AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

BY

JOHN LOCKE

[Based on the 2d Edition] CONTENTS OF THE SECOND VOLUME

BOOK III. OF WORDS. 

CHAP. 

I. OF WORDS OR LANGUAGE IN GENERALII. OF THE SIGNIFICATION OF WORDSIII. OF GENERAL TERMSIV. OF THE NAMES OF SIMPLE IDEASV. OF THE NAMES OF MIXED MODES AND RELATIONSVI. OF THE NAMES OF SUBSTANCESVII. OF PARTICLESVIII. OF ABSTRACT AND CONCRETE TERMSIX. OF THE IMPERFECTION OF WORDSX. OF THE ABUSE OF WORDSXI. OF THE REMEDIES OF THE FOREGOING IMPERFECTION AND ABUSES

BOOK IV. OF KNOWLEDGE AND PROBABILITY. 

CHAP. 

I. OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERALII. OF THE DEGREES OF OUR KNOWLEDGEIII. OF THE EXTENT OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGEIV. OF THE REALITY OF OUR KNOWLEDGEV. OF TRUTH IN GENERALVI. OF UNIVERSAL PROPOSITIONS: THEIR TRUTH AND CERTAINTYVII. OF MAXIMSVIII. OF TRIFLING PROPOSITIONSIX. OF OUR THREEFOLD KNOWLEDGE OF EXISTENCEX. OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF A GODXI. OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF OTHER THINGSXII. OF THE IMPROVEMENT OF OUR KNOWLEDGEXIII. SOME OTHER CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING OUR KNOWLEDGEXIV. OF JUDGMENTXV. OF PROBABILITYXVI. OF THE DEGREES OF ASSENTXVII. OF REASON [AND SYLLOGISM]XVIII. OF FAITH AND REASON, AND THEIR DISTINCT PROVINCESXIX. [OF ENTHUSIASM]XX. OF WRONG ASSENT, OR ERRORXXI. OF THE DIVISION OF THE SCIENCES

BOOK III

OF WORDS

CHAPTER I. 

OF WORDS OR LANGUAGE IN GENERAL. 

1. Man fitted to form articulated Sounds. 

God, having designed man for a sociable creature, made him not only withan inclination, and under a necessity to have fellowship with those ofhis own kind, but furnished him also with language, which was to bethe great instrument and common tie of society. Man, therefore, had bynature his organs so fashioned, as to be fit to frame articulate sounds, which we call words. But this was not enough to produce language; forparrots, and several other birds, will be taught to make articulatesounds distinct enough, which yet by no means are capable of language. 

2. To use these sounds as Signs of Ideas. 

Besides articulate sounds, therefore, it was further necessary that heshould be able to use these sounds as signs of internal conceptions; andto make them stand as marks for the ideas within his own mind, wherebythey might be made known to others, and the thoughts of men's minds beconveyed from one to another. 

3. To make them general Signs. 

But neither was this sufficient to make words so useful as they ought tobe. It is not enough for the perfection of language, that sounds canbe made signs of ideas, unless those signs can be so made use of as tocomprehend several particular things: for the multiplication of wordswould have perplexed their use, had every particular thing need ofa distinct name to be signified by. [To remedy this inconvenience, language had yet a further improvement in the use of GENERAL TERMS, whereby one word was made to mark a multitude of particular existences:which advantageous use of sounds was obtained only by the difference ofthe ideas they were made signs of: those names becoming general, whichare made to stand for GENERAL IDEAS, and those remaining particular, where the IDEAS they are used for are PARTICULAR. ]

4. To make them signify the absence of positive Ideas. 

Besides these names which stand for ideas, there be other words whichmen make use of, not to signify any idea, but the want or absence ofsome ideas, simple or complex, or all ideas together; such as are NIHILin Latin, and in English, IGNORANCE and BARRENNESS. All which negativeor privative words cannot be said properly to belong to, or signify noideas: for then they would be perfectly insignificant sounds; but theyrelate to positive ideas, and signify their absence. 

5. Words ultimately derived from such as signify sensible Ideas. 

It may also lead us a little towards the original of all our notions andknowledge, if we remark how great a dependence our words have on commonsensible ideas; and how those which are made use of to stand for actionsand notions quite removed from sense, have their rise from thence, andfrom obvious sensible ideas are transferred to more abstrusesignifications, and made to stand for ideas that come not under thecognizance of our senses; v. G. To IMAGINE, APPREHEND, COMPREHEND, ADHERE, CONCEIVE, INSTIL, DISGUST, DISTURBANCE, TRANQUILLITY, &c. , areall words taken from the operations of sensible things, and applied tocertain modes of thinking. SPIRIT, in its primary signification, isbreath; ANGEL, a messenger: and I doubt not but, if we could trace themto their sources, we should find, in all languages, the names whichstand for things that fall not under our senses to have had their firstrise from sensible ideas. By which we may give some kind of guess whatkind of notions they were, and whence derived, which filled their mindswho were the first beginners of languages, and how nature, even in thenaming of things, unawares suggested to men the originals and principlesof all their knowledge: whilst, to give names that might make known toothers any operations they felt in themselves, or any other ideas thatcame not under their senses, they were fain to borrow words fromordinary known ideas of sensation, by that means to make others the moreeasily to conceive those operations they experimented in themselves, which made no outward sensible appearances; and then, when they had gotknown and agreed names to signify those internal operations of their ownminds, they were sufficiently furnished to make known by words all theirother ideas; since they could consist of nothing but either of outwardsensible perceptions, or of the inward operations of their minds aboutthem; we having, as has been proved, no ideas at all, but whatoriginally come either from sensible objects without, or what we feelwithin ourselves, from the inward workings of our own spirits, of whichwe are conscious to ourselves within. 

6. Distribution of subjects to be treated of. 

But to understand better the use and force of Language, as subservientto instruction and knowledge, it will be convenient to consider:

First, TO WHAT IT IS THAT NAMES, IN THE USE OF LANGUAGE, ARE IMMEDIATELYAPPLIED. 

Secondly, Since all (except proper) names are general, and so stand notparticularly for this or that single thing, but for sorts and ranks ofthings, it will be necessary to consider, in the next place, what thesorts and kinds, or, if you rather like the Latin names, WHAT THESPECIES AND GENERA OF THINGS ARE, WHEREIN THEY CONSIST, AND HOW THEYCOME TO BE MADE. These being (as they ought) well looked into, we shallthe better come to find the right use of words; the natural advantagesand defects of language; and the remedies that ought to be used, to avoid the inconveniences of obscurity or uncertainty in thesignification of words: without which it is impossible to discourse withany clearness or order concerning knowledge: which, being conversantabout propositions, and those most commonly universal ones, has greaterconnexion with words than perhaps is suspected. These considerations, therefore, shall be the matter of the following chapters. 

CHAPTER II. 

OF THE SIGNIFICATION OF WORDS. 

1. Words are sensible Signs, necessary for Communication of Ideas. 

Man, though he have great variety of thoughts, and such from whichothers as well as himself might receive profit and delight; yet they areall within his own breast, invisible and hidden from others, nor can ofthemselves be made to appear. The comfort and advantage of society notbeing to be had without communication of thoughts, it was necessarythat man should find out some external sensible signs, whereof thoseinvisible ideas, which his thoughts are made up of, might be made knownto others. For this purpose nothing was so fit, either for plenty orquickness, as those articulate sounds, which with so much ease andvariety he found himself able to make. Thus we may conceive how WORDS, which were by nature so well adapted to that purpose, came to be madeuse of by men as the signs of their ideas; not by any natural connexionthat there is between particular articulate sounds and certain ideas, for then there would be but one language amongst all men; but by avoluntary imposition, whereby such a word is made arbitrarily the markof such an idea. The use, then, of words, is to be sensible marks ofideas; and the ideas they stand for are their proper and immediatesignification. 

2. Words, in their immediate Signification, are the sensible Signs ofhis Ideas who uses them. 

The use men have of these marks being either to record their ownthoughts, for the assistance of their own memory; or, as it were, tobring out their ideas, and lay them before the view of others: words, in their primary or immediate signification, stand for nothing but THEIDEAS IN THE MIND OF HIM THAT USES THEM, how imperfectly soever orcarelessly those ideas are collected from the things which they aresupposed to represent. When a man speaks to another, it is that he maybe understood: and the end of speech is, that those sounds, as marks, may make known his ideas to the hearer. That then which words are themarks of are the ideas of the speaker: nor can any one apply them asmarks, immediately, to anything else but the ideas that he himself hath:for this would be to make them signs of his own conceptions, and yetapply them to other ideas; which would be to make them signs and notsigns of his ideas at the same time; and so in effect to have nosignification at all. Words being voluntary signs, they cannot bevoluntary signs imposed by him on things he knows not. That would be tomake them signs of nothing, sounds without signification. A mancannot make his words the signs either of qualities in things, or ofconceptions in the mind of another, whereof he has none in his own. Tillhe has some ideas of his own, he cannot suppose them to correspond withthe conceptions of another man; nor can he use any signs for them: forthus they would be the signs of he knows not what, which is in truth tobe the signs of nothing. But when he represents to himself other men'sideas by some of his own, if he consent to give them the same names thatother men do, it is still to his own ideas; to ideas that he has, andnot to ideas that he has not. 

3. Examples of this. 

This is so necessary in the use of language, that in this respect theknowing and the ignorant, the learned and the unlearned, use the wordsthey speak (with any meaning) all alike. They, in every man's mouth, stand for the ideas he has, and which he would express by them. A childhaving taken notice of nothing in the metal he hears called GOLD, butthe bright shining yellow colour, he applies the word gold only to hisown idea of that colour, and nothing else; and therefore calls the samecolour in a peacock's tail gold. Another that hath better observed, addsto shining yellow great weight: and then the sound gold, when he usesit, stands for a complex idea of a shining yellow and a very weightysubstance. Another adds to those qualities fusibility: and then the wordgold signifies to him a body, bright, yellow, fusible, and very heavy. Another adds malleability. Each of these uses equally the word gold, when they have occasion to express the idea which they have applied itto: but it is evident that each can apply it only to his own idea; norcan he make it stand as a sign of such a complex idea as he has not. 

4. Words are often secretly referred, First to the Ideas supposed to bein other men's minds. 

But though words, as they are used by men, can properly and immediatelysignify nothing but the ideas that are in the mind of the speaker; yetthey in their thoughts give them a secret reference to two other things. 

First, THEY SUPPOSE THEIR WORDS TO BE MARKS OF THE IDEAS IN THE MINDSALSO OF OTHER MEN, WITH WHOM THEY COMMUNICATE; for else they should talkin vain, and could not be understood, if the sounds they applied to oneidea were such as by the hearer were applied to another, which is tospeak two languages. But in this men stand not usually to examine, whether the idea they, and those they discourse with have in theirminds be the same: but think it enough that they use the word, as theyimagine, in the common acceptation of that language; in which theysuppose that the idea they make it a sign of is precisely the same towhich the understanding men of that country apply that name. 

5. Secondly, to the Reality of Things. 

Secondly, Because men would not be thought to talk barely of their ownimagination, but of things as really they are; therefore they oftensuppose the WORDS TO STAND ALSO FOR THE REALITY OF THINGS. But thisrelating more particularly to substances and their names, as perhapsthe former does to simple ideas and modes, we shall speak of these twodifferent ways of applying words more at large, when we come to treat ofthe names of mixed modes and substances in particular: though give meleave here to say, that it is a perverting the use of words, and bringsunavoidable obscurity and confusion into their signification, wheneverwe make them stand for anything but those ideas we have in our ownminds. 

6. Words by Use readily excite Ideas of their objects. 

Concerning words, also, it is further to be considered:

First, that they being immediately the signs of men's ideas, and by thatmeans the instruments whereby men communicate their conceptions, andexpress to one another those thoughts and imaginations they have withintheir own breasts; there comes, by constant use, to be such a connexionbetween certain sounds and the ideas they stand for, that the namesheard, almost as readily excite certain ideas as if the objectsthemselves, which are apt to produce them, did actually affect thesenses. Which is manifestly so in all obvious sensible qualities, and inall substances that frequently and familiarly occur to us. 

7. Words are often used without Signification, and Why. 

Secondly, That though the proper and immediate signification of wordsare ideas in the mind of the speaker, yet, because by familiar use fromour cradles, we come to learn certain articulate sounds very perfectly, and have them readily on our tongues, and always at hand in ourmemories, but yet are not always careful to examine or settle theirsignifications perfectly; it often happens that men, even when theywould apply themselves to an attentive consideration, do set theirthoughts more on words than things. Nay, because words are many of themlearned before the ideas are known for which they stand: therefore some, not only children but men, speak several words no otherwise than parrotsdo, only because they have learned them, and have been accustomed tothose sounds. But so far as words are of use and signification, so faris there a constant connexion between the sound and the idea, and adesignation that the one stands for the other; without which applicationof them, they are nothing but so much insignificant noise. 

8. Their Signification perfectly arbitrary, not the consequence of anatural connexion. 

Words, by long and familiar use, as has been said, come to excite in mencertain ideas so constantly and readily, that they are apt to supposea natural connexion between them. But that they signify only men'speculiar ideas, and that BY A PERFECT ARBITRARY IMPOSITION, is evident, in that they often fail to excite in others (even that use the samelanguage) the same ideas we take them to be signs of: and every man hasso inviolable a liberty to make words stand for what ideas he pleases, that no one hath the power to make others have the same ideas in theirminds that he has, when they use the same words that he does. Andtherefore the great Augustus himself, in the possession of that powerwhich ruled the world, acknowledged he could not make a new Latin word:which was as much as to say, that he could not arbitrarily appoint whatidea any sound should be a sign of, in the mouths and common language ofhis subjects. It is true, common use, by a tacit consent, appropriatescertain sounds to certain ideas in all languages, which so far limitsthe signification of that sound, that unless a man applies it to thesame idea, he does not speak properly: and let me add, that unless aman's words excite the same ideas in the hearer which he makes themstand for in speaking, he does not speak intelligibly. But whatever bethe consequence of any man's using of words differently, either fromtheir general meaning, or the particular sense of the person to whomhe addresses them; this is certain, their signification, in his use ofthem, is limited to his ideas, and they can be signs of nothing else. 

CHAPTER III. 

OF GENERAL TERMS. 

1. The greatest Part of Words are general terms. 

All things that exist being particulars, it may perhaps be thoughtreasonable that words, which ought to be conformed to things, shouldbe so too, --I mean in their signification: but yet we find quite thecontrary. The far greatest part of words that make all languages aregeneral terms: which has not been the effect of neglect or chance, butof reason and necessity. 

2. That every particular Thing should have a Name for itself isimpossible. 

First, It is impossible that every particular thing should have adistinct peculiar name. For, the signification and use of wordsdepending on that connexion which the mind makes between its ideas andthe sounds it uses as signs of them, it is necessary, in the applicationof names to things, that the mind should have distinct ideas of thethings, and retain also the particular name that belongs to every one, with its peculiar appropriation to that idea. But it is beyond thepower of human capacity to frame and retain distinct ideas of all theparticular things we meet with: every bird and beast men saw; every treeand plant that affected the senses, could not find a place in themost capacious understanding. If it be looked on as an instance of aprodigious memory, that some generals have been able to call everysoldier in their army by his proper name, we may easily find a reasonwhy men have never attempted to give names to each sheep in their flock, or crow that flies over their heads; much less to call every leaf ofplants, or grain of sand that came in their way, by a peculiar name. 

3. And would be useless, if it were possible. 

Secondly, If it were possible, it would yet be useless; because it wouldnot serve to the chief end of language. Men would in vain heap up namesof particular things, that would not serve them to communicate theirthoughts. Men learn names, and use them in talk with others, only thatthey may be understood: which is then only done when, by use or consent, the sound I make by the organs of speech, excites in another man's mindwho hears it, the idea I apply it to in mine, when I speak it. Thiscannot be done by names applied to particular things; whereof I alonehaving the ideas in my mind, the names of them could not be significantor intelligible to another, who was not acquainted with all those veryparticular things which had fallen under my notice. 

4. A distinct name for every particular thing not fitted for enlargementof knowledge. 

Thirdly, But yet, granting this also feasible, (which I think is not, )yet a distinct name for every particular thing would not be of anygreat use for the improvement of knowledge: which, though founded inparticular things, enlarges itself by general views; to which thingsreduced into sorts, under general names, are properly subservient. These, with the names belonging to them, come within some compass, anddo not multiply every moment, beyond what either the mind can contain, or use requires. And therefore, in these, men have for the most partstopped: but yet not so as to hinder themselves from distinguishingparticular things by appropriated names, where convenience demands it. And therefore in their own species, which they have most to do with, andwherein they have often occasion to mention particular persons, theymake use of proper names; and there distinct individuals have distinctdenominations. 

5. What things have proper Names, and why. 

Besides persons, countries also, cities, rivers, mountains, and otherthe like distinctions of lace have usually found peculiar names, andthat for the same reason; they being such as men have often as occasionto mark particularly, and, as it were, set before others in theirdiscourses with them. And I doubt not but, if we had reason to mentionparticular horses as often as as have reason to mention particular men, we should have proper names for the one, as familiar as for the other, and Bucephalus would be a word as much in use as Alexander. Andtherefore we see that, amongst jockeys, horses have their proper namesto be known and distinguished by, as commonly as their servants:because, amongst them, there is often occasion to mention this or thatparticular horse when he is out of sight. 

6. How general Words are made. 

The next thing to be considered is, --How general words come to be made. For, since all things that exist are only particulars, how come we bygeneral terms; or where find we those general natures they are supposedto stand for? Words become general by being made the signs ofgeneral ideas: and ideas become general, by separating from them thecircumstances of time and place, and any other ideas that may determinethem to this or that particular existence. By this way of abstractionthey are made capable of representing more individuals than one; each ofwhich having in it a conformity to that abstract idea, is (as we callit) of that sort. 

7. Shown by the way we enlarge our complex ideas from infancy. 

But, to deduce this a little more distinctly, it will not perhaps beamiss to trace our notions and names from their beginning, and observeby what degrees we proceed, and by what steps we enlarge our ideas fromour first infancy. There is nothing more evident, than that the ideas ofthe persons children converse with (to instance in them alone) are, likethe persons themselves, only particular. The ideas of the nurse and themother are well framed in their minds; and, like pictures of them there, represent only those individuals. The names they first gave to them areconfined to these individuals; and the names of NURSE and MAMMA, thechild uses, determine themselves to those persons. Afterwards, when timeand a larger acquaintance have made them observe that there are a greatmany other things in the world, that in some common agreements of shape, and several other qualities, resemble their father and mother, and thosepersons they have been used to, they frame an idea, which they findthose many particulars do partake in; and to that they give, withothers, the name MAN, for example. And thus they come to have a generalname, and a general idea. Wherein they make nothing new; but only leaveout of the complex idea they had of Peter and James, Mary and Jane, thatwhich is peculiar to each, and retain only what is common to them all. 

8. And further enlarge our complex ideas, by still leaving outproperties contained in them. 

By the same way that they come by the general name and idea of MAN, theyeasily advance to more general names and notions. For, observing thatseveral things that differ from their idea of man, and cannot thereforebe comprehended out under that name, have yet certain qualities whereinthey agree with man, by retaining only those qualities, and uniting theminto one idea, they have again another and more general idea; to whichhaving given a name they make a term of a more comprehensive extension:which new idea is made, not by any new addition, but only as before, byleaving out the shape, and some other properties signified by the nameman, and retaining only a body, with life, sense, and spontaneousmotion, comprehended under the name animal. 

9. General natures are nothing but abstract and partial ideas of morecomplex ones. 

That this is the way whereby men first formed general ideas, and generalnames to them, I think is so evident, that there needs no other proofof it but the considering of a man's self, or others, and the ordinaryproceedings of their minds in knowledge. And he that thinks GENERALNATURES or NOTIONS are anything else but such abstract and partial ideasof more complex ones, taken at first from particular existences, will, Ifear, be at a loss where to find them. For let any one effect, and thentell me, wherein does his idea of MAN differ from that of PETER andPAUL, or his idea of HORSE from that of BUCEPHALUS, but in the leavingout something that is peculiar to each individual, and retaining so muchof those particular complex ideas of several particular existences asthey are found to agree in? Of the complex ideas signified by the namesMAN and HORSE, leaving out but those particulars wherein they differ, and retaining only those wherein they agree, and of those making a newdistinct complex idea, and giving the name ANIMAL to it, one has a moregeneral term, that comprehends with man several other creatures. Leaveout of the idea of ANIMAL, sense and spontaneous motion, and theremaining complex idea, made up of the remaining simple ones of body, life, and nourishment, becomes a more general one, under the morecomprehensive term, VIVENS. And, not to dwell longer upon thisparticular, so evident in itself; by the same way the mind proceeds toBODY, SUBSTANCE, and at last to BEING, THING, and such universal terms, which stand for any of our ideas whatsoever. To conclude: this wholemystery of genera and species, which make such a noise in the schools, and are with justice so little regarded out of them, is nothing else butABSTRACT IDEAS, more or less comprehensive, with names annexed to them. In all which this is constant and unvariable, That every more generalterm stands for such an idea, and is but a part of any of thosecontained under it. 

10. Why the Genus is ordinarily made Use of in Definitions. 

This may show us the reason why, in the defining of words, which isnothing but declaring their signification, we make use of the GENUS, ornext general word that comprehends it. Which is not out of necessity, but only to save the labour of enumerating the several simple ideaswhich the next general word or GENUS stands for; or, perhaps, sometimesthe shame of not being able to do it. But though defining by GENUS andDIFFERENTIA (I crave leave to use these terms of art, though originallyLatin, since they most properly suit those notions they are applied to), I say, though defining by the GENUS be the shortest way, yet I think itmay be doubted whether it be the best. This I am sure, it is not theonly, and so not absolutely necessary. For, definition being nothing butmaking another understand by words what idea the term defined standsfor, a definition is best made by enumerating those simple ideas thatare combined in the signification of the term defined: and if, insteadof such an enumeration, men have accustomed themselves to use thenext general term, it has not been out of necessity, or for greaterclearness, but for quickness and dispatch sake. For I think that, to onewho desired to know what idea the word MAN stood for; if it should besaid, that man was a solid extended substance, having life, sense, spontaneous motion, and the faculty of reasoning, I doubt not but themeaning of the term man would be as well understood, and the idea itstands for be at least as clearly made known, as when it is definedto be a rational animal: which, by the several definitions of ANIMAL, VIVENS, and CORPUS, resolves itself into those enumerated ideas. I have, in explaining the term MAN, followed here the ordinary definition ofthe schools; which, though perhaps not the most, exact, yet serves wellenough to my present purpose. And one may, in this instance, see whatgave occasion to the rule, that a definition must consist of GENUS andDIFFERENTIA; and it suffices to show us the little necessity there isof such a rule, or advantage in the strict observing of it. For, definitions, as has been said, being only the explaining of one wordby several others, so that the meaning or idea it stands for may becertainly known; languages are not always so made according to the rulesof logic, that every term can have its signification exactly and clearlyexpressed by two others. Experience sufficiently satisfies us to thecontrary; or else those who have made this rule have done ill, that theyhave given us so few definitions conformable to it. But of definitionsmore in the next chapter. 

11. General and Universal are Creatures of the Understanding, and belongnot to the Real Existence of things. 

To return to general words: it is plain, by what has been said, thatGENERAL and UNIVERSAL belong not to the real existence of things; butare the inventions and creatures of the understanding, made by it forits own use, and concern only signs, whether words or ideas. Words aregeneral, as has been said, when used for signs of general ideas, and soare applicable indifferently to many particular things; and ideas aregeneral when they are set up as the representatives of many particularthings: but universality belongs not to things themselves, which are allof them particular in their existence, even those words and ideas whichin their signification are general. When therefore we quit particulars, the generals that rest are only creatures of our own making; theirgeneral nature being nothing but the capacity they are put into, by theunderstanding, of signifying or representing many particulars. For thesignification they have is nothing but a relation that, by the mind ofman, is added to them. 

12. Abstract Ideas are the Essences of Genera and Species. 

The next thing therefore to be considered is, What kind of significationit is that general words have. For, as it is evident that they do notsignify barely one particular thing; for then they would not be generalterms, but proper names, so, on the other side, it is as evident they donot signify a plurality; for MAN and MEN would then signify the same;and the distinction of numbers (as the grammarians call them) would besuperfluous and useless. That then which general words signify is a SORTof things; and each of them does that, by being a sign of an abstractidea in the mind; to which idea, as things existing are found to agree, so they come to be ranked under that name, or, which is all one, be ofthat sort. Whereby it is evident that the ESSENCES of the sorts, or, ifthe Latin word pleases better, SPECIES of things, are nothing else butthese abstract ideas. For the having the essence of any species, beingthat which makes anything to be of that species; and the conformity tothe idea to which the name is annexed being that which gives a right tothat name; the having the essence, and the having that conformity, mustneeds be the same thing: since to be of any species, and to have a rightto the name of that species, is all one. As, for example, to be a MAN, or of the SPECIES man, and to have right to the NAME man, is the samething. Again, to be a man, or of the species man, and have the ESSENCEof a man, is the same thing. Now, since nothing can be a man, or have aright to the name man, but what has a conformity to the abstract ideathe name man stands for, nor anything be a man, or have a right to thespecies man, but what has the essence of that species; it follows, thatthe abstract idea for which the name stands, and the essence of thespecies, is one and the same. From whence it is easy to observe, thatthe essences of the sorts of things, and, consequently, the sorting ofthings, is the workmanship of the understanding that abstracts and makesthose general ideas. 

13. They are the Workmanship of the Understanding, but have theirFoundation in the Similitude of Things. 

I would not here be thought to forget, much less to deny, that Nature, in the production of things, makes several of them alike: there isnothing more obvious, especially in the races of animals, and all thingspropagated by seed. But yet I think we may say, THE SORTING OF THEMUNDER NAMES IS THE WORKMANSHIP OF THE UNDERSTANDING, TAKING OCCASION, FROM THE SIMILITUDE IT OBSERVES AMONGST THEM, TO MAKE ABSTRACT GENERALIDEAS, and set them up in the mind, with names annexed to them, aspatterns or forms, (for, in that sense, the word FORM has a very propersignification, ) to which as particular things existing are found toagree, so they come to be of that species, have that denomination, orare put into that CLASSIS. For when we say this is a man, that a horse;this justice, that cruelty; this a watch, that a jack; what do we elsebut rank things under different specific names, as agreeing to thoseabstract ideas, of which we have made those names the signs? And whatare the essences of those species set out and marked by names, but thoseabstract ideas in the mind; which are, as it were, the bonds betweenparticular things that exist, and the names they are to be ranked under?And when general names have any connexion with particular beings, theseabstract ideas are the medium that unites them: so that the essences ofspecies, as distinguished and denominated by us, neither are nor canbe anything but those precise abstract ideas we have in our minds. Andtherefore the supposed real essences of substances, if different fromour abstract ideas, cannot be the essences of the species WE rankthings into. For two species may be one, as rationally as two differentessences be the essence of one species: and I demand what are thealterations [which] may, or may not be made in a HORSE or LEAD, withoutmaking either of them to be of another species? In determining thespecies of things by OUR abstract ideas, this is easy to resolve: but ifany one will regulate himself herein by supposed REAL essences, he willI suppose, be at a loss: and he will never be able to know when anythingprecisely ceases to be of the species of a HORSE or LEAD. 

14. Each distinct abstract Idea is a distinct Essence. 

Nor will any one wonder that I say these essences, or abstract ideas(which are the measures of name, and the boundaries of species) arethe workmanship of the understanding, who considers that at least thecomplex ones are often, in several men, different collections of simpleideas; and therefore that is COVETOUSNESS to one man, which is not so toanother. Nay, even in substances, where their abstract ideas seem to betaken from the things themselves, they are not constantly the same; no, not in that species which is most familiar to us, and with which we havethe most intimate acquaintance: it having been more than once doubted, whether the FOETUS born of a woman were a MAN, even so far as that ithath been debated, whether it were or were not to be nourished andbaptized: which could not be, if the abstract idea or essence towhich the name man belonged were of nature's making; and were notthe uncertain and various collection of simple ideas, which theunderstanding put together, and then, abstracting it, affixed a nameto it. So that, in truth, every distinct abstract idea is a distinctessence; and the names that stand for such distinct ideas are thenames of things essentially different. Thus a circle is as essentiallydifferent from an oval as a sheep from a goat; and rain is asessentially different from snow as water from earth: that abstract ideawhich is the essence of one being impossible to be communicated to theother. And thus any two abstract ideas, that in any part vary onefrom another, with two distinct names annexed to them, constitute twodistinct sorts, or, if you please, SPECIES, as essentially different asany two of the most remote or opposite in the world. 

15. Several significations of the word Essence. 

But since the essences of things are thought by some (and not withoutreason) to be wholly unknown, it may not be amiss to consider theseveral significations of the word ESSENCE. 

Real essences. 

First, Essence may be taken for the very being of anything, whereby itis what it is. And thus the real internal, but generally (in substances)unknown constitution of things, whereon their discoverable qualitiesdepend, may be called their essence. This is the proper originalsignification of the word, as is evident from the formation of it;essential in its primary notation, signifying properly, being. And inthis sense it is still used, when we speak of the essence of PARTICULARthings, without giving them any name. 

Nominal Essences. 

Secondly, The learning and disputes of the schools having been muchbusied about genus and species, the word essence has almost lost itsprimary signification: and, instead of the real constitution of things, has been almost wholly applied to the artificial constitution ofgenus and species. It is true, there is ordinarily supposed a realconstitution of the sorts of things; and it is past doubt there mustbe some real constitution, on which any collection of simple ideasco-existing must depend. But, it being evident that things are rankedunder names into sorts or species, only as they agree to certainabstract ideas, to which we have annexed those names, the essence ofeach GENUS, or sort, comes to be nothing but that abstract idea whichthe general, or sortal (if I may have leave so to call it from sort, asI do general from genus, ) name stands for. And this we shall find to bethat which the word essence imports in its most familiar use. 

These two sorts of essences, I suppose, may not unfitly be termed, theone the REAL, the other NOMINAL ESSENCE. 

16. Constant Connexion between the Name and nominal Essence. 

Between the NOMINAL ESSENCE and the NAME there is so near a connexion, that the name of any sort of things cannot be attributed to anyparticular being but what has this essence, whereby it answers thatabstract idea whereof that name is the sign. 

17. Supposition, that Species are distinguished by their real Essencesuseless. 

Concerning the REAL ESSENCES of corporeal substances (to mention theseonly) there are, if I mistake not, two opinions. The one is of thosewho, using the word essence for they know not what, suppose a certainnumber of those essences, according to which all natural things aremade, and wherein they do exactly every one of them partake, and sobecome of this or that species. The other and more rational opinion isof those who look on all natural things to have a real, but unknown, constitution of their insensible parts; from which flow those sensiblequalities which serve us to distinguish them one from another, accordingas we have occasion to rank them into sorts, under common denominations. The former of these opinions, which supposes these essences as a certainnumber of forms or moulds, wherein all natural things that exist arecast, and do equally partake, has, I imagine, very much perplexed theknowledge of natural things. The frequent productions of monsters, inall the species of animals, and of changelings, and other strange issuesof human birth, carry with them difficulties, not possible to consistwith this hypothesis; since it is as impossible that two thingspartaking exactly of the same real essence should have differentproperties, as that two figures partaking of the same real essence of acircle should have different properties. But were there no other reasonagainst it, yet the supposition of essences that cannot be known; andthe making of them, nevertheless, to be that which distinguishes thespecies of things, is so wholly useless and unserviceable to any part ofour knowledge, that that alone were sufficient to make us lay it by, andcontent ourselves with such essences of the sorts or species of thingsas come within the reach of our knowledge: which, when seriouslyconsidered, will be found, as I have said, to be nothing else but, thoseABSTRACT complex ideas to which we have annexed distinct general names. 

18. Real and nominal Essence

Essences being thus distinguished into nominal and real, we may furtherobserve, that, in the species of simple ideas and modes, they are alwaysthe same; but in substances always quite different. Thus, a figureincluding a space between three lines, is the real as well as nominalessence of a triangle; it being not only the abstract idea to which thegeneral name is annexed, but the very ESSENTIA or being of the thingitself; that foundation from which all its properties flow, and to whichthey are all inseparably annexed. But it is far otherwise concerningthat parcel of matter which makes the ring on my finger; wherein thesetwo essences are apparently different. For, it is the real constitutionof its insensible parts, on which depend all those properties of colour, weight, fusibility, fixedness, &c. , which are to be found in it; whichconstitution we know not, and so, having no particular idea of, havingno name that is the sign of it. But yet it is its colour, weight, fusibility, fixedness, &c. , which makes it to be gold, or gives ita right to that name, which is therefore its nominal essence. Sincenothing can be called gold but what has a conformity of qualities tothat abstract complex idea to which that name is annexed. But thisdistinction of essences, belonging particularly to substances, we shall, when we come to consider their names, have an occasion to treat of morefully. 

19. Essences ingenerable and incorruptible. 

That such abstract ideas, with names to them, as we have been speakingof are essences, may further appear by what we are told concerningessences, viz. That they are all ingenerable and incorruptible. Whichcannot be true of the real constitutions of things, which begin andperish with them. All things that exist, besides their Author, are allliable to change; especially those things we are acquainted with, andhave ranked into bands under distinct names or ensigns. Thus, that whichwas grass to-day is to-morrow the flesh of a sheep; and, within a fewdays after, becomes part of a man: in all which and the like changes, it is evident their real essence--i. E. That constitution whereon theproperties of these several things depended--is destroyed, and perisheswith them. But essences being taken for ideas established in the mind, with names annexed to them, they are supposed to remain steadily thesame, whatever mutations the particular substances are liable to. For, whatever becomes of ALEXANDER and BUCEPHALUS, the ideas to which MAN andHORSE are annexed, are supposed nevertheless to remain the same; andso the essences of those species are preserved whole and undestroyed, whatever changes happen to any or all of the individuals of thosespecies. By this means the essence of a species rests safe and entire, without the existence of so much as one individual of that kind. For, were there now no circle existing anywhere in the world, (as perhapsthat figure exists not anywhere exactly marked out, ) yet the ideaannexed to that name would not cease to be what it is; nor cease to beas a pattern to determine which of the particular figures we meet withhave or have not a right to the NAME circle, and so to show which ofthem, by having that essence, was of that species. And though thereneither were nor had been in nature such a beast as an UNICORN, or sucha fish as a MERMAID; yet, supposing those names to stand for complexabstract ideas that contained no inconsistency in them, the essence of amermaid is as intelligible as that of a man; and the idea of an unicornas certain, steady, and permanent as that of a horse. From what has beensaid, it is evident, that the doctrine of the immutability of essencesproves them to be only abstract ideas; and is founded on the relationestablished between them and certain sounds as signs of them; andwill always be true, as long as the same name can have the samesignification. 

20. Recapitulation. 

To conclude. This is that which in short I would say, viz. That all thegreat business of GENERA and SPECIES, and their ESSENCES, amounts to nomore but this:--That men making abstract ideas, and settling them intheir minds with names annexed to them, do thereby enable themselves toconsider things, and discourse of them, as it were in bundles, for theeasier and readier improvement and communication of their knowledge, which would advance but slowly were their words and thoughts confinedonly to particulars. 

CHAPTER IV. 

OF THE NAMES OF SIMPLE IDEAS. 

1. Names of simple Ideas, Modes, and Substances, have each somethingpeculiar. 

Though all words, as I have shown, signify nothing immediately but theideas in the mind of the speaker; yet, upon a nearer survey, we shallfind the names of SIMPLE IDEAS, MIXED MODES (under which I compriseRELATIONS too), and NATURAL SUBSTANCES, have each of them somethingpeculiar and different from the other. For example:--

2. First, Names of simple Ideas, and of Substances intimate realExistence. 

First, the names of SIMPLE IDEAS and SUBSTANCES, with the abstract ideasin the mind which they immediately signify, intimate also some realexistence, from which was derived their original pattern. But the namesof MIXED MODES terminate in the idea that is in the mind, and lead notthe thoughts any further; as we shall see more at large in the followingchapter. 

3. Secondly, Names of simple Ideas and Modes signify always both realand nominal Essences. 

Secondly, The names of simple ideas and modes signify always the realas well as nominal essence of their species. But the names of naturalsubstances signify rarely, if ever, anything but barely the nominalessences of those species; as we shall show in the chapter that treatsof the names of substances in particular. 

4. Thirdly, Names of simple Ideas are undefinable. 

Thirdly, The names of simple ideas are not capable of any definition;the names of all complex ideas are. It has not, that I know, been yetobserved by anybody what words are, and what are not, capable of beingdefined; the want whereof is (as I am apt to think) not seldom theoccasion of great wrangling and obscurity in men's discourses, whilstsome demand definitions of terms that cannot be defined; and othersthink they ought not to rest satisfied in an explication made by a moregeneral word, and its restriction, (or to speak in terms of art, by agenus and difference, ) when, even after such definition, made accordingto rule, those who hear it have often no more a clear conception of themeaning of the word than they had before. This at least I think, thatthe showing what words are, and what are not, capable of definitions, and wherein consists a good definition, is not wholly besides ourpresent purpose; and perhaps will afford so much light to the natureof these signs and our ideas, as to deserve a more particularconsideration. 

5. If all names were definable, it would be a Process IN INFINITUM. 

I will not here trouble myself to prove that all terms are notdefinable, from that progress IN INFINITUM, which it will visibly leadus into, if we should allow that all names could be defined. For, if theterms of one definition were still to be defined by another, where atlast should we stop? But I shall, from the nature of our ideas, and thesignification of our words, show WHY SOME NAMES CAN, AND OTHERS CANNOTBE DEFINED; and WHICH THEY ARE. 

6. What a Definition is. 

I think it is agreed, that a DEFINITION is nothing else but THE SHOWINGTHE MEANING OF ONE WORD BY SEVERAL OTHER NOT SYNONYMOUS TERMS. Themeaning of words being only the ideas they are made to stand for by himthat uses them, the meaning of any term is then showed, or the word isdefined, when, by other words, the idea it is made the sign of, andannexed to, in the mind of the speaker, is as it were represented, orset before the view of another; and thus its signification ascertained. This is the only use and end of definitions; and therefore the onlymeasure of what is, or is not a good definition. 

7. Simple Ideas, why undefinable. 

This being premised, I say that the NAMES OF SIMPLE IDEAS, AND THOSEONLY, ARE INCAPABLE OF BEING DEFINED. The reason whereof is this, Thatthe several terms of a definition, signifying several ideas, they canall together by no means represent an idea which has no compositionat all: and therefore a definition, which is properly nothing but theshowing the meaning of one word by several others not signifying eachthe same thing, can in the names of simple ideas have no place. 

8. Instances: Scholastic definitions of Motion. 

The not observing this difference in our ideas, and their names, hasproduced that eminent trifling in the schools, which is so easy to beobserved in the definitions they give us of some few of these simpleideas. For, as to the greatest part of them, even those mastersof definitions were fain to leave them untouched, merely by theimpossibility they found in it. What more exquisite jargon could the witof man invent, than this definition:--'The act of a being in power, asfar forth as in power;' which would puzzle any rational man, to whom itwas not already known by its famous absurdity, to guess what word itcould ever be supposed to be the explication of. If Tully, asking aDutchman what BEWEEGINGE was, should have received this explicationin his own language, that it was 'actus entis in potentia quatenus inpotentia;' I ask whether any one can imagine he could thereby haveunderstood what the word BEWEEGINGE signified, or have guessed what ideaa Dutchman ordinarily had in his mind, and would signify to another, when he used that sound?

9. Modern definition of Motion. 

Nor have the modern philosophers, who have endeavoured to throw off thejargon of the schools, and speak intelligibly, much better succeededin defining simple ideas, whether by explaining their causes, or anyotherwise. The atomists, who define motion to be 'a passage from oneplace to another, ' what do they more than put one synonymous word foranother? For what is PASSAGE other than MOTION? And if they were askedwhat passage was, how would they better define it than by motion? For isit not at least as proper and significant to say, Passage is a motionfrom one place to another, as to say, Motion is a passage, &c. ? This isto translate, and not to define, when we change two words of the samesignification one for another; which, when one is better understood thanthe other, may serve to discover what idea the unknown stands for; butis very far from a definition, unless we will say every English word inthe dictionary is the definition of the Latin word it answers, and thatmotion is a definition of MOTUS. Nor will 'the successive application ofthe parts of the superficies of one body to those of another, ' which theCartesians give us, prove a much better definition of motion, when wellexamined. 

10. Definitions of Light. 

'The act of perspicuous, as far forth as perspicuous, ' is anotherPeripatetic definition of a simple idea; which, though not moreabsurd than the former of motion, yet betrays its uselessness andinsignificancy more plainly; because experience will easily convince anyone that it cannot make the meaning of the word LIGHT (which it pretendsto define) at all understood by a blind man, but the definition ofmotion appears not at first sight so useless, because it escapes thisway of trial. For this simple idea, entering by the touch as well assight, it is impossible to show an example of any one who has no otherway to get the idea of motion, but barely by the definition of thatname. Those who tell us that light is a great number of little globules, striking briskly on the bottom of the eye, speak more intelligibly thanthe Schools: but yet these words never so well understood would make theidea the word light stands for no more known to a man that understandsit not before, than if one should tell him that light was nothing but acompany of little tennis-balls, which fairies all day long struck withrackets against some men's foreheads, whilst they passed by others. Forgranting this explication of the thing to be true, yet the idea of thecause of light, if we had it never so exact, would no more give us theidea of light itself, as it is such a particular perception in us, thanthe idea of the figure and motion of a sharp piece of steel would giveus the idea of that pain which it is able to cause in us. For the causeof any sensation, and the sensation itself, in all the simple ideas ofone sense, are two ideas; and two ideas so different and distant onefrom another, that no two can be more so. And therefore, should DesCartes's globules strike never so long on the retina of a man who wasblind by a gutta serena, he would thereby never have any idea of light, or anything approaching it, though he understood never so well whatlittle globules were, and what striking on another body was. Andtherefore the Cartesians very well distinguish between that light whichis the cause of that sensation in us, and the idea which is produced inus by it, and is that which is properly light. 

11. Simple Ideas, why undefinable, further explained. 

Simple ideas, as has been shown, are only to be got by those impressionsobjects themselves make on our minds, by the proper inlets appointedto each sort. If they are not received this way, all the words in theworld, made use of to explain or define any of their names, will neverbe able to produce in us the idea it stands for. For, words beingsounds, can produce in us no other simple ideas than of those verysounds; nor excite any in us, but by that voluntary connexion which isknown to be between them and those simple ideas which common use hasmade them the signs of. He that thinks otherwise, let him try if anywords can give him the taste of a pine apple, and make him have the trueidea of the relish of that celebrated delicious fruit. So far as heis told it has a resemblance with any tastes whereof he has the ideasalready in his memory, imprinted there by sensible objects, notstrangers to his palate, so far may he approach that resemblance in hismind. But this is not giving us that idea by a definition, but excitingin us other simple ideas by their known names; which will be stillvery different from the true taste of that fruit itself. In light andcolours, and all other simple ideas, it is the same thing: for thesignification of sounds is not natural, but only imposed and arbitrary. And no DEFINITION of light or redness is more fitted or able to produceeither of those ideas in us, than the SOUND light or red, by itself. For, to hope to produce an idea of light or colour by a sound, howeverformed, is to expect that sounds should be visible, or colours audible;and to make the ears do the office of all the other senses. Which is allone as to say, that we might taste, smell, and see by the ears: a sortof philosophy worthy only of Sancho Panza, who had the faculty to seeDulcinea by hearsay. And therefore he that has not before received intohis mind, by the proper inlet, the simple idea which any word standsfor, can never come to know the signification of that word by any otherwords or sounds whatsoever, put together according to any rules ofdefinition. The only way is, by applying to his senses the properobject; and so producing that idea in him, for which he has learned thename already. A studious blind man, who had mightily beat his headabout visible objects, and made use of the explication of his books andfriends, to understand those names of light and colours which oftencame in his way, bragged one day, That he now understood what SCARLETsignified. Upon which, his friend demanding what scarlet was? Theblind man answered, It was like the sound of a trumpet. Just such anunderstanding of the name of any other simple idea will he have, whohopes to get it only from a definition, or other words made use of toexplain it. 

12. The contrary shown in complex ideas, by instances of a Statue andRainbow. 

The case is quite otherwise in COMPLEX IDEAS; which, consisting ofseveral simple ones, it is in the power of words, standing for theseveral ideas that make that composition, to imprint complex ideas inthe mind which were never there before, and so make their names beunderstood. In such collections of ideas, passing under one name, definition, or the teaching the signification of one word by severalothers, has place, and may make us understand the names of things whichnever came within the reach of our senses; and frame ideas suitable tothose in other men's minds, when they use those names: provided thatnone of the terms of the definition stand for any such simple ideas, which he to whom the explication is made has never yet had in histhought. Thus the word STATUE may be explained to a blind man by otherwords, when PICTURE cannot; his senses having given him the idea offigure, but not of colours, which therefore words cannot excite in him. This gained the prize to the painter against the statuary: each of whichcontending for the excellency of his art, and the statuary bragging thathis was to be preferred, because it reached further, and even those whohad lost their eyes could yet perceive the excellency of it. The painteragreed to refer himself to the judgment of a blind man; who beingbrought where there was a statue made by the one, and a picture drawn bythe other; he was first led to the statue, in which he traced with hishands all the lineaments of the face and body, and with great admirationapplauded the skill of the workman. But being led to the picture, andhaving his hands laid upon it, was told, that now he touched the head, and then the forehead, eyes, nose, &c. , as his hand moved over theparts of the picture on the cloth, without finding any the leastdistinction: whereupon he cried out, that certainly that must needs be avery admirable and divine piece of workmanship, which could represent tothem all those parts, where he could neither feel nor perceive anything. 

13. Colours indefinable to the born-blind. 

He that should use the word RAINBOW to one who knew all those colours, but yet had never seen that phenomenon, would, by enumerating thefigure, largeness, position, and order of the colours, so welldefine that word that it might be perfectly understood. But yet thatdefinition, how exact and perfect soever, would never make a blindman understand it; because several of the simple ideas that makethat complex one, being such as he never received by sensation andexperience, no words are able to excite them in his mind. 

14. Complex Ideas definable only when the simple ideas of which theyconsist have been got from experience. 

Simple ideas, as has been shown, can only be got by experience fromthose objects which are proper to produce in us those perceptions. When, by this means, we have our minds stored with them, and know the namesfor them, then we are in a condition to define, and by definition tounderstand, the names of complex ideas that are made up of them. Butwhen any term stands for a simple idea that a man has never yet had inhis mind, it is impossible by any words to make known its meaning tohim. When any term stands for an idea a man is acquainted with, but isignorant that that term is the sign of it, then another name of thesame idea, which he has been accustomed to, may make him understandits meaning. But in no case whatsoever is any name of any simple ideacapable of a definition. 

15. Fourthly, Names of simple Ideas of less doubtful meaning than thoseof mixed modes and substances. 

Fourthly, But though the names of simple ideas have not the help ofdefinition to determine their signification, yet that hinders not butthat they are generally less doubtful and uncertain than those ofmixed modes and substances; because they, standing only for one simpleperception, men for the most part easily and perfectly agree in theirsignification; and there is little room for mistake and wrangling abouttheir meaning. He that knows once that whiteness is the name of thatcolour he has observed in snow or milk, will not be apt to misapply thatword, as long as he retains that idea; which when he has quite lost, heis not apt to mistake the meaning of it, but perceives he understands itnot. There is neither a multiplicity of simple ideas to be put together, which makes the doubtfulness in the names of mixed modes; nor asupposed, but an unknown, real essence, with properties dependingthereon, the precise number whereof is also unknown, which makes thedifficulty in the names of substances. But, on the contrary, in simpleideas the whole signification of the name is known at once, and consistsnot of parts, whereof more or less being put in, the idea may be varied, and so the signification of name be obscure, or uncertain. 

16. Simple Ideas have few Ascents in linea praedicamentali. 

Fifthly, This further may be observed concerning simple Simple ideas andtheir names, that they have but few ascents in linea praedicamentali, (as they call it, ) from the lowest species to the summum genus. Thereason whereof is, that the lowest species being but one simple idea, nothing can be left out of it, that so the difference being taken away, it may agree with some other thing in one idea common to them both;which, having one name, is the genus of the other two: v. G. There isnothing that can be left out of the idea of white and red to makethem agree in one common appearance, and so have one general name; asRATIONALITY being left out of the complex idea of man, makes it agreewith brute in the more general idea and name of animal. And thereforewhen, to avoid unpleasant enumerations, men would comprehend both whiteand red, and several other such simple ideas, under one general name, they have been fain to do it by a word which denotes only the way theyget into the mind. For when white, red, and yellow are all comprehendedunder the genus or name colour, it signifies no more but such ideasas are produced in the mind only by the sight, and have entrance onlythrough the eyes. And when they would frame yet a more general term tocomprehend both colours and sounds, and the like simple ideas, they doit by a word that signifies all such as come into the mind only by onesense. And so the general term QUALITY, in its ordinary acceptation, comprehends colours, sounds, tastes, smells, and tangible qualities, with distinction from extension, number, motion, pleasure, and pain, which make impressions on the mind and introduce their ideas by moresenses than one. 

17. Sixthly, Names of simple Ideas not arbitrary, but perfectly takenfrom the existence of things. 

Sixthly, The names of simple ideas, substances, and mixed modes havealso this difference: that those of MIXED MODES stand for ideasperfectly arbitrary; those of SUBSTANCES are not perfectly so, but referto a pattern, though with some latitude; and those of SIMPLE IDEAS areperfectly taken from the existence of things, and are not arbitrary atall. Which, what difference it makes in the significations of theirnames, we shall see in the following chapters. 

Simple modes. 

The names of SIMPLE MODES differ little from those of simple ideas. 

CHAPTER V. 

OF THE NAMES OF MIXED MODES AND RELATIONS. 

1. Mixed modes stand for abstract Ideas, as other general Names. 

The names of MIXED MODES, being general, they stand, as has been shewed, for sorts or species of things, each of which has its peculiar essence. The essences of these species also, as has been shewed, are nothing butthe abstract ideas in the mind, to which the name is annexed. Thus farthe names and essences of mixed modes have nothing but what is common tothem with other ideas: but if we take a little nearer survey of them, weshall find that they have something peculiar, which perhaps may deserveour attention. 

2. First, The abstract Ideas they stand for are made by theUnderstanding. 

The first particularity I shall observe in them, is, that the abstractideas, or, if you please, the essences, of the several species of mixedmodes, are MADE BY THE UNDERSTANDING, wherein they differ from those ofsimple ideas: in which sort the mind has no power to make any one, butonly receives such as are presented to it by the real existence ofthings operating upon it. 

3. Secondly, Made arbitrarily, and without Patterns. 

In the next place, these essences of the species of mixed modes are notonly made by the mind, but MADE VERY ARBITRARILY, MADE WITHOUT PATTERNS, OR REFERENCE TO ANY REAL EXISTENCE. Wherein they differ from those ofsubstances, which carry with them the supposition of some real being, from which they are taken, and to which they are conformable. But, inits complex ideas of mixed modes, the mind takes a liberty not tofollow the existence of things exactly. It unites and retains certaincollections, as so many distinct specific ideas; whilst others, that asoften occur in nature, and are as plainly suggested by outward things, pass neglected, without particular names or specifications. Nor does themind, in these of mixed modes, as in the complex idea of substances, examine them by the real existence of things; or verify them by patternscontaining such peculiar compositions in nature. To know whether hisidea of ADULTERY or INCEST be right, will a man seek it anywhere amongstthings existing? Or is it true because any one has been witness to suchan action? No: but it suffices here, that men have put together such acollection into one complex idea, that makes the archetype and specificidea; whether ever any such action were committed in rerum natura or no. 

4. How this is done. 

To understand this right, we must consider wherein this making of thesecomplex ideas consists; and that is not in the making any new idea, butputting together those which the mind had before. Wherein the mind doesthese three things: First, It chooses a certain number; Secondly, Itgives them connexion, and makes them into one idea; Thirdly, It tiesthem together by a name. If we examine how the mind proceeds in these, and what liberty it takes in them, we shall easily observe how theseessences of the species of mixed modes are the workmanship of the mind;and, consequently, that the species themselves are of men's making. 

5. Evidently arbitrary, in that the Idea is often before the Existence. 

Nobody can doubt but that these ideas of mixed modes are made by avoluntary collection of ideas, put together in the mind, independentfrom any original patterns in nature, who will but reflect that thissort of complex ideas may be made, abstracted, and have names giventhem, and so a species be constituted, before any one individual ofthat species ever existed. Who can doubt but the ideas of SACRILEGE orADULTERY might be framed in the minds of men, and have names given them, and so these species of mixed modes be constituted, before either ofthem was ever committed; and might be as well discoursed of and reasonedabout, and as certain truths discovered of them, whilst yet they had nobeing but in the understanding, as well as now, that they have but toofrequently a real existence? Whereby it is plain how much the sorts ofmixed modes are the creatures of the understanding, where they have abeing as subservient to all the ends of real truth and knowledge, aswhen they really exist. And we cannot doubt but law-makers have oftenmade laws about species of actions which were only the creatures oftheir own understandings; beings that had no other existence but intheir own minds. And I think nobody can deny but that the RESURRECTIONwas a species of mixed modes in the mind, before it really existed. 

6. Instances: Murder, Incest, Stabbing. 

To see how arbitrarily these essences of mixed modes are made by themind, we need but take a view of almost any of them. A little lookinginto them will satisfy us, that it is the mind that combines severalscattered independent ideas into one complex one; and, by the commonname it gives them, makes them the essence of a certain species, withoutregulating itself by any connexion they have in nature. For what greaterconnexion in nature has the idea of a man than the idea of a sheep withkilling, that this is made a particular species of action, signified bythe word MURDER, and the other not? Or what union is there in naturebetween the idea of the relation of a father with killing than that ofa son or neighbour, that those are combined into one complex idea, andthereby made the essence of the distinct species PARRICIDE, whilst theother makes no distinct species at all? But, though they have madekilling a man's father or mother a distinct species from killing his sonor daughter, yet, in some other cases, son and daughter are taken intoo, as well as father and mother: and they are all equally comprehendedin the same species, as in that of INCEST. Thus the mind in mixed modesarbitrarily unites into complex ideas such as it finds convenient;whilst others that have altogether as much union in nature are leftloose, and never combined into one idea, because they have no need ofone name. It is evident then that the mind, by its free choice, givesa connexion to a certain number of ideas, which in nature have no moreunion with one another than others that it leaves out: why else is thepart of the weapon the beginning of the wound is made with taken noticeof, to make the distinct species called STABBING, and the figure andmatter of the weapon left out? I do not say this is done without reason, as we shall see more by and by; but this I say, that it is done by thefree choice of the mind, pursuing its own ends; and that, therefore, these species of mixed modes are the workmanship of the understanding. And there is nothing more evident than that, for the most part, in theframing these ideas, the mind searches not its patterns in nature, norrefers the ideas it makes to the real existence of things, but puts suchtogether as may best serve its own purposes, without tying itself to aprecise imitation of anything that really exists. 

7. But still subservient to the End of Language, and not made at random. 

But, though these complex ideas or essences of mixed modes depend on themind, and are made by it with great liberty, yet they are not made atrandom, and jumbled together without any reason at all. Though thesecomplex ideas be not always copied from nature, yet they are alwayssuited to the end for which abstract ideas are made: and though they becombinations made of ideas that are loose enough, and have as littleunion in themselves as several other to which the mind never gives aconnexion that combines them into one idea; yet they are always made forthe convenience of communication, which is the chief end of language. The use of language is, by short sounds, to signify with ease anddispatch general conceptions; wherein not only abundance of particularsmay be contained, but also a great variety of independent ideascollected into one complex one. In the making therefore of the speciesof mixed modes, men have had regard only to such combinations as theyhad occasion to mention one to another. Those they have combined intodistinct complex ideas, and given names to; whilst others, that innature have as near a union, are left loose and unregarded. For, to gono further than human actions themselves, if they would make distinctabstract ideas of all the varieties which might be observed in them, thenumber must be infinite, and the memory confounded with the plenty, aswell as overcharged to little purpose. It suffices that men make andname so many complex ideas of these mixed modes as they find they haveoccasion to have names for, in the ordinary occurrence of their affairs. If they join to the idea of killing the idea of father or mother, andso make a distinct species from killing a man's son or neighbour, itis because of the different heinousness of the crime, and the distinctpunishment is due to the murdering a man's father and mother, differentto what ought to be inflicted on the murder of a son or neighbour; andtherefore they find it necessary to mention it by a distinct name, whichis the end of making that distinct combination. But though the ideas ofmother and daughter are so differently treated, in reference to the ideaof killing, that the one is joined with it to make a distinct abstractidea with a name, and so a distinct species, and the other not; yet, inrespect of carnal knowledge, they are both taken in under INCEST: andthat still for the same convenience of expressing under one name, andreckoning of one species, such unclean mixtures as have a peculiarturpitude beyond others; and this to avoid circumlocutions and tediousdescriptions. 

8. Whereof the intranslatable Words of divers Languages are a Proof. 

A moderate skill in different languages will easily satisfy one of thetruth of this, it being so obvious to observe great store of words inone language which have not any that answer them in another. Whichplainly shows that those of one country, by their customs and manner oflife, have found occasion to make several complex ideas, and given namesto them, which others never collected into specific ideas. This couldnot have happened if these species were the steady workmanship ofnature, and not collections made and abstracted by the mind, in order tonaming, and for the convenience of communication. The terms of our law, which are not empty sounds, will hardly find words that answer them inthe Spanish or Italian, no scanty languages; much less, I think, couldany one translate them into the Caribbee or Westoe tongues: and theVERSURA of the Romans, or CORBAN of the Jews, have no words in otherlanguages to answer them; the reason whereof is plain, from what hasbeen said. Nay, if we look a little more nearly into this matter, andexactly compare different languages, we shall find that, though theyhave words which in translations and dictionaries are supposed to answerone another, yet there is scarce one often amongst the names of complexideas, especially of mixed modes, that stands for the same precise ideawhich the word does that in dictionaries it is rendered by. There areno ideas more common and less compounded than the measures of time, extension, and weight; and the Latin names, HORA, PES, LIBRA, arewithout difficulty rendered by the English names, HOUR, FOOT, and POUND:but yet there is nothing more evident than that the ideas a Romanannexed to these Latin names, were very far different from those whichan Englishman expresses by those English ones. And if either of theseshould make use of the measures that those of the other languagedesigned by their names, he would be quite out in his account. These aretoo sensible proofs to be doubted; and we shall find this much more soin the names of more abstract and compounded ideas, such as are thegreatest part of those which make up moral discourses: whose names, whenmen come curiously to compare with those they are translated into, inother languages, they will find very few of them exactly to correspondin the whole extent of their significations. 

9. This shows Species to be made for Communication. 

The reason why I take so particular notice of this is, that we may notbe mistaken about GENERA and SPECIES, and their ESSENCES, as if theywere things regularly and constantly made by nature, and had a realexistence in things; when they appear, upon a more wary survey, tobe nothing else but an artifice of the understanding, for the easiersignifying such collections of ideas as it should often have occasion tocommunicate by one general term; under which divers particulars, as farforth as they agreed to that abstract idea, might be comprehended. Andif the doubtful signification of the word SPECIES may make it soundharsh to some, that I say the species of mixed modes are 'made by theunderstanding'; yet, I think, it can by nobody be denied that it is themind makes those abstract complex ideas to which specific names aregiven. And if it be true, as it is, that the mind makes the patterns forsorting and naming of things, I leave it to be considered who makes theboundaries of the sort or species; since with me SPECIES and SORT haveno other difference than that of a Latin and English idiom. 

10. In mixed Modes it is the Name that ties the Combination of simpleideas together, and makes it a Species. 

The near relation that there is between SPECIES, ESSENCES, and theirGENERAL NAME, at least in mixed modes, will further appear when weconsider, that it is the name that seems to preserve those essences, andgive them their lasting duration. For, the connexion between the looseparts of those complex ideas being made by the mind, this union, whichhas no particular foundation in nature, would cease again, were therenot something that did, as it were, hold it together, and keep the partsfrom scattering. Though therefore it be the mind that makes thecollection, it is the name which is as it were the knot that ties themfast together. What a vast variety of different ideas does the wordTRIUMPHUS hold together, and deliver to us as one species! Had this namebeen never made, or quite lost, we might, no doubt, have haddescriptions of what passed in that solemnity: but yet, I think, thatwhich holds those different parts together, in the unity of one complexidea, is that very word annexed to it; without which the several partsof that would no more be thought to make one thing, than any other show, which having never been made but once, had never been united into onecomplex idea, under one denomination. How much, therefore, in mixedmodes, the unity necessary to any essence depends on the mind; and howmuch the continuation and fixing of that unity depends on the name incommon use annexed to it, I leave to be considered by those who lookupon essences and species as real established things in nature. 

11. 

Suitable to this, we find that men speaking of mixed modes, seldomimagine or take any other for species of them, but such as are set outby name: because they, being of man's making only, in order to naming, no such species are taken notice of, or supposed to be, unless a name bejoined to it, as the sign of man's having combined into one idea severalloose ones; and by that name giving a lasting union to the parts whichwould otherwise cease to have any, as soon as the mind laid by thatabstract idea, and ceased actually to think on it. But when a nameis once annexed to it, wherein the parts of that complex idea havea settled and permanent union, then is the essence, as it were, established, and the species looked on as complete. For to what purposeshould the memory charge itself with such compositions, unless it wereby abstraction to make them general? And to what purpose make themgeneral, unless it were that they might have general names for theconvenience of discourse and communication? Thus we see, that killing aman with a sword or a hatchet are looked on as no distinct species ofaction; but if the point of the sword first enter the body, it passesfor a distinct species, where it has a distinct name, as in England, inwhose language it is called STABBING: but in another country, where ithas not happened to be specified under a peculiar name, it passes notfor a distinct species. But in the species of corporeal substances, though it be the mind that makes the nominal essence, yet, since thoseideas which are combined in it are supposed to have an union in naturewhether the mind joins them or not, therefore those are looked on asdistinct species, without any operation of the mind, either abstracting, or giving a name to that complex idea. 

12. For the Originals of our mixed Modes, we look no further than theMind; which also shows them to be the Workmanship of the Understanding. 

Conformable also to what has been said concerning the essences of thespecies of mixed modes, that they are the creatures of the understandingrather than the works of nature; conformable, I say, to this, we findthat their names lead our thoughts to the mind, and no further. When wespeak of JUSTICE, or GRATITUDE, we frame to ourselves no imagination ofanything existing, which we would conceive; but our thoughts terminatein the abstract ideas of those virtues, and look not further; as they dowhen we speak of a HORSE, or IRON, whose specific ideas we consider notas barely in the mind, but as in things themselves, which afford theoriginal patterns of those ideas. But in mixed modes, at least the mostconsiderable parts of them, which are moral beings, we consider theoriginal patterns as being in the mind, and to those we refer for thedistinguishing of particular beings under names. And hence I think itis that these essences of the species of mixed modes are by a moreparticular name called NOTIONS; as, by a peculiar right, appertaining tothe understanding. 

13. Their being made by the Understanding without Patterns, shows theReason why they are so compounded. 

Hence, likewise, we may learn why the complex ideas of mixed modesare commonly more compounded and decompounded than those of naturalsubstances. Because they being the workmanship of the understanding, pursuing only its own ends, and the conveniency of expressing in shortthose ideas it would make known to another, it does with great libertyunite often into one abstract idea things that, in their nature, haveno coherence; and so under one term bundle together a great variety ofcompounded and decompounded ideas. Thus the name of PROCESSION: what agreat mixture of independent ideas of persons, habits, tapers, orders, motions, sounds, does it contain in that complex one, which the mind ofman has arbitrarily put together, to express by that one name? Whereasthe complex ideas of the sorts of substances are usually made up of onlya small number of simple ones; and in the species of animals, these two, viz. Shape and voice, commonly make the whole nominal essence. 

14. Names of mixed Modes stand alway for their real Essences, which arethe workmanship of our minds. 

Another thing we may observe from what has been said is, That thenames of mixed modes always signify (when they have any determinedsignification) the REAL essences of their species. For, these abstractideas being the workmanship of the mind, and not referred to the realexistence of things, there is no supposition of anything more signifiedby that name, but barely that complex idea the mind itself has formed;which is all it would have expressed by it; and is that on which all theproperties of the species depend, and from which alone they all flow:and so in these the real and nominal essence is the same; which, of whatconcernment it is to the certain knowledge of general truth, we shallsee hereafter. 

15. Why their Names are usually got before their Ideas. 

This also may show us the reason why for the most part the names ofmixed modes are got before the ideas they stand for are perfectly known. Because there being no species of these ordinarily taken notice of butwhat have names, and those species, or rather their essences, beingabstract complex ideas, made arbitrarily by the mind, it is convenient, if not necessary, to know the names, before one endeavour to framethese complex ideas: unless a man will fill his head with a companyof abstract complex ideas, which, others having no names for, he hasnothing to do with, but to lay by and forget again. I confess that, inthe beginning of languages, it was necessary to have the idea before onegave it the name: and so it is still, where, making a new complex idea, one also, by giving it a new name, makes a new word. But this concernsnot languages made, which have generally pretty well provided for ideaswhich men have frequent occasion to have and communicate; and in such, Iask whether it be not the ordinary method, that children learn the namesof mixed modes before they have their ideas? What one of a thousand everframes the abstract ideas of GLORY and AMBITION, before he has heard thenames of them? In simple ideas and substances I grant it is otherwise;which, being such ideas as have a real existence and union in nature, the ideas and names are got one before the other, as it happens. 

16. Reason of my being so large on this Subject. 

What has been said here of MIXED MODES is, with very little difference, applicable also to RELATIONS; which, since every man himself mayobserve, I may spare myself the pains to enlarge on: especially, sincewhat I have here said concerning Words in this third Book, will possiblybe thought by some to this be much more than what so slight a subjectrequired. I allow it might be brought into a narrower compass; but I waswilling to stay my reader on an argument that appears to me new and alittle out of the way, (I am sure it is one I thought not of when Ibegan to write, ) that, by searching it to the bottom, and turning it onevery side, some part or other might meet with every one's thoughts, andgive occasion to the most averse or negligent to reflect on a generalmiscarriage, which, though of great consequence, is little taken noticeof. When it is considered what a pudder is made about ESSENCES, and howmuch all sorts of knowledge, discourse, and conversation are pesteredand disordered by the careless and confused use and application ofwords, it will perhaps be thought worth while thoroughly to lay it open. And I shall be pardoned if I have dwelt long on an argument which Ithink, therefore, needs to be inculcated, because the faults men areusually guilty of in this kind, are not only the greatest hindrances oftrue knowledge, but are so well thought of as to pass for it. Men wouldoften see what a small pittance of reason and truth, or possibly none atall, is mixed with those huffing opinions they are swelled with; if theywould but look beyond fashionable sounds, and observe what IDEAS are orare not comprehended under those words with which they are so armed atall points, and with which they so confidently lay about them. I shallimagine I have done some service to truth, peace, and learning, if, byany enlargement on this subject, I can make men reflect on their own useof language; and give them reason to suspect, that, since it is frequentfor others, it may also be possible for them, to have sometimes verygood and approved words in their mouths and writings, with veryuncertain, little, or no signification. And therefore it is notunreasonable for them to be wary herein themselves, and not to beunwilling to have them examined by others. With this design, therefore, I shall go on with what I have further to say concerning this matter. 

CHAPTER VI. 

OF THE NAMES OF SUBSTANCES. 

1. The common Names of Substances stand for Sorts. 

The common names of substances, as well as other general terms, standfor SORTS: which is nothing else but the being made signs of suchcomplex ideas wherein several particular substances do or might agree, by virtue of which they are capable of being comprehended in one commonconception, and signified by one name. I say do or might agree: forthough there be but one sun existing in the world, yet the idea of itbeing abstracted, so that more substances (if there were several) mighteach agree in it, it is as much a sort as if there were as many suns asthere are stars. They want not their reasons who think there are, andthat each fixed star would answer the idea the name sun stands for, toone who was placed in a due distance: which, by the way, may show us howmuch the sorts, or, if you please, GENERA and SPECIES of things (forthose Latin terms signify to me no more than the English word sort)depend on such collections of ideas as men have made, and not on thereal nature of things; since it is not impossible but that, in proprietyof speech, that might be a sun to one which is a star to another. 

