AGAINST HOME RULE

THE CASE FOR THE UNION

BY

ARTHUR J. BALFOUR, M. P. ; J. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN, M. P. ;WALTER LONG, M. P. ; GEORGE WYNDHAM, M. P. ;LORD CHARLES BERESFORD, M. P. ; J. H. CAMPBELL, K. C. , M. P. ;GERALD W. BALFOUR; THOMAS SINCLAIR;MARQUIS OF LONDONDERRY;EARL PERCY; L. S. AMERY, M. P. ; GEORGE CAVE, K. C. , M. P. ;GODFREY LOCKER LAMPSON, M. P. , &c. 

WITH INTRODUCTION BYSIR EDWARD CARSON, K. C. , M. P. 

AND PREFACE BYA. BONAR LAW, M. P. 

EDITED BYS. ROSENBAUM

LONDONFREDERICK WARNE & CO, AND NEW YORK1912

IRISH ESSAYS COMMITTEE

Chairman. THE RT. HON. SIR EDWARD CARSON, M. P. 

Vice-Chairman. GODFREY LOCKER LAMPSON, M. P. 

Committee. L. S. AMERY, M. P. GEORGE CAVE, K. C. , M. P. THE RT. HON. J. H. CAMPBELL, K. C. , M. P. A. L. HORNER, K. C. , M. P. A. D. STEEL-MAITLAND, M. P. A. W. SAMUELS, K. C. P. CAMBRAY

Secretary & Editor. S. ROSENBAUM, M. SC. , F. S. S. 

PREFACE

BY THE RIGHT HON. A. BONAR LAW, M. P. 

This book, for which I have been asked to write a short preface, presents the case against Home Rule for Ireland. The articles arewritten by men who not only have a complete grasp of the subjects uponwhich they write, but who in most cases, from their past experience andfrom their personal influence, are well entitled to outline the Irishpolicy of the Unionist Party. 

Ours is not merely a policy of hostility to Home Rule, but it is, as ithas always been, a constructive policy for the regeneration of Ireland. 

We are opposed to Home Rule because, in our belief, it would seriouslyweaken our national position; because it would put a stop to theremarkable increase of prosperity in Ireland which has resulted from theLand Purchase Act; and because it would inflict intolerable injustice onthe minority in Ireland, who believe that under a Government controlledby the men who dominate the United Irish League neither their civil northeir religious liberty would be safe. 

To create within the United Kingdom a separate Parliament with anExecutive Government responsible to that Parliament would at the bestmean a danger of friction. But if we were ever engaged in a great war, and the men who controlled the Irish Government took the view in regardto that war which was taken by the same men in regard to the Boer War;if they thought the war unjust, and if, as under the last Home RuleBill they would have the right to do, they passed resolutions in theIrish Parliament in condemnation of the war, and even sent embassiescarrying messages of good-will to our enemy, then this second Governmentat the heart of the Empire would be a source of weakness which might befatal to us. 

The ameliorative measures originated by Mr. Balfour when he was ChiefSecretary, and which culminated in the Wyndham Purchase Act, havecreated a new Ireland. Mr. Redmond, speaking a year or two ago, saidthat Ireland "was studded with the beautiful and happy homes of anemancipated peasantry. " It is a true picture, but it is a picture of theresult of Unionist policy in Ireland, a policy which Mr. Redmond and hisfriends, including the present Government, have done their best tohamper. The driving power of the agitation for Home Rule has always beendiscontent with the land system of Ireland, and just in proportion asland purchase has extended, the demand for Home Rule has died down. TheNationalist leaders, realising this, and regarding political agitationas their first object, have compelled the Government to putinsurmountable obstacles in the way of land purchase--not because it hadnot been successful, but because it had been too successful. 

The prosperity and the peace of Ireland depend upon the completion ofland purchase, and it can only be completed by the use of Britishcredit, which in my belief can and ought only to be freely given so longas Ireland is in complete union with the rest of the United Kingdom. Inthe present deplorable position of British credit the financing of landpurchase would be difficult; but it is not unreasonable to hope that thereturn to power of a Government which would adopt sane financialmethods would restore our credit; and in any case, the object is of suchvital importance that, whatever the difficulties, it must be our policyto complete with the utmost possible rapidity the system of landpurchase in Ireland. 

It will also be our aim to help to the utmost, in the manner suggestedin different articles in this book, in the development of the resourcesof Ireland. The Nationalist policy, which is imposed also on the RadicalParty, is in fact more politics and less industry. Our policy is moreindustry and less politics. 

The strongest objection, however, and, in my opinion, the insurmountableobstacle to Home Rule, is the injustice of attempting to impose itagainst their will upon the Unionists of Ulster. The only intelligibleground upon which Home Rule can now be defended is the nationality ofIreland. But Ireland is not a nation; it is two nations. It is twonations separated from each other by lines of cleavage which cut fardeeper than those which separate Great Britain from Ireland as a whole. Every argument which can be adduced in favour of separate treatment forthe Irish Nationalist minority as against the majority of the UnitedKingdom, applies with far greater force in favour of separate treatmentfor the Unionists of Ulster as against the majority of Ireland. 

To the majority in Ireland Home Rule may seem to be a blessing, but tothe minority it appears as an intolerable curse. Their hostility to itis quite as strong as that which was felt by many of the Catholics ofIreland to Grattan's Parliament. They, too, would say, as the CatholicBishop of Waterford said at the time of the Union, that they "wouldprefer a Union with the Beys and Mamelukes of Egypt to the iron rod ofthe Mamelukes of Ireland. "

The minority which holds this view is important in numbers, for itcomprises at the lowest estimate more than a fourth of the population ofIreland. From every other point of view it is still more important, forprobably the minority pays at least half the taxes and does half thetrade of Ireland. The influence and also the power of the minority isenormously increased by the way in which its numbers are concentrated inBelfast and the surrounding counties. 

The men who compose this minority ask no special privilege. They demandonly--and they will not demand in vain--that they should not be deprivedagainst their will of the protection of British law and of the rights ofBritish citizenship. 

CONTENTS. 

PREFACE

_By the Rt. Hon. A. Bonar Law, M. P. _

INTRODUCTION

_By the Rt. Hon. Sir Edward Carson, K. C. , M. P. _

HISTORICAL

I. A NOTE ON HOME RULE

_By the Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, M. P. _

II. HISTORICAL RETROSPECT

_By J. R. Fisher_

CRITICAL

III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION

_By George Cave, K. C. , M. P. _

IV. HOME RULE FINANCE

_By the Rt. Hon. J. Austen Chamberlain, M. P. _

V. HOME RULE AND THE COLONIAL ANALOGY

_By L. S. Amery, M. P. _

VI. THE CONTROL OF JUDICIARY AND POLICE

_By the Rt. Hon. J. H. Campbell, K. C. , M. P. _

VII. THE ULSTER QUESTION

_By the Marquis of Londonderry, K. G. _

VIII. THE POSITION OF ULSTER

_By the Rt. Hon. Thomas Sinclair. _

IX. THE SOUTHERN MINORITIES

_By Richard Bagwell, M. A. _

X. HOME RULE AND NAVAL DEFENCE

_By Admiral Lord Charles Beresford, M. P. _

XI. THE MILITARY DISADVANTAGES OF HOME RULE

_By the Earl Percy. _

XII. THE RELIGIOUS DIFFICULTY UNDER HOME RULE

(i. ) The Church View

_By the Rt. Rev. C. F. D'Arcy, Bishop of Down. _

(ii. ) The Nonconformist View

_By Rev. Samuel Prenter, M. A. , D. D. (Dublin). _

CONSTRUCTIVE

XIII. UNIONIST POLICY IN RELATION TO RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN IRELAND

_By the Rt. Hon. Gerald Balfour. _

XIV. THE COMPLETION OF LAND PURCHASE

_By the Rt. Hon. George Wyndham, M. P. _

XV. POSSIBLE IRISH FINANCIAL REFORMS UNDER THE UNION

_By Arthur Warren Samuels, K. C. _

XVI. THE ECONOMICS OF SEPARATISM

_By L. S. Amery, M. P. _

XVII. PRIVATE BILL LEGISLATION

_By the Rt. Hon. Walter Long, M. P. _

XVIII. IRISH POOR LAW REFORM

_By John E. Healy, Editor of the "Irish Times. "_

XIX. IRISH EDUCATION UNDER THE UNION

_By Godfrey Locker Lampson, M. P. _

XX. THE PROBLEM OF TRANSIT AND TRANSPORT IN IRELAND

_By an Irish Railway Director. _

INTRODUCTION

BY THE RIGHT HON. SIR EDWARD CARSON, M. P. 

The object of the various essays collected in this book is to set outthe case against Home Rule for Ireland, and to re-state Unionist policyin the light of the recent changes in that country. The authors are not, however, to be regarded as forming anything in the nature of a corporatebody, and no collective responsibility is to be ascribed to them. Eachwriter is responsible for the views set out in his own article, and forthose alone. At the same time, they are all leaders of Unionist thoughtand opinion, and their views in the main represent the policy which theUnionist Government, when returned to power, will have to carry intoeffect. 

Among the contributors to the book are an ex-Premier, four ex-ChiefSecretaries for Ireland, an ex-Lord Lieutenant, two ex-Law officers, anda number of men whose special study of the Irish question entitles themto have their views most carefully considered when the time comes forrestoring to Ireland those economic advantages of which she has beendeprived by political agitation and political conspiracy. At the presentmoment the discussion of the Irish question is embittered by thepressing and urgent danger to civil and religious liberties involved inthe unconditional surrender of the Government to the intrigues of adisloyal section of the Irish people. It is the object of writers inthis book to raise the discussions on the Home Rule question above thebitter conflict of Irish parties, and to show that not only is Unionisma constructive policy and a measure of hope for Ireland, but that inUnionist policy lies the only alternative to financial ruin andexterminating civil dissensions. 

We who are Unionists believe first and foremost that the Act of Unionis required--in the words made familiar to us by the Book of CommonPrayer--"for the safety, honour and welfare, of our Sovereign and hisdominions. " We are not concerned with the supposed taint which marredthe passing of that Act; we are unmoved by the fact that its terms haveundergone considerable modification. We do not believe in the plenaryinspiration of any Act of Parliament. It is not possible for the livingneeds of two prosperous countries to be bound indefinitely by the "deadhand" of an ancient statute, but we maintain that geographical andeconomic reasons make a legislative Union between Great Britain andIreland necessary for the interests of both. We see, as Irish Ministerssaw in 1800, that there can be no permanent resting place betweencomplete Union and total separation. We know that Irish Nationalistshave not only proclaimed separatist principles, but that they havereceived separatist money, on the understanding that they would notoppose a movement to destroy whatever restrictions and safeguards theImperial Parliament might impose upon an Irish Government. 

The first law of nature with nations and governments, as withindividuals, is self-preservation. It was the vital interests ofnational defence that caused Pitt to undertake the difficult andthankless task of creating the legislative union. If that union wasnecessary for the salvation of England and the foundation of the BritishEmpire, it is assuredly no less necessary for the continued security ofthe one and the maintenance and prestige of the other. 

Mr. J. R. Fisher, in his historical retrospect, shows us how bitterexperience convinced successive generations of English statesmen of thedangers that lay in an independent Ireland. One of the very earliestconflicts between the two countries was caused by the action of theIrish Parliament in recognising and crowning a Pretender in DublinCastle. Then the fact that the Reformation, which soon won the adherenceof the English Government and the majority of the English people, nevergained any great foothold in Ireland, caused the bitter religious warswhich devastated Europe to be reproduced in the relations of the twocountries. When England was fighting desperately with the Spanishchampions of the Papacy, Spanish forces twice succeeded in effecting alanding on the Irish coast, and were welcomed by the people. Later on, by the aid of subsidies from an Irish Parliament, Strafford raised10, 000 men in Ireland in order to support Charles I. In his conflictwith the English people. Cromwell realised that the only remedy for theintrigues and turbulence of the Irish Parliament lay in a legislativeunion. But, unfortunately, his Union Parliament was terminated by theRestoration. Then, again, when France became the chief danger thatEngland had to face, Tyrconnel, with the aid of French troops and Frenchsubsidies, endeavoured to make Ireland a base for the invasion ofEngland. Under the Old Pretender again, another effort was made to makethe Irish Parliament a medium for the destruction of English liberties. 

In these long-continued and bitter struggles we see the excuse, if notthe justification, for the severe penal laws which were introduced inorder to curb the power of the Irish chieftains. We see also thebeginning of the feud between Ulster and the other provinces in Ireland, which has continued in a modified form to the present day. Straffordfound that, in order to bolster up the despotism of the Stuarts, he hadnot only to invade England, but to expel the Scottish settlers from theNorthern province. The Irish Parliament in the time of Tyrconnel againbegan to prepare for the invasion of England by an attempt to destroythe Ulster plantation. The settlers had their estates confiscated, theProtestant clergy were driven out and English sympathisers outlawed byname, in the "hugest Bill of Attainder which the world has seen. "

Admiral Lord Charles Beresford points out the danger from a naval pointof view of the French attempts to use Ireland as a base for operationsagainst England, both under Louis XIV. And under the RepublicanDirectory. He quotes Admiral Mahan as saying that the movement whichdesigned to cut the English communications in St. George's Channelwhile an invading party landed in the south of Ireland was a strictlystrategic movement and would be as dangerous to England now as it was in1690. When Grattan extorted from England's weakness the unworkable andimpracticable constitution of 1782, the danger which had always beenpresent became immensely increased. In less than three years from theperiod of boasted final adjustment, Ireland came to a breach withEngland on the important question of trade and navigation. Then, again, at the time of the Regency, the Irish Parliament was actually ready tochoose a person in whom to rest the sovereign executive power of thenation, different from him whom the British Parliament were prepared todesignate. 

In 1795, when the French had made themselves masters of Brabant, Flanders, and Holland, the rebel government of United Irishmen was sowell-established in Ireland that, as Lord Clare, the Irish Chancellor, subsequently admitted in the House of Lords, Ireland was for some weeksin a state of actual separation from Great Britain. When the greatRebellion of 1798 broke out, the French Directory sent assistance to theIrish rebels in order to facilitate the greater scheme--the conquest ofEngland and of Europe. When we come to estimate the danger which thegrant of Home Rule to Ireland would bring to the safety of England, weare faced with two considerations. In the first place, the movements ofthe French in the past were, as we have said, strategic. Given an IrishParliament that was hostile to England, or at least dubious in herloyalty to this country, the movement of a hostile fleet against ourcommunications would be as dangerous now as it was in the past. 

When we try to estimate what would be the feelings of an IrishGovernment when England was at war, we have to consider not only thespeeches of avowed enemies of the Empire like Major McBride and theIrish Americans, but we have also to remember the attitude adopted uponall questions of foreign policy by the more responsible Nationalists ofthe type of Mr. Dillon. Not only have the Irish Nationalist partyconsistently opposed every warlike operation that British Governmentshave found to be necessary, but they have also fervently attacked thePowers on the Continent of Europe that have been suspected of friendshipto England. We have only to imagine the element of weakness and disunionwhich would be introduced into our foreign policy by an Irish Parliamentthat passed resolutions regarding the policy of the Governments, say, ofRussia and of France, in order to realise the immense dangers of settingup such a Parliament when we are again confronted with a mightyConfederation of opponents in Europe. It is admitted that the nextEuropean war will be decided by the events of the first few days. Inorder to succeed, we shall have to strike and strike quickly. But inorder that there should be swift and effective action, there should beonly one Government to be consulted. The Irish Ministry that was notactively hostile, but only unsympathetic and dilatory, might, in manyways, fatally embarrass Ministers at Westminster. 

Moreover, another complication has been introduced by the dependence ofEngland upon Irish food supplies. Lord Percy points out that there aretwo stages in every naval war; first, the actual engagement, and thenthe blockade or destruction of the ships of the defeated country. Hepoints out that, even after the destruction of the French Navy atTrafalgar, the damage done to British oversea commerce was very great. Modern conditions of warfare have made blockade an infinitely moredifficult and precarious operation, and we must therefore face thecertainty that hostile cruisers will escape and interfere with ouroversea supplies of food. Since Ireland lies directly across our traderoutes, it is probable that the majority of our food supplies will bederived from Ireland or carried through that country. But IrishMinisters would not have forgotten the lesson of the famine, when foodwas exported from Ireland though the people starved. Curious as it mayseem, Ireland, though a great exporting country, does not under presentconditions feed herself, and therefore an Irish Ministry wouldcertainly lay in a large stock of the imported food supplies before theywere brought to England, in order first of all absolutely to secure thefood of their own people. It would be open for them at any time, bycutting off our supplies, our horses and our recruits, to extract anyterms they liked out of the English people or bring this country to itsknees. "England's difficulty" would once again become "Ireland'sopportunity. " The experience of 1782 would be repeated. Resistance toIreland's demands for extended powers would bring about war between thetwo countries. In the striking phrase of Mr. Balfour's arrestingarticle, "The battle of the two Parliaments would become the battle ofthe two peoples. " It is only necessary to refer briefly to the fact thatthe active section of the Nationalist party has continually andconsistently opposed recruiting for the British Army. It is perfectlycertain that, under Home Rule, this policy would be accentuated ratherthan reversed. We now draw recruits from Ireland out of all proportionto its population. Under Home Rule, the difficulties of maintaining aproper standard of men and efficiency must be immensely increased. 

If there were no other arguments against Home Rule, the paramountnecessities of Imperial defence would demand the maintenance of theUnion. But the opposition to the proposed revolution in Ireland is basednot only on the considerations of Imperial safety, but also on those ofnational honour. The historical bases of Irish nationalism have beendestroyed by the arguments summarised in this book by Mr. Fisher and Mr. Amery. It was the existence of a separate Parliament in Dublin that madeIreland, for so many centuries, alike a menace to English liberty andthe victim of English reprisals. Miss A. E. Murray has pointed out[1]that experience seemed to show to British statesmen that Irishprosperity was dangerous to English liberty. It was the absence ofdirect authority over Ireland which made England so nervously anxiousto restrict Irish resources in every direction in which they might, evenindirectly, interfere with the growth of English power. Irish industrieswere penalised and crippled, not from any innate perversity on the partof English statesmen, or from any deliberate desire to ruin Ireland, butas a natural consequence of exclusion from the Union under the economicpolicy of the age. The very poverty of Ireland, as expressed in thelowness of Irish wages, was a convenient and perfectly justifiableargument for exclusion. Mr. Amery shows that the Protestant settlers ofUlster were penalised even more severely than the intriguing Irishchieftains against whom they were primarily directed. 

It was the consciousness of the natural result of separation that causedthe Irish Parliament, upon two separate occasions, to petition for thatunion with England which was delayed for over a century. The action ofGrattan and his supporters in wresting the impossible Constitution of1782, from the harassed and desperate English Government, began thatfatal policy of substituting political agitation for economic reformwhich has ever since marred the Irish Nationalist movement. JohnFitzgibbon[2] pointed out in the Irish House of Commons that only twoalternatives lay before his country--Separation or Union. UnderSeparation an Irish Parliament might be able to pursue an economicpolicy of its own; under Union the common economic policy of the twocountries might be adjusted to the peculiar interests of each. 

Pitt, undoubtedly, looked forward to a Customs Union with internal freetrade as the ultimate solution of the difficulty, but a Customs Unionwas impossible without the fullest kind of legislative unity. It is truethat the closing years of the eighteenth century were years ofprosperity to certain classes and districts in Ireland, but Mr. Fisherhas shown beyond dispute that this prosperity neither commenced withGrattan's Parliament nor ended with its fall. It was based upon thepeculiar economic conditions which years of war and preparations forwar had fostered in England; it was bound in any case to disappear withthe growing concentration of industrial interests which followed thegeneral introduction of machinery. The immediate result of the passingof the Act of Union was to increase the Irish population and Irishtrade. 

But to a certain extent that prosperity was fictitious and doomed tofailure so soon as peace and the introduction of scientific methods ofindustry had caused the concentration of the great manufactures. Thencame the great economic disaster for Ireland--the adoption of free tradeby England. The Irish famine of 1849 was not more severe than othersthat had preceded it, but its evil effects were accentuated by thepolicy of the English Government. The economists decided that the Stateought to do nothing to interfere with private enterprise in feeding thestarving people, and as there was no private enterprise in the country, where all classes were involved in the common ruin, the people were leftto die of hunger by the roadside. The lands the potato blight sparedwere desolated by the adoption of free trade. The exploitation of thevirgin lands of the American West gradually threw the fertile midlandsof Ireland from tillage into grass. A series of bad harvests aggravatedthe evil. The landlords and the farmers of Ireland were divided into twopolitical camps, and, instead of uniting for their common welfare, eachattempted to cast upon the other the burden of the economic catastrophe. To sum up in the words of Mr. Amery--

 "The evils of economic Separatism, aggravated by social evils surviving from the Separatism of an earlier age, united to revive a demand for the extension and renewal of the very cause of those evils. "

The political demand for the repeal of the Act of Union, which had laindormant for so many years, was revived by the energies of Isaac Butt. Hefound in the Irish landlords, smarting under the disestablishment of theIrish Church, a certain amount of sympathy and assistance, but the"engine" for which Finton Lalor had asked in order to draw the "repealtrain, " was not discovered until Parnell linked the growing agrarianunrest to the Home Rule Campaign. This is not the place to tell againthe weary story of the land war or to show how the Irish Nationalistsexploited the grievances of the Irish tenants in order to encouragecrime and foment disloyalty in the country. It is sufficient to say thatthis conflict--the conduct of which reflects little credit either uponthe Irish protagonists or the British Government which alternatelypampered and opposed it--was ended, for the time at least, by thepassing of Mr. Wyndham's Land Act. We look forward in perfect confidenceto the time when that great measure shall achieve its full result inwiping out the memory of many centuries of discord and hatred. But theSeparatist movement, which has always been the evil genius of Irishpolitics, has not yet been completely exorcised. The memory of thosepast years when the minority in Ireland constituted the only bulwark ofIrish freedom and of English liberty, has not yet passed away. The IrishNationalist party since Parnell have spared no exertions to impress moredeeply upon the imaginations of a sentimental race the memory of those"ancient weeping years. " They have preached a social and a civil warupon all those in Ireland who would not submit their opinions andconsciences to the uncontrolled domination of secret societies andleagues. 

The articles upon the Ulster question by Lord Londonderry and Mr. Sinclair show that the Northern province still maintains her historicopposition to Irish Separatism and Irish intrigue. She stands firmly bythe same economic principles which have enabled her, in spite ofpersecution and natural disadvantages, to build up so great aprosperity. She knows well that the only chance for the rest of Irelandto attain to the standard of education, enlightenment and independencewhich she has reached, is to free itself from the sinister dominationunder which it lies, and to assert its right to political and religiousliberty. Ulster sees in Irish Nationalism a dark conspiracy, buttressedupon crime and incitement to outrage, maintained by ignorance andpandering to superstition. Even at this moment the Nationalist leagueshave succeeded in superseding the law of the land by the law of theleague. We need only point to the remarks which the Lord Chief Justiceof Ireland and Mr. Justice Kenny have been compelled to make to theGrand Juries quite recently, to show what Nationalist rule means to thehelpless peasants in a great part of the country. 

But the differences which still sever the two great parties in Irelandare not only economic but religious. The general slackening oftheological dispute which followed the weary years of religious warfareafter the Reformation, has never brought peace to Ireland. In Englandthe very completeness of the defeat of Roman Catholicism has renderedthe people oblivious to the dangers of its aggression. The IrishUnionists are not monsters of inhuman frame; they are men of likepassions with Englishmen. Though they hold their religious views withvigour and determination, there is nothing that they would like morethan to be able to forget their points of difference from those who aretheir fellow Christians. It is perhaps necessary to point out once againthat the Roman Catholic Church is a political, as well as a religious, institution, and to remind Englishmen that it is by the first law of itsbeing an intolerant and aggressive organisation. All Protestants inIreland feel deep respect for much of the work which is carried on bythe Roman Catholic Church in Ireland. They gladly acknowledge theinfluence of its priesthood in maintaining and upholding the traditionalmorality and purity of the Irish race. They venerate the memories ofthose brave Irish priests who defied persecution in order to bringsuccour to their flocks in time of need. But they are bound to deal withthe present political situation as they find it. They are determinedthat no Church, however admirable, and no creed, however lofty, shouldbe forced upon them against their wills. There is a dark side to thepicture, on which it is unnecessary to dwell. We have only to ask theNonconformists of England what would be their feelings were a RomanCatholic majority returned to the British House of Commons. 

In most of the articles in this book which deal with the religiousquestion; special stress is laid upon recent Papal legislation. The _NeTemere_ and the _Motu Proprio_ decrees have constituted an invasion ofthe rights hitherto enjoyed by the minority in Ireland, and they areeven more significant as an illustration of the policy of the Romancuria. Those who have watched the steady increase of Roman aggression inevery Roman Catholic country, followed as it has been by passionateprotest and determined action by the civil Governments, must realise thedanger which Home Rule would bring to the faith and liberty of thepeople of Ireland. It is not inconsistent to urge, as many of us haveurged, that Home Rule would mean alike a danger to the Protestant faithand a menace to Catholic power. The immediate result of successful Papalinterference with civil liberties in every land has been a sweepingmovement among the people which has been, not Protestant, butanti-Christian in its nature. If we fear the tyranny which the RomanCatholic Church has established under British rule in Malta and inQuebec, may we not fear also the reaction from such tyranny which hasalready taken place in France and Portugal. 

But we are told that there are to be in the new Home Rule Billsafeguards which will protect the minority from any interference withtheir civil and religious liberties. It is not necessary for me to goover again in detail the ground which is so admirably covered by Mr. George Cave and Mr. James Campbell. They show clearly that the existenceof restrictions and limitations upon the activities of a DublinParliament, whether they are primarily intended to safeguard the Britishconnection or to protect the liberties of minorities, cannot be worththe paper on which they are printed. Let us take, for instance, anattempt to prevent the marriages of Irish Protestants from beinginvalidated by an Irish Parliament. We may point out that an amendmentto the 1893 Home Rule Bill, designed to safeguard such marriages, wasrejected by the vote of the Irish Nationalist party. But even werelegislation affecting the marriage laws of the minority to be placedoutside the control of a Dublin Parliament, the effect would not be toreassure the Protestant community. Mr. James Campbell mentions a casewhich has profoundly stirred the Puritan feelings of IrishProtestantism. A man charged with bigamy has been released withoutpunishment because the first marriage, although in conformity with thelaw of the land, was not recognised by the Roman Catholic Church. However justifiable that course may have been in the exceptionalcircumstances of that particular case, the precedent obviously preparesthe way for a practical reversal of the law by executive or judicialaction. We must remember that, since the _Ne Temere_ decree has comeinto force, the marriages of Protestants and Roman Catholics are held bythe Roman Catholic Church to be absolutely null and void unless they arecelebrated in a Roman Catholic Church. We have also to bear in mind thatthese marriages will not be permitted by the priesthood except underconditions which many Irish Protestants consider humiliating andimpossible. No more deadly attack upon the faith of the Protestantminority in the three provinces in Ireland can be imagined than to makea denial of their faith the essential condition to the enjoyment of thehighest happiness for which they may look upon this earth. 

The second decree prohibits, under pain of excommunication, any RomanCatholic from bringing an ecclesiastical officer before a Court ofJustice. Even under the Union Government this decree is a danger to theliberty of the subject. Under an independent Irish Government, nothingexcept that vast anti-clerical revolution which some people foreseecould possibly reassure the people as to the attitude of the ExecutiveGovernment in dealing with a large and privileged class. Theseconsiderations make one more reason for refusing the Colonial analogywhich is so ingeniously pressed by such apologists for Home Rule as Mr. Erskine Childers. Mr. Amery analyses the confusion of thought betweenHome Rule as meaning responsible Government and Home Rule as meaningseparate government which underlies the arguments of Liberal HomeRulers. Ireland has Home Rule in the sense of having free representativeinstitutions. She is prevented by geographical and economic conditionsfrom enjoying separate government under the same terms on which theColonies possess it. As Mr. Amery points out, the United Kingdom isgeographically a single island group. No part of Ireland is soinaccessible from the political centre of British power as the remoterparts of the Highlands, while racially no less than physically Irelandis an integral part of the United Kingdom. Economically also the twocountries are bound together in a way which makes a common physicalpolicy absolutely necessary for the welfare of both countries. Thefinancial arguments which might have made it possible to permit anindependent fiscal policy for Ireland under free trade, have disappearedwith the certain approach of a revision of the tariff policies ofEngland. There can be no separate tariffs for the two countries, or evena common tariff, without a common Government to negotiate and enforceit. If there were no other objection to the establishment of a separateGovernment in Dublin, it would be impossible because legislativeautonomy can only be coupled with financial independence. 

The financial difficulties in the way of any grant of Home Rule arefully explained by Mr. Austen Chamberlain. Three attempts at framingschemes for financing Home Rule were made by Mr. Gladstone in the past. All the powers of this great and resourceful dialectician were employedin defending these various schemes in turn. He was not deterred frompressing any scheme by the fact that in important details it wasinconsistent with or even opposed to what had been previouslyrecommended. But if there was one principle on which Mr. Gladstone neverturned his back it was in demanding a contribution from Ireland forImperial services. At one time he demanded a cash payment, at anotherthe assignment of the Customs, and on yet another occasion the paymentto the Imperial Exchequer of a quota--one-third--of the tax-revenue inIreland. 

The effect of recent social legislation, such as Old Age Pensions, Labour Exchanges, and Sickness and Unemployment Insurance has been toconfer on Ireland benefits much greater in value than the Irishcontribution in respect of the new taxation imposed. In consequence ofthis change the present Irish revenue falls short of the expenditureincurred for Irish purposes in Ireland. Mr. Chamberlain shows that ifany scheme even remotely resembling any of those put forward on previousoccasions by Mr. Gladstone is embodied in the new Bill, and if amoderate contribution for Imperial services is included, the Irishdeficit must range from £2, 500, 000 to £3, 500, 000. If by any process ofjuggling with the figures the Irish Parliament is again to be startedwith a surplus the deficit must have been made good by charging itagainst the Imperial taxpayer. But again there is no permanence in sucha surplus. It must disappear if the ameliorative measures which are longoverdue in Ireland are undertaken by an Irish Parliament; and previousexperience has already illustrated that even without the adoption of anysuch new schemes surpluses would long ago have made room for deficits. It will be the duty of the Nationalists party to say definitely what arethe fiscal reserves upon which they can draw in order to establishpermanent equilibrium between revenue and expenditure in Ireland. 

Not only does Unionist policy for Ireland involve considerations ofnational safety and national honour, but it is also necessary for theeconomic welfare of both countries. The remarkable success which hasattended Mr. Wyndham's Land Act of 1903 has alarmed the political partyin Ireland, which depends for its influence on the poverty anddiscontent of the rural population of Ireland. Mr. Wyndham in hisarticle upon Irish Land Purchase shows clearly the blessings which havefollowed wherever his Act has been given fair play, and the evils whichhave resulted in the suppression of Land Purchase by Mr. Birrell's Actof 1909. The dual ownership created by Mr. Gladstone's ill-advised andreckless legislation led to Ireland being starved both in capital andindustry and brought the whole of Irish agriculture to the brink ofruin, and under these circumstances, Conservative statesmen determined, in accordance with the principles of the Act of Union, to use a jointexchequer for the purpose of relieving Irish distress. Credit of theState was employed to convert the occupiers of Irish farms into theowners of the soil. The policy of the Ashbourne Acts was briefly thatany landlord could agree with any tenant on the purchase price of hisholding. The State then advanced the credit sum to the landlord in cash, while the tenant paid an instalment of 4 per cent. For forty-nine years. It is important to notice that the landlord received cash and that thetenants paid interest at the then existing rate of interest on Consols, namely, 3 per cent. The great defect in these Acts was that they appliedonly to separate holdings and not to estates as a whole; but theirsuccess can be estimated by the fact that under them twenty-seventhousand tenants became owners by virtue of advances which amounted toover ten million pounds. Under Mr. Balfour's Acts of 1891 and 1896, thelandlord was paid in stock instead of cash, and the tenants still paid 4per cent. , the interest being reduced to the then rate on Consols--2-3/4per cent. --and the Sinking Fund being proportionately increased. It willbe noticed that these Acts began the practise of paying the landlord instock, though at that time Irish Land Stock with a face value of £100became worth as much as £114. The exchequer was, moreover, permitted toretain grants due for various purposes in Ireland and to recoup itselfout of them in case of any combined refusal to repay on the part oftenants. 

The Irish Land Act of 1903 was the product of the experience gainedduring eighteen years of the operation of the preceding Purchase Acts. It was founded upon an agreement made in 1902 between representatives ofIrish landlords and tenants. Cash payments were resumed to thelandlords, the tenants' instalments were reduced to 3-1/4 per cent. , anda bonus, as it was called, of twelve millions of money was madeavailable to bridge the gap between the landlords and the tenants at therate of 12 per cent, on the amount advanced. That Act possessed theadditional advantage of dealing with the estates as a whole instead ofwith individual holdings, and it substituted the principle of speedypurchase for that of dilatory litigation. This remarkable and generousmeasure initiated a great and beneficent revolution, but every popularand useful feature of the Act of 1903 was distorted or destroyed in theLand Act which the present Government passed at the instigation of theIrish Nationalist Party in 1909. In Mr. Wyndham's words "a solemn treatyframed in the interest of Ireland was torn up to deck with its tattersthe triumph of Mr. Dillon's unholy alliance with the British Treasury. "Under the Act of 1909, landlords, instead of cash payments, are toreceive stock at 3 per cent. Issued on a falling market. This stockcannot possibly appreciate because owing to the embarrassment of Irishestates a large proportion of each issue is thrown back upon the marketat the redemption of mortgages. The tenant's annuity is raised from3-1/4 per cent, to 3-1/2 per cent. , a precedent not to be found in anyprevious experiment under Irish Land Purchase finance. The bonus isdestroyed and litigation is substituted for security and speed. Theresults of the two Acts are instructive. Under the 1903 Act thepotential purchasers amounted to nearly a quarter of a million; underthe 1909 Act the applications in respect of direct sales being less thannine thousand. It is hardly necessary to go into the reasons advancedfor this disastrous change. It has been brought about not in order torelieve the British Treasury, but in order to rescue from finaldestruction the waning influence of Irish Nationalism. Mr. Wyndham hasthe authority of the leader of the Unionist Party for his statement thatthe first constructive work of the Unionist Party in Ireland must be toresume the Land policy of 1903 and to pursue the same objects by thebest methods until they have all been fully and expeditiously achieved. Unionist policy cannot, however, be confined to the restoration of LandPurchase. The ruin which Free Trade finance has inflicted upon Irishagriculture can only be remedied, as Mr. Childers saw at the time of theFinancial Relations Commission in 1895, by a readjustment of the fiscalsystem of the United Kingdom. 

Mr. Gerald Balfour shows us in one of the most able papers in the bookthe extraordinary development which has been seen in recent years inIrish agricultural methods. The revival of Irish rural industries datesfrom Mr. Balfour's chief-secretaryship. The Parliament which set up inIreland the Congested Districts Board and sanctioned the building oflight railways at the public expense, also witnessed the formation inIreland of a Society which was destined to work great changes in thesocial conditions of the country. The Irish Agricultural OrganisationSociety represents the fruit of a work begun in the face of incredibledifficulties and remorseless opposition by Sir Horace Plunkett in 1889. "Better farming, better business, better living"--these were theprinciples which he and Mr. Anderson set out to establish in Ireland. Their representatives were described as monsters in human shape, andthey were adjured to cease their "hellish work. " Now the branches of theSociety number nearly 1000, with an annual turnover of upwards of 2-1/2millions, and they include creameries, village banks, and societies forthe purchase of seeds and manure and for the marketing of eggs. It isnot necessary to tell again the story of the Recess Committee and theformation of the Department of Agriculture. The result of its work, crowned as it was by Mr. Wyndham's Purchase Act, is shown by the factthat Irish trade has increased from 103 millions in 1904 to 130 millionsin 1910. The steady object which Sir Horace Plunkett has set before himis to counteract the demoralising effect of paternal legislation on thepart of the Government, by reviving and stimulating a policy ofself-help. The I. A. O. S. Has done valuable work in enabling the Irishfarmers, by co-operating, to secure a more stable position in theEnglish market, to secure themselves against illegitimate and fraudulentcompetition and to standardise the quality of their product, but evenmore important has been the work of the Society in releasing the farmersfrom the bondage of the "Gombeen" man who has for so many years been thecurse of Irish agriculture. The "Gombeen" man is alike trader, publican, and money-lender, and he is the backbone of official Nationalistinfluence. By lending money to the peasant proprietors at exorbitantrates, by selling inferior seeds and manures and by carrying on histransactions with the farmers chiefly in kind, the "Gombeen" man hasgrown fat upon the poverty and despair of the farmer. It is notsurprising that he views the liberating work of the I. A. O. S. With thebitterest hostility--an hostility which has been translated intoeffective action by the Nationalist Party in Parliament. 

Sir Horace Plunkett was driven from office on the pretext that it shouldbe held by a member of Parliament. His successor, Mr. T. W. Russell, losthis seat in the General Election of 1910, but he was retained in powersince he was willing to lend himself to the destructive intrigues of the"Molly Maguires. " The Unionist Party does not intend to interfere withthe independence of the I. A. O. S. Which constitutes in their eyes itsgreatest feature, but they are determined that it shall have fair play, and that the hundred thousand Irish farmers which constitutes itsmembership shall be enabled to increase their prosperity by co-operativeaction. The Unionist Party will also have to undertake more activemeasures in order to restore to Irish agriculture the position ofsupremacy for which it is naturally fitted. Mr. Amery and Mr. Samuelsboth discuss in outline the effects of Tariff Reform upon the future ofIreland. 

I do not intend at the present moment to go further into the details ofthe policy which the Unionist Government will be likely to adopt on thisquestion. I think, however, it would be desirable to point out that indairy produce and poultry, in barley and oats, in hops, tobacco, sugar-beet, vegetables and fruit, in all of which Ireland is especiallyinterested, Irish products would have free entry into the protectedmarkets of Great Britain, Canadian and Australian products would ofcourse have such a preference over foreign competitors as a Home RuleIreland might claim, but it is only under the Union that Ireland couldexpect complete freedom of access to our markets. Mr. Amery sees in thetrain ferry a possible bridge over the St. George's Channel and looksforward to the time when the west coast of Ireland will be the startingpoint of all our fast mail and passenger steamers across the Atlantic. Two schemes with this object have received the attention of Parliament. How far the present practical difficulties can be surmounted it is notvery easy to say, but it is certain that if Home Rule were granted theBlacksod Bay and the Galway Bay Atlantic routes would have to beabandoned. 

These conditions naturally raise the whole transport problem in Ireland. Mr. Arthur Samuels suggests a scheme of State assistance to a cheaptransport which may require attention later on, though it can only formpart of a larger scheme of traffic reorganisation. The Nationalist Partyseems definitely to have pledged itself to a scheme of nationalisation. This policy has been urged in season and out of season upon an apatheticIreland by the _Freeman's Journal. _ The cost of the nationalisation ofIrish railways could not be less than fifty millions, while the annualcharge on the Exchequer was assessed by the Irish Railways Commission at£250, 000, and it was anticipated that a further recourse to Irish ratesmight be required. It would be obviously impossible to ask the BritishTreasury to advance such an enormous sum of money to an independentIrish Government. 

At what rate could an Irish government raise the money? The presentreturn on Irish Railway capital is 3. 77 per cent. , and thus, to borrowfifty millions at 4 per cent, will involve an annual loss of over£300, 000 a year, even without a sinking fund. It is extremely doubtfulwhether the credit of an Irish Government would be better than that ofHungary or Argentina. If anything more surely led an Irish Governmentto financial disaster it would be the working of railways. As theMajority Report of the Railway Commission recommended on other thancommercial lines, the 25 per cent. Reduction in rates and faressuggested by Nationalist witnesses would involve a loss of more thanhalf a million a year. We see, therefore, immediately, that if anythingis to be done at all to improve Irish transport it must be done by aGovernment that has the confidence of the money market. The railwaydirector who contributes the principal article on this subject in thebook calculates that a public grant of two millions, and a guaranteedloan of eight millions would suffice to carry out all the reforms thatare necessary in order to place Irish railways in a thoroughly soundposition. 

It is obvious that with the development of trade which will follow onthe adoption of Tariff Reform by England, Irish companies will be in abetter position to help themselves, and the increase in the wealth andprosperity of Ireland must soon enable the railways to carry outconstructive works which they all admit to be necessary. 

Mr. Locker Lampson's article on education undoubtedly shows the IrishGovernment in its less favourable light. The neglect and starvation ofIrish education has been a reproach to the intelligence and humanity ofsuccessive Irish administrations. Mr. Locker Lampson shows, however, that financially and politically it would be impossible for any Irishadministration to carry out the great and sweeping reforms in Irisheducation as are still necessary. The mischievous principle of payingfees by results, although it has disappeared from the National schools, still clings to intermediate education in Ireland. Before any other kindof reform is even considered the intermediate system in Ireland shouldbe placed upon a proper foundation. The secondary system is alsodeficient because--what Mr. Dillon called "gaps in the law"--there is noco-ordination between the primary and the secondary schools. Theestablishment of higher grade schools in large centres and theinstitution of advanced departments in connection with selected primaryschools in rural districts would only cost about £25, 000 a year, andwould go far to meet the disastrous effects of the present system. Butno system of education can possibly be successful that does not placethe teachers in a position of dignity and comfort. At the present momentthe salaries of the secondary teachers are miserable; lay assistants insecondary schools are paid about £80 a year. They have no security oftenure; they have no register of teachers as a guarantee of efficiency. 

The other problems which immediately confront the Irish government arethe establishment of a private bill legislation and a reform of theIrish Poor Law. With regard to the private bill legislation I will sayno more than that it has always formed part of the Unionist policy forIreland, and that I agree fully with the arguments by which Mr. WalterLong shows the necessity and justice for such a reform. 

Finally, having given to the Irish farmers the security of a freehold intheir holdings at home, and a free entrance into the protected marketsof Great Britain; having assisted the development of rural industries ofthe country; having placed Irish education on a sound and intelligiblebasis, it would be necessary for the Unionist Party to undertake areform of the Poor Law in Ireland. Whether this reform will beundertaken the same time as the larger social problems of England, withwhich the party is pledged to deal, may be a matter of politicalexpediency, but there is no reason why the reform which is so urgentlyrequired in Ireland should have to await the adoption of a scheme forEngland. In outlining the problems, the supreme necessity is theabolition of the present workhouse system. The Vice-Regal Commission andthe Royal Commission on the Poor Laws are in agreement as to the guidingprinciples of reform. They recommend classification by institutions ofall the present inmates of the workhouses; the sick in the hospital, theaged and infirm in alms-houses; the mentally defective in asylums. Theysuggest the bringing together into one institution of all the inmates ofone class from a number of neighbouring workhouses. The sick should besent to existing Poor Law or County hospitals, strengthened by theaddition of cottage hospitals in certain districts, while children mustbe boarded out. The able-bodied paupers, if well conducted, might beplaced in labour colonies; if ill conducted, in detention colonies. Ifthese are established, they must be controlled by the State and not byCounty authorities. Of course, the resources of the existing Unions aremuch too limited to undertake such sweeping reforms, and the county mustbe substituted for the Union as the area of charge. The establishment ofthe Public Assistance authority will relieve us from the greatestscandal which now mars the administration of the Poor Law reform inIreland--the corrupt appointment of officers in the Poor Law medicalservice. If we cannot have a State medical service, we can at all eventsensure that appointments under the Poor Law shall be placed inincorruptible hands. 

It is not to be assumed that this short sketch of policy is exhaustive, or that it touches even in outline upon all that the Unionist Partymight fairly hope to do in Ireland. It is designed to show only thatfinancially and politically, every step which can be taken to relievethe poverty and oppression which has too long continued in Ireland mustbe taken by a Unionist Parliament and a Government pledged to secure theadministration of law and order in Ireland. 

I desire on behalf of the Committee under whose auspices this work hasbeen prepared to thank Mr. S. Rosenbaum for the ability and zeal he hasshown in editing the book and in preparing it for publication. I wishalso to acknowledge my personal debt to Mr. G. Locker Lampson, M. P. , who, as Vice-Chairman of the Committee, has shown so much zeal andassiduity in connection with this important work. 

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 1: "Commercial Relations Between England and Ireland. " By MissA. E. Murray (P. S. King & Sons). ]

[Footnote 2: Attorney General in the Irish Parliament, and later Earl ofClare. ]

HISTORICAL

I

A NOTE ON HOME RULE

BY THE RIGHT HON. A. J. BALFOUR, M. P. 

The greater part of the present volume is devoted to showing why thiscountry should not adopt Home Rule; but it is perhaps worth while forthe ordinary British citizen to ask himself a preliminary question, namely, why he should be pressed even to consider it. That theestablishment of an Irish Parliament must involve doubtful andfar-reaching consequences is denied by no one. What then is the _primāfacie_ case which has induced many Englishmen and Scotchmen to thinkthat it ought to be seriously debated? If we could erase the past andapproach the problem of framing representative institutions in theirmost practicable shape for the inhabitants of the United Kingdom, whowould think it wise to crowd into these small Islands two, or, as somewould have it, three, four, or five separate Parliaments, with theirseparate elections, their separate sets of ministers and Offices, theirseparate party systems, their divergent policies? Distances are, undermodern conditions, so small, our population is so compact, the interestsof its component parts are so intimately fused together, that any deviceat all resembling Home Rule would seem at the best cumbersome, costly, and ineffective; at the worst, perilous to the rights of minorities, thepeace of the country, and the unity of the Kingdom. If, then, thesecommon-sense considerations are thrust on one side by so manywell-meaning persons, it must surely be because they think that for thedestruction of our existing system there is to be found a compellingjustification in the history of the past:

I am well aware that many of the persons of whom I am thinking professto base their approval of Home Rule on purely administrative grounds. The Parliament of the United Kingdom, they say, is overweighted; it hasmore to do than it can manage; we must diminish its excessive burdens;and we can only do so by throwing them in part upon other andsubordinate assemblies. But this, if it be a reason at all, is certainlya most insufficient one. Would any human being, anxious merely to giverelief to the House of Commons, adopt so illogical a scheme as one whichinvolves a provincial Parliament in Ireland, and no provincialParliaments anywhere else; which puts Ireland under two Parliaments, andleft the rest of the country under one; which, if Irishmen are to beadmitted to the Imperial Parliament, would give Ireland privileges andpowers denied to England and Scotland, and, if they are to be excludedfrom the Imperial Parliament, would deprive Ireland of rights whichsurely she ought to possess?

Again, if the "administrative" argument was really more than an ornamentof debate, would any one select Ireland as the administrative districtin which to make trial of the new system? Would any one, in his desireto relieve the Imperial Parliament of some of its functions, select asan area of self-government a region where one part is divided againstanother by passions, and, if you will, by prejudices, more violent, andmore deeply-rooted than those which afflict any other fraction of theUnited Kingdom, choose that other fraction where, and how, you will?

I take it, then, as certain that in the mind of the ordinary BritishHome Ruler the justification for Home Rule is not administrative buthistorical. He pictures Ireland before the English invasion as anorganised and independent State, happy in the possession of a nativepolity which Englishmen have ruthlessly destroyed, now suffering underlaws and institutions forced upon her by the conquerors, suitable it maybe to men of Anglo-Saxon descent, but utterly alien to the genius andtemper of a Celtic population. To him, therefore, Home Rule presentsitself as an act of National restitution. 

Personally, I believe this to be a complete misreading of history. It isnot denied--at least I do not deny--that both the English and BritishGovernments, in their dealings with Ireland have done many things thatwere stupid, and some things that were abominable. But among theirfollies or their crimes is not to be counted the destruction of any suchState as I have described; for no such State existed. They did notuproot one type of civilisation in order to plant another. The Irelandwith which England had to deal had not acquired a national organisation, and when controversialists talk of "restoring" this or that institutionto Ireland, the only institutions that can possibly be "restored" are intheir origin importations from England. 

This does not, of course, mean that the English were a superior racedealing with an inferior one. Indeed, there is, in my view, no sharpdivision of race at all. In the veins of the inhabitants of theseIslands runs more than one strain of blood. The English are not simplyTeutonic--still less are the Irish Celtic. We must conceive thepre-historic inhabitants both of Britain and of Ireland as subject torepeated waves of invasion from the wandering peoples of the Continent. The Celt preceded the Teuton; and in certain regions his language stillsurvives. The Teuton followed him in (as I suppose) far greater numbers, and his language has become that of a large fraction of the civilisedworld. But in no part of the United Kingdom is the Teutonic strain freefrom either the Celtic or pre-Celtic strain; nor do I believe that theCeltic strain has anywhere a predominance such as that which, speakingvery roughly, the Teutonic strain possesses in the East of theseIslands, or the pre-Celtic strain in the West. 

There is, therefore, no race frontier to be considered, still less isthere any question of inferiority or superiority. The Irish difficulty, historically considered, arises in the main from two circumstances. Thefirst of these, to which I have just referred, is that when Englandbegan to intervene in the welter of Irish inter-tribal warfare, she wasalready an organised State, slowly working its way through feudalmonarchy to constitutional freedom. The second is that while thereligious revolution of the sixteenth century profoundly and permanentlyaffected the larger Island, it left the smaller Island untouched. Theresult of the first of these has been that Irish institutions, Irishlaws, Irish forms of local government, and Irish forms of parliamentarygovernment are necessarily of the English type. The result of the secondhas been that while no sharp divisions of race exist, divisions ofreligion have too often taken their place; that in the constitutionalstruggles of the seventeenth century Ireland was not the partner but thevictim of English factions; and that civil war in its most brutal form, with the confiscations and penal laws which followed in its train, havefed, have indeed created, the bitter fiction that Ireland was once a"nation" whose national life has been destroyed by its more powerfulneighbour. 

To all this it will perhaps be replied that even if the general accuracyof the foregoing statement be admitted (and nothing about Ireland ever_is_ admitted), it is quite irrelevant to the question of Home Rule;because what is of importance to practical statesmanship is not what didactually happen in the past, but what those who live in the presentsuppose to have happened. If, therefore, to the imagination ofcontemporary Irishmen, Ireland appears a second Poland, statesmen mustact as if the dream were fact. 

In such a contention there is some element of truth. But it must beobserved in the first place that dreams, however vivid, are not eternal;and, in the second place, that while this particular dream endures itsupplies a practical argument against Home Rule, the full force of whichis commonly under-rated. For what are the main constitutional dangers ofcreating rival Parliaments in the same State? They are--friction, collision of jurisdiction, and, in the end, national disintegration. Ofthese, friction is scarcely to be avoided. I doubt whether it has beenwholly avoided in any State where the system, either of co-equal or ofsubordinate Parliaments, has been thoroughly tried. It certainly was notavoided in the days past when Ireland had a Parliament of its own. It isincredible that it should be avoided in the future, however elaborate bethe safeguards which the draughtsman's ingenuity can devise. Butfriction, in any case inevitable, becomes a peril to every communitywhere the rival assemblies can appeal to nationalist sentiment. The soregets poisoned. What under happier conditions might be no more than apassing storm of rhetoric, forgotten as soon as ended, will gatherstrength with time. The appetite for self-assertion, inherent in everyassembly, and not likely to be absent from one composed of orators sobrilliantly gifted as the Irish, will take the menacing form of aninternational quarrel. The appeal will no longer be to precedents andstatutes, but to patriotism and nationality, and the quarrel of twoParliaments will become the quarrel of two peoples. What will it avail, when that time comes, that in 1912 the Irish leaders declared themselvescontent with a subordinate legislature? It is their earlier speeches ofa very different tenour that will be remembered; and it will be asked, with a logic that may well seem irresistible, by what right Irish"nationality" was ever abandoned by Irish representatives. 

On these dangers I do not in this brief note propose to dwell, though itseems to me insane either to ignore them or to belittle them. The pointon which I desire to insist is that they arise not from theestablishment of a subordinate Parliament alone, nor from the existenceof a "nationalist" sentiment alone, but from the action and reaction ofthe sentiment upon the institution, and of the institution upon thesentiment. 

Let me conclude by asking whether Irish history does not support to thefull these gloomy prognostications. The Parliament that came to an endat the Union was a Parliament utterly antagonistic to anything that nowgoes by the name of Irish Nationalism. In every sphere, except theeconomic sphere, it represented the forces, political and religious, which the Irish Nationalist now regards as English and alien, andagainst which, for many years, he has been waging bitter warfare. Yetthis Parliament, representing only a small minority of the inhabitantsof Ireland, found its position of subordination intolerable. It chose amoment of national disaster to assert complete equality, and so used itspowers that at last the Union became inevitable. It is surely no remedyfor the ancient wrongs of Ireland--real, alas! though they were--that weshould compel her again to tread the weary round of constitutionalexperiment, and that, in the name of Irish Nationalism, we should againmake her the victim of an outworn English scheme, which has been tried, which has failed, which has been discarded, and which, in my judgment, ought never to be revived. 

II

HISTORICAL RETROSPECT

BY J. R. FISHER

(Author of "The End of the Irish Parliament"; Editor of the _NorthernWhig_)

When Pitt commended his proposals for the Union to "the dispassionateand sober judgment of the Parliament of Ireland, " he argued that such ameasure was at once "transcendently important" to the Empire, and"eminently useful" to the true interests of Ireland. Lord Clare, as anIrishman, naturally reversed the order, but his compelling points werethe same:--To Ireland the Union was a "vital interest, " which at thesame time "intimately affected the strength and prosperity of theBritish Empire. " From that day to this the two fundamental arguments forthe Union of Great Britain and Ireland have remained unchanged, and theyapply with ever-growing force to the existing situation at home andabroad. But the argument from history has, perhaps, been a littleneglected of late, and calls for at least a passing notice. 

Popular oratory will have it that England has always been keen andaggressive in regard to the incorporation of Ireland within the Empire, but as a matter of fact, the very opposite has been the case. From thetime of Pope Adrian's Bull, _Laudabiliter_, in 1154, which granted toHenry II. The Lordship of Ireland, but which Henry left unemployed forseventeen years, to that of the Irish petition for a legislative Unionin 1703, which remained unanswered for nearly a century, vacillation andhesitation rather than eagerness for aggression have been thecharacteristic marks of English policy in Ireland. Far-sighted statesmencould point out the benefits to Ireland from such a connection, but asa rule it was the presence of actual foreign danger that forced theBritish Parliament to act. For four centuries the Lordship of theEnglish Kings over Ireland was largely nominal. It was only when thereligious quarrels of the sixteenth century became acute that theTudors--already alarmed at the action of the Irish Parliament inrecognising and crowning a pretender in Dublin Castle--found themselvescompelled to assert direct Kingship. 

From that time till the legislative Union every enemy of England couldsafely count on finding a foothold and active friends in Ireland. It ismuch too late in the day to indulge in any recriminations on this score. The issues were the most tremendous that have divided Europe; each sidewas passionately convinced of the rightness and justice of its cause. There were, in Pitt's words relating to a later day, "dreadful andinexcusable cruelties" on the one side, and "lamentable severities" uponthe other, just as there were all over Europe. But in the case ofIreland every evil was exaggerated and every danger intensified by thesystem of dualism which encouraged resistance from within and invitedinterference from without. For England and English liberty it was morethan once a question of existence or extinction, and the knowledge ofthe constant danger from the immediate west did not tend to sweeten thesituation. 

In Elizabeth's time the menace was from Spain; Spanish forces twicesucceeded in effecting a landing on the Irish coast, and were welcomedby the inhabitants. Spain was then the most powerful enemy of Englandand of civil and religious liberty all the world over; Elizabeth wasdeclared by the Pope to have forfeited the crown of England, and if theArmada had been successful at sea, the Spanish army in England wouldhave found enthusiastic supporters in Ireland. Later on it was inIreland, and by the aid of subsidies from an Irish Parliament, thatStrafford raised 10, 000 men to invade Scotland and England in support ofCharles I. Against his Parliament, and, incidentally, to drive theScottish settlers out of Ulster. As the Articles of Impeachment put it, his object in raising the Irish army was "for the ruin and destructionof England and of his Majesty's subjects, and altering and subvertingthe fundamental laws and established Government of this Kingdom. "Strafford fell, but the insurrection and massacre of 1641 were thenatural result of his intrigues with the Irish Parliament and the Irishchiefs. It was under the impression of this manifest danger thatCromwell--a century and a half before his time--abolished the DublinParliament and summoned Irish representatives to the first UnitedParliament at Westminster. 

As the power of Spain declined, France came to be the chief menace toEngland and to the peace of Europe. Again Ireland instinctively alliedherself with the enemy. Tyrconnel now played the part of Strafford, andwith the aid of French troops and French subsidies, and a sympatheticIrish Parliament, endeavoured to destroy the Ulster Plantation, and makeIreland a jumping-off place for the invasion of England. The IrishParliament, in the meantime, did its part by confiscating the estates ofthe settlers, driving out the Protestant clergy, and outlawing Englishsympathisers by name in "the hugest Bill of Attainder which the worldhas seen. "[3] It was the successful defence of Derry and Enniskillen bythe Scotch and English colonists that saved Ireland and gave KingWilliam and his troops the foothold that enabled them to save England, too, in the Irish campaign of the following year. 

Not the least remarkable instance of the use to which separateParliaments within the Kingdom could be put for the ruin of Englandoccurred during the activity of James the Second's son, the so-called"Old Pretender. " In 1723 his chief adviser, the Earl of Mar, presentedto the Regent of France a memorial setting out in detail a project forbetraying Britain into the power of France by dismembering the BritishParliament. [4] The Irish Parliament, in close alliance with a restoredScottish Parliament, was to be used to curb the power of England. "Thepeople of Ireland and Scotland, " according to Mar, "are of the sameblood and possess similar interests, " and they should thus always beallied against England and oppose their "united strength"--backed, ofcourse, by that of France--to any undue growth of the English power. Thescheme came to nothing, but if the Pretender had possessed a little moreenergy and capacity; if the French Court had been in earnest, and ifIreland and Scotland had each possessed a separate Parliament, "with anexecutive responsible to it, " and with the control of a nationalmilitia, the story of 1745 might have ended differently. 

It is necessary that these facts should be kept in mind when complaintis made of the oppressive and demoralising Irish Penal Code. That Codeno one defends now, although it was lauded at the time by Swift as abulwark of the Church against the Catholics on the one hand, and thePresbyterians on the other. It was the product of a cruel and bigotedage, and at its worst it was less severe than similar laws prevailingagainst Protestants in those parts of the Continent where the RomanChurch held sway. [5] Spain and France were at that time vastly morepowerful, populous, and wealthy countries than England: England wasnever free from the dread of foreign invasion, and to the would-beinvader Ireland always held a guiding light and an open door. 

Finally, it must also be remembered that at a time when the chancesseemed fairly even, as between William and England on the one hand, andJames and France on the other, the Prince of Orange, accustomed to theGerman way of settling such differences, had made formal offer toTyrconnel of a working compromise--the free exercise of their religionto the Irish Catholics: half the Churches of the Kingdom: half theemployments, civil and military, if they pleased, and even the moiety oftheir ancient properties. "These proposals, " says the Chevalier Wogan, Tyrconnel's nephew and confidant, who is our informant, "though theywere to have had an English Act of Parliament for their sanction, wererefused with universal contempt. " In other words, the party which withthe assistance of France still hoped to obtain all, refused to becontent with half. It is true that Wogan, in the letter from which wehave quoted, [6] after stating that the exiles, "in the midst of theirhard usage abroad, could not be brought to repent of their obstinacy, "justifies their refusal by the way in which the Articles of Limerickwere afterwards disregarded by the Irish Parliament. But this isevidently an argument of retrospective invention, and it may fairly beargued that the position would have been very different if peace onequal terms had been made on the direct authority of the King beforeAughrim rather than by his deputies after Limerick. 

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. 

And if the separatist theory has involved, as we have seen, suchexternal dangers to the Empire, the case for the old Irish Parliamentfrom the point of the "vital interests" of Ireland itself is evenweaker. By it the bulk of the Irish people were treated for a century ina fashion described by an Irish Chief Secretary as "ingrafting absurdityon the wisdom of England and tyranny on the religion that professeshumanity. " It was conspicuous for its corruption even in a corrupt age, and, as was inevitable, it involved Ireland in constant conflicts withEngland, conflicts that were vexatious and injurious to both countries. Swift, who, amongst those who have not read his works, passes for anIrish patriot, is at his savagest when inveighing against this shamParliament. [7]

Its members are, he says--

 "... Three hundred brutes All involved in wild disputes, Roaring till their lungs are spent Privilege of Parliament'!"

