ALCIBIADES I

by Plato (may be spurious--see Appendix I)

Translated by Benjamin Jowett

APPENDIX I. 

It seems impossible to separate by any exact line the genuine writingsof Plato from the spurious. The only external evidence to them which isof much value is that of Aristotle; for the Alexandrian catalogues ofa century later include manifest forgeries. Even the value of theAristotelian authority is a good deal impaired by the uncertaintyconcerning the date and authorship of the writings which are ascribed tohim. And several of the citations of Aristotle omit the name of Plato, and some of them omit the name of the dialogue from which they aretaken. Prior, however, to the enquiry about the writings of a particularauthor, general considerations which equally affect all evidence to thegenuineness of ancient writings are the following: Shorter works aremore likely to have been forged, or to have received an erroneousdesignation, than longer ones; and some kinds of composition, such asepistles or panegyrical orations, are more liable to suspicion thanothers; those, again, which have a taste of sophistry in them, or thering of a later age, or the slighter character of a rhetorical exercise, or in which a motive or some affinity to spurious writings can bedetected, or which seem to have originated in a name or statement reallyoccurring in some classical author, are also of doubtful credit; whilethere is no instance of any ancient writing proved to be a forgery, which combines excellence with length. A really great and originalwriter would have no object in fathering his works on Plato; and to theforger or imitator, the 'literary hack' of Alexandria and Athens, theGods did not grant originality or genius. Further, in attempting tobalance the evidence for and against a Platonic dialogue, we must notforget that the form of the Platonic writing was common to several ofhis contemporaries. Aeschines, Euclid, Phaedo, Antisthenes, and in thenext generation Aristotle, are all said to have composed dialogues; andmistakes of names are very likely to have occurred. Greek literature inthe third century before Christ was almost as voluminous as our own, andwithout the safeguards of regular publication, or printing, or binding, or even of distinct titles. An unknown writing was naturally attributedto a known writer whose works bore the same character; and the name onceappended easily obtained authority. A tendency may also be observed toblend the works and opinions of the master with those of his scholars. To a later Platonist, the difference between Plato and his imitators wasnot so perceptible as to ourselves. The Memorabilia of Xenophon and theDialogues of Plato are but a part of a considerable Socratic literaturewhich has passed away. And we must consider how we should regard thequestion of the genuineness of a particular writing, if this lostliterature had been preserved to us. 

These considerations lead us to adopt the following criteria ofgenuineness: (1) That is most certainly Plato's which Aristotleattributes to him by name, which (2) is of considerable length, of (3)great excellence, and also (4) in harmony with the general spirit ofthe Platonic writings. But the testimony of Aristotle cannot alwaysbe distinguished from that of a later age (see above); and has variousdegrees of importance. Those writings which he cites without mentioningPlato, under their own names, e. G. The Hippias, the Funeral Oration, thePhaedo, etc. , have an inferior degree of evidence in their favour. Theymay have been supposed by him to be the writings of another, although inthe case of really great works, e. G. The Phaedo, this is not credible;those again which are quoted but not named, are still more defectivein their external credentials. There may be also a possibility thatAristotle was mistaken, or may have confused the master and his scholarsin the case of a short writing; but this is inconceivable about a moreimportant work, e. G. The Laws, especially when we remember that he wasliving at Athens, and a frequenter of the groves of the Academy, duringthe last twenty years of Plato's life. Nor must we forget that in allhis numerous citations from the Platonic writings he never attributesany passage found in the extant dialogues to any one but Plato. Andlastly, we may remark that one or two great writings, such as theParmenides and the Politicus, which are wholly devoid of Aristotelian(1) credentials may be fairly attributed to Plato, on the ground of (2)length, (3) excellence, and (4) accordance with the general spiritof his writings. Indeed the greater part of the evidence for thegenuineness of ancient Greek authors may be summed up under two headsonly: (1) excellence; and (2) uniformity of tradition--a kind ofevidence, which though in many cases sufficient, is of inferior value. 

Proceeding upon these principles we appear to arrive at the conclusionthat nineteen-twentieths of all the writings which have ever beenascribed to Plato, are undoubtedly genuine. There is another portion ofthem, including the Epistles, the Epinomis, the dialogues rejected bythe ancients themselves, namely, the Axiochus, De justo, De virtute, Demodocus, Sisyphus, Eryxias, which on grounds, both of internal andexternal evidence, we are able with equal certainty to reject. But therestill remains a small portion of which we are unable to affirm eitherthat they are genuine or spurious. They may have been written in youth, or possibly like the works of some painters, may be partly or whollythe compositions of pupils; or they may have been the writings of somecontemporary transferred by accident to the more celebrated name ofPlato, or of some Platonist in the next generation who aspired toimitate his master. Not that on grounds either of language or philosophywe should lightly reject them. Some difference of style, or inferiorityof execution, or inconsistency of thought, can hardly be considereddecisive of their spurious character. For who always does justice tohimself, or who writes with equal care at all times? Certainly notPlato, who exhibits the greatest differences in dramatic power, in theformation of sentences, and in the use of words, if his earlier writingsare compared with his later ones, say the Protagoras or Phaedrus withthe Laws. Or who can be expected to think in the same manner duringa period of authorship extending over above fifty years, in an ageof great intellectual activity, as well as of political and literarytransition? Certainly not Plato, whose earlier writings are separatedfrom his later ones by as wide an interval of philosophical speculationas that which separates his later writings from Aristotle. 

The dialogues which have been translated in the first Appendix, andwhich appear to have the next claim to genuineness among the Platonicwritings, are the Lesser Hippias, the Menexenus or Funeral Oration, theFirst Alcibiades. Of these, the Lesser Hippias and the Funeral Orationare cited by Aristotle; the first in the Metaphysics, the latter in theRhetoric. Neither of them are expressly attributed to Plato, but in hiscitation of both of them he seems to be referring to passages in theextant dialogues. From the mention of 'Hippias' in the singular byAristotle, we may perhaps infer that he was unacquainted with a seconddialogue bearing the same name. Moreover, the mere existence of aGreater and Lesser Hippias, and of a First and Second Alcibiades, doesto a certain extent throw a doubt upon both of them. Though a veryclever and ingenious work, the Lesser Hippias does not appear to containanything beyond the power of an imitator, who was also a careful studentof the earlier Platonic writings, to invent. The motive or leadingthought of the dialogue may be detected in Xen. Mem. , and there isno similar instance of a 'motive' which is taken from Xenophon in anundoubted dialogue of Plato. On the other hand, the upholders of thegenuineness of the dialogue will find in the Hippias a true Socraticspirit; they will compare the Ion as being akin both in subject andtreatment; they will urge the authority of Aristotle; and they willdetect in the treatment of the Sophist, in the satirical reasoningupon Homer, in the reductio ad absurdum of the doctrine that vice isignorance, traces of a Platonic authorship. In reference to the lastpoint we are doubtful, as in some of the other dialogues, whether theauthor is asserting or overthrowing the paradox of Socrates, or merelyfollowing the argument 'whither the wind blows. ' That no conclusionis arrived at is also in accordance with the character of the earlierdialogues. The resemblances or imitations of the Gorgias, Protagoras, and Euthydemus, which have been observed in the Hippias, cannot withcertainty be adduced on either side of the argument. On the whole, moremay be said in favour of the genuineness of the Hippias than against it. 

The Menexenus or Funeral Oration is cited by Aristotle, and isinteresting as supplying an example of the manner in which the oratorspraised 'the Athenians among the Athenians, ' falsifying persons anddates, and casting a veil over the gloomier events of Athenian history. It exhibits an acquaintance with the funeral oration of Thucydides, andwas, perhaps, intended to rival that great work. If genuine, theproper place of the Menexenus would be at the end of the Phaedrus. Thesatirical opening and the concluding words bear a great resemblance tothe earlier dialogues; the oration itself is professedly a mimetic work, like the speeches in the Phaedrus, and cannot therefore be tested bya comparison of the other writings of Plato. The funeral oration ofPericles is expressly mentioned in the Phaedrus, and this may havesuggested the subject, in the same manner that the Cleitophon appears tobe suggested by the slight mention of Cleitophon and his attachment toThrasymachus in the Republic; and the Theages by the mention of Theagesin the Apology and Republic; or as the Second Alcibiades seems to befounded upon the text of Xenophon, Mem. A similar taste for parodyappears not only in the Phaedrus, but in the Protagoras, in theSymposium, and to a certain extent in the Parmenides. 

To these two doubtful writings of Plato I have added the FirstAlcibiades, which, of all the disputed dialogues of Plato, has thegreatest merit, and is somewhat longer than any of them, though notverified by the testimony of Aristotle, and in many respects at variancewith the Symposium in the description of the relations of Socratesand Alcibiades. Like the Lesser Hippias and the Menexenus, it is to becompared to the earlier writings of Plato. The motive of the piece may, perhaps, be found in that passage of the Symposium in which Alcibiadesdescribes himself as self-convicted by the words of Socrates. For thedisparaging manner in which Schleiermacher has spoken of this dialoguethere seems to be no sufficient foundation. At the same time, the lessonimparted is simple, and the irony more transparent than in the undoubteddialogues of Plato. We know, too, that Alcibiades was a favouritethesis, and that at least five or six dialogues bearing this name passedcurrent in antiquity, and are attributed to contemporaries of Socratesand Plato. (1) In the entire absence of real external evidence (forthe catalogues of the Alexandrian librarians cannot be regarded astrustworthy); and (2) in the absence of the highest marks either ofpoetical or philosophical excellence; and (3) considering that we haveexpress testimony to the existence of contemporary writings bearingthe name of Alcibiades, we are compelled to suspend our judgment on thegenuineness of the extant dialogue. 

Neither at this point, nor at any other, do we propose to draw anabsolute line of demarcation between genuine and spurious writings ofPlato. They fade off imperceptibly from one class to another. There mayhave been degrees of genuineness in the dialogues themselves, as thereare certainly degrees of evidence by which they are supported. Thetraditions of the oral discourses both of Socrates and Plato may haveformed the basis of semi-Platonic writings; some of them may be of thesame mixed character which is apparent in Aristotle and Hippocrates, although the form of them is different. But the writings of Plato, unlike the writings of Aristotle, seem never to have been confused withthe writings of his disciples: this was probably due to their definiteform, and to their inimitable excellence. The three dialogues whichwe have offered in the Appendix to the criticism of the reader maybe partly spurious and partly genuine; they may be altogetherspurious;--that is an alternative which must be frankly admitted. Norcan we maintain of some other dialogues, such as the Parmenides, andthe Sophist, and Politicus, that no considerable objection can be urgedagainst them, though greatly overbalanced by the weight (chiefly)of internal evidence in their favour. Nor, on the other hand, canwe exclude a bare possibility that some dialogues which are usuallyrejected, such as the Greater Hippias and the Cleitophon, may begenuine. The nature and object of these semi-Platonic writings requiremore careful study and more comparison of them with one another, andwith forged writings in general, than they have yet received, before wecan finally decide on their character. We do not consider them all asgenuine until they can be proved to be spurious, as is often maintainedand still more often implied in this and similar discussions; butshould say of some of them, that their genuineness is neither proven nordisproven until further evidence about them can be adduced. And we areas confident that the Epistles are spurious, as that the Republic, theTimaeus, and the Laws are genuine. 

On the whole, not a twentieth part of the writings which pass underthe name of Plato, if we exclude the works rejected by the ancientsthemselves and two or three other plausible inventions, can be fairlydoubted by those who are willing to allow that a considerable changeand growth may have taken place in his philosophy (see above). Thattwentieth debatable portion scarcely in any degree affects our judgmentof Plato, either as a thinker or a writer, and though suggesting someinteresting questions to the scholar and critic, is of little importanceto the general reader. 

