Transcriber's Note A number of typographical errors have been maintained in this version ofthis book. They have been marked with a [TN-#], which refers to adescription in the complete list found at the end of the text. AN ETHNOLOGIST'S VIEW OF HISTORY. AN ADDRESS BEFORE THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NEW JERSEY HISTORICAL SOCIETY, AT TRENTON, NEW JERSEY, JANUARY 28, 1896. BY DANIEL G. BRINTON, A. M. , M. D. , LL. D. , D. Sc. PROFESSOR OF AMERICAN ARCHÆOLOGY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA AND OF GENERAL ETHNOLOGY AT THE ACADEMY OF NATURAL SCIENCES OF PHILADELPHIA. PHILADELPHIA, PA. 1896. An Ethnologist's View of History. MR. PRESIDENT: * * * * * The intelligent thought of the world is ever advancing to a fullerappreciation of the worth of the past to the present and the future. Never before have associations, societies and journals devoted tohistorical studies been so numerous. All times and tribes are searchedfor memorials; the remote corners of modern, medieval and ancientperiods are brought under scrutiny; and going beyond these again, thesemi-historic eras of tradition and the nebulous gleams frompre-historic milleniums[TN-1] are diligently scanned, that theiruncertain story may be prefaced to that registered in "the syllables ofrecorded time. " In this manner a vast mass of material is accumulating with which thehistorian has to deal. What now is the real nature of the task he setsbefore himself? What is the mission with which he is entrusted? To understand this task, to appreciate that mission, he must ask himselfthe broad questions: What is the aim of history? What are the purposesfor which it should be studied and written? He will find no lack of answers to these inquiries, all offered withequal confidence, but singularly discrepant among themselves. Hisembarrassment will be that of selection between widely divergent views, each ably supported by distinguished advocates. As I am going to add still another, not exactly like any already on thelist, it may well be asked of me to show why one or other of thosealready current is not as good or better than my own. This requires meto pass in brief review the theories of historic methods, or, as it isproperly termed, of the Philosophy of History, which are most popularto-day. They may be classified under three leading opinions, as follows: 1. History should be an accurate record of events, and nothing more; anexact and disinterested statement of what has taken place, concealingnothing and coloring nothing, reciting incidents in their naturalconnections, without bias, prejudice, or didactic application of anykind. This is certainly a high ideal and an excellent model. For many, yes, for the majority of historical works, none better can be suggested. Iplace it first and name it as worthiest of all current theories ofhistorical composition. But, I would submit to you, is a literaryproduction answering to this precept, really _History_? Is it anythingmore than a well-prepared annal or chronicle? Is it, in fact anythingelse than a compilation containing the materials of which real historyshould be composed? I consider that the mission of the historian, taken in its completestsense, is something much more, much higher, than the collection andnarration of events, no matter how well this is done. The historianshould be like the man of science, and group his facts under inductivesystems so as to reach the general laws which connect and explain them. He should, still further, be like the artist, and endeavor so to exhibitthese connections under literary forms that they present to the readerthe impression of a symmetrical and organic unity, in which each part orevent bears definite relations to all others. Collection and collationare not enough. The historian must "work up his field notes, " as thegeologists say, so as to extract from his data all the useful resultswhich they are capable of yielding. I am quite certain that in these objections I can count on the suffragesof most. For the majority of authors write history in a style widelydifferent from that which I have been describing. They are distinctlyteachers, though not at all in accord as to what they teach. They aregenerally advocates, and with more or less openness maintain what I callthe second theory of the aim of history, to wit: 2. History should be a collection of evidence in favor of certainopinions. In this category are to be included all religious and politicalhistories. Their pages are intended to show the dealings of God withman; or the evidences of Christianity, or of one of its sects, Catholicism or Protestantism; or the sure growth of republican or ofmonarchial institutions; or the proof of a divine government of theworld; or the counter-proof that there is no such government; and thelike. You will find that most general histories may be placed in this class. Probably a man cannot himself have very strong convictions aboutpolitics or religion, and not let them be seen in his narrative ofevents where such questions are prominently present. A few familiarinstances will illustrate this. No one can take either Lingard's orMacauley's History of England as anything more than a plea for eitherwriter's personal views. Gibbon's anti-Christian feeling is asperceptibly disabling to him in many