And if only the Devil were some day to come "with poker fiery red, "and--

 "When the den of thieves is full, Quite destroy the harpies' nest, How might then our Isle be blest!"

Capable observers, from Swift to Arthur Young, bear continuous testimonyto the systematic and habitual corruption of the Irish Parliament. Offices were multiplied and were distributed among clamorous applicantson the ground of family or personal influence, or politicalsupport--never by any chance on the ground of merit or capacity. Publicmoney was squandered for private purposes. Sir George Macartney, himselfan Irishman and a Member of Parliament, in his "Account of Ireland, "speaking of the year 1745, says--[8]

 "The House of Commons now began to appropriate a considerable part of the additional duties to their own use. This was done under pretence of encouraging public works such as inland navigation, collieries, and manufactories of different kinds; but the truth is that most of these public works were private jobs carried on under the direction and for the advantage of some considerable gentlemen in the House of Commons. "

Arthur Young, whose careful and impartial study of the state of affairsin Ireland under the Dublin Parliament has become a classic, speaks ofthe same class of transaction, [9]

 "The members of the House of Commons at the conclusion of the sessions met for the purpose of voting the uses to which this money should be applied: the greater part of it was amongst themselves, their friends or dependants, and though some work of apparent use to the public was always the plea, yet under the sanction there were a great number of very scandalous jobs. "

Young admits that some useful public work was done, but that most of themoney was misappropriated was matter of common report. After areference to the construction of a certain canal he adds--

 "Some gentlemen I have talked with on this subject have replied, 'It is a job: 'twas meant as a job: you are not to consider it as a canal of trade, but as a canal for public money!' ... Sorry I am to say that a history of public works in Ireland would be a history of jobs. "

Money was voted, he says elsewhere, for--

 "Collieries where there is no coal, for bridges where there are no rivers, navigable cuts where there is no water, harbours where there are no ships, and churches where there are no congregations. "

And when the Union was finally on its way, Hamilton Rowan, one of thefounders of the United Irishmen, then in exile in America, wrote home tohis father: "I congratulate you on the report which spreads here that aUnion is intended. In that measure I see the downfall of one of the mostcorrupt assemblies, I believe, that ever existed. "[10]

It is little wonder that men of good will in Ireland prayed to bedelivered from such a Parliament. Molyneux, the first of the IrishParliamentary patriots, whose book, "The Case of Ireland's beingGoverned by Laws made in England Stated, " was burnt by the commonhangman, pleaded indeed for a reformed and independent Parliament, butonly because fair representation in the English Parliament was at thetime "a happiness they could hardly hope for. " And a few years later theIrish House, in congratulating Queen Anne on the Union of England andScotland, added, "May God put it into your royal heart to add greaterstrength and lustre to your Crown by a yet more comprehensive Union. "

The English Parliament, through sheer lethargy and carelessness, missedat this time an opportunity which would have peacefully launched Irelandon her career on an equality with Scotland and England, and must haveprofoundly modified the relations of the two countries. Immediateprosperity, in the case of a land wasted by a century of strife andbloodshed, was not indeed to be hoped for any more than in the case ofScotland, which had still two armed rebellions, and much bickering andjealousy in store before settling down to peaceful development. But ifIreland had been granted her petitions for Union in 1703 and 1707, andhad thus secured equal laws and equal trading privileges, she would atany rate have emerged from her period of trial and discord not laterthan Scotland, and would have anticipated the economic and socialadvantages predicted by Adam Smith, [11] when he says--

 "By a union with Great Britain, Ireland would gain, besides the freedom of trade, other advantages much more important, and which would much more than compensate any increase of taxes that might accompany that union. By the union with England, the middling and inferior ranks of people in Scotland gained a complete deliverance from the power of an aristocracy which had always before oppressed them. By a union with Great Britain, the greater part of the people of all ranks in Ireland would gain an equally complete deliverance from a much more oppressive aristocracy, an aristocracy not founded, like that of Scotland, in the natural and respectable distinctions of birth and fortune, but in the most odious of all distinctions, those of religious and political prejudices.... Without a union with Great Britain, the inhabitants of Ireland are not likely, for many ages, to consider themselves as one people. "

Pitt, who was proud to proclaim himself the pupil of Adam Smith inpolitics and in economics, found himself, a quarter of a century afterthese words were written, in a position to carry out, in face of greatdifficulties and dangers at home and abroad, the beneficent reformadvocated by his great master--a reform which, as we have seen, couldhave been carried a century earlier without any difficulty whatever. Butthe century that had been wasted involved many concurrent miseries andmisfortunes: social and economic stagnation, an intensification ofreligious and racial bitterness, conspiracy, and invasion; savageoutbreaks savagely repressed. When the time comes to measure up therights and wrongs of those dark days, the judgment on England willassuredly be that her fault was not the carrying of the Union, but thedelaying of that great measure of reform and emancipation until it wasalmost too late. 

The story of the Union has been told and retold in the utmost detailthroughout the century. The present writer has attempted quite recentlyto summarise it, [12] and there is little to add. The charge that it wascarried by corruption is simply another way of saying that it had, constitutionally, to be passed through the Dublin Parliament, that bodywhich, from the days of Swift's invective to those of its finalcondemnation, lived and moved and had its being solely in and bycorruption. As Lord Castlereagh, who had charge of the Bill in the IrishHouse of Commons, put it, the Government was forced to recognise thesituation and its task was "to buy out and secure to the Crown foreverthe fee simple of Irish corruption, which has so long enfeebled thepower of Government and endangered the connection. "

THE UNION. 

The Irish Parliament had run its course, and had involved the unhappycountry in chaos, bankruptcy, revolution, and bloodshed. Lord Clare--alate and reluctant convert to the policy of the Union--said in the IrishHouse of Lords (Feb. 10, 1800)--

 "We have not three years of redemption from bankruptcy, intolerable taxation, nor one hour's security against the renewal exterminating civil war. Session after session have you been compelled to enact laws of unexampled rigour and novelty to repress the horrible excesses of the mass of your people: and the fury of murder and pillage and desolation have so outrun all legislative exertions that you have been at length driven to the hard necessity of breaking down the pale of municipal law, and putting your courage under the ban of military government--and in every little circle of dignity and independence we hear whispers of discontent at the temperate discretion with which it is administered.... Look to your civil and religious dissensions. Look to the fury of political faction and the torrents of human blood that stain the face of your country, and of what materials is that man composed who will not listen with patience and good will to any proposition that can be made to him for composing the distractions and healing the wounds and alleviating the miseries of this devoted nation?"

Lord Clare's words--unanswered and unanswerable then and now--constitutea sufficient comment on the foolish fable of later invention, thatIreland was a land of peace and harmony, of orderly government andabounding prosperity, when a wicked English minister came and "stoleaway the Parliament House"--since which all has been decay anddesolation. The halcyon period is generally made to coincide with thatof "Grattan's Parliament"--of the semi-independent and quite unworkableConstitution of 1782, which had been extorted from England's weaknesswhen Ireland was denuded of regular troops, and at the mercy of aVolunteer National Guard, when Cornwallis had just surrendered atYorktown, and Spain and France were once more leagued with half Europefor the destruction of the British Empire. 

It is quite true that the latter part of the eighteenth century was, onthe whole, a time of considerable prosperity to certain classes inIreland--a prosperity varied by periods of acute depression anddistress. But that prosperity, such as it was, neither began withGrattan's Parliament nor ended with it--had, indeed, no more connectionwith the Irish Parliament in any of its phases than had the GoodwinSands with Tenterden steeple. With the exception of the respite betweenthe Treaty of Versailles and the outbreak of the French Revolution, England was almost constantly at war, or feverishly preparing for war. Simultaneously came the unprecedented increase of urban industry, following on the invention of the steam-engine and spinning machinery. The result was an enormous and growing demand for corn, beef, and pork, sailcloth, stores of all kinds for our armies and fleets, a demand whichEngland, owing to the growth of her town population and the consequentgrowth of the home demand, was unable adequately to meet. 

Ireland reaped the benefit. As a largely agricultural country, she wasas yet little influenced by the discoveries of Watt, of Hargreaves, ofArkwright, or of Crompton. But her long-rested soil could produce inapparently unlimited quantities those very products of which the Britishforces stood most in need. The fleets were victualled and fitted out atCork, and they carried thence a constant stream of supplies of all sortsfor our armies in the field. Indeed, so keen was the demand that it wassoon discovered that not only our own troops, but those of the enemy, were receiving Irish supplies, and smugglers on the south and westcoasts reaped a rich harvest. 

The result was obvious. Cattle graziers and middlemen made enormousprofits, rents were doubled and trebled. Dublin, Cork, Waterford, Limerick and Belfast flourished exceedingly on war prices and warprofits. But there is no evidence that the mass of the people in theirdegraded and debased condition shared to any extent in this prosperity. It was at this very period that Arthur O'Connor spoke of them as "theworst clad, the worst fed, the worst housed people in Europe. "Whiteboyism, outrage and lawlessness spread over the face of thecountry, and, as Lord Clare reminded Parliament, "session after sessionhave you been compelled to enact laws of unexampled rigour and noveltyto repress the horrible excesses of the mass of your people. " It hasbeen made a charge against the Union that during some disturbed periodsof the nineteenth century the United Parliament had to pass "Coercion"Acts at the rate of nearly one every session. The complainants shouldlook nearer home and they would find from the records of the IrishLegislature that during the "halcyon" days of "Grattan'sParliament"--the eighteen years between 1782 and the Union--no less thanfifty-four Coercion Acts were passed, some of them of a thoroughness andferocity quite unknown in later legislation. The close of the nineteenthcentury and the opening of the twentieth were, in reality, in spite of acertain amount of agrarian crime, organised and subsidised from abroad, a period of much greater peace and more widespread prosperity than thebloodstained years that marked the close of the eighteenth century--andof the Irish Parliament. 

Another fiction regarding the Union may perhaps be worth notice. It hassometimes been suggested that it was carried by a venal oligarchy inopposition to the will of the great mass of the population, of the RomanCatholic population in particular. This is precisely the reverse of thetruth. The oligarchy controlled the Parliament, and it thereforefollowed that the uniformly corrupt traditions of the Irish Parliamenthad to be observed in carrying the Union as in carrying every otherGovernment Bill throughout the century. But, so far from the Act ofUnion being carried by landowners and Protestants against the will ofthe Catholics, it was, as a matter of fact, carried with the ardent andunanimous assent and support of the Catholic hierarchy, and against theembittered opposition of the old ascendancy leaders, who feared the lossof their influence of power. 

The evidence on this point is documentary and precise. Indeed, no onethought of doubting or challenging it at the time; Grattan contentedhimself with denouncing the Catholic Bishops as "a band of prostitutedmen. " Dr. Troy, Archbishop of Dublin, was, as his correspondence shows, a warm, consistent and active supporter of the Union. Dr. Dillon, Archbishop of Tuam, wrote in September, 1799, that he had had anopportunity during his recent visitation "of acquiring the strongestconviction that this measure alone can restore harmony and happiness toour unhappy country. " His neighbour, Dr. Bodkin, Bishop Galway, wrotethat the Union was the only measure to save "poor infatuated Ireland"from "ruin and destruction. " Dr. Moylan, Bishop of Cork, was equallyemphatic. "I am perfectly satisfied, " he says, "that it is impossible toextinguish the feuds and animosities which disgrace this Kingdom, norgive it the advantages of its natural local situation, without a Unionwith Great Britain. God grant that it may soon take place!"

As for the feeling of the rank and file of the electors--under a verywidely extended franchise--two examples will suffice. In two cases--inthe County of Kerry and the borough of Newry--both openconstituencies--by-elections occurred during the passing of the Unionlegislation. In both instances the Roman Catholic vote predominated, andin both the feeling was so strong in favour of the Union that noopponent dared to face the poll. In after years Mr. Maurice Fitzgerald, the Knight of Kerry, recounted his experiences. "Having acceptedoffice, " he says, "as a supporter of the Union, I went to two electionspending the measure and was returned without opposition in a countywhere the Roman Catholic interest greatly preponderated, and adeclaration almost unanimous in favour of the Union proceeded from theCounty of Kerry. One of my most strenuous supporters in bringing forwardthat declaration was Mr. Maurice O'Connell, uncle of Mr. DanielO'Connell, and my most active partisan was Mr. John O'Connell, brotherof Mr. Daniel O'Connell. "

In Newry an attempt was made to put up an anti-Unionist candidate, butthe Roman Catholic Bishop, Dr. Lennan, met and repulsed the intruder inmilitant fashion. "Mr. Bell, " he reports to Archbishop Troy, "declinedthe poll, and surrendered yesterday. The Catholics stuck together likethe Macedonian phalanx, and with ease were able to turn the scale infavour of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. "

To the Irish Catholic at the time of the Union, the Dublin legislaturewas, indeed, in the words of Mr. Denys Scully, a leading Catholiclayman, "not our Parliament, for we had no share in it, but theirClub-house. "

The summing up of the whole matter is perhaps best expressed in themeasured judgment of Mr. John Morley in his study of the life of EdmundBurke. Burke, in an evil moment for himself and for Ireland, had lenthimself in 1785 to what Mr. Morley called the "factious" and"detestable" course of Fox and the English Whig leaders in destroyingPitt's Commercial Propositions. 

 "Had it not been for what he himself called the delirium of the preceding session" (writes Burke's biographer)[13] "he would have seen that Pitt was in truth taking his first measures for the emancipation of Ireland from an unjust and oppressive subordination and for her installation as a corporate member of the Empire--the only position permanently possible for her.... A substantial boon was sacrificed amid bonfires and candles to the phantom of Irish Legislative Independence. The result must have convinced Pitt more firmly than ever that his great master, Adam Smith, was right in predicting that nothing short of the Union of the two countries would deliver Ireland out of the hands of her fatuous chiefs and of their too worthy followers. "

What would Mr. John Morley, the historian who wrote those words in theprime of his intellectual strength and judgment, have said if any onehad told him that in his old age Lord Morley, the politician, would havebeen actively engaged in assisting another generation of "fatuouschiefs" and still more worthy followers to sacrifice the true interestsof Ireland in the pursuit of "the phantom of Irish LegislativeIndependence"?

AFTER THE UNION. 

That the Union to some extent failed in the beneficent effects which itwas calculated to produce in Ireland is only another instance of theworking of the "curse of mis-chance" which has so often, before andsince, interposed to thwart the intentions of statesmen in theirdealings with the two countries. Pitt, Castlereagh, and Cornwallis, thethree men chiefly concerned in planning the change, were all agreed inexplaining that the Union was not a policy complete in itself, but wasonly the necessary foundation upon which a true remedial policy was tobe based. As Lord Cornwallis said at the time, "the word 'Union' willnot cure the ills of this wretched country. It is a necessarypreliminary, but a great deal more remains to be done. " CatholicEmancipation, a series of parliamentary, educational, financial, andeconomic reforms, and the abolition of the Viceroyalty, the visiblesymbol of separatism and dependence, were all essential portions ofPitt's scheme. But Pitt was destined to sink into an early grave withoutseeing any of them materially furthered. Treacherous colleagues and thethreatened insanity of the King blocked the way of some of them:England's prolonged struggle for existence against the power ofNapoleon, involving as it did financial embarrassment and a generationof political reaction, accounted for the rest. 

Pitt and Castlereagh resigned on the King's refusal to accept theiradvice, "and so, " as Lord Rosebery says, [14] "all went wrong. " It was"like cutting the face out of a portrait and leaving the picture in theframe. The fragment of policy flapped forlornly on the deserted mansionsof the capital. " A generation of agitation, strife, and discontent wasto pass before Emancipation was carried, and the reforms had to waitstill longer. Meanwhile a wonderful change of front had taken place. Theleading opponents of the Union--Plunket, Foster, Beresford--even Grattanhimself--came to accept it, and, in some cases, figured as its warmestdefenders. And the Catholic Party, whom we have seen so stronglysupporting the Union, gradually grew into opponents. Daniel O'Connell, whose brother and uncle were the leading supporters of the Unioncandidate for Kerry, started a formidable agitation first forEmancipation and then for Repeal of the Union. In the former hesucceeded because enlightened public opinion in both countries was onhis side: in the latter he failed utterly, both parties in Great Britainand a large section in Ireland being inflexibly opposed to any suchreactionary experiment. In the end O'Connell died disillusioned andbroken-hearted, and the Repeal movement disappeared from the field ofIrish politics till revived many years later in the form of Home Rule. 

But whilst recognising the fact that the Union, owing to the causesstated, failed partially, and for a time, to respond to all theanticipations of its authors, readers must be warned against acceptingthe wild and woeful tales of decay and ruin that were recklesslycirculated for propagandist purposes by O'Connell and the Repealers. Many people who are content to take their facts at second hand have thuscome to believe that the legislative Union changed a smiling andprosperous Kingdom into a blighted province where manufactures andagriculture, commerce and population fell into rapid and hopelessdecline. Needless to say, things do not happen in that way: economicchanges, for better or for worse, are slow and gradual and depend onnatural causes, not on artificial. Ireland has not, as a whole, kept inline with nineteenth-century progress, and her population, after astriking increase for over forty years, showed under peculiar causes anequally striking decrease; but to assert that her course has been one ofuniversal decay and of decay dating from the Union is to say what isdemonstrably untrue. 

It was inevitable that a city of very limited industry like Dublinshould suffer from the disappearance of its Parliament, which broughtinto residence for some months in every year some hundreds of persons ofwealth and distinction. It was also inevitable that the mechanicalinventions to which we have already alluded--the steam-engine, the"spinning jenny, " and the "mule"--which revolutionised the world'sindustry, should have their effect in Ireland also. Under primitiveconditions, with lands almost roadless and communications slow, difficult and costly, the various districts of any country had ofnecessity to produce articles of food and clothing to satisfy theirrequirements, or they had to go without. With the progress of invention, and with the opening up of the world by roads and canals, a totallydifferent state of things presents itself. Industries tend to becomecentralised--the fittest survive and grow, the unfit wither away. Thisis what occurred in many districts of England and Scotland, and thecourse of events was naturally the same in Ireland. 

When we read of small towns now lying idle, which in the eighteenthcentury produced woollen cloth, linen, cotton, fustian, boots, hats, glass, beer, and food products, it simply means that a more highlyorganised system of industry has in its progress left such districtsbehind in the race. The woollen manufacture has centred in Yorkshire, cotton in Lancashire, linen in Belfast, and so forth--one districtdwindled as others advanced and tended to monopolise production, withoutthe legislature having anything to say to it. To say that this or thatmanufacture is not so prosperous in Ireland as it was a century agobefore power looms, spindles, steamships, and railways came torevolutionise industry, is simply to say that Ireland, like othercountries, has had its part, for better or for worse, in the greatworld-movement of nineteenth-century industry. 

The figures of Irish exports and imports lend no countenance to thestory of decay setting in with the Union. Taking the two decennialperiods, before and after the Union, the figures are as follows:--[15]

 Total value Total value of imports. Of exports. 

1790-1801 ... ... £49, 000, 000 £51, 000, 0001802-1813 ... ... £74, 000, 000 £63, 000, 000 ----------- ----------- Increase ... £25, 000, 000 £12. 000, 000

an increase of over fifty per cent. In imports, and over twenty-threeper cent. In exports in the ten years after the Union as compared withthe ten years before it. 

Taking single years the result is similar. The amalgamation of the twoExchequers and the financial re-arrangements that followed, put an endto the accurate record of exports and imports until quite recently, butthe increase during the early years of the Union and also over the wholecountry is unmistakable. The average annual value of Irish exports atthe time of the Union was, according to Mr. Chart. [16] £4, 000, 000. In1826 they had increased to £8, 000, 000, a corresponding increase beingrecorded in imports. Coming down to the period of the FinancialRelations Commission (1895), that very cautious and painstakingstatistician, the late Sir Robert Giffen, [17] roughly estimated Irishimports at £25, 000, 000 and exports at £20, 000, 000. Since that time theIrish Agricultural Department has been created, and has undertaken thecollection and tabulation of such statistics. Turning to their latestreport we find that the imports had in 1910 attained the relativelyenormous figure of £65, 000, 000, and the exports £65, 800, 000, a total ofover £130, 000, 000 in place of nine or ten millions, at the very outside, of the time of the Union. And it is worth noting in addition that, forthe first time in these recorded tables, Ireland's exports exceed herimports. 

But we are assured with triumphant and invincible despondency thatpopulation has decreased alarmingly. The movements of population sincethe time of the Union have been, it may be admitted, very remarkable, but the figures are double-edged and require a more careful handlingthan they generally receive. If we are to assume, as the prophets ofgloom will have it, that increase and decrease of population are aninfallible test of a country's growth or decay, then Ireland for nearlyhalf a century after the Union must have been the most prosperouscountry in Europe. The population of Ireland, which in 1792 wasestimated at 4, 088, 226, had increased in 1814 to 5, 937, 856, in 1821 to6, 801, 827, and in 1841 to 8, 196, 597. In other words, the population, like the trade, of the doomed island had more than doubled since theUnion. We doubt if any European country could say as much. 

Then came the great disaster, the potato famine of 1846-47, which, undoubtedly, dealt a stunning blow to Irish agriculture. It was not thefirst, nor the worst, of Irish famines--there is evidence that thefamines of 1729 and 1740 were, proportionately, more widespread and moreappalling in their effects. But, occurring as it did, in the middle ofthe nineteenth century, with the press of the world as witnesses, itattracted immense attention, and the nations, whom England, then highand mighty in the undisputed supremacy of the doctrines of _laissezfaire_ and free trade, were not slow in retorting on their mentor. TheState, it was laid down dogmatically by the economists, must not doanything to feed the starving people, because that would interfere withthe principle of private enterprise; and as there was naturally noprivate enterprise in wide stretches of country where landlord andtenant, shopkeeper and labourer, were involved in common ruin, thepeople starved. For the same reason, the sufferers must not be paid todo useful work, so they were set to make roads that led to nowhere--andthat have been grass-grown ever since--and to build walls that had to bepulled down again. 

It was a ghastly specimen of doctrinaire dogmatism run mad, and thoughit was not the fault of the Government so much as of the arid doctrinesof ill-understood economics which then prevailed in the schools, it didmore than anything to embitter the relations between the Irish peopleand the Imperial Government. The death-rate from famine and famine-feverwas appalling. The poor law system--then a new experiment inIreland--broke down hopelessly, and agitators were not slow to improvethe occasion by denouncing the "callousness" of the Imperial Government. 

Nations, as a rule, recover from such calamities as famine, war, andpestilence with surprising quickness; but there were certain incidentsconnected with the famine of 1846-47 that intensified and perpetuatedthe evil in the case of Ireland. We have already referred to thehigh-and-dry doctrines of _laissez faire_ then in the ascendant, and anyreal or permanent recovery of Irish agriculture was rendered practicallyimpossible by England's adhesion to the doctrine of free imports, by theabolition of the Corn Laws, and by the crushing increase of taxationunder Mr Gladstone's budgets of 1853 and the succeeding years. 

Ireland was entitled under the Act of Union to "special exemptions andabatements" in taxation, in consideration of her backward economiccondition. All Chancellors of the Exchequer till Mr. Gladstone's timerespected these exemptions, and although no one could suggest, in viewof Ireland's recent progress, that she could have been permanentlyexempted from the burdens imposed on the British taxpayer, it will beadmitted that the time chosen by Mr. Gladstone for abruptly raising thetaxation of Ireland from 14_s. _ 9_d. _ per head to 26_s. _ 7_d. _ wasinopportune, not to say ungenerous. 

Sir David Barbour, in his minority report on the Financial RelationsCommission, perhaps the most carefully thought out and the mostpractical of all the many reports emanating from that heterogeneousbody, gives a table of the "estimated true revenue" extracted from GreatBritain and Ireland respectively from 1819 to 1894. This table showsthat the revenue raised from Ireland was increased between 1849-50 and1859-60 from £4, 861, 465 to £7, 700, 334, and he adds: "It will be observedthat a great and rapid rise took place in the taxation of Ireland duringthe decade 1850-1860. This great increase was due to the equalisation ofthe spirit duties in the two countries, and the extension of the IncomeTax to Ireland. The special circumstances of Ireland do not appear tohave received due consideration at this time. Many arguments of ageneral character might be employed to justify the equalisation of thespirit duties, and the imposition of an Income Tax, but Ireland wasentitled under the Act of Union to such exemptions and abatements as hercircumstances might require, and the time was not opportune for imposingadditional burdens upon her. "

Irish Agriculture was thus almost simultaneously struck down by thegreatest famine of the century, which swept away two million of thepopulation, disabled for resuming the competition by the free admissionof foreign grain, which in the long run rendered successful corn-growingin Ireland impossible, and saddled with an additional two and a quartermillions of taxation. When remonstrated with, Mr. Gladstone retortedflippantly that he could not see that it was any part of the rights ofman that an Irishman should be able to make himself drunk more cheaplythan the inhabitant of Great Britain. The taunt would have possessedmore relevance if whisky had been an article of importation. Seeing, however, that it was an article of manufacture and export, employingdirectly or indirectly much capital and labour, the injury to Irishindustry was very serious, many distilleries and breweries being obligedto close their doors. 

As Miss Murray says in her masterly work on Irish commerce[18]:--

 "Just as the country was thoroughly exhausted from the effects of the famine, the whole financial policy adopted towards Ireland changed, and Irish taxation began to be rapidly assimilated to British at a time when great prosperity had come to Great Britain, and the reverse to Ireland. The repeal of the Corn Laws had stimulated the commercial prosperity of Britain; large cities were expanding, railways were developing, and the foreign trade of the country was increasing by leaps and bounds. But Ireland had just passed through the awful ordeal of famine: her population had suddenly diminished by one fourth, there had been a universal decline in Irish manufactures, the repeal of the Corn Laws had begun the destruction of the Irish export trade in cereals, and the extension of the Poor Law system to Ireland had greatly increased the local rates. Just as the famine subsided the results of free trade began to take effect. Wheat-growing decayed; local industries were destroyed by the competition of large manufacturing towns in Great Britain; every class of Irish producers saw ruin staring him in the face, while landlords and farmers were further impoverished by the huge poor-rates, which sometimes reached 20_s. _ in the £. The misery and poverty of the country could hardly have been greater, and to us at the present day it seems extraordinary that just at this inopportune time the Government should have thought fit to go back from the conciliatory fiscal policy which had existed since 1817. "

It is not to be wondered at that Gladstonian finance was ever afterlooked at with well-grounded suspicion in Ireland. 

Another circumstance that has had a serious and lasting effect on Irishpopulation has still to be mentioned. At first the emigration movementwas largely a flight from starvation, a movement that would have come toan end under normal circumstances with the end of the famine crisis. Butas we have seen, the conditions were not normal; the crisis wasartificially protracted by injurious financial legislation. And, inaddition, although many of them perished by the way owing to theabominably insanitary conditions of the coffin ships employed for thejourney, the emigrants arriving at New York or Boston soon foundconditions unexpectedly favourable for the class of labour which theywere best qualified to supply. America was just then opening up andturning to the new West, and the demand for unskilled labour for railwaywork was unlimited. The Irish emigrant seldom or never takes to the landwhen he goes to America, and navvy work just suited him. To a manaccustomed to sixpence a day the wages offered seemed to representunbounded wealth, and as the news spread in Ireland the move to America, which at the first seemed hopeless exile, presented itself as a highlydesirable step towards social betterment. Emigration is now the resultof attraction from America rather than of repulsion from Ireland, a factwhich explains the failure of more than one well-meant attempt to checkthe movement by action on this side of the Atlantic. 

ULSTER'S DEVELOPMENT. 

A word should perhaps be given to the position of the industrial portionof Ulster, which has flourished so remarkably since the Union. This ofitself affords sufficient proof that that Act, whatever its defects, cannot be held accountable for any lack of prosperity that may stillexist in other parts of Ireland. It is sometimes stated that Ulster wasfavoured at the time when the commercial jealousy of certain Englishcities succeeded in securing a prohibition of the Irish woollenindustry. The southern wool, it is alleged, was checked, and the Belfastlinen was favoured--hence the prosperity of the northern capital. Thisis a really curious perversion of quite modern history. The linenindustry was at the time in question in no sense confined to the Northand was by no means prominent in Belfast. It was distributed over manydistricts of Ireland, for whilst Louis Crommelin was sent to Lisburn tolook after the French colony settled there, and to improve and promotethe industry, his brother William was sent on a similar errand toKilkenny, and stations were also started at Rathkeale, Cork andWaterford. When, later on, the Irish Parliament distributed bountiesthrough the Linen Board, the seat of that Board was in Dublin, and itsoperations included every county in Ireland. 

At the time of the Union, indeed, the linen manufacture was almostunknown in Belfast, the "manufacturers" or handloom weavers in theNorth, as elsewhere, living mostly in the smaller country towns andbringing their webs in for sale on certain market days. From Benn's"History of the Town of Belfast, " published early in the century, welearn that at that time the principal manufacture of the town was"cotton in its various branches. " This industry had been introduced in1777, we are told, to give employment in the poorhouse, but it caught onand spread amazingly. "In many of the streets and populous roads in thesuburbs of the town, particularly at Ballymacarrett, the sound of theloom issues almost from every house, and all, with very few exceptions, are employed in the different branches of the cotton trade. In the year1800 this business engaged in Belfast and its neighbourhood 27, 000persons. " In 1814 there were eight cotton mills at work with steam powerdriving 99, 000 spindles. On the other hand, "there is very little linencloth woven in this town or parish. In 1807 Belfast contained 723 looms, only four of which were for weaving linen. "

The story of the sudden change from cotton to linen is an instructiveone. Cotton appears to have forced itself to the front because cottonspinning could be carried on by machinery whilst the linen weavers werestill dependent on the spinning wheel for their yarn. It was AndrewMulholland, the owner of the York Street cotton mill, who first tooknote of the fact that while the supply of hand-made linen yarn was quiteinsufficient to justify the manufacture of linen on a large scale inBelfast, quantities of flax were shipped from Belfast to Manchester tobe spun there and reimported as yarn. Mulholland determined to try if hecould not spin yarn as well as the Manchester people, and accordingly in1830, "the first bundle of linen yarn produced by machinery in Belfastwas thrown off from the York Street mill. " That, and not legislation norany system of State bounties or State favour, was the beginning of theBelfast linen industry in which the York Street mill still maintains itsdeserved pre-eminence. When the critical moment arrived, as it does inthe case of all industries, when manufacturers must adapt themselves tonew methods or succumb, the Belfast leaders of industry rose to theoccasion and secured for themselves the chief share in the linen trade. In the rest of Ireland, it is true, the manufacture dwindled anddisappeared, but whatever may have been the cause of that disappearance, it was certainly not the Act of Union. 

THE LAND QUESTION. 

The agrarian problem has caused more trouble in Ireland than any other, and statesmen have long recognised that on its definite settlementdepends the hope of permanent peace and progress over the greater partof the country. It is not, and never has been, the real cause of ruraldepopulation, for, as we have seen, the increase of the rural populationwas most rapid at the time when agrarian conditions were at their veryworst, whilst on the other hand emigration continues almost unchecked incounties where the question has been virtually settled. And in 1881 thelate Mr. J. H. Tuke discovered by an analysis of the census returns thatthe only "townlands" in which the rural population was actuallyincreasing were those scattered along the western seaboard of Ireland, where the tenure and the conditions of existence seemed most hopeless. But, as the Devon Commission announced in 1845, it was an essentiallydefective system of land tenure that lay at the root of the perennialdiscontent with which Ireland was troubled, and things went from bad toworse until the Party organised for the defence of the Union and thesocial betterment of Ireland took up the task of settling the questionby the transfer on fair terms of the ownership of the soil from thelarge landowners to the tenants. 

The system of land tenure in England has been the growth of customgradually hardening into law; in Ireland the traditional custom wassuddenly abolished, and English law substituted in its place. TheEnglish law was no doubt a better law, and one more fitted to aprogressive community; but in Ireland it violently upset the traditionallaw of the country, and, consequently, was met with sullen andunremitting hostility. By Irish law, the tribe was owner; the tribesmenwere joint proprietors, and the forfeiture of the chief did not involvethe forfeiture of the land occupied by the tribesmen. By English law, however, these latter, such of them as were not expelled or exiled, suddenly found themselves transformed from joint-owners into tenants atwill. Further, the difficulty of dealing direct with tenants, experienced by landlords who were in very many cases absentees, led tothe abominable "middleman" system by which the owner leased greatstretches of land to some one who undertook to "manage" it for him, andwho in turn sub-let it in smaller patches at rack-rents to those who, toget back their money, had to sub-let again at still higher rents. Theresult was, as an official report in the eighteenth century states: "Itis well known that over the most part of the country, the lands aresub-let six deep, so that those who actually labour it are squeezed tothe very utmost. " And Lord Chesterfield, when Viceroy, complained of theoppression of the people by "deputies of deputies of deputies. " Theeighteenth-century policy of checking or suppressing the industrialenterprises of the English colony aggravated the evil until, as LordDufferin expressed it: "Debarred from every other industry, the entirenation flung itself back upon the land, with as fatal an impulse as whena river whose current is suddenly impeded, rolls back and drowns thevalley it once fertilised. "

In time the middleman tended to die out, but the evil results of thesystem in preventing direct and friendly and helpful relations betweenlandlord and tenant remained. Here and there, even in Arthur Young'stime, enterprising and devoted landlords had established something likethe "English system" on their estates, but, as a rule, the landlordremained a mere rent charger. The report of the Devon Commission says:--

 "It is admitted on all hands that, according to the general practice in Ireland, the landlord neither builds dwelling-houses nor farm offices, nor puts fences, gates, etc. , in good order before he lets his land to a tenant. The cases where a landlord does any of these things are the exception. In most cases, whatever is done in the way of building or fencing is done by the tenant, and in the ordinary language of the country, dwelling-houses, farm buildings, and even the making of fences, are described by the general word, 'improvements, ' which is thus employed to denote the necessary adjuncts of a farm without which in England or Scotland no tenant would be found to rent it. "

In a word, as one who owned land both in England and in Ireland put it, "In England we let farms, in Ireland we let land. " And by law an unjustlandlord had the power at any moment to expel a tenant or a group oftenants, although no rent was owing, and without giving any compensationfor the "improvements" which were the sole work of the tenant. Mostlandlords acted reasonably and equitably in such matters, but, especially among the new class of purely mercantile purchasers who camein under the Landed Estates Court after the great famine of 1846, therewere too many who insisted on their extreme legal rights, thusdisturbing the peace of the country and producing the Irish LandQuestion in an acute form that called for State interference. 

The systems of "compensation for improvements" (1870), and of rentfixing by itinerant tribunals (1881), were tried in turn, but each wasfound to raise more difficulties than it settled, until finally Mr. Parnell and his Land League set the whole country in a flame, andproduced a series of strikes against the payment of any rent. For someyears it is hardly too much to say that the law of the League, with itspurely revolutionary propaganda, supplanted the law of the land andreduced large areas to a condition of chaos, the decrees of the "villageruffians, " who ruled the situation, being enforced by systematic outrageand assassination. 

The first statesman who made a really serious attempt to meet thisappalling state of things was Mr. Arthur Balfour, who, as ChiefSecretary for Ireland, resolutely took up the task, first of repressingcrime and enforcing the law, and then of recasting the whole land systemin such a way that the tenant, transformed into an owner, would for thefirst time feel it his interest to range himself on the side of the lawand of orderly government. At the same time, a systematic attempt wasmade to deal with the question of perennial poverty in the extreme Westof Ireland in what came to be known as the "Congested Districts. " Theconstruction of railways and piers, the draining of land, and theprovision of instruction in agriculture, fisheries, etc. , speedily gavepromise of a new era in the economic history of a hitherto helpless andhopeless population. 

All this was done by Mr. Balfour and his successors in spite ofopposition and obstruction of a kind such as no Chief Secretary had everbefore had to encounter. Formerly, all through the centuries, whenever aViceroy or Chief Secretary was face to face with an organised outbreakof crime and sedition in Ireland, both British parties united insupporting and strengthening the hands of the executive as representingthe Crown. Mr. Gladstone's extraordinary reversal of policy andprinciple in the winter of 1885-86 put an end to all this, and gravelyincreased the difficulties of the Irish Government. 

When Mr. Gladstone was first confronted with the demand for Home Rule, even in the mild and constitutional form advocated by Mr. Isaac Butt, and his Home Government Association, founded in the autumn of 1870, hepromptly declared, like Mr. John Morley, that legislative Union withGreat Britain was the only position permanently possible for an islandsituated as Ireland is. In a speech at Aberdeen[19] he indignantlyasked--

 "Can any sensible man, can any rational man, suppose that at this time of day, in this condition of the world, we are going to disintegrate the great capital institutions of this country for the purpose of making ourselves ridiculous in the sight of all mankind and crippling any powers we possess for conferring benefits on the country to which we belong. "

And for fifteen years, in power or in opposition, Mr. Gladstone preachedand acted upon the same doctrine. When the Land League was founded hedenounced it as an organisation whose steps were "dogged with crime, "and whose march was "through rapine to the dismemberment of the Empire. "The League was finally "proclaimed" by his Government as a criminalconspiracy and its members, from Mr. Parnell downwards, arrested andimprisoned without trial as being "reasonably suspected" of criminalpractices. 

This continued until in an unfortunate moment for himself Mr. Gladstonediscovered, in November, 1885, that the votes of Mr. Parnell and hiseighty-six colleagues were necessary for his own return to power asPrime Minister, whereupon he entered into negotiations which resulted, on the one hand, in his securing the necessary votes, and on the otherin his accepting the principles and the policy of those whom until thenhe had denounced and imprisoned as instigators to crime and sedition. Herightly recognised that there was no half-way house, and that he couldnot become a Home Ruler without accepting and defending the actions ofthe Home Rulers. He worshipped what he had formerly burnt, and he burnedwhat he had hitherto worshipped. The result was that for several yearsEngland beheld for the first time the scandalous spectacle of men whohad held high office under the Crown openly defending--and eveninstigating--lawlessness and disorder, shielding and excusing criminals, proved such before the courts, and thwarting, misrepresenting, andobstructing those whose duty it was to restore order and legality inIreland. 

Such were the difficulties that confronted Mr. Arthur Balfour as ChiefSecretary for Ireland from 1887 to 1891, difficulties which hesurmounted with such resolution and such statesmanship that he retiredfrom an office that has been called "the grave of reputations" with areputation so much enhanced as to ensure him the leadership of his partyand the gratitude of Irishmen of all classes for generations to come. And yet his method was a supremely simple one--to reassert the supremacyof the law, to neglect, almost ostentatiously, all merely politicalcries, and to set himself seriously to deal with the real Irishquestion, that of conferring some measure of security and prosperity ona population which over wide districts had known too little of suchthings. 

Occupying ownership of Irish land by means of State credit was not, ofcourse, a new policy in Mr. Balfour's day. The Bright clauses (1869)had introduced the principle into the Statute-book, and Lord Ashbourne'sAct (1885) had carried it several steps further. But it was Mr. ArthurBalfour and his successors, Mr. Gerald Balfour and Mr. George Wyndham, who carried it by a series of boldly conceived steps almost within sightof completion. So thorough was the success of this policy of landpurchase, and so marked was the cessation of crime and outrage andseditious agitation in every district into which it was carried, thatthose who made their living by agitation grew alarmed, and did all intheir power to stop the working of the Purchase Acts. One Nationalistmember declared that the process had gone "quite far enough, " and thathe wished it could be stopped. The farmers who had purchased theirholdings were declared to have become selfish, and "as bad as thelandlords. " In other words, they had become orderly and industrious, andhad ceased to subscribe for the upkeep of the United Irish League andits salaried agitators. 

The unhappy result of this outcry on the part of those whose occupationwould be gone, and who would be compelled to resort to honest industryshould Ireland become peaceful and prosperous, was the passing of Mr. Birrell's "amending" Bill, which has practically stopped for the presentthe beneficent working of the Wyndham Act of 1903. Under the variouspurchase Acts over 180, 000 Irish farmers have become the owners of theirholdings, thanks to over one hundred millions of public money advancedon Imperial credit for the purpose. The first task of a Unionistgovernment, when again in power, must be the resumption of this policyof State-aided land-purchase--the only completely and unquestionablysuccessful and pacifying piece of agrarian legislation in the history ofEnglish rule in Ireland. 

Other writers will give, later on, a more detailed account of variousbranches of Unionist practical policy in Ireland. The story of theCongested Districts Board, Mr. Arthur Balfour's special work, is aromance in itself. So well, in fact, has it accomplished its immediatetask that the time has probably come when it could with advantage bemerged in the later-created Department of Agriculture and TechnicalInstruction. This department, which has been linked up with the Countyor Borough Councils, by the legislation of Mr. Gerald Balfour, has donean immense amount of educational and practical work in connection withagriculture in all its branches, including dairying, poultry rearing, fruit-growing, and other rural industries, not to speak of technicalinstruction in matters suited for artisans and town workers. 

These remarkable achievements, the work of successive UnionistGovernments from 1896 to 1906, have revolutionised the face of thecountry, and are bringing about a new Ireland. The chief danger now liesin the intrigues of discredited politicians, whose object is to divertthe eyes of the people from practical, remedial, and constructivelegislation, and to keep them fixed upon what Mr. John Morley has called"the phantom of Irish legislative independence. "

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 3: J. R. Green, "Short History, " chap. Ix. Sec. 8. ]

[Footnote 4: "Dict. Nat. Biog. , " sub. -tit. "Erskine, John, Earl of Mar, "p. 430. ]

[Footnote 5: "England, " says Mr. James Bryce in his Introduction to "TwoCenturies of Irish History, " "acted as conquering nations do act, andbetter than some nations of that age. "]

[Footnote 6: Wogan to Swift, Feb. 27th, 1732. ]

[Footnote 7: Swift, "The Legion Club. "]

[Footnote 8: "Life of Macartney, " vol. Ii, p. 136. ]

[Footnote 9: "Tour in Ireland, " vol. Ii. , p. 123 ff. ]

[Footnote 10: Hamilton Rowan's "Autobiography, " p. 340. ]

[Footnote 11: "Wealth of Nations, " Book V. , Chap. III. ]

[Footnote 12: "The End of the Irish Parliament, " 1911, Edward Arnold. ]

[Footnote 13: "Edmund Burke, a Historical Study, " by John Morley, pp. 286 ff. ]

[Footnote 14: "Pitt, " by Lord Rosebery, p. 155. ]

[Footnote 15: From the official returns embodied in "A Statement to thePrime Minister, " Irish Loyal and Patriotic Union, Dublin, 1886. ]

[Footnote 16: "Ireland from the Union to Catholic Emancipation, " by D. A. Chart, M. A. A most valuable and instructive work. ]

[Footnote 17: It is, I hope, no reflection on the memory of an eminentpublic servant to suggest that in this, as in too many of the estimatedfigures contained in his evidence before the Commission, and upon whichthe Majority Report of the Commission was largely based, Sir Robertseriously under-estimated the resources of Ireland. It is obvious whenthe ascertained figures of 1910 are compared with the estimated figuresof 1895 that Sir Robert Giffen must have been several millions below thetruth. The steady nature of the growth of Irish commerce is shown by thefollowing figures taken from the Official Report for the year endedDecember 31, 1910. 

 Imports, Exports, Total, Mill. £. Mill. £. Mill. £. 

1904 54 49 1031905 55 51 1061906 57 56 1131907 61 59 1201908 59 57 1161909 63 61 1241910 65 65 130]

[Footnote 18: "A History of the Commercial Relations between GreatBritain and Ireland, " by Alice E. Murray, D. Sc. ]

[Footnote 19: Sept. 26, 1871. ]

CRITICAL

III

THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION

BY GEORGE CAVE, K. C. , M. P. 

INTRODUCTORY

Few things are more remarkable in the Parliamentary history of the HomeRule movement than the complete absence from the counsels of the Englishadvocates of Home Rule of any definite and settled policy as to the formof self-government to be offered to Ireland, and their consequentoscillation between proposals radically differing from one another. Since the "new departure" initiated by Davitt and Devoy in 1878, [20] ithas been the deliberate practice of Irish Nationalists to abstain fromdefining the Nationalist demand and to ask in general terms for"self-government, " doubtless with the object of attracting the supportof all who favour any change which could be described by that veryelastic term. Such a policy has its advantages. But confusion ofthought, however favourable to popular agitation, is a disadvantage whenthe moment for legislation arrives; and uncertainty as to the aim goesfar to explain the vacillation in Home Rule policy. 

Mr. Gladstone's Home Rule Bill of 1886 would have given to Ireland thesubstance of "responsible" or colonial self-government, subject only tocertain reservations and restrictions, the value of which will beconsidered later in this chapter, and would have excluded the Irishmembers and representative peers from the Parliament of the UnitedKingdom. By the Bill of 1893 the reservations and restrictions wereincreased, and representatives of Ireland were to be permitted to sit atWestminster--by the Bill as introduced for some purposes, and by theBill as passed by the House of Commons for all purposes. 

After the defeat of this second Bill, a "cold fit" appears to haveseized the Liberal Party. Lord Rosebery, in 1894, declared that beforeHome Rule could be carried England, as the predominant partner, must beconvinced. Sir Edward Grey in 1905 declared that his party on its returnto power would "go on with Sir Anthony MacDonnell's policy, " which herightly described as a policy of large administrative reforms; and Mr. Asquith "associated himself entirely and unreservedly with every word"of Sir Edward Grey's speech. [21] Accordingly the Irish Council Billproposed by Mr. Asquith's Government in 1907 was purely a measure ofdevolution, certain administrative functions only being put under thecontrol of an Irish Council, subject to the veto of the Lord Lieutenant, and the whole legislative power remaining in the Parliament of theUnited Kingdom. This proposal, having been condemned by a NationalConvention at Dublin, was incontinently withdrawn. 

In the years succeeding this fiasco the Liberal policy for Irelandappeared to be at the mercy of shifting winds. For some time Liberalspeakers contented themselves with vague declarations in favour ofFederalism or "Home Rule all round"--phrases which may mean much orlittle according to the sense in which they are used. More recently anable writer, [22] while admitting that "there is no public opinion inIreland as to the form of the Irish Constitution, " has argued in a workof 350 pages in favour of the grant to Ireland of full legislative, administrative and financial autonomy; while a member of theGovernment[23] declared that fiscal autonomy for all practical purposesmeans separation and the disintegration of the United Kingdom. In apublication recently issued by a committee of Liberals, comprisingseveral members of the present Government, [24] two views directlycontrary to one another are put forward, one writer arguing for adevolution to an Irish body of "definite and defined powers only, " andanother for the grant of the widest possible form of Home Rule and theexclusion from Westminster of all Irish representation. The latestofficial pronouncements indicate that the Government have it in theirminds to revert to the Gladstonian form of Home Rule; but even now[25]no one outside the Cabinet, and possibly few inside that inner circle, would venture on a confident prophecy even as to the broad lines of themeasure which in a few days may be submitted to Parliament asrepresenting the urgent and considered demand of public opinion. 

Franklin said truly that--

 "those who govern, having much business on their hands, do not generally like to take the trouble of considering and carrying into execution new projects. "

But surely on a question of such vital moment to the Empire as therevision of the constitution of the United Kingdom, the bases, if notthe details, of the contemplated change are deserving of prolongedconsideration and even of some public and ordered discussion. TheBritish North America Act, 1867, by which the relation of the Dominionof Canada to its provinces is regulated, was the result, not only ofyears of preliminary debate in the provincial Legislatures andelsewhere, but of a formal conference at Quebec in 1864, followed by theappointment of delegates to confer with the Imperial Government on thematter. In Australia the proposal for union, agitated at intervals since1846, was canvassed in every detail at inter-colonial Conferences orConventions in 1883, in 1891, and in 1897-8, as well as in the severalcolonial Legislatures, before it was embodied in the AustraliaConstitution Act, 1900. And although in the case of South Africa, owingto the urgency of the question of union, the time occupied in thediscussion was less than in the other great dominions, yet in theConvention of 1908-9 the best brains in the country were occupied formonths in considering every detail of the proposal for union before itwas submitted to the Colonial and Imperial Parliaments for theirsanction. [26] And yet in the Mother Country, where centuries of militaryand political conflict have given us the Union, it is considered that afew weeks' consideration by a committee of the Cabinet, without advicefrom independent constitutional experts, [27] and without formalconsultation even with the Government's own supporters outside theMinistry, is sufficient to determine both the general form and thedetails of a proposal for its dissolution. 

In the confusion so engendered it may be useful to consider in somedetail the different proposals which have been or may be made under thename of Home Rule, their special qualities and dangers, and the resultsto which they may severally lead. 

RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT. 

A proposal to give to Ireland full "responsible" government, without anyother limitations than such as are imposed on our self-governingColonies, would find few supporters in this country. Under such aconstitution an Irish Government would have power to forbid or restrictrecruiting for the Imperial forces in Ireland, and to raise and train aforce of its own. It might establish or subsidise a religion, makeeducation wholly denominational, levy customs duties on imports fromGreat Britain and give fiscal advantages to a foreign power, confiscateor transfer property without payment, and deprive individuals ofnationality, franchise, liberty, or life without process of law. Howeverimprobable some of these contingencies may appear, it is right on amatter of so much moment to consider possibilities and not probabilitiesonly. Such powers as these could not without serious risk be conceded toany part of the kingdom, and in the case of Ireland there would be aspecial danger in granting them to a popularly elected body. 

In the first place, the national safety would be involved. Englishmenwere at one time too fond of saying that the great Colonies might, ifthey chose, sever the link which binds them to the Mother Country. Happily, in their case, no such catastrophe need now be considered. Butit would be folly to shut our eyes to the fact that to many Irishmennational independence appears to be the only goal worth striving for. Ifthe concession of full responsible government should be followed (atwhatever interval) by an assertion of complete independence, we mayassume that Great Britain would follow the example of Federal Americaand re-establish the Union by force of arms, but at how great a cost!Those who deny the possibility of a serious movement towards separationwould do well to remember Mr. Gladstone's reference[28] to the positionof Norway and Sweden, then united under one crown:--

 "Let us look to those two countries, neither of them very large, but yet countries which every Englishman and every Scotchman must rejoice to claim his kin--I mean the Scandinavian countries of Sweden and Norway. Immediately after the great war the Norwegians were ready to take sword in hand to prevent their coming under the domination of Sweden. But the Powers of Europe undertook the settlement of that question, and they united those countries upon a footing of strict legislative independence and co-equality.... And yet with two countries so united, what has been the effect? Not discord, not convulsions, not danger to peace, not hatred, not aversion, but a constantly growing sympathy; and every man who knows their condition knows that I speak the truth when I say that in every year that passes the Norwegians and the Swedes are more and more feeling themselves to be the children of a common country, united by a tie which never is to be broken. "

The tie was broken within twenty years. 

It may be that the Nationalist leaders, or some of them, do not desireseparation; but it by no means follows that a concession of theirdemands would not lead to that result. Franklin, in 1774, had aninterview with Chatham, in which he says--

 "I assured him that, having more than once travelled almost from one end of the continent (of America) to the other, and kept a great variety of company, eating, drinking, and conversing with them freely, I never had heard in any conversation from any person, drunk or sober, the least expression of a wish for a separation, or a hint that such a thing would be advantageous to America. "[29]

And yet independence came within ten years. 

In the case of the United Kingdom there is no need to consider in detailhow serious would be the effects--naval, military, and economic--ofseparation, for the gravity of such a contingency is admitted by all. Admiral Mahan, the American naval expert, writes that--

 "the ambition of the Irish separatists, realised, might be even more threatening to the national life of Great Britain than the secession of the South was to that of the American Union.... The instrument for such action in the shape of an independent Parliament could not safely be trusted even to avowed friends. "

Some Home Rulers are able to--

 "rise superior to the philosophy, as fallacious in fact as it is base and cowardly in purpose, which sets the safety of a great nation above the happiness and prosperity of a small one, "[30]

but to less lofty souls it appears that the safety of the nation isparamount, and that upon it depends the prosperity of each of itscomponent parts. 

In the next place, in considering whether complete "colonial"self-government can be conceded to Ireland, it must not be forgottenthat the island is bi-racial, that the two races differ widely incharacter, in politics, and in religion, and that the differences areapt to find vent in violent conflict or secret attacks. Further, Irelandhas for generations been the scene of a revolt against one particularspecies of property, the ownership of land; and although under theoperation of the Land Purchase Acts this cause of conflict tends toabate, it still breaks out from time to time in the form of cattledrives and attacks on "land grabbers. "[31] Hitherto we have, broadlyspeaking, kept the peace. That we should now forsake this duty, and, washing our hands of Ireland, leave the Protestant and the landowner, ator small, to his fate is unthinkable. 

In connection with the question last-mentioned it may be necessary atsome time to consider how far it is the constitutional right of thiscountry to impose upon the minority in Ireland the new obligationsimplied in a grant to the whole island of colonial Home Rule. It may bethat the Imperial Parliament can disallow the claim of a section of thepopulation of Ireland to remain subject to its own control. But it isone thing to reject the allegiance of a community, it is quite anotherthing forcibly to transfer that allegiance to a practically independentlegislature; and this is especially the case when the transfer mayinvolve the use against a loyal population of coercion in its extremeform. 

CHECKS AND SAFEGUARDS. 

In every formal proposal for Home Rule in Ireland, weight has been givento the above considerations, and attempts have been made to meet them byqualifying the grant of responsible Government. The qualificationssuggested have taken the form of _(a)_ the reservation of certainpowers to the Imperial Parliament, or (_b_) the restriction of thepowers granted to the Irish legislature by prohibiting their exercise incertain specific ways, or (_c_) the provision of some form of Imperialveto or control. It is important to consider whether and how far suchchecks or "safeguards" are likely to prove effective and lasting. 

The "safeguards" proposed by the Government of Ireland Bill, 1886, weresomewhat extended by the Bill of 1893; and the proposals shortly to besubmitted to Parliament, so far as they can be gathered from recentspeeches of Ministers, will not in this respect differ materially fromthose contained in the latter Bill. It will therefore be convenient totake as a basis for discussion the provisions of the Bill of 1893, aspassed by the House of Commons. 

The Bill of 1893, after stating in a preamble that it was "expedientthat without impairing or restricting the supreme authority ofParliament an Irish Legislature should be created for such purposes inIreland as in this Act mentioned, " proposed to set up in Ireland aLegislature[32] consisting of the Sovereign and two Houses, namely aLegislative Council of 48 members to be returned under a restrictedfranchise by the Irish counties and the boroughs of Dublin and Belfast, and a Legislative Assembly of 103 members to be returned by the existingparliamentary constituencies in Ireland. A Bill introduced into theIrish Legislature was to pass both Houses; but in the event ofdisagreement the proposals of the Legislative Assembly were to besubmitted, after a dissolution or a delay of two years, to a jointSession of the two Houses. The executive power was to remain in theCrown, aided and advised by an Irish Ministry (called an ExecutiveCommittee of the Privy Council of Ireland), and the assent of the Crownto Irish legislation was to be given or withheld on the advice of thisExecutive Committee subject to any instructions given by the Sovereign. 

The specific reservations and restrictions were contained in clauses 3and 4 of the Bill, which were as follows:--

 "3. The Irish Legislature shall not have power to make laws in respect of the following matters or any of them:--

 "(1) The Crown, or the succession to the Crown, or a Regency; or the Lord Lieutenant as representative of the Crown; or

 "(2) The making of peace or war or matters arising from a state of war; or the regulation of the conduct of any portion of Her Majesty's subjects during the existence of hostilities between foreign States with which Her Majesty is at peace, in respect of such hostilities; or

 "(3) Navy, army, militia, volunteers, and any other military forces, or the defence of the realm, or forts, permanent military camps, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings, or any places purchased for the erection thereof; or

 "(4) Authorising either the carrying or using of arms for military purposes, or the formation of associations for drill or practice in the use of arms for military purposes; or

 "(5) Treaties or any relations with foreign States or the relations between different parts of Her Majesty's dominions, or offences connected with such treaties or relations, or procedure connected with the extradition of criminals under any treaty; or

 "(6) Dignities or titles of honour; or

 "(7) Treason, treason-felony, alienage, aliens as such, or naturalisation; or

 "(8) Trade with any place out of Ireland; or quarantine, or navigation, including merchant shipping (except as respects inland waters and local health or harbour regulations); or

 "(9) Lighthouses, buoys, or beacons within the meaning of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, and the Acts amending the same (except so far as they can consistently with any general Act of Parliament be constructed or maintained by a local harbour authority); or

 "(10) Coinage; legal tender; or any change in the standard of weights and measures; or

 "(11) Trade marks, designs, merchandise marks, copyright, or patent rights. 

 "Provided always, that nothing in this section shall prevent the passing of any Irish Act to provide for any charges imposed by Act of Parliament, or to prescribe conditions regulating importation from any place outside Ireland for the sole purpose of preventing the introduction of any contagious disease. 

 "It is hereby declared that the exceptions from the powers of the Irish Legislature contained in this section are set forth and enumerated for greater certainty, and not so as to restrict the generality of the limitation imposed in the previous section on the powers of the Irish Legislature. 

 "Any law made in contravention of this section shall be void. 

 "4. The powers of the Irish Legislature shall not extend to the making of any law--

 "(1) Respecting the establishment or endowment of religion, whether directly or indirectly, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or

 "(2) Imposing any disability, or conferring any privilege, advantage, or benefit, on account of religious belief, or raising or appropriating directly or indirectly, save as heretofore, any public revenue for any religious purpose, or for the benefit of the holder of any religious office as such; or

 "(3) Diverting the property, or, without its consent, altering the constitution of any religious body; or

 "(4) Abrogating or prejudicially affecting the right to establish or maintain any place of denominational education, or any denominational institution or charity; or

 "(5) Whereby there may be established or endowed out of public funds any theological professorship, or any university or college in which the conditions set out in the University of Dublin Tests Acts, 1873, are not observed; or

 "(6) Prejudicially affecting the right of any child to attend a school receiving public money without attending the religious instruction at that school; or

 "(7) Directly or indirectly imposing any disability or conferring any privilege, benefit, or advantage upon any subject of the Crown on account of his parentage or place of birth, or of the place where any part of his business is carried on, or upon any corporation or institution constituted or existing by virtue of the law of some part of the Queen's dominions, and carrying on operations in Ireland, on account of the persons by whom or in whose favour, or the place in which any of its operations are carried on; or

 "(8) Whereby any person may be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law in accordance with settled principles and precedents, or may be denied the equal protection of the laws, or whereby private property may be taken without just compensation; or

 "(9) Whereby any existing corporation incorporated by Royal Charter or by any local or general Act of Parliament may, unless it consents, or the leave of Her Majesty is first obtained on address from the two Houses of the Irish Legislature, be deprived of its rights, privileges, or property without due process of law in accordance with settled principles and precedents, and so far as respects property without just compensation. Provided nothing in this sub-section shall prevent the Irish Legislature from dealing with any public department, municipal corporation, or local authority, or with any corporation administering for public purposes taxes, rates, cess, dues, or tolls, so far as concerns the same. Any law made in contravention of this section shall be void. "

The power to impose taxation other than duties of custom and excise wasto be transferred, subject to a short delay as to existing taxes and toa special provision in respect of taxes for war expenditure, to theIrish Legislature (clause II). Two judges of the Supreme Court inIreland, to be called "Exchequer Judges, " were to be appointed under theGreat Seal of the United Kingdom, and to be removable only on an addressfrom the Imperial Parliament; and proceedings relating to the reservedpowers or to the customs or excise duties were to be determined by suchjudges (clause 19). Appeals from the Courts in Ireland were to lie tothe Judicial Committee of the Imperial Privy Council (clause 21); andany question as to the powers of the Irish Legislature could be referredto the same Committee (clause 22). The Royal Irish Constabulary andDublin Metropolitan Police Force were gradually to disappear, and policematters to be regulated by the Irish Legislature and Executive (clause29). The Irish Legislature was to be prohibited from passing landlegislation for a period of three years (clause 34). 

