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An Apology for Atheism by Charles Southwell (1814-1860)First published anonymously in 1846

Transcribed by the Freethought Archives, www. Freethought. Vze. Com

AN APOLOGY FOR ATHEISM:

ADDRESSED TORELIGIOUS INVESTIGATORS OF EVERY DENOMINATIONBY ONE OF ITS APOSTLES. 

"Not one of you reflects, that you oughtknow your Gods before you worship them. "

LONDON:J. WATSON, 5, PAUL'S ALLEY, PATERNOSTER ROW. AND ALL BOOKSELLERS. 

1846

AN APOLOGY FOR ATHEISM

It would be absurd to doubt that religion has an important bearing onall the relations and conditions of life. The connexion betweenreligions faith and political practice is, in truth, far closer than isgenerally thought. Public opinion has not ripened into a knowledge thatreligious error is the intangible but real substratum of all politicalinjustice. Though the 'schoolmaster' has done much, there still remainand hold some away among us, many honest and energetic assertors of 'therights of man, ' who have to learn that a people in the fetters ofsuperstition, can never achieve political freedom. Many of thesereformers admit the vast, the incalculable influence of Mahommedanism onthe politics of Constantinople, and yet persist in acting as ifChristianity had little or nothing to do with the politics of England. 

At a recent meeting of the Anti-State Church Association it wasremarked, that 'throw what we would into the political cauldron, out itcame in an ecclesiastical shape'. If the newspaper report may be reliedon, there was much laughing among the hearers of those words, the deepmeaning of which it may safely be affirmed, only a select few of themcould fathom. 

Hostility to state churches by no means implies a knowledge of the closeand important connection between ecclesiastical and political questions. Men may appreciate the justice of voluntaryism in religion, and yet haverather cloudy conceptions with respect to the influence of opinions andthings ecclesiastical on the condition of nations. They may clearly seethat he who needs the priest, should disdain to saddle others with thecost of him, while blind to the fact that no people having faith in thesupernatural ever failed to mix up such faith with political affairs. Even leading members of the 'Third Estate' are constantly declaringtheir disinclination for religious controversy, and express particularanxiety to keep their journals free of everything 'strictlytheological. ' Their notion is, that newspaper writers should endeavourto keep clear of so 'awful' a topic. And yet seldom does a day pass inwhich this self-imposed editorial rule is not violated--a factsignificant as fact can be, of that connection between religion andpolitics the author thinks has been far too little regarded. 

It is quite possible the editors of newspapers have weighty reasons fortheir repugnance to agitate the much vexed question of religion, but itseems they cannot help doing so. In a leading article of this day's_Post_, [Endnote 4:1] we are told--'The stain and reproach of Romanismin Ireland is, that it is a political system, and a wicked politicalsystem, for it regards only the exercise of power, and neglects utterlythe duty of improvement. ' In journals supported by Romanists, and ofcourse devoted to the interests of their church, the very same charge ismade against English Protestantism. To denounce each other's 'holyapostolic religion' may be incompatible with the taste of 'gentlemen ofthe press, ' but certainly they do it with a brisk and hearty vehemencethat inclines one to think it a 'labour of love. ' What men do _conamore_ they usually do well, and no one can deny the wonderful talentfor denunciation exhibited by journalists when writing down each other's'true Christianity. ' The unsparing invective quoted above from the_Post_ is a good specimen. If just, Irish Romanism _ought_ to bedestroyed, and newspaper writers cannot be better employed than inhelping on the work of its destruction, or the destruction of any otherreligion to which the same 'stain and reproach' may be fairly attached. 

The author of this Apology has no spite or ill-will towards RomanCatholics, though opposed to their religion, and a willing subscriber tothe opinion of Romanism in Ireland, expressed by the _Post, becauseconvinced of its truth. _ The past and present condition of that countryis a deep disgrace to its priests, the bulk of whom, Protestant as wellas Romanist, can justly be charged with 'regarding only the exercise ofpower, while neglecting utterly the duty of improvement. '

The intriguing and essentially political character of Romanism, it wouldbe idle to deny. No one at all acquainted with its cunningly contrived'system' will hesitate to characterise it as 'wickedly political, 'productive of nothing but mischief--a system through whose accursedinstrumentality millions are cheated of their sanity as well assubstance, and trained like the dog to lick the hand that smites them. So perfect is their degradation that literally they 'take no thought forto-morrow, ' it being their practice to wait 'till starvation stares themin the face, ' [5:1] and _then_ make an effort against it. Notwithstanding the purely Christian education of which they are taughtto boast, nothing can exceed the superstitious recklessness displayed intheir daily conduct. 

The _Globe_ of Thursday, October 30th, 1845, contains an article on thedamage sustained by the potato crops here and in Ireland, full of mattercalculated to enlighten our first rate reformers, who seem profoundlyignorant that superstition is the bane of intellect, and most formidableof all the obstacles which stand between the people and their rights:one paragraph is so peculiarly significant of the miserable condition towhich Romanism and Protestantism have reduced a peasantry, said to be'the finest in the world, ' that we here subjoin it--

 'The best means to arrest the progress of the pestilence in the people's food have occupied the attention of scientific men. The commission appointed by government, consisting of three of the most celebrated practical chemists, has published a preliminary report, in which several suggestions, rather than ascertained results, are communicated, by which the sound portions of the root may, it is hoped, be preserved from the epidemy, and possibly, the tainted be rendered innoxious, and even partially nutritious. Followed implicitly, their directions might mitigate the calamity. But the care, the diligence, the persevering industry which the various forms of process require, in order to effecting the purposes which _might_ result if they were promptly adopted and properly carried out, are the very qualities in which the Irish peasantry are most deficient. In the present crisis, the people are more disposed to regard the extensive destruction of their crops in the light of an extraordinary visitation of Heaven, with which it is vain for human efforts to contend, than to employ counteracting or remedial applications. "Sure the Almighty sent the potato-plague, and we must bear it as well as we can!" is the remark of many; while, in other places, the copious sprinklings of holy water on the potato gardens, and on the produce, as it lies upon the surface, are more depended on for disinfecting the potatoes than the suggestions of science, which require the application of patient industry. '

Daniel O'Connell may continue to boast about Irish morale and Irishintellect--the handsome women, and stalwart men of his 'belovedcountry;' but no sensible persons will pay the least attention to him. It is, at all events, too late in the day for we 'Saxons' to be eithercajoled or amused by such nonsense. An overwhelming majority of theIrish people have been proved indolent beyond all parallel, and not muchmore provident than those unhappy savages who sell their beds in themorning, not being able to foresee they shall again require them atnight. A want of forethought so remarkable, and indolence so abominable, as characterize the peasantry of Ireland, are results of their religiouseducation. Does any one suppose the religion of that peasantry haslittle, if anything, to do with their political condition; or can it bebelieved they will be fit for, much less achieve political emancipation, while priests, and priests alone, are their instructors? We may relyupon it, that intellectual freedom is the natural and necessaryprecursor of political freedom. Education, said Lord Brougham, makes meneasy to lead, but difficult to drive; easy to govern, but impossible toenslave. The Irish peasantry clamour for 'Repeal, ' never consideringthat did they get it, no essential change would be made in their social, moral, or to say all in one word, _political_ condition; they wouldstill be the tool of O'Connell and other unprincipled politicalmountebanks--themselves the tool of priests. 

Great has been the outcry raised against the 'godless colleges, thatSir Robert Peel had the courageous good sense to _inflict_ on Ireland. Protestant as well as Romanist priests are terribly alarmed lest thosecolleges should spoil the craft by which they live. Sagacious enough toperceive that whatever influence they possess must vanish with theignorance on which it rests, they moved heaven and earth to disgust theIrish people with an educational measure of which religion formed nopart. Their fury, like 'empty space, ' is boundless. They cannot endurethe thought that our ministers should so far play the game of'infidelity' as to take from them the delightful task of teachingIreland's young ideas 'how to shoot. ' Sir Robert Inglis _christened_this 'odious' measure, a 'gigantic scheme of godless education, ' and alarge majority of Irish Roman Catholic Prelates have solemnly pronouncedit 'dangerous to faith and morals, ' Neither ministerial allurements, norministerial threats can subdue the cantankerous spirit of these bigots. They are all but frantic, and certainly not without reason, for theIrish Colleges Bill is the fine point of that wedge which, driven home, will shiver to pieces their 'wicked political system. ' Whatever improvesIrish intellect will play the mischief with its 'faith, ' though not atall likely to deteriorate its 'morals. ' The best guarantee for nationalmorality is to be found in national intelligence; nor need any one feelalarmed at the progress of principles and measures inimical to faith ineither Romanism or Protestantism. Let the people of Ireland be properlyemployed, as a preliminary to being well educated, and speedily they may_deserve_ to be singled out as 'the most moral people on the face of theearth. '

An educated nation will never tamely submit to be priest-ridden, andwell do Ireland's enslavers know it. The most stupid of her priests, equally with the shrewdest of her 'patriots, ' are quite alive to theexpediency of teaching as facts, the fraudulent fables of the 'darkages. ' To keep the people ignorant, or what is worse, to teach them onlywhat is false, is the great end of _their_ training; and if a Britishministry propose anything better than the merest mockery of education, they call it 'dangerous to faith and morals. '

The sage who writes 'leaders' for the _Morning Herald_, is of opinionthat Ireland would indeed be 'great, glorious, and free, ' if its RomanCatholic people were to cease all efforts for Repeal, and turn goodProtestants. But the _Herald_ does greatly err not knowing human natureand the source of Irish evils. It is not by substituting Protestantismfor Romanism that those evils are to be cured. Were every Romanist inIreland at once to turn 'good Protestant, ' their political emancipationwould be far off as ever. Protestantism everywhere, like Romanismeverywhere, is 'a political system, and a wicked political system, forit regards only the exercise of power, and neglects utterly the duty ofimprovement. '

Religion is the curse of Ireland. To the rival churches of that countrymay be traced nearly all the oppressions suffered by its people, whonever can be materially improved till purged of their faith in priests. When that salutary work shall be accomplished, Ireland will indeed be 'anation' in the secure enjoyment of political liberty. The priest-riddenmay talk of freedom, but can never secure it; for, as truly said by oneof our most admired poets--

 Tis man's base grovelling nature makes the priest, Who always rides a superstitious beast. 

And he is a poor politician who expects to see political libertyachieved or enjoyed by nations made up of 'base, grovelling' specimensof human nature. 

What then can be thought of the first-rate reformers before alluded to, who are going to emancipate every body without the least offence to anybody's superstition? It should be borne in memory that other people aresuperstitious as well as the Irish, and that the churches of allcountries are as much parts of 'a wicked political system' as are thechurches of Ireland. The judges of our own country frequently remind usthat its laws have a religious sanction; nay they assure us Christianityis part and parcel of those laws. Do we not know that orthodoxChristianity means Christianity as by law established? And can any onefail to perceive that such a religion must needs be political? Thecunning few, who make a market of delusion, and esteem nothing apartfrom their own aggrandisement, are quite aware that the civil andcriminal law of England is intimately associated with Christianity--theypublicly proclaim their separation impossible, except at the cost ofdestruction to both. They are sagacious enough to perceive that a peopletotally untrammelled by the fears, the prejudices, and the wickedness ofreligion would never consent to remain in bondage. 

Hence the pains taken by piety-mongers to perpetuate the dominion ofthat ignorance which proverbially is 'the mother of devotion. ' What carethey for universal emancipation? Free themselves, their grand object isto rivet the chains of others. So that those they defraud of their hardearned substance be kept down, they are not over scrupulous with respectto means. Among the most potent of their helps in the 'good work' arechurches, various in name and character, but in principle the very same. All are pronounced true by priests who profit by them, and false bypriests who do not. Every thing connected with them bears the mark ofdespotism. Whether we look at churches foreign or domestic, Popish orProtestant, that mark of the 'beast' appears in characters as legibleas, it is fabled, the hand writing on the wall did to a tyrant of old. In connection with each is a hierarchy of intellect stultifiers, whoexplain doctrines without understanding them, or intending they shouldbe understood by others; and true to their 'sacred trust, ' throw everyavailable impediment in the way of improvement. Knowledge is theirdevil. So far as antagonism to progression goes, there is no sensibledifference between the hierarchies of Rome or of England, or ofConstantinople. To diffuse the 'truth' that 'will set men free' is nopart of their 'wicked political system. ' On the contrary, they labour toexcite a general disgust of truth, and in defence of bad governmentspreach fine sermons from some one of the many congenial texts to begathered in their 'Holy Scripture. '

Nor is it found that non-established priesthoods are much more disposedto emancipate 'mind' and oil the wheels of political progression thanthose kept in state pay. The air of conventicles is not of the freest ormost bracing description. No doubt the 'voluntary principle' isjust--only brazen faced impostors will say it is right to tax a man forthe support of those who promulgate doctrines abhorrent to his feelingsand an insult to his judgment. Still, the fact is incontestable, thatDissenting Priests are, for the most part, opposed to the extension ofpolitical rights, or, what is equal, that' knowledge which wouldinfallibly secure them. The Methodist preacher, who has the foolisheffrontery to tell his congregation 'the flesh lusteth always contraryto the spirit; and, therefore, every person born into the worlddeserveth God's wrath and damnation, ' may be a liberal politician, onewell fitted to pilot his flock into the haven of true republicanism: butthe author is extremely suspicious of such persons, and would not on anyaccount place his liberty in their keeping. He has little faith inpolitical fanaticism, especially when in alliance with the frightfuldoctrines enunciated from conventicle pulpits, and has no hesitation insaying that Anti-State Church Associations do not touch the root of allpolitical evils. Their usefulness is great, because they give currencyto a sound principle, but that principle, though important, is notall-important--though powerful, is not all-powerful. If universallyadopted, it is questionable that any useful change of a lastingcharacter would be worked in the economy of politics. 

Priests of all religion are the same, said Dryden--the religions theyteach are false, and in their tendency anti-progressive, say Atheists, who put no trust in doctrine which involves or assumes supernaturalexistence. Believing that supernaturalism reduced to 'system' cannot beother than 'wickedly political, ' the Atheist, truly so called, sees nohope for 'slave classes, ' apart from a general diffusion ofanti-religious ideas. According to his theory, religion is in part acunningly and in part a stupidly devised fable. He cannot reconcile thewisdom of theologians with undoubted facts, and though willing to admitthat some 'modes of faith' are less absurd than others, is convincedthey are all essentially alike, because all fundamentally erroneous. Rousseau said 'philosophy can do nothing that religion cannot do better, and religion can do many things which philosophy cannot do at all. ' ButAtheists believe religion the most formidable evil with whichprogressors have to cope, and see in philosophy that mighty agent in thework of improvement so beautifully described by Curran as _theirresistible genius of universal emancipation_. 

Speculative thinkers of so decidedly irreligious a temper are notnumerous. If esteemed, as happens to certain commodities, in proportionto their scarcity they would enjoy a large share of public respect. Indeed, they are so few and far between, or at least so seldom maketheir presence visible, that William Gillespie is convinced they are ananomalous species of animal, produced by our common parent 'in a momentof madness. ' Other grave Christian writers, though horrified atAtheism--though persuaded its professors, 'of all earth's madmen, mostdeserve a chain;' and, though constantly abusing them, are still unableto believe in the reality of such persons. These, among all theopponents of Atheism and Atheists, may fairly claim to be consideredmost mysterious; for, while lavishing on deniers of their Gods everykind of sharp invective and opprobrious epithet, they cannot assurethemselves the 'monsters' did, or do actually exist. With characteristichumour, David Hume observed 'There are not a greater number ofphilosophical reasonings displayed upon any subject than those whichprove the existence of Deity, and refute the fallacies of Atheists, andyet the most religious philosophers still dispute whether any man can beso blinded as to be a speculative Atheist;' 'how (continues he) shall wereconcile these contradictions? The Knight-errants who wandered about toclear the world of dragons and of giants, never entertained the leastdoubt with regard to the existence of these monsters. ' [10:1]

The same Hume who thus pleasantly rebuked 'most religious philosophers, 'was himself a true Atheist. That he lacked faith in the supernaturalmust be apparent to every student of his writings, which abound withreflections far from flattering to the self-love of religionists, andlittle calculated to advance their cause. Many Deists have been calledAtheists: among others Robert Owen and Richard Carlile, both of whomprofessed belief in something superior to nature, something acting uponand regulating matter, though not itself material. [11:1] This somethingthey named _power_. But Hume has shown we may search 'in vain for anidea of power or necessary connection in all the sources from which wewould suppose it to be derived. [11:2] Owen, Carlile, and otherAtheists, falsely so called, supposed power the only entity worthy ofdeification. They dignified it with such appellations as 'internal orexternal cause of all existence, ' and ascribed to it intelligence, withsuch other honourable attributes as are usually ascribed to 'deified, error. ' But Hume astonished religious philosophers by declaring that, 'while we argue from the course of nature and infer a particularintelligent cause, which first bestowed, and still preserves order inthe universe, we embrace a principle which is both uncertain anduseless. It is uncertain, because the subject lies entirely beyond thereach of human experience. It is useless, because our knowledge of thiscause being derived entirely from the course of nature, we can never, according to the rules of just reasoning, return back from the causewith any new inference, or making additions to the common andexperienced course of nature, establish any principles of conduct andbehaviour. [11:3]

Nor did Hume affect to consider Christianity less repugnant to reasonthan any other theory or system of supernaturalism. Though confessedlyfast in friendship, generous in disposition, and blameless in all therelations of life, few sincere Divines can forgive his hostility totheir faith. And without doubt it was hostility eminently calculated toexhaust their stock of patience, because eminently calculated to damagetheir religion, which has nothing to fear from the assaults of ignorantand immoral opponents; but when assailed by men of unblemishedreputation, who know well how to wield the weapons of wit, sarcasm, andsolid argumentation, its priests are not without reason alarmed lesttheir house should be set _out_ of order. 

It would be difficult to name a philosopher at once so subtle, soprofound, so bold, and so _good_ as Hume. Notwithstanding his heterodoxreputation, many learned and excellent Christians openly enjoyed hisfriendship. A contemporary critic recently presented the public with 'acurious instance of contrast and of parallel, ' between Robertson andHume. 'Flourishing (says he) in the same walk of literature, living inthe same society at the same time; similar in their habits and generousdispositions; equally pure in their morals, and blameless in all therelations of private life: the one was a devout believer, the other amost absolute atheist, and both from deep conviction, founded uponinquiries, carefully and anxiously conducted. The close and warmfriendship which subsisted between these two men, may, after what wehave said, be a matter of surprise to some; but Robertson's Christianitywas enlarged and tolerant, and David Hume's principles were liberal andphilosophical in a remarkable degree. ' [12:1]

This testimony needs no comment. It clearly tells its own tale, andought to have the effect of throwing discredit upon the vulgar notionthat disgust of all religion is incompatible with talents and virtues ofthe highest order; for, in the person of David Hume, the world sawabsolute Atheism co-existent with genius, learning, and moralexcellence, rarely, if ever, surpassed. 

The unpopularity of that creed it would be vain to deny. A vast majorityof mankind associate with the idea of disbelief in their Gods everything stupid, monstrous, absurd, and atrocious. Absolute Atheism isthought by them the inseparable ally of most shocking wickedness, involving as it manifestly does that 'blasphemy against the Holy Ghost'which we are assured shall not be forgiven unto men 'neither in thisworld nor in that which is to come. ' Educated to consider it 'aninhuman, bloody, ferocious system, equally hostile to every restraintand to every virtuous affection, ' the majority of all countries detestand shun its apostles. Their horror of them may be likened to that it ispresumed the horse feels towards the camel, upon whom (so travellerstell us) he cannot look without _shuddering_. 

To keep alive and make the most of this strong religious feeling hasever been the object of Christian priests, who rarely hesitate to makecharges of Atheism, not only against opponents, but each other; not onlyagainst disbelievers but believers in God. The Jesuit Lafiteau, in aPreface to his 'Histoire des Sauvages Americanes, ' [13:1] endeavours toprove that only Atheists will dare assert that God created theAmericans. Scarcely a metaphysical writer of eminence has escaped the'imputation' of Atheism. The great Clarke and his antagonist the greaterLeibnitz were called Atheists. Even Newton was put in the same category. No sooner did sharp-sighted divines catch a glimpse of an 'Essay on theHuman Understanding' than they loudly proclaimed the Atheism of itsauthor. Julian Hibbert, in his learned account 'Of Persons FalselyEntitled Atheists, ' says, 'the existence of some sort of a Deity hasusually been considered undeniable, so the imputation of Atheism and thetitle of Atheist have usually been considered as insulting. ' Thisauthor, after giving no fewer than thirty and two names of 'individualsamong the Pagans who (with more or less injustice) have been accused ofAtheism, ' says, 'the list shews, I think, that almost all the mostcelebrated Grecian metaphysicians have been, either in their own or infollowing ages, considered, with more or less reason, to beAtheistically inclined. For though, the word Atheist was probably notoften used till about a hundred years before Christ, yet the imputationof _impiety_ was no doubt as easily and commonly bestowed, before thatperiod, as it has been since. ' [13:2]

Voltaire relates, in the eighteenth chapter of his 'Philosophie deL'Histoire, ' [13:3] that a Frenchman named Maigrot, Bishop of Conon, whoknew not a word of Chinese, was deputed by the then Pope to go and passjudgment on the opinions of certain Chinese philosophers: he treatedConfucius as Atheist, because that sage had said 'the sky has given mevirtue, and man can do me no hurt. '

On grounds no more solid than this, charges of Atheism are often erectedby 'surpliced sophists. ' Rather ridiculous have been the mistakescommitted by some of them in their hurry to affix on objects of theirhate the brand of impiety. These persons, no doubt, supposed they wereprivileged to write or talk any amount of nonsense and contradiction. Men who fancy themselves commissioned by Deity to interpret his'mysteries, ' or announce his 'will, ' are apt to make blunders withoutbeing sensible of it, as did those worthy Jesuits who declared, inopposition to Bayle, that a society of Atheists was impossible, and atthe same time assured the world that the government of China, byVoltaire and many others considered the most ancient on earth, was asociety of Atheists. So difficult it is for men inflamed by religiousprejudices, interests, and animosities to keep clear of sophisms, whichcan impose on none but themselves. 

Many Atheists conceal their sentiments on account of the odium whichwould certainly be their reward did they avow them. But the unpopularityof those sentiments cannot, by persons of sense and candour be allowed, in itself, a sufficient reason for their rejection. The fact of a creedbeing unpopular is no proof it is false. The argument from generalconsent is at best a suspicious one, for the truth of any opinion or thevalidity of any practice. History proves that the generality of men arethe slaves of prejudice, the sport of custom, and foes most bigotted tosuch opinions concerning religion as have not been drawn in from thesucking-bottles, or 'hatched within the narrow fences of their ownconceit. ' No prudent searcher after truth will accept an opinion becauseit is the current one, but rather view it with distrust for that veryreason. The genius of him who said, in our journey to the other worldthe common road is the safest, was cowardly as deceptive, and thereforeopposed to sound philosophy. Like horses yoked to a team, 'one's nose int'others tail, ' is a mode of journeying anywhere the opposite ofdignified, pleasant, or improving. They who are enamoured of 'the commonroad, ' unless handsomely paid for journeying thereon, must be slavish infeeling, and willing submitters to every indignity sanctioned by custom, that potent enemy of truth, which from time immemorial has been 'the lawof fools. '

Every day experience demonstrates the fallibility of majorities. Itpalpably exhibits, too, the danger as well as the folly of presuming theunpopularity of certain speculative opinions an evidence of theirfalsity. A public intellect, untainted by gross superstition, cannowhere be appealed to. Even in this favoured country, 'the envy ofsurrounding nations and admiration of the world, ' the multitude areanything but patterns of moral purity and intellectual excellence. Theywho assure us _vox populi_ is the voice of God, are fairly open to thecharge of ascribing to Him what orthodox pietists inform us exclusivelybelongs to the Father of evil. If by 'voice of God' is meant somethingdifferent from noisy ebullitions of anger, intemperance, and fanaticism, they who would have us regulate our opinions in conformity therewith arerespectfully requested to reconcile mob philosophy with the soberdictates of experience, and mob law with the law of reason. 