2. The Essence of each Sort of substance is our abstract Idea to whichthe name is annexed. 

The measure and boundary of each sort or species, whereby it isconstituted that particular sort, and distinguished from others, is thatwe call its ESSENCE, which is nothing but that abstract idea to whichthe name is annexed; so that everything contained in that idea isessential to that sort. This, though it be all the essence of naturalsubstances that WE know, or by which we distinguish them into sorts, yetI call it by a peculiar name, the NOMINAL ESSENCE, to distinguish itfrom the real constitution of substances, upon which depends thisnominal essence, and all the properties of that sort; which, therefore, as has been said, may be called the REAL ESSENCE: v. G. The nominalessence of gold is that complex idea the word gold stands for, letit be, for instance, a body yellow, of a certain weight, malleable, fusible, and fixed. But the real essence is the constitution of theinsensible parts of that body, on which those qualities and all theother properties of gold depend. How far these two are different, thoughthey are both called essence, is obvious at first sight to discover. 

3. The nominal and real Essence different. 

For, though perhaps voluntary motion, with sense and reason, joined to abody of a certain shape, be the complex idea to which I and others annexthe name MAN, and so be the nominal essence of the species so called:yet nobody will say that complex idea is the real essence and source ofall those operations which are to be found in any individual of thatsort. The foundation of all those qualities which are the ingredientsof our complex idea, is something quite different: and had we such aknowledge of that constitution of man; from which his faculties ofmoving, sensation, and reasoning, and other powers flow, and on whichhis so regular shape depends, as it is possible angels have, and it iscertain his Maker has, we should have a quite other idea of his essencethan what now is contained in our definition of that species, be it whatit will: and our idea of any individual man would be as far differentfrom what it is now, as is his who knows all the springs and wheels andother contrivances within of the famous clock at Strasburg, from thatwhich a gazing countryman has of it, who barely sees the motion of thehand, and hears the clock strike, and observes only some of the outwardappearances. 

4. Nothing essential to Individuals. 

That ESSENCE, in the ordinary use of the word, relates to sorts, andthat it is considered in particular beings no further than as they areranked into sorts, appears from hence: that, take but away the abstractideas by which we sort individuals, and rank them under common names, and then the thought of anything essential to any of them instantlyvanishes: we have no notion of the one without the other, which plainlyshows their relation. It is necessary for me to be as I am; God andnature has made me so: but there is nothing I have is essential to me. An accident or disease may very much alter my colour or shape; a feveror fall may take away my reason or memory, or both; and an apoplexyleave neither sense, nor understanding, no, nor life. Other creatures ofmy shape may be made with more and better, or fewer and worse facultiesthan I have; and others may have reason and sense in a shape and bodyvery different from mine. None of these are essential to the one or theother, or to any individual whatever, till the mind refers it to somesort or species of things; and then presently, according to the abstractidea of that sort, something is found essential. Let any one examine hisown thoughts, and he will find that as soon as he supposes or speaksof essential, the consideration of some species, or the complex ideasignified by some general name, comes into his mind; and it is inreference to that that this or that quality is said to be essential. So that if it be asked, whether it be essential to me or any otherparticular corporeal being, to have reason? I say, no; no more than itis essential to this white thing I write on to have words in it. But ifthat particular being be to be counted of the sort MAN, and to have thename MAN given it, then reason is essential to it; supposing reasonto be a part of the complex idea the name man stands for: as it isessential to this thing I write on to contain words, if I will give itthe name TREATISE, and rank it under that species. So that essential andnot essential relate only to our abstract ideas, and the names annexedto them; which amounts to no more than this, That whatever particularthing has not in it those qualities which are contained in the abstractidea which any general term stands for, cannot be ranked under thatspecies, nor be called by that name; since that abstract idea is thevery essence of that species. 

5. The only essences perceived by us in individual substances are thosequalities which entitle them to receive their names. 

Thus, if the idea of BODY with some people be bare extension or space, then solidity is not essential to body: if others make the idea to whichthey give the name BODY to be solidity and extension, then solidity isessential to body. That therefore, and that alone, is considered asessential, which makes a part of the complex idea the name of a sortstands for; without which no particular thing can be reckoned of thatsort, nor be entitled to that name. Should there be found a parcel ofmatter that had all the other qualities that are in iron, but wantedobedience to the loadstone, and would neither be drawn by it nor receivedirection from it, would any one question whether it wanted anythingessential? It would be absurd to ask, Whether a thing really existingwanted anything essential to it. Or could it be demanded, Whether thismade an essential or specific difference or no, since WE have no othermeasure of essential or specific but our abstract ideas? And to talk ofspecific differences in NATURE, without reference to general ideas innames, is to talk unintelligibly. For I would ask any one, What issufficient to make an essential difference in nature between any twoparticular beings, without any regard had to some abstract idea, whichis looked upon as the essence and standard of a species? All suchpatterns and standards being quite laid aside, particular beings, considered barely in themselves, will be found to have all theirqualities equally essential; and everything in each individual will beessential to it; or, which is more, nothing at all. For, though it maybe reasonable to ask, Whether obeying the magnet be essential to iron?yet I think it is very improper and insignificant to ask, whether it beessential to the particular parcel of matter I cut my pen with; withoutconsidering it under the name IRON, or as being of a certain species. And if, as has been said, our abstract ideas, which have names annexedto them, are the boundaries of species, nothing can be essential butwhat is contained in those ideas. 

6. Even the real essences of individual substances imply potentialsorts. 

It is true, I have often mentioned a REAL ESSENCE, distinct insubstances from those abstract ideas of them, which I call theirnominal essence. By this real essence I mean, that real constitutionof anything, which is the foundation of all those properties that arecombined in, and are constantly found to co-exist with the nominalessence; that particular constitution which everything has withinitself, without any relation to anything without it. But essence, evenin this sense, RELATES TO A SORT, AND SUPPOSES A SPECIES. For, beingthat real constitution on which the properties depend, it necessarilysupposes a sort of things, properties belonging only to species, and notto individuals: v. G. Supposing the nominal essence of gold to be a bodyof such a peculiar colour and weight, with malleability and fusibility, the real essence is that constitution of the parts of matter on whichthese qualities and their union depend; and is also the foundation ofits solubility in aqua regia and other properties, accompanying thatcomplex idea. Here are essences and properties, but all upon suppositionof a sort or general abstract idea, which is considered as immutable;but there is no individual parcel of matter to which any of thesequalities are so annexed as to be essential to it or inseparable fromit. That which is essential belongs to it as a condition whereby itis of this or that sort: but take away the consideration of its beingranked under the name of some abstract idea, and then there is nothingnecessary to it, nothing inseparable from it. Indeed, as to the realessences of substances, we only suppose their being, without preciselyknowing what they are; but that which annexes them still to the speciesis the nominal essence, of which they are the supposed foundation andcause. 

7. The nominal Essence bounds the Species to us. 

The next thing to be considered is, by which of those essences it isthat substances are determined into sorts or species; and that, it isevident, is by the nominal essence. For it is that alone that the name, which is the mark of the sort, signifies. It is impossible, therefore, that anything should determine the sorts of things, which WE rank undergeneral names, but that idea which that name is designed as a mark for;which is that, as has been shown, which we call nominal essence. Whydo we say this is a horse, and that a mule; this is an animal, that anherb? How comes any particular thing to be of this or that sort, butbecause it has that nominal essence; or, which is all one, agrees tothat abstract idea, that name is annexed to? And I desire any one butto reflect on his own thoughts, when he hears or speaks any of those orother names of substances, to know what sort of essences they stand for. 

8. The nature of Species as formed by us. 

And that the species of things to us are nothing but the ranking themunder distinct names, according to the complex ideas in US, and notaccording to precise, distinct, real essences in THEM, is plain fromhence:--That we find many of the individuals that are ranked intoone sort, called by one common name, and so received as being of onespecies, have yet qualities, depending on their real constitutions, as far different one from another as from others from which they areaccounted to differ specifically. This, as it is easy to be observedby all who have to do with natural bodies, so chemists especially areoften, by sad experience, convinced of it, when they, sometimes in vain, seek for the same qualities in one parcel of sulphur, antimony, orvitriol, which they have found in others. For, though they are bodies ofthe same species, having the same nominal essence, under the same name, yet do they often, upon severe ways of examination, betray qualities sodifferent one from another, as to frustrate the expectation and labourof very wary chemists. But if things were distinguished into species, according to their real essences, it would be as impossible to finddifferent properties in any two individual substances of the samespecies, as it is to find different properties in two circles, ortwo equilateral triangles. That is properly the essence to US, whichdetermines every particular to this or that CLASSIS; or, which is thesame thing, to this or that general name: and what can that be else, butthat abstract idea to which that name is annexed; and so has, in truth, a reference, not so much to the being of particular things, as to theirgeneral denominations?

9. Not the real Essence, or texture of parts, which we know not. 

Nor indeed can we rank and sort things, and consequently (which is theend of sorting) denominate them, by their real essences; because we knowthem not. Our faculties carry us no further towards the knowledge anddistinction of substances, than a collection of THOSE SENSIBLE IDEASWHICH WE OBSERVE IN THEM; which, however made with the greatestdiligence and exactness we are capable of, yet is more remote from thetrue internal constitution from which those qualities flow, than, as Isaid, a countryman's idea is from the inward contrivance of that famousclock at Strasburg, whereof he only sees the outward figure and motions. There is not so contemptible a plant or animal, that does not confoundthe most enlarged understanding. Though the familiar use of things aboutus take off our wonder, yet it cures not our ignorance. When we cometo examine the stones we tread on, or the iron we daily handle, wepresently find we know not their make; and can give no reason ofthe different qualities we find in them. It is evident the internalconstitution, whereon their properties depend, is unknown to us: for togo no further than the grossest and most obvious we can imagine amongstthem, What is that texture of parts, that real essence, that makes leadand antimony fusible, wood and stones not? What makes lead and ironmalleable, antimony and stones not? And yet how infinitely these comeshort of the fine contrivances and inconceivable real essences ofplants or animals, every one knows. The workmanship of the all-wiseand powerful God in the great fabric of the universe, and every partthereof, further exceeds the capacity and comprehension of the mostinquisitive and intelligent man, than the best contrivance of the mostingenious man doth the conceptions of the most ignorant of rationalcreatures. Therefore we in vain pretend to range things into sorts, anddispose them into certain classes under names, by their real essences, that are so far from our discovery or comprehension. A blind man may assoon sort things by their colours, and he that has lost his smell aswell distinguish a lily and a rose by their odours, as by those internalconstitutions which he knows not. He that thinks he can distinguishsheep and goats by their real essences, that are unknown to him, maybe pleased to try his skill in those species called CASSIOWARY andQUERECHINCHIO; and by their internal real essences determine theboundaries of those species, without knowing the complex idea ofsensible qualities that each of those names stand for, in the countrieswhere those animals are to be found. 

10. Not the substantial Form, which know Not. 

Those, therefore, who have been taught that the several species ofsubstances had their distinct internal SUBSTANTIAL FORMS, and that itwas those FORMS which made the distinction of substances into their truespecies and genera, were led yet further out of the way by having theirminds set upon fruitless inquiries after 'substantial forms'; whollyunintelligible, and whereof we have scarce so much as any obscure orconfused conception in general. 

11. That the Nominal Essence is that only whereby we distinguish Speciesof Substances, further evident, from our ideas of finite Spirits and ofGod. 

That our ranking and distinguishing natural substances into speciesconsists in the nominal essences the mind makes, and not in the realessences to be found in the things themselves, is further evident fromour ideas of spirits. For the mind getting, only by reflecting on itsown operations, those simple ideas which it attributes to spirits, ithath or can have no other notion of spirit but by attributing all thoseoperations it finds in itself to a sort of beings; without considerationof matter. And even the most advanced notion we have of GOD is butattributing the same simple ideas which we have got from reflection onwhat we find in ourselves, and which we conceive to have more perfectionin them than would be in their absence; attributing, I say, those simpleideas to Him in an unlimited degree. Thus, having got from reflecting onourselves the idea of existence, knowledge, power and pleasure--each ofwhich we find it better to have than to want; and the more we have ofeach the better--joining all these together, with infinity to each ofthem, we have the complex idea of an eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, infinitely wise and happy being. And though we are told that there aredifferent species of angels; yet we know not how to frame distinctspecific ideas of them: not out of any conceit that the existence ofmore species than one of spirits is impossible; but because having nomore simple ideas (nor being able to frame more) applicable to suchbeings, but only those few taken from ourselves, and from the actions ofour own minds in thinking, and being delighted, and moving several partsof our bodies; we can no otherwise distinguish in our conceptions theseveral species of spirits, one from another, but by attributing thoseoperations and powers we find in ourselves to them in a higher or lowerdegree; and so have no very distinct specific ideas of spirits, exceptonly of GOD, to whom we attribute both duration and all those otherideas with infinity; to the other spirits, with limitation: nor, asI humbly conceive, do we, between GOD and them in our ideas, put anydifference, by any number of simple ideas which we have of one and notof the other, but only that of infinity. All the particular ideas ofexistence, knowledge, will, power, and motion, &c. , being ideas derivedfrom the operations of our minds, we attribute all of them to all sortsof spirits, with the difference only of degrees; to the utmost we canimagine, even infinity, when we would frame as well as we can an idea ofthe First Being; who yet, it is certain, is infinitely more remote, inthe real excellency of his nature, from the highest and perfectest ofall created beings, than the greatest man, nay, purest seraph, is fromthe most contemptible part of matter; and consequently must infinitelyexceed what our narrow understandings can conceive of Him. 

12. Of finite Spirits there are probably numberless Species in acontinuous series of gradations. 

It is not impossible to conceive, nor repugnant to reason, that theremay be many species of spirits, as much separated and diversified onefrom another by distinct properties whereof we have no ideas, as thespecies of sensible things are distinguished one from another byqualities which we know and observe in them. That there should be morespecies of intelligent creatures above us, than there are of sensibleand material below us, is probable to me from hence: that in all thevisible corporeal world, we see no chasms or gaps. All quite down fromus the descent is by easy steps, and a continued series of things, thatin each remove differ very little one from the other. There are fishesthat have wings, and are not strangers to the airy region: and there aresome birds that are inhabitants of the water, whose blood is cold asfishes, and their flesh so like in taste that the scrupulous are allowedthem on fish-days. There are animals so near of kin both to birds andbeasts that they are in the middle between both: amphibious animals linkthe terrestrial and aquatic together; seals live at land and sea, andporpoises have the warm blood and entrails of a hog; not to mention whatis confidently reported of mermaids, or sea-men. There are some brutesthat seem to have as much knowledge and reason as some that are calledmen: and the animal and vegetable kingdoms are so nearly joined, that, if you will take the lowest of one and the highest of the other, therewill scarce be perceived any great difference between them: and so on, till we come to the lowest and the most inorganical parts of matter, weshall find everywhere that the several species are linked together, and differ but in almost insensible degrees. And when we consider theinfinite power and wisdom of the Maker, we have reason to think that itis suitable to the magnificent harmony of the universe, and the greatdesign and infinite goodness of the Architect, that the species ofcreatures should also, by gentle degrees, ascend upward from us towardhis infinite perfection, as we see they gradually descend from usdownwards: which if it be probable, we have reason then to be persuadedthat there are far more species of creatures above us than there arebeneath; we being, in degrees of perfection, much more remote from theinfinite being of God than we are from the lowest state of being, andthat which approaches nearest to nothing. And yet of all those distinctspecies, for the reasons abovesaid, we have no clear distinct ideas. 

13. The Nominal Essence that of the Species, as conceived by us, provedfrom Water and Ice. 

But to return to the species of corporeal substances. If I should askany one whether ice and water were two distinct species of things, Idoubt not but I should be answered in the affirmative: and it cannot bedenied but he that says they are two distinct species is in the right. But if an Englishman bred in Jamaica, who perhaps had never seen norheard of ice, coming into England in the winter, find the water he putin his basin at night in a great part frozen in the morning, and, notknowing any peculiar name it had, should call it hardened water; I askwhether this would be a new species to him, different from water? And Ithink it would be answered here, It would not be to him a new species, no more than congealed jelly, when it is cold, is a distinct speciesfrom the same jelly fluid and warm; or than liquid gold in the furnaceis a distinct species from hard gold in the hands of a workman. Andif this be so, it is plain that OUR DISTINCT SPECIES are NOTHING BUTDISTINCT COMPLEX IDEAS, WITH DISTINCT NAMES ANNEXED TO THEM. It is trueevery substance that exists has its peculiar constitution, whereondepend those sensible qualities and powers we observe in it; but theranking of things into species (which is nothing but sorting them underseveral titles) is done by us according to the ideas that WE have ofthem: which, though sufficient to distinguish them by names, so that wemay be able to discourse of them when we have them not presentbefore us; yet if we suppose it to be done by their real internalconstitutions, and that things existing are distinguished by nature intospecies, by real essences, according as we distinguish them into speciesby names, we shall be liable to great mistakes. 

14. Difficulties in the supposition of a certain number of real Essences

To distinguish substantial beings into species, according to the usualsupposition, that there are certain precise essences or forms of things, whereby all the individuals existing are, by nature distinguished intospecies, these things are necessary:--

15. A crude supposition. 

First, To be assured that nature, in the production of things, alwaysdesigns them to partake of certain regulated established essences, whichare to be the models of all things to be produced. This, in that crudesense it is usually proposed, would need some better explication, beforeit can fully be assented to. 

16. Monstrous births. 

Secondly, It would be necessary to know whether nature always attainsthat essence it designs in the production of things. The irregular andmonstrous births, that in divers sorts of animals have been observed, will always give us reason to doubt of one or both of these. 

17. Are monsters really a distinct species?

Thirdly, It ought to be determined whether those we call monsters bereally a distinct species, according to the scholastic notion of theword species; since it is certain that everything that exists has itsparticular constitution. And yet we find that some of these monstrousproductions have few or none of those qualities which are supposed toresult from, and accompany, the essence of that species from whence theyderive their originals, and to which, by their descent, they seem tobelong. 

18. Men can have no ideas of Real Essences. 

Fourthly, The real essences of those things which we distinguish intospecies, and as so distinguished we name, ought to be known; i. E. Weought to have ideas of them. But since we are ignorant in these fourpoints, the supposed real essences of things stand US not in stead forthe distinguishing substances into species. 

19. Our Nominal Essences of Substances not perfect collections of theproperties that flow from the Real Essence. 

Fifthly, The only imaginable help in this case would be, that, havingframed perfect complex ideas of the properties of things flowing fromtheir different real essences, we should thereby distinguish them intospecies. But neither can this be done. For, being ignorant of the realessence itself, it is impossible to know all those properties that flowfrom it, and are so annexed to it, that any one of them being away, wemay certainly conclude that that essence is not there, and so the thingis not of that species. We can never know what is the precise number ofproperties depending on the real essence of gold, any one of whichfailing, the real essence of gold, and consequently gold, would not bethere, unless we knew the real essence of gold itself, and by thatdetermined that species. By the word GOLD here, I must be understood todesign a particular piece of matter; v. G. The last guinea that wascoined. For, if it should stand here, in its ordinary signification, forthat complex idea which I or any one else calls gold, i. E. For thenominal essence of gold, it would be jargon. So hard is it to show thevarious meaning and imperfection of words, when we have nothing else butwords to do it by. 

20. Hence names independent of Real Essence. 

By all which it is clear, that our distinguishing substances intospecies by names, is not at all founded on their real essences; nor canwe pretend to range and determine them exactly into species, accordingto internal essential differences. 

21. But stand for such collections of simple ideas as we have made theName stand for. 

But since, as has been remarked, we have need of GENERAL words, thoughwe know not the real essences of things; all we can do is, to collectsuch a number of simple ideas as, by examination, we find to be unitedtogether in things existing, and thereof to make one complex idea. Which, though it be not the real essence of any substance that exists, is yet the specific essence to which our name belongs, and isconvertible with it; by which we may at least try the truth of thesenominal essences. For example: there be that say that the essence ofbody is EXTENSION; if it be so, we can never mistake in putting theessence of anything for the thing itself. Let us then in discourse putextension for body, and when we would say that body moves, let us saythat extension moves, and see how ill it will look. He that should saythat one extension by impulse moves another extension, would, by thebare expression, sufficiently show the absurdity of such a notion. Theessence of anything in respect of us, is the whole complex ideacomprehended and marked by that name; and in substances, besides theseveral distinct simple ideas that make them up, the confused one ofsubstance, or of an unknown support and cause of their union, is alwaysa part: and therefore the essence of body is not bare extension, but anextended solid thing; and so to say, an extended solid thing moves, orimpels another, is all one, and as intelligible, as to say, BODY movesor impels. Likewise, to say that a rational animal is capable ofconversation, is all one as to say a man; but no one will say thatrationality is capable of conversation, because it makes not the wholeessence to which we give the name man. 

22. Our Abstract Ideas are to us the Measures of the Species we make ininstance in that of Man. 

There are creatures in the world that have shapes like ours, but arehairy, and want language and reason. There are naturals amongst us thathave perfectly our shape, but want reason, and some of them languagetoo. There are creatures, as it is said, (sit fides penes authorem, butthere appears no contradiction that there should be such, ) that, withlanguage and reason and a shape in other things agreeing with ours, havehairy tails; others where the males have no beards, and others wherethe females have. If it be asked whether these be all men or no, allof human species? it is plain, the question refers only to the nominalessence: for those of them to whom the definition of the word man, orthe complex idea signified by that name, agrees, are men, and the othernot. But if the inquiry be made concerning the supposed real essence;and whether the internal constitution and frame of these severalcreatures be specifically different, it is wholly impossible for usto answer, no part of that going into our specific idea: only we havereason to think, that where the faculties or outward frame so muchdiffers, the internal constitution is not exactly the same. But whatdifference in the real internal constitution makes a specific differenceit is in vain to inquire; whilst our measures of species be, as theyare, only our abstract ideas, which we know; and not that internalconstitution, which makes no part of them. Shall the difference of haironly on the skin be a mark of a different internal specific constitutionbetween a changeling and a drill, when they agree in shape, and want ofreason and speech? And shall not the want of reason and speech be a signto us of different real constitutions and species between a changelingand a reasonable man? And so of the rest, if we pretend that distinctionof species or sorts is fixedly established by the real frame and secretconstitutions of things. 

23. Species in Animals not distinguished by Generation. 

Nor let any one say, that the power of propagation in animals by themixture of male and female, and in plants by seeds, keeps the supposedreal species distinct and entire, For, granting this to be true, itwould help us in the distinction of the species of things no furtherthan the tribes of animals and vegetables. What must we do for the rest?But in those too it is not sufficient: for if history lie not, womenhave conceived by drills; and what real species, by that measure, such aproduction will be in nature will be a new question: and we have reasonto think this is not impossible, since mules and jumarts, the one fromthe mixture of an ass and a mare, the other from the mixture of a bulland a mare, are so frequent in the world. I once saw a creature that wasthe issue of a cat and a rat, and had the plain marks of both about it;wherein nature appeared to have followed the pattern of neither sortalone, but to have jumbled them both together. To which he that shalladd the monstrous productions that are so frequently to be met with innature, will find it hard, even in the race of animals, to determine bythe pedigree of what species every animal's issue is; and be at aloss about the real essence, which he thinks certainly conveyed bygeneration, and has alone a right to the specific name. But further, if the species of animals and plants are to be distinguished only bypropagation, must I go to the Indies to see the sire and dam of the one, and the plant from which the seed was gathered that produced the other, to know whether this be a tiger or that tea?

24. Not by substantial Forms. 

Upon the whole matter, it is evident that it is their own collections ofsensible qualities that men make the essences of THEIR several sorts ofsubstances; and that their real internal structures are not consideredby the greatest part of men in the sorting them. Much less were anySUBSTANTIAL FORMS ever thought on by any but those who have in this onepart of the world learned the language of the schools: and yet thoseignorant men, who pretend not any insight into the real essences, nortrouble themselves about substantial forms, but are content with knowingthings one from another by their sensible qualities, are often betteracquainted with their differences; can more nicely distinguish themfrom their uses; and better know what they expect from each, than thoselearned quick-sighted men, who look so deep into them, and talk soconfidently of something more hidden and essential. 

25. The specific Essences that are common made by Men. 

But supposing that the REAL essences of substances were discoverable bythose that would severely apply themselves to that inquiry, yet we couldnot reasonably think that the ranking of things under general names wasregulated by those internal real constitutions, or anything else buttheir OBVIOUS appearances; since languages, in all countries, havebeen established long before sciences. So that they have not beenphilosophers or logicians, or such who have troubled themselves aboutforms and essences, that have made the general names that are in useamongst the several nations of men: but those more or less comprehensiveterms have, for the most part, in all languages, received their birthand signification from ignorant and illiterate people, who sortedand denominated things by those sensible qualities they found in them;thereby to signify them, when absent, to others, whether they had anoccasion to mention a sort or a particular thing. 

26. Therefore very various and uncertain in the ideas of different men. 

Since then it is evident that we sort and name substances by theirnominal and not by their real essences, the next thing to be consideredis how, and by whom these essences come to be made. As to the latter, itis evident they are made by the mind, and not by nature: for were theyNature's workmanship, they could not be so various and different inseveral men as experience tells us they are. For if we will examine it, we shall not find the nominal essence of any one species of substancesin all men the same: no, not of that which of all others we are the mostintimately acquainted with. It could not possibly be that the abstractidea to which the name MAN is given should be different in several men, if it were of Nature's making; and that to one it should be animalrationale, and to another, animal implume bipes latis unguibus. He thatannexes the name man to a complex idea, made up of sense and spontaneousmotion, joined to a body of such a shape, has thereby one essence of thespecies man; and he that, upon further examination, adds rationality, has another essence of the species he calls man: by which means the sameindividual will be a true man to the one which is not so to the other. I think there is scarce any one will allow this upright figure, so wellknown, to be the essential difference of the species man; and yet howfar men determine of the sorts of animals rather by their shape thandescent, is very visible; since it has been more than once debated, whether several human foetuses should be preserved or received tobaptism or no, only because of the difference of their outwardconfiguration from the ordinary make of children, without knowingwhether they were not as capable of reason as infants cast in anothermould: some whereof, though of an approved shape, are never capable ofas much appearance of reason all their lives as is to be found in anape, or an elephant, and never give any signs of being acted by arational soul. Whereby it is evident, that the outward figure, whichonly was found wanting, and not the faculty of reason, which nobodycould know would be wanting in its due season, was made essential to thehuman species. The learned divine and lawyer must, on such occasions, renounce his sacred definition of animal rationale, and substitute someother essence of the human species. [Monsieur Menage furnishes us withan example worth the taking notice of on this occasion: 'When the abbotof Saint Martin, ' says he, 'was born, he had so little of the figure ofa man, that it bespake him rather a monster. It was for some time underdeliberation, whether he should be baptized or no. However, he wasbaptized, and declared a man provisionally [till time should show whathe would prove]. Nature had moulded him so untowardly, that he wascalled all his life the Abbot Malotru; i. E. Ill-shaped. He was of Caen. (Menagiana, 278, 430. ) This child, we see, was very near being excludedout of the species of man, barely by his shape. He escaped very narrowlyas he was; and it is certain, a figure a little more oddly turned hadcast him, and he had been executed, as a thing not to be allowed to passfor a man. And yet there can be no reason given why, if the lineamentsof his face had been a little altered, a rational soul could not havebeen lodged in him; why a visage somewhat longer, or a nose flatter, ora wider mouth, could not have consisted, as well as the rest of his illfigure, with such a soul, such parts, as made him, disfigured as he was, capable to be a dignitary in the church. ]

27. Nominal Essences of particular substances are undetermined bynature, and therefore various as men vary. 

Wherein, then, would I gladly know, consist the precise and unmovableboundaries of that species? It is plain, if we examine, there is nosuch thing made by Nature, and established by her amongst men. The realessence of that or any other sort of substances, it is evident, we knownot; and therefore are so undetermined in our nominal essences, which wemake ourselves, that, if several men were to be asked concerning someoddly-shaped foetus, as soon as born, whether it were a man or no, itis past doubt one should meet with different answers. Which could nothappen, if the nominal essences, whereby we limit and distinguish thespecies of substances, were not made by man with some liberty; butwere exactly copied from precise boundaries set by nature, whereby itdistinguished all substances into certain species. Who would undertaketo resolve what species that monster was of which is mentioned byLicetus (lib. I. C. 3), with a man's head and hog's body? Or those otherwhich to the bodies of men had the heads of beasts, as dogs, horses, &c. If any of these creatures had lived, and could have spoke, it would haveincreased the difficulty. Had the upper part to the middle been of humanshape, and all below swine, had it been murder to destroy it? Or mustthe bishop have been consulted, whether it were man enough to beadmitted to the font or no? As I have been told it happened in Francesome years since, in somewhat a like case. So uncertain are theboundaries of species of animals to us, who have no other measuresthan the complex ideas of our own collecting: and so far are we fromcertainly knowing what a MAN is; though perhaps it will be judged greatignorance to make any doubt about it. And yet I think I may say, thatthe certain boundaries of that species are so far from being determined, and the precise number of simple ideas which make the nominal essence sofar from being settles and perfectly known, that very material doubtsmay still arise about it. And I imagine none of the definitions of theword MAN which we yet have, nor descriptios of that sort of animal, areso perfect and exact as to satisfy a considerate inquisitive person;much less to obtain a general consent, and to be that which men wouldeverywhere stick by, in the decision of cases, and determining of lifeand death, baptism or no baptism, in productions that mights happen. 

28. But not so arbitrary as Mixed Modes. 

But though these nominal essences of substances are made by the mind, they are not yet made so arbitrarily as those of mixed modes. To themaking of any nominal essence, it is necessary, First, that the ideaswhereof it consists have such a union as to make but one idea, howcompounded soever. Secondly, that the particular ideas so united beexactly the same, neither more nor less. For if two abstract complexideas differ either in number or sorts of their component parts, theymake two different, and not one and the same essence. In the first ofthese, the mind, in making its complex ideas of substances, only followsnature; and puts none together which are not supposed to have a union innature. Nobody joins the voice of a sheep with the shape of a horse;nor the colour of lead with the weight and fixedness of gold, to be thecomplex ideas of any real substances; unless he has a mind to fill hishead with chimeras, and his discourse with unintelligible words. Menobserving certain qualities always joined and existing together, thereincopied nature; and of ideas so united made their complex ones ofsubstances. For, though men may make what complex ideas they please, andgive what names to them they will; yet, if they will be understood WHENTHEY SPEAK OF THINGS REALLY EXISTING, they must in some degree conformtheir ideas to the things they would speak of; or else men's languagewill be like that of Babel; and every man's words, being intelligibleonly to himself, would no longer serve to conversation and the ordinaryaffairs of life, if the ideas they stand for be not some way answeringthe common appearances and agreement of substances as they really exist. 

29. Our Nominal Essences of substances usually consist of a few obviousqualities observed in things. 

Secondly, Though the mind of man, in making its complex ideas ofsubstances, never puts any together that do not really, or are notsupposed to, co-exist; and so it truly borrows that union from nature:yet the number it combines depends upon the various care, industry, orfancy of him that makes it. Men generally content themselves with somefew sensible obvious qualities; and often, if not always, leave outothers as material and as firmly united as those that they take. Ofsensible substances there are two sorts: one of organized bodies, whichare propagated by seed; and in these the SHAPE is that which to us isthe leading quality, and most characteristical part, that determinesthe species. And therefore in vegetables and animals, an extended solidsubstance of such a certain figure usually serves the turn. For howeversome men seem to prize their definition of animal rationale, yet shouldthere a creature be found that had language and reason, but partaked notof the usual shape of a man, I believe it would hardly pass for a man, how much soever it were animal rationale. And if Balaam's ass had allhis life discoursed as rationally as he did once with his master, Idoubt yet whether any one would have thought him worthy the name man, orallowed him to be of the same species with himself. As in vegetablesand animals it is the shape, so in most other bodies, not propagated byseed, it is the COLOUR we most fix on, and are most led by. Thuswhere we find the colour of gold, we are apt to imagine all the otherqualities comprehended in our complex idea to be there also: and wecommonly take these two obvious qualities, viz. Shape and colour, for sopresumptive ideas of several species, that in a good picture, we readilysay, this is a lion, and that a rose; this is a gold, and that a silvergoblet, only by the different figures and colours represented to the eyeby the pencil. 

30. Yet, imperfect as they thus are, they serve for common converse. 

But though this serves well enough for gross and confused conceptions, and inaccurate ways of talking and thinking; yet MEN ARE FAR ENOUGHFROM HAVING AGREED ON THE PRECISE NUMBER OF SIMPLE IDEAS OR QUALITIESBELONGING TO ANY SORT OF THINGS, SIGNIFIED BY ITS NAME. Nor is it awonder; since it requires much time, pains, and skill, strict inquiry, and long examination to find out what, and how many, those simple ideasare, which are constantly and inseparably united in nature, and arealways to be found together in the same subject. Most men, wantingeither time, inclination, or industry enough for this, even to sometolerable degree, content themselves with some few obvious and outwardappearances of things, thereby readily to distinguish and sort them forthe common affairs of life: and so, without further examination, givethem names, or take up the names already in use. Which, though in commonconversation they pass well enough for the signs of some few obviousqualities co-existing, are yet far enough from comprehending, in asettled signification, a precise number of simple ideas, much less allthose which are united in nature. He that shall consider, after somuch stir about genus and species, and such a deal of talk of specificdifferences, how few words we have yet settled definitions of, may withreason imagine, that those FORMS which there hath been so much noisemade about are only chimeras, which give us no light into the specificnatures of things. And he that shall consider how far the names ofsubstances are from having significations wherein all who use them doagree, will have reason to conclude that, though the nominal essences ofsubstances are all supposed to be copied from nature, yet they are all, or most of them, very imperfect. Since the composition of those complexideas are, in several men, very different: and therefore that theseboundaries of species are as men, and not as Nature, makes them, if atleast there are in nature any such prefixed bounds. It is true that manyparticular substances are so made by Nature, that they have agreementand likeness one with another, and so afford a foundation of beingranked into sorts. But the sorting of things by us, or the making ofdeterminate species, being in order to naming and comprehending themunder general terms, I cannot see how it can be properly said, thatNature sets the boundaries of the species of things: or, if it be so, our boundaries of species are not exactly conformable to those innature. For we, having need of general names for present use, stay notfor a perfect discovery of all those qualities which would BEST show ustheir most material differences and agreements; but we ourselves dividethem, by certain obvious appearances, into species, that we may theeasier under general names communicate our thoughts about them. For, having no other knowledge of any substance but of the simple ideas thatare united in it; and observing several particular things to agree withothers in several of those simple ideas; we make that collection ourspecific idea, and give it a general name; that in recording ourthoughts, and in our discourse with others, we may in one short worddesignate all the individuals that agree in that complex idea, withoutenumerating the simple ideas that make it up; and so not waste our timeand breath in tedious descriptions: which we see they are fain to do whowould discourse of any new sort of things they have not yet a name for. 

31. Essences of Species under the same Name very different in differentminds. 

But however these species of substances pass well enough in ordinaryconversation, it is plain that this complex idea wherein they observeseveral individuals to agree, is by different men made very differently;by some more, and others less accurately. In some, this complex ideacontains a greater, and in others a smaller number of qualities; and sois apparently such as the mind makes it. The yellow shining colour makesgold to children; others add weight, malleableness, and fusibility; andothers yet other qualities, which they find joined with that yellowcolour, as constantly as its weight and fusibility. For in all these andthe like qualities, one has as good a right to be put into the complexidea of that substance wherein they are all joined as another. Andtherefore different men, leaving out or putting in several simple ideaswhich others do not, according to their various examination, skill, orobservation of that subject, have different essences of gold, which musttherefore be of their own and not of nature's making. 

32. The more general our Ideas of Substances are, the more incompleteand partial they are. 

If the number of simple ideas that make the nominal essence of thelowest species, or first sorting, of individuals, depends on the mind ofman, variously collecting them, it is much more evident that they do soin the more comprehensive classes, which, by the masters of logic, arecalled genera. These are complex ideas designedly imperfect: and it isvisible at first sight, that several of those qualities that are tobe found in the things themselves are purposely left out of genericalideas. For, as the mind, to make general ideas comprehending severalparticulars, leaves out those of time and place, and such other, thatmake them incommunicable to more than one individual; so to make otheryet more general ideas, that may comprehend different sorts, it leavesout those qualities that distinguish them, and puts into its newcollection only such ideas as are common to several sorts. The sameconvenience that made men express several parcels of yellow mattercoming from Guinea and Peru under one name, sets them also upon makingof one name that may comprehend both gold and silver, and some otherbodies of different sorts. This is done by leaving out those qualities, which are peculiar to each sort, and retaining a complex idea made upof those that are common to them all. To which the name METAL beingannexed, there is a genus constituted; the essence whereof being thatabstract idea, containing only malleableness and fusibility, withcertain degrees of weight and fixedness, wherein some bodies of severalkinds agree, leaves out the colour and other qualities peculiar to goldand silver, and the other sorts comprehended under the name metal. Whereby it is plain that men follow not exactly the patterns set them bynature, when they make their general ideas of substances; since there isno body to be found which has barely malleableness and fusibility init, without other qualities as inseparable as those. But men, in makingtheir general ideas, seeking more the convenience of language, and quickdispatch by short and comprehensive signs, than the true and precisenature of things as they exist, have, in the framing their abstractideas, chiefly pursued that end; which was to be furnished with storeof general and variously comprehensive names. So that in this wholebusiness of genera and species, the genus, or more comprehensive, is buta partial conception of what is in the species; and the species but apartial idea of what is to be found in each individual. If therefore anyone will think that a man, and a horse, and an animal, and a plant, &c. , are distinguished by real essences made by nature, he must think natureto be very liberal of these real essences, making one for body, anotherfor an animal, and another for a horse; and all these essences liberallybestowed upon Bucephalus. But if we would rightly consider what is donein all these genera and species, or sorts, we should find that there isno new thing made; but only more or less comprehensive signs, whereby wemay be enabled to express in a few syllables great numbers of particularthings, as they agree in more or less general conceptions, which wehave framed to that purpose. In all which we may observe, that the moregeneral term is always the name of a less complex idea; and that eachgenus is but a partial conception of; the species comprehended under it. So that if these abstract general ideas be thought to be complete, itcan only be in respect of a certain established relation between themand certain names which are made use of to signify them; and not inrespect of anything existing, as made by nature. 

33. This all accommodated to the end of the Speech. 

This is adjusted to the true end of speech, which is to be the easiestand shortest way of communicating our notions. For thus he that woulddiscourse of things, as they agreed in the complex idea of extension andsolidity, needed but use the word BODY to denote all such. He thatto these would join others, signified by the words life, sense, andspontaneous motion, needed but use the word ANIMAL to signify all whichpartaked of those ideas, and he that had made a complex idea of a body, with life, sense, and motion, with the faculty of reasoning, and acertain shape joined to it, needed but use the short monosyllable MAN, to express all particulars that correspond to that complex idea. This isthe proper business of genus and species: and this men do without anyconsideration of real essences, or substantial forms; which come notwithin the reach of our knowledge when we think of those things, norwithin the signification of our words when we discourse with others. 

34. Instance in Cassowaries. 

Were I to talk with any one of a sort of birds I lately saw in St. James's Park, about three or four feet high, with a covering ofsomething between feathers and hair, of a dark brown colour, withoutwings, but in the place thereof two or three little branches coming downlike sprigs of Spanish broom, long great legs, with feet only of threeclaws, and without a tail; I must make this description of it, and somay make others understand me. But when I am told that the name of itis CASSUARIS, I may then use that word to stand in discourse for all mycomplex idea mentioned in that description; though by that word, whichis now become a specific name, I know no more of the real essenceor constitution of that sort of animals than I did before; and knewprobably as much of the nature of that species of birds before I learnedthe name, as many Englishmen do of swans or herons, which are specificnames, very well known, of sorts of birds common in England. 

35. Men determine the Sorts of Substances, which may be sortedvariously. 

From what has been said, it is evident that MEN make sorts of things. For, it being different essences alone that make different species, itis plain that they who make those abstract ideas which are the nominalessences do thereby make the species, or sort. Should there be a bodyfound, having all the other qualities of gold except malleableness, itwould no doubt be made a question whether it were gold or not, i. E. Whether it were of that species. This could be determined only by thatabstract idea to which every one annexed the name gold: so that itwould be true gold to him, and belong to that species, who included notmalleableness in his nominal essence, signified by the sound gold; andon the other side it would not be true gold, or of that species, to himwho included malleableness in his specific idea. And who, I pray, is itthat makes these diverse species, even under one and the same name, butmen that make two different abstract ideas, consisting not exactlyof the same collection of qualities? Nor is it a mere supposition toimagine that a body may exist wherein the other obvious qualities ofgold may be without malleableness; since it is certain that gold itselfwill be sometimes so eager, (as artists call it, ) that it will as littleendure the hammer as glass itself. What we have said of the putting in, or leaving out of malleableness, in the complex idea the name gold is byany one annexed to, may be said of its peculiar weight, fixedness, andseveral other the like qualities: for whatever is left out, or put in, it is still the complex idea to which that name is annexed that makesthe species: and as any particular parcel of matter answers that idea, so the name of the sort belongs truly to it; and it is of that species. And thus anything is true gold, perfect metal. All which determinationof the species, it is plain, depends on the understanding of man, makingthis or that complex idea. 

36. Nature makes the Similitudes of Substances. 

This, then, in short, is the case: Nature makes many PARTICULAR THINGS, which do agree one with another in many sensible qualities, and probablytoo in their internal frame and constitution: but it is not this realessence that distinguishes them into species; it is men who, takingoccasion from the qualities they find united in them, and wherein theyobserve often several individuals to agree, range them into sorts, inorder to their naming, for the convenience of comprehensive signs;under which individuals, according to their conformity to this or thatabstract idea, come to be ranked as under ensigns: so that this is ofthe blue, that the red regiment; this is a man, that a drill: and inthis, I think, consists the whole business of genus and species. 

37. The manner of sorting particular beings the work of fallible men, though nature makes things alike. 

I do not deny but nature, in the constant production of particularbeings, makes them not always new and various, but very much alikeand of kin one to another: but I think it nevertheless true, that theboundaries of the species, whereby men sort them, are made by men; sincethe essences of the species, distinguished by different names, are, ashas been proved, of man's making, and seldom adequate to the internalnature of the things they are taken from. So that we may truly say, sucha manner of sorting of things is the workmanship of men. 

38. Each abstract Idea, with a name to it, makes a nominal Essence. 

One thing I doubt not but will seem very strange in this doctrine, whichis, that from what has been said it will follow, that each abstractidea, with a name to it, makes a distinct species. But who can help it, if truth will have it so? For so it must remain till somebody can showus the species of things limited and distinguished by something else;and let us see that general terms signify not our abstract ideas, butsomething different from them. I would fain know why a shock and a houndare not as distinct species as a spaniel and an elephant. We have noother idea of the different essence of an elephant and a spaniel, than we have of the different essence of a shock and a hound; all theessential difference, whereby we know and distinguish them one fromanother, consisting only in the different collection of simple ideas, towhich we have given those different names. 

39. How Genera and Species are related to naming. 

How much the making of species and genera is in order to general names;and how much general names are necessary, if not to the being, yet atleast to the completing of a species, and making it pass for such, willappear, besides what has been said above concerning ice and water, ina very familiar example. A silent and a striking watch are but onespecies, to those who have but one name for them: but he that has thename WATCH for one, and CLOCK for the other, and distinct complex ideasto which those names belong, to HIM they are different species. Itwill be said perhaps, that the inward contrivance and constitution isdifferent between these two, which the watchmaker has a clear idea of. And yet it is plain they are but one species to him, when he has but onename for them. For what is sufficient in the inward contrivance to makea new species? There are some watches that are made with four wheels, others with five; is this a specific difference to the workman? Somehave strings and physics, and others none; some have the balance loose, and others regulated by a spiral spring, and others by hogs' bristles. Are any or all of these enough to make a specific difference tothe workman, that knows each of these and several other differentcontrivances in the internal constitutions of watches? It is certaineach of these hath a real difference from the rest; but whether it be anessential, a specific difference or no, relates only to the complex ideato which the name watch is given: as long as they all agree in the ideawhich that name stands for, and that name does not as a generical namecomprehend different species under it, they are not essentially norspecifically different. But if any one will make minuter divisions, fromdifferences that he knows in the internal frame of watches, and to suchprecise complex ideas give names that shall prevail; they will then benew species, to them who have those ideas with names to them, and can bythose differences distinguish watches into these several sorts; andthen WATCH will be a generical name. But yet they would be no distinctspecies to men ignorant of clock-work, and the inward contrivances ofwatches, who had no other idea but the outward shape and bulk, with themarking of the hours by the hand. For to them all those other nameswould be but synonymous terms for the same idea, and signify no more, nor no other thing but a watch. Just thus I think it is in naturalthings. Nobody will doubt that the wheels or springs (if I may so say)within, are different in a RATIONAL MAN and a CHANGELING; no morethan that there is a difference in the frame between a DRILL and aCHANGELING. But whether one or both these differences be essential orspecifical, is only to be known to us by their agreement or disagreementwith the complex idea that the name man stands for: for by that alonecan it be determined whether one, or both, or neither of those be a man. 

40. Species of Artificial Things less confused than Natural. 

From what has been before said, we may see the reason why, in thespecies of artificial things, there is generally less confusion anduncertainty than in natural. Because an artificial thing being aproduction of man, which the artificer designed, and therefore wellknows the idea of, the name of it is supposed to stand for no otheridea, nor to import any other essence, than what is certainly to beknown, and easy enough to be apprehended. For the idea or essence ofthe several sorts of artificial things, consisting for the most partin nothing but the determinate figure of sensible parts, and sometimesmotion depending thereon, which the artificer fashions in matter, suchas he finds for his turn; it is not beyond the reach of our faculties toattain a certain idea thereof; and so settle the signification of thenames whereby the species of artificial things are distinguished, withless doubt, obscurity, and equivocation than we can in things natural, whose differences and operations depend upon contrivances beyond thereach of our discoveries. 

41. Artificial Things of distinct Species. 

I must be excused here if I think artificial things are of distinctspecies as well as natural: since I find they are as plainly and orderlyranked into sorts, by different abstract ideas, with general namesannexed to them, as distinct one from another as those of naturalsubstances. For why should we not think a watch and pistol as distinctspecies one from another, as a horse and a dog; they being expressed inour minds by distinct ideas, and to others by distinct appellations?

42. Substances alone, of all our several sorts of ideas, have properNames. 

This is further to be observed concerning substances, that they alone ofall our several sorts of ideas have particular or proper names, wherebyone only particular thing is signified. Because in simple ideas, modes, and relations, it seldom happens that men have occasion to mention oftenthis or that particular when it is absent. Besides, the greatest part ofmixed modes, being actions which perish in their birth, are not capableof a lasting duration, as substances which are the actors; and whereinthe simple ideas that make up the complex ideas designed by the namehave a lasting union. 

43. Difficult to lead another by words into the thoughts of thingsstripped of those abstract ideas we give them. 

I must beg pardon of my reader for having dwelt so long upon thissubject, and perhaps with some obscurity. But I desire it may beconsidered, how difficult it is to lead another by words into thethoughts of things, stripped of those specifical differences we givethem: which things, if I name not, I say nothing; and if I do name them, I thereby rank them into some sort or other, and suggest to the mind theusual abstract idea of that species; and so cross my purpose. For, to talk of a man, and to lay by, at the same time, the ordinarysignification of the name man, which is our complex idea usually annexedto it; and bid the reader consider man, as he is in himself, and as heis really distinguished from others in his internal constitution, orreal essence, that is, by something he knows not what, looks liketrifling: and yet thus one must do who would speak of the supposed realessences and species of things, as thought to be made by nature, if itbe but only to make it understood, that there is no such thing signifiedby the general names which substances are called by. But because it isdifficult by known familiar names to do this, give me leave to endeavourby an example to make the different consideration the mind has ofspecific names and ideas a little more clear; and to show how thecomplex ideas of modes are referred sometimes to archetypes in the mindsof other intelligent beings, or, which is the same, to the significationannexed by others to their received names; and sometimes to noarchetypes at all. Give me leave also to show how the mind always refersits ideas of substances, either to the substances themselves, or to thesignification of their names, as to the archetypes; and also to makeplain the nature of species or sorting of things, as apprehended andmade use of by us; and of the essences belonging to those species: whichis perhaps of more moment to discover the extent and certainty of ourknowledge than we at first imagine. 

44. Instances of mixed Modes names KINNEAH and NIOUPH. 

Let us suppose Adam, in the state of a grown man, with a goodunderstanding, but in a strange country, with all things new and unknownabout him; and no other faculties to attain the knowledge of them butwhat one of this age has now. He observes Lamech more melancholy thanusual, and imagines it to be from a suspicion he has of his wife Adah, (whom he most ardently loved) that she had too much kindness for anotherman. Adam discourses these his thoughts to Eve, and desires her to takecare that Adah commit not folly: and in these discourses with Eve hemakes use of these two new words KINNEAH and NIOUPH. In time, Adam'smistake appears, for he finds Lamech's trouble proceeded from havingkilled a man: but yet the two names KINNEAH and NIOUPH, (the onestanding for suspicion in a husband of his wife's disloyalty to him; andthe other for the act of committing disloyalty, ) lost not their distinctsignifications. It is plain then, that here were two distinct complexideas of mixed modes, with names to them, two distinct species ofactions essentially different; I ask wherein consisted the essences ofthese two distinct species of actions? And it is plain it consisted in aprecise combination of simple ideas, different in one from the other. Iask, whether the complex idea in Adam's mind, which he called KINNEAH, were adequate or not? And it is plain it was; for it being a combinationof simple ideas, which he, without any regard to any archetype, withoutrespect to anything as a pattern, voluntarily put together, abstracted, and gave the name KINNEAH to, to express in short to others, by that onesound, all the simple ideas contained and united in that complex one;it must necessarily follow that it was an adequate idea. His own choicehaving made that combination, it had all in it he intended it should, and so could not but be perfect, could not but be adequate; it beingreferred to no other archetype which it was supposed to represent. 

45. These words, KINNEAH and NIOUPH, by degrees grew into common use, and then the case was somewhat altered. Adam's children had the samefaculties, and thereby the same power that he had, to make what complexideas of mixed modes they pleased in their own minds; to abstract them, and make what sounds they pleased the signs of them: but the use ofnames being to make our ideas within us known to others, that cannot bedone, but when the same sign stands for the same idea in two who wouldcommunicate their thoughts and discourse together. Those, therefore, of Adam's children, that found these two words, KINNEAH and NIOUPH, infamiliar use, could not take them for insignificant sounds, but mustneeds conclude they stood for something; for certain ideas, abstractideas, they being general names; which abstract ideas were the essencesof the species distinguished by those names. If therefore, they woulduse these words as names of species already established and agreed on, they were obliged to conform the ideas in their minds, signified bythese names, to the ideas that they stood for in other men's minds, asto their patterns and archetypes; and then indeed their ideas ofthese complex modes were liable to be inadequate, as being very apt(especially those that consisted of combinations of many simple ideas)not to be exactly conformable to the ideas in other men's minds, usingthe same names; though for this there be usually a remedy at hand, whichis to ask the meaning of any word we understand not of him that uses it:it being as impossible to know certainly what the words jealousy andadultery (which I think answer [Hebrew] and [Hebrew]) stand for inanother man's mind, with whom I would discourse about them; as it wasimpossible, in the beginning of language, to know what KINNEAH andNIOUPH stood for in another man's mind, without explication; they beingvoluntary signs in every one. 

46. Instances of a species of Substance named ZAHAB. 

Let us now also consider, after the same manner, the names of substancesin their first application. One of Adam's children, roving in themountains, lights on a glittering substance which pleases his eye. Homehe carries it to Adam, who, upon consideration of it, finds it to behard, to have a bright yellow colour, and an exceeding great weight. These perhaps, at first, are all the qualities he takes notice of in it;and abstracting this complex idea, consisting of a substance having thatpeculiar bright yellowness, and a weight very great in proportion to itsbulk, he gives the name ZAHAB, to denominate and mark all substancesthat have these sensible qualities in them. It is evident now, that, in this case, Adam acts quite differently from what he did before, informing those ideas of mixed modes to which he gave the names KINNEAHand NIOUPH. For there he put ideas together only by his own imagination, not taken from the existence of anything; and to them he gave names todenominate all things that should happen to agree to those his abstractideas, without considering whether any such thing did exist or not: thestandard there was of his own making. But in the forming his idea ofthis new substance, he takes the quite contrary course; here he hasa standard made by nature; and therefore, being to represent that tohimself, by the idea he has of it, even when it is absent, he puts in nosimple idea into his complex one, but what he has the perception of fromthe thing itself. He takes care that his idea be conformable to thisarchetype, and intends the name should stand for an idea so conformable. 

47. 

This piece of matter, thus denominated ZAHAB by Adam, being quitedifferent from any he had seen before, nobody, I think, will deny to bea distinct species, and to have its peculiar essence; and that the nameZAHAB is the mark of the species, and a name belonging to all thingspartaking in that essence. But here it is plain the essence Adam madethe name ZAHAB stand for was nothing but a body hard, shining, yellow, and very heavy. But the inquisitive mind of man, not content with theknowledge of these, as I may say, superficial qualities, puts Adam uponfurther examination of this matter. He therefore knocks, and beats itwith flints, to see what was discoverable in the inside: he finds ityield to blows, but not easily separate into pieces: he finds it willbend without breaking. Is not now ductility to be added to his formeridea, and made part of the essence of the species that name ZAHAB standsfor? Further trials discover fusibility and fixedness. Are not theyalso, by the same reason that any of the others were, to be put into thecomplex idea signified by the name ZAHAB? If not, what reason will therebe shown more for the one than the other? If these must, then all theother properties, which any further trials shall discover in thismatter, ought by the same reason to make a part of the ingredients ofthe complex idea which the name ZAHAB stands for, and so be the essenceof the species marked by that name. Which properties, because they areendless, it is plain that the idea made after this fashion, by thisarchetype, will be always inadequate. 

48. The Abstract Ideas of Substances always imperfect and thereforevarious. 

But this is not all. It would also follow that the names of substanceswould not only have, as in truth they have, but would also be supposedto have different significations, as used by different men, which wouldvery much cumber the use of language. For if every distinct qualitythat were discovered in any matter by any one were supposed to make anecessary part of the complex idea signified by the common name givento it, it must follow, that men must suppose the same word to signifydifferent things in different men: since they cannot doubt but differentmen may have discovered several qualities, in substances of the samedenomination, which others know nothing of. 

49. Therefore to fix the Nominal Species Real Essence supposed. 

To avoid this therefore, they have supposed a real essence belonging toevery species, from which these proper ties all flow, and would havetheir name of the species stand for that. But they, not having any ideaof that real essence in substances, and their words signifying nothingbut the ideas they have, that which is done by this attempt is only toput the name or sound in the place and stead of the thing having thatreal essence, without knowing what the real essence is, and this is thatwhich men do when they speak of species of things, as supposing themmade by nature, and distinguished by real essences. 

50. Which Supposition is of no Use. 

For, let us consider, when we affirm that 'all gold is fixed, ' eitherit means that fixedness is a part of the definition, i. E. , part of thenominal essence the word gold stands for; and so this affirmation, 'allgold is fixed, ' contains nothing but the signification of the term gold. Or else it means, that fixedness, not being a part of the definition ofthe gold, is a property of that substance itself: in which case it isplain that the word gold stands in the place of a substance, having thereal essence of a species of things made by nature. In which way ofsubstitution it has so confused and uncertain a signification, that, though this proposition--'gold is fixed'--be in that sense anaffirmation of something real; yet it is a truth will always fail us inits particular application, and so is of no real use or certainty. Forlet it be ever so true, that all gold, i. E. All that has the realessence of gold, is fixed, what serves this for, whilst we know not, inthis sense, WHAT IS OR IS NOT GOLD? For if we know not the real essenceof gold, it is impossible we should know what parcel of matter has thatessence, and so whether IT be true gold or no. 

51. Conclusion. 

To conclude: what liberty Adam had at first to make any complex ideas ofMIXED MODES by no other pattern but by his own thoughts, the same haveall men ever since had. And the same necessity of conforming his ideasof SUBSTANCES to things without him, as to archetypes made by nature, that Adam was under, if he would not wilfully impose upon himself, thesame are all men ever since under too. The same liberty also that Adamhad of affixing any new name to any idea, the same has any one still, (especially the beginners of languages, if we can imagine any such;) butonly with this difference, that, in places where men in society havealready established a language amongst them, the significations of wordsare very warily and sparingly to be altered. Because men being furnishedalready with names for their ideas, and common use having appropriatedknown names to certain ideas, an affected misapplication of them cannotbut be very ridiculous. He that hath new notions will perhaps venturesometimes on the coining of new terms to express them: but men think ita boldness, and it is uncertain whether common use will ever make thempass for current. But in communication with others, it is necessary thatwe conform the ideas we make the vulgar words of any language stand forto their known proper significations, (which I have explained at largealready, ) or else to make known that new signification we apply them to. 

CHAPTER VII. 

OF PARTICLES. 

1. Particles connect Parts, or whole Sentences together. 

Besides words which are names of ideas in the mind, there are a greatmany others that are made use of to signify the CONNEXION that the mindgives to ideas, or to propositions, one with another. The mind, incommunicating its thoughts to others, does not only need signs of theideas it has then before it, but others also, to show or intimate someparticular action of its own, at that time, relating to those ideas. This it does several ways; as _I_S and _I_S NOT, are the general marks, of the mind, affirming or denying. But besides affirmation or negation, without which there is in words no truth or falsehood, the mind does, in declaring its sentiments to others, connect not only the parts ofpropositions, but whole sentences one to another, with their severalrelations and dependencies, to make a coherent discourse. 

2. In right use of Particles consists the Art of Well-speaking

The words whereby it signifies what connexion it gives to the severalaffirmations and negations, that it unites in one continued reasoning ornarration, are generally called PARTICLES: and it is in the right use ofthese that more particularly consists the clearness and beauty of a goodstyle. To think well, it is not enough that a man has ideas clearand distinct in his thoughts, nor that he observes the agreement ordisagreement of some of them; but he must think in train, and observethe dependence of his thoughts and reasonings upon one another. And toexpress well such methodical and rational thoughts, he must have wordsto show what connexion, restriction, distinction, opposition, emphasis, &c. , he gives to each respective part of his discourse. To mistakein any of these, is to puzzle instead of informing his hearer: andtherefore it is, that those words which are not truly by themselvesthe names of any ideas are of such constant and indispensable use inlanguage, and do much contribute to men's well expressing themselves. 

3. They say what Relation the Mind gives to its own Thoughts. 

This part of grammar has been perhaps as much neglected as some othersover-diligently cultivated. It is easy for men to write, one afteranother, of cases and genders, moods and tenses, gerunds and supines: inthese and the like there has been great diligence used; and particlesthemselves, in some languages, have been, with great show of exactness, ranked into their several orders. But though PREPOSITIONS andCONJUNCTIONS, &c. , are names well known in grammar, and the particlescontained under them carefully ranked into their distinct subdivisions;yet he who would show the right use of particles, and what significancyand force they have, must take a little more pains, enter into hisown thoughts, and observe nicely the several postures of his mind indiscoursing. 

4. They are all marks of some action or intimation of the mind. 

Neither is it enough, for the explaining of these words, to render them, as is usual in dictionaries, by words of another tongue which comenearest to their signification: for what is meant by them is commonly ashard to be understood in one as another language. They are all marks ofsome action or intimation of the mind; and therefore to understand themrightly, the several views, postures, stands, turns, limitations, andexceptions, and several other thoughts of the mind, for which we haveeither none or very deficient names, are diligently to be studied. Ofthese there is a great variety, much exceeding the number of particlesthat most languages have to express them by: and therefore it is notto be wondered that most of these particles have divers and sometimesalmost opposite significations. In the Hebrew tongue there is a particleconsisting of but one single letter, of which there are reckoned up, asI remember, seventy, I am sure above fifty, several significations. 

5. Instance in But. 

'But' is a particle, none more familiar in our language: and he thatsays it is a discretive conjunction, and that it answers to sed Latin, or mais in French, thinks he has sufficiently explained it. But yet itseems to me to intimate several relations the mind gives to the severalpropositions or parts of them which it joins by this monosyllable. 

First, 'But to say no more:' here it intimates a stop of the mind in thecourse it was going, before it came quite to the end of it. 

Secondly, 'I saw but two plants;' here it shows that the mind limits thesense to what is expressed, with a negation of all other. 

Thirdly, 'You pray; but it is not that God would bring you to the truereligion. '

Fourthly, 'But that he would confirm you in your own. ' The first ofthese BUTS intimates a supposition in the mind of something otherwisethan it should be; the latter shows that the mind makes a directopposition between that and what goes before it. 

Fifthly, 'All animals have sense, but a dog is an animal:' here itsignifies little more but that the latter proposition is joined to theformer, as the minor of a syllogism. 

6. This Matter of the use of Particles but lightly touched here. 

To these, I doubt not, might be added a great many other significationsof this particle, if it were my business to examine it in its fulllatitude, and consider it in all the places it is to be found: which ifone should do, I doubt whether in all those manners it is made use of, it would deserve the title of DISCRETIVE, which grammarians give to it. But I intend not here a full explication of this sort of signs. Theinstances I have given in this one may give occasion to reflect on theiruse and force in language, and lead us into the contemplation of severalactions of our minds in discoursing, which it has found a way tointimate to others by these particles, some whereof constantly, andothers in certain constructions, have the sense of a whole sentencecontained in them. 

CHAPTER VIII. 

OF ABSTRACT AND CONCRETE TERMS. 

1. Abstract Terms predicated one on another and why. 

The ordinary words of language, and our common use of them, would havegiven us light into the nature of our ideas, if they had been butconsidered with attention. The mind, as has been shown, has a powerto abstract its ideas, and so they become essences, general essences, whereby the sorts of things are distinguished. Now each abstract ideabeing distinct, so that of any two the one can never be the other, themind will, by its intuitive knowledge, perceive their difference, andtherefore in propositions no two whole ideas can ever be affirmed one ofanother. This we see in the common use of language, which permits notany two abstract words, or names of abstract ideas, to be affirmed oneof another. For how near of kin soever they may seem to be, and howcertain soever it is that man is an animal, or rational, or white, yet every one at first hearing perceives the falsehood of thesepropositions: HUMANITY IS ANIMALITY, or RATIONALITY, or WHITENESS:and this is as evident as any of the most allowed maxims. All ouraffirmations then are only in concrete, which is the affirming, notone abstract idea to be another, but one abstract idea to be joined toanother; which abstract ideas, in substances, may be of any sort; in allthe rest are little else but of relations; and in substances the mostfrequent are of powers: v. G. 'a man is white, ' signifies that the thingthat has the essence of a man has also in it the essence of whiteness, which is nothing but a power to produce the idea of whiteness in onewhose eyes can discover ordinary objects: or, 'a man is rational, 'signifies that the same thing that hath the essence of a man hath alsoin it the essence of rationality, i. E. A power of reasoning. 

2. They show the Difference of our Ideas. 

This distinction of names shows us also the difference of our ideas:for if we observe them, we shall find that OUR SIMPLE IDEAS HAVE ALLABSTRACT AS WELL AS CONCRETE NAMES: the one whereof is (to speak thelanguage of grammarians) a substantive, the other an adjective; aswhiteness, white; sweetness, sweet. The like also holds in our ideas ofmodes and relations; as justice, just; equality, equal: only with thisdifference, that some of the concrete names of relations amongst menchiefly are substantives; as, paternitas, pater; whereof it were easy torender a reason. But as to our ideas of substances, we have very fewor no abstract names at all. For though the Schools have introducedanimalitas, humanitas, corporietas, and some others; yet they hold noproportion with that infinite number of names of substances, to whichthey never were ridiculous enough to attempt the coining of abstractones: and those few that the Schools forged, and put into the mouthsof their scholars, could never yet get admittance into common use, orobtain the license of public approbation. Which seems to me at least tointimate the confession of all mankind, that they have no ideas of thereal essences of substances, since they have not names for such ideas:which no doubt they would have had, had not their consciousness tothemselves of their ignorance of them kept them from so idle an attempt. And therefore, though they had ideas enough to distinguish gold from astone, and metal from wood; yet they but timorously ventured on suchterms, as aurietas and saxietas, metallietas and lignietas, or thelike names, which should pretend to signify the real essences of thosesubstances whereof they knew they had no ideas. And indeed it was onlythe doctrine of SUBSTANTIAL FORMS, and the confidence of mistakenpretenders to a knowledge that they had not, which first coined and thenintroduced animalitas and humanitas, and the like; which yet went verylittle further than their own Schools, and could never get to be currentamongst understanding men. Indeed, humanitas was a word in familiar useamongst the Romans; but in a far different sense, and stood not for theabstract essence of any substance; but was the abstracted name of amode, and its concrete humanus, not homo. 

CHAPTER IX. 

OF THE IMPERFECTION OF WORDS. 

1. Words are used for recording and communicating our Thoughts. 

From what has been said in the foregoing chapters, it is easy toperceive what imperfection there is in language, and how the very natureof words makes it almost unavoidable for many of them to be doubtfuland uncertain in their significations. To examine the perfection orimperfection of words, it is necessary first to consider their use andend: for as they are more or less fitted to attain that, so they aremore or less perfect. We have, in the former part of this discourseoften, upon occasion, mentioned a double use of words. 

First, One for the recording of our own thoughts. 

Secondly, The other for the communicating of our thoughts to others. 

2. Any Words will serve for recording. 

As to the first of these, FOR THE RECORDING OUR OWN THOUGHTS FOR THEHELP OF OUR OWN MEMORIES, whereby, as it were, we talk to ourselves, any words will serve the turn. For since sounds are voluntary andindifferent signs of any ideas, a man may use what words he pleases tosignify his own ideas to himself: and there will be no imperfection inthem, if he constantly use the same sign for the same idea: for then hecannot fail of having his meaning understood, wherein consists the rightuse and perfection of language. 

3. Communication by Words either for civil or philosophical purposes. 

Secondly, As to COMMUNICATION BY WORDS, that too has a double use. 

I. Civil. 

II. Philosophical. First, By, their CIVIL use, I mean such acommunication of thoughts and ideas by words, as may serve for theupholding common conversation and commerce, about the ordinary affairsand conveniences of civil life, in the societies of men, one amongstanother. 

Secondly, By the PHILOSOPHICAL use of words, I mean such a use of themas may serve to convey the precise notions of things, and to express ingeneral propositions certain and undoubted truths, which the mind mayrest upon and be satisfied with in its search after true knowledge. These two uses are very distinct; and a great deal less exactness willserve in the one than in the other, as we shall see in what follows. 

4. The imperfection of Words is the Doubtfulness or ambiguity of theirSignification, which is caused by the sort of ideas they stand for. 

The chief end of language in communication being to be understood, words serve not well for that end, neither in civil nor philosophicaldiscourse, when any word does not excite in the hearer the same ideawhich it stands for in the mind of the speaker. Now, since sounds haveno natural connexion with our ideas, but have all their significationfrom the arbitrary imposition of men, the doubtfulness and uncertaintyof their signification, which is the imperfection we here are speakingof, has its cause more in the ideas they stand for than in anyincapacity there is in one sound more than in another to signify anyidea: for in that regard they are all equally perfect. 

That then which makes doubtfulness and uncertainty in the significationof some more than other words, is the difference of ideas they standfor. 

5. Natural Causes of their Imperfection, especially in those that standfor Mixed Modes, and for our ideas of Substances. 

Words having naturally no signification, the idea which each stands formust be learned and retained, by those who would exchange thoughts, andhold intelligible discourse with others, in any language. But this isthe hardest to be done where, First, The ideas they stand for are very complex, and made up of a greatnumber of ideas put together. 

Secondly, Where the ideas they stand for have no certain connexion innature; and so no settled standard anywhere in nature existing, torectify and adjust them by. 

Thirdly, When the signification of the word is referred to a standard, which standard is not easy to be known. 

