AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF TASTE, AND OF THE ORIGIN OFOUR IDEAS OF BEAUTY, ETC. 

by

Frances Reynolds

1785

With an Introduction by James L. Clifford

The Augustan Reprint Society

Frances Reynolds 

_An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Taste, and of the Origin of Our Ideas of Beauty, etc. _(1785)

With an Introduction by James L. Clifford

Publication 27

Los AngelesWilliam Andrews Clark Memorial LibraryUniversity of California1951

_GENERAL EDITORS_

H. RICHARD ARCHER, _Clark Memorial Library_RICHARD C. BOYS, _University of Michigan_EDWARD NILES HOOKER, _University of California, Los Angeles_JOHN LOFTIS, _University of California, Los Angeles_

_ASSISTANT EDITORS_

W. EARL BRITTON, _University of Michigan_

_ADVISORY EDITORS_

EMMETT L. AVERY, _State College of Washington_BENJAMIN BOYCE, _Duke University_LOUIS I. BREDVOLD, _University of Michigan_CLEANTH BROOKS, _Yale University_JAMES L. CLIFFORD, _Columbia University_ARTHUR FRIEDMAN, _University of Chicago_SAMUEL H. MONK, _University of Minnesota_ERNEST MOSSNER, _University of Texas_JAMES SUTHERLAND, _Queen Mary College, London_H. T. SWEDENBERG, JR. , _University of California, Los Angeles_

INTRODUCTION

Since the early nineteenth century it has been known that FrancesReynolds, the sister of Sir Joshua, was the author of an essay ontaste, which she had printed but did not publish. Yet persistentsearch failed to turn up a single copy. It remained one of those lostpieces which every research scholar hoped someday to discover. 

In 1935 it appeared that the search was over. Among some manuscriptsof Mrs. Thrale-Piozzi, long hidden in Wales, was found a printed copyof an anonymous _Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Taste, and ofthe Origin of Our Ideas of Beauty_, which seemed to be the lost essay. The date was correct; the _Enquiry_ was dedicated to Mrs. Montagu; itcontained a quotation from Dr. Johnson; and, best of all, there wasattached to the pamphlet a copy (in an unidentified handwriting) ofJohnson's well-known letter to Miss Reynolds concerning her essay. 

Only one thing stood squarely in the way of the identification. JamesNorthcote in his _Life of Sir Joshua Reynolds_, published in 1818 (II, 116-19), after describing Johnson's connection with the manuscript, gives two pages of short excerpts. Most of the quotations are generalstatements such as "Dress is the strong indication of the moralcharacter" or "The fine arts comprehend all that is excellent in themoral system, and, at the same time, open every path that tends to thecorruption of moral excellence. " Unfortunately none of these excerptsappears directly in the _Enquiry_. Although some of the ideas aresimilar, the wording and specific details are different. By no stretchof the imagination could they be considered to come from the samepiece. Thus Northcote blocked the solution of the mystery for nearlyfifteen years. 

Recently, however, evidence has turned up which makes the attributiona certainty. It is now obvious that Northcote must have been mistakenin the source of his quotations. Writing as he did many years afterthe events he was describing, Northcote either had found a copy ofthe first draft of Miss Reynolds' essay, or erroneously quoted fromanother anonymous piece which he assumed was by Miss Reynolds. In anyevent he was not quoting from the final version which she wished theworld to see. 

The story of Miss Reynolds' attempts to publish her essay can atlast be pieced together from various bits of evidence, some hithertounpublished. Just when the essay was written is uncertain. All thatwe know is that a preliminary version was submitted to the rigorouscriticism of Dr. Johnson in 1781. Johnson, who had corrected some ofher verses in red ink the year before, commented on 21 July 1781:

 There is in these such force of comprehension, and such nicety of observation as Locke or Pascal might be proud of. This I say with intention to have you think that I speak my opinion. 

 They cannot however be printed in their present state. Many of your notions seem not very clear in your own mind, many are not sufficiently developed and expanded for the common reader; the expression almost every where wants to be made clearer and smoother. You may by revisal and improvement make it a very elegant and curious work. [1]

But Miss Reynolds was not easily discouraged, and Johnson wrote againon 8 April 1782:

 Your work is full of very penetrating meditation, and very forcible sentiment. I read it with a full perception of the sublime, with wonder and terrour, but I cannot think of any profit from it; it seems not born to be popular. 

 Your system of the mental fabric is exceedingly obscure, and without more attention than will be willingly bestowed, is unintelligible. The Ideas of Beauty will be more easily understood, and are often charming. I was delighted with the different beauty of different ages. 

 I would make it produce something if I could but I have indeed no hope. If a Bookseller would buy it at all, as it must be published without a name, he would give nothing for it worth your acceptance. [2]

In passing it might be pointed out that this letter has previously notbeen associated with Miss Reynolds' essay on taste, largely becausethe available text of the letter has been so faulty. Where Johnsonwrote "The Ideas of Beauty, " obviously referring to the second sectionof the _Enquiry_, Croker, followed by G. B. Hill, printed "The plansof Burnaby. " To this Hill added a note; "Burnaby, I conjecture, was acharacter in the book, " with the result that scholars have fruitlesslybeen searching ever since for the fictitious Mr. Burnaby, One moreexample of the dangers of using nineteenth-century transcripts!

Evidently Johnson's stringent objections temporarily halted her plans, for we hear nothing more about the essay for two years. Meanwhile, asappears from a later letter, she showed it to Bennett Langton, hopingin vain for his help. Nevertheless, she was determined to go ahead andprint the work, even at her own expense. Johnson, still counted uponfor aid, wrote to her on 12 April 1784:

 I am not yet able to wait on you, but I can do your business commodiously enough. You must send me the copy to show the printer. If you will come to tea this afternoon we will talk together about it. [3]

On 30 April he commented further: "Mr. Allen has looked over thepapers and thinks one hundred copies will come to five pounds. "Something, however, made her suspicious of his advice, and on 28 Maythere came an end to Johnson's connection with the matter. He wrote:"I have returned your papers, and am glad that you laid aside thethought of printing them. "

But Miss Reynolds had no intention of permanently giving up herproject. Instead she rewrote parts of the essay which had displeasedher critics, and shortly after Johnson's death proceeded to have 250copies privately printed, with a dedication to Mrs. Montagu. WithJohnson gone, "The Queen of the Bluestockings" must have appeared thenext best patron. That Mrs. Montagu, while no doubt flattered by thededication, was herself not overly enthusiastic about the essay maybe gathered from a letter written to her by Miss Reynolds on 12 July1785. Miss Reynolds began by insisting that "the slightest hint" ofdisapprobation on the part of Mrs. Montagu would "consign the work tooblivion"; then continued:

 I never did entertain any desire to publish it, tho I might to sell it. And my desire of printing it, originated from a motive which tho' vain I allow, is an natural vanity I wishd to leave behind me a respectable memorial of my existence, which I then flatterd myself this would be. Ten impressions or twenty at the most, were all I wishd to have taken off. Why I had so many as 250 was because Dr. Johnson advised me to print that number, and to sell them, to stand the sale of them was his expression, but I must do Dr. Johnson the justice to say, that, that advice was given me with a proviso that no person was in the secret but himself, for on my informing him to the contrary, he declined or seemd to decline the affair of getting them printed for me, which I perceiving sent to him for the manuscript, foolishly entertaining a slight suspicion which I much reproach myself for, that some other motives besides the want of merit in the work had influenced this change of behaviour. Unluckily from the beginning I made too great allowance in its favour, from an opinion I had con too of Dr. Johnsons being strongly prejudiced against womens literary productions. But I deceived myself. He was sincere, he judged justly of the work, and his opinion exactly corresponded with yours![4]

Not that she regretted the cost of printing the 250 copies. That was aminor consideration. She concluded:

 If I ever should shew it to any person it will be to Mr. Langton, from a motive of wishing him to see the alteration I have made in it for the better, since he saw it, and as it is also since Dr. Johnson saw it, and particularly that part he most objected to, my belief that I had obviated that objection, is another apology for my printing it. 

