ALCIBIADES II by An Imatator of Plato (see Appendix II) Translated by Benjamin Jowett APPENDIX II. The two dialogues which are translated in the second appendix are notmentioned by Aristotle, or by any early authority, and have no claimto be ascribed to Plato. They are examples of Platonic dialogues to beassigned probably to the second or third generation after Plato, whenhis writings were well known at Athens and Alexandria. They exhibitconsiderable originality, and are remarkable for containing severalthoughts of the sort which we suppose to be modern rather than ancient, and which therefore have a peculiar interest for us. The SecondAlcibiades shows that the difficulties about prayer which have perplexedChristian theologians were not unknown among the followers of Plato. The Eryxias was doubted by the ancients themselves: yet it may claim thedistinction of being, among all Greek or Roman writings, the one whichanticipates in the most striking manner the modern science of politicaleconomy and gives an abstract form to some of its principal doctrines. For the translation of these two dialogues I am indebted to my friendand secretary, Mr. Knight. That the Dialogue which goes by the name of the Second Alcibiades is agenuine writing of Plato will not be maintained by any modern critic, and was hardly believed by the ancients themselves. The dialectic ispoor and weak. There is no power over language, or beauty of style; andthere is a certain abruptness and agroikia in the conversation, whichis very un-Platonic. The best passage is probably that about thepoets:--the remark that the poet, who is of a reserved disposition, isuncommonly difficult to understand, and the ridiculous interpretation ofHomer, are entirely in the spirit of Plato (compare Protag; Ion; Apol. ). The characters are ill-drawn. Socrates assumes the 'superior person' andpreaches too much, while Alcibiades is stupid and heavy-in-hand. Thereare traces of Stoic influence in the general tone and phraseology of theDialogue (compare opos melesei tis. .. Kaka: oti pas aphron mainetai):and the writer seems to have been acquainted with the 'Laws' of Plato(compare Laws). An incident from the Symposium is rather clumsilyintroduced, and two somewhat hackneyed quotations (Symp. , Gorg. ) recur. The reference to the death of Archelaus as having occurred 'quitelately' is only a fiction, probably suggested by the Gorgias, where thestory of Archelaus is told, and a similar phrase occurs;--ta gar echtheskai proen gegonota tauta, k. T. L. There are several passages whichare either corrupt or extremely ill-expressed. But there is a moderninterest in the subject of the dialogue; and it is a good example ofa short spurious work, which may be attributed to the second or thirdcentury before Christ. ALCIBIADES II PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates and Alcibiades. SOCRATES: Are you going, Alcibiades, to offer prayer to Zeus? ALCIBIADES: Yes, Socrates, I am. SOCRATES: you seem to be troubled and to cast your eyes on the ground, as though you were thinking about something. ALCIBIADES: Of what do you suppose that I am thinking? SOCRATES: Of the greatest of all things, as I believe. Tell me, do younot suppose that the Gods sometimes partly grant and partly reject therequests which we make in public and private, and favour some personsand not others? ALCIBIADES: Certainly. SOCRATES: Do you not imagine, then, that a man ought to be very careful, lest perchance without knowing it he implore great evils for himself, deeming that he is asking for good, especially if the Gods are in themood to grant whatever he may request? There is the story of Oedipus, for instance, who prayed that his children might divide theirinheritance between them by the sword: he did not, as he might havedone, beg that his present evils might be averted, but called down newones. And was not his prayer accomplished, and did not many and terribleevils thence arise, upon which I need not dilate? ALCIBIADES: Yes, Socrates, but you are speaking of a madman: surely youdo not think that any one in his senses would venture to make such aprayer? SOCRATES: Madness, then, you consider to be the opposite of discretion? ALCIBIADES: Of course. SOCRATES: And some men seem to you to be discreet, and others thecontrary? ALCIBIADES: They do. SOCRATES: Well, then, let us discuss who these are. We acknowledge thatsome are discreet, some foolish, and that some are mad? ALCIBIADES: Yes. SOCRATES: And again, there are some who are in health? ALCIBIADES: There are. SOCRATES: While others are ailing? ALCIBIADES: Yes. SOCRATES: And they are not the same? ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. SOCRATES: Nor are there any who are in neither state? ALCIBIADES: No. SOCRATES: A man must either be sick or be well? ALCIBIADES: That is my opinion. SOCRATES: Very good: and do you think the same about discretion and wantof discretion? ALCIBIADES: How do you mean? SOCRATES: Do you believe that a man must be either in or out of hissenses; or is there some third or intermediate condition, in which he isneither one nor the other? ALCIBIADES: Decidedly not. SOCRATES: He must be either sane or insane? ALCIBIADES: So I suppose. SOCRATES: Did you not acknowledge that madness was the opposite ofdiscretion? ALCIBIADES: Yes. SOCRATES: And that there is no third or middle term between discretionand indiscretion? ALCIBIADES: True. SOCRATES: And there cannot be two opposites to one thing? ALCIBIADES: There cannot. SOCRATES: Then madness and want of sense are the same? ALCIBIADES: That appears to be the case. SOCRATES: We shall be in the right, therefore, Alcibiades, if we saythat all who are senseless are mad. For example, if among personsof your own age or older than yourself there are some who aresenseless, --as there certainly are, --they are mad. For tell me, byheaven, do you not think that in the city the wise are few, while thefoolish, whom you call mad, are many? ALCIBIADES: I do. SOCRATES: But how could we live in safety with so many crazy people?Should we not long since have paid the penalty at their hands, and havebeen struck and beaten and endured every other form of ill-usage whichmadmen are wont to inflict? Consider, my dear friend: may it not bequite otherwise? ALCIBIADES: Why, Socrates, how is that possible? I must have beenmistaken. SOCRATES: So it seems to me. But perhaps we may consider the matterthus:-- ALCIBIADES: How? SOCRATES: I will tell you. We think that some are sick; do we not? ALCIBIADES: Yes. SOCRATES: And must every sick person either have the gout, or be ina fever, or suffer from ophthalmia? Or do you believe that a man maylabour under some other disease, even although he has none of thesecomplaints? Surely, they are not the only maladies which exist? ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. SOCRATES: And is every kind of ophthalmia a disease? ALCIBIADES: Yes. SOCRATES: And every disease ophthalmia? ALCIBIADES: Surely not. But I scarcely understand what I mean myself. SOCRATES: Perhaps, if you give me your best attention, 'two of us'looking together, we may find what we seek. ALCIBIADES: I am attending, Socrates, to the best of my power. SOCRATES: We are agreed, then, that every form of ophthalmia is adisease, but not every disease ophthalmia? ALCIBIADES: We are. SOCRATES: And so far we seem to be right. For every one who suffers froma fever is sick; but the sick, I conceive, do not all have fever or goutor ophthalmia, although each of these is a disease, which, according tothose whom we call physicians, may require a different treatment. Theyare not all alike, nor do they produce the same result, but each hasits own effect, and yet they are all diseases. May we not take anillustration from the artizans? ALCIBIADES: Certainly. SOCRATES: There are cobblers and carpenters and sculptors and others ofall sorts and kinds, whom we need not stop to enumerate. All have theirdistinct employments and all are workmen, although they are not all ofthem cobblers or carpenters or sculptors. ALCIBIADES: No, indeed. SOCRATES: And in like manner men differ in regard to want of sense. Those who are most out of their wits we call 'madmen, ' while we termthose who are less far gone 'stupid' or 'idiotic, ' or, if we prefergentler language, describe them as 'romantic' or 'simple-minded, ' or, again, as 'innocent' or 'inexperienced' or 'foolish. ' You may even findother names, if you seek for them; but by all of them lack of senseis intended. They only differ as one art appeared to us to differ fromanother or one disease from another. Or what is your opinion? ALCIBIADES: I agree with you. SOCRATES: Then let us return to the point at which we digressed. We saidat first that we should have to consider who were the wise and who thefoolish. For we acknowledged that there are these two classes? Did wenot? ALCIBIADES: To be sure. SOCRATES: And you regard those as sensible who know what ought to bedone or said? ALCIBIADES: Yes. SOCRATES: The senseless are those who do not know this? ALCIBIADES: True. SOCRATES: The latter will say or do what they ought not without theirown knowledge? ALCIBIADES: Exactly. SOCRATES: Oedipus, as I was saying, Alcibiades, was a person ofthis sort. And even now-a-days you will find many who (have offeredinauspicious prayers), although, unlike him, they were not in anger northought that they were asking evil. He neither sought, nor