passages as in the churchhistorians is their search for "acts of Providence, " and the hand of Godin human affairs. All such histories suffer from fatal flaws. They are deductive insteadof inductive; they are a _defensio sententiarum_ instead of an_investigatio veri_; they assume the final truth as known, and go notforth to seek it. They are therefore "teleologic, " that is, they studythe record of man as the demonstration of a problem the solution ofwhich is already known. In this they are essentially "divinatory, "claiming foreknowledge of the future; and, as every ethnologist knows, divination belongs to a stadium of incomplete intellectual culture, oneconsiderably short of the highest. As has been well said by Wilhelm vonHumboldt, any teleologic theory "disturbs and falsifies the facts ofhistory;"[6-1] and it has been acutely pointed out by the philosopherHegel, that it contradicts the notion of progress and is no advance overthe ancient tenet of a recurrent cycle. [6-2] I need not dilate upon these errors. They must be patent to you. Nomatter how noble the conviction, how pure the purpose, there issomething nobler and purer than it, and that is, unswerving devotion torendering in history the truth, the whole truth and nothing but thetruth. I now turn to another opinion, that which teaches that-- 3. History should be a portraiture, more or less extended, of theevolution of the human species. This is claimed to be the "scientific" view of history. It was terselyexpressed by Alexander von Humboldt in the phrase: "The history of theworld is the mere expression of a predetermined, that is, fixed, evolution. "[6-3] It is that advocated by Auguste Comte, Draper and Spencer, and a fewyears ago Prof. Gerland, of Strasburg, formulated its basic maxim inthese words: "Man has developed from the brute through the action ofpurely mechanical, therefore fixed, laws. "[7-1] The scientist of to-day who hesitates to subscribe to these maxims isliable to be regarded as of doubtful learning or of debilitatedintellect. I acknowledge that I am one such, and believe that I can showsound reasons for denying the assumption on which this view is based. It appears to me just as teleologic and divinatory as those I havepreviously named. It assumes Evolution as a law of the universe, whereasin natural science it is only a limited generalization, inapplicable tomost series of natural events, and therefore of uncertain continuance inany series. The optimism which it inculcates is insecure and belongs todeductive, not inductive, reasoning. The mechanical theory on which itis based lacks proof, and is, I maintain, insufficient to explainmotive, and, therefore, historic occurrences. The assumption thathistory is the record of a necessary and uninterrupted evolution, progressing under ironclad mechanical laws, is a preconceived theory asdetrimental to clear vision as are the preoccupations of the theologianor the political partisan. Any definition of evolution which carries with it the justification ofoptimism is as erroneous in history, as it would be in biology to assertthat all variations are beneficial. There is no more certainty that thehuman species will improve under the operation of physical laws thanthat any individual will; there is far more evidence that it will not, as every species of the older geologic ages has succumbed to those laws, usually without leaving a representative. I am aware that I am here in opposition to the popular as well as thescientific view. No commonplace is better received than that, "Eternalprogress is the law of nature;" though by what process eternal laws arediscovered is imperfectly explained. Applied to history, a favorite dream of some of the most recent teachersis that the life of the species runs the same course as that of one ofits members. Lord Acton, of Oxford, in a late lecture states that: "Thedevelopment of society is like that of individual;"[8-1] and Prof. Fellows, of the University of Chicago, advances the same opinion in thewords, "Humanity as a whole developes[TN-2] like a child. "[8-2] The error of this view was clearly pointed out some years ago by Dr. Tobler. [8-3] There has been no growth of humanity at large at allcomparable to that of the individual. There are tribes to-day in thefull stone age, and others in all stages of culture above it. Thehorizons of progress have been as local as those of geography. Nosolidarity of advancement exists in the species as a whole. Epochs andstadia of culture vary with race and climate. The much talked of "law ofcontinuity" does not hold good either in national or intellectualgrowth. Such are the criticisms which may be urged against the historicalmethods now in vogue. What, you will ask, is offered in their stead?That which I offer is the view of the ethnologist. It is not soambitious as some I have named. It does not deal in eternal laws, nordivine the distant future. The ethnologist does not profess to have beenadmitted into the counsels of the Almighty, nor to have caught in hisgrasp the secret purposes of the Universe. He seeks the sufficientreason for known facts, and is content with applying the knowledge hegains to present action. Before stating the view of the ethnologist, I must briefly describe whatthe science of Ethnology is. You will see at once how closely it isallied