kept in the background that most of the older traditions shouldbe preserved. Diplomacy was still inspired by its traditional watchwords. Above all, the transformation so keenly and so vaguely desired was in thehands of sovereigns who were more anxious about their own interests thanperhaps was consistent with the common weal. 

EQUILIBRIUM

At first the four Great Powers proceeded very tentatively. They wished toconfine France--the dangerous element in Europe--within her legitimateboundaries. Next, they desired to arrange an equilibrium of Powers(observe, in passing, the old doctrine of the Balance of Power) so that noindividual state should for the future be in a position to upset thegeneral tranquillity. Revolutionary France was to be held under by there-establishment of its ancient dynasty. Hence Louis XVIII was to berestored. The other object was to be obtained by a careful parcelling outof the various territories of Europe, on the basis, so far as possible, ofold rights consecrated by treaties. It is unnecessary to go into detail inthis matter. We may say summarily that Germany was reconstituted as aConfederation of Sovereign States; Austria received the Presidency of theFederal Diet; in Italy Lombardo-Venetia was erected into a kingdom underAustrian hegemony, while the Low Countries were annexed to the crown ofHolland so as to form, under the title of the United Netherlands, anefficient barrier against French aggression northwards. It was troublesometo satisfy Alexander I of Russia because of his ambition to secure forhimself the kingdom of Poland. Indeed, as we shall see presently, thepersonality of Alexander was a permanent stumbling-block to most of theprojects of European statesmen. As a whole, it cannot be denied that thisparticular period of history, between Napoleon's abdication in 1814 andthe meeting of the European Congress at Verona in 1882, presented aprofoundly distressing picture of international egotism. The ruin of theircommon enemy, relieving the members of the European family from thenecessity of maintaining concord, also released their individualselfishnesses and their long-suppressed mutual jealousies. [7]

[7] See _The Confederation of Europe_, by Walter Alison Phillips(Longmans), esp. Chapters V and VI. Cf. Also _Political and LiteraryEssays_, by the Earl of Cromer, 2nd series (Macmillan), on _TheConfederation of Europe_. 

THE HOLY ALLIANCE

The figure of Alexander I dominates this epoch. His character exhibits avery curious mixture of autocratic ambition and a mystical vein of sheerundiluted idealism. Probably it would be true to say that he began bybeing an idealist, and was forced by the pressure of events to adoptreactionary tactics. Perhaps also, deeply embedded in the Russian naturewe generally find a certain unpracticalness and a tendency to mysticaldreams, far remote from the ordinary necessities of every day. It wasAlexander's dream to found a Union of Europe, and to consecrate itspolitical by its spiritual aims. He retained various nebulous thinkersaround his throne; he also derived much of his crusade from theinspiration of a woman--Baroness von Krüdener, who is supposed to haveowed her own conversion to the teaching of a pious cobbler. Even if wehave to describe Alexander's dream as futile, we cannot afford to dismissit as wholly inoperative. For it had as its fruit the so-called HolyAlliance, which was in a sense the direct ancestor of the peace programmesof the Hague, and, through a different chain of ideas, the Monroe Doctrineof the United States. We are apt sometimes to confuse the Holy Alliancewith the Grand Alliance. The second, however, was a union of the fourGreat Powers, to which France was ultimately admitted. The first was notan alliance at all, hardly, perhaps, even a treaty. It was in its originalconception a single-hearted attempt to arrange Europe on the principles ofthe Christian religion, the various nations being regarded as brothers whoought to have proper brotherly affection for one another. We know that, eventually, the Holy Alliance became an instrument of something likeautocratic despotism, but in its essence it was so far from beingreactionary that, according to the Emperor Alexander, it involved thegrant of liberal constitutions by princes to their subjects. 

DIPLOMATIC CRITICISM

But just because it bound its signatories to act on certain vagueprinciples for no well-defined ends, it was bound to become the mockeryof diplomatists trained in an older school. Metternich, for instance, called it a "loud sounding nothing"; Castlereagh "a piece of sublimemysticism and nonsense, " while Canning declared that for his part hewanted no more of "Areopagus and the like of that. " What happened on thisoccasion is what ordinarily happens with well-intentioned idealists whohappen also to be amateur statesmen. Trying to regulate practicalpolitics, the Holy Alliance was deflected from its original purposebecause its chief author, Alexander I, came under the influence ofMetternich and was frightened by revolutionary movements in Italy andwithin his own dominions. Thus the instrument originally intended topreserve nationalities and secure the constitutional rights of people wasconverted into a weapon for the use of autocrats only anxious to preservetheir own thrones. Nevertheless, though it may have been a failure, theHoly Alliance did not leave itself without witness in the modern world. Ittried to regulate ordinary diplomacy in accordance with ethical andspiritual principles; and the dreaming mind of its first founder wasreproduced in that later descendant of his who initiated the Haguepropaganda of peace. 

FAILURE

"These things were written for our ensamples, " and we should be foolishindeed if we did not take stock of them with an anxious eye to the future. The main and startling fact is that with every apparent desire for there-establishment of Europe on better lines, Europe, as a matter of fact, drifted back into the old welter of conflicting nationalities, while thevery instrument of peace--the Holy Alliance--was used by autocraticgovernments for the subjection of smaller nationalities and thedestruction of popular freedom. It is accordingly very necessary that weshould study the conditions under which so startling a transformation tookplace. Even in England herself it cannot be said that the people were inany sense benefited by the conclusions of the war. They had borne itsburdens, but at its end found themselves hampered as before in the freedevelopment of a democracy. Meanwhile, Europe at large presented aspectacle of despotism tempered by occasional popular outbreaks, while inthe majority of cases the old fetters were riveted anew by cunning and byno means disinterested hands. 