As to these proposals the first observation that occurs is that, inaddition to the matters proposed to be reserved, there are others inwhich legislative uniformity throughout the kingdom is greatly to bedesired. To mention but a few such matters, questions of status, contract and succession, of international trade and navigation, of theregulation of railways and of industrial labour, and of the criminallaw, should not be differently determined in different parts of thekingdom; and as life becomes more complex, the number of subjects inwhich diversity of laws is a hindrance continues to increase. 

In the next place, it is to be noted that the checks proposed affectlegislation only and not administration. If the Bill of 1893 or anysimilar Bill should become law, the whole executive power in Irelandwill be in an Irish Ministry responsible to an Irish Assembly; and it isobvious that many of the wrongs against which the restrictive clauses ofthe Bill were directed may be inflicted by administrative act oromission as effectively as by legislation. To quote a work ofauthority[33]--

 "An independent Irish Executive will possess immense power. It will be able by mere administrative action or inaction, without passing a single law which infringes any restriction to be imposed by the Irish Government Act, 1893, to effect a revolution. Let us consider for a moment a few of the things which the Irish Cabinet might do if it chose. It might confine all political, administrative, or judicial appointments to Nationalists, and thus exclude Loyalists from all positions of public trust. It might place the bench, the magistracy, the police, wholly in the hands of Catholics; it might, by encouragement of athletic clubs where the Catholic population were trained to the use of arms, combined with the rigorous suppression of every Protestant association suspected, rightly or not, of preparing resistance to the Parliament at Dublin, bring about the arming of Catholic, and the disarming of Protestant, Ireland, and, at the same time, raise a force as formidable to England as an openly enrolled Irish army. But the mere inaction of the executive might in many spheres produce greater results than active unfairness. The refusal of the police for the enforcement of evictions would abolish rent throughout the country. And the same result might be attained by a more moderate course. Irish Ministers might in practice draw a distinction between 'good' landlords and 'bad' landlords, and might grant the aid of the police for the collection of 'reasonable, ' though refusing it for the collection of 'excessive, ' rents. "

Irish Ministers might even refuse actively to oppose the "moral claim"of the Irish Catholics to the use of the cathedrals and of theaccumulated capital of the Irish Church. [34]

To contemplate the possibility of action or calculated inaction of thecharacter above described is not to attribute to Irishmen any specialmeasure of original sin. In every case where the executive power isdivorced from the ultimate legislative authority such divergencies arelikely to recur; and more than one instance may be found in our ownrecent history. In 1859 the Canadian Government warned the HomeGovernment that any attempt to interfere with the customs policy of theDominion was inadmissible, unless the home authorities were prepared toundertake the responsibility of administering the whole government ofCanada. The Home Government gave way. [35] In 1878 the Governor of CapeColony proposed to place the colonial forces under the control of theofficer commanding the Imperial forces. The Cape Government resisted, and refused to resign; and eventually the Governor, on the advice of theHome Government, dismissed his ministers. In this case a change ofgovernment occurred after the general election, but in the end the claimput forward by the Imperial authorities had to be withdrawn. [36] In 1906the Natal Government proclaimed martial law, and ordered the executionof twelve natives on charges of murder. The Imperial Governmentintervened, and suggested the suspension of the order pending furtherconsideration. The Natal Ministry immediately resigned; and as there wasno chance of the formation of a new Government, the Imperial authoritieshastily withdrew. [37]

Differences have arisen even on so grave a matter as the succession tothe throne. The union of England and Scotland in 1707 was preceded andhastened by the so-called Act of Security, by which the Scottish Estatesasserted the right to name a successor to the throne of Scotland, whoshould not (except under certain specified conditions) be the persondesignated as sovereign by the English law. And during the illness ofKing George III. In the year 1788, Grattan, in defiance of the views ofPitt and of the majority in both Houses of the Imperial Parliament, carried in the Irish Parliament an address to the Prince of Wales, calling upon him (without waiting for a Regency Bill) to assume theGovernment of the Irish nation, "and to exercise and administer alllegal power, jurisdiction and prerogatives to the Crown and Governmentthereof belonging"--words borrowed from the address by which in theRevolution of 1688 William of Orange was requested to assume the Crown. Happily, the Viceroy declined to present the address, and a deputationsent from Ireland to present it found on their arrival that the king hadrecovered; but the incident might have led to a conflict upon a matterso important as the exercise of the royal power. 

The fact is that the word "supremacy, " so often used in thiscontroversy, is one of ambiguous meaning. Parliament is supreme in theUnited Kingdom, Parliament is likewise supreme in New Zealand; but thetwo supremacies are of widely different kinds. Supremacy consists of twoingredients--authority to enact and power to enforce; and without thelatter the former is little more than a legal figment, which may have nomore practical importance than the theoretical right of veto which isretained by the Crown. Mr. Balfour, speaking on the second readingdebate of the 1893 Bill, referred to this matter as follows:--

 "Legally, of course, the Imperial Parliament would be supreme: no one has doubted it. But what layman takes the slightest interest in these paper supremacies? For my part I take no more interest in the question of whether the Imperial Parliament is on paper superior to the Irish Parliament, than I do as to the order of precedence at a London dinner party. The thing is of no public interest or importance whatever. What we want to know is where the power lies. Who is going to exercise supremacy? Who is going to be the _de facto_ ruler of Ireland?"

Special importance attaches to these considerations owing to the heavyliabilities undertaken by this country in respect of land purchase inIreland. At the present time many millions of British money are sunk inIrish land, and the amount may increase to a sum approaching two hundredmillions. The tenants now pay their annuities because, in the lastresort, the Government can turn them out. Under Home Rule the powers ofGovernment would rest with men who have led "no rent" agitations in thepast, and who would be dependent upon the votes of those personallyinterested in repudiating the debt. The British Treasury can hardly runsuch a risk; and some sort of concurrent control, with all its evils andrisks, seems to be necessary. And yet financial independence is thefirst essential to genuine autonomy. 

But, it may be said, if the Irish Government go beyond the law, theIrish Courts may be asked to interfere; and in the event of theirrefusal, the Bill provides an appeal to the Judicial Committee inLondon. No doubt it does, but in practice the person aggrieved mighthave very great difficulty in making the remedy effective. He mustobtain a decision in his favour from the Judicial Committee of the PrivyCouncil, at no small cost of money and personal odium; and the decisionof that "alien" tribunal (as it would be called) must then be enforcedunder the jurisdiction of a Government which (on the hypothesis which weare considering) would be unfriendly, by judges and executive officersappointed and perhaps removable by that authority, and in the midst of apopulation hostile to "foreign" interference. Is it extravagant tosuppose that the complainant would not gain much by his appeal toCęsar?

And even if we suppose the Irish Legislature and Executive to confinethemselves within the letter of the Act, are the checks of any realvalue? The Irish Parliament might still interfere with contracts, ormight validate contracts now held to be void as contrary to publicpolicy. They might defeat the Mortmain Acts. They might deal as theythought fit with internal trade; and the great industries of Belfast andits neighbourhood might find their views on trade questions of no avail. The Irish Legislature might create new offences and institute newtribunals; and the reference in the Bill to "due process of law" wouldnot necessarily secure trial by jury or by an impartial tribunal. [38]

It is said that legislation of this character would be subject to theveto of the Crown. But that veto is to be exercised on the advice of theIrish Ministry subject to any instructions given by the Sovereign; andso long as an Irish Legislature is entitled to withhold Irish supply, aveto against the advice of the Irish ministry would surely tend tobecome impossible. 

Again, it is said that an unjust law passed by the Irish Parliamentmight be repealed by the Imperial Parliament. Doubtless the technicalright would exist, as in the case of the Colonies; but no one dreamsthat, with "responsible" government existing in Ireland and Irishrepresentatives at Westminster, it would in practice be used. TheImperial Government has never been known to interfere with thelegislation of a self-governing colony except where Imperial interestsare concerned, or where a fraud on the colony can be established;[39]and the same rule would obtain in the case of Ireland. 

Lastly, it is said that in the last resort there is the British Army. But if the civil power in Ireland does not call in the military force, how can the latter be used to enforce the law? Are the forces to becontrolled from England, and what is this but a counter revolution? Itis hardly worth while to liberate Ireland from the peaceful rule of theImperial Government in order to govern her by military force. 

But in fact the so-called "safeguards" would not last. ProfessorDicey[40] and Professor Morgan, [41] writing from opposite sides of thecontroversy, agree in holding that no colony would tolerate them for amoment; and it is incredible that Ireland, with a Parliament of her own, would submit to them for more than a few years. [42] Suppose the majorityof the Irish Legislature to grow weary of the "safeguards, " and todemand their repeal. The Imperial ministry might refuse, but the replyof the Irish ministry (if in command of a majority in the Irish House ofCommons) would be to resign and to make the government of Irelandimpossible except by force. And if Ireland were still represented in theImperial Parliament, the new "sorrows of Ireland" would find eloquentand insistent expression there. What, then, would England do? What couldshe do, except, after a futile struggle, to give way? The truth is, thatif you part with the executive power, all checks and "safeguards" arefutile. Mr. Redmond[43] eagerly "accepts every one of them, " and willaccept others if desired; for he knows that they must prove ineffective. "If, " said Lord Derby in 1887, "Ireland and England are not to be one, Ireland must be treated like Canada or Australia. All between isdelusion or fraud. "

IRISH REPRESENTATION AT WESTMINSTER. 

The hybrid form of government proposed in the Home Rule Bills of 1886and 1893 gave rise to a further difficulty, and one which went fartowards wrecking them both. Should Ireland under Home Rule berepresented at Westminster by its members and representative peers?Under a system of Gladstonian Home Rule there appear to be only threepossible answers to this question. The Irish representatives may beexcluded altogether, they may be retained altogether, or they may beretained in diminished numbers and with some limitation on their votingpowers. 

The total exclusion clause in the Bill of 1886 was one of the mostunpopular parts of an unpopular Bill. It was immediately urged that thisarrangement was virtually equivalent to separation, and Mr. Gladstoneadmitted[44] that the argument had force. Since 1886 public sentimenthas advanced in the direction of a closer Imperial unity, and it isunlikely that the country will recur in 1912 to a proposal which in 1886was admitted to be intolerable. Moreover, if the British Parliament isto retain control of the whole foreign policy of the kingdom, and--whatis likely to be of enormous importance in the future--of its wholefiscal policy, it would be manifestly unjust to deny to Ireland a voiceand vote in such matters. How would it be possible, for instance, todiscuss the effect upon agriculture of a Tariff Reform Budget in theabsence of competent representatives of the Irish farmers, or toconsider the yearly grant to be made (as it is said) in aid of Irishfinance without the assistance of any representatives of Ireland?

A recognition of the difficulties in the way of total exclusion led Mr. Gladstone to propose, in 1893, what was known as the "popping-in-and-outclause, " under which Irish members would have sat at Westminster, butwould have voted only on Imperial measures. The best criticism of thisattempt to distinguish between local and Imperial matters was suppliedon another occasion by Mr. Gladstone himself:--

 "I have thought much, reasoned much, and inquired much with regard to that distinction, but I have arrived at the conclusion that it cannot be drawn. I believe it passes the wit of man. "

To distinguish between matters which might and those which could notaffect Ireland was impossible to the ordinary man, and the device ofcommitting all matters of special difficulty to the decision of Mr. Speaker had not then its present vogue. Further, it was obvious thatunder such a system a British Ministry might have on one day, whenEnglish or Scottish affairs were under discussion, a commandingmajority; but on the next, when a vote possibly affecting the sisterisland was in question, might find itself labouring in the trough of thesea; while on the third day, that vote having been disposed of and theIrish members having taken their leave, it might rise once more on thecrest of the wave. The proposal was too ludicrous to be long defended. The sense of humour of the House prevailed over Mr. Gladstone'searnestness, and he fell back on inclusion for all purposes. 

But inclusion for all purposes had its own difficulties. Under theGladstonian system the Imperial Parliament would have considered, notonly matters affecting the whole kingdom, but also purely English orpurely Scottish affairs; and to give to the Irish representatives thecontrol in their own Parliament of purely Irish affairs, and also avoice at Westminster on matters affecting England or Scotland only, wasobviously unjust. Such a power would have been used, not for the benefitof England or Scotland, but as an instrument for wresting furtherconcessions for Ireland. 

 "I will never be a party, " said Mr. Gladstone at one time, "to allowing the Irish members to manage their own affairs in Dublin, and at the same time to come over here and manage British affairs. Such an arrangement would not be a Bill to grant self-government to Ireland, but one to remove self-government from England; it would create a subordinate Parliament indeed, but it would be the one at Westminster, and not that in Dublin. "[45]

The problem seems insoluble because, under a hybrid (or Gladstonian)system of Home Rule, it is insoluble. If a clear line is taken, thereis no difficulty under this head. If full "responsible" or colonialgovernment is granted, clearly representation in the Imperial Parliament(I do not now speak of a federal assembly) is an anomaly. On the otherhand, if nothing more is in question than the extension of localgovernment generally known as Devolution, then adequate representationin the Imperial Parliament is a matter of course. If a federalgovernment is established, each member of the Federation must needs berepresented in the federal Parliament; but in that case there must be noattempt to entrust to the same assembly both the duties of the federalParliament and those of a Legislature for one of the federating states. It was this attempt to treat the Imperial Parliament as the local orstate Legislature for Great Britain, and also as the federal Parliamentfor Great Britain and Ireland, which was fatal to Mr. Gladstone'sproposals. 

FEDERALISM. 

These considerations bring us face to face with Federalism, or, to usethe phrase which to so many perplexed Liberals has seemed to point theway to safety, "Home Rule all round. " The expression covers a widefield, and before any opinion can be pronounced upon the proposal, it isessential to know what its advocates in fact desire. 

To some the phrase means nothing less than Gladstonian Home Rule "allround, " in other words that we should meet the objections to dissolvingthe legislative and executive Union with Ireland by dissolving also theolder Union with Scotland, and even (for some do not shrink from the_reductio ad absurdum_) the yet older unity of England and Wales. Consider what this means. For more than two hundred years the Englishand Scottish races have been united by a constitutional bondstrengthened by mutual respect and good feeling, and Scotsmen, likeEnglishmen, have taken their part in the government of these islands. Ifin the division of labour and of honours there has been a balance ofadvantage, it has not been against the virile Scottish race, from whichhave sprung so many of our great soldiers and administrators, so manyleaders of the nation. And such a combination is to be broken up, andScotland to become a colony, because Ireland, unwilling to bear hershare in the duties of government, desires to be reduced to that status!To such a proposal Mr. Gladstone's phrase about Home Rule applies in allits force:--

 "Can any sensible man, can any rational man, suppose that at this time of day, in this condition of the world, we are going to disintegrate the great capital institutions of this country for the purpose of making ourselves ridiculous in the sight of all mankind, and crippling any power we possess for bestowing benefits through legislation on the country to which we belong?"

The proposal would be incredibly stupid, if it were not recklesslymischievous. 

But to most advocates of the federal system the word means less thanthis; and the conception, usually vaguely expressed, is that therelations of England, Scotland, and Ireland, should be something likethose of the communities which make up (to quote instances commonlygiven) the German Empire, the Swiss Federation, the United States ofAmerica, or the British self-governing dominions of Canada, Australia, and South Africa. So expressed, the aspiration for a federal uniondeserves respectful consideration. 

In the first place, it must not be forgotten that no proposal of thisnature has yet been put forward, even in general terms, by any Englishor Irish Party. Mr. John Redmond, the leader of the Irish Nationalists, has indeed said that he and his friends "were only asking what hadalready been given in twenty-eight different portions of theEmpire:"[46] and a speaker usually more careful in his language[47]lately suggested to his audience that they should

 "ask the twenty-eight Home Rule Parliaments if the Empire would be split in pieces if there were a twenty-ninth. "

But in order to make up the number of Parliaments and Legislatureswithin the Empire to twenty-eight it is necessary to include in onecategory the Parliament of the United Kingdom, the colonial Parliamentsof Newfoundland and New Zealand, the federal Parliaments of Canada andAustralia, the provincial or state Legislatures (widely differing fromone another in their constitution and powers) comprised in thoseFederations, the Union of South Africa and its constituent provinces, and the tiny assemblies surviving in the Channel Islands and the Isle ofMan. From a reference so vague and confused no inference as to the realmeaning or desire of either speaker can safely be drawn. [48]

But let us put aside, with the foreign confederacies (which have in mostcases been achieved or maintained by armed conflict), the practicallyindependent Parliaments within the British Empire, and confine ourselvesto the Federations of Canada and Australia, and to the Union (sometimesincorrectly called a Federation) of South Africa. 

In the first place, it is not immaterial to observe that each of theLegislatures here referred to resulted, not from the dissolution of anexisting union, but from the voluntary assumption by communitiesformerly independent of one another of a closer bond. In other words, there was in each case a real _Jędus_ or treaty, not imposed by theImperial power, but having a local origin and springing from the need ofcommon action. The operative force was centripetal; and as the forcecontinues to operate, the tendency of the mass is towards a chemical inlieu of a mechanical fusion. [49] But in the case of the United Kingdom achange from organic union to Federation would be the beginning ofdissolution; and the centrifugal force, once set in motion, might leadfurther in the same direction. 

Again, there can be no true federation without (1) provinciallegislatures and executives, (2) a central Parliament and executive, (3)a careful definition of the powers of each, and (4) a federal court towhich should be entrusted the duty of determining questions arisingbetween the federal and provincial governments and legislatures. If, therefore, provincial or state Governments are created for Ireland andfor Scotland, a like Government should logically be created for England. Are we prepared to see four (or, if Wales be added, five) legislatures, and four (or five) executives, in these islands? Have we considered thepossible effect on our whole system of government, on the theory ofCabinet responsibility to Parliament, on the powers of the House ofCommons over grievance and supply? Must not each unit in a Federation beput as regards financial matters upon a like footing; and, if so, canIreland bear her share? Is federation consistent with the predominanceof one state, England, in wealth and population? These questions arevital, and none of them have received consideration. By declaring ingeneral terms for Federalism you go but a little way. 

And if we treat the proposal for Federation as indicating a desire toadopt a constitution under which the relations of the United Kingdom toeach of its constituent parts would be as the relation of some one ofthe three self-governing Dominions to the states or provinces of whichit is composed, the question remains, which of those Dominions should beadopted as a model? For they differ not only in form but in essence. 

Under the British North America Act, 1867, and the amending statutes, there is "one Parliament for Canada" (sect. 17), while each province hasits Legislature. Each provincial Legislature is empowered exclusively tomake laws in relation to certain specified subjects (including propertyand civil rights and the administration of justice), and also inrelation to "all matters of a merely local or private nature in theprovince"; while the Dominion Parliament may "make laws for the peace, order, and good government of Canada in relation to all matters notcoming within" the classes of subjects assigned exclusively to theprovincial Legislatures. The division of functions has given rise tomuch confusion and litigation; but, speaking generally, the trend ofjudicial decision has been towards a wide interpretation of theprovincial powers. The "residuary powers" are in the DominionParliament. 

The constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, as defined by theCommonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900, is of a differentcharacter. The Federal Parliament is entrusted with power to make lawswith respect to a number of subjects divided into no less than 39classes (sect. 51); the State Legislatures have concurrent powers oflegislation, but in case of conflict the law of the Commonwealth is toprevail over the State law (sect. 109). The "residuary powers" are inthis case left to the States. There is power to alter the Constitutionwith the consent of a majority of the electors in a majority of theStates and of a majority of the electors of the Commonwealth (sect. 123)--a power which has been freely used. 

The case of South Africa is sometimes cited as a precedent for looseningthe bonds in the United Kingdom. It is a strong precedent for closerunion. The South Africa Act, 1909, created in fact as well as in name, not a Federation but a true Legislative Union. Under the Act, the SouthAfrican colonies were "united in a legislative union under onegovernment under the name of the Union of South Africa" (sect. 4). Thelegislative power is vested in the Parliament of the Union (sect. 19), which has full power to make laws for the peace, order, and goodgovernment of the Union (sect. 59). In each province (formerly a colony)there is an administrator appointed by the Governor-General of the Unionin Council (sect. 68), and a Provincial Council (sect. 70); but thepowers of the Provincial Councils are confined within narrow limits(sect. 85), and their ordinances (they are not called laws) have effectwithin the province as long as and so far as they are not repugnant toany Act of the Union Parliament (sect. 86). The Supreme Courts of theold colonies become provincial divisions of the Supreme Court of SouthAfrica (sect. 98), and the colonial property and debts are transferredto the Union (sects. 121-124). In fact, in South Africa, where, as inIreland, the distinction in the past has been racial and notterritorial, Union and not Federation has gained the day. It is safe toprophesy that the coming proposals of the Government will not follow theSouth African plan. 

DEVOLUTION. 

The South African precedent leads naturally to a few observations on theproposals for the extension of local self-government, usually classifiedunder the head of Devolution. These proposals differ, not in degree onlybut in kind, from schemes for the granting of responsible government, orGladstonian Home Rule. Under all devolutionary schemes, properlyso-called, the central Parliament and executive remain the ultimatedepositaries of power; and the powers entrusted to local bodies areadministrative only, and can be resumed at will. The Acts by whichCounty Councils were set up, first in Great Britain and afterwards inIreland, were steps in this direction. The Welsh Intermediate EducationAct, 1889, was another. The establishment by the Agriculture andTechnical Instruction (Ireland) Act, 1899, of a Council of Agriculture, as Agricultural Board, and a Board of Technical Instruction, was athird. By these statutes wide powers are delegated to representativebodies directly or indirectly elected by popular vote; but in each casethe delegated powers are strictly defined, their exercise is madesubject to central control, and the right of Parliament to modify orwithdraw any of them is absolute and unquestioned. The appointment bythe House of Commons of a Grand Committee for Scottish Bills is anotherexperiment of a similar character, though on different lines. Suchdelegations of power are consistent with the maintenance in its entiretyof the Union of the Kingdom, and there is no reason whatever whyfurther progress should not be made in the same direction. The events of1907 are evidence that Devolution, regarded merely as a means ofsatisfying the political cry for Home Rule, is indeed "dead. " But whenthe din of political battle has once more passed by, it may be possibleto obtain consideration for a moderate and clearly defined scheme ofdelegation which, if applied not exclusively to Ireland, but to thewhole country, might relieve the House of Commons of much of its work, and strengthen the habit of local self-government throughout the UnitedKingdom. 

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 20: See "_Times_ Special Commission, " vol. V. P. 175, and"Home Rule. What is it?" by A. W. Samuels, K. C. (Simpkin Marshall, 1911), p. 60. ]

[Footnote 21: See No. 213 of the Liberal League publications. ]

[Footnote 22: Erskine Childers, "The Framework of Home Rule" (Arnold, 1911). ]

[Footnote 23: See speech of J. M. Robertson, M. P. , London, January 11, 1912. ]

[Footnote 24: "Home Rule Problems" (P. S. King & Son, 1911). ]

[Footnote 25: Written in March, 1912. ]

[Footnote 26: See Egerton, "Federations and Unions in the BritishEmpire" (Clarendon Press, 1911). Introduction. ]

[Footnote 27: On the financial questions involved the Government havebeen advised by a Committee containing financial experts; but the Reportof this Committee is withheld from publication, and it is believed thatits advice will not be followed. ]

[Footnote 28: House of Commons, April 8, 1886. ]

[Footnote 29: Quoted in "The True History of the American Revolution, "by S. G. Fisher (Lippincott, 1903). ]

[Footnote 30: Childers, p. 340. ]

[Footnote 31: See Cambray, "Irish Affairs and the Irish Question"(Murray, 1911), p. 146. ]

[Footnote 32: Mr. Gladstone always declined to call it a "Parliament, "but some Ministers of to-day are less scrupulous. ]

[Footnote 33: Dicey, "A Leap in the Dark" (Murray, 1911), p. 71. ]

[Footnote 34: See "The Church of Ireland and Home Rule, " by J. H. Bernard, D. D. , Bishop of Ossory, 1911. ]

[Footnote 35: House of Commons Papers, 1864, xli. 79. ]

[Footnote 36: Parliamentary Papers, 2079. ]

[Footnote 37: Parliamentary Papers (Cd. 2905). ]

[Footnote 38: "Home Rule Problems, " p. 124. ]

[Footnote 39: See the Newfoundland railway case of 1898 (ParliamentaryPapers, Cd. 8867, 9137). ]

[Footnote 40: "A Leap in the Dark, " p. 110. ]

[Footnote 41: "Home Rule Problems, " p. 112. ]

[Footnote 42: Mr. Redmond rejected the provisions of the 1893 Bill, saying in the House of Commons on August 30, 1893, that "as the Bill nowstands, no man in his senses can any longer regard it as a full, final, or satisfactory settlement of the Irish Nationalist question. "]

[Footnote 43: Speech at Belfast, February 8, 1912. ]

[Footnote 44: July 18, 1886, at Cockermouth. ]

[Footnote 45: See "The Perils of Home Rule, " by P. Kerr-Smiley (Cassell, 1911), p. 45, where Lord Morley's opinion to the same effect is quoted. ]

[Footnote 46: Speech at Whitechapel (_Times_, October 11, 1911). ]

[Footnote 47: Sir John Simon at Dewsbury (_Times_, February 8, 1912). ]

[Footnote 48: No such charge of ambiguity applies to the forcibleletters of "Pacificus" on "Federalism and Home Rule" (Murray, 1910). ]

[Footnote 49: The changes in the Australian Constitution have been infavour of greater unity. ]

IV

HOME RULE FINANCE

By THE RIGHT HON. J. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN, M. P. 

The financial problems connected with the grant of Home Rule in 1912 areamong the most complicated that call for solution, and differfundamentally from those which faced the Governments of 1886 and 1893. And by common consent, the problems are not merely different; they areimmensely more difficult. No clauses in the earlier Bills lentthemselves more readily to destructive criticism; and though theprovisions of the new scheme are still shrouded in mystery, it isinherent in the conditions under which it must be framed that thefinancial clauses will prove to be even less defensible on the groundsof logic or equity than those of either of its predecessors. 

Since the first Home Rule Bill was introduced the interests ofIreland--social, economic, industrial, and political--have becomeincreasingly identified with those of the other parts of the UnitedKingdom. The commercial, banking, and railway systems of Ireland areintimately associated with those of the greater and more firmlyestablished systems of Great Britain. Irish railways are so largelycontrolled at the present time by British concerns, and there exist somany agreements and understandings between them and British companies asto facilities and rates, that they might be regarded as part of the samenetwork of communications. Hardly less close are the relations which nowexist between British and Irish banks. 

It is not, however, on the commercial side only that greater intimacyand more firmly established relations exist now than formerly. Irishindustries are agricultural, dairying and manufacturing. In each ofthese branches the country is increasingly dependent on the markets ofEngland and Scotland; while reciprocally the products of the factoriesand workshops of Great Britain find in Ireland one of their mostimportant markets. We do not always sufficiently realise that on theother side of the St. George's Channel lies a country whose annualimports amount to sixty-five millions sterling. Even less do we realisethat one-half (thirty-two millions sterling) is the value of the importsof manufactures, mainly British, into Ireland. This trade inmanufactured goods is not only already enormous; it is rapidly growing. It has increased by more than four millions in four years. Anyill-considered legislative measure which interfered with or disturbedthis great volume of trade would no doubt cause serious loss to Ireland;but it would bring bankruptcy and disaster to many British firms andtheir workmen. 

It is, nevertheless, in respect of the political changes and thelegislative measures passed in the last quarter of a century that themost serious obstacles will be found in the way of framing anysatisfactory scheme for financing a measure of Home Rule. The IrishLocal Government system, framed on the British model by the Act of 1898, the Congested Districts Board, and the Department of Agriculture, havehitherto depended financially, either wholly or in part, on Imperialgrants in aid. Local taxation payments alone from the Imperial Exchequeramounted in 1910-11 to £1, 478, 000. The financial scheme under Home Rulemust obviously contemplate and provide for the continuance of thosegrants. Land Purchase schemes have been enacted which have already hadthe effect of converting a quarter of a million tenants into ownersunder a contingent liability of 120 millions sterling guaranteed by theImperial Exchequer. No financial scheme can ignore the fact that theearliest of the annuities created under the Wyndham Act will not expirebefore 1972, so that the Imperial liability for the payment of the bulkof the annuities already created will continue for at least seventyyears more. 

Finally, we are faced with the fact that in the last twenty-five yearsthe relations of the State to its citizens have been completelyreformed and extended. Social reform is now in the programme of allparties. Education costs several times as much as in 1885. The aged poorhave been provided with pensions by the State, and the Insurance Act oflast year will shortly call for additional subventions from the ImperialTreasury. 

In addition to the new duties thus undertaken by the State, the cost ofDefence and of the Civil Services has grown by leaps and bounds. We neednot look too closely into the apportionment of these charges whilst weremain partners in a United Kingdom, but if the partnership is to bedissolved at the suit of Irish Nationalism, a new balance must bestruck, and on any fair basis the contribution of Ireland underpresent-day conditions should far exceed the amount under either of theschemes for which Mr. Gladstone made himself responsible. Both schemesrecognised the equity of some contribution for these services fromIreland, and it must be assumed that the same broad principles will beapplied in any scheme which may be framed hereafter. 

By way of introduction to any adequate discussion of the possiblefinancial proposals of any Home Rule measure, it is desirable to set outin some detail the existing financial relations of Ireland and GreatBritain. The Treasury calculations on this subject are embodied in twoWhite Papers which have been prepared and published annually during thelast eighteen years. It is true that doubts have from time to time beencast on the accuracy of these calculations and of the methods by whichthe materials on which they are based have been collected. As to this, it is only necessary to say that the information in the possession ofthe Treasury officials is infinitely more voluminous and likely to bemore accurate than any in the possession of private individuals; andthere is no reason to suppose the succession of eminent public servants, who have been in turn responsible for the preparation of these returnshave been moved in one direction or the other by prepossessions or bias. Their one attempt has been throughout to present a statement, asaccurate as it is possible to make it on the one hand of the cost ofthe existing administration in Ireland and the expenditure incurredthere, and on the other of the revenue derived from persons or propertyliving or situated in that country. As the Prime Minister said onNovember 27 of last year--

 "The utmost pains have been taken to make the estimates of 'true' revenue approximately correct, and it is believed that the total revenue as given in the revised returns approximates closely to the facts. "[50]

So long as Ireland is an integral part of the United Kingdom, such aninvestigation has mainly an academic interest. The State is ahomogeneous entity; the taxes imposed on individuals similarlycircumstanced are the same (with some trifling exceptions--all in favourof Ireland) in whatever quarter of the United Kingdom the individualresides. But the case is wholly different when a proposal is made tosplit up the State into its constituent parts. It then becomes necessaryto inquire if there is any prospect that the constituent parts will haveresources sufficient for the various services, commitments andliabilities--present and contingent--which do or will belong to them. And the beginning of any such inquiry is, as has been already said, thepresent Irish revenue and expenditure. 

The essential figures for such an investigation are contained in thefollowing statement. This shows separately the expenditure on thevarious items which have been the subject of discussion or specialmention in the different financial schemes proposed in connection withHome Rule. On the revenue side the effect of the delayed collection ofduties under the Budget of 1909-10 has been eliminated by taking theaverage revenue in the two years in certain items. The figures ofexpenditure relate to the year 1910-11. The corresponding figures forboth collection and contribution are set out in this table inconsequence of the suggestion made in some quarters that we shouldrevert to the Gladstonian proposal of 1886 and credit Ireland with thefull revenue as collected. Though any such proposal is patently absurdit is mentioned here for the sake of completeness. 

STATEMENT SHOWING ESTIMATED REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE IN IRELAND (BASED ONWHITE PAPERS 220 AND 221 OF 1911). 

 Revenue As collected. As contributed. £ £1. Customs[A] 2, 922, 000 2, 866, 0002. Excise (_ex. _ licences)[A] 4, 872, 000 2, 952, 0003. Licence Duties[A] 284, 000 284, 0004. Estate, etc. [A] 914, 000 914, 0005. General Stamps[A] 310, 000 333, 0006. Income Tax[A] 1, 106, 000 1, 307, 0007. Postal Services 1, 155, 000 1, 155, 0008. Miscellaneous 139, 000 139, 000

 Total £11, 702, 000 £9, 950, 000

[A] = Average of two years, 1909-10 and 1910-11. 

 Expenditure. £1. Civil list and miscellaneous charges (_ex. _ Lord-Lieutenant's salary) 118, 5002. Lord-Lieutenant's salary 20, 0003. Local Taxation Payments 1, 477, 5004. Public Works 415, 5005. Civil Service Departments 289, 5006. Department of Agriculture 415, 0007. Police 1, 464, 5008. Judiciary, etc. 924, 0009. Education, etc. 1, 805, 00010. Old Age Pensions 2, 408, 00011. Superannuation, etc. 103, 00012. Ireland Development Grant 191, 50013. Miscellaneous 12, 00014. Revenue Departments 298, 00015. Postal Services 1, 404, 500

Total £11, 346, 500

The first striking fact in the foregoing statement is the largedifference between "contributions" and "collections, " _i. E. _ between the"true" revenue derived from Ireland and the sums merely collected there. During the last two financial years this difference amounted to anaverage of £1, 752, 000. The excise collections alone represent an excessof £1, 920, 000 over the actual contribution. This, of course, arises fromthe movements of duty-paid spirits and beer between different parts ofthe United Kingdom. The last Report of the Commissioners of Customs andExcise (Cd. 5827) gives the amount of home-made spirits on which dutyhas been paid in Ireland at 5, 209, 000 proof gallons, whereas thequantity retained for consumption was only 2, 776, 000 proof gallons. Asimilar but smaller difference exists in the case of beer. To creditIreland with the full amounts of the duties collected in Ireland, as wasdone by Mr. Gladstone in 1886, and as is now proposed in some quarters, would, in effect, amount to a gift from the British Exchequer of£1, 750, 000 a year. And there is obviously no security that the IrishExchequer could rely on this boon being continued for more than a shorttime. There would be nothing to prevent the British spirit merchant fromremoving his spirits to this country in bond and paying the duty hereafter arrival. It is obvious that the Treasury would be compelled togrant facilities for this course. The present system is merely one ofbook-keeping and administrative convenience, but as the withdrawal ofthis sum from the British Exchequer to which it properly belongs wouldhave to be made good from other British sources, there would be everyinducement for the British merchant to effect such slight changes ofmethod as would transfer the whole of this sum from the Irish to theBritish Exchequer. Having regard to the fact that on the other sourcesof revenue the collections in Ireland are estimated to fall short of theactual contributions by nearly £200, 000, and that these are in the maindirect taxes paid by the individuals concerned, it is not unlikely thata scheme which gave to Ireland the full benefit of her revenues ascollected would in a short time be converted from a gain of some£1, 700, 000 to a loss of £100, 000 to £200, 000 to the Irish taxpayer. Stability in the tax system and reliability upon the realisation of theestimated revenue could not be assumed if "collections" instead of"contributions" were to be made the basis of any financial arrangements. 

Turning next to the contributed revenue upon which alone an IrishParliament could rely, we note first the large proportion of the revenuerepresented by Customs and Excise. Contrasted with the figures for GreatBritain, it is seen by the following table that whereas in Ireland therevenue from Customs and Excise amounts to 60 per cent. Of the total, inGreat Britain the proportion was not more than 36 per cent. 

PERCENTAGE OF REVENUE FROM DIFFERENT SOURCES CONTRIBUTED BY IRELAND ANDGREAT BRITAIN RESPECTIVELY IN TWO YEARS ENDING MARCH 31, 1911. [51]

 Ireland. Great Britain. Per cent. Per cent. 

Customs 29 18-1/2Excise (_ex. _ licences) 30 17-1/2Estate, etc. , duties 9 14-1/2Income tax 13 23-1/2Postal, etc. 11 15Other sources 8 11 --- --- 100 100

Exclusive of the licence duties the average yield (contribution) ofCustoms and Excise in Great Britain amounted in the last two years to£55, 900, 000, or at the rate of £1 7_s. _ 5_d. _ per head; in Ireland theaverage yield was £5, 800, 000, or at the rate of £1 7_s. _ 10_d. _ perhead. The incidence of our consumption taxes is thus seen to be at thepresent time practically the same in Ireland as in Great Britain; andthe much larger proportion of the Irish revenue obtained from them isdue to the smaller relative yield of direct taxes. Ireland being mainlyan agricultural country, income tax, death duties, and stamps yield muchless per head of the population there than in Great Britain. Suchconditions are highly suggestive of inelasticity. An Irish Chancellor ofthe Exchequer will find no such fiscal reserves in direct taxes as doeshis more fortunate British colleague. This conclusion should give pauseto those who think that if the Customs and Excise continued to becontrolled from Westminster, it would be still possible to extract thelarger revenue needed for the growing expenditure of Ireland by higherrates of income tax and death duties. Such a course would increase theburdens of the direct taxpayers of Ireland, but it would not fill theIrish Treasury. On the other hand, it is clear that there is no chanceof relief being afforded to the Irish indirect taxpayer under Home Rule, supposing Customs and Excise were handed over to the Irish Parliament. Yet whenever a British Chancellor of the Exchequer has found itnecessary to increase any of the taxes on consumption, the protests fromthe Irish benches have been invariably both loud and vehement. Irishmembers have pointed to the low wages earned in Ireland, the greateraddiction of the people to tea and spirits, and the higher toll of theirearnings consequently extracted by the Exchequer. The yield of existingtaxes, therefore, whether direct or indirect, is not elastic in Ireland. Neither of them afford sufficient resources to meet the necessities ofan Irish Parliament. 

There are, of course, other reasons why there should be no delegation ofthe power to impose Customs and Excise. The constitutional objections tosuch a course are overwhelming. It would involve the abandonment of theplea that Home Rule for Ireland was the prelude to Home Rule all round;in other words, that separation was the condition precedent tofederalism. In every federal system in the world the control of Customsand Excise has been retained by the central authority. This is true notonly of the quasi-federations within the British Empire; it is equallytrue of the United States, Germany, and Switzerland. One can scarcely besurprised at the emphatic repudiation which such a proposal received atthe hands of the Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade (Mr. J. M. Robertson) when, on February 7, 1912, in a speech at Lincoln, he said--

 "There was, however, just one thing that must remain one for three kingdoms, and that was the fiscal system, Customs and Excise. _It was a federal union we want, a federal state. _ If they were to do as some of his unreflecting Home Rule friends, Irish and English, have done, and demand that Ireland should not only have power to lay taxes but to fix Customs and Excise then they had no State left at all. "

Another obvious objection to such a course is that it necessitates theerection of a Customs barrier between Ireland and Great Britain. TariffReformers are ready to admit that the present fiscal system is at leastas injurious to Ireland as to other portions of the United Kingdom. Thepower to impose Customs duties on British goods--and the proportion ofBritish total imports is so large that if this power were limited toforeign goods it would be financially valueless--would no doubt providethe Irish Exchequer with considerable funds and might be used to developher prosperity. But the separation of the Customs systems for thepurpose of enabling Ireland to impose tariffs in her own interests wouldnecessarily be followed by a demand for treaty-making powers such ashave been successfully claimed and are now enjoyed by British Dominionsoverseas. Under a general tariff for the United Kingdom the sameadvantages would accrue to Ireland without any corresponding damage toBritish or Imperial interests. 

Thus, whether Customs and Excise are handed over to the Irish Parliamentor retained by the Imperial Parliament, the consequences are equallyembarrassing. In the one case Ireland would be deprived of the controlof some 60 per cent. Of her present revenue, and of all power ofexpansion; in the other, British trade with Ireland might be gravelyinjured by hostile legislation, and the union of the three kingdoms infinancial and commercial policy would be destroyed. But this is notfederation, nor is it a step towards it. It is separation pure andsimple. Unless we are prepared to accept separation as the end of ourpolicy the control of Customs and therefore of Excise, must remain anImperial affair. 

There can, therefore, be no justification for taking the control of theCustoms and Excise from the Imperial Parliament. The Irish Parliamentwould thus be left with some 40 per cent. Of present revenue under herown control. But the power to raise further revenue within the limitslegally reserved to the Irish Parliament would be even less than thisfigure would imply. For of the £4, 100, 000 of revenue other than Customsand Excise, nearly £1, 200, 000 comes from the Postal Services; and evenif these services were controlled by Ireland, it may be taken that therates charged will be the same as in Great Britain. Of the remaining£2, 900, 000 nearly one-half comes from income tax. It has already beenpointed out that its yield cannot be materially increased. There areonly two ways by which an Irish Chancellor might attempt such a task. Hemight raise the rate of income tax or he might lower the exemptionlimit. The former course would almost certainly be followed by twoequally undesirable results. So far as the tax continued to be paid inIreland it would fall with crushing force on the alreadyheavily-burdened agricultural industry. Still, from the point of view ofthe Exchequer, there might be some additional revenue on this account. On the other hand, there would be a check to the investment of capitalin Ireland--and no country needs capital more--and a powerful temptationto transfer it where the tax would be lower. It may be seriouslyquestioned, therefore, whether any increase in the income tax above theBritish rate is practicable. The other alternative, namely, the loweringof the exemption limit, would be so unpopular that no Irish Chancelloris ever likely to consider it seriously. 

Passing from the consideration of revenue it is necessary to examine therelation of present revenue to present expenditure. The first table inthe present article shows that the ascertainable expenditure for Irishpurposes in 1910-11 was about £1, 400, 000 more than the revenue. To thisexpenditure must be added about £300, 000 for the State Share of thebenefits under Part I. Of the National Insurance Act, about £50, 000 inrespect of Part II. , and about £100, 000 for cost of administration ofboth parts, increasing the immediate deficit to about £1, 550, 000. Thiscalculation, moreover, includes no charge against Irish revenue onaccount of Imperial Services--navy and army; National Debt, interest andmanagement; the diplomatic services, and so forth. The equity of suchpayments has been consistently recognised in the two Bills and the threefinancial schemes submitted by Mr. Gladstone. However moderate the scaleof contribution it would in the present case double or treble the marginbetween Irish revenue and Irish expenditure for local purposes. If, forexample, the precedent of the 1886 Bill were followed, and Irelandcharged with a contribution for Imperial services in proportion to theestimated relative taxable capacities, the additional charges on theIrish Exchequer would amount to not less than about £4, 000, 000 on the1910-11 figures if the taxable capacity of Ireland be taken atone-twenty-fifth, and to nearly £3, 500, 000 if it be taken atone-thirtieth. 

It may be worth while here to refer to the amazing statement that GreatBritain has made a large "profit out of the Union. " At the last meetingof the British Association, Prof. Oldham affected to prove that Ireland"in the course of one hundred years ... Had sent across the Channel asher contribution to the British Exchequer a clear net payment of about330 millions sterling. " The same contention has been urged by LordMacDonnell. This calculation ignores the fact that even the IrishParliament between 1782 and 1800 acknowledged its obligation tocontribute to Imperial services, and voted contributions for Imperialpurposes, besides raising and maintaining in Ireland a force of 12, 000to 15, 000 men, some of whom were available for foreign service. It makesno allowance also for the debt which Ireland brought into the Unionwhen the Exchequers were amalgamated in 1817. The importance of the lastitem may be judged from the fact that if the whole of the so-calledcontribution to Imperial services, _i. E. _ the excess of true revenueover local expenditure, had been employed since 1817 in paying interestat 3 per cent. On the old Irish debt and the whole of any balanceremaining after payment of interest had been used for redemption of thecapital, this debt would only have been extinguished in 1886. If acontribution of only 1 per cent. To the cost of Imperial services hadbeen previously charged against this excess, there would be a largebalance of the Irish debt still outstanding. As a matter of fact, in thesame period that Ireland is said to have contributed £330, 000, 000, GreatBritain may be shown by a precisely similar calculation to havecontributed no less than £5, 800, 000, 000 for Imperial purposes. Themeasure of "injustice to Ireland" meted out by unsympathetic Britons inrespect to the Imperial contribution extracted from Ireland may be seenfrom the following comparison for different dates in the last century. 

RATIOS OF POPULATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO IMPERIAL SERVICESOF IRELAND AND GREAT BRITAIN AT DECENNIAL INTERVALS. 

 Ratio of British to Ratio of British to Irish Populations. Irish Contributions. 

1819-20 2·1 12·71829-30 2·1 10·91839-40 2·3 11·51849-50 3·2 17·61859-60 4·0 9·81869-70 4·8 12·31879-80 5·7 16·31889-90 7·0 22·61899-00 8·9 46·51909-10 9·3 [52]

The truth is that from a financial point of view Ireland has no validcomplaint to make on the score of her contributions for Imperialpurposes. Between 1820 and 1840 the Irish population was a little lessthan one-half of the population of Great Britain; her contribution forImperial Services varied from one-eleventh to one-thirteenth. In1899-1900 the British contribution was 46-1/2 times the Irish, thoughthe population was less than nine times as large. If any contributionfor Imperial Services from Ireland is justified, and Mr. Gladstone atleast acknowledged it, no one can say that the contribution actuallytaken from Ireland has been excessive. 

As already stated we are still without any information as to thefinancial proposals to be included in the Home Rule Bill of 1912. TheGovernment have appointed a Committee to advise them upon this subject. Though the cost of the Committee has been met out of public funds, andsources of information were laid open to them which are not readilyavailable to the public, the Prime Minister has steadily refused tosupply to Parliament any information as to the results of theirlabours. [53] The terms of reference to the Commission; the witnessesexamined by them; the information placed at their disposal; thecharacter of the conclusions and recommendations; these have, all alike, been refused to the House of Commons. But while Parliament has beendenied this information, there is every reason to believe that theleaders of the Nationalist Party have been taken fully into theconfidence of the Government. We do not know whether, for example, theCustoms or Excise or both will be imposed and collected by the futureIrish Parliament. We do not know whether any contribution will berequired for the Irish share of Imperial services. We are equallyuncertain whether any and what purely Irish services will be retained bythe Imperial Parliament, and charged on the Imperial Exchequer. Andlastly, the intentions of the Government in regard to the payment of asubsidy from the Imperial Exchequer to the Irish Parliament, with whichrumour is busy, are as yet unrevealed. 

In spite of this lamentable paucity of information as to the Governmentplan, I think it can be safely said that no scheme even remotelyresembling any of those presented in connection with the two previousBills can be put forward now. Each of those schemes would involve theIrish Parliament in a huge deficit from the very outset. Even if theschemes were adapted to the changed modern conditions the sameimpassable gap between available revenue and certain expenditureremains. Those schemes presumably embodied principles which theGovernments of 1886 and 1893, and the Nationalist parties of those datesregarded as adequate. It would be strange if it were otherwise, seeingthat an examination and comparison of the separate schemes can discoverno other consistent principles except the solitary one of juggling withthe revenues, expenditures, and contributions in such manner as wouldstart the Irish Parliament with a small surplus. In view of theimportance of these earlier attempts to secure an approximation tofinancial equilibrium, it appears desirable to examine how Ireland wouldfare in modern conditions under each of them. 

The essential features of the 1886 scheme were as follows:--

1. Customs and Excise to be under the complete control of the ImperialParliament. 

2. Irish Parliament to have power to levy any other taxes. 

3. Ireland to contribute annually to the Consolidated Fund of the UnitedKingdom. 

(_a_) £1, 466, 000 for interest and management of Irish share of NationalDebt. 

(_b_) £1, 466, 000 for contribution to Imperial Defence. 

(_c_) £110, 000 for contribution to Imperial Civil Services. 

(_d_) £1, 000, 000 for Irish Constabulary. 

4. Contributions 3 (_a_) to 3 (_d_) were not to be increased for thirtyyears, but might be diminished. 

5. Irish share of National Debt to be reckoned at £48, 000, 000, and IrishSinking Fund to begin at £360, 000, increasing by amount of interestreleased on redeemed portion of debt. 

6. Contribution to Imperial Defence and Civil Services not to exceedone-fifteenth of the total cost in any year. 

7. Irish contribution to be credited with receipts on account of CrownRevenues in Ireland. 

8. If expenditure on Constabulary fell below £1, 000, 000, contribution 3(_d_) to be correspondingly reduced. 

9. Customs and Excise _collected_ in Ireland were to be subject tofollowing charges:--

(_a_) Cost of collection, not more than 4 per cent. 

(_b_) Contributions to Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom. 

(_c_) Payments to National Debt Commissioners. 

(_d_) Any sums required under the Land Act of that Session the balancebeing paid over to the Irish Government. 

10. The Lord Lieutenant's salary not to fall on the Irish Exchequer. 

Broadly the scheme gave to the Irish Government credit for the Customsand Excise _collected_ in Ireland and charged it with annual payments of£4, 502, 000 in addition to the cost of collection. It is clear that Mr. Gladstone, at the time when the Irish population was about one-eighth ofthe United Kingdom, assumed Ireland to have a taxable capacity ofone-fifteenth. If such a scheme were introduced at the present moment itis obvious that, owing to the further decline in the population ofIreland, a smaller figure for taxable capacity must be taken. What thatfigure should be it is difficult, if not impossible, to decidesatisfactorily. It is generally assumed that on the basis of thecalculations made by the Financial Relations Commission in 1896, thepresent relative taxable capacity for Ireland would be aboutone-twenty-fifth that of the United Kingdom. In the last two financialyears the Irish contribution to Income Tax has been one-twenty-eighth, and the contribution to Estate Duties one-twenty-sixth of the totalcollection in the United Kingdom. These proportions, taken as measuresof taxable capacity must be exceptionally favourable to Ireland, wherethe proportion of Income Tax payers and of persons possessing propertypaying Death Duties is relatively to the total population smaller than inthe United Kingdom as a whole. If, therefore, for the sake of the presentcalculations the mean of two proportions--_i. E. _ one-twenty-seventhdeducible from the Income Tax and Death Duty contributions is assumed, we employ a figure exceptionally favourable to Ireland. The financialstatement on the next page showing the 1886 scheme applied to presentconditions has been drawn up on this basis. The revenue is here assumedto come in at the average rate of the last two years (1909-10 and1910-11) and the expenditure is taken as that of 1910-11. 

The state of the Irish Exchequer under the foregoing scheme would beindeed a parlous one. It would start with a deficit of £3, 200, 000, andwith a prospective immediate increase by about £450, 000 on account ofthe Insurance Act. The actual budget deficit would thus be about£3, 650, 000. The Imperial Parliament would collect about £7, 794, 000, andafter deducting £5, 346, 000 would hand back to the Irish Exchequer thedifference of £2, 458, 000. The revenues upon which the Chancellor in theIrish Parliament could rely would be, therefore, £6, 366, 000. Out of thisan expenditure of £9, 562, 000 would have to be met. The postal serviceswould probably not stand any increased charges; there is left, therefore, only £5, 211, 000 of free revenue, and only £2, 753, 000 underthe unrestricted control of the Irish Parliament. With such resources itwould be obviously impossible to make good a deficit of £3, 206, 000 byany increase of taxation. It must not be overlooked, also, that theeffect of crediting Ireland with Customs and Excise as "collected"instead of as "contributed" is practically to make the Irish Parliamenta further free gift of nearly £2, 000, 000. 

A totally different scheme accompanied the Home Rule Bill of 1893 asintroduced. The principal features of the new scheme were as follows:--

1. Customs, excise, and postage to be imposed by the ImperialParliament. 

2. Excise and postage to be collected and managed by the IrishParliament. 

3. Customs to be collected and retained by the Imperial Parliament inview of contribution to Imperial services. 

4. Excise duties collected in Ireland on articles consumed in GreatBritain to be handed over to Imperial Exchequer. 

5. If Excise duties be increased the yield of the excess duties to behanded over to the Imperial Exchequer. 

6. If Excise duties be reduced and Irish revenue diminished, thedeficiency to be made good to Irish revenue. 

7. Two-thirds of the cost of the Constabulary to be repaid to theImperial Exchequer. 

Some of the provisions of this scheme are of exceptional interest. If ithad ever been in operation the plan, for example, of adjusting thepayments from one exchequer to the other in the event of changes beingenacted by the Imperial Parliament in the Excise duties must have beenfruitful of difficulties and created much friction. If the duties hadbeen reduced there might have been an increased consumption. Who can sayhow much of the revenue lost to the Irish Exchequer in the event of areduction of duties would have been due to the reduced rates of duty, and how much had been regained by increased consumption. Again, if theExcise duties had been increased, as in the Budget of 1909, to such adegree that the total revenue at the higher duty was less than the totalrevenue from the lower duty, who could have determined whether this wasa case requiring a payment from the Irish to the British Exchequer, orfrom the British to the Irish Exchequer. 

Perhaps the most striking novelty of the first scheme of 1893 was theretention of the Customs duties in lieu of Ireland's contribution toImperial Services. At that time the estimated value of the Customscontributed by Ireland was £2, 400, 000, and seeing that in 1886 herreasonable share of liability on account of Imperial Services was put at£4, 600, 000, the very large gift to Ireland represented by this schememay be readily imagined. Even with the full advantage of this gift theestimated Irish surplus was put at £500, 000. During the discussions ofthe Bill an error in the Excise contributions, reducing the revenueavailable to the Irish Exchequer by £356, 000 was discovered. The reducedsurplus of £144, 000 was regarded by Mr. Gladstone as "cutting it toofine, " and the financial scheme was completely recast. Before explainingthe third scheme it might be well to examine as before how the originalscheme of 1893 would work out at the present time. This is shown in thefollowing balance sheet. 

SCHEME B (BASED ON BILL OF 1893, AS INTRODUCED). 

REVENUE. £ EXPENDITURE. £

1. Excise (true revenue 1. Civil Government _ex. _ licences) 2, 952, 000 charges (_ex. _ Constabulary2. Local Taxes-- and Lord (_a_) Stamps 333, 000 Lieutenant's salary) 6, 952, 000 (_b_) Death Duties 914, 000 2. Collection of Ireland (_c_) Income Tax 1, 307, 000 Revenues, etc. 298, 000 (_d_) Excise licences 284, 000 3. Postal Services 1, 404, 0003. Postal Revenue 1, 155, 000 4. Contribution to Constabulary4. Miscellaneous 150, 000 (2/3rds of --------- £1, 464, 500) 976, 000 7, 095, 000 Deficit 2, 535, 000 --------- --------- 9, 630, 000 9, 630, 000

The narrow surplus of £144, 000 has disappeared, and instead there is onpresent-day figures the substantial deficit of £2, 535, 000. Here again itmay be observed that the Excise duties are fixed by the ImperialParliament, and the Postal charges are presumably also invariable. Thefirst Budget deficit would, as before, be not less than £3, 000, 000. Thetaxes within the absolute control of the Irish Parliament would havebeen producing a revenue of £2, 838, 000. It is within this range oftaxation, or by the imposition of new direct taxes, that the IrishChancellor of the Exchequer would have been compelled to raise anadditional £3, 000, 000 in order to make the two sides of his accountbalance. 

Owing to the mistake already referred to, Mr. Gladstone prepared andpresented a third scheme, whose principal features were as follows:--

1. Ireland's contribution to Imperial expenditure to be one-third ofthe true revenue of taxes levied in Ireland. 

2. Ireland to be credited with miscellaneous receipts and surplus (ifany) arising from postal services. 

3. Ireland to pay out of revenues credited to her, two-thirds of thecost of the Constabulary, all Civil Government charges and any deficiton postal services. 

4. The Customs and Inland Revenue duties and the rates for Postalcharges to be fixed and collected by Imperial Parliament. 

5. After six years (1) Irish contribution to Imperial Services to berevised; (2) the collection of Inland Revenue duties to be undertaken byIrish Government; (3) Irish legislation to impose the stamp duties, income tax, and excise licences. The financial clauses as thusremodelled and simplified were expected to produce a surplus of£512, 000. The characteristic feature of this arrangement was theprovision for handing over to the Imperial Exchequer one-third of theIrish true tax revenue as Ireland's payment on account of ImperialServices. How matters would stand if this arrangement were applied tothe present financial situation in Ireland may be seen from thefollowing table. 

SCHEME C (BASED ON BILL OF 1893, AS AMENDED). 

REVENUE. £ EXPENDITURE £

1. Customs 2, 866, 000 1. Civil Government2. Excise (_ex. _ licence Charges 6, 952, 000 duties) 2, 952, 000 2. Constabulary (2/3rds3. Stamps 333, 000 of £1, 464, 000) 976, 0004. Death duties 914, 000 3. Estimated deficit on5. Licence duties 284, 000 Postal Services 249, 0006. Income Tax 1, 307, 0007. Crown Lands, etc. 25, 000 --------- 8, 681, 000 ---------8. 2/3rds of £8, 965, 000 5, 757, 0009. Miscellaneous Receipts 115, 000 --------- 5, 902, 000 Deficit 2, 275, 000 --------- --------- Total 8, 177, 000 Total 8, 177, 000 --------- ---------

The main Irish objection to a scheme of this description is that, whatever tax be imposed, the amount taken from the Irish taxpayer wouldbe 50 per cent. Greater than the amount going into the Irish Exchequer. It is easy to foresee that such an arrangement would have led to muchfriction and difficulty, and that it could not have lasted even the sixyears for which it was provisionally fixed. If applied to the presentsituation Ireland would have been contributing less than £3, 000, 000 forImperial services, although a very moderate estimate of what hercontribution should be would require her to pay at least £5, 000, 000. Inspite of this modest payment, however, this scheme would have confrontedthe Irish Chancellor of the Exchequer with a deficit of more than£2, 250, 000 rising at once to £2, 700, 000 in consequence of the InsuranceAct. 

In reviewing the three financial schemes which have previously seen thelight, the following facts stand out clearly:--

1. Some contribution was expected from Ireland for Imperial services ineach scheme. 

2. The rates of customs, excise, and postage were in all cases to becontrolled by the Imperial Parliament. 

3. The customs were in every case to be collected by officers of theImperial Exchequer. 

4. In the two schemes of 1893 "true" revenue and not "collected" revenuewas the basis of the financial arrangement. 

5. Each of these schemes would involve the Irish Parliament from theoutset in a huge deficit. 

In view of these facts it is certain that any arrangement whichpretended to give a Budget surplus to the Irish Parliament wouldinvolve, overtly or covertly, the payment of a large subsidy to Irelandout of the Imperial Exchequer. Such a contingency is not likely to makeHome Rule more acceptable, or the path of any Bill through Parliamentmore easy. 

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 50: See Parliamentary Debates. ]

[Footnote 51: Based on White Papers 233 (1910) and 220 (1911). ]

[Footnote 52: No contribution from Ireland in this year; localexpenditure is estimated to have been in excess of revenue contributed. ]

[Footnote 53: Since the above was written, Mr. Birrell has promised(March 27, 1912) to publish the report "some time" after theintroduction of the Home Rule Bill. ]

V

HOME RULE AND THE COLONIAL ANALOGY. 

BY L. S. AMERY, M. P. 

There is no argument in favour of Home Rule for Ireland which is morefrequently used to-day than that which is based on the analogy of ourColonial experience. In the history of every one of our Colonies--soruns one variant of the argument--from Lord Durham's report on Canadadown to the grant of responsible government to the Transvaal, "HomeRule" has turned disaffection into loyalty, and has inaugurated a careerof prosperity. Why should we then hesitate to apply to Irish discontentthe "freedom" which has proved so sovereign a remedy elsewhere? Again, if our Dominions have been able to combine local Home Rule with nationalunity--so runs another variant--why should a policy which workssuccessfully in Canada or Australia not work in the United Kingdom?Another suggestion freely thrown out is that Home Rule is only thebeginning of a process of federalisation which is to bring us to thegoal of Imperial Federation. In one form or another the Colonial Analogyoccupies the foreground of almost every speech or article in favour ofIrish Home Rule. The ablest, as well as the most courageous, piece ofHome Rule advocacy which has so far appeared, Mr. Erskine Childers's"Framework of Home Rule, " is based from first to last on this analogyand on little else. 

That the argument is effective cannot be gainsaid. It is the argumentwhich appeals most strongly to the great body of thoughtful Liberals whofrom every other point of view look upon the project with unconcealedmisgiving. It is the argument which has appealed to public opinion inthe Dominions, and has there secured public resolutions and privatesubscriptions for the Nationalist cause. In one of its forms it appealedto the imagination of an Imperialist like Cecil Rhodes. In another ithas, undoubtedly, in recent years attracted not a few Unionists who havebeen prepared to approach with, at any rate, an open mind theconsideration of a federal constitution for the United Kingdom. And, indeed, if the analogy really applied, it would be difficult to resistthe conclusion. If Ireland has really been denied something which hasproved the secret of Colonial loyalty and prosperity, what Englishmanwould be so short-sighted as to wish to deprive her of it for the meresake of domination? If Home Rule were really a stepping-stone towardsImperial Federation, how insincere our professions of "thinkingImperially, " if we are not prepared to sacrifice a merely localsentiment of union for a great all-embracing ideal!