A writer in the _Edinburgh Review_ [15:1] assures us 'the majority ofevery nation consists of rude uneducated masses, ignorant, intolerant, suspicious, unjust, and uncandid, without the sagacity which discoverswhat is right, or the intelligence which comprehends it when pointedout, or the morality which requires it to be done. ' And yet religiousphilosophers are fond of quoting the all but universal horror of Atheismas a formidable argument against that much misunderstood creed. 

The least reflection will suffice to satisfy any reasonable man that thespeculative notions of rude, uneducated masses, so faithfully describedby the Scotch Reviewer, are for the most part grossly absurd andconsequently the reverse of true. If the masses of all nations areignorant, intolerant, suspicions, unjust, and uncandid, without thesagacity which discovers what is right, or the intelligence whichcomprehends it when pointed out, or the morality which requires it to bedone; who with the least shadow of claim to be accounted reasonable willassert that a speculative heresy is the worse for being unpopular, orthat Atheism is false, and must be demoralising in its influence becausethe majority of mankind declare it so. 

The Author of this Apology does not desire it may be inferred from theforegoing remarks, that horror of Atheism, and detestation of itsapostles, is confined to the low, the vulgar, the base, or theilliterate. Any such inference would be wrong, for it is certainly truethat learned, benevolent, and very able Christian writers, havesignalised themselves in the work of obstructing the progress of Atheismby denouncing its principles, and imputing all manner of wickedness toits defenders. It must indeed be admitted by the really enlightened ofevery name, that their conduct in this particular amply justifies piousMatthew Henry's confessions, that 'of all the christian graces, zeal ismost apt to turn sour. '

One John Ryland, A. M. Of Northampton, published a 'Preceptor, or GeneralRepository of useful information, very necessary for the various agesand departments of life' in which 'pride and lust, a corrupt pride ofheart, and a furious filthy lust of body, ' are announced as theatheist's 'springs of action, ' 'desire to act the beast without control, and live like a devil without a check of conscience, ' his only 'reasonsfor opposing the existence of God;' in which he is told 'a world ofcreatures are up in arms against him to kill him as they would avenomous mad dog, ' in which among other hard names he is called 'absurdfool, ' 'beast, ' 'dirty monster, ' 'brute, ' 'gloomy dark animal, ' 'enemyof mankind, ' 'wolf to civil society, ' 'butcher and murderer of the humanrace, ' in which moreover he is _cursed_ in the following hearty terms:

'Let the glorious mass of fire burn him, let the moon light him to thegallows, let the stars in their courses fight against the atheist, letthe force of the comets dash him to pieces, let the roar of thundersstrike him deaf, let red lightnings blast his guilty soul, let the sealift up her mighty waves to bury him, let the lion tear him to pieces, let dogs devour him, let the air poison him, let the next crumb of breadchoke him, nay, let the dull ass spurn him to death. '

Dr. Balguy in the course of a Treatise which the 'liberal' author of aSketch of the Denominations of the Christian World, 'considered anexcellent antidote against atheistical tenets, ' expresses himself in thefollowing manner: 'Of all the false opinions which ever infested themind of man, nothing can possibly equal that of atheism, which is such amonstrous contradiction of all evidence, to all the powers of theunderstanding and the dictates of common sense, that it may well bequestioned whether any man can really fall into it by a deliberate useof his judgment. All nature so clearly points out, and so clearlyproclaims a Creator of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, thatwhoever hears not its voice and sees not its proofs may well be thoughtwilfully deaf and obstinately blind. '

These are notable specimens of zeal turned sour. 

Now, when it is considered that such writings are carefully put intopopular hands, and writings of an irreligious character as carefullykept out of them, astonishment at human intolerance must cease. So far, indeed, from wondering that the 'giddy multitude' shrink aghast fromAtheists we shall conceive it little short of miraculous, that they donot fall upon and tear them to pieces. 

Beattie, another Christian doctor, towards the close of his celebratedEssay on the Immutability of Truth, denounces every sincere outspokenunbeliever as a 'murderer of human souls, ' and it being obvious that themurderer of a single soul must to the 'enlightened' majority of ourpeople appear an act infinitely more horrible than the butchery of manybodies, it really does at first view seem 'passing strange' that bodymurderers are almost invariably hanged, whilst they who murder 'souls, 'if punished at all, usually escape with some harmless abuse and a yearor two's imprisonment. 

Even the 'tolerant' Richard Watson, Lord Bishop of Llandaff, wrote withcontemptuous bitterness of 'Atheistical madmen, ' and in his Apology forthe Bible, assured Deistical Thomas Paine, Deism was so much better thanAtheism, he (Bishop Watson) meant 'not to say anything to itsdiscredit. '

The Rev. Mr. Ward, whose 'Ideal of a Christian Church' spread suchconsternation in the anti-popish camp, describes his own hatred ofProtestantism as 'fierce and burning. ' Nothing can go beyond that--it isthe _ne plus ultra_ of bigotry, and just such hatred is displayedtowards Atheists by at least nine-tenths of their opponents. Strange tosay, in Christians, in the followers of him who is thought to haverecommended, by act and word, unlimited charity, who is thought to have_commanded_ that we judge not, that we be sat judged; the Atheist findshis most active foe, his bitterest and least scrupulous maligner. Toexaggerate their bigotry would be difficult, for whether sage or simple, learned or unlearned, priests or priest-led, they regularly practise thedenunciation of Atheists in language foul as it is false. They call them'traitors to human kind, ' yea 'murderers of the human soul, ' and unlesshypocrites, or much better than their sentiments, would rather see themswing upon the gibbet than murderers of the body, especially if likeJohn Tawell, 'promoters of religion and Christian Missions. '

Robert Hall was a Divine of solid learning and unquestionable piety, whose memory is reverenced by a large and most respectable part of theChristian world. He ranked amongst the best of his class, and generallyspeaking, was so little disposed to persecute his opponents because oftheir heterodox opinions, that he wrote and published a Treatise onModeration, in the course of which he eloquently condemns the practiceof regulating, or rather attempting to regulate opinion by act ofparliament: yet, incredible as it may appear, in that very Treatise heapplauds Calvin on account of his conduct towards Servetus. Ourauthority for this statement is not 'Infidel' but Christian--theauthority of Evans, who, after noticing the Treatise in question, says, 'he (Bishop Hall) has discussed the subject with that ability which ispeculiar to all his writings. But this great and good man, towards theclose of the same Treatise, forgetting the principles which he had beeninculcating, devotes one solitary page to the cause of intolerance: thispage he concludes with these remarkable expressions: "Master Calvin didwell approve himself to God's Church in bringing Servetus to the stakein Geneva. "'

Remarkable, indeed! and what is the moral that they point? To the Authorof this Apology they are indicative of the startling truth, that neithereloquence nor learning, nor faith in God and his Scripture, nor allthree combined, are incompatible with the cruelest spirit ofpersecution. The Treatise on Moderation will stand an everlastingmemorial against its author, whose fine intellect, spoiled bysuperstitious education, urged him to approve a deed, the bareremembrance of which ought to excite in every breast, feelings of horrorand indignation. That such a man should declare the aim of Atheists is'to dethrone God and destroy man, ' is not surprising. From genuinebigots they have no right to expect mercy. He who applauded the bringingof Servetus to the stake must have deemed the utter extermination ofAtheists a religious duty. 

That our street and field preaching Christians, with very fewexceptions, heartily sympathise with the fire and faggot sentiments ofRobert Hall, is well known; but happily, their absurd ravings areattended to by none save eminently pious people, whose brains areunclogged by any conceivable quantity of useful knowledge. In point ofintellect they are utterly contemptible. Their ignorance, however, isfully matched by their impudence, which never forsakes them. They claimto be considered God's right-hand men, and of course duly qualifiedpreachers of his 'word, ' though unable to speak five minutes withouttaking the same number of liberties with the Queen's English. Swift wasprovoked by the prototypes of these pestiferous people, to declare that, 'formerly, the apostles received the gift of speaking several languages, a knowledge so remote from our dealers in the art of enthusiasm, thatthey neither understand propriety of speech nor phrases of their own, much less the gift of tongues. '

The millions of Christian people who have been trained up in the waythey should _not_ go, by this active class of fanatics, are naturallyeither opposed to reason or impervious to it. Hence, arguing with themis sheer waste of brains and leisure--a casting of pearls before swine. They are convinced not only that the wisdom of the world is foolishnesswith God, but that wisdom with God is foolishness with the world; norwill any one affirm their 'moderation' in respect to unbelievers onetittle more moderate than Robert Hall's; or that they are one tittleless disposed than 'that good and great man, ' to think those who bringheretics to the stake at Geneva or elsewhere, 'do well approvethemselves to God's Church. ' Educated, that is to say, _duped_ as theyare, they cannot but think unbelief highly criminal, and whenpracticable, or convenient, deal with it as such. Atheists would, be'astonished with a great astonishment' if they did not. Their craftyteachers adjure them to do so 'on peril of their souls;' and if, as Mr. Jay, of Bath, said in one of his best sermons, 'the readiest way in theworld to thin heaven, and replenish the regions of hell, is to call inthe spirit of bigotry, ' the Author of this Apology would not for all thetreasures of India stand in the shoes of these men, whose whole time andenergies are employed in generating and perpetuating that detestablespirit. But when your Rylands, and Balguys and Beatties, and Watsons andHalls make a merit of abusing those who cannot believe as they believe, what can be hoped or expected from the tribe of illiterate canters, who'go about Mawworming?'

It is nevertheless true, that Atheists have been helped to some of theirbest arguments by adversaries. Bishop Watson, to wit, has suggestedobjections to belief in the Christian's Deity, which they who hold nosuch belief, consider unanswerable. In his famous 'Apology' he desiredto know what Paine thought 'of an uncaused cause of everything, and aBeing who has no relation to time, not being older to day than he wasyesterday, nor younger to day than he will be to-morrow--who has norelation to space, not being a part here and a part there, or a wholeanywhere? of an omniscient Being who cannot know the future actions ofman, or if his omniscience enables him to know them, of the contingencyof human actions? of the distinction between vice and virtue, crime andinnocence, sin and duty? of the infinite goodness of a Being who existedthrough eternity, without any emanation of his goodness manifested inthe creation of sensitive beings? or if it be contended that there wasan eternal creation of an effect coeval with its 'cause, of matter notposterior to its maker? of the existence of evil, moral and natural, inthe work of an Infinite Being, powerful, wise, and good? finally, of thegift of freedom of will, when the abuse of freedom becomes the cause ofgeneral misery?' [20:1]

These questions imply what, to the author of this Apology, appears anample _justification_ of Atheism. That they flowed from the pen of aBishop, is one of many extraordinary facts which have grown out oftheological controversy. They are questions strongly suggestive ofanother. Is it possible to have experience of, or even to imagine aBeing with attributes so strange, anomalous, and contradictory? To thatquestion reason prompts an answer in the negative--It is plain thatBishop Watson was convinced 'no man by searching can find out God. ' Thecase is, that he, in the hope of converting Deists, ventured toinsinuate arguments highly favourable to Atheism, whose professorsconsider an admission of utter ignorance of God, tantamount to a denialof His existence. Many Christians, with more candour, perhaps, thanprudence, have avowed the same opinion. Minutius Felix, for example, said to the Heathen, 'Not one of you reflects that you ought to knowyour gods before you worship them. ' [20:2] As if he felt the absurdityof pretending to love and honour an unknown 'Perhaps. ' That he didhimself what he ridiculed in them proves nothing but his owninconsistency. To the Author of this Apology it seems certain, a Godwhose being is not as our being, whose thoughts are not as our thoughts, and whose ways are not as our ways, is neither more nor less than themerest figment of ill-regulated imagination. He is _sure_ a Being, abovenature, can only be conceived of by itself; it being obviously true thatthe natural cannot attain to the supernatural. 

The Christian, equally with the Heathen, is open to the reproach ofworshipping he knows not what. Yes, to idol-hating, enlightenedChristians, may fairly be applied the severe sarcasm Minutius Felix sotriumphantly levelled at idol-loving 'benighted Heathens. ' Will any onesay the Christian absolutely knows more about Jehovah than the Heathendid about Jupiter? The Author believes that few, if any, who haveattentively considered Bishop Watson's queries, will say the 'dimUnknown, ' they so darkly shadow forth, is conceivable by any effort, either of sense or imagination. 

Under cover, then, of what reason Christians can escape the imputationof pretending to adore what they have no conception of, the Author ofthis Apology is unable to divine. The very 'book of books, ' to whichthey so boldly appeal, is conclusive against them. In its pages theystand convicted of idolatry. Without doubt a God is revealed byrevelation; but not _their_ God; not a supernatural Being, infinite inpower, in wisdom, and in goodness. The Bible Deity is superhuman innothing; all that His adorers have ascribed to Him being mereamplification of human powers, human ideas, and human passions. TheBible Deity 'has mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will hehardeneth;' is 'jealous, ' especially of other Gods; changeful, vindictive, partial, cruel, unjust, 'angry with the wicked every day;'and altogether a Being far from respectable, or worthy to be consideredinfinite in wisdom, power, and goodness. Is it credible that a Beingsupernaturally wise and good, proclaimed the murderous adulterer David, a man after his own heart, and commanded the wholesale butchery ofCanaanites? Or that a God of boundless power, 'whose tender mercies areover all his works, ' decreed the extermination of entire nations forbeing what he made them? Jehovah did all three. Confessedly a God ofarmies and Lord of Hosts; confessedly, too, a hardener of men's heartsthat he might destroy them: he authorised acts at which human natureshudders, and of which it is ashamed: yet to love, respect, yea, reverence Him, we are commanded by the self-styled 'stewards of hismysteries, ' on peril of our 'immortal souls. ' Verily, these piousanathematisers ask our credulity a little too much. ' In their zeal forthe God of Israel, they are apt to forget that only Himself can compassimpossibilities, and altogether lose sight of the fact that where, who, or what Jehovah is, no man knoweth. Revelation (so-called) revealsnothing about the imagined creator of heaven and earth on which acultivated intellect can repose with satisfaction. Men naturally desirepositive information concerning the superhuman Deity, belief in whom isthe _sine qua non_ of all religion. But the Bible furnishes no suchinformation concerning Jehovah. On the contrary, he is their pronounced'past finding out, ' incomprehensible, and the like. 'Canst thou, bysearching, find out God? Canst thou find out the Almighty toperfection?' are questions put by an 'inspired writer, ' who felt thecloudy and unsatisfactory nature of all human conceit about Gods. 

Now, a Revelation from God, at least so thinks the Author of thisApology, might reasonably be expected to make the mode and nature of Hisexistence manifest. But the Christian Bible falls infinitely short inthis particular. It teaches there is a God; but throws no light on thedark questions, who, what, or where is God? Numerous and various as areScripture texts, none can be cited in explanation of a Deity no olderto-day than he was yesterday, nor younger to-day than he will beto-morrow; of a Deity who has no relation to space, not being a parthere and a part there, or a whole anywhere: in short, of that Deitywritten about by Bishop Watson, who, like every other sincere Christian, made the mistake of resting his religious faith on 'words withoutknowledge. '

It is to this description of faith Atheists object. They think it theroot of superstition, that greatest of all plagues, by which poorhumanity is afflicted. Are they to blame for thus thinking? TheChristian has no mercy on the superstition of the Heathen; and shouldscorn to complain when the bitter chalice is returned to his own lips. Atheists believe the God of Bishop Watson a supernatural chimera, and toits worshippers have a perfect right to say, 'not one of you reflectsthat you ought to know your Gods before you worship them. ' Theseremarkable words, originally addressed to the Heathen, lose none oftheir force when directed against the Christian. 

No one can conceive a supernatural Being, and what none can conceive, none ought to worship, or even assert the existence of. Who worships asomething of which he knows nothing, is an idolater. To talk of, or bowdown to it, is nonsensical; to pretend affection for it, is worse thannonsensical. Such conduct, however pious, involves the rankesthypocrisy; the meanest and most odious species of idolatry; forlabouring to destroy which, Atheists are called 'murderers of the humansoul, ' 'blasphemers, ' and other foolish names, too numerous to mention. 

It would be well for all parties, if those who raise against Atheiststhe cry of 'blasphemy, ' were made to perceive that godless unbelieverscannot be blasphemers; for, as contended by Lord Brougham in his Life ofVoltaire, blasphemy implies belief, and, therefore, Atheists who do notbelieve in God, cannot logically or justly be said to blaspheme him. Theblasphemer, properly so called, is he who imagines Deity, and ascribesto the idol of his own brain, all manner of folly, contradiction, inconsistency, and wickedness. Yes, the blasphemer is he who invents amonster and calls it God; while to reject belief therein, is an act bothreasonable and virtuous. 

Superstition is universally abhorred, but no one believes himselfsuperstitious. There never was a religionist who believed his ownreligion mere superstition. All shrink indignantly from the charge ofbeing superstitious; while all raise temples to, and bow down before, 'thingless names. ' The 'masses' of every nation erect 'thingless names'into substantial realities, and woe to those, who follow not the insaneexample. The consequences--the fatal consequences--are everywhereapparent. In our own country, one consequence is social disunion on thegrandest possible scale. Society is split up into an almost infinitevariety of sects, whose members imagine themselves patented to thinktruth, and never to be wrong in the enunciation of it. This if no idleor frivolous charge, as the Author of this Apology can easily show. 

Before him is _Sanders' News Letter and Daily Advertiser_ of Feb. 18, 1845, which, among other curiosities, contains an 'Address of the DublinProtestant Operative Association, and Reformation Society, ' one sentenceof which is--'We have raised our voices against the spirit ofcompromise, which is the opprobrium of the age; we have unfurled thebanner of Protestant truth, and placed ourselves beneath it, we haveinsisted upon Protestant ascendancy as just and equitable, becauseProtestant principles are true and undeniable. '

Puseyite Protestants tell a tale the very reverse of that so modestlytold by their nominal brethren of the Dublin Operative Association. They, as may be seen in Palmer's Letter to Golightly, 'utterly rejectand anathematise the principle of Protestantism, as a heresy with allits forms, sects, or denominations. ' Nor is that all our 'RomewardDivines' do, for in addition to rejecting utterly and cursing bitterly, as well the name as the principle of Protestantism, they eulogise theChurch of Rome because forsooth 'she yields, ' says Newman in his Letterto Jelf, 'free scope to feelings of awe, mystery, tenderness, reverence, and devotedness;' while we have it on the authority of Tract 90, thatthe Church of England is 'in bondage, working in chains, and (tell itnot in Dublin) teaching with the stammering lips of ambiguousformularies. ' Fierce and burning is the hatred of Dublin OperativeAssociation Christians to Popery, but the reader has seen exactly thatstyle of hatred to Protestantism is avowed by Mr. Ward. Both sets ofChristians are quite sure they are right: but (alas! for infallibility)a third set of Christians insist that they are both wrong. There arePapists or Roman Catholics who consider Protestant principles the veryreverse of true and undeniable, and treat with derisive scorn the'fictitious Catholicism' of Puseyite Divines. 

Count De Montalambert, in his recently published 'Letter to the Rev. Mr. Neale on the Architectural, Artistical, and Archaeological Movements ofthe Puseyites, ' enters his 'protest' against the most unwarranted andunjustifiable assumption of the name of Catholic by people and thingsbelonging to the actual Church of England. 'It is easy, ' he observes, 'to take up a name, but it is not so easy to get it recognised by theworld and by competent authority. Any man, for example, may come out toMadeira and call himself a Montmorency, or a Howard, and even enjoy thehonour and consideration belonging to such a name till the realMontmorencys or Howards hear something about it, and denounce him, andthen such a man would be justly scouted from society, and fall down muchlower than the lowness from which he attempted to rise. The attempt tosteal away from us and appropriate to the use of a fraction of theChurch of England that glorious title of Catholic is proved to be anusurpation by every monument of the past and present; by the coronationoath of your sovereigns--by all the laws which have established yourChurch--even by the recent answer of your University of Oxford to thelay address against Dr. Pusey, &c. , where the Church of England isjustly styled the Reformed Protestant Church. The name itself is spurnedat with indignation by the greater half, at least, of the inhabitants ofthe United Kingdom. The judgment of the whole indifferent world--thecommon sense of humanity--agrees with the judgment of the Church ofRome, and with the sense of her 150, 000, 000 of children, to dispossessyou (Puseyites) of this name. The Church of England, who has denied hermother, is rightly without a sister. She has chosen to break the bondsof unity and obedience; let her therefore stand before the judgment-seatof God and of man. Again, supposing the spirit of the Camden Societyultimately to prevail over its Anglican adversaries; supposing you doone day get every old thing back again; copes, letters, roodlofts, candlesticks, and the abbey lands into the bargain, what will it all bebut an empty pageant, like the Tournament of Eglington Castle, separatedfrom the reality of Catholic truth and unity, by the abyss of threehundred years of schism? The question then is, have you, the Church ofEngland, got the picture for your frame? have you got the truth, the onetruth; the same truth as the men of the middle ages? The Camden Societysays yes; but the whole Christian world, both Protestant and Catholic, says no; and the Catholic world adds that there is no truth but inunity, and this unity you most certainly have not. Once more; everyCatholic will repeat to you the words of Manzoni, as quoted by M. Faber:'The greatest deviations are none if the main point be recognised; thesmallest are damnable heresies, if it be denied. That main point is theinfallibility of the Church, or rather of the Pope. '

Our Anti-Romish priests would have us think the more and more we haveof-faith, the more and more we have of happiness. Faith they exalt far, very far, above hope or even charity. 'Oh Lord, increase our faith, ' isthe text on which they love to enlarge. Faith is their panacea for allhuman ills: but their faith is worse than useless if it be not truefaith. And how can we so test conflicting faiths as to distinguish thetrue from the false? Aye, there's the rub! Undoubtedly faith is toreligion what the root is to the tree; and men in search of 'savingfaith' are naturally anxious to find it. No one desires to be eternallypunished; and therefore, if any one embrace a false faith it is becausehe makes the mistake of supposing it the true one. The three sets ofChristians just adverted to, may all be equally sincere, but cannot allhave the true faith. Protestant principles as taught by the DublinOperative Association, may be true. Anglo-Catholic principles, as taughtby the Oxford Tractmen, may be true. Roman Catholic principles, astaught by the Count de Montalambert, may be true; but they cannot all betrue. It is impossible to reconcile that orthodox Papists' 'main point', _i. E. _ the infallability of the (Romish) Church, or rather of the Pope, with the 'main point' of orthodox protestants, who denounce 'the greatharlot of Babylon, ' that 'scarlet lady who sitteth upon the seven hills, in the most unmeasured and virulent terms. Anti-Christ is the name they'blasphemously' apply to the actual 'old chimera of a Pope. ' PuseyiteDivines treat his Holiness with more tenderness; but even they boggle athis infallibility, and seem to occupy a position between the rivalchurches of Rome and England analogous to that of Captain Macheath whensinging between two favourite doxies--

 How happy could I be with either, Were t'other dear charmer away; But while you thus teaze me together, The devil a word can I say. 