A DECEPTIVE PARALLEL

What we have to ask ourselves is whether the conditions a hundred yearsago have any real similarity with those likely to obtain when Europebegins anew to set its house in order. To this, fortunately, we can returna decided negative. We have already shown that the general outlinespresent a certain similarity, but the parallelism is at most superficial, and in many respects deceptive. A despot has to be overthrown, an end hasto be put to a particular form of autocratic regime, and smaller stateshave to be protected against the exactions of their strongerneighbours--that is the extent of the analogy. But it is to be hoped thatwe shall commence our labours under much better auspices. The personalforces involved, for instance, are wholly different. Amongst those whotook upon themselves to solve the problems of the time is to be found thewidest possible divergence in character and aims. On the one side we havea sheer mystic and idealist in the person of Alexander I, with all kindsof visionary characters at his side--La Harpe, who was his tutor, aJacobin pure and simple, and a fervent apostle of the teachings of JeanJacques Rousseau; Czartoryski, a Pole, sincerely anxious for theregeneration of his kingdom; and Capo d'Istria, a champion of Greeknationality. To these we have to add the curious figure of the Baronessvon Krüdener, an admirable representative of the religious sickliness ofthe age. "I have immense things to say to him, " she said, referring to theEmperor, "the Lord alone can prepare his heart to receive them. " She had, indeed, many things to say to him, but her influence was evanescent andhis Imperial heart was hardened eventually to quite different issues. 

METTERNICH

Absolutely at the other extreme was a man like Metternich, trained in theold school of politics, wily with the wiliness of a practised diplomatictraining, naturally impatient of speculative dreamers, thoroughlypractical in the only sense in which he understood the term, that is tosay, determined to preserve Austrian supremacy. To a reactionary of thiskind the Holy Alliance represented nothing but words. He knew, with thecynicism bred of long experience of mankind, that the rivalries andjealousies between different states would prevent their union in anycommon purpose, and in the long run the intensity with which he pursuedhis objects, narrow and limited as it was, prevailed over the large andvague generosity of Alexander's nature. To the same type belonged bothTalleyrand and Richelieu, who concentrated themselves on the single taskof winning back for France her older position in the Europeancommonwealth--a laudable aim for patriots to espouse, but one which wasnot likely to help the cause of the Holy Alliance. 

CASTLEREAGH AND CANNING

Half-way between these two extremes of unpractical idealists and extremelypractical but narrow-minded reactionaries come the English statesmen, Castlereagh, Wellington, and Canning. Much injustice has been done to thefirst of these. For many critics have been misled by Byron's denunciationof Castlereagh, just as others have spoken lightly of the stubbornconservatism of Wellington, or the easy and half-cynical insouciance ofthe author of the _Anti-Jacobin_. As a matter of fact, Castlereagh was byno means an opponent of the principles of the Holy Alliance. He joinedwith Russia, Austria, and Prussia as a not unwilling member of thesuccessive Congresses, but both he and Wellington, true to their nationalinstincts, sought to subordinate all proposals to the interests of GreatBritain, and to confine discussions to immediate objects, such as thelimitation of French power and the suppression of dangerous revolutionaryideas. They were not, it is true, idealists in the sense in whichAlexander I understood the term. And yet, on the whole, both Castlereaghand Canning did more for the principle of nationality than any of theother diplomatists of the time. The reason why Canning broke with the HolyAlliance, after Troppau, Laibach, and Verona, was because he discernedsomething more than a tendency on the part of Continental States to crushthe free development of peoples, especially in reference to theLatin-American States of South America. It is true that in these mattershe and his successor were guided by a shrewd notion of British interest, but it would be hardly just to blame them on this account. "You know mypolitics well enough, " wrote Canning in 1822 to the British Ambassador inSt. Petersburg, "to know what I mean when I say that for Europe I shouldbe desirous now and then to read England. " Castlereagh was, no doubt, moreconciliatory than Canning, but he saw the fundamental difficulty oforganising an international system and yet holding the balance betweenconflicting nations. And thus we get to a result such as seems to haverejoiced the heart of Canning, when he said in 1823 that "the issue ofVerona has split the one and indivisible alliance into three parts asdistinct as the constitutions of England, France, and Muscovy. " "Thingsare getting back, " he added, "to a wholesome state again. Every nation foritself and God for us all. Only bid your Emperor (Alexander I) be quiet, for the time for Areopagus and the like of that is gone by. "[8]

[8] _The Confederation of Europe_, by W. A. Phillips, p. 280. 

EARTHEN VESSELS

If, then, the ardent hopes of a regenerated Europe in the early years ofthe nineteenth century failed, the result was due in large measure to thefact that the business was committed to wrong hands. The organs forworking the change were for the most part autocratic monarchs andold-world diplomatists--the last people in the world likely to bring abouta workable millennium. A great crisis demands very careful manipulation. Cynicism must not be allowed to play any part in it. Traditionalwatchwords are not of much use. Theoretical idealism itself may turn outto be a most formidable stumbling-block. Yet no one can doubt that asolution of the problem, whenever it is arrived at, must come along thepath of idealism. Long ago a man of the world was defined as a man who inevery serious crisis is invariably wrong. He is wrong because he appliesold-fashioned experience to a novel situation--old wine in newbottles--and because he has no faith in generous aspirations, having notedtheir continuous failure in the past. Yet, after all, it is only faithwhich can move mountains, and the Holy Alliance itself was not so muchwrong in the principles to which it appealed as it was in the personageswho signed it. We have noticed already that, like all other great ideas, it did not wholly die. The propaganda of peace, however futile may be someof the discussions of pacifists, is the heritage which even sowrong-headed a man as Alexander I has left to the world. The idea ofarbitration between nations, the solution of difficulties by argumentsrather than by swords, the power which democracies hold in their hands forguiding the future destinies of the world--all these in their variousforms remain with us as legacies of that splendid, though ineffective, idealism which lay at the root of the Holy Alliance. 

SMALL NATIONALITIES

And now after this digression, which has been necessary to clear theground, and also to suggest apt parallels, let us return to what Mr. Asquith said in Dublin on the ultimate objects of the present war. Heborrowed from Mr. Gladstone the phrase "the enthronement of the idea ofpublic right as the governing idea of European politics, " and indeveloping it as applicable to the present situation he pointed out thatfor us three definite objects are involved. The first, assented to byevery publicist of the day, apart from those educated in Germany, is thewholesale obliteration of the notion that states exist simply for the sakeof going to war. This kind of militarism, in all its different aspects, will have to be abolished. The next point brings us at once to the heartof some of the controversies raised in 1815 and onwards. "Room, " said Mr. Asquith--agreeing in this matter with Mr. Winston Churchill--"room must befound, and kept, for the independent existence and the free development ofthe smaller nationalities, each with a corporate consciousness of itsown. " Now this is a plain issue which every one can understand. Not onlydid we go to war in order to help a small nationality--Belgium--but thevery principle of nationality is one of the familiar phrases which havecharacterised British policy through the greater part of the nineteenthcentury. Our principle is to live and let live, to allow smaller states toexist and thrive by the side of their large neighbours without undueinterference on the part of the latter. Each distinct nationality is tohave its voice, at all events, in the free direction of its own future. And, above all, its present and future position must be determined not bythe interests of the big Powers, but by a sort of plebiscite of the wholenationality. 