ALCIBIADES I

by

Plato (see Appendix I above)

Translated by Benjamin Jowett

INTRODUCTION. 

The First Alcibiades is a conversation between Socrates and Alcibiades. Socrates is represented in the character which he attributes to himselfin the Apology of a know-nothing who detects the conceit of knowledge inothers. The two have met already in the Protagoras and in the Symposium;in the latter dialogue, as in this, the relation between them is thatof a lover and his beloved. But the narrative of their loves is tolddifferently in different places; for in the Symposium Alcibiadesis depicted as the impassioned but rejected lover; here, as coldlyreceiving the advances of Socrates, who, for the best of purposes, liesin wait for the aspiring and ambitious youth. 

Alcibiades, who is described as a very young man, is about to enter onpublic life, having an inordinate opinion of himself, and an extravagantambition. Socrates, 'who knows what is in man, ' astonishes him by arevelation of his designs. But has he the knowledge which is necessaryfor carrying them out? He is going to persuade the Athenians--aboutwhat? Not about any particular art, but about politics--when to fightand when to make peace. Now, men should fight and make peace on justgrounds, and therefore the question of justice and injustice must enterinto peace and war; and he who advises the Athenians must know thedifference between them. Does Alcibiades know? If he does, he musteither have been taught by some master, or he must have discovered thenature of them himself. If he has had a master, Socrates would like tobe informed who he is, that he may go and learn of him also. Alcibiadesadmits that he has never learned. Then has he enquired for himself? Hemay have, if he was ever aware of a time when he was ignorant. Buthe never was ignorant; for when he played with other boys at dice, hecharged them with cheating, and this implied a knowledge of justand unjust. According to his own explanation, he had learned of themultitude. Why, he asks, should he not learn of them the nature ofjustice, as he has learned the Greek language of them? To this Socratesanswers, that they can teach Greek, but they cannot teach justice; forthey are agreed about the one, but they are not agreed about the other:and therefore Alcibiades, who has admitted that if he knows he musteither have learned from a master or have discovered for himself thenature of justice, is convicted out of his own mouth. 

Alcibiades rejoins, that the Athenians debate not about what is just, but about what is expedient; and he asserts that the two principles ofjustice and expediency are opposed. Socrates, by a series of questions, compels him to admit that the just and the expedient coincide. Alcibiades is thus reduced to the humiliating conclusion that he knowsnothing of politics, even if, as he says, they are concerned with theexpedient. 

However, he is no worse than other Athenian statesmen; and he will notneed training, for others are as ignorant as he is. He is reminded thathe has to contend, not only with his own countrymen, but with theirenemies--with the Spartan kings and with the great king of Persia; andhe can only attain this higher aim of ambition by the assistance ofSocrates. Not that Socrates himself professes to have attained thetruth, but the questions which he asks bring others to a knowledge ofthemselves, and this is the first step in the practice of virtue. 

The dialogue continues:--We wish to become as good as possible. But tobe good in what? Alcibiades replies--'Good in transacting business. ' Butwhat business? 'The business of the most intelligent men at Athens. ' Thecobbler is intelligent in shoemaking, and is therefore good in that; heis not intelligent, and therefore not good, in weaving. Is he good inthe sense which Alcibiades means, who is also bad? 'I mean, ' repliesAlcibiades, 'the man who is able to command in the city. ' But to commandwhat--horses or men? and if men, under what circumstances? 'I meanto say, that he is able to command men living in social and politicalrelations. ' And what is their aim? 'The better preservation of thecity. ' But when is a city better? 'When there is unanimity, such asexists between husband and wife. ' Then, when husbands and wives performtheir own special duties, there can be no unanimity between them; norcan a city be well ordered when each citizen does his own work only. Alcibiades, having stated first that goodness consists in the unanimityof the citizens, and then in each of them doing his own separate work, is brought to the required point of self-contradiction, leading him toconfess his own ignorance. 

But he is not too old to learn, and may still arrive at the truth, if heis willing to be cross-examined by Socrates. He must know himself; thatis to say, not his body, or the things of the body, but his mind, ortruer self. The physician knows the body, and the tradesman knowshis own business, but they do not necessarily know themselves. Self-knowledge can be obtained only by looking into the mind and virtueof the soul, which is the diviner part of a man, as we see our own imagein another's eye. And if we do not know ourselves, we cannot know whatbelongs to ourselves or belongs to others, and are unfit to take a partin political affairs. Both for the sake of the individual and of thestate, we ought to aim at justice and temperance, not at wealth orpower. The evil and unjust should have no power, --they should bethe slaves of better men than themselves. None but the virtuous aredeserving of freedom. 

And are you, Alcibiades, a freeman? 'I feel that I am not; but I hope, Socrates, that by your aid I may become free, and from this day forwardI will never leave you. '

The Alcibiades has several points of resemblance to the undoubteddialogues of Plato. The process of interrogation is of the same kindwith that which Socrates practises upon the youthful Cleinias in theEuthydemus; and he characteristically attributes to Alcibiades theanswers which he has elicited from him. The definition of good isnarrowed by successive questions, and virtue is shown to be identicalwith knowledge. Here, as elsewhere, Socrates awakens the consciousnessnot of sin but of ignorance. Self-humiliation is the first step toknowledge, even of the commonest things. No man knows how ignorant heis, and no man can arrive at virtue and wisdom who has not once in hislife, at least, been convicted of error. The process by which the soulis elevated is not unlike that which religious writers describe underthe name of 'conversion, ' if we substitute the sense of ignorance forthe consciousness of sin. 

In some respects the dialogue differs from any other Platoniccomposition. The aim is more directly ethical and hortatory; the processby which the antagonist is undermined is simpler than in other Platonicwritings, and the conclusion more decided. There is a good deal ofhumour in the manner in which the pride of Alcibiades, and of the Greeksgenerally, is supposed to be taken down by the Spartan and Persianqueens; and the dialogue has considerable dialectical merit. But wehave a difficulty in supposing that the same writer, who has given soprofound and complex a notion of the characters both of Alcibiadesand Socrates in the Symposium, should have treated them in so thin andsuperficial a manner in the Alcibiades, or that he would have ascribedto the ironical Socrates the rather unmeaning boast that Alcibiadescould not attain the objects of his ambition without his help; or thathe should have imagined that a mighty nature like his could havebeen reformed by a few not very conclusive words of Socrates. For thearguments by which Alcibiades is reformed are not convincing; the writerof the dialogue, whoever he was, arrives at his idealism by crooked andtortuous paths, in which many pitfalls are concealed. The anachronism ofmaking Alcibiades about twenty years old during the life of his uncle, Pericles, may be noted; and the repetition of the favourite observation, which occurs also in the Laches and Protagoras, that great Athenianstatesmen, like Pericles, failed in the education of their sons. Thereis none of the undoubted dialogues of Plato in which there is so littledramatic verisimilitude. 

ALCIBIADES I

by

Plato (see Appendix I above)

Translated by Benjamin Jowett

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Alcibiades, Socrates. 

SOCRATES: I dare say that you may be surprised to find, O son ofCleinias, that I, who am your first lover, not having spoken to youfor many years, when the rest of the world were wearying you with theirattentions, am the last of your lovers who still speaks to you. Thecause of my silence has been that I was hindered by a power morethan human, of which I will some day explain to you the nature; thisimpediment has now been removed; I therefore here present myself beforeyou, and I greatly hope that no similar hindrance will again occur. Meanwhile, I have observed that your pride has been too much for thepride of your admirers; they were numerous and high-spirited, but theyhave all run away, overpowered by your superior force of character; notone of them remains. And I want you to understand the reason why youhave been too much for them. You think that you have no need of themor of any other man, for you have great possessions and lack nothing, beginning with the body, and ending with the soul. In the firstplace, you say to yourself that you are the fairest and tallest of thecitizens, and this every one who has eyes may see to be true; in thesecond place, that you are among the noblest of them, highly connectedboth on the father's and the mother's side, and sprung from one of themost distinguished families in your own state, which is the greatest inHellas, and having many friends and kinsmen of the best sort, who canassist you when in need; and there is one potent relative, who is moreto you than all the rest, Pericles the son of Xanthippus, whom yourfather left guardian of you, and of your brother, and who can do as hepleases not only in this city, but in all Hellas, and among many andmighty barbarous nations. Moreover, you are rich; but I must say thatyou value yourself least of all upon your possessions. And all thesethings have lifted you up; you have overcome your lovers, and they haveacknowledged that you were too much for them. Have you not remarkedtheir absence? And now I know that you wonder why I, unlike the rest ofthem, have not gone away, and what can be my motive in remaining. 

ALCIBIADES: Perhaps, Socrates, you are not aware that I was just goingto ask you the very same question--What do you want? And what is yourmotive in annoying me, and always, wherever I am, making a point ofcoming? (Compare Symp. ) I do really wonder what you mean, and shouldgreatly like to know. 

SOCRATES: Then if, as you say, you desire to know, I suppose that youwill be willing to hear, and I may consider myself to be speaking to anauditor who will remain, and will not run away?

ALCIBIADES: Certainly, let me hear. 

SOCRATES: You had better be careful, for I may very likely be asunwilling to end as I have hitherto been to begin. 

ALCIBIADES: Proceed, my good man, and I will listen. 

SOCRATES: I will proceed; and, although no lover likes to speak withone who has no feeling of love in him (compare Symp. ), I will make aneffort, and tell you what I meant: My love, Alcibiades, which I hardlylike to confess, would long ago have passed away, as I flatter myself, if I saw you loving your good things, or thinking that you ought topass life in the enjoyment of them. But I shall reveal other thoughtsof yours, which you keep to yourself; whereby you will know that I havealways had my eye on you. Suppose that at this moment some God came toyou and said: Alcibiades, will you live as you are, or die in an instantif you are forbidden to make any further acquisition?--I verily believethat you would choose death. And I will tell you the hope in which youare at present living: Before many days have elapsed, you think that youwill come before the Athenian assembly, and will prove to them thatyou are more worthy of honour than Pericles, or any other man that everlived, and having proved this, you will have the greatest power in thestate. When you have gained the greatest power among us, you will goon to other Hellenic states, and not only to Hellenes, but to all thebarbarians who inhabit the same continent with us. And if the God werethen to say to you again: Here in Europe is to be your seat of empire, and you must not cross over into Asia or meddle with Asiatic affairs, Ido not believe that you would choose to live upon these terms; but theworld, as I may say, must be filled with your power and name--no manless than Cyrus and Xerxes is of any account with you. Such I know to beyour hopes--I am not guessing only--and very likely you, who know thatI am speaking the truth, will reply, Well, Socrates, but what havemy hopes to do with the explanation which you promised of yourunwillingness to leave me? And that is what I am now going to tell you, sweet son of Cleinias and Dinomache. The explanation is, that all thesedesigns of yours cannot be accomplished by you without my help; so greatis the power which I believe myself to have over you and your concerns;and this I conceive to be the reason why the God has hitherto forbiddenme to converse with you, and I have been long expecting his permission. For, as you hope to prove your own great value to the state, and havingproved it, to attain at once to absolute power, so do I indulge a hopethat I shall be the supreme power over you, if I am able to prove my owngreat value to you, and to show you that neither guardian, nor kinsman, nor any one is able to deliver into your hands the power which youdesire, but I only, God being my helper. When you were young (compareSymp. ) and your hopes were not yet matured, I should have wasted mytime, and therefore, as I conceive, the God forbade me to converse withyou; but now, having his permission, I will speak, for now you willlisten to me. 