To this Mrs. Montagu returned a wordy and diffuse reply, commentingthat "having for many years past left off all metaphysical studies, "she was "not a competent judge of any work on subjects of thatnature, " yet insisting that she doubted if contemporary readers wouldlike it. It was obvious that Mrs. Montagu refused to be a party tofurther dissemination of the printed copies. And there the matterrested for almost three more years. 

The wish to have some of the copies read by the general public provedtoo strong, and on 15 April 1788 Miss Reynolds wrote again to Mrs. Montagu, asking her aid in recovering a letter, or transcription of aletter, of Johnson's:

 It is of great importance to me the recovery of this letter particularly so as I perceive I must not presume to hope for the only patronage that could countervail the loss of Dr. Johnsons, should I ever be induced to publish the work. I do not mean that I would publish the letter, but that the testimony it conveys of Dr. Johnsons approbation, would be highly advantageous to me in the disposal of the copy to a Bookseller, indeed _approbation_ is an improper Word, inadequate to the praises he bestows on the work, I durst not repeat his expressions tho I well remember them. Some friendly strictures also the letter contained, all these I remember I transcribed verbatim in a letter I sent to you in the beginning of the year 82. They begin

 Many of your notions seem not to be very clear in your own imagination. .. . [5]

It was not until the next year that with the help of James Northcoteshe finally made active preparations to have the work published. AsMiss Reynolds wrote to Mrs. Montagu on 5 February, I forgot to say that Mr. Nurse recommended Mr. Northcote to a Mr. Bladen in Paternoster Row for a Publisher, but I sent in the utmost haste to him to prevent his taking any steps towards so disgraceful a place as I imagine that to be so incongruous. [6]

In preparation for the new printing, Miss Reynolds had further revisedher essay, and in order to enhance the value of the piece for generalreaders she decided to add three letters from Johnson of which shechanced to have copies. Totally unconnected with the essay, one wasto Sir Joseph Banks concerning the motto for his goat's collar; theothers concerned the unfortunate Dr. Dodd. But before going ahead sheagain asked the advice of her patroness. Mrs. Montagu replied:

 I do not see that there is any objection to publishing the 3 letters, but I own I think Dr Johnson judges too lightly of the crime of forgery . .. I believe the tenderness of sentiment Dr Johnson expresses for Dr Dodd in his afflictions will do him honour in the eyes of the Publick, & therefore as his friend you may with propriety publish the letters. [7]

Mrs. Montagu concluded, "I wish some name that would do more honour toyour work was to appear in the dedication, but to be presented tothe publick with such a mark of Mrs Reynolds' friendly regard, willcertainly be esteemed an honour. .. . "

Sometime between February and July 1789 the _Enquiry_ was reprinted, this time by J. Smeeton (copies of this version may be found in theBodleian Library and the Library of Congress). The terminal date forthe reprinting is established by the fact that the three lettersof Johnson which were appended to the essay were reprinted withoutcomment in the July issue of the _European Magazine_. 

Just where Miss Reynolds secured copies of the Johnson letters isnot certain. It is suggestive, however, that the letter to Banks hadoriginally been sent under cover to Sir Joshua Reynolds and that SirJoshua's copy is now among the Boswell papers at Yale University. There would have been ample opportunity for Frances Reynolds also tohave secured a copy. And the letter to Charles Jenkinson of 20 June1777 and to Dr. Dodd of 26 June were of the sort that an enterprisinglady might well have wheedled copies from the Doctor. The importantpoint is that the inclusion of the letters in the 1789 printing of the_Enquiry_ provides incontrovertible proof of Miss Reynolds' connectionwith the piece. 

For this second printing the entire pamphlet was reset, withnumerous minor changes of wording and punctuation, but with no majoralterations in meaning. In general the textual improvements are suchas a bluestocking lady might well wish to make. It will be noted thaton pages 25 and 49 of the copy here reproduced someone has made minorchanges in wording in ink. These corrections are made in the laterprinting. Moreover, at the end of the 1789 version there is an erratalist, indicating three alterations from the 1785 text which weremistakes. The Dedication remained unchanged, but the geometricalillustration was now placed facing the beginning of Chapter I. 

The _Enquiry_ was written in what is now recognized as one of the mostexciting periods in the history of aesthetics, the late eighteenthcentury being a crucial point in the gradual shift from absoluteclassical standards to the relative approaches of the next age. Mostof the important thinkers of the day--Hume, Burke, Lord Kames, AdamSmith, among others--were thinking deeply about the problem of taste. And if Miss Reynolds' essay is not one of the most perceptive of thediscussions, it is at least one of the liveliest. 

In brief, the _Enquiry_ is what one might expect from an intelligentamateur, from one not a professional writer, yet one who has givenmuch thought to the problems of aesthetics. Of course, many of theideas are derivative, with echoes of the "moral sense" of Hutcheson, the "line of grace" of Hogarth, and the terrible sublime of Burke. Thethree divisions of the essay--the development of a mental system, theorigin of our ideas of Beauty, and the analysis of taste--follow thecustomary pattern of eighteenth-century discussions. Yet the pieceis no slavish refurbishing of old phrases. It is packed with fresharguments and novel suggestions. If these are not always completelycoherent or logical, they do represent original thinking. 

Twentieth-century readers may be astonished by some of the ideas:witness the claim that Negroes could never arrive at true taste, because their eyes were so accustomed to objects diametricallyopposite to taste. As a further example of Miss Reynolds' occasionallymuddled thinking there is the development of her initial assumption. While the groundwork of man is perfection, this perfection has beenblemished and man is impelled to recapture it in the sublime. Yetinstead of analyzing this impulse, Miss Reynolds appears to take itfor granted. Nor does she consider how perfection is to be achievedin taste, preferring to conclude with a diatribe in the manner ofRousseau on the depravity of the times and the corrupting effect ofthe arts. (For this and many of the following comments I am indebtedto Mr. Ralph Cohen of the College of the City of New York. )

The cause of some of the ambiguities in her discussion may perhaps betraced to a rather careless use of terms. At one time "instinct"or "impulsion, " the moral force driving man toward perfection, is apotentiality developed by cultivation, and at another a force thatis created by cultivation. Although the sublime is the apex of hermathematically-definite program and is a moral quality attained bythe few, every human being has his point of sublimity in the idea ofa Supreme Being. On the one hand, beauty is a preconceived idea inthe human species; on the other it is not preconceived, but developed. Finally, the rules of art are perceptions of moral virtue, yet artwhich exhibits these rules can corrupt. 

It is easy to pick flaws in Miss Reynolds' thinking, for the lack ofsustained logic which Johnson early recognized is apparent at everyturn. Yet for students of the history of ideas the _Enquiry_ containsmuch of interest. As a painter, Miss Reynolds throughout stresses thevisual, a concentration which leads her to several valuable insights. She divides form into two categories, masculine and feminine, butmakes a novel use of these Ciceronian divisions. All non-humanobjects--flowers, animals, etc. --are seen as exhibiting male or femaleattributes. It might almost be said that with this anthropomorphicapproach she is attempting to develop a "philosophical" basis for thepathetic fallacy. Furthermore, if the human is used to measure beautyin the non-human, the implication is that man, not God, is the measureof beauty. By setting up man as the mediator between the material andthe divine, she points to the concentration in the next century onhuman values. 

When discussing the _Enquiry_ in his book on the _Sublime_, SamuelMonk pointed out certain other tendencies which fore-shadow thecoming Romantic revolt. This shift may also be noted in Miss Reynolds'extension of countenance, the reflection of internal virtue, to mean"form, " and the extension of internal virtue to mean "disposition, ""object, " or content. In developing this form-content division, shestumbles on a key criticism of associationism: "From association ofideas, any object may be pleasing, though absolutely devoid of beauty, and displeasing with it. The form is _then_ out of the question; it issome _real_ good or evil, with which the object, but not its form, isassociated. " This notion that associationism leads away from thework of art as such is a perceptive comment. Her notion that form anddisposition (or content) must correspond in order to give aestheticpleasure suggests, though the terms are different, certain ofColeridge's basic ideas. 