But, as a matter of fact, there is no such analogy bearing on thequestion which, here and now, is at issue. On the contrary the wholetrend of Colonial experience confirms, in the most striking fashion, theessential soundness of the position which Unionists have maintainedthroughout, that the material, social and moral interests, alike ofIreland and of Great Britain, demand that they should remain members ofone effective, undivided legislative and administrative organisation. 

The whole argument, indeed, plausible as it is, is based on a series ofconfusions, due, in part, to deliberate obscuring of the issue, in partto the vagueness of the phrase "Home Rule, " and to the general ignoranceof the origin and real nature of the British Colonial system. There are, indeed, three main confusions of thought. There is, first of all, theconfusion between "free" or "self-governing" institutions, as contrastedwith unrepresentative or autocratic rule, and separate government, whether for all or for specified purposes, as contrasted with a commongovernment. In the next place there is the confusion between the statusof a self-governing Dominion, in its relations to the ImperialGovernment, and the status of a Colonial state or provincial governmenttowards the Dominion of which it forms a part. A truly inimitableinstance of this confusion has been provided by Mr. Redmond in adeclaration made on more than one occasion that all that Ireland asksfor, is, "What has already been given to twenty-eight different portionsof the Empire. "[54] Considering that the "portions" thus enumeratedinclude practically sovereign nation states like Canada, provinces likethose of the South African Union, with little more than county councilpowers, and stray survivals, like the Isle of Man, of an earlier systemof government, based on the same principle of ascendency andinterference as the government of Ireland under Poynings's Act, it isdifficult to know which to admire most, Mr. Redmond's assurance, or hiscynical appreciation of the ignorance or capacity for deliberateself-deception of those with whom he has to deal. The third confusion isthat between Imperial functions and national or Dominion functions, dueto the fact that the two are combined in the United Kingdom Parliament, which is also, under present conditions, the Imperial Parliament, and tothe consequent habitual use of the word "Imperial" in two quitedifferent senses. It is this last confusion which makes such adeclaration as Mr. Asquith's about safeguarding "the indefeasibleauthority of the Imperial Parliament" a mere equivocation, for itaffords no indication as to whether the supremacy retained is theeffective and direct control maintained by Canada over Ontario, or themuch slighter and vaguer supremacy exercised by the United Kingdom overthe Dominions. It is this same confusion, too, which is responsible forthe notion that the problem of creating a true Imperial Parliament orCouncil by a federation of the Dominions would be assisted, either bycreating an additional Dominion in the shape of Ireland, or byarranging the internal constitution of the United Kingdom, as one of thefederating Dominions, on a federal rather than on a unitary basis. 

The confusion of ideas between self-government and separate governmentpervades the whole argument that the granting of "Home Rule" to Irelandwould be analogous to the grant of responsible institutions to theColonies. The essence of Home Rule is the creation of a separategovernment for Ireland. The essence of our Colonial policy has been theestablishment of popular self-government in the Colonies. That thisself-government has been effected through local parliaments and localexecutives, and not by representation in a common parliament, is aconsequence of the immense distances and the profound differences inlocal conditions separating the Dominions from the Mother Country. It isan adaptation of the policy to peculiar conditions, and not an essentialprinciple of the policy itself. 

This is obvious from any consideration of the circumstances under whichthe policy of Colonial self-government originated. Under the oldColonial system which preceded it, the Governor not only controlled theexecutive government, whose members were simply his officialsubordinates, but also controlled legislation through a nominated UpperChamber or Legislative Council. The object of this restrictive policywas not interference with local affairs, but the supposed necessity ofsafeguarding general Imperial interests. Local affairs were, in themain, left to the local government. But the peculiar constitution ofthat government rendered it almost inevitable that the practical controlof those affairs should fall into the hands of a narrowly limited class, clustering round the Governor and his circle, and by its privileges andprejudices creating in those excluded from that class a spirit ofopposition, which extended from its members to the whole Imperial systemwhich they were supposed to personify. In each of the North AmericanColonies a small oligarchy, generally known as the "Family Compact, "was able to "monopolise the Executive Council, the Legislative Council, the Bench, the Bar, and all offices of profit. " It was against thissystem, and not against the Imperial connection or even against undueinterference from England, that the Canadian rebellion of 1837 wasdirected. In 1838 Lord Durham made his famous report in which heattributed the troubles to their true cause, the disregard of publicopinion, and proposed that the Governor should in future govern, inlocal affairs, in accordance with the advice given by Colonial Ministersenjoying the confidence of the popular Assembly. A few years later hispolicy was put into execution by Lord Elgin in Canada, and rapidlyextended to other Colonies. Five years ago the same system of governmentwas applied to the Transvaal and to the Orange River Colony. [55]

From the foregoing brief summary, it is sufficiently clear that thereally vital feature of the policy inaugurated by Lord Durham was theacceptance of responsible popular government in local affairs, and notthe separation of Colonial government from Imperial control. The policydid not involve the setting up of new legislative machinery or a newdefinition of Imperial relations. For an existing system of separategovernment in local affairs, which created friction and discontent, itsimply substituted a new system which has, in the main, worked smoothlyup to the present. From the success of this policy, what possible directinference can be drawn as to the effect of setting up in Ireland, not asimilar system of government, for Ireland already enjoys politicalinstitutions as fully representative as those of any Colony, or of anyother portion of the United Kingdom, but a separate centre ofgovernment?

At the same time the success of responsible government in the Coloniesis, on closer examination, by no means without bearing on the problem ofIreland. That system of Colonial responsible government which seems tous so simple and obvious is, on the contrary, one of the most artificialsystems the world has ever known, based as it is upon conditions whichhave never been present before in the world's history, and which are nowrapidly disappearing, never, perhaps, to recur. That a popular assemblyin complete control of the executive, should respect an unwrittenconvention limiting its powers and rights to purely local affairs, andsubmit to a purely external control of its wider interests anddestinies, seemed to most of Lord Durham's contemporaries almostunthinkable. Not only those who opposed the policy, but many of thosewho advocated it, were convinced that it would lead to completeseparation. Nor were their fears or hopes by any means ill-grounded. That they were not justified by the event was due to an altogetherexceptional combination of factors. The first of these was theoverwhelming supremacy of the United Kingdom in commerce and navalpower, and its practical monopoly of political influence in the outerworld. Sheltered by an invincible navy, far removed from the sound ofinternational conflict, the Colonies had no practical motive forconcerning themselves with foreign affairs, or with any but purely localmeasures of defence. Even when, as in 1854, they were technicallyinvolved by the United Kingdom in war with a great Power, they were notso much as inconvenienced. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, incurred no serious expenditure for their defence beyond what was in anycase required for the defence of its sea-borne commerce, nor was itsforeign policy at any time seriously deflected by regard for Colonialconsiderations. Even when the Colonies encroached on the original limitsset them, and began to establish protectionist tariffs against theMother Country, British manufacturers could afford to disregard ahandicap of which they were at first scarcely sensible, while Britishstatesmen smiled condescendingly at the harmless aberrations of Colonialinexperience. Another factor was the very fact that it was colonies thatthe United Kingdom was dealing with, new countries where every otherinterest was secondary to that of opening up and developing the untamedwilderness, to creating the material framework which, in fulness oftime, might support a complete national life. There was consequentlylittle real interest in external policy in the Colonial assemblies, little leisure for criticism of the Imperial authorities, little desireto assert any particular point of view. Last, but not least, was thefactor of distance, interposing a veil of obscurity between thedifferent communities in the Empire; mitigating minor causes offriction, keeping Colonial politics free from being entangled in theBritish Party system. 

The British system of Colonial self-government has so far provedworkable because of the exceptional circumstances in which itoriginated. But its success cannot be regarded as wholly unqualified. The failure to provide any direct representation of Colonial interestsand aspirations in the Imperial Parliament may not have mattered as faras foreign policy and defence were concerned. But it did affect thecolonies most seriously from the economic point of view, for itprecluded them from pressing with any effect for the development ofinter-Imperial communications, or from resisting the abolition of thesystem of preferential trade which meant so much to their prosperity. Under the influence of a narrowly selfish and short-sighted policy, inspired by English manufacturing interests, Canada saw the stream ofcommerce and population pass by her shores on its way to the UnitedStates. The relative progress of the British Colonies and of the UnitedStates since the abolition of preference is some measure of the economicweakness of a political system which has no common trade policy. In anycase the British Colonial system, as we have known it is inevitablymoving towards its crisis. The conditions under which it originated arefast disappearing. The commercial and political expansion of Europe, ofAmerica, of Asia, are bringing the Dominions more and more into thearena of international conflict. The growth of foreign navies is forcingthem to realise the necessity of taking a larger part in their owndefence. Their growing national self-consciousness demands not only thatthey should cease to be dependent on the Mother Country for theirsafety, but also that they should exercise control over the foreignpolicy of which defence is merely the instrument. There are only twopossible solutions to the problem which is now developing: the one iscomplete separation, the other is partnership in an Imperial Union inwhich British subjects in the Dominions shall stand on exactly the samefooting, and enjoy the same powers and privileges in Imperial affairs, as British subjects in the United Kingdom. 

The conditions--geographical, economic, political--which, in theColonies, made the grant of free institutions, unaccompanied by someform of political federation or union, even a temporary success, were, indeed, exceptional. None of them were present in the circumstances ofIreland before the Union. They are not present to-day. Geographicallythe United Kingdom is a single compact island group, of which Ireland isby no means the most outlying portion. No part of Ireland is to-day, orever was, as inaccessible from the political centre of British power asthe remoter parts of the Highlands, not to speak of the Shetlands orHebrides. Racially, no less than physically, Ireland is an integral partof the United Kingdom, peopled as it is with the same mixture of racialelements as the main island of the group. The blend of Celt with Dane, with Normans and English of the Pale, with English citizens of theseaports and Cromwellian settlers, which constitutes Celtic Ireland, so-called, is less Celtic both in speech and in blood than either Walesor the Highlands. Religion alone has maintained a difference between apredominantly Celtic and a predominantly Teutonic Ireland which wouldotherwise have disappeared far more completely than the differencebetween Celtic and Teutonic Scotland. Economically, the connectionbetween Ireland and Great Britain, always close, has become such thatto-day Ireland subsists almost wholly upon the English market. In theserespects, at least, there is no resemblance between the conditions ofIreland and that of any of the Colonies. 

On the other hand, politically, Ireland was for centuries treated as acolony--"the first and nearest of the Colonies, " as Mr. Childers putsit. The difficulties and defects of early Colonial government wereintensified by the great conflict of the Reformation, which made Irelanda centre of foreign intrigue, and by the long religious andconstitutional struggle of the seventeenth century, which fell withterrible severity upon a population which had throughout espoused thelosing cause. Cromwell; realising that "if there is to be a prosperous, strong and United Kingdom there must be one Parliament and oneParliament only, " freed Ireland from the Colonial status. Unfortunately, his policy was reversed in 1660, and for over a century Ireland enduredthe position of "least favoured Colony"--least favoured, partly because, with the possible exception of linen, all her industries werecompetitive with, and not complementary to English industries, and sowere deliberately crushed in accordance with the common economic policyof the time, partly because the memories of past struggles kept Englandsuspicious and jealous of Irish prosperity. Every evil under which theold colonial system laboured in Canada before the rebellion wasintensified in Ireland by the religious and racial feud between the massof the people and the ascendant caste. The same solvent of freegovernment that Durham recommended was needed by Ireland. In view of thegeographical and economic position of Ireland, and in the politicalcircumstances of the time, it could only be applied through union withGreat Britain. Union had been vainly prayed for by the Irish Parliamentat the time of the Scottish Union. Most thoughtful students, not leastamong them Adam Smith, [56] had seen in it the only cure for the evilswhich afflicted the hapless island. 

Meanwhile, in 1782, the dominant caste utilised the Ulster volunteermovement to wrest from Great Britain, then in the last throes of the waragainst France, Spain, and America, the independence of the IrishParliament. Theoretically co-equal with the British Parliament, Grattan's Parliament was, in practice, kept by bribery in a positiondiffering very little from that of Canada before the rebellion. Stillthe new system in Ireland might, under conditions resembling those ofCanada in 1840, have gradually evolved into a workable scheme ofself-government. But the conditions were too different. A temporaryeconomic revival, indeed, followed the removal of the cripplingrestrictions upon Irish trade. But, politically, the new system began tobreak down almost from the start. Its entanglement in English partypolitics, which geography made inevitable, lead to deadlocks over tradeand over the regency question, the latter practically involving theright to choose a separate sovereign. The same geographical conditionsmade it impossible for Ireland to escape the influence of the FrenchRevolution. The factious spirit and the oppression of the ruling castedid the rest. There is no need to dwell here on the horrors of therising of 1798, and of its repression, or on the political and financialchaos that marked the collapse of an ill-starred experiment. England, struggling for her existence, had had enough of French invasion, civilwar, and general anarchy on her flank. The Irish Parliament died, as ithad lived, by corruption, and Castlereagh and Pitt conferred uponIreland the too long delayed boon of equal partnership in the UnitedKingdom. 

The mistakes which, for a century, deprived the Union of much of itseffect--the delay in granting Catholic emancipation, the folly of FreeTrade, acquiesced in by Irish members, by which agrarian strife wasintensified, and through which Ireland again lost the increase ofpopulation which she had gained in the first half century of Union--neednot be discussed here. The fact remains that to-day Ireland isprosperous, and on the eve of far greater prosperity under a sanesystem of national economic policy. What is more, Ireland is in theenjoyment of practically every liberty and every privilege that isenjoyed by any other part of the United Kingdom, of greater liberty andprivilege than is enjoyed by Dominions which have no control of Imperialaffairs. The principle which in the case of the Colonies was appliedthrough separate governments has, in her case, been applied throughUnion. It could only have been applied through Union in 1800. It canonly be applied through Union to-day. Railways and steamships havestrengthened the geographical and economic reasons for union;train-ferries and aircraft will intensify them still further. Meanwhilethe political and strategical conditions of these islands in the nearfuture are far more likely to resemble those of the great Napoleonicstruggle than those of the Colonial Empire in its halcyon period. 

In one aspect, then, the Union was the only feasible way of carrying outthe principle which underlay the successful establishment of Colonialself-government. In another aspect it was the last step of a naturaland, indeed, inevitable process for which the history of the BritishColonies since the grant of self-government has furnished analogies inabundance. It has furnished none for the reversal of that process. It isonly necessary to consider the reasons which, in various degrees, influenced the several groups of independent Colonies in North America, Australia, and South Africa to unite under a single government, whetherfederal or unitary, thus wholly or partially surrendering the "HomeRule" previously enjoyed by them, in order to see how close is theparallel. The weak and scattered North American Colonies were at aserious disadvantage in all political and commercial negotiations withtheir powerful neighbour, the United States, a fact very clearlyemphasised by the termination of Lord Elgin's reciprocity treaty in1864. None of them was in a position to deal with the vast territoriesof the North-West, undeveloped by the Hudson's Bay Company, and inimminent danger of American occupation. A common trade policy, a commonrailway policy, and a common banking system were essential to a rapiddevelopment of their great resources, and only a common government couldprovide them. In Australia the chief factor in bringing about federationwas the weakness and want of influence of the separate Colonies indealing with problems of defence and external policy, impressed uponthem by German and French colonial expansion in the Pacific, and by thegrowth of Japan. In South Africa, on the other hand, the factors weremainly internal. The constant friction over railway and customsagreements, continually on the verge of breaking down, embittered therelations of the different Colonies and maintained an atmosphere ofuncertainty discouraging to commercial enterprise. Four differentgovernments dealt with a labour supply mainly required in one colony. Four agricultural departments dealt with locusts and cattle plagues, which knew no political boundaries, and which could only be stamped outby the most prompt and determined action. Four systems of law and fourorganisations for defence secured, as Lord Selborne pointed out in astriking Memorandum (Blue Book Cd. 3564) a minimum of return for amaximum of expense. A native rising in Natal warned South Africans thatthe mistake of a single Colony might at any moment set the whole ofSouth Africa ablaze with rebellion. In the absence of larger issueslocal politics in each Colony turned almost exclusively on the racialfeud. A comprehensive union alone could bring commercial stability andprogressive development, mitigate race hatred, and pave the way to atrue South African nationality. 

All the weakness in external relations, all the internal friction andimpediment to progress, all the bitterness and pettiness of localpolitics, which marked the absence of union among neighbouring colonies, also characterised the relations of Great Britain and Ireland in theeighteenth century. But there was this difference: the immensedisproportion in wealth and power, and the political control exercisedby the greater state, caused all the evils of disunion to concentratewith intensified force upon the smaller state. To undo the mischief ofeighteenth century disunion required at least a generation. A series ofpolitical mistakes and mischances, and a disastrous economic policy, have left the healing task of union incomplete after a century. Butrenewed disunion to-day would only mean a renewal of old local feuds tothe point of civil war, a renewal of old economic friction, in whichmost of the injury would be suffered by the weaker combatant, theindefinite postponing for Ireland of the prospect, now so hopeful, ofnational development and social amelioration, a weakening of the wholeUnited Kingdom for diplomacy or for defence. It is a policy which noDominion in the Empire would dream of adopting--a policy which everyDominion would most certainly resist by force, just as the United Statesresisted it when attempted, with more than a mere pretext ofconstitutional justification, by the Southern States. 

Now for the "exception which proves the rule": there is one Colonialanalogy for what would be the position of Ireland under Home Rule, namely, the position of Newfoundland outside the confederation of theother North American Colonies. [57] The analogy is only partial, for thisreason, that whereas Ireland is almost wholly dependent economically onGreat Britain, Newfoundland has little direct trade with Canada, andmoreover enjoys a virtual monopoly of one particular commodity, namelycodfish, by which it manages to support its small population. Nevertheless, no one can doubt that with its favoured geographicalposition, and with its great natural resources, Newfoundland would havebeen developed in a very different fashion if for the last forty yearsit had been an integral part of the Dominion. Nor is the loss all on theside of Newfoundland, as the history of even the last few years hasshown. In 1902, Newfoundland negotiated a commercial Convention with theUnited States which, in return for a free entry for Newfoundland fishinto the United States, practically gave the Newfoundland market toAmerican manufacturers, and explicitly forbade the granting of any tradepreference to the United Kingdom or to Canada. When, fortunately, theAmerican Senate rejected the Convention, Newfoundland embarked on acourse of legislative reprisal against American fishing. But thisinvolved the Imperial Government in a diplomatic conflict which, but forthe excellent relations subsisting with the United States, might easilyhave led to a grave crisis. The inconveniences and dangers which Irishtrade policy might lead to under Home Rule can easily be inferred fromthis single example, all the more if Irish policy should be influenced, as Newfoundland's policy certainly was not, by a bias of hostility tothe Empire. 

So much for the first confusion, that which would base the case for a_separate government_ in Ireland on the success of _free institutions_in the Colonies, entirely ignoring the whole movement for union, whichhas made every geographical group of Colonies follow the example of theMother Country. We must now deal with the second confusion, that whichis based on a hazy notion that Home Rule is only a preliminary step toendowing the United Kingdom as a whole with a working federalconstitution like that of Canada or Australia. Ireland, in fact, so runsthe pleasing delusion, is to be set up as an experimental Quebec, andthe other provinces will follow suit shortly. Not all Home Rulers, indeed, are obsessed by this confusion. Mr. Childers, for instance, makes short work of what he calls the "federal chimera, " dismissing theidea as "wholly impracticable, " and pointing out that Home Rule must be"not merely non-federal, but anti-federal. " But the great majority ofLiberals to-day are busy deluding themselves or each other, and theNationalists are, naturally, not unwilling to help them in that task, with the idea of Home Rule for Ireland followed by "Home Rule allround. "

The new Home Rule Bill has not yet appeared, but certain main featuresof it can be taken for granted. It will be a Bill which, save possiblyfor a pious expression of hope in the preamble, will deal with Irelandonly. It will set up in Ireland an Irish legislature and executiveresponsible for the "peace, order, and good government" of Ireland, subject to certain restrictions and limitations. It will assign toIreland the whole of the Irish revenues, though probably retaining thecontrol of customs and excise, and in that case retaining some Irishrepresentatives at Westminster. So far from fixing any contribution toImperial expenditure from Ireland, it will, apparently, include theprovision of an Imperial grant in aid towards Land Purchase and Old AgePensions. Any such measure is wholly incompatible with even the loosestfederal system. A federal scheme postulates the existence over the wholeconfederation of two concurrent systems of government, each exercisingdirect control over the citizens within its own sphere, each having itslegislative and executive functions, and its sources of revenue, clearlydefined. The Home Rule Bill will certainly not set up any such divisionof government and its functions in Great Britain. Nor will it, inreality, set up any such effective double system of government inIreland. What it will set up will be a national or Dominion governmentin Ireland, separate and exclusive, but subject to certain restrictionsand interferences which it will be the first business of the Irishrepresentatives, in Dublin or Westminster, to get rid of. Long beforeScotland or Wales, let alone England, get any consideration of theirdemand for Home Rule, if demand there be, the last traces of anyquasi-federal element the Bill may contain will have been got rid of. 

In a federation every citizen, in whatever state or province he resides, is as fully a citizen of the federation as every other citizen. He notonly has the same federal vote, and pays the same federal taxes, but hehas the same access to the federal courts, and the same right to thedirect protection of the federal executive. In what sense are any ofthese conditions likely to be true of, let us say, an Irish landlordunder this Home Rule Bill? Again, federalism implies that all thesubordinate units are in an equal position relatively to the federalauthority. Is this Bill likely to be so framed that its provisions canbe adapted unchanged to Scotland, Wales, or England? And if they could, what sort of a residuum of a United Kingdom government would be leftover? Take finance alone: if every unit under "Home Rule all round" isto receive the whole product of its taxation, what becomes of therevenue on which the general government of the United Kingdom will haveto subsist? The fact is that the creation of a federal state, whether byconfederation or by devolution of powers, must be, in the main, asimultaneous act. Additional subordinate units may subsequently join theconfederation under the conditions of the federal constitution. Backwardareas which are unable to provide for an efficient provincialexpenditure, over and above their contribution to federal expenditure, may be held back as territories directly controlled by the federalauthorities till they are financially and in other respects ripe for thegrant of provincial powers. If a federal scheme were really seriouslycontemplated by the present Government they would have to adopt one oftwo courses. They would either have to establish it simultaneously forthe whole United Kingdom, and in that case limit the powers andfunctions of the provinces so narrowly as to make it possible forIreland to raise its provincial revenue without undue difficulty, therest of Ireland's needs being met by a substantial federal expenditurecarried out by federal officials. Or else they might begin by thecreation of a federal constitution with considerable provincial powersfor England, Scotland, and Wales, keeping back Ireland as a federalterritory till its economic and social conditions justified theestablishment of provincial institutions. The converse policy oftreating the case of Ireland as "prior in point of time andurgency, "[58] of giving the poorest and most backward portion of theUnited Kingdom the whole of its revenue and a practically unfetteredcontrol of its territory, is, indeed, "not merely non-federal, butanti-federal. "

The truth is that the federal element in this Home Rule Bill, as in thatof 1893, will be merely a pretence, designed to keep timid andhesitating Home Rulers in line--a tactical manoeuvre of much the samecharacter as the talk about a reformed Second Chamber which preceded theParliament Act, and found due burial in the preamble to that Act. Inessence the Bill will set up Ireland as an entirely separate statesubject to certain restrictions which the Government have no seriousintention of enforcing, and the Irish every intention of disregarding, or abolishing as the outcome of further agitation. For this policy ofpretence there is one admirable parallel in our Colonial history--thepolicy by which "Home Rule" was "given" to the Transvaal after Majuba. It was the same policy of avoiding expense and trouble, political ormilitary--the policy, in fact, of "cutting the loss"--tricked out withthe same humbug about "magnanimity" and "conciliation, " about trust inBoer (or Nationalist) moderation when in power, the same contemptuouspassing over of the loyalists as persons of "too pronounced" views, oras "interested contractors and stock-jobbers. "[59] It was embodied in aConvention by which the "inhabitants of the Transvaal territory" were"accorded complete self-government, subject to the suzerainty of HerMajesty" under a series of limitations which, if enforced, would haveimplied a measure of British control in many respects greater than thatexercised over a self-governing Colony, and with a number of guaranteesto protect the loyalists. The Government was able to "save its face, "while its hesitating followers were able to quiet their consciences, bythe reassuring phrases of the Convention. The Boer Volksraad franklydeclared itself still dissatisfied, but ratified the Convention, "maintaining all objections to the Convention ... And for the purpose ofshowing to everybody that the love of peace and unity inspires it, forthe time being, and provisionally submitting the articles of theConvention to a practical test. " If any Nationalist Convention in Dublinshould accept the new Home Rule Bill, we can take it for granted that itwill be in exactly the same spirit, and possibly in almost the samephraseology. [60]

From the first the limitations of the Convention were disregarded. Shortof armed intervention there was no machinery for enforcing them, and theBoers knew perfectly well that there was no real desire on the part ofan embarrassed Government to raise a hornet's nest by making theattempt. The British resident, with his nominally autocratic powers, wasa mere impotent laughing stock. The ruined loyalists left the country, or remained to become the most embittered enemies of the BritishGovernment. In three years a new Convention was drafted--an even greatermasterpiece of make-believe than the first--which could be expounded toParliament as a mere modification of certain unworkable provisions, butwhich the Boers took as a definite surrender of all claims tosuzerainty, and as a definite recognition of their position as an"independent sovereign state, " bound temporarily by the provisions of atreaty, which could have no permanent force in "fixing the boundary tothe march of a nation. " So far from being reconciled they were onlyemboldened to embark on a policy of aggression, which in 1885 involvedthe British Government in military measures costing nearly as much aswould have been required to suppress the whole rising in 1881. For thetime being the stagnation and chronic bankruptcy which followed theremoval of British rule and the exodus of the loyalists limitedTransvaal ambitions. The gold discoveries both increased that ambitionby furnishing it with revenue, and at the same time brought about aclose economic intercourse with the neighbouring colonies which, underthe political conditions of disunion, was bound to create friction. Inthe end the policy of make-believe and "cutting the loss" had to beredeemed at the cost of 20, 000 lives and of £200, 000, 000. Reconciliation, in large measure, has come since. But it has only comebecause British statesmen showed, firstly, in the war, their inflexibleresolution to stamp out the policy of separation, and secondly, afterthe war, their devotion to the real welfare of South Africa in a policyof economic reconstruction, and in the establishment of those free andequal British institutions under which--by the final dying out of aspurious nationalism based on racial prejudice and garbledhistory--South Africa may become a real, living nation. 

The reservations and guarantees which this Home Rule Bill may containcannot possibly constitute the framework of a federal constitution. Allthey can guarantee is a period of friction and agitation which willcontinue till Ireland has secured a position of complete separation fromthe United Kingdom. At the best the Home Rule experiment would thenreduce Ireland to the position of another Newfoundland; at the worst itmight repeat all the most disastrous features of the history of "HomeRule" in the Transvaal. At the same time it may be worth inquiring howfar there would really be any valid Colonial analogy for theintroduction of a federal system of "Home Rule all round" if such ascheme had been honestly contemplated. The first thing to keep in mindis that the internal constitution of the Dominions presents a wholegradation of constitutional types. There is the loose federal system ofAustralia, in which the Commonwealth powers are strictly limited anddefined, and all residuary powers left to the States. There is the closeconfederation of Canada in which all residuary powers are vested in theDominion. There is the non-federal unitary government of South Africawith a system of provincial local governments with somewhat wide countycouncil powers. There is, lastly, the purely unitary government of thetwo islands of New Zealand. Each of these types is the outcome ofpeculiar geographical, economic, and historical conditions. Tounderstand the federal system of Australia it is essential to rememberthat till comparatively recent times Australia consisted, to allintents, of four or five seaport towns, each with its own tributaryagricultural and mining area, strung out, at distances varying from 500to 1300 miles, along the southern and eastern third of a coast line ofnearly 9000 miles looped round an unexplored and reputedly uninhabitableinterior. Each of these seaports traded directly with the United Kingdomand Europe in competition with the others. With economic motives forunion practically non-existent, with external factors awakening ageneral apprehension rather than confronting Australia with anyimmediate danger, it was impossible to find the driving power toovercome local jealousies sufficiently to secure more than a minimum ofunion. The Commonwealth Constitution is a makeshift which, as theinternal trade of Australia grows and as railway communications aredeveloped, will inevitably be amended in the direction of increasing thepower of the Commonwealth and diminishing that of the States. In Canadathe economic link between Canada proper and the Maritime Provinces was, before Confederation, almost as weak as that of Australia. BritishColumbia, which it was hoped to include in the Confederation, was thenseparated by a journey of months from Eastern Canada, and was, indeed, much nearer to Australia or New Zealand. Quebec, with its racial andreligious peculiarities, added another problem. That the Confederationwas nevertheless such a close and strong one was due both to the menaceof American power in the south, and to the terrible example of theweakness of the American constitution as made manifest by the Civil War. Yet even so, Sir John Macdonald, the father of Confederation, franklydeclared the federal constitution a necessary evil--

 "As regards the comparative advantages of a Legislative and a Federal Union I have never hesitated to state my own opinions.... I have always contended that if we could agree to have one government and one Parliament ... It would be the best, the cheapest, the most vigorous, the strongest system of government we could adopt. "

This also was the view of the framers of the South African Union. Thecircumstances of South Africa enabled them to carry it into effect. Forall its extent, South Africa is geographically a single, homogeneouscountry with no marked internal boundaries. It is peopled by two whiteraces everywhere intermixed in varying proportions and nowhere separatedinto large compact blocks. The immense preponderance and centralposition of the Rand mining industry makes South Africa practically asingle economic system. The very bitterness of the long political andracial struggle which had preceded intensified the argument for reallyeffective union. 

If we compare the conditions in the United Kingdom with those of theDominions it is obvious at once that there is no possible analogy withthe conditions of Canada or Australia, but a considerable analogy withSouth Africa and New Zealand. The British Isles are but little largerthan the New Zealand group, and much more compact and homogeneous. Theirclose economic intercourse, the presence of two races with a history ofstrife behind them, but compelled by their inextricable geographicalblending to confront the necessity of union, are reproduced in theconditions of South Africa. In so far then as the Colonial analogy bearsupon the question at all, it cannot be said to be in favour of FederalHome Rule any more than of Separatist Home Rule. The most it can fairlybe said to warrant is the establishment of provincial councils withpowers akin to those of the South African Councils. For such councils, built up by the federation of adjoining counties and county boroughs, carrying out more effectively some of the existing powers of thosebodies, and adding to them such other powers, legislative oradministrative, as it may be convenient to bestow on them, a very strongcase may be made on the grounds of the congestion of Parliamentarybusiness. But that has nothing to do with Home Rule, either Separatistor Federal. 

But if the congestion of Parliamentary business might be appreciablyrelieved by some such provincial bodies--larger "national" bodies wouldonly duplicate work, not relieve it--the true remedy for the confusionof principles and objectives which, rather than the mere waste of time, is the chief defect of our Parliamentary system, lies in a properseparation of the local affairs of the United Kingdom from the generalwork of the Empire, in other words, in some form of Imperial federation. What is needed is not the creation of separate parliaments _within_ theUnited Kingdom, but the creation of a separate Parliament _for_ theUnited Kingdom, a Parliament which should deal with the affairs of theUnited Kingdom considered as one of the Dominions, leaving the generalproblems of Imperial policy to a common Imperial Parliament or Councilequally representative of the citizens of every Dominion. No form ofHome Rule can in any sense advance that desirable solution of ourImperial problems. The creation of an additional Dominion in the shapeof Ireland would merely add one to the number of units to be considered, and would be contrary to the spirit of the resolution passed at the 1897Conference, that it was desirable "wherever and whenever practicable, togroup together under a federal union those Colonies which aregeographically united. " The problem would be no more affected by thesetting up of a federal constitution for the United Kingdom, than itwould be if South Africa decided, after all, to give her provincesfederal powers, or Australia carried unification by a referendum. Thenotion that the Dominions could simply come inside the United Kingdomfederation, though it sometimes figures in Home Rule speeches, is merelya product of the third form of confusion of ideas previously referredto, and is a sheer absurdity. The terms and conditions of a UnitedKingdom federation would necessarily differ in almost every respect fromthose of an Imperial Federation, and a constitution framed for the oneobject would be unworkable for the other. Nor would it ever beacceptable to the Dominions, which regard themselves as potentially, ifnot actually, the equals of the United Kingdom as a whole. From theirpoint of view the United Kingdom might almost as well be asked to stepinside the Australian Commonwealth on the footing of Tasmania, as thatthey should be asked to join in, in the capacity of an additionalIreland, Scotland, or Wales, under any scheme of "Home Rule all round. "

It should be sufficiently clear from the foregoing analysis that thevague and confused claim that the success of British Colonial policy isan argument for the Home Rule Bill has no shadow of justification. Ithas been shown, first of all, that the factor of success in our Colonialpolicy was not the factor of separatism implied in Home Rule, but thefactor of responsible government already secured for Ireland by theUnion. It has been shown, secondly, that the experience of the Coloniessince the establishment of responsible government has in every caseforced union upon them, and union in the closest form which the facts oftrade and geography permitted of. Colonial experience is thus noargument even for a federal scheme of "Home Rule all round, " if such ascheme could possibly result from an Irish Home Rule Bill, which itcannot. The disadvantages and dangers of the contrary policy of disunionhave been shown, in their least noxious form in the case ofNewfoundland, which has simply remained outside the adjoining Dominion, and in their deadliest form in the case of the Transvaal, where "HomeRule" was given in 1881, as it would be given to Ireland to-day, if theGovernment succeeded, not from conviction and whole-heartedly, but as amean-spirited concession, made to save trouble, and under the mostdisingenuous and least workable provisions. Lastly, it has been madeclear that Home Rule cannot possibly assist, but can only obscure andconfuse, the movement for the establishment of a true Imperial Union. Unionists and Imperialists can choose no better ground for theirresistance to Home Rule than the wide and varied field of Colonialexperience. 

But Colonial experience can give us more than that. It can provide usnot only with an immense mass of arguments and instances againstdisruption, but with invaluable instances of what can be done tostrengthen and build up the Union against all possible future danger ofdisruptive tendencies. The confederation of Canada was accomplished inthe teeth of all the geographical and economic conditions of the time. Canadian statesmanship thereupon set itself to transform geography, andto divert the course of trade in order to make the Union a reality. TheIntercolonial Railway, the Canadian Pacific, the Grand Trunk Pacific, the proposed Hudson Bay Railway, and the Georgian Bay Canal schemes, allthese have been deliberate instruments of policy, aiming, first of all, at bridging the wilderness between practically isolated settlementsscattered across a continent, and creating a continuous Canada, east andwest; and, secondly, at giving that continuous strip depth as well asextension. Hand in hand with the policy of constructing the internalframework of transportation, which is the skeleton of the economic andsocial life of a nation, went the policy of maintaining a nationaltariff to clothe that skeleton with the flesh and blood of productionand exchange, and, as far as possible, to clothe it evenly. Australia, too, is waking, though somewhat hesitatingly, to the need oftranscontinental railways, for the protection of new industries and forthe even development and filling up of all her territories. In SouthAfrica the economic process preceded the political. It was the dread ofthe breakdown of a temporary customs union already in existence thatprecipitated the discussion of union. And it was the development of theRand as the great internal market of South Africa, and the competitiveconstruction of railway lines from the coast, that really decided thequestion of legislative union against federation. All three instanceslead to the same conclusion that union to be really effective and stableneeds three things: firstly, a developed system of internalcommunications reducing all natural barriers to social, political, andcommercial intercourse to the very minimum; secondly, a national tariff, protective or otherwise, sufficient at least to encourage the fullestflow of trade along those communications rather than outside of them;thirdly, a deliberate use of the tariff and of the national expenditureto secure, as far as possible, the even development of every portion ofthe national territory. 

In the United Kingdom all these instruments for making the Union realare still unutilised. The system of _laisser faire_ in the matter ofinternal communications has allowed St. George's Channel still to remaina real barrier. A dozen train-ferries, carrying not only the railwaytraffic between Great Britain and Ireland, but enabling the true westcoast of the United Kingdom to be used for transatlantic traffic, wouldobliterate that strip of sea which a British minister recently urged asan insuperable objection to a democratic union. [61] To construct themwould not be doing as much, relatively, as little Denmark has long sincedone, by the same means, to unite her sea-divided territory. Thecreation of a tariff which shall assist not only manufactures, butagriculture and rural industries, is another essential step. In view ofIreland's undeveloped industrial condition the giving of bounties to theestablishment in Ireland of new industries, such as the silk industry, would be a thoroughly justifiable extension of the Unionist policycarried out through the Congested Districts Board and the Department ofAgriculture. The diversion to Ireland of a larger part of the generalnational and Imperial expenditure, whether by the establishment of anaval base, or the giving out of battleship contracts, or even only ofcontracts for Army uniforms, would also be of appreciable assistance toIreland and to the Union. Ireland suffers to-day economically andpolitically, from the legacy of political separation in the eighteenthcentury, and of economic disunion in the nineteenth. It is the businessof Unionists not only to maintain the legal framework of the Union, butto give it a vitality and fulness of content which it has neverpossessed. 

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 54: Speech at Whitechapel, Oct. 10, 1911. There is an almostidentical passage in Mr. Redmond's article in _McClure's Magazine_ forOctober, 1910. Sir J. Simon, the Solicitor-General, has sinceperpetrated the same absurdity (Dewsbury, Feb. 6, 1912). ]

[Footnote 55: The usual rhetorical appeal to "What Home Rule has done inSouth Africa" presents, indeed, a most perfect specimen of the confusionof thought which it is here attempted to analyse. For no sooner had theTransvaal received "Home Rule" (_i. E. _ responsible government) than itsurrendered the "Home Rule" (_i. E. _ separate government) which it hadpreviously enjoyed in order to enter the South African Union. Strippedof mere verbal confusion the argument from the Transvaal analogy thenruns somewhat as follows: "The Transvaal is now contented because itenjoys free representative institutions as an integral portion of aUnited South Africa; therefore, Ireland cannot be contented until sheceases to be a freely represented integral portion of the UnitedKingdom!"]

[Footnote 56: Quoted on p. 54. ]

[Footnote 57: The position of New Zealand, outside the AustralianCommonwealth, is no parallel. New Zealand is almost as far fromAustralia as Newfoundland is from the British Isles; it differs fromAustralia in every climatic and physical feature; there is comparativelylittle trade between them. ]

[Footnote 58: Mr. Asquith at St. Andrews, Dec. 7, 1910. ]

[Footnote 59: See "The _Times_' History of the South African War, " vol. I. Pp. 67 _et seq. _]

[Footnote 60: _Cf_. Mr. J. Redmond on the third reading of the Home RuleBill of 1893. "The word 'provisional, ' so to speak, has been stamped inred ink across every page of the Bill. I recognise that the Bill isoffered as a compromise and accepted as such.... England has no right toask from Irish members any guarantee of finality in its acceptance. "]

[Footnote 61: Colonel Seely at Newry, December 9, 1911. ]

VI

THE CONTROL OF JUDICIARY AND POLICE

BY THE RIGHT HON. J. H. CAMPBELL, K. C. , M. P. 

The various forecasts, inspired and uninspired, of the new Home RuleBill which have been given to us, have shed little light upon the futureof the Irish Judiciary and Police. The two previous Bills contemplatedthe handing over of the control of the whole administration of justicein Ireland to the Irish Executive after an interval, in the first caseof two years, and in the later Bill, of six years. We may assume that, whatever period of grace may be allowed to us under the coming measure, it will propose to vest this control in the Irish Government within sixyears. The interposition of any interval at all will probably beregarded by Ministers as a concession to Unionist fears and as one ofthe "safeguards" in which the minority will be urged to place its trust. It must be realised at once that, so far from this interval making thetransition from British justice to Irish intrigue easier and more safe, it may have precisely the contrary effect. Once the Irish police areconvinced that they are about to be delivered into the hands of thesecret organisations who have been the most successful and relentlessenemies of public order in Ireland, a paralysis must fall upon theforce. During the closing years of the transition, at all events, theRoyal Irish Constabulary will be given nominal responsibility for thepeace of the country without any opportunity effectually to preserve it. It would be fairer and better to cast upon puppet nominees of theAncient Order of Hibernians and the Irish Republican Brotherhood theresponsibility and odium of controlling the passions that they havehelped to raise. The present judges would of course continue to dotheir duty without fear or favour, but it is impossible that thesentence passed upon them and the system of law and government for whichthey stand could leave their authority unimpaired. We have recently seenin England how easy it may be to stir up popular clamour against judgeswho administer the law without regard to the prejudices of any politicalparty. Directly the Irish Courts sought to translate the papersafeguards of the Home Rule Bill into practical effect, they would befaced by the violent hostility of an ignorant and excitable assemblystimulated by an irresponsible and inexperienced executive. The resultwould be recriminations and friction which must deplorably injure andlower the reputation and prestige of both the Executive and theJudiciary. 

The first thing necessary for securing public and private liberty in acountry like Ireland, where party feeling runs high and internaldisputes have a bitterness from which more fortunate countries are free, is a strong independent and impartial administration of the law. Thiscan only be secured by freeing the Courts from any kind of interferenceor control on the part of the Executive, and by ensuring that the wholearmed forces of the Executive should be at the disposal of the Courtsfor executing and enforcing their decrees. Let us only assume a case toarise after the statutory period had elapsed, such as is now of frequentoccurrence in the Irish Courts. The Land Judge, for instance, or theJudge of the Court of Bankruptcy, finds it necessary to order the arrestof the chairman and secretary of a local branch of the United IrishLeague for interfering by gross intimidation with a sale under the orderof his Court. The case excites a good deal of local feeling and thearrests can only be effected by the employment of a large force of armedpolice. The question is raised on a motion for adjournment in the IrishHouse of Commons. The majority of the members owe their seats to theintervention of the United Irish League, many of them--perhapsmost--have themselves been in similar conflicts with the Court. Theresult is that Ministers have to choose between a refusal of the policeand expulsion from office. Once the Government could decide whichdecrees of the Judiciary it would enforce and which it would not, thetechnical immovability of the Judges would be irrelevant, since the realcontrol of justice would be vested, not in the courts but in theexecutive Ministers in Dublin Castle. The very existence of thelimitations and safeguards foreshadowed in the coming Home Rule Billwould naturally tempt the Irish Government to adopt a policy which wouldreduce to a minimum the effective power of these restraints upon thepopular will. The most obvious way of attaining this result would be tokeep the police, and with them the judicature, in a position of greaterdependence upon the Executive than is consistent with the supremacy oflaw and the safety of private rights and individual freedom. 

We must remember that the men who would have the control of the newIrish Government would be those who have spent the greater part of theirlives in violent conflict with the attempts of the Irish Courts tosecure respect for the elementary rights of property and of personalfreedom in Ireland. Power which has been won by the open violation ofevery principle of English law, is not likely either to assert theauthority it has lived by defying to maintaining the independence of thecourts and institutions which have been its deadliest opponents. Thecorruption of judicial authority and prestige in Ireland will beaccomplished by entrenching the Executive behind large and shadowydiscretionary powers, and also by manipulating the personnel andjurisdiction of the judges and magistracy throughout the country. Themost deplorable movement in modern Nationalism is the attempt tointroduce into Irish politics the worst methods of American politicalcorruption. There have recently sprung into prominence in Ireland twosocieties which are in some respects the most sinister, the mostimmoral, and the most destructive of those which have corrupted andinfected public life in the country. These two--the Ancient Order ofHibernians and the Irish Republican Brotherhood--have in common thesecrecy of their operations and the destructiveness of their aims. Theirinfluence is marked not only by despotic and tyrannical government, but, what may be even more mischievous from the point of view of thecommunity, by the deliberate persecution and suppression of allindependent thought. Those who have watched the proceedings of theDublin Corporation have felt the increasing strength of an influenceproceeding from Belfast--an influence which is threatening to controlthe whole course of Nationalist politics in Dublin and the south. Theforces of influence, combination, and intimidation which forced theBudget on a reluctant Ireland and routed the Roman Catholic Hierarchyover the Insurance Bill will not be disbanded under Home Rule. On thecontrary, they are now being exercised so as to enable the Board of Erinto absorb the older organisations and to place in the hands of itsleaders--or rather in those of a single man--the nomination of most, ifnot all, the representatives of the Nationalist party in Ireland. Mr. Joseph Devlin, who seeks to build this vast power, is a politician ofAmerican ideals and sympathies, and under the guidance of hisorganisation politics in Ireland would be shaped after the model ofTammany Hall rather than that of St. Stephen's. The party which appointsthe municipal officers of Dublin in secret caucus, meeting for reasonswhich are never avowed and after debates which are never published, isonly waiting to extend its operations. Even now it is notorious that themagistrates' bench in Ireland is regularly and systematically "packed"whenever licensing or agrarian cases are under discussion. Thescandalous inaction of the present Irish Executive in reference tocattle driving and other forms of organised intimidation, the failure toenforce the law and the absolute immunity which the present ChiefSecretary has persistently allowed to Nationalist Members of Parliamentand paid organisers in incitement to outrage and intimidation, haveparalysed the administration of justice and disheartened and disgustedthe Judiciary, the Magistrates, and the Police. But under Home Rule themeasure of protection which is still afforded by a strong andindependent Bench would be removed. The Resident Magistrate would be asmuch under the heel of the caucus as the local justice; the Recorder'sBench and even the High Court would be constantly subjected toinfluences of a mischievous and incalculable kind. Whatever may be saidagainst the present occupants of the Judicial Bench, their integrity andfairness have never been seriously questioned. Since the days when theIrish judges issued a writ of _habeas corpus_ for the release of WolfeTone, while the Irish Rebellion was actually in progress, they haveconsistently held an even balance between the two parties. Theirlearning, their impartiality and their wit have rightly made Irishjudges respected throughout the world. Their reputation and theirservices alike demand that they shall not be set aside wantonly orwithout consideration. But there is no doubt that Home Rule must meanthe end of the Irish Bench as we have seen it in history. The men whohave been proud to represent the British Crown would resent withindignation the idea that they should become the tools of the Hiberniancaucus. They realise that the judges who oppose the lawless will ofpopular ministers will have to face obloquy and perhaps direct attack inthe Irish Parliament. Even if the concurrence of both Houses in theIrish Parliament were made necessary for the removal of judges, it wouldnot adequately safeguard their independence. The lower House would becomposed of the men whom Nationalist constituencies already return toParliament--excitable, fierce partisans, always ready to subordinateprivate convictions to the exigencies of party discipline. Nor wouldthere be in Ireland under Home Rule any power or influence, either ofproperty or station, sufficiently strong to furnish a constituency whichwould return a senate representing interests, opinions, or desiressubstantially distinct from those of the more powerful House electedupon the wider suffrage. 

The situation has been strongly complicated by the promulgation of the_Motu Proprio_ decree, and the refusal of the authorities of the RomanCatholic Church to say definitely whether it applies to Ireland or not. We may assume that, if Archbishop Walsh could have given a categoricaldenial to the statement that the decree must operate in Ireland underHome Rule, he would have done so. The decree _Motu Proprio_ forbids anyRoman Catholic to bring his priest or bishop into court under pain ofexcommunication. The Roman Catholic Church has made many similar effortsduring history to oust the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts, and eachattempt has had to be sharply and sternly resisted by the civilauthorities of Roman Catholic countries. We need not discuss how muchthere may be said from a theological standpoint for the decree; we areonly concerned to show that it raises pretensions which no State canpossibly permit to be recognised. There have been too many attempts, successful and unsuccessful, to oust the jurisdiction of the King'sCourts in Ireland, for this new attempt to be viewed with equanimity. The United Irish League has set up courts which try men for imaginaryoffences committed during the exercise of their ordinary civil rights, and pass illegal sentences and inflict illegal punishments. Under thereign of Liberal Governments the writ of these courts runs where theKing's writ cannot run, and the law of the League has been allowed ingreat measure to supersede the law of the land. We have also anincreasing force in Irish Nationalism which seeks to paralyse thegovernment of Ireland by means of the general or sympathetic strike. This organisation seeks to establish courts in Ireland in opposition tothe ordinary law courts, and to enforce their decrees by means ofillegal intimidation and outrage. The people of Ireland have thereforebeen familiarised with the idea of courts competing in authority withthose of the King's Government. Supposing under Home Rule the Judiciaryproved less pliable than was expected or desired, the development ofsuch competing authorities would be facilitated by a complaisantCabinet in Dublin. But of all attempts to over-ride the authority of lawthis conspiracy to exempt ecclesiastical persons from its scope is themost insidious and dangerous. The existence of a class of men answerablefor their actions, not to any domestic tribunal, but to a foreignecclesiastical court, cannot now be tolerated by any self-respectingGovernment. Yet it is not easy to see how an Irish Cabinet could refuseto make, by executive if not by legislative action, what is now the lawof the Church eventually the law of Ireland. Against this danger nosafeguards can be devised. If the Administration refuses to put the lawinto effective operation against a certain class of offender or abusesthe prerogative of mercy in his favour, there is no power in theconstitution to coerce it. A few years ago we saw in Ireland theextraordinary spectacle of persons being prosecuted for cattle-drivingand similar offences, while those who openly incited them to crimeescaped with impunity. We saw judges from the Bench complaining in vainthat the real offenders were not brought before them, and criticisingopenly the negligence and partiality of the Crown. If the Nationalists, whose influence then paralysed the aims of the Government, ever getsupreme control of the Executive, we are certain to see these abusesrevived on a still more shocking scale. The operation of the new decreeplaces the Roman Catholic minister or law officer who is called upon toadminister justice under the terms of his oath in a position of cruelembarrassment. As a law officer it might be his duty to order theprosecution of some clerical offender; as a Roman Catholic compliancewith his duty to the State must entail the awful consequences ofexcommunication. It needs no elaboration to show that what may be agrave embarrassment under the rule of impartial British Ministers, mustunder a local Irish Government develop into a danger to the State. Acase recently tried at the Waterford Assizes establishes a precedentwhich may prove most mischievous. Recent illustrations in Ireland of theworking of the _Temere_ decree have secured for it a sort ofquasi-legality and provided a great argument to those devout Churchmenwho, under Home Rule, would naturally desire to carry the process afurther step. 

We have proceeded on the assumption that the Irish Parliamentwould--formally, at least--confine itself within the limits prescribedby the law of its creation. But it is necessary at least to contemplatethe possibility that it would prove less complaisant. The safeguards andlimitations inserted in any Act of the kind must of necessity be couchedin general terms. The constitutional history of the United States andother countries is full of cases showing how difficult it is to definein practice where the border line between _intra_ and _ultra vires_comes. It is the custom of all Governments, if there is any possibleroom for debate as to their competence to take any particular line ofaction, to give themselves the fullest benefit of the doubt, and theIrish Government is unlikely to prove any exception to the rule. Whenthe Judicature and all the forces of Executive Government, except thedirect command of troops, is in their hands, the laws passed by theIrish Parliament could be put in force in Ireland. The BritishGovernment could not intervene except by acts which would amount to openwar between the two countries. We must remember that this enforcement ofIrish laws by Irish police in spite of the decisions of a "foreign"Government at Westminster is openly advocated and contemplated by thelarge and active section of the Nationalists who have adopted as theirwatchword the motto "Ourselves alone" (_Sinn Fein_). Nothing could bemore futile than the idea that the judgments of the Judicial Committeeof the Privy Council would ever be accepted as final by the Nationalistmajority, or that the royal assent could ever be withheld from an Actconstitutionally passed by the Irish Legislature, without precipitatinga crisis. The result of applying the veto of the House of Lords inEngland to the measures of Liberal Ministers was the agitation forremoving the veto. The Nationalists took part in that agitation and havelearned its lesson. Directly the British Government asserts itstechnical right of veto, a similar agitation to get rid of allobnoxious restraints would arise in Ireland. 

If anything could increase the danger of friction, it would be thescheme favoured by Mr. Erskine Childers and other Liberals of submittingconstitutional questions to the decision of the British Privy Councilreinforced by Irish judges. Either these judges would concur in verdictsgiven against the pretensions of the Irish Parliament or they would not. If they did concur, there would be a fierce outcry against the right ofjudges appointed under the Union Government to nullify Acts of the IrishLegislature. But if they did not concur, the patriotic indignation withwhich a decision over the heads of the Irish representatives would bereceived is easy to foresee. It would be a matter of the greatestdifficulty to enforce any such decision when the Irish Government, supported by an agitation in the country, refused to be bound by it. Thesituation thus created has no parallel in the case of the colonies. InCanada or Australia, where the legislative power is divided betweenfederal and provincial Parliaments, a decision that the one legislatureis incompetent affirms the competence of the other. Both legislatureshave on the spot proper means of enforcing, by judicial and executiveauthority, decisions which are within their powers. The case of Irelandis fundamentally different. There can be no half-way house betweenkeeping Ireland a partner in all our legislative and judicialactivities, or giving to her with a separate Executive uncontrolled andunchecked rights of internal sovereignty. 

VII

THE ULSTER QUESTION

BY THE MARQUIS OF LONDONDERRY, K. G. 

In the Home Rule controversy to-day Ulster occupies the place of publicinterest. Lord Rosebery upon one occasion committed himself to theopinion that, before Home Rule was conceded by the Imperial Parliament, England, as the predominant member of the partnership of the threekingdoms, would have to be convinced of its justice. [62] He did notforesee that the party of which he was then the leader would, underduress, abandon even the pretence of consulting the "predominantpartner, " much less be guided by its wishes. But it has come to pass:and Ulster alone remains the stumbling-block to the successful issue ofthe plot against the Constitution. By Ulster we do not mean, as Mr. Sinclair points out, the geographical area, but the district whichhistorical events have made so different in every respect from the restof Ireland. 

In the Act of Union I have a personal interest from family connection. Iam convinced that Lord Castlereagh was absolutely right on both Imperialand Irish grounds. I feel that so far as Ireland is concerned theconditions and position of Ulster to-day afford ample confirmation: andof Ulster I may claim to have some knowledge. I represented County Downin the Imperial Parliament at Westminster before it was divided intoconstituencies, and in my later days I have maintained my close interestin Ulster. At the least, then, I may say that the temperament, thepolitical and religious convictions, and the character of UlsterUnionists are not unknown to me. 

I often read of "the Ulster bogey;" and I believe Mr. John Redmond oncedevoted an article in a Sunday paper to elaborate statisticalcalculations from which he drew the deduction that there was no Ulsterquestion. Other Home Rulers, by an expert use of figures, show thatthere is a Home Rule majority in Ulster itself. To those who know Ulstertheir efforts fail to carry the slightest conviction. Figures, howeverskilfully chosen, articles in the press, however cleverly written, cannot destroy the facts of Ulster Unionist opposition to Home Rule, theintensity and seriousness of which is, I believe, only now beginning tobe appreciated by His Majesty's Ministers. 

I hear of "Ulster bigots, " "Ulster deadheads, " and assertions made thatthe opposition only proceeds from a few aristocratic Tory landlords. Hard words do us no harm; but abusive epithets will not lessen Ulsteropposition. Indeed the more we are reviled by our opponents, the more webelieve they recognize the futility of persuading us to accept HomeRule. 

We read of the intense anxiety of Irish Nationalists on Englishplatforms lest even the suspicion of intolerance should cloud theiradministration and legislation under Home Rule, with interest butwithout respect. We do not believe in these sudden repentances, and wehave heard these professions time and again when the exigencies of themoment demanded them. 

The spirit of change has even affected the Government. At first Ulsterwas to be ignored; now it is to be conciliated. There is no safeguardthat they will not insert in the Bill at our request. The First Lord ofthe Admiralty has a list already prepared; and they will welcomeadditions. Mr. Redmond accepts them all; and the fact that he does itreadily raises our suspicions of their worth. Has not Mr. John Dillonsaid that artificial guarantees in an Act of Parliament were no realprotection, [63] and for once it is possible to agree with him. 

Why should "bigots" be conciliated; or "deadheads" receive so muchconsideration? Why should the opposition of aristocratic Tory landlordsbe thought worthy of respect? Whenever have they been treated in thismanner before by the Government in their schemes of legislation?

That our views receive so much attention is indeed the proof of thefalsity of these hard names. Opposition to Home Rule in Ulster proceedsnot from "bigots" or "deadheads, " not from "Tories, " or "aristocrats, "or "landlords" exclusively. It is neither party question, nor classquestion. It has destroyed all differences between parties and classes. I doubt if there are any more democratic organizations than those of theUlster Unionist Council, the Unionist Clubs, and the Orangemen. Nor arethe religious bodies less popularly organized--the Church of Ireland, the Presbyterians, and other Protestant denominations have no classrestrictions in their government. And as for party distinctions, thoseof us who took part in the old political contests before Home Rulebecame an urgent danger are now side by side in this greater fight forour very existence. 

What stronger evidence that opposition to Home Rule in Ulster is noparty question is to be found than in the disappearance of the LiberalParty. I can remember when it was powerful; but it has vanished beforethe threat of Home Rule. All attempts to resuscitate the corpse havefailed, and a Liberal Party, independent of the Nationalists, representing Ulster constituencies in the House of Commons, in spite ofrepeated efforts, does not exist. 

Let me impress upon the people of Great Britain that Ulster oppositionto Home Rule is no party matter. It is an uprising of a people againsttyranny and coercion; against condemnation to servitude; againstdeprivation of the right of citizens to an effective voice in thegovernment of the country. 

Mr. Birrell said recently at Bristol that Ulster would be right to fightif it were oppressed in its religion or despoiled of its property. Wewelcome his conversion. When he pleads for Ulster to wait until it isplain that oppression has come, we recall to mind the phrase so often onLiberal lips, "Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty, " and we saythat we should be false to ourselves and to our trust if we wereunprepared for what the future will bring under Home Rule. 

For our opposition to Home Rule we are condemned by the IrishNationalists as the enemies of our country. We believe ourselves to beits best friends. We believe Home Rule to be the greatest obstacle toIrish progress and prosperity. Irish Nationalists have made Home Ruletheir only idol and denounce every one who will not worship at itsshrine. Every reform, unless they thought that it tended to advance HomeRule or magnify their powers, has received their hostility, sometimesopen and avowed, at other times secret and working through devious ways. 

No one who reads the history of Ulster can doubt that its inhabitantshave not as much love of Ireland and as much wish to see her prosperousas the Nationalists. They indeed attribute all Irish shortcomings to theUnion. Ulstermen, bearing in mind their own progress since the Union, not unnaturally decline to accept so absurd an argument. The Union hasbeen no obstacle to their development: why should it have been thebarrier to the rest of Ireland? Ulstermen believe that the Union withGreat Britain has assisted the development of their commerce andindustry. They are proud of the progress of Belfast and of her positionin the industrial and shipping world. Without great natural advantagesit has been built up by energy, application, clearheadedness and hardwork. The opposition to Home Rule is the revolt of a business andindustrial community against the domination of men who have shown noaptitude for either. The United Irish League, the official organizationof the Home Rule Party, is, as a Treasurer once confessed, remarkablylacking in the support of business men, merchants, manufacturers, leaders of industry, bankers, and men who compose a successful andprogressive community. [64] In the management of their party funds, theirimpending bankruptcy but a few years ago, the mad scheme of NewTipperary, and the fiasco of the Parnell Migration Company there is thesame monotonous story of failure. Can surprise be felt that Ulstermenrefuse to place the control of national affairs in the hands of thosewho have shown little capacity in the direction of their own personalconcerns. What responsible statesman would suggest that the City ofLondon, Liverpool, Manchester, Sheffield, Newcastle, or any advancingindustrial and commercial centre in Great Britain should be ruled andgoverned and taxed, without the hope of effective intervention, by aparty led by Mr. Keir Hardie and Mr. Lansbury? Yet Home Rule means muchlike that for Ulstermen, and the impossibility of the scheme isemphasized in the example of Ireland by religious differences which havetheir roots in Irish history. 

Ulster's opposition to Home Rule is no unreasoning hate. It proceeds notfrom the few; it is not the outcome of political prejudice; it is thehostility of a progressive and advancing people who have made theirportion of their country prosperous and decline to hand it over to thecontrol of representatives from the most backward and unprogressivecounties. 