to history, and that the explanation of the one almost carrieswith it the prescription for the other. It begins with the acknowledged maxim that man is by nature a gregariousanimal, a _zoon politikon_, as Aristotle called him, living in society, and owing to society all those traits which it is the business ofhistory, as distinguished from biology, to study. From this standpoint, all that the man is he owes to others; and whatthe others are, they owe, in part, to him. Together, they make up thesocial unit, at first the family or clan, itself becoming part of alarger unit, a tribe, nation or people. The typical folk, or _ethnos_, is a social unit, the members of which are bound together by certaintraits common to all or most, which impart to them a prevailingcharacter, an organic unity, specific peculiarities and generaltendencies. You may inquire what these traits are to which I refer as making upethnic character. The answer cannot be so precise as you would like. Weare dealing with a natural phenomenon, and Nature, as Goethe onceremarked, never makes groups, but only individuals. The group is asubjective category of our own minds. It is, nevertheless, psychologically real, and capable of definition. The _Ethnos_ must be defined, like a species of natural history, by arehearsal of a series of its characteristics, not by one alone. Themembers of this series are numerous, and by no means of equalimportance; I shall mention the most prominent of them, and in the orderin which I believe they should be ranked for influence on nationalcharacter. First, I should rank Language. Not only is it the medium of intelligibleintercourse, of thought-tranference, [TN-3] but thought itself ispowerfully aided or impeded by the modes of its expression in sound. As"spoken language, " in poetry and oratory, its might is recognized on allhands; while in "written language, " as literature, it works silently butwith incalculable effect on the character of a people. [10-1] Next to this I should place Government, understanding this word in itswidest sense, as embracing the terms on which man agrees to live withhis fellow man and with woman, family, therefore, as well as societyties. This includes the legal standards of duty, the rules ofrelationship and descent, the rights of property and the customs ofcommerce, the institutions of castes, classes and rulers, and thoseinternational relations on which depend war and peace. I need notenlarge on the profound impress which these exert on the traits of thepeople. [10-2] After these I should name Religion, though some brilliant scholars, suchas Schelling and Max Müller, [10-3] have claimed for it the first placeas a formative influence on ethnic character. No one will deny theprominent rank it holds in the earlier stages of human culture. It isscarcely too much to say that most of the waking hours of the males ofsome tribes are taken up with religious ceremonies. Religion is, however, essentially "divinatory, " that is, its chief end and aim istoward the future, not the present, and therefore the impress it leaveson national character is far less permanent, much more ephemeral, thaneither government or language. This is constantly seen in daily life. Persons change their religion with facility, but adhere resolutely tothe laws which protect their property. The mighty empire of Rome securedethnic unity to a degree never since equalled in parallel circumstances, and its plan was to tolerate all religions--as, indeed, do allenlightened states to-day--but to insist on the adoption of the Romanlaw, and, in official intercourse, the Latin language. I have notforgotten the converse example of the Jews, which some attribute totheir religion; but the Romany, who have no religion worth mentioning, have been just as tenacious of their traits under similar adversecircumstances. The Arts, those of Utility, such as pottery, building, agriculture andthe domestication of animals, and those of Pleasure, such as music, painting and sculpture, must come in for a full share of theethnologist's attention. They represent, however, stadia of culturerather than national character. They influence the latter materially andare influenced by it, and different peoples have toward them widelydifferent endowments; but their action is generally indirect andunequally distributed throughout the social unit. These four fields, Language, Government, Religion and the Arts, arethose which the ethnologist explores when he would render himselfacquainted with a nation's character; and now a few words about themethods of study he adopts, and the aims, near or remote, which he keepsin view. He first gathers his facts, from the best sources at his command, withthe closest sifting he can give them, so as to exclude errors ofobservation or intentional bias. From the facts he aims to discover onthe above lines what are or were the regular characteristics of thepeople or peoples he is studying. The ethnic differences so revealed areto him what organic variations are to the biologist and morphologist;they indicate evolution or retrogression, and show an advance towardhigher forms and wider powers, or toward increasing feebleness anddecay. To understand them they must be studied in connection and causation. Hence, the method of the ethnologist becomes that which in the