One other point might be stressed: Miss Reynolds takes an extrememoralistic position toward the arts. Again and again it is insistedthat taste and beauty are moral attributes, not purely aestheticconcepts. Chapter II ends with the ringing statement: "Of this Iam certain, that true refinement is the effect of true virtue; thatvirtue is truth, and good; and that beauty dwells in them, and theyin her. " And the next chapter begins: "Taste seems to be an inherentimpulsive tendency of the soul towards true good. " On the otherhand, she sees that the arts are not to be encouraged because suchencouragement is apt to lead to the destruction of moral virtue--thedesire for fame and wealth. The value of art as education is dismissedas of importance only to the few; the dangers of encouragement willimperil the many. "Though the arts are thus beneficial to the growingprinciples of taste, respecting a few individuals, it is well knownthat their establishment in every nation has had a contrary effect onthe community in general. .. . "

To conclude: despite its many deficiencies Frances Reynolds' _Enquiry_is worth reading. It serves admirably to mirror the conflictingeighteenth-century theories out of which our own aesthetic conceptshave been formed. 

 James L. Clifford Columbia University

Notes to the Introduction

1. _Letters_, II, 223-24; corrected from original letter in possessionof Professor F. W. Hilles of Yale University, who has given invaluableaid in the present investigation. 

2. _Letters_, II, 249-50, corrected from the original by Dr. R. W. Chapman. 

3. Copy in possession of Mrs. Doreen Ashworth, Windlesham, Surrey. 

4. Original in Huntington Library. 

5. Original in possession of Mrs. Ashworth. 

6. Rough draft in possession of Mrs. Ashworth. 

7. Original in possession of Professor F. W. Hilles. 

AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES of TASTE, AND OF THE ORIGIN OFOUR IDEAS of BEAUTY, &c. 

 Sunt certi denique fines, Quos ultra citraquè nequit consistere rectum. HOR. 

To Mrs. MONTAGU. 

MADAM, Were I not prompted by gratitude, admiration, and affection, todedicate to you the best produce of my abilities, which I imagine thisto be, yet, as the subject, of which it particularly treats, is moralexcellence, the universal voice of mankind, with whom your very nameis synonymous with virtue itself, must plead my apology for takingthis liberty. Besides, madam, it was natural for me, as an author, towith to avail myself of the advantage, which this address affordsme, of prepossessing the minds of my readers with an example of thatperfection to which all my arguments tend, as a preparative, or aid, to their better comprehending my meaning. 

The influence of virtue is every way beneficial! Your character, not only secures me from all imputation of flattery, but this publicavowal of my admiration of its excellence conveys an honourabletestimony of the consistency of my principles; having endeavoured toinculcate, that the love and esteem of true virtue is true honour. AndI may add, that the sweet gratification I feel, in the indulging thestrongest and best propension of my nature, in thus expatiating in itspraise, is true pleasure, true happiness. 

I am, Madam, Your obliged, Most obedient, And most humble, servant, The AUTHOR. 

CHAPTER I. 

A SKETCH of the MENTAL SYSTEM respecting our Perceptions of Taste, &c. 

The mind of man, introspecting itself, seems, as it were, (inconjunction with the inscrutable principles of nature, ) placed in thecentral point of the creation: from whence, impelled by her energeticpowers and illumined by her light, the intellectual faculties, likerays, shoot forth in direct tendency to their ultimate point ofperfection; and, as they advance, each individual mind imperceptiblyimbibes the influence and light of each, and is by this imbibitionalone enabled to approach it. 

But, though the light of nature and of reason direct the human mindto perfection, or true good, yet, being in its progress perpetuallyimpeded by adventitious causes, casual occurrences, &c. &c. Whichinduce false opinions of good and evil, its progressive powersgenerally stop at a middle point between mere uncultivated nature andperfection, a medium which constitutes what we call common sense, andwhich, in degree, seems as distant from the perfection of the mentalfaculties as common form is from the perfection of form, _beauty_. 

[Illustration: SUBLIMITY. | GRACE | BEAUTY | TRUTH | COMMON SENSE | COMMON FORM | NATURE]

On meditating on this subject, and marking the progressive stagesor degrees of human excellence, the great leading general truths, or mental rests, as I may call them, _the common, the beautiful, thegraceful, and the sublime_, I have been naturally led to form a kindof diagrammatic representation of their respective distances, &c. &c. Which I present to my reader on the opposite page, requesting him torefer to it now and then as he goes on, in order to facilitate hiscomprehension of my meaning. 

And here it may be necessary to premise, that, however whimsical andabsurd this delineation may appear to my reader, something analogousto the thought may be found in the works of many eminent philosophers, particularly in those of Bacon[A] and of Locke:[B] the lattersuggesting that the whole system of morality might be reduced tomathematical demonstration; and the former, in his treatise on theAdvancement of Learning, gives a description of the stages of sciencevery much resembling my delineation of the stages of intellectualperfection, or taste. 

[Footnote A: Advancement of Learning, Book 2d. ]

[Footnote B: Essay on human Understanding, Chap. 3d, Book the 4th, andChap. 12th, same Book, Sect. 8th. ]

It could have been no dishonour to me to have been led by suchconductors! Yet, as the truth cannot dishonour me neither, I mustaver, that my little system was projected, and brought to the exactstate it now is in, without my having the least apprehension that anything similar had been suggested before by any person whatever; norhave I, in consequence of the discovery I have lately made of theopinions of these respectable authors, added or omitted a singlethought in my treatise. But to return from my digression. 

In the exact center of my circle of humanity, I have placed nature, or the springs of the intellectual powers, which tend, in astraight line, to its boundary; and, on its boundary, I have placeddemonstrable beauty and truth, and the utmost power of rules; and, midway; I have placed common sense and common form, half derivingtheir existence from pure nature, and half from its highestcultivation, as far as art or rules can teach. A conjunction whichwould itself be the perfection of humanity, but that it is mixed withall that is not nature, and all that is not art, and thereby mademediocrity, i. E. _common sense_. 

The intellectual powers, arriving at the limit of my common circle, i. E. At the limit of the basis of my pyramidical system, where Ihave placed the fixed proportions of beauty and of truth, (if theyprogress, ) mount up as a flame, with undulating[A] motion, refiningas they advance, and terminate in the pinnacle, or ultimate point, _sublimity_; forming in the imagination the figure of a pyramid, or cone, from the limit of whose base, (on which, as I have beforeobserved, I have placed demonstrable truth and beauty, the utmostpower of rules, &c. ) from that limit up to the ultimate point ofsublimity, I call the region of intellectual pleasure, genius, ortaste; and in its center I place grace, whose influence pervades, cheers, and nourishes, every part of it, an object which, in thisideal region, is similar in its situation and degree to that of commonsense in the common or fundamental region. Grace seems to partakeof the perception both of beauty and of sublimity, as common sensepartakes of nature and of art. Grace is the characteristic object orgeneral form of the ideal region, and its perception is the generallimit of the powers of imagination or taste. Few, very few, attain tothe point of sublimity; the _ne plus ultra_ of human conception! thealpha and omega. The sentiment of sublimity sinks into the source ofnature, and that of the source of nature mounts to the sentiment ofsublimity, each point seeming to each the cause and the effect; theorigin and the end!

[Footnote A: I use that expression, because it is the peculiar motionof grace as well as of a flame. ]

Having thus drawn the outline of my pyramidical mental system, Ipropose to expatiate a little on each point or stage throughout thegreat characteristic line of intellectual power. 

The first point The exact center, _nature_, or the origin of ourintellectual faculties, admits of no investigation, its idea, as Ihave observed before, loses itself in the sentiment of sublimity, and we see nothing; and therefore I pass on to an object which isperceptible, _the common general character of humanity_, _exterior andinferior_. I have placed them on a line, because their ideas are soanalogous, that they unite in one. 

Section 1. _Common Sense and common Form_. 

Perfection seems to be the ground-work both of common sense andof common form; and, what prevents each from being perfect, is theadventitious blemishes, the additions to, and the diminutions from, what is perfect, making the too little and the too large. But, thesedefects being distributed in, small portions throughout the generalcommon form and common mind, they constitute an object, whethervisible or intellectual, between perfection and imperfection, namely, that of mediocrity, neither exciting admiration nor disgust. And, asexperience gives the general idea of the common and true appearanceof the human form, as well to the rustic as to the most enlightenedphilosopher, so consequently does it enable him to see deformity, orwhat is an unusual appearance in that form. 