Fourthly, Where the signification of the word and the real essence ofthe thing are not exactly the same. 

These are difficulties that attend the signification of several wordsthat are intelligible. Those which are not intelligible at all, suchas names standing for any simple ideas which another has not organs orfaculties to attain; as the names of colours to a blind man, or soundsto a deaf man, need not here be mentioned. 

In all these cases we shall find an imperfection in words; which I shallmore at large explain, in their particular application to our severalsorts of ideas: for if we examine them, we shall find that the NAMES OF_M_IXED _M_ODES ARE MOST LIABLE TO DOUBTFULNESS AND IMPERFECTION, FORTHE TWO FIRST OF THESE REASONS; and the NAMES OF _S_UBSTANCES CHIEFLYFOR THE TWO LATTER. 

6. The Names of mixed Modes doubtful. 

First, The names of MIXED MODES are, many of them, liable to greatuncertainty and obscurity in their signification. 

I. Because the Ideas they stand for are so complex. 

Because of that GREAT COMPOSITION these complex ideas are often madeup of. To make words serviceable to the end of communication, it isnecessary, as has been said, that they excite in the hearer exactly thesame idea they stand for in the mind of the speaker. Without this, menfill one another's heads with noise and sounds; but convey not therebytheir thoughts, and lay not before one another their ideas, which is theend of discourse and language. But when a word stands for a very complexidea that is compounded and decompounded, it is not easy for men to formand retain that idea so exactly, as to make the name in common use standfor the same precise idea, without any the least variation. Hence itcomes to pass that men's names of very compound ideas, such as for themost part are moral words, have seldom in two different men the sameprecise signification; since one man's complex idea seldom agrees withanother's, and often differs from his own--from that which he hadyesterday, or will have tomorrow. 

7. Secondly because they have no Standards in Nature. 

Because the names of mixed modes for the most part WANT STANDARDSIN NATURE, whereby men may rectify and adjust their significations;therefore they are very various and doubtful. They are assemblages ofideas put together at the pleasure of the mind, pursuing its own ends ofdiscourse, and suited to its own notions; whereby it designs not to copyanything really existing, but to denominate and rank things as theycome to agree with those archetypes or forms it has made. He that firstbrought the word SHAM, or WHEEDLE, or BANTER, in use, put together as hethought fit those ideas he made it stand for; and as it is with any newnames of modes that are now brought into any language, so it was withthe old ones when they were first made use of. Names, therefore, thatstand for collections of ideas which the mind makes at pleasure mustneeds be of doubtful signification, when such collections are nowhereto be found constantly united in nature, nor any patterns to be shownwhereby men may adjust them. What the word MURDER, or SACRILEGE, &c. , signifies can never be known from things themselves: there be many ofthe parts of those complex ideas which are not visible in the actionitself; the intention of the mind, or the relation of holy things, whichmake a part of murder or sacrilege, have no necessary connexion with theoutward and visible action of him that commits either: and the pullingthe trigger of the gun with which the murder is committed, and is allthe action that perhaps is visible, has no natural connexion with thoseother ideas that make up the complex one named murder. They have theirunion and combination only from the understanding which unites themunder one name: but, uniting them without any rule or pattern, it cannotbe but that the signification of the name that stands for such voluntarycollections should be often various in the minds of different men, whohave scarce any standing rule to regulate themselves and their notionsby, in such arbitrary ideas. 

8. Common use, or propriety not a sufficient Remedy. 

It is true, common use, that is, the rule of propriety may be supposedhere to afford some aid, to settle the signification of language; and itcannot be denied but that in some measure it does. Common use regulatesthe meaning of words pretty well for common conversation; but nobodyhaving an authority to establish the precise signification of words, nor determine to what ideas any one shall annex them, common use isnot sufficient to adjust them to Philosophical Discourses; there beingscarce any name of any very complex idea (to say nothing of others)which, in common use, has not a great latitude, and which, keepingwithin the bounds of propriety, may not be made the sign of fardifferent ideas. Besides, the rule and measure of propriety itself beingnowhere established, it is often matter of dispute, whether this or thatway of using a word be propriety of speech or no. From all which it isevident, that the names of such kind of very complex ideas arenaturally liable to this imperfection, to be of doubtful and uncertainsignification; and even in men that have a mind to understand oneanother, do not always stand for the same idea in speaker and hearer. Though the names GLORY and GRATITUDE be the same in every man's mouththrough a whole country, yet the complex collective idea which every onethinks on or intends by that name, is apparently very different in menusing the same language. 

9. The way of learning these Names contributes also to theirDoubtfulness. 

The way also wherein the names of mixed modes are ordinarily learned, does not a little contribute to the doubtfulness of their signification. For if we will observe how children learn languages, we shall find that, to make them understand what the names of simple ideas or substancesstand for, people ordinarily show them the thing whereof they would havethem have the idea; and then repeat to them the name that stands forit; as WHITE, SWEET, MILK, SUGAR, CAT, DOG. But as for mixed modes, especially the most material of them, MORAL WORDS, the sounds areusually learned first; and then, to know what complex ideas they standfor, they are either beholden to the explication of others, or (whichhappens for the most part) are left to their own observation andindustry; which being little laid out in the search of the true andprecise meaning of names, these moral words are in most men's mouthslittle more than bare sounds; or when they have any, it is for the mostpart but a very loose and undetermined, and, consequently, obscure andconfused signification. And even those themselves who have with moreattention settled their notions, do yet hardly avoid the inconvenienceto have them stand for complex ideas different from those which other, even intelligent and studious men, make them the signs of. Where shallone find any, either controversial debate, or familiar discourse, concerning honour, faith, grace, religion, church, &c. , wherein it isnot easy to observe the different notions men have of them? Which isnothing but this, that they are not agreed in the signification of thosewords, nor have in their minds the same complex ideas which they makethem stand for, and so all the contests that follow thereupon areonly about the meaning of a sound. And hence we see that, in theinterpretation of laws, whether divine or human, there is no end;comments beget comments, and explications make new matter forexplications; and of limiting, distinguishing, varying the significationof these moral words there is no end. These ideas of men's making are, by men still having the same power, multiplied in infinitum. Many a manwho was pretty well satisfied of the meaning of a text of Scripture, orclause in the code, at first reading, has, by consulting commentators, quite lost the sense of it, and by these elucidations given rise orincrease to his doubts, and drawn obscurity upon the place. I say notthis that I think commentaries needless; but to show how uncertain thenames of mixed modes naturally are, even in the mouths of those who hadboth the intention and the faculty of speaking as clearly as languagewas capable to express their thoughts. 

10. Hence unavoidable Obscurity in ancient Authors. 

What obscurity this has unavoidably brought upon the writings of men whohave lived in remote ages, and different countries, it will be needlessto take notice. Since the numerous volumes of learned men, employingtheir thoughts that way, are proofs more than enough, to show whatattention, study, sagacity, and reasoning are required to find out thetrue meaning of ancient authors. But, there being no writings we haveany great concernment to be very solicitous about the meaning of, butthose that contain either truths we are required to believe, or lawswe are to obey, and draw inconveniences on us when we mistake ortransgress, we may be less anxious about the sense of other authors;who, writing but their own opinions, we are under no greater necessityto know them, than they to know ours. Our good or evil depending not ontheir decrees, we may safely be ignorant of their notions: and thereforein the reading of them, if they do not use their words with a dueclearness and perspicuity, we may lay them aside, and without any injurydone them, resolve thus with ourselves, Si non vis intelligi, debes negligi. 

11. Names of Substances of doubtful Signification, because the ideasthey stand for relate to the reality of things. 

If the signification of the names of mixed modes be uncertain, becausethere be no real standards existing in nature to which those ideas arereferred, and by which they may be adjusted, the names of SUBSTANCES areof a doubtful signification, for a contrary reason, viz. Because theideas they stand for are supposed conformable to the reality of things, and are referred to as standards made by Nature. In our ideas ofsubstances we have not the liberty, as in mixed modes, to frame whatcombinations we think fit, to be the characteristical notes to rank anddenominate things by. In these we must follow Nature, suit our complexideas to real existences, and regulate the signification of their namesby the things themselves, if we will have our names to be signs of them, and stand for them. Here, it is true, we have patterns to follow; butpatterns that will make the signification of their names very uncertain:for names must be of a very unsteady and various meaning, if the ideasthey stand for be referred to standards without us, that either cannotbe known at all, or can be known but imperfectly and uncertainly. 

12. Names of Substances referred, I. To real Essences that cannot beknown. 

The names of substances have, as has been shown, a double reference intheir ordinary use. 

First, Sometimes they are made to stand for, and so their significationis supposed to agree to, THE REAL CONSTITUTION OF THINGS, from whichall their properties flow, and in which they all centre. But this realconstitution, or (as it is apt to be called) essence, being utterlyunknown to us, any sound that is put to stand for it must be veryuncertain in its application; and it will be impossible to know whatthings are or ought to be called a HORSE, or ANTIMONY, when those wordsare put for real essences that we have no ideas of at all. And thereforein this supposition, the names of substances being referred to standardsthat cannot be known, their significations can never be adjusted andestablished by those standards. 

13. Secondly, To co-existing Qualities, which are known but imperfectly. 

Secondly, The simple ideas that are FOUND TO CO-EXIST IN SUBSTANCESbeing that which their names immediately signify, these, as united inthe several sorts of things, are the proper standards to which theirnames are referred, and by which their significations may be bestrectified. But neither will these archetypes so well serve to thispurpose as to leave these names without very various and uncertainsignifications. Because these simple ideas that co-exist, and are unitedin the same subject, being very numerous, and having all an equal rightto go into the complex specific idea which the specific name is to standfor, men, though they propose to themselves the very same subject toconsider, yet frame very different ideas about it; and so the name theyuse for it unavoidably comes to have, in several men, very differentsignifications. The simple qualities which make up the complex ideas, being most of them powers, in relation to changes which they are aptto make in, or receive from other bodies, are almost infinite. He thatshall but observe what a great variety of alterations any one of thebaser metals is apt to receive, from the different application only offire; and how much a greater number of changes any of them will receivein the hands of a chymist, by the application of other bodies, will notthink it strange that I count the properties of any sort of bodies noteasy to be collected, and completely known, by the ways of inquiry whichour faculties are capable of. They being therefore at least so many, that no man can know the precise and definite number, they aredifferently discovered by different men, according to their variousskill, attention, and ways of handling; who therefore cannot choosebut have different ideas of the same substance, and therefore make thesignification of its common name very various and uncertain. For thecomplex ideas of substances, being made up of such simple ones as aresupposed to co-exist in nature, every one has a right to put into hiscomplex idea those qualities he has found to be united together. For, though in the substance of gold one satisfies himself with colour andweight, yet another thinks solubility in aqua regia as necessary tobe joined with that colour in his idea of gold, as any one does itsfusibility; solubility in aqua regia being a quality as constantlyjoined with its colour and weight as fusibility or any other; othersput into it ductility or fixedness, &c. , as they have been taught bytradition or experience. Who of all these has established the rightsignification of the word, gold? Or who shall be the judge to determine?Each has his standard in nature, which he appeals to, and with reasonthinks he has the same right to put into his complex idea signified bythe word gold, those qualities, which, upon trial, he has found united;as another who has not so well examined has to leave them out; or athird, who has made other trials, has to put in others. For the union innature of these qualities being the true ground of their union in onecomplex idea, who can say one of them has more reason to be put in orleft out than another? From hence it will unavoidably follow, that thecomplex ideas of substances in men using the same names for them, will be very various, and so the significations of those names veryuncertain. 

14. Thirdly, To co-existing Qualities which are known but imperfectly. 

Besides, there is scarce any particular thing existing, which, in someof its simple ideas, does not communicate with a greater, and in othersa less number of particular beings: who shall determine in this casewhich are those that are to make up the precise collection that is tobe signified by the specific name? or can with any just authorityprescribe, which obvious or common qualities are to be left out;or which more secret, or more particular, are to be put into thesignification of the name of any substance? All which together, seldomor never fail to produce that various and doubtful signification inthe names of substances, which causes such uncertainty, disputes, ormistakes, when we come to a philosophical use of them. 

15. With this imperfection, they may serve for civil, but not well forphilosophical Use. 

It is true, as to civil and common conversation, the general names ofsubstances, regulated in their ordinary signification by some obviousqualities, (as by the shape and figure in things of known seminalpropagation, and in other substances, for the most part by colour, joined with some other sensible qualities, ) do well enough to design thethings men would be understood to speak of: and so they usuallyconceive well enough the substances meant by the word gold or apple, todistinguish the one from the other. But in PHILOSOPHICAL inquiries anddebates, where general truths are to be established, and consequencesdrawn from positions laid down, there the precise signification of thenames of substances will be found not only not to be well establishedbut also very hard to be so. For example: he that shall makemalleability, or a certain degree of fixedness, a part of his complexidea of gold, may make propositions concerning gold, and drawconsequences from them, that will truly and clearly follow from gold, taken in such a signification: but yet such as another man can neverbe forced to admit, nor be convinced of their truth, who makes notmalleableness, or the same degree of fixedness, part of that complexidea that the name gold, in his use of it, stands for. 

16. Instance, Liquor. 

This is a natural and almost unavoidable imperfection in almost all thenames of substances, in all languages whatsoever, which men will easilyfind when, once passing from confused or loose notions, they come tomore strict and close inquiries. For then they will be convinced howdoubtful and obscure those words are in their signification, which inordinary use appeared very clear and determined. I was once in a meetingof very learned and ingenious physicians, where by chance there arose aquestion, whether any liquor passed through the filaments of the nerves. The debate having been managed a good while, by variety of arguments onboth sides, I (who had been used to suspect, that the greatest partof disputes were more about the signification of words than a realdifference in the conception of things) desired, that, before they wentany further on in this dispute, they would first examine and establishamongst them, what the word LIQUOR signified. They at first were alittle surprised at the proposal; and had they been persons lessingenious, they might perhaps have taken it for a very frivolous orextravagant one: since there was no one there that thought not himselfto understand very perfectly what the word liquor stood for; which Ithink, too, none of the most perplexed names of substances. However, they were pleased to comply with my motion; and upon examination foundthat the signification of that word was not so settled or certainas they had all imagined; but that each of them made it a sign of adifferent complex idea. This made them perceive that the main of theirdispute was about the signification of that term; and that they differedvery little in their opinions concerning SOME fluid and subtle matter, passing through the conduits of the nerves; though it was not so easyto agree whether it was to be called LIQUOR or no, a thing, which, whenconsidered, they thought it not worth the contending about. 

17. Instance, Gold. 

How much this is the case in the greatest part of disputes that men areengaged so hotly in, I shall perhaps have an occasion in another placeto take notice. Let us only here consider a little more exactly thefore-mentioned instance of the word GOLD, and we shall see how hard itis precisely to determine its signification. I think all agree to makeit stand for a body of a certain yellow shining colour; which being theidea to which children have annexed that name, the shining yellow partof a peacock's tail is properly to them gold. Others finding fusibilityjoined with that yellow colour in certain parcels of matter, make ofthat combination a complex idea to which they give the name gold, todenote a sort of substances; and so exclude from being gold all suchyellow shining bodies as by fire will be reduced to ashes; and admit tobe of that species, or to be comprehended under that name gold, onlysuch substances as having that shining yellow colour, will by fire bereduced to fusion, and not to ashes. Another, by the same reason, addsthe weight, which, being a quality as straightly joined with that colouras its fusibility, he thinks has the same reason to be joined in itsidea, and to be signified by its name: and therefore the other made upof body, of such a colour and fusibility, to be imperfect; and so onof all the rest: wherein no one can show a reason why some of theinseparable qualities, that are always united in nature, should be putinto the nominal essence, and others left out, or why the word gold, signifying that sort of body the ring on his finger is made of, shoulddetermine that sort rather by its colour, weight, and fusibility, than by its colour, weight, and solubility in aqua regia: since thedissolving it by that liquor is as inseparable from it as the fusionby fire, and they are both of them nothing but the relation whichthat substance has to two other bodies, which have a power to operatedifferently upon it. For by what right is it that fusibility comes to bea part of the essence signified by the word gold, and solubility buta property of it? Or why is its colour part of the essence, and itsmalleableness but a property? That which I mean is this, That thesebeing all but properties, depending on its real constitution, andnothing but powers, either active or passive, in reference to otherbodies, no one has authority to determine the signification of theword gold (as referred to such a body existing in nature) more to onecollection of ideas to be found in that body than to another: wherebythe signification of that name must unavoidably be very uncertain. Since, as has been said, several people observe several properties inthe same substance; and I think I may say nobody all. And therefore wehave but very imperfect descriptions of things, and words have veryuncertain significations. 

18. The Names of simple Ideas the least doubtful. 

From what has been said, it is easy to observe what has been beforeremarked, viz. That the NAMES OF SIMPLE IDEAS are, of all others, theleast liable to mistakes, and that for these reasons. First, Because theideas they stand for, being each but one single perception, are mucheasier got, and more clearly retained, than the more complex ones, andtherefore are not liable to the uncertainty which usually attends thosecompounded ones of substances and mixed modes, in which the precisenumber of simple ideas that make them up are not easily agreed, soreadily kept in mind. And, Secondly, Because they are never referred toany other essence, but barely that perception they immediately signify:which reference is that which renders the signification of the namesof substances naturally so perplexed, and gives occasion to so manydisputes. Men that do not perversely use their words, or on purpose setthemselves to cavil, seldom mistake, in any language which they areacquainted with, the use and signification of the name of simple ideas. WHITE and SWEET, YELLOW and BITTER, carry a very obvious meaning withthem, which every one precisely comprehends, or easily perceives he isignorant of, and seeks to be informed. But what precise collection ofsimple ideas MODESTY or FRUGALITY stand for, in another's use, is notso certainly known. And however we are apt to think we well enough knowwhat is meant by GOLD or IRON; yet the precise complex idea others makethem the signs of is not so certain: and I believe it is very seldomthat, in speaker and hearer, they stand for exactly the same collection. Which must needs produce mistakes and disputes, when they are made useof in discourses, wherein men have to do with universal propositions, and would settle in their minds universal truths, and consider theconsequences that follow from them. 

19. And next to them, simple Modes. 

By the same rule, the names of SIMPLE MODES are, next to those of simpleideas, least liable to doubt and uncertainty; especially those of figureand number, of which men have so clear and distinct ideas. Who ever thathad a mind to understand them mistook the ordinary meaning of SEVEN, ora TRIANGLE? And in general the least compounded ideas in every kind havethe least dubious names. 

20. The most doubtful are the Names of very compounded mixed Modes andSubstances. 

Mixed modes, therefore, that are made up but of a few and obvious simpleideas, have usually names of no very uncertain signification. But thenames of mixed modes, which comprehend a great number of simple ideas, are commonly of a very doubtful and undetermined meaning, as has beenshown. The names of substances, being annexed to ideas that are neitherthe real essences, nor exact representations of the patterns they arereferred to, are liable to yet greater imperfection and uncertainty, especially when we come to a philosophical use of them. 

21. Why this Imperfection charged upon Words. 

The great disorder that happens in our names of substances, proceeding, for the most part, from our want of knowledge, and inability topenetrate into their real constitutions, it may probably be wonderedwhy I charge this as an imperfection rather upon our words thanunderstandings. This exception has so much appearance of justice, that Ithink myself obliged to give a reason why I have followed this method. I must confess, then, that, when I first began this Discourse of theUnderstanding, and a good while after, I had not the least thought thatany consideration of words was at all necessary to it. But when, havingpassed over the original and composition of our ideas, I began toexamine the extent and certainty of our knowledge, I found it had sonear a connexion with words, that, unless their force and manner ofsignification were first well observed, there could be very little saidclearly and pertinently concerning knowledge: which being conversantabout truth, had constantly to do with propositions. And though itterminated in things, yet it was for the most part so much by theintervention of words, that they seemed scarce separable from ourgeneral knowledge. At least they interpose themselves so much betweenour understandings, and the truth which it would contemplate andapprehend, that, like the medium through which visible objects pass, theobscurity and disorder do not seldom cast a mist before our eyes, andimpose upon our understandings. If we consider, in the fallacies men putupon themselves, as well as others, and the mistakes in men's disputesand notions, how great a part is owing to words, and their uncertain ormistaken significations, we shall have reason to think this no smallobstacle in the way to knowledge; which I conclude we are the morecarefully to be warned of, because it has been so far from being takennotice of as an inconvenience, that the arts of improving it havebeen made the business of men's study, and obtained the reputation oflearning and subtilty, as we shall see in the following chapter. ButI am apt to imagine, that, were the imperfections of language, as theinstrument of knowledge, more thoroughly weighed, a great many of thecontroversies that make such a noise in the world, would of themselvescease; and the way to knowledge, and perhaps peace too, lie a great dealopener than it does. 

22. This should teach us Moderation in imposing our own Sense of oldAuthors. 

Sure I am that the signification of words in all languages, dependingvery much on the thoughts, notions, and ideas of him that uses them, must unavoidably be of great uncertainty to men of the same language andcountry. This is so evident in the Greek authors, that he that shallperuse their writings will find in almost every one of them, a distinctlanguage, though the same words. But when to this natural difficulty inevery country, there shall be added different countries and remote ages, wherein the speakers and writers had very different notions, tempers, customs, ornaments, and figures of speech, &c. , every one of whichinfluenced the signification of their words then, though to us now theyare lost and unknown; it would become us to be charitable one to anotherin our interpretations or misunderstandings of those ancient writings;which, though of great concernment to be understood, are liable to theunavoidable difficulties of speech, which (if we except the names ofsimple ideas, and some very obvious things) is not capable, without aconstant defining the terms, of conveying the sense and intention of thespeaker, without any manner of doubt and uncertainty to the hearer. Andin discourses of religion, law, and morality, as they are matters of thehighest concernment, so there will be the greatest difficulty. 

23. Especially of the Old and New Testament Scriptures. 

The volumes of interpreters and commentators on the Old and NewTestament are but too manifest proofs of this. Though everything said inthe text be infallibly true, yet the reader may be, nay, cannot choosebut be, very fallible in the understanding of it. Nor is it to bewondered, that the will of God, when clothed in words, should be liableto that doubt and uncertainty which unavoidably attends that sort ofconveyance, when even his Son, whilst clothed in flesh, was subject toall the frailties and inconveniences of human nature, sin excepted. Andwe ought to magnify his goodness, that he hath spread before all theworld such legible characters of his works and providence, and given allmankind so sufficient a light of reason, that they to whom this writtenword never came, could not (whenever they set themselves to search)either doubt of the being of a God, or of the obedience due to him. Since then the precepts of Natural Religion are plain, and veryintelligible to all mankind, and seldom come to be controverted; andother revealed truths, which are conveyed to us by books and languages, are liable to the common and natural obscurities and difficultiesincident to words; methinks it would become us to be more careful anddiligent in observing the former, and less magisterial, positive, andimperious, in imposing our own sense and interpretations of the latter. 

CHAPTER X. 

OF THE ABUSE OF WORDS. 

1. Woeful abuse of Words. 

Besides the imperfection that is naturally in language, and theobscurity and confusion that is so hard to be avoided in the use ofwords, there are several WILFUL faults and neglects which men are guiltyof in this way of communication, whereby they render these signs lessclear and distinct in their signification than naturally they need tobe. 

2. First, Words are often employed without any, or without clear Ideas. 

FIRST, In this kind the first and most palpable abuse is, the usingof words without clear and distinct ideas; or, which is worse, signswithout anything signified. Of these there are two sorts:--

I. Some words introduced without clear ideas annexed to them, even intheir first original. 

One may observe, in all languages, certain words that, if they beexamined, will be found in their first original, and their appropriateduse, not to stand for any clear and distinct ideas. These, for the mostpart, the several sects of philosophy and religion have introduced. Fortheir authors or promoters, either affecting something singular, and outof the way of common apprehensions, or to support some strange opinions, or cover some weakness of their hypothesis, seldom fail to coin newwords, and such as, when they come to be examined, may justly be calledINSIGNIFICANT TERMS. For, having either had no determinate collection ofideas annexed to them when they were first invented; or at least suchas, if well examined, will be found inconsistent, it is no wonder, if, afterwards, in the vulgar use of the same party, they remain emptysounds, with little or no signification, amongst those who think itenough to have them often in their mouths, as the distinguishingcharacters of their Church or School, without much troubling their headsto examine what are the precise ideas they stand for. I shall not needhere to heap up instances; every man's reading and conversation willsufficiently furnish him. Or if he wants to be better stored, thegreat mint-masters of this kind of terms, I mean the Schoolmen andMetaphysicians (under which I think the disputing natural and moralphilosophers of these latter ages may be comprehended) have wherewithalabundantly to content him. 

3. II. Other Words, to which ideas were annexed at first, usedafterwards without distinct meanings. 

Others there be who extend this abuse yet further, who take so littlecare to lay by words, which, in their primary notation have scarceany clear and distinct ideas which they are annexed to, that, by anunpardonable negligence, they familiarly use words which the proprietyof language HAS affixed to very important ideas, without any distinctmeaning at all. WISDOM, GLORY, GRACE, &c. , are words frequent enough inevery man's mouth; but if a great many of those who use them should beasked what they mean by them, they would be at a stand, and not knowwhat to answer: a plain proof, that, though they have learned thosesounds, and have them ready at their tongues ends, yet there are nodetermined ideas laid up in their minds, which are to be expressed toothers by them. 

4. This occasioned by men learning Names before they have the Ideas thenames belong to. 

Men having been accustomed from their cradles to learn words which areeasily got and retained, before they knew or had framed the complexideas to which they were annexed, or which were to be found in thethings they were thought to stand for, they usually continue to do soall their lives; and without taking the pains necessary to settle intheir minds determined ideas, they use their words for such unsteady andconfused notions as they have, contenting themselves with the same wordsother people use; as if their very sound necessarily carried with itconstantly the same meaning. This, though men make a shift with inthe ordinary occurrences of life, where they find it necessary to beunderstood, and therefore they make signs till they are so; yet thisinsignificancy in their words, when they come to reason concerningeither their tenets or interest, manifestly fills their discourse withabundance of empty unintelligible noise and jargon, especially in moralmatters, where the words for the most part standing for arbitrary andnumerous collections of ideas, not regularly and permanently united innature, their bare sounds are often only thought on, or at least veryobscure and uncertain notions annexed to them. Men take the wordsthey find in use amongst their neighbours; and that they may not seemignorant what they stand for, use them confidently, without muchtroubling their heads about a certain fixed meaning; whereby, besidesthe ease of it, they obtain this advantage, That, as in such discoursesthey seldom are in the right, so they are as seldom to be convinced thatthey are in the wrong; it being all one to go about to draw those menout of their mistakes who have no settled notions, as to dispossess avagrant of his habitation who has no settled abode. This I guess to beso; and every one may observe in himself and others whether it be so ornot. 

5. Secondly Unsteady Application of them. 

SECONDLY, Another great abuse of words is INCONSTANCY in the use ofthem. It is hard to find a discourse written on any subject, especiallyof controversy, wherein one shall not observe, if he read withattention, the same words (and those commonly the most material in thediscourse, and upon which the argument turns) used sometimes for onecollection of simple ideas, and sometimes for another; which is aperfect abuse of language. Words being intended for signs of my ideas, to make them known to others, not by any natural signification, but bya voluntary imposition, it is plain cheat and abuse, when I make themstand sometimes for one thing and sometimes for another; the wilfuldoing whereof can be imputed to nothing but great folly, or greaterdishonesty. And a man, in his accounts with another may, with as muchfairness make the characters of numbers stand sometimes for one andsometimes for another collection of units: v. G. This character 3, standsometimes for three, sometimes for four, and sometimes for eight, asin his discourse or reasoning make the same words stand for differentcollections of simple ideas. If men should do so in their reckonings, Iwonder who would have to do with them? One who would speak thus in theaffairs and business of the world, and call 8 sometimes seven, andsometimes nine, as best served his advantage, would presently haveclapped upon him, one of the two names men are commonly disgusted with. And yet in arguings and learned contests, the same sort of proceedingspasses commonly for wit and learning; but to me it appears a greaterdishonesty than the misplacing of counters in the casting up a debt; andthe cheat the greater, by how much truth is of greater concernment andvalue than money. 

6. Thirdly, Affected Obscurity, as in the Peripatetic and other sects ofPhilosophy. 

THIRDLY. Another abuse of language is an AFFECTED OBSCURITY; by eitherapplying old words to new and unusual significations; or introducing newand ambiguous terms, without defining either; or else putting themso together, as may confound their ordinary meaning. Though thePeripatetick philosophy has been most eminent in this way, yet othersects have not been wholly clear of it. There are scarce any of themthat are not cumbered with some difficulties (such is the imperfectionof human knowledge, ) which they have been fain to cover with obscurityof terms, and to confound the signification of words, which, like amist before people's eyes, might hinder their weak parts from beingdiscovered. That BODY and EXTENSION in common use, stand for twodistinct ideas, is plain to any one that will but reflect a little. Forwere their signification precisely the same, it would be as proper, andas intelligible to say, 'the body of an extension, ' as the 'extension ofa body;' and yet there are those who find it necessary to confound theirsignification. To this abuse, and the mischiefs of confounding thesignification of words, logic, and the liberal sciences as they havebeen handled in the schools, have given reputation; and the admired Artof Disputing hath added much to the natural imperfection of languages, whilst it has been made use of and fitted to perplex the significationof words, more than to discover the knowledge and truth of things: andhe that will look into that sort of learned writings, will find thewords there much more obscure, uncertain, and undetermined in theirmeaning, than they are in ordinary conversation. 

7. Logic and Dispute have must have contributed to this. 

This is unavoidably to be so, where men's parts and learning areestimated by their skill in disputing. And if reputation and rewardshall attend these conquests, which depend mostly on the fineness andniceties of words, it is no wonder if the wit of man so employed, shouldperplex, involve, and subtilize the signification of sounds, so as neverto want something to say in opposing or defending any question; thevictory being adjudged not to him who had truth on his side, but thelast word in the dispute. 

8. Calling it Subtlety. 

This, though a very useless skill, and that which I think the directopposite to the ways of knowledge, hath yet passed hitherto under thelaudable and esteemed names of SUBTLETY and ACUTENESS, and has had theapplause of the schools, and encouragement of one part of the learnedmen of the world. And no wonder, since the philosophers of old, (thedisputing and wrangling philosophers I mean, such as Lucian wittily andwith reason taxes, ) and the Schoolmen since, aiming at glory and esteem, for their great and universal knowledge, easier a great deal to bepretended to than really acquired, found this a good expedient to covertheir ignorance, with a curious and inexplicable web of perplexed words, and procure to themselves the admiration of others, by unintelligibleterms, the apter to produce wonder because they could not be understood;whilst it appears in all history, that these profound doctors were nowiser nor more useful than their neighbours, and brought but smalladvantage to human life or the societies wherein they lived; unless thecoining of new words, where they produced no new things to apply themto, or the perplexing or obscuring the signification of old ones, and sobringing all things into question and dispute, were a thing profitableto the life of man, or worthy commendation and reward. 

9. This Learning very little benefits Society. 

For, notwithstanding these learned disputants, these all-knowingdoctors, it was to the unscholastic statesman that the governmentsof the world owed their peace, defence, and liberties; and from theilliterate and contemned mechanic (a name of disgrace) that theyreceived the improvements of useful arts. Nevertheless, this artificialignorance, and learned gibberish, prevailed mightily in these last ages, by the interest and artifice of those who found no easier way to thatpitch of authority and dominion they have attained, than by amusingthe men of business, and ignorant, with hard words, or employing theingenious and idle in intricate disputes about unintelligible terms, andholding them perpetually entangled in that endless labyrinth. Besides, there is no such way to gain admittance, or give defence to strange andabsurd doctrines, as to guard them round about with legions of obscure, doubtful, and undefined words. Which yet make these retreats more likethe dens of robbers, or holes of foxes, than the fortresses of fairwarriors; which, if it be hard to get them out of, it is not for thestrength that is in them, but the briars and thorns, and the obscurityof the thickets they are beset with. For untruth being unacceptableto the mind of man, there is no other defence left for absurdity butobscurity. 

10. But destroys the instruments of Knowledge and communication. 

Thus learned ignorance, and this art of keeping even inquisitive menfrom true knowledge, hath been propagated in the world, and hath muchperplexed, whilst it pretended to inform the understanding. For we seethat other well-meaning and wise men, whose education and parts had notacquired that ACUTENESS, could intelligibly express themselves to oneanother; and in its plain use make a benefit of language. But thoughunlearned men well enough understood the words white and black; &c. , andhad constant notions of the ideas signified by those words; yet therewere philosophers found who had learning and subtlety enough to provethat snow was black; i. E. To prove that white was black. Whereby theyhad the advantage to destroy the instruments and means of discourse, conversation, instruction, and society; whilst, with great art andsubtlety, they did no more but perplex and confound the signification ofwords, and thereby render language less useful than the real defects ofit had made it; a gift which the illiterate had not attained to. 

11. As useful as to confound the sound that the Letters of the Alphabetstand for. 

These learned men did equally instruct men's understandings, andprofit their lives, as he who should alter the signification of knowncharacters, and, by a subtle device of learning, far surpassing thecapacity of the illiterate, dull, and vulgar, should in his writing showthat he could put A for B, and D for E, &c. , to the no small admirationand benefit of for his reader. It being as senseless to put BLACK, which is a word agreed on to stand for one sensible idea, to put it, Isay, for another, or the contrary idea; i. E. To call SNOW BLACK, asto put this mark A, which is a character agreed on to stand for onemodification of sound, made by a certain motion of the organs of speech, for B, which is agreed on to stand for another modification of sound, made by another certain mode of the organs of speech. 

12. This Art has perplexed Religion and Justice. 

Nor hath this mischief stopped in logical niceties, or curious emptyspeculations; it hath invaded the great concernments of human life andsociety; obscured and perplexed the material truths of law and divinity;brought confusion, disorder, and uncertainty into the affairs ofmankind; and if not destroyed, yet in a great measure rendered useless, these two great rules, religion and justice. What have the greatest partof the comments and disputes upon the laws of God and man served for, but to make the meaning more doubtful, and perplex the sense? What havebeen the effect of those multiplied curious distinctions, and acuteniceties, but obscurity and uncertainty, leaving the words moreunintelligible, and the reader more at a loss? How else comes it to passthat princes, speaking or writing to their servants, in their ordinarycommands are easily understood; speaking to their people, in their laws, are not so? And, as I remarked before, doth it not often happen that aman of an ordinary capacity very well understands a text, or a law, thathe reads, till he consults an expositor, or goes to counsel; who, bythat time he hath done explaining them, makes the words signify eithernothing at all, or what he pleases. 

13. And ought not to pass for Learning. 

Whether any by-interests of these professions have occasioned this, Iwill not here examine; but I leave it to be considered, whether it wouldnot be well for mankind, whose concernment it is to know things as theyare, and to do what they ought, and not to spend their lives in talkingabout them, or tossing words to and fro;--whether it would not be well, I say, that the use of words were made plain and direct; and thatlanguage, which was given us for the improvement of knowledge and bondof society, should not be employed to darken truth and unsettle people'srights; to raise mists, and render unintelligible both morality andreligion? Or that at least, if this will happen, it should not bethought learning or knowledge to do so?

14. IV. Fourthly, by taking Words for Things. 

FOURTHLY, Another great abuse of words is, the TAKING THEM FOR THINGS. This, though it in some degree concerns all names in general, yet moreparticularly affects those of substances. To this abuse those men aremost subject who most confine their thoughts to any one system, andgive themselves up into a firm belief of the perfection of any receivedhypothesis: whereby they come to be persuaded that the terms of thatsect are so suited to the nature of things, that they perfectlycorrespond with their real existence. Who is there that has been bred upin the Peripatetick philosophy, who does not think the Ten Names, underwhich are ranked the Ten Predicaments, to be exactly conformable to thenature of things? Who is there of that school that is not persuaded thatSUBSTANTIAL FORMS, VEGETATIVE SOULS, ABHORRENCE OF A VACUUM, INTENTIONALSPECIES, &c. , are something real? These words men have learned fromtheir very entrance upon knowledge, and have found their masters andsystems lay great stress upon them: and therefore they cannot quitthe opinion, that they are conformable to nature, and are therepresentations of something that really exists. The Platonists havetheir SOUL OF THE WORLD, and the Epicureans their ENDEAVOR TOWARDSMOTION in their atoms when at rest. There is scarce any sect inphilosophy has not a distinct set of terms that others understand not. But yet this gibberish, which, in the weakness of human understanding, serves so well to palliate men's ignorance, and cover their errors, comes, by familiar use amongst those of the same tribe, to seem themost important part of language, and of all other the terms the mostsignificant: and should AERIAL and OETHERIAL VEHICLES come once, by theprevalency of that doctrine, to be generally received anywhere, no doubtthose terms would make impressions on men's minds, so as to establishthem in the persuasion of the reality of such things, as much asPeripatetick FORMS and INTENTIONAL SPECIES have heretofore done. 15. Instance, in Matter. 

How much names taken for things are apt to mislead the understanding, the attentive reading of philosophical writers would abundantlydiscover; and that perhaps in words little suspected of any such misuse. I shall instance in one only, and that a very familiar one. How manyintricate disputes have there been about MATTER, as if there were somesuch thing really in nature, distinct from BODY; as it is evident theword matter stands for an idea distinct from the idea of body? For ifthe ideas these two terms stood for were precisely the same, they mightindifferently in all places be put for one another. But we see thatthough it be proper to say, There is one matter of all bodies, onecannot say, There is one body of all matters: we familiarly say one bodyis bigger than another; but it sounds harsh (and I think is never used)to say one matter is bigger than another. Whence comes this, then? Viz. From hence: that, though matter and body be not really distinct, butwherever there is the one there is the other; yet matter and body standfor two different conceptions, whereof the one is incomplete, and buta part of the other. For body stands for a solid extended figuredsubstance, whereof matter is but a partial and more confused conception;it seeming to me to be used for the substance and solidity of body, without taking in its extension and figure: and therefore it is that, speaking of matter, we speak of it always as one, because in truth itexpressly contains nothing but the idea of a solid substance, which iseverywhere the same, everywhere uniform. This being our idea of matter, we no more conceive or speak of different MATTERS in the world thanwe do of different solidities; though we both conceive and speak ofdifferent bodies, because extension and figure are capable of variation. But, since solidity cannot exist without extension and figure, thetaking matter to be the name of something really existing under thatprecision, has no doubt produced those obscure and unintelligiblediscourses and disputes, which have filled the heads and books ofphilosophers concerning materia prima; which imperfection or abuse, how far it may concern a great many other general terms I leave to beconsidered. This, I think, I may at least say, that we should have agreat many fewer disputes in the world, if words were taken for whatthey are, the signs of our ideas only; and not for things themselves. For, when we argue about MATTER, or any the like term, we truly argueonly about the idea we express by that sound, whether that precise ideaagree to anything really existing in nature or no. And if men would tellwhat ideas they make their words stand for, there could not be half thatobscurity or wrangling in the search or support of truth that there is. 

16. This makes Errors lasting. 

But whatever inconvenience follows from this mistake of words, this I amsure, that, by constant and familiar use, they charm men into notionsfar remote from the truth of things. It would be a hard matter topersuade any one that the words which his father, or schoolmaster, theparson of the parish, or such a reverend doctor used, signified nothingthat really existed in nature: which perhaps is none of the least causesthat men are so hardly drawn to quit their mistakes, even in opinionspurely philosophical, and where they have no other interest but truth. For the words they have a long time been used to, remaining firm intheir minds, it is no wonder that the wrong notions annexed to themshould not be removed. 

17. Fifthly, by setting them in the place of what they cannot signify. 

V. FIFTHLY, Another abuse of words is, THE SETTING THEM IN THE PLACE OFTHINGS WHICH THEY DO OR CAN BY NO MEANS SIGNIFY. We may observe that, inthe general names of substances, whereof the NOMINAL essences are onlyknown to us, when we put them into propositions, and affirm or denyanything about them, we do most commonly tacitly suppose or intend, theyshould stand for the REAL essence of a certain sort of substances. For, when a man says gold is malleable, he means and would insinuatesomething more than this, That what I call gold is malleable, (thoughtruly it amounts to no more, ) but would have this understood, viz. That gold, i. E. What has the real essence of gold, is malleable; whichamounts to thus much, that malleableness depends on, and is inseparablefrom the real essence of gold. But a man, not knowing wherein that realessence consists, the connexion in his mind of malleableness is nottruly with an essence he knows not, but only with the sound gold he putsfor it. Thus, when we say that ANIMAL RATIONALE is, and animal imflumebipes latis unguibus is not a good definition of a man; it is plain wesuppose the name man in this case to stand for the real essence of aspecies, and would signify that 'a rational animal' better describedthat real essence than 'a two-legged animal with broad nails, andwithout feathers. ' For else, why might not Plato as properly make theword [word in Greek], or MAN, stand for his complex idea, made up of theidea of a body, distinguished from others by a certain shape and otheroutward appearances, as Aristotle make the complex idea to which he gavethe name [word in Greek], or MAN, of body and the faculty of reasoningjoined together; unless the name [word in Greek], or MAN, were supposedto stand for something else than what it signifies; and to be put in theplace of some other thing than the idea a man professes he would expressby it?

18. VI. Putting them for the real Essences of Substances. 

It is true the names of substances would be much more useful, andpropositions made in them much more certain, were the real essences ofsubstances the ideas in our minds which those words signified. And itis for want of those real essences that our words convey so littleknowledge or certainty in our discourses about them; and therefore themind, to remove that imperfection as much as it can, makes them, by asecret supposition, to stand for a thing having that real essence, as ifthereby it made some nearer approaches to it. For, though the word MANor GOLD signify nothing truly but a complex idea of properties unitedtogether in one sort of substances; yet there is scarce anybody, in theuse of these words, but often supposes each of those names to stand fora thing having the real essence on which these properties depend. Whichis so far from diminishing the imperfection of our words, that by aplain abuse it adds to it, when we would make them stand for something, which, not being in our complex idea, the name we use can no ways be thesign of. 

19. Hence we think Change of our Complex Ideas of Substances not tochange their Species. 

This shows us the reason why in MIXED MODES any of the ideas that makethe composition of the complex one being left out or changed, it isallowed to be another thing, i. E. To be of another species, as is plainin CHANCE-MEDLEY, MANSLAUGHTER, MURDER, PARRICIDE, &c. The reasonwhereof is, because the complex idea signified by that name is the realas well as nominal essence; and there is no secret reference of thatname to any other essence but that. But in SUBSTANCES, it is not so. Forthough in that called GOLD, one puts into his complex idea what anotherleaves out, and vice versa: yet men do not usually think that thereforethe species is changed: because they secretly in their minds refer thatname, and suppose it annexed to a real immutable essence of a thingexisting, on which those properties depend. He that adds to his complexidea of gold that of fixedness and solubility in AQUA REGIA, which heput not in it before, is not thought to have changed the species; butonly to have a more perfect idea, by adding another simple idea, whichis always in fact joined with those other, of which his former complexidea consisted. But this reference of the name to a thing, whereof wehave not the idea, is so far from helping at all, that it only servesthe more to involve us in difficulties. For by this tacit reference tothe real essence of that species of bodies, the word GOLD (which, bystanding for a more or less perfect collection of simple ideas, servesto design that sort of body well enough in civil discourse) comes tohave no signification at all, being put for somewhat whereof we have noidea at all, and so can signify nothing at all, when the body itself isaway. For however it may be thought all one, yet, if well considered, itwill be found a quite different thing, to argue about gold in name, andabout a parcel in the body itself, v. G. A piece of leaf-gold laid beforeus; though in discourse we are fain to substitute the name for thething. 

20. The Cause of this Abuse, a supposition of Nature's working alwaysregularly, in setting boundaries to Species. 

That which I think very much disposes men to substitute their names forthe real essences of species, is the supposition before mentioned, that nature works regularly in the production of things, and sets theboundaries to each of those species, by giving exactly the same realinternal constitution to each individual which we rank under one generalname. Whereas any one who observes their different qualities can hardlydoubt, that many of the individuals, called by the same name, are, intheir internal constitution, as different one from another as several ofthose which are ranked under different specific names. This supposition, however, that the same precise and internal constitution goes alwayswith the same specific name, makes men forward to take those names forthe representatives of those real essences; though indeed they signifynothing but the complex ideas they have in their minds when they usethem. So that, if I may so say, signifying one thing, and being supposedfor, or put in the place of another, they cannot but, in such a kind ofuse, cause a great deal of uncertainty in men's discourses; especiallyin those who have thoroughly imbibed the doctrine of SUBSTANTIALFORMS, whereby they firmly imagine the several species of things to bedetermined and distinguished. 

21. This Abuse contains two false Suppositions. 

But however preposterous and absurd it be to make our names stand forideas we have not, or (which is all one) essences that we know not, it being in effect to make our words the signs of nothing; yet it isevident to any one who ever so little reflects on the use men makeof their words, that there is nothing more familiar. When a man askswhether this or that thing he sees, let it be a drill, or a monstrousfoetus, be a MAN or no; it is evident the question is not, Whether thatparticular thing agree to his complex idea expressed by the name man:but whether it has in it the real essence of a species of things whichhe supposes his name man to stand for. In which way of using the namesof substances, there are these false suppositions contained:--

First, that there are certain precise essences according to which naturemakes all particular things, and by which they are distinguished intospecies. That everything has a real constitution, whereby it is what itis, and on which its sensible qualities depend, is past doubt: but Ithink it has been proved that this makes not the distinction of speciesas WE rank them, nor the boundaries of their names. 

Secondly, this tacitly also insinuates, as if we had IDEAS of theseproposed essences. For to what purpose else is it, to inquire whetherthis or that thing have the real essence of the species man, if we didnot suppose that there were such a specifick essence known? Which yetis utterly false. And therefore such application of names as would makethem stand for ideas which we have not, must needs cause great disorderin discourses and reasonings about them, and be a great inconvenience inour communication by words. 

22. VI. Sixthly, by proceeding upon the supposition that the WOrds weuse have a certain and evident Signification which other men cannot butunderstand. 

SIXTHLY, there remains yet another more general, though perhaps lessobserved, abuse of words; and that is, that men having by a long andfamiliar use annexed to them certain ideas, they are apt to imagine SONEAR AND NECESSARY A CONNEXION BETWEEN THE NAMES AND SIGNIFICATION THEYUSE THEM IN, that they forwardly suppose one cannot but understand whattheir meaning is; and therefore one ought to acquiesce in the wordsdelivered, as if it were past doubt that, in the use of those commonreceived sounds, the speaker and hearer had necessarily the same preciseideas. Whence presuming, that when they have in discourse used any term, they have thereby, as it were, set before others the very thing theytalked of. And so likewise taking the words of others, as naturallystanding for just what they themselves have been accustomed to applythem to, they never trouble themselves to explain their own, orunderstand clearly others' meaning. From whence commonly proceeds noise, and wrangling, without improvement or information; whilst men take wordsto be the constant regular marks of agreed notions, which in truth areno more but the voluntary and unsteady signs of their own ideas. And yetmen think it strange, if in discourse, or (where it is often absolutelynecessary) in dispute, one sometimes asks the meaning of their terms:though the arguings one may every day observe in conversation make itevident, that there are few names of complex ideas which any two men usefor the same just precise collection. It is hard to name a word whichwill not be a clear instance of this. LIFE is a term, none morefamiliar. Any one almost would take it for an affront to be asked whathe meant by it. And yet if it comes in question, whether a plant thatlies ready formed in the seed have life; whether the embryo in an eggbefore incubation, or a man in a swoon without sense or motion, be aliveor no; it is easy to perceive that a clear, distinct, settled idea doesnot always accompany the use of so known a word as that of life is. Somegross and confused conceptions men indeed ordinarily have, to which theyapply the common words of their language; and such a loose use of theirwords serves them well enough in their ordinary discourses or affairs. But this is not sufficient for philosophical inquiries. Knowledge andreasoning require precise determinate ideas. And though men will notbe so importunately dull as not to understand what others say, withoutdemanding an explication of their terms; nor so troublesomely criticalas to correct others in the use of the words they receive from them:yet, where truth and knowledge are concerned in the case, I know notwhat fault it can be, to desire the explication of words whose senseseems dubious; or why a man should be ashamed to own his ignorance inwhat sense another man uses his words; since he has no other way ofcertainly knowing it but by being informed. This abuse of taking wordsupon trust has nowhere spread so far, nor with so ill effects, asamongst men of letters. The multiplication and obstinacy of disputes, which have so laid waste the intellectual world, is owing to nothingmore than to this ill use of words. For though it be generally believedthat there is great diversity of opinions in the volumes and variety ofcontroversies the world is distracted with; yet the most I can find thatthe contending learned men of different parties do, in their arguingsone with another, is, that they speak different languages. For I am aptto imagine, that when any of them, quitting terms, think upon things, and know what they think, they think all the same: though perhaps whatthey would have be different. 

23. The Ends of Language: First, To convey our Ideas. 

To conclude this consideration of the imperfection and abuse oflanguage. The ends of language in our discourse with others beingchiefly these three: First, to make known one man's thoughts or ideas toanother; Secondly, to do so with as much ease and quickness as possible;and, Thirdly, thereby to convey the knowledge of things: language iseither abused or deficient, when it fails of any of these three. 

First, Words fail in the first of these ends, and lay not open one man'sideas to another's view: 1. When men have names in their mouths withoutany determinate ideas in their minds whereof they are the signs: or, 2. When they apply the common received names of any language to ideas, towhich the common use of that language does not apply them: or 3. Whenthey apply them very unsteadily, making them stand now for one, and byand by for another idea. 

24. Secondly, To do it with Quickness. 

Secondly, Men fail of conveying their thoughts with the quickness andease that may be, when they have complex ideas without having anydistinct names for them. This is sometimes the fault of the languageitself, which has not in it a sound yet applied to such a signification;and sometimes the fault of the man, who has not yet learned the name forthat idea he would show another. 

25. Thirdly, Therewith to convey the Knowledge of Things. 

Thirdly, there is no knowledge of things conveyed by men's words, whentheir ideas agree not to the reality of things. Though it be a defectthat has its original in our ideas, which are not so conformable to thenature of things as attention, study and application might make them, yet it fails not to extend itself to our words too, when we use them assigns of real beings, which yet never had any reality or existence. 

26. How Men's Words fail in all these: First, when used without anyideas. 

First, He that hath words of any language, without distinct ideas inhis mind to which he applies them, does, so far as he uses them indiscourse, only make a noise without any sense or signification; and howlearned soever he may seem, by the use of hard words or learned terms, is not much more advanced thereby in knowledge, than he would be inlearning, who had nothing in his study but the bare titles of books, without possessing the contents of them. For all such words, howeverput into discourse, according to the right construction of grammaticalrules, or the harmony of well-turned periods, do yet amount to nothingbut bare sounds, and nothing else. 

27. Secondly, when complex ideas are without names annexed to them. 

Secondly, He that has complex ideas, without particular names for them, would be in no better case than a bookseller, who had in his warehousevolumes that lay there unbound, and without titles, which he couldtherefore make known to others only by showing the loose sheets, andcommunicate them only by tale. This man is hindered in his discourse, for want of words to communicate his complex ideas, which he istherefore forced to make known by an enumeration of the simple ones thatcompose them; and so is fain often to use twenty words, to express whatanother man signifies in one. 

28. Thirdly, when the same sign is not put for the same idea. 

Thirdly, He that puts not constantly the same sign for the same idea, but uses the same word sometimes in one and sometimes in anothersignification, ought to pass in the schools and conversation for as faira man, as he does in the market and exchange, who sells several thingsunder the same name. 

29. Fourthly, when words are diverted from their common use. 

Fourthly, He that applies the words of any language to ideas differentfrom those to which the common use of that country applies them, howeverhis own understanding may be filled with truth and light, will not bysuch words be able to convey much of it to others, without defining histerms. For however the sounds are such as are familiarly known, andeasily enter the ears of those who are accustomed to them; yet standingfor other ideas than those they usually are annexed to, and are wont toexcite in the mind of the hearers, they cannot make known the thoughtsof him who thus uses them. 

30. Fifthly, when they are names of fantastical imaginations. 

Fifthly, He that imagined to himself substances such as never have been, and filled his head with ideas which have not any correspondence withthe real nature of things, to which yet he gives settled and definednames, may fill his discourse, and perhaps another man's head, with thefantastical imaginations of his own brain, but will be very far fromadvancing thereby one jot in real and true knowledge. 

31. Summary. 

He that hath names without ideas, wants meaning in his words, and speaksonly empty sounds. He that hath complex ideas without names for them, wants liberty and dispatch in his expressions, and is necessitated touse periphrases. He that uses his words loosely and unsteadily willeither be not minded or not understood. He that applies his names toideas different from their common use, wants propriety in his language, and speaks gibberish. And he that hath the ideas of substancesdisagreeing with the real existence of things, so far wants thematerials of true knowledge in his understanding, and hath insteadthereof chimeras. 

32. How men's words fail when they stand for Substances. 

In our notions concerning Substances, we are liable to all the formerinconveniences: v. G. He that uses the word TARANTULA, without havingany imagination or idea of what it stands for, pronounces a goodword; but so long means nothing at all by it. 2. He that, in anewly-discovered country, shall see several sorts of animals andvegetables, unknown to him before, may have as true ideas of them, as ofa horse or a stag; but can speak of them only by a description, till heshall either take the names the natives call them by, or give them nameshimself. 3. He that uses the word BODY sometimes for pure extension, and sometimes for extension and solidity together, will talk veryfallaciously. 4. He that gives the name HORSE to that idea which commonusage calls MULE, talks improperly, and will not be understood. 5. Hethat thinks the name CENTAUR stands for some real being, imposes onhimself, and mistakes words for things. 

33. How when they stand for Modes and Relations. 

In Modes and Relations generally, we are liable only to the four firstof these inconveniences; viz. 1. I may have in my memory the names ofmodes, as GRATITUDE or CHARITY, and yet not have any precise ideasannexed in my thoughts to those names, 2. I may have ideas, and not knowthe names that belong to them: v. G. I may have the idea of a man'sdrinking till his colour and humour be altered, till his tongue trips, and his eyes look red, and his feet fail him; and yet not know thatit is to be called DRUNKENNESS. 3. I may have the ideas of virtues orvices, and names also, but apply them amiss: v. G. When I apply the nameFRUGALITY to that idea which others call and signify by this sound, COVETOUSNESS. 4. I may use any of those names with inconstancy. 5. But, in modes and relations, I cannot have ideas disagreeing to the existenceof things: for modes being complex ideas, made by the mind at pleasure, and relation being but by way of considering or comparing two thingstogether, and so also an idea of my own making, these ideas can scarcebe found to disagree with anything existing; since they are not in themind as the copies of things regularly made by nature, nor as propertiesinseparably flowing from the internal constitution or essence of anysubstance; but, as it were, patterns lodged in my memory, with namesannexed to them, to denominate actions and relations by, as they cometo exist. But the mistake is commonly in my giving a wrong name to myconceptions; and so using words in a different sense from other people:I am not understood, but am thought to have wrong ideas of them, when Igive wrong names to them. Only if I put in my ideas of mixed modes orrelations any inconsistent ideas together, I fill my head also withchimeras; since such ideas, if well examined, cannot so much as exist inthe mind, much less any real being ever be denominated from them. 

34. Seventhly, Language is often abused by Figurative Speech. 

Since wit and fancy find easier entertainment in the world than drytruth and real knowledge, figurative speeches and allusion in languagewill hardly be admitted as an imperfection or abuse of it. I confess, indiscourses where we seek rather pleasure and delight than informationand improvement, such ornaments as are borrowed from them can scarcepass for faults. But yet if we would speak of things as they are, wemust allow that all the art of rhetoric, besides order and clearness;all the artificial and figurative application of words eloquence hathinvented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move thepassions, and thereby mislead the judgment; and so indeed are perfectcheats: and therefore, however laudable or allowable oratory may renderthem in harangues and popular addresses, they are certainly, in alldiscourses that pretend to inform or instruct, wholly to be avoided; andwhere truth and knowledge are concerned, cannot but be thought a greatfault, either of the language or person that makes use of them. What andhow various they are, will be superfluous here to take notice; the booksof rhetoric which abound in the world, will instruct those who want tobe informed: only I cannot but observe how little the preservation andimprovement of truth and knowledge is the care and concern of mankind;since the arts of fallacy are endowed and preferred. It is evident howmuch men love to deceive and be deceived, since rhetoric, that powerfulinstrument of error and deceit, has its established professors, ispublicly taught, and has always been had in great reputation: and Idoubt not but it will be thought great boldness, if not brutality, in meto have said thus much against it. Eloquence, like the fair sex, has tooprevailing beauties in it to suffer itself ever to be spoken against. And it is in vain to find fault with those arts of deceiving, whereinmen find pleasure to be deceived. 

CHAPTER XI. 

OF THE REMEDIES OF THE FOREGOING IMPERFECTIONS AND ABUSES OF WORDS. 

1. Remedies are worth seeking. 

The natural and improved imperfections of languages we have seen aboveat large: and speech being the great bond that holds society together, and the common conduit, whereby the improvements of knowledge areconveyed from one man and one generation to another, it would welldeserve our most serious thoughts to consider, what remedies are to befound for the inconveniences above mentioned. 

2. Are not easy to find. 

I am not so vain as to think that any one can pretend to attempt theperfect reforming the languages of the world, no not so much as of hisown country, without rendering himself ridiculous. To require that menshould use their words constantly in the same sense, and for none butdetermined and uniform ideas, would be to think that all men should havethe same notions, and should talk of nothing but what they have clearand distinct ideas of: which is not to be expected by any one who hathnot vanity enough to imagine he can prevail with men to be very knowingor very silent. And he must be very little skilled in the world, whothinks that a voluble tongue shall accompany only a good understanding;or that men's talking much or little should hold proportion only totheir knowledge. 

3. But yet necessary to those who search after Truth. 

But though the market and exchange must be left to their own ways oftalking, and gossipings not be robbed of their ancient privilege: thoughthe schools, and men of argument would perhaps take it amiss to haveanything offered, to abate the length or lessen the number of theirdisputes; yet methinks those who pretend seriously to search after ormaintain truth, should think themselves obliged to study how they mightdeliver themselves without obscurity, doubtfulness, or equivocation, towhich men's words are naturally liable, if care be not taken. 

4. Misuse of Words the great Cause of Errors. 

For he that shall well consider the errors and obscurity, the mistakesand confusion, that are spread in the world by an ill use of words, willfind some reason to doubt whether language, as it has been employed, hascontributed more to the improvement or hindrance of knowledge amongstmankind. How many are there, that, when they would think on things, fixtheir thoughts only on words, especially when they would apply theirminds to moral matters? And who then can wonder if the result of suchcontemplations and reasonings, about little more than sounds, whilst theideas they annex to them are very confused and very unsteady, or perhapsnone at all; who can wonder, I say, that such thoughts and reasoningsend in nothing but obscurity and mistake, without any clear judgment orknowledge?

5. Has made men more conceited and obstinate. 

This inconvenience, in an ill use of words, men suffer in their ownprivate meditations: but much more manifest are the disorders whichfollow from it, in conversation, discourse, and arguings with others. For language being the great conduit, whereby men convey theirdiscoveries, reasonings, and knowledge, from one to another, he thatmakes an ill use of it, though he does not corrupt the fountains ofknowledge, which are in things themselves, yet he does, as much as inhim lies, break or stop the pipes whereby it is distributed to thepublic use and advantage of mankind. He that uses words without anyclear and steady meaning, what does he but lead himself and others intoerrors? And he that designedly does it, ought to be looked on as anenemy to truth and knowledge. And yet who can wonder that all thesciences and parts of knowledge have been so overcharged with obscureand equivocal terms, and insignificant and doubtful expressions, capableto make the most attentive or quick-sighted very little, or not atall, the more knowing or orthodox: since subtlety, in those who makeprofession to teach or defend truth, hath passed so much for a virtue: avirtue, indeed, which, consisting for the most part in nothing but thefallacious and illusory use of obscure or deceitful terms, is only fitto make men more conceited in their ignorance, and more obstinate intheir errors. 

6. Addicted to Wrangling about sounds. 

Let us look into the books of controversy of any kind, there we shallsee that the effect of obscure, unsteady, or equivocal terms is nothingbut noise and wrangling about sounds, without convincing or betteringa man's understanding. For if the idea be not agreed on, betwixt thespeaker and hearer, for which the words stand, the argument is not aboutthings, but names. As often as such a word whose signification is notascertained betwixt them, comes in use, their understandings have noother object wherein they agree, but barely the sound; the things thatthey think on at that time, as expressed by that word, being quitedifferent. 

7. Instance, Bat and Bird. 

Whether a BAT be a BIRD or no, is not a question, Whether a bat beanother thing than indeed it is, or have other qualities than indeed ithas; for that would be extremely absurd to doubt of. But the questionis, (i) Either between those that acknowledged themselves to have butimperfect ideas of one or both of this sort of things, for which thesenames are supposed to stand. And then it is a real inquiry concerningthe NATURE of a bird or a bat, to make their yet imperfect ideas ofit more complete; by examining whether all the simple ideas to which, combined together, they both give name bird, be all to be found ina bat: but this is a question only of inquirers (not disputers) whoneither affirm nor deny, but examine: Or, (2) It is a question betweendisputants; whereof the one affirms, and the other denies that a bat isa bird. And then the question is barely about the signification of oneor both these WORDS; in that they not having both the same complex ideasto which they give these two names, one holds and the other denies, thatthese two names may be affirmed one of another. Were they agreed in thesignification of these two names, it were impossible they should disputeabout them. For they would presently and clearly see (were that adjustedbetween them, ) whether all the simple ideas of the more general namebird were found in the complex idea of a bat or no; and so there couldbe no doubt whether a bat were a bird or no. And here I desire it maybe considered, and carefully examined, whether the greatest part of thedisputes in the world are not merely verbal, and about the significationof words; and whether, if the terms they are made in were defined, andreduced in their signification (as they must be where they signifyanything) to determined collections of the simple ideas they do orshould stand for, those disputes would not end of themselves, andimmediately vanish. I leave it then to be considered, what the learningof disputation is, and how well they are employed for the advantage ofthemselves or others, whose business is only the vain ostentation ofsounds; i. E. Those who spend their lives in disputes and controversies. When I shall see any of those combatants strip all his terms ofambiguity and obscurity, (which every one may do in the words he useshimself, ) I shall think him a champion for knowledge, truth, and peace, and not the slave of vain-glory, ambition, or a party. 

8. Remedies. 

To remedy the defects of speech before mentioned to some degree, andto prevent the inconveniences that follow from them, I imagine theobservation of these following rules may be of use, till somebody betterable shall judge it worth his while to think more maturely on thismatter, and oblige the world with his thoughts on it. 

First Remedy: To use no Word without an Idea annexed to it. 

First, A man shall take care to use no word without a signification, noname without an idea for which he makes it stand. This rule willnot seem altogether needless to any one who shall take the pains torecollect how often he has met with such words as INSTINCT, SYMPATHY, and ANTIPATHY, &c. , in the discourse of others, so made use of as hemight easily conclude that those that used them had no ideas in theirminds to which they applied them, but spoke them only as sounds, whichusually served instead of reasons on the like occasions. Not but thatthese words, and the like, have very proper significations in which theymay be used; but there being no natural connexion between any words andany ideas, these, and any other, may be learned by rote, and pronouncedor writ by men who have no ideas in their minds to which they haveannexed them, and for which they make them stand; which is necessarythey should, if men would speak intelligibly even to themselves alone. 

9. Second Remedy: To have distinct, determinate Ideas annexed to Words, especially in mixed Modes. 

Secondly, It is not enough a man uses his words as signs of some ideas:those he annexes them to, if they be simple, must be clear and distinct;if complex, must be determinate, i. E. The precise collection of simpleideas settled in the mind, with that sound annexed to it, as the sign ofthat precise determined collection, and no other. This is very necessaryin names of modes, and especially moral words; which, having no settledobjects in nature, from whence their ideas are taken, as from theiroriginal, are apt to be very confused. JUSTICE is a word in every man'smouth, but most commonly with a very undetermined, loose signification;which will always be so, unless a man has in his mind a distinctcomprehension of the component parts that complex idea consists of andif it be decompounded, must be able to resolve it still only till he atlast comes to the simple ideas that make it up: and unless this be done, a man makes an ill use of the word, let it be justice, for example, orany other. I do not say, a man needs stand to recollect, and make thisanalysis at large, every time the word justice comes in his way: butthis at least is necessary, that he have so examined the significationof that name, and settled the idea of all its parts in his mind, thathe can do it when he pleases. If any one who makes his complex idea ofjustice to be, such a treatment of the person or goods of another as isaccording to law, hath not a clear and distinct idea what LAW is, whichmakes a part of his complex idea of justice, it is plain his idea ofjustice itself will be confused and imperfect. This exactness will, perhaps, be judged very troublesome; and therefore most men will thinkthey may be excused from settling the complex ideas of mixed modes soprecisely in their minds. But yet I must say, till this be done, it mustnot be wondered, that they have a great deal of obscurity and confusionin their own minds, and a great deal of wrangling in their discoursewith others. 

10. And distinct and conformable ideas in Words that stand forSubstances. 

In the names of substances, for a right use of them, something more isrequired than barely DETERMINED IDEAS. In these the names must also beCONFORMABLE TO THINGS AS THEY EXIST; but of this I shall have occasionto speak more at large by and by. This exactness is absolutely necessaryin inquiries after philosophical knowledge, and in controversies abouttruth. And though it would be well, too, if it extended itself to commonconversation and the ordinary affairs of life; yet I think that isscarce to be expected. Vulgar notions suit vulgar discourses: and both, though confused enough, yet serve pretty well the market and the wake. Merchants and lovers, cooks and tailors, have words wherewithal todispatch their ordinary affairs: and so, I think, might philosophersand disputants too, if they had a mind to understand, and to clearlyunderstood. 

11. Third Remedy: To apply Words to such ideas as common use has annexedthem to. 

Thirdly, it is not enough that men have ideas, determined ideas, forwhich they make these signs stand; but they must also take care to applytheir words as near as may be to such ideas as common use has annexedthem to. For words, especially of languages already framed, beingno man's private possession, but the common measure of commerce andcommunication, it is not for any one at pleasure to change the stampthey are current in, nor alter the ideas they are affixed to; or atleast, when there is a necessity to do so, he is bound to give noticeof it. Men's intentions in speaking are, or at least should be, to beunderstood; which cannot be without frequent explanations, demands, and other the like incommodious interruptions, where men do not followcommon use. Propriety of speech is that which gives our thoughtsentrance into other men's minds with the greatest ease and advantage:and therefore deserves some part of our care and study, especially inthe names of moral words. The proper signification and use of termsis best to be learned from those who in their writings and discoursesappear to have had the clearest notions, and applied to them their termswith the exactest choice and fitness. This way of using a man's words, according to the propriety of the language, though it have not alwaysthe good fortune to be understood; yet most commonly leaves the blameof it on him who is so unskilful in the language he speaks, as not tounderstand it when made use of as it ought to be. 

12. Fourth Remedy: To declare the meaning in which we use them. 

Fourthly, But, because common use has not so visibly annexed anysignification to words, as to make men know always certainly what theyprecisely stand for: and because men, in the improvement of theirknowledge, come to have ideas different from the vulgar and ordinaryreceived ones, for which they must either make new words, (which menseldom venture to do, for fear of being thought guilty of affectation ornovelty, ) or else must use old ones in a new signification: therefore, after the observation of the foregoing rules, it is sometimes necessary, for the ascertaining the signification of words, to DECLARE THEIRMEANING; where either common use has left it uncertain and loose, (as ithas in most names of very complex ideas;) or where the term, being verymaterial in the discourse, and that upon which it chiefly turns, isliable to any doubtfulness or mistake. 

13. And that in three Ways. 

As the ideas men's words stand for are of different sorts, so the way ofmaking known the ideas they stand for, when there is occasion, is alsodifferent. For though DEFINING be thought the proper way to make knownthe proper signification of words; yet there are some words that willnot be defined, as there are others whose precise meaning cannot be madeknown but by definition: and perhaps a third, which partake somewhat ofboth the other, as we shall see in the names of simple ideas, modes, andsubstances. 