SOME PLAIN ISSUES

Applying such principles to Europe as it exists to-day, and as it islikely to exist to-morrow, we arrive at certain very definite conclusions. The independence of Belgium must be secured, so also must the independenceof Holland and Denmark. Alsace and Lorraine must, if the inhabitants sowish, be restored to France, and there can be little doubt that Alsace atall events will be only too glad to resume her old allegiance to theFrench nation. The Duchies of Schleswig-Holstein must also decide whetherthey would like to be reunited to Denmark. And we are already aware thatthe Tsar has promised to give independence to the country of Poland--apoint which forms a curious analogy with the same offer originallyproposed by the Tsar's ancestor, Alexander I. Of course, these do notexhaust by any means the changes that must be forthcoming. Finland willhave to be liberated; those portions of Transylvania which are akin toRoumania must be allowed to gravitate towards their own stock. Italy mustarrogate to herself--if she is wise enough to join her forces with thoseof the Triple Entente--those territories which come under the generaltitle of "unredeemed Italy"--the Trentino and Trieste, to say nothing ofwhat Italy claims on the Adriatic littoral. Possibly the greatest changesof all will take place in reference to the Slavs. Servia and Montenegrowill clearly wish to incorporate in a great Slav kingdom a great many oftheir kinsmen who at present are held in uneasy subjection by Austria. [9]Nor must we forget how these same principles apply to the Teutonic States. If the principle of nationality is to guide us, we must preserve theGerman nation, even though we desire to reduce its dangerous elements toimpotence. Prussia must remain the home of all those Germans who acceptthe hegemony of Berlin, but it does not follow that the southern states ofthe German Empire--who have not been particularly fond of their northernneighbours--should have to endure any longer the Prussian yoke. Lastly, the German colonies can hardly be permitted to remain under the dominionof the Kaiser. [10] Here are only a few of the changes which maymetamorphose the face of Europe as a direct result of enforcing theprinciple of nationalities. 

[9] The entrance of Turkey into the quarrel of course brings new factorsinto the ultimate settlement. 

[10] Cf. _Who is Responsible?_ by Cloudesley Brereton (Harrap), ChapterIV, "The Settlement. "

EUROPEAN PARTNERSHIP

But there is a further point to which Mr. Asquith referred, one which ismore important than anything else, because it represents the far-off idealof European peace and the peace of the world. "We have got to substituteby a slow and gradual process, " said Mr. Asquith, "instead of force, instead of the clash of compelling ambition, instead of groupings andalliances, a real European partnership, based on the recognition of equalright and established and enforced by a common will. " There we have thewhole crux of the situation, and, unfortunately, we are forced to add, itsmain difficulty. For if we desire to summarise in a single sentence therock on which European negotiations from 1815 to 1829 ultimately split, itwas the union of two such contradictory things as independentnationalities and an international committee or system of public law. Intrinsically the two ideas are opposed, for one suggests absolutefreedom, and the other suggests control, superintendence, interference. Ifthe one recognises the entire independence of a nationality within its ownlimits, the other seeks to enforce something of the nature of a Europeanpolice to see that every nation does its duty. It is true, of course, thatthis public will of Europe must be incorporated in a kind of parliament, to which the separate nations must send their representatives, and thatthus in a fashion each nation will have its proper say in any of theconclusions arrived at. But here the difficulty starts anew owing to therelative size, and therefore the relative importance of the differentstates constituting the union. If all alike are given an equivalent vote, it is rather hard on the big states, which represent larger numbers andtherefore control larger destinies. If, on the other hand, we adopt theprinciple of proportional representation, we may be pretty certain thatthe larger states will press somewhat heavily on the smaller. Forinstance, suppose that some state violates, or threatens to violate, thepublic law of the world. In that case the Universal Union must, of course, try to bring it to reason by peaceful means first, but if that shouldfail, the only other alternative is by force of arms. If once we admit theright of the world-organisation to coerce its recalcitrant members, whatbecomes of the sovereign independence of nations? That, as we have said, was the main difficulty confronting the European peace-maker of a hundredyears ago, and, however we may choose to regard it, it remains adifficulty, we will not say insuperable, but at all events exceedinglyformidable, for the European peace-makers of the twentieth century. Theantithesis is the old antithesis between order and progress; betweencoercion and independence; between the public voice, or, if we like tophrase it so, the public conscience, and the arbitrariness andirresponsibility of individual units. Or we might put the problem in astill wider form. A patriot is a man who believes intensely in the rightsof his own nationality. But if we have to form a United States of Europewe shall have gradually to soften, diminish, or perhaps even destroy thenarrower conceptions of patriotism. The ultimate evolution of democracy inthe various peoples means the mutual recognition of their commoninterests, as against despotism and autocracy. It is clear that such aprocess must gradually wipe out the distinction between the differentpeoples, and substitute for particularism something of universal import. In such a process what, we ask once more, becomes of the principle ofnationality, which is one of our immediate aims? In point of fact, it isobvious that, from a strictly logical standpoint, the will of Europe, orthe public right of Europe, and the free independence of nationalities areantithetical terms, and will continue to remain so, however cunningly, bya series of compromises, we may conceal their essential divergence. Thatis the real problem which confronts us quite as obstinately as it did ourforefathers after the destruction of the Napoleonic power. And it willhave to be faced by all reformers, whether they are pacifists oridealists, on ethical or political grounds. 