But, though unusual defects seem to be evident to every eye, it isonly to the man of taste and nice discernment that the same degree ofunusual beauties are equally perceptible; which corresponds with myopinion, that the ground-work of humanity is perfection, and that itsblemishes only tinge its pure white, not discolour it so much, but, when held at a distance, i. E. In abstract idea, it is still a white, like a sheet of paper, or cloth of the most perfect white, regularlycheckered over with a variety of figures of every colour, and placedat a distance, appearing to the eye a white, a mezzo common white;and, as any unusual figure, I mean unusually large and opaque, on thismezzo ground, would be more conspicuous than any of a greater degreeof transparency or a more perfect white could be by an absence of anyof the figures; so any degree of deformity is, more opposite to thegeneral common form than beauty, and any degree of insanity is moreopposite to common sense than intellectual excellence. 

And, (to continue my allusion, ) as those tints, or blemishes, whichobscure the ground, must be discharged to make a perfect white, somust the artist, in creating beauty, discharge the blemishes thattinge and obscure the human form, and which give it the character ofmediocrity, till the perfect white, or total absence of defect, orbeauty, result. 

Common sense seems to be diffusive truth, and common form diffusivebeauty; and, as this diffusion is always existing with us, externallyand internally, it is no wonder that we should more easily perceivewhat is in opposition to it, _evil_, than what is in unison with it, _good_. 

On a line with common form and common sense I place common ease ofbody and of mind: unfelt health, unfelt good, or that arising to thedegree of _satisfaction_ and _content_; in fine, whatever we call_commonly_ good, and requisite for the well-being of humanity. 

Section 2. _Beauty and Truth_. 

I mean that beauty which is demonstrable truth, and that truth whichis demonstrable beauty. _Exactitude. Completion. The just medium. Thesatisfactory rest of the mind. Perfection_. A point, indeed, in whichthe mind cannot rest! It must go forward or backward. If the latter, it relapses into the dominion of error; if the former, if assumesthe charms of _design_, or _intention_. The artist, arrived at theultimate limit of rules, or demonstrable truth, stands, as it were, between the visible and invisible world; between that of sense andintellect; the common and the uncommon; and his productions will be aconjunction of both. He looks back through all the variety of commonnature, and reviews, through the medium of truth and beauty, thevarious objects it exhibits; and on its spotless ground, i. E. Theabstract idea of nature without defects, can only exist in idea, he arranges those objects, objects, so as they may best produce theeffects he aims at in his art. He does not attempt to obliterateany character in the common circle of nature; but, following herown oeconomy, he endeavours, by juxtaposition, &c. To make eachsubservient to each in creating delight, and giving beauty to the_whole_. But, to descend from the abstract general idea to theparticular idea of beauty, or idea of a particular form:

We discard every thing, that is not beauty, to compose beauty; butevery thing that is not beauty is not therefore deformity. The wrongwe see in each individual we do not call deformity: when it is so, itstands on the limit of the common circle, in opposition to beauty. 

From common form seem to originate beauty and deformity; and, as theyrecede from each other in opposite directions, they become less andless like their parent, _common form_, but never totally unlike; forit is their likeness to that form that constitutes the one beauty, andthe other deformity; for, were there no resemblance in deformityto the common form, it would be a different species, and no longerdisgust; and none in beauty, it would no longer please. 

There is no particular common form, but which, to create beauty, anartist, who studies the perfection of the human form, must improve insome, if not in every part; to effect which, considered as mere formonly, rules will suffice, but, considered as grace, it must express asentiment that no rules can give!

That all feel the same sentiment of admiration for that which theythink the most perfect, however the objects may differ, has inducedsome to believe that beauty is an arbitrary idea, and that it existsonly in the imagination! But does it follow, that, because it is notpossible for the savage or the man of taste to judge of any objectbut as experience enables him to judge, that therefore there is nopreeminence in that form which is beauty to the one above that whichis beauty to the other?

Somewhere there must exist, whether perceived or not, the perfection, or highest point of excellence of the human form respectingproportion; and somewhere there must exist, or does at times exist, the highest excellence of its expression, i. E. The moral charm of thehuman countenance, _grace_. 

The artist, who has only seen the beauty of his own nation, will fromthat form his standard of perfection. But, when he comes to extend hisenquiry, when he has viewed the beauty of other nations, particularlythat form and that expression which the Grecian artists (who wereprobably on a line with the Grecian philosophers) modelled from theirideas of beauty! he will quit his partiality for the beauty of his owncountry, and prefer that of the Grecian, which I imagine is preferableto that of the whole world! The only criterion to prove it so, I meanits form, would be to select from every nation the most perfect in it, and from that number to choose the most perfect, were this possibleto be done, respecting the external form of beauty: it could notrespecting the internal expression of beauty, _grace_; for who shallbe the world's arbiter of the ne plus ultra of grace!

That the artists of all ages and of all nations have terminated theirenquiries after beauty in that of the Grecian form is the highestproof that can be given of its superior excellence to that of all theworld!

Common form, as I have observed before, is so much nearer beauty thandeformity, that it is, in abstract idea, the model to compose beautyof form from. The _universal_ appearance of nature is, to every eye, right, fit, faultless, &c. Therefore, if every part of the copy be thesame, particularly, I mean, in the _human_ form, beauty of form mustresult. 

The beauty of every part of the human body, forming a _perfect_ whole, is analogous to an instrument of music in perfect concord, and mereexactitude of proportion in its parts, exclusive of the idea of mind, would, I imagine, have no more effect upon the spectator than the mereconcord of the strings of an instrument has on the hearer; it amountsto no more than blameless right, nor, till influenced by sentiment, can it go farther. 

But, as we are incapable of separating the idea of the human form fromthe human mind, and as the touch of an instrument in perfect concordgives a presentiment of harmony, so does the perception of theconcordance of the parts of a beautiful form give a perception ofgrace. The mind, as I have observed before, cannot rest in fixedperfection, the _Spotless white_; and its natural transition frombeauty must be into the region of grace. 

Section 3. _Grace_. 

The principles, which constitute grace, genius, or taste, are one;which is denominated grace in the object, genius in the production ofthe object, and taste in the perception of it. 

The existence of grace _seems_ to depend more upon the character ofmental than of corporeal beauty. All its motions seem to indicate and, to be regulated by the utmost delicacy of sentiment! I have placed itbetween the highest sentiment of the human mind, _sublmity_, thatno rules can teach, and the highest sentiment that rules can teach, _exact beauty_, the two extremes of the vrai reel and the vrai ideal. Grace seems, as it were, to hang between the influence of both; theirregular sublime giving character and relief to the negative anddetermined qualities of beauty; and beauty, i. E. Truth, confiningwithin due bounds the eccentric qualities of sublimity, forming, bothto sight and in idea, orderly variety, _the waving line_, neitherstraight nor crooked. The waving line is the symbol, or memento, asI may say, of grace, wherever it is seen in whatever form, animate orinanimate; and may be justly styled the line of taste or grace!

The perception of grace seems not to be intirely new nor intirelyfamiliar to us; but is, as it were, what we have had a presentiment ofin the mind, without examining it, and which the graceful object, oraction, &c. Calls forth to our view. Being so much our own idea, welike to behold it, to dwell upon it; and yet, not being a familiaridea, it creates a pleasing mild degree of admiration. 

Grace seems half celestial; for all the virtues accompany, indeedcompose, the perception; for none, I imagine, can have a perception ofgrace that has none of the charms of virtue. 

The sentiment of grace, caused by the motion of beauty, music, poetry, beneficence, compassion, &c. May be ranked as the highest intellectualpleasure the mind is capable of perceiving, and brings with it a sortof undetermined consciousness of the delicacy of our own perceptionsin making the discovery, a degree of that glorying that Longinusobserves always accompanies the perception of the sublime. 

You can no more define grace than you can happiness. The mind cannotso stedfastly behold it as to investigate its real properties. Graceis indeed the point of happiness in the ideal region, both because itarises spontaneously, without effort, &c. And because it seems partly_within_ our own power, and partly _without_ it. 

As common sense, in my fundamental circle, seems diffusive truth, sograce, in my ideal circle, seems diffusive sublimity; every perceptionof the former seems to be tinged, as it were, with the colour of thelatter. 