ALCIBIADES: Your silence, Socrates, was always a surprise to me. I nevercould understand why you followed me about, and now that you have begunto speak again, I am still more amazed. Whether I think all this or not, is a matter about which you seem to have already made up your mind, andtherefore my denial will have no effect upon you. But granting, ifI must, that you have perfectly divined my purposes, why is yourassistance necessary to the attainment of them? Can you tell me why?

SOCRATES: You want to know whether I can make a long speech, such as youare in the habit of hearing; but that is not my way. I think, however, that I can prove to you the truth of what I am saying, if you will grantme one little favour. 

ALCIBIADES: Yes, if the favour which you mean be not a troublesome one. 

SOCRATES: Will you be troubled at having questions to answer?

ALCIBIADES: Not at all. 

SOCRATES: Then please to answer. 

ALCIBIADES: Ask me. 

SOCRATES: Have you not the intention which I attribute to you?

ALCIBIADES: I will grant anything you like, in the hope of hearing whatmore you have to say. 

SOCRATES: You do, then, mean, as I was saying, to come forward ina little while in the character of an adviser of the Athenians? Andsuppose that when you are ascending the bema, I pull you by the sleeveand say, Alcibiades, you are getting up to advise the Athenians--do youknow the matter about which they are going to deliberate, better thanthey?--How would you answer?

ALCIBIADES: I should reply, that I was going to advise them about amatter which I do know better than they. 

SOCRATES: Then you are a good adviser about the things which you know?

ALCIBIADES: Certainly. 

SOCRATES: And do you know anything but what you have learned of others, or found out yourself?

ALCIBIADES: That is all. 

SOCRATES: And would you have ever learned or discovered anything, if youhad not been willing either to learn of others or to examine yourself?

ALCIBIADES: I should not. 

SOCRATES: And would you have been willing to learn or to examine whatyou supposed that you knew?

ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. 

SOCRATES: Then there was a time when you thought that you did not knowwhat you are now supposed to know?

ALCIBIADES: Certainly. 

SOCRATES: I think that I know tolerably well the extent of youracquirements; and you must tell me if I forget any of them: accordingto my recollection, you learned the arts of writing, of playing on thelyre, and of wrestling; the flute you never would learn; this is the sumof your accomplishments, unless there were some which you acquired insecret; and I think that secrecy was hardly possible, as you could nothave come out of your door, either by day or night, without my seeingyou. 

ALCIBIADES: Yes, that was the whole of my schooling. 

SOCRATES: And are you going to get up in the Athenian assembly, and givethem advice about writing?

ALCIBIADES: No, indeed. 

SOCRATES: Or about the touch of the lyre?

ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. 

SOCRATES: And they are not in the habit of deliberating about wrestling, in the assembly?

ALCIBIADES: Hardly. 

SOCRATES: Then what are the deliberations in which you propose to advisethem? Surely not about building?

ALCIBIADES: No. 

SOCRATES: For the builder will advise better than you will about that?

ALCIBIADES: He will. 

SOCRATES: Nor about divination?

ALCIBIADES: No. 

SOCRATES: About that again the diviner will advise better than you will?

ALCIBIADES: True. 

SOCRATES: Whether he be little or great, good or ill-looking, noble orignoble--makes no difference. 

ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. 

SOCRATES: A man is a good adviser about anything, not because he hasriches, but because he has knowledge?

ALCIBIADES: Assuredly. 

SOCRATES: Whether their counsellor is rich or poor, is not a matterwhich will make any difference to the Athenians when they aredeliberating about the health of the citizens; they only require that heshould be a physician. 

ALCIBIADES: Of course. 

SOCRATES: Then what will be the subject of deliberation about which youwill be justified in getting up and advising them?

ALCIBIADES: About their own concerns, Socrates. 

SOCRATES: You mean about shipbuilding, for example, when the question iswhat sort of ships they ought to build?

ALCIBIADES: No, I should not advise them about that. 

SOCRATES: I suppose, because you do not understand shipbuilding:--isthat the reason?

ALCIBIADES: It is. 

SOCRATES: Then about what concerns of theirs will you advise them?

ALCIBIADES: About war, Socrates, or about peace, or about any otherconcerns of the state. 

SOCRATES: You mean, when they deliberate with whom they ought to makepeace, and with whom they ought to go to war, and in what manner?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: And they ought to go to war with those against whom it isbetter to go to war?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: And when it is better?

ALCIBIADES: Certainly. 

SOCRATES: And for as long a time as is better?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: But suppose the Athenians to deliberate with whom they oughtto close in wrestling, and whom they should grasp by the hand, wouldyou, or the master of gymnastics, be a better adviser of them?

ALCIBIADES: Clearly, the master of gymnastics. 

SOCRATES: And can you tell me on what grounds the master of gymnasticswould decide, with whom they ought or ought not to close, and when andhow? To take an instance: Would he not say that they should wrestle withthose against whom it is best to wrestle?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: And as much as is best?

ALCIBIADES: Certainly. 

SOCRATES: And at such times as are best?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: Again; you sometimes accompany the lyre with the song anddance?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: When it is well to do so?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: And as much as is well?

ALCIBIADES: Just so. 

SOCRATES: And as you speak of an excellence or art of the best inwrestling, and of an excellence in playing the lyre, I wish you wouldtell me what this latter is;--the excellence of wrestling I callgymnastic, and I want to know what you call the other. 

ALCIBIADES: I do not understand you. 

SOCRATES: Then try to do as I do; for the answer which I gave isuniversally right, and when I say right, I mean according to rule. 

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: And was not the art of which I spoke gymnastic?

ALCIBIADES: Certainly. 

SOCRATES: And I called the excellence in wrestling gymnastic?

ALCIBIADES: You did. 

SOCRATES: And I was right?

ALCIBIADES: I think that you were. 

SOCRATES: Well, now, --for you should learn to argue prettily--let me askyou in return to tell me, first, what is that art of which playing andsinging, and stepping properly in the dance, are parts, --what is thename of the whole? I think that by this time you must be able to tell. 

ALCIBIADES: Indeed I cannot. 

SOCRATES: Then let me put the matter in another way: what do you callthe Goddesses who are the patronesses of art?

ALCIBIADES: The Muses do you mean, Socrates?

SOCRATES: Yes, I do; and what is the name of the art which is calledafter them?

ALCIBIADES: I suppose that you mean music. 

SOCRATES: Yes, that is my meaning; and what is the excellence of theart of music, as I told you truly that the excellence of wrestling wasgymnastic--what is the excellence of music--to be what?

ALCIBIADES: To be musical, I suppose. 

SOCRATES: Very good; and now please to tell me what is the excellence ofwar and peace; as the more musical was the more excellent, or the moregymnastical was the more excellent, tell me, what name do you give tothe more excellent in war and peace?

ALCIBIADES: But I really cannot tell you. 

SOCRATES: But if you were offering advice to another and said tohim--This food is better than that, at this time and in this quantity, and he said to you--What do you mean, Alcibiades, by the word'better'? you would have no difficulty in replying that you meant 'morewholesome, ' although you do not profess to be a physician: and when thesubject is one of which you profess to have knowledge, and about whichyou are ready to get up and advise as if you knew, are you not ashamed, when you are asked, not to be able to answer the question? Is it notdisgraceful?

ALCIBIADES: Very. 

SOCRATES: Well, then, consider and try to explain what is the meaningof 'better, ' in the matter of making peace and going to war with thoseagainst whom you ought to go to war? To what does the word refer?

ALCIBIADES: I am thinking, and I cannot tell. 

SOCRATES: But you surely know what are the charges which we bringagainst one another, when we arrive at the point of making war, and whatname we give them?

ALCIBIADES: Yes, certainly; we say that deceit or violence has beenemployed, or that we have been defrauded. 

SOCRATES: And how does this happen? Will you tell me how? For there maybe a difference in the manner. 

ALCIBIADES: Do you mean by 'how, ' Socrates, whether we suffered thesethings justly or unjustly?

SOCRATES: Exactly. 

ALCIBIADES: There can be no greater difference than between just andunjust. 

SOCRATES: And would you advise the Athenians to go to war with the justor with the unjust?

ALCIBIADES: That is an awkward question; for certainly, even if a persondid intend to go to war with the just, he would not admit that they werejust. 

SOCRATES: He would not go to war, because it would be unlawful?

ALCIBIADES: Neither lawful nor honourable. 

SOCRATES: Then you, too, would address them on principles of justice?

ALCIBIADES: Certainly. 

SOCRATES: What, then, is justice but that better, of which I spoke, ingoing to war or not going to war with those against whom we ought orought not, and when we ought or ought not to go to war?

ALCIBIADES: Clearly. 

SOCRATES: But how is this, friend Alcibiades? Have you forgotten thatyou do not know this, or have you been to the schoolmaster without myknowledge, and has he taught you to discern the just from the unjust?Who is he? I wish you would tell me, that I may go and learn of him--youshall introduce me. 

ALCIBIADES: You are mocking, Socrates. 

SOCRATES: No, indeed; I most solemnly declare to you by Zeus, who is theGod of our common friendship, and whom I never will forswear, that I amnot; tell me, then, who this instructor is, if he exists. 

ALCIBIADES: But, perhaps, he does not exist; may I not have acquired theknowledge of just and unjust in some other way?

SOCRATES: Yes; if you have discovered them. 

ALCIBIADES: But do you not think that I could discover them?

SOCRATES: I am sure that you might, if you enquired about them. 

ALCIBIADES: And do you not think that I would enquire?

SOCRATES: Yes; if you thought that you did not know them. 

ALCIBIADES: And was there not a time when I did so think?

SOCRATES: Very good; and can you tell me how long it is since youthought that you did not know the nature of the just and the unjust?What do you say to a year ago? Were you then in a state of consciousignorance and enquiry? Or did you think that you knew? And please toanswer truly, that our discussion may not be in vain. 

ALCIBIADES: Well, I thought that I knew. 

SOCRATES: And two years ago, and three years ago, and four years ago, you knew all the same?

ALCIBIADES: I did. 

SOCRATES: And more than four years ago you were a child--were you not?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: And then I am quite sure that you thought you knew. 

ALCIBIADES: Why are you so sure?

SOCRATES: Because I often heard you when a child, in your teacher'shouse, or elsewhere, playing at dice or some other game with the boys, not hesitating at all about the nature of the just and unjust; but veryconfident--crying and shouting that one of the boys was a rogue and acheat, and had been cheating. Is it not true?

ALCIBIADES: But what was I to do, Socrates, when anybody cheated me?

SOCRATES: And how can you say, 'What was I to do'? if at the time youdid not know whether you were wronged or not?

ALCIBIADES: To be sure I knew; I was quite aware that I was beingcheated. 

SOCRATES: Then you suppose yourself even when a child to have known thenature of just and unjust?

ALCIBIADES: Certainly; and I did know then. 

SOCRATES: And when did you discover them--not, surely, at the time whenyou thought that you knew them?

ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. 

SOCRATES: And when did you think that you were ignorant--if youconsider, you will find that there never was such a time?

ALCIBIADES: Really, Socrates, I cannot say. 

SOCRATES: Then you did not learn them by discovering them?

ALCIBIADES: Clearly not. 

SOCRATES: But just before you said that you did not know them bylearning; now, if you have neither discovered nor learned them, how andwhence do you come to know them?

ALCIBIADES: I suppose that I was mistaken in saying that I knew themthrough my own discovery of them; whereas, in truth, I learned them inthe same way that other people learn. 

SOCRATES: So you said before, and I must again ask, of whom? Do tell me. 

ALCIBIADES: Of the many. 

SOCRATES: Do you take refuge in them? I cannot say much for yourteachers. 