14. In Simple Ideas, either by synonymous terms, or by showing examples. 

I. First, when a man makes use of the name of any simple idea, whichhe perceives is not understood, or is in danger to be mistaken, he isobliged, by the laws of ingenuity and the end of speech, to declare hismeaning, and make known what idea he makes it stand for. This, ashas been shown, cannot be done by definition: and therefore, when asynonymous word fails to do it, there is but one of these ways left. First, Sometimes the NAMING the subject wherein that simple idea isto be found, will make its name to be understood by those who areacquainted with that subject, and know it by that name. So to make acountryman understand what FEUILLEMORTE colour signifies, it may sufficeto tell him, it is the colour of withered leaves falling in autumn. Secondly, but the only sure way of making known the signification of thename of any simple idea, is BY PRESENTING TO HIS SENSES THAT SUBJECTWHICH MAY PRODUCE IT IN HIS MIND, and make him actually have the ideathat word stands for. 

15. In mixed Modes, by Definition. 

II. Secondly, Mixed modes, especially those belonging to morality, beingmost of them such combinations of ideas as the mind puts together of itsown choice, and whereof there are not always standing patterns to befound existing, the signification of their names cannot be made known, as those of simple ideas, by any showing: but, in recompense thereof, may be perfectly and exactly defined. For they being combinations ofseveral ideas that the mind of man has arbitrarily put together, withoutreference to any archetypes, men may, if they please, exactly know theideas that go to each composition, and so both use these words in acertain and undoubted signification, and perfectly declare, when thereis occasion, what they stand for. This, if well considered, would laygreat blame on those who make not their discourses about MORAL thingsvery clear and distinct. For since the precise signification of thenames of mixed modes, or, which is all one, the real essence of eachspecies is to be known, they being not of nature's, but man's making, itis a great negligence and perverseness to discourse of moral thingswith uncertainty and obscurity; which is more pardonable in treating ofnatural substances, where doubtful terms are hardly to be avoided, for aquite contrary reason, as we shall see by and by. 

16. Morality capable of Demonstration. 

Upon this ground it is that I am bold to think that morality is capableof demonstration, as well as mathematics: since the precise real essenceof the things moral words stand for may be perfectly known, and sothe congruity and incongruity of the things themselves be certainlydiscovered; in which consists perfect knowledge. Nor let any one object, that the names of substances are often to be made use of in morality, as well as those of modes, from which will arise obscurity. For, as tosubstances, when concerned in moral discourses, their divers naturesare not so much inquired into as supposed: v. G. When we say that manis subject to law, we mean nothing by man but a corporeal rationalcreature: what the real essence or other qualities of that creature arein this case is no way considered. And, therefore, whether a child orchangeling be a man, in a physical sense, may amongst the naturalists beas disputable as it will, it concerns not at all the moral man, as Imay call him, which is this immovable, unchangeable idea, a corporealrational being. For, were there a monkey, or any other creature, to befound that had the use of reason to such a degree, as to be able tounderstand general signs, and to deduce consequences about generalideas, he would no doubt be subject to law, and in that sense be a MAN, how much soever he differed in shape from others of that name. The namesof substances, if they be used in them as they should, can no moredisturb moral than they do mathematical discourses; where, if themathematician speaks of a cube or globe of gold, or of any other body, he has his clear, settled idea, which varies not, though it may bymistake be applied to a particular body to which it belongs not. 

17. Definitions can make moral Discourse clear. 

This I have here mentioned, by the by, to show of what consequence it isfor men, in their names of mixed modes, and consequently in all theirmoral discourses, to define their words when there is occasion: sincethereby moral knowledge may be brought to so great clearness andcertainty. And it must be great want of ingenuousness (to say no worseof it) to refuse to do it: since a definition is the only way wherebythe precise meaning of moral words can be known; and yet a way wherebytheir meaning may be known certainly, and without leaving any room forany contest about it. And therefore the negligence or perverseness ofmankind cannot be excused, if their discourses in morality be not muchmore clear than those in natural philosophy: since they are about ideasin the mind, which are none of them false or disproportionate; theyhaving no external beings for the archetypes which they are referred toand must correspond with. It is far easier for men to frame in theirminds an idea, which shall be the standard to which they will give thename justice; with which pattern so made, all actions that agree shallpass under that denomination, than, having seen Aristides, to frame anidea that shall in all things be exactly like him; who is as he is, letmen make what idea they please of him. For the one, they need but knowthe combination of ideas that are put together in their own minds; forthe other, they must inquire into the whole nature, and abstruse hiddenconstitution, and various qualities of a thing existing without them. 

18. And is the only way in which the meaning of mixed Modes can be madeknown. 

Another reason that makes the defining of mixed modes so necessary, especially of moral words, is what I mentioned a little before, viz. That it is the only way whereby the signification of the most of themcan be known with certainty. For the ideas they stand for, being forthe most part such whose component parts nowhere exist together, butscattered and mingled with others, it is the mind alone that collectsthem, and gives them the union of one idea: and it is only by wordsenumerating the several simple ideas which the mind has united, that wecan make known to others what their names stand for; the assistance ofthe senses in this case not helping us, by the proposal of sensibleobjects, to show the ideas which our names of this kind stand for, asit does often in the names of sensible simple ideas, and also to somedegree in those of substances. 

19. In Substances, both by showing and by defining. 

III. Thirdly, for the explaining the signification of the names ofsubstances, as they stand for the ideas we have of their distinctspecies, both the forementioned ways, viz. Of showing and defining, arerequisite, in many cases, to be made use of. For, there being ordinarilyin each sort some leading qualities, to which we suppose the other ideaswhich make up our complex idea of that species annexed, we forwardlygive the specific name to that thing wherein that characteristic mark isfound, which we take to be the most distinguishing idea of that species. These leading or characteristical (as I may call them) ideas, in thesorts of animals and vegetables, are (as has been before remarked, ch vi. Section 29 and ch. Ix. Section 15) mostly figure; and in inanimatebodies, colour; and in some, both together. Now, 20. Ideas of the leading Qualities of Substances are best got byshowing. 

These leading sensible qualities are those which make the chiefingredients of our specific ideas, and consequently the most observableand invariable part in the definitions of our specific names, asattributed to sorts of substances coming under our knowledge. For thoughthe sound MAN, in its own nature, be as apt to signify a complex ideamade up of animality and rationality, united in the same subject, as tosignify any other combination; yet, used as a mark to stand for a sortof creatures we count of our own kind, perhaps the outward shape is asnecessary to be taken into our complex idea, signified by the word man, as any other we find in it: and therefore, why Plato's ANIMAL IMPLUMEBIPES LATIS UNGUIBUS should not be a good definition of the name man, standing for that sort of creatures, will not be easy to show: for itis the shape, as the leading quality, that seems more to determine thatspecies, than a faculty of reasoning, which appears not at first, and insome never. And if this be not allowed to be so, I do not know how theycan be excused from murder who kill monstrous births, (as we call them, )because of an unordinary shape, without knowing whether they have arational soul or no; which can be no more discerned in a well-formedthan ill-shaped infant, as soon as born. And who is it has informed usthat a rational soul can inhabit no tenement, unless it has just such asort of frontispiece; or can join itself to, and inform no sort of body, but one that is just of such an outward structure?

21. And can hardly be made known otherwise. 

Now these leading qualities are best made known by showing, and canhardly be made known otherwise. For the shape of a horse or cassowarywill be but rudely and imperfectly imprinted on the mind by words; thesight of the animals doth it a thousand times better. And the idea ofthe particular colour of gold is not to be got by any description of it, but only by the frequent exercise of the eyes about as is evident inthose who are used to this metal, who frequently distinguish true fromcounterfeit, pure from adulterate, by the sight, where others (who haveas good eyes, but yet by use have not got the precise nice idea of thatpeculiar yellow) shall not perceive any difference. The like may be saidof those other simple ideas, peculiar in their kind to any substance;for which precise ideas there are no peculiar names. The particularringing sound there is in gold, distinct from the sound of other bodies, has no particular name annexed to it, no more than the particular yellowthat belongs to that metal. 

22. The Ideas of the Powers of Substances are best known by Definition. 

But because many of the simple ideas that make up our specific ideas ofsubstances are powers which lie not obvious to our senses in the thingsas they ordinarily appear; therefore, in the signification of our namesof substances, some part of the signification will be better made knownby enumerating those simple ideas, than by showing the substance itself. For, he that to the yellow shining colour of gold, got by sight, shall, from my enumerating them, have the ideas of great ductility, fusibility, fixedness, and solubility, in aqua regia, will have a perfecter idea ofgold than he can have by seeing a piece of gold, and thereby imprintingin his mind only its obvious qualities. But if the formal constitutionof this shining, heavy, ductile thing, (from whence all these itsproperties flow, ) lay open to our senses, as the formal constitution oressence of a triangle does, the signification of the word gold might aseasily be ascertained as that of triangle. 

23. A Reflection on the Knowledge of corporeal things possessed bySpirits separate from bodies. 

Hence we may take notice, how much the foundation of all our knowledgeof corporeal things lies in our senses. For how spirits, separate frombodies, (whose knowledge and ideas of these things are certainly muchmore perfect than ours, ) know them, we have no notion, no idea at all. The whole extent of our knowledge or imagination reaches not beyond ourown ideas limited to our ways of perception. Though yet it be not to bedoubted that spirits of a higher rank than those immersed in flesh mayhave as clear ideas of the radical constitution of substances as we haveof a triangle, and so perceive how all their properties and operationsflow from thence: but the manner how they come by that knowledge exceedsour conceptions. 

24. Ideas of Substances must also be conformable to Things. 

Fourthly, But, though definitions will serve to explain the names ofsubstances as they stand for our ideas, yet they leave them not withoutgreat imperfection as they stand for things. For our names of substancesbeing not put barely for our ideas, but being made use of ultimately torepresent things, and so are put in their place, their significationmust agree with the truth of things as well as with men's ideas. Andtherefore, in substances, we are not always to rest in the ordinarycomplex idea commonly received as the signification of that word, butmust go a little further, and inquire into the nature and properties ofthe things themselves, and thereby perfect, as much as we can, our ideasof their distinct species; or else learn them from such as are usedto that sort of things, and are experienced in them. For, since it isintended their names should stand for such collections of simple ideasas do really exist in things themselves, as well as for the complex ideain other men's minds, which in their ordinary acceptation they standfor, therefore, to define their names right, natural history is to beinquired into, and their properties are, with care and examination, tobe found out. For it is not enough, for the avoiding inconveniences indiscourse and arguings about natural bodies and substantial things, to have learned, from the propriety of the language, the common, butconfused, or very imperfect, idea to which each word is applied, and tokeep them to that idea in our use of them; but we must, by acquaintingourselves with the history of that sort of things, rectify and settleour complex idea belonging to each specific name; and in discourse withothers, (if we find them mistake us, ) we ought to tell what the complexidea is that we make such a name stand for. This is the more necessaryto be done by all those who search after knowledge and philosophicalverity, in that children, being taught words, whilst they have butimperfect notions of things, apply them at random, and without muchthinking, and seldom frame determined ideas to be signified by them. Which custom (it being easy, and serving well enough for the ordinaryaffairs of life and conversation) they are apt to continue when they aremen: and so begin at the wrong end, learning words first and perfectly, but make the notions to which they apply those words afterwards veryovertly. By this means it comes to pass, that men speaking the languageof their country, i. E. According to grammar rules of that language, doyet speak very improperly of things themselves; and, by their arguingone with another, make but small progress in the discoveries of usefultruths, and the knowledge of things, as they are to be found inthemselves, and not in our imaginations; and it matters not much for theimprovement of our knowledge how they are called. 

25. Not easy to be made so. 

It were therefore to be wished, That men versed in physical inquiries, and acquainted with the several sorts of natural bodies, would set downthose simple ideas wherein they observe the individuals of each sortconstantly to agree. This would remedy a great deal of that confusionwhich comes from several persons applying the same name to a collectionof a smaller or greater number of sensible qualities, proportionably asthey have been more or less acquainted with, or accurate in examining, the qualities of any sort of things which come under one denomination. But a dictionary of this sort, containing, as it were, a naturalhistory, requires too many hands as well as too much time, cost, pains, and sagacity ever to be hoped for; and till that be done, we mustcontent ourselves with such definitions of the names of substances asexplain the sense men use them in. And it would be well, where there isoccasion, if they would afford us so much. This yet is not usually done;but men talk to one another, and dispute in words, whose meaning is notagreed between them, out of a mistake that the significations of commonwords are certainly established, and the precise ideas they stand forperfectly known; and that it is a shame to be ignorant of them. Bothwhich suppositions are false, no names of complex ideas having sosettled determined significations, that they are constantly used forthe same precise ideas. Nor is it a shame for a man to have a certainknowledge of anything, but by the necessary ways of attaining it; and soit is no discredit not to know what precise idea any sound stands for inanother man's mind, without he declare it to me by some other way thanbarely using that sound, there being no other way, without such adeclaration, certainly to know it. Indeed the necessity of communicationby language brings men to an agreement in the signification of commonwords, within some tolerable latitude, that may serve for ordinaryconversation: and so a man cannot be supposed wholly ignorant of theideas which are annexed to words by common use, in a language familiarto him. But common use being but a very uncertain rule, which reducesitself at last to the ideas of particular men, proves often but avery variable standard. But though such a Dictionary as I have abovementioned will require too much time, cost, and pains to be hoped forin this age; yet methinks it is not unreasonable to propose, that wordsstanding for things which are known and distinguished by their outwardshapes should be expressed by little draughts and prints made of them. Avocabulary made after this fashion would perhaps with more ease, and inless time, teach the true signification of many terms, especially inlanguages of remote countries or ages, and settle truer ideas in men'sminds of several things, whereof we read the names in ancient authors, than all the large and laborious comments of learned critics. Naturalists, that treat of plants and animals, have found the benefit ofthis way: and he that has had occasion to consult them will have reasonto confess that he has a clearer idea of APIUM or IBEX, from a littleprint of that herb or beast, than he could have from a long definitionof the names of either of them. And so no doubt he would have of STRIGILand SISTRUM, if, instead of CURRYCOMB and CYMBAL, (which are the Englishnames dictionaries render them by, ) he could see stamped in the marginsmall pictures of these instruments, as they were in use amongst theancients. TOGA, TUNICA, PALLIUM, are words easily translated by GOWN, COAT, and CLOAK; but we have thereby no more true ideas of the fashionof those habits amongst the Romans, than we have of the faces of thetailors who made them. Such things as these, which the eye distinguishesby their shapes, would be best let into the mind by draughts made ofthem, and more determine the signification of such words, than any otherwords set for them, or made use of to define them. But this is only bythe bye. 

26. V. Fifth Remedy: To use the same word constantly in the same sense. 

Fifthly, If men will not be at the pains to declare the meaning of theirwords, and definitions of their terms are not to be had, yet this isthe least that can be expected, that, in all discourses wherein one manpretends to instruct or convince another, he should use the same wordconstantly in the same sense. If this were done, (which nobody canrefuse without great disingenuity, ) many of the books extant might bespared; many of the controversies in dispute would be at an end; severalof those great volumes, swollen with ambiguous words, now used inone sense, and by and by in another, would shrink into a very narrowcompass; and many of the philosophers (to mention no other) as well aspoets works, might be contained in a nutshell. 

27. When not so used, the Variation is to be explained. 

But after all, the provision of words is so scanty in respect to thatinfinite variety of thoughts, that men, wanting terms to suit theirprecise notions, will, notwithstanding their utmost caution, be forcedoften to use the same word in somewhat different senses. And though inthe continuation of a discourse, or the pursuit of an argument, therecan be hardly room to digress into a particular definition, as oftenas a man varies the signification of any term; yet the import of thediscourse will, for the most part, if there be no designed fallacy, sufficiently lead candid and intelligent readers into the true meaningof it; but where there is not sufficient to guide the reader, there itconcerns the writer to explain his meaning, and show in what sense hethere uses that term. 

BOOK IV

OF KNOWLEDGE AND PROBABILITY SYNOPSIS OF THE FOURTH BOOK. 

Locke's review of the different sorts of ideas, or appearances of whatexists, that can be entertained in a human understanding, and of theirrelations to words, leads, in the Fourth Book, to an investigation ofthe extent and validity of the Knowledge that our ideas bring within ourreach; and into the nature of faith in Probability, by which assent isextended beyond Knowledge, for the conduct of life. He finds (ch. I, ii)that Knowledge is either an intuitive, a demonstrative, or a sensuousperception of absolute certainty, in regard to one or other of foursorts of agreement or disagreement on the part of ideas:--(1) of eachidea with itself, as identical, and different from every other; (2) intheir abstract relations to one another; (3) in their necessaryconnexions, as qualities and powers coexisting in concrete substances;and (4) as revelations to us of the final realities of existence. Theunconditional certainty that constitutes Knowledge is perceptible by manonly in regard to the first, second, and fourth of these four sorts: inall general propositions only in regard to the first and second; that isto say, in identical propositions, and in those which express abstractrelations of simple or mixed modes, in which nominal and real essencescoincide, e. G. Propositions in pure mathematics and abstract morality(chh. Iii, v-viii). The fourth sort, which express certainty as torealities of existence, refer to any of three realities. For every manis able to perceive with absolute certainty that he himself exists, thatGod must exist, and that finite beings other than himself exist;--thefirst of these perceptions being awakened by all our ideas, the secondas the consequence of perception of the first, and the last in thereception of our simple ideas of sense (chh. I. Section 7; ii. Section14; iii. Section 21; iv, ix-xi). Agreement of the third sort, ofnecessary coexistence of simple ideas as qualities and powers inparticular substances, with which all physical inquiry is concerned, lies beyond human Knowledge; for here the nominal and real essences arenot coincident: general propositions of this sort are determined byanalogies of experience, in judgments that are more or less probable:intellectually necessary science of nature presupposes Omniscience;man's interpretations of nature have to turn upon presumptions ofProbability (chh. Iii. Sections 9-17; iv. SectionS 11-17; vi, xiv-xvi). In forming their stock of Certainties and Probabilities men employ thefaculty of reason, faith in divine revelation, and enthusiasm (chh. Xvii-xix); much misled by the last, as well as by other causes of 'wrongassent' (ch. Xx), when they are at work in 'the three great provinces ofthe intellectual world' (ch. Xxi), concerned respectively with (1)'things as knowable' (physica); (2) 'actions as they depend on us inorder to happiness' (practica); and (3) methods for interpreting thesigns of what is, and of what ought to be, that are presented in ourideas and words (logica). 

CHAPTER I. 

OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL. 

1. Our Knowledge conversant about our Ideas only. 

Since the mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings, hath no otherimmediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does or cancontemplate, it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant aboutthem. 

2. Knowledge is the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of twoIdeas. 

KNOWLEDGE then seems to me to be nothing but THE PERCEPTION OF THECONNEXION OF AND AGREEMENT, OR DISAGREEMENT AND REPUGNANCY OF ANY OF OURIDEAS. In this alone it consists. 

Where this perception is, there is knowledge, and where it is not, there, though we may fancy, guess, or believe, yet we always come shortof knowledge. For when we know that white is not black, what do weelse but perceive, that these two ideas do not agree? When we possessourselves with the utmost security of the demonstration, that the threeangles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, what do we more butperceive, that equality to two right ones does necessarily agree to, andis inseparable from, the three angles of a triangle?

3. This Agreement or Disagreement may be any of four sorts. 

But to understand a little more distinctly wherein this agreement ordisagreement consists, I think we may reduce it all to these four sorts:

I. IDENTITY, or DIVERSITY. II. RELATION. III. CO-EXISTENCE, or NECESSARYCONNEXION. IV. REAL EXISTENCE. 

4. First, Of Identity, or Diversity in ideas. 

FIRST, As to the first sort of agreement or disagreement, viz. IDENTITYor DIVERSITY. It is the first act of the mind, when it has anysentiments or ideas at all, to perceive its ideas; and so far as itperceives them, to know each what it is, and thereby also to perceivetheir difference, and that one is not another. This is so absolutelynecessary, that without it there could be no knowledge, no reasoning, noimagination, no distinct thoughts at all. By this the mind clearly andinfallibly perceives each idea to agree with itself, and to be what itis; and all distinct ideas to disagree, i. E. The one not to be theother: and this it does without pains, labour, or deduction; but atfirst view, by its natural power of perception and distinction. Andthough men of art have reduced this into those general rules, WHAT IS, IS, and IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SAME THING TO BE AND NOT TO BE, forready application in all cases, wherein there may be occasion to reflecton it: yet it is certain that the first exercise of this faculty isabout particular ideas. A man infallibly knows, as soon as ever he hasthem in his mind, that the ideas he calls WHITE and ROUND are the veryideas they are; and that they are not other ideas which he calls RED orSQUARE. Nor can any maxim or proposition in the world make him know itclearer or surer than he did before, and without any such generalrule. This then is the first agreement or disagreement which the mindperceives in its ideas; which it always perceives at first sight: andif there ever happen any doubt about it, it will always be found tobe about the names, and not the ideas themselves, whose identity anddiversity will always be perceived, as soon and clearly as the ideasthemselves are; nor can it possibly be otherwise. 

5. Secondly, Of abstract Relations between ideas. 

SECONDLY, the next sort of agreement or disagreement the mind perceivesin any of its ideas may, I think, be called RELATIVE, and is nothingbut the perception of the RELATION between any two ideas, of what kindsoever, whether substances, modes, or any other. For, since all distinctideas must eternally be known not to be the same, and so be universallyand constantly denied one of another, there could be no room for anypositive knowledge at all, if we could not perceive any relation betweenour ideas, and find out the agreement or disagreement they have one withanother, in several ways the mind takes of comparing them. 

6. Thirdly, Of their necessary Co-existence in Substances. 

THIRDLY, The third sort of agreement or disagreement to be found inour ideas, which the perception of the mind is employed about, isCO-EXISTENCE or NON-CO-EXISTENCE in the SAME SUBJECT; and this belongsparticularly to substances. Thus when we pronounce concerning gold, thatit is fixed, our knowledge of this truth amounts to no more but this, that fixedness, or a power to remain in the fire unconsumed, is an ideathat always accompanies and is joined with that particular sort ofyellowness, weight, fusibility, malleableness, and solubility in AQUAREGIA, which make our complex idea signified by the word gold. 

7. Fourthly, Of real Existence agreeing to any idea. 

FOURTHLY, The fourth and last sort is that of ACTUAL REAL EXISTENCEagreeing to any idea. 

Within these four sorts of agreement or disagreement is, I suppose, contained all the knowledge we have, or are capable of. For all theinquiries we can make concerning any of our ideas, all that we know orcan affirm concerning any of them, is, That it is, or is not, the samewith some other; that it does or does not always co-exist with someother idea in the same subject; that it has this or that relation withsome other idea; or that it has a real existence without the mind. Thus, 'blue is not yellow, ' is of identity. 'Two triangles upon equal basesbetween two parallels are equal, ' is of relation. 'Iron is susceptibleof magnetical impressions, ' is of co-existence. 'God is, ' is of realexistence. Though identity and co-existence are truly nothing butrelations, yet they are such peculiar ways of agreement or disagreementof our ideas, that they deserve well to be considered as distinct heads, and not under relation in general; since they are so different groundsof affirmation and negation, as will easily appear to any one, who willbut reflect on what is said in several places of this ESSAY. 

I should now proceed to examine the several degrees of our knowledge, but that it is necessary first, to consider the different acceptationsof the word KNOWLEDGE. 

8. Knowledge is either actual or habitual. 

There are several ways wherein the mind is possessed of truth; each ofwhich is called knowledge. 

I. There is ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE, which is the present view the mind has ofthe agreement or disagreement of any of its ideas, or of the relationthey have one to another. 

II. A man is said to know any proposition, which having been oncelaid before his thoughts, he evidently perceived the agreement ordisagreement of the ideas whereof it consists; and so lodged it in hismemory, that whenever that proposition comes again to be reflected on, he, without doubt or hesitation, embraces the right side, assents to, and is certain of the truth of it. This, I think, one may call HABITUALKNOWLEDGE. And thus a man may be said to know all those truths which arelodged in his memory, by a foregoing clear and full perception, whereofthe mind is assured past doubt as often as it has occasion to reflecton them. For our finite understandings being able to think clearly anddistinctly but on one thing at once, if men had no knowledge of any morethan what they actually thought on, they would all be very ignorant: andhe that knew most, would know but one truth, that being all he was ableto think on at one time. 

9. Habitual Knowledge is of two degrees. 

Of habitual knowledge there are, also, vulgarly speaking, two degrees:

First, The one is of such truths laid up in the memory as, whenever theyoccur to the mind, it ACTUALLY PERCEIVES THE RELATION is between thoseideas. And this is in all those truths whereof we have an intuitiveknowledge; where the ideas themselves, by an immediate view, discovertheir agreement or disagreement one with another. 

Secondly, The other is of such truths whereof the mind having beenconvinced, it RETAINS THE MEMORY OF THE CONVICTION, WITHOUT THE PROOFS. Thus, a man that remembers certainly that he once perceived thedemonstration, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to tworight ones, is certain that he knows it, because he cannot doubt thetruth of it. In his adherence to a truth, where the demonstration bywhich it was at first known is forgot, though a man may be thoughtrather to believe his memory than really to know, and this way ofentertaining a truth seemed formerly to me like something betweenopinion and knowledge; a sort of assurance which exceeds bare belief, for that relies on the testimony of another;--yet upon a due examinationI find it comes not short of perfect certainty, and is in effect trueknowledge. That which is apt to mislead our first thoughts into amistake in this matter is, that the agreement or disagreement of theideas in this case is not perceived, as it was at first, by an actualview of all the intermediate ideas whereby the agreement or disagreementof those in the proposition was at first perceived; but by otherintermediate ideas, that show the agreement or disagreement of the ideascontained in the proposition whose certainty we remember. For example:in this proposition, that 'the three angles of a triangle are equalto two right ones, ' one who has seen and clearly perceived thedemonstration of this truth knows it to be true, when that demonstrationis gone out of his mind; so that at present it is not actually in view, and possibly cannot be recollected: but he knows it in a different wayfrom what he did before. The agreement of the two ideas joined in thatproposition is perceived; but it is by the intervention of other ideasthan those which at first produced that perception. He remembers, i. E. He knows (for remembrance is but the reviving of some past knowledge)that he was once certain of the truth of this proposition, that thethree angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones. The immutabilityof the same relations between the same immutable things is now the ideathat shows him, that if the three angles of a triangle were once equalto two right ones, they will always be equal to two right ones. Andhence he comes to be certain, that what was once true in the case, isalways true; what ideas once agreed will always agree; and consequentlywhat he once knew to be true, he will always know to be true; as longas he can remember that he once knew it. Upon this ground it is, thatparticular demonstrations in mathematics afford general knowledge. Ifthen the perception, that the same ideas will ETERNALLY have the samehabitudes and relations, be not a sufficient ground of knowledge, therecould be no knowledge of general propositions in mathematics; for nomathematical demonstration would be any other than particular: andwhen a man had demonstrated any proposition concerning one triangle orcircle, his knowledge would not reach beyond that particular diagram. Ifhe would extend it further, he must renew his demonstration in anotherinstance, before he could know it to be true in another like triangle, and so on: by which means one could never come to the knowledge ofany general propositions. Nobody, I think, can deny, that Mr. Newtoncertainly knows any proposition that he now at any time reads in hisbook to be true; though he has not in actual view that admirable chainof intermediate ideas whereby he at first discovered it to be true. Sucha memory as that, able to retain such a train of particulars, maybe well thought beyond the reach of human faculties, when the verydiscovery, perception, and laying together that wonderful connexion ofideas, is found to surpass most readers' comprehension. But yet it isevident the author himself knows the proposition to be true, rememberinghe once saw the connexion of those ideas; as certainly as he knows sucha man wounded another, remembering that he saw him run him through. Butbecause the memory is not always so clear as actual perception, and doesin all men more or less decay in length of time, this, amongst otherdifferences, is one which shows that DEMONSTRATIVE knowledge is muchmore imperfect than INTUITIVE, as we shall see in the following chapter. 

CHAPTER II. 

OF THE DEGREES OF OUR KNOWLEDGE. 

1. Of the degrees, or differences in clearness, of our Knowledge:I. Intuitive

All our knowledge consisting, as I have said, in the view the mind hasof its own ideas, which is the utmost light and greatest certainty we, with our faculties, and in our way of knowledge, are capable of, itmay not be amiss to consider a little the degrees of its evidence. Thedifferent clearness of our knowledge seems to me to lie in the differentway of perception the mind has of the agreement or disagreement of anyof its ideas. For if we will reflect on our own ways of thinking, we will find, that sometimes the mind perceives the agreement ordisagreement of two ideas IMMEDIATELY BY THEMSELVES, without theintervention of any other: and this I think we may call INTUITIVEKNOWLEDGE. For in this the mind is at no pains of proving or examining, but perceives the truth as the eye doth light, only by being directedtowards it. Thus the mind perceives that WHITE is not BLACK, that aCIRCLE is not a TRIANGLE, that THREE are more than TWO and equal to ONEAND TWO. Such kinds of truths the mind perceives at the first sight ofthe ideas together, by bare intuition; without the intervention of anyother idea: and this kind of knowledge is the clearest and mostcertain that human frailty is capable of. This part of knowledge isirresistible, and, like bright sunshine, forces itself immediately to beperceived, as soon as ever the mind turns its view that way; and leavesno room for hesitation, doubt, or examination, but the mind is presentlyfilled with the clear light of it. IT IS ON THIS INTUITION THAT DEPENDSALL THE CERTAINTY AND EVIDENCE OF ALL OUR KNOWLEDGE; which certaintyevery one finds to be so great, that he cannot imagine, and thereforenot require a greater: for a man cannot conceive himself capable of agreater certainty than to know that any idea in his mind is such ashe perceives it to be; and that two ideas, wherein he perceives adifference, are different and not precisely the same. He that demands agreater certainty than this, demands he knows not what, and showsonly that he has a mind to be a sceptic, without being able to be so. Certainty depends so wholly on this intuition, that, in the next degreeof knowledge which I call demonstrative, this intuition is necessary inall the connexions of the intermediate ideas, without which we cannotattain knowledge and certainty. 

2. II. Demonstrative. 

The next degree of knowledge is, where the mind perceives the agreementor disagreement of any ideas, but not immediately. Though wherever themind perceives the agreement or disagreement of any of its ideas, therebe certain knowledge; yet it does not always happen, that the mind seesthat agreement or disagreement, which there is between them, even whereit is discoverable; and in that case remains in ignorance, and at mostgets no further than a probable conjecture. The reason why the mindcannot always perceive presently the agreement or disagreement oftwo ideas, is, because those ideas, concerning whose agreement ordisagreement the inquiry is made, cannot by the mind be so put togetheras to show it. In this case then, when the mind cannot so bring itsideas together as by their immediate comparison, and as it werejuxta-position or application one to another, to perceive theiragreement or disagreement, it is fain, BY THE INTERVENTION OF OTHERIDEAS, (one or more, as it happens) to discover the agreement ordisagreement which it searches; and this is that which we callREASONING. Thus, the mind being willing to know the agreement ordisagreement in bigness between the three angles of a triangle andtwo right ones, cannot by an immediate view and comparing them do it:because the three angles of a triangle cannot be brought at once, and becompared with any other one, or two, angles; and so of this the mind hasno immediate, no intuitive knowledge. In this case the mind is fain tofind out some other angles, to which the three angles of a triangle havean equality; and, finding those equal to two right ones, comes to knowtheir equality to two right ones. 

3. Demonstration depends on clearly perceived proofs. 

Those intervening ideas, which serve to show the agreement of any twoothers, are called PROOFS; and where the agreement and disagreement isby this means plainly and clearly perceived, it is called DEMONSTRATION;it being SHOWN to the understanding, and the mind made to see that it isso. A quickness in the mind to find out these intermediate ideas, (thatshall discover the agreement or disagreement of any other, ) and to applythem right, is, I suppose, that which is called SAGACITY. 

4. As certain, but not so easy and ready as Intuitive Knowledge. 

This knowledge, by intervening proofs, though it be certain, yet theevidence of it is not altogether so clear and bright, nor the assent soready, as in intuitive knowledge. For, though in demonstration the minddoes at last perceive the agreement or disagreement of the ideas itconsiders; yet it is not without pains and attention: there must be morethan one transient view to find it. A steady application and pursuit arerequired to this discovery: and there must be a progression by steps anddegrees, before the mind can in this way arrive at certainty, and cometo perceive the agreement or repugnancy between two ideas that needproofs and the use of reason to show it. 

5. The demonstrated conclusion not without Doubt, precedent to thedemonstration. 

Another difference between intuitive and demonstrative knowledgeis, that, though in the latter all doubt be removed when, by theintervention of the intermediate ideas, the agreement or disagreementis perceived, yet before the demonstration there was a doubt; which inintuitive knowledge cannot happen to the mind that has its faculty ofperception left to a degree capable of distinct ideas; no more than itcan be a doubt to the eye (that can distinctly see white and black), Whether this ink and this paper be all of a colour. If there be sight inthe eyes, it will, at first glimpse, without hesitation, perceive thewords printed on this paper different from the colour of the paper: andso if the mind have the faculty of distinct perception, it will perceivethe agreement or disagreement of those ideas that produce intuitiveknowledge. If the eyes have lost the faculty of seeing, or the mind ofperceiving, we in vain inquire after the quickness of sight in one, orclearness of perception in the other. 

6. Not so clear as Intuitive Knowledge. 

It is true, the perception produced by demonstration is also very clear;yet it is often with a great abatement of that evident lustre and fullassurance that always accompany that which I call intuitive: like aface reflected by several mirrors one to another, where, as long as itretains the similitude and agreement with the object, it produces aknowledge; but it is still, in every successive reflection, with alessening of that perfect clearness and distinctness which is in thefirst; till at last, after many removes, it has a great mixture ofdimness, and is not at first sight so knowable, especially to weak eyes. Thus it is with knowledge made out by a long train of proof. 

7. Each Step in Demonstrated Knowledge must have Intuitive Evidence. 

Now, in every step reason makes in demonstrative knowledge, there is anintuitive knowledge of that agreement or disagreement it seeks with thenext intermediate idea which it uses as a proof: for if it were notso, that yet would need a proof; since without the perception of suchagreement or disagreement, there is no knowledge produced: if itbe perceived by itself, it is intuitive knowledge: if it cannot beperceived by itself, there is need of some intervening idea, as a commonmeasure, to show their agreement or disagreement. By which it is plain, that every step in reasoning that produces knowledge, has intuitivecertainty; which when the mind perceives, there is no more requiredbut to remember it, to make the agreement or disagreement of the ideasconcerning which we inquire visible and certain. So that to makeanything a demonstration, it is necessary to perceive the immediateagreement of the intervening ideas, whereby the agreement ordisagreement of the two ideas under examination (whereof the one isalways the first, and the other the last in the account) is found. This intuitive perception of the agreement or disagreement of theintermediate ideas, in each step and progression of the demonstration, must also be carried exactly in the mind, and a man must be sure that nopart is left out: which, because in long deductions, and the use ofmany proofs, the memory does not always so readily and exactly retain;therefore it comes to pass, that this is more imperfect than intuitiveknowledge, and men embrace often falsehood for demonstrations. 

8. Hence the Mistake, ex praecognitis, et praeconcessis. 

The necessity of this intuitive knowledge, in each step of scientificalor demonstrative reasoning, gave occasion, I imagine, to that mistakenaxiom, That all reasoning was EX PRAECOGNITIS ET PRAECONCESSIS: which, how far it is a mistake, I shall have occasion to show more atlarge, when I come to consider propositions, and particularly thosepropositions which are called maxims, and to show that it is by amistake that they are supposed to be the foundations of all ourknowledge and reasonings. 

9. Demonstration not limited to ideas of mathematical Quantity. 

[It has been generally taken for granted, that mathematics alone arecapable of demonstrative certainty: but to have such an agreement ordisagreement as may intuitively be perceived, being, as I imagine, notthe privilege of the ideas of number, extension, and figure alone, itmay possibly be the want of due method and application in us, and not ofsufficient evidence in things, that demonstration has been thought tohave so little to do in other parts of knowledge, and been scarce somuch as aimed at by any but mathematicians. ] For whatever ideas we havewherein the mind can perceive the immediate agreement or disagreementthat is between them, there the mind is capable of intuitive knowledge;and where it can perceive the agreement or disagreement of any twoideas, by an intuitive perception of the agreement or disagreementthey have with any intermediate ideas, there the mind is capable ofdemonstration: which is not limited to ideas of extension, figure, number, and their modes. 

10. Why it has been thought to be so limited. 

The reason why it has been generally sought for, and supposed to be onlyin those, I imagine has been, not only the general usefulness of thosesciences; but because, in comparing their equality or excess, the modesof numbers have every the least difference very clear and perceivable:and though in extension every the least excess is not so perceptible, yet the mind has found out ways to examine, and discoverdemonstratively, the just equality of two angles, or extensions, orfigures: and both these, i. E. Numbers and figures, can be set down byvisible and lasting marks, wherein the ideas under consideration areperfectly determined; which for the most part they are not, where theyare marked only by names and words. 

11. Modes of Qualities not demonstrable like modes of Quantity. 

But in other simple ideas, whose modes and differences are made andcounted by degrees, and not quantity, we have not so nice and accuratea distinction of their differences as to perceive, or find ways tomeasure, their just equality, or the least differences. For those othersimple ideas, being appearances of sensations produced in us, by thesize, figure, number, and motion of minute corpuscles singly insensible;their different degrees also depend upon the variation of some or of allthose causes: which, since it cannot be observed by us, in particles ofmatter whereof each is too subtile to be perceived, it is impossible forus to have any exact measures of the different degrees of these simpleideas. For, supposing the sensation or idea we name whiteness beproduced in us by a certain number of globules, which, having averticity about their own centres, strike upon the retina of the eye, with a certain degree of rotation, as well as progressive swiftness; itwill hence easily follow, that the more the superficial parts of anybody are so ordered as to reflect the greater number of globules oflight, and to give them the proper rotation, which is fit to producethis sensation of white in us, the more white will that body appear, that from an equal space sends to the retina the greater number of suchcorpuscles, with that peculiar sort of motion. I do not say that thenature of light consists in very small round globules; nor of whitenessin such a texture of parts as gives a certain rotation to these globuleswhen it reflects them: for I am not now treating physically of light orcolours. But this I think I may say, that I cannot (and I would be gladany one would make intelligible that he did) conceive how bodies withoutus can any ways affect our senses, but by the immediate contact of thesensible bodies themselves, as in tasting and feeling, or the impulseof some sensible particles coming from them, as in seeing, hearing, and smelling; by the different impulse of which parts, caused by theirdifferent size, figure, and motion, the variety of sensations isproduced in us. 

12. Particles of light and simple ideas of colour. 

Whether then they be globules or no; or whether they have a verticityabout their own centres that produces the idea of whiteness in us; thisis certain, that the more particles of light are reflected from a body, fitted to give them that peculiar motion which produces the sensationof whiteness in us; and possibly too, the quicker that peculiar motionis, --the whiter does the body appear from which the greatest number arereflected, as is evident in the same piece of paper put in the sunbeams, in the shade, and in a dark hole; in each of which it will produce in usthe idea of whiteness in far different degrees. 

13. The secondary Qualities of things not discovered by Demonstration. 

Not knowing, therefore, what number of particles, nor what motion ofthem, is fit to produce any precise degree of whiteness, we cannotDEMONSTRATE the certain equality of any two degrees of whiteness;because we have no certain standard to measure them by, nor means todistinguish every the least real difference, the only help we have beingfrom our senses, which in this point fail us. But where the differenceis so great as to produce in the mind clearly distinct ideas, whosedifferences can be perfectly retained, there these ideas or colours, as we see in different kinds, as blue and red, are as capable ofdemonstration as ideas of number and extension. What I have here said ofwhiteness and colours, I think holds true in all secondary qualities andtheir modes. 

14. III. Sensitive Knowledge of the particular Existence of finitebeings without us. 

These two, viz. Intuition and demonstration, are the degrees of ourKNOWLEDGE; whatever comes short of one of these, with what assurancesoever embraced, is but FAITH or OPINION, but not knowledge, at least inall general truths. There is, indeed, another perception of the mind, employed about THE PARTICULAR EXISTENCE OF FINITE BEINGS WITHOUT US, which, going beyond bare probability, and yet not reaching perfectly toeither of the foregoing degrees of certainty, passes under the nameof KNOWLEDGE. There can be nothing more certain than that the idea wereceive from an external object is in our minds: this is intuitiveknowledge. But whether there be anything more than barely that ideain our minds; whether we can thence certainly infer the existence ofanything without us, which corresponds to that idea, is that whereofsome men think there may be a question made; because men may have suchideas in their minds, when no such thing exists, no such object affectstheir senses. But yet here I think we are provided with an evidence thatputs us past doubting. For I ask any one, Whether he be not invinciblyconscious to himself of a different perception, when he looks on the sunby day, and thinks on it by night; when he actually tastes wormwood, orsmells a rose, or only thinks on that savour or odour? We as plainlyfind the difference there is between any idea revived in our minds byour own memory, and actually coming into our minds by our senses, as wedo between any two distinct ideas. If any one say, a dream may do thesame thing, and all these ideas may be produced, in us withoutany external objects; he may please to dream that I make him thisanswer:--I. That it is no great matter, whether I remove his scruple orno: where all is but dream, reasoning and arguments are of no use, truthand knowledge nothing. 2. That I believe he will allow a very manifestdifference between dreaming of being in the fire, and being actually init. But yet if he be resolved to appear so sceptical as to maintain, that what I call being actually in the fire is nothing but a dream;and that we cannot thereby certainly know, that any such thing as fireactually exists without us: I answer, That we certainly finding thatpleasure or pain follows upon the application of certain objects to us, whose existence we perceive, or dream that we perceive, by our senses;this certainty is as great as our happiness or misery, beyond which wehave no concernment to know or to be. So that, I think, we may addto the two former sorts of knowledge this also, of the existence ofparticular external objects, by that perception and consciousness wehave of the actual entrance of ideas from them, and allow these threedegrees of knowledge, viz. INTUITIVE, DEMONSTRATIVE, and SENSITIVE;in each of which there are different degrees and ways of evidence andcertainty. 

15. Knowledge not always clear, where the Ideas that enter into it areclear. 

But since our knowledge is founded on and employed about our ideas only, will it not follow from thence that it is conformable to our ideas; andthat where our ideas are clear and distinct, or obscure and confused, our knowledge will be so too? To which I answer, No: for our knowledgeconsisting in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of any twoideas, its clearness or obscurity consists in the clearness or obscurityof that perception, and not in the clearness or obscurity of the ideasthemselves: v. G. A man that has as clear ideas of the angles of atriangle, and of equality to two right ones, as any mathematician in theworld, may yet have but a very obscure perception of their AGREEMENT, and so have but a very obscure knowledge of it. [But ideas which, byreason of their obscurity or otherwise, are confused, cannot produce anyclear or distinct knowledge; because, as far as any ideas are confused, so far the mind cannot perceive clearly whether they agree or disagree. Or to express the same thing in a way less apt to be misunderstood:he that hath not determined ideas to the words he uses, cannot makepropositions of them of whose truth he can be certain. ]

CHAPTER III. 

OF THE EXTENT OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 

1. Extent of our Knowledge. 

Knowledge, as has been said, lying in the perception of the agreement ordisagreement of any of our ideas, it follows from hence, That, First, it extends no further than we have Ideas. 

First, we can have knowledge no further than we have IDEAS. 

2. Secondly, It extends no further than we can perceive their Agreementor Disagreement. 

Secondly, That we can have no knowledge further than we can havePERCEPTION of that agreement or disagreement. Which perception being: 1. Either by INTUITION, or the immediate comparing any two ideas; or, 2. By REASON, examining the agreement or disagreement of two ideas, bythe intervention of some others; or, 3. By SENSATION, perceiving theexistence of particular things: hence it also follows:

3. Thirdly, Intuitive Knowledge extends itself not to all the relationof all our Ideas. 

Thirdly, That we cannot have an INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE that shall extenditself to all our ideas, and all that we would know about them; becausewe cannot examine and perceive all the relations they have one toanother, by juxta-position, or an immediate comparison one with another. Thus, having the ideas of an obtuse and an acute angled triangle, bothdrawn from equal bases, and between parallels, I can, by intuitiveknowledge, perceive the one not to be the other, but cannot thatway know whether they be equal or no; because their agreement ordisagreement in equality can never be perceived by an immediatecomparing them: the difference of figure makes their parts incapableof an exact immediate application; and therefore there is need of someintervening qualities to measure them by, which is demonstration, orrational knowledge. 

4. Fourthly, Nor does Demonstrative Knowledge. 

Fourthly, It follows, also, from what is above observed, that ourRATIONAL KNOWLEDGE cannot reach to the whole extent of our ideas:because between two different ideas we would examine, we cannot alwaysfind such mediums as we can connect one to another with an intuitiveknowledge in all the parts of the deduction; and wherever that fails, wecome short of knowledge and demonstration. 

5. Fifthly, Sensitive Knowledge narrower than either. 

Fifthly, SENSITIVE KNOWLEDGE reaching no further than the existence ofthings actually present to our senses, is yet much narrower than eitherof the former. 

6. Sixthly, Our Knowledge, therefore narrower than our Ideas. 

Sixthly, From all which it is evident, that the EXTENT OF OUR KNOWLEDGEcomes not only short of the reality of things, but even of the extent ofour own ideas. Though our knowledge be limited to our ideas, and cannotexceed them either in extent or perfection; and though these be verynarrow bounds, in respect of the extent of All-being, and far shortof what we may justly imagine to be in some even created understandings, not tied down to the dull and narrow information that is to be receivedfrom some few, and not very acute, ways of perception, such as are oursenses; yet it would be well with us if our knowledge were but as largeas our ideas, and there were not many doubts and inquiries CONCERNINGTHE IDEAS WE HAVE, whereof we are not, nor I believe ever shall be inthis world resolved. Nevertheless, I do not question but thathuman knowledge, under the present circumstances of our beings andconstitutions, may be carried much further than it has hitherto been, ifmen would sincerely, and with freedom of mind, employ all that industryand labour of thought, in improving the means of discovering truth, which they do for the colouring or support of falsehood, to maintain asystem, interest, or party they are once engaged in. But yet after all, I think I may, without injury to human perfection, be confident, that our knowledge would never reach to all we might desire to knowconcerning those ideas we have; nor be able to surmount all thedifficulties, and resolve all the questions that might arise concerningany of them. We have the ideas of a SQUARE, a CIRCLE, and EQUALITY; andyet, perhaps, shall never be able to find a circle equal to a square, and certainly know that it is so. We have the ideas of MATTER andTHINKING, but possibly shall never be able to know whether [any merematerial being] thinks or no; it being impossible for us, by thecontemplation of our own ideas, without revelation, to discover whetherOmnipotency has not given to some systems of matter, fitly disposed, a power to perceive and think, or else joined and fixed to matter, sodisposed, a thinking immaterial substance: it being, in respect of ournotions, not much more remote from our comprehension to conceive thatGOD can, if he pleases, superadd to matter A FACULTY OF THINKING, thanthat he should superadd to it ANOTHER SUBSTANCE WITH A FACULTY OFTHINKING; since we know not wherein thinking consists, nor to what sortof substances the Almighty has been pleased to give that power, whichcannot be in any created being, but merely by the good pleasure andbounty of the Creator. For I see no contradiction in it, that the firstEternal thinking Being, or Omnipotent Spirit, should, if he pleased, give to certain systems of created senseless matter, put together as hethinks fit, some degrees of sense, perception, and thought: though, asI think I have proved, lib. Iv. Ch. 10, Section 14, &c. , it is no lessthan a contradiction to suppose matter (which is evidently in its ownnature void of sense and thought) should be that Eternal first-thinkingBeing. What certainty of knowledge can any one have, that someperceptions, such as, v. G. , pleasure and pain, should not be in somebodies themselves, after a certain manner modified and moved, as well asthat they should be in an immaterial substance, upon the motion of theparts of body: Body, as far as we can conceive, being able only tostrike and affect body, and motion, according to the utmost reach of ourideas, being able to produce nothing but motion; so that when we allowit to produce pleasure or pain, or the idea of a colour or sound, we arefain to quit our reason, go beyond our ideas, and attribute it wholly tothe good pleasure of our Maker. For, since we must allow He has annexedeffects to motion which we can no way conceive motion able to produce, what reason have we to conclude that He could not order them as well tobe produced in a subject we cannot conceive capable of them, as well asin a subject we cannot conceive the motion of matter can any way operateupon? I say not this, that I would any way lessen the belief of thesoul's immateriality: I am not here speaking of probability, butknowledge, and I think not only that it becomes the modesty ofphilosophy not to pronounce magisterially, where we want that evidencethat can produce knowledge; but also, that it is of use to us to discernhow far our knowledge does reach; for the state we are at present in, not being that of vision, we must in many things content ourselveswith faith and probability: and in the present question, aboutthe Immateriality of the Soul, if our faculties cannot arrive atdemonstrative certainty, we need not think it strange. All the greatends of morality and religion are well enough secured, withoutphilosophical proofs of the soul's immateriality; since it is evident, that he who made us at the beginning to subsist here, sensibleintelligent beings, and for several years continued us in such a state, can and will restore us to the like state of sensibility in anotherworld, and make us capable there to receive the retribution he hasdesigned to men, according to their doings in this life. [And thereforeit is not of such mighty necessity to determine one way or the other, assome, over-zealous for or against the immateriality of the soul, havebeen forward to make the world believe. Who, either on the one side, indulging too much their thoughts immersed altogether in matter, canallow no existence to what is not material: or who, on the other side, finding not COGITATION within the natural powers of matter, examinedover and over again by the utmost intention of mind, have the confidenceto conclude--That Omnipotency itself cannot give perception and thoughtto a substance which has the modification of solidity. He that considershow hardly sensation is, in our thoughts, reconcilable to extendedmatter; or existence to anything that has no extension at all, willconfess that he is very far from certainly knowing what his soul is. It is a point which seems to me to be put out of the reach of ourknowledge: and he who will give himself leave to consider freely, andlook into the dark and intricate part of each hypothesis, will scarcefind his reason able to determine him fixedly for or against the soul'smateriality. Since, on which side soever he views it, either as anUNEXTENDED SUBSTANCE, or as a THINKING EXTENDED MATTER, the difficultyto conceive either will, whilst either alone is in his thoughts, stilldrive him to the contrary side. An unfair way which some men take withthemselves: who, because of the inconceivableness of something they findin one, throw themselves violently into the contrary hypothesis, thoughaltogether as unintelligible to an unbiassed understanding. This servesnot only to show the weakness and the scantiness of our knowledge, butthe insignificant triumph of such sort of arguments; which, drawn fromour own views, may satisfy us that we can find no certainty on one sideof the question: but do not at all thereby help us to truth by runninginto the opposite opinion; which, on examination, will be found cloggedwith equal difficulties. For what safety, what advantage to any one isit, for the avoiding the seeming absurdities, and to him unsurmountablerubs, he meets with in one opinion, to take refuge in the contrary, which is built on something altogether as inexplicable, and as farremote from his comprehension? It is past controversy, that we have inus SOMETHING that thinks; our very doubts about what it is, confirmthe certainty of its being, though we must content ourselves in theignorance of what KIND of being it is: and it is in vain to go about tobe sceptical in this, as it is unreasonable in most other cases to bepositive against the being of anything, because we cannot comprehendits nature. For I would fain know what substance exists, that has notsomething in it which manifestly baffles our understandings. Otherspirits, who see and know the nature and inward constitution of things, how much must they exceed us in knowledge? To which, if we add largercomprehension, which enables them at one glance to see the connexionand agreement of very many ideas, and readily supplies to them theintermediate proofs, which we by single and slow steps, and long poringin the dark, hardly at last find out, and are often ready to forget onebefore we have hunted out another; we may guess at some part of thehappiness of superior ranks of spirits, who have a quicker and morepenetrating sight, as well as a larger field of knowledge. ]

But to return to the argument in hand: our knowledge, I say, is not onlylimited to the paucity and imperfections of the ideas we have, and whichwe employ it about, but even comes short of that too: but how far itreaches, let us now inquire. 

7. How far our Knowledge reaches. 

The affirmations or negations we make concerning the ideas we have, may, as I have before intimated in general, be reduced to these four sorts, viz. Identity, co-existence, relation, and real existence. I shallexamine how far our knowledge extends in each of these:

8. Firstly, Our Knowledge of Identity and Diversity in ideas extends asfar as our Ideas themselves. 

FIRST, as to IDENTITY and DIVERSITY. In this way of agreement ordisagreement of our ideas, our intuitive knowledge is as far extendedas our ideas themselves: and there can be no idea in the mind, which itdoes not, presently, by an intuitive knowledge, perceive to be what itis, and to be different from any other. 

9. Secondly, Of their Co-existence, extends only a very little way. 

SECONDLY, as to the second sort, which is the agreement or disagreementof our ideas in CO-EXISTENCE, in this our knowledge is very short;though in this consists the greatest and most material part of ourknowledge concerning substances. For our ideas of the species ofsubstances being, as I have showed, nothing but certain collections ofsimple ideas united in one subject, and so co-existing together; v. G. Our idea of flame is a body hot, luminous, and moving upward; of gold, a body heavy to a certain degree, yellow, malleable, and fusible: forthese, or some such complex ideas as these, in men's minds, do these twonames of the different substances, flame and gold, stand for. When wewould know anything further concerning these, or any other sort ofsubstances, what do we inquire, but what OTHER qualities or powers thesesubstances have or have not? Which is nothing else but to know whatOTHER simple ideas do, or do not co-exist with those that make up thatcomplex idea?

10. Because the Connexion between simple Ideas in substances is for themost part unknown. 

This, how weighty and considerable a part soever of human science, isyet very narrow, and scarce any at all. The reason whereof is, that thesimple ideas whereof our complex ideas of substances are made up are, for the most part, such as carry with them, in their own nature, noVISIBLE NECESSARY connexion or inconsistency with any other simpleideas, whose co-existence with them we would inform ourselves about. 

11. Especially of the secondary Qualities of Bodies. 

The ideas that our complex ones of substances are made up of, and aboutwhich our knowledge concerning substances is most employed, are those oftheir secondary qualities; which depending all (as has been shown) uponthe primary qualities of their minute and insensible parts; or, if notupon them, upon something yet more remote from our comprehension; it isimpossible we should know which have a NECESSARY union or inconsistencyone with another. For, not knowing the root they spring from, notknowing what size, figure, and texture of parts they are, on whichdepend, and from which result those qualities which make our complexidea of gold, it is impossible we should know what OTHER qualitiesresult from, or are incompatible with, the same constitution of theinsensible parts of gold; and so consequently must always co-exist withthat complex idea we have of it, or else are inconsistent with it. 

12. Because necessary Connexion between any secondary and the primaryQualities is undiscoverable by us. 

Besides this ignorance of the primary qualities of the insensible partsof bodies, on which depend all their secondary qualities, there is yetanother and more incurable part of ignorance, which sets us more remotefrom a certain knowledge of the co-existence or INCO-EXISTENCE (if I mayso say) of different ideas in the same subject; and that is, that thereis no discoverable connexion between any secondary quality and thoseprimary qualities which it depends on. 

13. We have no perfect knowledge of their Primary Qualities. 

That the size, figure, and motion of one body should cause a changein the size, figure, and motion of another body, is not beyond ourconception; the separation of the parts of one body upon the intrusionof another; and the change from rest to motion upon impulse; these andthe like seem to have SOME CONNEXION one with another. And if we knewthese primary qualities of bodies, we might have reason to hope we mightbe able to know a great deal more of these operations of them one uponanother: but our minds not being able to discover any connexion betwixtthese primary qualities of bodies and the sensations that are producedin us by them, we can never be able to establish certain and undoubtedrules of the CONSEQUENCE or CO-EXISTENCE of any secondary qualities, though we could discover the size, figure, or motion of those invisibleparts which immediately produce them. We are so far from knowing WHATfigure, size, or motion of parts produce a yellow colour, a sweet taste, or a sharp sound, that we can by no means conceive how ANY size, figure, or motion of any particles, can possibly produce in us the idea of anycolour, taste, or sound whatsoever: there is no conceivable connexionbetween the one and the other. 

14. And seek in vain for certain and universal knowledge of unperceivedqualities in substances. 

In vain, therefore, shall we endeavour to discover by our ideas (theonly true way of certain and universal knowledge) what other ideas areto be found constantly joined with that of OUR complex idea of anysubstance: since we neither know the real constitution of the minuteparts on which their qualities do depend; nor, did we know them, could we discover any necessary connexion between them and any ofthe secondary qualities: which is necessary to be done before we cancertainly know their necessary co-existence. So, that, let our complexidea of any species of substances be what it will, we can hardly, fromthe simple ideas contained in it, certainly determine the necessaryco-existence of any other quality whatsoever. Our knowledge in all theseinquiries reaches very little further than our experience. Indeed somefew of the primary qualities have a necessary dependence and visibleconnexion one with another, as figure necessarily supposes extension;receiving or communicating motion by impulse, supposes solidity. Butthough these, and perhaps some others of our ideas have: yet there areso few of them that have a visible connexion one with another, that wecan by intuition or demonstration discover the co-existence of very fewof the qualities that are to be found united in substances: and we areleft only to the assistance of our senses to make known to us whatqualities they contain. For of all the qualities that are co-existentin any subject, without this dependence and evident connexion of theirideas one with another, we cannot know certainly any two to co-exist, any further than experience, by our senses, informs us. Thus, though wesee the yellow colour, and, upon trial, find the weight, malleableness, fusibility, and fixedness that are united in a piece of gold; yet, because no one of these ideas has any evident dependence or necessaryconnexion with the other, we cannot certainly know that where any fourof these are, the fifth will be there also, how highly probable soeverit may be; because the highest probability amounts not to certainty, without which there can be no true knowledge. For this co-existence canbe no further known than it is perceived; and it cannot be perceived buteither in particular subjects, by the observation of our senses, or, ingeneral, by the necessary connexion of the ideas themselves. 

15. Of Repugnancy to co-exist, our knowledge is larger. 

As to the incompatibility or repugnancy to co-existence, we may knowthat any subject may have of each sort of primary qualities but oneparticular at once: v. G. Each particular extension, figure, number ofparts, motion, excludes all other of each kind. The like also is certainof all sensible ideas peculiar to each sense; for whatever of each kindis present in any subject, excludes all other of that sort: v. G. No onesubject can have two smells or two colours at the same time. To this, perhaps will be said, Has not an opal, or the infusion of LIGNUMNEPHRITICUM, two colours at the same time? To which I answer, thatthese bodies, to eyes differently, placed, may at the same time afforddifferent colours: but I take liberty also to say, that, to eyesdifferently placed, it is different parts of the object that reflect theparticles of light: and therefore it is not the same part of the object, and so not the very same subject, which at the same time appears bothyellow and azure. For, it is as impossible that the very same particleof any body should at the same time differently modify or reflect therays of light, as that it should have two different figures and texturesat the same time. 

16. Our Knowledge of the Co-existence of Power in Bodies extends but avery little Way. 

But as to the powers of substances to change the sensible qualities ofother bodies, which make a great part of our inquiries about them, andis no inconsiderable branch of our knowledge; I doubt as to these, whether our knowledge reaches much further than our experience; orwhether we can come to the discovery of most of these powers, and becertain that they are in any subject, by the connexion with any of thoseideas which to us make its essence. Because the active and passivepowers of bodies, and their ways of operating, consisting in a textureand motion of parts which we cannot by any means come to discover; it isbut in very few cases we can be able to perceive their dependence on, or repugnance to, any of those ideas which make our complex one of thatsort of things. I have here instanced in the corpuscularian hypothesis, as that which is thought to go furthest in an intelligible explicationof those qualities of bodies; and I fear the weakness of humanunderstanding is scarce able to substitute another, which will affordus a fuller and clearer discovery of the necessary connexion andco-existence of the powers which are to be observed united in severalsorts of them. This at least is certain, that, whichever hypothesis beclearest and truest, (for of that it is not my business to determine, )our knowledge concerning corporeal substances will be very littleadvanced by any of them, till we are made to see what qualities andpowers of bodies have a NECESSARY connexion or repugnancy one withanother; which in the present state of philosophy I think we know but toa very small degree: and I doubt whether, with those faculties wehave, we shall ever be able to carry our general knowledge (I say notparticular experience) in this part much further. Experience is thatwhich in this part we must depend on. And it were to be wished that itwere more improved. We find the advantages some men's generous painshave this way brought to the stock of natural knowledge. And if others, especially the philosophers by fire, who pretend to it, had been so waryin their observations, and sincere in their reports as those who callthemselves philosophers ought to have been, our acquaintance with thebodies here about us, and our insight into their powers and operationshad been yet much greater. 

17. Of the Powers that co-exist in Spirits yet narrower. 

If we are at a loss in respect of the powers and operations of bodies, Ithink it is easy to conclude we are much more in the dark in referenceto spirits; whereof we naturally have no ideas but what we draw fromthat of our own, by reflecting on the operations of our own soulswithin us, as far as they can come within our observation. But howinconsiderable a rank the spirits that inhabit our bodies hold amongstthose various and possibly innumerable kinds of nobler beings; and howfar short they come of the endowments and perfections of cherubim andseraphim, and infinite sorts of spirits above us, is what by a transienthint in another place I have offered to my reader's consideration. 

18. Thirdly, Of Relations between abstracted ideas it is not easy to sayhow far our knowledge extends. 

THIRDLY, As to the third sort of our knowledge, viz. The agreement ordisagreement of any of our ideas in any other relation: this, as it isthe largest field of our knowledge, so it is hard to determine howfar it may extend: because the advances that are made in this part ofknowledge, depending on our sagacity in finding intermediate ideas, thatmay show the relations and habitudes of ideas whose co-existence is notconsidered, it is a hard matter to tell when we are at an end of suchdiscoveries; and when reason has all the helps it is capable of, for thefinding of proofs, or examining the agreement or disagreement of remoteideas. They that are ignorant of Algebra cannot imagine the wonders inthis kind are to be done by it: and what further improvements and helpsadvantageous to other parts of knowledge the sagacious mind of man mayyet find out, it is not easy to determine. This at least I believe, that the IDEAS OF QUANTITY are not those alone that are capable ofdemonstration and knowledge; and that other, and perhaps more useful, parts of contemplation, would afford us certainty, if vices, passions, and domineering interest did not oppose or menace such endeavours. 

Morality capable of Demonstration

The idea of a supreme Being, infinite in power, goodness, and wisdom, whose workmanship we are, and on whom we depend; and the idea ofourselves, as understanding, rational creatures, being such as are clearin us, would, I suppose, if duly considered and pursued, afford suchfoundations of our duty and rules of action as might place MORALITYamongst the SCIENCES CAPABLE OF DEMONSTRATION: wherein I doubt notbut from self-evident propositions, by necessary consequences, asincontestible as those in mathematics, the measures of right and wrongmight be made out, to any one that will apply himself with the sameindifferency and attention to the one as he does to the other of thesesciences. The RELATION of other MODES may certainly be perceived, aswell as those of number and extension: and I cannot see why they shouldnot also be capable of demonstration, if due methods were thought on toexamine or pursue their agreement or disagreement. 'Where there is noproperty there is no injustice, ' is a proposition as certain as anydemonstration in Euclid: for the idea of property being a right toanything, and the idea of which the name 'injustice' is given being theinvasion or violation of that right, it is evident that these ideas, being thus established, and these names annexed to them, I can ascertainly know this proposition to be true, as that a triangle has threeangles equal to two right ones. Again: 'No government allows absoluteliberty. ' The idea of government being the establishment of society uponcertain rules or laws which require conformity to them; and the idea ofabsolute liberty being for any one to do whatever he pleases; I am ascapable of being certain of the truth of this proposition as of any inthe mathematics. 

19. Two things have made moral Ideas to be thought incapable ofDemonstration: their unfitness for sensible representation, and theircomplexedness. 

That which in this respect has given the advantage to the ideasof quantity, and made them thought more capable of certainty anddemonstration, is, First, That they can be set down and represented by sensible marks, which have a greater and nearer correspondence with them than any wordsor sounds whatsoever. Diagrams drawn on paper are copies of the ideas inthe mind, and not liable to the uncertainty that words carry in theirsignification. An angle, circle, or square, drawn in lines, lies open tothe view, and cannot be mistaken: it remains unchangeable, and may atleisure be considered and examined, and the demonstration be revised, and all the parts of it may be gone over more than once, without anydanger of the least change in the ideas. This cannot be thus done inmoral ideas: we have no sensible marks that resemble them, whereby wecan set them down; we have nothing but words to express them by; which, though when written they remain the same, yet the ideas they stand formay change in the same man; and it is very seldom that they are notdifferent in different persons. 

Secondly, Another thing that makes the greater difficulty in ethics is, That moral ideas are commonly more complex than those of thefigures ordinarily considered in mathematics. From whence these twoinconveniences follow:--First, that their names are of more uncertainsignification, the precise collection of simple ideas they stand fornot being so easily agreed on; and so the sign that is used for them incommunication always, and in thinking often, does not steadily carrywith it the same idea. Upon which the same disorder, confusion, anderror follow, as would if a man, going to demonstrate something of anheptagon, should, in the diagram he took to do it, leave out one of theangles, or by oversight make the figure with one angle more than thename ordinarily imported, or he intended it should when at firsthe thought of his demonstration. This often happens, and is hardlyavoidable in very complex moral ideas, where the same name beingretained, one angle, i. E. One simple idea, is left out, or put in thecomplex one (still called by the same name) more at one time thananother. Secondly, From the complexedness of these moral ideas therefollows another inconvenience, viz. That the mind cannot easily retainthose precise combinations so exactly and perfectly as is necessary inthe examination of the habitudes and correspondences, agreements ordisagreements, of several of them one with another; especially where itis to be judged of by long deductions, and the intervention of severalother complex ideas to show the agreement or disagreement of two remoteones. 

The great help against this which mathematicians find in diagrams andfigures, which remain unalterable in their draughts, is very apparent, and the memory would often have great difficulty otherwise to retainthem so exactly, whilst the mind went over the parts of them step bystep to examine their several correspondences. And though in casting upa long sum either in addition, multiplication, or division, every partbe only a progression of the mind taking a view of its own ideas, andconsidering their agreement or disagreement, and the resolution ofthe question be nothing but the result of the whole, made up of suchparticulars, whereof the mind has a clear perception: yet, withoutsetting down the several parts by marks, whose precise significationsare known, and by marks that last, and remain in view when the memoryhad let them go, it would be almost impossible to carry so manydifferent ideas in the mind, without confounding or letting slip someparts of the reckoning, and thereby making all our reasonings about ituseless. In which case the cyphers or marks help not the mind at all toperceive the agreement of any two or more numbers, their equalities orproportions; that the mind has only by intuition of its own ideas ofthe numbers themselves. But the numerical characters are helps tothe memory, to record and retain the several ideas about which thedemonstration is made, whereby a man may know how far his intuitiveknowledge in surveying several of the particulars has proceeded; that sohe may without confusion go on to what is yet unknown; and at last havein one view before him the result of all his perceptions and reasonings. 

20. Remedies of our Difficulties in dealing demonstratively with moralideas. 

One part of these disadvantages in moral ideas which has made them bethought not capable of demonstration, may in a good measure be remediedby definitions, setting down that collection of simple ideas, whichevery term shall stand for; and then using the terms steadily andconstantly for that precise collection. And what methods algebra, orsomething of that kind, may hereafter suggest, to remove the otherdifficulties, it is not easy to foretell. Confident I am, that, if menwould in the same method, and with the same indifferency, search aftermoral as they do mathematical truths, they would find them have astronger connexion one with another, and a more necessary consequencefrom our clear and distinct ideas, and to come nearer perfectdemonstration than is commonly imagined. But much of this is not tobe expected, whilst the desire of esteem, riches, or power makes menespouse the well-endowed opinions in fashion, and then seek argumentseither to make good their beauty, or varnish over and cover theirdeformity. Nothing being so beautiful to the eye as truth is to themind; nothing so deformed and irreconcilable to the understanding as alie. For though many a man can with satisfaction enough own a no veryhandsome wife in his bosom; yet who is bold enough openly to avow thathe has espoused a falsehood, and received into his breast so ugly athing as a lie? Whilst the parties of men cram their tenets down allmen's throats whom they can get into their power, without permittingthem to examine their truth or falsehood; and will not let truth havefair play in the world, nor men the liberty to search after it; whatimprovements can be expected of this kind? What greater light can behoped for in the moral sciences? The subject part of mankind in mostplaces might, instead thereof, with Egyptian bondage, expect Egyptiandarkness, were not the candle of the Lord set up by himself in men'sminds, which it is impossible for the breath or power of man wholly toextinguish. 