Section 4. _Sublimity_. 

Where pure grace ends, the awe of the sublime begins, composed of theinfluence of pain, of pleasure, of grace, and deformity, playing intoeach other, that the mind is unable to determine which to call it, pain, pleasure, or terror. Without a conjunction of these powers therecould be no sublimity. 

Those only who have passed through the degrees, _common sense, truth_and _grace_, i. E. The sentiment of grace, can have a sentiment ofsublimity. It is the mild admiration of grace raised to _wonder_and _astonishment_; to a sentiment of _power_ out of _our power_ toproduce or control. Grace must have been as familiar to the intellect, in order to discover sublimity, as common sense in the common regionmust have been to the discovery of truth and beauty. In fine, genius, or taste, which is the sentiment of grace, and which I have called thecommon sense of the ideal region, can alone discover the true sublime. 

It is a pinnacle of beatitude bordering upon horror, deformity, madness! an eminence from whence the mind, that dares to look farther, is lost! It seems to stand, or rather to waver, between certaintyand uncertainty, between security and destruction. It is the point ofterror, of undetermined fear, of undetermined power!

The idea of the supreme Being is, I imagine, in every breast, from theclown to the greatest philosopher, his point of sublimity!

CHAPTER II. 

On the ORIGIN of our IDEAS of BEAUTY. 

In proportion as the principles of beauty exist in the common form, undetermined to the common eye, so do they exist in common sense, undetermined to the common mind. It is cultivation that calls theminto view, gives them a determined form, creates the object, and theperception, that

 'Truth and good are one, And beauty dwells in them, and they in her. ' AKENSIDE. 

But, though all truth resolves into one truth, one beauty, onegood, as all colours resolve into one light; though the scientificalintellectual colours, classes, or leading principles of science, the_physical_, the _moral_, the _metaphysical_, &c. &c. Resolve intointellectual light, beauty, or good; it is, I imagine, the moraltruth, that is the characteristic truth of beauty: for, were we toanalyse the pleasing emotions we feel at the sight of beauty, weshould, I imagine, find them composed of our most refined moralaffections; and hence the universal interesting charm of beauty. And, as those affections refine by culture, hence the different degrees ofthe sentiments which beauty creates in the rustic, and in the man oftaste. The former perceives only the physical charm of beauty, thefreshness of colour, the bloom of youth, &c. But, to the man of taste, the physical pleases only through the medium of the moral: _the bodycharms because the soul is seen_; beauty, in his breast, is the sourcefrom whence _endless streams of fair ideas flow_, extending throughoutthe whole region of taste, no object of which but is more or lessrelated to the principles of human beauty. But taste, though a subjectalmost inseparable from that of beauty, I must forbear to enlarge uponin this chapter, as I propose to make it the particular subject of mynext. 

It is but at that period, at which we begin to perceive the charms ofmoral virtue, that we begin to perceive the real charms of beauty. Itis true, a man may attain, by experience, the knowledge of its justproportions; without that concomitant sentiment. He may be unconsciousof the characteristic moral charm resulting from the whole. Andan artist, I imagine, by the habitual practice of the rules whichconstitute beauty, may produce forms which charm the moral sense ofothers, without being conscious of it himself; the utmost limit ofthe rules of the imitative arts being so intimately united with theintuitive principles of taste, or refined moral sense, that the mindin general cannot distinguish where the one ends or the other begins. The artist, who separates them, _leans on the second cause_ instead ofthe first. 

As the strongest proof that the moral sense is the governing principleof beauty, we may remark, that the human form, from infancy toold age, has its peculiar beauty annexed to it from the virtueor affection that nature gives it, and which it exhibits in thecountenance. The negative virtue, innocence, is the beauty of thechild. The more formed virtues, benevolence, generosity, compassion, &c. Are the virtues of youth, and its beauty. The fixed and determinedvirtues, justice, temperance, fortitude, &c. Compose the beauty ofmanhood. The philosophic and religious cast of countenance is thebeauty of old age. Now, were any of these expressions misapplied, i. E. Commuted, they would disgust rather than please: without congruitythere could be no virtue; without virtue, no beauty, no sentiment oftaste. 

And thus the beauty of each sex is seen only through the medium ofthe virtues belonging to each. The beauty of the masculine sex is seenonly through the medium of the masculine virtues; the beauty of thefeminine only through the medium of the feminine. The moral sensegives each its distinct portion of the same virtues, but draws a linewhich neither can pass without a diminution of their specificbeauty. The softness and mildness of the feminine expression wouldbe displeasing in a man. The robust and determined expression ofthe rigid virtues, justice, fortitude, &c. Would be displeasing in awoman. However perfect the Form, if an incongruity that touches thewell-being of humanity mingles with the idea, the Form will not affordthe pleasing perception of beauty: though the eye may be capable ofseeing its regularity, &c. So far is it from pleasing, that it isthe more disgusting from its semblance to virtue, because that thatsemblance is a contradiction to her laws. 

May it not be owing to these expressions, so familiar to every eye, that the general sense of good taste eternally exists? They are thelegible characters of human excellence, no where visible but in thehuman countenance, every observation of which improves and confirmsthe moral sentiment, or image of beauty, implanted by nature in themind of man. 

The origin of the idea of beauty is the same in every breast, savageand civilized. Every nation's characteristic Form or expression ofbeauty will be a representation, or portrait, of their characteristicvirtue, their happiness, their good. Thus, in the opinion of the wildsavage, that face or form will be the most beautiful that assimilateswith his idea of savage virtues, corporeal strength, courage, &c. _perfections that are placed in bones and nerves_: as that of the mostcultivated nations, witness the Grecians, will indicate or portray themost refined mental virtues. And hence we may conclude, if there beany dignity, any truth, any beauty, in virtue, there must be a _real_difference, _superior_ and _inferior_ characteristic power of pleasingin the exterior of the human form. 

It is cultivation that gives birth to beauty as well as to virtue, by calling forth the visible object to correspond with the invisibleintellectual object. In the face or form of an idiot, or the lowestrustic, there is no beauty; and, supposing a nation of idiots, andthat they never could improve in mental beauty, they never could, Iimagine, improve in corporeal, even though their natural form was uponan equality with the rest of mankind; for, without sentiment, theycould not only be incapable of expressing any sentiment analogous tobeauty, but, wanting the surrounding influence of a moral system, i. E. Of the general influence of education on the exterior, they could notsuppress or veil a semblance incongruous with beauty. What no personfelt no person could teach. 

In cultivated nations, every precept for exterior appearance, from thefirst rudiments of the dancing-master to the motion of grace, has forits object _mind_, that is, a desire to impress upon the spectator afavourable idea of our mental character; but, passed the true point ofcultivation, they lose with the sentiment of mental excellence that oftrue beauty; witness the exterior artificial appearance of humanityin a neighbouring nation, which probably is on a par with the mostuncultivated rustic. The one does not enough for nature, the othertoo much. But, as the former has an object before him, to which natureherself directs him, the other is receding from it; and, as it is moreagreeable, more easy, and more natural, to the human mind, to learnthan to unlearn, I should sooner expect the most uncultivated nation, the negro excepted, to arrive at taste in true beauty than them. Thenegro-race seems to be the farthest removed from the line of truecultivation of any of the human species; their defect of form andcomplexion being, I imagine, as strong an obstacle to their acquiringtrue taste (the produce of mental cultivation) as any natural defectthey may have in their intellectual faculties. For if, as I haveobserved, the total want of cultivation would preclude externalbeauty, the total want of external beauty would preclude the powerof cultivation. It appears to me inconceivable, that the negro-racesupposing their mental powers were upon a level with other nations, could ever arrive at true taste, when their eye is accustomed _only_to objects so diametrically opposite to taste as the face and form ofnegroes are! Our being used or not used to the object cannot make usperceive any similarity in the lineaments of their countenance to thelineaments, if I may so say, of our refined virtues and affections, which alone constitute beauty; and therefore I am induced to believethat they are a lower order of human beings than the Europeans. 

Beauty is an assemblage of every human charm; yet what we call the_agreeable_ is often more captivating. 