ALCIBIADES: Why, are they not able to teach?

SOCRATES: They could not teach you how to play at draughts, which youwould acknowledge (would you not) to be a much smaller matter thanjustice?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: And can they teach the better who are unable to teach theworse?

ALCIBIADES: I think that they can; at any rate, they can teach many farbetter things than to play at draughts. 

SOCRATES: What things?

ALCIBIADES: Why, for example, I learned to speak Greek of them, and Icannot say who was my teacher, or to whom I am to attribute my knowledgeof Greek, if not to those good-for-nothing teachers, as you call them. 

SOCRATES: Why, yes, my friend; and the many are good enough teachersof Greek, and some of their instructions in that line may be justlypraised. 

ALCIBIADES: Why is that?

SOCRATES: Why, because they have the qualities which good teachers oughtto have. 

ALCIBIADES: What qualities?

SOCRATES: Why, you know that knowledge is the first qualification of anyteacher?

ALCIBIADES: Certainly. 

SOCRATES: And if they know, they must agree together and not differ?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: And would you say that they knew the things about which theydiffer?

ALCIBIADES: No. 

SOCRATES: Then how can they teach them?

ALCIBIADES: They cannot. 

SOCRATES: Well, but do you imagine that the many would differ about thenature of wood and stone? are they not agreed if you ask them what theyare? and do they not run to fetch the same thing, when they want apiece of wood or a stone? And so in similar cases, which I suspect to bepretty nearly all that you mean by speaking Greek. 

ALCIBIADES: True. 

SOCRATES: These, as we were saying, are matters about which they areagreed with one another and with themselves; both individuals and statesuse the same words about them; they do not use some one word and someanother. 

ALCIBIADES: They do not. 

SOCRATES: Then they may be expected to be good teachers of these things?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: And if we want to instruct any one in them, we shall be rightin sending him to be taught by our friends the many?

ALCIBIADES: Very true. 

SOCRATES: But if we wanted further to know not only which are men andwhich are horses, but which men or horses have powers of running, wouldthe many still be able to inform us?

ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. 

SOCRATES: And you have a sufficient proof that they do not know thesethings and are not the best teachers of them, inasmuch as they are neveragreed about them?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: And suppose that we wanted to know not only what men are like, but what healthy or diseased men are like--would the many be able toteach us?

ALCIBIADES: They would not. 

SOCRATES: And you would have a proof that they were bad teachers ofthese matters, if you saw them at variance?

ALCIBIADES: I should. 

SOCRATES: Well, but are the many agreed with themselves, or with oneanother, about the justice or injustice of men and things?

ALCIBIADES: Assuredly not, Socrates. 

SOCRATES: There is no subject about which they are more at variance?

ALCIBIADES: None. 

SOCRATES: I do not suppose that you ever saw or heard of men quarrellingover the principles of health and disease to such an extent as to go towar and kill one another for the sake of them?

ALCIBIADES: No indeed. 

SOCRATES: But of the quarrels about justice and injustice, even ifyou have never seen them, you have certainly heard from many people, including Homer; for you have heard of the Iliad and Odyssey?

ALCIBIADES: To be sure, Socrates. 

SOCRATES: A difference of just and unjust is the argument of thosepoems?

ALCIBIADES: True. 

SOCRATES: Which difference caused all the wars and deaths of Trojansand Achaeans, and the deaths of the suitors of Penelope in their quarrelwith Odysseus. 

ALCIBIADES: Very true. 

SOCRATES: And when the Athenians and Lacedaemonians and Boeotians fellat Tanagra, and afterwards in the battle of Coronea, at which yourfather Cleinias met his end, the question was one of justice--this wasthe sole cause of the battles, and of their deaths. 

ALCIBIADES: Very true. 

SOCRATES: But can they be said to understand that about which they arequarrelling to the death?

ALCIBIADES: Clearly not. 

SOCRATES: And yet those whom you thus allow to be ignorant are theteachers to whom you are appealing. 

ALCIBIADES: Very true. 

SOCRATES: But how are you ever likely to know the nature of justice andinjustice, about which you are so perplexed, if you have neither learnedthem of others nor discovered them yourself?

ALCIBIADES: From what you say, I suppose not. 

SOCRATES: See, again, how inaccurately you speak, Alcibiades!

ALCIBIADES: In what respect?

SOCRATES: In saying that I say so. 

ALCIBIADES: Why, did you not say that I know nothing of the just andunjust?

SOCRATES: No; I did not. 

ALCIBIADES: Did I, then?

SOCRATES: Yes. 

ALCIBIADES: How was that?

SOCRATES: Let me explain. Suppose I were to ask you which is the greaternumber, two or one; you would reply 'two'?

ALCIBIADES: I should. 

SOCRATES: And by how much greater?

ALCIBIADES: By one. 

SOCRATES: Which of us now says that two is more than one?

ALCIBIADES: I do. 

SOCRATES: Did not I ask, and you answer the question?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: Then who is speaking? I who put the question, or you whoanswer me?

ALCIBIADES: I am. 

SOCRATES: Or suppose that I ask and you tell me the letters which makeup the name Socrates, which of us is the speaker?

ALCIBIADES: I am. 

SOCRATES: Now let us put the case generally: whenever there is aquestion and answer, who is the speaker, --the questioner or theanswerer?

ALCIBIADES: I should say, Socrates, that the answerer was the speaker. 

SOCRATES: And have I not been the questioner all through?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: And you the answerer?

ALCIBIADES: Just so. 

SOCRATES: Which of us, then, was the speaker?

ALCIBIADES: The inference is, Socrates, that I was the speaker. 

SOCRATES: Did not some one say that Alcibiades, the fair son ofCleinias, not understanding about just and unjust, but thinking that hedid understand, was going to the assembly to advise the Athenians aboutwhat he did not know? Was not that said?

ALCIBIADES: Very true. 

SOCRATES: Then, Alcibiades, the result may be expressed in the languageof Euripides. I think that you have heard all this 'from yourself, andnot from me'; nor did I say this, which you erroneously attribute to me, but you yourself, and what you said was very true. For indeed, my dearfellow, the design which you meditate of teaching what you do not know, and have not taken any pains to learn, is downright insanity. 

ALCIBIADES: But, Socrates, I think that the Athenians and the rest ofthe Hellenes do not often advise as to the more just or unjust; for theysee no difficulty in them, and therefore they leave them, and considerwhich course of action will be most expedient; for there is a differencebetween justice and expediency. Many persons have done great wrong andprofited by their injustice; others have done rightly and come to nogood. 

SOCRATES: Well, but granting that the just and the expedient are ever somuch opposed, you surely do not imagine that you know what is expedientfor mankind, or why a thing is expedient?

ALCIBIADES: Why not, Socrates?--But I am not going to be asked againfrom whom I learned, or when I made the discovery. 

SOCRATES: What a way you have! When you make a mistake which might berefuted by a previous argument, you insist on having a new and differentrefutation; the old argument is a worn-our garment which you will nolonger put on, but some one must produce another which is clean andnew. Now I shall disregard this move of yours, and shall ask overagain, --Where did you learn and how do you know the nature of theexpedient, and who is your teacher? All this I comprehend in a singlequestion, and now you will manifestly be in the old difficulty, andwill not be able to show that you know the expedient, either because youlearned or because you discovered it yourself. But, as I perceivethat you are dainty, and dislike the taste of a stale argument, I willenquire no further into your knowledge of what is expedient or what isnot expedient for the Athenian people, and simply request you to saywhy you do not explain whether justice and expediency are the same ordifferent? And if you like you may examine me as I have examined you, or, if you would rather, you may carry on the discussion by yourself. 

ALCIBIADES: But I am not certain, Socrates, whether I shall be able todiscuss the matter with you. 

SOCRATES: Then imagine, my dear fellow, that I am the demus and theecclesia; for in the ecclesia, too, you will have to persuade menindividually. 

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: And is not the same person able to persuade one individualsingly and many individuals of the things which he knows? Thegrammarian, for example, can persuade one and he can persuade many aboutletters. 

ALCIBIADES: True. 

SOCRATES: And about number, will not the same person persuade one andpersuade many?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: And this will be he who knows number, or the arithmetician?

ALCIBIADES: Quite true. 

SOCRATES: And cannot you persuade one man about that of which you canpersuade many?

ALCIBIADES: I suppose so. 

SOCRATES: And that of which you can persuade either is clearly what youknow?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: And the only difference between one who argues as we aredoing, and the orator who is addressing an assembly, is that the oneseeks to persuade a number, and the other an individual, of the samethings. 

ALCIBIADES: I suppose so. 

SOCRATES: Well, then, since the same person who can persuade a multitudecan persuade individuals, try conclusions upon me, and prove to me thatthe just is not always expedient. 

ALCIBIADES: You take liberties, Socrates. 

SOCRATES: I shall take the liberty of proving to you the opposite ofthat which you will not prove to me. 

ALCIBIADES: Proceed. 

SOCRATES: Answer my questions--that is all. 

ALCIBIADES: Nay, I should like you to be the speaker. 

SOCRATES: What, do you not wish to be persuaded?

ALCIBIADES: Certainly I do. 

SOCRATES: And can you be persuaded better than out of your own mouth?

ALCIBIADES: I think not. 

SOCRATES: Then you shall answer; and if you do not hear the words, thatthe just is the expedient, coming from your own lips, never believeanother man again. 

ALCIBIADES: I won't; but answer I will, for I do not see how I can cometo any harm. 

SOCRATES: A true prophecy! Let me begin then by enquiring of you whetheryou allow that the just is sometimes expedient and sometimes not?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: And sometimes honourable and sometimes not?

ALCIBIADES: What do you mean?

SOCRATES: I am asking if you ever knew any one who did what wasdishonourable and yet just?

ALCIBIADES: Never. 

SOCRATES: All just things are honourable?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: And are honourable things sometimes good and sometimes notgood, or are they always good?

ALCIBIADES: I rather think, Socrates, that some honourable things areevil. 

SOCRATES: And are some dishonourable things good?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: You mean in such a case as the following:--In time of war, menhave been wounded or have died in rescuing a companion or kinsman, whenothers who have neglected the duty of rescuing them have escaped insafety?

ALCIBIADES: True. 

SOCRATES: And to rescue another under such circumstances is honourable, in respect of the attempt to save those whom we ought to save; and thisis courage?

ALCIBIADES: True. 

SOCRATES: But evil in respect of death and wounds?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: And the courage which is shown in the rescue is one thing, andthe death another?

ALCIBIADES: Certainly. 

SOCRATES: Then the rescue of one's friends is honourable in one point ofview, but evil in another?

ALCIBIADES: True. 

SOCRATES: And if honourable, then also good: Will you consider nowwhether I may not be right, for you were acknowledging that the couragewhich is shown in the rescue is honourable? Now is this courage good orevil? Look at the matter thus: which would you rather choose, good orevil?

ALCIBIADES: Good. 

SOCRATES: And the greatest goods you would be most ready to choose, andwould least like to be deprived of them?

ALCIBIADES: Certainly. 

SOCRATES: What would you say of courage? At what price would you bewilling to be deprived of courage?

ALCIBIADES: I would rather die than be a coward. 

SOCRATES: Then you think that cowardice is the worst of evils?

ALCIBIADES: I do. 

SOCRATES: As bad as death, I suppose?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: And life and courage are the extreme opposites of death andcowardice?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: And they are what you would most desire to have, and theiropposites you would least desire?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: Is this because you think life and courage the best, and deathand cowardice the worst?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: And you would term the rescue of a friend in battlehonourable, in as much as courage does a good work?

ALCIBIADES: I should. 