The Infallibility of Popes is the doctrine insisted upon by Count DeMontalambert as essential--as doctrine, the smallest deviation fromwhich is damnable heresy. Believe and admit 'Antichrist' is notAntichrist, but God's accredited vicegerent upon earth, infinite is themercy in store for you; but woe to those who either cannot or will notbelieve and admit anything of the kind. On them every sincere RomanCatholic is sure God will pour out the vials of his wrath, as if the'Great Perhaps, '

 Who sees with equal eye, as God of all, A hero perish, or a sparrow fall, could be angry with creatures of his own creation for thinking what theycannot help thinking, and being what they cannot help being. Every onehas heard of the Predestinarian, who, having talked much of his God, wasasked by a bystander to speak worse of the Devil if he could; butcomparatively few persons feel the full force of that question, or areprepared to admit God-worshippers in general, picture their Deities asif they were demons. 'Recognise, ' exclaims the Roman Catholic Priest, 'the "main point" of our holy apostolic religion, or God will judge andeternally punish you. ' The priests of nearly all religionaldenominations ascribe to Deity the low grovelling vindictive feelingswhich agitate and disgrace themselves. If Roman Catholic principles aretrue and undeniable, none but Roman Catholics will be saved from thewrath to come. If Anglo-Catholic principles are true and undeniable, none but Anglo-Catholic will be saved from the wrath to come. Iforthodox Protestant principles are true and undeniable, none butorthodox Protestants will be saved from the wrath to come. Thus doreligionists

 Grunt and groan, And curse all systems but their own;

Never scrupling to assure the advocates of those systems a hell iswaiting to receive them. Agreeing in little else save disagreement, the'main point' of this class of believers is a matter of littleconsequence to that class of believers, and no matter at all to a thirdclass of believers. Look at the thousand-and-one sects into which theChristian world is divided. 'Some reject Scripture; others admit noother writings but Scripture. Some say the devils shall be saved, othersthat they shall be damned; others that there are no devils at all. Somehold that it is lawful to dissemble in religion, others the contrary. Some say that Antichrist is come, some say not; others that he is aparticular man, others that he is not a man, but the devil; and othersthat by Antichrist is meant a succession of men. Some will have him tobe Nero, some Caligula, some Mohammed, some the Pope, some Luther, somethe Turk, some of the tribe of Dan, and so each man according to hisfancy will make an Antichrist. Some only will observe the Lord's day, some only the Sabbath; some both, and some neither. Some will have allthings in common, some not. Some will have Christ's body only in Heaven, some everywhere; some in the bread, others with the bread, others aboutthe bread, others under the bread, and others that Christ's body is thebread, or the bread his body. And others that his body is transformedinto his divinity. Some will have the Eucharist administered in bothkinds, some in one, some not at all. Some will have Christ descend tohell in respect of his soul, some only in his power, some in hisdivinity; some in his body, some not at all. Some by hell understand theplace of the damned, some _limbus partum_, others the wrath of God, others the grave. Some will make Christ two persons, some give him butone nature and one will; some affirming him to be only God, some onlyman, some made up of both, some altogether deny him. Some will have hisbody come from Heaven, some from the Virgin, some from the elements. Some will have our souls mortal, some immortal; some bring them into thebody by infusion, some by traduction. Some will have souls created. Before the world, some after; some will have them created altogether, others severally; some will have them corporeal, some incorporeal; someof the substance of God, some of the substance of the body. Soinfinitely are men's conceits distracted with a variety of opinions, whereas _there is but one Truth_, which every man aims at, but fewattain it; every man thinks he hath it, and yet few enjoy it. ' [27:1]

The chiefs of these sects are, for the most part, ridiculouslyintolerant; so many small Popes, who fancy that whomsoever they bind onearth shall be bound in heaven, and whomsoever they loose on earth shallbe loosed in heaven. They remorselessly cobble the true faith, withoutwhich to their 'sole exclusive heaven, ' none can be admitted;

 As if religion were intended, For nothing else but to be mended, and rarely seem so happy as when promising eternal misery to those whoreject their chimeras. Even Dissenting ministers, from whom betterthings might be expected, have been heard to declare at public meetings, called by themselves for the purpose of sympathising with, andsupporting one of themselves who was suffering for 'conscience sake, 'that when they spoke of liberty to express opinions, they meant suchliberty for religionists, not irreligionists. When learned and 'liberal'Dissenters gratuitously confess this species of faith, none have a rightto be surprised that the 'still small voice of truth' should be drownedamid the clamour of fanaticism, or that Atheists should be so recklesslyvillified. 

But wisdom, we read, is justified of her children; and to the wise ofevery nation the Atheist confidently appeals. He rejects religion, because religion is based on principles of imaginative ignorance. Baillydefines it as 'the worship of the unknown, piety, godliness, humility, before the _unknown_. ' Lavater as 'Faith in the supernatural, invisible, _unknown_. ' Vauvenargus as 'the duties of men towards the _unknown_. 'Dr. Johnson as 'Virtue founded upon reverence of the unknown, andexpectation of future rewards and punishments. ' Rivarol as 'the scienceof serving the _unknown_. ' La Bruyere as 'the respectful fear of theunknown. ' Du Marsais, as 'the worship of the _unknown_, and the practiceof all the virtues. ' Walker as 'Virtue founded upon reverence of the_unknown_, and expectation of rewards or punishments: a system of divinefaith and worship as opposed to other systems. ' De Bonald as 'Socialintercourse between man and the _unknown_. ' Rees as 'the worship orhomage that is due to the _unknown_ as creator, preserver, and withChristians as redeemer of the world. ' Lord Brougham as 'the subject ofthe science called Theology:' a science he defines as 'the knowledge andattributes of the _unknown_;' which definitions agree in making theessential principle of religion a principle of ignorance. That they aresufficiently correct definitions will not be disputed, and upon them theAtheist is satisfied to rest his case. To him the worship or adorationof what is confessedly _unknown_ is mere superstition; and to himprofessors of theology are 'artists in words, ' who pretend to teach whatnobody has any conception of. Now, such persons may be well-intentioned;but their wisdom is by no means apparent. They must be wonderfullydeficient of the invaluable sense so falsely called 'common. ' Idolisersof 'thingless names, ' they set at naught the admirable dictum of Locke, that it is 'unphilosophic to suppose names in books signify realentities in nature, unless we can frame clear and distinct ideas ofthose entities. '

Theists of every class would do well to calmly and fully consider thisrule of philosophising, for it involves nothing less than thedestruction of belief in the supernatural. The Jupiter of MythologicHistory, the Allah of Alkoran, and the Jehovah of 'Holy Scripture, ' ifentities at all, are assuredly entities that baffle human conception. To'frame clear and distinct ideas of them' is impossible. In respect tothe attribute of _unknowability_ all Gods are alike. They are allsupernatural; and the merely natural cannot attach rational ideas tonames assumed to stand for something above nature. It is easy to talkabout seeing the Creator in creation, looking through nature up tonature's God, and the like, but very difficult to have any idea whateverof a God without body, parts, or passions; that is to say, the God setforth in one of the Church of England's Thirty-Nine Articles. 

No such God can be believed to exist by reasoners who rigidly abide byJohn Locke's rule of philosophising, and if it be urged that he, theauthor of the rule, was a Theist and a Christian--our answer is, that insuch case, like many other philosophers, he practically gave the lie tohis own best precept. 

Books have been written to exhibit the difficulties of (what priestschoose to call) Infidelity; and without doubt unbelief _has_ itsdifficulties. But according to a universally recognised rule ofphilosophising, of two difficulties we are in all cases to choose theleast. From a rule so palpably just no one can reasonably depart, andthe Atheist, while freely admitting a great difficulty on his own side, is satisfied there can be demonstrated an infinitely greater difficultyon the side of his opponents. The Atheist labours to convince mankindthey are not warranted by the general course of Nature in assigning toit a Cause, inasmuch as it is more in accordance with experience tosuppose Nature the uncaused cause, than to imagine, as religionists do, that there is an uncaused cause of Nature. 

Theologians ask, who created Nature? without adducing satisfactoryevidence that Nature was created, and without reflecting that if it isdifficult to believe Nature self-existent, it is much more difficult tobelieve some self-existent Super-nature, capable of producing it. Intheir anxiety to get rid of a natural difficulty, they invent asupernatural one, and accuse Atheists of 'wilful blindness, ' and'obstinate deafness, ' for not choosing so unphilosophic a mode ofexplaining universal mystery. Call upon them to define their'all-creative Deity, ' and they know not what to answer. Ask them who, what, or where He is, and at once you have them on the hip; at once youspy their utter ignorance, and reduce them to a condition very similarto that of Master Abraham Slender, when with stammering lips he 'singssmall like a woman. ' To assume everything they are always ready; but toprove anything concerning their Immense Supernatural, they are neverprepared. Regularly drilled to argue in a circle, they foolishly imagineeverybody else should do the same, and marvel at the man who rigidlyadheres to just rules of philosophising and considers experience ofnatural derivation a far safer guide than their crude, undigested, extravagant, contradictory notions about the confessedly _unknown_. 

The rule of philosophising just adverted to--that rule which forbids us, in any case, to choose the greater of two difficulties--is of immenseimportance, and should be carefully considered by every one anxious toarrive at correct conclusions with respect to theology. For if believersin God do depart from that rule--if their belief necessarily involve itsviolation--to persist in such belief is to persist in what is clearlyopposed to pure reason. Now, it has been demonstrated, so far as wordscan demonstrate any truth whatever, that the difficulty of him whobelieves Nature never had an author, is infinitely less than thedifficulty of him who believes it had a cause itself uncaused. In the'Elements of Materialism, ' an unequal but still admirable work by Dr. Knowlton, a well-known American writer, this question of comparativedifficulty is well handled, and the Author of this Apology conceivesmost satisfactorily exhausted. 

'The sentiment, ' says the Doctor, ' that a being exists which nevercommenced existence, or what is the same thing, that a being existswhich has existed from all eternity, appears to us to favour Atheism, for if one being exist which never commenced existence--why notanother--why not the universe? It weighs nothing, says the Atheist, inthe eye of reason, to say the universe appears to man as though it wereorganised by an Almighty Designer; for the maker of a thing must besuperior to the thing made; and if there be a maker of the universethere can be no doubt, but that if such maker were minutely examined byman, man would discover such indications of wisdom and design that itwould be more difficult for him to admit that such maker was not causedor constructed by a pre-existing Designer, than to admit that theuniverse was not caused or constructed by a Designer. But no one willcontend for an infinite series of Makers; and if, continues the Atheist, what would, if viewed, be indications of design, are no proofs of adesigner in the one case, they are not; in the other; and as suchindications are the only evidence we have of the existence of a Designerof the universe, we, as rational beings, contend there is no God. We donot suppose the existence of any being, of which there is no evidence, when such supposition, if admitted, so far from diminishing would onlyincrease a difficulty, which at best is sufficiently great. Surely, if asuperior being may have existed from all eternity, an inferior may haveexisted from all eternity; if a great God sufficiently mighty to make aworld may have existed from all eternity, of course without beginningand without cause, such world may have existed from all eternity, without beginning, and without cause. ' [31:1]

These are 'strong reasons' for Atheism--they prove that Theists set atnought the rule of philosophising which forbids us to choose the greaterof two difficulties. Their system compels them to do so, for having noother groundwork than the strange hypotheses that time was when therewas no time--something existed when there was nothing, which somethingcreated everything; its advocates would be tongue-tied and lost ifreduced to the hard necessity of appealing to facts, or rigidlyregarding rules of philosophising, which have only their reasonablenessto recommend them. They profess ability to account for nature, and areof course exceedingly eager to justify a profession so presumptuous. This eagerness betrays them into courses, of which no one bent onrejecting whatever is either opposed to, or unsanctioned by experience, can possibly approve. It is plain that of the God they tell us tobelieve 'created the worlds, ' no man has any experience. This granted, it follows that worship of such fancied Being is mere superstition. Until it be shown by reference to the general course of things, thatthings had an author, Himself uncreated or unauthorised, religiousphilosophers have no right to expect Atheists to abandon their Atheism. The duty of priests is to reconcile religion with reason, if they can, and admit their inability to do so, if they cannot. 

Romanists will have nothing to do with reason whenever it appears atissue with their faith. All sects, as sects, play fast and loose withreason. Many members of all sects are forward enough to boast aboutbeing able to give a reason for the faith that is in them; but anoverwhelming majority love to exalt faith above reason. Philosophy theycall 'vain, ' and some have been found so filled with contempt for it, asto openly maintain that what is theologically true, is philosophicallyfalse; or, in other terms, that the truths of religion and the truths ofphilosophy have nothing in common. According to them, religious truthsare independent and superior to all other truths. Our faith, say they, if not agreeable to _mere_ reason, is infinitely superior to it. Priestsare 'at one' on the point. Dissenting and Protestant, as well asRomanising priests, find it convenient to abuse reason and extol faith. As priests, they can scarcely be expected to do otherwise; for reason isa stern and upright judge, whose decrees have hitherto been unfavourableto religion. Its professors who appeal to that judge, play a part mostinconsistent and dangerous, as is evident in the case of OrigenBachelor, who more zealous and candid than prudent, declared the realand only question between Atheism and Theism a question of fact, reducing it to these terms--'Is there reason, all things considered, forbelieving that there is a God, an intelligent cause of things, infiniteand perfect in all his attributes and moral qualities? [32:1]

Now, the reader has seen that the hypothesis of 'an intelligent cause ofthings' involves difficulties, greater, infinitely greater than the_one_ difficulty, involved in the hypothesis that things always existed. He has seen the folly of explaining natural, by the invention ofsupernatural mystery, because it manifestly violates a rule ofphilosophising, the justness of which it would be ridiculous to dispute. Having clearly perceived thus much, he will perhaps think it rather 'toobad' as well as absurd, to call Atheists 'madmen' for lacking faith inthe monstrous dogma that nature was caused by 'something amounting tonothing' itself uncaused. 

There is something. That truth admits not of being evidenced. It is, nevertheless, accepted. It is accepted by men of all religious opinions, equally with men of no religious opinions. If any truth be self evidentand eternal, here is that truth. To call it in question would be worsethan idle. We may doubt the reality of an external world, we may besceptical as to the reality of our own bodies, but we cannot doubt thatthere is something. The proposition falls not within the domain ofscepticism. It must be true. To suppose it false is literallyimpossible. Its falsehood would involve a contradiction, and allcontradiction involves impossibility. But if proof of this were needed, we have it in the fact that no man, sage or simple, ever pretended todeny there is something. Whatever men could doubt or deny they havedoubted or denied, but in no country of the world, in no age, has thedogma--there is something, been denied or even treated as doubtful. Herethen Atheists, Theists, and Polytheists agree. They agree of necessity. There is no escape from the conclusion that something is, except weadopt the unintelligible dogma there is nothing, which no human beingcan, as nothing amounts to nothing and of what amounts to nothing no onecan have an idea. To define the word something by any other word, wouldbe labour in vain. There is no other word in any language whose meaningis better understood, and they who do not under stand what it means, ifsuch persons there be, are not likely to understand the meaning of anyword or words whatever. Ideas of nothing none have. That there issomething, we repeat, must be true; all dogmas or propositions beingnecessarily true whose denial involves an impossibility. What the natureof that something may be is a secondary question, and however determinedcannot affect the primary dogma--things are things whatever may be theirindividual or their aggregate nature. Nor is it of the least consequencewhat name or names we may see fit to give things, so that each word hasits fixed and true meaning. Whether, for example, we use for the sign ofthat something which is, the word Universe, or God, or Substance, orSpirit, or Matter, or the letter X, is of no importance, if weunderstand the word or letter used to be merely the sign of thatsomething. Words are only useful, when they are the signs of true ideas;evidently therefore, their legitimate function is to convey such ideas;and words which convey no ideas at all, or what is worse, only thosewhich are false, should at once be expunged from the vocabularies ofnations. Something is. The Atheist calls it matter. Other persons maychoose to call it other names; let them. He chooses to call it this oneand no other. 

There ever has been something. Here again, is a point of unity. All areequally assured there ever has been something. Something is, somethingmust always have been, cry the religions, and the cry is echoed by theirreligious. This last dogma, like the first, admits not of beingevidenced. As nothing is inconceivable, we cannot even imagine a timewhen there was nothing. Atheists say, something ever was, whichsomething is matter. Theists say, something has been from all eternity, which something is not matter, but God. They boldly affirm that matterbegan to be. They affirm its creation from nothing, by a something, which was before the universe. Indeed, the notion of universal creationinvolves first, that of universal annihilation, and second, that of asomething prior to everything. What creates everything must be beforeeverything, in the same way that he who manufactures a watch must existbefore the watch. As already remarked. Atheists agree with Theists, thatsomething ever has been; but the point of difference lies here. TheAtheist says, matter is the eternal something, and asks proof of itsbeginning to be. The Theist insists that matter is not the eternalsomething, but that God is, and when pushed for an account of what hemeans by God, he coolly answers, a Being, having nothing in common withanything, who, nevertheless, by his Almighty will created everything. 

It may without injustice be affirmed, that the sincerest and strongestbelievers in this mysterious Deity, are often tormented by doubts, and, if candid, must own they believe in the existence of many things with afeeling much closer allied to certainty than they do in the reality oftheir 'Great First Cause, least understood. ' No man can be so fully andperfectly satisfied there is a God in heaven as the Author of thisApology cannot but be of his own existence on earth. No man's faith inthe imaginary is ever half so strong as his belief in the visible andtangible. 

But few among professional mystifiers will admit this, obviously true asit is. Some have done so. Baxter, of pious memory, to wit, who said, 'Iam not so foolish as to pretend my certainty be greater than it is, because it is dishonour to be less certain, nor will I by shame be keptfrom confessing those infirmities which those have as much as I, whohypocritically reproach with them. _My certainty that I am a man isbefore my certainty that there is a God. _'

So candid was Richard Baxter, and so candid are _not_ the most part ofour priests, who would fain have us think they have no more, and weought to have no more, doubt about God's existence than our own. Nevertheless, they write abundance of books to convince us 'God is, 'though they never penned a line in order to convince us, we actuallyare, and that to disbelieve we are is a 'deadly sin. '

Could God be known, could his existence be made 'palpable to feeling asto sight, ' as unquestionably is the existence of matter, there would beno need of 'Demonstrations of the existence of God, ' no need ofarguments _a priori_ or _a posteriori_ to establish that existence. Saint John was right; 'No man hath seen God at any time, ' to which 'openconfession' he might truly have added, 'none ever will, ' for the unrealis always unseeable. Yet have 'mystery men' with shameless and mostinsolent pertinacity asserted the existence of God while denying theexistence of matter. 

Define your terms, said Locke. Atheists do so, and where necessaryinsist upon others following the philosophic example. On this accountthey are 'ugly customers' to Priests, who, with exceptions, much dislikebeing called upon to explain their idealess language. Ask one to definethe word God and you stagger him. If he do not fly into a passion deemyourself fortunate, but as to an intelligible definition, look fornothing of the sort. He can't furnish such definition however disposedto do so. The incomprehensible is not to be defined. It is difficult togive an intelligible account of an 'Immense Being' confessedlymysterious, and about whom his worshippers admit they only know, theyknow nothing, except that

 'He is good, And that themselves are blind. '

Spinoza said, _of things which have nothing in common, one cannot be thecause of the other;_ and to the Author of this Apology, it seemseminently unphilosophic to believe a Being having nothing in common withanything, capable of creating or causing everything. 'Only matter can betouched or touch;' and as the Christian's God is not material, hisadorers are fairly open to the charge of superstition. An unknown Deity, without body, parts or passions, is of all idols the least tangible; andthey who pretend to know and reverence him, are deceived or deceivers. Knowledge of, and reverence for an object, imply, the power ofconceiving that object; but who is able to conceive a God without body, parts, or passions?

In this Christian country where men are expected to believe and called'infidel' if they cannot believe in a 'crucified Saviour, ' it seemsstrange so much fuss should be made about his immateriality. All butUnitarian Christians hold as an essential article of faith, that in himdwelt the fulness of the Godhead bodily, in other words, that ourRedeemer and our Creator; though two persons are one God. It is truethat Divines of our 'Reformed Protestant Church, ' call everything butgentlemen those who lay claim to the equivocal privilege of feastingperiodically upon the body and blood of Omnipotence. The pains taken byProtestants to show from Scripture, Reason and Nature, that Priestscannot change lumps of dough into the body, and bumpers of wine into theblood of their God, are well known and appreciated. But the RomanCatholics are neither to be argued nor laughed out of their 'awfuldoctrine' of the real presence, to which they cling with desperateearnestness. Proselytes are apt to misunderstand, and make sad mistakesabout, that doctrine. Two cases are cited by Hume in his 'Essay of theNatural History of Religion, ' which he announces as 'pleasant stories, though somewhat profane. ' According to one, a Priest gave inadvertently, instead of the sacrament, a counter, which had by accident fallen amongthe holy wafers. The communicant waited patiently for some time, expecting that it would dissolve on his tongue, but finding that itstill remained entire, he took it off. I hope, said he, to the Priest, you have not made a mistake; I hope you have not given me God theFather, he is so hard and tough that there is no swallowing him. Theother story is thus related. A famous General, at that time in theMuscovite Service, having come to Paris for the recovery of his wounds, brought along with him a young Turk whom he had taken prisoner. Some ofthe doctors of the Sorbonne (who are altogether as positive as thedervises of Constantinople) thinking it a pity that the poor Turk shouldbe damned for want of instruction, solicited Mustapha very hard to turnChristian, and promised him for encouragement, plenty of good wine inthis world and paradise in the next. These allurements were too powerfulto be resisted; and therefore having been well instructed andcatechised, he at last agreed to receive the sacraments of baptism andLord's Supper. Nevertheless, the Priest to make everything sure andsolid, still continued his instructions, and began the next day with theusual question, _How many God's are there? None at all_, repliedBenedict, for that was his new name. _How! None at all?_ Cries thePriest. _To be sure_, said the honest proselyte, _you have told me allalong that there it but one God; and yesterday I ate him. _

This is sufficiently ridiculous; and yet if we fairly consider the wholequestion of divinity there will be found no more absurdity in the notionof our Benedict eating the Creator, than in Jews crucifying Him. Bothnotions involve materiality. A God without body, parts, or passions, could no more be nailed upon a cross than taken into the stomach. And ifit be urged there is something awful in the blasphemy of him who talksof swallowing his God, the Author of this Apology can as conscientiouslyurge that there is something very disgusting in the idea of a murderedDeity. 

Locke wrote rather disparagingly of 'many among us, ' who 'will be foundupon inquiry, to fancy God in the shape of a man sitting in heaven, andhave other absurd and unfit conceptions of him. ' As though it werepossible to think of shapeless Being, or as though it were criminal inthe superstitious to believe 'God made man after his own image. ' A'Philosophical Unbeliever, ' who made minced meat of Dr. Priestley'sreasonings on the existence of God, well remarked that 'Theists arealways for turning their God into an overgrown Man. Anthropomorphiteshas long been a term applied to them. They give him hand and eyes, norcan they conceive him otherwise than as a corporeal Being. We make aDeity ourselves, fall down and worship him. It is the molten calf overagain. Idolatry is still practised. The only difference is that now weworship idols of our own imagination before of our hands. ' [37:1]

This is bold language, but if the language of truth and soberness no oneshould take offence at it. That Christians as well as Turks 'have hadwhole sects earnestly contending that the Deity was corporeal and ofhuman shapes, ' is a fact, testified to by Locke, and so firmlyestablished as to defy contradiction. And though every sinceresubscriber to the Thirty Nine Articles must believe, or at least mustbelieve he believes in Deity without body, parts, or passions, it iswell known that 'whole sects' of Christians do even now 'fancy God inthe shape a man sitting in heaven, and entertain other absurd and unfitconceptions of him. '

Mr. Collibeer, who is considered by Christian writers 'a most ingeniousgentleman, ' has told the world in his treatise entitled 'The Knowledgeof God, ' that Deity must have some form, and intimates it may probablybe the spherical; an intimation which has grievously offended manylearned Theists who consider going so far 'an abuse of reason, ' and warnus that 'its extension beyond the assigned boundaries, has proved anample source of error. ' But what the 'assigned boundaries' of reasonare, they don't state, nor by whom 'assigned. ' That if there is a God, He must have some form is self-evident; and why Mr. Collibeer should be'called over the coals' by his less daringly imaginative brethren, forpreferring a spherical to a square or otherwise shaped Deity, is to myunderstanding what God's grace is to their's. 

But admitting the unfitness, and absurdity, and 'blasphemy' of suchconceptions, it is by no means clear that any other conceptions of the'inconceivable' would be an improvement upon them. The Author's seriousand deliberate opinion is, that ascribing to Deity a body analagous toour own, is less ridiculous than affirming he has _no_ body; nor can headmire the wisdom of those Christians who prefer a partless, passionlessGod, to the substantial piece of supernaturalism adored by theirforefathers. Undoubtedly, the matter-God-system has its difficulties, but they are trifles in comparison with those by which thespirit-God-system is encompassed: for, one obvious consequence of faithin bodiless Divinity is, an utter confusion of ideas in those who haveit, as regards possibilities and impossibilities. The Author confidentlysubmits that, no man having 'firm faith' in a Deity--without body partsand passions--can be half so wise as the famous cook of my LordHoppergollop, who said, What is impossible can't be, And never never comes to pass. 