They are actuated by love of their country. They yield to no one intheir patriotism and their desire for Ireland's welfare. They havealways given their support to movements which have had for their objectsthe improvement of Irish conditions and the increase of Irishwell-being. Their sympathies are with Irish social reform--and thesympathies of many of them with social reform of an advanced character. Contrast their attitude with that of the Irish Nationalist Party inrespect of reforms which have proceeded from the Imperial Parliament andmovements within Ireland herself. 

Take the Irish Land Act of 1903, accepted by both political parties inGreat Britain as affording the real solution of the Irish agrarianproblem. What has been the Irish Nationalist attitude? Praise for it onplatforms in the United States when it was essential to reach thepockets of subscribers by recounting a record of results gained fromthe expenditure of American donations; but in Ireland itself oppositionto its effective working. Read Nationalist speeches and there is alwaysrunning through them the fear that the Act by solving the land questionwould remove the real motive power which made Home Rule a living issue. Hence the interference to prevent landlords and tenants coming to anagreement over sales without outside assistance. So to-day IrishNationalists are still endeavouring to keep alive the old bad feelingbetween landlord and tenant which they so successfully created in theseventies and eighties. What better proof of this deliberate attempt toprevent the success of a great reform is to be found than the frankutterance of Mr. John Dillon at Swinford. [65] "It has been said, " hedeclared, "that we have obstructed the smooth working of the Act. I wishto heaven we had the power to obstruct the smooth working of the Actmore than we did. It has worked too smoothly--far too smoothly to mymind.... Some men have complained with the past year that the Land Actwas not working fast enough. For my part I look upon it as working agreat deal too fast, and at a pace which has been ruinous to thepeople. " What have the Ulster people done which can compare with thisopposition to a measure that has admittedly effected a beneficialrevolution in Irish agrarian life? Yet Mr. John Dillon is acclaimed as atrue Irish patriot and we are denounced as the enemies of our country!

What greater blow to the continuance of land purchase than the BirrellAct of 1909. Granted that some revision of the law was necessary inrespect of finance; yet, the Act of 1909 went far beyond finance. Anyone with a knowledge of land purchase law knows that the measure of 1909contained innumerable provisions of a technical character calculated tomake the free sale between landlord and tenant difficult, and in respectof a large portion of Ireland impossible. No wonder it was welcomed bythe Irish Nationalist Party, since it did so much to restore them totheir self-elected position of counsellors and arbiters in the affairsof the tenants. And Ulster Unionists for declining to accede to thisre-establishment of the old supremacy of the agitators are regarded asthe opponents of liberty and freedom!

The same sad story of Nationalist opposition to Irish progress meets thestudent of the co-operative movement at every period of its existence. No one who knows Sir Horace Plunkett will believe for a moment that hewas actuated by other than the sole desire to do something for Ireland'sbenefit. From the leaders of the Nationalist Party he has had noassistance, although they claim to be the only workers for Irishprogress, and the co-operative movement was intended to complete theagrarian revolution. In more recent times the hostility of theNationalist leaders has become bolder as they found a ready instrumentin Mr. T. W. Russell in his official capacity as Vice-President of theDepartment of Agriculture. 

The co-operative movement is flourishing in spite of the opposition ofthe Nationalist leaders. From Ulster it has received considerablesupport for the reason that Ulstermen believed it to be for the benefitof Irish agriculture. Their support, unlike Nationalist hostility, hasnot arisen from political motives. They do not believe that Sir HoracePlunkett has given a moment's thought to politics in their relation tothe co-operative movement, and they have appreciated his movement eitheras co-operators or as supporters and members of the Irish AgriculturalOrganization Society. Contrast the Ulster welcome with the Nationalistopposition, and ask why we should be denounced as bad Irishmen and theNationalists receive praise as true lovers of Ireland. 

The co-operative movement has brought into existence another movementwhich has for its object the prosperity of Irish industries. TheIndustrial Development movement which seeks to bring before the peopleof Ireland and the Irish public bodies the excellence of Irishmanufactures is as yet in its infancy. It has no political character, yet I should hesitate to say that official Irish Nationalism gives ithearty support. In Belfast, however, it has made great strides. It gainsits support in Ulster not for any political reason, but simply andsolely because the North of Ireland thinks that the industrial movementis to Ireland's advantage. 

Where in these instances is our "bigotry" or our hostility to Irishprogress? Does not the balance of credit when the comparison is madewith the Nationalists come on the side of Ulster? The Nationalists showtheir unreasoning opposition by proclaiming that they would rather seeIreland in rags and poverty than abate their demand for Home Rule. Ulster Unionists desire to see Ireland prosperous and contented. Forthat reason they welcome all reforms and movements from whatever quarterwhich have this excellent end in view. They intend to offer thestrongest and most unrelenting opposition to Home Rule not as politicalpartisans for party gain, but as Irishmen determined to resist soreactionary a measure which they firmly believe will prove of thegreatest evil to their unhappy country. 

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 62: House of Lords, March 12, 1894. ]

[Footnote 63: Salford, November 21, 1911. ]

[Footnote 64: Mr. A. J. Kettle, _Freeman's Journal, _ July 18, 1907. ]

[Footnote 65: September 10, 1906. ]

VIII

THE POSITION OF ULSTER

BY THE RIGHT HON. THOS. SINCLAIR

By Ulster, I mean the six counties, Antrim, Down, Londonderry, Armagh, Tyrone, Fermanagh, with the important adjacent Unionist sections ofMonaghan, Cavan, and Donegal, in all of which taken together theUnionist population is in an unmistakable majority, and in which thecommercial and manufacturing prosperity of the province is maintained byUnionist energy, enterprise, and industry. 

The relation of Ulster to a separate Irish Parliament, with an Executiveresponsible to it, is a question which demands the most seriousconsideration on the part of English and Scotch electors. The UlsterScot is not in Ireland to-day upon the conditions of an ordinaryimmigrant. His forefathers were "planted" in Ulster in the troubloustimes of the seventeenth century. Although at the end of the reign ofQueen Elizabeth peace had been secured all over Ireland, war was renewedin the Northern province early in the seventeenth century. The uprisingwas speedily crushed, and the lands of several of the rebellious noblesforfeited to the Crown. In order to prevent a repetition of lawlessness, the forfeited estates were entrusted to undertakers, on whom theobligation rested of peopling them with settlers from Great Britain. This scheme was devised in the hope that through the industry, character, and loyalty of the new population, the Northern province atall events should enjoy peace and prosperity, and become an attachedportion of the King's dominions; and that eventually its influence wouldbe usefully felt throughout the rest of Ireland. This policy was carriedout under the rule of an English King, himself a Scot--James VI. OfScotland and I. Of England. Large numbers of settlers were brought overto Ulster, many of them English, but the majority Scotch. We UlsterUnionists who inhabit the province to-day, or at least the greaternumber of us, are descendants of these settlers. The overwhelmingmajority are passionately loyal to the British Throne and to themaintenance of the integrity of the United Kingdom. 

These things being so, it seems to Ulster Unionists that a graveresponsibility rests on their English and Scottish fellow-citizens, withregard to our position, should any constitutional changes be imposedupon our country. We are in Ireland as their trustees, having hadcommitted to us, through their and our forefathers, the development ofthe material resources of Ulster, the preservation of its loyalty, andthe discharge of its share of Imperial obligations. 

It cannot be denied, on an examination of the history of the last threecenturies, and especially of that of the one hundred and ten years sincethe establishment of the Legislative Union, that, through good reportand ill report, and allowing for all our shortcomings, we have notunsuccessfully fulfilled our trust. Our forefathers found a province, the least favoured by nature of the four of which Ireland consists, andit is to-day the stronghold of Irish industry and commerce. Its capital, Belfast, stands abreast of the leading manufacturing centres in GreatBritain; it contains the foremost establishments in Europe, in respectof such undertakings as linen manufacturing, ship-building, rope-making, etc. It is the fourth port in the United Kingdom in respect of revenuefrom Customs, its contributions thereto being £2, 207, 000 in 1910, ascompared with £1, 065, 000 from the rest of Ireland. Ulster's loyalty tothe British King and Constitution is unsurpassed anywhere in HisMajesty's dominions. 

The North of Ireland has contributed to Imperial service some of itsgreatest ornaments. England owes to Ulster Governors-General like LordDufferin and Lord Lawrence; soldiers like John Nicholson and Sir GeorgeWhite; administrators like Sir Henry Lawrence and Sir Robert Montgomery;great judges like Lord Cairns and Lord Macnaghten. At the recent DelhiDurbar the King decorated three Ulster men, one of them being Sir JohnJordan, British Ambassador at Pekin. Ulster produced Sir Robert Hart, the incomparable Chinese administrator, who might also have been ourAmbassador to China had he accepted the position. 

The Ulster plantation is the only one which has fulfilled the purposefor which Irish plantations were made. The famous colonisation on bothsides of the Shannon by Cromwell entirely failed of its design, thegreat proportion of its families having, through inter-marriage, becomeabsorbed in the surrounding population. 

Ulster Unionists, therefore, having conspicuously succeeded inmaintaining the trust committed to their forefathers, and constitutingas they do a community intensely loyal to the British connection, believe that they present a case for the unimpaired maintenance of thatconnection which is impregnable on the grounds of racial sentiment, inherent justice, social well-being, and the continued security of theUnited Kingdom and of the Empire. They cannot believe that their Britishfellow-citizens will, at this crisis, turn a deaf ear to this claim. Three or four decades after the Ulster plantation, when, in the midst ofthe horrors of 1641, the Scotch colony in Ulster was threatened withextermination, it appealed for help to its motherland. It did not appealin vain. A collection for its benefit was made in the Scottish churches, supplies of food and several regiments of Scottish soldiers were sent toits aid, and its position was saved. We are confident that thedescendants of these generous helpers will be no less true to theirUlster kith and kin to-day. 

The history and present condition of Ulster throw an important light onwhat is currently described as the national demand of Ireland for HomeRule. There is no national Irish demand for Home Rule, because therenever has been and there is no homogeneous Irish nation. On thecontrary, as Mr. Chamberlain long ago pointed out, Ireland to-dayconsists of two nations. These two nations are so utterly distinct intheir racial characteristics, in their practical ideals, in theirreligious sanctions, and in their sense of civic and nationalresponsibility that they cannot live harmoniously side by side unlessunder the even-handed control of a just central authority, in which atthe same time they have full co-partnership. Ireland, accordingly, cannot make a claim for self-government on the ground that she is apolitical unit. She consists of two units, which owe their distinctiveexistence, not to geographical boundaries, but to inherent andineradicable endowments of character and aims. If, then, it is claimedthat the unit of Nationalist Ireland is to be entitled to choose itsparticular relation to the British Constitution, the same choiceundoubtedly belongs to the Unionist unit. 

But Mr. Birrell, for example, would tell us that the Nationalist unit inIreland is three times as large as the Unionist unit, and that thereforethe smaller entity should submit, because, as he has cynically observed, "minorities must suffer, for that is the badge of their tribe. " But aminority in the United Kingdom is not to be measured by mere numbers;its place in the Constitution is to be estimated by its contribution topublic well-being, by its relation to the industries and occupations ofits members, by its association with the upbuilding of nationalcharacter, by its fidelity to law and order, and by its sympathy withthe world mission of the British Empire in the interests of civil andreligious freedom. Tried by all these tests, Ulster is entitled toretain her full share in every privilege of the whole realm. Tried bythe same tests the claim of 3, 000, 000 Irish Nationalists to break up theconstitution of the United Kingdom, of whose population they constituteperhaps one-fifteenth, is surely unthinkable. 

Other writers in this volume have discussed Home Rule as it affectsvarious vital interests in Ireland as a whole. It remains for me brieflyto point out its special relation to the Northern province--

1. _Home Rule, in the judgment of Ulster, would degrade the status ofUlster citizenship by impairing its relationship to ImperialParliament. _ This would be effected both by lessening or extinguishingthe representation of Ulster in that Parliament, and by removing thecontrol of Ulster rights and liberties from Imperial Parliament andentrusting it to a hostile Parliament in Dublin. Ulstermen would thusstand on a dangerously lower plane of civil privilege than theirfellow-citizens in Great Britain. To place them in this undeservedinferiority, they hold to be unjust and cruel. 

2. _Home Rule would gravely imperil our civil and religious liberties. _Ireland is pre-eminently a clerically controlled country, the number ofRoman Catholic priests being per head greater than that of any countryin Europe. Her staff of members of religious orders, male and female, isalso enormous, their numbers having increased during the last fiftyyears 150 per cent. , while the population has decreased 30 per cent. Itis undeniable, therefore, that in a Dublin Parliament, the overwhelmingmajority of whose members would be adherents of the Roman Catholicfaith, the Roman ecclesiastical authority, which claims the right todecide as to what questions come within the region of faith and moralswould be supreme. Great stress has lately been laid in Nationalistspeeches from British platforms on the tolerant spirit towardsProtestants which animates Irish Roman Catholics. We gladly acknowledgethat in most parts of Ireland Protestants and Roman Catholics, asregards the ordinary affairs of life, live side by side on friendlyneighbourly terms. Indeed, that spirit, as a consequence of the growingprosperity of Ireland, had been steadily increasing, till the recentrevival of the Home Rule proposal, with its attendant fears ofhierarchical ascendency, as illustrated by the promulgation of the _NeTemere_ decree, suddenly interrupted it. But the fundamental fact of thecase is, that in the last resort, it is not with their Roman Catholicneighbours, or even with their hierarchy, that Irish Protestants have toreckon; it is rather with the Vatican, the inexorable power behind themall, whose decrees necessarily over-ride all the good-will whichneighbourly feeling might inspire in the Roman Catholic mind. The _NeTemere_ decree affords a significant premonition of the spirit whichwould direct Home Rule legislation. It is noteworthy that no Nationalistmember has protested against the cruelties of that decree as shown inthe M'Cann case, and Mr. Devlin, M. P. , even defended what was done fromhis place in Parliament. This action is all the more significant in viewof the fact that during the Committee stage of the 1893 Home Rule BillMr. Gladstone, Mr. Redmond, and his Irish Nationalist colleagues votedagainst, and defeated, an Ulster amendment which proposed to exemptmarriage and other religious ceremonies from the legislative powers ofthe Dublin Parliament. It would be intolerable that such litigation asin the Hubert case at present in progress in Montreal, arising out ofthe Marriage Law of the Province of Quebec, should be made possible inIreland. No paper safeguards in a Home Rule Bill could prevent it. 

Again, a most serious peril has just been disclosed in the publicationof the _Motu Proprio_ Papal Decree, under which the bringing by a RomanCatholic layman of a clergyman of his Church into any civil or criminalprocedure in a court of law, whether as defendant or witness, withoutthe sanction previously ob tamed of his bishop, involves to that laymanthe extreme penalty of excommunication. The same penalty appears to beincurred _ipso facto_ by any Roman Catholic Member of Parliament whotakes part in passing, and by every executive officer of the Governmentwho takes part in promulgating, a law or decree which is held to invadethe liberty or rights of the Church of Rome. This is a matter of supremeimportance in our civil life. It was one of the questions which, inReformation times, led to the breach between Henry VIII. And the Pope. In a Dublin Parliament no power could resist the provisions of thisdecree from becoming law. As a matter of fact, the liberty of speech andvoting attaching to every member of the Roman Catholic majority in aDublin Parliament would be under the absolute control of theirhierarchy. Each Roman Catholic member would be bound to act under thedread of excommunication if he voted for or condoned any legislationcontrary to the asserted rights of his Church, or which conflicted withits claims. Not only would the legislative independence of a DublinParliament be thus destroyed, but the administration of justice would beaffected on every Bench in the country, from the Supreme Court of Appealdown to ordinary petty sessions. A grievous wrong would be inflicted onRoman Catholic judges and law officers, some of whom are unsurpassed forintegrity and legal ability. It is contrary to every principle ofjustice to place these honourable men in a position in which they wouldhave to choose between their oath to their King and theirduty--arbitrarily imposed upon them--to their Church. Jurymen andwitnesses would be equally brought under the sinister influences of thedecree, and confidence in just administration of the law, which is atthe root of civil well-being, would be fatally destroyed. 

3. _Home Rule would involve the entire denominationalising, in theinterests of the Roman Catholic Church, of Irish education in all itsbranches. _ To secure this result has long been the great educational aimof the Irish hierarchy. How they have succeeded as regards highereducation Mr. Birrell's Irish Universities Act (1908) gives abundantevidence. The National University of Ireland, created by that Act, whichon paper was represented to Nonconformists in England as having aconstitution free from religious tests, is now, according to the recentboast of Cardinal Logue, thoroughly Roman Catholic, in spite of allpaper safeguards to the contrary. Persistent attempts have been made tosectarianise the Irish primary National School system, founded seventyyears ago, and which now receives an annual State endowment of£1, 621, 921, with the object of safeguarding the faith of the children ofminorities, on the principle of united secular and separate religiousinstruction. That system worked so satisfactorily through many decadesthat Lord O'Hagan, the eminent first Roman Catholic Lord Chancellor ofIreland, declared that under it, up till his time, no case whatever ofproselytism to any Church had occurred. But gradually a sectarian systemof education under the Roman Catholic Church was developed through theteaching order of Christian Brothers, whose schools are now to be foundall over Ireland, and which in many places now supplant thenon-sectarian schools of the National Board. The strongest efforts weremade to bring these sectarian schools into the system of the NationalBoard, and thus entitle them to a share of the State annual endowment. There is no greater peril to the religious faith of Protestantminorities in the border counties of Ulster and elsewhere in Irelandthan the sectarianising of primary schools by Roman Catholics. A fewyears ago a Protestant member of a public service was transferred uponpromotion from Belfast to a Roman Catholic district, in which his boyshad no available school but that of the Christian Brothers, and hisgirls none but that of the local convent. I shall never forget theexpression of that man's face or the pathos in his voice while hepressed me to help him to obtain a transfer to a Protestant district, asotherwise he feared his children would be lost to the faith of theirfathers. Given a Parliament in Dublin, the management of education wouldbe so conducted as gradually to extinguish Protestant minorities in theborder counties of Ulster and in the other provinces of Ireland. It ishere that a chief danger to Protestantism lies. 

4. _Home Rule will seriously injure Ulster's materialprosperity--industrial, commercial, agricultural. _ The root of the evilwill lie in the want of credit of an Irish Exchequer in the moneymarkets of the world. The best financial authorities agree that ifIreland should be left to her own resources, there would be, on thepresent basis of taxation, and after providing for a fair Irishcontribution towards Imperial defence, an annual deficit in the IrishExchequer of £3, 000, 000 to £4, 000, 000. An Irish Government in suchcircumstances--consols themselves being now some £23 under par--couldnot borrow money at any reasonable rate of interest. Ever; if theBritish taxpayer were compelled to provide for the deficiency, eitherby an annual grant or by payment of a divorce penalty of £15, 000, 000 to£20, 000, 000, or by both, a prudent investor would fear that the annualdole might at any moment be withdrawn should, for instance, John Bullbecome irritated by the action of a Dublin Parliament, say, in declaringenlisting in His Majesty's forces a criminal act; or that the capitalgift would soon be frittered away in the interests of agitators andtheir friends. He would simply refuse to invest in Irish stock. 

Now, a fundamental condition of commercial and industrial well-being isfinancial confidence. If the Public Exchequer of a country lacksconfidence, it is a truism to say that consequently commercialconfidence must be gravely impaired. The magnates of Lombard Street andWall Street would view their Irish clients with unpleasant reserve. Irish bankers would in turn restrict advances to their customers, andthese again would limit the credit of those with whom they transactedbusiness. Curtailment of industrial enterprise, the shutting down ofmany manufacturing concerns, with consequent depreciation of buildingsand plant, as well as increase of unemployment, would follow. Already, since the present Home Rule crisis has become acute, the handwriting onthe wall has been made evident in the depreciation of leading Irishstocks to the extent of 15 to 20 per cent. Every one in trade wouldsuffer from the diminution of purchasing power, capital would shrink, income and wages decrease, and the incentives to emigration, which isalready depriving our population of some of its most hopeful elements, would be dangerously increased. 

All these tendencies would be stimulated by the social disorganisationwhich would certainly follow Home Rule. Unionist Ulster, from the UlsterConvention of 1892, to the Craigavon demonstration of 1911, has beenconsistent in her loyal determination that no Parliament but theImperial Parliament shall control her destinies. It is an ignorantmistake to say that she is weakening in this resolve. The steadilyincreasing Unionist majorities in contested Ulster seats at bothelections in 1910 conclusively prove that she is more staunch than everin her Unionist faith. She would certainly resist the decrees of aDublin Parliament and refuse to pay its taxes. The result of its passiveresistance would be civil disorder, which would certainly gravely injureher industrial welfare, especially that of her artisan and workingpopulation. But Ulstermen ask, What is industrial prosperity withoutfreedom? And if, in defence of freedom, they should suffer disaster, theresponsibility would lie with their fellow-citizens in Great Britain whowould impose a hostile yoke upon them. 

Under Home Rule, agricultural Ulster would also suffer. Very many Ulsterfarmers are now occupying owners. But a large number have not yetsucceeded in purchasing, and these eagerly desire the privilege of doingso. Mr. Birrell's 1909 Act has already practically strangled furtherland purchase in Ireland, and if he intends that its completion shouldbe the work of a Home Rule Parliament, the Ulster tenants ask wherewould the £75, 000, 000 to £100, 000, 000 necessary to accomplish theprocess, come from?[66] They know that the procuring of such a sum froman Irish Government would be hopeless, for they are aware thatEnglishmen have better judgment than to allow their Parliament to lendfurther money to a country over which they had relinquished directParliamentary authority, and whose Exchequer would be bankrupt. HomeRule would thus permanently relegate the agricultural population, notonly of Ulster, but of Ireland generally, into two classes living sideby side with each other--one consisting of occupying owners, the otherof rent-payers without hope of ownership. The evil results indiscontent, friction, deterioration of agricultural methods and lessenedproduction would inflict serious injury on Ulster prosperity. 

Again, Home Rule would involve Ulster industry and commerce in excessivetaxation. No one who is aware of the passionate desire amongst Irishagitators and their friends for lucrative jobs, of the efforts thatwould be made to subsidise industries with Government funds, of thedetermination of the clergy to have their monastic, Christian Brothers', monastic and convent schools largely supported by the State, and of theimpossibility, in view of the social disorder all over Ireland thatwould follow Home Rule, of reducing further the police force or theJudiciary, entertains any doubt that retrenchment in Irish expenditurewould be impossible. On the contrary, Irish taxation would increase, andas recent legislation has placed upon Irish farmers imposts greater thanthey think they can bear, the additional revenue would be sought formainly from the industrial North. But with business disorganised, incomes decreased and unemployment increased, the yield of taxationwould be much reduced, and the rate must therefore be made higher. Allthis would fortify Ulster in her determined refusal to pay Home Ruletaxation, and the bankruptcy of the Dublin Exchequer would be complete. 

It is from having regard to considerations such as I have outlined, andof the validity of which she is profoundly convinced, that Ulster hasregistered the historic Convention declaration, "We will not have HomeRule. " Her position is plain and intelligible. She demands no separationfrom her Nationalist countrymen. On the contrary, she wishes, under theprotection of the Legislative Union, to live side by side with them inpeaceful industry and neighbourly fellowship, with the desire that theyand we may in common partake of the benefits conferred on Ireland bygenerous Imperial legislation and repay it by sympathetic and energeticcontribution to the service of the Empire. 

But if Home Rule legislation should be passed contrary to Ulster'searnest and patriotic pleading, then she claims--not a separateParliament for herself, but that she may remain as she is in theunimpaired enjoyment of her position as an integral portion of theUnited Kingdom and with unaltered representation in Imperial Parliament. She wishes to continue as an Irish Lancashire, or an Irish Lanarkshire. In this relationship to Great Britain she is confident she will bestpreserve, not only her own interests, but also those of her fellowloyalists, Roman Catholic as well as Protestants, whose lot is cast inthe other provinces and whose welfare will always be her responsible andearnest concern. 

But if this demand--based on loyalty to the King and Constitution, andfounded on the elementary right of British citizens to the unimpairedprotection of Imperial Parliament--be refused, then the only alternativeis the Ulster Provincial Government, which will be organised to comeinto operation on the day that a Home Rule Bill should receive the RoyalAssent; and under that Provisional Government we shall continue tosupport our King, and to render the same services' to the United Kingdomand to the Empire as have characterised the history of Ulster during thepast three hundred years. 

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 66: See Mr. Wyndham's article, p. 249. ]

IX

THE SOUTHERN MINORITIES

BY RICHARD BAGWELL, M. A. 

At the present moment no county or borough in the three southernprovinces of Ireland returns a Unionist member. There are substantialminorities in many places, but very few in which there would be anychance of a successful contest. The University of Dublin sends twoconspicuous Unionists to Parliament, who represent not only aconstituency of graduates, but the vast majority of educated andthinking people. The bearing of the question on religious interests willbe dealt with by others, but it may be said here that the Protestantcommunity is Unionist. The exceptions are few, and are much more thancounter-balanced by the Roman Catholic opponents of Home Rule, who forobvious reasons are less outspoken, but are quite as anxious to avertthe threatened revolution. 

The great bone of contention has always been the land, the cause ofvarious wars and of ceaseless civil disputes. Parnell saw and said thatpurely political Nationalism was weak by itself, and he took up the landquestion to get leverage. For many years it has been evident that theonly feasible solution was to convert occupiers into owners, and a verylong step was made by the Purchase Act of 1903. Progress has now beenarrested, for the Act of 1909 does not work. The vendors or expropriatedowners, whichever is the more correct term, are expected to take a lowerprice and to be paid in depreciated paper. The minorities to be mostimmediately affected by legislation consist of landlords who are unable, though willing, to sell, and of tenants who are unable but very anxiousto buy. The present deadlock is disastrous, for many tenants think theyought not to pay more than their neighbours, and demand reductions ofrent without considering that the owner has received no part of hiscapital and dares not destroy the basis on which he hopes to beultimately paid. It has been an essential part of the purchase policythat the instalment due by the occupier to recoup the State advanceshould be less than the rent. This has been made possible by the magicof British credit, and if that is withheld the confusion in Ireland willbe worse than ever. The Exchequer has lost little or nothing, and evenat much greater cost it would be the cheapest money that England everspent. More than half the tenanted land has now passed to the occupiers, and it would be the most cruel injustice to leave the remaininglandlords without power either to sell their property or to collectrents judicially fixed and refixed. They would fare badly with an Irishlegislature and an Irish executive. They are, for the most part, poorbut loyal men, and have exercised a great civilising influence. Are theyto be deserted and ruined to keep an English party in place by the votesof men who have never pretended to be anything but England's enemies?

Irish Unionists laugh at the idea of a local Parliament being keptsubordinate. It will have the power of making laws for everything Irish, that is, for everything that immediately concerns those that live inIreland. There will be ceaseless efforts to enlarge its sphere ofaction, and if Irish members continue to sit at Westminster they will beas troublesome as ever there. If there are to be no Irish membersIreland will be a separate nation. Even candid Home Rulers confess thatstatutory safeguards would be of none effect. Hedged in by Britishbayonets the Lord Lieutenant may exercise his veto, but upon whoseadvice will he do it? If on that of an Irish Ministry the minority willhave no protection at all, and does any one suppose it possible to goback to the practice of the seventeenth century, when all Irish Billswere settled in the English Privy Council, and could not be altered in aDublin Parliament? Orators declaim about our lost legislature, but theytake good care not to say what it was. In the penultimate decade of theeighteenth century the trammels were taken off, and a Union was soonfound necessary. During the short interval of Independence there weretwo French invasions and a bloody rebellion. Protestant ascendency, though used as a catchword, is a thing long past. Roman Catholicascendency would be a very real thing under Home Rule. The supremacy ofthe Imperial Parliament alone makes both the one and the otherimpossible. 

If a legislature is established it must be given the means of enforcingits laws. We do not know what the present Government propose to do withthe Irish police, but whatever the law says in practice, they will beunder the local executive. Unpopular people will not be protected, andmany of them will be driven out of the country. Parliamentary HomeRulers draw rosy pictures of the future Arcadia; but they will not beable to fulfil their own prophecies. Apart from the agrarian question, there is the party of revolutionists in Ireland whose headquarters arein America. They have furnished the means for agitation, and will lookfor their reward. The Fenian party has less power in the United Statesthan it used to have, but there will be congenial work to do in Ireland. A violent faction can be kept in order where there is a stronggovernment, but in a Home Rule Ireland it would not be strong for anysuch purpose. Appeals to cupidity and envy would find hearers, and therecould be no effective resistance. The French Jacobins were a minoritybut they swept all before them. In the end better counsels mightprevail, but the mischief done would be great, and much of itirreparable. 

The justice dealt out by the superior courts in Ireland is as good as itis anywhere. A judge in the last resort has the whole force of the Statebehind him, and no one dreams of resistance. With an Irish Parliamentand an Irish Executive this would hardly be the case. The judges wouldstill be lawyers, but their power would be greatly impaired. In Irelandpopular feeling is always against creditors, and it would be very hardindeed either to execute a writ of ejectment or a seizure of goods. Ifthe sanction of the law is weakened, public respect for it is lessened, and the result will be a general relaxation of the bonds which drawsociety together. There is nothing in the antecedents of the Home RuleParty to make one suppose that it contains the materials of a good andimpartial government. 

Home Rule politicians are talkative and pertinacious. As members ofParliament they are of course listened to, while Unionists outsideUlster make little noise; it is, therefore, constantly said that theyacquiesce in the inevitable change. Unrepresented men cannot easily makethemselves heard, but they have done what they could. An enormousmeeting has been held in Dublin, and the building, which contains some7000, was filled in a quarter of an hour. There has since been a largegathering of young men who wish to remain full citizens of the Empire inwhich they were born, and others are to follow. In rural districts it isalmost impossible to collect people in winter. Days are short anddistances are long. Unionist farmers cannot forget the outrages thatprevailed some years ago, and are not yet unknown. In the native land ofboycotting and cattle-driving it is not surprising that they do not wishto be conspicuous. The difficulty extends to the towns, in many of whichit would be almost impossible to hire a room for Unionist purposes. Hotel keepers object to risking their business and their windows, for amob is easily excited to riot on patriotic grounds. Shopkeepers alsohave to be cautious in a country which has been wittily described as aland of liberty where no one can do as he likes, but where every onemust do exactly what everybody else likes. In the summer people can meetin the open air, and there will, no doubt, be abundant protests fromSouthern Unionists. There will then be something definite to talk about. 

It is often said that the County Councils have done well, and thattherefore there is no danger in an Irish Parliament, but the two thingsare different in kind. County or District Councils, or Boards ofGuardians, are constituted by Acts of the Imperial Parliament toadminister Acts of the same, and are subject to constant supervision bythe Local Government Board, and to the peremptory action of the King'sBench. A Parliament is by nature supreme within its sphere of action, and its constant effort would be to enlarge that field. The men who aimat independence would have the easy part to play, for no one in or outof Ulster, former Unionist or confirmed Nationalist, would have anyinterest in opposing them. In the meantime local councils have taught uswhat is likely to happen. Minorities are virtually excluded from themand from paid places in their gift. Of Protestants holding local officethe great majority are survivals from the old Grand Jury system. Political discussions are frequent, but they are all among Nationalists. Intolerance of independent opinion and impatience of criticism areeverywhere noticeable, and the Corporation of Dublin does not show agood example. It is intolerance of this kind rather than any approach toreligious persecution that Protestants suffer from in the present andfear for the future. 

Men who have something to lose dread the idea of Home Rule, includingfarmers who have bought their holdings, but as yet this has not beenallowed time to work. There is a long way between not caring to supporta Nationalist and voting for a Unionist. The chief employers of labourare mostly for the Union, but few are in a position to help the Unionistcause effectively, for they have to deal with strike makers and possibleboycotters. When Labour troubles come, Nationalist politicians try tomake out that they are caused by English agitators, and that there wouldbe none under Home Rule. The probability is all the other way. Therecould be nothing in the existence of an Irish Parliament to preventEnglish Socialists from crossing the Channel, and some Labour leaders inEngland are Irish. We have heard a great deal lately about the union ofthe two democracies, and that is the point where they would unite. Passing from labour to land, which is after all the great interest ofSouthern and Western Ireland, the danger is even greater. With the lossof British credit it would be almost impossible to carry out the plan ofoccupying ownership without the grossest injustice, and the mischiefwould not stop there. An Irish Government would be poor, but would beexpected to do all and more than all that the united government hasdone. At first the gap might be stopped by extravagant super-income tax, by half-compensated seizures of demesne land, and by penalising theowners of ground rents and town property. Confiscation is not apermanent source of wealth, for it soon kills the goose that laid thegolden egg. Then the turn of the large farmer would come. 

Most Unionists, and many who call themselves Home Rulers, are satisfiedwith the form of government they now have. The country has prosperedwonderfully, and it will continue to prosper if the land purchase systemis carried out to the end in a liberal spirit. The worst danger comesfrom the check given to the process by the present Ministry. But thenational feelings of Ireland must not be ignored. Her far-back history, bad in itself, but represented worse by unscrupulous writers, makes itnecessary to maintain an impartial power above the warring elements. Ina pastoral country people have much time on their hands, and are apt tospend it in brooding over bygone wrongs. But over the past not Jovehimself hath power, and it is for the future that we are responsible. From Wellington onwards Ireland has given many great soldiers to theBritish Army, and it is the classes from which they spring that it isnow proposed to abandon. Under Home Rule the flag would be a foreignemblem, useless to protect the weak in Ireland, and perhaps available tooppress them. England would have cast off her friends and gained none inexchange. Nothing will conciliate the revolutionary faction in Ireland, and there is every reason to think that it would become the strongest. Modern Ireland is the creation of English policy, and many wrong thingswere formerly done, but for a long time amends have been making. IfEngland, from weariness or for the sake of Party advantage, abandons hersupporters, they will have no successors. Ireland will be moretroublesome than ever, and the crime will receive its fittingpunishment. 

X

HOME RULE AND NAVAL DEFENCE

BY ADMIRAL LORD CHARLES BERESFORD, M. P. 

Ireland under Home Rule must, in the event of war, be regarded as apotentially hostile country. 

In this statement resides the dominant factor of the situation viewedfrom the naval and military point of view. It is not asserted that thegovernment of Ireland would be disloyal; but it is asserted that theauthorities charged with the defence of his Majesty's dominions cannotafford to take risks when the safety of the country is at stake. Thatsuch risks must exist under the circumstances indicated, is obvious toall those who have studied the speeches of the leaders of the IrishNationalist party, in which they have unequivocally declared theirintention to rid Ireland of English rule, and in which they extol asheroes such men as Theobald Wolfe Tone, who intrigued with Franceagainst England in order to achieve Irish independence, and who took hisown life rather than receive the just reward of his deeds. That someamong the Irish Nationalist leaders have recently professed theirdevotion to the British Empire cannot be regarded by serious persons asa relevant consideration. The demand for Home Rule is in fact a demandfor separation from the United Kingdom or it is nothing. Naval officersare accustomed to deal with facts rather than with words. 

In the great sea-wars of the past, Ireland has always been regarded bythe enemy as providing the base for a flank attack upon England. HadKing Louis XIV. Rightly used his opportunities, the army of King Williamwould have been cut off from its base in England, and would have beendestroyed by reinforcements arriving from France to assist King JamesII. There is no more concise presentment of the case than the account ofit given by Admiral Mahan in "The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783. "

 "The Irish Sea, separating the British Islands, rather resembles an estuary than an actual division; but history has shown the danger from it to the United Kingdom. In the days of Louis XIV. , when the French navy nearly equalled the combined English and Dutch, the gravest complications existed in Ireland, which passed almost wholly under the control of the natives and the French. Nevertheless, the Irish Sea was rather a danger to the English--a weak point in their communications--than an advantage to the French. The latter did not venture their ships-of-the-line in its narrow waters, and expeditions intending to land were directed upon the ocean ports in the south and west. At the supreme moment the great French fleet was sent upon the south coast of England, where it decisively defeated the allies, and at the same time twenty-five frigates were sent to St. George's Channel, against the English communications. In the midst of a hostile people the English army in Ireland was seriously imperilled, but was saved by the battle of the Boyne and the flight of James II. _This movement against the enemy's communications was strictly strategic, and would be just as dangerous to England now as in 1690_[67].... 

 "There can be little doubt that an effective co-operation of the French fleet in the summer of 1689 would have broken down all opposition to James in Ireland, by isolating that country from England, with corresponding injury to William's power.... 

 "The battle of the Boyne, which from its peculiar religious colouring has obtained a somewhat factitious celebrity, may be taken as the date at which the English crown was firmly fixed on William's head. Yet it would be more accurate to say that the success of William, and with it the success of Europe, against Louis XIV. In the war of the League of Augsburg, was due to the mistakes and failure of the French naval campaign in 1690; though in that campaign was won the most conspicuous single success the French have ever gained at sea over the English. "

Every great naval power has gone to school to Admiral Mahan; and thiscountry can hardly expect again to profit by those mistakes in strategywhich the gifted American writer has so lucidly exposed. 

Ireland, lying on the western flank of Great Britain, commands on thesouth the approaches to the Channel, on the west the North Atlantic; andon the east the Irish Sea, all sea-roads by which millions of pounds'worth of supplies are brought to England. On every coast Ireland hasexcellent harbours. There are Lough Swilly on the north, Blacksod Bay onthe west, Bantry Bay, Cork Harbour and Waterford Harbour on the south, Kingstown Harbour and Belfast Lough on the east--to name butthese--besides numerous lesser inlets which can serve as shelter forsmall craft and destroyers. It should here be noted that BelfastHarbour, owing to the enterprise of the Harbour Board, now possesses achannel and dock capable of accommodating a ship of the Dreadnoughttype[68]. 

There is no necessity to presuppose an actively hostile Ireland; but anIreland ruled by a disloyal faction would easily afford shelter to thewarships of the enemy in her ports, whence they could draw supplies, where they could execute small repairs, and could coal from colliersdespatched there for the purpose or captured. Thus lodged, a fleet or asquadron would command the main trade routes to England; and mightinflict immense damage in a short time. Intelligence of its positioncould be prevented from reaching England by the simple method ofdestroying wireless stations and cutting cables. 

These considerations would necessarily impose upon the Navy the task ofdetaching a squadron of watching cruisers charged with the duty ofkeeping guard about the whole of Ireland. 

Is the Admiralty prepared to discharge this office in the event of war?

If not, there falls to be considered the further danger of the invasionof Ireland. That such a peril is not imaginary, is proved by the factthat Ireland has been invaded in the past. 

The attempt of Hoche and Grouchy to land in Bantry Bay in 1796 failedignominiously; and the next expedition designed to invade Ireland wasdefeated at Camperdown. But in 1798, the year of the Great Rebellion inIreland, three French frigates evaded the British cruisers, and onAugust 22 dropped anchor in Killala Bay. General of Brigade, Jean JosephAmable Humbert, landed with his second in command, General Sarazin, several rebel Irish leaders, 1700 men and 82 officers. 

On August 27 Humbert defeated the British troops at Castlebar "Races. "On September 8, his forces surrendered at Ballinamuck to LordCornwallis. General Humbert was carried to England; and it is worthnoting that while he was on his way, Admiral Bompard set sail from Brestwith a ship of the line and three frigates, carrying 2587 men and 172officers, commanded by General Hardy and the notorious Wolfe Tone(called General Smith for the occasion). Bompard was turned back by anEnglish fleet of forty-two sail. The obvious conclusion of the wholematter is that the fleet can stop an invasion, always provided that theships thereof are the right number in the right place at the right time. 

The Irish Rebellion of 1798 is often discussed as though it was whollybred of the corruption of Ireland itself. The fact was, of course, thatit was an offshoot of the French Revolution, and that the condition ofIreland at the time was no more than a contributory cause. My LordsCornwallis, Castlereagh, and Clare, in combating the forces of theRebellion, were actually in conflict with the vast insurrections of theFrench nation. The design of the Irish rebels was to enlist the mightydestructive force of France to serve their own ends. 

Wolfe Tone and his colleague Lewens, in 1796, had succeeded inpersuading Carnot and the French Directory to embrace the cause ofIreland. When the Rebellion of 1798 broke out, Lewens wrote to theDirectory reminding them that they had promised that France shouldpostulate the conferring of independence upon Ireland as the conditionof making peace with England, and specifying five thousand troops of allarms, and thirty thousand muskets with artillery and ammunition, assufficient to ensure the success of the Rebellion. 

The attitude of the Directory is defined in the despatch addressed toGeneral Hardy (upon whom the supreme command of the Humbert expeditionat first devolved) by Bruix, Minister of Marine, dated July 30, 1798. 

"The executive Directory is busily engaged in arranging to send help tothe Irish who have taken up arms to sever the yoke of British rule. Itis for the French Government to second the efforts of a brave people whohave too long suffered under oppression. "

In other words, the Directory regarded the achievement of herindependence by Ireland as an enterprise incidental to the greaterscheme of the conquest of England and of Europe. 

It was further laid down in the despatch that "it is most important totake every possible means to arouse the public spirit of the country, and particularly to foster sedulously its hatred of the English name ... There has never been an expedition whose result might more powerfullyaffect the political situation in Europe, or could more advantageouslyassist the Republic.... "

Irish conspirators have never risen to play any part higher than theoffice of cat's-paw to a foreign nation. To-day, they are content--atpresent--to bribe with votes a political party in England. But it isnone the less essential to remember that, as in 1688 and as in 1798 agreat and militant foreign Power used the weapon of Irish seditionagainst England, so in 1912 the same instrument lies ready to hand. Forthe Home Rule conspiracy of to-day is nothing but the lees of the evilheritage bequeathed by the French Revolution. 

It is the business of the naval officer, who is not concerned with partypolitics, to estimate the posture of international affairs solely inrelation to the security of the State. The condition of Ireland at thismoment, when the Home Rule issue has been wantonly revived, would, inthe event of a war occurring between Great Britain and a foreign Power, involve the necessity of regarding Ireland as a strategic base ofessential value, a part of whose inhabitants might combine with thehostile forces by giving them shelter and supplies, and even by invitingthem to occupy the country. Elsewhere in these pages, Lord Percy haspointed out that the necessity of holding a disaffected Ireland bygarrisoning the country would totally disorganise our militarypreparations for war--such as they are. 

These considerations must materially affect strategical dispositions inthe event of war, involving the establishment and maintenance of aseparate force of cruisers charged with the duty of patrolling the searoutes which converge upon Ireland, and of watching the harbours of hercoasts. As matters stand at present, such a force does not exist. 

It may, of course, be urged that a strategical plan designed for thedouble purpose of surveying the movements of a hostile battle-fleet andof guarding the trade-routes, must of necessity cover the coasts ofIreland, on the principle that the greater includes the less. Theargument, however, omits the essential qualification that a part of theIrish population cannot be trusted. It is this additional difficultywhich has been introduced into the problem of naval defence by therevival by politicians of the agitation of 1798, under another name. 

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 67: The writer's italics. ]

[Footnote 68: According to _The Daily Telegraph_ of January 22, 1912. ]

XI

THE MILITARY DISADVANTAGES OF HOME RULE

BY THE EARL PERCY

The problems of Imperial defence have become of late years extremelycomplex, owing to the rise of a great European naval power, and also tothe predominance of Japan in the Pacific. These two factors, combinedwith the invention of the Dreadnought type of ship which is now beingbuilt by other powers whose navies we could formerly afford to ignore, have rendered our position in the world more precarious, more dependentupon foreign alliances and _ententes_, and have rendered combination fordefence far more essential. No Home Rule scheme can be judged withouttaking into consideration what its effect will be on this situation. Itis proposed to consider it first in the light of the more pressingEuropean danger, and next to examine how it will affect the widerproblem of the future, namely, the co-operation of all parts of theBritish Empire for defence. 

But first it is of course necessary to find out what Home Rule means, and what the internal state of Ireland will be if it passes. On thispoint there is at present no certainty. We can dismiss at once Mr. Redmond's picture of a serenely contented and grateful Ireland, onlydesirous of helping her benefactor, and, under a strong andincorruptible government, engaged in setting its house in order. Thepresence of a strong Protestant community, the history of the RomanCatholic Church in all countries, and the deliberate fostering ofseparatist national ideals preclude the possibility of anything but aprolonged period of unrest, which, on the most favourable hypothesis, can only cease altogether when the present generation has passed away. This unrest may take two forms; either civil war, or a condition wherethe rousing of old animosities, religious and otherwise, leads tointernal disturbances of all kinds. It is not proposed to deal here withthe consequences involved by the calling in of troops to suppress byforce of arms an insurrectionary movement against the Government ofIreland. In view of the present state of affairs in Ulster, such anevent seems extremely probable, but the disastrous results of passingHome Rule in face of it are so patent to all that it is unnecessary toenlarge upon them here. We have, therefore, to consider a condition ofthings in which old mutual hatreds have re-awakened, in which Irelandwill be governed by men who have up till now preached sedition, havedone their best to check recruiting, who have deliberately set up anideal of "complete separation" as their ultimate goal, and whose mottohas always been "England's difficulty is Ireland's opportunity. "

It is conceivable, of course, though it is extremely improbable, thatthese aims and ideals may be abjured in course of time, but the gravityof these risks must be taken into account in examining Ireland'sposition in any scheme of national and Imperial defence both now and inthe future. 

And in this connection it may be remarked that an almost exact analogyto the situation which will probably result from this measure may beseen in the events which preceded the Boer war, and it seems somewhatremarkable that those who endeavour to justify Home Rule by the supposedColonial analogy should overlook a warning so evident and so recent inthe history of our oversea dominions. 

A Separatist party in Ireland would be enabled to work for ultimateindependence as did President Kruger, and by the same methods, the samesecret acquisition of arms and implements of war, the same building offortresses with a view to a declaration of independence when a suitableopportunity arrived; and this would be all the more likely to occur ifUlster were exempted from a Home Rule Parliament. In this case Ulstermenwould occupy exactly the same position as did the Uitlanders from 1895to 1899. The same arguments for granting independence to Ireland areused now, the same talk of injustice towards those who are disloyal withequal disregard of the loyalist section, and the results will be thesame. Would independence have been granted to the Transvaal or OrangeFree State had their use of it been foreseen? Taking the factors in bothcases into account, is there anything to justify the doubt that arepetition of that situation will occur, with the only difference thateventual rupture will probably entail the dismemberment of the Empire?

It is universally acknowledged that this country is at present facedwith a more critical European situation than any we have experienced fora hundred years. It has tied our fleet to home waters, and has induced avery large and influential section of our people to advocate thenecessity of compulsory military service. Our military organisation ison the face of it a makeshift, and the makeshift is not even complete, for in the Territorial Army and the Special Reserve alone there is ashortage of more than 80, 000 men. 

Now, our foreign policy of _ententes_ and the needs of our overseaterritories have necessitated a military organisation, the foundation ofwhich is readiness to undertake an oversea expedition as well as toprovide for home defence. The critical situation in Europe especiallywill demand the instant despatch of our Expeditionary Force on theoutbreak of war, in which case there will be left in these islands thefollowing forces after deducting 10 per cent, for casualties:--

About 55, 000 Regulars, of whom 30, 000 will be under 20 years of age. 

About 30, 000 Reservists. These will be required to reinforce theExpeditionary Force. 

About 60, 000 Special Reservists. Some 30, 000 of these are under 20. Thisforce is to be used to reinforce the troops abroad. 

About 245, 000 Territorials. 72, 000 of these are under 20. 

In all there are some 400, 000 men, of whom 130, 000 are boys and 60, 000will leave the country soon after war breaks out. This will leave some210, 000 men to provide for the defence of England, Scotland, andIreland, supplemented by 130, 000 boys. These troops will be deprived ofpractically all Regular and even Reserve officers, and will have toprovide for coast defence, for the security of law and order, and forthe numbers required for a central field force. By means of jugglingwith figures, by the registration of names in what is called theNational Reserve, but has no organisation or corporate existence, and bysimilar means, the seriousness of this situation has been concealed tosome extent, but it is generally recognised as being little short of anational scandal, and would not be tolerated were it not for the generalignorance of our people concerning the exigencies of war and their blindbelief in the omnipotence of the navy. This defencelessness has twodangers: firstly, the chance of a successful raid or invasion. As longas our navy is not defeated, no invading force of more than 70, 000 menis supposed to be capable of landing. The second danger is that the merefear of such an event will prevent the despatch of the ExpeditionaryForce and the fulfilment of our oversea obligations. 

It must be obvious that in the precarious state of our national defenceanything which renders either of these dangers more probable should beavoided at all costs. If, for instance, the condition of Ireland shoulddemand the maintenance of a larger garrison in that country, the wholeof our present organisation for defence falls to pieces. Looking only atthe present foreign situation, and the ever-growing menace of increasingarmaments, if the passing of Home Rule should require the retention of asingle extra soldier in Ireland, it is perfectly certain that nothingcould justify the adoption of such a measure. It is not intended toconvey the impression that there is any fear of Ireland repeating thehistory of 1796 and welcoming a foreign invasion, although it isimpossible to ignore the anti-English campaign of agitation, or to sayto what length it will go; but the mere fact of internal dissension inthat country will give an enemy exactly the chance he looks for. Many ofthose best qualified to judge are of opinion that Germany is onlywaiting to free herself of an embarrassing situation, until one power ofthe Triple Entente is for the time being too much occupied to intervenein a Continental struggle. We have had one warning when, in September, 1911, a railway strike at home coincided with a foreign crisis. Are wedeliberately to take a step which will almost certainly involve us in asimilar dilemma?

This is the more immediate danger, but, apart from this, the strategicalvalue of Ireland will be profoundly affected by its separation fromEngland, and this constitutes a grave source of weakness, even ifinternal trouble be avoided, and a comparatively loyal government beinstalled. Ireland lies directly across all the trade routes by whichnearly all our supplies of food and raw material are brought, and itcovers the principal trade centres of the Midlands and the South ofScotland. In any attack by an enemy on our commerce, Ireland will becomeof supreme importance. There are two stages in every naval war: first, the engagement between the two navies; second, the blockade ordestruction of the ships of the beaten side. This was the method bywhich we fought Napoleon, but even then we could not prevent the enemy'sships escaping from time to time; and even after we had destroyed theirnavy at Trafalgar, the damage to our oversea commerce was enormous. Nowadays, torpedoes, submarines, and floating mines have renderedblockade infinitely more precarious, and consequently we have to takeinto account the extreme probability, and indeed, certainty, of hostilecruisers escaping and menacing our oversea supplies. This danger will beincreased tenfold if Germany has been able to defeat France, and useFrench, Dutch, and Belgian ports for privateering purposes. In thesecond, if not in the first, stage of European war, therefore, theclosest co-operation between the governments of Ireland and England willbe essential. In this case, Queenstown and Lough Swilly will be thebases for our own protecting cruisers, and on their success will dependthe issues of life and death for our people. As the West of Ireland isthe nearest point in these islands to America, it is probable thatcargoes destined for English ports will reach them _via_ Ireland toavoid the longer sea-transit. Lord Wolseley has even gone so far as tominimise the dangers of blockade, because the Irish coast offered suchfacilities for blockade-running. It is certain that in our greatest needIreland might well prove our salvation, provided we had not absolutelylost command of the sea, and this advantage a Liberal Government isprepared to jeopardise for reasons, which, compared with the interestsat stake, are little less than sordid. 

But even if Ireland be less directly affected by war than in this case, and even if its internal condition should give little anxiety, the verynature of its resources should prevent us taking a step which maydeprive us of them in emergency or, at least, render them less readilyavailable. Not only do we draw a number of our soldiers from there, outof all proportion to the quotas provided by the populations of Englandand Scotland, but we are absolutely dependent for our mounted brancheson Irish horses. For our supplies in time of stress, for our horses, andfor a great and valuable recruiting area, we shall be forced to rely ona government whose future is wrapped in the deepest obscurity, and whichat the best is hardly likely to give us enthusiastic support. 

Our whole military organisation is becoming more decentralised and moredependent on voluntary effort; it is devolving more and more uponTerritorial Associations and local bodies of all kinds. We do notpossess the reserves of horses and transport which continental nationshold ready for use on mobilisation, and, as a substitute, we have had tofall back on a system of registration which demands care, zeal, andenergy on the part of these civilian bodies. How will an IrishGovernment and its officials fulfil a duty which will be distorted byevery Nationalist into an attempt to employ the national resources forthe sole benefit of England?

War is a stern taskmaster, demanding long years of preparation andcombination of effort for one end. The political separation of the twocountries does not alter the fact that they are, in the military sense, one area of operations and of supply, and, at a time like the present, when the mutual dependence of all parts of the Empire is gradually beingrealised; when the dominions are building navies, and all ourdependencies are co-operating in one scheme of defence for the whole;when the elaboration of the details of this scheme are the pressing needof the hour, the dissolution of the Union binding together the veryheart of the Empire, is a strategic mistake, the disastrous significanceof which it is impossible to exaggerate. For it must be remembered thathere is no analogy to a federation of semi-independent provinces as inCanada, where national defence is equally the interest of the whole. Ireland has never recognised this community of interest with England. Quebec, it is true, stands aloof and indifferent to the ideals of thesister provinces; but there is no bitter religious hatred, no fierce, anti-national aims fostered by ancient traditions, life-long feuds andunscrupulous agitation, and every Canadian knows that Quebec would fightto the last against American aggression, if only to preserve herreligious independence. There is no such bond here--or, at least, theIrish Nationalist has refused to acknowledge it. 

The year 1912 has opened amid signs of unrest and change, the meaning orthe end of which no man can know. In the Far East and the Near Eastpolitical and religious systems are disappearing, and chaos is steadilyincreasing. In Europe the nations have set out on the march toArmageddon, and there is no staying the progress of their armaments. InGreat Britain alone the question of preparation for war is shirked onthe plea that it is one for experts, and even soldiers and sailors, drawn into the political vortex, make light of our necessities, believing in the hopelessness of ever convincing the people of the truthuntil "a white calamity of steel and iron, the bearing of burdens andthe hot rage of insult, " fall upon us. It is for this reason that we seethe extraordinary phenomenon of men denying the necessity for becominga nation in arms, and yet urging our Government to contract nofriendships abroad, and to interfere on behalf of every petty princedomoppressed by a powerful neighbour, and every downtrodden subject of someforeign power. It is these same men who wish to dissolve the Union, andto impose obligations at home upon an inadequate army which would leaveus powerless abroad. And the longer war delays in coming, the greaterwill be the danger when it comes. With the increase in armaments, thiscountry must undergo a proportionate sacrifice. If compulsory serviceshould be adopted, it must apply to Ireland as well as the UnitedKingdom. But how will an independent government in Dublin view thecompulsory enrolment of the manhood of Ireland, two-thirds of which havebeen taught to regard England as the national and hereditary enemy? TheIrish are, above all, a military race. Had we been able to enforce suchservice within the Union, whatever temporary opposition it might haveencountered, it might ultimately have proved an indissoluble bond offriendship. 

The future is very dark, and it is all important that we should face itwith open eyes. War cannot long be delayed, and there is too little timeleft to put our house in order. Even if Home Rule could be shown to bean act of justice due to a wronged people who have proved themselvescapable of self-government, even then it could not be justified in thepresent crisis abroad. But it is not so. Ulster will fight for the samecause as did the Northern States of America, and may well show the sameself-sacrifice. It will be civil war in a country peculiarly adapted tothe movements of irregular troops, well acquainted with its features; itwill be accompanied by atrocities which will be remembered forcenturies. And this is the tremendous risk we are deliberately running, when we only possess six divisions of regular troops to support ourallies on the continent and to safeguard the interests of the wholeBritish Empire. 

It is for the British people to decide whether the thin red line is tobe still thinner in the day of battle, and whether those who should befighting side by side shall be embittered and divided, or whether theywill rather believe the words of the greatest naval expert living[69]:

 "It is impossible for a military man or a statesman with appreciation of military conditions, to look at the map and not perceive that the ambition of the Irish separatists, realised, would be even more threatening to the national life than the secession of the South was to that of the American Union. "

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 69: Admiral Mahan. ]

XII

THE RELIGIOUS DIFFICULTY UNDER HOME RULE

(i) THE CHURCH VIEW

BY THE RT. REV. C. F. D'ARCY, BISHOP OF DOWN

Irish Unionists are determined in their opposition to Home Rule by manyconsiderations. But deepest of all is the conviction that, on theestablishment of a separate legislature and executive for Ireland, thereligious difficulty, which is ever with us here, would be increasedenormously. Occasionally, in English newspapers and in Irish politicalspeeches, there occur phrases which imply that the Protestantascendency, as it was called, still exists in Ireland. Those who knowIreland are well aware that this is not merely false: it is impossible. Even in Belfast, as a recent controversy proved, Roman Catholics gettheir full share of whatever is to be had. There are no Roman Catholicdisabilities. The majority has every means of making its power felt. Atthe present moment, the most impossible of all things in Ireland is thatRoman Catholics, as such, should be oppressed or unfairly treated. 

It used to be imagined that when this happy condition was attained therewould be no more religious disagreement in Ireland. But events haveshown the exact opposite to be the case. There never was a time whenthere was in the minds of Irish Protestants so deep a dread of Romanaggression, and so firm a conviction that the object of that aggressionis the complete subjection of this country to Roman domination. Recalling very distinctly the events and discussions of 1886 and 1893, when Home Rule for Ireland seemed so near accomplishment under Mr. Gladstone's leadership, the writer has no hesitation in saying that thedread of Roman tyranny is now far more vivid and, as a motive, far moreurgent than it was at those epochs. Protestants are now convinced, asnever before, that Home Rule must mean Rome Rule, and that, should it beforced upon them, in spite of all their efforts, they will be face toface with a struggle for liberty and conscience such as this land hasnot witnessed since the year 1690. That such should be the conviction ofone-fourth of the people of Ireland, and that fourth by far the mostenergetic portion of its inhabitants, is a fact which politicians maywell lay to heart. 

Approaching this subject as one whose duties give him the spiritualoversight of more than 200, 000 of the Protestants of Ireland--members ofthe Church of Ireland, and who has had twenty-seven years of experienceas a clergyman in Ireland, both in the north and in the south, thewriter may venture to speak with some confidence as to the mind of thepeople among whom he has worked for so long. In doing so, he feels atliberty to say that he is one who has always avoided religiouscontroversy, and who has ever made it his endeavour to be tolerant andconsiderate of the feelings and convictions of others. He has a deepregard for his Roman Catholic fellow-countrymen, and recognises to thefull their many excellent qualities and the sincerity of their religion. 

It is possible to bring to a single point the reasons which make IrishUnionists so apprehensive as regards the religious difficulty under HomeRule. Their fears are not concerned with any of the special dogmas ofthe Roman Church. But they recognise, as people in England do not, theinevitable tendency of the consistent and immemorial policy of theChurch of Rome in relation to persons who refuse to submit to herclaims. They know that policy to be one of absolute and uncompromisinginsistence on the exacting of everything which she regards as her rightas soon as she possesses the power. They know that, for her, tolerationis only a temporary expedient. They know that professions and promisesmade by individual Roman Catholics and by political leaders, statementswhich to English ears seem a happy augury of a good time coming, are ofno value whatever. They do not deny that such promises and guaranteesexpress a great deal of good intention, but they know that above theindividual, whether he be layman or ecclesiastic, there is a systemwhich moves on, as soon as such movement becomes possible, in utterdisregard of his statements. At the time when Catholic emancipation wasin view, high Roman authorities gave the most emphatic guarantees thatthe position of the then Established Church in Ireland would never beendangered, so far as their Church and people were concerned. But whenthe time came, such promises proved absolutely worthless. Whether thedisestablishment of the Irish Church was a good thing or not, is not thequestion here. The essential point, for our present purpose, is that theguarantees of individual Roman Catholics, no matter how positively orhow confidently stated, are of no account as against the steady age-longpolicy of the Roman Church. 

It is well known to all students that, while other religious bodieshave, both in theory and in practice, renounced certain old methods ofpersuasion, the Roman Church still formally claims the power to controlstates, to depose princes, to absolve subjects from their allegiance, toextirpate heresy. She has never accepted the modern doctrine oftoleration. But there are many who think that these ancient claims, though not renounced, are so much out-of-date in the modern world thatthey mean practically nothing. Such is the opinion of the averageEnglishman, and the mild and cultivated form of Romanism which is to bemet with usually in England lends colour to the opinion. In Ireland weknow better. 

The recent Papal Decree, termed _Ne Temere_, regulating thesolemnisation of marriages, has been enforced in Ireland in a mannerwhich must seem impossible to Englishmen. 