SOCRATES: But evil because of the death which ensues?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: Might we not describe their different effects as follows:--Youmay call either of them evil in respect of the evil which is the result, and good in respect of the good which is the result of either of them?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: And they are honourable in so far as they are good, anddishonourable in so far as they are evil?

ALCIBIADES: True. 

SOCRATES: Then when you say that the rescue of a friend in battle ishonourable and yet evil, that is equivalent to saying that the rescue isgood and yet evil?

ALCIBIADES: I believe that you are right, Socrates. 

SOCRATES: Nothing honourable, regarded as honourable, is evil; noranything base, regarded as base, good. 

ALCIBIADES: Clearly not. 

SOCRATES: Look at the matter yet once more in a further light: he whoacts honourably acts well?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: And he who acts well is happy?

ALCIBIADES: Of course. 

SOCRATES: And the happy are those who obtain good?

ALCIBIADES: True. 

SOCRATES: And they obtain good by acting well and honourably?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: Then acting well is a good?

ALCIBIADES: Certainly. 

SOCRATES: And happiness is a good?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: Then the good and the honourable are again identified. 

ALCIBIADES: Manifestly. 

SOCRATES: Then, if the argument holds, what we find to be honourable weshall also find to be good?

ALCIBIADES: Certainly. 

SOCRATES: And is the good expedient or not?

ALCIBIADES: Expedient. 

SOCRATES: Do you remember our admissions about the just?

ALCIBIADES: Yes; if I am not mistaken, we said that those who actedjustly must also act honourably. 

SOCRATES: And the honourable is the good?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: And the good is expedient?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: Then, Alcibiades, the just is expedient?

ALCIBIADES: I should infer so. 

SOCRATES: And all this I prove out of your own mouth, for I ask and youanswer?

ALCIBIADES: I must acknowledge it to be true. 

SOCRATES: And having acknowledged that the just is the same as theexpedient, are you not (let me ask) prepared to ridicule any one who, pretending to understand the principles of justice and injustice, getsup to advise the noble Athenians or the ignoble Peparethians, that thejust may be the evil?

ALCIBIADES: I solemnly declare, Socrates, that I do not know what I amsaying. Verily, I am in a strange state, for when you put questions tome I am of different minds in successive instants. 

SOCRATES: And are you not aware of the nature of this perplexity, myfriend?

ALCIBIADES: Indeed I am not. 

SOCRATES: Do you suppose that if some one were to ask you whether youhave two eyes or three, or two hands or four, or anything of that sort, you would then be of different minds in successive instants?

ALCIBIADES: I begin to distrust myself, but still I do not suppose thatI should. 

SOCRATES: You would feel no doubt; and for this reason--because youwould know?

ALCIBIADES: I suppose so. 

SOCRATES: And the reason why you involuntarily contradict yourself isclearly that you are ignorant?

ALCIBIADES: Very likely. 

SOCRATES: And if you are perplexed in answering about just and unjust, honourable and dishonourable, good and evil, expedient and inexpedient, the reason is that you are ignorant of them, and therefore inperplexity. Is not that clear?

ALCIBIADES: I agree. 

SOCRATES: But is this always the case, and is a man necessarilyperplexed about that of which he has no knowledge?

ALCIBIADES: Certainly he is. 

SOCRATES: And do you know how to ascend into heaven?

ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. 

SOCRATES: And in this case, too, is your judgment perplexed?

ALCIBIADES: No. 

SOCRATES: Do you see the reason why, or shall I tell you?

ALCIBIADES: Tell me. 

SOCRATES: The reason is, that you not only do not know, my friend, butyou do not think that you know. 

ALCIBIADES: There again; what do you mean?

SOCRATES: Ask yourself; are you in any perplexity about things of whichyou are ignorant? You know, for example, that you know nothing about thepreparation of food. 

ALCIBIADES: Very true. 

SOCRATES: And do you think and perplex yourself about the preparation offood: or do you leave that to some one who understands the art?

ALCIBIADES: The latter. 

SOCRATES: Or if you were on a voyage, would you bewilder yourself byconsidering whether the rudder is to be drawn inwards or outwards, or doyou leave that to the pilot, and do nothing?

ALCIBIADES: It would be the concern of the pilot. 

SOCRATES: Then you are not perplexed about what you do not know, if youknow that you do not know it?

ALCIBIADES: I imagine not. 

SOCRATES: Do you not see, then, that mistakes in life and practiceare likewise to be attributed to the ignorance which has conceit ofknowledge?

ALCIBIADES: Once more, what do you mean?

SOCRATES: I suppose that we begin to act when we think that we know whatwe are doing?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: But when people think that they do not know, they entrusttheir business to others?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: And so there is a class of ignorant persons who do not makemistakes in life, because they trust others about things of which theyare ignorant?

ALCIBIADES: True. 

SOCRATES: Who, then, are the persons who make mistakes? They cannot, ofcourse, be those who know?

ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. 

SOCRATES: But if neither those who know, nor those who know that theydo not know, make mistakes, there remain those only who do not know andthink that they know. 

ALCIBIADES: Yes, only those. 

SOCRATES: Then this is ignorance of the disgraceful sort which ismischievous?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: And most mischievous and most disgraceful when having to dowith the greatest matters?

ALCIBIADES: By far. 

SOCRATES: And can there be any matters greater than the just, thehonourable, the good, and the expedient?

ALCIBIADES: There cannot be. 

SOCRATES: And these, as you were saying, are what perplex you?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: But if you are perplexed, then, as the previous argument hasshown, you are not only ignorant of the greatest matters, but beingignorant you fancy that you know them?

ALCIBIADES: I fear that you are right. 

SOCRATES: And now see what has happened to you, Alcibiades! I hardlylike to speak of your evil case, but as we are alone I will: My goodfriend, you are wedded to ignorance of the most disgraceful kind, and ofthis you are convicted, not by me, but out of your own mouth and byyour own argument; wherefore also you rush into politics before you areeducated. Neither is your case to be deemed singular. For I might saythe same of almost all our statesmen, with the exception, perhaps ofyour guardian, Pericles. 

ALCIBIADES: Yes, Socrates; and Pericles is said not to have got hiswisdom by the light of nature, but to have associated with several ofthe philosophers; with Pythocleides, for example, and with Anaxagoras, and now in advanced life with Damon, in the hope of gaining wisdom. 

SOCRATES: Very good; but did you ever know a man wise in anything whowas unable to impart his particular wisdom? For example, he who taughtyou letters was not only wise, but he made you and any others whom heliked wise. 

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: And you, whom he taught, can do the same?

ALCIBIADES: True. 

SOCRATES: And in like manner the harper and gymnastic-master?

ALCIBIADES: Certainly. 

SOCRATES: When a person is enabled to impart knowledge to another, hethereby gives an excellent proof of his own understanding of any matter. 

ALCIBIADES: I agree. 

SOCRATES: Well, and did Pericles make any one wise; did he begin bymaking his sons wise?

ALCIBIADES: But, Socrates, if the two sons of Pericles were simpletons, what has that to do with the matter?

SOCRATES: Well, but did he make your brother, Cleinias, wise?

ALCIBIADES: Cleinias is a madman; there is no use in talking of him. 

SOCRATES: But if Cleinias is a madman and the two sons of Pericles weresimpletons, what reason can be given why he neglects you, and lets yoube as you are?

ALCIBIADES: I believe that I am to blame for not listening to him. 

SOCRATES: But did you ever hear of any other Athenian or foreigner, bond or free, who was deemed to have grown wiser in the society ofPericles, --as I might cite Pythodorus, the son of Isolochus, andCallias, the son of Calliades, who have grown wiser in the society ofZeno, for which privilege they have each of them paid him the sum ofa hundred minae (about 406 pounds sterling) to the increase of theirwisdom and fame. 

ALCIBIADES: I certainly never did hear of any one. 

SOCRATES: Well, and in reference to your own case, do you mean to remainas you are, or will you take some pains about yourself?

ALCIBIADES: With your aid, Socrates, I will. And indeed, when I hear youspeak, the truth of what you are saying strikes home to me, and Iagree with you, for our statesmen, all but a few, do appear to be quiteuneducated. 

SOCRATES: What is the inference?

ALCIBIADES: Why, that if they were educated they would be trainedathletes, and he who means to rival them ought to have knowledgeand experience when he attacks them; but now, as they have becomepoliticians without any special training, why should I have the troubleof learning and practising? For I know well that by the light of natureI shall get the better of them. 

SOCRATES: My dear friend, what a sentiment! And how unworthy of yournoble form and your high estate!

ALCIBIADES: What do you mean, Socrates; why do you say so?

SOCRATES: I am grieved when I think of our mutual love. 

ALCIBIADES: At what?

SOCRATES: At your fancying that the contest on which you are entering iswith people here. 

ALCIBIADES: Why, what others are there?

SOCRATES: Is that a question which a magnanimous soul should ask?

ALCIBIADES: Do you mean to say that the contest is not with these?

SOCRATES: And suppose that you were going to steer a ship into action, would you only aim at being the best pilot on board? Would you not, while acknowledging that you must possess this degree of excellence, rather look to your antagonists, and not, as you are now doing, to yourfellow combatants? You ought to be so far above these latter, that theywill not even dare to be your rivals; and, being regarded by you asinferiors, will do battle for you against the enemy; this is the kindof superiority which you must establish over them, if you mean toaccomplish any noble action really worthy of yourself and of the state. 

ALCIBIADES: That would certainly be my aim. 

SOCRATES: Verily, then, you have good reason to be satisfied, if you arebetter than the soldiers; and you need not, when you are their superiorand have your thoughts and actions fixed upon them, look away to thegenerals of the enemy. 

ALCIBIADES: Of whom are you speaking, Socrates?

SOCRATES: Why, you surely know that our city goes to war now and thenwith the Lacedaemonians and with the great king?

ALCIBIADES: True enough. 

SOCRATES: And if you meant to be the ruler of this city, would you notbe right in considering that the Lacedaemonian and Persian king wereyour true rivals?

ALCIBIADES: I believe that you are right. 

SOCRATES: Oh no, my friend, I am quite wrong, and I think that you oughtrather to turn your attention to Midias the quail-breeder and otherslike him, who manage our politics; in whom, as the women would remark, you may still see the slaves' cut of hair, cropping out in their mindsas well as on their pates; and they come with their barbarous lingo toflatter us and not to rule us. To these, I say, you should look, andthen you need not trouble yourself about your own fitness to contend insuch a noble arena: there is no reason why you should either learn whathas to be learned, or practise what has to be practised, and only whenthoroughly prepared enter on a political career. 

ALCIBIADES: There, I think, Socrates, that you are right; I do notsuppose, however, that the Spartan generals or the great king are reallydifferent from anybody else. 

SOCRATES: But, my dear friend, do consider what you are saying. 

ALCIBIADES: What am I to consider?

SOCRATES: In the first place, will you be more likely to take care ofyourself, if you are in a wholesome fear and dread of them, or if youare not?

ALCIBIADES: Clearly, if I have such a fear of them. 

SOCRATES: And do you think that you will sustain any injury if you takecare of yourself?

ALCIBIADES: No, I shall be greatly benefited. 

SOCRATES: And this is one very important respect in which that notion ofyours is bad. 

ALCIBIADES: True. 

SOCRATES: In the next place, consider that what you say is probablyfalse. 

ALCIBIADES: How so?

SOCRATES: Let me ask you whether better natures are likely to be foundin noble races or not in noble races?

ALCIBIADES: Clearly in noble races. 

SOCRATES: Are not those who are well born and well bred most likely tobe perfect in virtue?

ALCIBIADES: Certainly. 