He, moreover, confidently submits that, granting the existence of soutterly incomprehensible a Deity, still such Deity could not have causednature, or matter, unless we deny the palpably true proposition ofSpinoza, to wit--Of things which have nothing in common, one cannot bethe cause of the other. In harmony with this proposition, Atheistscannot admit the supernatural caused the natural; for, between thenatural and the supernatural it is impossible to imagine any thing incommon. 

The universe is an uncaused existence, or it was caused by somethingbefore it. By universe we mean matter, the sum total of things, whenceall proceeds, and whither all returns. No truth is more obviously truethan the truth that matter, or something not matter, exists of itself, and consequently is not an effect, but an uncaused cause of all effects. 

From such conviction, repugnant though it be to vulgar ideas, there isno rational way of escape; for however much we may desire, however muchwe may struggle to believe there was a time when there was nothing, wecannot so believe. Human nature is constituted intuitively orinstinctively to feel the eternity of something. To rid oneself of thatfeeling is impossible. Nature, or something not nature must ever havebeen, is a conclusion to which, what poets call Fate--

 Leads the willing and drags the unwilling. 

But does this undeniable truth make against Atheism? Far from it--sofar, indeed, as to make for it: the reason is no mystery. Of matter wehave ideas clear, precise, and indispensable, whereas, of something notmatter we cannot have any idea whatever, good, bad, or indifferent. TheUniverse is extraordinary, no doubt, but so much of it as acts upon usis perfectly conceivable, whereas, any thing within, without, or apartfrom the Universe is perfectly inconceivable. 

The notion of necessarily existing matter seems to the Author of thisApology fatal to belief in God; that is, if by the word God beunderstood something not matter, for 'tis precisely because priests wereunable to reconcile such belief with the idea of matter's self-existenceor eternity, that they took to imagining a 'First Cause. ' In the'forlorn hope' of clearing the difficulty of necessarily existing_matter_, they assent to a necessarily existing _spirit_; and when thenature of spirit is demanded from these assertors of its existence theyare constrained to avow that it is material or nothing. 

Yes, they are constrained to make directly or indirectly one or other ofthese admissions; for, as between truth and falsehood there is no middlepassage, so between something and nothing there is no intermediateexistence. Hence the serious dilemma of Spiritualists, who gravely tellus their God is a Spirit, and that a Spirit is not any thing, which notany thing or nothing (for the life of us we cannot distinguish betweenthem) 'framed the worlds nay, _created_ as well as framed them. 

If it be granted, for the mere purpose of explanation, that Spirit is anentity, we can frame 'clear and distinct ideas of'--a real though notmaterial existence, surely no man will pretend to say an uncreatedreality called Spirit, is less inexplicable than uncreated Matter. Allcould not have been caused or created unless nothing can be a Cause, thevery notion of which involves the grossest of absurdities. 

'Whatever is produced, ' said Hume, 'without any cause, is produced bynothing; or, in other words, has nothing for its cause. But nothingnever can be a cause no more than it can be something or equal to tworight angles. By the same intuition that we perceive nothing not to beequal to two right angles, or not to be something, we perceive that itcan never be a cause and consequently must perceive that every objecthas a real cause, of its existence. When we exclude all causes we reallydo exclude them, and neither suppose nothing nor the object itself to bethe causes of the existence, and consequently can draw no argument fromthe absurdity of these suppositions to prove the absurdity of thatexclusion. If everything must have a cause, it follows that upon theexclusion of other causes we must accept of the object itself or nothingas causes. But it is the very point in question whether everything musthave a cause or not, and therefore, according to all just reasoningought not to be taken for granted. [40:1]

This reasoning amounts to logical demonstration (if logicaldemonstration there can be) of a most essential truth, which in all ageshas been obstinately set at nought by dabblers in the supernatural. Itdemonstrates that something never was, never can be caused by nothing, which can no more be a cause, properly so called, than 'it can besomething, or equal to two right angles;' and therefore that everythingcould not have had a cause which the reader has seen is the very pointassumed by Theists--the very point on which as a pivot they so merrilyand successfully turn their fine metaphysical theories, and immaterialsystems. 

The universe, quoth they, must have had a cause, and that cause musthave been a First Cause, or cause number one, because nothing can existof itself. Oh, most lame and impotent conclusion! How in consistency canthey declare nothing can exist without a cause in the teeth of their oftrepeated dogma that God is uncaused. If God never commenced to be _He_is an uncaused existence, that is to say, exists without a cause. Thedifference on this point between Theists and Atheists is very palpable. The former say, Spirit can exist without a cause; the latter say Mattercan exist without a cause. Whole libraries of theologic dogma would bedearly purchased by Hume's profound remark--'if everything must have acause, it follows that upon the exclusion of other causes we must acceptof the object itself or of nothing as causes. '

If the God of our Deists and Christians is not matter, what is He? Uponthem devolves the difficult duty of answering that question. They aremorally bound to answer it or make the humiliating confession that they'ignorantly worship;' that with all their boasted certainty as to theexistence of their 'deified error' they can furnish no satisfactory, oreven intelligible account of His [41:1] nature, if indeed a supernaturalor rather Unnatural Being can properly be said to have a nature. 

The author of 'Good Sense' has observed, that names which may be made tomean anything in reality mean nothing. Is not God a name of this class?Our 'state puppet showmen, ' as my Lord Brougham nicknamed Priests, whotalk so much about Gods, forcibly remind one of that ingenious exhibitorof puppets, who, after saying to his juvenile patronisers--'Look to theright, and there you will see the lions a dewouring the dogs, ' wasasked--Which is the lion and which is the dogs?' to which query hereplied, 'Vichever you please, my little dears, it makes no differencevotsomnever. ' For in exactly the same spirit do our ghostly exhibitors, they who set up the state puppet show meet the inquiries of the grownchildren they make so handsomely (again we are under an obligation toLord Brougham) 'to pay for peeping. ' Children of this sort would fainknow what is meant by the doctrines concerning the many 'true Gods' theyhear such precious rigmaroles about in Church and Conventicle, as wellas the many orthodox opinions of that God, whose name is there so often'taken in vain. ' But Priests like the showman in question, answer, inlanguage less inelegant to be sure, but substantially the same, 'Vichever you please, my little dears, it makes no differencevotsomnever. '

He who declared that the word God was invented by philosophers to screentheir own ignorance, taught a valuable truth, though the Author of thisApology never fails mentally to Substitute _quacks_ for _philosophers_. 

Saint Augustin more candid than modern theologians, said, 'God is abeing whom we speak of but whom we cannot describe, and who is superiorto all definitions. ' Atheists on the other hand, as candidly deny thereis any such being. To them it seems that the name God stands fornothing, is the archetype of nothing, explains nothing, and contributesto nothing but the perpetuation of human imbecility, ignorance anderror. To them it represents neither shadow nor substance, neitherphenomenon nor thing, neither what is ideal nor what is real; yet is itthe name without full faith in which there could be no religion. If tothe name God some rational signification cannot be attached away goes, or at least away _ought_ to go, that belief in something supernaturalwhich is 'the fundamental principle of all false metaphysics. ' 'No suchbelief can for a moment be entertained by those who see in nature thecause of all effects, and treat with the contempt it merits, thepreposterous notion that out of nothing at the bidding of something, ofwhich one can make anything, started everything. 

The famous Mr. Law, in his 'Appeal to all that doubt or disbelieve thetruths of the Gospel, ' gratuitously allows 'it is the same impossibilityfor a thing to be created out of nothing as by nothing, ' for whichsensible allowance 'insane philosophy' owes him much. Indeed the dogma, if true, proves all religion false, for it strikes full at belief in aGod, a belief which, it cannot be too often repeated, is to religionwhat blood is to the brain and oxygen to the blood. 

Materialism is hated by priests, because no consistent Materialist canstop short of disbelief in God. He believes in Nature and Nature alone. By Nature he understands unity. The ONE which; includes all, and is all. 

That it pertains to the nature of substance to exist; and that allsubstance is necessarily infinite, we are told by Spinoza, whounderstood by substance that which exists in itself, and is conceivedthrough itself; _i. E. _ the knowledge of which does not require theknowledge of anything antecedent to it. 

This substance of Spinoza is just the matter of Materialists. With himmost likely, with them certainly, matter and substance are convertibleterms. They have no objection to the word substance so long as it is thesign of something substantial; for substantiality implies materiality. Whether we say--Substance exists, and is conceived through itself;_i. E. _ the knowledge of which does not require the knowledge of anythingantecedent to it, or--Matter exists and is conceived through itself;_i. E. _ 'the knowledge of which does not require the knowledge ofanything antecedent to itself'--our meaning is exactly the same. 

To exclude matter from our conception (if it were possible) would be tothink universal existence out of existence, which is tantamount tothinking without anything to think about. The ideas of those who trytheir brains at this odd sort of work, have been well likened to anatmosphere of dust superintended by a whirlwind. They who assume theexistence of an unsubstantial _i. E. _ immaterial First Cause, outrageevery admitted rule and every sound principle of philosophising. Onlypious persons with ideas like unto an atmosphere of dust superintendedby a whirl wind would write books in vindication of the monstrouslyabsurd assumption that there exists an unsubstantial Great First Causeof all substantialities. Nothing can be wilder than the speculations ofsuch 'hair brained' individuals, excepting only the speculations ofthose sharp-sighted enough to see reason and wisdom in them. 

A Great Cause, or a Small Cause, a First Cause, or a Last Cause, involves the idea of real existence, namely, the existence of matter. Bycause of itself, said Spinoza, I understand that which involvesexistence, or that the nature of which can only be considered asexistent. And who does not so understand Cause? Why Gillespie and othereminently dogmatic Christian writers whose Great First Cause cannot beconsidered an entity, because they assert, yes, expressly assert itsimmateriality. 

If Nature is all, and all is Nature, nothing but itself could ever haveexisted, and of course nothing but itself can be supposed ever to havebeen capable of causing. To cause is to act, and though body withoutaction is conceivable, action without body is not. Neither can twoInfinites be supposed to tenant one Universe. Only 'most religiousphilosophers' can pretend to acknowledge the being of an infinite Godco-existent with an infinite universe. 

Atheists are frequently asked--What moves matter? to which question, _nothing_ is the true and sufficient answer. Matter moves matter. Ifasked how we know it does, our answer is, because we see it do so, whichis more than mind imaginers can say of their 'prime mover. ' They tell usmind moves matter; but none save the _second sighted_ among them eversaw mind; and if they never saw mind, they never could have seen matterpushed about by it. They babble about mind, but nowhere does mind existsave in their mind; that is to say, nowhere but nowhere. Ask thesebroad-day dreamers where mind is, _minus_ body? and very acutely theyanswer, body is the mind and mind is the body. 

That this is neither joke nor slander, we will show by reference toNo. 25 of 'The Shepherd, ' a clever and well known periodical, whoseeditor, [44:1] in reply to a correspondent of the 'chaotic' tribe, said 'As to the question--where is magnetism without the magnet? Weanswer, magnetism is the magnet, and the magnet is magnetism. ' If so, body is the mind and the mind is body; and our Shepherd, if asked, 'Where is mind without the body?' to be consistent, should answer, bodyis the mind and the mind is the body. Both these answers are true orboth are false; and it must be allowed--

 Each lends to each a borrowed charm, Like pearls upon an Ethiop's arm. 

Ask the 'Shepherd' where is mind without the body? and if not at issuewith himself, he must reply, mind is the man and man is the mind. 

If this be so, --if the mind is the man and the man is the mind, whichnone can deny who say magnetism is the magnet and the magnetmagnetism--how, in Reason's name, can they be different, or how can the'Shepherd' consistently pretend to distinguish between them: yet he doesso. He writes about the spiritual part of man as though he reallybelieved there is such apart. Not satisfied, it would seem, with body, like Nonentitarians of vulgarest mould, he tenants it with Soul orSpirit, or Mind, which Soul, or Spirit, or Mind, according to his ownshowing, is nothing but body in action: in other terms, organised matterperforming vital functions. Idle declamation against 'fact mongers' wellbecomes such self-stultifying dealers in fiction. Abuse of'experimentarians' is quite in keeping with the philosophy of those whomaintain the reality of mind in face of their own strange statement, that magnetism is the magnet and the magnet magnetism. 

But we deny that magnetism is the magnet. Those words magnetism andmagnet do not, it is true, stand for two things, but one thing: that oneand only thing called matter. The magnet is an existence; _i. E. _, thatwhich moves. Magnetism is not an existence, but phenomenon, or, if youplease, phenomena. It is the effect of which magnetic body is theimmediate and obvious cause. 

Cause implies action; and till Nonentitarians can explain how nothingmay contrive to cause something, they should assume the virtue ofmodesty, even if they have it not. To rail at 'fact mongers' is, doubtless, far easier than to overturn facts themselves. The 'Shepherd'calls Atheists 'Chaotics' and Materialism 'the philosophy of lunacy, 'which is a very free and very easy way of 'Universalising. ' Butarguments grounded on observation and experience are not to be bornedown by hard names. Man, like the magnet, is something--he acts. Dustand ashes he was; dust and ashes he will be. --He may be touched, andtasted, and seen, and smelt. In the immateriality of _his_ compositionno one believes; and none but Nonentitarians pretend to do so. Hethinks--thinking is the very condition of his existence. To think is tolive. To the sum total of vital manifestations we apply the term mind. To call mind matter, or matter mind, is ridiculous--_genuine_ lunacy. Itwould be as wise to call motion matter and wind up the spiritual work bymaking nothing of both. The man who ran half round our planet in searchof his soul did not succeed in finding it. How should he when there isno such thing as soul. 

To evade the charge of Materialism, said Dr. Engledue, we(Phrenologists) content ourselves with stating that the immaterial makesuse of the material to show forth its powers. What is the result ofthis? We have the man of theory and believer in supernaturalismquarrelling with the man of fact and supporter of Materialism. We havetwo parties; the one asserting that man possesses a _spirit_ superaddedto, but not inherent in, the brain--added to it, yet having no necessaryconnexion with it--producing material changes, yet immaterial--destituteof any of the known properties of matter--in fact an _immaterialsomething_ which in one word means nothing, producing all the cerebralfunctions of man, yet not localised--not susceptible of proof; the otherparty contending that the belief in spiritualism fetters and ties downphysiological investigation--that man's intellect is prostrated by thedomination of metaphysical speculation--that we have no evidence of theexistence of an essence, and that organised matter is all that isrequisite to produce the multitudinous manifestations of human and brutecerebration. 

We rank ourselves with the second party, and conceive that we must ceasespeaking of 'the mind, ' and discontinue enlisting in our investigationsa spiritual essence, the existence of which cannot be proved, but whichtends to mystify and perplex a question sufficiently clear if we confineourselves to the consideration of organised matter--its forms--itschanges--and its aberrations from normal structure. [46:1]

The eccentric Count de Caylus, when on his death-bed, was visited bysome near relations and a pious Bishop, who hoped that under such tryingcircumstances he would manifest some concern respecting those'spiritual' blessings which, while in health, he had uniformly treatedwith contempt. After a long pause he broke silence by saying, 'Ah, friends, I see you are anxious about my soul;' whereupon they pricked uptheir ears with delight; before, however, any reply could be made, theCount added, '_but the fact is I have not got one, and really my goodfriends, you must allow me to know best_. '

If people in general had one tenth the good sense of this _impious_Count, the fooleries of spiritualism would at once give place to thephilosophy of Materialism; and none would waste time in talking orwriting about nonentities. All would know that what theologians callsometimes spirit, sometimes soul, and sometimes mind, is an imaginaryexistence. All would know that the terms _immaterial something_, do invery truth mean _nothing_. Count de Caylus died as became a manconvinced that soul is not an entity, and that upon the dissolution ofour 'earthly tabernacle, ' the particles composing it cease to performvital functions, and return to the shoreless ocean of Eternal Being. Pietists may be shocked by such _nonchalance_ in the face of their 'grimmonster, ' but philosophers will admire an indifference to inevitableconsequences resulting from profoundest love of truth and contempt ofsuperstition. Count de Caylus was a Materialist, and no Materialist canconsistently feel the least alarm at the approach of what religionistshave every reason to consider the 'king of terrors. ' Believers in thereality of immaterial existence cannot be 'proper' Materialists. Obviously, therefore, no believers in the reality of 'God' can be _bonafide_ Materialists, for 'God' is a name signifying something or nothing;in other terms, matter, or that which is not matter. If the latter, toMaterialists the name is meaningless--sound without sense. If theformer, they at once pronounce it a name too many; because it expressesnothing that their word MATTER does not express better. 

Dr. Young held in horror the Materialist's 'universe of dust. ' But thereis nothing either bad or contemptible in dust--man is dust--all will bedust. A _dusty_ universe, however _shocked_ the poetic Doctor, whosewritings analogise with--

 Rich windows that exclude the light, And passages that lead to nothing. 

A universe of nothing was more to his taste than a universe of dust, andhe accordingly amused himself with the 'spiritual' work of imaginingone, and called its builder 'God. '

The somewhat ungentle 'Shepherd' cordially sympathises with Dr. Young inhis detestation of 'the Materialist's universe' of dust, and is sorelypuzzled to know how mere dust contrives to move without the assistanceof 'an immaterial power between the particles;' as if he supposedanything could be between everything--or nothing be able to movesomething. Verily this gentleman is as clever a hand at 'darkeningcounsel by words without knowledge' as the cleverest of those he ratesso soundly. 

We observe that motion is caused by body, and apart from body no one canconceive the idea of motion. Local motion may, but general motion cannotbe accounted for. The Shepherd contends there is nothing more mysteriousthan motion. There he is right; and had he said nothing is _less_mysterious than motion he would have been equally so. 

For telling these unpalatable truths the Atheist is bitterly detested. 'The Shepherd' is a most unorthodox kind of Pantheist; yet even he doesnot scruple to swell the senseless cry against 'Godless infidels, ' whomhe calls an almost infinite variety of bad names, and among othershocking crimes accuses them of propounding a 'dead philosophy. ' Yet thedifference between his Pantheism and our Atheism is only perceptible tothe microscopic eye of super-sublimated spiritualism. The subjoined isoffered to the reader's notice as a sample of Pantheism so closelyresembling Atheism, that, like the two Sosias in the play, todistinguish them is difficult:

'What Coleridge meant by the motto (all Theology depends on masteringthe term nature) concerns us not. We appropriate the motto, but we donot profess to appropriate it in the same sense as Coleridgeappropriated it. Every man must appropriate it for himself. Coleridgeperceived what every thinking mind has perceived--the difficulty ofbelieving in two self-determining powers, viz. , God and Nature, as alsothe consequences of regarding them as identical. If Nature be one powerand God another power, and if God be not responsible for what Naturedoes, then Nature is a self-subsisting God. If God and Nature beesteemed one universal existence, this is Pantheism, which isdenominated an accursed doctrine by the disciples of Sectarianism, andformed no part of the creed, of the great dialectician of modern times. The attempt to separate God from Nature will mistify the clearest head:not even Coleridge could wade the depths of this vulgar Theology. Isthere any man who can rest satisfied in the faith of two independentpowers who exist together in any other sense than the two polar energiesof a magnet, which are really one? No: and men are afraid to regard themas one. On the one hand they are puzzled to understand an unintelligibleabsurdity, and on the other, they are afraid to admit a simple truismwhich leads to the abolition of all ceremonial forms, and lipprofessions of religion, and is execrated by priests and theiraccomplices on this very account. We do not pretend to understandanything. Every subject whatsoever is too high, too deep, and too broadfor us. But coming into a world where men act upon certain modes ofreasoning, which are unsatisfactory to our minds, we battle immediatelywith these men, like an animalcule thrown into a glass of water amongstother animalcules of opposite principles, and in doing so we act fromthe impulse within which is our sole authority--that impulse within isthe preference we give to a mode of reasoning which begins by regardingthe existing of every kind and, degree as a 'perfect unity, ' and makingthe unity, responsible for every mode--the cause of every mode. ' [49:1]That is to say, dealing with it as what it is, the only existence; theone, or all and in all. Can Atheists object to that? No, surely, forthey uniformly thus reason with respect to Nature; and unless traitorsto their own principles, cannot object to Pantheistical philosophy _ashere laid down_. Atheists say, Nature never had an Author--so doPantheists of the 'Shepherd' school. Atheists say Nature is at once thewomb and grave and cause and effect of all phenomena--so do they. Atheists say 'death is nothing, and nothing death;' all matter breathingthe breath of life--so do they. Indeed, notwithstanding their talk aboutGod and Devil, they think Nature both, which amounts to denying both. Can Atheists do more? or can Pantheists do so much without themselvesbeing Atheists?

But the Rev. Mr. Smith is no Atheist; at least he makes no profession ofAtheism. _Au contraire_, he makes fine sport with those who do. Himselfa Pantheist of the all-God school, he took to calling Atheists 'uglynames, ' as if quite innocent that no 'thinking mind' can fail toperceive the downright lunacy, or something worse, of supposing a pin tochoose on the score of piety, between universal Deity and no Deity atall. The 'Shepherd' of a new philosophic flock should have known betterthan to attempt the reform of 'vulgar theology' by setting forth themystical nonsense of 'vulgar' Pantheism. All falsehood is 'vulgar'; butthe most 'vulgar' of falsehood is that which assumes the convenient garbof transcendentalism, with a view to throw dust in the eyes of 'vulgar'lookers-on. If Pantheists of this reverend gentleman's school areneither sophists nor simpletons, Materialism is neither true nor false. They do not plainly write down philosophy of so strangely negative akind; that would be too ridiculous; but every reader of the 'Shepherd'knows that, in their way, they cleverly demonstrate all doctrine--theirown of course excepted--true _and_ false, which, no one need mount apair of 'universal' spectacles to see, comes to neither true _nor_false. Spiritualism receives at their hands no better treatment thanMaterialism, nor Southcottianism than either. Southcottianism (they say)is true and false; Materialism is true and false; Spiritualism is trueand false: in brief, all doctrine, positive or negative, faithful orunfaithful, is true and false, except the doctrine of Pantheism aliasUniversalism, which is, bye and bye, to supersede every other. Accordingto this mystically wise, but rather inconsistent school, Atheists arestupid as Christians, Christians stupid as Mohammedans, and Mohammedansstupid as nearly everybody else. These men are peculiarly fitted to makein the world of intellect the best possible 'arrangements for generalconfusion. ' Atheists in all but good sense, and seemingly withoutknowing it, they contrive to mix up, with skill worthy of betteremployment, a very novel and amusing species of philosophicalhodge-podge. Their Reverend leader or 'Shepherd' was wont to rail mostfuriously against dogmatists, especially those of the Atheistic sort;but his own dogmatism is at least a match for theirs. He did more thandogmatize when combatting Materialism, he from ignorance or design, libelled it by putting, according to a custom 'more honoured in thebreach than the observance, ' words into the mouths of Materialists thatno real Materialist could utter. Take an example. In the periodical justreferred to and quoted from, [50:1] are these words:--'The mode of(matter's) existence is the only subject in dispute. The Materialistsays, it is an infinite collection of dead unintelligent particles ofsand; the spiritualist, that it is the visible and tangible developmentof an infinite, eternal, omnipresent, thinking, sentient mind. ' Now, thetruth is, Materialists contend that matter _as a whole_ cannot instrictness be considered either dead or living, intelligent ornon-intelligent, but simply matter; which matter when in certainwell-known states is called dead, and when in other equally well-knownstates is called living. If where motion is there is life, then there isno dead matter; for all matter, or at least all matter of which we haveexperience, moves. To charge upon Materialists the dogma of matter'sdeadness is a paltry trick which a writer like Mr. Smith should disdainto practice. Nor does it become him to lecture Atheists about theirdogmatism, while from his own published writings can be adduced suchpassages as the following:--

'We know that the two principal attributes of matter are visibility andtangibility, and these two properties are purely spiritual orimmaterial. Thus resistance is nothing but that mysterious power we callrepulsion--a power which fills the whole universe--which holds the sun, moon, and stars in its hand, and yet is invisible. '

This is what our Rev. Pantheist calls one of Spiritualism's 'splendidarguments, ' and splendidly absurd it certainly is; quite equal, considered as a provocative of mirth, to Robert Owen's sublimesteffusions about that very mysterious and thoroughly incomprehensiblepower which 'directs the atom and controuls the aggregate of nature. 'But the argument though 'splendid, ' is false. Who is ignorant thatresistance is _not_ a power at all, though we properly enough give thename resistance to one of matter's phenomena. Only half crazedSpiritualists would confound phenomena with things by which they areexhibited. Matter under certain circumstances resists, and under certainother circumstances attracts. But neither repulsion nor attractionexists, though we see every day of our lives that matter does repel anddoes attract. Its doing so proves it is able to do so, and provesnothing more. Mr. Smith says, 'if we want repose for our minds upon thissubject we may find it; but it can only be found in the universal mind. 'He does not however explain the co-existence of universal mind withuniversal matter. He does not tell us how two universals could find roomin one universe. 