A MORAL FOR PACIFISTS

What is the outcome of the foregoing considerations? The only moral atpresent which I am disposed to draw is one which may be addressed topacifists in general, and to all those who avail themselves of large andgenerous phrases, such as "the public will of Europe, " or "the commonconsciousness of civilised states. " The solution of the problem before usis not to be gained by the use of abstract terms, but by very definite andconcrete experience used in the most practical way to secure immediatereforms. We demand, for instance, the creation of what is to all intentsand purposes an international federal system applied to Europe at large. Now it is obvious that a federal system can be created amongst nationsmore or less at the same level of civilisation, inspired by much the sameideals, acknowledging the same end of their political and social activity. But in what sense is this true of Europe as we know it? There is everykind of diversity between the constituent elements of the suggestedfederation. There is no real uniformity of political institutions andideals. But in order that our object may be realised it is precisely thisuniformity of political institutions and ideals amongst the nations whichwe require. How is a public opinion formed in any given state? It comesinto being owing to a certain community of sentiments, opinions, andprejudices, and without such community it cannot develop. The same thingholds true of international affairs. If we desiderate the public voice ofEurope, or the public conscience of Europe, Europe must grow to be farmore concordant than it is at present, both in actual politicalinstitutions and in those inspiring ideals which form the life-blood ofinstitutions. How many states, for instance, recognise or put intopractice a really representative system of government?

COMPULSORY ARBITRATION

If we turn to the programme of the pacifists, we shall be confronted bysimilar difficulties. Pacifism, as such, involves an appeal to all thedemocracies, asking them to come into line, as it were, for the executionof certain definite projects intended to seek peace and ensure it. Thefirst stage of the peace movement is the general recognition of theprinciple of arbitration between states. That first period has, we maytake it, been already realised. The second stage is the recognition ofcompulsory arbitration. When, in 1907, the second Hague Conference washeld, this principle was supported by thirty-two different states, representing more than a thousand million human beings. Something likethree or four hundred millions remained not yet prepared to admit theprinciple in its entirety. I may remark in passing that the verbalacceptance of a general principle is one thing, the application, as wehave lately had much reason to discover, is quite another. We mayrecognise, however, that this second stage of the pacifist programme has, undoubtedly, made large advances. But of course it must necessarily befollowed by its consequence, a third stage which shall ensure respect for, and obedience to arbitration verdicts. Recalcitrant states will have to becoerced, and the one thing that can coerce them is an international policeadministered by an international executive power. That is to say, we musthave a parliament of parliaments, a universal parliament, therepresentatives of which must be selected by the different constituentmembers of the United States of Europe. When this has been done, and onlywhen this has been done, can we arrive at a fourth stage, that of ageneral disarmament. In the millennium that is to be it is only theinternational police which shall be allowed to use weapons of war in orderto execute the decrees of the central parliament representing the commonEuropean will. 

DEMOCRATIC UNANIMITY

Here we have all the old difficulties starting anew, and especially themain one--democratic unanimity. How far the democracies of the EuropeanCommonwealth can work in unison is one of the problems which the futurewill have to solve. At present they, obviously, do not do so. The SocialDemocrats of Germany agreed to make war on the democrats of othercountries. Old instincts were too strong for them. For it must always beremembered that only so far as a cosmopolitan spirit takes the place ofnarrow national prejudices can we hope to reach the level of a commonconscience, or a common will of Europe. And are we prepared to say thatnational prejudices _ought_ to be obliterated and ignored? The veryprinciple of nationality forbids it. 

I do not wish, however, to end on a note of pessimism. The mistake of thepacifist has all along been the assumption that bellicose impulses havedied away. They have done nothing of the kind, and are not likely to doso. But, happily, all past experience in the world's history shows us thatideas in a real sense govern the world, and that a logical difficulty isnot necessarily a practical impossibility. In this case, as in others, anoble and generous idea of European peace will gradually work its ownfulfilment, if we are not in too much of a hurry to force the pace, orimagine that the ideal has been reached even before the preliminaryfoundations have been laid. 

CHAPTER III

SOME SUGGESTED REFORMS

It is an obvious criticism on the considerations which have been occupyingus in the preceding chapters that they are too purely theoretical to be ofany value. They are indeed speculative, and, perhaps, from one point ofview come under the edge of the usual condemnation of prophecy. Prophecyis, of course, if one of the most interesting, also one of the mostdangerous of human ingenuities, and the usual fate of prophets is, in ninecases out of ten, to be proved wrong. Moreover, it is possible that theremay come an issue to the present war which would be by far the worst whichthe human mind can conceive. It may end in a deadlock, a stalemate, animpasse, because the two opposing forces are so equal that neither sidecan get the better of the other. If peace has to be made because of such abalance between the opposing forces as this, it would be a calamity almostworse than the original war. German militarism would still be unsubdued, the Kaiser's pretensions to universal sovereignty, although clipped, wouldnot be wiped out, and we should find remaining in all the nations of theearth a sort of sullen resentment which could not possibly lead toanything else than a purely temporary truce. The only logical object ofwar is to make war impossible, and if merely an indecisive result wereachieved in the present war, it would be as certain as anything human canbe that a fresh war would soon arise. At the present moment we confessthat there is an ugly possibility of this kind, and that it is one of themost formidable perils of future civilisation. 

AN IGNOBLE PACIFICATION

It is so immensely important, however, that the cause of the Allies shouldprevail not for their own sakes alone, but for the sake of the world, thatit is difficult to imagine their consenting to an ignoble pacification. The Allies have signed an important document, in order to prove theirsolidarity, that no one of them will sign peace without the sanction ofthe other partners. Let us suppose that the rival armies have fought eachother to a standstill; let us suppose that France is exhausted; let usfurther suppose that the German troops, by their mobility and theirtactical skill, are able to hold the Russians in the eastern sphere ofwar. We can suppose all these things, but what we cannot imagine even fora moment is that Great Britain--to confine ourselves only to our owncase--will ever consent to stop until she has achieved her object. Americamay strive to make the combatants desist from hostilities, partly becauseshe is a great pacific power herself, and partly because it is a practicalobject with her as a commercial nation to secure tranquil conditions. Yet, even so, there would be no answer to the question which most thoughtfulminds would propound: Why did we go to war, and what have we gained by thewar? If we went to war for large cosmic purposes, then we cannot consentto a peace which leaves those ultimate purposes unfulfilled. I think, therefore, we can put aside this extremely uncomfortable suggestion thatthe war may possibly end in a deadlock, because, in the last resort, GreatBritain, with her fleet, her sister dominions over the seas, her colonies, and her eastern ally Japan, will always, to use the familiar phrase, have"something up her sleeve, " even though continental nations should reach apitch of absolute exhaustion. 