naturalsciences is called the "developmental" method. It may be defined as thehistoric method where history is lacking. The biologist explains thepresent structure of an organ by tracing it back to simpler forms inlower animals until he reaches the germ from which it began. Theethnologist pursues the same course. He selects, let us say, a peculiarinstitution, such as caste, and when he loses the traces of its originthrough failure of written records, he seeks for them in the survivalsof unwritten folk-lore, or in similar forms in primitive conditions ofculture. Here is where Archæology renders him most efficient aid. By means of ithe has been able to follow the trail of most of the arts andinstitutions of life back to a period when they were so simple anduncomplicated that they are quite transparent and intelligible. Laterchanges are to be analyzed and explained by the same procedure. [12-1] This is the whole of the ethnologic method. It is open and easy when thefacts are in our possession. There are no secret springs, no occultforces, in the historic development of culture. Whatever seems hidden ormysterious, is so only because our knowledge of the facts is imperfect. No magic and no miracle has aided man in his long conflict with thematerial forces around him. No ghost has come from the grave, no Godfrom on high, to help him in the bitter struggle. What he has won is hisown by the right of conquest, and he can apply to himself the words ofthe poet: "Hast du nicht alles selbst vollendet, Heilig glühend Herz?" (_Goethe_). Freed from fear we can now breathe easily, for we know that no _Deus exmachina_ meddles with those serene and mighty forces whose adamantinegrasp encloses all the phenomena of nature and of life. The ethnologist, however, has not completed his task when he has definedan _ethnos_, and explained its traits by following them to theirsources. He has merely prepared himself for a more delicate anddifficult part of his undertaking. It has been well said by one of the ablest ethnologists of thisgeneration, the late Dr. Post, of Bremen, that "The facts of ethnologymust ever be regarded as the expressions of the general consciousness ofHumanity. "[13-1] The time has passed when real thinkers can be satisfiedwith the doctrines of the positive philosophers, who insisted thatevents and institutions must be explained solely from the phenomenal orobjective world, that is, by other events. Sounder views prevail, both in ethnology and its history. "The historyof man, " says a German writer, "is neither a divine revelation, nor aprocess of nature; it is first and above all, the work of man;"[13-2] anopinion reiterated by Prof. Flint in his work on the philosophy ofhistory in these words: "History is essentially the record of the workand manifestation of _human nature_. "[14-1] In both sciences it is theessentially human which alone occupies us; it is the _life of man_. Now men do not live in material things, but in mental states; and solelyas they affect these are the material things valuable or valueless. Religions, arts, laws, historic events, all have but one standard ofappraisement, to wit, the degree to which they produce permanentlybeneficial mental states in the individuals influenced by them. All mustagree to this, though they may differ widely as to what such a mentalstate may be; whether one of pleasurable activity, or that of theBuddhist hermit who sinks into a trance by staring at his navel, or thatof the Trappist monk whose occupations are the meditation of death anddigging his own grave. The ethnologist must make up his own mind about this, and with utmostcare, for if his standard of merit and demerit is erroneous, hisresults, however much he labors on them, will have no permanent value. There are means, if he chooses to use them, which will aid him here. He must endeavor to picture vividly to himself the mental conditionwhich gave rise to special arts and institutions, or which these evolvedin the people. He must ascertain whether they increased or diminishedthe joy of living, or stimulated the thirst for knowledge and the loveof the true and the beautiful. He must cultivate the liveliness ofimagination which will enable him to transport himself into the epochand surroundings he is studying, and feel on himself, as it were, theirpeculiar influences. More than all, chief of all, he must have a broad, many-sided, tender sympathy with all things human, enabling him toappreciate the emotions and arguments of all parties and all peoples. Such complete comprehension and spiritual accord will not weaken, butwill strengthen his clear perception of those standards by which allactions and institutions must ultimately be weighed and measured. Thereare such standards, and the really learned ethnologist will be the lastto deny or overlook them. The saying of Goethe that "The most unnatural action is yet natural, " isa noble suggestion of tolerance; but human judgment can scarcely go tothe length of Madame de Stael's opinion, when she claims that "Tounderstand all actions is to pardon all. " We must brush away thesophisms which insist that all standards are merely relative, and thattime and place alone decide on right and wrong. Were that so, not onlyall morality, but all science and all knowledge were fluctuating assand. But it is not so. The