'We are gravely assured (by spiritualising Pantheists among the rest)that God is something out of time and space; but since our knowledge isintuition comprehended under conception, we cannot have any knowledge ofthat which is not received into the imaginary recipients of time andspace, and consequently God is not an entity. 

'But here comes the jugglery--reason forms the idea of the soul or asubstance out of nature, by connecting substance and accident intoinfinite and absolute substance. What is that verbiage, but that thereason gives the name of soul to something that does not exist at all?'

'Reason forms the idea of God or of Supreme Intelligence out of Nature, by connecting action and reaction into infinite and absoluteconcurrence. What is God out of Nature? Where is out? Where is God? Whatis God?--an absolute nothing. '

'For an imagination to exist there must be two properties or qualitiescoming in contact with each other to produce that imagination. For thesetwo properties or qualities to exist there must be matter for them toexist in; and for matter to exist there must be space for it to existin, and so on. Matter might exist without two different properties toproduce an imagination; but neither two properties nor one property canexist without matter for it to exist in. Man may exist for a time as hedoes when he is dead without an imagination; but the imagination cannotexist without the material man. Matter cannot become non-existent, butthe imagination can and does become so. Matter therefore is the realityand the imagination a nonentity, an unsubstantial idea; or animagination only. ' [52:1]

The anonymous writer of the passages here given within inverted commasclearly draws the line of demarcation between the real and the unreal. His remarks on imagination are specially important. Theologians do notseem to be aware that imagination is a modification of mind, and minditself a modification of sensibility--no sensations--no thought--nolife. Though awkwardly expressed, there is truth in the dogma ofGassendi--_ideas are only transformed sensations. _ All attempts toconceive sensibility without organs of sense are vain. As profitablymight we labour to think of motion where nothing exists to be moved, assensibility where there is no organ of sense. We often see organs voidof sensibility, but who ever saw, or who can imagine sensibilityindependent of organs? Pantheists and other Divinitarians write aboutmind as if it were an existence; nay, they claim, for it the first placeamong existences, according to 'mere matter' the second. The 'Shepherd'plainly tells us mind is a _primary_ and matter a _secondary_ existence. Having conjured up an Universal Mind God, it was natural he should tryto establish the supremacy of mind--but though a skilful logician hewill be unable to do so. Experience is against him. On experience ofnatural operations Materialists base their conclusion that matterwithout mind is possible, and mind without matter is impossible. It hasbeen proved that even the modification of mind called imagination isindebted for all its images, yea, for its very existence as imagination, to the material world. 

D'Alembert states in the Discourse prefixed to the French Encyclopaediathat 'the objects about which our minds are occupied are eitherspiritual or material, and the media employed for this purpose are ourideas either directly received or derived from reflection'--whichreflection he tells us 'is of two kinds, according as it is employed inreasoning on the objects of our direct ideas, or in studying them asmodels for imitation. ' And then he tells us 'the imagination is acreative faculty, and the mind, before it attempts to create, begins byreasoning upon what it sees and knows. ' He lauds the metaphysicaldivision of things into Material and Spiritual, appending however tosuch laudation these remarkable words--'With the Material and Spiritualclasses of existence, philosophy is equally conversant; but as forimagination, her imitations are imitations entirely confined to thematerial world. '

Des Cartes, in his second 'Meditation, ' says--_Imaginari nihil aliud estquam rei corporeos figuram seu imaginem contemplari_--which sentenceindicates that he agreed with D'Alembert as to the exclusive limitationof imagination to things material and sensible. 

The same opinion seems to have been held by Locke, who in the concludingchapter of his 'Essay on the Human Understanding, ' states as somethingcertain, and therefore beyond dispute, that 'the understanding can onlycompass, first--the nature of things as they are in themselves, theirrelations and manner of operation--or secondly, that which man ought todo, as a rational and voluntary agent, for the attainment of any end, especially happiness--or thirdly, the ways and means by which theknowledge of both the one and the other of these is attained andcommunicated. '

Adam Smith too, in book 5, c. 1, of his 'Wealth of Nations, ' assures usthe ancient Greek philosophy was divided, into three branches--Physics, Ethics, and Logic; and after praising such general division ofphilosophy, as being perfectly agreeable to the nature of things, saysthat, 'as the human, mind and the Deity, in whatever their essence maybe supposed to consist, are parts of the great system, of the universe, and parts too, productive of the most important effects, whatever wastaught in the ancient schools of Greece concerning their nature, made apart of the system of Physics. '

Dr. Campbell, in his 'Philosophy of Rhetoric, ' ventures to assign 'localhabitation, ' as well as 'name' to spirit itself. Nay, he makes somethingof Deity, and the Soul; for spirit, says he, which here comprises onlythe Supreme Being and the human Soul, is surely as much included underthe idea of natural object as body is, and is knowable to thephilosopher purely in the same way--by observation and experience. 

It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of theseopinions--they are eminently worthy of attention. If God is aspirit--and spirit 'is surely as much a natural object as body is'--theidea of something supernatural cannot for one instant be entertained. IfGod is really no more than a 'part' of the great system of the universe, to immaterialise Him is absurd, inconsistent, and idolatrous. Let it begranted that God is 'part of nature, and a part too, productive of mostimportant effects;' and what Logician will be fool-hardy enough todeclare Him without body, parts, or passions?

Nor are Locke's _dicta_ as to the compass of the understanding easier tobe explained away than these of Dr. Campbell and Adam Smith. If wecannot know more than 'the nature of things as they are in themselves, 'their relations, manner of operation, &c. Only ignorant or cunning menwill pretend acquaintance with the supernatural. That nothing naturalcan possibly conceive what is above nature is indeed so palpably true asto deserve a place among philosophical axioms. Imagination itself, however lofty, wild, or daring its flights, cannot quit theuniverse--matter is its prison, where, like Sterne's starling, it is'caged and can't get out. ' Fortunately, however, imagination, though aprisoner, has abundance of room to legitimately exercise itself in. But, is it not obvious that if, as Des Cartes and D'Alembert contended, the'imitations of imagination are imitations entirely confined to thematerial world, ' all conceits about a Supernatural somebody, orSupernatural somebodies, are necessarily false, because of purelynatural origin, and should be viewed as at best 'mere cobwebs oflearning, admirable indeed, for the fineness of the thread and work, butof no substance or profit. ' [54:1]

It is unfortunate for Theologians that the fundamental principle oftheir 'science' either cannot be comprehended, or, if comprehended, cannot be reconciled with any known principle of nature. 'God is, ' theypompously declare; but what He is they are unable to tell us, withoutcontradicting themselves and each other. Some say God must be material;some say, nay, He must be no such thing; some will have Him spiritual, others immaterial, others again neither spiritual nor material, norimmaterial, nor even conceivable. Some say, if a Spirit, He can only beknown by His place and figure; some not. Some call Him the author ofSin, some the permitter of sin, while some are sure He could notconsistently, with his own perfections, either authorize sin or grant tosinners a permit. Some say He made the Devil, others that the Most Lowbedevil'd himself; others that He created Him angelic and upright, butcould not keep him so. Some say He hardens men's hearts, others thatthey harden their own hearts; others again, that to harden men's heartsis the Devil's peculiar and exclusive privilege. Some say He hasprepared a Hell for all wicked people, others that Hell will receivemany good as well as tricked, while others cannot believe either thejust or the unjust, the faithful or the unfaithful, will be consigned toperdition and made to endure torments unutterable by a God 'whose tendermercies are over all his works. ' Some affirm His omnipotency, some denyit; some say He is no respecter of persons, some the reverse. Some sayHe is Immensity, others that He fills Immensity; others that He don'tfill anything, though 'the Heaven, of Heavens cannot contain Him;'others again, that He neither contains nor is contained, but 'dwells onhis own thoughts. ' Some say He created matter out of nothing; some sayit is quite a mistake--inasmuch as creation meant bringing order out ofchaos. Some say He is not one person, but three persons--the Father, theSon, and the Holy Ghost, which together constitute Godhead; others thatHe is 'one and indivisible, ' while others believe Him 'our father whichart in heaven, ' but will have nothing to do with the Son and the HolyGhost, Unitarians, for example, one of whose popular preachers in thetown of Manchester, was about twelve months ago charged with having inthe course of a single sermon 'killed, two Gods, one Devil, and slackedout Hell Fire. '

The names of Newton and Clarke are held in great esteem by all who arefamiliar with the history of mechanical and metaphysical philosophy. Asa man of science, there is no individual, ancient or, modern, who wouldnot suffer by comparison with Sir Isaac Newton; while common consent hasassigned to Dr. Samuel Clarke the first place among religiousmetaphysicians. It would be difficult, if not impossible; to cite anyother Theists of better approved reputation than these two, andtherefore we introduce them to the reader's notice in this place; for asthey ranked among the most philosophic of Theists, it might be expectedthat their conceptions of Deity, would be clear, satisfactory, anddefinite. --Let us see, then, _in their own writings_, what thoseconceptions were. 

Newton conceived God to be one and the same for ever, and everywhere, not only by his own virtue or energy, but also in virtue of hissubstance--Again, 'All things are contained in him and move in him, butwithout reciprocal action. ' (_sed sine mutua passione_) God feelsnothing from the movements of bodies; nor do they experience anyresistance from his universal presence. [56:1]

Pause reader, and demand of yourself whether such a conception of Deityis either clear, satisfactory, or definite, --God. Is _one_. --Verygood--but one _what_? From the information, 'He is the same for ever andeverywhere, ' we conclude that Newton thought him a Being. Here however, matter stops the way; for the idea of Being is in all of us inseparablyassociated with the idea of substance. When told that God is an 'ImmenseBeing, ' without parts, and consequently unsubstantial, we try to thinkof such a Being; but in vain. Reason puts itself in a _quandary_, themoment it labours to realise an idea of absolute nothingness; yetmarvellous to relate, Newton did distinctly declare his Deity 'totallydestitute of body, ' and urged that _fact_ as a _reason_ why He cannot beeither seen, touched, or understood, and also as a _reason_ why He oughtnot to be adored under any corporeal figure!

The proper function of 'Supernaturality or Wonder, ' according toPhrenologists, is to create a belief in the reality of supernaturalbeings, and begets fondness for news, particularly if extravagant. Mostlikely then, such readers of our Apology as have that organ 'large' willbe delighted with Newton's rhodomontade about a God who resists nothing, feels nothing, and yet with condescension truly divine, not onlycontains all things, but permits them to move in His motionless and'universal presence'; for 'news' more extravagant, never fell from thelips of an idiot, or adorned the pages of a prayer-book. 

By the same great _savan_, we are taught that God governs all, not asthe soul of the world, but as the Lord and sovereign of all things; thatit is in consequence of His sovereignty He is called the Lord God, theUniversal Emperor--that the word God is relative, and relates itselfwith slaves--and that the Deity is the dominion or the sovereignty ofGod, not over his own body, as those think who look upon God as the soulof the world, but over slaves--from all which _slavish_ reasoning, aplain man who had not been informed it was concocted by Europe's petphilosopher, would infallibly conclude some unfortunate lunatic hadgiven birth to it. That there is no creature now tenanting Bedlam whowould or could scribble purer nonsense about God than this of Newton's, we are well convinced--for how could the most frenzied of brains imagineanything more repugnant to every principle of good sense than aself-existent, eternal, omnipotent, omnipresent Being, creator of allthe worlds, who acts the part of 'universal emperor, ' and plays upon aninfinitely large scale, the same sort of game as Nicholas of Russia, orMohammed of Egypt plays upon a small scale. There cannot be slaverywhere there is no tyranny, and to say as Newton did, that we stand inthe same relation to a universal God, as a slave does to his earthlymaster, is practically to accuse such God, at reason's bar, of_tyranny_. If the word of God is relative, and relates itself withslaves, it incontestably follows that all human beings are slaves, andDeity is by such reasoners degraded into the character of universalslave-driver. Really theologians and others who declaim so bitterlyagainst 'blasphemers, ' and take such very stringent measures to punish'infidels, ' who speak or write of their God, should seriously considerwhether the worst, that is, the least religious of infidel writers, everpenned a paragraph so disparaging to the character of that God theyaffect to adore, as the last quoted paragraph of Newton's. If even itcould be demonstrated that there _is_ a super-human Being, it cannot beproper to clothe him in the noblest human attributes--still less can itbe justifiable in pigmies, such as we are, to invest Him with odiousattributes belonging only to despots ruling over slaves. Besides, howcan we imagine a God who is 'totally destitute of body and of corporealfigure, ' to have any kind of attributes? Earthly emperors we know to besubstantial and common-place sort of beings enough, but is it not sheerabuse of reason to argue as though the character of God were at allanalogous to theirs; or rather, is it not a shocking abuse of ourreasoning faculties to employ them at all about a Being whose existence, if it really have an existence, is perfectly enigmatical, and allowed tobe so by those very men who pretend to explain its character andattributes? We find no less a sage than Newton explicitly declaring asincontestable truth, that God exists necessarily--that the samenecessity obliges him to exist always and everywhere--that he is alleyes, all ears, all brains, all arms, all feeling, all intelligence, allaction--that he exists in a mode by no means corporeal, and yet thissame sage, in the self-same paragraph, acknowledges God is _totallyunknown to us_. 

Now, we should like to be informed by what _reasonable_ right Newtoncould pen a long string of 'incontestible truths, ' such as are hereselected from his writings, with respect to a Being of whom, by his ownconfession, he had not a particle of knowledge. Surely it is not thepart of a wise man to write about that which is 'totally unknown' tohim, and yet that is precisely what Newton did, when he wrote about God. 

There is, however, one remark of his respecting the God he thoughtnecessarily existed, worthy of notice, which is, that 'human beingsrevere and adore Gad on account of his (supposed) sovereignty, andworship him like his slaves;' for to all _but_ worshippers, the practiceas well as principle of worship does appear pre-eminently slavish. Indeed, the Author has always found himself unable to dissociate theidea of worshipping beings or things of which no one has the most remoteconception, from that of genuine hypocrisy. Christians despise the rudeHeathen for praying to a Deity of wood or stone, whom he soundly cudgelsif his prayer is not granted; and yet their own treatment of Jehovah, though rather more respectful, is equally ridiculous. When praying, theylay aside truth, sincerity, and sanity. Their language is the languageof fawning, lying, imbecile, cowardly slaves. Intending to exalt, theydebase the imaginary object of their adoration. They presume Him to beunstable as themselves, and no less greedy of adulation thanThemistocles the Athenian, who, when presiding at certain games of hiscountrymen, was asked which voice pleased him best? _'That, '_ repliedhe, _'which sings my praises. '_ They love to enlarge on 'the moralefficacy of prayer, ' and would have us think their 'omnipotent tyrant'best pleased with such of his 'own image' as best 'sing his praises. ' Oftheir 'living God' they make an amplified Themistocles, and thus reduce(conscientiously, no doubt, ) the Creator to a level with His creature. 

The author is without God; but did he believe there is one, still wouldhe scorn to _affect_ for Him a love and a reverence that nothing naturalcan feel for the supernatural; still would he scorn to _carry favour_with Deity by hypocritical and most fulsome adulation. 

Finely did Eschylus say of Aristides--

 To be and not to seem is this man's maxim; His mind reposes on its proper wisdom, And wants no other praise. 

Tell us, ye men of mystery, shall a God need praises beneath the dignityof a man? Shall the Creator of Nature act less worthily than one of hiscreatures? To do God homage, we are quite aware, is reckoned byChristians among their highest duties. But, nevertheless, it seems to usimpossible that any one can love an existence or creature of which henever had any experience. Love is a feeling generated in the humanbreast, by certain objects that strike the sense--and in no otherconceivable way can love be generated! But God, according to Newton, isneither an _object_ nor a _subject_, and though, all eyes, all ears, allbrains, all arms, all feeling, all intelligence, and all action, he is_totally unknown to us_. If Christians allow this to be a truedescription of the God they worship, we wish to understand how they canlove Him so vehemently as they affect to do--or how they can pay anyother than _lip_ homage to so mysterious a Deity? It is usual for slavesto feign an affection for their masters that they do not, cannotfeel--but that believers in a God should imagine that he who 'searchethall hearts, ' can be ignorant of what is passing in theirs, or make thetremendous mistake of supposing that their _lip homage_, or interestedexpressions of love, are not _properly_ appreciated by the Most HighGod, and 'Universal Emperor, ' is indeed very strange. To overreach ordeceive a God who created the heavens and the earth, is altogetherbeyond the power of puny mortals. Let not therefore those who bend theknee, while the heart is unbent, and raise the voice of thankfuldevotion, while all within is frost and barrenness, fancy they havestolen a march upon their Deity; for surely _if_ the lord liveth, hejudgeth rightly of these things. But it were vain to expect that thosewho think God is related to his creatures as a despot is related to hisslaves, will hope to please that God by aught save paltry, cringing, anddishonestly despicable practices. Yet, no other than a despotic God hasthe great Newton taught us to adore--no other than mere slaves of such aGod, has he taught us to deem ourselves. So much for the Theism ofEurope's chief religious philosopher. Turn we now to the Theism ofDr. Samuel Clarke. 

He wrote a book about the being and attributes of God, in which heendeavoured to establish, first, that 'something has existed from alleternity;' second, that 'there has existed from eternity some oneunchangeable and independent Being;' third, that 'such unchangeable andindependent Being, which has existed from all eternity, without anyexternal cause of its existence, must be necessarily existent;' fourth, that 'what is the substance or essence of that Being, which isnecessarily existing, or self-existent, we have no idea--neither is itpossible for us to comprehend it;' fifth, that 'the self-existent Beingmust of necessity be eternal as well as infinite and omnipresent;'sixth, that 'He must be one, and as he is the self-existent and originalcause of all things, must be intelligent;' seventh, that 'God is not anecessary agent, but a Being endowed with liberty and choice;' eighth, that 'God is infinite in power, infinite in wisdom, and, as He issupreme cause of all things, must of necessity be a Being infinitelyjust, truthful, and good--thus comprising within himself all such moralperfections as becomes the supreme governor and judge of the world. '

These are the leading dogmas contained in Clarke's book--and as they aredeemed invincible by a respectable, though not very numerous, section ofTheists, we will briefly examine the more important of them. 

The dogma that _something has existed from all eternity_, as alreadyshown, is perfectly intelligible, and may defy contradiction--but thereal difficulty is to satisfactorily determine _what that something is_. Matter exists; and as no one can even imagine its non-existence orannihilation, the materialist infers _that_ must be the eternalsomething. Newton as well as Clarke thought the everlasting Beingdestitute of body, and consequently without parts, figure, motion, divisibility, or any other such properties as we find in matter--_ergo_, they did not believe matter to be the eternal something; but if notmatter, again we ask, what can it be? Of bodilessness or incorporiety noone, even among those who say their God is incorporeal, pretend to havean idea. Abady insisted that _the question is not what incorporiety is, but whether it be?_ Well, we have no objection to parties taking thatposition, because there is nothing more easy than to dislodge those whothink fit to do so--for this reason: the advocates of nothing, orincorporiety, can no more establish by arguments drawn from unquestionedfacts, that incorporiety _is_ than they can clearly show _what_ it is. It has always struck the Author as remarkable that men should soobstinately refuse to admit the possibility of matter's necessaryexistence, while they readily embrace, not only as possibly, butcertainly, true, the paradoxical proposition that a something, havingnothing in common with anything, is necessarily existent. Matter iseverywhere around and about us. We ourselves are matter--all our ideasare derived _from_ matter--and yet such is the singularly perversecharacter of human intellect that, while resolutely denying thepossibility of matter's eternity, an immense number of our race embracethe incredible proposition that matter was created in time by anecessarily existing Being who is without body, parts, passions, orpositive nature!

The second dogma informs us that this always-existing Being isunchangeable and independent. One unavoidable inference from which isthat Deity is itself immoveable, as well as unconnected with theuniverse--for a moveable Being must be a changeable Being by the veryfact of its motion; while an independent Being must be motiveless, as itis evident all motives result from our relationship to things external;but an independent Being can have no relations, and consequently mustact without motives. Now, as no human action can be imagined withoutnecessary precursors in the shape of motives, reasoning from analogy, itseems impossible that the unchangeable and independent Being, Clarke wasso sure must ever have existed, could have created the universe, seeinghe could have had no _motive_ or _inducement_ to create it. 

The third dogma may be rated a truism--it being evidently true that athing or Being, which has existed from eternity without any externalcause of its existence, must be self-existent; but of course that dogmaleaves the disputed question, namely, whether matter, or something notmatter, is self-existent, just where it found it. 

The fourth dogma is not questioned by Atheists, as they are quiteconvinced that it is not possible for us to comprehend the substance oressence of an immaterial Being. 

The other dogmas we need not enlarge upon, as they are little more thanrepetitions or expansions of the preceding one. Indeed, much of theforegoing would be superfluous, were it not that it serves toillustrate, so completely and clearly, Theistical absurdities. The onlydogma worth overturning, of the eight here noticed, is the _first_, forif that fall, the rest must fall with it. If, for example, the reader isconvinced that it is more probable matter is mutable as regards _form_, but eternal as regards _essence_, than that it was willed into existenceby a Being said to be eternal and immutable, he at once becomes anAtheist--for if matter always was, no Being could have been before it, nor can any exist after it. It is because men in general are shocked atthe idea of matter without beginning and without end, that they soreadily embrace the idea of a God, forgetting that if the idea ofeternal matter shock our sense of the _probable_, the idea of an eternalBeing who existed _before_ matter, _if well considered_, is sufficientto shock all sense of the _possible_. 

The man who is contented with the universe, who stops at _that_ has atleast the satisfaction of dealing with something tangible--but he whodon't find the universe large enough for him to expatiate in, and whirlshis brains into a belief that there is a necessarily existing somethingbeyond the limits of a world _unlimited_, is in a mental condition noreasonable man need envy. 

Of the universe, or at least so much of it as our senses have beenoperated upon by, we have conceptions clear, vivid, and distinct; butwhen Dr. Clarke tells us of an intelligent Being, not _part_ but_creator_ of that universe, we can form no clear, vivid, distinct, or, in point of fact, _any_ conception of such a Being. When he explainsthat it is infinite and omnipresent, like poor Paddy's famed ale, theexplanation 'thickens as it clears;' for being ourselves _finite_, andnecessarily present on one small spot of our very small planet, thewords _infinite_ and _omnipresent_ do not suggest to us either positiveor practical ideas--of course, therefore, we have neither positive norpractical ideas of an infinite and omnipresent Being. 

We can as easily understand that the universe ever did exist, as we nowunderstand that it does exist--but we cannot conceive its absence forthe millionth part of an instant--and really it puzzles one to conceivewhat those people can be dreaming about who talk as familiarly about theextinction of a universe as the chemist does of extinguishing the flameof his spirit-lamp. 

The unsatisfactory character of all speculations having for their object'nonentities with formidable names, ' should long ere this have openedmen's eyes to the folly of _multiplying causes without necessity_--another rule of philosophising, for which we are indebted toNewton, but to which no religious philosophiser pays due attention. Newton himself, in his Theistical character, wrote and talked as thoughmost blissfully ignorant of that rule. The passages given above from his'Principia' palpably violate it. But Theists, however learned, paylittle regard to any rules of philosophising, which put in peril theirfundamental crotchet. If they did, Atheism would need no apologist, andTheism have no defenders; for Theism, in all its varieties, presupposesa supernatural Causer of what experience pronounces natural effects. 