According to this Decree, "No marriage is valid which is not contractedin the presence of the (Roman) parish priest of the place, or of theOrdinary, or of a priest deputed by them, and of two witnesses atleast. " This rule is binding on all Roman Catholics. 

It is easy to see what hardship and wrong must follow the observance ofthis rule in the case of mixed marriages. 

As a result, it is now the case that, in Ireland, marriages which thelaw of the land declares to be valid are declared null and void by theChurch of Rome, and the children of them are pronounced illegitimate. Nor is this a mere academic opinion: such is the power of the RomanChurch in this country that she is able to enforce her laws withoutdeference to the authority of the State. 

The celebrated McCann case is the most notable illustration. Even in theProtestant city of Belfast we have seen a faithful wife deserted and herchildren spirited away from her, in obedience to this cruel decree. Andwe have seen an executive afraid to do its duty, because Rome had spokenand justified the outrage. Those who know intimately what is happeninghere are aware of case after case in which husband or wife is living indaily terror of similar interference, and also know that Protestantsmarried to Roman Catholics, and living in the districts where the latterare in overwhelming majority, often find it impossible to stand againstthe odium arising from a bigoted and hostile public opinion. Nor doessuch interference stop here. Only a few weeks ago the kidnapping of ayoung wife by Roman Catholic ecclesiastics was prevented only by thebrave and prompt action of her husband. In this case a sworn deposition, made in the presence of a well-known magistrate and fully attested, hasbeen published, and no attempt at contradiction or explanation has beenmade. Let none imagine the _Ne Temere_ question is extinct in Ireland. It is at this moment a burning question. Under Home Rule it would createa conflagration. And surely there is reason for the indignation ofProtestants. Here we see the most solemn contract into which a man orwoman can enter broken at the bidding of a system which claims supremecontrol over all human relations, public and private; and this, not forthe maintenance of any moral principle, but to secure obedience to adisciplinary regulation which is regarded as of so little moral valuethat it is not enforced in any country in which the Government is strongenough to protect its subjects. 

As if to define with perfect clearness, in the face of the modern world, the traditional claim of the Roman See, there has issued from theVatican, within the last few weeks, a Decree which sets the Roman clergyabove the law of the land. This ordinance, which is issued _motuproprio_ by the Pope, is the re-enactment and more exact definition ofan old law. It lays down the rule that whoever, without permission fromany ecclesiastical authority, summons any ecclesiastical persons to alay tribunal and compels them to attend publicly such a court, incursinstant excommunication. The excommunication is automatic, andabsolution from it is specially reserved to the Roman Pontiff. This factadds enormously to the terror of it, especially among a people like theIrish Roman Catholics. Great discussion has taken place as to thecountries in which this Decree is in force. No one was surprised to hearthat Germany was exempt. Archbishop Walsh, the Roman Catholic Archbishopof Dublin, in an elaborate discussion, gives the opinion that the Decreeis abrogated under British law by the custom of the country, which hasin the past rendered impossible the observance of the strictecclesiastical rule in this matter, but is careful to add that this isonly his opinion as a canonist, and is subject to the decision of theHoly See. When this plea is examined, it is found to mean simply this, that the law is not strictly observed in case of necessity. That this isthe meaning of Archbishop Walsh's plea is proved by a quotation which hemakes from Pope Benedict XIV. The principle laid down by Pope Benedictis that when it became impossible to resist the encroachment of adversecustoms, the Popes shut their eyes to what was going on, and toleratedwhat they had no power to prevent. It is exactly the principle oftoleration as a temporary expedient. The re-enactment of the law by thepresent Pope means surely, if it means anything, that such tolerationis to cease wherever and whenever the law can be enforced. But, be itobserved, this necessity is entirely dependent on the strength of theauthority which administers the civil law. The moment the civilauthority grows weak in its assertion of its supremacy, the plea ofnecessity fails, and the ecclesiastical law must be enforced. Those whoknow Ireland are well aware that this is exactly what would happen underHome Rule. Here is the crowning proof of the truth that, above all thewell-intentioned persons who give assurances of the peace and goodwillthat would flourish under Home Rule, there is a power which would bringall their good intentions to nothing. 

But what of the Church of Ireland under Home Rule? Formerly theEstablished Church of the country, and as such occupying a position ofspecial privilege, she still enjoys something of the traditionalconsideration which belonged to that position, and is more than everconscious of her unbroken ecclesiastical descent from the Ancient Churchof Ireland. Her adherents number 575, 000, of whom 366, 000 are in Ulster. As part of her heritage she holds nearly all the ancient ecclesiasticalsites and the more important of the ancient buildings which stillsurvive. These possessions, thus inherited from an immemorial past, weresecured to her by the Act of Disestablishment. For the rest, theendowments which she enjoys at the present time have been created since1870 by the self-denial and generosity of her clergy and laity. UnderBritish law, her position is secure. But would she be secure under HomeRule? Those of her advisers who have most right to speak with authorityare convinced that she would not. The Bishop of Ossory, in an able andvery moderate statement made at the meeting of the Synod of thatDiocese, last September, showed that both the principal churches and theendowments now held by the Church of Ireland have been claimedrepeatedly by prominent representatives of the Church of Rome. It isstated that the Church sites and buildings belong to the Roman Communionin Ireland because, on Roman Catholic principles, that communion trulyrepresents the ancient Irish Church, and no lapse of time can invalidatethe Church's title; and that the endowments belong to the same communionbecause they "represent moneys derived from pre-Disestablishment days, which were, in their turn, the alienated possessions of the RomanChurch" (see Bishop of Ossory's Synod Address, p. 7). As regards thislast statement, it must be noted that the only sense in which it can betruly said that the endowments represent moneys derived frompre-Disestablishment days is that the foundation of the new financialsystem was laid by the generosity of the clergy in office at the time. They entrusted to the Representative Body of the Church the capitalisedvalue of the life-interests secured to them by the Act. The money wastheir private property, and their action one which involved greatself-denial, for they gave up the security offered by the State. Themoney was so calculated that the whole should be exhausted when allpayments were made. By good management, however, it yielded considerableprofit, and meanwhile formed a foundation on which to build. It was, however, in no sense an endowment given by the State, nor was it a fundon which any but the legal owners (_i. E. _ the clergy of the time) had ajustifiable claim. 

The Bishop of Ossory's statement excited much discussion, but, thoughmany Roman Catholic apologists endeavoured to laugh away his fears asgroundless, not one denied the validity of his argument. The fact that, as he showed, the Church of Ireland holds her churches by exactly thesame title as that by which the English Church holds Westminster Abbey, and that, for the Irish Church, there is the additional security of theAct of 1869, count for nothing in the eye of Roman Canon Law. 

In an Ireland ruled by a Parliament of which the vast majority would beRoman Catholics, devout and sincere, representing constituencies peopledby devout and sincere persons who believe that the laws of the Vaticanare the laws of God, with a clergy lifted above the civil law by theoperation of the recent _Motu Proprio_ Decree, an Ireland in which eventhe school catechisms (see the "Christian Brothers' Catechism, " quotedby the Bishop of Ossory, _op. Cit. _ p. 8) teach that an alien Churchunlawfully excludes "the Catholics" from their own churches, how longwould it be before a movement, burning with holy zeal and piousindignation, against the usurpers, would sweep away every barrier anddrive out "the heretics" from the ancient shrines?

Irish Churchmen who know their country are aware that even the moststringent guarantees would be worthless in such a case, as they provedworthless in the Act of Union, and at the time of Catholic emancipation. 

Some English Liberals imagine that Home Rule would be followed by anuprising of popular independence which would destroy the power of theRoman Church in Ireland. Let those who think this consider that the moreindependent spirits among the Irish Roman Catholics go to America, andlet them further consider what has happened in the Province of Quebec inCanada. The immense strength of the bonds--religious, social, andeducational--by which the mass of the people in the South and West ofIreland are held in the grip of the Roman ecclesiastical system, and thepower which would be exerted by the central authority of that system bymeans of the recent decrees, make it certain that clerical dominationwould, from the outset, be the ruling principle of an Irish Parliament. 

There is no desire nearer to the hearts of the clergy and people whoform the Church to which the writer belongs than that they should beenabled to live at peace with their Roman Catholic fellow-countrymen, and work in union with them, for the good of their country and thepromotion of that new prosperity which recent years have brought. Theydread Home Rule, because they know that, instead of peace, it wouldbring a sword, and plunge their country once again into all the horrorsof civil and religious strife. 

THE RELIGIOUS DIFFICULTY UNDER HOME RULE

(ii) THE NONCONFORMIST VIEW

BY REV. SAMUEL PRENTER, M. A. , D. D. (DUBLIN), _Moderator of General Assembly of Presbyterian Church in Ireland in_1904-5. 

For obvious reasons, the Religious Difficulty under Home Rule does notreceive much attention on the political platform in Great Britain. Butin Ireland a religious problem flames at the heart of the wholecontroversy. This religious problem creates the cleavage in the Irishpopulation, and is the real secret of the intense passion on both sideswith which Home Rule is both prosecuted and resisted. Irishmenunderstand this very well; but as Home Rule, on its face value, is onlya question of a mode of civil government, it is almost impossible tomake the matter clear to British electors. They say, What has religiongot to do with Home Rule? Home Rule is a pure question of politics, andit must be solved on exclusively political lines. Even if this were so, might not Englishmen remember that the Nationalist Members of Parliamenthave been controlled by the Church of Rome in their votes on the Englisheducation question? I mention this to show that under the disguise ofpure politics ecclesiastical authority may stalk in perfect freedomthrough the lobbies of the House of Commons. Is it, then, an absolutelyincredible thing that what has been done in the English Parliament inthe name of politics may be done openly and undisguised in the name ofpolitics in a Home Rule Parliament? That such will be the case I shallnow attempt to show. 

Let us begin with the most elementary facts. According to the officialcensus of 1911 the population of Ireland is grouped as follows:--

Roman Catholics 3, 238, 656Irish Church 575, 489Presbyterians 439, 876Methodists 61, 806All other Christian denominations 57, 718Jews 5, 101Information refused 3, 305

I beg the electors of Great Britain to look steadily into the abovefigures, and to ask themselves who are the Home Rulers and who are theUnionists in Ireland. Irish Home Rulers are almost all Roman Catholics, and the Protestants and others are almost all stout Unionists. Does thisfact suggest nothing? How is it that the line of demarcation in Irishpolitics almost exactly coincides with the line of demarcation inreligion? Quite true, there are a few Irish Roman Catholics who areUnionists, and a few Protestants who are Home Rulers. But they are sofew and so uninfluential on both sides that the exception only serves toprove the rule. These exceptions, no doubt, have been abundantlyexploited, and the very most has been made of them. But the greatelementary fact remains, that one-fourth of the Irish people, mostlyProtestant, are resolutely, and even passionately, opposed to Home Rule;and the remarkable thing is that the most militant Irish Unionists forthe past twenty years have not been the members of the Irish Church whomight be suspected of Protestant Ascendency prejudices, but they are thePresbyterians and Methodists who never belonged to the old ProtestantAscendency party. It is of Irish Presbyterians that I can speak with themost ultimate knowledge. Their record in Ireland requires to be madeperfectly clear. In 1829 they were the champions of CatholicEmancipation. In 1868 they supported Mr. Gladstone in his great Irishreforms. They have been at all times the advocates of perfect equalityin religion, and of unsectarianism in education. They stand firm andstaunch on these two principles still. But they are the sternest andstrongest opponents of Home Rule, and their reason is because Home Rulespells for Ireland a new religious ascendency and the destruction of theunsectarian principle in education. 

I ask on these grounds that English and Scottish electors should pausefor a moment, and open their minds to the fact that there is a greatreligious problem at the heart of Home Rule. Irish Presbyterians claimthat they know what they are doing, and that they are not the blinddupes of religious prejudice and political passion. It is for a greatsomething that they have embarked in this conflict; they are determinedto risk everything in this resistance, and in proportion as the dangerapproaches, in like proportion does their hostility to the Home Ruleclaim increase. 

What, then, is the secret of this determination? It lies in a nutshell. A Parliament in Dublin would be under the control and domination of theChurch of Rome. Two facts in Irish life render this not only likely andprobable, but inevitable and certain. The first fact is thatthree-fourths of the members would be Roman Catholic, and the secondfact is that the Irish people are the most devoted Roman Catholics atpresent in Christendom. No one disputes the first fact, but the secondrequires to be made clear to the electors of Great Britain. Let no onesuppose that I am finding fault with Irishmen for being devoted RomanCatholics. What I wish to show is that the Church of Rome would besupreme in the new Parliament, and that she is not a good guardian ofProtestant liberties and interests. Ireland has been for the last twogenerations brought into absolute captivity to the principles ofultramontanism. When Italy asserted her nationality, and fought for itin 1870, Ireland sent out a brigade to fight on the side of the Pope. When France, a few years ago, broke up in that land the bondage ofEcclesiasticism, the streets of Dublin were filled Sunday after Sundayfor weeks with crowds of Irishmen, headed by priests, shouting for thePope against France. The Church first, nationality afterwards, is thecreed of the ultramontane; and it is the avowed creed of the Irishpeople. But this would be changed in an Irish Parliament, Britishelectors affirm. Let us hear what Mr. John Dillon, M. P. , says on thepoint. Speaking about a year ago in the Free Trade Hall in Manchester, Mr. Dillon said--

 "I assert, and it is the glory of our race, that we are to-day the right arm of the Catholic Church throughout the world ... We stand to-day as we have stood throughout, without abating one jot or tittle of that faith, the most Catholic nation on the whole earth. "

What Mr. Dillon says is perfectly true. The Irish Parliament would beconstituted on the Roman model. If there were none but Roman Catholicsin Ireland, Ireland would rapidly become a "State of the Church. " Buthow would Protestants fare? Just as they fared in old Papal days inItaly under the temporal rule of the Vatican. But it may still be saidthat Irishmen themselves would curb the ecclesiastical power. This isone of the delusions by which British electors conceal from themselvesthe peril of Home Rule to Irish Protestants. They forget that Irishmenare, if possible, more Roman than Rome herself. I take the followingpicture of the Romanised condition of Ireland from a Roman Catholicwriter--

 "Mr. Frank Hugh O'Donnell, who 'believes in the Papal Church in every point, who accepts her teaching from Nicaea to Trent, and from Trent to the Vatican, ' says, 'While the general population of Ireland has been going down by leaps and bounds to the abyss, the clerical population has been mounting by cent. Per cent. During the same period.... ' A short time ago, when an Austrian Cabinet was being heckled by some anti-clerical opponents upon its alleged encouragement of an excessive number of clerical persons in Austria, the Minister replied, 'If you want to know what an excessive number of the clergy is like go to Ireland. In proportion to their population the Irish have got ten priests and nuns to the one who exists in Austria. I do not prejudge the question. They may be wanted in Ireland. But let not honourable members talk about over-clericalism in Austria until they have studied the clerical Statistics of Ireland. ' A Jesuit visitor to Ireland, on returning to his English acquaintances, and being asked how did he find the priests in Ireland, replied, 'The priests in Ireland! There is nobody but priests in Ireland. Over there they are treading on one another's heels. ' While the population of Ireland has diminished one-half, the population of the Presbyteries and convents has multiplied threefold or more. Comparisons are then instituted between the Sacerdotal census of Ireland, and that of the European Papal countries. I shall state results only. Belgium has only one Archbishop and five Bishops; but if it were staffed with prelates on the Irish scale it would have nine or ten Archbishops and some sixty Bishops. I suppose the main army of ecclesiastics in the two countries is in the same grossly incongruous proportions--ten or twelve priests in Ireland for every one in Belgium! The German Empire, with its 21, 000, 000 Roman Catholics, has actually fewer mitred prelates than Ireland with its 3, 000, 000 of Roman Catholics. The figures of Austria-Hungary with its Roman Catholic population of 36, 000, 000 are equally impressive. It has eleven Archbishops, but if it were staffed on the Irish scale it would have forty-eight. It has forty Bishops, but if it were like Ireland it would have 288. Mr. O'Donnell goes on: 'This enormous population of Churchmen, far beyond the necessities and even the luxuries of religious worship and service, would be a heavy tax upon the resources of great and wealthy lands. What must it be for Ireland to have to supply the Episcopal villas, the new Cathedrals, and handsome Presbyteries, and handsome incomes of this enormous and increasing host of reverend gentlemen, who, as regards five-sixths of their number, contribute neither to the spiritual nor temporal felicity of the Island? They are the despotic managers of all primary schools, and can exact what homage they please from the poor serf-teachers, whom they dominate and whom they keep eternally under their thumb. They absolutely own and control all the secondary schools, with all their private profits and all their Government grants. In the University what they do not dominate they mutilate. Every appointment, from dispensary doctors to members of Parliament, must acknowledge their ownership, and pay toll to their despotism. The County Councils must contribute patronage according to their indications; the parish committees of the congested districts supplement their pocket-money. They have annexed the revenues of the industrial schools. They are engaged in transforming the universal proprietary of Ireland in order to add materials for their exactions from the living and the moribund. I am told that not less than £5, 000, 000 are lifted from the Irish people every year by the innumerable agencies of clerical suction which are at work upon all parts of the Irish body, politic and social. Nor can it be forgotten that the material loss is only a portion of the injury. The brow-beaten and intimidated condition of the popular action and intelligence which is necessary to this state of things necessarily communicates its want of will and energy to every function of the community. '"

Of course Mr. F. H. O'Donnell has been driven out of public life inIreland for plain speaking like this; and so would every man be whoventured to cross swords with his Church. It aggravates the situationimmensely when we take another fact in Irish life into account. 

In quite recent months Mr. Devlin, M. P. , has brought into prominence asociety called the Ancient Order of Hibernians (sometimes called theMolly Maguires) which, according to the late Mr. Michael Davitt, is "themost wonderful pro-Celtic organisation in the world. " This is a secretsociety which at one time was under the ban of the Church; but quiterecently the ban has been removed, and priests are now allowed to jointhe order. The present Pope is said to be its most powerful friend. Ithas branches in many lands, and it is rapidly gathering into it all thegreat mass of the Irish Roman Catholic people. This is the mostwonderful political machine in Ireland. 

Mr. William O'Brien, M. P. , has recently given an account of this societywhich has never been seriously questioned. 

 "The fundamental object of the Hibernian Society is to give preference to its own members first and Catholics afterwards as against Protestants on all occasions. Whether it is a question of custom, office, public contracts, or positions on Public Boards, Molly Maguires are pledged always to support a Catholic as against a Protestant. If Protestants are to be robbed of their business, if they are to be deprived of public contracts, if they are to be shut out of every office of honour or emolument, what is this but extermination? The domination of such a society would make this country a hell. It would light the flame of civil war in our midst, and blight every hope of its future prosperity. "

And now we reach the core of the question. It is perfectly clear thatHome Rule would create a Roman Catholic ascendency in Ireland, butstill it might be said that the Church of Rome would be tolerant. Onthat point we had best consult the Church of Rome herself. Has she eversaid that she would practise toleration towards Protestants when she wasin power? Never; on the contrary, she declares most clearly thattoleration of error is a deadly sin. In this respect the Church of Romeclaims to differ _toto coelo_ from the churches of the Reformation. InIreland she has passed through all the stages of ecclesiasticalexperience from the lowest form of disability to the present claim ofsupremacy. In the dark days of her suffering she cried for toleration, and as the claim was just in Protestant eyes she got it. Then as shegrew in strength she stretched forth her hands for equality, and as thistoo was just, she gradually obtained it. At present she enjoys equalityin every practical right and privilege with her Protestant neighbours. But in the demand for Home Rule there is involved the claim of exertingan ecclesiastical ascendency not only over her own members but overIrish Protestants, and this is the claim which is unjust and which oughtnot to be granted. Green, the historian, points out that William Pittmade the Union with England the ground of his plea for Roman Catholicemancipation, as it would effectually prevent a Romish ascendency inIreland. Home Rule in practice will destroy the control of GreatBritain, and, therefore, involves the removal of the bulwark againstRoman Catholic ascendency. 

The contention of the Irish Protestants is that neither their will northeir religious liberties would be safe in the custody of Rome. In anIrish Parliament civil allegiance to the Holy See would be the test ofmembership, and would make every Roman Catholic member a civil servantof the Vatican. That Parliament would be compelled to carry out thebehests of the Church. The Church is hostile to the liberty of thePress, to liberty of public speech, to Modernism in science, inliterature, in philosophy; is bound to exact obedience from her ownmembers and to extirpate heresy and heretics; claims to be above CivilLaw, and the right to enforce Canon Law whenever she is able. There aresimply no limits even of life or property to the range of herintolerance. This is not an indictment; it is the boast of Rome. Sheplumes herself upon being an intolerant because she is an infallibleChurch, and her Irish claim, symbolised by the Papal Tiara, is supremacyover the Church, supremacy over the State, and supremacy over theinvisible world. Unquestioning obedience is her law towards her ownsubjects, and intolerance tempered with prudence is her law towardsProtestants. It is a strange hallucination to find that there arepoliticians to-day who think that Rome will change her principles at thebidding of Mr. Redmond, or to please hard-driven politicians, or to makeRome attractive to a Protestant Empire. Rome claims supremacy, and shetells us quite candidly what she will do when she gets it. 

Here is our difficulty under Home Rule. Irish Protestants see that theymust either refuse to go into an Irish Parliament, or else go into it asa hopeless minority, and turn it into an arena for the maintenance oftheir most elementary rights; in which case the Irish Parliament wouldbe simply a cockpit of religio-political strife. But it would be a greatmistake to suppose that the religious difficulty is confined to IrishProtestants. It is a difficulty which would become in time a crushingburden to Roman Catholics themselves. The yoke of Rome was found tooheavy for Italy, and in a generation or two it would be found too heavyfor Ireland. But for the creation of the Papal ascendency in Ireland, the responsibility must rest, in the long run, on Great Britain herself. England and Scotland, the most favoured lands of the Reformation, byestablishing Home Rule in Ireland, will do for Rome what no othercountry in the world would do for her. They would entrust her with alegislative machine which she could control without check, hand over toher tender mercies a million of the best Protestants of the Empire, andestablish at the heart of the Empire a power altogether at variance withher own ideals of Government, fraught with danger, and a good base ofoperations for the conquest of England. Can this be done with impunity?Can Great Britain divest herself of a religious responsibility indealing with Home Rule? Is there not a God in Heaven who will take noteof such national procedure? Are electors not responsible to Him for theuse they make of their votes? If they sow to the wind, must they notreap the whirlwind?

In brief compass, I hope I have made it quite clear what the ReligiousDifficulty in Ireland under Home Rule is. It is not a mere accident ofthe situation; it does not spring from any question of temper, or ofprejudice, or of bigotry. The Religious Difficulty is created by theessential and fundamental genius of Romanism. Her whole ideal of lifediffers from the Protestant ideal. It is impossible to reconcile thesetwo ideals. It is impossible to unite them in any amalgam that would notmean the destruction of both. Under Imperial Rule these ideals havediscovered a decently working _modus vivendi_. Mr. Pitt's contentionthat the union with Great Britain would be an effectual barrier againstRomanism has held good. But if you remove Imperial Rule than you createat a stroke the ascendency of Rome, and under that ascendency thegreatest injustice would be inflicted on the Protestant minority. Questions of public situations and of efficient patronage are of verysubordinate importance indeed. Mr. Redmond demands that IrishProtestants must be included in his Home Rule scheme, and threatens thatif they object they must be dealt with "by the strong hand, " and hisHome Rule Parliament would be subservient to the Church of Rome. Doesany one suppose that a million of the most earnest Protestants in theworld are going to submit to such an arrangement? Neither Englishmen norScotsmen would be willing themselves to enter under such a yoke, and whyshould they ask Irishmen to do so?

It is contended, indeed, that the power of the priest in Ireland is onthe wane. This is partly true and partly not true. It is true that he isnot quite the political and social autocrat that he once was. But it isnot true that the Church of Rome is less powerful in Ireland than shewas. On the contrary, as an ecclesiastical organisation Rome was neverso compact in organisation, never so ably manned by both regular andsecular clergy, never so wealthy nor so full of resource, never soobedient to the rule of the Vatican, as at the present moment. Give heran Irish Parliament, and she will be complete; she will patiently subdueall Ireland to her will. Emigration has drained the country of thestrong men of the laity, who might be able to resist her encroachments. Dr. Horton truly says: "The Roman Church dominates Ireland and the Irishas completely as Islam dominates Morocco. " By Ireland and the Irish Dr. Horton, of course, means Roman Catholic Ireland. Are you now going toplace a legislative weapon in her hand whereby she will be able todominate Protestants also? It is bad statesmanship; bad politics; badreligion. For Ireland it can bring nothing but ruin; and for the Empirenothing but terrible retribution in the future. 

CONSTRUCTIVE

XIII

UNIONIST POLICY IN RELATION TO RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN IRELAND

BY THE RIGHT HON. GERALD BALFOUR

"_For the last two and twenty years, at first a few and now a goodlycompany of rural reformers with whom I have been associated, and onwhose behalf I write, have been steadily working out a complete schemeof rural development, their formula being better farming, betterbusiness, better living. "_--SIR H. PLUNKETT, letter to the _Times_, December, 1911. 

"_Ireland would prefer rags and poverty rather than surrender hernational spirit. "_--MR. JOHN REDMOND, speech at Buffalo, September 27, 1910. 

It should never be forgotten that the maintenance of the legislativeUnion between Ireland and Great Britain is defended by Unionists no lessin the interests of Ireland than in that of the United Kingdom and ofthe Empire. That the ills from which Ireland has admittedly suffered inthe past, and for which she still suffers, though in diminished measure, in the present, are economic and social rather than political, is afundamental tenet of Unionism. Unionists also believe that economic andsocial conditions in Ireland can be more effectively dealt with underthe existing political constitution than under any form of Home Rule. Ireland is a poor country, and needs the financial resources which onlythe Imperial Parliament can provide. She is, moreover, a country dividedinto hostile camps marked by strong racial and religious differences. AsSir George Trevelyan long ago pointed out, there is not one Ireland, there are two Irelands; and only so far as Ireland continues anintegral part of a larger whole can the antagonism between the twoelements be prevented from forming a dangerous obstacle to all realprogress. 

Nationalist politicians, of course, diagnose the situation verydifferently. Apply suitable remedial measures, say the Unionists, to thesocial and economic conditions of the country, and it is notunreasonable to hope that political discontent--or, in other words, thedemand for Home Rule--will gradually die away of itself. Give us HomeRule, say the Nationalists, and all other things will be added to us. 

The main object of the present paper is to give a bird's eye view ofUnionist policy in relation to rural development in Ireland during theeventful years 1885-1905. It does not pretend to deal with the largerissue raised between Unionism and Nationalism; but incidentally, it willbe found to throw some interesting side lights upon it. 

The Irish Question in its most essential aspect is a Farmers' Question. The difficulties which it presents have their deepest roots in anunsatisfactory system of land tenure, excessive sub-division ofholdings, and antiquated methods of agricultural economy. 

Mr. Gladstone endeavoured to deal with the system of land tenure in thetwo important Acts of 1870 and 1881; but the system of dual ownershipwhich those Acts set up introduced, perhaps, as many evils as theyremoved. It became more and more evident that the only effectual remedylay in the complete transference of the ownership of the land from thelandlord to the occupying tenant. The successful application of thisremedy with anything like fairness to both sides absolutely demanded theuse of State credit on a large scale. The plan actually adopted in asuccession of Land Acts passed by Unionist Governments, beginning withthe Ashbourne Act of 1885, and ending with the Wyndham Act of 1903, isbroadly speaking as follows:--The State purchases the interest of thelandlord outright and vests the ownership in the occupying tenantsubject to a fixed payment for a definite term of years. These annualpayments are not in the nature of rent: they represent a low rate ofinterest on the purchase money, plus such contribution to a sinking fundas will repay the principal in the term of years for which the annualpayments are to run. The practical effect of this arrangement is thatthe occupier becomes the owner of his holding, subject to a terminableannual payment to the State of a sum less in amount than the rent he hashad to pay heretofore. 

The successful working of the scheme obviously depends on the credit ofthe State, in other words, its power of borrowing at a low rate ofinterest. In this respect the Imperial Government has an immenseadvantage over any possible Home Rule Government: indeed, it is doubtfulwhether any Home Rule Government could have attempted this great reformwithout wholesale confiscation of the landlords' property. Here then inLand Purchase and the abolition of dual ownership, we have one of thetwin pillars on which, on its constructive side, the Irish policy of theUnionist party rests. But to solve the problem of rural Ireland--which, as I have said, is _the_ Irish problem--more is required than theconversion of the occupying tenant into a peasant proprietor. The senseof ownership may be counted on to do much; but it will not make itpossible for a family to live in decent comfort on an insufficientholding; neither will it enable the small farmer to compete with thoseforeign rivals who have at their command improved methods of production, improved methods of marketing their produce, facilities for obtainingcapital adequate to their needs, and all the many advantages whichsuperior education and organised co-operation bring in their train. 

Looking back to-day, the wide field that in these directions was open tothe beneficent action of the State, and to the equally beneficent actionof voluntary associations, seems evident and obvious. It was by no meansso evident or obvious twenty years ago. At that time the traditionalpolicy of _laisser faire_ had still a powerful hold over men's minds, and to abandon it even in the case of rural Ireland was a veritable newdeparture in statesmanship. The idea of establishing a voluntaryassociation to promote agricultural co-operation was even more remote;and, as will be seen in the sequel, it was to the insight and devotedpersistence of a single individual that its successful realisation hasbeen ultimately due. 

So far as State action was concerned, a beginning was naturally madewith the poorest parts of the country. Mr. Arthur Balfour led the waywith two important measures. One of these was the construction of lightrailways in the most backward tracts on the western seaboard. Theserailways were constructed at the public expense, but worked by existingrailway companies, and linked up with existing railway systems. Thebenefits conferred on those parts of the country through which theypassed have been great and lasting. 

Mr. Balfour's second contribution to Irish rural development was thecreation of the Congested Districts Board in 1891. The "congesteddistricts" embraced the most poverty-stricken areas in the westerncounties, and the business of the Board was to devise and apply, withinthose districts, schemes for the amelioration of the social and economiccondition of the population comprised in them. For this purpose, theBoard was invested with very wide powers of a paternal character, and anannual income of upwards of £40, 000 was placed at their free disposal, asum which has been largely increased by subsequent Acts. 

The experiment was an absolutely novel one, but no one who is able tocompare the improved condition of the congested districts to-day withthe state of things that prevailed twenty years ago can doubt that ithas been amply justified by results. 

Every phase of the life of the Irish peasant along the whole of thewestern seaboard has been made brighter and more hopeful by thebeneficent operations of the Board. Its activities have been manifold, including the purchase and improvement of estates prior to re-sale tothe tenants; the re-arrangement and enlargement of holdings; theimprovement of stock; the provision of pure seeds and high-classmanures; practical demonstration of various kinds, all educational incharacter; drainage; the construction of roads; improvement in thesanitary conditions of the people's dwellings; assistance to provideproper accommodation for the livestock of the farm, which too frequentlywere housed with the people themselves; the development of seafisheries; the encouragement of many kinds of home industries for womenand girls; the quarrying of granite; the making of kelp; the promotionof co-operative credit; and many other schemes which had practicalregard to the needs of the people, and have contributed in a variety ofways to raise the standard of comfort of the inhabitants of theseimpoverished areas. 

It will be noticed that among the other activities of the CongestedDistricts Board, I have specially mentioned the work of promotingco-operative credit by means of village banks managed on the Raffeisensystem. The actual work of organising these co-operative bankingassociations has not been carried out directly by the Board, but throughthe agency of the Irish Agricultural Organisation Society (generallyknown by the shorter title of the I. A. O. S. ), to which the Board has formany years past paid a small subsidy--a subsidy which might well havebeen on a more generous scale, having regard to the immense advantageswhich co-operation is capable of conferring on the small farmer. 

The I. A. O. S. Is a voluntary association of a strictly non-politicalcharacter. "Business, not politics, " has been its principle of action;and partly, perhaps, for this very reason it may claim to havecontributed more than any other single agency towards the prosperity ofrural Ireland. To its work I now turn. 

THE I. A. O. S. 

The movement which the I. A. O. S. Represents was started by Sir HoracePlunkett, and he has remained the most prominent figure in it eversince. Sir Horace Plunkett bears an honoured name wherever the ruralproblem is seriously studied; but, like other prophets, he has receivedperhaps less honour in his own country than elsewhere. At all events, inthe task to which he has devoted his life, he has had to encounter thetacit, and indeed at times the open opposition, of powerful sections ofNationalist opinion. Happily he belongs to the stamp of men whom noobstacles can discourage, and who find in the work itself theirsufficient reward. 

Sir Horace Plunkett's leading idea was a simple one, and has becometo-day almost a commonplace. He compared the backward state ofagriculture in Ireland with the great advance that had been made invarious continental countries, where the natural conditions were notdissimilar to those of Ireland, and asked himself the secret of thedifference. That secret he found in the word _organisation_, and he sethimself to organise. The establishment of co-operative creameries seemedto afford the most hopeful opening, and it was to this that Sir HoracePlunkett and a few personal friends, in the year 1889, directed theirearliest missionary efforts. The difficulties to be overcome were atfirst very great. "My own diary, " writes Sir Horace, "records attendanceat fifty meetings before a single society had resulted therefrom. It wasweary work for a long time. These gatherings were miserable affairscompared with those which greeted our political speakers. "

The experiences[70] of another of the little band of devoted workers, Mr. R. A. Anderson, now Secretary of the I. A. O. S. , throw an interestinglight upon the nature of some of the obstacles which the new movementhad to encounter. 

 "It was hard and thankless work. There was the apathy of the people, and the active opposition of the Press and the politicians. It would be hard to say now whether the abuse of the Conservative _Cork Constitution_, or that of the Nationalist _Eagle_ of Skibbereen, was the louder. We were 'killing the calves, ' we were 'forcing the young women to emigrate, ' we were 'destroying the industry. ' Mr. Plunkett was described as a 'monster in human shape, ' and was adjured to 'cease his hellish work. ' I was described as his 'man Friday, ' and as 'Roughrider Anderson. ' Once when I thought I had planted a creamery within the town of Rathkeale, my co-operative apple-cart was upset by a local solicitor, who, having elicited the fact that our movement recognised neither political nor religious differences--that the Unionist-Protestant cow was as dear to us as her Nationalist-Catholic sister--gravely informed me that our programme would not suit Rathkeale. 'Rathkeale, ' said he pompously, 'is a Nationalist town--Nationalist to the backbone--and every pound of butter made in this creamery must be made on Nationalist principles, or it shan't be made at all. ' This sentiment was applauded loudly, and the proceedings terminated. "

Eventually, however, the zeal of the preachers, coupled with theeconomic soundness of the doctrine, prevailed over all difficulties. By1894 the movement had outgrown the individual activities of thefounders, and the Irish Agricultural Organisation Society wasestablished in Dublin in order to promote and direct its furtherprogress. That progress has been rapid and continuous, and to-day theco-operative societies connected with the I. A. O. S. Number nearly 1000, with an annual turnover of upwards of 2-1/2 millions. They extend overthe length and breadth of the land, and include creameries, agriculturalsocieties (whose main business is the purchase of seeds and manure fordistribution to the members), credit societies (village banks), poultrykeepers' societies (for the marketing of eggs), flax societies, industries societies, as well as other societies of a miscellaneouscharacter. 

In 1892 the Liberal Party came into power. During their three years'tenure of office a Home Rule Bill was introduced and passed through theHouse of Commons, but little or nothing was attempted by the Governmentfor the economic regeneration of the country. 

The Unionist Party came back with a large majority in 1896, and theattention of the new Irish Government, in which the post of LordLieutenant was held by Lord Cadogan and that of Chief Secretary by thepresent writer, was from the first directed to the condition of theIrish farmer. The session of 1896 was largely devoted to the passing ofa Bill for amending the Land Acts, and for further facilitating theconversion of occupying tenants into owners of their holdings. Time, however, was also found for a new Light Railways Act, under theprovision of which railway communication has been opened up at theexpense of the State in the poorest parts of North-West Ireland. 

It was in the following year that the first attempt was made toestablish an Irish Department of Agriculture. The Bill was not carriedbeyond a first reading, because it was ultimately decided that a LocalGovernment Act should have precedence of it. But the project was onlyput aside for a time, and it was always looked upon by me as an integralpart of our legislative programme. In framing the Bill of 1897, and alsothe later Bill of 1899, which passed into law, we received the greatestassistance from the labours of a body known as the Recess Committee, concerning which a few words must now be said. 

THE RECESS COMMITTEE. 

To be the founder of agricultural co-operation in Ireland was Sir HoracePlunkett's first great achievement; the bringing together of the RecessCommittee was his second. He conceived the idea of inviting a number ofthe most prominent men in Ireland, irrespective of religious orpolitical differences, to join in an inquiry into the means by which theGovernment could best promote the development of the agricultural andindustrial resources of Ireland. This idea he propounded in an openletter published in August, 1895. The proposal was a bold one--how boldno one unacquainted with Ireland will easily realise. AmongstNationalist politicians the majority fought shy of it. Mr. JustinMcCarthy, the leader of the party, could only see in Sir Horace's letter"the expression of a belief that if your policy could be successfullycarried out, the Irish people would cease to desire Home Rule. " "I donot feel, " he added, "that I could possibly take part in anyorganisation which had for its object the seeking of a substitute forthat which I believe to be Ireland's greatest need--Home Rule. "Fortunately, then as now, the Irish party was divided into two camps, and Mr. Redmond, at the head of a small minority of "Independents, " wasat liberty to take a different line. "I am unwilling, " he wrote, "totake the responsibility of declining to aid in any effort to promoteuseful legislation in Ireland. "

Ultimately, Sir Horace Plunkett's strong personality, his manifestsingleness of purpose, and the intrinsic merits of his proposal carriedthe day. A committee, truly representative of all that was best in Irishlife, was brought together, and commissioners were despatched to theContinent to report upon those systems of State aid linked withvoluntary organisation which appeared to have revolutionised agriculturein countries not otherwise more favoured than Ireland itself. A largemass of most valuable information was collected. In less than a year thecommittee reported. The substance of the recommendation was

 "That a Department of Government should be specially created, with a minister directly responsible to Parliament at its head. The Central Body was to be assisted by a Consultative Council representative of the interests concerned. The Department was to be adequately endowed from the Imperial Treasury, and was to administer State aid to agriculture and industries in Ireland upon principles which were fully described. "[71]

With the general policy of these recommendations the Irish Governmentwere in hearty sympathy, and the Bill of 1897, already referred to, wasa first attempt to give effect to it. But in the absence of popularlyelected local authorities an important part of the machinery forcarrying out the proposals was wanting. 

IRISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACT. 

A reform of local government in Ireland had long been given a place inthe Unionist programme, but the magnitude of the undertaking and thepressure of other business had hitherto stood in its way. It was nowdecided to take up this task in earnest, on the understanding that othermeasures relating to Ireland should be postponed in the meantime. TheIrish Local Government Bill was accordingly introduced and passed in thefollowing session (1898). 

Of this Act, which involved not merely the creation of new popularAuthorities, but also an entire re-arrangement of local taxation, andsome important changes in the system of poor relief, I will only sayhere that it must be counted as another of the great remedial measureswhich Ireland owes to the Unionist Party, and which it would have beendifficult, if not impossible, to carry out in a satisfactory mannerwithout assistance on a generous scale from the ample resources of theImperial Exchequer. 

IRISH DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION. 

The way was now open for the measure to which I had looked forward fromthe first moment of my going to Ireland, and which was to constitute thefinal abandonment of the old _laissez faire_ policy in connection withIrish agriculture and industries. Great care and labour were devoted tothe framing of the new Bill, and I was in constant touch throughout withmembers of the Recess Committee. It contained clauses dealing with urbanas well as rural industries, but these lie outside my present subject, and I shall not refer to them further here. On the side of ruraldevelopment the Bill embodied a novel experiment in the art ofgovernment--novel at all events in British or Irish experience, thoughsomething like it had already been tried with conspicuous success invarious countries on the Continent. It was the continental example whichhad inspired the Report of the Recess Committee, and it was therecommendations of the Recess Committee which in their turn suggestedthe main features of the Bill of 1899. 

There was indeed one body in Ireland whose functions corresponded insome degree with those of the Authority it was now proposed to set up. This body was the Congested Districts Board; and it might be said withsome approximation to the truth that the object we had in view was to dofor the rest of Ireland, _mutatis mutandis_, what the CongestedDistricts Board was intended to do for the poverty-stricken districts ofthe West. But there was this very important difference. The operationsof the Congested Districts Board were carried out, and necessarilycarried out, on strictly "paternal" lines; the dominant note in the newdeparture was to be the encouragement of self-help. This differencecarried with it an equally important difference in the constitution andmethods of the administering Authority. 

Out of a total endowment of £166, 000 a year, a sum of over £100, 000 wasplaced at the disposal of the Department to be applied to the "purposesof agriculture and other rural industries. " These "purposes" are definedin the Act as including--

 "the aiding, improving, and developing of agriculture, horticulture, forestry, dairying, the breeding of horses, cattle, and other live stock and poultry, home and cottage industries, the preparation and cultivation of flax, inland fisheries, and any industries immediately connected with and subservient to any of the said matters, and any instruction relating thereto, and the facilitating of the carriage and distribution of produce. "

This part of the Endowment Fund was, in short, a grant to the Departmentto be applied to what may be described as rural development in thewidest sense of the term. As to the methods, little or no restrictionwas imposed upon the scope of its powers; and in the expenditure of themoney it was to be as free from Treasury control as the CongestedDistricts Board itself. 

On the other hand, the Congested Districts Board was not only free fromTreasury control, it was free from any control whatever. It was anunpaid Board, and it could spend its money where it pleased and how itpleased, and there was nobody to say it nay. True, its members wereappointed by Government, and the Chief Secretary was _ex-officio_ amember of the Board; but he had no greater authority given to him thanany of his colleagues, and in case of any difference of opinion thedecision was that of the majority of the Board. No single member of theBoard could be held responsible for any of its acts; and accordingly, although the vote for the Board came annually before Parliament, of realParliamentary responsibility there was none. 

Such an arrangement was not without its disadvantages even as regardsthe Congested Districts Board itself: its adoption in the case of theAuthority to be created under the Agriculture and Industries Bill wouldhave been open to yet greater objection. 

A further point was this. The Congested Districts Board was an unpaidbody. An unpaid body consisting of busy men cannot be in perpetualsession. The Congested Districts Board, as a matter of fact, met onlyonce a month; and in the intervals of its meeting there was no one withfull authority to act on its behalf. 

The problem, then, in connection with the expenditure of the EndowmentFund was to provide for its administration by an efficient andpromptly-acting executive, responsible to Parliament on the one hand, and on the other hand brought by the very nature of its administrativemachinery into the closest possible touch with the new localAuthorities, as well as with the voluntary organisations which were nowspringing up all over the country. 

In order to satisfy these requirements, the Bill provided that thecontrol of the Endowment Fund should be vested not in a Board attachedto the new Department, but in the Department itself; that is to say, ina Minister appointed by the Government of the day. The Chief Secretarywas to be the titular head of the Department, but it was not intendedthat he should intervene in its ordinary administrative business. Thereal working head was to be the Vice-President, a new Minister withdirect responsibility to Parliament. So far as related to certain powersand duties transferred from existing departments of the IrishGovernment, and similar to the powers and duties of the English Board ofAgriculture, the new Minister was to have complete executive authority. But as regards the administration of the Endowment Fund, a differentarrangement was proposed--an arrangement without precedent, so far as Iknow, in any previous legislation in this country. 

In order to bring the Department into close touch with local bodies, theBill attached to it a "Council of Agriculture" and an "AgriculturalBoard. " One-third of the members of each of these bodies were to benominated by the Department, and the intention was that in making thesenominations due regard should be had to the representation of voluntaryorganisations. The remaining two-thirds were to be elected in the caseof the "Council of Agriculture" by the newly created County Councils, inthe case of the "Agricultural Board" by the "Council of Agriculture, "divided for this purpose into four "Provincial Committees. " In additionto the functions of an electoral college thus entrusted to its fourprovincial committees, the business of the "Council of Agriculture" as awhole was to meet together, at least once a year, for the discussion ofquestions of general interest in connection with the provisions of theAct; but its powers were only advisory. The "Board, " on the other hand, was more than an advisory body; for it was given a veto on anyexpenditure of money out of the Agricultural Endowment Fund. Theapplication of the Endowment Fund was thus made dependent on the_concurrence_ of the "Agricultural Board" and of the minister in chargeof the Department--an entirely novel plan which, although it mightclearly result in a deadlock as regards any particular application ofmoney from the fund, has nevertheless, I believe, worked extremely well, and answered the purpose for which it was devised of reconcilingministerial and executive responsibility with a reasonable power ofcontrol given to local bodies. 

Finally, with a view to stimulating local effort and the spirit ofself-help, a provision was inserted in the Bill to which I attached thegreatest importance. Power was given to the Council of any county or ofany urban district, or to two or more public bodies jointly, to appointcommittees composed partly of members of the local bodies and partly ofco-opted persons, for the purpose of carrying out such of theDepartment's schemes as were of local rather than of general interest. But in such cases, it was laid down that

 "the Department shall not, in the absence of any special considerations, apply or approve of the application of money ... To schemes in respect of which aid is not given out of money provided by local authorities, or from other local sources. "

To meet this requirement, the local authorities were given the power ofraising a limited rate for the purposes of the Act. 

That the Act of 1899 has in the main answered the expectations formed ofit by those who were responsible for its introduction there can, Ithink, be no doubt. The Act itself, as well as the methods ofadministration adopted in carrying out its provisions, have been thesubject of a full inquiry by a Departmental Committee which reported in1907. Their report must be regarded as on the whole eminentlyfavourable. In one point only has any important change been recommended. The Committee suggest that the post of Vice-President of the Departmentshould not be held by a Minister with a seat in Parliament, nor yet by aregular civil servant, but should be an office _sui generis_ tenablefor five years with power of reappointment. No effect has so far beengiven to this proposal by legislation. 

THE UNIONIST ATTITUDE. 

In this brief sketch of the measures passed by Unionist Governmentssince 1886 with the object of promoting the material prosperity ofIreland, many points of interest have been necessarily omitted; but whathas been said will suffice to show how baseless is the assertion, sofrequently urged as an argument for Home Rule, that the ImperialParliament is incapable of legislating successfully for Irish wants. [72]Nothing could be more futile than to represent Irish problems, andespecially the problems of Irish rural life, as so unique that only aParliament sitting in Dublin can hope to solve them satisfactorily. As amatter of fact, the rural question in Ireland is, in most of itsessential features, very similar to the rural question in othercountries, of which Denmark is perhaps the best example; and themethods which have been successful there are already proving successfulhere. Single ownership of the land by the cultivator; State aid, encouraging and supplemementing co-operation and self-help; co-operationand self-help providing suitable opportunities for the fruitfulapplication of State aid--these are the principles by which Unionistlegislation for Ireland has been guided, and they are the principleswhich any wise legislation must follow, whether it emanate from an Irishor from the Imperial Parliament. Indeed, if there is anything "unique"in the Irish case, it is the deep division of sentiment inherited fromthe unhappy history of the country and reinforced by those differencesof race and creed to which I have already alluded as making two Irelandsout of one. But the remedy for this is not to cut Ireland adrift andleave the two sections to fight it out alone, but rather to maintain theexisting constitution as the best guarantee that the balance will beheld even between them. 

Sir Horace Plunkett has well summed up the real needs of rural Irelandin the formula "better farming, better business, better living. " He hashimself done more than any other single man to bring the desiredimprovement about. I am not ashamed to acknowledge myself his disciple, and in the measures for which I was responsible during my time inIreland, I ever kept the practical objects for which he has strivensteadily in view. In a speech which I made shortly after taking office Iused the phrase "killing Home Rule with kindness. " This phrase has beenrepeatedly quoted since, as if it had been a formal declaration on thepart of the incoming Irish Government that to "kill Home Rule" was theAlpha and the Omega of their policy. What I really said was that weintended to promote measures having for their object an increase in thematerial prosperity of the country; that if we could thereby kill HomeRule with kindness, so much the better; but that the policy stood on itsown merits, irrespective of any ulterior consequences. 

In my view that is the only true attitude for a Unionist Government totake up. But in our efforts to improve material conditions and to removegrievances, how small is the encouragement or help that we have receivedfrom leaders of the Nationalist Party! "Their aim, " said Goldwin Smithlong ago, "has always been to create a Nationalist feeling, which wouldend in political separation, not the redress of particular wrongs andgrievances, or the introduction of practical improvements. " I shouldimagine that there has seldom, if ever, been an important politicalparty which has exhibited so little constructive ability as the IrishParliamentarians. Their own legislative proposals during the last thirtyyears have been a negligible quantity; and I think I am justified insaying that there is not one of the great measures passed by UnionistGovernments since 1886 which has not been either opposed by theaccredited leaders of the Party, or, at best, received with carping andfutile, rather than helpful, criticism. I must personallyacknowledge--and I do so gladly--that I received useful assistance andvaluable criticism from the Messrs. Healy in conducting the LocalGovernment Bill through the House of Commons; and credit must also begiven to Mr. John Redmond for the part he took in aiding to bringtogether the Recess Committee. But the Messrs. Healy have always actedindependently; and Mr. John Redmond was, at the time referred to, leaderof only a small minority of the Irish Nationalists. The feeling of themajority, and certainly of the leaders of the majority, was reflected, as we have seen, in the refusal of Mr. Justin McCarthy to have anythingto do with the movement. 

Mr. Dillon in particular has shown a disposition to regard minorpolitical grievances, and even poverty and discontent, as so much fuelwherewith to stoke the lagging engine of Home Rule. Remedial measuresshort of Home Rule seem to take in his eyes the character of attempts todeprive the Irish Party of so many valuable assets. Nor is this spiritof tacit or open hostility confined to acts of the legislature. Of allthe social and economic movements in Ireland during recent years, thespread of agricultural co-operation has been without doubt among thegreatest and the most beneficial. It has never found a friend in Mr. Dillon. In the movement itself and in the Irish AgriculturalOrganisation Society, founded expressly to promote it, he can only see acunning device of the enemy to undermine Nationalism. In this matter Mr. Dillon's attitude is also the official attitude of the Irish Party. ThusMr. Redmond (now reconciled with Mr. Dillon and become leader of themain body of Nationalists), in a letter to Mr. Patrick Ford, datedOctober 4, 1904, does not scruple to say of Sir Horace Plunkett's trulypatriotic work:--

 "I myself, indeed, at one time entertained some belief in the good intentions of Sir Horace Plunkett and his friends, but recent events have entirely undeceived me; and Sir Horace Plunkett's recent book, full as it is of undisguised contempt for the Irish race, makes it plain to me that the real object of the movement in question is to undermine the National Party and divert the minds of our people from Home Rule, which is the only thing that can ever lead to a real revival of Irish industries. "

Those who have read Sir H. Plunkett's "Ireland in the New Century" willhardly know which most to wonder at in these words, the extraordinarymisdescription of the whole spirit of his book, or the total failure torealise the absolute necessity to Irish farming of a movement which notonly has its counterpart all over the Continent of Europe, but has sinceinspired similar action in the United States, in India, and quiterecently in Great Britain as well. 

NATIONALIST HOSTILITY. 

Nationalist hostility to the I. A. O. S. Has not been confined to words. When the Agriculture and Technical Instruction Bill was passing throughthe House of Commons, Mr. Dillon endeavoured to secure an undertakingfrom me that public moneys should not be employed to subsidise the workof the Society. I naturally refused to give any such undertaking. [73] Ihad followed the efforts of the Society very closely; I was deeplyimpressed with the value of the results which it had accomplished; butits field of activity was limited by the narrowness of its resources. Inmy opinion, a subsidy to the Society from the Endowment Fund of theDepartment would be a useful and proper application of public money. Atthe same time I pointed out that if the Agricultural Board, which in themain represented the popularly-elected local authorities, thoughtdifferently, they had a power of veto and could use it in this case. 

Sir Horace Plunkett held the position of Vice-President of theDepartment of Agriculture and Technical Instruction from 1899 to 1907, and during his tenure of office, as I had always expected and intended, there was close co-operation between the Department and the I. A. O. S. During that period a sum amounting in all to less than £30, 000 was paidby the Department to the I. A. O. S. , of which more than half was fortechnical instruction, while the balance represented contributions tothe work of co-operative organisation. [74]

When Sir H. Plunkett was replaced by Mr. T. W. Russell, the pressure ofthe Irish Parliamentary Party immediately began to make itself felt. Thenew vice-president informed the Council of Agriculture that he had madeup his mind to withdraw the subsidy, but he undertook to continue adiminishing grant for three years, £3000 for the first year, £2000 forthe second, and £1000 for the third. The I. A. O. S. Were not seriouslyopposed to the gradual withdrawal of the subsidy, the loss of which theyhoped to be able to cover in course of time by increased voluntarysubscriptions. 

The opposition of the Nationalist Party was, however, not yetexhausted. In the _Freeman's Journal _of January 21, 1908, thereappeared a letter from Mr. John Redmond enclosing a copy of a letterfrom Mr. T. W. Rolleston to a correspondent at St. Louis. Mr. Rollestonaccompanied his letter with a copy of a speech by Sir Horace Plunkett. In his letter he remarked plainly upon the antagonism displayed by theIrish Nationalists to the co-operative movement. Although Sir HoracePlunkett declared that he had nothing whatever to do with the letter, the Irish Parliamentarians professed to find in it abundant proof of anintention to destroy Nationalism. "That correspondence, " said Mr. T. W. Russell, "[75] compelled me to take action. Mr. John Redmond made itimperative upon me by his letter--I mean a public letter to thePress--and as so much was involved, I took the precaution of convening aspecial meeting of the Agricultural Board. " The Board decided that thesubsidy should be withdrawn at the end of the year 1908. 

The last act in this drama of hostility to Sir Horace Plunkett and allhis works is still in the course of being played. Under the provisionsof the Development Fund Act of 1909, the Development Commissioners wereempowered to make advances for the organisation of co-operation, either"to a Government Department or through a Government Department to avoluntary association not trading for profit. " During the Report stageof the Development Fund Bill, Mr. Dillon tried to get a ruling from theSolicitor-General that the I. A. O. S. Would be excluded from receivinggrants from the fund, thus repeating the manoeuvre which he had alreadyunsuccessfully attempted in connection with the Agriculture andTechnical Instruction (Ireland) Bill of 1899. 

In accordance with this provision, the three Agricultural OrganisationSocieties for England, Scotland, and Ireland, each applied for a grantin aid. The applications were referred in due course for report to theGovernment Departments concerned--that is to say, to the Board ofAgriculture and Fisheries for the English and Scottish applications, andto the Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction for that fromthe I. A. O. S. The Board of Agriculture and Fisheries reported favourably, and the British and Scottish Organisation Societies are to have theirgrant. But the I. A. O. S. Had to reckon with Mr. T. W. Russell, behindwhom stood Mr. Dillon and the politicians. The report of the IrishDepartment on the Irish application was adverse, but the Commissionersdo not appear to have found the reasons given convincing. Much delayensued, but, ten months after the application was sent in, the matterwas submitted to the Council of Agriculture. 

The machinery of the United Irish League was brought into action toinfluence the votes of this body. Mr. Russell delivered an impassionedharangue, and eventually the Council was induced to endorse his actionby a majority of 47 to 33. 

Any grant in aid of agricultural co-operation is to be administered, ifMr. Russell has his way, not by the society which has already beeninstrumental in establishing nearly a thousand co-operative associationsin Ireland, and has served as a model on which the corresponding Englishand Scottish Organisation Societies, now in the enjoyment of a Statesubsidy, have been founded, but by the Department, which has hithertohad no experience whatever of such work. Moreover, the co-operationpromoted by the Department is to be "non-competitive, " by which Isuppose is meant, that it is not to affect any existing tradinginterest. It is safe to say that agricultural co-operation, which has_no_ effect upon any trading interest, will have very little effect uponthe farmers' interests either. So far as I know, the DevelopmentCommissioners have not decided what course to take in this strangesituation. It may be that Ireland will lose the grant altogether; but inany case I can well believe that they must hesitate to reverse thepolicy already approved for England and Scotland, and in the face ofall experience commit the work of organising agricultural co-operationto a State Department rather than to a voluntary association possessingsuch a record as the I. A. O. S. Has placed to its credit. 

If now we ask what are the grounds of the hostility of the NationalistParty to the most hopeful Irish movement of recent years, the answerappears to be twofold. The first is economic, or purports to beeconomic: the second is frankly political. 

1. Co-operation, it is urged, injures the middleman and the smalltrader. 

To encourage farmers to do well and economically for themselves what isnow done indifferently and expensively for them by the middleman, mustof course act injuriously on some existing interests. This is notdisputed. But the change is absolutely necessary for the regeneration ofrural Ireland, and this objection cannot be allowed to stand in the way. Looked at in its broader and more enduring aspects, co-operation isbound to stimulate and improve general trade by increasing the spendingpower of the farmers. The Chambers of Commerce of Dublin and Belfasthave not been slow to perceive this, and have warmly endorsed theSociety's application for a grant from the Development Commissioners. 

2. The political objection to the movement, so far as it takes thedefinite form of charging the I. A. O. S. With being a propagandist bodyaiming under the mask of economic reform at the covert spread ofUnionist opinions, will not stand a moment's examination. There is not aparticle of evidence in support of such a charge, and the presumptionagainst it is overwhelming. To mix political propagandism withorganisation would be the certain ruin of the movement. The Committee ofthe I. A. O. S. Consists of men of all shades of political faith. These mencould never have joined hands except on the basis that politics shouldbe rigidly excluded from the work of the Society. The members of theco-operative societies founded by the I. A. O. S. Number nearly 100, 000. Probably at least three-fourths of these are Nationalists. 

In order, however, that all doubt on the subject might be finallyremoved, the I. A. O. S. Issued a circular to all its societies, in whichthe following question was directly put:--

 "Has the I. A. O. S. , as a body, or the Committee acting for it, done, in your opinion, any act in the interest of any political party, or any act calculated to offend the political principles of any section of your members?"

The answers received have been published and form very interestingreading. Not a single society, of the many hundreds that have repliedfrom all parts of Ireland, has been found to assert that politics haveever been mentioned by the agents of the parent association. 

The hostility of the politicians to the co-operative movement rests, itis safe to surmise, upon some other foundation than these flimsy chargesagainst the I. A. O. S. 

In itself the movement is vital to the prosperity of rural Ireland. Thedisfavour shown to it arises from apprehensions respecting its_indirect_ bearing upon the great issue between Unionism andNationalism. Home Rulers who oppose the co-operative movement findthemselves in this dilemma: either they hold that nothing in the way ofmaterial improvement could affect the demand for Home Rule, or else theyare really afraid lest "better farming, better business, and betterliving, " should weaken the attractions of their own political nostrum. In the former case, they are left without a shadow of justification fortheir attitude towards the I. A. O. S. ; in the latter, they tacitly admitthat the interests of the farming classes must suffer in order that thecause of Home Rule may be promoted. 

Unionists are in no such difficulty. Our policy is clear and consistent. Improvement in the social and economic condition of the people must beour first object. It is an end to be pursued for its own sake, whateverthe indirect consequences may be. But the indirect consequences needcause us no anxiety. Increased material prosperity, and the contentmentwhich inevitably accompanies it, whatever their other effects may be, are not likely to strengthen the demand for constitutional changes. Successful resistance to Home Rule at the present crisis may well meanthe saving of the Union for good and all. 