A NEW EUROPE

It follows then that, even if we admit the purely speculative character ofour argument, it is not only right and proper, but absolutely necessarythat we should prepare ourselves for something which we can reallydescribe as a new Europe. Thoughtful minds ought imaginatively to putthemselves in the position of a spectator of a reconstituted world, orrather of a world that waits to be reconstituted. It is necessary thatthis should be done, because so many older prejudices have to be sweptaway, so many novel conceptions have to be entertained. Let us take only asingle example. If we look back over history, we shall see that all thegreat nations have made themselves great by war. There is a possibleexception in the case of Italy, whose present greatness has flowed fromloyal help rendered her by other kindred nations, and by realising forherself certain large patriotic ideals entertained by great minds. But forthe majority of nations it is certainly true that they have fought theirway into the ranks of supreme powers. From this the deduction is easy thatgreatness depends on the possession of formidable military power. Indeed, all the arguments of those who are very anxious that we should not reduceour armaments is entirely based on this supposition. The strong man armedkeepeth his goods in peace; his only fear is that a stronger man may comewith better arms and take away his possessions. Now if the new Europedawns not indeed for those who are past middle age--for they will havedied before its realisation--but for the younger generation for whose sakewe are bearing the toil and burden of the day, the one thing which isabsolutely necessary is that the index of greatness must no longer befound in armies and navies. Clearly it will take a long time for men toget used to this novel conception. Inveterate prejudices will stand in theway. We shall be told over and over again that peace-lovers are nopatriots; that imperialism demands the possible sacrifice of our manhoodto the exigencies of war; and that the only class of men who are everrespected in this world are those who can fight. And so, even though wehave had ocular demonstration of the appalling ruin which militarism canproduce, we may yet, if we are not careful, forget all our experience anddrift back into notions which are not really separable from preciselythose ideas which we are at present reprobating in the German nation. Thereal test is this: Is, or is not, war a supreme evil? It is no answer tothis question to suggest that war educes many splendid qualities. Ofcourse it does. And so, too, does exploration of Polar solitudes, or evenclimbing Alpine or Himalayan heights. Either war is a detestable solutionof our difficulties, or it is not. If it is not, then we have no rightwhatsoever to object to the Prussian ideal. But if it is, let us call itby its proper name. Let us say that it is devil's work, and have done withit. 

EVIL OF ARMAMENTS

We are trying not only to understand what Europe will be like if, as wehope, this war ends successfully for the Allies, but what sort of newEurope it will be in the hands of the conquerors to frame. Those who comeafter us are to find in that new Europe real possibilities of advance inall the higher kinds of civilisation. Not only are the various states tocontain sane and healthy people who desire to live in peace with theirneighbours, but people who will desire to realise themselves in science, in philosophic thought, in art, in literature. What is an indispensablecondition for an evolution of this sort? It must be the absence of alluneasiness, the growth of a serene confidence and trust, the obliterationof envy, jealousy, and every kind of unreasonableness. The cause, aboveall others, which has produced an opposite condition of things, which hascreated the unfortunate Europe in which we have hitherto had to live, isthe growth and extension of armaments. The main factor, then, in ourproblem is the existence of such swollen armaments as have wasted theresources of every nation and embittered the minds of rival peoples. Howare we to meet this intolerable evil of armaments?

ABSENCE OF PROVOCATION

In the first place, let us remark that on our supposition--the eventualvictory of the Allies--one of the great disturbing elements will have beenput out of the field. Europe has hitherto been lulled into an uneasy andfractious sleep by the balance of two great organisations. Under thehappiest hypothesis the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente will havedisappeared into the deep backward and abysm of time. For all practicalpurposes there will be no Triple Alliance, and therefore no Triple Ententeto confront it. With Austria wiped out of the map for all purposes ofoffence, and Germany restricted within modest dimensions, the three powersof the Triple Entente--Great Britain, France, and Russia--can do what theylike, and as they are sworn friends and allies they can take their ownsteps undisturbed by fears of hostile combinations. Why should thesethree allies consent any further to keep up bloated armaments? It isagainst their own interests and against the interests of the world. Solong as Germany existed as a power and developed her own ambitions, wewere always on the edge of a catastrophe. With the conquest of Germanythat nightmare will have gone. And observe some of the consequences whichmust inevitably follow. It was against the menace of Germany that Francehad to pass her three years' law of military service: in the absence ofthe German army France can reduce as she pleases her militaryestablishment. It was against the menace of a German fleet that we had toincur an outlay of millions of pounds: in the absence of the German fleetwe, too, can do what we please. It is certain also that Russia, so long asthe deep-seated antagonism between Teuton and Slav remained, was understrong compulsion to reform and reinforce her army. 

FEAR OF RUSSIA

There may, it is true, remain in some minds a certain fear about Russia, because it is difficult to dispel the old conception of a great despoticRussian autocracy, or, if we like to say so, a semi-eastern andhalf-barbarous power biding her time to push her conquests both towardsthe rising and the setting sun. But many happy signs of quite a new spiritin Russia have helped to allay our fears. It looks as if a reformed Russiamight arise, with ideas of constitutionalism and liberty and a much truerconception of what the evolution of a state means. At the very beginningof the war the Tsar issued a striking proclamation to the Poles, promisingthem a restoration of the national freedom which they had lost a centuryand a half previously. This doubtless was a good stroke of policy, butalso it seemed something more--a proof of that benevolent idealism whichbelongs to the Russian nature, and of which the Tsar himself has givenmany signs. Of the three nations who control the Poles, the Austrians havedone most for their subjects: at all events, the Poles under Austriancontrol are supposed to be the most happy and contented. Then come theRussian Poles. But the Poles under German government are the mostmiserable of all, mainly because all German administration is somechanical, so hard, in a real sense so inhuman. But this determination ofthe Tsar to do some justice to the Polish subjects is not the only sign ofa newer spirit we have to deal with. There was also a proclamationpromising liberty to the Jews--a very necessary piece of reform--andgiving, as an earnest of the good intentions of the Government, commissions to Jews in the army. Better than all other evidence is theextraordinary outburst of patriotic feeling in all sections of the Russianpeople. It looks as if this war has really united Russia in a sense inwhich it has never been united before. When we see voluntary serviceoffered on the part of those who hitherto have felt themselves the victimsof Russian autocracy, we may be pretty certain that even the reformers inthe great northern kingdom have satisfied themselves that theirlong-deferred hopes may at length gain fulfilment. Nor ought we to forgetthat splendid act of reform which has abolished the Imperial monopoly ofthe sale of vodka. If by one stroke of the pen the Tsar can sacrificeninety-three millions of revenue in order that Russia may be sober, it isnot very extravagant to hope that in virtue of the same kind of benevolentdespotism Russia may secure a liberal constitution and the Russian peoplebe set free. [11]

[11] See _Our Russian Ally_, by Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace (Macmillan). 