The Author is aware that 'Natural Theologians' seek to justify theirrebellion against the rules of philosophising, to which the reader'sattention has been specially directed, by appealing to (what they call)evidences of design in the universal fabric. But though they think sohighly of the design argument, it is not the less true that thatargument rests on mere assumption of a disputed fact; that even thoughit were proved the universe was designed, still whether designed by oneGod, two Gods, or two million of Gods, would be unshown; and that Paley, 'the most famous of natural Theologians'--Paley, who wrote as never manwrote before on the design question, has been satisfactorily refuted _inhis own words_. [63:1]

A distinguished modern Fabulist [63:2] has introduced to us aphilosophical mouse who praised beneficent Deity because of his greatregard for mice: for one half of us, quoth he, received the gift ofwings, so that if we who have none, should by cats happen to beexterminated, how easily could our 'Heavenly Father, ' out of the batsre-establish our exterminated species. 

Voltaire had no objection to fable if it were symbolic of truth; andhere is fable, which, according to its author, is symbolic of the littleregarded truth, that our pride rests mainly on our ignorance, for, as hesagely says, 'the good mouse knew not that there are also winged cats. 'If she had her speculations concerning the beneficence of Deity wouldhave been less orthodox, mayhap, but decidedly more rational. The wisdomof this pious mouse is very similar to that of the Theologian who knewnot how sufficiently to admire God's goodness in causing large riversalmost always to flow in the neighbourhood of large towns. 

To jump at conclusions on no other authority than their own ignorantassumptions, and to Deify errors on no other authority than their ownheated imaginations, has in all ages been the practice of Theologians. Of that practice they are proud, as was the mouse of our Fabulist. Clothed in no other panoply than their own conceits; they deemthemselves invulnerable. While uttering the wildest incoherencies theirself-complacency remains undisturbed. They remind one of that ambitiouscrow who, thinking more highly of himself than was quite proper, strutted so proudly about with the peacock's feathers in which he hadbedecked himself. --Like him, they plume themselves upon their ownegregious folly, and like him should get well _plucked_ for their pains. 

Let any one patiently examine their much talked of argument from design, and he will be satisfied that these are no idle charges. That argumenthas for its ground-work beggarly assumptions and for its main pillar, reasoning no less beggarly. Nature must have had a cause, because itevidently is an effect. The cause of Nature must have been one God;because two Gods, or two million Gods, could not have agreed to causeit. That cause must be omnipotent, wise, and good, because all thingsare double one against another, and He has left nothing imperfect. Menmake watches, build ships or houses, out of pre-existing metals, wood, hemp, bricks, mortar, and other materials, therefore God made nature outof no materials at all. Unassisted nature cannot produce the phenomenawe behold, therefore such phenomena clearly prove there is somethingsupernatural. Not to believe in a God who designed Nature, is to closeboth ears and eyes against evidence, therefore Atheists are wilfullydeaf and obstinately blind. 

These are samples of the flimsy stuff, our teachers of what nobodyknows, would palm upon us as argument for, yea demonstration of, theBeing and Attributes of God. 

Design, said Shelley, must be proved before a designer can beinferred--the matter in controversy, is the existence of design in theuniverse, and it is not permitted to assume the contested premises andthence infer the matter in dispute. Insidiously to employ the wordscontrivance, design and adaptation, before these circumstances areapparent in the universe, thence justly inferring a contriver, is apopular sophism against which it behoves us to be watchful. 

To assert that motion is an attribute of mind, that matter is inert, that every combination is the result of intelligence, is also anassumption of the matter in dispute. 

Why do we admit design in any machine of human contrivance? simplybecause innumerable instances of machines having been constructed byhuman art are present to our mind--because we are acquainted withpersons who could construct such machines; but if having no previousknowledge of any artificial contrivance, we had accidently found a watchupon the ground, we should have been justified in concluding that it wasa thing of nature, that it was a combination of matter with whose causewe were unacquainted, and that any attempt to account for the origin ofits existence would be equally presumptuous and unsatisfactory. [64:1]

The acuteness and, accuracy of this reasoning can only be disputed bypersons wedded to system, who either lack capacity to understand what isadvanced in opposition to it, or, Being convinced against their will, Are of the same opinion still. 

Experience, the only safe guide on religious as well as other topics, lends no sanction to belief in design apart from material agency. Byartfully taking for granted what no Atheist can admit and assuming casesaltogether dissimilar to be perfectly analogous, our natural theologiansfind no difficulty in proving that God is, was, and ever will be; thatafter contemplating His own perfections, a period sufficiently long for'eternity to begin and end in, ' He said, let there be matter, and therewas matter; that with Him all things are possible, and He, of course, might easily have kept, as well as made, man upright and happy, butcould not consistently with his own wisdom, or with due regard to hisown glorification. Wise in their generation, these 'blind leaders of theblind' ascribe to this Deity of their own invention, powers impossible, acts inconceivable, and qualities incompatible; thus erecting doctrinalsystems on no sounder basis than their own ignorance; deifying their ownmonstrous errors, and filling the earth with misery, madness, and crime. 

The writer who declared theology _ignorance of natural causes reduced tosystem_, did not strike wide of the true mark. It is plain that theargument from design, so vastly favoured by theologians, amounts toneither more nor less than ignorance of natural causes reduced tosystem. An argument to be sound must be soundly premised. But here is anargument whose primary premise is a false premise--a mere begging of thevery question in dispute. Did Atheists _admit_ the universe wascontrived, designed, or adapted, they could not _deny_ there must havebeen at least one Being to contrive, design, or adapt; but they see noanalogy between a watch made with hands out of something, and a universemade without hands out of nothing--Atheists are unable to perceive theleast resemblance between the circumstance of one intelligent bodyre-forming or changing the condition of some other body, intelligent ornon-intelligent, and the circumstance of a bodiless Being creating allbodies; of a partless Being acting upon all parts; and of a passionlessBeing generating and regulating all passions. Atheists consider thegeneral course of nature, though strangely unheeded, does proclaim with'most miraculous organ, ' that dogmatisers about any such 'figment ofimagination, ' would, in a rational community, be viewed with the samefeelings of compassion, which, even in these irrational days, areexhibited towards confirmed lunatics. 

The Author was recently passing an evening with some pleasant people inAshton-under-Lyne, one of whom related that before the schoolmaster hadmuch progress in that _devil dusted_ neighbourhood, a labouring manwalking out one fine night, saw on the ground a watch, whose ticking wasdistinctly audible; but never before having seen anything of the kind hethought it a living creature, and full of fear ran back among hisneighbours, exclaiming that he had seen a most marvellous thing, forwhich he could conceive of no better name than CLICKMITOAD. Afterrecovering from their surprise and terror, this 'bold peasant' and hisneighbours, all armed with pokers or ether formidable weapons, crept upto the ill-starred ticker, and smashed it to pieces. 

The moral of this anecdote is no mystery. Our clickmitoadist had neverseen watches, knew nothing about watches, and hearing as well as seeingone for the first time, naturally judged it must be an animal. Readerswho may feel inclined to laugh at his simplicity, should ask themselveswhether, if accustomed to see watches growing upon watch trees, theywould feel more astonished than they usually do when observing crystalsin process of formation, or cocoa-nuts growing upon cocoa-nut trees; andif as inexperienced with respect to watches, or works of art, more orless analogous to watches, they would not under his circumstances haveacted very much as he did. Admirably is it said in the unpublished workbefore referred to, that the analogy which theologians attempt toestablish between the contrivances of human art and the variousexistences of the universe is inadmissable. We attribute these effectsto human intelligence, because we know beforehand that humanintelligence is capable of producing them. Take away this knowledge, andthe grounds of our reasoning will be destroyed. Our entire ignorancetherefore of the Divine Nature leaves this analogy defective in its mostessential point of comparison. 

Supposing, however, that theologians were to succeed in establishing ananalogy between 'the contrivances of human art and the variousexistences of the universe, ' is it not evident that Spinoza's axiom--ofthings which having nothing in common one cannot be the cause of theothers--is incompatible with belief in the Deity of our Thirty-NineArticles, or, indeed, belief in _any_ unnatural Designer or Causer ofMaterial Nature. Only existence can have anything in common withexistence. 

Now an existence, properly so called, must have at least two attributes, and whatever exhibits two or more attributes is matter. The twoattributes necessary to existence are solidity and extension. Take frommatter these attributes, and matter itself vanishes. This fact wasspecially testified to by Priestley, who acknowledged the primary truthsof Materialism though averse to the legitimate consequences flowing fromtheir recognition. 

According to this argument, then, nothing exists which has not solidityand extension, and nothing is extended and solid but matter, which inone state forms a crystal, in another a blade of grass, in a third abutterfly, and in other states other forms. The _essence_ of grass, orthe _essence_ of crystal, in other words, those native energies of theirseveral forms constituting and keeping them what they are, can no morebe explained than can the _essentiality_ of human nature. 

But the Atheist, because he finds it impossible to explain the action ofmatter, because unable to state why it exhibits such vast and variousenergies as it is seen to exhibit, is none the less assured it_naturally_ and therefore _necessarily_ acts thus energetically. NoAtheist pretends to understand how bread nourishes his frame, but of the_fact_ that bread does nourish it he is well assured. He understands nothow or why two beings should by conjunction give vitality to a thirdbeing more or less analogous to themselves, but the _fact_ stares him inthe face. 

Our 'sophists in surplices, ' who can no otherwise bolster up theirsupernatural system than by outraging all such rules of philosophisingas forbid us to choose the greater of two difficulties, or to multiplycauses without necessity, are precisely the men to explain everything. But unfortunately their explanations do for the most part stand more inneed of explanation than the thing explained. Thus they explain theorigin of matter by reference to an occult, immense, and immenselymysterious phantasm without body, parts or passions, who sees though notto be seen, hears though not to be heard, feels though not to be felt, moves though not to be moved, knows though not to be known, and inshort, does everything, though not to be _done_ by anything. Well mightGodwin say the rage of accounting for what, like immortal Gibbs, isobviously unaccountable, so common among 'philosophers' of this stamp, has brought philosophy itself into discredit. 

There is an argument against the notion of a Supernatural Causer whichthe Author of this Apology does not remember to have met with, but whichhe considers an argument of great force--it is this. Cause means change, and as there manifestly could not be change before there was anything tochange, to conceive the universe caused is impossible. 

That the sense here attached to the word cause is not a novel one everyreader knows who has seen an elaborate and ably written article by Mr. G. H. Lewes, on 'Spinoza's Life and Works, ' [68:1] where effect isdefined as cause realised, the _natura naturans_ conceived as _naturanaturata_; and cause or causation is defined as simply change. When, says Mr. Lewis, the change is completed, we name the result effect. Itis only a matter of naming. 

These definitions conceded accurate, the conclusion that neither causenor effect _exist_, seems inevitable, for change of being is not beingitself, any more than attraction is the thing attracted. One might asphilosophically erect attraction into reality and fall down and worship_it_, as change, which is in very truth, a mere "matter of naming. " Notso the things changing or changed: _they_ are real, the prolific parentof all appearance we behold, of all sensation we experience, of allideas we receive; in short, of all causes and of all effects, whichcauses and effects, as shown by; Mr. Lewis, are merely notional, for "wecall the antecedent cause, and the sequent effect; but these are merelyrelative conceptions; the sequence itself is antecedent to somesubsequent change, and the former antecedent was once only a sequent toits cause, and so on. " Now, to reconcile with this theory of causation, the notion of an

 Eternal, mighty, causeless God, may be possible, but the Author of this Apology cannot persuade himselfthat it is. His poor faculties are unequal to the mighty task ofconceiving the amazing Deity in question, whom Sir Richard Blackmore, inhis Ode to Jehovah, describes as sitting on an 'eternal throne'--

 Above the regions of etherial space, And far extended frontier of the skies; Beyond the outlines of wide nature's face, Where void, not yet enclosed, uncultivated lies; Completely filling every place And far outstretching all imaginary space. 

Still less has he the right to pretend acquaintance with a process ofreasoning by which such

 Eternal, mighty, causeless God

can be believed in consistently with the conviction that cause is effectrealised, and means only CHANGE. 

Ancient Simonides, when asked by Dionysius to explain the nature ofDeity, demanded a day to 'see about it, ' then an additional two days, and then four days more, thus wisely intimating to his silly pupil, thatthe more men think about Gods; the less competent they are to give anyrational account of them. 

Cicero was sensible and candid enough to acknowledge that he found itmuch easier to say what God was not, than what he was. Like Simonides, he was _mere_ Pagan, and like him, arguing from the known course ofnature, was unable, with all his mastery of talk, to convey positiveideas of Deity. But how should he convey to others what he did not, could not, himself possess? To him no revelation had been vouchsafed, and though my Lord Brougham is quite sure, without the proof of naturalTheology, revelation has no other basis than mere tradition, we haveeven better authority than his Lordship's for the staggering fact thatnatural Theology, without the prop of revelation, is a 'rhapsody ofwords, ' mere jargon, analogous to the tale told by an idiot, so happilydescribed by our great poet as 'full of sound and fury, signifyingnothing. ' We have a Rev. Hugh M'Neil 'convinced that, from externalcreation, no right conclusion can be drawn concerning the _moral_character of God, ' and that 'creation is too deeply and disastrouslyblotted in consequence of man's sin, to admit of any satisfactory resultfrom an adequate contemplation of nature. ' [69:1] We have a Gillespiesetting aside the Design Argument on the ground that the reasonings bywhich it is supported are 'inapt' to show such attributes as infinity, omnipresence, free agency, omnipotency, eternality, or unity, ' belong inany way to God. On this latter attribute he specially enlarges, andafter allowing 'the contrivances we observe in nature, may establish aunity of _counsel_, desires to be told' how they can establish a unityof _substance_. [69:2] We have Dr. Chalmers and Bishop Watson, whosecapacities were not the meanest, contending that there is no naturalproof of a God, and that we must trust solely to revelation. ' [69:3] Wehave the Rev. Mr. Faber in his 'Difficulties of Infidelity, ' boldlyaffirming that no one ever did, or ever will 'prove without the aid ofrevelation, that the universe was designed by a single designer. 'Obviously, then, there is a division in the religious camp with respectto the sufficiency of natural Theology, unhelped by revelation. By threeof the four Christian authors just quoted, the design argument istreated with all the contempt it merits. Faber says, 'evident designmust needs imply a designer, ' and that 'evident design shines out inevery part of the universe. ' But he also tells us 'we reasonexclusively, if with the Deist we thence infer the existence of one and_only_ one Supreme Designer. ' By Gillespie and M'Neil, the same truth istold in other words. By Chalmers and Watson we are assured that, naturalproof of a God there is none, and our trust must be placed _solely_ inrevelation; while Brougham, another Immense Being worshipper, declaresthat revelation derives its chief support from natural Theology, withoutwhich it has 'no other basis than vague tradition. '

Now, Atheists agree with Lord Brougham as to the traditionary basis ofScripture; and as they also agree with Chalmers and Watson with respectto their being no natural proof of a God, they stand acquitted to theirown consciences of 'wilful deafness' and 'obstinate blindness, ' inrejecting as inadequate the evidence that 'God is' drawn either fromNature, Revelation, or both. 

It was long a Protestant custom to taunt Roman Catholics with beingdivided among themselves as regards topics vitally important, and todraw from the fact of such division an argument for making Scripture theonly 'rule of faith and manners. ' Chillingworth said, 'there are Popesagainst Popes, councils against councils, some fathers against others, the same fathers against themselves--a consent of fathers of one ageagainst a consent of fathers of another age, the church of one ageagainst the church of another age. Traditive interpretations ofScripture are pretended, but there are few or none to be found. Notradition but only of scripture can derive itself from the fountain, butmay be plainly proved, either to have been brought in in such an ageafter Christ; or that in such an age it was not in. In a word, there isno sufficient certainty but of Scripture only for any considering man tobuild on. [70:1] And after reading this should 'any considering man' beanxious to know something about the Scripture on which alone he is tobuild, he cannot do better than dip into Dr. Watt's book on the rightuse of Reason, where we are told 'every learned (Scripture) critic hashis own hypothesis, and if the common text be not favourable to hisviews a various lection shall be made authentic. The text must besupposed to be defective or redundant, and the sense of it shall beliteral or metaphorical according as it best supports his own scheme. Whole chapters or books shall be added or left out of the sacred canon, or be turned into parables by this influence. Luther knew not well howto reconcile the epistle of St. James to the doctrine of justificationby faith alone, and so he could not allow it to be divine. The Papistsbring all their Apocrypha into their Bible, and stamp divinity upon it, for they can fancy purgatory is there, and they find prayers for thedead. But they leave out the second commandment because it forbids theworship of images. Others suppose the Mosaic history of the creation, and the fall of man, to be oriental ornaments, or a mere allegory, because the literal sense of those three chapters of Genesis, do notagree with their theories. 

These remarks are certainly not calculated to make 'considering men' puttheir trust in Scripture. Coming from a Protestant Divine of such hightalent and learning, they may rather be expected to breed in'considering men' very unorthodox opinions as well of the authenticityas the genuineness of _both Testaments_, and a strong suspicion thatChillingworth was joking when he talked about their "sufficientcertainty. " The author of this Apology has searched Scripture in vainfor 'sufficient certainty, ' with respect to the long catalogue ofreligious beliefs which agitate and distract society. Laying claim tothe character of a 'considering man, ' he requires that Scripture to be_proved_ the word of a God before appealed to, as His Revelation; a featno man has yet accomplished. Priests, the cleverest, most industrious, and least scrupulous, have tried their hands at the pious work, but allhave failed. Notwithstanding the mighty labours of our Lardner's andTillemont's and Mosheim's, no case is made out for the divinity ofeither the Old or New Testament. 'Infidels' have shown the monstrousabsurdity of supposing that any one book has an atom more divinity aboutit than any other book. Those 'brutes' have completely succeeded inproving that Christianity is a superstition, no less absurd thanMohammedanism, and to the full as mischievous. To us, we candidly avowthat its doctrines, precepts, and injunctions appear so utterly opposedto good sense, and good government, that we are persuaded even if itwere practicable to establish a commonwealth in harmony with them atsun-rise it would infallibly go to pieces before sunset. The author hasread that Roman augurs rarely met to do the professional withoutlaughing at each other, and he is bothered to understand how Christianpriests contrive to keep their countenances, amid the many strongtemptations to mirth, by which, in their official capacity they aresurrounded. No doubt very many of them laugh immoderately in private, byway of revenge for the gravity they are constrained to assume in public. It is well known that hypocrites are most prone to an affectation ofsanctity; which marvellously steads them in this world, happen what mayin the world to come. Nine-tenths of those who make a parade of theirpiety, are rotten at heart, as that Cardinal de Crema, Legate of PopeCalixtus 2nd, in the reign of Henry 1st, who declared at a London Synod, it was an intolerable enormity, that a priest should dare to consecrate, and touch the body of Christ immediately after he had risen from theside of a strumpet, (for that was the decent appellation he gave to thewives of the clergy), but it happened, that the very next night, theofficers of justice, breaking into a disorderly house, found theCardinal in bed with a courtezan; an incident, says Hume, [72:1] "whichthrew such ridicule upon him, that he immediately stole out of thekingdom; the synod broke up, and the canons against the marriage of itsclergymen, were worse executed than ever. "

Christian practice is after all, the best answer to Christian theory. Men who think wisely, do not it is true, always act wisely; butgenerally speaking, the moral, like the physical tree, is known by itsfruit, and bitter, most bitter, is the fruit of that moral tree, thefollowers of Jesus planted. Notwithstanding their talk about the pureand benign influence of their religion, an opinion is fast gainingground, that Bishop Kiddor was right, when he said, 'were a wise man tojudge of religion by the lives of its professors, perhaps, Christianityis the last he would choose. '

No unprejudiced thinker who is familiar with the history of religionwill deny, that of all priests in this priest-ridden world Christianpriests are the worst. Though less potent they are not much less proudor ambitious than when Pope Pascal II. Told King Henry I. That allecclesiastics must enter into the church through Christ and Christalone, not through the civil magistrate or any profane laymen. Nor arethey less jealous of such as would fain reduce the dimensions of their'spiritual jurisdiction, ' than when that haughty Pope reminded his kingthat 'priests are called God in Scripture as being the vicars of God;'while in consideration for the poor and the oppressed, modern priestsare disadvantageously distinguished, from those 'vicars of God, ' whotrod upon the necks of emperors and kings, made or unmade laws atpleasure, and kept Europe, intellectual Europe, in unreasoning, unresisting subjection. The reader who agrees with Milton that

 To know, what every day before us lies, Is the prime wisdom, will in all likelihood not object to cast his eyes around and about him, where proofs of modern priestly selfishness are in wonderful abundance. By way of example may be cited the cases of those right reverend Fathersin God the Bishops of London and Chester, prelates high in the church;disposers of enormous wealth with influence almost incalculable; theformer more especially. And how stand they affected towards the poor? Byreference to the _Times_ newspaper of September 27th, 1845, it will beseen that those very influential and wealthy Bishops are supporters _enchef_ of a 'Reformed Poor Law, ' the 'virtual principle' of which is 'toreduce the condition of those whose necessities oblige them to apply forrelief, below that of the labourer of the _lowest class_. ' A ReformedPoor Law, having for its 'object, ' yes reader, its object, therestoration of the pauper to a position below that of the independentlabourer. ' This is their 'standard' of reference, by rigid attention towhich they hope to fully carry out their 'vital principle, ' and thusbring to a satisfactory conclusion the great work of placing 'the pauperin a worse condition than the independent labourer. ' It appears, fromthe same journal, that in reply to complaints against their dietary, theCommissioners appointed to work the Reformed Poor Law, consider thattwenty-one ounces of food daily 'is more than the hard working labourerwith a family could accomplish for himself by his own exertions. ' This, observes a writer in the _Times_, being the Commissioners' reading oftheir own 'standard, ' it may be considered superfluous to refer to anyother authority; but, as the Royal Agricultural Society of England haveclubbed their general information on this subject in a compilation froma selection of essays submitted to them, we are bound to refer to suchwitnesses who give the most precise information on the actual conditionof the _independent labourer_, with minute instructions for his generalguidance, and the economical expenditure of his income. 'He should, 'they say, 'toil early and late' to make himself 'perfect' in hiscalling. 'He should _pinch and screw_ the family, even in the _commonestnecessaries_, ' until he gets 'a week's wages to the fore. ' He shoulddrink in his work 'water mixed with some powdered ginger, ' which warmsthe stomach, and is 'extremely cheap. ' He should remember that 'fromthree to four pounds of potatoes are equal in point of nourishment to apound of the best wheaten bread, besides having the great advantage of_filling_ the stomach. He is told that 'a lot of bones may always be gotfrom the butchers for 2d. , and they are never scraped so clean as not tohave some scraps of meat adhering to them. ' He is instructed to boilthese two penny worth of bones, for the first day's family dinner, untilthe liquor 'tastes _something_ like broth. ' For the second day, thebones are to be again boiled in the same manner, but for _a longertime_. Nor is this all, they say, 'that the bones, if again boiled for a_still longer_ time, will _once more_ yield a nourishing broth, whichmay be made into pea soup. '

This is the system and this the schoolmastership expressly sanctioned bythe Bishops of London and Chester. In piety nevertheless these prelatesare not found wanting. They may starve the bodies but no one can chargethem with neglecting the souls of our 'independent labourers. ' Nothingcan exceed their anxiety to feed and clothe the spiritually destitute. They raise their mitred fronts, even in palaces, to proclaim and lamentover the spiritual destitution which so extensively prevails--but theyseldom condescend to notice _physical_ destitution. When the cry offamine rings throughout the land they coolly recommend rapid churchextension, thus literally offering stone to those who ask them forbread. To get the substantial and give the spiritual is their practicalChristianity. To spiritualise the poor into contentment with the'nourishing broth' from thrice boiled bones, and to die of hunger ratherthan demand relief, are their darling objects. Verily, if these and menlike these do not grind the faces of the poor, the Author of thisApology is unable to conceive in what that peculiar process consists. InScripture we are told, the bread of the poor is his life, and they whodefraud him thereof are men of blood; and by whom are the poor defraudedof their bread if not by those who, like the Bishops of London andChester, legislate for poverty as if it were a crime, and lend theftsanction to a system which, while it necessitates the wholesale pinchingand screwing even in the commonest necessaries of life 'of independentlabourers, ' does also necessitate the wholesale starvation of still morewretched paupers? Formerly our 'surplus populations' were 'killed off'by bullet and sabre, now they are got rid of in Poor Law Unions by aprocess less expensive perhaps, but not less effectual. 