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 70: Originally published in the _Irish Homestead_, and quotedin Sir Horace Plunkett's "Ireland in the New Century, " p. 190. ]

[Footnote 71: "Ireland in the New Century, " p. 220. ]

[Footnote 72: In this connection attention may be called to theremarkable increase of wealth in Ireland in the past twenty years. Thedeposits in the Joint Stock Banks have increased from £33, 700, 000 in1891 to £56, 011, 000 in 1911, the balances in the Post Office SavingsBanks in Ireland from £3, 878, 000 in 1891 to £12, 253, 000 in 1911, and thenumber of accounts from 261, 352 in 1891 to 662, 589 at the end of 1910. Irish investments in Government Funds, India Stocks, and Guaranteed LandStock have increased from £26, 609, 000 in 1891 to £41, 363, 000 in 1911. But more noteworthy still, perhaps, is the increase in Irish trade. Figures are only available since 1904, but in that period Irish importshave increased from £54, 078, 399 to £65, 044, 477--an increase of£10, 966, 078 in seven years. Irish exports have increased in the sameperiod from £49, 712, 400 to £65, 844, 255, or an increase of £16, 131, 155. Or, if we take the aggregate trade, there has been an increase from£103, 790, 799 in 1904 to £130, 888, 732 in 1910, an increase of£27, 097, 933. In other words, the aggregate import and export trade inIreland in the year 1910 amounted to nearly £28 sterling per head ofpopulation, while the corresponding figure for Great Britain is justover £20. These figures are, I submit, eloquent testimony that thegeneral policy of the Imperial Parliament in relation to Ireland duringrecent years has been wisely conceived, and that the successful solutionof the "Irish Problem" is to be found in the steady pursuit of methodswhich have already achieved such striking results. ]

[Footnote 73: It appears that Mr. Dillon was under a misapprehension onthis point. He thought he had obtained an amendment to the Bill whichprevented the I. A. O. S. From getting a subsidy. This, however, was anentire mistake. See App. B. To the Report of the Committee on the Dept. Of Agriculture. Cd. 3573 of 1907. ]

[Footnote 74: The _voluntary_ contributions to the I. A. O. S. For the workof organisation amounted to no less than £100, 000. ]

[Footnote 75: See his evidence before the House of Lords Committee onthe Thrift and Credit Bank Bill (Paper 96 of 1910). ]

XIV

THE COMPLETION OF LAND PURCHASE

BY THE RIGHT HON. GEORGE WYNDHAM, M. P. 

The case for resisting all attempts at impairing the Union between GreatBritain and Ireland can be made unimpeachable without reference to theIrish Land Question. It would be our duty to defend the Union as abulwark of national safety, an instalment of Imperial consolidation, anda protection to the freedom of minorities in Ireland, even if it couldbe shown that agriculture, the chief industry of Ireland, had little togain under the Union and nothing to lose under Home Rule. Fortunately, this cannot be alleged except by those who shut their eyes to theresults of State-aided Land Purchase in Ireland, and refuse to considerthe consequences of tampering with the mainspring of that beneficentoperation: I mean the credit of a joint exchequer under one Parliamentfor both countries. "England's Case against Home Rule" coincides withIreland's need for retaining the prosperity that has come to her, afterlong waiting, under, and because of, the Union. It is, therefore, fitting that a place should be found in this book for a brief account ofwhat Irish agriculture may hope from the Union and must fear from HomeRule. 

The history of Irish Agriculture until recent years differed from thehistory of English Agriculture at many points, and always to the markeddisadvantage of Ireland. Dynastic and religious controversies which--ifwe except the suppression of monasteries and the exile of a fewJacobites--left English countrysides untouched, in Ireland carried withthem the confiscation of vast territories and the desolating Influenceof Penal Laws. Changes in economic theory contributed even more sharplyto the decay of Irish enterprise. When England favoured Protection Irishindustry was handicapped out of manufactures. When England adopted FreeTrade Irish agriculture, on which the hopes of Ireland had perforce beenfixed, suffered in a greater degree. The doctrine of _laisser faire_wrought little but wrong when applied by absentee buyers of bankruptestates to tracts hardly susceptible of development by capital, amid apeasantry wedded to continuity of tenure, and justified in thattradition by the fact that they and their forbears had executed nearlyall the improvements on their holdings. Most of the nation wererestricted to agriculture under conditions that spelt failure, andimposed exile as the penalty for failure, since other avenues tocompetence were closed. The climax of misfortune was reached ageneration after the triumph of Free Trade. Ireland, being almost whollyan agricultural country, suffered as a whole, whereas England, anindustrial country, suffered only in districts, from the collapse ofagricultural prices in 1879. That catastrophe in rural life precipitatedMr. Gladstone's Land Law Act (Ireland), 1881. Being precluded by hispolitical tenets from protecting Irish agriculture against foreigncompetition, or assisting it with the resources of the State, Mr. Gladstone aimed at alleviating the distress due to the decadence of anational industry by defining with meticulous nicety the respectiveshares which the two parties engaged in agriculture--landlord andtenant--were to derive from its dwindling returns. He believed that theproportion of diminishing profits due to the landlord, because of theinherent capabilities of his property, and to the tenant, because of hisown and his predecessors' exertions, could be roughly determined by afew leading cases in the Land Court; and, further, that landlords andtenants throughout Ireland would conform to such guidance as thesedecisions might afford. In this anticipation he ignored the vitalfunction of agriculture in Irish life, and the effect which the growingstringency of agricultural conditions would have on a population thatloved the land and rejoiced in litigation. He created dual-ownershipthroughout Ireland, and this led, as Lord Dufferin and other far-seeingstatesmen had foretold, to the land being starved of both capital andindustry. Irish agriculture was brought to the brink of ruin. The miseryof those involved in that pass was exploited to engineer an attack onthe fabric of social order, and the lawlessness so engendered wasadduced as an argument for dissolving the Union under which suchtragedies could occur. 

The leaders of the Conservative Party, when confronted with thissituation, determined that their duty, in accordance with the spirit ofthe Act of Union, demanded some use of the resources of a jointexchequer for ministration to the peculiar needs of Ireland. Theydecided that the credit of the State should be employed to effect theabolition of dual-ownership by converting the occupiers of Irish farmsinto owners of the soil. Let it be granted that this policy had beenadvocated by John Bright and enshrined in the Land Law Acts of 1870 and1881. It must be added that these pious intentions remained a "deadletter" until adequate machinery for giving them effect was provided bythe Land Purchase Acts, commonly called the Ashbourne Acts, of 1885 and1889. The method pursued was as follows. Any individual landlord couldagree with any individual tenant on the price which he would accept forthe extinction of his interest in that tenant's holding. The Statefacilitated the transaction by advancing that amount to the landlord in_cash_ whenever the holding offered sufficient security, and acceptingfrom the tenant an undertaking to pay an instalment of £4 a year forevery £100 advanced over a period of forty-nine years. The instalmentcomprised £3 for interest, 2_s. _ 6_d. _ for expenses, and 17_s. _ 6_d. _for sinking fund. The loan from the exchequer was secured againstindividual failures to pay by the realisable value of the holdings. 

The salient features in this procedure were that the landlord receivedcash and that the tenant paid interest at the then existing rate onConsols, viz. 3 per cent. Both these features are important. A paymentin cash, or its equivalent, is preferable for such transactions to apayment in stock, with a fluctuating value, because, if the stockappreciates the landlord gets more than he bargained for, and this, byarousing the suspicions of other would-be tenant-purchasers, produces adisinclination on their part to buy. Again, if the stock depreciates, the landlord cannot carry out contemplated redemptions of mortgages onhis property, and this produces a disinclination on the part of otherlandlords to sell. In the second place it is difficult to persuade Irishtenants that the State is assisting them if they, the poor, are asked topay higher interest for the State's credit than the State pays for thecredit of the rich. The chief defect in this procedure lay in itsrestriction to separate bargains in respect of single holdings. It madea patchwork, whereas the untoward results of the historic and economiccauses on which I have touched demanded the wholesale treatment ofconvenient areas. 

Under these Acts, in the course of six years, more than 27, 000 tenantsbecame owners by virtue of advances which amounted to over £10, 000, 000. The largest number of applications for purchase in any one year was6, 195 for £2, 271, 569 in 1887, and the average price for all the holdingsbought under these Acts was £396. 

When the sums provided by the Ashbourne Acts were exhausted, Mr. ArthurBalfour carried the Act of 1891, subsequently amended by the Act of1896. Under these Acts the landlord was paid in stock instead of cash. The tenant still paid an instalment of £4, which was, ultimately, divided into £1 5_s. _ for sinking fund and £2 15_s. _ for interest. Thislarge sinking fund, £1 5_s. _ instead of 17_s. _ 6_d. _, was retained afterinterest had been reduced to the rate on Consols, 2-3/4 per cent. , chiefly to avoid a discrepancy in the total of annual instalments asbetween purchasers under the Act of 1891 and purchasers under theAshbourne Acts. Difficulties were feared if the earlier purchasers wereto pay £4 and the later purchasers only £3 15_s. _ for each £100advanced, so the spare five shillings was put in the sinking fund. Thisspeculative difficulty was afterwards discounted in order to deal withone of a more practical character. Under Mr. Gladstone's Land Law Act of1881, which dealt with rent-fixing, statutory rents were revised everyfifteen years, and the second term rents, beginning in 1896, seemedcertain to reveal considerable reductions on the rents payable duringthe first period. It was felt that the security for the earlier advanceswould be endangered if rents throughout Ireland fell below the level ofthe purchase-instalments, and that purchase would be retarded if thepurchaser did not obtain immediate relief by agreeing to buy. To meetthis practical difficulty Mr. Gerald Balfour, in 1896, permitted thepurchaser to write off the amount repaid by sinking fund during thefirst and two successive periods of ten years. These "decadalreductions" were optional. If the purchaser forewent them he paid £4 per£100, and extinguished his debt in 42-1/2 years. If he availed himselfof them he paid £3 8_s. 7d. _ per £100 after the first ten years, andcontinued to pay, with two further reductions in prospect, till the debtwas extinguished in a period undefined, but estimated at about 72-1/2years. But this privilege was made retrospective, so that purchasersunder the Ashbourne Acts could also reduce their instalments of £4 to £311_s. 10d. _

The salient features in the procedure of the Acts of 1891 and 1896 werethat, (1) the landlord was paid in stock instead of cash. But owing tothe rise in the value of gilt-edged securities, Irish Land Stock, with aface value of £100, became at one moment worth as much as £114; (2) thepurchaser's interest was at 2-3/4 per cent. _i. E. _ the existing rate onConsols; but (3) his instalment, prospectively fined down by decadalreductions, enabled him to offer an acceptable price and yet pay farless to the State, by way of instalment, after purchase than was due tohis landlord, by way of rent, before purchase. The operation of purchasewas still confined, almost wholly, to single bargains. But in Mr. ArthurBalfour's Act of 1891 a new departure was authorised which, afterdevelopment in Mr. Gerald Balfour's Act of 1896, has led to importantand far-reaching consequences. The Congested Districts Board wasestablished to deal with scheduled areas in the West of Ireland thatcomprised a large number of holdings at once too limited in area, andtoo poor in soil, for any one of them to support a family by farming orto afford security to the State, under existing facilities for purchase, in the event of the occupier wishing to become the owner. A selectcommittee of the House of Commons, so long ago as in 1878 (No. 249, pp. 4 and 5), when Disraeli was Prime Minister, had recommended that aproperly constituted body should be empowered to purchase, not singlefarms, but whole estates, and to re-sell them after amalgamating, enlarging, and re-distributing what are now called "uneconomic"holdings. Provisions to this end had been inserted in earlier Acts, but, in the absence of administrative machinery and financial resources, theyremained abortive. It had for long been evident that the small, impoverished holdings, which had supported a dense population before thefamine, stood in need of fundamental remodelling if they were to supporteven a largely reduced population. The efforts made by wealthy Irishlandlords in this direction were arrested by the Land Law Act of 1870and rendered impossible by the Land Law Act of 1881. With the PurchaseActs of 1891 and 1896 a beginning was made. 

Another feature must be noted. In addition to the value of any oneholding, as a security against individual failure, a further securitywas provided against the risk of a combined refusal to repay. TheExchequer was empowered to retain grants due for various purposes inIreland and to recoup itself in proportion to the defalcation in anycounty. It should be added that individual failures have been rare tothe point of insignificance, and that no combined refusal has beenattempted, or advocated, even during periods of agricultural unrest. 

Under the Acts of 1891 and 1896 in the course of just over twelve yearsmore than 44, 000 tenants became owners by virtue of advances whichamounted to over £13, 000, 000. Here we must note that the success ofthese Acts coincided with, and depended on, a rise in the price ofgilt-edged securities. The number of applications rose from 1503 in theyear ending March 31, 1896, to 6911 in the year ending March 31, 1900. But, with the fall in the price of stock, land purchase showed signs ofcoming to a standstill. By 1902 it was evident that new legislation wasneeded, and in the next year the Irish Land Act of 1903 was carried. 

The Irish Land Act of 1903 was not, as some suggest, a short cut to themillennium, evolved on the spur of the moment, and translated intofantastic finance. It had two bases, the one practical, the other moral. In the first place, it was founded on the ripe experience garneredduring eighteen years from the operation of preceding purchase Acts. Inthe second place, it was founded on the historic agreement spontaneouslyarrived at in 1902 by accredited representatives of Irish landlords andtenants. They resolved that dual ownership ought to be abolishedthroughout Ireland, and that this primary policy should be accompaniedby effective remedies for the uneconomic conditions prevalent in theWest, but existing elsewhere, though sporadically, to a limited extent. This agreement, in itself unprecedented, was rendered the moreremarkable by the fact that the signatories assumed the responsibilityof telling the Government how the first object could be achieved. Theyadvised that landlords could not be expected to sell, as a class, unlessthe price paid to them in cash would yield from sound securities 90 percent. Of their income in terms of a rent that had been twice revisedunder the Land Law Act of 1881; and that tenants could not be expectedto buy, as a class, unless their instalments due to the Treasury afterpurchase were from 15 per cent. To 25 per cent. Less than such rents sorevised. They invited the Government to give effect to that agreement. The Government accepted and, in the Act of 1903, tendered the costlybut, under the circumstances, not extravagant _imprimatur_ of theTreasury on a political treaty thenceforward to be binding on all threecontracting parties: landlords, tenants, and the State. The Nationalistmembers, as spokesmen for the tenants, and the representatives of thelandlords, subscribed to the provisions offered, and the reports of theEstates Commissioners prove that these have been fulfilled so exactlythat, in the case of second term rents, landlords and tenants haveobtained average incomes and reductions that differ only by a decimalfrom the mean advocated at the Conference. 

The objects of the Irish Land Act were, in conformity with theconclusions of the Conference, to abolish dual ownership rapidly and, atthe same time, to deal systematically with "agricultural slums. " Itssalient features fall under four heads. 

A. _State assistance to voluntary bargaining. _ For this purpose it wasprovided that (1) cash payments should be resumed to the landlords; (2)that the tenants' instalments should be £3 5_s. _ for each £100 advanced, divided into £2 15_s. _ (2-3/4 per cent. ) for interest and 10_s. _ forsinking fund. This was not, as the able and well-informed specialcorrespondent of the _Times_ suggests (February 9, 1912) a suddendeparture from an instalment of £4. "Decadal reductions" under the Actof 1896 had, as I have said, diminished the instalments of purchasersunder the Act of 1891 to £3 8_s. 7d. _ after ten years with furtherprospective diminutions, and subjected the instalments of purchasersunder earlier Acts to a similar process. A wholesale expansion ofpurchase was impossible unless would-be purchasers were offered termscomparable to those accorded to their predecessors. For this reason thetenantry of Ireland were offered repayment at £3 5_s. _ per £100 for aperiod of about 62 years, in lieu, under the Act of 1896, of repaymentat £3 8_s. 9d. _, with further reductions, for about 72-1/2 years, andtheir representatives accepted the offer. They would certainly haverefused, and rightly, the offer substituted by Mr. Birrell in the Act of1909, viz. An instalment of £3 10_s. _ with the same sinkingfund--10_s. _--and interest increased to £3. The third feature to benoted under this head is, that the terms agreed to by representatives oflandlords and tenants at the conference could not be ratified unlessthe State added some help by way of cash to the assistance of itscredit. It was agreed by all parties that £12, 000, 000 should beavailable to bridge the gap, at the rate of 12 per cent. On the amountadvanced, with the right to revise that rate after five years, but _onlyfor the purpose of extending the bonus_--as it was called--_to allfuture transactions_. It was an integral part of a solemn covenant thatthe bonus should not be diverted to any object other than the abolitionof dual ownership and the remedy of "congestion. "

B. _The substitution of speedy purchase for dilatory litigation. _ To allmembers of the Conference of 1902 and of the House of Commons in 1903, with, I believe, the exception of Mr. Dillon, who was away in Americawhile the Conference sat, it was evident that, if dual ownership was tobe abolished, our choice was confined to two courses. We could, on theone hand, pursue, under the guise of purchase, the metaphysical andcostly distinctions between landlord-right and tenant-right, which Mr. Gladstone had established under the guise of rent-fixing; or else, asthe only alternative, we had "to cut the cackle" and get to business. Under this head the House of Commons--Mr. Dillon ingeminatingdissent--decided in so far as landlords and tenants were concerned, twothings: (1) It was agreed that where the tenant-purchaser's instalment, after purchase, was substantially less than his statutory rent revisedat great cost--£140, 000 a year for Land Courts--then, in those cases theState needed not to inquire at further cost and delay into either itsown security in the holding, or the metaphysical distinction betweenvalue due to the landlord's ownership of the soil and value due to thetenant's improvement of the soil. This close approximation to unanimitywill not surprise those who grasp that every landlord and tenant was tomake a voluntary bargain on precisely those terms which therepresentatives of their classes had combined to obtain from the State. The alternative method of delay and litigation had been furtherdiscounted, for everybody except Mr. Dillon, by the fact that in theclassic case--_Adams_ v. _Dunseath_--tried out in accordance with Mr. Gladstone's panacea, Adams, after repeated lawsuits, improved hisfinancial position by an infinitesimal sum per annum without becoming anowner of his farm. It was also agreed that the Estates Commissionersappointed to administer the Act, should be administrative officialsunder the Government, and not amateur judges. This was essential, notonly to substitute cheap speed for costly delay, but also to ensure thatthe benefits offered by the State should not be absorbed, say, in therich province of Leinster to the detriment of the poorer province ofConnaught, or--for who knows what may happen in Ireland?--absorbed inthe Home Rule province of Connaught to the detriment of the Unionistprovince of Ulster. 

C. _Dealing with Estates as a whole instead of with single holdings. _This process, till then applied tentatively in the congested districtsof the West, became the general method throughout Ireland, and wasassisted by the provision of working capital for carrying out necessaryamalgamations and improvements before resale. 

D. _Increase in the 'borrowing power and funds of the CongestedDistricts Board, _ for the purpose of dealing systematically with"agricultural slums. "

The features of the Irish Land Act (1903), founded, as they were, onexperience and the consent of all parties concerned, became widelypopular in Ireland. But, by Mr. Birrell's Act of 1909, they were alldistorted or destroyed. A solemn treaty, framed in the interest ofIreland, was torn up to deck with its tatters the triumph of Mr. Dillon's unholy alliance with the British Treasury. The effect of thisbetrayal on the prospects of Irish agriculture will appear from arecital of the changes made by Mr. Birrell's Act, followed by acomparison of the results obtained under the two Acts. From thatcomparison I shall proceed to an examination of the reasons alleged forthe breach of faith, and a statement of the Unionist party's pledge tocontinue their policy of 1903. I shall then conclude by inviting allwho care for Ireland to weigh the prospects of Irish Agriculture underthe Union against its prospects under Home Rule. 

_Changes made by the Act of _1909. --(1) Instead of cash paymentslandlords are to receive stock at three per cent. Issued on a fallingmarket, and this stock cannot appreciate because, owing to theembarrassment of Irish estates, about half of each issue must be thrownback on the market for the redemption of mortgages; a result fatal toland purchase and detrimental to the credit of the State. (2) Instead ofpaying £3 5_s. _ per £100, tenants are to pay £3 10_s. _ without anyreduction in the period of repayment. The sinking fund remains at 10_s. _and the interest £3 is, for the first time since land purchase wasattempted, placed at a higher rate than in the preceding Purchase Act, whilst the whole instalment of £3 10_s. _ is raised, not only above therate of the Act of 1903, but also above the rates, diminished by decadalreductions, of purchasers under still earlier Acts. This again, in viewof these reductions and of periodic revisions of _rent_ under the LandLaw Act of 1881, is fatal to purchase. (3) The bonus of £12, 000, 000--onthe application of which all parties agreed in 1903--was diverted fromthe unanimous policy of that year and brought in aid of Mr. Dillon'shobby, which all parties then rejected. Mr. Dillon is at liberty torejoice over the ruin of one landlord more than over the salvation of99, 000 tenants. The laws of lunacy do not, and ought not to, touch him. But there is no reason why taxpayers should minister to his peculiarpleasure, with the result of postponing indefinitely any settlement ofthe Irish land question. (4) By reverting to inspection for securitydelay is substituted for speed, and speed is necessary in the conclusionof bargains that are themselves the result of prolonged negotiations;the more so when, as now, owing to the substitution of stock for cash, the seller cannot know what his bargain will turn out to be; and thebuyer, owing to the block in agreements under the Act of 1903, cannotknow when his bargain will take effect. In most cases it will not do sofor from six to eight years, which must be added to the period ofrepayment, although his instalment has been increased. (5) The reversionto attempts at defining the metaphysical rights of the landlords andtenants revives the social poison of litigation of which, in 1903, everyone but Mr. Dillon was weary. (6) The revival of litigation in respectof single holdings defeats the policy of dealing with convenient areas. (7) By transforming the Estates Commissioners, much I imagine to theirdisgust, from administrative officers into amateur judges, a furtherpremium is put on litigation and delay, whilst the interests of oneprovince as against the interests of another, are left withoutprotection from the State. (8) Although more than half the holdings ofIreland are valued at less than £10 a year, a presumption is createdthat all holdings below that value are to be deemed "uneconomic. " Thewhole of Connaught with the counties of Donegal and Kerry and part ofCounty Cork are branded as "congested, " and the Board, charged withconducting purchase in that area, is swollen to unmanageable size, whilst three commissioners are held sufficient for the rest of Ireland, which is twice as large. 

To these eight changes, all inimical, and, as I believe, fatal to theabolition of dual ownership, two have been added of a more insidiouseffect. Compulsion has been adopted. This of itself checks voluntarypurchase. It kills it when, as under this Act, compulsory purchases areto be paid for in cash and voluntary purchases in depreciated stock. Finally, the Act contemplates diverting the resources, applied under thetreaty of 1903 to the abolition of dual ownership and the remedy ofcongestion, to a new purpose, for which Ireland can make no specialclaim. I mean the creation, over all Ireland, of new tenancies, to besold to new men, who have never suffered from dual ownership oruneconomic conditions, and may be presumed to be ignorant of farming. This new policy amounts to a repeal of the policy sanctioned by all, viz. Of giving special State aid to meet the peculiar needs of Ireland. 

_A comparison of the results obtained under the Acts of_ 1903 _and_1909. --In order to gauge the respective efficacy of these two Acts forthe purpose of abolishing dual ownership, it is necessary to distinguishbetween applications for purchase, and advances actually made in respectof completed transactions. The applications exhibit the comparativepopularity and convenience of the two Acts. The advances exhibit onlythe readiness of the Government to proceed with purchase. They pertainto the financial, rather than the political, aspect of the problem, andmay be examined later together with the reasons alleged for the delay ofits solution. The fact of the delay appears from the followingfigures:--

Under the Irish Land Act (1903) the number of purchase agreements lodgedin respect of direct sales by landlords to tenants was 217, 299 in thecourse of less than six years from November 1, 1903, to September 15, 1909. To these should be added proposed purchasers in other categories, viz. In respect of estates sold to the Land Commission for subsequentre-sale, or to the Congested Districts Board, or in the Court of theLand Judge, or in respect of offers to evicted tenants. These bring thetotal of potential purchasers up to 248, 109. Under the Act of 1909, intwo years from December 3, 1909, to December 1, 1911, the number ofapplications in respect of direct sales stands at 8, 992. In the othercategories the number of potential purchasers amounted to 373 up toMarch 31, 1911. Since then tentative negotiations have been essayed, under the threat of compulsion and the menace of Home Rule, whichsuggest a far larger figure. But these transactions--to which I shallreturn--are of an eminently dubious character. We are on safe ground ifwe compare the number of tenants who were ready under the two Acts toacquire their holdings. After discounting whatever may be claimed on thescore that the operation of the Act of 1903 was expedited by the fear ofits destruction, a comparision of 217, 299 would-be purchasers in sixyears with 8, 992 in two years demonstrates that the abolition of dualownership has been thrown back to the conditions which called for theTreaty of 1903. Furthermore, it is proper to discount, in turn, even themeagre total of 8, 992. For it includes the remainders of estates, otherparts of which had been sold under the Act of 1903 and the spurt ofapplications expedited, in this case, by the revolution of last August. To the over-sanguine and the over-timid this seemed to foreshadow therapid passage of Home Rule, and, bad as are the terms of the Act of1909, they are estimated to be better than any obtainable after theUnion has been thrown on the scrap-heap of the Constitution. One othercomparison may be noted. It was part of the Treaty of 1903 thatlandlords should be encouraged to remain in their native land byassistance in the repurchase of their demesnes--that is, homes--afterselling their properties. Under the Act of 1903 the advances on resaleto owners sanctioned by the Land Commission numbered 205. Under the Actof 1909 they number two. 

It will readily be inferred, even by those unacquainted with Ireland;that a process for healing ancient wounds has been turned into a processfor exasperating future conflicts. A blister has been substituted for apoultice on the sores of centuries. Existing agreements are blocked. Future agreements--for this is their appropriate, if cynical--designation, are relegated to a future which few can foresee. Landlords who havecontracted to sell are threatened with bankruptcy by the foreclosure ofmortgages. Tenants who have contracted to buy see their hopes deferredwith sick hearts. Whilst to owners and occupiers who have not completedtheir bargains "no hope comes at all. " The newly won prosperity ofIreland is doomed because the Nationalist party and British Governmenthave not kept faith; and with prosperity peace is departing. Theenvironment that breeds agrarian disorder and crime has been restored, and agitators, in expectation of Home Rule, are already at "their dirtywork again. " A new plan of campaign menaces the peace of Ireland inthose districts whose past records are most darkly stained. 

_Examination of the reasons alleged for tearing up the Treaty of1903_. --The Government defended their reversal of the policy of 1903, and departure from their pledges to carry out that policy, by making twoassertions. They asserted (1) that the size of the problem, which allparties undertook to solve, would exceed by far the speculative estimateput forward in 1903; (2) that the credit of the British Exchequer, whichthey have depressed, would prove unequal to the burden foreshadowed bythe new dimensions, which they have assigned. (1) _Size of the problem_. The first assertion, that much nearer £200, 000, 000 than £100, 000, 000must be borrowed in order to complete purchase, is based on twoassumptions explicitly stated in the Return presented to Parliament (Cd. 4412 of 1908) as follows: "It will be observed that the purchase moneyof the agricultural land not yet brought before the Commissioners forsale under the Land Purchase Acts has been estimated _on the assumptionthat it will be all sold_ and that _it will be sold on an average at theprice for which lands had been sold up to 30th April last, under theIrish Land Act_ (1903). " The assumptions on which the Governmentproceeded are not, therefore, in doubt, but the validity of thoseassumptions, on which the whole case of the Government depends, isrefuted by the ascertained facts of Irish agriculture. The census showsthat the number of agricultural holdings in Ireland is about 490, 000, including nearly 19 million acres. The whole area of Ireland includessome 21 million acres, apportioned to 3-1/2 million acres under crops, 6million acres of waste, and 11-1/2 million acres under grass. The Returnto which I have referred (Cd. 4412 of 1908) cavils at the figures givenin the census on the ground that the 490, 000 "holdings" are moreaccurately 490, 000 "land-holders, " since a tenant holding "half a dozenfarms in the same county is returned as having a single holding. " But itis right to take "holders" when, as under the Act of 1903, the limit onadvances applies to the person who receives them. Again, the Returnthrows over the census for figures supplied by the Department ofAgriculture. But it is wrong to use these figures, for they includeholdings not exceeding one acre, of which there are 80, 000 in Ireland, and many more that cannot be described as "in the main agricultural orpastoral. " No special pleading on the part of the Government can alterthe fact that the 490, 000 holdings given by the census include all thelands under crops and grass and two-thirds of the waste. They embrace 19million acres, and more than cover the ground. For the purpose of anestimate it is an outside figure, the more so since, in respect of grasslands the value of a single farm may exceed the limit of any oneadvance, and it is not uncommon for a large grazier to rent many grassfarms. If the Government, by conferring a judicial status on the EstateCommissioners, surrendered their control over the amounts of singleadvances; and again, if the Government, at the dictation of Mr. Dillon, embarked on a new policy of creating tenancies in grass land and sellingthem to new men, they are debarred from increasing the estimate to covertheir own misfeasance. In tendering the speculative estimate of 1903, itwas clearly laid down that the amount of one advance was only to beincreased in rare cases, and the sub-division of permanent pasture wasdenounced as a "form of economic insanity. " It was also explained thatdeductions must be made from the 490, 000 holdings in respect of smalltown plots, accommodation plots, and market gardens; nor are theseinsignificant, for to the 80, 000 holdings not exceeding one acre we mustadd 62, 000 of from 1 to 5 acres. In the face of these facts, theassumption that "all agricultural land"--as defined in the Return--willbe sold, is not only unsound but preposterous. 

The second assumption, that the average price of future transactionswill equal that of past transactions is opposed to the presumption thatbetter, and therefore dearer farms, came into the market before worseand therefore cheaper farms. I am not referring to the number of years'purchase offered, a point on which I have never expressed an opinion, but to the value of the property which passes. It is with farms as withoranges, the good ones go first. The pertinence of this maxim to landpurchase is proved by the reports of the Estates Commissioners. Thesecontradict the Government's second assumption, for they exhibit asteady and continuous decline in the average of advances that have beenmade. The average amount of advances under the Act of 1903 to March 31, 1908, was in round numbers £361. On some such figures the secondassumption rests. I ventured at the time to assert that the average inthe future would not exceed £300. This estimate has been confirmed, forthe average advances from March 31, 1908, to September 15, 1909--whenthe Act ceased to operate--was £287. A further reduction may beconfidently expected, since the progress of purchase in the richerprovinces has by far exceeded its progress in Connaught. In Leinsterover 53, 000 agreements have been lodged at an average price of over£481; in Munster over 58, 000 at an average of over £420; in Ulster over84, 000 at an average of over £226; whilst in Connaught only some 26, 000at an average of just under £200. 

The reasons alleged in defence of the Act of 1909 failed to justify, oreven to explain, the changes it imposed. An explanation must be soughtin the real reasons, and they are not far to seek. The first was thatthe old methods of litigation and delay, abjured by all parties in 1903, were substituted for the new methods of speed and ease, because Mr. Dillon so willed it; and the second, that the policy of abolishing dualownership, to which Mr. Redmond stood pledged, had to be ousted, againat Mr. Dillon's dictation, to make way for the folly of creating newtenancies, of symmetrical size, throughout all Ireland. The Treaty wastorn up because Mr. Dillon, acting as deputy for Mr. Birrell (whose mainargument for Home Rule is that it bores him to be Chief Secretary), ordered Mr. Redmond to eat his words. 

From this examination of the reasons for destroying the Act of 1903, thetrue size and nature of the financial problem emerges. From the total ofsome 490, 000 holdings substantial reductions must be made in respect ofwaste lands, grass lands, and accommodation plots, and, again, in viewof the limitation on the amount that may be advanced to one person. Weought probably to deduct 20 per cent. , but if, to be on the safe side, we deduct only 15 per cent. , 416, 000 are left. These, however, includesome 80, 000 sold before the Act of 1903, or under the Land Commissionersas distinct from the Estates Commissioners. In respect of the 336, 500remaining, 257, 474 agreements have been lodged under all categories inthe Acts of 1903 and 1909. Indeed, a larger number have been lodged, forin most cases our information is only to March 31, 1911, leaving lessthan 79, 000 holdings that may still come into the market. This is anoutside figure, provided always that the policy of 1903 be adhered to, viz. That advances are made to _occupiers_ and not to new men, except asunder the Act of that year (sect. 2 (I) _b_ and _d_, and sect. 75) inrare cases, rigidly defined, of the sons of tenants and of evictedtenants. 

If the average price remains at the figure for the period March 31, 1908, to September 15, 1909--viz. £287--a further sum of £22, 673, 000 maybe required in excess of £84, 099, 818 already required under the Acts of1903 and 1909; making £106, 772, 818. This total includes nearly£1, 000, 000 for re-sales to owners and some provision for evictedtenants. Under these heads it will not expand in a greater relativedegree. It includes, also, purchase of whole estates and of untenantedland by the Estates Commissioners and Congested Districts Board, andthese may involve larger sums than were originally contemplated. Ipromised to return to that point, and will now do so. Since the Returnunder these heads up to March 31, 1911, tentative negotiations have beenmade for the purchase of a number of estates and for supplying moreevicted tenants with holdings. But this does not increase the money sizeof the problem by much, because many of these estates--if sold to thenew Congested Districts Board--are subtracted from business that wouldhave been done by the Estates Commissioners; again, it is, as we know, impossible to spend much money, or move many migrants, or even enlargemany holdings, in one year. If the new Congested Districts Boardattempts to handle some millions' worth of land in a hurry, one of twothings must happen, either their work will be indefinitely delayed, orelse they will sell off "uneconomic" holdings without amending theirdefects. The business will not cost more. It will only be scamped, orshirked. I doubt if the additions, which do not conflict with the policyof 1903, will increase the amount to be borrowed in the market, thoughthey may increase the sums needed for working capital. Let us add forthese expansions, which are strictly limited by physical impediments, £2, 000, 000 or even twice that amount. It still remains obvious that, even after expansions, good, bad, or indifferent, of the policy of 1903, the total sum to be borrowed cannot exceed from £110, 000, 000 to£113, 000, 000, as the outside figure that need be contemplated, providedwe refrain from the "economic insanity" of distributing eleven millionacres of permanent pasture among shopkeepers and "Gombeen" men. Thisfigure of £113, 000, 000, indeed, exceeds what may reasonably be expected. The average of advances fell from £426 on the earliest agreements, to£361 on all agreements to March 31, 1908, and to £287 on agreementsbetween that date and September 15, 1909. We may count on a continuationof that fall until the average approaches £200, the price for Connaught, where purchase has proceeded most slowly. But let the total stand at£113, 000, 000. That sum neither warrants the breach of faith of which theGovernment and the Nationalist party have been guilty, nor does itpresent an insoluble problem to the resources of a united Exchequer. £41, 097, 939 has already been borrowed in the market, and advanced, inless than eight years. 

The policy to which the leaders of the Unionist party stand pledged maynow be re-stated in the words which I was authorised to use by Mr. Arthur Balfour and Lord Lansdowne after consultation with theircolleagues. Speaking on July 9, 1909, I said:--

 "Our attitude is, that it is necessary to deal effectively with the block of pending agreements, but in dealing with that block it is not necessary to prejudice the interests either of the landlords or tenants, who may come to terms on some future agreements. We think that the spirit of the Act of 1903 must be observed in the case of pending agreements, but it must not be departed from in the case of future agreements. "--Hansard, 1909, vol. Vii. No. 93, cols. 1542, 1543. 

Mr. Bonar Law confirms this pledge. He instructs me to say that theUnionist party will resume the land policy of 1903, and pursue the sameobjects by the best methods until all have been fully and expeditiouslyachieved. 

The prospects of Irish agriculture under the Union include a return tothe land policy of 1903, with its fair hopes of reconciliation betweenclasses and creeds, and its accomplished result of abounding prosperity. What are the prospects of Irish agriculture under Home Rule? Of whatHome Rule may mean in this, as in other respects, we have been told solittle that we are driven to consider its effect on Irish agriculture inthe light of two contingencies. It may be that the extremists, with whomMr. Dillon invariably ranges himself, as a preliminary to dragging Mr. Redmond after him, will have their way. In that case, Ireland will exactcomplete fiscal autonomy from a Government which invariably surrendersto Mr. Dillon's puppet. Should this occur, land purchase will ceaseabruptly in the absence of credit for borrowing the sums it requires. Take the other alternative, hazily outlined by Mr. Winston Churchill atBelfast. We glean from his pronouncement that the Government intend--ifthey can--to refuse fiscal autonomy, and to preserve control over landpurchase. Can it be expected that this attempt, even if it succeeds, will produce better results for land purchase than the pitiable failureof the Act of 1909? Is it not certain that less money will be raised inEngland, for Ireland, after Home Rule? And if raised in driblets, onwhat will it be spent? Obviously, not on the policy of 1903, but on thepolicy substituted by Mr. Dillon in 1909. It will be spent on expellinglandlords and graziers to make room for subscribers to the propaganda ofextremists. We must judge of what will happen to agriculture after HomeRule by what has happened since the Treaty of 1903 was repudiated. Normust we forget that Mr. Dillon's destructive activity has ranged beyondland purchase. That policy could have achieved little but for theuntiring and generous patriotism of Sir Horace Plunkett. He establishedthe Department of Agriculture and converted his countrymen toco-operation, in the absence of which no system of small ownership cansucceed. He, too, based his efforts on a conference--the RecessCommittee. How has he been met? Mr. Redmond, a member of that Committee, as later of the Land Conference, has, here again, succumbed to Mr. Dillon, who seeks to defeat co-operation between farmers, in theinterests of his disciples; whilst Mr. Russell, with the hectic zeal ofa pervert, has refused Ireland's share of the new Development Grant inorder to spite Sir Horace Plunkett. 

Such signs of the times are read in Ireland more quickly than inEngland, and in several ways. To this man they spell speedy triumph forthe form of economic insanity in which he vindictively believes; to thatman, the retention of an office won by recanting his opinions. But thereare others in the saddest districts of Ireland who must also be takeninto account. To the few--for they are few--who thrive by deeds ofdarkness whenever the Union is attacked, these signs of coming changesuggest a more tragic interpretation, from which the fanatic and theplace-hunter would recoil--when too late. The blatant publican whostrangles a neighbourhood in the toils of usury and illicit drink, andthe bestial survivor of half-forgotten murder-rings take note of thesesigns. The atavism of cruelty returns. Emboldened by Mr. Birrell's blandacquiescence in milder prologues to Home Rule, a new plan of campaignis, even now, being devised, charged with sinister consequences fromwhich all men in 1903 trusted that Ireland would be for ever absolved. The prospects of Irish Agriculture under Home Rule include the return, after a brief chapter of "hope, and energy the child of hope, " to theold cycle of bitterness and listlessness and despair. 

A consideration of these alternatives leads to this dilemma. If theGovernment concede fiscal autonomy Land Purchase ends. If they refuseit, and Mr. Redmond accepts a "gas-and-water" Bill, that compromise, soaccepted, will receive from Mr. Dillon the treatment accorded to therecommendations of the Recess Committee and of the Land Conference. Thecompromise will be repudiated and the millions already advanced forpurchase will be used as a lever to extort complete autonomy. The leveris a powerful one. All depends upon who holds the handle. 

It may be said in conclusion that the Unionist policy of Land Purchasevindicates the Union, and that the treatment it has receiveddemonstrates the futility, and the tragedy, of granting Home Rule. 

XV

POSSIBLE IRISH FINANCIAL REFORMS UNDER THE UNION

BY ARTHUR WARREN SAMUELS, K. C. 

THE CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION. 

The best possible system for Irish financial reform is adherence to theprinciples of the Act of Union. The constitution, as settled by the Actof Union and the Supplementary Act for the amalgamation of theExchequer, contemplated that each of the three Kingdoms shouldcontribute by "equal taxes" to the Imperial Exchequer. "Equal taxes"were to be those which would press upon each country equitably inproportion to its comparative ability to bear taxation. These taxes wereto be imposed subject to such exemptions and abatements as Scotland andIreland should from time to time appear to be entitled to. If theircircumstances should so require, they should receive specialconsideration. 

All the revenues of England, Scotland and Ireland, wherever and howeverraised, when paid into the common Exchequer, form one consolidated fund. The Act for the consolidation of the Exchequers directs that there shallbe paid out of the common fund "indiscriminately" under the control ofParliament all such moneys as are required at any time and in any placefor any of the public services in England, Scotland, Ireland orelsewhere in the Empire. [76] Such payments are to be made withoutconsideration of anything but necessity. They are to be withoutdifferentiation on the ground of the locality of the expenditure, or ofthe relative amount of the contributions to the common chest ofEngland, Scotland or Ireland. All expenditure is alike "common";whatever its object may be, civil, naval or military or foreign, it isall alike "Imperial, " and all of it is under the constitution"indiscriminate. " The whole United Kingdom forms one domain, and but onearea for the purposes of expenditure. As long as the Act of Union lastsno one of the three Kingdoms can be said to be "run" either "at a loss"or "at a profit. " They are all run together as one incorporate body. Thecommon revenue balances the common expenditure, and they bear togetherone another's burden and the weight of Empire. 

THE VICE-TREASURERSHIP OF IRELAND. 

The Act for the amalgamation of the Exchequers of Great Britain andIreland contained provisions for the continued representation of Irelandin fiscal matters at the Exchequer and in Parliament. Power was given toHis Majesty by Letters Patent under the Great Seal of Ireland to appointa Vice-Treasurer of Ireland. The Vice-Treasurer could sit in Parliament, and appointment to the office did not vacate a seat in the House ofCommons. This office has been allowed to fall into abeyance. TheExchequer is only represented in Ireland by a Treasury Remembrancer. Most persons who know Ireland would concur in the view that the existingarrangement is not satisfactory, and that it would be of great advantageto Great Britain, as well as to Ireland, to have in Parliament aMinister specially responsible for Irish finance, acting under theChancellor of the Exchequer. The Vice-Treasurership should be revived, and the occupant of it should be a member in touch with Irish opinion, understanding Ireland and her real wants, which are often very differentfrom the demands upon the Exchequer that are most loudly proclaimed. Therestoration of the office would facilitate business, and tend to removemany misunderstandings, and prevent many mistakes. Personal interviewsin Ireland with such a Minister would be worth reams of correspondence, and would save weeks of time. Promptitude, economy and efficiency wouldbe secured. 

IRISH INTERESTS UNDER TARIFF REFORM. 

For the purposes of a system of Tariff Reform, the revival of the IrishVice-Treasurership is expedient. The peculiar circumstances, conditions, aptitudes, and requirements of Ireland must be regarded, inquired into, discussed and weighed. Her commercial, industrial, and agriculturalinterests must be specially considered. They vary in many particularsfrom those of Scotland and England. This can only be done satisfactorilyby a responsible Irish Minister charged with the duty of protecting andsecuring her interests and harmonising them with those of the sisterKingdoms in the framing of a scientific scheme of Tariff Reform. 

If Irish interests are properly provided for, she should gain greatlyunder Tariff Reform. The effect of the Whig finance, inaugurated byGladstone in 1853, accompanied by a rigid application of the Ricardiantheories of political economy, and the continuous narrowing of the basisof indirect taxation, told against Ireland most severely, depleted herresources and retarded her progress. Sir Stafford Northcote thusaddressed the House of Commons after twelve years' experience of theGladstone Budget:--

 "The upshot of our present system of taxation has been to increase the taxation of the United Kingdom within the last ten or twelve years by 20 per cent. , and they would find that whereas the taxation of England had increased by 17 per cent. , that of Ireland had increased no less than 52 per cent, between 1851 and 1861. This disproportion had been brought about by laying upon Ireland the burden of the Income-tax and by heavily increasing the spirit duties, making use at the same time of these two great engines of taxation to relieve the United Kingdom, but more especially England, of particular fiscal impositions.... Taxation in these two parts have pressed so heavily on Ireland, it was incumbent upon the people of England to take into account the necessity of relieving Ireland in any way they could. "[77]

This plea of a great Conservative financial authority for that specialconsideration for Ireland to which she is entitled in fiscal mattersunder the Act of Union was not carried into effect until the Unionistadministration of Lord Salisbury, in 1886. Then began, under the ChiefSecretaryship of Mr. Arthur Balfour, that practical application of the"Exemptions and Abatements" clause of the Act of Union in the policy ofConstructivism which has fructified so magnificently, and which, ifallowed to continue uninterrupted by Home Rule, will lead Ireland toaffluence. 

The Lloyd George Budget penalised Ireland still further by exaggeratingthose methods of Whig finance which persistently narrowed the basis ofindirect taxation and heaped up disproportionate imposts on a fewselected articles--articles which are either very largely produced orvery largely consumed in Ireland. The effect of Gladstone's Budget of1853 was to reduce the area under barley in Ireland by 134, 000 acres insix years; the Lloyd George Budget has reduced the Irish barley crop by10, 000 acres in one year. Therefore in the framing of the Tariff ReformBudgets of the future, Ireland's equitable claim under the Act of Unionshould be recognised and given effect to. 

REFORM OF AGRICULTURAL LAND TAXATION. 

Agricultural land in the hands of the farmers who have bought theirholdings under the Irish Land Acts has been made liable to extravagantburdens by the Lloyd George Budget. These peasant purchasers are treatedas if they were "Dukes. " When they discover their real position, theirresentment will be bitter. Form IV. Has not yet been circulated amongthem. It has been kept back deliberately. It would not suit Mr. Redmondor the Ministry, should the Irish farmer discover what the actualworking of the new Land taxes means while the legislative logs are stillbeing rolled by the Radical-Socialist-Nationalist combination. When HomeRule is defeated Unionist finance should provide that the burden imposedby these taxes on agricultural progress and national prosperity shallbe removed, and that the benefits conferred by the great Unionist policyof State purchase on the peasant proprietors shall not be allowed to befilched away by the Socialist budget, though it was by that very Irishparty, whose first duty should have been to protect them, that the Irishfarmers' interests have been betrayed. 

CONSTRUCTIVISM. 

It was found by the Financial Relations Commission that Irelandcontributed a revenue in excess of her relative capacity. Mr. Childers, in his draft report, suggested that practical steps might possibly betaken to give Ireland relief or afford her equitable compensation inthree different ways--[78]

 (1) By so altering the general fiscal policy of the United Kingdom as to make the incidence of taxation fall more lightly on Ireland. It was suggested that the taxation upon tea, tobacco, and spirits, which weigh more heavily on Ireland in proportion to her relative capacity, because of the habits of the people, and the larger proportion in Ireland of the poorer classes, might be reduced and a part of the burden transferred to other commodities. It was, however, felt, he said, that this would open up questions of such magnitude--like Free Trade and the incidence of taxation as between different classes--that it would be inexpedient to urge it, when the object in view was the solution of a pressing difficulty with regard to Ireland taken apart from the rest of the United Kingdom. But that difficulty will be removed under Tariff Reform--one-sided Free Trade is no longer a sacrosanct fetish--and the case of Ireland must be taken not as apart from, but as part of, the United Kingdom. Irish interests, Agricultural and Industrial, can be far better promoted, furthered, and secured under a scientific tariff system than under the so-called free trade system, which insists on the fallacy that identity of imposts means equality of burden, and concentrates its pressure on the great Irish industries of brewing, distillery, and tobacco manufacturing; a system which taxes heavily tea--the great article of consumption--and has brought peculiar disaster on agriculture. Therefore, the remedy which Mr. Childers thought impracticable in 1896 will become eminently practicable with a Tariff Reform Ministry in power. 

 (2) The second suggestion then made was that there should be a policy of distinct customs and excise for Ireland as apart from Great Britain. This would involve a customs barrier between the two islands. The inconvenience of such a course would be immeasurable and disastrous under modern conditions. It would certainly come sooner or later under Home Rule, but it would be a reversal of the policy of the Union. 

 (3) The third method which most strongly recommended itself to Mr. Childers was to give compensation to Ireland by making an allocation of revenue in her favour, to be employed in promoting the material prosperity and social welfare of the country. 

This is the course which has been pursued by Unionist statesmen, andfinds practical expression in their Constructive policy. The resultscannot be better proved than by the fact that within the six years from1904, during which the statistics of Irish Export and Import trade havebeen kept, her commerce has increased in money value by more thantwenty-seven millions. At least four-fifths of that great increaserepresents a corresponding increase in British trade with Ireland. 

Mr. Childers wrote in 1896--

 "Apart from the claim of Ireland to special and distinct consideration under the provisions of the Act of Union, and upon the ground that she has for many years been, and now is, contributing towards the public revenue a share much in excess of her relative taxable capacity; I think that Great Britain as a manufacturing and trading country would in the course of time be amply repaid by the increase of prosperity and purchasing power in Ireland for any additional burdens which this annual grant to Ireland might involve. Looked at simply as a matter of good policy, it would be that often advocated with regard to Crown Colonies of Imperial expenditure with a view to the development of a backward portion of the Imperial estate. Ireland is so much nearer to and more exclusively the customer of the trading and manufacturing districts of Great Britain than any Colony, that this argument in her case should have redoubled weight. It is at least probable that, if in place of the fitful method of casual loans and grants hitherto pursued, there was a steady, persevering, and well-directed application of public money by way of free annual grant towards increasing the productive power of Ireland, the true revenue derived from that country might in time be no longer in excess of its relative taxable capacity. "[79]

The wisdom of this Liberal Chancellor of the Exchequer makes a strangecontrast with the folly of the Radical Chief Secretary, who tellsEngland to "cut the loss" at the moment of Ireland's rapid progressbecause Irish Old Age Pensions have exceeded in number the recklessanticipation of the Right Hon. Mr. Lloyd George. 

A SUGGESTION FOR STATE TRANSIT OF HOME-GROWN PRODUCE. 

The present writer ventures to suggest that under a general scheme ofTariff Reform, the home-grown food supply of the United Kingdom might begenerally increased and cheapened, and Ireland, along with the otheragricultural districts of the United Kingdom greatly developed, by anextension of the principle of the Parcel Post, and the constitution of agreat Home-Grown Commodity Consignment Service worked througharrangements between the Post Office, the Railway Companies, theAgricultural Departments and Farmers' Co-operative Associations. Therailways already provide special rates for farm produce. But if thesystem were organised by the State in connection with the Railways andAgricultural Associations, and the parcel post expanded from thecarriage of parcels of eleven pounds weight to the carriage ofconsignments of a tonnage limit to be delivered on certain days atdepots in the large cities and centres of population, great nationalinterests might be served. 

The value of proximity to the Home Markets which has been so depreciatedin favour of foreign supplies by modern transit methods and quick seapassages, would be restored to the British and Irish farmer. If thiswere accompanied by a tariff system which would secure a preference forhome-grown cereals such as oats and barley, a direct effect instimulating agriculture, and an indirect effect in increasing winterdairying, cattle feeding and poultry rearing, would be produced. Thecountry would become more self-sustaining. The peace food supply wouldbe cheapened and the food supply in time of war augmented. The defensivepower of the realm would be increased. If, under the new Tariff system, it seems not inexpedient to reimpose the small registration duty onimported foreign as contrasted with colonial wheat and flour, therevenue thus produced might, without exactly earmarking it, be appliedpartly towards encouraging and advancing agriculture in the UnitedKingdom, and partly towards financing such a Commodity Post as abovesuggested. This subvention to domestic, agricultural and pastoralindustries would balance the tariff on foreign manufactured goods, andthe farmer of England, Scotland and Ireland would share amply in thestimulus of a new fiscal policy. Tariff Reform may assist themanufacturer and artisan by imposing duties at the ports, and the farmerand agricultural labourer by cheapening transit and encouraging foodproduction within the United Kingdom. 

EQUIVALENT GRANTS IN AID. 

In 1888 a system was inaugurated by which Grants in Aid of LocalPurposes have been made in the Three Kingdoms on the basis that Englandshould get 80 per cent. , Scotland 11 per cent. , and Ireland 9 per cent. , when such subventions are given from the Imperial Exchequer. TheLegislation sanctioning this proportional allocation began with theEnglish Local Government Act of 1888, when Grants in Aid were made outof the Probate Duties, and has been carried into several other Statutesrelating to England, Scotland and Ireland. These proportions have becometo a large extent stereotyped in the allocation of such grants. The newbasis of contribution was originated by Mr. Goschen and was stated byhim to depend upon the amount of the assumed contribution of eachcountry to the Revenue for Common purposes. The method of calculation, he said, was a very complex one. [80]

It was pointed out at the time that under the new system the party thatwould probably require the largest amount of the grant would be thepoorest country, and yet the richer country would get the largerproportionate grants. [81] The method of segregation is as follows. TheRevenue and Expenditure Returns divide public expenditure into fourclauses: (a) "Imperial or Common Services, " (b) "English Services, " (c)"Scottish Services, " and (d) "Irish Services"; and having treated thethree latter as "local services" and charged the particular outlay onthem against each of the three countries, they estimate the balance leftin cash as "the Contribution" of England, Scotland and Ireland to the"Imperial" Expenditure. It is admitted that this division is absolutelyarbitrary. It has no sanction by any Act of Parliament. It is opposed tothe system of Finance under the Act of Union. All the revenues ofEngland, Scotland or Ireland are contributed for "Common" purposes, andin which all expenditure of any kind in any portion of the UnitedKingdom is alike "Common" or "Imperial. " The details of the divisionwere never disclosed, when the proportions were originally fixed. Thesegregation of the services classified as "Imperial" is open to seriousobjections. The method of computation is empirical and unconstitutional, and if carried to its logical conclusion would now result in deprivingIreland of any share whatever in future Equivalent grants, as hercontribution to the services thus classified as "Imperial" ispractically a minus quantity, though the revenue actually raised inIreland is much higher than it ever has been before. This method ofDistribution of Grants in Aid has been condemned by a succession of thehighest financial authorities. Lord Ritchie, as Chancellor of theExchequer, said, "he did not think it possible really to defend in allits details distribution by contribution. "[82]

Mr. Wyndham said--

 "It leads to results which all must hold to be illogical, and results which everybody in Ireland holds to be unjust because the greater the increase of taxation the less is the proportion that comes from Ireland, the poorer partner in the business, and so the less is the equivalent grant. As the evil increases the remedy diminishes, and you have only to force up taxation sufficiently high to extinguish the remedy altogether. "[83]

Mr. Asquith said--

 "A more confused and illogical condition of things it is impossible to imagine. The House ought really to take the opportunity of threshing out the principle upon which these equivalent grants ought to be distributed between the three countries. "[84]

Lord St. Aldwyn said--

 "That he always had a very strong objection to the system of Equivalent Grants, because when they had to make a grant for certain purposes to England, they were obliged to make proportionate grants to Ireland and Scotland quite irrespective of whether they needed them or not. "[85]

Neither the "Imperial" contribution basis nor the "Population" basis, which has in some instances been resorted to for grants in aid, issatisfactory, nor is the method desirable of setting aside a certainfund raised by some particular tax to finance a particular service. Forinstance, the subvention of Education in Ireland out of the "Whiskymoney" recently broke down owing to the diminution of the Revenue fromthis source. The more sober Ireland became, the less she got forEducation. Chaos was imminent, and finally, after much friction, aspecial grant had to be made from the Treasury to save the situation. There are numerous instances in which great complications have beencaused in dealing with local authorities owing to these methods ofmaking grants in aid, and the system should be reformed. The true basisis the basis of each Kingdom's need.... England has her needs, let thembe supplied. Scotland has hers, let them be supplied. Ireland has hers, and having regard to her present comparative poverty, let them besupplied "not grudgingly or of necessity, " but by the Chancellor of theExchequer "as a cheerful giver. " This is the constitutional principleunder the Act of Union, and the soundest financial principle to observefor the United Kingdom. 

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 76: 56 Geo. III. C. 98. ]

[Footnote 77: "Hansard, " Feb. 27, 1865, vol. 177, p. 813. ]

[Footnote 78: "Financial Relations Report, " 1896, c. 8262, vol. Iii. P. 194. ]

[Footnote 79: 1896, c. 8262, p. 194. ]

[Footnote 80: "Hansard, " 1888, vol. 327, p. 1287. ]

[Footnote 81: "Parl. Deb. , " vol. 332, p. 790. ]

[Footnote 82: Ibid. , vol. 120, p. 976. ]

[Footnote 83: "Parl. Deb. , " vol. 120, p. 823. ]

[Footnote 84: Ibid. , vol. 175, p. 1088. ]

[Footnote 85: Ibid. , May 31, 1903. ]

XVI

THE ECONOMICS OF SEPARATISM

BY L. S. AMERY, M. P. 

The history of Ireland for the last two centuries and more is acontinuous exposition of the disastrous consequences of political andeconomic separatism within an area where every natural condition, andthe whole course of historical development, pointed to political andeconomic union. Geographically, racially and historically an integralpart of a single homogeneous island group, Ireland has never really beenallowed to enjoy the full advantages of political and economic unionwith the adjoining main island. Almost every misfortune which Irelandhas suffered is directly traceable to this cause. In spite of this, itis now seriously proposed to subject her once again to the disadvantagesof political separation, and that on the very eve of an inevitablechange of economic policy, which, while it would restore real vitalityand purpose to political union, would also once more intensify all theinjury which economic disunion has inflicted upon Ireland in the past. 

In the long constitutional struggle of the seventeenth century herposition as a separate political unit made Ireland a convenientinstrument of Stuart policy against the English Parliament. Cromwell, with true insight, solved the difficulty by legislative union withEngland. But his work was undone at the Restoration, and for another 122years Ireland remained outside the Union as a separate and subordinatestate. Her economic position was that of a Colony, as Colonies were thenadministered. But it was that of a "least favoured Colony. " This wasdue, in part, to a real fear of Ireland as a danger to Britishconstitutional liberty and British Protestantism[86] which longsurvived the occasion which has seemed to justify it. But what was amore serious and permanent factor was the circumstance that Ireland'seconomic development could only be on lines which competed with England, and not like Colonial development on lines complementary to Englishtrade. One after another Irish industries were penalised and crippled bybeing forbidden all part in the export trade. A flourishing woollenindustry, a prosperous shipping, promising cotton, silk, glass, glovemaking and sugar refining industries were all ruthlessly repressed, [87]not from any innate perversity on the part of English statesmen, or fromany deliberate desire to ruin Ireland, but as a natural and inevitableconsequence of exclusion from the Union under the economic policy of theage. Whatever outlet Irish economic activity took there was always someEnglish trade whose interests were prejudicially affected, and whichpromptly exercised a perfectly legitimate pressure upon the Governmentto put a stop to the competition. The very poverty of Ireland, asexpressed in the lowness of Irish wages, was an ever convenient andperfectly justifiable argument for exclusion. The linen industry alonereceived a certain amount of toleration, and even encouragement. Theseregulations were so little animated by direct religious or racialantipathy that it was upon the Protestant Scotch and English settlersthat they fell with the greatest severity, driving them into exile bythousands, to become, subsequently, one of the chief factors in theAmerican Revolution. But if the direct economic effect of politicalseparation weighed less heavily upon the Catholic majority, theysuffered all the more from the utter paralysis of all industry andenterprise consequent upon the Penal Laws. These laws, monstrous as theyseemed even to Burke, were in their turn a natural outcome of apolitical separation which made the security of Protestantism in Irelandrest upon the domination of a narrow oligarchy in instant terror ofbeing swamped. Under Union they would never have been devised, or couldcertainly never have endured. 

The revolution by which the Irish Parliament, in 1782, asserted itsconstitutional equality with the British Parliament, subject only to thepower of bribery, direct or indirect, retained by the Crown, brought outin still more glaring relief the utter unsoundness of the existingpolitical structure under separation. After eighteen years of fermentwithin Ireland and friction without, British and Irish statesmen, faceto face with civil war and French invasion, realised that the sorryfarce had to come to an end. Meanwhile the immediate economic effect ofliberation from the direct restrictions on Irish foreign trade, alreadyconceded in 1779, and helped in various directions by judiciousbounties, was undoubtedly to give a new impetus to production inIreland. The first ten years of Grattan's Parliament were, on the whole, years of growing prosperity. Whether, even apart from civil war andincreasing taxation, that prosperity would have continued to increase, if the Union had not come about, is, however, a more doubtful matter. The immense industrial development of England during the nexthalf-century would probably, in any case, have crushed out the smallerand weaker Irish industries, while the existence of a separate tariff inGreat Britain would have been a serious obstacle to the development ofIrish agriculture. A full customs union, with internal free trade, wasundoubtedly the best solution of the difficulty. But Pitt's CommercialPropositions of 1785 failed, partly, indeed, owing to politicalintrigues, but still more owing to the fundamental impossibility ofsecuring an effective customs union without some form of politicalunion. 