MILITARY AUTOCRACY

The end of a great war, however, has one inevitable result, that it leavesa military autocracy in supreme control of affairs. The armies which havewon the various campaigns, the generals who have led them, theCommanders-in-Chief who have carried out the successful strategy, theseare naturally left with almost complete authority in their hands. Wellington, for instance, a hundred years ago, held an extraordinarilystrong position in deciding the fate of Europe. And so, too, did theRussian Tsar, whose armies had done so much to destroy the legend ofNapoleonic invincibility. Similar conditions must be expected on thepresent occasion. And, perhaps, the real use of diplomats, if they areprudent and level-headed men, is to control the ambitions of the militaryelement, to adopt a wider outlook, to consider the ultimate consequencesrather than the immediate effects of things. It would indeed be alamentable result if a war which was intended to destroy militarism inEurope should end by setting up militarism in high places. 

LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS

Thus we seem to see still more clearly than before that the size ofarmaments in Europe constitutes a fundamental problem with which we haveto grapple. Every soldier, as a matter of course, believes in militaryarmaments, and is inclined to exaggerate their social and not merely theiroffensive value. Those of us who are not soldiers, but who are interestedin the social and economic development of the nation, know, on thecontrary, that the most destructive and wasteful form of expenditure isthat which is occupied with armaments grown so bloated that they go far torender the most pressing domestic reforms absolutely impossible. How, then, can we limit the size of armaments? What provision can we make tokeep in check that desire to fortify itself, to entrench itself in anabsolutely commanding position, which inherently belongs to the militarymind? In the case of both navies and armies something depends ongeographical conditions, and something on financial possibilities. Thefirst represents, as it were, the minimum required for safety; the secondthe maximum burden which a state can endure without going intobankruptcy. [12] Our own country, we should say, requires fleets, so far asgeographical conditions are concerned, for the protection of her shores, and, inasmuch as she is a scattered empire, we must have our warships inall the Seven Seas. France, in her turn, requires a navy which shallprotect her in the Mediterranean, and especially render access easy toher North African possessions. On the supposition that she is good friendswith England, she does not require ships in the North Sea or in theEnglish Channel, while, vice versa, England, so long as France is strongin the Mediterranean, need only keep quite small detachments at Gibraltar, Malta, and elsewhere. Russia must have a fleet for the Baltic, and also afleet in the Black Sea. Beyond that her requirements assuredly do not go. Italy's activities are mainly in the Mediterranean. Under the suppositionthat she is conquered, Germany stands in some danger of losing her navyaltogether. 

[12] Brailsford's _War of Steel and Gold_: Chap. IX. 

PROTECTION OF COMMERCE

It is obvious, therefore, that if we confine ourselves purely togeographical conditions, and adhere to the principle that navies arerequired for the protection of coasts, we can at once reduce, withinrelatively small limits, the building of armoured ships. The reason whylarge navies have hitherto been necessary is because it has been assumedthat they do not merely protect coasts, but protect lines of commerce. Wehave been told, for instance, that inasmuch as we cannot feed our ownpopulation, and our national food comes to us from Canada, America, theArgentine, Russia, and elsewhere, we must possess a very large amount ofcruisers to safeguard the ships that are conveying to us our daily bread. If we ask why our ships must not only protect our shores, but ourmerchandise--the latter being for the most part a commercial enterpriseworked by individual companies--the answer turns on that much-discussedprinciple, the Right of Capture at Sea, which was debated at the lastHague Conference, and as a matter of fact stoutly defended both by Germanyand ourselves. If we look at this doctrine--the supposed right that apower possesses to capture the merchandise of private individuals whobelong to an enemy country in times of war--we shall perhaps feel somesurprise that a principle which is not admitted in land warfare shouldstill prevail at sea. According to the more benevolent notions ofconducting a campaign suggested, and indeed enforced by Hague Conventionsand such like, an army has no right to steal the food of a country whichit has invaded. It must pay for what it takes. Well-conducted armies, as amatter of fact, behave in this fashion: the necessity of paying for whatthey take is very strictly enforced by responsible officers. Why, therefore, at sea an opposite state of affairs should prevail is reallynot easy to understand. Most of the enemy's merchant ships which have beencaptured in the recent war belong to private individuals, or privatecompanies. But they are taken, subject to the decision of Prize Courts, aspart of the spoils of a successful maritime power. I am aware that thequestion is an exceedingly controversial one, and that Great Britain hashitherto been very firm, or, perhaps, I might be allowed to say, obstinatein upholding the law of capture at sea. But I also know that a great manycompetent lawyers and politicians do not believe in the validity of such aprinciple, and would not be sorry to have it abolished. [13] At all events, it is clear enough that if it were abolished one of the main arguments forkeeping up a strong navy would fall to the ground. We should then requireno patrol of cruisers in the Atlantic, in the Pacific, and in theMediterranean. One thing at least is certain, that if we can ever arriveat a time when a real Concert of Europe prevails, one of the first thingswhich it must take in hand is a thorough examination of the extent ofdefensive force which a nation requires as a minimum for the preservationof its independence and liberty. 

[13] Notably Lord Loreburn, in his _Capture at Sea_ (Methuen). 