21. Fourthly, Of the three real Existences of which we have certainknowledge. 

FOURTHLY, As to the fourth sort of our knowledge, viz. Of the REALACTUAL EXISTENCE OF THINGS, we have an intuitive knowledge of OUR OWNEXISTENCE, and a demonstrative knowledge of the existence of a GOD:of the existence of ANYTHING ELSE, we have no other but a sensitiveknowledge; which extends not beyond the objects present to our senses. 

22. Our Ignorance great. 

Our knowledge being so narrow, as I have shown, it will perhaps give ussome light into the present state of our minds if we look a little intothe dark side, and take a view of OUR IGNORANCE; which, being infinitelylarger than our knowledge, may serve much to the quieting of disputes, and improvement of useful knowledge; if, discovering how far wehave clear and distinct ideas, we confine our thoughts within thecontemplation of those things that are within the reach of ourunderstandings, and launch not out into that abyss of darkness, (wherewe have not eyes to see, nor faculties to perceive anything), out ofa presumption that nothing is beyond our comprehension. But to besatisfied of the folly of such a conceit, we need not go far. He thatknows anything, knows this, in the first place, that he need not seeklong for instances of his ignorance. The meanest and most obvious thingsthat come in our way have dark sides, that the quickest sight cannotpenetrate into. The clearest and most enlarged understandings ofthinking men find themselves puzzled and at a loss in every particle ofmatter. We shall the less wonder to find it so, when we consider theCAUSES OF OUR IGNORANCE; which, from what has been said, I suppose willbe found to be these three:--

First, Want of ideas. Its causes. 

Secondly, Want of a discoverable connexion between the ideas we have. 

Thirdly, Want of tracing and examining our ideas. 

23. First, One Cause of our ignorance Want of Ideas. 

I. Want of simple ideas that other creatures in other parts of theuniverse may have. 

FIRST, There are some things, and those not a few, that we are ignorantof, for want of ideas. 

First, all the simple ideas we have are confined (as I have shown) tothose we receive from corporeal objects by sensation, and from theoperations of our own minds as the objects of reflection. But how muchthese few and narrow inlets are disproportionate to the vast wholeextent of all beings, will not be hard to persuade those who are not sofoolish as to think their span the measure of all things. What othersimple ideas it is possible the creatures in other parts of the universemay have, by the assistance of senses and faculties more or perfecterthan we have, or different from ours, it is not for us to determine. Butto say or think there are no such, because we conceive nothing of them, is no better an argument than if a blind man should be positive in it, that there was no such thing as sight and colours, because he had nomanner of idea of any such thing, nor could by any means frame tohimself any notions about seeing. The ignorance and darkness that is inus no more hinders nor confines the knowledge that is in others, thanthe blindness of a mole is an argument against the quicksightedness ofan eagle. He that will consider the infinite power, wisdom, and goodnessof the Creator of all things will find reason to think it was not alllaid out upon so inconsiderable, mean, and impotent a creature as hewill find man to be; who in all probability is one of the lowest ofall intellectual beings. What faculties, therefore, other species ofcreatures have to penetrate into the nature and inmost constitutions ofthings; what ideas they may receive of them far different from ours, weknow not. This we know and certainly find, that we want several otherviews of them besides those we have, to make discoveries of them moreperfect. And we may be convinced that the ideas we can attain to byour faculties are very disproportionate to things themselves, whena positive, clear, distinct one of substance itself, which is thefoundation of all the rest, is concealed from us. But want of ideas ofthis kind, being a part as well as cause of our ignorance, cannot bedescribed. Only this I think I may confidently say of it, That theintellectual and sensible world are in this perfectly alike: that thatpart which we see of either of them holds no proportion with what we seenot; and whatsoever we can reach with our eyes or our thoughts of eitherof them is but a point, almost nothing in comparison of the the rest. 

24. Want of simple ideas that men are capable of having, but havingnot, (1) Because their remoteness, or, Secondly, Another great cause of ignorance is the want of ideas we arecapable of. As the want of ideas which our faculties are not ableto give us shuts us wholly from those views of things which it isreasonable to think other beings, perfecter than we, have, of which weknow nothing; so the want of ideas I now speak of keeps us in ignoranceof things we conceive capable of being known to us. Bulk, figure, andmotion we have ideas of. But though we are not without ideas of theseprimary qualities of bodies in general, yet not knowing what is theparticular bulk, figure, and motion, of the greatest part of the bodiesof the universe, we are ignorant of the several powers, efficacies, andways of operation, whereby the effects which we daily see are produced. These are hid from us, in some things by being too remote, and in othersby being too minute. When we consider the vast distance of the known andvisible parts of the world, and the reasons we have to think that whatlies within our ken is but a small part of the universe, we shall thendiscover a huge abyss of ignorance. What are the particular fabrics ofthe great masses of matter which make up the whole stupendous frame ofcorporeal beings; how far they are extended; what is their motion, andhow continued or communicated; and what influence they have one uponanother, are contemplations that at first glimpse our thoughts losethemselves in. If we narrow our contemplations, and confine our thoughtsto this little canton--I mean this system of our sun, and the grossermasses of matter that visibly move about it, What several sorts ofvegetables, animals, and intellectual corporeal beings, infinitelydifferent from those of our little spot of earth, may there probably bein the other planets, to the knowledge of which, even of their outwardfigures and parts, we can no way attain whilst we are confined to thisearth; there being no natural means, either by sensation or reflection, to convey their certain ideas into our minds? They are out of the reachof those inlets of all our knowledge: and what sorts of furniture andinhabitants those mansions contain in them we cannot so much as guess, much less have clear and distinct ideas of them. 

25. (2) Because of their Minuteness. 

If a great, nay, far the greatest part of the several ranks of bodiesin the universe escape our notice by their remoteness, there are othersthat are no less concealed from us by their minuteness. These INSENSIBLECORPUSCLES, being the active parts of matter, and the great instrumentsof nature, on which depend not only all their secondary qualities, butalso most of their natural operations, our want of precise distinctideas of their primary qualities keeps us in an incurable ignorance ofwhat we desire to know about them. I doubt not but if we could discoverthe figure, size, texture, and motion of the minute constituent parts ofany two bodies, we should know without trial several of their operationsone upon another; as we do now the properties of a square or a triangle. Did we know the mechanical affections of the particles of rhubarb, hemlock, opium, and a man, as a watchmaker does those of a watch, whereby it performs its operations; and of a file, which by rubbing onthem will alter the figure of any of the wheels; we should be able totell beforehand that rhubarb will purge, hemlock kill, and opium makea man sleep: as well as a watchmaker can, that a little piece of paperlaid on the balance will keep the watch from going till it be removed;or that, some small part of it being rubbed by a file, the machine wouldquite lose its motion, and the watch go no more. The dissolving ofsilver in AQUA FORTIS, and gold in AQUA REGIA, and not VICE VERSA, wouldbe then perhaps no more difficult to know than it is to a smith tounderstand why the turning of one key will open a lock, and not theturning of another. But whilst we are destitute of senses acute enoughto discover the minute particles of bodies, and to give us ideas oftheir mechanical affections, we must be content to be ignorant of theirproperties and ways of operation; nor can we be assured about them anyfurther than some few trials we make are able to reach. But whether theywill succeed again another time, we cannot be certain. This hinders ourcertain knowledge of universal truths concerning natural bodies: and ourreason carries us herein very little beyond particular matter of fact. 

26. Hence no Science of Bodies within our reach. 

And therefore I am apt to doubt that, how far soever human industrymay advance useful and experimental philosophy in physical things, SCIENTIFICAL will still be out of our reach: because we want perfect andadequate ideas of those very bodies which are nearest to us, and mostunder our command. Those which we have ranked into classes under names, and we think ourselves best acquainted with, we have but very imperfectand incomplete ideas of. Distinct ideas of the several sorts of bodiesthat fall under the examination of our senses perhaps we may have: butadequate ideas, I suspect, we have not of any one amongst them. Andthough the former of these will serve us for common use and discourse, yet whilst we want the latter, we are not capable of scientificalknowledge; nor shall ever be able to discover general, instructive, unquestionable truths concerning them. CERTAINTY and DEMONSTRATION arethings we must not, in these matters, pretend to. By the colour, figure, taste, and smell, and other sensible qualities, we have as clear anddistinct ideas of sage and hemlock, as we have of a circle and atriangle: but having no ideas of the particular primary qualities of theminute parts of either of these plants, nor of other bodies which wewould apply them to, we cannot tell what effects they will produce; norwhen we see those effects can we so much as guess, much less know, theirmanner of production. Thus, having no ideas of the particular mechanicalaffections of the minute parts of bodies that are within our view andreach, we are ignorant of their constitutions, powers, and operations:and of bodies more remote we are yet more ignorant, not knowing so muchas their very outward shapes, or the sensible and grosser parts of theirconstitutions. 

27. Much less a science of unembodied Spirits. 

This at first will show us how disproportionate our knowledge is tothe whole extent even of material beings; to which if we add theconsideration of that infinite number of spirits that may be, andprobably are, which are yet more remote from our knowledge, whereof wehave no cognizance, nor can frame to ourselves any distinct ideas oftheir several ranks and sorts, we shall find this cause of ignoranceconceal from us, in an impenetrable obscurity, almost the wholeintellectual world; a greater certainly, and more beautiful world thanthe material. For, bating some very few, and those, if I may so callthem, superficial ideas of spirit, which by reflection we get of ourown, and from thence the best we can collect of the Father of allspirits, the eternal independent Author of them, and us, and all things, we have no certain information, so much as of the existence of otherspirits, but by revelation. Angels of all sorts are naturally beyond ourdiscovery; and all those intelligences, whereof it is likely there aremore orders than of corporeal substances, are things whereof our naturalfaculties give us no certain account at all. That there are minds andthinking beings in other men as well as himself, every man has a reason, from their words and actions, to be satisfied: and the knowledge of hisown mind cannot suffer a man that considers, to be ignorant that thereis a God. But that there are degrees of spiritual beings between us andthe great God, who is there, that, by his own search and ability, cancome to know? Much less have we distinct ideas of their differentnatures, conditions, states, powers, and several constitutions whereinthey agree or differ from one another and from us. And, therefore, inwhat concerns their different species and properties we are in absoluteignorance. 

28. Secondly, Another cause, Want of a discoverable Connexion betweenIdeas we have. 

SECONDLY, What a small part of the substantial beings that are in theuniverse the want of ideas leaves open to our knowledge, we have seen. In the next place, another cause of ignorance, of no less moment, isa want of a discoverable connection between those ideas we have. Forwherever we want that, we are utterly incapable of universal and certainknowledge; and are, in the former case, left only to observation andexperiment: which, how narrow and confined it is, how far from generalknowledge we need not be told. I shall give some few instances of thiscause of our ignorance, and so leave it. It is evident that the bulk, figure, and motion of several bodies about us produce in us severalsensations, as of colours, sounds, tastes, smells, pleasure, and pain, &c. These mechanical affections of bodies having no affinity at all withthose ideas they produce in us, (there being no conceivable connexionbetween any impulse of any sort of body and any perception of a colouror smell which we find in our minds, ) we can have no distinct knowledgeof such operations beyond our experience; and can reason no otherwiseabout them, than as effects produced by the appointment of an infinitelyWise Agent, which perfectly surpass our comprehensions. As the ideas ofsensible secondary qualities which we have in our minds, can by us be noway deduced from bodily causes, nor any correspondence or connexion befound between them and those primary qualities which (experience showsus) produce them in us; so, on the other side, the operation of ourminds upon our bodies is as inconceivable. How any thought shouldproduce a motion in body is as remote from the nature of our ideas, ashow any body should produce any thought in the mind. That it is so, if experience did not convince us, the consideration of the thingsthemselves would never be able in the least to discover to us. These, and the like, though they have a constant and regular connexion in theordinary course of things; yet that connexion being not discoverable inthe ideas themselves, which appearing to have no necessary dependenceone on another, we can attribute their connexion to nothing else but thearbitrary determination of that All-wise Agent who has made them to be, and to operate as they do, in a way wholly above our weak understandingsto conceive. 

29. Instances

In some of our ideas there are certain relations, habitudes, andconnexions, so visibly included in the nature of the ideas themselves, that we cannot conceive them separable from them by any powerwhatsoever. And in these only we are capable of certain and universalknowledge. Thus the idea of a right-lined triangle necessarily carrieswith it an equality of its angles to two right ones. Nor can we conceivethis relation, this connexion of these two ideas, to be possiblymutable, or to depend on any arbitrary power, which of choice made itthus, or could make it otherwise. But the coherence and continuity ofthe parts of matter; the production of sensation in us of coloursand sounds, &c. , by impulse and motion; nay, the original rules andcommunication of motion being such, wherein we can discover no naturalconnexion with any ideas we have, we cannot but ascribe them to thearbitrary will and good pleasure of the Wise Architect. I need not, Ithink, here mention the resurrection of the dead, the future state ofthis globe of earth, and such other things, which are by every oneacknowledged to depend wholly on the determination of a free agent. Thethings that, as far as our observation reaches, we constantly find toproceed regularly, we may conclude do act by a law set them; but yetby a law that we know not: whereby, though causes work steadily, andeffects constantly flow from them, yet their connexions and dependenciesbeing not discoverable in our ideas, we can have but an experimentalknowledge of them. From all which it is easy to perceive what a darknesswe are involved in, how little it is of Being, and the things that are, that we are capable to know. And therefore we shall do no injury to ourknowledge, when we modestly think with ourselves, that we are so farfrom being able to comprehend the whole nature of the universe, and allthe things contained in it, that we are not capable of a philosophicalknowledge of the bodies that are about us, and make a part of us:concerning their secondary qualities, powers, and operations, we canhave no universal certainty. Several effects come every day within thenotice of our senses, of which we have so far sensitive knowledge: butthe causes, manner, and certainty of their production, for the twoforegoing reasons, we must be content to be very ignorant of. In thesewe can go no further than particular experience informs us of matter offact, and by analogy to guess what effects the like bodies are, uponother trials, like to produce. But as to a PERFECT SCIENCE of naturalbodies, (not to mention spiritual beings, ) we are, I think, so far frombeing capable of any such thing, that I conclude it lost labour to seekafter it. 

30. Thirdly A third cause, Want of Tracing our ideas. 

THIRDLY, Where we have adequate ideas, and where there is a certain anddiscoverable connexion between them, yet we are often ignorant, forwant of tracing those ideas which we have or may have; and for want offinding out those intermediate ideas, which may show us what habitude ofagreement or disagreement they have one with another. And thus many areignorant of mathematical truths, not out of any imperfection of theirfaculties, or uncertainty in the things themselves, but for want ofapplication in acquiring, examining, and by due ways comparing thoseideas. That which has most contributed to hinder the due tracing of ourideas, and finding out their relations, and agreements or disagreements, one with another, has been, I suppose, the ill use of words. It isimpossible that men should ever truly seek or certainly discover theagreement or disagreement of ideas themselves, whilst their thoughtsflutter about, or stick only in sounds of doubtful and uncertainsignifications. Mathematicians abstracting their thoughts from names, and accustoming themselves to set before their minds the ideasthemselves that they would consider, and not sounds instead of them, have avoided thereby a great part of that perplexity, puddering, andconfusion, which has so much hindered men's progress in other parts ofknowledge. For whilst they stick in words of undetermined and uncertainsignification, they are unable to distinguish true from false, certainfrom probable, consistent from inconsistent, in their own opinions. Thishaving been the fate or misfortune of a great part of men of letters, the increase brought into the stock of real knowledge has been verylittle, in proportion to the schools disputes, and writings, the worldhas been filled with; whilst students, being lost in the great wood ofwords, knew not whereabouts they were, how far their discoveries wereadvanced, or what was wanting in their own, or the general stock ofknowledge. Had men, in the discoveries of the material, done as theyhave in those of the intellectual world, involved all in the obscurityof uncertain and doubtful ways of talking, volumes writ of navigationand voyages, theories and stories of zones and tides, multiplied anddisputed; nay, ships built, and fleets sent out, would never have taughtus the way beyond the line; and the Antipodes would be still as muchunknown, as when it was declared heresy to hold there were any. Buthaving spoken sufficiently of words, and the ill or careless use that iscommonly made of them, I shall not say anything more of it here. 

31. Extent of Human Knowledge in respect to its Universality. 

Hitherto we have examined the extent of our knowledge, in respect ofthe several sorts of beings that are. There is another extent of it, inrespect of UNIVERSALITY, which will also deserve to be considered; andin this regard, our knowledge follows the nature of our ideas. If theideas are abstract, whose agreement or disagreement we perceive, ourknowledge is universal. For what is known of such general ideas, will betrue of every particular thing in whom that essence, i. E. That abstractidea, is to be found: and what is once known of such ideas, will beperpetually and for ever true. So that as to all GENERAL KNOWLEDGE wemust search and find it only in our minds; and it is only the examiningof our own ideas that furnisheth us with that. Truths belonging toessences of things (that is, to abstract ideas) are eternal; and areto be found out by the contemplation only of those essences: as theexistence of things is to be known only from experience. But having moreto say of this in the chapters where I shall speak of general and realknowledge, this may here suffice as to the universality of our knowledgein general. 

CHAPTER IV. OF THE REALITY OF KNOWLEDGE. 

1. Objection. 'Knowledge placed in our Ideas may be all unreal orchimerical'

I DOUBT not but my reader, by this time, may be apt to think that I havebeen all this while only building a castle in the air; and be ready tosay to me:--

'To what purpose all this stir? Knowledge, say you, is only theperception of the agreement or disagreement of our own ideas: but whoknows what those ideas may be? Is there anything so extravagant as theimaginations of men's brains? Where is the head that has no chimeras init? Or if there be a sober and a wise man, what difference willthere be, by your rules, between his knowledge and that of the mostextravagant fancy in the world? They both have their ideas, and perceivetheir agreement and disagreement one with another. If there be anydifference between them, the advantage will be on the warm-headed man'sside, as having the more ideas, and the more lively. And so, by yourrules, he will be the more knowing. If it be true, that all knowledgelies only in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ownideas, the visions of an enthusiast and the reasonings of a sober manwill be equally certain. It is no matter how things are: so a manobserve but the agreement of his own imaginations, and talk conformably, it is all truth, all certainty. Such castles in the air will be asstrongholds of truth, as the demonstrations of Euclid. That an harpy isnot a centaur is by this way as certain knowledge, and as much a truth, as that a square is not a circle. 

'But of what use is all this fine knowledge of MEN'S OWN IMAGINATIONS, to a man that inquires after the reality of things? It matters not whatmen's fancies are, it is the knowledge of things that is only to beprized: it is this alone gives a value to our reasonings, and preferenceto one man's knowledge over another's, that it is of things as theyreally are, and not of dreams and fancies. '

2. Answer Not so, where Ideas agree with Things. 

To which I answer, That if our knowledge of our ideas terminate in them, and reach no further, where there is something further intended, ourmost serious thoughts will be of little more use than the reveries ofa crazy brain; and the truths built thereon of no more weight than thediscourses of a man who sees things clearly in a dream, and with greatassurance utters them. But I hope, before I have done, to make itevident, that this way of certainty, by the knowledge of our own ideas, goes a little further than bare imagination: and I believe it willappear that all the certainty of general truths a man has lies innothing else. 

3. But what shall be the criterion of this agreement?

It is evident the mind knows not things immediately, but only by theintervention of the ideas it has of them. Our knowledge, therefore, isreal only so far as there is a CONFORMITY between our ideas and thereality of things. But what shall be here the criterion? How shall themind, when it perceives nothing but its own ideas, know that they agreewith things themselves? This, though it seems not to want difficulty, yet, I think, there be two sorts of ideas that we may be assured agreewith things. 

4. As, First All Simple Ideas are really conformed to Things. 

FIRST, The first are simple ideas, which since the mind, as has beenshowed, can by no means make to itself, must necessarily be the productof things operating on the mind, in a natural way, and producing thereinthose perceptions which by the Wisdom and Will of our Maker they areordained and adapted to. From whence it follows, that simple ideas arenot fictions of our fancies, but the natural and regular productions ofthings without us, really operating upon us; and so carry with them allthe conformity which is intended; or which our state requires: for theyrepresent to us things under those appearances which they are fittedto produce in us: whereby we are enabled to distinguish the sorts ofparticular substances, to discern the states they are in, and so to takethem for our necessities, and apply them to our uses. Thus the idea ofwhiteness, or bitterness, as it is in the mind, exactly answeringthat power which is in any body to produce it there, has all the realconformity it can or ought to have, with things without us. And thisconformity between our simple ideas and the existence of things, issufficient for real knowledge. 

5. Secondly, All Complex Ideas, except ideas of Substances, are theirown archetypes. 

Secondly, All our complex ideas, EXCEPT THOSE OF SUBSTANCES, beingarchetypes of the mind's own making, not intended to be the copiesof anything, nor referred to the existence of anything, as to theiroriginals, cannot want any conformity necessary to real knowledge. Forthat which is not designed to represent anything but itself, can neverbe capable of a wrong representation, nor mislead us from the trueapprehension of anything, by its dislikeness to it: and such, exceptingthose of substances, are all our complex ideas. Which, as I have showedin another place, are combinations of ideas, which the mind, by its freechoice, puts together, without considering any connexion they have innature. And hence it is, that in all these sorts the ideas themselvesare considered as the archetypes, and things no otherwise regarded, butas they are conformable to them. So that we cannot but be infalliblycertain, that all the knowledge we attain concerning these ideas isreal, and reaches things themselves. Because in all our thoughts, reasonings, and discourses of this kind, we intend things no furtherthan as they are conformable to our ideas. So that in these we cannotmiss of a certain and undoubted reality. 

6. Hence the reality of Mathematical Knowledge

I doubt not but it will be easily granted, that the knowledge we have ofmathematical truths is not only certain, but real knowledge; and not thebare empty vision of vain, insignificant chimeras of the brain: and yet, if we will consider, we shall find that it is only of our own ideas. The mathematician considers the truth and properties belonging to arectangle or circle only as they are in idea in his own mind. For it ispossible he never found either of them existing mathematically, i. E. Precisely true, in his life. But yet the knowledge he has of any truthsor properties belonging to a circle, or any other mathematical figure, are nevertheless true and certain, even of real things existing: becausereal things are no further concerned, nor intended to be meant by anysuch propositions, than as things really agree to those archetypes inhis mind. Is it true of the IDEA of a triangle, that its three anglesare equal to two right ones? It is true also of a triangle, whereverit REALLY EXISTS. Whatever other figure exists, that it is not exactlyanswerable to that idea of a triangle in his mind, is not at allconcerned in that proposition. And therefore he is certain all hisknowledge concerning such ideas is real knowledge: because, intendingthings no further than they agree with those his ideas, he is surewhat he knows concerning those figures, when they have BARELY AN IDEALEXISTENCE in his mind, will hold true of them also when they have A REALEXISTANCE in matter: his consideration being barely of those figures, which are the same wherever or however they exist. 

7. And of Moral. 

And hence it follows that moral knowledge is as capable of realcertainty as mathematics. For certainty being but the perception of theagreement or disagreement of our ideas, and demonstration nothing butthe perception of such agreement, by the intervention of other ideasor mediums; our moral ideas, as well as mathematical, being archetypesthemselves, and so adequate and complete ideas; all the agreement ordisagreement which we shall find in them will produce real knowledge, aswell as in mathematical figures. 

8. Existence not required to make Abstract Knowledge real. 

[For the attaining of knowledge and certainty, it is requisite that wehave determined ideas:] and, to make our knowledge real, it is requisitethat the ideas answer their archetypes. Nor let it be wondered, that Iplace the certainty of our knowledge in the consideration of our ideas, with so little care and regard (as it may seem) to the real existence ofthings: since most of those discourses which take up the thoughts andengage the disputes of those who pretend to make it their business toinquire after truth and certainty, will, I presume, upon examination, befound to be general propositions, and notions in which existence is notat all concerned. All the discourses of the mathematicians about thesquaring of a circle, conic sections, or any other part of mathematics, concern not the existence of any of those figures: but theirdemonstrations, which depend on their ideas, are the same, whether therebe any square or circle existing in the world or no. In the same manner, the truth and certainty of moral discourses abstracts from the lives ofmen, and the existence of those virtues in the world whereof they treat:nor are Tully's Offices less true, because there is nobody in the worldthat exactly practises his rules, and lives up to that pattern of avirtuous man which he has given us, and which existed nowhere when hewrit but in idea. If it be true in speculation, i. E. In idea, thatmurder deserves death, it will also be true in reality of any actionthat exists conformable to BOOK IV. That idea of murder. As for otheractions, the truth of that proposition concerns them not. And thus it isof all other species of things, which have no other essences but thoseideas which are in the minds of men. 

9. Nor will it be less true or certain, because Moral Ideas are of ourown making and naming. 

But it will here be said, that if moral knowledge be placed in thecontemplation of our own moral ideas, and those, as other modes, beof our own making, What strange notions will there be of justice andtemperance? What confusion of virtues and vices, if every one may makewhat ideas of them he pleases? No confusion or disorder in the thingsthemselves, nor the reasonings about them; no more than (in mathematics)there would be a disturbance in the demonstration, or a change in theproperties of figures, and their relations one to another, if a manshould make a triangle with four corners, or a trapezium with four rightangles: that is, in plain English, change the names of the figures, andcall that by one name, which mathematicians call ordinarily by another. For, let a man make to himself the idea of a figure with three angles, whereof one is a right one, and call it, if he please, EQUILATERUM orTRAPEZIUM, or anything else; the properties of, and demonstrations aboutthat idea will be the same as if he called it a rectangular triangle. Iconfess the change of the name, by the impropriety of speech, will atfirst disturb him who knows not what idea it stands for: but as soon asthe figure is drawn, the consequences and demonstrations are plain andclear. Just the same is it in moral knowledge: let a man have the ideaof taking from others, without their consent, what their honest industryhas possessed them of, and call this JUSTICE if he please. He that takesthe name here without the idea put to it will be mistaken, by joininganother idea of his own to that name: but strip the idea of that name, or take it such as it is in the speaker's mind, and the same things willagree to it, as if you called it INJUSTICE. Indeed, wrong names in moraldiscourses breed usually more disorder, because they are not so easilyrectified as in mathematics, where the figure, once drawn and seen, makes the name useless and of no force. For what need of a sign, whenthe thing signified is present and in view? But in moral names, thatcannot be so easily and shortly done, because of the many decompositionsthat go to the making up the complex ideas of those modes. But yet forall this, the miscalling of any of those ideas, contrary to the usualsignification of the words of that language, hinders not but that we mayhave certain and demonstrative knowledge of their several agreements anddisagreements, if we will carefully, as in mathematics, keep to the sameprecise ideas, and trace THEM in their several relations one to another, without being led away by their names. If we but separate the idea underconsideration from the sign that stands for it, our knowledge goesequally on in the discovery of real truth and certainty, whatever soundswe make use of. 

10. Misnaming disturbs not the certainty of the Knowledge

One thing more we are to take notice of, That where God or any otherlaw-maker, hath defined any moral names, there they have made theessence of that species to which that name belongs; and there it isnot safe to apply or use them otherwise: but in other cases it is bareimpropriety of speech to apply them contrary to the common usage ofthe country. But yet even this too disturbs not the certainty of thatknowledge, which is still to be had by a due contemplation and comparingof those even nick-named ideas. 

11. Thirdly, Our complex Ideas of Substances have their Archetypeswithout us; and here knowledge comes short. 

THIRDLY, There is another sort of complex ideas, which, being referredto archetypes without us, may differ from them, and so our knowledgeabout them may come short of being real. Such are our ideas ofsubstances, which, consisting of a collection of simple ideas, supposedtaken from the works of nature, may yet vary from them; by having moreor different ideas united in them than are to be found united in thethings themselves. From whence it comes to pass, that they may, andoften do, fail of being exactly conformable to things themselves. 

12. So far as our complex ideas agree with those Archetypes without us, so far our Knowledge concerning Substances is real. 

I say, then, that to have ideas of SUBSTANCES which, by beingconformable to things, may afford us real knowledge, it is not enough, as in MODES, to put together such ideas as have no inconsistence, thoughthey did never before so exist: v. G. The ideas of sacrilege or perjury, &c. , were as real and true ideas before, as after the existence of anysuch fact. But our ideas of substances, being supposed copies, andreferred to archetypes without us, must still be taken from somethingthat does or has existed: they must not consist of ideas put together atthe pleasure of our thoughts, without any real pattern they were takenfrom, though we can perceive no inconsistence in such a combination. Thereason whereof is because we, knowing not what real constitution it isof substances whereon our simple ideas depend, and which really is thecause of the strict union of some of them one with another, and theexclusion of others; there are very few of them that we can be sureare or are not inconsistent in nature: any further than experience andsensible observation reach Herein, therefore, is founded the reality ofour knowledge concerning substances--That all our complex ideas of themmust be such, and such only, as are made up of such simple ones as havebeen discovered to co-exist in nature. And our ideas being thus true, though not perhaps very exact copies, are yet the subjects of real (asfar as we have any) knowledge of them. Which (as has been already shown)will not be found to reach very far: but so far as it does, it willstill be real knowledge. Whatever ideas we have, the agreement wefind they have with others will still be knowledge. If those ideas beabstract, it will be general knowledge. But to make it real concerningsubstances, the ideas must be taken from the real existence of things. Whatever simple ideas have been found to co-exist in any substance, these we may with confidence join together again, and so make abstractideas of substances. For whatever have once had an union in nature, maybe united again. 

13. In our inquiries about Substances, we must consider Ideas, and notconfine our Thoughts to Names, or Species supposed set out by Names. 

This, if we rightly consider, and confine not our thoughts and abstractideas to names, as if there were, or could be no other SORTS of thingsthan what known names had already determined, and, as it were, set out, we should think of things with greater freedom and less confusion thanperhaps we do. It would possibly be thought a bold paradox, if not avery dangerous falsehood, if I should say that some CHANGELINGS, whohave lived forty years together, without any appearance of reason, aresomething between a man and a beast: which prejudice is founded uponnothing else but a false supposition, that these two names, man andbeast, stand for distinct species so set out by real essences, thatthere can come no other species between them: whereas if we willabstract from those names, and the supposition of such specific essencesmade by nature, wherein all things of the same denominations did exactlyand equally partake; if we would not fancy that there were a certainnumber of these essences, wherein all things, as in moulds, were castand formed; we should find that the idea of the shape, motion, and lifeof a man without reason, is as much a distinct idea, and makes as much adistinct sort of things from man and beast, as the idea of the shape ofan ass with reason would be different from either that of man or beast, and be a species of an animal between, or distinct from both. 

14. Objection against a Changeling being something between a Man andBeast, answered. 

Here everybody will be ready to ask, If changelings may be supposedsomething between man and beast, pray what are they? I answer, CHANGELINGS; which is as good a word to signify something different fromthe signification of MAN or BEAST, as the names man and beast are tohave significations different one from the other. This, well considered, would resolve this matter, and show my meaning without any more ado. ButI am not so unacquainted with the zeal of some men, which enables themto spin consequences, and to see religion threatened, whenever any oneventures to quit their forms of speaking, as not to foresee what namessuch a proposition as this is like to be charged with: and without doubtit will be asked, If changelings are something between man and beast, what will become of them in the other world? To which I answer, I. Itconcerns me not to know or inquire. To their own master they stand orfall. It will make their state neither better nor worse, whether wedetermine anything of it or no. They are in the hands of a faithfulCreator and a bountiful Father, who disposes not of his creaturesaccording to our narrow thoughts or opinions, nor distinguishes themaccording to names and species of our contrivance. And we that know solittle of this present world we are in, may, I think, content ourselveswithout being peremptory in defining the different states whichcreatures shall come into when they go off this stage. It may sufficeus, that He hath made known to all those who are capable of instruction, discoursing, and reasoning, that they shall come to an account, andreceive according to what they have done in this body. 

15. What will become of Changelings in a future state?

But, Secondly, I answer, The force of these men's question (viz. Willyou deprive changelings of a future state?) is founded on one of thesetwo suppositions, which are both false. The first is, That all thingsthat have the outward shape and appearance of a man must necessarily bedesigned to an immortal future being after this life: or, secondly, Thatwhatever is of human birth must be so. Take away these imaginations, andsuch questions will be groundless and ridiculous. I desire then thosewho think there is no more but an accidental difference betweenthemselves and changelings, the essence in both being exactly the same, to consider, whether they can imagine immortality annexed to any outwardshape of the body; the very proposing it is, I suppose, enough to makethem disown it. No one yet, that ever I heard of, how much soeverimmersed in matter, allowed that excellency to any figure of the grosssensible outward consequence of it; or that any mass of mattershould, after its dissolution here, be again restored hereafter to aneverlasting state of sense, perception, and knowledge, only because itwas moulded into this or that figure, and had such a particular frameof its visible parts. Such an opinion as this, placing immortality in acertain superficial figure, turns out of doors all consideration of soulor spirit; upon whose account alone some corporeal beings have hithertobeen concluded immortal, and others not. This is to attribute more tothe outside than inside of things; and to place the excellency of a manmore in the external shape of his body, than internal perfections of hissoul: which is but little better than to annex the great and inestimableadvantage of immortality and life everlasting, which he has above othermaterial beings, to annex it, I say, to the cut of his beard, or thefashion of his coat. For this or that outward mark of our bodies no morecarries with it the hope of an eternal duration, than the fashion of aman's suit gives him reasonable grounds to imagine it will never wearout, or that it will make him immortal. It will perhaps be said, thatnobody thinks that the shape makes anything immortal, but it is theshape that is the sign of a rational soul within, which is immortal. Iwonder who made it the sign of any such thing: for barely saying it, will not make it so. It would require some proofs to persuade one of it. No figure that I know speaks any such language. For it may as rationallybe concluded, that the dead body of a man, wherein there is to be foundno more appearance or action of life than there is in a statue, has yetnevertheless a living soul in it, because of its shape; as that thereis a rational soul in a changeling, because he has the outside of arational creature, when his actions carry far less marks of reason withthem, in the whole course of his life than what are to be found in manya beast. 

16. Monsters

But it is the issue of rational parents, and must therefore be concludedto have a rational soul. I know not by what logic you must so conclude. I am sure this is a conclusion that men nowhere allow of. For if theydid, they would not make bold, as everywhere they do to destroyill-formed and mis-shaped productions. Ay, but these are MONSTERS. Let them be so: what will your drivelling, unintelligent, intractablechangeling be? Shall a defect in the body make a monster; a defect inthe mind (the far more noble, and, in the common phrase, the far moreessential part) not? Shall the want of a nose, or a neck, make amonster, and put such issue out of the rank of men; the want of reasonand understanding, not? This is to bring all back again to what wasexploded just now: this is to place all in the shape, and to take themeasure of a man only by his outside. To show that according to theordinary way of reasoning in this matter, people do lay the whole stresson the figure, and resolve the whole essence of the species of man (asthey make it) into the outward shape, how unreasonable soever it be, andhow much soever they disown it, we need but trace their thoughtsand practice a little further, and then it will plainly appear. Thewell-shaped changeling is a man, has a rational soul, though it appearnot: this is past doubt, say you: make the ears a little longer, andmore pointed, and the nose a little flatter than ordinary, and then youbegin to boggle: make the face yet narrower, flatter, and longer, andthen you are at a stand: add still more and more of the likeness of abrute to it, and let the head be perfectly that of some other animal, then presently it is a monster; and it is demonstration with you that ithath no rational soul, and must be destroyed. Where now (I ask) shall bethe just measure; which the utmost bounds of that shape, that carrieswith it a rational soul? For, since there have been human foetusesproduced, half beast and half man; and others three parts one, and onepart the other; and so it is possible they may be in all the variety ofapproaches to the one or the other shape, and may have several degreesof mixture of the likeness of a man, or a brute;--I would gladly knowwhat are those precise lineaments, which, according to this hypothesis, are or are not capable of a rational soul to be joined to them. Whatsort of outside is the certain sign that there is or is not such aninhabitant within? For till that be done, we talk at random of MAN: andshall always, I fear, do so, as long as we give ourselves up to certainsounds, and the imaginations of settled and fixed species in nature, weknow not what. But, after all, I desire it may be considered, that thosewho think they have answered the difficulty, by telling us, that amis-shaped foetus is a MONSTER, run into the same fault they are arguingagainst; by constituting a species between man and beast. For what else, I pray, is their monster in the case, (if the word monster signifiesanything at all, ) but something neither man nor beast, but partakingsomewhat of either? And just so is the CHANGELING before mentioned. Sonecessary is it to quit the common notion of species and essences, if wewill truly look into the nature of things, and examine them by what ourfaculties can discover in them as they exist, and not by groundlessfancies that have been taken up about them. 

17. Words and Species. 

I have mentioned this here, because I think we cannot be too cautiousthat words and species, in the ordinary notions which we have been usedto of them, impose not on us. For I am apt to think therein lies onegreat obstacle to our clear and distinct knowledge, especially inreference to substances: and from thence has rose a great part of thedifficulties about truth and certainty. Would we accustom ourselves toseparate our contemplations and reasonings from words, we might in agreat measure remedy this inconvenience within our own thoughts: but yetit would still disturb us in our discourse with others, as long as weretained the opinion, that SPECIES and their ESSENCES were anything elsebut our abstract ideas (such as they are) with names annexed to them, tobe the signs of them. 

18. Recapitulation. 

Wherever we perceive the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas, there is certain knowledge: and wherever we are sure those ideas agreewith the reality of things, there is certain real knowledge. Of whichagreement of our ideas with the reality of things, having here giventhe marks, I think, I have shown WHEREIN IT IS THAT CERTAINTY, REALCERTAINTY, CONSISTS. Which, whatever it was to others, was, I confess, to me heretofore, one of those desiderata which I found great want of. 

CHAPTER V. OF TRUTH IN GENERAL. 

1. What Truth is. 

WHAT is truth? was an inquiry many ages since; and it being that whichall mankind either do, or pretend to search after, it cannot but beworth our while carefully to examine wherein it consists; and soacquaint ourselves with the nature of it, as to observe how the minddistinguishes it from falsehood. 

2. A right joining or separating of signs, i. E. Either Ideas or Words. 

Truth, then, seems to me, in the proper import of the word, to signifynothing but THE JOINING OR SEPERATING OF SIGNS, AS THE THINGS SIGNIFIEDBY THEM DO AGREE OR DISAGREE ONE WITH ANOTHER. The joining or separatingof signs here meant, is what by another name we call PROPOSITION. Sothat truth properly belongs only to propositions: whereof there are twosorts, viz. Mental and verbal; as there are two sorts of signs commonlymade use of, viz. Ideas and words. 

3. Which make mental or verbal Propositions. 

To form a clear notion of truth, it is very necessary to consider truthof thought, and truth of words, distinctly one from another: but yet itis very difficult to treat of them asunder. Because it is unavoidable, in treating of mental propositions, to make use of words: and then theinstances given of mental propositions cease immediately to be barelymental, and become verbal. For a MENTAL PROPOSITION being nothing but abare consideration of the ideas, as they are in our minds, stripped ofnames, they lose the nature of purely mental propositions as soon asthey are put into words. 

4. Mental Propositions are very hard to be treated of. 

And that which makes it yet harder to treat of mental and verbalpropositions separately is, that most men, if not all, in their thinkingand reasonings within themselves, make use of words instead of ideas; atleast when the subject of their meditation contains in it complex ideas. Which is a great evidence of the imperfection and uncertainty of ourideas of that kind, and may, if attentively made use of, serve fora mark to show us what are those things we have clear and perfectestablished ideas of, and what not. For if we will curiously observe theway our mind takes in thinking and reasoning, we shall find, I suppose, that when we make any propositions within our own thoughts about WHITEor BLACK, SWEET or BITTER, a TRIANGLE or a CIRCLE, we can and oftendo frame in our minds the ideas themselves, without reflecting on thenames. But when we would consider, or make propositions about the morecomplex ideas, as of a MAN, VITRIOL, FORTITUDE, GLORY, we usually putthe name for the idea: because the ideas these names stand for, beingfor the most part imperfect, confused, and undetermined, we reflecton the names themselves, because they are more clear, certain, anddistinct, and readier occur to our thoughts than the pure ideas: and sowe make use of these words instead of the ideas themselves, even whenwe would meditate and reason within ourselves, and make tacit mentalpropositions. In substances, as has been already noticed, this isoccasioned by the imperfections of our ideas: we making the name standfor the real essence, of which we have no idea at all. In modes, it isoccasioned by the great number of simple ideas that go to the makingthem up. For many of them being compounded, the name occurs much easierthan the complex idea itself, which requires time and attention to berecollected, and exactly represented to the mind, even in those men whohave formerly been at the pains to do it; and is utterly impossibleto be done by those who, though they have ready in their memory thegreatest part of the common words of that language, yet perhaps nevertroubled themselves in all their lives to consider what precise ideasthe most of them stood for. Some confused or obscure notions have servedtheir turns; and many who talk very much of RELIGION and CONSCIENCE, of CHURCH and FAITH, of POWER and RIGHT, of OBSTRUCTIONS and HUMOURS, MELANCHOLY and CHOLER, would perhaps have little left in their thoughtsand meditations, if one should desire them to think only of the thingsthemselves, and lay by those words with which they so often confoundothers, and not seldom themselves also. 

5. Mental and Verbal Propositions contrasted. 

But to return to the consideration of truth: we must, I say, observe twosorts of propositions that we are capable of making:--

First, MENTAL, wherein the ideas in our understandings are without theuse of words put together, or separated, by the mind perceiving orjudging of their agreement or disagreement. 

Secondly, VERBAL propositions, which are words, the signs of our ideas, put together or separated in affirmative or negative sentences. By whichway of affirming or denying, these signs, made by sounds, are, as itwere, put together or separated from another. So that propositionconsists in joining or separating signs; and truth consists in theputting together or separating those signs, according as the thingswhich they stand for agree or disagree. 

6. When Mental Propositions contain real Truth, and when Verbal. 

Every one's experience will satisfy him, that the mind, either byperceiving, or supposing, the agreement or disagreement of any of itsideas, does tacitly within itself put them into a kind of propositionaffirmative or negative; which I have endeavoured to express by theterms putting together and separating. But this action of the mind, which is so familiar to every thinking and reasoning man, is easier tobe conceived by reflecting on what passes in us when we affirm or deny, than to be explained by words. When a man has in his head the idea oftwo lines, viz. The side and diagonal of a square, whereof the diagonalis an inch long, he may have the idea also of the division of that lineinto a certain number of equal parts; v. G. Into five, ten, a hundred, athousand, or any other number, and may have the idea of that inch linebeing divisible, or not divisible, into such equal parts, as a certainnumber of them will be equal to the sideline. Now, whenever heperceives, believes, or supposes such a kind of divisibility to agree ordisagree to his idea of that line, he, as it were, joins or separatesthose two ideas, viz. The idea of that line, and the idea of that kindof divisibility; and so makes a mental proposition, which is true orfalse, according as such a kind of divisibility, a divisibility intosuch ALIQUOT parts, does really agree to that line or no. When ideas areso put together, or separated in the mind, as they or the things theystand for do agree or not, that is, as I may call it, MENTAL TRUTH. ButTRUTH OF WORDS is something more; and that is the affirming or denyingof words one of another, as the ideas they stand for agree or disagree:and this again is two-fold; either purely verbal and trifling, which Ishall speak of, (chap. Viii. , ) or real and instructive; which is theobject of that real knowledge which we have spoken of already. 

7. Objection against verbal Truth, that thus it may all be chimerical. 

But here again will be apt to occur the same doubt about truth, that didabout knowledge: and it will be objected, that if truth be nothing butthe joining and separating of words in propositions, as the ideas theystand for agree or disagree in men's minds, the knowledge of truth isnot so valuable a thing as it is taken to be, nor worth the pains andtime men employ in the search of it: since by this account it amounts tono more than the conformity of words to the chimeras of men's brains. Who knows not what odd notions many men's heads are filled with, andwhat strange ideas all men's brains are capable of? But if we rest here, we know the truth of nothing by this rule, but of the visionary words inour own imaginations; nor have other truth, but what as much concernsharpies and centaurs, as men and horses. For those, and the like, may beideas in our heads, and have their agreement or disagreement there, aswell as the ideas of real beings, and so have as true propositions madeabout them. And it will be altogether as true a proposition to say ALLCENTAURS ARE ANIMALS, as that ALL MEN ARE ANIMALS; and the certainty ofone as great as the other. For in both the propositions, the words areput together according to the agreement of the ideas in our minds: andthe agreement of the idea of animal with that of centaur is as clear andvisable to the mind, as the agreement of the idea of animal with that ofman; and so these two propositions are equally true, equally certain. But of what use is all such truth to us?

8. Answered, Real Truth is about Ideas agreeing to things. 

Though what has been said in the foregoing chapter to distinguish realfrom imaginary knowledge might suffice here, in answer to this doubt, to distinguish real truth from chimerical, or (if you please) barelynominal, they depending both on the same foundation; yet it may not beamiss here again to consider, that though our words signify things, thetruth they contain when put into propositions will be only verbal, whenthey stand for ideas in the mind that have not an agreement with thereality of things. And therefore truth as well as knowledge may wellcome under the distinction of verbal and real; that being onlyverbal truth, wherein terms are joined according to the agreement ordisagreement of the ideas they stand for; without regarding whether ourideas are such as really have, or are capable of having, an existencein nature. But then it is they contain REAL TRUTH, when these signs arejoined, as our ideas agree; and when our ideas are such as we know arecapable of having an existence in nature: which in substances we cannotknow, but by knowing that such have existed. 

9. Truth and Falsehood in general. 

Truth is the marking down in words the agreement or disagreement ofideas as it is. Falsehood is the marking down in words the agreement ordisagreement of ideas otherwise than it is. And so far as these ideas, thus marked by sounds, agree to their archetypes, so far only is thetruth real. The knowledge of this truth consists in knowing what ideasthe words stand for, and the perception of the agreement or disagreementof those ideas, according as it is marked by those words. 

10. General Propositions to be treated of more at large. 

But because words are looked on as the great conduits of truth andknowledge, and that in conveying and receiving of truth, and commonly inreasoning about it, we make use of words and propositions, I shall moreat large inquire wherein the certainty of real truths contained inpropositions consists, and where it is to be had; and endeavour to showin what sort of universal propositions we are capable of being certainof their real truth or falsehood. 

I shall begin with GENERAL propositions, as those which most employ ourthoughts, and exercise our contemplation. General truths are most lookedafter by the mind as those that most enlarge our knowledge; and by theircomprehensiveness satisfying us at once of many particulars, enlarge ourview, and shorten our way to knowledge. 

11. Moral and Metaphysical Truth. 

Besides truth taken in the strict sense before mentioned, there areother sorts of truths: As, 1. Moral truth, which is speaking of thingsaccording to the persuasion of our own minds, though the proposition wespeak agree not to the reality of things; 2. Metaphysical truth, whichis nothing but the real existence of things, conformable to the ideas towhich we have annexed their names. This, though it seems to consist inthe very beings of things, yet, when considered a little nearly, willappear to include a tacit proposition, whereby the mind joins thatparticular thing to the idea it had before settled with the name toit. But these considerations of truth, either having been before takennotice of, or not being much to our present purpose, it may suffice hereonly to have mentioned them. 

CHAPTER VI. OF UNIVERSAL PROPOSITIONS: THEIR TRUTH AND CERTAINTY. 

1. Treating of Words necessary to Knowledge. 

THOUGH the examining and judging of ideas by themselves, their namesbeing quite laid aside, be the best and surest way to clear and distinctknowledge: yet, through the prevailing custom of using sounds for ideas, I think it is very seldom practised. Every one may observe how common itis for names to be made use of, instead of the ideas themselves, evenwhen men think and reason within their own breasts; especially if theideas be very complex, and made up of a great collection of simple ones. This makes the consideration of WORDS and PROPOSITIONS so necessarya part of the Treatise of Knowledge, that it is very hard to speakintelligibly of the one, without explaining the other. 

2. General Truths hardly to be understood, but in verbal Propositions. 

All the knowledge we have, being only of particular or general truths, it is evident that whatever may be done in the former of these, thelatter, which is that which with reason is most sought after, can neverbe well made known, and is very seldom apprehended, but as conceivedand expressed in words. It is not, therefore, out of our way, in theexamination of our knowledge, to inquire into the truth and certainty ofuniversal propositions. 

3. Certainty twofold--of Truth and of Knowledge. 

But that we may not be misled in this case by that which is the dangereverywhere, I mean by the doubtfulness of terms, it is fit to observethat certainty is twofold: CERTAINTY OF TRUTH and CERTAINTY OFKNOWLEDGE. Certainty of truth is, when words are so put together inpropositions as exactly to express the agreement or disagreement of theideas they stand for, as really it is. Certainty of knowledge is toperceive the agreement or disagreement of ideas, as expressed in anyproposition. This we usually call knowing, or being certain of the truthof any proposition. 

4. No Proposition can be certainly known to be true, where the realEssence of each Species mentioned is not known. 

Now, because we cannot be certain of the truth of any generalproposition, unless we know the precise bounds and extent of the speciesits terms stand for, it is necessary we should know the essence of eachspecies, which is that which constitutes and bounds it. 

This, in all simple ideas and modes, is not hard to do. For in thesethe real and nominal essence being the same, or, which is all one, theabstract idea which the general term stands for being the sole essenceand boundary that is or can be supposed of the species, there can be nodoubt how far the species extends, or what things are comprehended undereach term; which, it is evident, are all that have an exact conformitywith the idea it stands for, and no other. But in substances, whereina real essence, distinct from the nominal, is supposed to constitute, determine, and bound the species, the extent of the general word is veryuncertain; because, not knowing this real essence, we cannot know whatis, or what is not of that species; and, consequently, what may or maynot with certainty be affirmed of it. And thus, speaking of a MAN, or GOLD, or any other species of natural substances, as supposedconstituted by a precise and real essence which nature regularly impartsto every individual of that kind, whereby it is made to be of thatspecies, we cannot be certain of the truth of any affirmation ornegation made of it. For man or gold, taken in this sense, and usedfor species of things constituted by real essences, different from thecomplex idea in the mind of the speaker, stand for we know not what; andthe extent of these species, with such boundaries, are so unknown andundetermined, that it is impossible with any certainty to affirm, thatall men are rational, or that all gold is yellow. But where the nominalessence is kept to, as the boundary of each species, and men extend theapplication of any general term no further than to the particular thingsin which the complex idea it stands for is to be found, there they arein no danger to mistake the bounds of each species, nor can be in doubt, on this account, whether any proposition be true or not. I have chosento explain this uncertainty of propositions in this scholastic way, andhave made use of the terms of ESSENCES, and SPECIES, on purpose to showthe absurdity and inconvenience there is to think of them as of anyother sort of realities, than barely abstract ideas with names to them. To suppose that the species of things are anything but the sorting ofthem under general names, according as they agree to several abstractideas of which we make those names signs, is to confound truth, andintroduce uncertainty into all general propositions that can be madeabout them. Though therefore these things might, to people not possessedwith scholastic learning, be treated of in a better and clearer wayyet those wrong notions of essences or species having got root in mostpeople's minds who have received any tincture from the learning whichhas prevailed in this part of the world, are to be discovered andremoved, to make way for that use of words which should convey certaintywith it. 

5. This more particularly concerns Substances. 

The names of substances, then, whenever made to stand for species whichare supposed to be constituted by real essences which we know not, arenot capable to convey certainty to the understanding. Of the truthgeneral propositions made up of such terms we cannot be sure. [Thereason whereof is plain: for how can we be sure that this or thatquality is in gold, when we know not what is or is not gold? Since inthis way of speaking, nothing is gold but what partakes of an essence, which we, not knowing, cannot know where it is or is not, and so cannotbe sure that any parcel of matter in the world is or is not in thissense gold; being incurably ignorant whether IT has of has not thatwhich makes anything to be called gold; i. E. That real essence of goldwhereof we have no idea at all. This being as impossible for us to knowas it is for a blind man to tell in what flower the colour of a pansy isor is not to be found, whilst he has no idea of the colour of a pansy atall. Or if we could (which is impossible) certainly know where a realessence, which we know not, is, v. G. In what parcels of matter the realessence of gold is, yet could we not be sure that this or that qualitycould with truth be affirmed of gold; since it is impossible for us toknow that this or that quality or idea has a necessary connexion witha real essence of which we have no idea at all, whatever species thatsupposed real essence may be imagined to constitute. ]

6. 

On the other side, the names of substances, when made use of as theyshould be, for the ideas men have in their minds, though they carry aclear and determinate signification with them, will not yet serve us tomake many universal propositions of whose truth we can be certain. Notbecause in this use of them we are uncertain what things are signifiedby them, but because the complex ideas they stand for are suchcombinations of simple ones as carry not with them any discoverableconnexion or repugnancy, but with a very few other ideas. 

7. 

The complex ideas that our names of the species of substances properlystand for, are collections of such qualities as have been observed toco-exist in an unknown substratum, which we call substance; but whatother qualities necessarily co-exist with such combinations, we cannotcertainly know, unless we can discover their natural dependence; which, in their primary qualities, we can go but a very little way in; and inall their secondary qualities we can discover no connexion at all: forthe reasons mentioned, chap. Iii. Viz. 1. Because we know not thereal constitutions of substances, on which each secondary qualityparticularly depends. 2. Did we know that, it would serve us only forexperimental (not universal) knowledge; and reach with certainty nofurther than that bare instance: because our understandings candiscover no conceivable connexion between any secondary quality and anymodification whatsoever of any of the primary ones. And therefore thereare very few general propositions to be made concerning substances, which can carry with them undoubted certainty. 

8. Instance in Gold. 

'All gold is fixed, ' is a proposition whose truth we cannot be certainof, how universally soever it be believed. For if, according to theuseless imagination of the Schools, any one supposes the term gold tostand for a species of things set out by nature, by a real essencebelonging to it, it is evident he knows not what particular substancesare of that species; and so cannot with certainty affirm anythinguniversally of gold. But if he makes gold stand for a species determinedby its nominal essence, let the nominal essence, for example, be thecomplex idea of a body of a certain yellow colour, malleable, fusible, and heavier than any other known;--in this proper use of the word gold, there is no difficulty to know what is or is not gold. But yet no otherquality can with certainty be universally affirmed or denied of gold, but what hath a DISCOVERABLE connexion or inconsistency with thatnominal essence. Fixedness, for example, having no necessary connexionthat we can discover, with the colour, weight, or any other simpleidea of our complex one, or with the whole combination together; it isimpossible that we should certainly know the truth of this proposition, that all gold is fixed. 

9. No discoverable necessary connexion between nominal essence gold, andother simple ideas. 

As there is no discoverable connexion between fixedness and the colour, weight, and other simple ideas of that nominal essence of gold; so, if we make our complex idea of gold, a body yellow, fusable, ductile, weighty, and fixed, we shall be at the same uncertainty concerningsolubility in AQUA REGIA, and for the same reason. Since we can never, from consideration of the ideas themselves, with certainty affirm ordeny of a body whose complex idea is made up of yellow, very weighty, ductile, fusible, and fixed, that it is soluble in AQUA REGIA: and soon of the rest of its qualities. I would gladly meet with one generalaffirmation concerning any will, no doubt, be presently objected, Is notthis an universal proposition, ALL GOLD IS MALLEABLE? To which I answer, It is a very complex idea the word gold stands for. But then here isnothing affirmed of gold, but that that sound stands for an idea inwhich malleableness is contained: and such a sort of truth and certaintyas this it is, to say a centaur is four-footed. But if malleableness makenot a part of the specific essence the name of gold stands for, it isplain, ALL GOLD IS MALLEABLE, is not a certain proposition. Because, let the complex idea of gold be made up of whichsoever of its otherqualities you please, malleableness will not appear to depend on thatcomplex idea, nor follow from any simple one contained in it: theconnexion that malleableness has (if it has any) with those otherqualities being only by the intervention of the real constitution of itsinsensible parts; which, since we know not, it is impossible we shouldperceive that connexion, unless we could discover that which ties themtogether. 

10. As far as any such Co-existence can be known, so far UniversalPropositions maybe certain. But this will go but a little way. 

The more, indeed, of these co-existing qualities we unite into onecomplex idea, under one name, the more precise and determinate we makethe signification of that word; but never yet make it thereby morecapable of universal certainty, IN RESPECT OF OTHER QUALITIES NOTCONTAINED IN OUR COMPLEX IDEA: since we perceive not their connexion ordependence on one another; being ignorant both of that real constitutionin which they are all founded, and also how they flow from it. For thechief part of our knowledge concerning substances is not, as in otherthings, barely of the relation of two ideas that may exist separately;but is of the necessary connexion and co-existence of several distinctideas in the same subject, or of their repugnancy so to co-exist. Couldwe begin at the other end, and discover what it was wherein that colourconsisted, what made a body lighter or heavier, what texture of partsmade it malleable, fusible, and fixed, and fit to be dissolved in thissort of liquor, and not in another;--if, I say, we had such an ideaas this of bodies, and could perceive wherein all sensible qualitiesoriginally consist, and how they are produced; we might frame suchabstract ideas of them as would furnish us with matter of more generalknowledge, and enable us to make universal propositions, that shouldcarry general truth and certainty with them. But whilst our complexideas of the sorts of substances are so remote from that internal realconstitution on which their sensible qualities depend, and are made upof nothing but an imperfect collection of those apparent qualities oursenses can discover, there can be few general propositions concerningsubstances of whose real truth we can be certainly assured; since thereare but few simple ideas of whose connexion and necessary co-existencewe can have certain and undoubted knowledge. I imagine, amongst all thesecondary qualities of substances, and the powers relating to them, there cannot any two be named, whose necessary co-existence, orrepugnance to co-exist, can certainly be known; unless in those of thesame sense, which necessarily exclude one another, as I have elsewhereshowed. No one, I think, by the colour that is in any body, cancertainly know what smell, taste, sound, or tangible qualities it has, nor what alterations it is capable to make or receive on or from otherbodies. The same may be said of the sound or taste, &c. Our specificnames of substances standing for any collections of such ideas, itis not to be wondered that we can with them make very few generalpropositions of undoubted real certainty. But yet so far as any complexidea of any sort of substances contains in it any simple idea, whoseNECESSARY co-existence with any other MAY be discovered, so faruniversal propositions may with certainty be made concerning it: v. G. Could any one discover a necessary connexion between malleableness andthe colour or weight of gold, or any other part of the complex ideasignified by that name, he might make a certain universal propositionconcerning gold in this respect; and the real truth of this proposition, that ALL GOLD IS MALLIABLE, would be as certain as of this, THE THREEANGLES OF ALL RIGHT-LINED TRIANGLES ARE ALL EQUAL TO TWO RIGHT ONES. 

11. The Qualities which make our complex Ideas of Substances dependmostly on external, remote, and unperceived Causes. 

Had we such ideas of substances as to know what real constitutionsproduce those sensible qualities we find in them, and how thosequalities flowed from thence, we could, by the specific ideas oftheir real essences in our own minds, more certainly find out theirproperties, and discover what qualities they had or had not, than we cannow by our senses: and to know the properties of gold, it would beno more necessary that gold should exist, and that we should makeexperiments upon it, than it is necessary for the knowing the propertiesof a triangle, that a triangle should exist in any matter, the idea inour minds would serve for the one as well as the other. But we are sofar from being admitted into the secrets of nature, that we scarce somuch as ever approach the first entrance towards them. For we are wontto consider the substances we meet with, each of them, as an entirething by itself, having all its qualities in itself, and independent ofother things; overlooking, for the most part, the operations of thoseinvisible fluids they are encompassed with, and upon whose motions andoperations depend the greatest part of those qualities which are takennotice of in them, and are made by us the inherent marks of distinctionwhereby we know and denominate them. Put a piece of gold anywhere byitself, separate from the reach and influence of all other bodies, it will immediately lose all its colour and weight, and perhapsmalleableness too; which, for aught I know, would be changed into aperfect friability. Water, in which to us fluidity is an essentialquality, left to itself, would cease to be fluid. But if inanimatebodies owe so much of their present state to other bodies without them, that they would not be what they appear to us were those bodies thatenviron them removed; it is yet more so in vegetables, which arenourished, grow, and produce leaves, flowers, and seeds, in a constantsuccession. And if we look a little nearer into the state of animals, we shall find that their dependence, as to life, motion, and themost considerable qualities to be observed in them, is so wholly onextrinsical causes and qualities of other bodies that make no part ofthem, that they cannot subsist a moment without them: though yet thosebodies on which they depend are little taken notice of, and make no partof the complex ideas we frame of those animals. Take the air but for aminute from the greatest part of living creatures, and they presentlylose sense, life, and motion. This the necessity of breathing has forcedinto our knowledge. But how many other extrinsical and possibly veryremote bodies do the springs of these admirable machines depend on, which are not vulgarly observed, or so much as thought on; and how manyare there which the severest inquiry can never discover? The inhabitantsof this spot of the universe, though removed so many millions ofmiles from the sun, yet depend so much on the duly tempered motion ofparticles coming from or agitated by it, that were this earth removedbut a small part of the distance out of its present situation, andplaced a little further or nearer that source of heat, it is more thanprobable that the greatest part of the animals in it would immediatelyperish: since we find them so often destroyed by an excess or defect ofthe sun's warmth, which an accidental position in some parts of this ourlittle globe exposes them to. The qualities observed in a loadstone mustneeds have their source far beyond the confines of that body; and theravage made often on several sorts of animals by invisible causes, thecertain death (as we are told) of some of them, by barely passingthe line, or, as it is certain of other, by being removed into aneighbouring country; evidently show that the concurrence and operationsof several bodies, with which they are seldom thought to have anythingto do, is absolutely necessary to make them be what they appear to us, and to preserve those qualities by which we know and distinguish them. We are then quite out of the way, when we think that things containWITHIN THEMSELVES the qualities that appear to us in them; and wein vain search for that constitution within the body of a fly or anelephant, upon which depend those qualities and powers we observe inthem. For which, perhaps, to understand them aright, we ought to looknot only beyond this our earth and atmosphere, but even beyond the sunor remotest star our eyes have yet discovered. For how much the beingand operation of particular substances in this our globe depends oncauses utterly beyond our view, is impossible for us to determine. Wesee and perceive some of the motions and grosser operations of thingshere about us; but whence the streams come that keep all these curiousmachines in motion and repair, how conveyed and modified, is beyond ournotice and apprehension: and the great parts and wheels, as I may sosay, of this stupendous structure of the universe, may, for aught weknow, have such a connexion and dependence in their influences andoperations one upon another, that perhaps things in this our mansionwould put on quite another face, and cease to be what they are, if someone of the stars or great bodies incomprehensibly remote from us, should cease to be or move as it does. This is certain: things, howeverabsolute and entire they seem in themselves, are but retainers to otherparts of nature, for that which they are most taken notice of by us. Their observable qualities, actions, and powers are owing to somethingwithout them; and there is not so complete and perfect a part that weknow of nature, which does not owe the being it has, and the excellencesof it, to its neighbours; and we must not confine our thoughts withinthe surface of any body, but look a great deal further, to comprehendperfectly those qualities that are in it. 

12. Our nominal essences of Substances furnish few universalpropositions about them that are certain. 

If this be so, it is not to be wondered that we have very imperfectideas of substances, and that the real essences, on which depend theirproperties and operations, are unknown to us. We cannot discover so muchas that size, figure, and texture of their minute and active parts, which is really in much less the different motions and impulses made inand upon them by bodies from without, upon which depends, and by whichis formed the greatest and most remarkable part of those qualities weobserve in them, and of which our complex ideas of them are made up. This consideration alone is enough to put an end to all our hopes ofever having the ideas of their real essences; which whilst we want, thenominal essences we make use of instead of them will be able tofurnish us but very sparingly with any general knowledge, or universalpropositions capable of real certainty. 

13. Judgment of Probability concerning Substances may reach further: butthat is not Knowledge. 

We are not therefore to wonder, if certainty be to be found in very fewgeneral propositions made concerning substances: our knowledge of theirqualities and properties goes very seldom further than our senses reachand inform us. Possibly inquisitive and observing men may, by strengthof judgment, penetrate further, and, on probabilities taken from waryobservation, and hints well laid together, often guess right at whatexperience has not yet discovered to them. But this is but guessingstill; it amounts only to opinion, and has not that certainty which isrequisite to knowledge. For all general knowledge lies only in our ownthoughts, and consists barely in the contemplation of our own abstractideas. Wherever we perceive any agreement or disagreement amongst them, there we have general knowledge; and by putting the names of those ideastogether accordingly in propositions, can with certainty pronouncegeneral truths. But because the abstract ideas of substances, forwhich their specific names stand, whenever they have any distinctand determinate signification, have a discoverable connexion orinconsistency with but a very few other ideas, the certainty ofuniversal propositions concerning substances is very narrow and scanty, in that part which is our principal inquiry concerning them; and thereare scarce any of the names of substances, let the idea it is appliedto be what it will, of which we can generally, and with certainty, pronounce, that it has or has not this or that other quality belongingto it, and constantly co-existing or inconsistent with that idea, wherever it is to be found. 

14. What is requisite for our Knowledge of Substances. 

Before we can have any tolerable knowledge of this kind, we must Firstknow what changes the primary qualities of one body do regularly producein the primary qualities of another, and how. Secondly, We must knowwhat primary qualities of any body produce certain sensations or ideasin us. This is in truth no less than to know ALL the effects of matter, under its divers modifications of bulk, figure, cohesion of parts, motion and rest. Which, I think every body will allow, is utterlyimpossible to be known by us without revelation. Nor if it were revealedto us what sort of figure, bulk, and motion of corpuscles would producein us the sensation of a yellow colour, and what sort of figure, bulk, and texture of parts in the superficies of any body were fit to givesuch corpuscles their due motion to produce that colour; would that beenough to make universal propositions with certainty, concerning theseveral sorts of them; unless we had faculties acute enough to perceivethe precise bulk, figure, texture, and motion of bodies, in those minuteparts, by which they operate on our senses, so that we might by thoseframe our abstract ideas of them. I have mentioned here onlycorporeal substances, whose operations seem to lie more level to ourunderstandings. For as to the operations of spirits, both their thinkingand moving of bodies, we at first sight find ourselves at a loss; thoughperhaps, when we have applied our thoughts a little nearer to theconsideration of bodies and their operations, and examined how far ournotions, even in these, reach with any clearness beyond sensible matterof fact, we shall be bound to confess that, even in these too, ourdiscoveries amount to very little beyond perfect ignorance andincapacity. 

15. Whilst our complex Ideas of Substances contain not ideas of theirreal Constitutions, we can make but few general Propositions concerningthem. 

This is evident, the abstract complex ideas of substances, for whichtheir general names stand, not comprehending their real constitutions, can afford us very little universal certainty. Because our ideas of themare not made up of that on which those qualities we observe in them, andwould inform ourselves about, do depend, or with which they have anycertain connexion: v. G. Let the ideas to which we give the name MAN be, as it commonly is, a body of the ordinary shape, with sense, voluntarymotion, and reason joined to it. This being the abstract idea, andconsequently the essence of OUR species, man, we can make but very fewgeneral certain propositions concerning man, standing for such an idea. Because, not knowing the real constitution on which sensation, power ofmotion, and reasoning, with that peculiar shape, depend, and wherebythey are united together in the same subject, there are very few otherqualities with which we can perceive them to have a necessary connexion:and therefore we cannot with certainty affirm: That all men sleep byintervals; That no man can be nourished by wood or stones; That all menwill be poisoned by hemlock: because these ideas have no connexion norrepugnancy with this our nominal essence of man, with this abstract ideathat name stands for. We must, in these and the like, appeal to trial inparticular subjects, which can reach but a little way. We must contentourselves with probability in the rest: but can have no generalcertainty, whilst our specific idea of man contains not that realconstitution which is the root wherein all his inseparable qualities areunited, and from whence they flow. Whilst our idea the word MAN standsfor is only an imperfect collection of some sensible qualities andpowers in him, there is no discernible connexion or repugnance betweenour specific idea, and the operation of either the parts of hemlock orstones upon his constitution. There are animals that safely eat hemlock, and others that are nourished by wood and stones: but as long as we wantideas of those real constitutions of different sorts of animals whereonthese and the like qualities and powers depend, we must not hope toreach certainty in universal propositions concerning them. Those fewideas only which have a discernible connexion with our nominal essence, or any part of it, can afford us such propositions. But these are sofew, and of so little moment, that we may justly look on our certaingeneral knowledge of substances as almost none at all. 