supposed thathe sought for good, but others have had quite the contrary notion. Ibelieve that if the God whom you are about to consult should appear toyou, and, in anticipation of your request, enquired whether you would becontented to become tyrant of Athens, and if this seemed in your eyes asmall and mean thing, should add to it the dominion of all Hellas; andseeing that even then you would not be satisfied unless you were rulerof the whole of Europe, should promise, not only that, but, if you sodesired, should proclaim to all mankind in one and the same day thatAlcibiades, son of Cleinias, was tyrant:--in such a case, I imagine, youwould depart full of joy, as one who had obtained the greatest of goods. ALCIBIADES: And not only I, Socrates, but any one else who should meetwith such luck. SOCRATES: Yet you would not accept the dominion and lordship of all theHellenes and all the barbarians in exchange for your life? ALCIBIADES: Certainly not: for then what use could I make of them? SOCRATES: And would you accept them if you were likely to use them to abad and mischievous end? ALCIBIADES: I would not. SOCRATES: You see that it is not safe for a man either rashly to acceptwhatever is offered him, or himself to request a thing, if he is likelyto suffer thereby or immediately to lose his life. And yet we could tellof many who, having long desired and diligently laboured to obtaina tyranny, thinking that thus they would procure an advantage, havenevertheless fallen victims to designing enemies. You must have heard ofwhat happened only the other day, how Archelaus of Macedonia was slainby his beloved (compare Aristotle, Pol. ), whose love for the tyranny wasnot less than that of Archelaus for him. The tyrannicide expected by hiscrime to become tyrant and afterwards to have a happy life; but when hehad held the tyranny three or four days, he was in his turn conspiredagainst and slain. Or look at certain of our own citizens, --and of theiractions we have been not hearers, but eyewitnesses, --who have desired toobtain military command: of those who have gained their object, someare even to this day exiles from the city, while others have lost theirlives. And even they who seem to have fared best, have not only gonethrough many perils and terrors during their office, but after theirreturn home they have been beset by informers worse than they once wereby their foes, insomuch that several of them have wished that theyhad remained in a private station rather than have had the gloriesof command. If, indeed, such perils and terrors were of profit to thecommonwealth, there would be reason in undergoing them; but the verycontrary is the case. Again, you will find persons who have prayedfor offspring, and when their prayers were heard, have fallen into thegreatest pains and sufferings. For some have begotten children who wereutterly bad, and have therefore passed all their days in misery, whilethe parents of good children have undergone the misfortune of losingthem, and have been so little happier than the others that they wouldhave preferred never to have had children rather than to have hadthem and lost them. And yet, although these and the like examples aremanifest and known of all, it is rare to find any one who has refusedwhat has been offered him, or, if he were likely to gain aught byprayer, has refrained from making his petition. The mass of mankindwould not decline to accept a tyranny, or the command of an army, or anyof the numerous things which cause more harm than good: but rather, if they had them not, would have prayed to obtain them. And often in ashort space of time they change their tone, and wish their old prayersunsaid. Wherefore also I suspect that men are entirely wrong when theyblame the gods as the authors of the ills which befall them (compareRepublic): 'their own presumption, ' or folly (whichever is the rightword)-- 'Has brought these unmeasured woes upon them. ' (Homer. Odyss. ) He must have been a wise poet, Alcibiades, who, seeing as I believe, hisfriends foolishly praying for and doing things which would not reallyprofit them, offered up a common prayer in behalf of them all:-- 'King Zeus, grant us good whether prayed for or unsought by us; But thatwhich we ask amiss, do thou avert. ' (The author of these lines, whichare probably of Pythagorean origin, is unknown. They are found also inthe Anthology (Anth. Pal. ). ) In my opinion, I say, the poet spoke both well and prudently; but if youhave anything to say in answer to him, speak out. ALCIBIADES: It is difficult, Socrates, to oppose what has been wellsaid. And I perceive how many are the ills of which ignorance is thecause, since, as would appear, through ignorance we not only do, butwhat is worse, pray for the greatest evils. No man would imagine thathe would do so; he would rather suppose that he was quite capable ofpraying for what was best: to call down evils seems more like a cursethan a prayer. SOCRATES: But perhaps, my good friend, some one who is wiser than eitheryou or I will say that we have no right to blame ignorance thus rashly, unless we can add what ignorance we mean and of what, and also to whomand how it is respectively a good or an evil? ALCIBIADES: How do you mean? Can ignorance possibly be better thanknowledge for any person in any conceivable case? SOCRATES: So I believe:--you do not think so? ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. SOCRATES: And yet surely I may not suppose that you would ever wish toact towards your mother as they say that Orestes and Alcmeon and othershave done towards their parent. ALCIBIADES: Good words, Socrates, prithee. SOCRATES: You ought not to bid him use auspicious words, who says thatyou would not be willing to commit so horrible a deed, but rather himwho affirms the contrary, if the act appear to you unfit even to bementioned. Or do you think that Orestes, had he been in his senses andknew what was best for him to do, would ever have dared to venture onsuch a crime? ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. SOCRATES: Nor would any one else, I fancy? ALCIBIADES: No. SOCRATES: That ignorance is bad then, it would appear, which is of thebest and does not know what is best? ALCIBIADES: So I think, at least. SOCRATES: And both to the person who is ignorant and everybody else? ALCIBIADES: Yes. SOCRATES: Let us take another case. Suppose that you were suddenly toget into your head that it would be a good thing to kill Pericles, yourkinsman and guardian, and were to seize a sword and, going to the doorsof his house, were to enquire if he were at home, meaning to slay onlyhim and no one else:--the servants reply, 'Yes': (Mind, I do not meanthat you would really do such a thing; but there is nothing, you think, to prevent a man who is ignorant of the best, having occasionally thewhim that what is worst is best? ALCIBIADES: No. ) SOCRATES:--If, then, you went indoors, and seeing him, did not know him, but thought that he was some one else, would you venture to slay him? ALCIBIADES: Most decidedly not (it seems to me). (These words areomitted in several MSS. ) SOCRATES: For you designed to kill, not the first who offered, butPericles himself? ALCIBIADES: Certainly. SOCRATES: And if you made many attempts, and each time failed torecognize Pericles, you would never attack him? ALCIBIADES: Never. SOCRATES: Well, but if Orestes in like manner had not known his mother, do you think that he would ever have laid hands upon her? ALCIBIADES: No. SOCRATES: He did not intend to slay the first woman he came across, norany one else's mother, but only his own? ALCIBIADES: True. SOCRATES: Ignorance, then, is better for those who are in such a frameof mind, and have such ideas? ALCIBIADES: Obviously. SOCRATES: You acknowledge that for some persons in certain cases theignorance of some things is a good and not an evil, as you formerlysupposed? ALCIBIADES: I do. SOCRATES: And there is still another case which will also perhapsappear strange to you, if you will consider it? (The reading is hereuncertain. ) ALCIBIADES: What is that, Socrates? SOCRATES: It may be, in short, that the possession of all the sciences, if unaccompanied by the knowledge of the best, will more often than notinjure the possessor. Consider the matter thus:--Must we not, when weintend either to do or say anything, suppose that we know or ought toknow that which we propose so confidently to do or say? ALCIBIADES: Yes, in my opinion. SOCRATES: We may take the orators for an example, who from time totime advise us about war and peace, or the building of walls and theconstruction of harbours, whether they understand the business inhand, or only think that they do. Whatever the city, in a word, does toanother city, or in the management of her own affairs, all happens bythe counsel of the orators. ALCIBIADES: True. SOCRATES: But now see what follows, if I can (make it clear to you). (Some words appear to have dropped out here. ) You would distinguish thewise from the foolish? ALCIBIADES: Yes. SOCRATES: The many are foolish, the few wise? ALCIBIADES: Certainly. SOCRATES: And you use both the terms, 'wise' and 'foolish, ' in referenceto something? ALCIBIADES: I do. SOCRATES: Would you call a person wise who can give advice, but does notknow whether or when it is better to carry out the advice? ALCIBIADES: Decidedly not. SOCRATES: Nor again, I suppose, a person who knows the art of war, butdoes not know whether it is better to go to war or for how long? ALCIBIADES: No. SOCRATES: Nor, once more, a person who knows how to kill another or totake away his property or to drive him from his native land, but notwhen it is better to do so or for whom it is better? ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. SOCRATES: But he who understands anything of the kind and has at thesame time the knowledge of the best course of action:--and the best andthe useful are surely the same?-- ALCIBIADES: Yes. SOCRATES:--Such an one, I say, we should call wise and a useful adviserboth of himself and of the city. What do you think? ALCIBIADES: I agree. SOCRATES: And if any one knows how to ride or to shoot with the bow orto box or to wrestle, or to engage in any other sort of contest or todo anything whatever which is in the nature of an art, --what do you callhim who knows what is best according to that art? Do you not speak ofone who knows what is best in riding as a good rider? ALCIBIADES: Yes. SOCRATES: And in a similar way you speak of a good boxer or a goodflute-player or a good performer in any other art? ALCIBIADES: True. SOCRATES: But is it necessary that the man who is clever in any of thesearts should be wise also in general? Or is there a difference betweenthe clever artist and the wise man? ALCIBIADES: All the difference in the world. SOCRATES: And what sort of a state do you think that would be which wascomposed of good archers and flute-players and athletes and masters inother arts, and besides them of those others about whom we spoke, whoknew how to go to war and how to kill, as well as of orators puffedup with political pride, but in which not one of them all had thisknowledge of the best, and there was no one who could tell when it wasbetter to apply any of these arts or in regard to whom? ALCIBIADES: I should call such a state bad, Socrates. SOCRATES: You certainly would when you saw each of them rivalling theother and esteeming that of the greatest importance in the state, 'Wherein he himself most excelled. ' (Euripides, Antiope. ) --I mean thatwhich was best in any art, while he was entirely ignorant of what wasbest for himself and for the state, because, as I think, he trusts toopinion which is devoid of intelligence. In such a case should we notbe right if we said that the state would be full of anarchy andlawlessness? ALCIBIADES: Decidedly. SOCRATES: But ought we not then, think you, either to fancy that we knowor really to know, what we confidently propose to do or say? ALCIBIADES: Yes. SOCRATES: And if a person does that which he knows or supposes that heknows, and the result is beneficial, he will act advantageously both forhimself and for the state? ALCIBIADES: True. SOCRATES: And if he do the contrary, both he and the state will suffer? ALCIBIADES: Yes. SOCRATES: Well, and are you of the same mind, as before? ALCIBIADES: I am. SOCRATES: But were you not saying that you would call the many unwiseand the few wise? ALCIBIADES: I was. SOCRATES: And have we not come back to our old assertion that the manyfail to obtain the best because they trust to opinion which is devoid ofintelligence? ALCIBIADES: That is the case. SOCRATES: It is good, then, for the many, if they particularly desire todo that which they know or suppose that they know, neither to know norto suppose that they know, in cases where if they carry out their ideasin action they will be losers rather than gainers? ALCIBIADES: What you say is very true. SOCRATES: Do you not see that I was really speaking the truth when Iaffirmed that the possession of any other kind of knowledge was morelikely to injure than to benefit the possessor, unless he had also theknowledge of the best? ALCIBIADES: I do now, if I did not before, Socrates. SOCRATES: The state or the soul, therefore, which wishes to have aright existence must hold firmly to this knowledge, just as the sickman clings to the physician, or the passenger depends for safety on thepilot. And if the soul does not set sail until she have obtained thisshe will be all the safer in the voyage through life. But when sherushes in pursuit of wealth or bodily strength or anything else, nothaving the knowledge of the best, so much the more is she likely tomeet with misfortune. And he who has the love of learning (Or, readingpolumatheian, 'abundant learning. '), and is skilful in many arts, anddoes not possess the knowledge of the best, but is under some otherguidance, will make, as he deserves, a sorry voyage:--he will, Ibelieve, hurry through the brief space of human life, pilotless inmid-ocean, and the words will apply to him in which the poet blamed hisenemy:-- '. .. Full many a thing he knew; But