TRADE IN ARMAMENTS

Certainly one crying evil exists which ought to be dealt with promptly andeffectively in accordance with the dictates of common sense as well ascommon morality. I refer to the trade in armaments carried on by privatecompanies, whose only interest it is to foment, or perhaps actually toproduce, war scares in order that munitions of war may be greedilypurchased. A notorious example is furnished by the great works at Essenowned by Krupp. In the same position are the great French works atCreusot, owned by Schneider, and those of our own English firms, Armstrongs, Vickers, John Brown, and Cammell Laird. These are allsuccessful concerns, and the shareholders have reaped large profits. Ibelieve that at Creusot the dividends have reached twenty per cent. , andArmstrongs yield rarely less than ten per cent. It is necessary to speakvery plainly about industries of this kind, because, however we like tophrase it, they represent the realisation of private profit through theinstruments of death and slaughter. It would be bad enough if theyremained purely private companies, but they really represent the mostsolid public organisations in the world. We know the intimate relationsbetween Krupp and the German Government, and doubtless also betweenMessrs. Schneider and the French Government. This sordid manufacture ofthe instruments of death constitutes a vast business, with all kinds oframifications, and the main and deadly stigma on it is that it is bound toencourage and promote war. Let me quote some energetic sentences from Mr. H. G. Wells on this point: "Kings and Kaisers must cease to be commercialtravellers of monstrous armament concerns.... I do not need to argue, whatis manifest, what every German knows, what every intelligent educated manin the world knows. The Krupp concern and the tawdry Imperialism of Berlinare linked like thief and receiver; the hands of the German princes aredirty with the trade. All over the world statecraft and royalty have beenapproached and touched and tainted by these vast firms, but it is inBerlin that the corruption is centred, it is from Berlin that theintolerable pressure to arm and still to arm has come. "[14]

What is the obvious cure for this state of things? It stares us in theface. Governments alone should be allowed to manufacture weapons. Thisought not to be an industry left in private hands. If a nation, throughits accredited representatives, thinks it is necessary to arm itself, itmust keep in its own hands this lethal industry. Beyond the Governmentfactories there clearly ought to be no making of weapons all over Europeand the world. 

[14] There are one or two pamphlets on this subject which are worthconsulting, especially _The War Traders_, by G. H. Perris (National PeaceCouncil, St. Stephen's House, Westminster), and _The War Trust Exposed_, by J. F. Walton Newbold (the National Leader Press, Manchester). See also_The War of Steel and Gold_, by H. N. Brailsford, Chapter II, "RealPolitics, " p. 89. The sentences quoted from Mr. Wells come from _The Warthat will end War_ (F. And C. Palmer), p. 39. 

FINANCIAL INTERESTS

It has already been remarked that the conditions which limit and controlthe size of armaments are partly geographical and partly financial, andthat while the former represent the minimum, the latter stand for themaximum of protective force. I need say nothing further about thegeographical conditions. Every one who studies a map can see for himselfwhat is required by a country anxious to protect its shores or itsboundaries. If we suppose that armaments are strictly limited to the needsof self-defence, and if we further assume that in the new Europe countriesare not animated by the strongest dislikes against one another, but areprepared to live and let live (a tolerably large assumption, I am aware), we can readily imagine a steady process of curtailment in the absolutelynecessary armament. Further, if Great Britain gave up its doctrine of theRight of Capture at Sea (and if Great Britain surrendered it, we may bepretty sure that, after Germany has been made powerless, no other countrywould wish to retain it), the supposed necessity of protecting lines ofcommerce would disappear and a further reduction in cruisers would takeplace. I cannot imagine that either America or Japan would wish to revivethe Right of Capture theory if we ourselves had given it up. And they arethe most important maritime and commercial nations after ourselves. [15]

The financial conditions, however, deserve study because they leadstraight to the very heart of the modern bellicose tendencies. In anobvious and superficial sense, financial conditions represent the maximumin the provision of armaments, because ultimately it becomes a question ofhow much a nation can afford to spend without going bankrupt or beingfatally hampered in its expenditure on necessary social reforms. This, however, is not perhaps the most significant point. Financial conditionsact much more subtly than this. Why has it grown so imperative on statesto have large armies or large navies, or both? Because--so we have beentold over and over again--diplomacy cannot speak with effect unless it isbacked by power. And what are the main occasions on which diplomacy has tospeak effectively? We should be inclined to answer off-hand that it mustpossess this stentorian power when there is any question about nationalhonour--when the country for whom it speaks is insulted or bullied, ordefrauded of its just rights; when treaties are torn up and disregarded;when its plighted word has been given and another nation acts as though nosuch pledge had been made; when its territory is menaced with invasion andso forth. 

[15] As a matter of fact, the United States are opposed to the Capture atSea principle. 

PROTECTION OF FINANCIERS

But these justifiable occasions do not exhaust the whole field. Sometimesdiplomacy is brought to bear on much more doubtful issues. It is used tosupport the concession-hunter, and to coerce a relatively powerless nationto grant concessions. It backs up a bank which has financed a company tobuild railroads or develop the internal resources of a country; or toexploit mines or oil-fields, or to do those thousand-and-one things whichconstitute what is called "peaceful penetration. " Think of the recentdealings with Turkey, [16] and the international rivalry, always suspiciousand inflammatory, which has practically divided up her Asiatic dominionsbetween European States--so that Armenia is to belong to Russia, Syria toFrance, Arabia to Great Britain, and Anatolia and I know not what besidesto Germany! Think of the competition for the carrying out of railways inAsia Minor and the constant friction as to which power has obtained, byfair means or foul, the greatest influence! Or let us remember the recentdisputes as to the proper floating of a loan to China and the bickeringabout the Five-Power Group and the determination on the part of the lastnamed that no one else should share the spoil! Or shall we transfer ourattention to Mexico, where the severe struggle between the two rival OilCompanies--the Cowdray group and the American group--threw into the shadethe quarrel between Huerta and Carranza? These are only a few instancestaken at random to illustrate the dealings of modern finance. Relativelysmall harm would be done if financiers were allowed to fight out their ownquarrels. Unfortunately, however, diplomacy is brought in to support thisside or that: and ambassadors have to speak in severe terms if a Chinesemandarin does not favour our so-called "nationals, " or if corrupt Turkishofficials are not sufficiently squeezable to suit our "patriotic"purposes. Our armaments are big not merely to protect the nation's honour, but to provide large dividends for speculative concerns held in privatehands. 

[16] Turkey has now thrown in her lot with Germany. 