principles of Reason, Truth, Justice andLove have been, are, and ever will be the same. Time and place, race andculture, make no difference. Whenever a country is engaged in thediffusion of these immortal verities, whenever institutions arecalculated to foster and extend them, that country, those institutions, take noble precedence over all others whose efforts are directed tolower aims. [15-1] Something else remains. When the ethnologist has acquired a competentknowledge of his facts, and deduced from them a clear conception of themental states of the peoples he is studying, he has not finished hislabors. Institutions and arts in some degree reflect the mentalconditions of a people, in some degree bring them about; but theunderlying source of both is something still more immaterial andintangible, yet more potent, to wit, Ideas and Ideals. These are theprimary impulses of conscious human endeavor, and it is vain to attemptto understand ethnology or to write history without assigning theirconsideration the first place in the narration. I am anxious to avoid here any metaphysical obscurity. My assertion is, that the chief impulses of nations and peoples are abstract ideas andideals, unreal and unrealizable; and that it is in pursuit of these thatthe great as well as the small movements on the arena of national lifeand on the stage of history have taken place. You are doubtless aware that this is no new discovery of mine. Early inthis century Wilhelm von Humboldt wrote: "The last and highest duty ofthe historian is to portray the effort of the Idea to attain realizationin fact;" and the most recent lecture on the philosophy of history whichI have read, that by Lord Acton, contains this maxim: "Ideas which inreligion and politics are truths, in history are living forces. " I do claim that it is timely for me to repeat these doctrines and tourge them with vehemence, for they are generally repudiated by theprevailing schools of ethnology and history in favor of the opinion thatobjective, mechanical influences alone suffice to explain all thephenomena of human life. This I pronounce an inadequate and anunscientific opinion. There is in living matter everywhere something which escapes the mostexhaustive investigation, some subtle center of impulse, which liesbeyond the domain of correlated energy, and which acts directively, without increasing or diminishing the total of that energy. Also in thetransformations of organic forms, there are preparations and propulsionswhich no known doctrine of the mechanical, natural causes can interpret. We must accept the presence of the same powers, and in a greaterdegree, in the life and the history of man. [17-1] It may be objected that abstract ideas are far beyond the grasp of theuncultivated intellect. The reply is, consciously to regard them asabstract, may be; but they exist and act for all that. All sane peoplethink and talk according to certain abstract laws of grammar and logic;and they act in similar unconsciousness of the abstractions which impelthem. Moreover, the Idea is usually clothed in a concrete Ideal, apersonification, which brings it home to the simplest mind. This waslong ago pointed out by the observant Machiavelli in his statement thatevery reform of a government or religion is in the popular mindpersonified as the effort of one individual. In every nation or _ethnos_ there is a prevailing opinion as to what thehighest typical human being should be. This "Ideal of Humanity, " as ithas been called, is more or less constantly and consciously pursued, andbecomes a spur to national action and to a considerable degree anarbiter of national destiny. If the ideal is low and bestial, the courseof that nation is downward, self-destroying; if it is lofty and pure, the energies of the people are directed toward the maintenance of thoseprinciples which are elevating and preservative. These are notmechanical forces, in any rational sense of the term; but they areforces the potent directive and formative influence of which cannot bedenied and must not be underestimated. Just in proportion as such ideas are numerous, clear and true in thenational mind, do their power augment and their domain extend; just somuch more quickly and firmly do they express themselves, in acts, formsand institutions, and thus enable the nation to enrich, beautify andstrengthen its own existence. We have but to glance along the nationsof the world and to reflect on the outlines of their histories, toperceive the correctness of the conclusion which Prof. Lazarus, perhapsthe most eminent analyst of ethnic character of this generation, reachesin one of his essays: "A people which is not rich in ideas, is neverrich; one that is not strong in its thinking powers, is neverstrong. "[18-1] I claim, therefore, that the facts of ethnology and the study of racialpsychology justify me in formulating this maxim for the guidance of thehistorian: _The conscious and deliberate pursuit of ideal aims is thehighest causality in human history. _ The historian who would fulfil his mission in its amplest sense musttrace his facts back to the ideas which gave them birth; he mustrecognize and define these as the properties of specific peoples; and hemust estimate their worth by their tendency to national preservation ornational destruction. This is the