Did Atheists thus act, did they perpetrate, connive at, or tolerate suchatrocities as were brought to light during the Andover inquiry, suchcold blooded heartlessness would at once be laid to the account of theirprinciples. Oh yes, Christians are forward to judge of trees by theirfruit, except the tree called Christianity. Their great 'prophet' arguedthat if the tree is good the fruit will be good; but when their ownreligion is in question they give such argument the slip. The vices ofthe Atheist they ascribe to his creed. The vices of the Christian toanything but his creed. Let professors of Christianity be convicted ofgross criminality, and lo its apologists say such professors are notChristians. Let fanatical Christians commit excesses which admit not ofopen justification, and the apologist of Christianity coolly assures ussuch conduct is mere rust on the body of his religion--moss which growson the stock of his piety. 

It has been computed that the Spaniards in America destroyed in aboutforty-five years ten millions of human creatures, and this with a viewof converting them to Christianity. Bartholomew Casa, who made thiscomputation, affirms that they (the Spaniards) hanged those unhappypeople _thirteen in a row_, in honour of the _thirteen Apostles_, andthat they also gave their infants to be devoured by dogs. [75:1]

Corsini, another religious author, tells us the Spaniards destroyed morethan fifteen millions of American aborigines, and calculates that theblood of these devoted victims, added to that of the slaves destroyed inthe mines, where they were compelled to labour, would weigh as much asall the gold and silver that had been dug out of them. 

If these or similar horrors were perpetrated by Atheists, who can doubtthat Roman Catholics would at once ascribe them to the pestiferousinfluence of Atheistical principles. And the Author of this Apology isof opinion that they would be justified in so doing. When whole nationsof professed irreligionists shall be found conquering a country, andhanging the aborigines of that country thirteen in a row, in honour ofsome thirteen apostles of Atheism, their barbarity may fairly beascribed to their creed. Habit does much, and perhaps much of ourvirtue, or its opposite is contingent on temperament; but no peopleentertaining correct speculative opinions could possibly act, ortolerate, atrocities like these. But strange to say, neither RomanCatholic, nor any other denomination of Christians, will submit to betried to the same standard they deem so just when applied to Atheists. Now sauce for the goose every body knows is equally sauce for thegander, and it is difficult to discover the consistency or the honestyof men, who trace to their creed the crimes or merest peccadilloes ofAtheists, and will not trace to their creed the shocking barbarity ofChristians. To understand such men is easy; to admire them isimpossible; for their conduct in this particular palpably shocks everyprinciple of truth and fairness. Why impute to Atheism the vices orfollies of its Apostles, while refusing to admit that the vices orfollies of Christians should be imputed to Christianity. Of both follyand vice it is notorious professing Christians have 'the lion's share. 'Yet the apologists of Christianity, who would fain have us believe thelives of Atheists a consequence of Atheism, will by no means believethat the lives of Christians are a consequence of Christianity. 

Let no one suppose the Author of this Apology is prepared to allow thatAtheists are men of cruel dispositions or vicious. He will not say withColeridge that only men of good hearts and strong heads can be Atheists, but he is quite ready to maintain that the generality of Atheists aremen of mild, generous, peaceable studious dispositions, who desire theoverthrow of superstition, or true religion as its devotees call it, because convinced a superstitious people never can be enlightened, virtuous, free, or happy. Their love of whatever helps on civilisationand disgust of war are testified to even by opponents. We may learn fromthe writings of Lord Bacon not only his _opinion_ that Atheism leavesmen to sense, to philosophy, to natural piety, to laws, to reputation, all which, he justly observes, may be guides to an outward moral virtue, though religion were not; but the _fact_ that 'the times inclined toAtheism (as the times of Augustus Caesar) were civil times. ' Nay, heexpressly declared 'Atheism did never perturb states; for it makes menwary of themselves as looking no further. ' [76:1] Can the same be saidof religion? Will any one have the hardihood to say religion did neverperturb states, or that the times inclined to religion (as the times ofOliver Cromwell) were civil times, or that it makes man wary ofthemselves as looking no further? During times inclined to religion morethan one hundred thousand witches were condemned to die by Christiantribunals in accordance with the holy text, thou shalt not suffer awitch to live. During times inclined to religion it was usual to burn, broil, bake, or otherwise murder heretics for the glory of God, and atthe same time to spare the vilest malefactors. During times inclined toreligion, it has been computed that in Spain alone no less than 32, 382people were, by the faithful, burnt alive; 17, 690 degraded and burnt ineffigy; and all the goods and chattels of the enormous number of 291, 450consigned to the chancery of the Inquisition. [77:1] In short, duringthose 'good old times, ' men yielded themselves up to practices sostrangely compounded of cruelty and absurdity, that one finds itdifficult to believe accounts of them, however well authenticated. 

Speaking of the bigotted fury of certain ecclesiastics, Hippolyto Josephde Costa, in his 'Narrative of the persecution' he suffered while lodgedgratis by the Portuguese Inquisition for the pretended crime of FreeMasonry, says, it would exceed the bounds of credulity, had not facts incorroboration of it been so established by witnesses, that nothing canshake them. Among ecclesiastics of this denomination we may mention thatPontiff, who, from a vile principle of hate for his predecessor, to whomhe had been an enemy, as soon as he ascended the Papal chair directedthe corpse to be taken out from the grave, had the fingers and the headcut off and thrown into the sea, ordered the remainder of the body to beburnt to ashes and excommunicated the soul. Could revenge be carriedfarther than in this instance? The institution itself of the inquisitionand the cruelty with which its members persecute those whom they suspectof tenets different from their own, may well excite surprise. In theireyes the tortures and the death of their fancied enemies are a mereamusement. They burn some of their prisoners alive, render theirmemories infamous, and prosecute their children and all the connectionsof these unhappy sufferers; they deprive orphans of the inheritance oftheir parents, dishonour families in every possible shape, and at lengthhave recourse to the auto da fe, [77:2] on which occasion, while themiserable wretches are lingering in torments, the members of theinquisition not only feast their eyes with this Infernal spectacle, butregale themselves with their friends at the expense of their unhappyvictims. Such are the practises of the Inquisition. 

When those Spanish Christians who amused themselves by hanging poorwretches, thirteen in a row, in honour of the thirteen apostles, weretaunted with cruelty, they boldly affirmed that as God had not redeemedwith his blood the souls of the Indians, no difference should be madebetween them and the lowest of beasts. In Irvings history of New York isa letter written, we are told, by a Spanish priest, to his superior inSpain, which, 'among other curiosities, contain this question--'Can anyone have the presumption to say these savage pagans have yieldedanything more than an inconsiderable recompense to their benefactors, insurrendering to them a little pitiful tract of this dirty sublunaryplanet in exchange for a glorious inheritance hereafter. '

Such is the conceit as well as cruelty of men who imagine themselves thevicegerents and avengers of Deity. In His name they burn, and slay, androb without compunction or remorse; nay, when like Sir Giles Overreach, their ears are pierced by widows cries, and undone orphans wash withtears their thresholds, they only think what 'tis to make themselvesacceptable in the sight of God. Believing pious ends justify any means, they glory in conduct the most repugnant to every principle of decency, equity, and humanity. 

In the cathedral of Saragossa, is a magnificent tomb, raised, in honorof a famous inquisitor; around it are six pillars, to each of which ischained a Moor preparatory to his being burnt. And if additionalevidence were needed of human folly, and stupid disposition, like drayhorses to go perpetually, on 'one's nose in t'others tail, ' we have itin the astounding fact, that when the Spanish Cortes proposed theabolition of the Inquisition, the populace of Spain considered suchproposal, 'an infringement of their liberties. ' [78:1] We have it onrespectable authority, that Torquemada in the space of fourteen yearsthat he wielded the chief inquisitorial powers, robbed, or otherwisepersecuted eighty thousand persons, of whom about six thousand werecommitted to the flames. 

Inquisitors made no secret of their hatred towards heretics; to destroythem they considered a sacred duty. Far from ashamed of their crueltytowards heretics, they gloried in it, as undeniable evidence of theirenthusiasm in the cause of Christ. Simoncas, one of their most esteemedwriters, said, 'the heretics deserve not merely one death, but manydeaths; because a single death is the punishment of an ordinary heretic;but these (the heretics) are deserving of punishment without mercy, andparticularly the teachers of the Lutheran heresy, who must by no meansbe spared. ' Pegma, another of their writers, insists, that dogmaticalheretics should be punished with death, even though they gave the mostunequivocal proof of their repentance. 

That eminently pious monarch, Phillip the Second of Spain, so loved tohear heretics groan, that he rarely missed Auto da Fes; at one of whichseveral distinguished persons were to be burnt for heresy; among therest Don John de Cesa, who while passing by him, said, ' Sire, how canyou permit so many unfortunate persons to suffer? How can you be witnessof so horrid a sight without shuddering?' Phillip coolly replied, 'If myson, sir, were suspected of heresy, I should myself hand him over to theInquisition. ' 'My detestation, ' continued he, 'of you and yourcompanions is so great, that I would act myself as your executioner, ifno other could be found. '

Phillip the Fifth, as may be seen in Coxe's Memoirs of the Kings ofSpain, 'presented about the year 1172, three standards taken from'infidels' to our lady of Atocha; and sent another to the Pope, as thegrateful homage of the Catholic King to the head of the Church. He also, for the first time, attended the celebration of an Auto da Fe, at whichin the commencement of his reign he had refused with horror to appear, and witnessed the barbarous ceremony of committing twelve Jews andMohammedans to the flames. ' So great during times inclined to religionwas inquisitorial power, that monarchs and statesmen of liberaltendencies were constrained to quail before it. It is related that aJewish girl, entered into her seventeenth year, extremely beautiful, whoin a public _act of faith_, at Madrid, June 30th, 1680, together withtwenty others of the same nation of both sexes, being condemned to thestake, turned herself to the Queen of Spain, then present, and prayed, that out of her goodness and clemency she might be delivered from thedreadful punishment of the fire. 'Great Queen, ' said she, 'is not yourpresence able to bring me some comfort under my misery? Consider myyouth, and that I am condemned for a religion which I have sucked inwith my mother's milk. ' The Queen turned away her eyes, declaring, shepitied the miserable creature, but did not dare to intercede for herwith a single word. 

Not only have Roman Catholic writers defended these inquisitorialabominations, but, with what every Protestant must needs consider daringand blasphemous impiety, laboured to prove that the first Inquisitor wasGod himself. Luis de Paramo, for instance, in his book 'De Origine etProgressu Officii Sanctoe Inquisitionis, ejusque dignitate etutilitate, ' proves God to be the first Inquisitor, and that in theGarden of Eden was the first auto da fe. 

Nor do these most pious casuists discover anything in Scripture whichforbids the burning of heretics, notwithstanding such texts as'Whosoever sheddeth man's blood by man shall his blood be shed, ' whichthey contend inquisitors do never violate the true meaning or spirit of, it being evident that to burn men is not to shed their blood--thuseluding the maxim Ecclesia non novit sanguinem. And if their right toburn heretics was questioned they triumphantly cited the text (as givenin the 'Beehive' of the Romish Church) 'Whosoever doth not abide in me, shall be cast out of the vineyard as a branch and there wither; and mengather those branches and cast them into the fire and burn them. '

On this text John Andreas, Panormitamis, Hostraensii, BernardusLeizenburgen, and others of the Roman Catholic casuists built up theirproof that heretics, like grape branches, should be cast into the fireand burnt. 

The execrable duplicity of these men is by Protestant priests made thetheme of unsparing invective, as if the burning of heretics and itsjustification by Scripture were crimes peculiar to Roman Catholics, whenin point of fact both have been shamelessly committed by Christiansrejoicing in the name of Protestants. John Calvin burnt Servetus, andRobert Hall, as we have seen, applauded the act. England, to say nothingof other countries, has had its auto da fe, as well since as before theReformation. Heretics were first made bonfires of in England during thereign of Henry the Fourth, who permitted the abomination in order toplease certain bishops he was under obligation to for assisting him todepose Richard the Second and usurp his throne. But that the practice ofcommitting heretics to the flame prevailed in England long after Poperyceased to be the dominant religion is notorious. If heretics were thussacrificed by Henry the Fourth to please Popish Bishops, they were alsosacrificed by Elizabeth with a view to the satisfaction of ProtestantBishops. Cranmer literally compelled her brother, the amiable Edward, tosend a half crazed woman named Joan Boacher to the stake. Elizabethherself caused two Dutch Anabaptists to be burnt in Smithfield, thoughit is but just to admit that, unlike her sullen sister, she preferredrather to hang than to burn heretics. Lord Brougham has recently donemankind another valuable piece of service by painting the portrait ofthat Protestant princess in colours at once so lively and faithful thatnone, save the lovers of vulgar fanaticism and murderous hypocrisy, willgaze on it without horror. [81:1]

'Mary, honoured with the title of "bloody, " appears to me a far moreestimable character than her ripping-up sister Elizabeth, who, whenMary, on her death-bed, asked her for a real avowal of her religion, "prayed God" that the earth might open and swallow her up if she was nota true Roman Catholic. ' She made the same declaration to the Duke ofFerria, the Spanish Ambassador, who was so deceived that he wrote toPhilip, stating no change in religious matters would take place on heraccession, and soon afterwards began ripping up the bellies ofCatholics. That was quite the fashionable punishment in this and thesucceeding reign. I have the account, with names, dates, and referenceof no less than 101 more Catholics who were burnt, hung, ripped up, &c. , by Elizabeth, and on to Charles the Second's end, than there wereProtestants in Mary's, and all the reigns which preceded her, lettinglying Fox count all he has got. Elizabeth, too, was by law a bastard, and is to this day; and so soon did her intentions appear of changingthe religion, that all the bishops but one refused to crown her; andwhen this was done, it was by the Catholic ritual. However theAct-of-Parliament religion was set up again; the prayer book of Cranmerwas set up again, after sundry alterations: it was altered too, inEdward's reign, yet when first made, it was duly declared to come fromthe 'Holy Ghost;' so it was after its second polishing under Elizabeth. To refuse the Queen's supremacy was death; it was death to continue inthat religion, which, at her coronation she had sworn to firmly believeand defend. It was high treason to admit or harbour, or relieve apriest, and hosts of these were ripped up, for, in the piety of theirhearts, risking all to afford the consolations of their religion to theCatholics of England. Victim after victim came to the sacrifice, mostlyfrom the college of Douay. It is really horrible to read of these goodand faithful champions of their religion being hung, cut downinstantaneously, their bellies ripped up, their hearts cut out, theirbodies chopped in pieces with every insult and indignity added toinjury, all through this reign, and then to be talked to about 'bloodyMary, ' and the 'Good Queen-Bess. ' Verily, countrymen, you are vilelydeceived. Taking into account the rippings, and burnings, and roastings, and hanging; the racks, whips, fines, imprisonments, and other horrorsof the reign of this 'Good Bess, ' there was a hundred times more humanmisery inflicted in her reign than in that of' Bloody Mary. ' [82:1]

The second Catherine of Russia, though remarkable for rigid andscrupulous adherence to the ceremonial mummeries of her 'true church, 'was at the same time as remarkable for liberality of sentiment. It issaid, that upon a certain occasion, being strongly advised by herministers to deal out severe punishment on some heretics of Atheisticaltendencies, who had given offence by rather freely expressing theiropinions, she laughingly said, 'Oh, fie, gentlemen fie, if theseheretics are to be eternally miserable in the other world, we reallyought to let them be comfortable in this. '

Few religious persons are liberal as this empress, whose strong goodsense seems to have been fully a match for her bad education: thateducation was Christian. She was taught to loathe the opinions, aye, andthe persons, of heretics, under which denomination may be included alldissenters from religious truth as it was in her, or rather in thechurch of which she was chief member. No other kind of teaching isaccounted orthodox in our 'land of Bibles' than that of state paidpriests of law established religion. Look at the true Church ofEngland's Thirty-Nine Articles. Do they not abound in anathema, andliterally teem with the venom of intolerance? Do they not shock thebetter feelings even of those who believe them divine? The truth is, allpriests teach religion which no wit can reconcile with reason, and verymany of them make their followers believe, and perhaps believethemselves, that to villify, abuse, and hunt down 'infidels, ' are actsacceptable in the sight of God. The idea of compensating poorunbelievers in this world by an extra quantum of comfort for thetorments they are doomed to suffer in the next, never enters their head. Indeed, not a few of them gloat with satisfaction over the prospect of'infidels' gnashing their teeth in that fiery gulph prepared for thedevil and his angels. By this odious class of fanatics neither the wormthat dieth not, nor the flame never to be extinguished, is deemedsufficient punishment for the wretch whose thoughts concerning religionare not as their thoughts. By them the imagined 'Creator of the Heavensand the earth' is dressed, up in attributes the most frightful. Witnessthe character of Him implied in the conceit of that popular preacher whodeclared 'there are children in hell not a span long'--a declarationwhich could only be made by one whose humanity was extinguished bydivinity. 

Our pulpits can furnish many such preachers of 'a religion of charity, 'while a whole army of Christian warriors might be gathered frommetropolitan pulpits alone, who deeming it impious to say their God ofmercy would permit the burning of infants not a span long, donevertheless, firmly believe that 'children of a larger growth' mayjustly be tormented by the great king of kings; and as _ignorantia legisnon excusat_ is a maxim of _human law_, so, according to them, ignoranceof _divine_ law is no excuse whatever, either for breaking ordisregarding it. 

The Author of this Apology was recently in Scotland, where a vast numberof religious tracts were put into his hand, one of which contains thefollowing among other striking paragraphs:--

'Man could, not _create_ himself, and far less can he save himself. WhenGod made him, he brought him out of nothing; when God. Saves him, hebrings him out of a state far lower and worse than nothing. If in theone case, then, everything depended, upon God's will and decree, muchmore in the other. There can be no injustice here. Had God pleased, Hemight have saved the whole world. But he did not; and thousands are nowin hell, and shall be to all eternity. '

'Hell is peopled already with millions of immortal souls doomed to fierywrath; while Heaven is filled with ransomed sinners as vile, yea perhapsviler than they. ' [83:1]

If the writer of this horrid nonsense do not blaspheme, there surely canbe no possibility of blaspheming. If he do not impute to his God ofmercy cruelty and injustice the most monstrous that can enter into humanconception, all language is void of meaning, and men had far bettercease 'civilising, ' and betake themselves to woods and wilds andfastnesses, to enjoy the state of mere brutishness so infinitelypreferable to that _reasonable_ state in which they are shaken andmaddened by terrible dreams of a vengeful cruel God. 

 Better be with the dead Than on the tortures of the mind to lie In restless ecstacy. 

Better, far better, roam the desert or the forest like any other brutes, than educate ourselves and others into the monstrous belief in a God whomight have saved the world and would not; who predestinates to endlessand unutterable agonies; who has with the one hand peopled Hell withmillions of immortal creatures, while with the other has filled Heavenwith millions of ransomed sinners, as vile, yea perhaps viler than they. 

In justice however to the large class of Christians under the despoticand truly lamentable influence of this belief, the Author is bound toadmit that they are far more consistent and logical in their notions ofDeity than perhaps any other section of Theists, for it cannot properlybe denied that the doctrine of an Omnipotent and Prescient God destroysall distinction of virtue and vice, justice and injustice, right andwrong, among men. Let the omnipotency and prescience of a First Cause begranted, the corollary of 'whatever is, is right, ' is one of the mostobvious that can flow from any proposition: the distance of any link inthe eternal sequence cannot lessen the connection with a First Cause, admitting its Omnipotency and Prescience. 

The author of these detestable paragraphs admits both. He is a rigidPredestinarian, which no one can be who doubts the all powerfulness orforeknowledge of that God whom Christians worship. Taking Scripture ashis guide, the Predestinarian must needs believe some are foredoomed toHell, and some to Hell, irrespective of all merit; it being manifestlyabsurd to suppose one man can deserve more or less than another, in aworld, where all are compelled to believe, feel, and act, as they dobelieve, feel, and act. The disgrace attached to the memory of Judas, supposing him really to have betrayed his Divine Master, has nofoundation in human justice, for 'surely as the Lord liveth, ' he wasforedoomed, and therefore compelled to betray him. Luther saw thattruth, and had the good sense to avow it. No more rational or just arethe denunciations of Judas than those so unsparingly heaped upon theJews for crucifying the Redeemer of the world, when every body must, orat least, should know, that admitting the world's redemption dependedupon the Crucifixion of Christ, if the Jews had _not_ crucified him theworld could not have been redeemed. So far then from blackguarding Judasand the Jews for doing, what in the Gospel they are represented to havedone, we should consider them rather as martyrs in the cause of DivineProvidence than as villains worthy only of abhorrence and execration. Tothe Author of this Apology it seems certain that if there is a God, suchas the Christian delighteth to honour, nothing happens, nothing hashappened, nothing can happen contrary to His will. And is it not absurdto say that what He pre-ordains mere mortals can hinder coming to pass?Even the Devil, believed in by Christians, is a creature--how then couldhe be anything else than the Creator thought fit to make him? Grant heis the Father of Lies, and then he will appear worthy of compassion, ifyou reflect that he was made so by the Father of Truth. In the Tract towhich such special reference has been made, it is contended that Adamwas made not because he chose to be made, but because God chose to makehim, and surely the same may be contended on the part of Judas, theJews, and last, though, assuredly, not least, the Devil himself. He whois without God cannot run into absurdities and blasphemies like these, whereas he who is with one cannot keep clear of them. If consistent hemust clothe Him with Calvinistic attributes. To present Him stripped offoreknowledge, or omnipotency would outrage all just conception of that'Immense Being' who brought his worshippers out of nothing. And yet ifwe allow him these attributes there is no help for us, headlong we gointo the dark and fathomless doctrine of predestination, than which noreligious doctrine is so consistent or so revolting. Receive it, and atonce you find yourself bound heart and brain to belief in a supernaturalMONSTER--'a vengeful, pitiless, and Almighty Fiend, whose mercies are anickname for the rage of hungry tigers. '

The believers in this terrible offspring of heated imagination, naturally aim at imitating, and thus rendering themselves acceptable, toHim. Here is the source, whence for ages have flowed the bitter watersof religious intolerance. If Calvin had not worshipped a cruel God, henever could have hoped to please Him by the murder of Servetius. IfCranmer had wanted lively faith in a God who people's Hell 'withmillions of immortal souls, ' he never would have brought Joan Bocher tothe stake. Full of that Christian zeal, so 'apt to tarn sour, ' these menlived like the hermit Honorius, 'in hopes of gaining heaven by makingearth a hell. '

The savage bigotry of an Elizabeth or a Mary, naturally resulted fromthe notion that monarchs unquestionably ruling by Divine right, werecalled upon by every earthly, as well as heavenly consideration, toprove their zeal in the cause of God, by destroying His adversaries. Heretics have been consigned to dungeon and to name, for His glory, andHis satisfaction. All inquisitors from St. Dominic downward, haveindignantly repelled the charge that they have punished heretics just toglut their own appetite for cruelty. Worshippers of a God who saith, 'vengeance is mine, ' they have felt themselves mere instruments in Hishands; of themselves, and for themselves, they did nothing; all was forGod. To please Him, the Jew and the Heretic shrieked amid the flames. They are not ashamed, why should they? to perform His behests. When thelate Duke of York was about to leave Lisbon, its Inquisitor-Generalwaited upon him, with a humble request that he would delay his departurefor a few days, in order to make one at an Auto da Fe, where it waskindly promised, some Jews should be burnt for his diversion: so crueland so blind are the superstitious. 