INVESTING MONEY ABROAD

The truth is, of course, that the honourable name of commerce is now usedto cover very different kinds of enterprise. We used to export goods; nowwe export cash. Wealthy men, not being content with the sound, but notmagnificent interest on home securities, take their money abroad andinvest in extremely remunerative--though of course speculative--businessesin South Africa, or South America, concerned with rubber, petroleum, orwhatnot. Often they subscribe to a foreign loan--in itself a perfectlylegitimate and harmless operation, but not harmless or legitimate if oneof the conditions of the loan is that the country to which it is lentshould purchase its artillery from Essen or Creusot, or its battleshipsfrom our yards. For that is precisely one of the ways in which the trafficin munitions of war goes on increasing and itself helps to bring about aconflagration. Financial enterprise is, of course, the life-blood ofmodern states. But why should our army and navy be brought in to protectfinanciers? Let them take their own risks, like every other man whopursues a hazardous path for his own private gain. Private investment inforeign securities does not increase the volume of a nation's commerce. The individual may make a colossal fortune, but the nation pays much toodearly for the enrichment of financiers if it allows itself to be draggedinto war on account of their "_beaux yeux_. "

IDEAL AIMS

It is time to gather together in a summary fashion some of theconsiderations which have been presented to us in the course of ourinquiry. We have gone to war partly for direct, partly for indirectobjects. The direct objects are the protection of small nationalities, thedestruction of a particularly offensive kind of militarism in Germany, thesecuring of respect for treaties, and the preservation of our own andEuropean liberty. But there are also indirect objects at which we have toaim, and it is here, of course, that the speculative character of ourinquiry is most clearly revealed. Apart from the preservation of thesmaller nationalities, Mr. Asquith has himself told us that we should aimat the organisation of a Public Will of Europe, a sort of CollectiveConscience which should act as a corrective of national defects and as asupport of international morality. Nothing could well be more speculativeor vague than this, and we have already seen the kind of difficultieswhich surround the conception, especially the conflict between acollective European constraint and an eager and energetic patriotism. Wemust not, however, be deterred by the nebulous character of some of theideals which are floating through our minds. Ideals are always nebulous, and always resisted by the narrow sort of practical men who suggest thatwe are metaphysical dreamers unaware of the stern facts of life. Nevertheless, the actual progress of the world depends on the visions ofidealists, and when the time comes for the reconstitution of Europe on anew basis we must already have imaginatively thought out some of the endstowards which we are striving. We must also be careful not to narrow ourconceptions to the level of immediate needs--that is not the right way ofany reform. Our conceptions must be as large and as wide and asphilanthropical as imagination can make them; otherwise Europe will missone of the greatest opportunities that it has ever had to deal with, andwe shall incur the bitterest of all disappointments--not to be awake whenthe dawn appears. 

GREATNESS OF STATES

What, then, are some of those nebulous visions which come before the mindsof eager idealists? We have got to envisage for ourselves a new idea ofwhat constitutes greatness in a state. Hitherto we have measured nationalgreatness by military strength, because most of the European nations haveattained their present position through successful war. So long as wecherish a notion like this, so long shall we be under the heel of agrinding militarism. We have set out as crusaders to destroy Prussianmilitarism, and in pursuit of this quest we have invoked, as a matter ofnecessity, the aid of our militarists. But when their work is done, allpeoples who value freedom and independence will refuse to be under theheel of any military party. To be great is not, necessarily, to be strongfor war. There are other qualities which ought to enter into thedefinition, a high standard of civilisation and culture--not culture inthe Prussian sense, but that which we understand by the term--the greatdevelopment and extension of knowledge, room for the discoveries ofscience, quick susceptibility in the domain of art, the organisation ofliterature--all these things are part and parcel of greatness, as we wantto understand it in the future. It is precisely these things thatmilitarism, as such, cares nothing for. Therefore, if we are out for waragainst militarism, the whole end and object of our endeavour must be bymeans of war to make war impossible. Hence it follows, as a matter ofcourse, that the new Europe must take very serious and energetic steps todiminish military establishments and to limit the size of armaments. Ifonce the new masters of Europe understand the immense importance ofreducing their military equipment, they have it in their power to relievenations of one of the greatest burdens which have ever checked the socialand economic development of the world. Suggestions have already been madeas to the reduction of armaments, and, although such schemes as have beenset forward are, in the truest sense, speculative, it does not follow thatthey, or something like them, cannot hereafter be realised. Nor yet inour conception of greatness must we include another false idea of thepast. If a nation is not necessarily great because it is strong for war, neither is it necessarily great because it contains a number ofcosmopolitan financiers trying to exploit for their own purposes variousundeveloped tracts of the world's surface. These financiers are certainlynot patriots because, amongst other things, they take particular care toinvest in foreign securities, the interest of home investments not beingsufficient for their financial greed. It will not be the least of the manybenefits which may accrue to us after the end of this disastrous war if avulgar and crude materialism, based on the notion of wealth, is dethronedfrom its present sovereignty over men's minds. The more we study thecourses of this world's history, the more certainly do we discover that alove of money is the root of most of the evils which beset humanity. 

APOSTLES OF THE NEW ERA

As we survey the possible reforms which are to set up a new and betterEurope on the ruin of the old, we naturally ask ourselves with somedisquietude: Who are the personalities, and what are the forces requiredfor so tremendous a change? Who are sufficient for these things? Are kingslikely to be saviours of society? Past experience hardly favours thissuggestion. Will soldiers and great generals help us? Here, again, we maybe pardoned for a very natural suspicion. Every one knows that abenevolent despotism has much to recommend it. But, unfortunately, thebenevolent are not usually despotic, nor are despots as a rule benevolent. Can diplomatists help us? Not so far as they continue to mumble thewatchwords of their ancient mystery: they will have to learn a new set offormulæ, or more likely, perhaps, they will find that ordinary people, whohave seen to what a pass diplomacy has brought us, may work out forthemselves some better system. Clearly the tasks of the future will dependon the co-operation of intelligent, far-sighted philanthropic reformers inthe various states of the world, who will recognise that at criticalperiods of the world's history they must set to work with a new ardour tothink out problems from the very beginning. We want fresh and intelligentminds, specially of the younger idealists, keen, ardent, and energeticsouls, touched with the sacred fire, erecting the fabric of humanity on anovel basis. Democracy will have a great deal to do in the new Europe. It, too, had better refurbish its old watchwords. It has got to set itselfpatiently to the business of preventing future wars by the extension ofits sympathies and its clear discernment of all that imperils its futuredevelopment and progress. Above all, it has got to solve that mostdifficult problem of creating a Public Will and a Common Conscience inEurope, a conscience sensitive to the demands of a higher ethics, and awill to enforce its decrees against obstructives and recalcitrants. We donot see our way clear as yet, it is true. But we have a dim idea of thefar-seen peaks towards which we must lift up our eyes. It is the greatestenterprise which humanity has ever been called upon to face, and, howeverdifficult, it is also the most splendid. 

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