maxim, the axiom, if you please, which both the ethnologistand the historian must bear ever present in mind if they wouldcomprehend the meaning of institutions or the significance of events. They must be referred to, and explained by, the ideas which gave thembirth. As an American historian has tersely put it, "The facts relatingto successive phases of _human thought_ constitute History. "[18-2] I am aware that a strong school of modern philosophers will present theobjection that thought itself is but a necessary result of chemical andmechanical laws, and therefore that it cannot be an independent cause. Dr. Post has pointedly expressed this position in the words: "We do notthink; thinking goes on within us, "[19-1] just as other functions, suchas circulation and secretion, go on. It is not possible for me at this time to enter into this branch of thediscussion. But I may ask your attention to the fact that one of thehighest authorities on the laws of natural science, the late George J. Romanes, reached by the severest induction an exactly opposite opinion, which he announced in these words: "The human mind is itself a causalagent. Its motives are in large part matters of its own creation. * * *Intelligent volition is a true cause of adjustive movement. "[19-2] For myself, after what I have endeavored to make an unbiased study ofboth opinions, I subscribe unhesitatingly to the latter, and look uponMind not only as a potent but as an independent cause of motion in thenatural world, of action in the individual life, and, therefore, ofevents in the history of the species. Confining ourselves to ethnology and history, the causative idea, as Ihave said, makes itself felt through ethnic ideals. These areinfluential in proportion as they are vividly realized by the nationalgenius; and elevating in proportion as they partake of those finaltruths already referred to, which are all merely forms of expression ofright reasoning. These ideals are the _idola fori_, which have sometimesdeluded, sometimes glorified, those who believed in them. I shall mention a few of them to make my meaning more apparent. That with which we are most familiar in history is the warrior ideal, the personification of military glory and martial success. It is presentamong the rudest tribes, and that it is active to-day, events in recentEuropean history prove only too clearly; and among ourselves, littlewould be needed to awaken it to vivid life. We are less acquainted with religious ideals, as they have weakenedunder the conditions of higher culture. They belong in European historymore to the medieval than to the modern period. Among Mohammedans andBrahmins we can still see them in their full vigor. In these lowerfaiths we can still find that intense fanaticism which can best bedescribed by the expression of Novalis, "intoxicated with God, " drunkwith the divine;[20-1] and this it is which preserves to these nationswhat power they still retain. Would that I could claim for our own people a grander conception of thepurpose of life than either of these. But alas! their ideal is tooevident to be mistaken. I call it the "divitial" ideal, that of the richman, that which makes the acquisition of material wealth the onestandard of success in life, the only justifiable aim of effort. To mostAmerican citizens the assertion that there is any more important, moresensible purpose than this, is simply incomprehensible or incredible. In place of any of these, the man who loves his kind would substituteothers; and as these touch closely on the business of the ethnologistand the historian when either would apply the knowledge he has gained tothe present condition of society, I will briefly refer to some advancedby various writers. The first and most favorite is that of _moral perfection_. It has beenformulated in the expression: "In the progress of ethical conceptionslies the progress of history itself. " (Schäfer. ) To such writers theideal of duty performed transcends all others, and is complete initself. The chief end of man, they say, is to lead the moral life, diligently to cultivate the ethical perception, the notion of "theought, " and to seek in this the finality of his existence. [21-1] Keener thinkers have, however, recognized that virtue, morality, theethical evolution, cannot be an end in itself, but must be a means tosome other end. Effort directed toward other, altruism in any form, musthave its final measurement of value in terms of self; otherwise theimmutable principles of justice are attacked. I cannot enlarge upon thispoint, and will content myself with a reference to Prof. Steinthal'sadmirable essay on "The Idea of ethical Perfection, " published someyears ago. [21-2] He shows that in its last analysis the Good has itsvalue solely in the freedom which it confers. Were all men trulyethical, all would be perfectly free. Therefore Freedom, in its highestsense, according to him and several other accomplished reasoners, is theaim of morality, and is that which gives it worth. This argument seems to me a step ahead, but yet to remain incomplete. For after all, what is freedom? It means only opportunity, not action;and opportunity alone is a negative quantity, a zero. Opportunity forwhat, I ask? For an answer, I turn with satisfaction to an older writer on thephilosophy of history, one