Queen Mary has long been the mark at which our most eloquent ProtestantDivines have aimed their shafts, while of her no less 'bloody' sister'sreputation, they have been most watchful and tender. With respect to_her_ persecution of heretics, they preserve a death-like silence. Fearof damaging Protestantism deters them from exposing the enormousabomination of Protestant monarchs. Against the bigotry of Catholicsthey hurl the fiercest denunciations; but if called upon to denounce asfiercely the bigotry of Protestants, they make us understand 'the casebeing altered, that alters the case. ' A Popish Inquisition they abhor, but see no evil in Inquisitions of their own. Smithfield Auto da Fe's, according to these consistent Christians, were wrong during the reign ofMary, and right during the reign of her pious sister, 'Good Queen Bess. 'Such is the justice of superstition. Its votaries knowing themselves thefavoured of heaven, feel privileged to outrage and trample under footthe great principles of sense, propriety, and honour. Between Catholicsand Protestants as regards these principles there is little todistinguish; for in the race of abomination, they have kept prettynearly neck and neck. The author of this Apology has no sympathy witheither, but of the two much prefers Popery. There is about it a breadthof purpose, a grandeur, and a potency which excites some respect, evenin the breast of an enemy. Unreasonable it assuredly is, but Christianswho object to it on that ground, may be told--religion was never meantto be reasonable; and that an appeal to rational principles will aslittle avail one religion as another, as little avail Protestant asRoman Catholic faith. All religion is unreasonable, and, moreover, torationalize would be to destroy it. Hobbes could discover nothing insuperstition essentially different from religion, nor can we. He deemedtrue religion as the religion which is fashionable, and superstition asthe religion which is not fashionable. 

So do we, so do all absolute Atheists. The notion that false religionimplies the true, just as base coin implies the pure, will have weightwith those, and only those, who cannot detect the sophistry of anargument _a rubii toto caelo differentibus_; or in plain English, fromthings entirely different presumed to be similar. Between coin andreligion there is no precise analogy. False coin implies true coin, because none are sceptical as to the reality of true coin, but falsereligion does not necessarily imply true religion, because the realityof true religion is not only questionable, but questioned. It is notusual for money-dealers to be at issue as to the quality of their cash. The genuine article will stand the test, and always passes muster. Apractised ear can easily decide between the rival claims of twohalf-crowns, one genuine, the other spurious, thrown upon a tradesman'scounter. But where are the scales in which we can weigh to a nicety trueand false religions? Where is the ear so well practised and sodelicately sensitive as to distinguish the true from the 'number withoutnumber' of false voices raised in their behalf? Where the eye soperfectly theologic, so sharp, piercing, and free of that film calledprejudice, as to see which of our religions is the genuine article? Allare agreed as to the genuineness of current money. All are at 'daggersdrawn' as to the genuineness of any one religion. That Christianity istrue no Christian denies, but which is the true Christianity _has not_and we think _cannot_ be determined. 

The knot of old fashioned politicians who call themselves Young England, are enamoured of 'graceful superstition. ' Alarmed at the march ofreason, and admirers of 'blind faith in mystery, ' they sigh for arenewal of those times when no one doubted the propriety of drowningwitches, or being touched for the king's evil. _Cui bono_ is thequestion repeatedly put to the proselytising Atheist by this modernantique class of persons, who cannot see the utility of destroying thevital principle of all religions. But if that principle is false, nosane man can doubt the expediency of proving it so. Falsehood may beuseful to individuals, but cannot tend to the moral and politicaladvancement of nations. Apologists of error find the presumed unfitnessof their fellow creatures to appreciate truth a sufficient reason fornot teaching it. To raise up the populace to their own intellectuallevel they deem impracticable, and therefore speak down to their lowestpassions and prejudices: like Varro they contend there are some truthsthe vulgar had better think falsehoods, and many falsehoods they hadbetter think truths. The consequences of such 'moral swindling' areeverywhere visible: on all sides superstition, wild, unreasoning, senseless superstition rears its hateful front, and vomits forthanathema on the friend of progress, humanity, and social justice. Lookat Ireland: see to what a Pandaemonium superstition has converted 'thefirst flower of the land and first gem of the sea. ' In that unhappycountry may be seen seven or eight millions of people cheated, willinglydefrauded of their substance, by a handful of designing priests, who, dead to shame, erect the most stupid credulity into exalted virtue--battle in support of ignorance because knowledge is incompatible withtheir 'blood-cemented pyramid of greatness, ' and to aggrandisethemselves, perpetuate the vilest as well as most palpable delusionsthat ever assumed the mask of divine truth. Daniel O'Connell may objectto have them called 'surpliced ruffians, ' not so the philosopher, whosees in pious fraud on a gigantic scale, the worst species of ruffianismthat ever disgraced the earth. 

These are no new tangled or undigested notions. From age to age thewisest among men have abhorred and denounced superstition. It is truethat only a small section of them treated religion as if _necessarily_superstition, or went quite so far as John Adams, who said, _this wouldbe the best of all possible worlds if there were no religion in it_. Butan attentive reading of ancient and modern philosophical books hassatisfied the Author of this Apology that through all recorded time, religion has been _tolerated_ rather than _loved_ by great thinkers, whohad _will_, but not _power_ to wage successful war upon it. Gibbonspeaks of Pagan priests who, 'under sacerdotal robes, concealed theheart of an Atheist. ' Now, these priests were also the philosophers ofRome, and it is not impossible that some modern philosophical priests, like their Pagan prototypes, secretly despise the religion they openlyprofess. Avarice, and lust of power, are potent underminers of humanvirtue. The mighty genius of Bacon was not proof against them, and hewho deserves to occupy a place among 'the wisest and greatest' has been'damned to eternal fame' as the, 'meanest of mankind. '

Nor are avarice and lust of power the only base passions under theinfluence of which men, great in intellect, have given the lie to theirown convictions, by calling that religion which they knew to be ranksuperstition. Fear of punishment for writing truth is the grand causewhy their books contain so little of it. If Bacon had openly treatedChristianity as mere superstition, will any one say that his life wouldhave been worth twenty-four hours purchase. He lived at a time whenheresy, to say nothing of Atheism, was _rewarded_ with death. Bacon wasnot the man to be ambitious of such a reward. Few great geniuses are. Philosophers seldom covet martyrdom, and hence it came to pass that fewof them would run the terrible risk of provoking bigotted authority bythe 'truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth' concerningreligion. In our own day the smell of a faggot would be too much for thenostrils of, that still unamiable but somewhat improved animal, calledthe public. One delightful as well as natural consequence is, thatphilosophical writers do ever and anon deal much more freely withreligion than its professors are _disposed_, though _compelled_, totolerate. But, even now, with all our boasted liberty of conscience, notone in one thousand of those who _think_ truth about religion dareexpress it. Philosophy still exhibits, in deference to popular prejudiceand fanaticism, what the great French maximist defined as 'thehomage that vice pays to virtue. ' Such is the rule to which, mostfortunately for the pause of truth, there are many, and some splendid, exceptions. One of these is worth citing not only because of itsintrinsic merit, but because the thing to be cited includes an opinionof religion, and a marked distinction between what is _pious_ and whatis honest, that calls for especial notice. The exception referred to isa paragraph from a paper on Saint Simonianism, written by ColonelThompson, and originally published in the Westminster Review, of April1, 1832, containing these remarkable words:--'The world wants _honest_law-givers, not pious ones. If piety will make men honest, let themfavour us with the honesty and keep the piety for God and their ownconsciences. There never was a man that brought piety upon the boardwhen honesty would do, without its being possible to trace a transfusionin the shape of money or money's worth, from his neighbour's pocket intohis. The object of puzzling the question with religion is clear. Youcannot quarrel for sixpences with the man who is helping you the way toheaven. The man who wants your sixpences, therefore, assumes a religiousphraseology, which is cant, and cant is fraud, and fraud is dishonesty, and the dishonest should have a mark set on them. '

There is an old story about a certain lady who said to her physician, 'Doctor, what is your religion?' 'My religion, madam, ' replied theDoctor, 'is the religion of all sensible men. ' 'What kind of religion isthat?' said the lady. 'The religion, madam, ' quoth the Doctor, 'that nosensible man will tell. '

This doctor may be taken as a type of the class of shrewd people whodespise religion, but will say nothing about it, lest by so doing theygive a shock to prejudice, and thus put in peril certain professional orother emoluments. Too sensible to be pious, and too cautious to behonest, they must be extremely well paid ere they will incur the riskattendant upon a confession of irreligious faith. Like Colonel Thompson, they know the world needs _honest_ lawgivers not pious ones, but unlikehim, they won't say so. Animated by a vile spirit of accommodation, their whole sum of practical wisdom can be told in four words--BE SILENTAND SAFE. They are amazed at the 'folly' of those who make sacrifices atthe shrine of sincerity; and while sagacious enough to perceive thatreligion is a clumsy political contrivance, are not wanting in theprudence which dictates at least a warning conformity to prevailingprejudices. 

None have done more to perpetuate error than these time serving 'men ofthe world, ' for instead of boldly attacking it, they preserve a prudentsilence which bigots do not fail to interpret as consent. Mosheim says, [90:1] 'The simplicity and ignorance of the generality in those times(fifth century) furnished the most favourable occasion for the exerciseof fraud; and the impudence of imposters, in contriving false miracles, was artfully proportioned to the credulity of the vulgar; while thesagacious and the wise, who perceived these cheats, were overawed intosilence by the dangers that threatened their lives and fortunes, if theyshould expose the artifice. Thus, ' continues this author, 'does itgenerally happen, when danger attends the discovery and the professionof the truth, the prudent are _silent_, the multitude _believe_, andimpostors _triumph_. '

Beausobre, too, in his learned, account of Manicheism reads a severelesson to the 'sensible _dummies_, who, under the influence of suchpassions as _fear_ and _avarice_, will do nothing to check the march ofsuperstition, or relieve their less 'sensible, ' but more honest, fellow-creatures from the weight of its fetters. After alluding to anepistle written by that 'demi-philosopher, ' Synesius, when offered bythe Patriarch the Bishopric of Ptolemais, [91:1] Beausobre says, 'We seein the history that I have related a kind of hypocrisy, which, perhaps, has been far too common in all times. It is that of ecclesiastics, whonot only do not say what they think, but the reverse of what they think. Philosophers in their closet, when out of them they are content withfables, though they know well they are fables. They do more; theydeliver to the executioner the excellent men who have said it. How manyAtheists and profane persons have brought holy men to the stake underthe pretext of heresy? Every day, hypocrites consecrate the host andcause it to be adored, although firmly convinced as I am that it isnothing more than a piece of bread. '

Whatever may be urged in defence of such execrable duplicity, there canbe no question as to its anti-progressive tendency. The majority of menare fools, and if such 'sensible' politicians as our Doctor and thedouble doctrinising persecuting ecclesiastics, for whose portraits weare indebted to Mosheim and Beausobre, shall have the teaching of them, fools they are sure to remain. Men who dare not be 'mentally faithful'to themselves may obstruct, but cannot advance the interests of truth. Colonel Thompson is right. In legislation, in law, in all the relationsof life, we want _honesty_, not piety. There is plenty of piety, and tospare, but of honesty--sterling, bold, uncompromising honesty--even thebest regulated societies can boast a very small stock. The men bestqualified to raise the veil under which truth lies concealed from vulgargaze, are precisely the men who fear to do it. Oh, shame upon yeself-styled philosophers, who in your closets laugh at 'our holyreligion, ' and in your churches do them reverence. Were your bosomswarmed by one spark of generous wisdom, _silence_ on the question ofreligion would be broken, the multitude cease to _believe_, andimposters to _triumph_. But the desire to enlighten others is lost inregard for yourselves, and what Mrs. Grundy may say, is sufficient tofrighten ye from the enunciation truth. 

Is superstition no evil? Is there nothing hateful, nothing against whichunceasing war should be waged, in the degradation of those unhappypersons who worship idols of their own imagination? Can error be fraughtwith good and truth with evil, that we should shrink from doing justiceto both? Everywhere are learnedly ignorant or basely cunning men, whowould scare us from dealing with religious error, as all error deservesto be dealt with, by high-sounding jargon about the danger of freeingvulgar minds from the wholesome restraints of certain antiquatedbeliefs. Themselves essentially vulgar by habit and in feeling, theirestimate of human tendencies is of the meanest, the most grovellingdescription. Measuring the _chaff_ of other men by their own bushel, they arrive at the pious but false conclusion that without fear of Godthere can be no genuine love of man, and that without faith in some oneof our five hundred and odd true religions, all the thoughts of ourhearts would be evil continually. They insist upon it that the 'absoluteAtheist, ' if virtuous, is so by accident not design; that he can neitherlove truth, justice, nor his neighbour, except by sheer luck, and that, if bad as his principles, would cut the throat of every man, woman, andchild who might have the misfortune to fall in his way. They argue as ifnone can think good thoughts or purposely perform good acts unless sofar eaten up by superstition as always to keep in view the probable_rewards_, or equally probable _vengeance_ of some supernatural Being. Faith in human goodness, irrespective of reward and punishment, eitherhere or hereafter, sophists of this bigotted class have literally none. Influenced by fanaticism and stimulated by cupidity they let slip noopportunity of dealing out upon such as oppose their hideous doctrinesthe choicest sort of vituperative blackguardism. The reader knows thisis no idle or ill-considered charge. He has seen at the commencement ofthis Apology verbatim extracts, affecting the moral character ofAtheists, from books written by pious Christians, so utterly disgustingthat only those in whom every sense of delicacy, truth, and justice hasbeen obliterated, by a worse than savage creed, can peruse them withouthorror. 

Not inaptly, we conceive, has religion been likened to a madman's robe, for the least puff of reason parts it and shows the wearer's nakedness. This view of religion explains the otherwise inexplicable fact thateminent piety is usually associated with eminent imbecility. Such men asNewton, Locke, and Bacon are not remembered and reverenced on account oftheir faith. By all but peddling narrow-thoughted bigots they are heldin honour for their science, their matter-of-fact philosophy; not theirpuerile conceits about 'airy nothings, ' to which half crazedsupernaturalists have assigned 'a local habitation and a name. ' LordBacon laid down principles so remote from pious, that no man canunderstand and philosophise in strict accordance with them, if he fearsto embrace Atheism. From his _Novum Organum Scientiarum_ may beextracted an antidote to the poison of superstition, for it is there weare told that _aiming at divine things through the human, breeds only anodd mixture of imaginations_. There we are told that _Man, the servantand interpreter of Nature, can only understand and act in proportion ashe observes or contemplates the order of nature--more he cannot do. _There too is set down the wise lesson that truth is justly to be calledthe daughter, not of Authority, but Time. Bacon abhorred superstition. He denounced it as the 'confusion of many states, ' and for a 'religiousphilosopher' wrote most liberally of Atheism. No one who has read hisEssay on Superstition can doubt that he thought it a far greater evilthan Atheism. Any man who should now write as favourably of Godlessnesswould be suspected of a latitudinarianism quite inimical to the geniusand spirit of 'true religion. ' The orthodox much prefer false piety tono piety at all. Mere honesty does not satisfy them. They insist onfaith in their chimerical doctrines and systems, as 'the basis of allexcellence. ' To please them we must sacrifice truth as it is in Nature, at the shrine of truth as it is in Jesus, and believe what derives nosanction from experience. Bacon taught us to 'interpret nature, ' andthat 'aiming at the divine through the human breeds only an odd mixtureof imaginations;' but these hair-brained fanatics who would have usbelieve him _one of them_, care little for natural knowledge, and affectcontempt for all that concerns most intimately our 'earthlytabernacles. ' Bacon taught us to _consider as suspicious every relation, which depends in any degree upon religion_, [93:1] but wiser than that'wisest of mankind, ' our _real_ Christians execrate such teaching, andwill have nothing _good_ to do with those who walk in the light andhonestly act in the spirit of it. How dare they then pretend tosympathise with the opinions of Bacon? It is true he announced himselfwilling to swallow all the fables of the Talmud or the Koran, ratherthan believe this Almighty frame without a Mind; but who is now preparedto determine the precise sense in which our illustrious philosopher usedthe words 'without a mind. ' We believe his own interpretation altogetherunchristian. 'To palter in a double sense' has ever been the practice ofphilosophers who, like Bacon, knew more than they found it discreet toutter. But with all their discretion, Locke, Milton, and even Newton didnot succeed in establishing an orthodox reputation. The passages fromLocke given in this Apology do at least warrant our opinion that it mayfairly be doubted whether he was either a Christian or a Theist. Had hebeen disposed to avow Atheistical sentiments, he could not have done so, except at the imminent hazard of his life. Speculative philosophers donot usually covet the crown of martyrdom, and are seldom unwilling tofling down a few religious sops to the Cerberus of popular bigotry. Itwas the boast of Synesius, Bishop of Ptolemais, that when communing withhimself, he was always a philosopher, but when dealing with the mass ofmankind, he was always a priest. Who knows how far John Locke followedthe _safe_ example. That he was a materialist his writings prove; andevery far sighted Theist will admit that Atheism is the naturaltermination of Materialism. John Locke may have been a devout believerin 'thingless names, ' to which no merely human creature can attach clearand distinct ideas: he may have thought the Bible had one of the said'thingless names' for its author, salvation for its end, and truthwithout mixture of error for its matter; though very probable heaffected such belief, to shield himself from persecution; but it isquite certain, and may be affirmed without injustice, that he should tohave professed Atheism; for his own rule of philosophising isinconsistent with belief in any thing supernatural. While living he wasoften charged with Atheism, by opponents who understood the tendenciesof his philosophy better than he appeared to do himself. But the Authorof this Apology has no such mean opinion of John Locke, as to supposehim ignorant that Materialism, as he taught it, is totallyirreconcileable with that God, and that Religion in which he professedto believe. Belief in inconceivable entities cannot be reconciled withdisbelief of all entities, save those of which we can frame clear anddistinct ideas. Nor is it easy to persuade oneself that Locke could sofar have done violence to his own principles as to feel 'lively faith'in a 'science' with no other aim, end, or ground-work, than 'theknowledge and attributes of the unknown. '

By a late writer in the Edinburgh Review, we are told that 'some of theopinions avowed by Milton, ' were so 'heterodox, ' as to have 'excitedconsiderable amazement. ' We can scarcely conceive, says this writer, that any one could have read his Paradise Lost without suspecting him ofheterodoxy; nor do we think that any reader acquainted with the historyof his life, ought to be much startled by his opinions on marriage. Theopinions which he expressed regarding the nature of the Deity, theeternity of matter, and the observation of the Sabbath, might, we think, have caused more just surprise. [95:1] Add to this good reader, Dr. Johnson's statement, ('Lives of the Poets, ' p. 134, Art. Milton, )that in the distribution of his (Milton's) hours _there was no hour ofprayer, either solitary or with his household_; and then come, if youcan, to the conclusion that he was a Christian. 

The piety of Newton we are not prepared to dispute. It is certain hemanufactured for himself a God, inasmuch as to space he ascribed thehonor of being His sensorium. It is equally clear that he believedChristianity a divine system, inasmuch as he wrote, and rushed intoprint with, a lot of exquisite nonsense about the exquisitelynonsensical Apocalypse. But we defy pietists to ferret out of hisreligious writings, any argument in defence of religion, not absolutelybeneath contempt; the best of them are execrably bad--mere ravings of adisordered and o'erwrought intellect. 'The sublime Newton, ' saidD'Holbach, 'is but a child when he quits physical science, to losehimself in the imaginary regions of theology. ' He failed, nevertheless, to achieve the favour, or escape the wrath, of thorough-goingtheologians who were in ecstacies at his childishness, but bitterlydetested him, as they detested every man who had the audacity to open upnew, and widen old fields, of investigation; to reject chimera and holdfast by fact in the pursuit of knowledge, and to teach a series ofscientific truths, no ability can reconcile with the philosophy (?) ofJesus and Moses, who, according to wise Dr. Epps, never intended toteach man NATURAL SCIENCE, which he defines to be 'God in Creation;' but'came to teach, in referring to natural events, SCIENTIFIC UNTRUTHS. [95:2]

The Author hopes that the opinions here advanced in reference to whatmay be named the Argument from 'Authority, ' as contradistinguished from'Time, ' will make obvious to Christians themselves, that it is an unsafeargument, an argument which, like the broken reed, not only fails, butcruelly wounds the hand that rests upon it. Much evidence _has been_, and much more _can be_ adduced to show that no prudent, well-informedChristian will say anything about the sanction lent to Christianity, orreligion of any sort, by the writings of Newton, Milton, Bacon, andLocke. By admirers of such sanction, (?) this, our Apology for Atheismwill, no doubt, be rejected with indignant contempt, but we venture topredict for it better treatment at the hands of those who are convincedthat _untruth_ can no more be _scientific_, than truth can be_unscientific_, and that belief, whether in the God of Nature, the Godof Scripture, or the Scripture itself, opposed to Philosophy, must needsbe opposed to Reason and Experience. 

[ENDNOTES]

[4:1] 25th of November, 1845. 

[5:1] Vide 'Time's' Commissioner's Letter on the Condition of Ireland, 'November 28, 1843. 

[10:1] Essay 'of the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy. '

[11:1] See the Creeds of R. Owen and R. Carlile in No. 14 of thePromptor. 

[11:2] 'Essay of the Idea of Necessary Connexion. '

[11:3] 'Essay of a Providence and a Future State. '

[12:1] Critical remarks on Lord Brougham's 'Lives of Men of Letters andScience, who flourished in the time of George III. '--The Times, Wednesday, October I, 1845. 

[13:1] History of American Savages. 

[13:2] Appendix the Second to 'Plutarchus and Theophrastus onSuperstition. '

[13:3] Philosophy of History. 

[15:1] See a Notice of Lord Brougham's Political Philosophy, in thenumber for April, 1845. 

[20:1] 'Apology for the Bible, ' page 133. 

[20:2] Unusquisque vestrum non cogitate prius se debere Deos nosse quamcolere. 

[27:1] See a curious 'Essay on Nature. ' Printed for Badcock and Co. , 2, Queen's Head Passage, Paternoster Row. 1807. 

[31:1] Elements of Materialism, chapter I. 

[32:1] Discussion on the Existence of God, between Origen Bachelor andRobert Dale Owen. 

[37:1] Answer to Dr. Priestly on the existence of God, by aPhilosophical Unbeliever. 

[40:1] Treatise on Human Nature. 

[41:1] This sexing is a stock receipt for mystification. --_Colonel Thompson. _

[44:1] The Rev. J. E. Smith. 

[46:1] 'An Address on Cerebral Physiology and Materialism, ' delivered tothe Phrenological Association in London, June 20, 1842. 

[49:1] No 40 of 'The Shepherd. '

[50:1] 'The Shepherd, ' Vol. I. , page 40. 

[52:1] Extracts from an able letter to the Editor of 'The Shepherd, ' inNo. 23 of that periodical. 

[54:1] Novum Organon. 

[56:1] Principia Mathmatica, p. 528. Lond. Edit. , l726. 

[63:1] See a pamphlet, price Sixpence, entitled 'Paley refuted in hisown words, ' by G. J. Holyoake. '

[63:2] Lessing. 

[64:1] See "Extract from an unpublished work, entitled the 'Refutationof Deism, '" by the late P. B. Shelley--given in the Model Republic of May1st, 1813. 

[68:1] 'Westminster Review' for May, 1843. 

[69:1] Lecture by the Rev. Hugh M'Neil, Minister of St. Jude's Church, Liverpool, delivered about seven years since, in presence of some 400 ofthe Irish Protestant Clergy. 

[69:2] The necessary existence of Deity, by William Gillespie. 

[69:3] Page 105 of a Discussion on the Existence of God, between OrigenBatchelor and R. D. Owen. 

[70:1] Quoted by Dr. Samuel Clarke, in his introduction to the Scripturedoctrine of the Trinity. 

[72:1] History of England, p. 51. 

[75:1] 'Dictionary of Conversions, ' page 4. 

[76:1] Essay on Superstition. 

[77:1] See article 'Auto da Fe, ' vol. I. Of 'Recreative Review, 'published in 1821. 

[77:2] Act of Faith. 

[78:1] St. Foix observes, with respect to this tomb, that if the JackKetch of any country should be rich enough to have a splendid tomb, thismight serve as an excellent model. 

[81:1] 'Lives of Men of Letters, ' by Henry Lord Brougham. 

[82:1] Vol iii. , page 593, 594, of 'A few hundred Bible Contradictions, a Hunt after the Devil, and other odd matters. ' By John P. Y. , M. D. 

[83:1] No. 8 of J. Rutherford's Series of Tracts, and entitled 'ElectingLove. '

[90:1] Ecclesiastical History, vol. Ii. Page 11. 

[91:1] 'Manicheisme, ' tome ii, p. 568, 569. 

[93:1] Nov. Org. , lib; ii. Aph. 29. 

[95:1] See 'Edinburgh Review' containing a notice of Milton's 'DeDoctrina Christiana. '

[95:2] Page 55 of a Pamphlet entitled, 'The Devil. '