The agreeable, in person, is composed of beauties and defects, as isthe common form, but differently composed. The beauties and defectsof the latter are blended into the idea of mediocrity; those of theformer are always distinct and perceptible, contrasting each other, they engage the attention, and create a kind of pleasing _re-creation_to the mental faculties; and, in proportion as we can bring themto unite with our governing principles of pleasure, they createaffection, which gives the person a more fascinating charm than beautyitself. 

It is the mental character that is the moving principle of affection;and any strong peculiarity, that contradicts not the moral sense, i. E. That is not _unnatural_, gives the object an accessary charm, andraises the affection to passion. The object is at once the common andthe uncommon; an union, which constitutes all we call excellent, allwe admire!

The perception of the charms of the agreeable seem to be wrought upto excellence by the operation of our own powers. We ourselveshave blended its beauties and defects into the sentiment of beauty, _pleasure_; and hence, probably, the strength and durability of thepassion which it creates. Beauty, on the contrary, is composed to ourhands, _full_, _perfect_, and _intire_; its idea is also a compound ofthe common and the uncommon, being at once like and unlike the generalform; but inherently it has no contrast, and therefore affords norecreation, no pleasing exercise, to the mental faculties; there isnothing to re-create, nothing to wish; and hence the instabilityof the passion which it inspires. Perfect beauty is, like perfecthappiness, lost as soon as it is attained. 

It is, I imagine, to the principles of the masculine and the femininecharacter, that we owe the perception of beauty or taste, in anyobject whatever, throughout all nature and all art that imitatesnature; and, in objects which differ from the human form, theprinciples must be in the extreme, because the object is then merelysymbolical. Thus, the meekness of the lamb, and the high-spiritedprancing steed; the gentle dove, and the impetuous eagle; the placidlake, and the swelling ocean; the lowly valley, and the aspiringmountain. It is the feminine character that is the sweetest, the mostinteresting, image of beauty; the masculine partakes of the sublime. Thus it will be found, that, in every object that is universallypleasing, there exist principles which are analogous to those thatconstitute beauty in the human species; and that its appearance doesalways, in some degree, move the affections, though the mind may beunconscious of its similitude to any idea in which the affections areconcerned. But the test of the object's possessing the principlesof beauty is when we are able to assimilate its appearance withsome amiable interesting affection; and, according as that affectionprevails in the breast of the spectator, it will appear with anadditional power of pleasing. 

From association of ideas, any object may be pleasing, thoughabsolutely devoid of beauty, and displeasing with it. The form is_then_ out of the question; it is some _real_ good or evil, with whichthe object, but not its form, is associated. 

It is observable, that those animals I have mentioned (and I imagineall animals that are symbolical of our affections have the same) havea double character of beauty, or reference to the affection that ismoved: i. E. Their form and their disposition, exactly correspondingwith each other. Probably on that union depends their power ofpleasing; their _form alone_, so different from human beauty, couldnot sufficiently engage the attention, or afford the interestingperception, which the consistency of truth does, in the _intire_ of anobject. 

Every object of taste has _at least_ a double reference to mentalpleasure, whether the object, in the philosophical scale of ourperceptions, belongs to those of _sense_ or _intellect_. Thus, thebeauty of the rose would not certainly be so perceptible to us, wanting its fragrance, and, with a nauseous smell, would not probablybe admitted, as I may say, into the rank of _agreeableness_, thoughit is in reality a beautiful and pleasing object; nor, supposing thethistle, or any other ugly flower, possessed of the fragrance of therose, should we therefore think it an object of taste, any more thanwe can think the form of an elephant beautiful, though endued withalmost intellectual beauty. 

In the form and colour of flowers, there appears to me a strikinganalogy to the character of human beauty. They afford an oculardemonstration, in the pleasure with which we contemplate theirparticular forms, that the pleasure, we receive from the beauty of thehuman form, originates from mental character: witness the charm ofthe infant, innocence of the snow-drop, of the soft elegance of thehyacinth, &c. And, on the contrary, our dis-relish of the gaudy tulip, the robust, unmeaning, masculine, piony, hollyhock, &c. &c. 

It is, I imagine, from a resemblance to some pre-conceived idea ofbeauty in the human species, that we are particularly pleased withthe sight of one flower more than with another, though the mindis unconscious of the cause. And thus the pleasure, caused by theapparent beauty of every object throughout the system of humanperception, is, according to my sentiment of that pleasure, the sameintellectual principle, _moral good_, however diversified, modified, and diminished, even to an unconsciousness or almost imperceptibledegree of relation to it. In fine, the true principles of beauty, inevery object, may be all _resolved_ into the same principle. But toconclude. 

I have no more doubt that the principles of beauty are moral, thanthat the principles of happiness are moral. It is the perception oftrue beauty, in its various modifications, that makes up the sumof human happiness; and hence the diversity of opinions concerningbeauty, but which, however diverse, are never contradictory, but asmens opinions in morals are so; for every view of beauty assimilateswith some good, and of course must be in unison. 

If, in the human system, there exists a principle which constitutestrue pleasure, that principle must be that which constitutes humanexcellence; and, if the visible object which excites true pleasuremust necessarily possess the principles of true pleasure, then mustevery object, which universally and invariably pleases, be relative tothe principle that constitutes human excellence, morality. 

Whatever appears, to each individual, the most excellent in the humansystem, at once constitutes his idea of _happiness_, of _morality_, and of _beauty_; and all mankind, I imagine, would agree in the sameidea, had all the same opportunities of seeing and knowing what wasexcellent. 

As I imagine the difference in national beauty is marked by thedifference in national morals, so, of course, must the difference ofthe opinions of individuals on the subject of beauty be. In fine, as the moral sense of mankind is coarse or refined, so will be theirtaste of beauty. 

Of this I am certain, that true refinement is the effect of truevirtue; that virtue is truth, and good; and that beauty dwells inthem, and they in her. 

CHAPTER III

On TASTE. 

Taste seems to be an inherent impulsive tendency of the soul towardstrue good, given by nature to all alike, and which improves in itssentiment as the reasoning faculties improve in their knowledge ofwhat _is_ true good. 

All the human faculties are, as one may say, constituents of theprinciple or faculty of taste. But its perception seems to be sharedbetween the judgement and the imagination: to the former seems tobelong the truth, or good, of an object of taste; to the latter itsbeauty or grace; and the stamina vitæ, or radical principles of taste, exist, I imagine, in the natural affections of the soul. 

What the impulsive spring is, which moves the affections invariably toperceive pleasure in the perception of good and beauty, and disgustin the perception of evil or deformity, I leave to my metaphysicalreaders to determine. I am afraid to give it an appellation soincongruous to the general idea of taste, as that of conscience. 

Yet, however absurd it may appear, I will venture to say, that, ifmy readers will give themselves the trouble to analyse the gratefulsensation or sentiment, we call _taste_ i. E. Their sentiment of whatis truly good, beautiful, right, just, ornamental, honourable, &c. &c. They will find it to originate from, and end in, some moral orreligious principle. Indeed, some objects (the highest in the scale ofour perceptions of excellence) bring with them an immediate convictionof the truth of this assertion; witness the devotional sentiment whichthe view of the main ocean inspires; the rising and setting sun; thecontemplation of the celestial orbs, &c. Witness the noblest objectof the creation, when viewed in his highest character. Does not theperception of human excellence immediately relate to the source of allexcellence?

The general diffusion of intellectual light, throughout mankind, constitutes rationality; and the aggregated excellence, or light ofrationality, constitutes morality. It is, I imagine, in this secondor purified light, that taste begins to exist. It is at this period ofcultivation that the mind begins to perceive its true good; that thenatural affections rectify, methodize, and refine, in a word, becomemoral affections, through whose medium, i. E. The _moral sense_, thesoul perceives every object of taste. 

Taste is intellectual pleasure, an approving sense of truth, of good, and of beauty. The latter seems the visible or ostensible principleof the two former, and is that in which the universal idea of taste iscomprised. All are pleased with the sight of beauty; but all are byno means sensible that the principles that make it pleasing, thatconstitute a form beautiful, are those, or, to be more intelligible, relate to those, that constitute man's highest excellence, his firstinterest, his chief good. Few, indeed, even among those who possesstaste, if they have not accustomed themselves to investigate itsprinciples, will readily conceive that they are thus deeply rootedin the mental frame. Indeed, the generality of mankind seem rather tothink that taste has no principles at all, or, if any, that they beginand end with the prevailing mode, fashion, &c. Of the times; a notionwhich, though in the highest degree absurd, corroborates my opinion, that the universal perception of taste (the true and the false) existsin the idea of honour. 