whose genial sympathy with the human heartglows on every page of his volumes, to Johann Gottfried vonHerder. [21-3] The one final aim, he tells us, of all institutions, laws, governments and religions, of all efforts and events, is that eachperson, undisturbed by others, may employ his own powers to theirfullest extent, and thus gain for himself a completer existence, a morebeautiful enjoyment of his faculties. Thus, to the enriching of the individual life, its worth, its happinessand its fullness, does all endeavor of humanity tend; in it, lies theend of all exertion, the reward of all toil; to define it, should be theobject of ethnology; and to teach it, the purpose of history. Let me recapitulate. The ethnologist regards each social group as an entity or individual, and endeavors to place clearly before his mind its similarities anddifferences with other groups. Taking objective facts as his guides, such as laws, arts, institutions and language, he seeks from these tounderstand the mental life, the psychical welfare of the people, andbeyond this to reach the ideals which they cherished and the ideas whichwere the impulses of their activities. Events and incidents, such as arerecorded in national annals, have for him their main, if not only value, as indications of the inner or soul life of the people. By the comparison of several social groups he reaches widergeneralizations; and finally to those which characterize the commonconsciousness of Humanity, the psychical universals of the species. Bysuch comparison he also ascertains under what conditions and in whatdirections men have progressed most rapidly toward the cultivation andthe enjoyment of the noblest elements of their nature; and this strictlyinductive knowledge is that alone which he would apply to furthering thepresent needs and aspirations of social life. This is the method which he would suggest for history in the broadmeaning of the term. It should be neither a mere record of events, northe demonstration of a thesis, but a study, through occurrences andinstitutions, of the mental states of peoples at different epochs, explanatory of their success or failure, and practically applicable tothe present needs of human society. Such explanation should be strictly limited in two directions. First, bythe principle that man can be explained only by man, and can be soexplained completely. That is, no super-human agencies need be invokedto interpret any of the incidents of history: and, on the other hand, nomerely material or mechanical conditions, such as climate, food andenvironment, are sufficient for a full interpretation. Beyond these liethe inexhaustible sources of impulse in the essence of Mind itself. Secondly, the past can teach us nothing of the future beyond a vaguesurmise. All theories which proceed on an assumption of knowledgeconcerning finalities, whether in science or dogma, are cobwebs of thebrain, not the fruit of knowledge, and obscure the faculty ofintellectual perception. It is wasteful of one's time to frame them, andfatal to one's work to adopt them. These are also two personal traits which, it seems to me, are requisiteto the comprehension of ethnic psychology, and therefore are desirableto both the ethnologist and the historian. The one of these is thepoetic instinct. I fear this does not sound well from the scientific rostrum, for theprevailing notion among scientists is that the poet is a fabulist, andis therefore as far off as possible from the platform they occupy. Noone, however, can really understand a people who remains outside thepale of the world of imagination in which it finds its deepest joys; andnowhere is this depicted so clearly as in its songs and by its bards. The ethnologist who has no taste for poetry may gather much that isgood, but will miss the best; the historian who neglects the poeticliterature of a nation turns away his eyes from the vista which wouldgive him the farthest insight into national character. The other trait is more difficult to define. To apprehend what isnoblest in a nation one must oneself be noble. Knowledge of facts and anunbiased judgment need to be accompanied by a certain development ofpersonal character which enables one to be in sympathy with the finesttissue of human nature, from the fibre of which are formed heroes andmartyrs, patriots and saints, enthusiasts and devotees. To appreciatethese something of the same stuff must be in the mental constitution ofthe observer. Such is the ethnologist's view of history. He does not pretend to beeither a priest or a prophet. He claims neither to possess the finaltruth nor to foresee it. He is, therefore equally unwelcome to thedogmatist, the optimistic naturalist and the speculative philosopher. Herefuses any explanations which either contradict or transcend humanreason; but he insists that human reason is one of the causal factswhich he has to consider; and this brings him into conflict with boththe mystic and the materialist. Though he exalts the power of ideas, he is no idealist, but practical tothe last degree; for he denies the worth of any art, science, event orinstitution which does not directly or indirectly contribute to theelevation of the individual man or woman, the common average person, thehuman being. To this one end, understanding it as we best can, he claims