knew them all badly. ' (A fragmentfrom the pseudo-Homeric poem, 'Margites. ') ALCIBIADES: How in the world, Socrates, do the words of the poet applyto him? They seem to me to have no bearing on the point whatever. SOCRATES: Quite the contrary, my sweet friend: only the poet is talkingin riddles after the fashion of his tribe. For all poetry has by naturean enigmatical character, and it is by no means everybody who caninterpret it. And if, moreover, the spirit of poetry happen to seize ona man who is of a begrudging temper and does not care to manifest hiswisdom but keeps it to himself as far as he can, it does indeed requirean almost superhuman wisdom to discover what the poet would be at. Yousurely do not suppose that Homer, the wisest and most divine of poets, was unaware of the impossibility of knowing a thing badly: for it wasno less a person than he who said of Margites that 'he knew manythings, but knew them all badly. ' The solution of the riddle is this, Iimagine:--By 'badly' Homer meant 'bad' and 'knew' stands for 'to know. 'Put the words together;--the metre will suffer, but the poet's meaningis clear;--'Margites knew all these things, but it was bad for himto know them. ' And, obviously, if it was bad for him to know so manythings, he must have been a good-for-nothing, unless the argument hasplayed us false. ALCIBIADES: But I do not think that it has, Socrates: at least, if theargument is fallacious, it would be difficult for me to find anotherwhich I could trust. SOCRATES: And you are right in thinking so. ALCIBIADES: Well, that is my opinion. SOCRATES: But tell me, by Heaven:--you must see now the nature andgreatness of the difficulty in which you, like others, have your part. For you change about in all directions, and never come to rest anywhere:what you once most strongly inclined to suppose, you put aside again andquite alter your mind. If the God to whose shrine you are going shouldappear at this moment, and ask before you made your prayer, 'Whether youwould desire to have one of the things which we mentioned at first, orwhether he should leave you to make your own request:'--what ineither case, think you, would be the best way to take advantage of theopportunity? ALCIBIADES: Indeed, Socrates, I could not answer you withoutconsideration. It seems to me to be a wild thing (The Homeric wordmargos is said to be here employed in allusion to the quotation from the'Margites' which Socrates has just made; but it is not used in thesense which it has in Homer. ) to make such a request; a man must be verycareful lest he pray for evil under the idea that he is asking for good, when shortly after he may have to recall his prayer, and, as you weresaying, demand the opposite of what he at first requested. SOCRATES: And was not the poet whose words I originally quoted wiserthan we are, when he bade us (pray God) to defend us from evil eventhough we asked for it? ALCIBIADES: I believe that you are right. SOCRATES: The Lacedaemonians, too, whether from admiration of the poetor because they have discovered the idea for themselves, are wont tooffer the prayer alike in public and private, that the Gods will giveunto them the beautiful as well as the good:--no one is likely to hearthem make any further petition. And yet up to the present time they havenot been less fortunate than other men; or if they have sometimes metwith misfortune, the fault has not been due to their prayer. For surely, as I conceive, the Gods have power either to grant our requests, or tosend us the contrary of what we ask. And now I will relate to you a story which I have heard from certain ofour elders. It chanced that when the Athenians and Lacedaemonians wereat war, our city lost every battle by land and sea and never gained avictory. The Athenians being annoyed and perplexed how to find a remedyfor their troubles, decided to send and enquire at the shrine of Ammon. Their envoys were also to ask, 'Why the Gods always granted the victoryto the Lacedaemonians?' 'We, ' (they were to say, ) 'offer them more andfiner sacrifices than any other Hellenic state, and adorn their templeswith gifts, as nobody else does; moreover, we make the most solemn andcostly processions to them every year, and spend more money in theirservice than all the rest of the Hellenes put together. But theLacedaemonians take no thought of such matters, and pay so littlerespect to the Gods that they have a habit of sacrificing blemishedanimals to them, and in various ways are less zealous than we are, although their wealth is quite equal to ours. ' When they had thusspoken, and had made their request to know what remedy they couldfind against the evils which troubled them, the prophet made no