SOCRATES: Then let us compare our antecedents with those of theLacedaemonian and Persian kings; are they inferior to us in descent?Have we not heard that the former are sprung from Heracles, and thelatter from Achaemenes, and that the race of Heracles and the race ofAchaemenes go back to Perseus, son of Zeus?

ALCIBIADES: Why, so does mine go back to Eurysaces, and he to Zeus!

SOCRATES: And mine, noble Alcibiades, to Daedalus, and he to Hephaestus, son of Zeus. But, for all that, we are far inferior to them. For theyare descended 'from Zeus, ' through a line of kings--either kingsof Argos and Lacedaemon, or kings of Persia, a country which thedescendants of Achaemenes have always possessed, besides being atvarious times sovereigns of Asia, as they now are; whereas, we and ourfathers were but private persons. How ridiculous would you be thought ifyou were to make a display of your ancestors and of Salamis the islandof Eurysaces, or of Aegina, the habitation of the still more ancientAeacus, before Artaxerxes, son of Xerxes. You should consider howinferior we are to them both in the derivation of our birth and in otherparticulars. Did you never observe how great is the property of theSpartan kings? And their wives are under the guardianship of the Ephori, who are public officers and watch over them, in order to preserve asfar as possible the purity of the Heracleid blood. Still greater is thedifference among the Persians; for no one entertains a suspicion thatthe father of a prince of Persia can be any one but the king. Such isthe awe which invests the person of the queen, that any other guard isneedless. And when the heir of the kingdom is born, all the subjects ofthe king feast; and the day of his birth is for ever afterwards keptas a holiday and time of sacrifice by all Asia; whereas, when you andI were born, Alcibiades, as the comic poet says, the neighbours hardlyknew of the important event. After the birth of the royal child, he istended, not by a good-for-nothing woman-nurse, but by the best of theroyal eunuchs, who are charged with the care of him, and especially withthe fashioning and right formation of his limbs, in order that he maybe as shapely as possible; which being their calling, they are held ingreat honour. And when the young prince is seven years old he is putupon a horse and taken to the riding-masters, and begins to go outhunting. And at fourteen years of age he is handed over to the royalschoolmasters, as they are termed: these are four chosen men, reputed tobe the best among the Persians of a certain age; and one of them is thewisest, another the justest, a third the most temperate, and a fourththe most valiant. The first instructs him in the magianism of Zoroaster, the son of Oromasus, which is the worship of the Gods, and teaches himalso the duties of his royal office; the second, who is the justest, teaches him always to speak the truth; the third, or most temperate, forbids him to allow any pleasure to be lord over him, that he may beaccustomed to be a freeman and king indeed, --lord of himself first, and not a slave; the most valiant trains him to be bold and fearless, telling him that if he fears he is to deem himself a slave; whereasPericles gave you, Alcibiades, for a tutor Zopyrus the Thracian, a slaveof his who was past all other work. I might enlarge on the nurture andeducation of your rivals, but that would be tedious; and what I havesaid is a sufficient sample of what remains to be said. I have onlyto remark, by way of contrast, that no one cares about your birth ornurture or education, or, I may say, about that of any other Athenian, unless he has a lover who looks after him. And if you cast an eye onthe wealth, the luxury, the garments with their flowing trains, theanointings with myrrh, the multitudes of attendants, and all the otherbravery of the Persians, you will be ashamed when you discern your owninferiority; or if you look at the temperance and orderliness and easeand grace and magnanimity and courage and endurance and love of toiland desire of glory and ambition of the Lacedaemonians--in all theserespects you will see that you are but a child in comparison of them. Even in the matter of wealth, if you value yourself upon that, I mustreveal to you how you stand; for if you form an estimate of the wealthof the Lacedaemonians, you will see that our possessions fall far shortof theirs. For no one here can compete with them either in the extentand fertility of their own and the Messenian territory, or in the numberof their slaves, and especially of the Helots, or of their horses, or ofthe animals which feed on the Messenian pastures. But I have said enoughof this: and as to gold and silver, there is more of them in Lacedaemonthan in all the rest of Hellas, for during many generations gold hasbeen always flowing in to them from the whole Hellenic world, and oftenfrom the barbarian also, and never going out, as in the fable of Aesopthe fox said to the lion, 'The prints of the feet of those going inare distinct enough;' but who ever saw the trace of money going out ofLacedaemon? And therefore you may safely infer that the inhabitants arethe richest of the Hellenes in gold and silver, and that their kings arethe richest of them, for they have a larger share of these things, andthey have also a tribute paid to them which is very considerable. Yetthe Spartan wealth, though great in comparison of the wealth of theother Hellenes, is as nothing in comparison of that of the Persians andtheir kings. Why, I have been informed by a credible person who went upto the king (at Susa), that he passed through a large tract of excellentland, extending for nearly a day's journey, which the people of thecountry called the queen's girdle, and another, which they called herveil; and several other fair and fertile districts, which were reservedfor the adornment of the queen, and are named after her severalhabiliments. Now, I cannot help thinking to myself, What if some onewere to go to Amestris, the wife of Xerxes and mother of Artaxerxes, andsay to her, There is a certain Dinomache, whose whole wardrobe is notworth fifty minae--and that will be more than the value--and she has ason who is possessed of a three-hundred acre patch at Erchiae, and hehas a mind to go to war with your son--would she not wonder to what thisAlcibiades trusts for success in the conflict? 'He must rely, ' she wouldsay to herself, 'upon his training and wisdom--these are the thingswhich Hellenes value. ' And if she heard that this Alcibiades whois making the attempt is not as yet twenty years old, and is whollyuneducated, and when his lover tells him that he ought to get educationand training first, and then go and fight the king, he refuses, and saysthat he is well enough as he is, would she not be amazed, and ask 'Onwhat, then, does the youth rely?' And if we replied: He relies on hisbeauty, and stature, and birth, and mental endowments, she would thinkthat we were mad, Alcibiades, when she compared the advantages which youpossess with those of her own people. And I believe that even Lampido, the daughter of Leotychides, the wife of Archidamus and mother of Agis, all of whom were kings, would have the same feeling; if, in your presentuneducated state, you were to turn your thoughts against her son, shetoo would be equally astonished. But how disgraceful, that we should nothave as high a notion of what is required in us as our enemies'wives and mothers have of the qualities which are required in theirassailants! O my friend, be persuaded by me, and hear the Delphianinscription, 'Know thyself'--not the men whom you think, but these kingsare our rivals, and we can only overcome them by pains and skill. Andif you fail in the required qualities, you will fail also in becomingrenowned among Hellenes and Barbarians, which you seem to desire morethan any other man ever desired anything. 

ALCIBIADES: I entirely believe you; but what are the sort of pains whichare required, Socrates, --can you tell me?

SOCRATES: Yes, I can; but we must take counsel together concerning themanner in which both of us may be most improved. For what I am tellingyou of the necessity of education applies to myself as well as to you;and there is only one point in which I have an advantage over you. 

ALCIBIADES: What is that?

SOCRATES: I have a guardian who is better and wiser than your guardian, Pericles. 

ALCIBIADES: Who is he, Socrates?

SOCRATES: God, Alcibiades, who up to this day has not allowed me toconverse with you; and he inspires in me the faith that I am especiallydesigned to bring you to honour. 

ALCIBIADES: You are jesting, Socrates. 

SOCRATES: Perhaps, at any rate, I am right in saying that all mengreatly need pains and care, and you and I above all men. 

ALCIBIADES: You are not far wrong about me. 

SOCRATES: And certainly not about myself. 

ALCIBIADES: But what can we do?

SOCRATES: There must be no hesitation or cowardice, my friend. 

ALCIBIADES: That would not become us, Socrates. 

SOCRATES: No, indeed, and we ought to take counsel together: for do wenot wish to be as good as possible?

ALCIBIADES: We do. 

SOCRATES: In what sort of virtue?

ALCIBIADES: Plainly, in the virtue of good men. 

SOCRATES: Who are good in what?

ALCIBIADES: Those, clearly, who are good in the management of affairs. 

SOCRATES: What sort of affairs? Equestrian affairs?

ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. 

SOCRATES: You mean that about them we should have recourse to horsemen?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: Well, naval affairs?

ALCIBIADES: No. 

SOCRATES: You mean that we should have recourse to sailors about them?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: Then what affairs? And who do them?

ALCIBIADES: The affairs which occupy Athenian gentlemen. 

SOCRATES: And when you speak of gentlemen, do you mean the wise or theunwise?

ALCIBIADES: The wise. 

SOCRATES: And a man is good in respect of that in which he is wise?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: And evil in respect of that in which he is unwise?

ALCIBIADES: Certainly. 

SOCRATES: The shoemaker, for example, is wise in respect of the makingof shoes?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: Then he is good in that?

ALCIBIADES: He is. 

SOCRATES: But in respect of the making of garments he is unwise?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: Then in that he is bad?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: Then upon this view of the matter the same man is good andalso bad?

ALCIBIADES: True. 

SOCRATES: But would you say that the good are the same as the bad?

ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. 

SOCRATES: Then whom do you call the good?

ALCIBIADES: I mean by the good those who are able to rule in the city. 

SOCRATES: Not, surely, over horses?

ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. 

SOCRATES: But over men?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: When they are sick?

ALCIBIADES: No. 

SOCRATES: Or on a voyage?

ALCIBIADES: No. 

SOCRATES: Or reaping the harvest?

ALCIBIADES: No. 

SOCRATES: When they are doing something or nothing?

ALCIBIADES: When they are doing something, I should say. 

SOCRATES: I wish that you would explain to me what this something is. 

ALCIBIADES: When they are having dealings with one another, and usingone another's services, as we citizens do in our daily life. 

SOCRATES: Those of whom you speak are ruling over men who are using theservices of other men?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: Are they ruling over the signal-men who give the time to therowers?

ALCIBIADES: No; they are not. 

SOCRATES: That would be the office of the pilot?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: But, perhaps you mean that they rule over flute-players, wholead the singers and use the services of the dancers?

ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. 

SOCRATES: That would be the business of the teacher of the chorus?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: Then what is the meaning of being able to rule over men whouse other men?

ALCIBIADES: I mean that they rule over men who have common rights ofcitizenship, and dealings with one another. 

SOCRATES: And what sort of an art is this? Suppose that I ask youagain, as I did just now, What art makes men know how to rule over theirfellow-sailors, --how would you answer?

ALCIBIADES: The art of the pilot. 

SOCRATES: And, if I may recur to another old instance, what art enablesthem to rule over their fellow-singers?

ALCIBIADES: The art of the teacher of the chorus, which you were justnow mentioning. 

SOCRATES: And what do you call the art of fellow-citizens?

ALCIBIADES: I should say, good counsel, Socrates. 

SOCRATES: And is the art of the pilot evil counsel?

ALCIBIADES: No. 

SOCRATES: But good counsel?

ALCIBIADES: Yes, that is what I should say, --good counsel, of which theaim is the preservation of the voyagers. 

SOCRATES: True. And what is the aim of that other good counsel of whichyou speak?

ALCIBIADES: The aim is the better order and preservation of the city. 

SOCRATES: And what is that of which the absence or presence improvesand preserves the order of the city? Suppose you were to ask me, what isthat of which the presence or absence improves or preserves the orderof the body? I should reply, the presence of health and the absence ofdisease. You would say the same?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: And if you were to ask me the same question about the eyes, Ishould reply in the same way, 'the presence of sight and the absence ofblindness;' or about the ears, I should reply, that they were improvedand were in better case, when deafness was absent, and hearing waspresent in them. 

ALCIBIADES: True. 

SOCRATES: And what would you say of a state? What is that by thepresence or absence of which the state is improved and better managedand ordered?