all effortshould tend; and any other view than this of the philosophy of history, any other standard of value applied to the records of the past, he looksupon as delusive and deceptive, no matter under what heraldry of titleor seal of sanctity it is offered. FOOTNOTES: [6-1] In his epochal essay "Die Aufgabe des Geschichtschreibers. "_Gesammelte Werke_, Bd. I. , s. 13. It was republished with adiscriminating introduction by Professor Steinthal in _DieSprachphilosophischen Werke Wilhelm von Humboldt's_ (Berlin, 1883). [6-2] "Der Zweck-Begriff bewirkt nur sich selbst, und ist am Ende was erim Anfange, in der Unsprünglichkeit, war. " _Encyclopädie derphilosophischen Wissenschaften. _ Theil, [TN-4] I. , § 204. [6-3] "Die Weltgeschichte ist der blosse Ausdruck einer vorbestimmtenEntwicklung. " (Quoted by Lord Acton. ) [7-1] "Die Menschheit hat sich aus natürlicher, tierischer Grundlage aufrein natürliche mechanische Weise entwickelt. " _AnthropolgischeBeiträge_, s. 21. [8-1] _A Lecture on the Study of History_, p. 1 (London, 1895). [8-2] See his article "The Relation of Anthropology to the Study ofHistory, " in _The American Journal of Sociology_, July, 1895. [8-3] Ludwig Tobler, in his article "Zur Philosophie der Geschichte, " inthe _Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie_, Bd. XII. , s. 195. [10-1] One of the most lucid of modern German philosophical writerssays, "Without language, there could be no unity of mental life, nonational life at all. " Friedrich Paulsen, _Introduction to Philosophy_, p. 193. (English translation, New York, 1895. ) I need scarcely recall tothe student that this was the cardinal principle of the ethnologicalwritings of Wilhelm von Humboldt, and that his most celebrated essay isentitled "Ueber die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues undihren Einfluss auf die geistige Entwickelung des Menschengeschlechts. "The thought is well and tersely put by Prof. Frank Granger--"Language isthe instinctive expression of national spirit. " (_The Worship of theRomans_, p. 19, London, 1896. ) [10-2] "Law, in its positive forms, may be viewed as an instrument usedto produce a certain kind of character. " Frank Granger, ubi supra, p. 19. [10-3] _Lectures on the Science of Religion_, p. 55. [12-1] How different from the position of Voltaire, who, expressing, [TN-5] the general sentiment of his times, wrote, --"Thehistory of barbarous nations has no more interest than that of bears andwolves!" [13-1] _Grundriss der ethnologischen Jurisprudenz_, Bd. I. , s. 5. (Leipzig, 1894. ) [13-2] "Das Geschichte ist weder eine Offenbarung Gottes, noch einNaturprocess, sondern eben Menschenwerk. " Tobler in the _Zeitschrift fürVölkerpsychologie_, Bd. XII. , s. 201. [14-1] _History of the Philosophy of History_, p. 579. [15-1] There is nothing in this inconsistent with the principle laiddown by Lecky: "The men of each age must be judged by the ideal of theirown age and country, and not by the ideal of ourselves. "--_The PoliticalValue of History_, p. 50, New York, 1892. The distinction is thatbetween the relative standard, which we apply to motives and persons, and the absolute standard, which we apply to actions. The effects of thelatter, for good or evil, are fixed, and independent of the motiveswhich prompt them. [17-1] "The historian, " says Tolstoi, "is obliged to admit aninexplicable force, which acts upon his elementary forces. " _Power andLiberty_, p. 28 (Eng. Trans. , New York, 1888). [18-1] See his article "Ueber die Ideen in der Geschichte, " in the_Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie_. [TN-6] Bd. III. , S. 486. [18-2] Brooks Adams, _The Law of Civilization and Decay_, Preface(London, 1895). This author has reached an advanced position withreference to thought and emotion as the impulses of humanity. [19-1] _Grundriss der ethnologischen Jurisprudenz_, Band I. , s. 4. [19-2] _Mind and Motion_, pp. 29, 140, etc. (London, 1895. ) Prof. Paulsen goes much further, as, "The inner disposition spontaneouslydetermines the development of the individual, " and "The organism is, asit were, congealed voluntary action. "--_Introduction to Philosophy_, pp, [TN-7] 187, 190. [20-1] Before him, however, the expression "ebrius Deo" was applied tothe ancient rhapsodists. [21-1] As expressed by Prof. Droysen, in his work, _Principles ofHistory_, (p. 16, New York, 1893), recently translated by PresidentAndrews, of Brown University--"Historical things are the perpetualactualization of the moral forces. " Elsewhere he says--"History ishumanity becoming conscious concerning itself, "[TN-8] There is noobjection to such expressions; they are good as far as they go; butthey do not go to the end. [21-2] In the _Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie_, Band XI. , Heft II. [21-3] _Ideen zur Geschichte der Menschheit_, B. XV. , Cap. I. Transcriber's Note The following misspellings and typographical errors were maintained. Page Error TN-1 3 milleniums should read millenniums TN-2 8 developes should read develops TN-3 10 thought-tranference, should read thought-transference TN-4 fn. 6-2 Theil, should read Theil TN-5 fn. 12-1 expressing, should read expressing TN-6 fn. 18-1 _Völkerpsychologie_. Should read _Völkerpsychologie_, TN-7 fn. 19-2 pp, should read pp. TN-8 fn. 21-1 itself, " should read itself. "