16. Wherein lies the general Certainty of Propositions. 

To conclude: general propositions, of what kind soever, are then onlycapable of certainty, when the terms used in them stand for such ideas, whose agreement or disagreement, as there expressed, is capable to bediscovered by us. And we are then certain of their truth or falsehood, when we perceive the ideas the terms stand for to agree or not agree, according as they are affirmed or denied one of another. Whence we maytake notice, that general certainty is never to be found but inour ideas. Whenever we go to seek it elsewhere, in experiment orobservations without us, our knowledge goes not beyond particulars. Itis the contemplation of our own abstract ideas that alone is able toafford us general knowledge. 

CHAPTER VII. OF MAXIMS

1. Maxims or Axioms are Self-evident Propositions. 

THERE are a sort of propositions, which, under the name of MAXIMS andAXIOMS, have passed for principles of science: and because they areSELF-EVIDENT, have been supposed innate, without that anybody (thatI know) ever went about to show the reason and foundation of theirclearness or cogency. It may, however, be worth while to inquire intothe reason of their evidence, and see whether it be peculiar to themalone; and also to examine how far they influence and govern our otherknowledge. 

2. Where in that Self-evidence consists. 

Knowledge, as has been shown, consists in the perception of theagreement or disagreement of ideas. Now, where that agreementor disagreement is perceived immediately by itself, without theintervention or help of any other, there our knowledge is self-evident. This will appear to be so to any who will but consider any of thosepropositions which, without any proof, he assents to at first sight: forin all of them he will find that the reason of his assent is from thatagreement or disagreement which the mind, by an immediate comparingthem, finds in those ideas answering the affirmation or negation in theproposition. 

3. Self evidence not peculiar to received Axioms. 

This being so, in the next place, let us consider whether thisself-evidence be peculiar only to those propositions which commonly passunder the name of maxims, and have the dignity of axioms allowed them. And here it is plain, that several other truths, not allowed to beaxioms, partake equally with them in this self-evidence. This we shallsee, if we go over these several sorts of agreement or disagreementof ideas which I have above mentioned, viz. Identity, relation, co-existence, and real existence; which will discover to us, that notonly those few propositions which have had the credit of maxims areself-evident, but a great many, even almost an infinite number of otherpropositions are such. 

4. As to Identity and Diversity all Propositions are equallyself-evident. 

I. For, FIRST, The immediate perception of the agreement or disagreementof IDENTITY being founded in the mind's having distinct ideas, thisaffords us as many self-evident propositions as we have distinct ideas. Every one that has any knowledge at all, has, as the foundation of it, various and distinct ideas: and it is the first act of the mind (withoutwhich it can never be capable of any knowledge) to know every one ofits ideas by itself, and distinguish it from others. Every one finds inhimself, that he knows the ideas he has; that he knows also, when anyone is in his understanding, and what it is; and that when more than oneare there, he knows them distinctly and unconfusedly one from another;which always being so, (it being impossible but that he should perceivewhat he perceives, ) he can never be in doubt when any idea is in hismind, that it is there, and is that idea it is; and that two distinctideas, when they are in his mind, are there, and are not one and thesame idea. So that all such affirmations and negations are madewithout any possibility of doubt, uncertainty, or hesitation, and mustnecessarily be assented to as soon as understood; that is, as soon as wehave in our minds [determined ideas, ] which the terms in the propositionstand for. [And, therefore, whenever the mind with attention considersany proposition, so as to perceive the two ideas signified by the terms, and affirmed or denied one of the other to be the same or different; itis presently and infallibly certain of the truth of such a proposition;and this equally whether these propositions be in terms standing formore general ideas, or such as are less so: v. G. Whether the generalidea of Being be affirmed of itself, as in this proposition, 'whatsoeveris, is'; or a more particular idea be affirmed of itself, as 'a man is aman'; or, 'whatsoever is white is white'; or whether the idea of beingin general be denied of not-Being, which is the only (if I may socall it) idea different from it, as in this other proposition, 'it isimpossible for the same thing to be and not to be': or any idea of anyparticular being be denied of another different from it, as 'a man isnot a horse'; 'red is not blue. ' The difference of the ideas, as soon asthe terms are understood, makes the truth of the proposition presentlyvisible, and that with an equal certainty and easiness in the less aswell as the more general propositions; and all for the same reason, viz. Because the mind perceives, in any ideas that it has, the same idea tobe the same with itself; and two different ideas to be different, andnot the same; and this it is equally certain of, whether these ideasbe more or less general, abstract, and comprehensive. ] It is not, therefore, alone to these two general propositions--'whatsoever is, is';and 'it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be'--that thissort of self-evidence belongs by any peculiar right. The perception ofbeing, or not being, belongs no more to these vague ideas, signified bythe terms WHATSOEVER, and THING, than it does to any other ideas. [Thesetwo general maxims, amounting to no more, in short, but this, that THESAME IS THE SAME, and THE SAME IS NOT DIFFERENT, are truths known inmore particular instances, as well as in those general maxims; and knownalso in particular instances, before these general maxims are everthought on; and draw all their force from the discernment of the mindemployed about particular ideas. There is nothing more visible thanthat] the mind, without the help of any proof, [or reflection on eitherof these general propositions, ] perceives so clearly, and knows socertainly, that the idea of white is the idea of white, and not the ideaof blue; and that the idea of white, when it is in the mind, is there, and is not absent; [that the consideration of these axioms can addnothing to the evidence or certainty of its knowledge. ] [Just so it is(as every one may experiment in himself) in all the ideas a man has inhis mind: he knows each to be itself, and not to be another; and to bein his mind, and not away when it is there, with a certainty that cannotbe greater; and, therefore, the truth of no general proposition can beknown with a greater certainty, nor add anything to this. ] So that, in respect of identity, our intuitive knowledge reaches as far as ourideas. And we are capable of making as many self-evident propositions, as we have names for distinct ideas. And I appeal to every one's ownmind, whether this proposition, 'a circle is a circle, ' be not asself-evident a proposition as that consisting of more general terms, 'whatsoever is, is'; and again, whether this proposition, 'blue is notred, ' be not a proposition that the mind can no more doubt of, assoon as it understands the words, than it does of that axiom, 'it isimpossible for the same thing to be and not to be?' And so of all thelike. 

5. In Co-existance we have few self-evident Propositions. 

II. SECONDLY, as to CO-EXISTANCE, or such a necessary connexion betweentwo ideas that, in the subject where one of them is supposed, there theother must necessarily be also: of such agreement or disagreement asthis, the mind has an immediate perception but in very few of them. Andtherefore in this sort we have but very little intuitive knowledge: norare there to be found very many propositions that are self-evident, though some there are: v. G. The idea of filling a place equal to thecontents of its superficies, being annexed to our idea of body, I thinkit is a self-evident proposition, that two bodies cannot be in the sameplace. 

6. III. In other Relations we may have many. 

THIRDLY, As to the RELATIONS OF MODES, mathematicians have framed manyaxioms concerning that one relation of equality. As, 'equals taken fromequals, the remainder will be equal'; which, with the rest of that kind, however they are received for maxims by the mathematicians, and areunquestionable truths, yet, I think, that any one who considers themwill not find that they have a clearer self-evidence than these, --that'one and one are equal to two', that 'if you take from the five fingersof one hand two, and from the five fingers of the other hand two, the remaining numbers will be equal. ' These and a thousand other suchpropositions may be found in numbers, which, at the very first hearing, force the assent, and carry with them an equal if not greater clearness, than those mathematical axioms. 

7. IV. Concerning real Existence, we have none. 

FOURTHLY, as to REAL EXISTANCE, since that has no connexion with anyother of our ideas, but that of ourselves, and of a First Being, we havein that, concerning the real existence of all other beings, not so muchas demonstrative, much less a self-evident knowledge: and, therefore, concerning those, there are no maxims. 

8. These Axioms do not much influence our other Knowledge. 

In the next place let us consider, what influence these received maximshave upon the other parts of our knowledge. The rules established in theschools, that all reasonings are EX PRAECOGNITIS ET PRAECONCESSIS, seemto lay the foundation of all other knowledge in these maxims, and tosuppose them to be PRAECOGNITA. Whereby, I think, are meant these twothings: first, that these axioms are those truths that are first knownto the mind; and, secondly, that upon them the other parts of ourknowledge depend. 

9. Because Maxims or Axioms are not the Truths we first knew. 

FIRST, That they are not the truths first known to the mind is evidentto experience, as we have shown in another place. (Book I. Chap, 1. ) Whoperceives not that a child certainly knows that a stranger is not itsmother; that its sucking-bottle is not the rod, long before he knowsthat 'it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be?' And howmany truths are there about numbers, which it is obvious to observe thatthe mind is perfectly acquainted with, and fully convinced of, before itever thought on these general maxims, to which mathematicians, in theirarguings, do sometimes refer them? Whereof the reason is very plain: forthat which makes the mind assent to such propositions, being nothingelse but the perception it has of the agreement or disagreement of itsideas, according as it finds them affirmed or denied one of another inwords it understands; and every idea being known to be what it is, and every two distinct ideas being known not to be the same; it mustnecessarily follow that such self-evident truths must be first knownwhich consist of ideas that are first in the mind. And the ideas firstin the mind, it is evident, are those of particular things, from whenceby slow degrees, the understanding proceeds to some few general ones;which being taken from the ordinary and familiar objects of sense, aresettled in the mind, with general names to them. Thus PARTICULAR IDEASare first received and distinguished, and so knowledge got about them;and next to them, the less general or specific, which are next toparticular. For abstract ideas are not so obvious or easy to children, or the yet unexercised mind, as particular ones. If they seem so togrown men, it is only because by constant and familiar use they are madeso. For, when we nicely reflect upon them, we shall find that GENERALIDEAS are fictions and contrivances of the mind, that carry difficultywith them and do not so easily offer themselves as we are apt toimagine. For example, does it not require some pains and skill to formthe general idea of a triangle, (which is yet none of the more abstract, comprehensive, and difficult, ) for it must be neither oblique norrectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalinon; but all andnone of these at once. In effect, it is something imperfect, that cannotexist; an idea wherein some part of several different and inconsistantideas are put together. It is true, the mind, in this imperfect state, has need of such ideas, and makes all the haste to them it can, for theconveniency of communication and enlargement of knowledge; to both whichit is naturally very much inclined. But yet one has reason to suspectsuch ideas are marks of our imperfection; at least, this is enough toshow that the most abstract and general ideas are not those that themind is first and most easily acquainted with, nor such as its earliestknowledge is conversant about. 

10. Because on perception of them the other Parts of our Knowledge donot depend. 

Secondly, from what has been said it plainly follows, that thesemagnified maxims are not the principles and foundations of all our otherknowledge. For if there be a great many other truths, which have as muchself-evidence as they, and a great many that we know before them, it isimpossible they should be the principles from which we deduce all othertruths. Is it impossible to know that one and two are equal to three, but by virtue of this, or some such axiom, viz. 'the whole is equal toall its parts taken together?' Many a one knows that one and two areequal to three, without having heard, or thought on, that or any otheraxiom by which it might be proved; and knows it as certainly as anyother man knows, that 'the whole is equal to all its parts, ' or anyother maxim; and all from the same reason of self-evidence: the equalityof those ideas being as visible and certain to him without that or anyother axiom as with it, it needing no proof to make it perceived. Norafter the knowledge, that the whole is equal to all its parts, does heknow that one and two are equal to three, better or more certainly thanhe did before. For if there be any odds in those ideas, the whole andparts are more obscure, or at least more difficult to be settled in themind than those of one, two, and three. And indeed, I think, I may askthese men, who will needs have all knowledge, besides those generalprinciples themselves, to depend on general, innate, and self-evidentprinciples. What principle is requisite to prove that one and one aretwo, that two and two are four, that three times two are six? Whichbeing known without any proof, do evince, That either all knowledge doesnot depend on certain PRAECOGNITA or general maxims, called principles;or else that these are principles: and if these are to be countedprinciples, a great part of numeration will be so. To which, if weadd all the self-evident propositions which may be made about allour distinct ideas, principles will be almost infinite, at leastinnumerable, which men arrive to the knowledge of, at different ages;and a great many of these innate principles they never come to know alltheir lives. But whether they come in view of the mind earlier or later, this is true of them, that they are all known by their native evidence;are wholly independent; receive no light, nor are capable of any proofone from another; much less the more particular from the more general, or the more simple from the more compounded; the more simple andless abstract being the most familiar, and the easier and earlierapprehended. But whichever be the clearest ideas, the evidence andcertainty of all such propositions is in this, That a man sees the sameidea to be the same idea, and infallibly perceives two different ideasto be different ideas. For when a man has in his understanding the ideasof one and of two, the idea of yellow, and the idea of blue, he cannotbut certainly know that the idea of one is the idea of one, and not theidea of two; and that the idea of yellow is the idea of yellow, and notthe idea of blue. For a man cannot confound the ideas in his mind, whichhe has distinct: that would be to have them confused and distinct at thesame time, which is a contradiction: and to have none distinct, isto have no use of our faculties, to have no knowledge at all. And, therefore, what idea soever is affirmed of itself, or whatsoever twoentire distinct ideas are denied one of another, the mind cannotbut assent to such a proposition as infallibly true, as soon as itunderstands the terms, without hesitation or need of proof, or regardingthose made in more general terms and called maxims. 

11. What use these general Maxims or Axioms have. 

[What shall we then say? Are these general maxims of no use? By nomeans; though perhaps their use is not that which it is commonly takento be. But, since doubting in the least of what hath been by somemen ascribed to these maxims may be apt to be cried out against, asoverturning the foundations of all the sciences; it may be worth whileto consider them with respect to other parts of our knowledge, andexamine more particularly to what purposes they serve, and to what not. 

{Of no use to prove less general propositions, nor as foundations onconsideration of which any science has been built. }

(1) It is evident from what has been already said, that they are of nouse to prove or confirm less general self-evident propositions. (2) Itis as plain that they are not, nor have been the foundations whereonany science hath been built. There is, I know, a great deal of talk, propagated from scholastic men, of sciences and the maxims on whichthey are built: but it has been my ill-luck never to meet with any suchsciences; much less any one built upon these two maxims, WHAT IS, IS;and IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SAME THING TO BE AND NOT TO BE. And I wouldbe glad to be shown where any such science, erected upon these or anyother general axioms is to be found: and should be obliged to any onewho would lay before me the frame and system of any science so built onthese or any such like maxims, that could not be shown to stand as firmwithout any consideration of them. I ask, Whether these general maximshave not the same use in the study of divinity, and in theologicalquestions, that they have in other sciences? They serve here, too, tosilence wranglers, and put an end to dispute. But I think that nobodywill therefore say, that the Christian religion is built upon thesemaxims, or that the knowledge we have of it is derived from theseprinciples. It is from revelation we have received it, and withoutrevelation these maxims had never been able to help us to it. When wefind out an idea by whose intervention we discover the connexion of twoothers, this is a revelation from God to us by the voice of reason:for we then come to know a truth that we did not know before. When Goddeclares any truth to us, this is a revelation to us by the voice of hisSpirit, and we are advanced in our knowledge. But in neither of thesedo we receive our light or knowledge from maxims. But in the one, thethings themselves afford it: and we see the truth in them by perceivingtheir agreement or disagreement. In the other, God himself affords itimmediately to us: and we see the truth of what he says in his unerringveracity. 

(3) Nor as helps in the discovery of yet unknown truths. 

They are not of use to help men forward in the advancement of sciences, or new discoveries of yet unknown truths. Mr. Newton, in his neverenough to be admired book, has demonstrated several propositions, whichare so many new truths, before unknown to the world, and are furtheradvances in mathematical knowledge: but, for the discovery of these, itwas not the general maxims, 'what is, is;' or, 'the whole is bigger thana part, ' or the like, that helped him. These were not the clues that ledhim into the discovery of the truth and certainty of those propositions. Nor was it by them that he got the knowledge of those demonstrations, but by finding out intermediate ideas that showed the agreementor disagreement of the ideas, as expressed in the propositions hedemonstrated. This is the greatest exercise and improvement of humanunderstanding in the enlarging of knowledge, and advancing thesciences; wherein they are far enough from receiving any help from thecontemplation of these or the like magnified maxims. Would those whohave this traditional admiration of these propositions, that they thinkno step can be made in knowledge without the support of an axiom, nostone laid in the building of the sciences without a general maxim, but distinguish between the method of acquiring knowledge, and ofcommunicating it; between the method of raising any science, and thatof teaching it to others, as far as it is advanced--they would seethat those general maxims were not the foundations on which the firstdiscoverers raised their admirable structures, nor the keys thatunlocked and opened those secrets of knowledge. Though afterwards, whenschools were erected, and sciences had their professors to teach whatothers had found out, they often made use of maxims, i. E. Laid downcertain propositions which were self-evident, or to be receivedfor true; which being settled in the minds of their scholars asunquestionable verities, they on occasion made use of, to convince themof truths in particular instances, that were not so familiar to theirminds as those general axioms which had before been inculcated to them, and carefully settled in their minds. Though these particular instances, when well reflected on, are no less self-evident to the understandingthan the general maxims brought to confirm them: and it was in thoseparticular instances that the first discoverer found the truth, withoutthe help of the general maxims: and so may any one else do, who withattention considers them. 

{Maxims of use in the exposition of what has been discovered, and insilencing obstinate wranglers. }

To come, therefore, to the use that is made of maxims. (1) They are ofuse, as has been observed, in the ordinary methods of teaching sciencesas far as they are advanced: but of little or none in advancing themfurther. (2) They are of use in disputes, for the silencing of obstinatewranglers, and bringing those contests to some conclusion. Whether aneed of them to that end came not in the manner following, I crave leaveto inquire. The Schools having made disputation the touchstone of men'sabilities, and the criterion of knowledge, adjudged victory to him thatkept the field: and he that had the last word was concluded to have thebetter of the argument, if not of the cause. But because by this meansthere was like to be no decision between skilful combatants, whilst onenever failed of a MEDIUS TERMINUS to prove any proposition; and theother could as constantly, without or with a distinction, deny the majoror minor; to prevent, as much as could be, running out of disputes intoan endless train of syllogisms, certain general propositions--most ofthem, indeed, self-evident--were introduced into the Schools: whichbeing such as all men allowed and agreed in, were looked on as generalmeasures of truth, and served instead of principles (where thedisputants had not lain down any other between them) beyond which therewas no going, and which must not be receded from by either side. Andthus these maxims, getting the name of principles, beyond which men indispute could not retreat, were by mistake taken to be the originals andsources from whence all knowledge began, and the foundations whereon thesciences were built. Because when in their disputes they came to anyof these, they stopped there, and went no further; the matter wasdetermined. But how much this is a mistake, hath been already shown. 

{How Maxims came to be so much in vogue. }

This method of the Schools, which have been thought the fountains ofknowledge, introduced, as I suppose, the like use of these maxims intoa great part of conversation out of the Schools, to stop the mouths ofcavillers, whom any one is excused from arguing any longer with, when they deny these general self-evident principles received by allreasonable men who have once thought of them: but yet their use hereinis but to put an end to wrangling. They in truth, when urged in suchcases, teach nothing: that is already done by the intermediate ideasmade use of in the debate, whose connexion may be seen without the helpof those maxims, and so the truth known before the maxim is produced, and the argument brought to a first principle. Men would give offa wrong argument before it came to that, if in their disputes theyproposed to themselves the finding and embracing of truth, and not acontest for victory. And thus maxims have their use to put a stop totheir perverseness, whose ingenuity should have yielded sooner. But themethod of the Schools having allowed and encouraged men to oppose andresist evident truth till they are baffled, i. E. Till they are reducedto contradict themselves, or some established principles: it is nowonder that they should not in civil conversation be ashamed of thatwhich in the Schools is counted a virtue and a glory, viz. Obstinatelyto maintain that side of the question they have chosen, whether true orfalse, to the last extremity; even after conviction. A strange way toattain truth and knowledge: and that which I think the rational part ofmankind, not corrupted by education, could scare believe should everbe admitted amongst the lovers of truth, and students of religion ornature, or introduced into the seminaries of those who are to propegatethe truths of religion or philosophy amongst the ignorant andunconvinced. How much such a way of learning is like to turn young men'sminds from the sincere search and love of truth; nay, and to make themdoubt whether there is any such thing, or, at least, worth the adheringto, I shall not now inquire. This I think, that, bating those places, which brought the Peripatetic Philosophy into their schools, where itcontinued many ages, without teaching the world anything but the art ofwrangling, these maxims were nowhere thought the foundations on whichthe sciences were built, nor the great helps to the advancement ofknowledge. ]

{Of great use to stop wranglers in disputes, but of little use to thediscovery of truths. }

As to these general maxims, therefore, they are, as I have said, ofgreat use in disputes, to stop the mouths of wranglers; but not of muchuse to the discovery of unknown truths, or to help the mind forwards inits search after knowledge. For who ever began to build his knowledge onthis general proposition, WHAT IS, IS; or, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SAMETHING TO BE AND NOT TO BE: and from either of these, as from a principleof science, deduced a system of useful knowledge? Wrong opinions ofteninvolving contradictions, one of these maxims, as a touchstone, mayserve well to show whither they lead. But yet, however fit to lay openthe absurdity or mistake of a man's reasoning or opinion, they are ofvery little use for enlightening the understanding: and it will not befound that the mind receives much help from them in its progress inknowledge; which would be neither less, nor less certain, were these twogeneral propositions never thought on. It is true, as I have said, theysometimes serve in argumentation to stop a wrangler's mouth, by showingthe absurdity of what he saith, [and by exposing him to the shame ofcontradicting what all the world knows, and he himself cannot but own tobe true. ] But it is one thing to show a man that he is in an error, andanother to put him in possession of truth, and I would fain know whattruths these two propositions are able to teach, and by their influencemake us know which we did not know before, or could not know withoutthem. Let us reason from them as well as we can, they are only aboutidentical predications, and influence, if any at all, none but such. Each particular proposition concerning identity or diversity is asclearly and certainly known in itself, if attended to, as either ofthese general ones: [only these general ones, as serving in all cases, are therefore more inculcated and insisted on. ] As to other less generalmaxims, many of them are no more than bare verbal propositions, andteach us nothing but the respect and import of names one to another. 'The whole is equal to all its parts:' what real truth, I beseech you, does it teach us? What more is contained in that maxim, than what thesignification of the word TOTUM, or the WHOLE, does of itself import?And he that knows that the WORD whole stands for what is made up of allits parts, knows very little less than that the whole is equal to allits parts. And, upon the same ground, I think that this proposition, 'Ahill is higher than a valley', and several the like, may also pass formaxims. But yet [masters of mathematics, when they would, as teachers ofwhat they know, initiate others in that science do not] without reasonplace this and some other such maxims [at the entrance of theirsystems]; that their scholars, having in the beginning perfectlyacquainted their thoughts with these propositions, made in such generalterms, may be used to make such reflections, and have these more generalpropositions, as formed rules and sayings, ready to apply to allparticular cases. Not that if they be equally weighed, they are moreclear and evident than the particular instances they are brought toconfirm; but that, being more familiar to the mind, the very naming themis enough to satisfy the understanding. But this, I say, is more fromour custom of using them, and the establishment they have got in ourminds by our often thinking of them, than from the different evidenceof the things. But before custom has settled methods of thinking andreasoning in our minds, I am apt to imagine it is quite otherwise; andthat the child, when a part of his apple is taken away, knows it betterin that particular instance, than by this general proposition, 'Thewhole is equal to all its parts;' and that, if one of these have need tobe confirmed to him by the other, the general has more need to be letinto his mind by the particular, than the particular by the general. For in _particulars_ our knowledge begins, and so spreads itself, bydegrees, to _generals_ [Footnote: This is the order in time of theconscious acquistion of knowledge that is human. The _Essay_ might beregarded as a commentary on this one sentence. Our intellectual progressis from particulars and involuntary recipiency, through reactive doubtand criticism, into what is at last reasoned faith. ]. Though afterwardsthe mind takes the quite contrary course, and having drawn its knowledgeinto as general propositions as it can, makes those familiar to itsthoughts, and accustoms itself to have recourse to them, as to thestandards of truth and falsehood. [Footnote: This is the philosophicattitude. Therein one consciously apprehends the intellectualnecessities that were UNCONCIOUSLY PRESUPPOSED, its previousintellectual progress. In philosophy we 'draw our knowledge into asgeneral propositions as it can' be made to assume, and thus either learnto see it as an organic while in a speculative unity, or learn that itcannot be so seen in a finite intelligence, and that even at the lastit must remain 'broken' and mysterious in the human understanding. ]By which familiar use of them, as rules to measure the truth of otherpropositions, it comes in time to be thought, that more particularpropositions have their truth and evidence from their conformity tothese more general ones, which, in discourse and argumentation, are sofrequently urged, and constantly admitted. And this I think to be thereason why, amongst so many self-evident propositions, the MOSTGENERAL ONLY have had the title of MAXIMS. 

12. Maxims, if care be not taken in the Use of Words, may proveContradictions. 

One thing further, I think, it may not be amiss to observe concerningthese general maxims, That they are so far from improving orestablishing our minds in true knowledge that if our notions be wrong, loose, or unsteady, and we resign up our thoughts to the sound of words, rather than [fix them on settled, determined] ideas of things; I saythese general maxims will serve to confirm us in mistakes; and in sucha way of use of words, which is most common, will serve to provecontradictions: v. G. He that with Descartes shall frame in his mindan idea of what he calls body to be nothing but extension, may easilydemonstrate that there is no vacuum, i. E. No space void of body, by thismaxim, WHAT IS, IS. For the idea to which he annexes the name body, being bare extension, his knowledge that space cannot be withoutbody, is certain. For he knows his own idea of extension clearly anddistinctly, and knows that it is what it is, and not another idea, though it be called by these three names, --extension, body, space. Whichthree words, standing for one and the same idea, may, no doubt, withthe same evidence and certainty be affirmed one of another, as each ofitself: and it is as certain, that, whilst I use them all to stand forone and the same idea, this predication is as true and identical in itssignification, that 'space is body, ' as this predication is true andidentical, that 'body is body, ' both in signification and sound. 

13. Instance in Vacuum. 

But if another should come and make to himself another idea, differentfrom Descartes's, of the thing, which yet with Descartes he calls by thesame name body, and make his idea, which he expresses by the word body, to be of a thing that hath both extension and solidity together; he willas easily demonstrate, that there may be a vacuum or space without abody, as Descartes demonstrated the contrary. Because the idea to whichhe gives the name space being barely the simple one of extension, andthe idea to which he gives the name body being the complex idea ofextension and resistibility or solidity, together in the samesubject, these two ideas are not exactly one and the same, but in theunderstanding as distinct as the ideas of one and two, white and black, or as of CORPOREITY and HUMANITY, if I may use those barbarous terms:and therefore the predication of them in our minds, or in words standingfor them, is not identical, but the negation of them one of another;[viz. This proposition: 'Extension or space is not body, ' is] as trueand evidently certain as this maxim, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SAME THINGTO BE AND NOT TO BE, [can make any proposition. ]

14. But they prove not the Existance of things without us. 

But yet, though both these propositions (as you see) may be equallydemonstrated, viz. That there may be a vacuum, and that there cannot bea vacuum, by these two certain principles, viz. WHAT IS, IS, and THESAME THING CANNOT BE AND NOT BE: yet neither of these principles willserve to prove to us, that any, or what bodies do exist: for that we areleft to our senses to discover to us as far as they can. Those universaland self-evident principles being only our constant, clear, and distinctknowledge of our own ideas, more general or comprehensive, can assure usof nothing that passes without the mind: their certainty is foundedonly upon the knowledge we have of each idea by itself, and of itsdistinction from others, about which we cannot be mistaken whilst theyare in our minds; though we may be and often are mistaken when we retainthe names without the ideas; or use them confusedly, sometimes forone and sometimes for another idea. In which cases the force of theseaxioms, reaching only to the sound, and not the signification of thewords, serves only to lead us into confusion, mistake, and error. [It isto show men that these maxims, however cried up for the great guards oftruth, will not secure them from error in a careless loose use of theirwords, that I have made this remark. In all that is here suggestedconcerning their little use for the improvement of knowledge, ordangerous use in undetermined ideas, I have been far enough from sayingor intending they should be laid aside; as some have been too forwardto charge me. I affirm them to be truths, self-evident truths; and socannot be laid aside. As far as their influence will reach, it is invain to endeavour, nor will I attempt, to abridge it. But yet, withoutany injury to truth or knowledge, I may have reason to think their useis not answerable to the great stress which seems to be laid on them;and I may warn men not to make an ill use of them, for the confirmingthemselves in errors. ]

15. They cannot add to our knowledge of Substances, and theirApplication to complex Ideas is dangerous. 

But let them be of what use they will in verbal propositions, theycannot discover or prove to us the least knowledge of the nature ofsubstances, as they are found and exist without us, any further thangrounded on experience. And though the consequence of these twopropositions, called principles, be very clear, and their use notdangerous or hurtful, in the probation of such things wherein there isno need at all of them for proof, but such as are clear by themselveswithout them, viz. Where our ideas are [determined] and known by thenames that stand for them: yet when these principles, viz. WHAT IS, IS, and IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SAME THING TO BE AND NOT TO BE, are madeuse of in the probation of propositions wherein are words standing forcomplex ideas, v. G. Man, horse, gold, virtue; there they are of infinitedanger, and most commonly make men receive and retain falsehood formanifest truth, and uncertainty for demonstration: upon which followerror, obstinacy, and all the mischiefs that can happen from wrongreasoning. The reason whereof is not, that these principles are lesstrue [or of less force] in proving propositions made of terms standingfor complex ideas, than where the propositions are about simple ideas. [But because men mistake generally, --thinking that where the same termsare preserved, the propositions are about the same things, though theideas they stand for are in truth different, therefore these maximsare made use of to support those which in sound and appearance arecontradictory propositions; and is clear in the demonstrations abovementioned about a vacuum. So that whilst men take words for things, as usually they do, these maxims may and do commonly serve to provecontradictory propositions; as shall yet be further made manifest]

16. Instance in demonstrations about Man which can only be verbal. 

For instance: let MAN be that concerning which you would by these firstprinciples demonstrate anything, and we shall see, that so far asdemonstration is by these principles, it is only verbal, and gives usno certain, universal, true proposition, or knowledge, of any beingexisting without us. First, a child having framed the idea of a man, itis probable that his idea is just like that picture which thepainter makes of the visible appearances joined together; and such acomplication of ideas together in his understanding makes up the singlecomplex idea which he calls man, whereof white or flesh-colour inEngland being one, the child can demonstrate to you that a negro is nota man, because white colour was one of the constant simple ideas of thecomplex idea he calls man; and therefore he can demonstrate, by theprinciple, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SAME THING TO BE AND NOT TO BE, thata negro is NOT a man; the foundation of his certainty being not thatuniversal proposition, which perhaps he never heard nor thought of, butthe clear, distinct perception he hath of his own simple ideas of blackand white, which he cannot be persuaded to take, nor can ever mistakeone for another, whether he knows that maxim or no. And to this child, or any one who hath such an idea, which he calls man, can you neverdemonstrate that a man hath a soul, because his idea of man includes nosuch notion or idea in it. And therefore, to him, the principle of WHATIS, IS, proves not this matter; but it depends upon collection andobservation, by which he is to make his complex idea called man. 

17. Another instance. 

Secondly, Another that hath gone further in framing and collecting theidea he calls MAN, and to the outward shape adds laughter and rationaldiscourse, may demonstrate that infants and changelings are no men, bythis maxim, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SAME THING TO BE AND NOT TO BE; andI have discoursed with very rational men, who have actually denied thatthey are men. 

18. A third instance. 

Thirdly, Perhaps another makes up the complex idea which he calls MAN, only out of the ideas of body in general, and the powers of language andreason, and leaves out the shape wholly: this man is able to demonstratethat a man may have no hands, but be QUADRUPES, neither of those beingincluded in his idea of man: and in whatever body or shape he foundspeech and reason joined, that was a man; because, having a clearknowledge of such a complex idea, it is certain that WHAT IS, IS. 

19. Little use of these Maxims in Proofs where we have clear anddistinct Ideas. 

So that, if rightly considered, I think we may say, That where our ideasare determined in our minds, and have annexed to them by us known andsteady names under those settled determinations, there is little need, or no use at all of these maxims, to prove the agreement or disagreementof any of them. He that cannot discern the truth or falsehood of suchpropositions, without the help of these and the like maxims, will not behelped by these maxims to do it: since he cannot be supposed to know thetruth of these maxims themselves without proof, if he cannot know thetruth of others without proof, which are as self-evident as these. Uponthis ground it is that intuitive knowledge neither requires nor admitsany proof, one part of it more than another. He that will suppose itdoes, takes away the foundation of all knowledge and certainty; and hethat needs any proof to make him certain, and give his assent to thisproposition, that two are equal to two, will also have need of a proofto make him admit, that what is, is. He that needs a probation toconvince him that two are not three, that white is not black, that atriangle is not a circle, &c. , or any other two [determined] distinctideas are not one and the same, will need also a demonstration toconvince him that IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SAME THING TO BE AND NOT TOBE. 

20. Their Use dangerous where our Ideas are not determined

And as these maxims are of little use where we have determined ideas, sothey are, as I have showed, of dangerous use where [our ideas are notdetermined; and where] we use words that are not annexed to determinedideas, but such as are of a loose and wandering signification, sometimesstanding for one, and sometimes for another idea: from which followmistake and error, which these maxims (brought as proofs to establishpropositions, wherein the terms stand for undetermined ideas) do bytheir authority confirm and rivet. 

CHAPTER VIII. OF TRIFLING PROPOSITIONS. 

1. Some Propositions bring no Increase to our Knowledge. 

WHETHER the maxims treated of in the foregoing chapter be of that use toreal knowledge as is generally supposed, I leave to be considered. This, I think, may confidently be affirmed, That there ARE universalpropositions, which, though they be certainly true, yet they add nolight to our understanding; bring no increase to our knowledge. Suchare--

2. As, First, identical Propositions. 

First, All purely IDENTICAL PROPOSITIONS. These obviously and at firstblush appear to contain no instruction in them; for when we affirm thesaid term of itself, whether it be barely verbal, or whether it containsany clear and real idea, it shows us nothing but what we must certainlyknow before, whether such a proposition be either made by, or proposedto us. Indeed, that most general one, WHAT IS, IS, may serve sometimesto show a man the absurdity he is guilty of, when, by circumlocution orequivocal terms, he would in particular instances deny the same thing ofitself; because nobody will so openly bid defiance to common sense, asto affirm visible and direct contradictions in plain words; or, if hedoes, a man is excused if he breaks off any further discourse with him. But yet I think I may say, that neither that received maxim, nor anyother identical proposition, teaches us anything; and though in suchkind of propositions this great and magnified maxim, boasted to be thefoundation of demonstration, may be and often is made use of to confirmthem, yet all it proves amounts to no more than this, That the same wordmay with great certainty be affirmed of itself, without any doubt of thetruth of any such proposition; and let me add, also, without any realknowledge. 

3. Examples. 

For, at this rate, any very ignorant person, who can but make aproposition, and knows what he means when he says ay or no, may make amillion of propositions of whose truth he may be infallibly certain, andyet not know one thing in the world thereby; v. G. 'what is a soul, is asoul;' or, 'a soul is a soul;' 'a spirit is a spirit;' 'a fetiche is afetiche, ' &c. These all being equivalent to this proposition, viz. WHATIS, IS; i. E. What hath existence, hath existence; or, who hath a soul, hath a soul. What is this more than trifling with words? It is but likea monkey shifting his oyster from one hand to the other: and had he butwords, might no doubt have said, 'Oyster in right hand is subject, andoyster in left hand is predicate:' and so might have made a self-evidentproposition of oyster, i. E. Oyster is oyster; and yet, with all this, not have been one whit the wiser or more knowing: and that way ofhandling the matter would much at one have satisfied the monkey'shunger, or a man's understanding, and they would have improved inknowledge and bulk together. 

4. Secondly, Propositions in which apart of any complex Idea ispredicated of the Whole. 

II. Another sort of trifling propositions is, WHEN A PART OF THECOMPLEXIDEA IS PREDICATED OF THE NAME OF THE WHOLE; a part of thedefinition of the word defined. Such are all propositions wherein thegenus is predicated of the species, or more comprehensive of lesscomprehensive terms. For what information, what knowledge, carries thisproposition in it, viz. 'Lead is a metal' to a man who knows the complexidea the name lead stands for? All the simple ideas that go to thecomplex one signified by the term metal, being nothing but what hebefore comprehended and signified by the name lead. Indeed, to a manthat knows the signification of the word metal, and not of the wordlead, it is a shorter way to explain the signification of the word lead, by saying it is a metal, which at once expresses several of its simpleideas, than to enumerate them one by one, telling him it is a body veryheavy, fusible, and malleable. 

5. As part of the Definition of the Term Defined. 

Alike trifling it is to predicate any other part of the definition ofthe term defined, or to affirm anyone of the simple ideas of a complexone of the name of the whole complex idea; as, 'All gold is fusible. 'For fusibility being one of the simple ideas that goes to the making upthe complex one the sound gold stands for, what can it be but playingwith sounds, to affirm that of the name gold, which is comprehendedin its received signification? It would be thought little better thanridiculous to affirm gravely, as a truth of moment, that gold is yellow;and I see not how it is any jot more material to say it is fusible, unless that quality be left out of the complex idea, of which the soundgold is the mark in ordinary speech. What instruction can it carry withit, to tell one that which he hath been told already, or he is supposedto know before? For I am supposed to know the signification of the wordanother uses to me, or else he is to tell me. And if I know that thename gold stands for this complex idea of body, yellow, heavy, fusible, malleable, it will not much instruct me to put it solemnly afterwards ina proposition, and gravely say, all gold is fusible. Such propositionscan only serve to show the disingenuity of one who will go from thedefinition of his own terms, by reminding him sometimes of it; but carryno knowledge with them, but of the signification of words, howevercertain they be. 

6. Instance, Man and Palfrey. 

'Every man is an animal, or living body, ' is as certain a proposition ascan be; but no more conducing to the knowledge of things than to say, apalfrey is an ambling horse, or a neighing, ambling animal, both beingonly about the signification of words, and make me know but this--Thatbody, sense, and motion, or power of sensation and moving, are three ofthose ideas that I always comprehend and signify by the word man: andwhere they are not to be found together, the NAME MAN belongs not tothat thing: and so of the other--That body, sense, and a certain way ofgoing, with a certain kind of voice, are some of those ideas which Ialways comprehend and signify by the WORD PALFREY; and when they are notto be found together, the name palfrey belongs not to that thing. It isjust the same, and to the same purpose, when any term standing for anyone or more of the simple ideas, that altogether make up that complexidea which is called man, is affirmed of the term man:--v. G. Suppose aRoman signified by the word HOMO all these distinct ideas united in onesubject, CORPORIETAS, SENSIBILITAS, POTENTIA SE MOVENDI, RATIONALITAS, RISIBILITAS; he might, no doubt, with great certainty, universallyaffirm one, more, or all of these together of the word HOMO, but did nomore than say that the word HOMO, in his country, comprehended in itssignification all these ideas. Much like a romance knight, who bythe word PALFREY signified these ideas:--body of a certain figure, four-legged, with sense, motion, ambling, neighing, white, used to havea woman on his back--might with the same certainty universally affirmalso any or all of these of the WORD palfrey: but did thereby teach nomore, but that the word palfrey, in his or romance language, stood forall these, and was not to be applied to anything where any of these waswanting But he that shall tell me, that in whatever thing sense, motion, reason, and laughter, were united, that thing had actually a notion ofGod, or would be cast into a sleep by opium, made indeed an instructiveproposition: because neither having the notion of God, nor being castinto sleep by opium, being contained in the idea signified by the wordman, we are by such propositions taught something more than barely whatthe word MAN stands for: and therefore the knowledge contained in it ismore than verbal. 

7. For this teaches but the Signification of Words. 

Before a man makes any proposition, he is supposed to understand theterms he uses in it, or else he talks like a parrot, only making a noiseby imitation, and framing certain sounds, which he has learnt of others;but not as a rational creature, using them for signs of ideas which hehas in his mind. The hearer also is supposed to understand the termsas the speaker uses them, or else he talks jargon, and makes anunintelligible noise. And therefore he trifles with words who makes sucha proposition, which, when it is made, contains no more than one of theterms does, and which a man was supposed to know before: v. G. A trianglehath three sides, or saffron is yellow. And this is no further tolerablethan where a man goes to explain his terms to one who is supposed ordeclares himself not to understand him; and then it teaches only thesignification of that word, and the use of that sign. 

8. But adds no real Knowledge. 

We can know then the truth of two sorts of propositions with perfectcertainty. The one is, of those trifling propositions which havea certainty in them, but it is only a verbal certainty, but notinstructive. And, secondly, we can know the truth, and so may be certainin propositions, which affirm something of another, which is a necessaryconsequence of its precise complex idea, but not contained in it: asthat, the external angle of all triangles is bigger than either of theopposite internal angles. Which relation of the outward angle to eitherof the opposite internal angles, making no part of the complex ideasignified by the name triangle, this is a real truth, and conveys withit instructive real knowledge. 

9. General Propositions concerning Substances are often trifling. 

We having little or no knowledge of what combinations there be of simpleideas existing together in substances, but by our senses, we cannot makeany universal certain propositions concerning them, any further than ournominal essences lead us. Which being to a very few and inconsiderabletruths, in respect of those which depend on their real constitutions, the general propositions that are made about substances, if they arecertain, are for the most part but trifling; and if they areinstructive, are uncertain, and such as we can have no knowledge oftheir real truth, how much soever constant observation and analogy mayassist our judgment in guessing. Hence it comes to pass, that one mayoften meet with very clear and coherent discourses, that amount yet tonothing. For it is plain that names of substantial beings, as well asothers, as far as they have relative significations affixed to them, may, with great truth, be joined negatively and affirmatively inpropositions, as their relative definitions make them fit to be sojoined; and propositions consisting of such terms, may, with the sameclearness, be deduced one from another, as those that convey the mostreal truths: and all this without any knowledge of the nature or realityof things existing without us. By this method one may makedemonstrations and undoubted propositions in words, and yet therebyadvance not one jot in the knowledge of the truth of things: v. G. Hethat having learnt these following words, with their ordinary mutualrelative acceptations annexed to them; v. G. SUBSTANCE, MAN, ANIMAL, FORM, SOUL, VEGETATIVE, SENSITIVE, RATIONAL, may make several undoubtedpropositions about the soul, without knowing at all what the soul reallyis: and of this sort, a man may find an infinite number of propositions, reasonings, and conclusions, in books of metaphysics, school-divinity, and some sort of natural philosophy; and, after all, know as little ofGod, spirits, or bodies, as he did before he set out. 

10. And why. 

He that hath liberty to define, i. E. To determine the signification ofhis names of substances (as certainly every one does in effect, whomakes them stand for his own ideas), and makes their significations at aventure, taking them from his own or other men's fancies, and not froman examination or inquiry into the nature of things themselves; may withlittle trouble demonstrate them one of another, according to thoseseveral respects and mutual relations he has given them one to another;wherein, however things agree or disagree in their own nature, he needsmind nothing but his own notions, with the names he hath bestowed uponthem: but thereby no more increases his own knowledge than he does hisriches, who, taking a bag of counters, calls one in a certain place apound, another in another place a shilling, and a third in a third placea penny; and so proceeding, may undoubtedly reckon right, and cast up agreat sum, according to his counters so placed, and standing for more orless as he pleases, without being one jot the richer, or without evenknowing how much a pound, shilling, or penny is, but only that one iscontained in the other twenty times, and contains the other twelve:which a man may also do in the signification of words, by making them, in respect of one another, more or less, or equally comprehensive. 

11. Thirdly, using Words variously is trifling with them. 

Though yet concerning most words used in discourses, equallyargumentative and controversial, there is this more to be complained of, which is the worst sort of trifling, and which sets us yet further fromthe certainty of knowledge we hope to attain by them, or find in them;viz. That most writers are so far from instructing us in the nature andknowledge of things, that they use their words loosely and uncertainly, and do not, by using them constantly and steadily in the samesignifications make plain and clear deductions of words one fromanother, and make their discourses coherent and clear, (how littlesoever they were instructive); which were not difficult to do, did theynot find it convenient to shelter their ignorance or obstinacy under theobscurity and perplexedness of their terms: to which, perhaps, inadvertency and ill custom do in many men much contribute. 

12. Marks of verbal Propositions. First, Predication in Abstract. 

To conclude. Barely verbal propositions may be known by these followingmarks:

First, All propositions wherein two abstract terms are affirmed one ofanother, are barely about the signification of sounds. For since noabstract idea can be the same with any other but itself, when itsabstract name is affirmed of any other term, it can signify no more butthis, that it may, or ought to be called by that name; or that these twonames signify the same idea. Thus, should any one say that parsimony isfrugality, that gratitude is justice, that this or that action is or isnot temperate: however specious these and the like propositions may atfirst sight seem, yet when we come to press them, and examine nicelywhat they contain, we shall find that it all amounts to nothing but thesignification of those terms. 

13. Secondly, A part of the Definition predicated of any Term. 

Secondly, All propositions wherein a part of the complex idea which anyterm stands for is predicated of that term, are only verbal: v. G. To saythat gold is a metal, or heavy. And thus all propositions wherein morecomprehensive words, called genera, are affirmed of subordinate or lesscomprehensive, called species, or individuals, are barely verbal. 

When by these two rules we have examined the propositions that make upthe discourses we ordinarily meet with, both in and out of books, weshall perhaps find that a greater part of them than is usually suspectedare purely about the signification of words, and contain nothing in thembut the use and application of these signs. 

This I think I may lay down for an infallible rule, That, wherever thedistinct idea any word stands for is not known and considered, andsomething not contained in the idea is not affirmed or denied of it, there our thoughts stick wholly in sounds, and are able to attain noreal truth or falsehood. This, perhaps, if well heeded, might save us agreat deal of useless amusement and dispute; and very much shorten ourtrouble and wandering in the search of real and true knowledge. 

CHAPTER IX. OF OUR THREEFOLD KNOWLEDGE OF EXISTENCE. 

1. General Propositions that are certain concern not Existence. 

HITHERTO we have only considered the essences of things; which beingonly abstract ideas, and thereby removed in our thoughts from particularexistence, (that being the proper operation of the mind, in abstraction, to consider an idea under no other existence but what it has in theunderstandings, ) gives us no knowledge of real existence at all. Where, by the way, we may take notice, that universal propositions of whosetruth or falsehood we can have certain knowledge concern not existence:and further, that all particular affirmations or negations that wouldnot be certain if they were made general, are only concerning existence;they declaring only the accidental union or separation of ideas inthings existing, which, in their abstract natures, have no knownnecessary union or repugnancy. 

2. A threefold Knowledge of Existence. 

But, leaving the nature of propositions, and different ways ofpredication to be considered more at large in another place, let usproceed now to inquire concerning our knowledge of the EXISTANCE OFTHINGS, and how we come by it. I say, then, that we have the knowledgeof OUR OWN existence by intuition; of the existence of GOD bydemonstration; and of OTHER THINGS by sensation. 

3. Our Knowledge of our own Existence is Intuitive. 

As for OUR OWN EXISTENCE, we perceive it so plainly and so certainly, that it neither needs nor is capable of any proof for nothing can bemore evident to us than our own existence. I think, I reason, I feelpleasure and pain: can any of these be more evident to me than my ownexistence? If I doubt of all other things, that very doubt makes meperceive my own existence, and will not suffer me to doubt of that. Forif I know I feel pain, it is evident I have as certain perception of myown existence, as of the existence of the pain I feel: or if I knowI doubt, I have as certain perception of the existence of the thingdoubting, as of that thought which I CALL DOUBT. Experience thenconvinces us, that we have an INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE of our own existence, and an internal infallible perception that we are. In every act ofsensation, reasoning, or thinking, we are conscious to ourselves of ourown being; and, in this matter, come not short of the highest degree ofcertainty. 

CHAPTER X. OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF A GOD. 

1. We are capable of knowing certainly that there is a God. 

THOUGH God has given us no innate ideas of himself; though he hasstamped no original characters on our minds, wherein we may read hisbeing; yet having furnished us with those faculties our minds areendowed with, he hath not left himself without witness: since we havesense, perception, and reason, and cannot want a clear proof of him, aslong as we carry OURSELVES about us. Nor can we justly complain of ourignorance in this great point; since he has so plentifully provided uswith the means to discover and know him; so far as is necessary to theend of our being, and the great concernment of our happiness. But, though this be the most obvious truth that reason discovers, and thoughits evidence be (if I mistake not) equal to mathematical certainty: yetit requires thought and attention; and the mind must apply itself to aregular deduction of it from some part of our intuitive knowledge, or else we shall be as uncertain and ignorant of this as of otherpropositions, which are in themselves capable of clear demonstration. Toshow, therefore, that we are capable of KNOWING, i. E. BEING CERTAIN thatthere is a God, and HOW WE MAY COME BY this certainty, I think we needgo no further than OURSELVES, and that undoubted knowledge we have ofour own existence. 

2. For Man knows that he himself exists. 

I think it is beyond question, that man has a clear idea of his ownbeing; he knows certainly he exists, and that he is something. He thatcan doubt whether he be anything or no, I speak not to; no more than Iwould argue with pure nothing, or endeavour to convince nonentity thatit were something. If any one pretends to be so sceptical as to deny hisown existence, (for really to doubt of it is manifestly impossible, ) lethim for me enjoy his beloved happiness of being nothing, until hunger orsome other pain convince him of the contrary. This, then, I think I maytake for a truth, which every one's certain knowledge assures him of, beyond the liberty of doubting, viz. That he is SOMETHING THAT ACTUALLYEXISTS. 

3. He knows also that Nothing cannot produce a Being; there oreSOmething must have existed from Eternity. 

In the next place, man knows, by an intuitive certainty, that bareNOTHING CAN NO MORE PRODUCE ANY REAL BEING, THAN IT CAN BE EQUAL TO TWORIGHT ANGLES. If a man knows not that nonentity, or the absence of allbeing, cannot be equal to two right angles, it is impossible he shouldknow any demonstration in Euclid. If, therefore, we know there is somereal being, and that nonentity cannot produce any real being, it is anevident demonstration, that FROM ETERNITY THERE HAS BEEN SOMETHING;since what was not from eternity had a beginning; and what had abeginning must be produced by something else. 

4. And that eternal Being must be most powerful. 

Next, it is evident, that what had its being and beginning from another, must also have all that which is in and belongs to its being fromanother too. All the powers it has must be owing to and received fromthe same source. This eternal source, then, of all being must also bethe source and original of all power; and so THIS ETERNAL BEING MUST BEALSO THE MOST POWERFUL. 

5. And most knowing. 

Again, a man finds in HIMSELF perception and knowledge. We have then gotone step further; and we are certain now that there is not only somebeing, but some knowing, intelligent being in the world. There was atime, then, when there was no knowing being, and when knowledge began tobe; or else there has been also A KNOWING BEING FROM ETERNITY. If itbe said, there was a time when no being had any knowledge, when thateternal being was void of all understanding; I reply, that then itwas impossible there should ever have been any knowledge: it being asimpossible that things wholly void of knowledge, and operating blindly, and without any perception, should produce a knowing being, as it isimpossible that a triangle should make itself three angles bigger thantwo right ones. For it is as repugnant to the idea of senseless matter, that it should put into itself sense, perception, and knowledge, as itis repugnant to the idea of a triangle, that it should put into itselfgreater angles than two right ones. 

6. And therefore God. 

Thus, from the consideration of ourselves, and what we infallibly findin our own constitutions, our reason leads us to the knowledge of thiscertain and evident truth, --THAT THERE IS AN ETERNAL, MOST POWERFUL, ANDMOST KNOWING BEING; which whether any one will please to call God, itmatters not. The thing is evident; and from this idea duly considered, will easily be deduced all those other attributes, which we ought toascribe to this eternal Being. [If, nevertheless, any one should befound so senselessly arrogant, as to suppose man alone knowing and wise, but yet the product of mere ignorance and chance; and that all the restof the universe acted only by that blind haphazard; I shall leave withhim that very rational and emphatical rebuke of Tully (1. Ii. De Leg. ), to be considered at his leisure: 'What can be more sillily arrogantand misbecoming, than for a man to think that he has a mind andunderstanding in him, but yet in all the universe beside there is nosuch thing? Or that those things, which with the utmost stretch of hisreason he can scarce comprehend, should be moved and managed without anyreason at all?' QUID EST ENIM VERIUS, QUAM NEMINEM ESSE OPORTERE TAMSTULTE AROGANTEM, UT IN SE MENTEM ET RATIONEM PUTET INESSE IN COELOMUNDOQUE NON PUTET? AUT EA QUOE VIZ SUMMA INGENII RATIONE COMPREHENDAT, NULLA RATIONE MOVERI PUTET?]

From what has been said, it is plain to me we have a more certainknowledge of the existence of a God, than of anything: our senses havenot immediately discovered to us. Nay, I presume I may say, that we morecertainly know that there is a God, than that there is anything elsewithout us. When I say we KNOW, I mean there is such a knowledge withinour reach which we cannot miss, if we will but apply our minds to that, as we do to several other inquiries. 

7. Our idea of a most perfect Being, not the sole Proof of a God. 

How far the IDEA of a most perfect being, which a man, may frame in hismind, does or does not prove the EXISTENCE of a God, I will not hereexamine. For in the different make of men's tempers and application oftheir thoughts, some arguments prevail more on one, and some on another, for the confirmation of the same truth. But yet, I think, this I maysay, that it is an ill way of establishing this truth, and silencingatheists, to lay the whole stress of so important a point as this uponthat sole foundation: and take some men's having that idea of God intheir minds, (for it is evident some men have none, and some worse thannone, and the most very different, ) for the only proof of a Deity; andout of an over fondness of that darling invention, cashier, or at leastendeavour to invalidate all other arguments; and forbid us to hearken tothose proofs, as being weak or fallacious, which our own existence, andthe sensible parts of the universe offer so clearly and cogently to ourthoughts, that I deem it impossible for a considering man to withstandthem. For I judge it as certain and clear a truth as can anywhere bedelivered, that 'the invisible things of God are clearly seen from thecreation of the world, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead. ' Though our own being furnishes us, as I have shown, with an evident and incontestible proof of a Deity; andI believe nobody can avoid the cogency of it, who will but as carefullyattend to it, as to any other demonstration of so many parts: yet thisbeing so fundamental a truth, and of that consequence, that all religionand genuine morality depend thereon, I doubt not but I shall be forgivenby my reader if I go over some parts of this argument again, and enlargea little more upon them. 

8. Recapitulation Something from Eternity. 

There is no truth more evident than that SOMETHING must be FROMETERNITY. I never yet heard of any one so unreasonable, or that couldsuppose so manifest a contradiction, as a time wherein there wasperfectly nothing. This being of all absurdities the greatest, toimagine that pure nothing, the perfect negation and absence of allbeings, should ever produce any real existence. 

It being, then, unavoidable for all rational creatures to conclude, thatSOMETHING has existed from eternity; let us next see WHAT KIND OF THINGthat must be. 

9. Two Sorts of Beings, cogitative and incogitative. 

There are but two sorts of beings in the world that man knows orconceives. 

First, such as are purely material, without sense, perception, orthought, as the clippings of our beards, and parings of our nails. 

Secondly, sensible, thinking, perceiving beings, such as we findourselves to be. Which, if you please, we will hereafter call COGITATIVEand INCOGITATIVE beings; which to our present purpose, if for nothingelse, are perhaps better terms than material and immaterial. 

10. Incogitative Being cannot produce a Cogitative Being. 

If, then, there must be something eternal, let us see what sort of beingit must be. And to that it is very obvious to reason, that it mustnecessarily be a cogitative being. For it is as impossible to conceivethat ever bare incogitative matter should produce a thinking intelligentbeing, as that nothing should of itself produce matter. Let us supposeany parcel of matter eternal, great or small, we shall find it, initself, able to produce nothing. For example: let us suppose the matterof the next pebble we meet with eternal, closely united, and the partsfirmly at rest together; if there were no other being in the world, mustit not eternally remain so, a dead inactive lump? Is it possible toconceive it can add motion to itself, being purely matter, or produceanything? Matter, then, by its own strength, cannot produce in itself somuch as motion: the motion it has must also be from eternity, or elsebe produced, and added to matter by some other being more powerful thanmatter; matter, as is evident, having not power to produce motion initself. But let us suppose motion eternal too: yet matter, INCOGITATIVEmatter and motion, whatever changes it might produce of figure and bulk, could never produce thought: knowledge will still be as far beyond thepower of motion and matter to produce, as matter is beyond the powerof nothing or nonentity to produce. And I appeal to every one's ownthoughts, whether he cannot as easily conceive matter produced byNOTHING, as thought to be produced by pure matter, when, before, therewas no such thing as thought or an intelligent being existing? Dividematter into as many parts as you will, (which we are apt to imagine asort of spiritualizing, or making a thinking thing of it, ) vary thefigure and motion of it as much as you please--a globe, cube, cone, prism, cylinder, &c. , whose diameters are but 100, 000th part of a GRY, will operate no otherwise upon other bodies of proportionable bulk, thanthose of an inch or foot diameter; and you may as rationally expect toproduce sense, thought, and knowledge, by putting together, in a certainfigure and motion, gross particles of matter, as by those that are thevery minutest that do anywhere exist. They knock, impel, and resist oneanother, just as the greater do; and that is all they can do. So that, if we will suppose NOTHING first or eternal, matter can never begin tobe: if we suppose bare matter without motion, eternal, motion can neverbegin to be: if we suppose only matter and motion first, or eternal, thought can never begin to be. [For it is impossible to conceive thatmatter, either with or without motion, could have, originally, in andfrom itself, sense, perception, and knowledge; as is evident from hence, that then sense, perception, and knowledge, must be a property eternallyinseparable from matter and every particle of it. Not to add, that, though our general or specific conception of matter makes us speak of itas one thing, yet really all matter is not one individual thing, neitheris there any such thing existing as ONE material being, or ONE singlebody that we know or can conceive. And therefore, if matter werethe eternal first cogitative being, there would not be one eternal, infinite, cogitative being, but an infinite number of eternal, finite, cogitative beings, independent one of another, of limited force, anddistinct thoughts, which could never produce that order, harmony, andbeauty which are to be found in nature. Since, therefore, whatsoever isthe first eternal being must necessarily be cogitative; and] whatsoeveris first of all things must necessarily contain in it, and actuallyhave, at least, all the perfections that can ever after exist; nor canit ever give to another any perfection that it hath not either actuallyin itself, or, at least, in a higher degree; [it necessarily follows, that the first eternal being cannot be matter. ]

11. Therefore, there has been an Eternal Wisdom. 

If, therefore, it be evident, that something necessarily must exist frometernity, it is also as evident, that that something must necessarilybe a cogitative being: for it is as impossible that incogitative mattershould produce a cogitative being, as that nothing, or the negation ofall being, should produce a positive being or matter. 

12. The Attributes of the Eternal Cogitative Being. 

Though this discovery of the NECESSARY EXISTANCE OF A ETERNAL MIND doessufficiently lead us into the knowledge of God; since it will hencefollow, that all other knowing beings that have a beginning must dependon him, and have in other ways of knowledge or extent of power than whatHe gives them; and therefore, if he made those, he made all the lessexcellent pieces of this universe, --all inanimate beings whereby hisomniscience, power, and providence will be established, and all hisother attributes necessarily follow yet, to clear up this a littlefurther, we will see what doubt can be raised against it. 

13. Whether the Eternal Mind may be also material or no. 

FIRST, Perhaps it will be said, that, though it be as clear asdemonstration can make it, that there must be an eternal Being, and thatBeing must also be knowing: yet it does not follow but that thinkingBeing may also be MATERIAL. Let it be so, it equally still follows thatthere is a God. For there be an eternal, omniscient, omnipotent Being, it is certain that there is a God, whether you imagine that Being to bematerial or no. But herein, I suppose, lies the danger and deceit ofthat supposition:--there being no way to avoid the demonstration, that there is an eternal knowing Being, men devoted to matter, wouldwillingly have it granted, that that knowing Being is material;and then, letting slide out of their minds, or the discourse, thedemonstration whereby an eternal KNOWING Being was proved necessarilyto exist, would argue all to be matter, and so deny a God, that is, aneternal cogitative Being: whereby they are so far from establishing, that they destroy their own hypothesis. For, if there can be, in theiropinion, eternal matter, without any eternal cogitative Being, theymanifestly separate matter and thinking, and suppose no necessaryconnexion of the one with the other, and so establish the necessity ofan eternal Spirit, but not of matter; since it has been proved already, that an eternal cogitative Being is unavoidably to be granted. Now, ifthinking and matter may be separated, the eternal existence of matterwill not follow from the eternal existence of a cogitative Being, andthey suppose it to no purpose. 

14. Not material: First, because each Particle of Matter is notcogitative. 

But now let us see how they can satisfy themselves, or others, that thiseternal thinking Being is material. 

I. I would ask them, whether they imagine that all matter, EVERYPARTICLE OF MATTER, thinks? This, I suppose, they will scarce say;since then there would be as many eternal thinking beings as there areparticles of matter, and so an infinity of gods. And yet, if they willnot allow matter as matter, that is, every particle of matter, to be aswell cogitative as extended, they will have as hard a task to make outto their own reasons a cogitative being out of incogitative particles, as an extended being out of unextended parts, if I may so speak. 

15. II. Secondly, Because one Particle alone of Matter cannot becogitative. 

If all matter does not think, I next ask, Whether it be ONLY ONE ATOMthat does so? This has as many absurdities as the other; for then thisatom of matter must be alone eternal or not. If this alone be eternal, then this alone, by its powerful thought or will, made all the rest ofmatter. And so we have the creation of matter by a powerful thought, which is that the materialists stick at; for if they suppose one singlethinking atom to have produced all the rest of matter, they cannotascribe that pre-eminency to it upon any other account than that of itsthinking, the only supposed difference. But allow it to be by some otherway which is above our conception, it must still be creation; and thesemen must give up their great maxim, EX NIHILO NIL FIT. If it be said, that all the rest of matter is equally eternal as that thinking atom, it will be to say anything at pleasure, though ever so absurd. For tosuppose all matter eternal, and yet one small particle in knowledge andpower infinitely above all the rest, is without any the least appearanceof reason to frame an hypothesis. Every particle of matter, as matter, is capable of all the same figures and motions of any other; and Ichallenge any one, in his thoughts, to add anything else to one aboveanother. 

16. III. Thirdly, Because a System of incogitative Matter cannot becogitative. 

If then neither one peculiar atom alone can be this eternal thinkingbeing; nor all matter, as matter, i. E. Every particle of matter, can beit; it only remains, that it is some certain SYSTEM of matter, duly puttogether, that is this thinking eternal Being. This is that which, Iimagine, is that notion which men are aptest to have of God; who wouldhave him a material being, as most readily suggested to them by theordinary conceit they have of themselves and other men, which they taketo be material thinking beings. But this imagination, however morenatural, is no less absurd than the other; for to suppose the eternalthinking Being to be nothing else but a composition of particles ofmatter, each whereof is incogitative, is to ascribe all the wisdom andknowledge of that eternal Being only to the juxta-position of parts;than which nothing can be more absurd. For unthinking particles ofmatter, however put together, can have nothing thereby added to them, but a new relation of position, which it is impossible should givethought and knowledge to them. 

17. And whether this corporeal System is in Motion or at Rest. 

But further: this corporeal system either has all its parts at rest, orit is a certain motion of the parts wherein its thinking consists. If itbe perfectly at rest, it is but one lump, and so can have no privilegesabove one atom. 

If it be the motion of its parts on which its thinking depends, all thethoughts there must be unavoidably accidental and limited; since all theparticles that by motion cause thought, being each of them in itselfwithout any thought, cannot regulate its own motions, much less beregulated by the thought of the whole; since that thought is not thecause of motion, (for then it must be antecedent to it, and so withoutit, ) but the consequence of it; whereby freedom, power, choice, and allrational and wise thinking or acting, will be quite taken away: sothat such a thinking being will be no better nor wiser than pure blindmatter; since to resolve all into the accidental unguided motions ofblind matter, or into thought depending on unguided motions of blindmatter, is the same thing: not to mention the narrowness of suchthoughts and knowledge that must depend on the motion of such parts. Butthere needs no enumeration of any more absurdities and impossibilitiesin this hypothesis (however full of them it be) than that beforementioned; since, let this thinking system be all or a part of thematter of the universe, it is impossible that any one particle shouldeither know its own, or the motion of any other particle, or the wholeknow the motion of every particle; and so regulate its own thoughts ormotions, or indeed have any thought resulting from such motion. 

18. Matter not co-eternal with an Eternal Mind. 

SECONDLY, Others would have Matter to be eternal, notwithstanding thatthey allow an eternal, cogitative, immaterial Being. This, though ittake not away the being of a God, yet, since it denies one and the firstgreat piece of his workmanship, the creation, let us consider it alittle. Matter must be allowed eternal: Why? because you cannot conceivehow it can be made out of nothing: why do you not also think yourselfeternal? You will answer, perhaps, Because, about twenty or forty yearssince, you began to be. But if I ask you, what that YOU is, which beganthen to be, you can scarce tell me. The matter whereof you are madebegan not then to be: for if it did, then it is not eternal: but itbegan to be put together in such a fashion and frame as makes up yourbody; but yet that frame of particles is not you, it makes not thatthinking thing you are; (for I have now to do with one who allows aneternal, immaterial, thinking Being, but would have unthinking Mattereternal too;) therefore, when did that thinking thing begin to be? If itdid never begin to be, then have you always been a thinking thing frometernity; the absurdity whereof I need not confute, till I meet with onewho is so void of understanding as to own it. If, therefore, you canallow a thinking thing to be made out of nothing, (as all things thatare not eternal must be, ) why also can you not allow it possible for amaterial being to be made out of nothing by an equal power, but that youhave the experience of the one in view, and not of the other? Though, when well considered, creation [of a spirit will be found to requireno less power than the creation of matter. Nay, possibly, if we wouldemancipate ourselves from vulgar notions, and raise our thoughts, as faras they would reach, to a closer contemplation of things, we might beable to aim at some dim and seeming conception how MATTER might at firstbe made, and begin to exist, by the power of that eternal first Being:but to give beginning and being to a SPIRIT would be found a moreinconceivable effect of omnipotent power. But this being what wouldperhaps lead us too far from the notions on which the philosophy now inthe world is built, it would not be pardonable to deviate so far fromthem; or to inquire, so far as grammar itself would authorize, if thecommon settled opinion opposes it: especially in this place, where thereceived doctrine serves well enough to our present purpose, and leavesthis past doubt, that] the creation or beginning of any one [SUBSTANCE]out of nothing being once admitted, the creation of all other but theCreator himself, may, with the same ease, be supposed. 