ALCIBIADES: I should say, Socrates:--the presence of friendship and theabsence of hatred and division. 

SOCRATES: And do you mean by friendship agreement or disagreement?

ALCIBIADES: Agreement. 

SOCRATES: What art makes cities agree about numbers?

ALCIBIADES: Arithmetic. 

SOCRATES: And private individuals?

ALCIBIADES: The same. 

SOCRATES: And what art makes each individual agree with himself?

ALCIBIADES: The same. 

SOCRATES: And what art makes each of us agree with himself about thecomparative length of the span and of the cubit? Does not the art ofmeasure?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: Individuals are agreed with one another about this; andstates, equally?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: And the same holds of the balance?

ALCIBIADES: True. 

SOCRATES: But what is the other agreement of which you speak, and aboutwhat? what art can give that agreement? And does that which gives it tothe state give it also to the individual, so as to make him consistentwith himself and with another?

ALCIBIADES: I should suppose so. 

SOCRATES: But what is the nature of the agreement?--answer, and faintnot. 

ALCIBIADES: I mean to say that there should be such friendship andagreement as exists between an affectionate father and mother and theirson, or between brothers, or between husband and wife. 

SOCRATES: But can a man, Alcibiades, agree with a woman about thespinning of wool, which she understands and he does not?

ALCIBIADES: No, truly. 

SOCRATES: Nor has he any need, for spinning is a female accomplishment. 

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: And would a woman agree with a man about the science of arms, which she has never learned?

ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. 

SOCRATES: I suppose that the use of arms would be regarded by you as amale accomplishment?

ALCIBIADES: It would. 

SOCRATES: Then, upon your view, women and men have two sorts ofknowledge?

ALCIBIADES: Certainly. 

SOCRATES: Then in their knowledge there is no agreement of women andmen?

ALCIBIADES: There is not. 

SOCRATES: Nor can there be friendship, if friendship is agreement?

ALCIBIADES: Plainly not. 

SOCRATES: Then women are not loved by men when they do their own work?

ALCIBIADES: I suppose not. 

SOCRATES: Nor men by women when they do their own work?

ALCIBIADES: No. 

SOCRATES: Nor are states well administered, when individuals do theirown work?

ALCIBIADES: I should rather think, Socrates, that the reverse is thetruth. (Compare Republic. )

SOCRATES: What! do you mean to say that states are well administeredwhen friendship is absent, the presence of which, as we were saying, alone secures their good order?

ALCIBIADES: But I should say that there is friendship among them, forthis very reason, that the two parties respectively do their own work. 

SOCRATES: That was not what you were saying before; and what do you meannow by affirming that friendship exists when there is no agreement? Howcan there be agreement about matters which the one party knows, and ofwhich the other is in ignorance?

ALCIBIADES: Impossible. 

SOCRATES: And when individuals are doing their own work, are they doingwhat is just or unjust?

ALCIBIADES: What is just, certainly. 

SOCRATES: And when individuals do what is just in the state, is there nofriendship among them?

ALCIBIADES: I suppose that there must be, Socrates. 

SOCRATES: Then what do you mean by this friendship or agreement aboutwhich we must be wise and discreet in order that we may be good men?I cannot make out where it exists or among whom; according to you, thesame persons may sometimes have it, and sometimes not. 

ALCIBIADES: But, indeed, Socrates, I do not know what I am saying; and Ihave long been, unconsciously to myself, in a most disgraceful state. 

SOCRATES: Nevertheless, cheer up; at fifty, if you had discovered yourdeficiency, you would have been too old, and the time for taking care ofyourself would have passed away, but yours is just the age at which thediscovery should be made. 

ALCIBIADES: And what should he do, Socrates, who would make thediscovery?

SOCRATES: Answer questions, Alcibiades; and that is a process which, by the grace of God, if I may put any faith in my oracle, will be veryimproving to both of us. 

ALCIBIADES: If I can be improved by answering, I will answer. 

SOCRATES: And first of all, that we may not peradventure be deceivedby appearances, fancying, perhaps, that we are taking care of ourselveswhen we are not, what is the meaning of a man taking care of himself?and when does he take care? Does he take care of himself when he takescare of what belongs to him?

ALCIBIADES: I should think so. 

SOCRATES: When does a man take care of his feet? Does he not take careof them when he takes care of that which belongs to his feet?

ALCIBIADES: I do not understand. 

SOCRATES: Let me take the hand as an illustration; does not a ringbelong to the finger, and to the finger only?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: And the shoe in like manner to the foot?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: And when we take care of our shoes, do we not take care of ourfeet?

ALCIBIADES: I do not comprehend, Socrates. 

SOCRATES: But you would admit, Alcibiades, that to take proper care of athing is a correct expression?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: And taking proper care means improving?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: And what is the art which improves our shoes?

ALCIBIADES: Shoemaking. 

SOCRATES: Then by shoemaking we take care of our shoes?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: And do we by shoemaking take care of our feet, or by someother art which improves the feet?

ALCIBIADES: By some other art. 

SOCRATES: And the same art improves the feet which improves the rest ofthe body?

ALCIBIADES: Very true. 

SOCRATES: Which is gymnastic?

ALCIBIADES: Certainly. 

SOCRATES: Then by gymnastic we take care of our feet, and by shoemakingof that which belongs to our feet?

ALCIBIADES: Very true. 

SOCRATES: And by gymnastic we take care of our hands, and by the art ofgraving rings of that which belongs to our hands?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: And by gymnastic we take care of the body, and by the art ofweaving and the other arts we take care of the things of the body?

ALCIBIADES: Clearly. 

SOCRATES: Then the art which takes care of each thing is different fromthat which takes care of the belongings of each thing?

ALCIBIADES: True. 

SOCRATES: Then in taking care of what belongs to you, you do not takecare of yourself?

ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. 

SOCRATES: For the art which takes care of our belongings appears not tobe the same as that which takes care of ourselves?

ALCIBIADES: Clearly not. 

SOCRATES: And now let me ask you what is the art with which we take careof ourselves?

ALCIBIADES: I cannot say. 

SOCRATES: At any rate, thus much has been admitted, that the art isnot one which makes any of our possessions, but which makes ourselvesbetter?

ALCIBIADES: True. 

SOCRATES: But should we ever have known what art makes a shoe better, ifwe did not know a shoe?

ALCIBIADES: Impossible. 

SOCRATES: Nor should we know what art makes a ring better, if we did notknow a ring?

ALCIBIADES: That is true. 

SOCRATES: And can we ever know what art makes a man better, if we do notknow what we are ourselves?

ALCIBIADES: Impossible. 

SOCRATES: And is self-knowledge such an easy thing, and was he to belightly esteemed who inscribed the text on the temple at Delphi? Or isself-knowledge a difficult thing, which few are able to attain?

ALCIBIADES: At times I fancy, Socrates, that anybody can know himself;at other times the task appears to be very difficult. 

SOCRATES: But whether easy or difficult, Alcibiades, still there isno other way; knowing what we are, we shall know how to take care ofourselves, and if we are ignorant we shall not know. 

ALCIBIADES: That is true. 

SOCRATES: Well, then, let us see in what way the self-existent can bediscovered by us; that will give us a chance of discovering our ownexistence, which otherwise we can never know. 

ALCIBIADES: You say truly. 

SOCRATES: Come, now, I beseech you, tell me with whom you areconversing?--with whom but with me?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: As I am, with you?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: That is to say, I, Socrates, am talking?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: And Alcibiades is my hearer?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: And I in talking use words?

ALCIBIADES: Certainly. 

SOCRATES: And talking and using words have, I suppose, the same meaning?

ALCIBIADES: To be sure. 

SOCRATES: And the user is not the same as the thing which he uses?

ALCIBIADES: What do you mean?

SOCRATES: I will explain; the shoemaker, for example, uses a squaretool, and a circular tool, and other tools for cutting?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: But the tool is not the same as the cutter and user of thetool?

ALCIBIADES: Of course not. 

SOCRATES: And in the same way the instrument of the harper is to bedistinguished from the harper himself?

ALCIBIADES: It is. 

SOCRATES: Now the question which I asked was whether you conceive theuser to be always different from that which he uses?

ALCIBIADES: I do. 

SOCRATES: Then what shall we say of the shoemaker? Does he cut with histools only or with his hands?

ALCIBIADES: With his hands as well. 

SOCRATES: He uses his hands too?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: And does he use his eyes in cutting leather?

ALCIBIADES: He does. 

SOCRATES: And we admit that the user is not the same with the thingswhich he uses?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: Then the shoemaker and the harper are to be distinguished fromthe hands and feet which they use?

ALCIBIADES: Clearly. 

SOCRATES: And does not a man use the whole body?

ALCIBIADES: Certainly. 

SOCRATES: And that which uses is different from that which is used?

ALCIBIADES: True. 

SOCRATES: Then a man is not the same as his own body?

ALCIBIADES: That is the inference. 

SOCRATES: What is he, then?

ALCIBIADES: I cannot say. 

SOCRATES: Nay, you can say that he is the user of the body. 

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: And the user of the body is the soul?

ALCIBIADES: Yes, the soul. 

SOCRATES: And the soul rules?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: Let me make an assertion which will, I think, be universallyadmitted. 

ALCIBIADES: What is it?

SOCRATES: That man is one of three things. 

ALCIBIADES: What are they?

SOCRATES: Soul, body, or both together forming a whole. 

ALCIBIADES: Certainly. 

SOCRATES: But did we not say that the actual ruling principle of thebody is man?

ALCIBIADES: Yes, we did. 

SOCRATES: And does the body rule over itself?

ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. 

SOCRATES: It is subject, as we were saying?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: Then that is not the principle which we are seeking?

ALCIBIADES: It would seem not. 

SOCRATES: But may we say that the union of the two rules over the body, and consequently that this is man?

ALCIBIADES: Very likely. 

SOCRATES: The most unlikely of all things; for if one of the members issubject, the two united cannot possibly rule. 

ALCIBIADES: True. 

SOCRATES: But since neither the body, nor the union of the two, is man, either man has no real existence, or the soul is man?

ALCIBIADES: Just so. 

SOCRATES: Is anything more required to prove that the soul is man?

ALCIBIADES: Certainly not; the proof is, I think, quite sufficient. 

SOCRATES: And if the proof, although not perfect, be sufficient, weshall be satisfied;--more precise proof will be supplied when we havediscovered that which we were led to omit, from a fear that the enquirywould be too much protracted. 

ALCIBIADES: What was that?

SOCRATES: What I meant, when I said that absolute existence must befirst considered; but now, instead of absolute existence, we have beenconsidering the nature of individual existence, and this may, perhaps, be sufficient; for surely there is nothing which may be called moreproperly ourselves than the soul?

ALCIBIADES: There is nothing. 

SOCRATES: Then we may truly conceive that you and I are conversing withone another, soul to soul?

ALCIBIADES: Very true. 

SOCRATES: And that is just what I was saying before--that I, Socrates, am not arguing or talking with the face of Alcibiades, but with the realAlcibiades; or in other words, with his soul. 

ALCIBIADES: True. 

SOCRATES: Then he who bids a man know himself, would have him know hissoul?

ALCIBIADES: That appears to be true. 

SOCRATES: He whose knowledge only extends to the body, knows the thingsof a man, and not the man himself?

ALCIBIADES: That is true. 

SOCRATES: Then neither the physician regarded as a physician, nor thetrainer regarded as a trainer, knows himself?

ALCIBIADES: He does not. 

SOCRATES: The husbandmen and the other craftsmen are very far fromknowing themselves, for they would seem not even to know their ownbelongings? When regarded in relation to the arts which they practisethey are even further removed from self-knowledge, for they only knowthe belongings of the body, which minister to the body. 