The compound word, or phrase, _le vrai idéal_, universally adopted todenote an object of taste, is the most exact and literal definition ofits sentiment that can be conceived; for it implies the union ofthe judgement and the imagination, without which there could be nosentiment of taste. The judgement, as I observed, perceives the truthof the object, the imagination its beauty; they may be said to relateto each other, in the perception of an object of taste, as a luminouspolish does to the substance from whence it proceeds: the substancecan exist without its polish, but the polish cannot exist without itssubstance. The perception of taste seems to me, if I may so expressmyself, to be illusive, but not erroneous; in a word, to exist in ouridea of true honour, i. E. In the polish, lustre, or ornament, of truevirtue. 

As the universal idea or sentiment of taste is honour, so theuniversal object of its perception is ornament, from the object, whoseexcellence we contemplate as an ornament or honour to human nature, toevery object which in the slightest degree indicates the influenceof that excellence. Take away the idea of that influence in the moralsphere, and taste is annihilated; and, in the natural sphere, takeaway the idea of divine influence, and taste cannot exist. Everysentiment of taste, as I observed before, ultimately relates to theone or to the other of these principles; indeed, strictly speaking, asthe moral relates to the divine, it may be said ultimately to do thesame. 

In the progress of civilization, the polishing principle, which I calltaste, is chiefly found in the highest sphere of life, highest bothfor internal and external advantages, wealth accelerates the lastdegree of cultivation, by giving efficacy to the principles of truehonour; but it also accelerates its corruption, by giving efficacyto the principles of false honour, by which the true loses itsdistinction, becomes less and less apparent, nay, by degrees, less andless real. Wealth becoming the object of honour, every principle oftrue taste must be reversed. Hence the _dire polish_ of the obdurateheart, repelling the force of nature. Hence avarice and profusion, dissipation, luxurious banqueting, &c. Supersede the love of oeconomy, domestic comfort, the sweet reciprocation of the natural affections, &c. &c. Hence the greatest evils of society: the sorrows of thevirtuous poor, _the spurns that patient merit of the unworthy takes_, in a word, the general corruption of morals, and, of course, of truetaste!

The vulgar, who are strangers to the internal principles of honour, always annex their ideas of taste to the external appearances of thehighest rank of life, which being easily acquired, particularly thatof dress, the prevalency of modes and fashions, however absurd, is universally adopted. Those of false taste adopt them to attractnotice; those of true taste, to avoid it. But, at this present, thedifficulty of avoiding singularity in dress is, I imagine, much to belamented by women of taste and virtue, the prevailing mode of feminineattire being diametrically opposite to every principle of feminineexcellence; a melancholy proof of our being arrived at the last stageof depravity!

I could expatiate largely on this subject, but it would beinconsistent with my plan, which the reader may perceive, throughoutthe whole work, to be a mere outline only. 

The three grand co-existing principles of taste, virtue, honour, andornament, run through all its perceptions. Their triple union cannotbe broken; but taste is nominally distinguished by the one or theother, according as its objects, situations, circumstances, &c. Vary. Ornament and honour seem the public character of taste; virtue to bethe private and domestic, where, though unperceived by the vulgar, to the eye of taste[A] she appears in her highest ornament, highesthonour. 

[Footnote A: Truth can only judge itself. BACON. ]

Taste seems to comprize three orders or degrees in its universalcomprehension. 

The first is composed of those objects which immediately relate to thedivinity, among which man claims the preeminence, when viewed in hishighest character: witness the inexpressible charm which the naturalvirtuous affections of the soul inspire, when moved by some strongimpulse, such as parental tenderness, filial piety, friendship, &c. &c. &c. Do they not unite the moral sentiment to the dïvine?

The second is in the immediate external effects of true taste, ormoral virtue, in the social sphere; the order, beauty, and honour, which every object derives from its influence; and, of course, itssentiment must be intimately related to moral excellence. 

The third and last degree is general ornament and honour, appearingin fashions, arts of decoration, &c. &c. Objects which seeming notimmediately to affect the interests of humanity, the taste theyexhibit in this sphere appears as an uncertain light, sometimes brightand sometimes obscured; or rather as refracted rays of taste, brokenby the general love of novelty and superfluity; two principles which, though they are, to a certain degree, essential to exterior ornament, and the sentiment of true taste, are those in which taste alwaysbegins to corrupt. To illustrate my meaning: true ornament seemsequally to partake of the idea of utility and superfluity, and everysentiment of taste seems equally to partake of the idea of novelty andof custom; for, were the object perfectly familiar to us, we shouldfeel no degree of admiration, without which we could feel no sentimentof taste; and, were it totally new, unlike any thing we had ever seen, it would excite wonder instead of admiration, which is a sentiment asdistant from taste as the love of fame is from the love of honour. 

This sphere, the last in my scale of the perceptions of taste, andwhich borders upon every thing that is contrary to its laws, isproperly the sphere of Fancy, who seems an undisciplined offspring ofTaste; sometimes sporting within the bounds of parental authority, andsometimes beyond them. Fancy seems to bear the same affinity to Tasteas Pleasure does to Happiness. 

Every object of taste is relative to some principle of excellencefrom which it derives its power of pleasing; of course, the highestsentiment of taste must exist in the relative principle to our highestobject of excellence. 

True ornament is, to the eye, what eloquence is to the ear: theirprinciples throughout are one, the truth or beauty of which exists inits exact relation or adaptation to the object it adorns, constitutingthe _just_, the _true_, the _beautiful_, objects, or qualities, which, in the conscious eye of taste, _relate_ to moral beauty. Theperception of the first relation, i. E. The adaptation of any thingornamental to the object it adorns, may, in a great measure, belearned by habit and general observation; but the higher relation, the second concoction (as one may say) of its principles, the moralrelation, is the immediate operation of taste. 

Ornament and harmonious sound are pleasing to the corporeal sense, but, when wanting a relative object, please but for a short time; and, if incongruously joined to an object, i. E. To one with which it canhave no relation, will, as soon as the understanding perceives theincongruity, become a principle of disgust. 

As the virtues differ, in some degree, as the character of the sexesdiffer, [A] of course so must the sentiment of taste differ. To theman I would give the laws of taste; to the woman, its sensibility. Thetaste of the former seems more derived from reason; that of thelatter from instinct: witness their impulsive maternal affection; thatinherent ornament of their sex, modesty; their tender susceptibilityof the benevolent virtues, pity, compassion, &c. &c. 

[Footnote A: Vide page 23. ]

Taste, however, is as far removed from mere instinct as from merereason. I only mean to say, that the taste of the masculine characteris rather on the side of reason, or the understanding; that of thefeminine on the side of instinct, and, let me add, imagination. Thetaste of the one and of the other seems to differ as justice does frommercy, as modesty from virtue, as grace from sublimity, &c. &c. And, as exterior feminine grace is the most perfect visible object oftaste, the highest degree of feminine excellence, externally andinternally united, must of course constitute woman, the most perfectexisting object of taste in the creation. 

The cultivation of the social moral affections is the cultivationof taste, and the domestic sphere is the true and almost only onein which it can appear in its highest dignity. It is peculiarlyappropriated to feminine taste, and I may say it is _absolutely_the only one in which it can appear in its true lustre. True taste, particularly the feminine, is retired, calm, modest; it is the privatehonour of the heart, and is, I imagine, incompatible with the love offame. 

In the present state of society, taste seems to be equally excludedfrom the highest and from the lowest sphere of life. The one seemsto be too much encumbered with artificial imaginary necessities; theother too much encumbered with the real and natural necessities oflife, to attend to its cultivation. It is in the former that taste isuniversally thought to reside, which is because the idea of tasteis inseparable from that of honour. It is that, indeed, in which thegeneral taste of the nation is exhibited. It is its _face_, as I maysay, which expresses the internal character of the heart. 