19. Objection: Creation out of nothing. 

But you will say, Is it not impossible to admit of the making anythingout of nothing, SINCE WE CANNOT POSSIBLY CONCEIVE IT? I answer, No. Because it is not reasonable to deny the power of an infinite being, because we cannot comprehend its operations. We do not deny othereffects upon this ground, because we cannot possibly conceive the mannerof their production. We cannot conceive how anything but impulse of bodycan move body; and yet that is not a reason sufficient to make us denyit possible, against the constant experience we have of it in ourselves, in all our voluntary motions; which are produced in us only by the freeaction or thought of our own minds, and are not, nor can be, the effectsof the impulse or determination of the motion of blind matter in or uponour own bodies; for then it could not be in our power or choice to alterit. For example: my right hand writes, whilst my left hand is still:What causes rest in one, and motion in the other? Nothing but mywill, --a thought of my mind; my thought only changing, the right handrests, and the left hand moves. This is matter of fact, which cannot bedenied: explain this and make it intelligible, and then the next stepwill be to understand creation. [For the giving a new determination tothe motion of the animal spirits (which some make use of to explainvoluntary motion) clears not the difficulty one jot. To alter thedetermination of motion, being in this case no easier nor less, thanto give motion itself: since the new determination given to the animalspirits must be either immediately by thought, or by some other body putin their way by thought which was not in their way before, and so mustowe ITS motion to thought: either of which leaves VOLUNTARY motion asunintelligible as it was before. ] In the meantime, it is an over-valuingourselves to reduce all to the narrow measure of our capacities; and toconclude all things impossible to be done, whose manner of doing exceedsour comprehension. This is to make our comprehension infinite, or Godfinite, when what He can do is limited to what we can conceive of it. If you do not understand the operations of your own finite mind, thatthinking thing within you, do not deem it strange that you cannotcomprehend the operations of that eternal infinite Mind, who made andgoverns all things, and whom the heaven of heavens cannot contain. 

CHAPTER XI. 

OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF OTHER THINGS. 

1. Knowledge of the existence of other Finite Beings is to be had onlyby actual Sensation. 

The knowledge of our own being we have by intuition. The existence of aGod, reason clearly makes known to us, as has been shown. 

The knowledge of the existence of ANY OTHER THING we can have only bySENSATION: for there being no necessary connexion of real existence withany IDEA a man hath in his memory; nor of any other existence but thatof God with the existence of any particular man: no particular mancan know the existence of any other being, but only when, by actualoperating upon him, it makes itself perceived by him. For, the havingthe idea of anything in our mind, no more proves the existence of thatthing, than the picture of a man evidences his being in the world, orthe visions of a dream make thereby a true history. 

2. Instance: Whiteness of this Paper. 

It is therefore the ACTUAL RECEIVING of ideas from without that givesus notice of the existence of other things, and makes us know, thatsomething doth exist at that time without us, which causes that idea inus; though perhaps we neither know nor consider how it does it. For ittakes not from the certainty of our senses, and the ideas we receive bythem, that we know not the manner wherein they are produced: v. G. WhilstI write this, I have, by the paper affecting my eyes, that idea producedin my mind, which, whatever object causes, I call WHITE; by which I knowthat that quality or accident (i. E. Whose appearance before my eyesalways causes that idea) doth really exist, and hath a being without me. And of this, the greatest assurance I can possibly have, and to which myfaculties can attain, is the testimony of my eyes, which are the properand sole judges of this thing; whose testimony I have reason to rely onas so certain, that I can no more doubt, whilst I write this, that Isee white and black, and that something really exists that causes thatsensation in me, than that I write or move my hand; which is a certaintyas great as human nature is capable of, concerning the existence ofanything, but a man's self alone, and of God. 

3. This notice by our Senses, though not so certain as Demonstration, yet may be called Knowledge, and proves the Existence of Things withoutus. 

The notice we have by our senses of the existing of things without us, though it be not altogether so certain as our intuitive knowledge, orthe deductions of our reason employed about the clear abstract ideasof our own minds; yet it is an assurance that deserves the name ofKNOWLEDGE. If we persuade ourselves that our faculties act and informus right concerning the existence of those objects that affect them, itcannot pass for an ill-grounded confidence: for I think nobody can, inearnest, be so sceptical as to be uncertain of the existence of thosethings which he sees and feels. At least, he that can doubt so far, (whatever he may have with his own thoughts, ) will never have anycontroversy with me; since he can never be sure I say anything contraryto his own opinion. As to myself, I think God has given me assuranceenough of the existence of things without me: since, by their differentapplication, I can produce in myself both pleasure and pain, whichis one great concernment of my present state. This is certain: theconfidence that our faculties do not herein deceive us, is the greatestassurance we are capable of concerning the existence of material beings. For we cannot act anything but by our faculties; nor talk of knowledgeitself, but by the help of those faculties which are fitted to apprehendeven what knowledge is. 

But besides the assurance we have from our senses themselves, that theydo not err in the information they give us of the existence of thingswithout us, when they are affected by them, we are further confirmed inthis assurance by other concurrent reasons:--

4. I. Confirmed by concurrent reasons:--First, Because we cannot haveideas of Sensation but by the Inlet of the Senses. 

It is plain those perceptions are produced in us by exterior causesaffecting our senses: because those that want the ORGANS of any sense, never can have the ideas belonging to that sense produced in theirminds. This is too evident to be doubted: and therefore we cannot but beassured that they come in by the organs of that sense, and no other way. The organs themselves, it is plain, do not produce them: for then theeyes of a man in the dark would produce colours, and his nose smellroses in the winter: but we see nobody gets the relish of a pineapple, till he goes to the Indies, where it is, and tastes it. 

5. II. Secondly, Because we find that an Idea from actual Sensatio, andanother from memory, are very distinct Perceptions. 

Because sometimes I find that I CANNOT AVOID THE HAVING THOSE IDEASPRODUCED IN MY MIND. For though, when my eyes are shut, or windows fast, I can at pleasure recal to my mind the ideas of light, or the sun, whichformer sensations had lodged in my memory; so I can at pleasure lay byTHAT idea, and take into my view that of the smell of a rose, or tasteof sugar. But, if I turn my eyes at noon towards the sun, I cannot avoidthe ideas which the light or sun then produces in me. So that there is amanifest difference between the ideas laid up in my memory, (over which, if they were there only, I should have constantly the same power todispose of them, and lay them by at pleasure, ) and those which forcethemselves upon me, and I cannot avoid having. And therefore it mustneeds be some exterior cause, and the brisk acting of some objectswithout me, whose efficacy I cannot resist, that produces those ideasin my mind, whether I will or no. Besides, there is nobody who doth notperceive the difference in himself between contemplating the sun, ashe hath the idea of it in his memory, and actually looking upon it: ofwhich two, his perception is so distinct, that few of his ideas aremore distinguishable one from another. And therefore he hath certainknowledge that they are not BOTH memory, or the actions of his mind, andfancies only within him; but that actual seeing hath a cause without. 

6. III. Thirdly, Because Pleasure or Pain, which accompanies actualSensation, accompanies not the returning of those Ideas without theexternal Objects. 

Add to this, that many of those ideas are PRODUCED IN US WITH PAIN, which afterwards we remember without the least offence. Thus, the painof heat or cold, when the idea of it is revived in our minds, gives usno disturbance; which, when felt, was very troublesome; and is again, when actually repeated: which is occasioned by the disorder the externalobject causes in our bodies when applied to them: and we remember thepains of hunger, thirst, or the headache, without any pain at all; whichwould either never disturb us, or else constantly do it, as often as wethought of it, were there nothing more but ideas floating in our minds, and appearances entertaining our fancies, without the real existenceof things affecting us from abroad. The same may be said of PLEASURE, accompanying several actual sensations. And though mathematicaldemonstration depends not upon sense, yet the examining them by diagramsgives great credit to the evidence of our sight, and seems to give it acertainty approaching to that of demonstration itself. For, it would bevery strange, that a man should allow it for an undeniable truth, thattwo angles of a figure, which he measures by lines and angles of adiagram, should be bigger one than the other, and yet doubt of theexistence of those lines and angles, which by looking on he makes use ofto measure that by. 

7. IV. Fourthly, Because our Senses assist one another's Testimony ofthe Existence of outward Things, and enable us to predict. 

Our SENSES in many cases BEAR WITNESS TO THE TRUTH OF EACH OTHER'SREPORT, concerning the existence of sensible things without us. He thatSEES a fire, may, if he doubt whether it be anything more than a barefancy, FEEL it too; and be convinced, by putting his hand in it. Whichcertainly could never be put into such exquisite pain by a bare idea orphantom, unless that the pain be a fancy too: which yet he cannot, whenthe burn is well, by raising the idea of it, bring upon himself again. 

Thus I see, whilst I write this, I can change the appearance of thepaper; and by designing the letters, tell BEFOREHAND what new idea itshall exhibit the very next moment, by barely drawing my pen over it:which will neither appear (let me fancy as much as I will) if my handsstand still; or though I move my pen, if my eyes be shut: nor, whenthose characters are once made on the paper, can I choose afterwards butsee them as they are; that is, have the ideas of such letters as I havemade. Whence it is manifest, that they are not barely the sport and playof my own imagination, when I find that the characters that were made atthe pleasure of my own thoughts, do not obey them; nor yet cease to be, whenever I shall fancy it, but continue to affect my senses constantlyand regularly, according to the figures I made them. To which if we willadd, that the sight of those shall from another man, draw such sounds asI beforehand design they shall stand for, there will be little reasonleft to doubt that those words I write do really exist without me, whenthey cause a long series of regular sounds to affect my ears, whichcould not be the effect of my imagination, nor could my memory retainthem in that order. 

8. This Certainty is as great as our Condition needs. 

But yet, if after all this any one will be so sceptical as to distrusthis senses, and to affirm that all we see and hear, feel and taste, think and do, during our whole being, is but the series and deludingappearances of a long dream, whereof there is no reality; and thereforewill question the existence of all things, or our knowledge of anything:I must desire him to consider, that, if all be a dream, then he doth butdream that he makes the question, and so it is not much matter that awaking man should answer him. But yet, if he pleases, he may dream thatI make him this answer, That the certainty of things existing in RERUMNATURA when we have the testimony of our senses for it is not only asgreat as our frame can attain to, but as our condition needs. For, our faculties being suited not to the full extent of being, nor to aperfect, clear, comprehensive knowledge of things free from all doubtand scruple; but to the preservation of us, in whom they are; andaccommodated to the use of life: they serve to our purpose well enough, if they will but give us certain notice of those things, which areconvenient or inconvenient to us. For he that sees a candle burning, andhath experimented the force of its flame by putting his finger in it, will little doubt that this is something existing without him, whichdoes him harm, and puts him to great pain: which is assurance enough, when no man requires greater certainty to govern his actions by thanwhat is as certain as his actions themselves. And if our dreamer pleasesto try whether the glowing heat of a glass furnace be barely a wanderingimagination in a drowsy man's fancy, by putting his hand into it, he mayperhaps be wakened into a certainty greater than he could wish, that itis something more than bare imagination. So that this evidence is asgreat as we can desire, being as certain to us as our pleasure or pain, i. E. Happiness or misery; beyond which we have no concernment, either ofknowing or being. Such an assurance of the existence of things withoutus is sufficient to direct us in the attaining the good and avoiding theevil which is caused by them, which is the important concernment we haveof being made acquainted with them. 

9. But reaches no further than actual Sensation. 

In fine, then, when our senses do actually convey into ourunderstandings any idea, we cannot but be satisfied that there dothsomething AT THAT TIME really exist without us, which doth affect oursenses, and by them give notice of itself to our apprehensive faculties, and actually produce that idea which we then perceive: and we cannotso far distrust their testimony, as to doubt that such COLLECTIONS ofsimple ideas as we have observed by our senses to be united together, doreally exist together. But this knowledge extends as far as the presenttestimony of our senses, employed about particular objects that do thenaffect them, and no further. For if I saw such a collection of simpleideas as is wont to be called MAN, existing together one minute since, and am now alone, I cannot be certain that the same man exists now, since there is no NECESSARY CONNEXION of his existence a minute sincewith his existence now: by a thousand ways he may cease to be, since Ihad the testimony of my senses for his existence. And if I cannot becertain that the man I saw last to-day is now in being, I can less becertain that he is so who hath been longer removed from my senses, and Ihave not seen since yesterday, or since the last year: and much less canI be certain of the existence of men that I never saw. And, therefore, though it be highly probable that millions of men do now exist, yet, whilst I am alone, writing this, I have not that certainty of it whichwe strictly call knowledge; though the great likelihood of it puts mepast doubt, and it be reasonable for me to do several things upon theconfidence that there are men (and men also of my acquaintance, withwhom I have to do) now in the world: but this is but probability, notknowledge. 

10. Folly to expect Demonstration in everything. 

Whereby yet we may observe how foolish and vain a thing it is for aman of a narrow knowledge, who having reason given him to judge ofthe different evidence and probability of things, and to be swayedaccordingly; how vain, I say, it is to expect demonstration andcertainty in things not capable of it; and refuse assent to veryrational propositions, and act contrary to very plain and clear truths, because they cannot be made out so evident, as to surmount every theleast (I will not say reason, but) pretence of doubting. He that, inthe ordinary affairs of life, would admit of nothing but direct plaindemonstration, would be sure of nothing in this world, but of perishingquickly. The wholesomeness of his meat or drink would not give himreason to venture on it: and I would fain know what it is he could doupon such grounds as are capable of no doubt, no objection. 

11. Past Existence of other things is known by Memory. 

As WHEN OUR SENSES ARE ACTUALLY EMPLOYED ABOUT ANY OBJECT, we do knowthat it does exist; so BY OUR MEMORY we may be assured, that heretoforethings that affected our senses have existed. And thus we have knowledgeof the past existence of several things, whereof our senses havinginformed us, our memories still retain the ideas; and of this we arepast all doubt, so long as we remember well. But this knowledge alsoreaches no further than our senses have formerly assured us. Thus, seeing water at this instant, it is an unquestionable truth to me thatwater doth exist: and remembering that I saw it yesterday, it will alsobe always true, and as long as my memory retains it always an undoubtedproposition to me, that water did exist the 10th of July, 1688; as itwill also be equally true that a certain number of very fine colours didexist, which at the same time I saw upon a bubble of that water: but, being now quite out of sight both of the water and bubbles too, it is nomore certainly known to me that the water doth now exist, than that thebubbles or colours therein do so: it being no more necessary that watershould exist to-day, because it existed yesterday, than that the coloursor bubbles exist to-day, because they existed yesterday, though it beexceedingly much more probable; because water hath been observed tocontinue long in existence, but bubbles, and the colours on them, quickly cease to be. 

12. The Existence of other finite Spirits not knowable, and rests onFaith. 

What ideas we have of spirits, and how we come by them, I have alreadyshown. But though we have those ideas in our minds, and know we havethem there, the having the ideas of spirits does not make us know thatany such things do exist without us, or that there are any finitespirits, or any other spiritual beings, but the Eternal God. We haveground from revelation, and several other reasons, to believe withassurance that there are such creatures: but our senses not beingable to discover them, we want the means of knowing their particularexistences. For we can no more know that there are finite spirits reallyexisting, by the idea we have of such beings in our minds, than by theideas any one has of fairies or centaurs, he can come to know thatthings answering those ideas do really exist. 

And therefore concerning the existence of finite spirits, as well asseveral other things, we must content ourselves with the evidence offaith; but universal, certain propositions concerning this matterare beyond our reach. For however true it may be, v. G. , that all theintelligent spirits that God ever created do still exist, yet itcan never make a part of our certain knowledge. These and the likepropositions we may assent to, as highly probable, but are not, I fear, in this state capable of knowing. We are not, then, to put others upondemonstrating, nor ourselves upon search of universal certainty in allthose matters; wherein we are not capable of any other knowledge, butwhat our senses give us in this or that particular. 

13. Only particular Propositions concerning concrete Existances areknowable. 

By which it appears that there are two sorts of propositions:--(1)There is one sort of propositions concerning the existence of anythinganswerable to such an idea: as having the idea of an elephant, phoenix, motion, or an angel, in my mind, the first and natural inquiry is, Whether such a thing does anywhere exist? And this knowledge is only ofparticulars. No existence of anything without us, but only of God, cancertainly be known further than our senses inform us, (2) There isanother sort of propositions, wherein is expressed the agreement ordisagreement of OUR ABSTRACT IDEAS, and their dependence on one another. Such propositions may be universal and certain. So, having the idea ofGod and myself, of fear and obedience, I cannot but be sure that God isto be feared and obeyed by me: and this proposition will be certain, concerning man in general, if I have made an abstract idea of such aspecies, whereof I am one particular. But yet this proposition, howcertain soever, that 'men ought to fear and obey God' proves not tome the EXISTENCE of MEN in the world; but will be true of all suchcreatures, whenever they do exist: which certainty of such generalpropositions depends on the agreement or disagreement to be discoveredin those abstract ideas. 

14. And all general Propositions that are know to be true concernabstract Ideas. 

In the former case, our knowledge is the consequence of the existenceof things, producing ideas in our minds by our senses: in the latter, knowledge is the consequence of the ideas (be they what they will) thatare in our minds, producing there general certain propositions. Many ofthese are called AETERNAE VERITATES, and all of them indeed are so; notfrom being written, all or any of them, in the minds of all men; or thatthey were any of them propositions in any one's mind, till he, havinggot the abstract ideas, joined or separated them by affirmation ornegation. But wheresoever we can suppose such a creature as man is, endowed with such faculties, and thereby furnished with such ideas as wehave, we must conclude, he must needs, when he applies his thoughts tothe consideration of his ideas, know the truth of certain propositionsthat will arise from the agreement or disagreement which he willperceive in his own ideas. Such propositions are therefore calledETERNAL TRUTHS, not because they are eternal propositions actuallyformed, and antecedent to the understanding that at any time makes them;nor because they are imprinted on the mind from any patterns that areanywhere out of the mind, and existed before: but because, being oncemade about abstract ideas, so as to be true, they will, whenever theycan be supposed to be made again at any time, past or come, by a mindhaving those ideas, always actually be true. For names being supposedto stand perpetually for the same ideas, and the same ideas havingimmutably the same habitudes one to another, propositions concerning anyabstract ideas that are once true must needs be ETERNAL VERITIES. 

CHAPTER XII. OF THE IMPROVEMENT OF OUR KNOWLEDGE

1. Knowledge is not got from Maxims. 

IT having been the common received opinion amongst men of letters, thatMAXIMS were the foundation of all knowledge; and that the scienceswere each of them built upon certain PRAECOGNITA, from whence theunderstanding was to take its rise, and by which it was to conductitself in its inquiries into the matters belonging to that science, thebeaten road of the Schools has been, to lay down in the beginning one ormore GENERAL PROPOSITIONS, as foundations whereon to build the knowledgethat was to be had of that subject. These doctrines, thus laid down forfoundations of any science, were called PRINCIPLES, as the beginningsfrom which we must set out, and look no further backwards in ourinquiries, as we have already observed. 

2. (The Occasion of that Opinion. )

One thing which might probably give an occasion to this way ofproceeding in other sciences, was (as I suppose) the good success itseemed to have in MATHEMATICS, wherein men, being observed to attain agreat certainty of knowledge, these sciences came by pre-eminence tobe called [word in Greek], and [word in Greek], learning, or thingslearned, thoroughly learned, as having of all others the greatestcertainty, clearness, and evidence in them. 

3. But from comparing clear and distinct Ideas. 

But if any one will consider, he will (I guess) find, that the greatadvancement and certainty of real knowledge which men arrived to inthese sciences, was not owing to the influence of these principles, norderived from any peculiar advantage they received from two or threegeneral maxims, laid down in the beginning; but from the clear, distinct, complete ideas their thoughts were employed about, and therelation of equality and excess so clear between some of them, that theyhad an intuitive knowledge, and by THAT a way to discover it in others;and this without the help of those maxims. For I ask, Is it not possiblefor a young lad to know that his whole body is bigger than his littlefinger, but by virtue of this axiom, that THE WHOLE IS BIGGER THAN APART; nor be assured of it, till he has learned that maxim? Or cannot acountry wench know that, having received a shilling from one that owesher three, and a shilling also from another that owes her three, theremaining debts in each of their hands are equal? Cannot she know this, I say, unless she fetch the certainty of it from this maxim, that IF YOUTAKE EQUALS FROM EQUALS, THE REMAINDER WILL BE EQUALS, a maxim whichpossibly she never heard or thought of? I desire any one to consider, from what has been elsewhere said, which is known first and clearest bymost people, the particular instance, or the general rule; and which itis that gives life and birth to the other. These general rules arebut the comparing our more general and abstract ideas, which are theworkmanship of the mind, made, and names given to them for the easierdispatch in its reasonings, and drawing into comprehensive terms andshort rules its various and multiplied observations. But knowledge beganin the mind, and was founded on particulars; though afterwards, perhaps, no notice was taken thereof: it being natural for the mind (forwardstill to enlarge its knowledge) most attentively to lay up those generalnotions, and make the proper use of them, which is to disburden thememory of the cumbersome load of particulars. For I desire it may beconsidered, what more certainty there is to a child, or any one, thathis body, little finger, and all, is bigger than his little fingeralone, after you have given to his body the name WHOLE, and to hislittle finger the name PART, than he could have had before; or what newknowledge concerning his body can these two relative terms give him, which he could not have without them? Could he not know that his bodywas bigger than his little finger, if his language were yet so imperfectthat he had no such relative terms as whole and part? I ask, further, when he has got these names, how is he more certain that his body is awhole, and his little finger a part, than he was or might be certainbefore he learnt those terms, that his body was bigger than his littlefinger? Any one may as reasonably doubt or deny that his little fingeris a part of his body, as that it is less than his body. And he that candoubt whether it be less, will as certainly doubt whether it be a part. So that the maxim, the whole is bigger than a part, can never be madeuse of to prove the little finger less than the body, but when it isuseless, by being brought to convince one of a truth which he knowsalready. For he that does not certainly know that any parcel of matter, with another parcel of matter joined to it, is bigger than either ofthem alone, will never be able to know it by the help of these tworelative terms, whole and part, make of them what maxim you please. 

4. Dangerous to build upon precarious Principles. 

But be it in the mathematics as it will, whether it be clearer, that, taking an inch from a black line of two inches, and an inch from a redline of two inches, the remaining parts of the two lines will be equal, or that IF YOU TAKE EQUALS FROM EQUALS, THE REMAINDER WILL BE EQUALS:which, I say, of these two is the clearer and first known, I leave toany one to determine, it not being material to my present occasion. Thatwhich I have here to do, is to inquire, whether, if it be the readiestway to knowledge to begin with general maxims, and build upon them, itbe yet a safe way to take the PRINCIPLES which are laid down in anyother science as unquestionable truths; and so receive them withoutexamination, and adhere to them, without suffering them to be doubtedof, because mathematicians have been so happy, or so fair, to use nonebut self-evident and undeniable. If this be so, I know not what may notpass for truth in morality, what may not be introduced and proved innatural philosophy. 

Let that principle of some of the old philosophers, That all is Matter, and that there is nothing else, be received for certain and indubitable, and it will be easy to be seen by the writings of some that have revivedit again in our days, what consequences it will lead us into. Let anyone, with Polemo, take the world; or with the Stoics, the aether, orthe sun; or with Anaximenes, the air, to be God; and what a divinity, religion, and worship must we needs have! Nothing can be so dangerous asPRINCIPLES thus TAKEN UP WITHOUT QUESTIONING OR EXAMINATION; especiallyif they be such as concern morality, which influence men's lives, andgive a bias to all their actions. Who might not justly expect anotherkind of life in Aristippus, who placed happiness in bodily pleasure; andin Antisthenes, who made virtue sufficient to felicity? And he who, withPlato, shall place beatitude in the knowledge of God, will have histhoughts raised to other contemplations than those who look not beyondthis spot of earth, and those perishing things which are to be had init. He that, with Archelaus, shall lay it down as a principle, thatright and wrong, honest and dishonest, are defined only by laws, and notby nature, will have other measures of moral rectitude and gravity, thanthose who take it for granted that we are under obligations antecedentto all human constitutions. 

5. To do so is no certain Way to Truth. 

If, therefore, those that pass for PRINCIPLES are NOT CERTAIN, (which wemust have some way to know, that we may be able to distinguish themfrom those that are doubtful, ) but are only made so to us by our blindassent, we are liable to be misled by them; and instead of being guidedinto truth, we shall, by principles, be only confirmed in mistake anderror. 

6. But to compare clear, complete Ideas, under steady Names. 

But since the knowledge of the certainty of principles, as well asof all other truths, depends only upon the perception we have of theagreement or disagreement of our ideas, the way to improve our knowledgeis not, I am sure, blindly, and with an implicit faith, to receive andswallow principles; but is, I think, to get and fix in our minds clear, distinct, and complete ideas, as far as they are to be had, and annexto them proper and constant names. And thus, perhaps, without any otherprinciples, but BARELY CONSIDERING THOSE PERFECT IDEAS, and by COMPARINGTHEM ONE WITH ANOTHER; finding their agreement and disagreement, andtheir several relations and habitudes; we shall get more true and clearknowledge by the conduct of this one rule, than by taking up principles, and thereby putting our minds into the disposal of others. 

7. The true Method of advancing Knowledge is by considering our abstractIdeas. 

We must, therefore, if we will proceed as reason advises, adapt ourmethods of inquiry to THE NATURE OF THE IDEAS WE EXAMINE, and the truthwe search after. General and certain truths are only founded in thehabitudes and relations of ABSTRACT IDEAS. A sagacious and methodicalapplication of our thoughts, for the finding out these relations, isthe only way to discover all that can be put with truth and certaintyconcerning them into general propositions. By what steps we are toproceed in these, is to be learned in the schools of the mathematicians, who, from very plain and easy beginnings, by gentle degrees, anda continued chain of reasonings, proceed to the discovery anddemonstration of truths that appear at first sight beyond humancapacity. The art of finding proofs, and the admirable methods they haveinvented for the singling out and laying in order those intermediateideas that demonstratively show the equality or inequality ofunapplicable quantities, is that which has carried them so far, andproduced such wonderful and unexpected discoveries: but whethersomething like this, in respect of other ideas, as well as those ofmagnitude, may not in time be found out, I will not determine. This, I think, I may say, that if other ideas that are the real as well asnominal essences of their species, were pursued in the way familiar tomathematicians, they would carry our thoughts further, and with greaterevidence and clearness than possibly we are apt to imagine. 

8. By which Morality also may be made clearer. 

This gave me the confidence to advance that conjecture, which I suggest, (chap. Iii. ) viz. That MORALITY is capable of demonstration as well asmathematics. For the ideas that ethics are conversant about, being allreal essences, and such as I imagine have a discoverable connexion andagreement one with another; so far as we can find their habitudes andrelations, so far we shall be possessed of certain, real, and generaltruths; and I doubt not but, if a right method were taken, a great partof morality might be made out with that clearness, that could leave, toa considering man, no more reason to doubt, than he could have todoubt of the truth of propositions in mathematics, which have beendemonstrated to him. 

9. Our Knowledge of Substances is to be improved, not by contemplationof abstract ideas, but only by Experience. 

In our search after the knowledge of SUBSTANCES, our want of ideas thatare suitable to such a way of proceeding obliges us to a quite differentmethod. We advance not here, as in the other, (where our abstract ideasare real as well as nominal essences, ) by contemplating our ideas, andconsidering their relations and correspondences; that helps us verylittle for the reasons, that in another place we have at large set down. By which I think it is evident, that substances afford matter of verylittle GENERAL knowledge; and the bare contemplation of their abstractideas will carry us but a very little way in the search of truth andcertainty. What, then, are we to do for the improvement of our knowledgein substantial beings? Here we are to take a quite contrary course: thewant of ideas of their real essences sends us from our own thoughts tothe things themselves as they exist. EXPERIENCE HERE MUST TEACH ME WHATREASON CANNOT: and it is by TRYING alone, that I can CERTAINLY KNOW, what other qualities co-exist with those of my complex idea, v. G. Whether that yellow heavy, fusible body I call gold, be malleable, orno; which experience (which way ever it prove in that particular body Iexamine) makes me not certain, that it is so in all, or any otheryellow, heavy, fusible bodies, but that which I have tried. Because itis no consequence one way or the other from my complex idea: thenecessity or inconsistence of malleability hath no visible connexionwith the combination of that colour, weight, and fusibility in any body. What I have said here of the nominal essence of gold, supposed toconsist of a body of such a determinate colour, weight, and fusibility, will hold true, if malleableness, fixedness, and solubility in aquaregia be added to it. Our reasonings from these ideas will carry us buta little way in the certain discovery of the other properties in thosemasses of matter wherein all these are to be found. Because the OTHERproperties of such bodies, depending not on these, but on that unknownreal essence on which these also depend, we cannot by them discover therest; we can go no further than the simple ideas of our nominal essencewill carry us, which is very little beyond themselves; and so afford usbut very sparingly any certain, universal, and useful truths. For, upontrial, having found that particular piece (and all others of thatcolour, weight, and fusibility, that I ever tried) malleable, that alsomakes now, perhaps, a part of my complex idea, part of my nominalessence of gold: whereby though I make my complex idea to which I affixthe name gold, to consist of more simple ideas than before; yet still, it not containing the real essence of any species of bodies, it helps menot certainly to know (I say to know, perhaps it may be to conjecture)the other remaining properties of that body, further than they have avisible connexion with some or all of the simple ideas that make up mynominal essence. For example, I cannot be certain, from this complexidea, whether gold be fixed or no; because, as before, there is noNECESSARY connexion or inconsistence to be discovered betwixt a COMPLEXIDEA OF A BODY YELLOW, HEAVY, FUSIBLE, MALLEABLE; betwixt these, I say, and FIXEDNESS; so that I may certainly know, that in whatsoever bodythese are found, there fixedness is sure to be. Here, again, forassurance, I must apply myself to experience; as far as that reaches, I may have certain knowledge, but no further. 

10. Experience may procure is Convenience, not Science. 

I deny not but a man, accustomed to rational and regular experiments, shall be able to see further into the nature of bodies, and guessrighter at their yet unknown properties, than one that is a stranger tothem: but yet, as I have said, this is but judgment and opinion, notknowledge and certainty. This way of GETTING AND IMPROVING OUR KNOWLEDGEIN SUBSTANCES ONLY BY EXPERIENCE AND HISTORY, which is all that theweakness of our faculties in this state of mediocrity which we are inthis world can attain to, makes me suspect that NATURAL PHILOSOPHY ISNOT CAPABLE IS BEING MADE A SCIENCE. We are able, I imagine, to reachvery little general knowledge concerning the species of bodies, andtheir several properties. Experiments and historical observations we mayhave, from which we may draw advantages of ease and health, and therebyincrease our stock of conveniences for this life; but beyond this I fearour talents reach not, nor are our faculties, as I guess, able toadvance. 

11. We are fitted for moral Science, but only for probableinterpretations of external Nature. 

From whence is it obvious to conclude, that, since our faculties arenot fitted to penetrate into the internal fabric and real essences ofbodies; but yet plainly discover to us the being of a God, and theknowledge of ourselves, enough to lead us into a full and cleardiscovery of our duty and great concernment; it will become us, asrational creatures, to employ those faculties we have about what theyare most adapted to, and follow the direction of nature, where it seemsto point us out the way. For it is rational to conclude, that our properemployment lies in those inquiries, and in that sort of knowledge whichis most suited to our natural capacities, and carries in it our greatestinterest, i. E. The condition of our eternal estate. Hence I think I mayconclude, that MORALITY IS THE PROPER SCIENCE AND BUSINESS OF MANKIND INGENERAL, (who are both concerned and fitted to search out their SUMMUMBONUM;) as several arts, conversant about several parts of nature, arethe lot and private talent of particular men, for the common use ofhuman life, and their own particular subsistence in this world. Of whatconsequence the discovery of one natural body and its properties maybe to human life, the whole great continent of America is a convincinginstance: whose ignorance in useful arts, and want of the greatest partof the conveniences of life, in a country that abounded with all sortsof natural plenty, I think may be attributed to their ignorance of whatwas to be found in a very ordinary, despicable stone, I mean the mineralof IRON. And whatever we think of our parts or improvements in this partof the world, where knowledge and plenty seem to vie with each other;yet to any one that will seriously reflect on it, I suppose it willappear past doubt, that, were the use of iron lost among us, we shouldin a few ages be unavoidably reduced to the wants and ignorance of theancient savage Americans, whose natural endowments and provisions comeno way short of those of the most flourishing and polite nations. Sothat he who first made known the use of that contemptible mineral, maybe truly styled the father of arts, and author of plenty. 

12. In the study of Nature we must beware of Hypotheses and wrongPrinciples. 

I would not, therefore, be thought to disesteem or dissuade the study ofNATURE. I readily agree the contemplation of his works gives us occasionto admire, revere, and glorify their Author: and, if rightly directed, may be of greater benefit to mankind than the monuments of exemplarycharity that have at so great charge been raised by the founders ofhospitals and almshouses. He that first invented printing, discoveredthe use of the compass, or made public the virtue and right use of KINKINA, did more for the propagation of knowledge, for the supply andincrease of useful commodities, and saved more from the grave than thosewho built colleges, workhouses, and hospitals. All that I would sayis, that we should not be too forwardly possessed with the opinion orexpectation of knowledge, where it is not to be had, or by ways thatwill not attain to it: that we should not take doubtful systemsfor complete sciences; nor unintelligible notions for scientificaldemonstrations. In the knowledge of bodies, we must be content toglean what we can from particular experiments: since we cannot, from adiscovery of their real essences, grasp at a time whole sheaves, and inbundles comprehend the nature and properties of whole species together. Where our inquiry is concerning co-existence, or repugnancy toco-exist, which by contemplation of our ideas we cannot discover; thereexperience, observation, and natural history, must give us, by oursenses and by retail, an insight into corporeal substances. Theknowledge of BODIES we must get by our senses, warily employed in takingnotice of their qualities and operations on one another: and what wehope to know of SEPARATE SPIRITS in this world, we must, I think, expectonly from revelation. He that shall consider how little general maxims, precarious principles, and hypotheses laid down at pleasure, havepromoted true knowledge, or helped to satisfy the inquiries of rationalmen after real improvements; how little, I say, the setting out at thatend has, for many ages together, advanced men's progress, towards theknowledge of natural philosophy, Will think we have reason to thankthose who in this latter age have taken another course, and have trodout to us, though not an easier way to learned ignorance, yet a surerway to profitable knowledge. 

13. The true Use of Hypotheses. 

Not that we may not, to explain any phenomena of nature, make use of anyprobable hypothesis whatsoever: hypotheses, if they are well made, are at least great helps to the memory, and often direct us to newdiscoveries. But my meaning is, that we should not take up any one toohastily (which the mind, that would always penetrate into the causes ofthings, and have principles to rest on, is very apt to do) till we havevery well examined particulars, and made several experiments, in thatthing which we would explain by our hypothesis, and see whether it willagree to them all; whether our principles will carry us quite through, and not be as inconsistent with one phenomenon of nature, as they seemto accommodate and explain another. And at least that we take care thatthe name of PRINCIPLES deceive us not, nor impose on us, by making usreceive that for an unquestionable truth, which is really at best but avery doubtful conjecture; such as are most (I had almost said all) ofthe hypotheses in natural philosophy. 

14. Clear and distinct Ideas with settled Names, and the finding ofthose intermediate ideas which show their Agreement or Disagreement, arethe Ways to enlarge our Knowledge. 

But whether natural philosophy be capable of certainty or no, the waysto enlarge our knowledge, as far as we are capable, seems to me, inshort, to be these two:--

First, The first is to get and settle in our minds [determined ideas ofthose things whereof we have general or specific names; at least, somany of them as we would consider and improve our knowledge in, orreason about. ] [And if they be specific ideas of substances, we shouldendeavour also to make them as complete as we can, whereby I mean, that we should put together as many simple ideas as, being constantlyobserved to co-exist, may perfectly determine the species; and each ofthose simple ideas which are the ingredients of our complex ones, shouldbe clear and distinct in our minds. ] For it being evident that ourknowledge cannot exceed our ideas; [as far as] they are eitherimperfect, confused, or obscure, we cannot expect to have certain, perfect, or clear knowledge. Secondly, The other is the art of findingout those intermediate ideas, which may show us the agreement orrepugnancy of other ideas, which cannot be immediately compared. 

15. Mathematics an instance of this. 

That these two (and not the relying on maxims, and drawing consequencesfrom some general propositions) are the right methods of improving ourknowledge in the ideas of other modes besides those of quantity, theconsideration of mathematical knowledge will easily inform us. Wherefirst we shall find that he that has not a perfect and clear idea ofthose angles or figures of which he desires to know anything, is utterlythereby incapable of any knowledge about them. Suppose but a man not tohave a perfect exact idea of a right angle, a scalenum, or trapezium, and there is nothing more certain than that he will in vain seek anydemonstration about them. Further, it is evident, that it was not theinfluence of those maxims which are taken for principles in mathematics, that hath led the masters of that science into those wonderfuldiscoveries they have made. Let a man of good parts know all the maximsgenerally made use of in mathematics ever so perfectly, and contemplatetheir extent and consequences as much as he pleases, he will, by theirassistance, I suppose, scarce ever come to know that the square of thehypothenuse in a right-angled triangle is equal to the squares of thetwo other sides. The knowledge that 'the whole is equal to all itsparts, ' and 'if you take equals from equals, the remainder will beequal, ' &c. , helped him not, I presume, to this demonstration: and a manmay, I think, pore long enough on those axioms, without ever seeing onejot the more of mathematical truths. They have been discovered by thethoughts otherwise applied: the mind had other objects, other viewsbefore it, far different from those maxims, when it first got theknowledge of such truths in mathematics, which men, well enoughacquainted with those received axioms, but ignorant of their method whofirst made these demonstrations, can never sufficiently admire. And whoknows what methods to enlarge our knowledge in other parts of sciencemay hereafter be invented, answering that of algebra in mathematics, which so readily finds out the ideas of quantities to measure othersby; whose equality or proportion we could otherwise very hardly, or, perhaps, never come to know?

CHAPTER XIII. 

SOME FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING OUR KNOWLEDGE. 

1. Our Knowledge partly necessary partly voluntary. 

Our knowledge, as in other things, so in this, has so great a conformitywith our sight, that it is neither wholly necessary, nor whollyvoluntary. If our knowledge were altogether necessary, all men'sknowledge would not only be alike, but every man would know all that isknowable; and if it were wholly voluntary, some men so little regard orvalue it, that they would have extreme little, or none at all. Men thathave senses cannot choose but receive some ideas by them; and if theyhave memory, they cannot but retain some of them; and if they haveany distinguishing faculty, cannot but perceive the agreement ordisagreement of some of them one with another; as he that has eyes, ifhe will open them by day, cannot but see some objects, and perceive adifference in them. But though a man with his eyes open in the light, cannot but see, yet there be certain objects which he may choose whetherhe will turn his eyes to; there may be in his reach a book containingpictures and discourses, capable to delight or instruct him, which yethe may never have the will to open, never take the pains to look into. 

2. The application of our Faculties voluntary; but they being employed, we know as things are, not as we please. 

There is also another thing in a man's power, and that is, though heturns his eyes sometimes towards an object, yet he may choose whether hewill curiously survey it, and with an intent application endeavour toobserve accurately all that is visible in it. But yet, what he does see, he cannot see otherwise than he does. It depends not on his will to seethat black which appears yellow; nor to persuade himself, that whatactually scalds him, feels cold. The earth will not appear painted withflowers, nor the fields covered with verdure, whenever he has a mind toit: in the cold winter, he cannot help seeing it white and hoary, if hewill look abroad. Just thus is it with our understanding: all that isvoluntary in our knowledge is, the employing or withholding any of ourFACULTIES from this or that sort of objects, and a more or less accuratesurvey of them: but, THEY BEING EMPLOYED, OUR WILL HATH NO POWER TODETERMINE THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE MIND ONE WAY OR ANOTHER; that is doneonly by the objects themselves, as far as they are clearly discovered. And therefore, as far as men's senses are conversant about externalobjects, the mind cannot but receive those ideas which are presented bythem, and be informed of the existence of things without: and so far asmen's thoughts converse with their own determined ideas, they cannotbut in some measure observe the agreement or disagreement that is to befound amongst some of them, which is so far knowledge: and if they havenames for those ideas which they have thus considered, they must needsbe assured of the truth of those propositions which express thatagreement or disagreement they perceive in them, and be undoubtedlyconvinced of those truths. For what a man sees, he cannot but see; andwhat he perceives, he cannot but know that he perceives. 

3. Instance in Numbers. 

Thus he that has got the ideas of numbers, and hath taken the pains tocompare one, two, and three, to six, cannot choose but know that theyare equal: he that hath got the idea of a triangle, and found the waysto measure its angles and their magnitudes, is certain that its threeangles are equal to two right ones; and can as little doubt of that, asof this truth, that, It is impossible for the same thing to be, and notto be. 

4. Instance in Natural Religion. 

He also that hath the idea of an intelligent, but frail and weak being, made by and depending on another, who is eternal, omnipotent, perfectlywise and good, will as certainly know that man is to honour, fear, andobey God, as that the sun shines when he sees it. For if he hath but theideas of two such beings in his mind, and will turn his thoughts thatway, and consider them, he will as certainly find that the inferior, finite, and dependent, is under an obligation to obey the supreme andinfinite, as he is certain to find that three, four, and seven are lessthan fifteen; if he will consider and compute those numbers: nor can hebe surer in a clear morning that the sun is risen; if he will but openhis eyes, and turn them that way. But yet these truths, being ever socertain, ever so clear, he may be ignorant of either, or all of them, who will never take the pains to employ his faculties, as he should, toinform himself about them. 

CHAPTER XIV. OF JUDGMENT. 

1. Our Knowledge being short, we want something else. 

The understanding faculties being given to man, not barely forspeculation, but also for the conduct of his life, man would be at agreat loss if he had nothing to direct him but what has the certainty oftrue knowledge. For that being very short and scanty, as we have seen, he would be often utterly in the dark, and in most of the actions of hislife, perfectly at a stand, had he nothing to guide him in the absenceof clear and certain knowledge. He that will not eat till he hasdemonstration that it will nourish him; he that will not stir till heinfallibly knows the business he goes about will succeed, will havelittle else to do but to sit still and perish. 

2. What Use to be made of this twilight State. 

Therefore, as God has set some things in broad daylight; as he has givenus some certain knowledge, though limited to a few things in comparison, probably as a taste of what intellectual creatures are capable of toexcite in us a desire and endeavour after a better state: so, in thegreatest part of our concernments, he has afforded us only the twilight, as I may so say, of probability; suitable, I presume, to that state ofmediocrity and probationership he has been pleased to place us in here;wherein, to check our over-confidence and presumption, we might, byevery day's experience, be made sensible of our short-sightedness andliableness to error; the sense whereof might be a constant admonition tous, to spend the days of this our pilgrimage with industry and care, inthe search and following of that way which might lead us to a stateof greater perfection. It being highly rational to think, even wererevelation silent in the case, that, as men employ those talents God hasgiven them here, they shall accordingly receive their rewards at theclose of the day, when their sun shall set, and night shall put an endto their labours. 

3. Judgement or assent to Probability, supplies our want of Knowledge. 

The faculty which God has given man to supply the want of clear andcertain knowledge, in cases where that cannot be had, is JUDGEMENT:whereby the mind takes its ideas to agree or disagree; or, which isthe same, any proposition to be true or false, without perceiving ademonstrative evidence in the proofs. The mind sometimes exercisesthis judgment out of necessity, where demonstrative proofs andcertain knowledge are not to be had; and sometimes out of laziness, unskilfulness, or haste, even where demonstrative and certain proofsare to be had. Men often stay not warily to examine the agreement ordisagreement of two ideas, which they are desirous or concerned to know;but, either incapable of such attention as is requisite in a long trainof gradations, or impatient of delay, lightly cast their eyes on, orwholly pass by the proofs; and so, without making out the demonstration, determine of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas, as it were by aview of them as they are at a distance, and take it to be the one orthe other, as seems most likely to them upon such a loose survey. Thisfaculty of the mind, when it is exercised immediately about things, iscalled JUDGEMENT; when about truths delivered in words, is most commonlycalled ASSENT or DISSENT: which being the most usual way, wherein themind has occasion to employ this faculty, I shall, under these terms, treat of it, as feast liable in our language to equivocation. 

4. Judgement is the presuming Things to be so, without perceiving it. 

Thus the mind has two faculties conversant (about truth and falsehood):--

First, KNOWLEDGE, whereby it certainly PERCEIVES, and is undoubtedlysatisfied of the agreement or disagreement of any ideas. 

Secondly, JUDGEMENT, which is the putting ideas together, or separatingthem from one another in the mind, when their certain agreement ordisagreement is not perceived, but PRESUMED to be so; which is, as theword imports, taken to be so before it certainly appears. And if itso unites or separates them as in reality things are, it is rightjudgement. 

CHAPTER XV. OF PROBABILITY. 

1. Probability is the appearance of Agreement upon fallible Proofs. 

As DEMONSTRATION is the showing the agreement or disagreement of twoideas, by the intervention of one or more proofs, which have a constant, immutable, and visible connexion one with another; so PROBABILITY isnothing but the appearance of such an agreement or disagreement, by theintervention of proofs, whose connexion is not constant and immutable, or at least is not perceived to be so, but is, or appears for the mostpart to be so, and is enough to induce the mind to judge the propositionto be true or false, rather than the contrary. For example: in thedemonstration of it a man perceives the certain, immutable connexionthere is of equality between the three angles of a triangle, and thoseintermediate ones which are made use of to show their equality to tworight ones; and so, by an intuitive knowledge of the agreement ordisagreement of the intermediate ideas in each step of the progress, the whole series is continued with an evidence, which clearly shows theagreement or disagreement of those three angles in equality to two rightones: and thus he has certain knowledge that it is so. But anotherman, who never took the pains to observe the demonstration, hearing amathematician, a man of credit, affirm the three angles of a triangle tobe equal to two right ones, assents to it, i. E. Receives it for true: inwhich case the foundation of his assent is the probability of the thing;the proof being such as for the most part carries truth with it: the manon whose testimony he receives it, not being wont to affirm anythingcontrary to or besides his knowledge, especially in matters of thiskind: so that that which causes his assent to this proposition, that thethree angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, that which makeshim take these ideas to agree, without knowings them to do so, is thewonted veracity of the speaker in other cases, or his supposed veracityin this. 

2. It is to supply our Want of Knowledge. 

Our knowledge, as has been shown, being very narrow, and we not happyenough to find certain truth in everything which we have occasion toconsider; most of the propositions we think, reason, discourse--nay, actupon, are such as we cannot have undoubted knowledge of their truth:yet some of them border so near upon certainty, that we make no act, according to the assent, as resolutely as if they were infalliblydemonstrated, and that our knowledge of them was perfect and certain. But there being degrees herein, from the very neighbourhood of certaintyand demonstration, quite down to improbability and unlikeness, even tothe confines of impossibility; and also degrees of assent from fullassurance and confidence, quite down to conjecture, doubt, and distrust:I shall come now, (having, as I think, found out THE BOUNDS OF HUMANKNOWLEDGE AND CERTAINTY, ) in the next place, to consider THE SEVERALDEGREES AND GROUNDS OF PROBABILITY, AND ASSENT OR FAITH. 

3. Being that which makes us presume Things to be true, before we knowthem to be so. 

Probability is likeliness to be true, the very notation of the wordsignifying such a proposition, for which there be arguments or proofs tomake it pass, or be received for true. The entertainment the mind givesthis sort of propositions is called BELIEF, ASSENT, or OPINION, which isthe admitting or receiving any proposition for true, upon arguments orproofs that are found to persuade us to receive it as true, withoutcertain knowledge that it is so. And herein lies the difference betweenPROBABILITY and CERTAINTY, FAITH, and KNOWLEDGE, that in all the partsof knowledge there is intuition; each immediate idea, each step has itsvisible and certain connexion: in belief, not so. That which makes mebelieve, is something extraneous to the thing I believe; something notevidently joined on both sides to, and so not manifestly showing theagreement or disagreement of those ideas that are under consideration. 

4. The Grounds of Probability are two: Conformity with our ownExperience, or the Testimony of others. 

Probability then, being to supply the defect of our knowledge, and toguide us where that fails, is always conversant about propositionswhereof we have no certainty, but only some inducements to receive themfor true. The grounds of it are, in short, these two following:--

First, The conformity of anything with our own knowledge, observation, and experience. 

Secondly, The testimony of others, vouching their observation andexperience. In the testimony of others is to be considered: 1. Thenumber. 2. The integrity. 3. The skill of the witnesses. 4. The designof the author, where it is a testimony out of a book cited. 5. Theconsistency of the parts, and circumstances of the relation. 6. Contrarytestimonies. 

5. In this, all the Arguments pro and con ought to be examined, beforewe come to a Judgment. 

Probability wanting that intuitive evidence which, infallibly determinesthe understanding and produces certain knowledge, the mind, if it WILLPROCEED RATIONALLY, ought to examine all the grounds of probability, andsee how they make more or less for or against any proposition, beforeit assents to or dissents from it; and, upon a due balancing the whole, reject or receive it, with a more or less firm assent, proportionably tothe preponderancy of the greater grounds of probability on one side orthe other. For example:--

If I myself see a man walk on the ice, it is past probability; it isknowledge. But if another tells me he saw a man in England, in the midstof a sharp winter, walk upon water hardened with cold, this has so greatconformity with what is usually observed to happen, that I am disposedby the natures of the thing itself to assent to it; unless some manifestsuspicion attend the relation of that matter of fact. But if the samething be told to one born between the tropics, who never saw norheard of any such thing before, there the whole probability relies ontestimony: and as the relators are more in number, and of more credit, and have no interest to speak contrary to the truth, so that matterof fact is like to find more or less belief. Though to a man whoseexperience has always been quite contrary, and who has never heard ofanything like it, the most untainted credit of a witness will scarcebe able to find belief. As it happened to a Dutch ambassador, whoentertaining the king of Siam with the particularities of Holland, whichhe was inquisitive after, amongst other things told him, that the waterin his country would sometimes, in cold weather, be so hard, that menwalked upon it, and that it would bear an elephant, if he were there. Towhich the king replied, HITHERTO _I_ HAVE BELIEVED THE STRANGE THINGSYOU HAVE TOLD ME, BECAUSE _I_ LOOK UPON YOU AS A SOBER FAIR MAN, BUT NOW_I_ AM SURE YOU LIE. 

6. Probable arguments capable of great Variety. 

Upon these grounds depends the probability of any proposition: and asthe conformity of our knowledge, as the certainty of observations, as the frequency and constancy of experience, and the number andcredibility of testimonies do more or less agree or disagree with it, sois any proposition in itself more or less probable. There is another, Iconfess, which, though by itself it be no true ground of probability, yet is often made use of for one, by which men most commonly regulatetheir assent, and upon which they pin their faith more than anythingelse, and that is, THE OPINION OF OTHERS; though there cannot be a moredangerous thing to rely on, nor more likely to mislead one; since thereis much more falsehood and error among men, than truth and knowledge. And if the opinions and persuasions of others, whom we know and thinkwell of, be a ground of assent, men have reason to be Heathens in Japan, Mahometans in Turkey, Papists in Spain, Protestants in England, andLutherans in Sweden. But of this wrong ground of assent I shall haveoccasion to speak more at large in another place. 

CHAPTER XVI. OF THE DEGREES OF ASSENT. 

1. Our Assent ought to be regulated by the Grounds of Probability. 

The grounds of probability we have laid down in the foregoing chapter:as they are the foundations on which our ASSENT is built, so are theyalso the measure whereby its several degrees are, or ought to beregulated: only we are to take notice, that, whatever grounds ofprobability there may be, they yet operate no further on the mind whichsearches after truth, and endeavours to judge right, than they appear;at least, in the first judgment or search that the mind makes. Iconfess, in the opinions men have, and firmly stick to in the world, their assent is not always from an actual view of the reasons that atfirst prevailed with them: it being in many cases almost impossible, andin most, very hard, even for those who have very admirable memories, toretain all the proofs which, upon a due examination, made them embracethat side of the question. It suffices that they have once with careand fairness sifted the matter as far as they could; and that they havesearched into all the particulars, that they could imagine to give anylight to the question; and, with the best of their skill, cast up theaccount upon the whole evidence: and thus, having once found on whichside the probability appeared to THEM, after as full and exact aninquiry as they can make, they lay up the conclusion in their memories, as a truth they have discovered; and for the future they remainsatisfied with the testimony of their memories, that this is the opinionthat, by the proofs they have once seen of it, deserves such a degree oftheir assent as they afford it. 

2. These can not always be actually in View; and then we must contentourselves with the remembrance that we once saw ground for such a Degreeof Assent. 

This is all that the greatest part of men are capable of doing, inregulating their opinions and judgments; unless a man will exact ofthem, either to retain distinctly in their memories all the proofsconcerning any probable truth, and that too, in the same order, andregular deduction of consequences in which they have formerly placedor seen them; which sometimes is enough to fill a large volume on onesingle question: or else they must require a man, for every opinion thathe embraces, every day to examine the proofs: both which are impossible. It is unavoidable, therefore, that the memory be relied on in the case, and that men be persuaded of several opinions, whereof the proofs arenot actually in their thoughts; nay, which perhaps they are not ableactually to recall. Without this, the greatest part of men must beeither very sceptics; or change every moment, and yield themselves upto whoever, having lately studied the question, offers them arguments, which, for want of memory, they are not able presently to answer. 

3. The ill consequence of this, if our former Judgments were not rightlymade. 

I cannot but own, that men's sticking to their past judgment, andadhering firmly to conclusions formerly made, is often the cause ofgreat obstinacy in error and mistake. But the fault is not that theyrely on their memories for what they have before well judged, butbecause they judged before they had well examined. May we not find agreat number (not to say the greatest part) of men that think they haveformed right judgments of several matters; and that for no other reason, but because they never thought otherwise? that themselves to have judgedright, only because they never questioned, never examined, their ownopinions? Which is indeed to think they judged right, because they neverjudged at all. And yet these, of all men, hold their opinions with thegreatest stiffness; those being generally the most fierce and firm intheir tenets, who have least examined them. What we once KNOW, we arecertain is so: and we may be secure, that there are no latent proofsundiscovered, which may overturn our knowledge, or bring it in doubt. But, in matters of PROBABILITY, it is not in every case we can be surethat we have all the particulars before us, that any way concern thequestion; and that there is no evidence behind, and yet unseen, whichmay cast the probability on the other side, and outweigh all that atpresent seems to preponderate with us. Who almost is there that haththe leisure, patience, and means to collect together all the proofsconcerning most of the opinions he has, so as safely to conclude that hehath a clear and full view; and that there is no more to be alleged forhis better information? And yet we are forced to determine ourselves onthe one side or other. The conduct of our lives, and the management ofour great concerns, will not bear delay: for those depend, for the mostpart, on the determination of our judgment in points wherein we arenot capable of certain and demonstrative knowledge, and wherein it isnecessary for us to embrace the one side or the other. 

4. The right Use of it, mutual Charity and Forbearance, in a necessarydiversity of opinions. 

Since, therefore, it is unavoidable to the greatest part of men, if notall, to have several OPINIONS, without certain and indubitable proofsof their truth; and it carries too great an imputation of ignorance, lightness, or folly for men to quit and renounce their former tenetspresently upon the offer of an argument which they cannot immediatelyanswer, and show the insufficiency of: it would, methinks, becomeall men to maintain peace, and the common offices of humanity, andfriendship, in the diversity of opinions; since we cannot reasonablyexpect that any one should readily and obsequiously quit his ownopinion, and embrace ours, with a blind resignation to an authoritywhich the understanding of man acknowledges not. For however it mayoften mistake, it can own no other guide but reason, nor blindly submitto the will and dictates of another. If he you would bring over to yoursentiments be one that examines before he assents, you must give himleave at his leisure to go over the account again, and, recalling whatis out of his mind, examine all the particulars, to see on which sidethe advantage lies: and if he will not think our arguments of weightenough to engage him anew in so much pains, it is but what we often doourselves in the like case; and we should take it amiss if others shouldprescribe to us what points we should study. And if he be one who takeshis opinions upon trust, how can we imagine that he should renouncethose tenets which time and custom have so settled in his mind, that hethinks them self-evident, and of an unquestionably certainty; or whichhe takes to be impressions he has received from God himself, or from mensent by him? How can we expect, I say, that opinions thus settled shouldbe given up to the arguments or authority of a stranger or adversary, especially if there be any suspicion of interest or design, as therenever fails to be, where men find themselves ill-trusted? We should dowell to commiserate our mutual ignorance, and endeavour to remove it inall the gentle and fair ways of information; and not instantly treatothers ill, as obstinate and perverse, because they will not renouncetheir own, and receive our opinions, or at least those we would forceupon them, when it is more than probable that we are no less obstinatein not embracing some of theirs. For where is the man that hasincontestable evidence of the truth of all that he holds, or of thefalsehood of all he condemns; or can say that he has examined to thebottom all his own, or other men's opinions? The necessity of believingwithout knowledge, nay often upon very slight grounds, in this fleetingstate of action and blindness we are in, should make us more busy andcareful to inform ourselves than constrain others. At least, those whohave not thoroughly examined to the bottom all their own tenets, mustconfess they are unfit to prescribe to others; and are unreasonable inimposing that as truth on other men's belief, which they themselves havenot searched into, nor weighed the arguments of probability, on whichthey should receive or reject it. Those who have fairly and trulyexamined, and are thereby got past doubt in all the doctrines theyprofess and govern themselves by, would have a juster pretence torequire others to follow them: but these are so few in number, and findso little reason to be magisterial in their opinions, that nothinginsolent and imperious is to be expected from them: and there is reasonto think, that, if men were better instructed themselves, they would beless imposing on others. 

5. Probability is either of sensible Matter of Fact, capable of humantestimony, or of what is beyond the evidence of our senses. 

But to return to the grounds of assent, and the several degrees of it, we are to take notice, that the propositions we receive upon inducementsof PROBABILITY are of TWO SORTS: either concerning some particularexistance, or, as it is usually termed, matter of fact, which, fallingunder observation, is capable of human testimony; or else concerningthings, which being beyond the discovery of our senses, are not capableof any such testimony. 

6. Concerning the FIRST of these, viz. PARTICULAR MATTER OF FACT. 

I. The concurrent Experience of ALL other Men with ours, producesAssurance approaching to Knowledge. 

Where any particular thing, consonant to the constant observation ofourselves and others in the like case, comes attested by the concurrentreports of all that mention it, we receive it as easily, and build asfirmly upon it, as if it were certain knowledge; and we reason and actthereupon with as little doubt as if it were perfect demonstration. Thus, if all Englishmen, who have occasion to mention it, should affirmthat it froze in England the last winter, or that there were swallowsseen there in the summer, I think a man could almost as little doubt ofit as that seven and four are eleven. The first, therefore, and HIGHESTDEGREE OF PROBABILITY, is, when the general consent of all men, in allages, as far as it can be known, concurs with a man's constant andnever-failing experience in like cases, to confirm the truth of anyparticular matter of fact attested by fair witnesses: such are allthe stated constitutions and properties of bodies, and the regularproceedings of causes and effects in the ordinary course of nature. Thiswe call an argument from the nature of things themselves. For what ourown and other men's CONSTANT OBSERVATION has found always to be afterthe same manner, that we with reason conclude to be the effect ofsteady and regular causes; though they come not within the reach of ourknowledge. Thus, That fire warmed a man, made lead fluid, and changedthe colour or consistency in wood or charcoal; that iron sunk inwater, and swam in quicksilver: these and the like propositions aboutparticular facts, being agreeable to our constant experience, as oftenas we have to do with these matters; and being generally spoke of (whenmentioned by others) as things found constantly to be so, and thereforenot so much as controverted by anybody--we are put past doubt that arelation affirming any such thing to have been, or any predicationthat it will happen again in the same manner, is very true. ThesePROBABILITIES rise so near to CERTAINTY, that they govern our thoughtsas absolutely, and influence all our actions as fully, as the mostevident demonstration; and in what concerns us we make little orno difference between them and certain knowledge. Our belief, thusgrounded, rises to ASSURANCE. 

7. II. Unquestionable Testimony, and our own Experience that a thing isfor the most part so, produce Confidence. 

The NEXT DEGREE OF PROBABILITY is, when I find by my own experience, andthe agreement of all others that mention it, a thing to be for the mostpart so, and that the particular instance of it is attested by many andundoubted witnesses: v. G. History giving us such an account of men inall ages, and my own experience, as far as I had an opportunity toobserve, confirming it, that most men prefer their private advantage tothe public: if all historians that write of Tiberius, say that Tiberiusdid so, it is extremely probable. And in this case, our assent has asufficient foundation to raise itself to a degree which we may callCONFIDENCE. 

8. III. Fair Testimony, and the Nature of the Thing indifferent, produceunavoidable Assent. 

In things that happen indifferently, as that a bird should fly this orthat way; that it should thunder on a man's right or left hand, &c. , when any particular matter of fact is vouched by the concurrenttestimony of unsuspected witnesses, there our assent is alsoUNAVOIDABLE. Thus: that there is such a city in Italy as Rome: thatabout one thousand seven hundred years ago, there lived in it a man, called Julius Caesar; that he was a general, and that he won a battleagainst another, called Pompey. This, though in the nature of the thingthere be nothing for nor against it, yet being related by historians ofcredit, and contradicted by no one writer, a man cannot avoid believingit, and can as little doubt of it as he does of the being and actions ofhis own acquaintance, whereof he himself is a witness. 

9. Experience and Testimonies clashing, infinitely vary the Degrees ofProbability. 

Thus far the matter goes easy enough. Probability upon such groundscarries so much evidence with it, that it naturally determines thejudgment, and leaves us as little liberty to believe or disbelieve, as ademonstration does, whether we will know, or be ignorant. The difficultyis, when testimonies contradict common experience, and the reports ofhistory and witnesses clash with the ordinary course of nature, or withone another; there it is, where diligence, attention, and exactness arerequired, to form a right judgment, and to proportion the assent to thedifferent evidence and probability of the thing: which rises andfalls, according as those two foundations of credibility, viz. COMMONOBSERVATION IN LIKE CASES, and PARTICULAR TESTIMONIES IN THAT PARTICULARINSTANCE, favour or contradict it. These are liable to so greatvariety of contrary observations, circumstances, reports, differentqualifications, tempers, designs, oversights, &c. , of the reporters, that it is impossible to reduce to precise rules the various degreeswherein men give their assent. This only may be said in general, Thatas the arguments and proofs PRO and CON, upon due examination, nicelyweighing every particular circumstance, shall to any one appear, uponthe whole matter, in a greater or less degree to preponderate oneither side; so they are fitted to produce in the mind such differententertainments, as we call BELIEF, CONJECTURE, GUESS, DOUBT, WAVERING, DISTRUST, DISBELIEF, &c. 

10. Traditional Testimonies, the further removed the less their Proofbecomes. 

This is what concerns assent in matters wherein testimony is made useof: concerning which, I think, it may not be amiss to take notice of arule observed in the law of England; which is, That though the attestedcopy of a record be good proof, yet the copy of a copy, ever so wellattested, and by ever so credible witnesses, will not be admitted as aproof in judicature. This is so generally approved as reasonable, and suited to the wisdom and caution to be used in our inquiry aftermaterial truths, that I never yet heard of any one that blamed it. This practice, if it be allowable in the decisions of right and wrong, carries this observation along with it, viz. THAT ANY TESTIMONY, THEFURTHER OFF IT IS FROM THE ORIGINAL TRUTH, THE LESS FORCE AND PROOF ITHAS. The being and existence of the thing itself, is what I call theoriginal truth. A credible man vouching his knowledge of it is a goodproof; but if another equally credible do witness it from his report, the testimony is weaker: and a third that attests the hearsay of anhearsay is yet less considerable. So that in traditional truths, eachremove weakens the force of the proof: and the more hands the traditionhas successively passed through, the less strength and evidence doesit receive from them. This I thought necessary to be taken notice of:because I find amongst some men the quite contrary commonly practised, who look on opinions to gain force by growing older; and what a thousandyears since would not, to a rational man contemporary with the firstvoucher, have appeared at all probable, is now urged as certain beyondall question, only because several have since, from him, said it oneafter another. Upon this ground propositions, evidently false ordoubtful enough in their first beginning, come, by an inverted rule ofprobability, to pass for authentic truths; and those which found ordeserved little credit from the mouths of their first authors, arethought to grow venerable by age, are urged as undeniable. 

11. Yet History is of great Use. 

I would not be thought here to lessen the credit and use of HISTORY: itis all the light we have in many cases, and we receive from it a greatpart of the useful truths we have, with a convincing evidence. I thinknothing more valuable than the records of antiquity: I wish we had moreof them, and more uncorrupted. But this truth itself forces me to say, That no probability can rise higher than its first original. What has noother evidence than the single testimony of one only witness must standor fall by his only testimony, whether good, bad, or indifferent; andthough cited afterwards by hundreds of others, one after another, is sofar from receiving any strength thereby, that it is only the weaker. Passion, interest, inadvertency, mistake of his meaning, and a thousandodd reasons, or capricios, men's minds are acted by, (impossible tobe discovered, ) may make one man quote another man's words or meaningwrong. He that has but ever so little examined the citations of writers, cannot doubt how little credit the quotations deserve, where theoriginals are wanting; and consequently how much less quotations ofquotations can be relied on. This is certain, that what in one age wasaffirmed upon slight grounds, can never after come to be more valid infuture ages by being often repeated. But the further still it is fromthe original, the less valid it is, and has always less force in themouth or writing of him that last made use of it than in his from whomhe received it. 

12. Secondly, In things which Sense cannot discover, Analogy is thegreat Rule of Probability. 

[SECONDLY], The probabilities we have hitherto mentioned are only suchas concern matter of fact, and such things as are capable of observationand testimony. There remains that other sort, concerning which menentertain opinions with variety of assent, though THE THINGS BE SUCH, THAT FALLING NOT UNDER THE REACH OF OUR SENSES, THEY ARE NOT CAPABLE OFTESTIMONY. Such are, 1. The existence, nature and operations of finiteimmaterial beings without us; as spirits, angels, devils, &c. Or theexistence of material beings which, either for their smallness inthemselves or remoteness from us, our senses cannot take notice of--as, whether there be any plants, animals, and intelligent inhabitants inthe planets, and other mansions of the vast universe. 2. Concerningthe manner of operation in most parts of the works of nature: wherein, though we see the sensible effects, yet their causes are unknown, and weperceive not the ways and manner how they are produced. We see animalsare generated, nourished, and move; the loadstone draws iron; and theparts of a candle, successively melting, turn into flame, and give usboth light and heat. These and the like effects we see and know: but thecauses that operate, and the manner they are produced in, we can onlyguess and probably conjecture. For these and the like, coming not withinthe scrutiny of human senses, cannot be examined by them, or be attestedby anybody; and therefore can appear more or less probable, only as theymore or less agree to truths that are established in our minds, and asthey hold proportion to other parts of our knowledge and observation. ANALOGY in these matters is the only help we have, and it is from thatalone we draw all our grounds of probability. Thus, observing that thebare rubbing of two bodies violently one upon another, produces heat, and very often fire itself, we have reason to think, that what we callHEAT and FIRE consists in a violent agitation of the imperceptibleminute parts of the burning matter. Observing likewise that thedifferent refractions of pellucid bodies produce in our eyes thedifferent appearances of several colours; and also, that the differentranging and laying the superficial parts of several bodies, as ofvelvet, watered silk, &c. , does the like, we think it probable thatthe COLOUR and shining of bodies is in them nothing but the differentarrangement and refraction of their minute and insensible parts. Thus, finding in all parts of the creation, that fall under human observation, that there is A GRADUAL CONNEXION OF ONE WITH ANOTHER, WITHOUT ANY GREATOR DISCERNIBLE GAPS BETWEEN, IN ALL THAT GREAT VARIETY OF THINGS WE SEEIN THE WORLD, which are so closely linked together, that, in the severalranks of beings, it is not easy to discover the bounds betwixt them; wehave reason to be persuaded that, BY SUCH GENTLE STEPS, things ascendupwards in degrees of perfection. It is a hard matter to say wheresensible and rational begin, and where insensible and irrational end:and who is there quick-sighted enough to determine precisely which isthe lowest species of living things, and which the first of those whichhave no life? Things, as far as we can observe, lessen and augment, asthe quantity does in a regular cone; where, though there be a manifestodds betwixt the bigness of the diameter at a remote distance, yet thedifference between the upper and under, where they touch one another, ishardly discernible. The difference is exceeding great between some menand some animals: but if we will compare the understanding and abilitiesof some men and some brutes, we shall find so little difference, that itwill be hard to say, that that of the man is either clearer or larger. Observing, I say, such gradual and gentle descents downwards in thoseparts of the creation that are beneath man, the rule of analogy may makeit probable, that it is so also in things above us and our observation;and that there are several ranks of intelligent beings, excelling us inseveral degrees of perfection, ascending upwards towards the infiniteperfection of the Creator, by gentle steps and differences, that areevery one at no great distance from the next to it. This sort ofprobability, which is the best conduct of rational experiments, and therise of hypothesis, has also its use and influence; and a wary reasoningfrom analogy leads us often into the discovery of truths and usefulproductions, which would otherwise lie concealed. 