ALCIBIADES: That is true. 

SOCRATES: Then if temperance is the knowledge of self, in respect of hisart none of them is temperate?

ALCIBIADES: I agree. 

SOCRATES: And this is the reason why their arts are accounted vulgar, and are not such as a good man would practise?

ALCIBIADES: Quite true. 

SOCRATES: Again, he who cherishes his body cherishes not himself, butwhat belongs to him?

ALCIBIADES: That is true. 

SOCRATES: But he who cherishes his money, cherishes neither himself norhis belongings, but is in a stage yet further removed from himself?

ALCIBIADES: I agree. 

SOCRATES: Then the money-maker has really ceased to be occupied with hisown concerns?

ALCIBIADES: True. 

SOCRATES: And if any one has fallen in love with the person ofAlcibiades, he loves not Alcibiades, but the belongings of Alcibiades?

ALCIBIADES: True. 

SOCRATES: But he who loves your soul is the true lover?

ALCIBIADES: That is the necessary inference. 

SOCRATES: The lover of the body goes away when the flower of youthfades?

ALCIBIADES: True. 

SOCRATES: But he who loves the soul goes not away, as long as the soulfollows after virtue?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: And I am the lover who goes not away, but remains with you, when you are no longer young and the rest are gone?

ALCIBIADES: Yes, Socrates; and therein you do well, and I hope that youwill remain. 

SOCRATES: Then you must try to look your best. 

ALCIBIADES: I will. 

SOCRATES: The fact is, that there is only one lover of Alcibiades theson of Cleinias; there neither is nor ever has been seemingly anyother; and he is his darling, --Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus andPhaenarete. 

ALCIBIADES: True. 

SOCRATES: And did you not say, that if I had not spoken first, you wereon the point of coming to me, and enquiring why I only remained?

ALCIBIADES: That is true. 

SOCRATES: The reason was that I loved you for your own sake, whereasother men love what belongs to you; and your beauty, which is not you, is fading away, just as your true self is beginning to bloom. And I willnever desert you, if you are not spoiled and deformed by the Athenianpeople; for the danger which I most fear is that you will become a loverof the people and will be spoiled by them. Many a noble Athenian hasbeen ruined in this way. For the demus of the great-hearted Erechteus isof a fair countenance, but you should see him naked; wherefore observethe caution which I give you. 

ALCIBIADES: What caution?

SOCRATES: Practise yourself, sweet friend, in learning what you ought toknow, before you enter on politics; and then you will have an antidotewhich will keep you out of harm's way. 

ALCIBIADES: Good advice, Socrates, but I wish that you would explain tome in what way I am to take care of myself. 

SOCRATES: Have we not made an advance? for we are at any rate tolerablywell agreed as to what we are, and there is no longer any danger, aswe once feared, that we might be taking care not of ourselves, but ofsomething which is not ourselves. 

ALCIBIADES: That is true. 

SOCRATES: And the next step will be to take care of the soul, and lookto that?

ALCIBIADES: Certainly. 

SOCRATES: Leaving the care of our bodies and of our properties toothers?

ALCIBIADES: Very good. 

SOCRATES: But how can we have a perfect knowledge of the things of thesoul?--For if we know them, then I suppose we shall know ourselves. Can we really be ignorant of the excellent meaning of the Delphianinscription, of which we were just now speaking?

ALCIBIADES: What have you in your thoughts, Socrates?

SOCRATES: I will tell you what I suspect to be the meaning and lessonof that inscription. Let me take an illustration from sight, which Iimagine to be the only one suitable to my purpose. 

ALCIBIADES: What do you mean?

SOCRATES: Consider; if some one were to say to the eye, 'See thyself, 'as you might say to a man, 'Know thyself, ' what is the nature andmeaning of this precept? Would not his meaning be:--That the eye shouldlook at that in which it would see itself?

ALCIBIADES: Clearly. 

SOCRATES: And what are the objects in looking at which we see ourselves?

ALCIBIADES: Clearly, Socrates, in looking at mirrors and the like. 

SOCRATES: Very true; and is there not something of the nature of amirror in our own eyes?

ALCIBIADES: Certainly. 

SOCRATES: Did you ever observe that the face of the person looking intothe eye of another is reflected as in a mirror; and in the visual organwhich is over against him, and which is called the pupil, there is asort of image of the person looking?

ALCIBIADES: That is quite true. 

SOCRATES: Then the eye, looking at another eye, and at that in the eyewhich is most perfect, and which is the instrument of vision, will theresee itself?

ALCIBIADES: That is evident. 

SOCRATES: But looking at anything else either in man or in the world, and not to what resembles this, it will not see itself?

ALCIBIADES: Very true. 

SOCRATES: Then if the eye is to see itself, it must look at the eye, and at that part of the eye where sight which is the virtue of the eyeresides?

ALCIBIADES: True. 

SOCRATES: And if the soul, my dear Alcibiades, is ever to know herself, must she not look at the soul; and especially at that part of the soulin which her virtue resides, and to any other which is like this?

ALCIBIADES: I agree, Socrates. 

SOCRATES: And do we know of any part of our souls more divine than thatwhich has to do with wisdom and knowledge?

ALCIBIADES: There is none. 

SOCRATES: Then this is that part of the soul which resembles the divine;and he who looks at this and at the whole class of things divine, willbe most likely to know himself?

ALCIBIADES: Clearly. 

SOCRATES: And self-knowledge we agree to be wisdom?

ALCIBIADES: True. 

SOCRATES: But if we have no self-knowledge and no wisdom, can we everknow our own good and evil?

ALCIBIADES: How can we, Socrates?

SOCRATES: You mean, that if you did not know Alcibiades, there wouldbe no possibility of your knowing that what belonged to Alcibiades wasreally his?

ALCIBIADES: It would be quite impossible. 

SOCRATES: Nor should we know that we were the persons to whom anythingbelonged, if we did not know ourselves?

ALCIBIADES: How could we?

SOCRATES: And if we did not know our own belongings, neither should weknow the belongings of our belongings?

ALCIBIADES: Clearly not. 

SOCRATES: Then we were not altogether right in acknowledging just nowthat a man may know what belongs to him and yet not know himself; nay, rather he cannot even know the belongings of his belongings; for thediscernment of the things of self, and of the things which belong to thethings of self, appear all to be the business of the same man, and ofthe same art. 

ALCIBIADES: So much may be supposed. 

SOCRATES: And he who knows not the things which belong to himself, willin like manner be ignorant of the things which belong to others?

ALCIBIADES: Very true. 

SOCRATES: And if he knows not the affairs of others, he will not knowthe affairs of states?

ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. 

SOCRATES: Then such a man can never be a statesman?

ALCIBIADES: He cannot. 

SOCRATES: Nor an economist?

ALCIBIADES: He cannot. 

SOCRATES: He will not know what he is doing?

ALCIBIADES: He will not. 

SOCRATES: And will not he who is ignorant fall into error?

ALCIBIADES: Assuredly. 

SOCRATES: And if he falls into error will he not fail both in his publicand private capacity?

ALCIBIADES: Yes, indeed. 

SOCRATES: And failing, will he not be miserable?

ALCIBIADES: Very. 

SOCRATES: And what will become of those for whom he is acting?

ALCIBIADES: They will be miserable also. 

SOCRATES: Then he who is not wise and good cannot be happy?

ALCIBIADES: He cannot. 

SOCRATES: The bad, then, are miserable?

ALCIBIADES: Yes, very. 

SOCRATES: And if so, not he who has riches, but he who has wisdom, isdelivered from his misery?

ALCIBIADES: Clearly. 

SOCRATES: Cities, then, if they are to be happy, do not want walls, ortriremes, or docks, or numbers, or size, Alcibiades, without virtue?(Compare Arist. Pol. )

ALCIBIADES: Indeed they do not. 

SOCRATES: And you must give the citizens virtue, if you mean toadminister their affairs rightly or nobly?

ALCIBIADES: Certainly. 

SOCRATES: But can a man give that which he has not?

ALCIBIADES: Impossible. 

SOCRATES: Then you or any one who means to govern and superintend, notonly himself and the things of himself, but the state and the things ofthe state, must in the first place acquire virtue. 

ALCIBIADES: That is true. 

SOCRATES: You have not therefore to obtain power or authority, inorder to enable you to do what you wish for yourself and the state, butjustice and wisdom. 

ALCIBIADES: Clearly. 

SOCRATES: You and the state, if you act wisely and justly, will actaccording to the will of God?

ALCIBIADES: Certainly. 

SOCRATES: As I was saying before, you will look only at what is brightand divine, and act with a view to them?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: In that mirror you will see and know yourselves and your owngood?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: And so you will act rightly and well?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: In which case, I will be security for your happiness. 

ALCIBIADES: I accept the security. 

SOCRATES: But if you act unrighteously, your eye will turn to the darkand godless, and being in darkness and ignorance of yourselves, you willprobably do deeds of darkness. 

ALCIBIADES: Very possibly. 

SOCRATES: For if a man, my dear Alcibiades, has the power to do what helikes, but has no understanding, what is likely to be the result, eitherto him as an individual or to the state--for example, if he be sick andis able to do what he likes, not having the mind of a physician--havingmoreover tyrannical power, and no one daring to reprove him, what willhappen to him? Will he not be likely to have his constitution ruined?

ALCIBIADES: That is true. 

SOCRATES: Or again, in a ship, if a man having the power to do what helikes, has no intelligence or skill in navigation, do you see what willhappen to him and to his fellow-sailors?

ALCIBIADES: Yes; I see that they will all perish. 

SOCRATES: And in like manner, in a state, and where there is any powerand authority which is wanting in virtue, will not misfortune, in likemanner, ensue?

ALCIBIADES: Certainly. 

SOCRATES: Not tyrannical power, then, my good Alcibiades, should be theaim either of individuals or states, if they would be happy, but virtue. 

ALCIBIADES: That is true. 

SOCRATES: And before they have virtue, to be commanded by a superior isbetter for men as well as for children? (Compare Arist. Pol. )

ALCIBIADES: That is evident. 

SOCRATES: And that which is better is also nobler?

ALCIBIADES: True. 

SOCRATES: And what is nobler is more becoming?

ALCIBIADES: Certainly. 

SOCRATES: Then to the bad man slavery is more becoming, because better?

ALCIBIADES: True. 

SOCRATES: Then vice is only suited to a slave?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: And virtue to a freeman?

ALCIBIADES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: And, O my friend, is not the condition of a slave to beavoided?

ALCIBIADES: Certainly, Socrates. 

SOCRATES: And are you now conscious of your own state? And do you knowwhether you are a freeman or not?

ALCIBIADES: I think that I am very conscious indeed of my own state. 

SOCRATES: And do you know how to escape out of a state which I do noteven like to name to my beauty?

ALCIBIADES: Yes, I do. 

SOCRATES: How?

ALCIBIADES: By your help, Socrates. 

SOCRATES: That is not well said, Alcibiades. 

ALCIBIADES: What ought I to have said?

SOCRATES: By the help of God. 

ALCIBIADES: I agree; and I further say, that our relations are likelyto be reversed. From this day forward, I must and will follow you as youhave followed me; I will be the disciple, and you shall be my master. 

SOCRATES: O that is rare! My love breeds another love: and so like thestork I shall be cherished by the bird whom I have hatched. 

ALCIBIADES: Strange, but true; and henceforward I shall begin to thinkabout justice. 

SOCRATES: And I hope that you will persist; although I have fears, notbecause I doubt you; but I see the power of the state, which may be toomuch for both of us.