In this sphere, namely, the most exalted station of mankind, what truetaste it does exhibit is placed in the strongest point of view; itscontrary principles are also the same, particularly so to those whohave been rightly educated at a distance from it; to such, the wrongwill instruct as much as the right; but sure I am, that it is not, at this _period_, the proper sphere for the infant mind to expand andimprove in. The wrong will be too familiar to the mind to disgust;and the right, which I imagine is chiefly confined to the _records_of taste in the fine arts, will be too remote (wanting the preparatorylove of nature and virtue) to please. 

It is not, I imagine, from objects of excellence in the arts, thatthe mind receives the first impressions of taste, though from themthe impressions, we have already received, may be strengthened andimproved. The truths they exhibit awaken the recollection of whathas pleased us in nature; and we exult in the confirmation of ourjudgement and taste on finding those objects represented, by genius, in their best and fairest light. Of course, the excellence we perceivein the fine arts, which is always relative to moral excellence, musttend to the improvement of taste. [A]

[Footnote A: L'esprit de l'homme est naturellement plein d'un nombreinfini d'idées confuses du vrai, que souvent il n'entrevoit qu'à demi;et rien ne lui est plus agréable, que lorsqu'on lui offre quelqu'unede ces idées bien éclaircie et mise dans un beau jour. BOILEAU, Préface. ]

But, though the arts are thus beneficial to the growing principlesof taste, reflecting a few individuals, it is well known that theirestablishment in every nation has had a contrary effect on thecommunity in general; for, in proportion to the encouragement giventhem, as that encouragement immediately promotes two of the mostpernicious principles that can affect the human heart, the mostdestructive of moral virtue, namely, the love of fame and the love ofriches, the general diffusion of corruption must ensue, and of coursethe extinction of the natural principles of taste, or relish of thehuman soul of what is truly beautiful, truly honourable, truly good. 

To conclude. I will not presume to say, that a man without taste iswithout virtue; but I think I may venture to say, that it is onlyas he can have virtue without loving virtue, that he can have virtuewithout having taste; the definition of taste being, according to myapprehension of its perception, the _love_ of virtue. And, as thatlove springs from, and tends to, the source of all virtue, all good, may I not add, that it is but as a man can be religious withoutdevotion, that a man can be religious without taste? the sentimentof devotion seeming to be, an aggregation of our most virtuous, mostrefined, conscious, energies of soul, in the awful vertical point ofsublimity. 

 'From thee, great God, we spring, to thee we tend, Path, motive, guide, original, and end!'

 JOHNSON. 

THE END. 

William Andrews Clark Memorial Library: University of CaliforniaTHE AUGUSTAN REPRINT SOCIETY

_General Editors_

H. RICHARD ARCHER, _Clark Memorial Library_R. C. BOYS, _University of Michigan_E. N. HOOKER, _University of California, Los Angeles_JOHN LOFTIS, _University of California, Los Angeles_

The society exists to make available inexpensive reprints (usuallyfacsimile reproductions) of rare seventeenth and eighteenth centuryworks. 

The editorial policy of the Society continues unchanged. As in the past, the editors welcome suggestions concerning publications. 

All correspondence concerning subscriptions in the United States andCanada should be addressed to the William Andrews Clark MemorialLibrary, 2205 West Adams Blvd. , Los Angeles 18, California. Correspondence concerning editoral matters may be addressed to any ofthe general editors. Membership fee continues $2. 50 per year. Britishand European subscribers should address B. H. Blackwell, Broad Street, Oxford, England. 

Publications for the fifth year [1950-1951]

(_At least six items, most of them from the following list, will bereprinted. )

FRANCES REYNOLDS (?): _An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Taste, and of the Origin of Our Ideas of Beauty, &c. _ (1785). Introduction byJames L. Clifford. 

THOMAS BAKER: _The Fine Lady's Airs_ (1709). Introduction by JohnHarrington Smith. 

DANIEL DEFOE: _Vindication of the Press_ (1718). Introduction by OrthoClinton Williams. 

JOHN EVELYN: _An Apologie for the Royal Party_ (1659); _A Panegyric toCharles the Second_ (1661). Introduction by Geoffery Keynes. 

CHARLES MACKLIN: _Man of the World_ (1781). Introduction by DougaldMacMillan. 

_Prefaces to Fiction_. Selected and with an Introduction by BenjaminBoyce. 

THOMAS SPRAT: _Poems_. 

SIR WILLIAM PETTY: _The Advice of W. P. To Mr. Samuel Hartlib for theAdvancement of some particular Parts of Learning_ (1648). 

THOMAS GRAY: _An Elegy Wrote in a Country Church Yard_ (1751). (Facsimile of first edition and of portions of Gray's manuscripts ofthe poem). 

 * * * * *

 To the Augustan Reprint Society _Subscriber's Name and Address:_ _William Andrews Clark Memorial Library 2205 West Adams Boulevard Los Angeles 18, California_

 _As_ MEMBERSHIP FEE _I enclose for the years marked:_ The current year $ 2. 50 The current & the 4th year 5. 00 The current, 3rd, & 4th year 7. 50 The current, 2nd, 3rd, & 4th year 10. 00 The current, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, & 4th year 11. 50 (_Publications no. 3 & 4 are out of print_)

Make check or money order payable to THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITYOF CALIFORNIA. 

NOTE: _All income of the Society is devoted to defraying cost ofprinting and mailing_. 

_William Andrews Clark Memorial Library_

PUBLICATIONS OF THE AUGUSTAN REPRINT SOCIETY

First Year (1946-1947)

1. Richard Blackmore's _Essay upon Wit_ (1716), and Addison's_Freeholder_ No. 45 (1716). 

2. Samuel Cobb's _Of Poetry_ and _Discourse on Criticism_ (1707). 

3. _Letter to A. H. Esq. ; concerning the Stage_ (1698), and RichardWillis' _Occasional Paper No. IX_ (1698). (OUT OF PRINT)

4. _Essay on Wit_ (1748), together with Characters by Flecknoe, andJoseph Warton's _Adventurer_ Nos. 127 and 133. (OUT OF PRINT)

5. Samuel Wesley's _Epistle to a Friend Concerning Poetry_ (1700) and_Essay on Heroic Poetry_ (1693). 

6. _Representation of the Impiety and Immorality of the Stage_(1704)and _Some Thoughts Concerning the Stage_ (1704). 

Second Year (1947-1948)

7. John Gay's _The Present State of Wit_ (1711); and a section on Witfrom _The English Theophrastus_ (1702). 

8. Rapin's _De Carmine Pastorali_, translated by Creech (1684). 

9. T. Hanmer's (?) _Some Remarks on the Tragedy of Hamlet_ (1736). 

10. Corbyn Morris _Essay towards Fixing the True Standards of Wit, etc_. (1744). 

11. Thomas Purney's _Discourse on the Pastoral_ (1717). 

12. Essays on the Stage, selected, with an Introduction by Joseph WoodKrutch. 

Third Year (1948-1949)

13. Sir John Falstaff (pseud. ), _The Theatre_ (1720). 

14. Edward Moore's _The Gamester_ (1753). 

15. John Oldmixon's _Reflections on Dr. Swift's Letter to Harley_(1712); and Arthur Mainwaring's _The British Academy_ (1712). 

16. Nevil Payne's _Fatal Jealousy_ (1673). 

17. Nicholas Rowe's _Some Account of the Life of Mr. WilliamShakespear_ (1709). 

18. Aaron Hill's Preface to _The Creation_; and Thomas Brereton'sPreface to _Esther_. 

Fourth Year (1949-1950)

19. Susanna Centlivre's _The Busie Body_ (1709). 

20. Lewis Theobald's _Preface to The Works of Shakespeare_ (1734). 

21. _Critical Remarks on Sir Charles Gradison, Clarissa, and Pamela_(1754). 

22. Samuel Johnson's _The Vanity of Human Wishes_ (1749) and Two_Rambler_ papers (1750). 

23. John Dryden's _His Majesties Declaration Defended_ (1681). 

24. Pierre Nicole's _An Essay on True and Apparent Beauty in Whichfrom Settled Principles is Rendered the Grounds for Choosing andRejecting Epigrams_, translated by J. V. Cunningham.