13. One Case where contrary Experience lessens not the Testimony. 

Though the common experience and the ordinary course of things havejustly a mighty influence on the minds of men, to make them give orrefuse credit to anything proposed to their belief; yet there is onecase, wherein the strangeness of the fact lessens not the assent toa fair testimony given of it. For where such supernatural events aresuitable to ends aimed at by Him who has the power to change the courseof nature, there, UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, that may be the fitter toprocure belief, by how much the more they are beyond or contrary toordinary observation. This is the proper case of MIRACLES, which, wellattested, do not only find credit themselves, but give it also to othertruths, which need such confirmation. 

14. The bare Testimony of Divine Revelation is the highest Certainty. 

Besides those we have hitherto mentioned, there is one sort ofpropositions that challenge the highest degree of our assent, upon baretestimony, whether the thing proposed agree or disagree with commonexperience, and the ordinary course of things, or no. The reason whereofis, because the testimony is of such an one as cannot deceive nor bedeceived: and that is of God himself. This carries with it an assurancebeyond doubt, evidence beyond exception. This is called by a peculiarname, REVELATION, and our assent to it, FAITH, which [as absolutelydetermines our minds, and as perfectly excludes all wavering, ] as ourknowledge itself; and we may as well doubt of our own being, as we canwhether any revelation from God be true. So that faith is a settled andsure principle of assent and assurance, and leaves no manner of roomfor doubt or hesitation. ONLY WE MUST BE SURE THAT IT BE A DIVINEREVELATION, AND THAT WE UNDERSTAND IT RIGHT: else we shall exposeourselves to all the extravagancy of enthusiasm, and all the error ofwrong principles, if we have faith and assurance in what is not DIVINErevelation. And therefore, in those cases, our assent can be rationallyno higher than the evidence of its being a revelation, and that this isthe meaning of the expressions it is delivered in. If the evidence ofits being a revelation, or that this is its true sense, be only onprobable proofs, our assent can reach no higher than an assurance ordiffidence, arising from the more or less apparent probability of theproofs. But of FAITH, and the precedency it ought to have before otherarguments of persuasion, I shall speak more hereafter; where I treat ofit as it is ordinarily placed, in contradistinction to reason; though intruth it be nothing else but AN ASSENT FOUNDED ON THE HIGHEST REASON. 

CHAPTER XVII. OF REASON

1. Various Significations of the word Reason. 

THE word REASON in the English language has different significations:sometimes it is taken for true and clear principles: sometimes for clearand fair deductions from those principles: and sometimes for the cause, and particularly the final cause. But the consideration I shall have ofit here is in a signification different from all these; and that is, asit stands for a faculty in man, that faculty whereby man is supposedto be distinguished from beasts, and wherein it is evident he muchsurpasses them. 

2. Wherein Reasoning consists. 

If general knowledge, as has been shown, consists in a perception of theagreement or disagreement of our own ideas, and the knowledge ofthe existence of all things without us (except only of a God, whoseexistence every man may certainly know and demonstrate to himself fromhis own existence), be had only by our senses, what room is therefor the exercise of any other faculty, but OUTWARD SENSE and INWARDPERCEPTION? What need is there of REASON? Very much: both for theenlargement of our knowledge, and regulating our assent. For it hath todo both in knowledge and opinion, and is necessary and assisting to allour other intellectual faculties, and indeed contains two of them, viz. SAGACITY and ILLATION. By the one, it finds out; and by the other, it soorders the intermediate ideas as to discover what connexion there isin each link of the chain, whereby the extremes are held together; andthereby, as it were, to draw into view the truth sought for, which isthat which we call ILLATION or INFERENCE, and consists in nothing butthe perception of the connexion there is between the ideas, in each stepof the deduction; whereby the mind comes to see, either the certainagreement or disagreement of any two ideas, as in demonstration, inwhich it arrives at KNOWLEDGE; or their probable connexion, on which itgives or withholds its assent, as in OPINION. Sense and intuition reachbut a very little way. The greatest part of our knowledge depends upondeductions and intermediate ideas: and in those cases where we are fainto substitute assent instead of knowledge, and take propositions fortrue, without being certain they are so, we have need to find out, examine, and compare the grounds of their probability. In both thesecases, the faculty which finds out the means, and rightly applies them, to discover certainty in the one, and probability in the other, isthat which we call REASON. For, as reason perceives the necessary andindubitable connexion of all the ideas or proofs one to another, ineach step of any demonstration that produces knowledge; so it likewiseperceives the probable connexion of all the ideas or proofs one toanother, in every step of a discourse, to which it will think assentdue. This is the lowest degree of that which can be truly called reason. For where the mind does not perceive this probable connexion, where itdoes not discern whether there be any such connexion or no; there men'sopinions are not the product of judgment, or the consequence of reason, but the effects of chance and hazard, of a mind floating at alladventures, without choice and without direction. 

3. Reason in its four degrees. 

So that we may in REASON consider these FOUR DEGREES: the first andhighest is the discovering and finding out of truths; the second, theregular and methodical disposition of them, and laying them in a clearand fit order, to make their connexion and force be plainly and easilyperceived; the third is the perceiving their connexion; and the fourth, a making a right conclusion. These several degrees may be observed inany mathematical demonstration; it being one thing to perceive theconnexion of each part, as the demonstration is made by another; anotherto perceive the dependence of the conclusion on all the parts; a third, to make out a demonstration clearly and neatly one's self; and somethingdifferent from all these, to have first found out these intermediateideas or proofs by which it is made. 

4. Whether Syllogism is the great Instrument of Reason. 

There is one thing more which I shall desire to be considered concerningreason; and that is, whether SYLLOGISM, as is generally thought, bethe proper instrument of it, and the usefullest way of exercising thisfaculty. The causes I have to doubt are these:--

First Cause to doubt this. 

FIRST, Because syllogism serves our reason but in one only of theforementioned parts of it; and that is, to show the CONNEXION OF THEPROOFS in any one instance, and no more; but in this it is of no greatuse, since the mind can perceive such connexion, where it really is, aseasily, nay, perhaps better, without it. 

Men can reason well who cannot make a Syllogism. 

If we will observe the actings of our own minds, we shall find that wereason best and clearest, when we only observe the connexion of theproof, without reducing our thoughts to any rule of syllogism. Andtherefore we may take notice, that there are many men that reasonexceeding clear and rightly, who know not how to make a syllogism. Hethat will look into many parts of Asia and America, will find men reasonthere perhaps as acutely as himself, who yet never heard of a syllogism, nor can reduce any one argument to those forms: [and I believe scarceany one makes syllogisms in reasoning within himself. ] Indeed syllogismis made use of, on occasion, to discover a fallacy hid in a rhetoricalflourish, or cunningly wrapt up in a smooth period; and, stripping anabsurdity of the cover of wit and good language, show it in its nakeddeformity. But the mind is not taught to reason by these rules; it has anative faculty to perceive the coherence or incoherence of its ideas, and can range them right without any such perplexing repetitions. Tella country gentlewoman that the wind is south-west, and the weatherlowering, and like to rain, and she will easily understand it is notsafe for her to go abroad thin clad in such a day, after a fever: sheclearly sees the probable connexion of all these, viz. South-west wind, and clouds, rain, wetting, taking cold, relapse, and danger of death, without tying them together in those artificial and cumbersome fettersof several syllogisms, that clog and hinder the mind, which proceedsfrom one part to another quicker and clearer without them: and theprobability which she easily perceives in things thus in their nativestate would be quite lost, if this argument were managed learnedly, andproposed in MODE and FIGURE. For it very often confounds the connexion;and, I think, every one will perceive in mathematical demonstrations, that the knowledge gained thereby comes shortest and clearest withoutsyllogism. 

Secondly, Because though syllogism serves to show the force or fallacyof an argument, made use of in the usual way of discoursing, BYSUPPLYING THE ABSENT PROPOSITION, and so, setting it before the viewin a clear light; yet it no less engages the mind in the perplexity ofobscure, equivocal, and fallacious terms, wherewith this artificial wayof reasoning always abounds: it being adapted more to the attaining ofvictory in dispute than the discovery and confirmation of truth in fairenquiries. 

5. Syllogism helps little in Demonstration, less in Probability. 

But however it be in knowledge, I think I may truly say, it is OF FARLESS, OR NO USE AT ALL IN PROBABILITIES. For the assent there beingto be determined by the preponderancy, after due weighing of all theproofs, with all circumstances on both sides, nothing is so unfit toassist the mind in that as syllogism; which running away with oneassumed probability, or one topical argument, pursues that till it hasled the mind quite out of sight of the thing under consideration; and, forcing it upon some remote difficulty, holds it fast there; entangledperhaps, and, as it were, manacled, in the chain of syllogisms, withoutallowing it the liberty, much less affording it the helps, requisite toshow on which side, all things considered, is the greater probability. 

6. Serves not to increase our Knowledge, but to fence with the Knowledgewe suppose we have. 

But let it help us (as perhaps may be said) in convincing men of theirerrors and mistakes: (and yet I would fain see the man that was forcedout of his opinion by dint of syllogism, ) yet still it fails our reasonin that part, which, if not its highest perfection, is yet certainly itshardest task, and that which we most need its help in; and that isTHE FINDING OUT OF PROOFS, AND MAKING NEW DISCOVERIES. The rules ofsyllogism serve not to furnish the mind with those intermediate ideasthat may show the connexion of remote ones. This way of reasoningdiscovers no new proofs, but is the art of marshalling and ranging theold ones we have already. The forty-seventh proposition of the firstbook of Euclid is very true; but the discovery of it, I think, not owingto any rules of common logic. A man knows first and then he is able toprove syllogistically. So that syllogism comes after knowledge, and thena man has little or no need of it. But it is chiefly by the finding outthose ideas that show the connexion of distant ones, that our stock ofknowledge is increased, and that useful arts and sciences are advanced. Syllogism, at best, is but the art of fencing with the little knowledgewe have, without making any addition to it. And if a man should employhis reason all this way, he will not do much otherwise than he who, having got some iron out of the bowels of the earth, should have itbeaten up all into swords, and put it into his servants' hands to fencewith and bang one another. Had the King of Spain employed the hands ofhis people, and his Spanish iron so, he had brought to light but littleof that treasure that lay so long hid in the dark entrails of America. And I am apt to think that he who shall employ all the force of hisreason only in brandishing of syllogisms, will discover very little ofthat mass of knowledge which lies yet concealed in the secret recessesof nature; and which, I am apt to think, native rustic reason (as itformerly has done) is likelier to open a way to, and add to the commonstock of mankind, rather than any scholastic proceeding by the strictrules of MODE and FIGURE. 

7. Other Helps to reason than Syllogism should be sought. 

I doubt not, nevertheless, but there are ways to be found to assistour reason in this most useful part; and this the judicious Hookerencourages me to say, who in his Eccl. Pol. 1. I. Section 6, speaksthus: 'If there might be added the right helps of true art and learning, (which helps, I must plainly confess, this age of the world, carryingthe name of a learned age, doth neither much know nor generally regard, )there would undoubtedly be almost as much difference in maturity ofjudgment between men therewith inured, and that which men now are, asbetween men that are now, and innocents. ' I do not pretend to have foundor discovered here any of those 'right helps of art, ' this great man ofdeep thought mentions: but that is plain, that syllogism, and the logicnow in use, which were as well known in his days, can be none of thosehe means. It is sufficient for me, if by a Discourse, perhaps somethingout of the way, I am sure, as to me, wholly new and unborrowed, I shallhave given occasion to others to cast about for new discoveries, andto seek in their own thoughts for those right helps of art, which willscarce be found, I fear, by those who servilely confine themselves tothe rules and dictates of others. For beaten tracks lead this sort ofcattle, (as an observing Roman calls them, ) whose thoughts reach only toimitation, NON QUO EUNDUM EST, SED QUO ITUR. But I can be bold to say, that this age is adorned with some men of that strength of judgment andlargeness of comprehension, that, if they would employ their thoughts onthis subject, could open new and undiscovered ways to the advancement ofknowledge. 

8. We can reason about Particulars; and the immediate object of all ourreasonings is nothing but particular ideas. 

Having here had occasion to speak of syllogism in general, and the useof it in reasoning, and the improvement of our knowledge, it is fit, before I leave this subject, to take notice of one manifest mistake inthe rules of syllogism: viz. That no syllogistical reasoning can beright and conclusive, but what has at least one GENERAL proposition init. As if we could not reason, and have knowledge about particulars:whereas, in truth, the matter rightly considered, the immediate objectof all our reasoning and knowledge, is nothing but particulars. Everyman's reasoning and knowledge is only about the ideas existing in hisown mind; which are truly, every one of them, particular existences: andour knowledge and reason about other things, is only as they correspondwith those our particular ideas. So that the perception of the agreementor disagreement of our particular ideas, is the whole and utmost of allour knowledge. Universality is but accidental to it, and consists onlyin this, that the particular ideas about which it is are such as morethan one particular, thing can correspond with and be represented by. But the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our particularideas, and consequently our knowledge, is equally clear and certain, whether either, or both, or neither of those ideas, be capable ofrepresenting more real beings than one, or no. 

9. Our Reason often fails us. 

REASON, though it penetrates into the depths of the sea and earth, elevates our thoughts as high as the stars, and leads us through thevast spaces and large rooms of this mighty fabric, yet it comes farshort of the real extent of even corporeal being. And there are manyinstances wherein it fails us: as, First, In cases when we have no Ideas. 

I. It perfectly fails us, where our ideas fail. It neither does nor canextend itself further than they do. And therefore, wherever we have noideas, our reasoning stops, and we are at an end of our reckoning: andif at any time we reason about words which do not stand for any ideas, it is only about those sounds, and nothing else. 

10. Secondly, Because our Ideas are often obscure or imperfect. 

II. Our reason is often puzzled and at a loss, because of the obscurity, confusion, or imperfection of the ideas it is employed about; and therewe are involved in difficulties and contradictions. Thus, not having anyperfect idea of the LEAST EXTENSION OF MATTER, nor of INFINITY, we areat a loss about the divisibility of matter; but having perfect, clear, and distinct ideas of NUMBER, our reason meets with none of thoseinextricable difficulties in numbers, nor finds itself involved in anycontradictions about them. Thus, we having but imperfect ideas of theoperations of our minds, and of the beginning of motion, or thought howthe mind produces either of them in us, and much imperfecter yet of theoperation of God, run into great difficulties about FREE CREATED AGENTS, which reason cannot well extricate itself out of. 

11. III. Thirdly, Because we perceive not intermediate Ideas to showconclusions. 

Our reason is often at a stand, because it perceives not those ideas, which could serve to show the certain or probable agreement ordisagreement of any other two ideas: and in this some men's facultiesfar outgo others. Till algebra, that great instrument and instance ofhuman sagacity, was discovered, men with amazement looked on several ofthe demonstrations of ancient mathematicians, and could scarce forbearto think the finding several of those proofs to be something more thanhuman. 

12. IV. Fourthly, Because we often proceed upon wrong Principles. 

The mind, by proceeding upon false principles, is often engaged inabsurdities and difficulties, brought into straits and contradictions, without knowing how to free itself: and in that case it is in vain toimplore the help of reason, unless it be to discover the falsehood andreject the influence of those wrong principles. Reason is so far fromclearing the difficulties which the building upon false foundationsbrings a man into, that if he will pursue it, it entangles him the more, and engages him deeper in perplexities. 

13. V. Fifthly, Because we often employ doubtful Terms. 

As obscure and imperfect ideas often involve our reason, so, upon thesame ground, do dubious words and uncertain signs, often, in discoursesand arguings, when not warily attended to, puzzle men's reason, andbring them to a nonplus. But these two latter are our fault, and notthe fault of reason. But yet the consequences of them are neverthelessobvious; and the perplexities or errors they fill men's minds with areeverywhere observable. 

14. Our highest Degree of Knowledge is intuitive, without Reasoning. 

Some of the ideas that are in the mind, are so there, that they can beby themselves immediately compared one with another: and in these themind is able to perceive that they agree or disagree as clearly as thatit has them. Thus the mind perceives, that an arch of a circle is lessthan the whole circle, as clearly as it does the idea of a circle: andthis, therefore, as has been said, I call INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE; which iscertain, beyond all doubt, and needs no probation, nor can have any;this being the highest of all human certainty. In this consists theevidence of all those MAXIMS which nobody has any doubt about, but everyman (does not, as is said, only assent to, but) KNOWS to be true, assoon as ever they are proposed to his understanding. In the discovery ofand assent to these truths, there is no use of the discursive faculty, NO NEED OF REASONING, but they are known by a superior and higher degreeof evidence. And such, if I may guess at things unknown, I am apt tothink that angels have now, and the spirits of just men made perfectshall have, in a future state, of thousands of things which now eitherwholly escape our apprehensions, or which our short-sighted reasonhaving got some faint glimpse of, we, in the dark, grope after. 

15. The next is got by Reasoning. 

But though we have, here and there, a little of this clear light, somesparks of bright knowledge, yet the greatest part of our ideas are such, that we cannot discern their agreement or disagreement by an immediatecomparing them. And in all these we have NEED OF REASONING, and must, bydiscourse and inference, make our discoveries. Now of these there aretwo sorts, which I shall take the liberty to mention here again:--

First, through Reasonings that are Demonstrative. 

First, Those whose agreement or disagreement, though it cannot be seenby an immediate putting them together, yet may be examined by theintervention of other ideas which can be compared with them. In thiscase, when the agreement or disagreement of the intermediate idea, onboth sides, with those which we would compare, is PLAINLY DISCERNED:there it amounts to DEMONSTRATION whereby knowledge is produced, which, though it be certain, yet it is not so easy, nor altogether so clearas intuitive knowledge. Because in that there is barely one simpleintuition, wherein there is no room for any the least mistake or doubt:the truth is seen all perfectly at once. In demonstration, it is true, there is intuition too, but not altogether at once; for there must bea remembrance of the intuition of the agreement of the medium, orintermediate idea, with that we compared it with before, when we compareit with the other: and where there be many mediums, there the danger ofthe mistake is the greater. For each agreement or disagreement of theideas must be observed and seen in each step of the whole train, andretained in the memory, just as it is; and the mind must be sure thatno part of what is necessary to make up the demonstration is omitted oroverlooked. This makes some demonstrations long and perplexed, and toohard for those who have not strength of parts distinctly to perceive, and exactly carry so many particulars orderly in their heads. And eventhose who are able to master such intricate speculations, are fainsometimes to go over them again, and there is need of more than onereview before they can arrive at certainty. But yet where the mindclearly retains the intuition it had of the agreement of any idea withanother, and that with a third, and that with a fourth, &c. , there theagreement of the first and the fourth is a demonstration, and producescertain knowledge; which may be called RATIONAL KNOWLEDGE, as the otheris intuitive. 

16. Secondly, to supply the narrowness of Demonstrative and IntuitiveKnowledge we have nothing but Judgment upon probable reasoning. 

Secondly, There are other ideas, whose agreement or disagreement can nootherwise be judged of but by the intervention of others which have nota certain agreement with the extremes, but an USUAL or LIKELY one:and in these is that the JUDGMENT is properly exercised; which is theacquiescing of the mind, that any ideas do agree, by comparing them withsuch probable mediums. This, though it never amounts to knowledge, no, not to that which is the lowest degree of it; yet sometimes theintermediate ideas tie the extremes so firmly together, and theprobability is so clear and strong, that ASSENT as necessarily followsit, as KNOWLEDGE does demonstration. The great excellency and use of thejudgment is to observe right, and take a true estimate of the force andweight of each probability; and then casting them up all right together, choose that side which has the overbalance. 

17. Intuition, Demonstration, Judgment. 

INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE is the perception of the CERTAIN agreement ordisagreement of two ideas immediately compared together. 

RATIONAL KNOWLEDGE is the perception of the CERTAIN agreement ordisagreement of any two ideas, by the intervention of one or more otherideas. 

JUDGMENT is the thinking or taking two ideas to agree or disagree, by the intervention of one or more ideas, whose certain agreement ordisagreement with them it does not perceive, but hath observed to beFREQUENT and USUAL. 

18. Consequences of Words, and Consequences of Ideas. 

Though the deducing one proposition from another, or making inferencesin WORDS, be a great part of reason, and that which it is usuallyemployed about; yet the principal act of ratiocination is THE FINDINGTHE AGREEMENT OR DISAGREEMENT OF TWO IDEAS ONE WITH ANOTHER, BY THEINTERVENTION OF A THIRD. As a man, by a yard, finds two houses to be ofthe same length, which could not be brought together to measure theirequality by juxta-position. Words have their consequences, as the signsof such ideas: and things agree or disagree, as really they are; but weobserve it only by our ideas. 

19. Four sorts of Arguments. 

Before we quit this subject, it may be worth our while a little toreflect on FOUR SORTS OF ARGUMENTS, that men, in their reasonings withothers, do ordinarily make use of to prevail on their assent; or atleast so to awe them as to silence their opposition. 

First, Argumentum ad verecundiam. 

I. The first is, to allege the opinions of men, whose parts, learning, eminency, power, or some other cause has gained a name, and settledtheir reputation in the common esteem with some kind of authority. Whenmen are established in any kind of dignity, it is thought a breachof modesty for others to derogate any way from it, and question theauthority of men who are in possession of it. This is apt to becensured, as carrying with it too much pride, when a man does notreadily yield to the determination of approved authors, which is wont tobe received with respect and submission by others: and it is looked uponas insolence, for a man to set up and adhere to his own opinion againstthe current stream of antiquity; or to put it in the balance againstthat of some learned doctor, or otherwise approved writer. Whoever backshis tenets with such authorities, thinks he ought thereby to carry thecause, and is ready to style it impudence in any one who shall stand outagainst them. This I think may be called ARGUMENTUM AD VERECUNDIAM. 

20. Secondly, Argumentum ad Ignorantiam. 

II. Secondly, Another way that men ordinarily use to drive others, andforce them to submit their judgments, and receive the opinion in debate, is to require the adversary to admit what they allege as a proof, or toassign a better. And this I call ARGUMENTUM AD IGNORANTIAM. 

21. Thirdly, Argumentum ad hominem. 

III. Thirdly, A third way is to press a man with consequences drawn fromhis own principles or concessions. This is already known under the nameof ARGUMENTUM AD HOMINEM. 

22. Fourthly, Argumentum ad justicium. The Fourth alone advances us inknowledge and judgment. 

IV. The fourth is the using of proofs drawn from any of the foundationsof knowledge or probability. This I call ARGUMENTUM AD JUSTICIUM. Thisalone, of all the four, brings true instruction with it, and advances usin our way to knowledge. For, 1. It argues not another man's opinion tobe right, because I, out of respect, or any other consideration but thatof conviction, will not contradict him. 2. It proves not another man tobe in the right way, nor that I ought to take the same with him, becauseI know not a better. 3. Nor does it follow that another man is in theright way, because he has shown me that I am in the wrong. I may bemodest, and therefore not oppose another man's persuasion: I may beignorant, and not be able to produce a better: I may be in an error, andanother may show me that I am so. This may dispose me, perhaps, for thereception of truth, but helps me not to it: that must come from proofsand arguments, and light arising from the nature of things themselves, and not from my shamefacedness, ignorance, or error. 

23. Above, contrary, and according to Reason. 

By what has been before said of reason, we may be able to make someguess at the distinction of things, into those that are accordingto, above, and contrary to reason. 1. ACCORDING TO REASON are suchpropositions whose truth we can discover by examining and tracing thoseideas we have from sensation and reflection; and by natural deductionfind to be true or probable. 2. ABOVE REASON are such propositions whosetruth or probability we cannot by reason derive from those principles. 3. CONTRARY TO REASON are such propositions as are inconsistent with orirreconcilable to our clear and distinct ideas. Thus the existence ofone God is according to reason; the existence of more than one God, contrary to reason; the resurrection of the dead, above reason. ABOVEREASON also may be taken in a double sense, viz. Either as signifyingabove probability, or above certainty: and in that large sense also, CONTRARY TO REASON, is, I suppose, sometimes taken. 

24. Reason and Faith not opposite, for Faith must be regulated byReason. 

There is another use of the word REASON, wherein it is OPPOSED TO FAITH:which, though it be in itself a very improper way of speaking, yetcommon use has so authorized it, that it would be folly either to opposeor hope to remedy it. Only I think it may not be amiss to take notice, that, however faith be opposed to reason, faith is nothing but a firmassent of the mind: which, if it be regulated, as is our duty, cannot beafforded to anything but upon good reason; and so cannot be opposite toit. He that believes without having any reason for believing, may be inlove with his own fancies; but neither seeks truth as he ought, nor paysthe obedience due to his Maker, who would have him use those discerningfaculties he has given him, to keep him out of mistake and error. Hethat does not this to the best of his power, however he sometimes lightson truth, is in the right but by chance; and I know not whetherthe luckiness of the accident will excuse the irregularity of hisproceeding. This at least is certain, that he must be accountable forwhatever mistakes he runs into: whereas he that makes use of the lightand faculties God has given him, and seeks sincerely to discover truthby those helps and abilities he has, may have this satisfaction in doinghis duty as a rational creature, that, though he should miss truth, hewill not miss the reward of it. For he governs his assent right, andplaces it as he should, who, in any case or matter whatsoever, believesor disbelieves according as reason directs him. He that doth otherwise, transgresses against his own light, and misuses those faculties whichwere given him to no other end, but to search and follow the clearerevidence and greater probability. But since reason and faith are by somemen opposed, we will so consider them in the following chapter. 

CHAPTER XVIII. 

OF FAITH AND REASON, AND THEIR DISTINCT PROVINCES. 

1. Necessary to know their boundaries. 

It has been above shown, 1. That we are of necessity ignorant, and wantknowledge of all sorts, where we want ideas. 2. That we are ignorant, and want rational knowledge, where we want proofs. 3. That we wantcertain knowledge and certainty, as far as we want clear and determinedspecific ideas. 4. That we want probability to direct our assent inmatters where we have neither knowledge of our own nor testimony ofother men to bottom our reason upon. From these things thus premised, Ithink we may come to lay down THE MEASURES AND BOUNDARIES BETWEEN FAITHAND REASON: the want whereof may possibly have been the cause, if not ofgreat disorders, yet at least of great disputes, and perhaps mistakesin the world. For till it be resolved how far we are to be guided byreason, and how far by faith, we shall in vain dispute, and endeavour toconvince one another in matters of religion. 

2. Faith and Reason, what, as contradistingushed. 

I find every sect, as far as reason will help them, make use of itgladly: and where it fails them, they cry out, It is matter of faith, and above reason. And I do not see how they can argue with any one, or ever convince a gainsayer who makes use of the same plea, withoutsetting down strict boundaries between faith and reason; which ought tobe the first point established in all questions where faith has anythingto do. 

REASON, therefore, here, as contradistinguished to FAITH, I take to bethe discovery of the certainty or probability of such propositions ortruths, which the mind arrives at by deduction made from such ideas, which it has got by the use of its natural faculties; viz. By sensationor reflection. 

FAITH, on the other side, is the assent to any proposition, not thusmade out by the deductions of reason, but upon the credit ofthe proposer, as coming from God, in some extraordinary way ofcommunication. This way of discovering truths to men, we callREVELATION. 

3. First, No new simple Idea can be conveyed by traditional Revelation. 

FIRST, Then I say, that NO MAN INSPIRED BY GOD CAN BY ANY REVELATIONCOMMUNICATE TO OTHERS ANY NEW SIMPLE IDEAS WHICH THEY HAD NOT BEFOREFROM SENSATION OR REFLECTION. For, whatsoever impressions he himself mayhave from the immediate hand of God, this revelation, if it be of newsimple ideas, cannot be conveyed to another, either by words or anyother signs. Because words, by their immediate operation on us, cause noother ideas but of their natural sounds: and it is by the custom ofusing them for signs, that they excite and revive in our minds latentideas; but yet only such ideas as were there before. For words, seen orheard, recal to our thoughts those ideas only which to us they have beenwont to be signs of, but cannot introduce any perfectly new, andformerly unknown simple ideas. The same holds in all other signs; whichcannot signify to us things of which we have before never had any ideaat all. 

Thus whatever things were discovered to St. Paul, when he was rapt upinto the third heaven; whatever new ideas his mind there received, allthe description he can make to others of that place, is only this, Thatthere are such things, 'as eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor hathit entered into the heart of man to conceive. ' And supposing God shoulddiscover to any one, supernaturally, a species of creatures inhabiting, for example, Jupiter or Saturn, (for that it is possible there may besuch, nobody can deny, ) which had six senses; and imprint on his mindthe ideas conveyed to theirs by that sixth sense: he could no more, bywords, produce in the minds of other men those ideas imprinted by thatsixth sense, than one of us could convey the idea of any colour, by thesound of words, into a man who, having the other four senses perfect, had always totally wanted the fifth, of seeing. For our simple ideas, then, which are the foundation, and sole matter of all our notions andknowledge, we must depend wholly on our reason, I mean our naturalfaculties; and can by no means receive them, or any of them, fromtraditional revelation. I say, TRADITIONAL REVELATION, in distinction toORIGINAL REVELATION. By the one, I mean that first impression which ismade immediately by God on the mind of any man, to which we cannot setany bounds; and by the other, those impressions delivered over to othersin words, and the ordinary ways of conveying our conceptions one toanother. 

4. Secondly, Traditional Revelation may make us know Propositionsknowable also by Reason, but not with the same Certainty that Reasondoth. 

SECONDLY, I say that THE SAME TRUTHS MAY BE DISCOVERED, AND CONVEYEDDOWN FROM REVELATION, WHICH ARE DISCERNABLE TO US BY REASON, AND BYTHOSE IDEAS WE NATURALLY MAY HAVE. So God might, by revelation, discoverthe truth of any proposition in Euclid; as well as men, by the naturaluse of their faculties, come to make the discovery themselves. In allthings of this kind there is little need or use of revelation, Godhaving furnished us with natural and surer means to arrive at theknowledge of them. For whatsoever truth we come to the clear discoveryof, from the knowledge and contemplation of our own ideas, will alwaysbe certainer to us than those which are conveyed to us by TRADITIONALREVELATION. For the knowledge we have that this revelation came at firstfrom God, can never be so sure as the knowledge we have from the clearand distinct perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ownideas: v. G. If it were revealed some ages since, that the three anglesof a triangle were equal to two right ones, I might assent to the truthof that proposition, upon the credit of the tradition, that it wasrevealed: but that would never amount to so great a certainty as theknowledge of it, upon the comparing and measuring my own ideas of tworight angles, and the three angles of a triangle. The like holds inmatter of fact knowable by our senses; v. G. The history of the deluge isconveyed to us by writings which had their original from revelation: andyet nobody, I think, will say he has as certain and clear a knowledge ofthe flood as Noah, that saw it; or that he himself would have had, hadhe then been alive and seen it. For he has no greater an assurance thanthat of his senses, that it is writ in the book supposed writ by Mosesinspired: but he has not so great an assurance that Moses wrote thatbook as if he had seen Moses write it. So that the assurance of itsbeing a revelation is less still than the assurance of his senses. 

5. Even Original Revelation cannot be admitted against the clear Evidenceof Reason. 

In propositions, then, whose certainty is built upon the clearperception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas, attainedeither by immediate intuition, as in self-evident propositions, orby evident deductions of reason in demonstrations we need not theassistance of revelation, as necessary to gain our assent, and introducethem into our minds. Because the natural ways of knowledge could settlethem there, or had done it already; which is the greatest assurance wecan possibly have of anything, unless where God immediately reveals itto us: and there too our assurance can be no greater than our knowledgeis, that it IS a revelation from God. But yet nothing, I think, can, under that title, shake or overrule plain knowledge; or rationallyprevail with any man to admit it for true, in a direct contradiction tothe clear evidence of his own understanding. For, since no evidence ofour faculties, by which we receive such revelations, can exceed, ifequal, the certainty of our intuitive knowledge, we can never receivefor a truth anything that is directly contrary to our clear and distinctknowledge; v. G. The ideas of one body and one place do so clearly agree, and the mind has so evident a perception of their agreement, that we cannever assent to a proposition that affirms the same body to be in twodistant places at once, however it should pretend to the authority ofa divine revelation: since the evidence, first, that we deceive notourselves, in ascribing it to God; secondly, that we understand itright; can never be so great as the evidence of our own intuitiveknowledge, whereby we discern it impossible for the same body to be intwo places at once. And therefore NO PROPOSITION CAN BE RECEIVED FORDIVINE REVELATION, OR OBTAIN THE ASSENT DUE TO ALL SUCH, IF IT BECONTRADICTORY TO OUR CLEAR INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. Because this would be tosubvert the principles and foundations of all knowledge, evidence, andassent whatsoever: and there would be left no difference between truthand falsehood, no measures of credible and incredible in the world, ifdoubtful propositions shall take place before self-evident; and whatwe certainly know give way to what we may possibly be mistaken in. Inpropositions therefore contrary to the clear perception of the agreementor disagreement of any of our ideas, it will be in vain to urge them asmatters of faith. They cannot move our assent under that or any othertitle whatsoever. For faith can never convince us of anything thatcontradicts our knowledge. Because, though faith be founded on thetestimony of God (who cannot lie) revealing any proposition to us:yet we cannot have an assurance of the truth of its being a divinerevelation greater than our own knowledge. Since the whole strength ofthe certainty depends upon our knowledge that God revealed it; which, in this case, where the proposition supposed revealed contradicts ourknowledge or reason, will always have this objection hanging to it, viz. That we cannot tell how to conceive that to come from God, the bountifulAuthor of our being, which, if received for true, must overturn all theprinciples and foundations of knowledge he has given us; render allour faculties useless; wholly destroy the most excellent part of hisworkmanship, our understandings; and put a man in a condition wherein hewill have less light, less conduct than the beast that perisheth. Forif the mind of man can never have a clearer (and perhaps not so clear)evidence of anything to be a divine revelation, as it has of theprinciples of its own reason, it can never have a ground to quit theclear evidence of its reason, to give a place to a proposition, whoserevelation has not a greater evidence than those principles have. 

6. Traditional Revelation much less. 

Thus far a man has use of reason, and ought to hearken to it, even inimmediate and original revelation, where it is supposed to be made tohimself. But to all those who pretend not to immediate revelation, butare required to pay obedience, and to receive the truths revealed toothers, which, by the tradition of writings, or word of mouth, areconveyed down to them, reason has a great deal more to do, and is thatonly which can induce us to receive them. For matter of faith being onlydivine revelation, and nothing else, faith, as we use the word, (calledcommonly DIVINE FAITH), has to do with no propositions, but those whichare supposed to be divinely revealed. So that I do not see how those whomake revelation alone the sole object of faith can say, That it is amatter of faith, and not of reason, to believe that such or sucha proposition, to be found in such or such a book, is of divineinspiration; unless it be revealed that that proposition, or all in thatbook, was communicated by divine inspiration. Without such a revelation, the believing, or not believing, that proposition, or book, to be ofdivine authority, can never be matter of faith, but matter of reason;and such as I must come to an assent to only by the use of my reason, which can never require or enable me to believe that which is contraryto itself: it being impossible for reason ever to procure any assent tothat which to itself appears unreasonable. 

In all things, therefore, where we have clear evidence from our ideas, and those principles of knowledge I have above mentioned, reason is theproper judge; and revelation, though it may, in consenting with it, confirm its dictates, yet cannot in such cases invalidate its decrees:nor can we be obliged, where we have the clear and evident sentence ofreason, to quit it for the contrary opinion, under a pretence that it ismatter of faith: which can have no authority against the plain and cleardictates of reason. 

7. Thirdly, things above Reason are, when revealed, the proper matter offaith. 

But, THIRDLY, There being many things wherein we have very imperfectnotions, or none at all; and other things, of whose past, present, orfuture existence, by the natural use of our faculties, we can have noknowledge at all; these, as being beyond the discovery of our naturalfaculties, and ABOVE REASON, are, when revealed, THE PROPER MATTER OFFAITH. Thus, that part of the angels rebelled against God, and therebylost their first happy state: and that the dead shall rise, and liveagain: these and the like, being beyond the discovery of reason, arepurely matters of faith, with which reason has directly nothing to do. 

8. Or not contrary to Reason, if revealed, are Matter of Faith; and mustcarry it against probable conjectures of Reason. 

But since God, in giving us the light of reason, has not thereby tiedup his own hands from affording us, when he thinks fit, the light ofrevelation in any of those matters wherein our natural faculties areable to give a probable determination; REVELATION, where God has beenpleased to give it, MUST CARRY IT AGAINST THE PROBABLE CONJECTURES OFREASON. Because the mind not being certain of the truth of that it doesnot evidently know, but only yielding to the probability that appearsin it, is bound to give up its assent to such a testimony which, it issatisfied, comes from one who cannot err, and will not deceive. Butyet, it still belongs to reason to judge of the truth of its beinga revelation, and of the signification of the words wherein it isdelivered. Indeed, if anything shall be thought revelation which iscontrary to the plain principles of reason, and the evident knowledgethe mind has of its own clear and distinct ideas; there reason must behearkened to, as to a matter within its province. Since a man can neverhave so certain a knowledge, that a proposition which contradictsthe clear principles and evidence of his own knowledge was divinelyrevealed, or that he understands the words rightly wherein it isdelivered, as he has that the contrary is true, and so is bound toconsider and judge of it as a matter of reason, and not swallow it, without examination, as a matter of faith. 

9. Revelation in Matters where Reason cannot judge, or but probably, ought to be hearkened to. 

First, Whatever proposition is revealed, of whose truth our mind, by itsnatural faculties and notions, cannot judge, that is purely matter offaith, and above reason. 

Secondly, All propositions whereof the mind, by the use of its naturalfaculties, can come to determine and judge, from naturally acquiredideas, are matter of reason; with this difference still, that, in thoseconcerning which it has but an uncertain evidence, and so is persuadedof their truth only upon probable grounds, which still admit apossibility of the contrary to be true, without doing violence to thecertain evidence of its own knowledge, and overturning the principles ofall reason; in such probable propositions, I say, an evident revelationought to determine our assent, even against probability. For where theprinciples of reason have not evidenced a proposition to be certainlytrue or false, there clear revelation, as another principle of truth andground of assent, may determine; and so it may be matter of faith, andbe also above reason. Because reason, in that particular matter, beingable to reach no higher than probability, faith gave the determinationwhere reason came short; and revelation discovered on which side thetruth lay. 

10. In Matters where Reason can afford certain Knowledge, that is to behearkened to. 

Thus far the dominion of faith reaches, and that without any violence orhindrance to reason; which is not injured or disturbed, but assisted andimproved by new discoveries of truth, coming from the eternal fountainof all knowledge. Whatever God hath revealed is certainly true: no doubtcan be made of it. This is the proper object of faith: but whether it bea DIVINE revelation or no, reason must judge; which can never permit themind to reject a greater evidence to embrace what is less evident, nor allow it to entertain probability in opposition to knowledge andcertainty. There can be no evidence that any traditional revelation isof divine original, in the words we receive it, and in the sense weunderstand it, so clear and so certain as that of the principles ofreason: and therefore NOTHING THAT IS CONTRARY TO, AND INCONSISTENTWITH, THE CLEAR AND SELF-EVIDENT DICTATES OF REASON, HAS A RIGHT TO BEURGED OR ASSENTED TO AS A MATTER OF FAITH, WHEREIN REASON HATH NOTHINGTO DO. Whatsoever is divine revelation, ought to overrule all ouropinions, prejudices, and interest, and hath a right to be received withfull assent. Such a submission as this, of our reason to faith, takesnot away the landmarks of knowledge: this shakes not the foundationsof reason, but leaves us that use of our faculties for which they weregiven us. 

11. If the Boundaries be not set between Faith and Reason, no Enthusiasmor Extravagancy in Religion can be contradicted. 

If the provinces of faith and reason are not kept distinct by theseboundaries, there will, in matters of religion, be no room for reason atall; and those extravagant opinions and ceremonies that are to be foundin the several religions of the world will not deserve to be blamed. For, to this crying up of faith in OPPOSITION to reason, we may, Ithink, in good measure ascribe those absurdities that fill almost allthe religions which possess and divide mankind. For men having beenprincipled with an opinion, that they must not consult reason in thethings of religion, however apparently contradictory to common sense andthe very principles of all their knowledge, have let loose their fanciesand natural superstition; and have been by them led into so strangeopinions, and extravagant practices in religion, that a considerate mancannot but stand amazed, at their follies, and judge them so far frombeing acceptable to the great and wise God, that he cannot avoidthinking them ridiculous and offensive to a sober good man. So that, in effect, religion, which should most distinguish us from beasts, and ought most peculiarly to elevate us, as rational creatures, abovebrutes, is that wherein men often appear most irrational, and moresenseless than beasts themselves. CREDO, QUIA IMPOSSIBILE EST: Ibelieve, because it is impossible, might, in a good man, pass for asally of zeal; but would prove a very ill rule for men to choose theiropinions or religion by. 

CHAPTER XIX. [not in early editions]

CHAPTER XX. 

OF WRONG ASSENT, OR ERROR. 

1. Causes of Error, or how men come to give assent contrary toprobability. 

KNOWLEDGE being to be had only of visible and certain truth, ERROR isnot a fault of our knowledge, but a mistake of our judgment givingassent to that which is not true. 

But if assent be grounded on likelihood, if the proper object and motiveof our assent be probability, and that probability consists in what islaid down in the foregoing chapters, it will be demanded HOW MEN COME TOGIVE THEIR ASSENTS CONTRARY TO PROBABILITY. For there is nothing morecommon than contrariety of opinions; nothing more obvious than thatone man wholly disbelieves what another only doubts of, and a thirdsteadfastly believes and firmly adheres to. 

The reasons whereof, though they may be very various, yet, I suppose mayall be reduced to these four:

I. WANT OF PROOFS. 

II. WANT OF ABILITY TO USE THEM. 

III. WANT OF WILL TO SEE THEM. 

IV. WRONG MEASURES OF PROBABILITY. 

2. First cause of Error, Want of Proofs. 

FIRST, By WANT OF PROOFS, I do not mean only the want of those proofswhich are nowhere extant, and so are nowhere to be had; but the wanteven of those proofs which are in being, or might be procured. And thusmen want proofs, who have not the convenience or opportunity to makeexperiments and observations themselves, tending to the proof of anyproposition; nor likewise the convenience to inquire into and collectthe testimonies of others: and in this state are the greatest part ofmankind, who are given up to labour, and enslaved to the necessity oftheir mean condition, whose lives are worn out only in the provisionsfor living. These men's opportunities of knowledge and inquiry arecommonly as narrow as their fortunes; and their understandings are butlittle instructed, when all their whole time and pains is laid out tostill the croaking of their own bellies, or the cries of their children. It is not to be expected that a man who drudges on all his life in alaborious trade, should be more knowing in the variety of things donein the world than a packhorse, who is driven constantly forwards andbackwards in a narrow lane and dirty road, only to market, should beskilled in the geography of the country. Nor is it at all more possible, that he who wants leisure, books, and languages, and the opportunityof conversing with variety of men, should be in a condition to collectthose testimonies and observations which are in being, and are necessaryto make out many, nay most, of the propositions that, in the societiesof men, are judged of the greatest moment; or to find out grounds ofassurance so great as the belief of the points he would build on them isthought necessary. So that a great part of mankind are, by the naturaland unalterable state of things in this world, and the constitution ofhuman affairs, unavoidably given over to invincible ignorance of thoseproofs on which others build, and which are necessary to establish thoseopinions: the greatest part of men, having much to do to get the meansof living, are not in a condition to look after those of learned andlaborious inquiries. 

3. Objection, What shall become of those who want Proofs? Answered. 

What shall we say, then? Are the greatest part of mankind, by thenecessity of their condition, subjected to unavoidable ignorance, inthose things which are of greatest importance to them? (for of thoseit is obvious to inquire. ) Have the bulk of mankind no other guide butaccident and blind chance to conduct them to their happiness ormisery? Are the current opinions, and licensed guides of every countrysufficient evidence and security to every man to venture his greatconcernments on; nay, his everlasting happiness or misery? Or can thosebe the certain and infallible oracles and standards of truth, whichteach one thing in Christendom and another in Turkey? Or shall a poorcountryman be eternally happy, for having the chance to be born inItaly; or a day-labourer be unavoidably lost, because he had theill-luck to be born in England? How ready some men may be to say some ofthese things, I will not here examine: but this I am sure, that men mustallow one or other of these to be true, (let them choose which theyplease, ) or else grant that God has furnished men with facultiessufficient to direct them in the way they should take, if they will butseriously employ them that way, when their ordinary vocations allow themthe leisure. No man is so wholly taken up with the attendance on themeans of living, as to have no spare time at all to think of his soul, and inform himself in matters of religion. Were men as intent upon thisas they are on things of lower concernment, there are none so enslavedto the necessities of life who might not find many vacancies that mightbe husbanded to this advantage of their knowledge. 

4. People hindered from Inquiry. 

Besides those whose improvements and informations are straitened bythe narrowness of their fortunes, there are others whose largeness offortune would plentifully enough supply books, and other requisites forclearing of doubts, and discovering of truth: but they are cooped inclose, by the laws of their countries, and the strict guards of thosewhose interest it is to keep them ignorant, lest, knowing more, theyshould believe the less in them. These are as far, nay further, fromthe liberty and opportunities of a fair inquiry, than these poor andwretched labourers we before spoke of: and however they may seem highand great, are confined to narrowness of thought, and enslaved in thatwhich should be the freest part of man, their understandings. This isgenerally the case of all those who live in places where care is takento propagate truth without knowledge; where men are forced, at aventure, to be of the religion of the country; and must thereforeswallow down opinions, as silly people do empiric's pills, withoutknowing what they are made of, or how they will work, and having nothingto do but believe that they will do the cure: but in this are muchmore miserable than they, in that they are not at liberty to refuseswallowing what perhaps they had rather let alone; or to choose thephysician, to whose conduct they would trust themselves. 

5. Second Cause of Error, Want of skill to use Proofs. 

SECONDLY, Those who WANT SKILL TO USE THOSE EVIDENCES THEY HAVE OFPROBABILITIES; who cannot carry a train of consequences in their heads;nor weigh exactly the preponderancy of contrary proofs and testimonies, making every circumstance its due allowance; may be easily misled toassent to positions that are not probable. There are some men of one, some but of two syllogisms, and no more; and others that can but advanceone step further. These cannot always discern that side on which thestrongest proofs lie; cannot constantly follow that which in itself isthe more probable opinion. Now that there is such a difference betweenmen, in respect of their understandings, I think nobody, who has had anyconversation with his neighbours, will question: though he never was atWestminster-Hall or the Exchange on the one hand, nor at Alms-housesor Bedlam on the other. Which great difference in men's intellectuals, whether it rises from any defect in the organs of the body, particularlyadapted to thinking; or in the dulness or untractableness of thosefaculties for want of use; or, as some think, in the natural differencesof men's souls themselves; or some, or all of these together; it mattersnot here to examine: only this is evident, that there is a difference ofdegrees in men's understandings, apprehensions, and reasonings, to sogreat a latitude, that one may, without doing injury to mankind, affirm, that there is a greater distance between some men and others in thisrespect, than between some men and some beasts. But how this comes aboutis a speculation, though of great consequence, yet not necessary to ourpresent purpose. 

6. Third cause of Error, Want of Will to use them. 

THIRDLY, There are another sort of people that want proofs, not becausethey are out of their reach, but BECAUSE THEY WILL NOT USE THEM: who, though they have riches and leisure enough, and want neither parts norlearning, may yet, through their hot pursuit of pleasure, or business, or else out of laziness or fear that the doctrines whose truth theywould inquire into would not suit well with their opinions, lives ordesigns, may never come to the knowledge of, nor give their assent to, those possibilities which lie so much within their view, that, to beconvinced of them, they need but turn their eyes that way. We know somemen will not read a letter which is supposed to bring ill news; and manymen forbear to cast up their accounts, or so much as think upon theirestates, who have reason to fear their affairs are in no very goodposture. How men, whose plentiful fortunes allow them leisure to improvetheir understandings, can satisfy themselves with a lazy ignorance, Icannot tell: but methinks they have a low opinion of their souls, wholay out all their incomes in provisions for the body, and employ none ofit to procure the means and helps of knowledge; who take great care toappear always in a neat and splendid outside, and would think themselvesmiserable in coarse clothes, or a patched coat, and yet contentedlysuffer their minds to appear abroad in a piebald livery of coarsepatches and borrowed shreds, such as it has pleased chance, or theircountry tailor (I mean the common opinion of those they have conversedwith) to clothe them in. I will not here mention how unreasonable thisis for men that ever think of a future state, and their concernment init, which no rational man can avoid to do sometimes: nor shall I takenotice what a shame and confusion it is to the greatest contemners ofknowledge, to be found ignorant in things they are concerned toknow. But this at least is worth the consideration of those who callthemselves gentlemen, That, however they may think credit, respect, power, and authority the concomitants of their birth and fortune, yetthey will find all these still carried away from them by men of lowercondition, who surpass them in knowledge. They who are blind willalways be led by those that see, or else fall into the ditch: and heis certainly the most subjected, the most enslaved, who is so in hisunderstanding. In the foregoing instances some of the causes have beenshown of wrong assent, and how it comes to pass, that probable doctrinesare not always received with an assent proportionable to the reasonswhich are to be had for their probability: but hitherto we haveconsidered only such probabilities whose proofs do exist, but do notappear to him who embraces the error. 

7. Fourth cause of Error, Wrong Measures of Probability: which are--

FOURTHLY, There remains yet the last sort, who, even where the realprobabilities appear, and are plainly laid before them, do not admitof the conviction, nor yield unto manifest reasons, but do eithersuspend their assent, or give it to the less probable opinion. Andto this danger are those exposed who have taken up WRONG MEASURES OFPROBABILITY, which are:

I. PROPOSITIONS THAT ARE IN THEMSELVES CERTAIN AND EVIDENT, BUT DOUBTFULAND FALSE, TAKEN UP FOR PRINCIPLES. 

II. RECEIVED HYPOTHESES. 

III. PREDOMINANT PASSIONS OR INCLINATIONS. 

IV. AUTHORITY. 

8. I. Doubtful Propositions taken for Principles. 

The first and firmest ground of probability is the conformity anythinghas to our own knowledge; especially that part of our knowledge whichwe have embraced, and continue to look on as PRINCIPLES. These have sogreat an influence upon our opinions, that it is usually by them wejudge of truth, and measure probability; to that degree, that what isinconsistent with our principles, is so far from passing for probablewith us, that it will not be allowed possible. The reverence borne tothese principles is so great, and their authority so paramount to allother, that the testimony, not only of other men, but the evidence ofour own senses are often rejected, when they offer to vouch anythingcontrary to these established rules. How much the doctrine of INNATEPRINCIPLES, and that principles are not to be proved or questioned, hascontributed to this, I will not here examine. This I readily grant, thatone truth cannot contradict another: but withal I take leave also tosay, that every one ought very carefully to beware what he admits for aprinciple, to examine it strictly, and see whether he certainly knows itto be true of itself, by its own evidence, or whether he does only withassurance believe it to be so, upon the authority of others. For hehath a strong bias put into his understanding, which will unavoidablymisguide his assent, who hath imbibed WRONG PRINCIPLES, and has blindlygiven himself up to the authority of any opinion in itself not evidentlytrue. 

9. Instilled in childhood. 

There is nothing more ordinary than children's receiving into theirminds propositions (especially about matters of religion) from theirparents, nurses, or those about them: which being insinuated into theirunwary as well as unbiassed understandings, and fastened by degrees, areat last (equally whether true or false) riveted there by long custom andeducation, beyond all possibility of being pulled out again. For men, when they are grown up, reflecting upon their opinions, and findingthose of this sort to be as ancient in their minds as their verymemories, not having observed their early insinuation, nor by what meansthey got them, they are apt to reverence them as sacred things, and notto suffer them to be profaned, touched, or questioned: they look onthem as the Urim and Thummim set up in their minds immediately by Godhimself, to be the great and unerring deciders of truth and falsehood, and the judges to which they are to appeal in all manner ofcontroversies. 

10. Of irresistible efficacy. 

This opinion of his principles (let them be what they will) being onceestablished in any one's mind, it is easy to be imagined what receptionany proposition shall find, how clearly soever proved, that shallinvalidate their authority, or at all thwart with these internaloracles; whereas the grossest absurdities and improbabilities, being butagreeable to such principles, go down glibly, and are easily digested. The great obstinacy that is to be found in men firmly believing quitecontrary opinions, though many times equally absurd, in the variousreligions of mankind, are as evident a proof as they are an unavoidableconsequence of this way of reasoning from received traditionalprinciples. So that men will disbelieve their own eyes, renounce theevidence of their senses, and give their own experience the lie, ratherthan admit of anything disagreeing with these sacred tenets. Take anintelligent Romanist that, from the first dawning of any notions in hisunderstanding, hath had this principle constantly inculcated, viz. Thathe must believe as the church (i. E. Those of his communion) believes, or that the pope is infallible, and this he never so much as heardquestioned, till at forty or fifty years old he met with one of otherprinciples: how is he prepared easily to swallow, not only against allprobability, but even the clear evidence of his senses, the doctrine ofTRANSUBSTANTIATION? This principle has such an influence on his mind, that he will believe that to be flesh which he sees to be bread. Andwhat way will you take to convince a man of any improbable opinion heholds, who, with some philosophers, hath laid down this as a foundationof reasoning, That he must believe his reason (for so men improperlycall arguments drawn from their principles) against his senses? Let anenthusiast be principled that he or his teacher is inspired, and actedby an immediate communication of the Divine Spirit, and you in vainbring the evidence of clear reasons against his doctrine. Whoever, therefore, have imbibed wrong principles, are not, in thingsinconsistent with these principles, to be moved by the most apparentand convincing probabilities, till they are so candid and ingenuous tothemselves, as to be persuaded to examine even those very principles, which many never suffer themselves to do. 

11. Received Hypotheses. 

Next to these are men whose understandings are cast into a mould, andfashioned just to the size of a received HYPOTHESIS. The differencebetween these and the former, is, that they will admit of matter offact, and agree with dissenters in that; but differ only in assigning ofreasons and explaining the manner of operation. These are not at thatopen defiance with their senses, with the former: they can endure tohearken to their information a little more patiently; but will by nomeans admit of their reports in the explanation of things; nor beprevailed on by probabilities, which would convince them that thingsare not brought about just after the same manner that they have decreedwithin themselves that they are. Would it not be an insufferable thingfor a learned professor, and that which his scarlet would blush at, tohave his authority of forty years standing, wrought out of hard rock, Greek and Latin, with no small expense of time and candle, and confirmedby general tradition and a reverend beard, in an instant overturnedby an upstart novelist? Can any one expect that he should be made toconfess, that what he taught his scholars thirty years ago was all errorand mistake; and that he sold them hard words and ignorance at a verydear rate. What probabilities, I say, are sufficient to prevail in sucha case? And who ever, by the most cogent arguments, will be prevailedwith to disrobe himself at once of all his old opinions, and pretencesto knowledge and learning, which with hard study he hath all this timebeen labouring for; and turn himself out stark naked, in quest afresh ofnew notions? All the arguments that can be used will be as little ableto prevail, as the wind did with the traveller to part with his cloak, which he held only the faster. To this of wrong hypothesis may bereduced the errors that may be occasioned by a true hypothesis, or rightprinciples, but not rightly understood. There is nothing more familiarthan this. The instances of men contending for different opinions, whichthey all derive from the infallible truth of the Scripture, are anundeniable proof of it. All that call themselves Christians, allow thetext that says, [word in Greek], to carry in it the obligation to a veryweighty duty. But yet how very erroneous will one of their practicesbe, who, understanding nothing but the French, take this rule with onetranslation to be, REPENTEZ-VOUS, repent; or with the other, FATIEZPENITENCE, do penance. 

12. III. Predominant Passions. 

Probabilities which cross men's appetites and prevailing passions runthe same fate. Let ever so much probability hang on one side of acovetous man's reasoning, and money on the other; it is easy to foreseewhich will outweigh. Earthly minds, like mud walls, resist the strongestbatteries: and though, perhaps, sometimes the force of a clear argumentmay make some impression, yet they nevertheless stand firm, and keepout the enemy, truth, that would captivate or disturb them. Tell a manpassionately in love, that he is jilted; bring a score of witnesses ofthe falsehood of his mistress, it is ten to one but three kind wordsof hers shall invalidate all their testimonies. QUOD VOLUMUS, FACILECREDIMUS; what suits our wishes, is forwardly believed, is, I suppose, what every one hath more than once experimented: and though men cannotalways openly gainsay or resist the force of manifest probabilities thatmake against them, yet yield they not to the argument. Not but that itis the nature of the understanding constantly to close with the moreprobable side; but yet a man hath a power to suspend and restrain itsinquiries, and not permit a full and satisfactory examination, as far asthe matter in question is capable, and will bear it to be made. Untilthat be done, there will be always these two ways left of evading themost apparent probabilities:

13. Two Means of evading Probabilities: 1. Supposed Fallacy latent inthe words employed. 

First, That the arguments being (as for the most part they are) broughtin words, THERE MAY BE A FALLACY LATENT IN THEM: and the consequencesbeing, perhaps, many in train, they may be some of them incoherent. There are very few discourses so short, clear, and consistent, to whichmost men may not, with satisfaction enough to themselves, raise thisdoubt; and from whose conviction they may not, without reproach ofdisingenuity or unreasonableness, set themselves free with the oldreply, Non persuadebis, etiamsi persuaseris; though I cannot answer, Iwill not yield. 

14. Supposed unknown Arguments for the contrary. 

Secondly, Manifest probabilities maybe evaded, and the assent withheld, upon this suggestion, That I know not yet all that may be said on thecontrary side. And therefore, though I be beaten, it is not necessary Ishould yield, not knowing what forces there are in reserve behind. Thisis a refuge against conviction so open and so wide, that it is hard todetermine when a man is quite out of the verge of it. 

15. What Probabilities naturally determine the Assent. 

But yet there is some end of it; and a man having carefully inquiredinto all the grounds of probability and unlikeliness; done his utmost toinform himself in all particulars fairly, and cast up the sum total onboth sides; may, in most cases, come to acknowledge, upon the wholematter, on which side the probability rests: wherein some proofs inmatter of reason, being suppositions upon universal experience, are socogent and clear, and some testimonies in matter of fact so universal, that he cannot refuse his assent. So that I think we may conclude, that, in propositions, where though the proofs in view are of most moment, yetthere are sufficient grounds to suspect that there is either fallacy inwords, or certain proofs as considerable to be produced on the contraryside; there assent, suspense, or dissent, are often voluntary actions. But where the proofs are such as make it highly probable, and there isnot sufficient ground to suspect that there is either fallacy of words(which sober and serious consideration may discover) nor equally validproofs yet undiscovered, latent on the other side (which also the natureof the thing may, in some cases, make plain to a considerate man;)there, I think, a man who has weighed them can scarce refuse his assentto the side on which the greater probability appears. Whether it beprobable that a promiscuous jumble of printing letters should oftenfall into a method and order, which should stamp on paper a coherentdiscourse; or that a blind fortuitous concourse of atoms, not guided byan understanding agent, should frequently constitute the bodies of anyspecies of animals: in these and the like cases, I think, nobody thatconsiders them can be one jot at a stand which side to take, nor at allwaver in his assent. Lastly, when there can be no supposition (the thingin its own nature indifferent, and wholly depending upon the testimonyof witnesses) that there is as fair testimony against, as for the matterof fact attested; which by inquiry is to be learned, v. G. Whether therewas one thousand seven hundred years ago such a man at Rome as JuliusCaesar: in all such cases, I say, I think it is not in any rationalman's power to refuse his assent; but that it necessarily follows, andcloses with such probabilities. In other less clear cases, I think it isin man's power to suspend his assent; and perhaps content himself withthe proofs he has, if they favour the opinion that suits with hisinclination or interest, and so stop from further search. But that aman should afford his assent to that side on which the less probabilityappears to him, seems to me utterly impracticable, and as impossibleas it is to believe the same thing probable and improbable at the sametime. 

16. Where it is in our Power to suspend our Judgment. 

As knowledge is no more arbitrary than perception; so, I think, assentis no more in our power than knowledge. When the agreement of any twoideas appears to our minds, whether immediately or by the assistance ofreason, I can no more refuse to perceive, no more avoid knowing it, thanI can avoid seeing those objects which I turn my eyes to, and look onin daylight; and what upon full examination I find the most probable, Icannot deny my assent to. But, though we cannot hinder our knowledge, where the agreement is once perceived; nor our assent, where theprobability manifestly appears upon due consideration of all themeasures of it: yet we can hinder both KNOWLEDGE and ASSENT, BY STOPPINGOUR INQUIRY, and not employing our faculties in the search of any truth. If it were not so, ignorance, error, or infidelity, could not in anycase be a fault. Thus, in some cases we can prevent or suspend ourassent: but can a man versed in modern or ancient history doubt whetherthere is such a place as Rome, or whether there was such a man as JuliusCaesar? Indeed, there are millions of truths that a man is not, or maynot think himself concerned to know; as whether our king Richard theThird was crooked or no; or whether Roger Bacon was a mathematician ora magician. In these and such like cases, where the assent one way orother is of no importance to the interest of any one; no action, noconcernment of his following or depending thereon, there it is notstrange that the mind should give itself up to the common opinion, orrender itself to the first comer. These and the like opinions are of solittle weight and moment, that, like motes in the sun, their tendenciesare very rarely taken notice of. They are there, as it were, by chance, and the mind lets them float at liberty. But where the mind judges thatthe proposition has concernment in it: where the assent or not assentingis thought to draw consequences of moment after it, and good and evil todepend on choosing or refusing the right side, and the mind sets itselfseriously to inquire and examine the probability: there I think it isnot in our choice to take which side we please, if manifest odds appearon either. The greater probability, I think, in that case will determinethe assent: and a man can no more avoid assenting, or taking it to betrue, where he perceives the greater probability, than he can avoidknowing it to be true, where he perceives the agreement or disagreementof any two ideas. 

If this be so, the foundation of error will lie in wrong measures ofprobability; as the foundation of vice in wrong measures of good. 

17. IV. Authority

The fourth and last wrong measure of probability I shall take notice of, and which keeps in ignorance or error more people than all the othertogether, is that which I have mentioned in the foregoing chapter: Imean the giving up our assent to the common received opinions, eitherof our friends or party, neighbourhood or country. How many men have noother ground for their tenets, than the supposed honesty, or learning, or number of those of the same profession? As if honest or bookishmen could not err; or truth were to be established by the vote of themultitude: yet this with most men serves the turn. The tenet has had theattestation of reverend antiquity; it comes to me with the passport offormer ages, and therefore I am secure in the reception I give it: othermen have been and are of the same opinion, (for that is all is said, )and therefore it is reasonable for me to embrace it. A man may morejustifiably throw up cross and pile for his opinions, than take them upby such measures. All men are liable to error, and most men are in manypoints, by passion or interest, under temptation to it. If we could butsee the secret motives that influenced the men of name and learning inthe world, and the leaders of parties, we should not always find that itwas the embracing of truth for its own sake, that made them espouse thedoctrines they owned and maintained. This at least is certain, there isnot an opinion so absurd, which a man may not receive upon this ground. There is no error to be named, which has not had its professors: and aman shall never want crooked paths to walk in, if he thinks that he isin the right way, wherever he has the footsteps of others to follow. 18. Not so many men in Errors as is commonly supposed. 

But, notwithstanding the great noise is made in the world about errorsand opinions, I must do mankind that right as to say, THERE ARE NOT SOMANY MEN IN ERRORS AND WRONG OPINIONS AS IS COMMONLY SUPPOSED. Not thatI think they embrace the truth; but indeed, because concerning thosedoctrines they keep such a stir about, they have no thought, no opinionat all. For if any one should a little catechise the greatest part ofthe partizans of most of the sects in the world, he would not find, concerning those matters they are so zealous for, that they have anyopinions of their own: much less would he have reason to think thatthey took them upon the examination of arguments and appearance ofprobability. They are resolved to stick to a party that education orinterest has engaged them in; and there, like the common soldiers of anarmy, show their courage and warmth as their leaders direct, withoutever examining, or so much as knowing, the cause they contend for. If aman's life shows that he has no serious regard for religion; for whatreason should we think that he beats his head about the opinions of hischurch, and troubles himself to examine the grounds of this or thatdoctrine? It is enough for him to obey his leaders, to have his handand his tongue ready for the support of the common cause, and therebyapprove himself to those who can give him credit, preferment, orprotection in that society. Thus men become professors of, andcombatants for, those opinions they were never convinced of norproselytes to; no, nor ever had so much as floating in their heads: andthough one cannot say there are fewer improbable or erroneous opinionsin the world than there are, yet this is certain; there are fewer thatactually assent to them, and mistake them for truths, than is imagined. 

CHAPTER XXI. 

OF THE DIVISION OF THE SCIENCES. 

1. Science may be divided into three sorts. 

All that can fall within the compass of human understanding, beingeither, FIRST, the nature of things, as they are in themselves, theirrelations, and their manner of operation: or, SECONDLY, that whichman himself ought to do, as a rational and voluntary agent, for theattainment of any end, especially happiness: or, THIRDLY, the ways andmeans whereby the knowledge of both the one and the other of these isattained and communicated; I think science may be divided properly intothese three sorts:--

2. First, Physica. 

FIRST, The knowledge of things, as they are in their own proper beings, then constitution, properties, and operations; whereby I mean not onlymatter and body, but spirits also, which have their proper natures, constitutions, and operations, as well as bodies. This, in a little moreenlarged sense of the word, I call [word in Greek: physika], or NATURALPHILOSOPHY. The end of this is bare speculative truth: and whatsoevercan afford the mind of man any such, falls under this branch, whether itbe God himself, angels, spirits, bodies; or any of their affections, asnumber, and figure, &c. 

3. Secondly, Practica. 

SECONDLY, [word in Greek: praktika], The skill of right applying our ownpowers and actions, for the attainment of things good and useful. Themost considerable under this head is ETHICS, which is the seeking outthose rules and measures of human actions, which lead to happiness, andthe means to practise them. The end of this is not bare speculation andthe knowledge of truth; but right, and a conduct suitable to it. 

4. Thirdly, [word in Greek: Semeiotika]

THIRDLY, the third branch may be called [word in Greek: Semeiotika], orTHE DOCTRINE OF SIGNS; the most usual whereof being words, it is aptlyenough termed also [word in Greek: Logika], LOGIC: the business whereofis to consider the nature of signs, the mind makes use of for theunderstanding of things, or conveying its knowledge to others. For, since the things the mind contemplates are none of them, besides itself, present to the understanding, it is necessary that something else, as asign or representation of the thing it considers, should be present toit: and these are IDEAS. And because the scene of ideas that makes oneman's thoughts cannot be laid open to the immediate view of another, norlaid up anywhere but in the memory, a no very sure repository: thereforeto communicate our thoughts to one another, as well as record them forour own use, signs of our ideas are also necessary: those which menhave found most convenient, and therefore generally make use of, areARTICULATE SOUNDS. The consideration, then, of IDEAS and WORDS as thegreat instruments of knowledge, makes no despicable part of theircontemplation who would take a view of human knowledge in the wholeextent of it. And perhaps if they were distinctly weighed, and dulyconsidered, they would afford us another sort of logic and critic, thanwhat we have been hitherto acquainted with. 

5. This is the first and most general Division of the Objects of ourUnderstanding. 

This seems to me the first and most general, as well as natural divisionof the objects of our understanding. For a man can employ his thoughtsabout nothing, but either, the contemplation of THINGS themselves, forthe discovery of truth; or about the things in his own power, which arehis own ACTIONS, for the attainment of his own ends; or the SIGNS themind makes use of both in the one and the other, and the right orderingof them, for its clearer information. All which three, viz. THINGS, asthey are in themselves knowable; ACTIONS as they depend on us, in orderto happiness; and the right use of SIGNS in order to knowledge, beingTOTO COELO different, they seemed to me to be the three great provincesof the intellectual world, wholly separate and distinct one fromanother. 

The End