directanswer, --clearly because he was not allowed by the God to do so;--but hesummoned them to him and said: 'Thus saith Ammon to the Athenians: "Thesilent worship of the Lacedaemonians pleaseth me better than all theofferings of the other Hellenes. "' Such were the words of the God, andnothing more. He seems to have meant by 'silent worship' the prayerof the Lacedaemonians, which is indeed widely different from the usualrequests of the Hellenes. For they either bring to the altar bulls withgilded horns or make offerings to the Gods, and beg at random for whatthey need, good or bad. When, therefore, the Gods hear them using wordsof ill omen they reject these costly processions and sacrifices oftheirs. And we ought, I think, to be very careful and consider well whatwe should say and what leave unsaid. Homer, too, will furnish uswith similar stories. For he tells us how the Trojans in making theirencampment, 'Offered up whole hecatombs to the immortals, ' and how the 'sweet savour' was borne 'to the heavens by the winds; 'But the blessed Gods were averse and received it not. For exceedingly did they hate the holy Ilium, Both Priam and the people of the spear-skilled king. ' So that it was in vain for them to sacrifice and offer gifts, seeingthat they were hateful to the Gods, who are not, like vile usurers, tobe gained over by bribes. And it is foolish for us to boast that we aresuperior to the Lacedaemonians by reason of our much worship. The ideais inconceivable that the Gods have regard, not to the justice andpurity of our souls, but to costly processions and sacrifices, which menmay celebrate year after year, although they have committed innumerablecrimes against the Gods or against their fellow-men or the state. Forthe Gods, as Ammon and his prophet declare, are no receivers of gifts, and they scorn such unworthy service. Wherefore also it would seem thatwisdom and justice are especially honoured both by the Gods and by menof sense; and they are the wisest and most just who know how to speakand act towards Gods and men. But I should like to hear what youropinion is about these matters. ALCIBIADES: I agree, Socrates, with you and with the God, whom, indeed, it would be unbecoming for me to oppose. SOCRATES: Do you not remember saying that you were in great perplexity, lest perchance you should ask for evil, supposing that you were askingfor good? ALCIBIADES: I do. SOCRATES: You see, then, that there is a risk in your approaching theGod in prayer, lest haply he should refuse your sacrifice when he hearsthe blasphemy which you utter, and make you partake of other evilsas well. The wisest plan, therefore, seems to me that you should keepsilence; for your 'highmindedness'--to use the mildest term which menapply to folly--will most likely prevent you from using the prayer ofthe Lacedaemonians. You had better wait until we find out how we shouldbehave towards the Gods and towards men. ALCIBIADES: And how long must I wait, Socrates, and who will be myteacher? I should be very glad to see the man. SOCRATES: It is he who takes an especial interest in you. But first ofall, I think, the darkness must be taken away in which your soul is nowenveloped, just as Athene in Homer removes the mist from the eyes ofDiomede that 'He may distinguish between God and mortal man. ' Afterwards the means may be given to you whereby you may distinguishbetween good and evil. At present, I fear, this is beyond your power. ALCIBIADES: Only let my instructor take away the impediment, whether itpleases him to call it mist or anything else! I care not who he is; butI am resolved to disobey none of his commands, if I am likely to be thebetter for them. SOCRATES: And surely he has a wondrous care for you. ALCIBIADES: It seems to be altogether advisable to put off the sacrificeuntil he is found. SOCRATES: You are right: that will be safer than running such atremendous risk. ALCIBIADES: But how shall we manage, Socrates?--At any rate I will setthis crown of mine upon your head, as you have given me such excellentadvice, and to the Gods we will offer crowns and perform the othercustomary rites when I see that day approaching: nor will it be longhence, if they so will. SOCRATES: I accept your gift, and shall be ready and willing to receivewhatever else you may proffer. Euripides makes Creon say in the play, when he beholds Teiresias with his crown and hears that he has gained itby his skill as the first-fruits of the spoil:-- 'An auspicious omen I deem thy victor's wreath: For well thou knowestthat wave and storm oppress us. ' And so I count your gift to be a token of good-fortune; for I am in noless stress than Creon, and would fain carry off the victory over yourlovers.