When finally Ireland entered the Union it was with the severe handicapof an industrial system artificially repressed for over a century. Theremoval of the last traces of internal protection in 1824 onlyaccelerated the process, inevitable in any case, by which Irishindustries, with the exception of linen, were submerged. Butmanufacturing industry was at the best a small matter in Irelandcompared with agriculture. And to Irish agriculture the Union meant animmense development in every direction. Unfortunately the inheritance ofthe preceding century, a vicious agrarian system and a low standard ofliving, was not easily to be eliminated, and little attempt was made toeliminate it. The great increase of agricultural production wasaccompanied, not by a progressive and well-diffused rise in the standardof national well-being, but by high rents and extravagance on the oneside, and, on the other, the rapid multiplication of a population livingon the very margin of subsistence. The terrible year of famine was awarning to British statesmanship of the need of a constructive andConservative policy for the reorganisation of Irish agricultural lifeand for the broadening of the economic basis in Ireland by thedeliberate encouragement of new industries. Under a true conception ofUnion, political and economic--and there were not wanting men like LordGeorge Bentinck and Disraeli who entertained it--Ireland might within ageneration have been levelled up to the general standard of the UnitedKingdom. 

But the evil effects of political and economic separatism in theeighteenth century were still unremedied when the whole economic policyof Union was abandoned. The very principle and conception of Free Tradeis, inherently, as opposed to the maintenance of national as of ImperialUnion. Ireland was deprived of that position of advantage in the Britishmarket which was one of the implied terms of the Union, and was notallowed to protect her own market. Incidentally, and as a consequence ofthe new fiscal policy, Ireland was saddled with a heavy additionalburden of taxation which only handicapped her yet further in thestruggle to recover from the famine and to meet foreign competition. Thefull severity of that competition was, however, not experienced tilltowards the end of the seventies, when the opening up of the AmericanWest, coupled with the demonetisation of silver, brought down priceswith a run. A series of bad harvests aggravated the evil. The sameconditions were experienced all over Europe, and were everywhere met byraising tariffs to the level required to enable agriculture to maintainitself. Even in England "Fair Trade" became a burning issue. Givennormal agrarian conditions in Ireland the Irish vote would have gonesolid with the Fair Traders, and the United Kingdom would in allprobability have reverted to a national system of economics a generationago. As things were, landlords and farmers in Ireland, instead ofuniting to defend their common interest, each endeavoured to thrust theburden of the economic _débācle_ on the other. The bitterness of theagrarian struggle which ensued was skilfully engineered into the channelof the Home Rule agitation. In other words, the evils of economicseparatism, aggravated by the social evils surviving from the separatismof an earlier age, united to revive a demand for the extension andrenewal of the very cause of these evils. 

Since then the underlying conditions of Irish economic life haveundergone a complete transformation. The wealth and credit of the UnitedKingdom have been used to inaugurate a settlement of the agrarianquestion. The productive and competitive efficiency of Irish agriculturehas been enormously increased both by Government advice and assistanceand by patriotic private effort. Old Age Pensions have alleviated theburden of an excessive residue of older persons, and irrigated thepoorer districts with a stream of ready money. In every direction thereis a deliberate effort to raise the economic standard of Ireland to theBritish level. Last, but by no means least, the exclusion of all foreignlive stock from the United Kingdom, though originally designed only as aprecautionary measure against cattle disease, has in effect protectedone most important branch of Irish agriculture and given it a vitalinterest in the maintenance of the Union. On the eve of the revival of anational policy of economic development Ireland stands on a far sounderbasis, and in a far better position to take advantage of thatdevelopment, than in 1800. The standard of life is rising, and will ofitself put a check on a mere multiplication of beings living on themargin of subsistence. For the natural increase of population, whichwill once more come about, there will be provision not only through moreintensive cultivation and in rural industries, but also in a real, though possibly gradual, development of new manufacturing industries. Incidentally the establishment of a protective tariff for the UnitedKingdom will, by lowering the excessive duties on tea and tobacco whichweigh so heavily upon Ireland, increase still further the local excessof Government expenditure over revenue and facilitate the localaccumulation of capital, already so noticeable a feature of recentyears, and thus provide an essential factor in stimulating newenterprise, whether agricultural or industrial. Nor would it be in anyway inconsistent with a national economic policy for the United Kingdomas a whole to devote special sums, through bounties and in other ways, towards the opening up of new fields for the economic activities of theIrish people. For the first time in her history Ireland will have a fairstart, and, under the Union, the twentieth century may yet proveIreland's century just as Canadians claim that it will prove Canada'scentury. 

Now let us turn to the other side of the picture. The establishment ofHome Rule, in other words of political separatism, must inevitably befollowed by active economic separatism, _i. E. _ by the creation of acompletely separate fiscal system in Ireland. The idea that an IrishChancellor of the Exchequer can carry on in dependence on a BritishBudget, which may at any moment upset all his calculations of revenue, is absurd. So is the idea that there can be separate tariffs with mutualFree Trade, or a common tariff without a common government to frame it. If Free Trade, indeed, were to be maintained in England, fiscalseparation would be no disadvantage to Ireland. On the contrary, shewould continue to enjoy the same access to the British market whilegiving her own industries such protection as might be convenient. It isone of the glaring weaknesses of the policy of Free Imports that itactually puts a premium on separatism. But it is impossible to discussthe future on that assumption. Whatever the fate of the Home Rule Billmay be it is certain that Free Trade is doomed, and that the UnitedKingdom, whether united or divided, will revert to a policy of nationalprotection and national development. 

What will be the effect upon Ireland? Assuming mutual good will, assuming that the Irish Government will be ready to grant a substantialpreference to British trade over foreign trade, there can be no doubtthat Great Britain would respond and give to Irish products the samepreference as might be extended to Canadian or Australian products. Butthe first duty of the British Government would be to British producers. While Empire-grown wheat, and possibly meat, would come in free, theBritish farmer would receive a measure of protection against the rest ofthe Empire in dairy products and poultry, in barley and oats, in hops, tobacco, sugar beet, vegetables and fruit, in all those crops, in fact, in which the British production could meet the British demand without anundue effect upon prices. 

Now, it is precisely by these intensive forms of production that Irelandstands to gain most under Union. Under Home Rule she would lose thisadvantage and have to compete on an equality with the rest of the Empireboth in respect to these products and in respect to wheat and meat. Itis extremely doubtful, too, whether her special privileges with regardto store cattle would long survive. They could no longer be defended, asagainst Canada, by the arguments now used, and as a piece of pureprotectionism there would be no reason for Great Britain to give them aseparate fiscal entity. And if the hopes of Irish agriculture would beseverely checked, still more would that be true of those hopes of newindustries already referred to. Even the great linen industry might finda small duty enough to transfer a large part of its production withinthe British tariff zone. On the other hand, it is doubtful whether anytariff that Ireland could impose, consistently either with preference orwith reasonable prices in so small a market and on so small a scale ofproduction, could be of much effect against the competition of Britishindustries, strengthened and made aggressive under the stimulus of anational trade policy. 

This is the most favourable hypothesis. But it is at least conceivablethat a Nationalist Government, whether actuated by a laudable desire tohurry on Irish industrial development, or influenced by the tradition ofanimosity which still plays so strong a part in Nationalist politics, may refuse to enter upon the policy of Imperial preference. It mighteven be tempted by various considerations to give a preference to theUnited States or to Germany. Germany is a large importer of foodstuffs. The establishment of a British tariff may prove a serious blow to hermanufacturing interests. A trade agreement with Ireland might be a veryuseful temporary business expedient from the German point of view. Incidentally a large increase of German merchant shipping in Irishharbours might, in the case of possible hostilities, be of no littleservice in providing commerce destroyers with a most convenient excusefor being in the most favourable area for their operations. Any fiscalexcursions of that sort would inevitably be visited upon Ireland bysevere economic reprisals of one kind or another on the part of GreatBritain, from which Ireland would receive permanent injury faroutweighing any temporary advantage which might be secured from foreigncountries. 

In other words, Ireland under Home Rule would be in almost every respectthrust back into her eighteenth century position of "least favouredColony. " She would, at the best, be handicapped in the British market inrespect of those products by which she could profit most, and in thosewhich she is less fitted to produce would have to compete with thevirgin soil and competitive energy and organisation of the greatDominions. At the worst, her fiscal policy might invite reprisals andmake her "least favoured" not only by her circumstances but by theintention of those who would frame the British tariff. It is true thatthe British Government would no longer dream of directly interdictingIrish exports. But in that respect modern organised capital has aninfluence to promote or kill almost as great as that of governments informer times. And the influence of British capital, under suchcircumstances, would certainly not tend to be directed towards theeconomic development of Ireland. 

But the use of the customs tariff is by no means the only greatinstrument of a national economic policy. To promote the flow of tradein national channels, to secure the fullest development of the nationalterritory and resources, the removal of natural internal barriers isoften even more important than the setting up of artificial externalbarriers. Statesmen who have had to face the task of giving strength andsolidity to weak political unions have always aimed at the developmentof internal communications. Washington's first concern after the successof the American War of Independence was to endeavour to create a systemof internal river and canal navigation in order to help to bind theloosely allied States into a real union. Bismarck used the Prussianrailways as well as the Zollverein to build up German unity. In themaking of Canada the Intercolonial railway and the Canadian Pacific wereessential complements to the national tariff. Railways forced SouthAfrica into union, and will gradually give Australia real cohesion andunity. In the United Kingdom there has been no national policy withregard to communications, least of all any nationally directed orstimulated effort to cement the political union of 1800. But such apolicy is essential to the reality of the Union. To get rid, as far aspossible, of the barrier which the St. George's Channel presents to-dayboth to the convenience of passenger traffic and to the direct throughcarriage of goods between internal points in the two islands should beone of the first objects of Unionist policy in the future. In thetrain-ferry, which has bridged the channels of sea-divided Denmark, which in spite of the Baltic, has made Sweden contiguous with Germany, which for the purposes of railway traffic, has practically abolishedLake Michigan, modern developments have provided us with the veryinstrument required. To Irish agriculture the gain of being put intodirect railway communication with all England and Scotland would beimmense. From the tourist and sporting point of view Ireland would reapa doubled and trebled harvest. More than that, the bridging of St. George's Channel will for the first time enable the west coast ofIreland to become what it ought to be, the true west coast of the UnitedKingdom, the starting point of all our fast mail and passenger servicesacross the Atlantic. 

But all this implies the Union, the existence of a single Governmentinterested in the development of the United Kingdom as a whole. Separategovernments in Great Britain and Ireland would not have the sameinducement to give financial encouragement to such schemes. Irishmanufacturers and British farmers alike might protest against beingtaxed to facilitate the competition of rivals in their own markets. AnIrish Government would have neither sufficient money nor sufficientinterest to give the subsidies necessary to secure a three days' serviceacross the Atlantic. A British Government would naturally develop one ofits existing ports, or some new port on the west coast of Scotland, rather than build up a new source of revenue and national strength in aseparate State. No one could blame it, any more than we could blame theCanadian Government for wishing to subsidise a fast service from Halifaxor some other port in the Dominion rather than one from St. John's, Newfoundland. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the NavigationActs deliberately destroyed Irish shipping. A policy of _laisser faire_in matters of national communication has hitherto prevented its revival. To-day new ideas are in the air. Those ideas can be applied, eitherfrom the standpoint of the Union or from that of separatism. In the onecase Ireland has the prospect of becoming, what her geographicalposition entitles her to be, the eastern bridge-head of the NorthAtlantic. In the other the immense power of the larger capital andlarger subsidies of Great Britain will be as effective as any navigationlaws of the past in leaving her a derelict by the wayside, continuing towait idle and hungry, with empty harbours, while the great streams ofcommerce flow past her to north and south. 

And if the theory of _laisser faire_ is rapidly dying out in matters oftrade and communications, it has already been largely superseded inregard to social questions. The duty of the State to expend money inorder to level up the standard of life of its citizens, or to preventtheir sinking below that standard, is to-day universally recognised. Themethods by which that object is aimed at are various. There is thecrudest form, that of direct money relief, such as is involved in OldAge Pensions. There is the subsidising of socially desirable economicoperations, such as insurance against sickness or the acquisition offreehold by tenants. There is the expenditure of money on various formsof education, in the scientific assistance of industry and agriculture, in promotion of forestry, drainage, or the improvement of localcommunication. There is the enforcement of innumerable regulations tosafeguard the health and safety of the working population. Nowhere hasthis conception of the duty of the State exercised a greater influencethan in Ireland during the last twenty years. The Congested DistrictsBoard, the Department of Agriculture, the Land Purchase Scheme, illustrate one phase of its carrying into effect. Old Age Pensions, cheap labourers' cottages, sickness insurance illustrate another. Allthese have been provided out of the United Kingdom exchequer. They couldnot be provided out of Irish revenues. Still less could Irish revenuesprovide for a continuous extension of this policy in order to keep on alevel with English conditions. 

It has been stated by Mr. Churchill that under the Government scheme ofHome Rule, Land Purchase and Old Age Pensions will be paid by GreatBritain. Even if that were a workable arrangement it only covers a smallpart of the field. For the rest Home Rule would mean the completeabandonment of the attempt to level up the social conditions of GreatBritain and Ireland to a common standard. The Irish Government wouldnever have the means to carry out the same programme of sociallegislation as will be carried out in Great Britain. Handicapped incompetition with British industries it would, moreover, naturally bedisinclined, even apart from the question of cost, to apply anylegislation or any regulations which might tend to raise the cost ofproduction. There will thus not only be an inevitable falling back forwant of means, but, in addition, a continual temptation to the weakerand more backward State to meet superior industrial efficiency by thetemporary cheapness of inferior social conditions. [88]

But such a policy would not only be disastrous in itself in its ultimateeffect upon Irish national life. It would at once provide a fresh andvalid excuse for effective fiscal differentiation against Ireland inGreat Britain. Once again, as in the eighteenth century, Ireland wouldbe penalised for being a poor and "sweated" country. 

So far the discussion of the economic results of separation has beenconfined to Ireland, because Ireland would undoubtedly be the chiefsufferer. Her dependence on the English market, the smallness of herhome market, her backward social condition, would all be insuperableobstacles to a really healthy development on independent lines. GreatBritain, on the other hand, would suffer relatively much less from HomeRule. The immediate shrinkage of trade with Ireland, even with an Irishtariff to overcome, might not be very great. The real loss would be notso much any actual decrease of trade, as the loss judged by thestandard of the possibilities of Irish development under the Union. Theessence of the situation after all is that the United Kingdom is asingle economic area. The exclusion of one part of that area from thepolitical and economic life of the rest, while injurious to the rest, must prove disastrous above all to the part excluded. After centuries ofalternate neglect and repression Ireland has at last been brought to acondition in which she is capable of taking the fullest advantage of anew era of progress and development for the United Kingdom as a whole. And this is the time which is chosen for seriously suggesting that sheshould once again be excluded from all the benefits of partnership inthe United Kingdom and driven out into the wilderness of poverty anddecay. The plea for this folly is an unreal sentiment which is itselfmerely the survival of the mistaken political or economic separatism ofthe past, and which is nothing to the real and justifiable sentiment ofbitterness which would be roused in Ireland if the plea were accepted. 

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 86: This fear itself was the result of separatism. Miss A. E. Murray, in her work on "The Commercial Relations between England andIreland" (p. 51), points out: "It was not so much jealousy of Ireland asjealousy and fear of the English Crown which influenced the Englishlegislature. Experience seemed to show that Irish prosperity wasdangerous to English liberty.... The difficulty was that Ireland was aseparate kingdom, and that the English Parliament had no directauthority over her. It was this absence of direct authority which madeEngland so nervously anxious to restrict Irish resources in all thosedirections in which they might even indirectly interfere with the growthof English power. "]

[Footnote 87: For details, see Miss Murray's "Commercial Relationsbetween England and Ireland. "]

[Footnote 88: It is worth noting that in 1893 the Liberal Governmentrejected amendments moved by Mr. Whiteley to prevent existing laws forthe protection of workers in factories, workshops, and mines, beingrepealed by the proposed Irish Legislature, and by Sir J. Gorst toreserve laws affecting the hours and conditions of labour to the UnitedKingdom Parliament. ]

XVII

PRIVATE BILL LEGISLATION

BY THE RIGHT HON. WALTER LONG, M. P. 

The argument so often and so plausibly presented in favour of Home Rule, which urges that the Imperial Parliament is overburdened with localaffairs, contains an element of truth. It would, however, be more inaccordance with the facts to put the case the other way round: forlocalities are much more seriously inconvenienced in certain respects bythe necessity of referring local business to the Imperial Parliament, than the Imperial Parliament is inconvenienced by the transaction ofsuch business, which, if we are to believe the Chancellor of theExchequer, it neglects (vide _Nash's Magazine_, February, 1912). At thesame time, to affirm that, in order to remedy what is no more than adefect in administration, it is necessary to overturn the BritishConstitution, and to build on its ruins four semi-independentLegislatures and one supreme Parliament, is merely to exemplify thecynical imposture of partisan misrepresentation: what Mr. Balfourdescribed as "the dream of political idiots. "

There is no impartial person who does not clearly recognise that toconstitute a separate Parliament for Ireland (to say nothing of England, Wales, and Scotland) must necessarily result, not in the more efficientdespatch of legislative and administrative business, but in perpetualfriction, clogging the mechanism alike of the subordinate and thepredominate body. Ireland enjoyed--or endured--an independent Parliamentduring eighteen years, from 1782 to 1800; and, in the result, thegreatest statesmen both in Ireland and in England were forced toacknowledge that the system had in practice failed utterly; and thatthere remained no alternative but the Union. To that view of thesituation the great majority of the Irish people, irrespective of raceor creed, were converted within a year before the passing of the Act, anevent which was hailed with rejoicing. The experience of 112 years, fraught as they have been with occasional calamity and burdened withmany blunders, has not produced a single valid objection to theprinciple of the Union, unless the survival among a diminishing sectionof the population of the old, bad tradition of hatred towards England, and its deliberate exploitation by pledge-bound politicians, is to beregarded as a reason for sacrificing the welfare and the prosperity ofboth countries. 

The framers of the Act of Union did not, and indeed could not, providefor every contingency. It is therefore the business of those who aredetermined to maintain the Union, to adjust its machinery to modernrequirements. An omission of capital import was the failure to providefor the efficient promotion of private Bills. The matter was, indeed, actually considered by the authors of the Act of Union. The Duke ofPortland wrote to Lord Cornwallis, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, underdate December 24, 1798, as follows:--

 "One of the greatest difficulties, however, which has been supposed to attend the project of union between the two kingdoms, is that of the expense and trouble which will be occasioned by the attendance of witnesses in trials of contested elections, or in matters of private business requiring Parliamentary interposition. It would, therefore, be very desirable to devise a plan (which does not appear impossible) for empowering the Speaker of either House of the United Parliament to issue his warrant to the Chairman of the Quarter Sessions in Ireland, or to such other person as may be thought more proper for the purpose, requiring him to appoint a time and a place within the County for his being attended by the agents of the respective parties, and reducing to writing in their presence the testimony (for the consents or dissents, as the case may be) of such persons as, by the said agents, may be summoned to attend, being resident within the County (if not there resident a similar proceeding should take place in the County where they reside), and such testimony so taken and reduced into writing may, by such Chairman or by the Sheriff of the County, be certified to the Speaker of either House, as the case may be. It seems difficult to provide a detailed Article of the Union for the various regulations which such a proceeding may require, but the principle might perhaps be stated there, and the provisions left to be settled by the United Parliament. "

According to Lord Ashbourne's "Life of Pitt, " the Prime Minister himselfframed a scheme for constituting a Court of Appeal in Ireland, withpower to examine evidence and certify all preliminaries and othermatters respecting private Bills. Why the provision was not included inthe Act of Union is not clear. The fact of its omission, however, provesthat the necessity of resorting to the Imperial Parliament for thetransaction of private business was not an objection that hindered thepassage of the Act of Union, although to-day the same omission isabsurdly used as an argument in favour of the repeal of that measure. Atthe same time, it is true that the requirements have immensely increasedin proportion as the resources of the country have been developed since1800. The introduction of railways, telegraphs, telephones and electricappliances, together with the grant of compulsory powers tomunicipalities, has involved the promotion of numerous private Bills atvast expense to Ireland. Mr. A. W. Samuels, K. C. , who contributed apaper on the subject to the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society ofIreland in November, 1899, quoted some instances of the cost of privateBill legislation in Ireland:--

 "The ratepayers of Dublin, of Rathmines, of Pembroke, of Clontarf, and other suburbs of the city, long will feel the burden added to their rates by the London litigation of the Session that has passed. The Dublin Boundaries Extension Bill of 1899 has cost the city, as I am informed on reliable authority, between £12, 000 and £13, 000. There were twenty-four separate sets of opponents. The cost to Rathmines of its opposition approaches, I am informed, £8, 000. To meet it about one shilling in the pound must be added to the taxation of that township. The costs of Pembroke cannot be far short of the same sum. If we add those of the oppositions of Kilmainham, Drumcondra, Clontarf, and of the County of Dublin, and of private persons and public bodies, the total expense to the inhabitants and ratepayers of the city and its suburbs will not fall short of £45, 000. 

 "Mr. Pope, Q. C. , stated before the Committee which considered the Irish Railways Amalgamation Scheme of last Session, that the Bill at hearing was costing £5 per minute. A high authority conversant with the proceedings in this case has informed me that this was an under-estimate rather than an over-estimate, having regard to the fact that there were twenty-seven separate oppositions. The Bill occupied twenty-seven working days of four hours each, and its cost to the shareholders of the promoting Company were calculated to amount to about £400 per day. What the loss was to the shareholders of other Companies, and to the ratepayers represented by public bodies, it would be impossible to say. The Bill probably cost at least £50, 000. There was a Belfast Corporation Bill. There was an Armagh and Keady Railway Bill. There were several other Irish Bills before the Houses, exhausting thousands more of Irish capital, and diverting it from the material development of the country. So abnormal was the waste of Irish money on the Railway Bill that it excited general attention even in England, and became the subject of comment in Parliament. Mr. J. H. Lewis, the member for Flint Burghs, speaking on the 24th July, 1899, on the third reading of the Scotch Private Legislation Procedure Bill, said, 'I am sure everybody must have regarded with great dissatisfaction the enormous expenditure to which certain Irish Railway Companies were put during the last few weeks within the walls of the House. Surely a better system can be devised than that which drags over from different parts of the United Kingdom a host of witnesses, who could be examined on the spot. I am sure all honourable members deeply regret this great waste of public money. '"

These disabilities have been the subject of frequent representations. Resolutions advocating reform have been repeatedly passed by the IrishChambers of Commerce, by the Incorporated Law Society, and by localbodies. Leaders of the Unionist party have constantly urged thenecessity of a provision for expediting and cheapening Private Billprocedure. In 1896 a deputation from the Dublin Chamber of Commercelaid the matter before Mr. Gerald Balfour, who was then Chief Secretaryfor Ireland. He expressed a hope that the Government would introduce areform. In the Queen's speech of February, 1897, it was announced thatBills for amending the procedure with respect to Private Bills comingfrom Scotland and Ireland had been prepared. The opportunity for layingthese measures before Parliament did not arise. 

But in 1899 a Bill amending the procedure of Scottish Private BillLegislation was passed into law. The measure forms the precedent forfuture legislation. In the year 1900, Mr. Atkinson (now Lord Atkinson), speaking for the Government, said that the Government were--

 "most favourable to the introduction and passing of a Bill dealing with private Bill legislation for Ireland. He thought the real and substantial difficulty was the creation of the tribunal which was to sit locally and to inquire into these matters. The Irish Government thought it wise to wait until they should see what would be the effect of the operation of the Scotch Act. "

Subsequent experience has proved that the Private Legislation Procedure(Scotland) Act of 1899 may well be taken for the model of a similarmeasure designed to apply to Ireland. The Scottish Act substituted forprocedure by means of a Private Bill, procedure in the first instance bymeans of a Provisional Order. Instead of applying to Parliament by apetition for leave to bring in a Private Bill, any public authority orpersons desirous of obtaining parliamentary powers now proceed bypresenting a petition to the Secretary for Scotland, "praying him to issue a Provisional Order in accordance with the terms of a draft Order submitted to him, or with such modifications as shall be necessary. "

Before the Secretary for Scotland proceeds with the Provisional Order, the draft Order is considered by the Chairman of Committee of the Houseof Lords, and the Chairman of Ways and Means in the House of Commons;and they report to the Secretary for Scotland whether or not thematters proposed to be dealt with by the draft Order, or any of them, should be dealt with by Provisional Order or by Private Bill. Should theChairmen report that these matters, or any of them, should be dealt withby a Private Bill, the Secretary for Scotland, without further inquiry, refuses to issue the Provisional Order so far as it is objected to bythe Chairmen; but the advertisements and notices already given by thepromoters of the scheme are regarded as fulfilling (subject to StandingOrders) the necessary conditions to be observed prior to theintroduction of a Private Bill. Should the Chairmen report that theProvisional Order, or a part of it, may proceed, the procedure is asfollows. If there is no opposition, the Secretary for Scotland may atonce issue the Provisional Order, which is then embodied in aConfirmation Bill for the assent of Parliament. If there is opposition, or in any case where he thinks inquiry necessary, the Secretary forScotland directs an inquiry, and the Order is then considered by thetribunal described below; and if passed by that tribunal, with orwithout modifications, it is brought up in a Confirmation Bill for theassent of Parliament. 

It follows that in the case of unopposed schemes brought in under theAct, there is a great saving of time and expense as compared with theformer system. 

With regard to schemes which are opposed, the judicial functions of aParliamentary Committee dealing with Private Bills were transferred bythe Act of 1899 to a special tribunal, composed of two Panels, aParliamentary Panel and an Extra-Parliamentary Panel, whose membersshall have no local or personal interest in the questions at issue. Fromthese is formed a Commission of four members. 

Mr. A. W. Samuels, K. C. , thus describes the constitution of theCommission:--

 "In the first instance it is provided that the members shall be taken--two from the Lords and two from the Commons. In the event of that being found impossible, three may be taken from one House and one from the other. In the next resort all may be from the same House. Finally--if members cannot be procured to serve--the extra Parliamentary Panel can be called upon, and the Commission manned from it. 

 "The next great reform introduced by the measure is, that the inquiry is to be held at such place, in Scotland, as may be convenient. The inquiry is to be localised as far as possible. It is to be held in public. The Commissioners are to settle questions of _locus standi_--they can decide upon the preamble before discussing clauses--and persons having a _locus standi_ can appear before them in person or by counsel or agent. 

 "When they have heard the evidence the Commissioners are to report to the Secretary of Scotland, and they can recommend that the Provisional Order should be issued as prayed for, or with such modifications as they may make. If there is no opposition to the Provisional Order as finally settled by the Commissioners, it is embodied in a Confirmation Bill by the Secretary of Scotland and passed through Parliament. 

 "If there is opposition a petition must be presented to Parliament against the Order, and then, on the second reading of the Confirmation Bill, a member can move that the Bill be referred to a Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament, and if the motion is carried in the House a Joint Committee of Lords and Commons shall sit, at the peril of costs to the opponents, to hear and take evidence and decide upon the measure in the same way as in the case of a Private Bill. " (Private Bill Procedure, pp. 9 and 10. )

In 1904, the Select Committee appointed to consider the provisions of asimilar measure to be applied to Wales, reported that in practice theScottish Act had proved a success, which they attributed largely to thesupervision of the Provisional Orders conducted by the Scottish Office. 

There would seem, then, every reason to believe that a measure framedupon the lines of the Scottish Act, to apply to Ireland, would beequally successful. 

The remarkable increase in the prosperity of Ireland, which has occurredduring the last twenty years, demonstrates the necessity for providingevery means of encouraging the further development of the country. 

All the available statistics amply confirm and corroborate the evidenceof this prosperity, which is known to every man with the smallest directacquaintance of Ireland in recent years. The figures of savings, bankdeposits, external trade, all alike show the exceptional advances inprosperity now enjoyed by Ireland. 

The progress of Ireland under the Union thus indicated, was inauguratedby Mr. Balfour, the best Chief Secretary Ireland ever had; to this dayhis name is always mentioned with respect and gratitude by the people ofIreland, especially by the residents in the South and West, where hispolicy produced splendid and lasting results. Insufficient credit hasbeen given to the work of agricultural and commercial developmentsteadily pursued by Mr. Gerald Balfour; the results upon which werejoice to-day are mainly due to the policy adopted by Mr. Balfour andhis brother. This policy, coupled with the restitution of sales underthe Land Act of 1903, is the one which Unionists intend resolutely topursue. 

The figures on the next page show that the increase of population insome important centres in the south and west is very small, and that inother centres there is a decrease. Ireland being mainly an agriculturalcountry, the population tends to decrease owing to emigration, althoughof late years, owing to the rise in prosperity, the tendency is ratherto remain stationary. At the same time, the increase of the populationin the provincial towns is not commensurate with the increase ofmaterial wealth in the country. 

With regard, for instance, to the increase in the number of touristsvisiting Ireland, both private persons and local bodies desire to extendexisting inducements and to improve the means of transit and to raisethe standard of accommodation. It is clear that, under a reformed methodof procedure in respect of Private Bill Legislation, enterprise would befreed from the restrictions which at present hinder its free exercise, and a substantial and a steadily increasing benefit would accrue toIreland. 

INCREASE AND DECREASE OF POPULATION OF CITIES AND TOWNSIN IRELAND HAVING IN 1901 A POPULATION EXCEEDING 10, 000. 

(_Census of Ireland_ 1911. )

Cities, towns, etc. Percentage of increase since 1901. 

Rathmines and Rathgar 17·1Portadown 16·2Pembroke 13·4Belfast 10·4Belfast[A] 10·1Dublin 6·4Lisburn 6·2Ballymena 4·5Lurgan 3·0Sligo 2·7Dublin[A] 2·6Wexford 2·6Waterford 2·5Cork[A] 2·3Londonderry[A] 2·3Limerick[A] 1·2Clonmel 1·1Cork 0·7Limerick 0·7Dundalk 0·4Newry[A] 5·2Newry 3·6Drogheda 2·6Galway[A] 2·0Galway 1·3Kilkenny[A] 1·0Kingstown 0·9Kilkenny 0·9Waterford[A] 0·4

Those marked [A] are Parliamentary Boroughs. 

XVIII

IRISH POOR LAW REFORM

By JOHN E. HEALY (Editor of the _Irish Times_)

An article on Irish Poor Law Reform written within the limits assignedto me can only be constructive in the broadest sense. It is a seriousand tangled problem: the existing system has developed in a haphazardfashion; there is about it hardly anything that is logical, much that isanomalous, some things that are tragic. The present conditions of theIrish Poor Law system are set forth in the reports of various Royal andViceregal Commissions. The most important are those of the ViceregalCommission on Poor Law Reform in Ireland (1906), the DepartmentalCommission on Vagrancy, the Royal Commission on the Care and Control ofthe Feeble-minded, and the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws (MajorityReport). The study of all these reports is a rather distractingbusiness. They establish between them an urgent need for reform; on themethods, and even principles, of reform there are wide differences ofopinion. I propose to set out here, so far as may be possible, a summaryof those reforms on which the various reports and Irish public opinionare nearly, or quite, unanimous. Such a summary may at least help toacquaint the rank and file of the Unionist Party with the primaryconditions and necessities of a work which, for historical, moral, social and political reasons, must receive the Party's early andpractical attention when it returns to power. 

The Unionist Party, as representing the best elements in BritishGovernment, owes in this matter a great act of reparation to Ireland. The present Poor Law system is based on the most fatal of allblunders--the deliberate disregard of educated opinion in Ireland. Thestory, a very remarkable and suggestive one, is told in the ViceregalCommission's report. The Royal Commission of 1836 came to the conclusionthat the English workhouse system would be unsuitable for Ireland. TheIrish Royal Commissioners, including the famous Archbishop Whately, madetwo sets of recommendations. One set involved a compulsory provision forthe sick, aged, lunatic and infirm. The other proposed to attack povertyat the root by instituting a large series of measures for the generaldevelopment of Ireland. Looking back over nearly eighty years of Irishhistory, we must be both humbled and astonished by the almost inspiredprecision and statesmanship of these proposals. They includedreclamation of waste land and the enforcement of drainage; an increasedgrant to the Board of Works; healthy houses for the labouring classes;local instruction in agriculture; the enlargement of leasing powers withthe object of encouraging land improvement, and the transfer of thefiscal powers of Grand Juries to County Boards. Here we have in embryothe Irish Labourers Acts from 1860 to 1906, the Department ofAgriculture and Technical Instruction, the Irish Land Acts from 1860 to1903, the Local Government Act of 1898--reforms which Ireland owesalmost entirely to the statesmanship (though it seems a rather belatedstatesmanship) of Unionist Governments. These Irish recommendations wereignored by the Government of the day. It sent an English Poor LawCommissioner (Mr. Nicholls) to Ireland. He spent six weeks in thecountry. On his return he recommended the establishment of the EnglishPoor Law system there, and it was accordingly established. 

The first Poor Law Act for Ireland was passed on July 31, 1838. Betweenthat year and 1851 one hundred and sixty-three Poor Law Unions werecreated. The number is at present one hundred and fifty-nine, and theyare administered by elected and co-opted Poor Law Guardians to thenumber of more than eight thousand. In every Union there is a workhouse, and in that workhouse all the various classes of destitute and poorpersons are maintained. They include sick, aged and infirm, legitimateand illegitimate children, insane of all classes, sane epileptics, mothers of illegitimate children, able-bodied male paupers, and theimportunate army of tramps. The mean number of such inmates in all theworkhouses on any day is about 40, 000, of whom about one-third are sick, one-third aged and infirm, one-seventh children, one-twentieth mothersof illegitimate children, and one-twelfth insane and epileptic. Thisawful confusion of infirmity and vice, this Purgatory perpetuatingitself to the exclusion of all hope of Paradise, presents the vitalproblem of Irish Poor Law Reform. 

A radical solution must be found for it. On that point the reports ofall the Commissions are unanimous. They differ, where they do differ, only as regards means to the end. 

The supreme reform which must be undertaken by any Government that seeksto remove this great blot on Irish administration is the abolition ofthe present workhouse system on some basis which, while effective, willmake no addition to the rates. The two chief reports (those of theViceregal Commission and the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws) are inagreement, not merely as to this necessity, but as to the guidingprinciples of reform. They recommend classification, by institutions, ofall the present inmates of the workhouses--the sick in hospitals, theaged and infirm in almshouses, the mentally defective in asylums. Appalling evidence was given before the Viceregal Commission and theRoyal Commission on the Care and Control of the Feeble-minded withregard to the present association of lunatics, epileptics, and imbecileswith sane women and children in the workhouse wards. The latterCommission recommended the creation of a strong central authority forthe general protection and supervision of mentally defective persons. 

The reforms do not contemplate the amalgamation of Unions and thecomplete closing of only a certain number of workhouses. They suggestrather the bringing together into one institution of all the inmates ofone class from a number of neighbouring workhouses, and the closing ofall workhouses as such. The sick should be sent to existing Poor Law orCounty Hospitals, strengthened by the addition of Cottage Hospitals incertain districts. Children should be boarded out. The bulk of theremaining inmates, classified with regard to their defects andinfirmities, should be segregated according to counties or othersuitable areas. On the treatment of able-bodied paupers there aredifferent opinions. It is suggested by the Philanthropic ReformAssociation, which includes some of the most earnest and disinterestedphilanthropists in Ireland, that the well-conducted of this class shouldbe placed in labour colonies, and the ill-conducted in detentioncolonies--both classes of institutions to be maintained and controlledby the State, and not by the County authorities. 

The areas and resources of the existing Unions are in most cases toolimited, and the numbers of necessitous persons too small, to warrantthe present Boards of Guardians in erecting as many types ofinstitutions as there are classes of inmates. The break-up of theworkhouse system involves, of necessity, the establishment of largerareas of administration. It is clear that the County must be substitutedfor the Union in any radical scheme of reform. On this point the RoyalCommissioners and the Viceregal Commissioners are agreed. County ratingmust take the place of Union rating, since the inmates of the differentinstitutions would be drawn from all parts of each County or CountyBorough. Substantial economies in administration might be expected fromthis plan. Hospitals should be brought into a County Hospital System, with the County Infirmary as the central institution, and nurses shouldbe trained there for the County District Hospitals (now WorkhouseInfirmaries). 

About such a general scheme of decentralised reform there is little orno disagreement. There is, however, a good deal of disagreementconcerning the control of the new institutions. The Viceregal Commissionadvocates the retention by the Poor Law Guardians of many of theirexisting functions. It suggests, for instance, that County Hospitalsshould be managed by a Committee consisting of all members of thepresent District Hospital Committees, strengthened by nine membersappointed by the County Council; and that the Chairman of the Board ofGuardians should be the Chairman of the District Hospital Committee. TheRoyal Commission, on the other hand, votes boldly for the abolition ofthe Boards of Guardians. It argues that, if we are to have a Countysystem of institutions maintained by a County rate, we must adopt thelogical consequence that the County Council which strikes and collectsthe rate should have the direct or indirect management of theinstitutions. It proposes that the Council should appoint a statutoryCommittee (one-half to be taken from outside its own members), to becalled the Public Assistance Authority, and that this Authority shouldmanage and control all the institutions in the County. The PhilanthropicReform Association, which has given much study to this question, suggests a _via media_ between the two official schemes. It recommendsthat all the institutions should be controlled by the County Council, through Committees directly responsible to it, to which persons ofexperience from outside should be added. Such committees need not beelected by the Poor Law Guardians, as recommended by the ViceregalCommission, or by the Statutory Committee of the County Council, asrecommended by the Royal Commission. The Association desires, and it hasa large volume of Irish opinion behind it in this, to minimise theexisting powers, and reduce the numbers, of the Poor Law Guardians. Itis also very earnestly impressed with the need of bringing women intothe Poor Law administration. In this it is absolutely right. The Women'sNational Health Association and the United Irishwomen have demonstratedtriumphantly the value of women's services in improving the social, economic, and sanitary conditions of rural life in Ireland. A recent Actof Parliament qualifies women for election to the Irish County andBorough Councils. No great reform of the Poor Law system can beeffective without their aid. The Unionist Party will only be actingconsistently with its social ideals if it encourages, by every meanswithin its power, an Irish feminist movement, full of hope for thecountry and wholly dissociated from party politics. 

Any thorough reform of the Irish Poor Law system will demand anincreased expenditure of Imperial funds. The growing severity of Irishtaxation under recent Radical budgets forbids the possibility ofaddition to the ratepayer's burdens. The anomalous distribution of thegrants in aid of Irish local taxation has done much to complicate thePoor Law question. The Royal Commission reported that "no accountwhatever is taken of the burden of pauperism, the magnitude of the localrates, or the circumstances of the ratepayers and their ability to payrates in the different areas. " Under this system the minimum of reliefis extended to the districts in which the weight of taxation is mostoppressive. The Commission proposed a scheme by which the old Uniongrants within each county would be pooled and credited to the commonfund in aid of the poor rate in that county. The Viceregal Commissionalso complained of inequality of expenditure, and advised areapportionment of the grants in aid of local taxation, on the basis ofthe recommendations of the minority of the Royal Commission on LocalTaxation (1902). That Commission was unanimous in recommending increasedgrants for Poor Law service in Ireland. The distribution of such newgrants would be a matter for discussion; of the necessity for them thereis no doubt. The Unionist Party must not rest content with reforming theIrish Poor Law system; it must help the reformed system to pay its ownway. No fair-minded Englishman who reads Sir George O'Farrell's evidenceas to the distribution of the Irish Church surplus (Report of the RoyalCommission on the Care and Control of the Feeble-minded, page 468) willdispute his country's obligations in this matter. The cost of Irish PoorLaw Reform is one of the strongest arguments against Home Rule. TheUnionist Party's full and generous recognition of its duty to Ireland inthis respect will establish a new argument for the Union. 

One vital factor in Poor Law Reform remains to be considered--the PoorLaw Medical service. The 740 Dispensary districts of Ireland are nowadministered by a little more than 800 Medical Officers. The salaries ofthese doctors, amounting in all to nearly £100, 000 per annum, are paidas to one half by the Poor Law Guardians, and as to the other half outof the Local Taxation (Ireland) account. Most of the doctors, inaddition to their public duties as servants of the poor, engage inprivate practice, of which, in most of the rural areas, their officialposition gives them a monopoly. A large--perhaps, a surprisinglylarge--number of the Dispensary doctors are earnest and self-sacrificingmen; but the system is corrupted by one radical defect. Owing to thesecurity of private practice involved, there is a fierceness ofcompetition for these appointments out of all proportion to theirfinancial value. The elections are made by the Guardians, and it is afact so notorious as even to be acknowledged by Mr. Birrell thatflagrant canvassing and bribery are a common feature of these elections. Candidates have been known to distribute sums of £400 or £500 toGuardians, in order to secure appointments of £150 or £160 a year. Another serious and extending feature of the present system is theboycotting by the Guardians of all candidates who have not graduated atthe new Roman Catholic University. The most highly qualified men fromthe University of Dublin have now practically abandoned competition forthese Dispensary offices outside the Protestant counties of Ulster. Moreover, throughout the whole country local candidates are consistentlypreferred to superior men from outside. Both the Viceregal and RoyalCommissions recognise the necessity of radical reform in this system, but they suggest different remedies. The Royal Commission proposes thatthe election and control of all the Dispensary Medical Officers of aCounty shall be vested in the Public Assistance Authority for thatCounty; and that little or no change be made in the present financialbasis of the payment of salaries. The Viceregal Commission suggests abolder and more drastic remedy. It advocates the establishment of aState Medical service on the lines of the existing services in Egypt andIndia. This would require the payment by the State of the whole, insteadof half, of the salaries of Medical Officers. The Commission regards itas proper and equitable that such a service should be, in the beginning, at any rate, restricted to candidates educated in Ireland. Arepresentative Medical Council should elect the candidates bycompetitive examination, and deal with all important questions ofpromotion, removal and superannuation. The Commission maintains that thecreation of a State Medical service in Ireland would mean a very smallincrease in the Parliamentary grant in comparison with the benefitsinvolved. This I believe to be the ideal system, but one must recognisethat its accomplishment is confronted with many difficulties. The IrishLocal Authorities would not willingly relinquish a privilege which is aprimary element in their influence and prestige. Irish medical opinionis acutely divided on the question, which is now further complicated bythe prospect that the medical benefits under the National Insurance Actmay soon be extended to Ireland. It would be outrageous to expect theDispensary Officers to add the heavy medical duties under the Act totheir present responsibilities without adequate payment. Indeed, theextension of the medical benefits to Ireland would make inevitable anearly reform of the whole Poor Law system. This is one reason why theUnionist Party, when it returns to office, should be ready to tackle thesubject without delay. To no department of the work will it be asked toapply greater sympathy, knowledge, tact and firmness, than to theproblems of the Poor Law Medical service. 

During the last three years the Irish Unionist Party has made three vainattempts to bring the reform of the Irish Poor Law before Parliament. Its Bill, which now stands in the name of Sir John Lonsdale, asks forthe appointment (as recommended by the Viceregal Commission) of a bodyof five persons with executive powers to carry out the recommendationsmade by that Commission. These temporary Commissioners would haveauthority to draft all necessary schemes, to consolidate or divideexisting institutions, and generally to reform the whole administrationof the Irish Poor Law service. The Bill assigns to them an executivelifetime of five years--hardly, perhaps, an adequate time for theestablishment of reforms which, in their making, must affect nearlyevery aspect of Irish life, and, in their operation, may reconstitutethe basis of Irish society. It is to be supposed that, when the wholeUnionist Party addresses itself seriously to the question, it will givefurther and careful attention to the principles of reform before settingup this, or some other, executive machinery. I can think of no morethirsty or fruitful field in Ireland for the exercise of the highestconstructive statesmanship that the Party may possess. The need isurgent, the time is ripe, all the circumstances are favourable. The OldAge Pensions Act and the Insurance Act, if not vitiated by furtherincreases in Irish taxation, will greatly simplify the task of Poor LawReform. The former Act has reduced the number of old inmates in theworkhouses; the Insurance Act should lead to a reduction in expenditureon outdoor relief. Moreover, it may be hoped that the infirm and pauperclasses will be henceforward, like the old age pensioners, a diminishingfraction of the population of Ireland. They are, to a large extent, flotsam and jetsam over the sea of Ireland's political troubles. Landagitation, with its attendant vices of restlessness and idleness, theemigration of wage-earners, the discouragement of industry underGovernments indifferent to the administration of law and the developmentof national resources, have all contributed to the Dantean horrors ofthe Irish workhouse system. These poor people are an excrescence on thebody of Ireland which good government, if it does not wholly remove, mayreduce nearly to vanishing point. Hitherto the chief rewards andblessings of British administration in Ireland have gone to the hardvoters and to the strong agitators. It is time for the Unionist Party tothink of the hapless, the helpless, the voteless, and, thereforevoiceless, elements in Irish life. Ireland, as she becomes bettereducated, gives more thought and truer thought than formerly to hersocial and economic problems. Her gratitude and loyalty will go inabundant measure to those who take counsel with her about these problemsand help her to solve them. The Government which cleans up many sadrelics of the past by a complete reform of the Irish Poor Law systemwill put all Irishmen and Irishwomen under a deep sense of obligation toit. Policy, not less than duty, should give this reform a place in theforefront of the Unionist Party's constructive programme for Ireland. 

XIX

IRISH EDUCATION UNDER THE UNION[89]

BY GODFREY LOCKER LAMPSON, M. P. 

Education is probably the most sorrowfully dull of all dull subjects. Itis difficult to repress a yawn when the word is mentioned. Yet we oweeverything to it that we value most. Through it we become emancipatedcitizens of the world. Through it we are able to appreciate what isbeautiful and what is ugly, what is right and what is wrong, what ispermanent and what is merely transitory. If the people of a country canmake it their boast that they are truly educated, they need boast oflittle else, for all the rest will have been added unto them. 

It will be found next to impossible to draw any argument for Home Rulefrom the history of Irish Education during the last decade. Indeed, if aNationalist Parliament were now to be established in College Green, itis more than probable that the progress made by educational reformerssince 1900 would be largely thrown away, and the prospects of stillfurther improvement endangered and perhaps destroyed. 

What has been done in the domain of Irish Education, and what stillremains to be done? Leaving out of account the problem of theUniversities, which, so far as can be seen, has at any rate beentemporarily solved--and solved, let it be marked, under the LegislativeUnion, with the participation and consent of the Nationalistparty--there are two broad branches of the educational tree which everyyear are growing in volume and putting forth finer leaves and fruit. Primary and Secondary Education, by far the most important parts of theIrish Educational system, if only allowed to continue their development, tended with care by those who have the interests of the youngergeneration at heart and left unmolested by the poisonous creepers ofpolitical prejudice, will be found to do more for the increase of Irishprosperity and the establishment of national and religious concord thanany device for legislative separation that the wit of man can frame. Notthat educational reform is not sorely needed. Far from it. There are fewaspects of Irish life where reform is more urgently required. But let itbe reform, as far as possible, along existing lines of progress, and infull recognition of religious susceptibilities and of certain stubbornfacts which may be deplored, but which it would be unwise to ignore. Letit be reform undertaken and pursued on the advice of those whounderstand this question and are in sympathy with its peculiardifficulties, and let not the Treasury turn a deaf ear to the demands ofreason, when a few extra thousand pounds might make all the differencebetween failure and success. Above all, let it be reform unembittered bythe strife of creeds warring for supremacy in an Irish House of Commons. Let it reap the advantages of a continuous policy undisturbed by therise and fall of local Ministries and the lobbying and log-rolling ofsects and factions. Treat it, as it is being treated to-day, in a calmspirit of inquiry and recommendation, and the richest blessing of theLegislative Union will be an Ireland at peace within herself, honouredfor her learning, distinguished by her refinement, and intellectuallythe equal of any nation upon earth. 

PRIMARY EDUCATION. [90]

The National Board which presides over Primary Education has shownitself, under the Union, singularly free from prejudice, eitherpolitical or religious. During the last few years it may be said to havechanged the face of the National schools in Ireland, and in a largepart of the country has contributed to make primary education what itought to be--not a mere glut of random scraps of knowledge, not a mereconglomerate of facts, dates, and figures, undigested and unassimilated, of no practical use to the pupil in his later life, and stifling anyconstructive powers of thought with which he might have been born, but asystem of self-development and self-expression, with the future of thepupil as a citizen in view, rather than his mere monetary value in theshape of school fees. This in itself is a remarkable stride in advance, which the Separatist will find difficult to explain away. Who will be sobold as to calculate the harm which was inflicted by the arid andartificial system of "cram, " introduced in 1871, but now fortunatelyabandoned in the National Schools, which had only one object inview--the money grant that was made proportionate to the output ofheterogeneous lumber that could be retained by the pupil until calledfor by the examiner? Surely, the great aim of education should beself-culture, the development of the mind, body, and character of thepupil, consideration being had to the career he is likely to pursue inthe future. This the National Board has realised in time, and it isowing to its efforts and the co-operation of men and women of all shadesof opinion who labour in the schools that such signal improvement hastaken place during the last few years. 

Apart from this larger question, there are various other features of theNational Schools that ought not to be excluded from this brief review. Some of them are evidence of progress made, others of grievances whichstill require redress. No one will deny that, taking Ireland as a whole, the structural character of the school buildings has been greatlyimproved in recent years, and that the cleanliness of school premises, which still leaves a good deal to be desired, is attended to with farmore care than it used to be. In days gone by, the Board could grantonly two-thirds of the estimated cost of a new building of the cheapestand shabbiest description. The result was that, for a whole generation, a low standard of school-house was stereotyped, and the requirement of alocal contribution entirely prevented the erection of new school-housesin poor districts where they were most needed. The new plans, on theother hand, are designed according to the most modern ideas, and as alocal contribution is not insisted upon in impecunious districts, wherevaluation is low, the Board can grant the whole of the cost wherenecessary. It is easy to appreciate what a difference this importantreform must make, not merely to the landscape or to the comfort andhealth of the children, but to the general efficiency of pupils andteachers alike. There is, however, still much room for improvement. Thegrants hitherto given have been sadly inadequate, and in order toprovide suitable school buildings, even in those cases alone where thepresent structures are actually a danger to the health of the children, it would be necessary to make grants at the rate of about £100, 000 ayear for the next 4 or 5 years, after which they might be reduced to£50, 000. 

Another satisfactory development is the increase of teachers' salarieswhich has taken place during the last two decades. In 1895, the averageincome from State sources of principal teachers in primary schools was£94 in respect of men, and £79 in respect of women. By 1910, it hadrisen to £112 and £90 respectively. Notwithstanding this, theirfinancial position, especially in large and important schools in centreswhere the cost of living is high, is not yet as good as it ought to be, if it be compared with that of similarly situated teachers in Englandand Scotland. As for the incomes of assistant teachers, they also haverisen in the same period from £61 for men, and £49 for women, to £81 and£68 respectively, and the money, though still insufficient, is now beingpaid for a better article. Readjustment of numbers in the higher gradesof national teachers is also required, so as to enable all efficientteachers who have complied with the conditions of service to receive theincreases of salary to which they are entitled. The cost of such areadjustment would be about £1, 000 a year for the present, but theexpense would gradually increase, and might ultimately amount to £18, 000per annum. For the convenience of the profession, it is also desirablethat salaries should be paid monthly, instead of quarterly, to theteaching staffs of the schools. The expenditure (non-recurring) requiredunder this head would be about £280, 000, with an additional yearly sumof £5, 000, due to increased cost of administration. That a DublinParliament would welcome or even less be able to satisfy these variousdemands upon its purse without further taxation is extremely improbable, especially in view of Mr. Birrell's warning that the finances of HomeRule would be a very "tight fit. "

Since 1900, a period of training has been required from the principals, and this rule has recently been extended to assistant masters. In fact, the qualifications demanded of national teachers in Ireland are muchhigher than in England. When all the foregoing changes are considered, it will be quite evident that not only must the teachers benefit fromthem, but that the children cannot fail to benefit as well. Indeed, itis these various reforms which, in all probability, have conduced to abetter school attendance than could be boasted of in the past. Many aneducational reformer has had cause to wring his hands over themeagreness of attendance in days gone by. Even to-day it is not as itshould be. It is lower than in England and in Scotland, but it hassteadily risen, and continues to rise, and stands now at about 71 percent. , an advance of between 30 or 40 per cent. Upon what it was lessthan 40 years ago; a fact which is certainly remarkable, when thepoverty of the population and its scattered character are taken intoaccount. 

Another evil which the Board has had to fight has been the mushroom-likemultiplication of small schools. It is hardly necessary to emphasisewhat must be a manifest disadvantage for any authority which is tryingto raise the standard of educational efficiency in a country. Thismultiplication was largely due to the fact that Protestant Schools wereaccustomed to receive grants when they could maintain an averageattendance of 20 pupils, quite irrespective of how many other schools ofthe same or a similar denomination there might be in the immediatevicinity, and whether they were really wanted or not. How far thesegrants were conducive to unnecessary multiplication may be gauged fromthe fact that, whilst there were 6, 500 schools in operation in 1871, when the population of Ireland was five and a half millions, there were8, 692 in 1901, or 2, 000 more, when the population was a million less. This vast and unprofitable growth in the numbers of educationalestablishments could be stayed only by drastic regulation. Whereneighbouring mixed Catholic or Protestant schools cannot show an averageattendance of 25, they are now obliged to amalgamate, and the sameresult has to follow if neighbouring boys' and girls' schools fall belowan average attendance of 30. These regulations have had the desiredeffect, and no less than 300 superfluous schools have been absorbed inthis manner during the last five years. 

Before leaving the details of the National Schools, some mention shouldbe made of the conspicuous improvement in the curriculum which has takenplace in the first decade of the new century. Formerly, it washidebound, bloodless, unintelligent, and useless. Now, it does what itcan to cater for the practical side of the pupil's future life, and isdesigned with the object of helping him to think out problems forhimself and of equipping him with any knowledge of the historic pastwhich may serve him, not as a collection of antiquities, but as exampleand precept. During the last twelve years an astonishing advance hasbeen made. In 1899, Hand and Eye training (including Kindergarten) wastaught in 448 schools, in 1910 it was taught in 6, 010. In 1899, Elementary Science was taught in 14 schools only, in 1910 it was taughtin 2, 400. In the former year Cookery was taught in 925 schools, in thelatter year in 2, 665. In 1899, Laundry Work was taught in 11 schools, in1910 in 691. If this is not progression--and progression under theLegislative Union--to what can the predicate be more truthfully applied?Statistics are apt to be barren and uninforming and can be adapted, withalmost equal plausibility, to support the arguments of either side; butthese figures are eloquent and speak for themselves. They embody a largeand vital portion of the history of Irish Primary Education, and are aproof of the interest which is being taken in it and of the activity ofthe architects behind the scenes. Long may this spirit of progressflourish and enlighten the generations that are yet to come!

It is only fair to say that, amid a good deal of discouragement and notalways intelligent criticism, the National Board has proved itselfbroad-minded and open to argument wherever the interests of IrishEducation have been concerned. Although nominated by the LordLieutenant, and therefore not an elected body, it has never laggedbehind public opinion. In the teaching of the Irish language, forexample, it has shown itself peculiarly sympathetic. In fact, theexperience of the Board has been, that the Irish parents are not quiteso anxious that their children should be taught Irish as the GaelicLeague would have us suppose. Indeed, the difficulty of the Board hasbeen to maintain sufficient interest in the subject. Nevertheless, ithas done its best. In 1899, teaching in Irish was provided in 105schools for 1, 825 children. In 1911, it was provided for 180, 000children in 3, 066 schools, and during the same time bilingualinstruction has been introduced into some 200 schools. 

In spite of what has been, and is being done, further reforms in primaryeducation are still unquestionably required, and can, moreover, beeasily effected without any of the convulsions of a constitutionalrevolution. The salaries of principals and assistants, especially inlarge and important schools, ought to be increased. In particular, thePensions Act needs modification, for, under the present Act, teacherswho retire before reaching the age qualifying for a pension receivegratuities considerably less than the Old Age Pensions. Even those whoqualify for pensions are very shabbily treated if they retire beforesixty years of age. Building grants also should be increased, so thatthe constant applications for the rebuilding of bad premises could bemet. [91] The teaching of infants, greatly improved by the institution ofjunior assistant mistresses by Mr. Walter Long during his ChiefSecretaryship, can be still further improved and brought up to theEnglish standard; and the efficiency of primary education generally canbe promoted in the direction of sympathetic appreciation of the realneeds of the children, regarded from the point of view of thinking humanbeings, and not merely as recording machines. 

The following desirable improvements may also be mentioned:--

 (_a_) Encouragement of the teaching of gardening in connection with country schools for boys, at a cost of about £2000 a year. 

 (_b_) Provision for instruction in wood-work for pupils of urban districts, at central classes in technical schools, at a cost of about £4000 a year. 

 (_c_) The provision of medical inspection and the treatment of school children, which would cost about £30, 000 a year, and dental inspection and clinics, which would cost another £50, 000. This expense should be defrayed largely out of the local rates, one third, say £25, 000, to come out of the estimates. There would also be the cost of supervision, etc. , by the Education Department, amounting to about £5000 a year. Committees, as for school attendance, composed partly of representatives of school managers and partly of local authorities, could be formed for administration. 

 (_d_) A considerable impetus might be given to Evening Continuation Schools, on which about £10, 000 a year is at present spent. A beginning could be made of compulsory attendance, and the amount of the grant doubled. 

Much might be done in all these directions. Much has been accomplishedalready. The worst that can happen is that a separate legislature shouldbe set up in Dublin, devoid of the requisite means, as it would mostcertainly be (unless, indeed, it had recourse to the rates, or thetaxpayer) of financing Irish Education; swayed from side to side by theexigencies of the party programme of the moment; and temperamentallyunable to look at the educational problem from the standpoint alone ofthe needs of the country in the way that it is now regarded. At present, under the Union, Irish Education is fortunately liberated from allappeals to party passion, and organised with but one end in view, theupbringing of the infant race whose possession is the future. 

SECONDARY EDUCATION. 

The need for reform is more urgent and, in many respects, better definedin the system of Secondary than in that of Primary Education in Ireland. But the two ought to be closely interconnected, and in discussing one atleast of the more important changes which it is desirable to introduce, the National Schools have as good a claim to be heard in the matter astheir elder brethren. 

Since 1900 great efforts have been made by the Intermediate Board topromote the interests of Secondary Schools and to supply the educationalneeds of those who want to equip themselves for the struggle of life inits various departments. In 1900, the Board of Intermediate Educationwas empowered to appoint inspectors, but it was not until quiterecently, after many fruitless applications and under a threat ofresignation by the Board, that inspection was placed on a business-likefooting and a permanent staff of six inspectors appointed. But this, after all, is a comparative detail, and reform will have to strike deepindeed if the secondary schools in Ireland are to take their place as aliving part of a living body. 

The question of reform may be dealt with under three principal heads:(1) the abolition of the examination tests, (2) the inter-relationshipbetween the Primary and Secondary systems, and (3) the position ofteachers. Although there are other matters which will be brieflyreferred to, these are the three cardinal difficulties that beset theIntermediate Board to-day and obstruct the most public-spirited effortsto convert the Irish educational system into one organic whole. 

(1) Although the mischievous principle of fees by results hasdisappeared for ever from the National Schools, it still clings toIntermediate Education, numbing and constricting, like some remorselessivy limb, the growth and free exercise of the central stem and itsbranches, and preventing the natural sap from rising and vitalising thewhole. It is not as though the rest of the world had set the seal of itsapproval upon this kind of examination. The contrary is the fact. Almostevery country in the world has rejected this system as whollypernicious, injurious for the pupil, demoralising for the teacher, andwasteful for the State. To regard the youth of the Secondary Schoolsmerely as the geese that lay the golden eggs when the examinationsoccur, is to destroy the true aims of education and pervert theprinciple of rational development. In fact, payments to IntermediateSchools ought to depend largely on the results of inspection, and muchless on written examinations, a change which would involve theappointment of a larger number of inspectors than at present exist. Itis all-important that this alteration should be undertaken withoutdelay. The mechanical agglomeration of lifeless snippets of informationwhich characterises the present method is an absurd and antiquatedremnant of the bad old times, and the sooner this part of the system ishewn down the better it will be for the conscientious discharge of theteacher's duties and the self-respect of all concerned. 

(2) As for any proper official relationship between the Primary andSecondary systems, it may be said as yet to be practically non-existent. That co-ordination of the two is essential--nay, vital--if Irisheducation is to be placed on a sound footing, may be appreciated fromthe fact that a large proportion, or 57 per cent, of the membership ofIntermediate Schools is recruited from the schools of the NationalBoard. There seem to be only two ways in which this co-ordination can besatisfactorily effected. Either the pupils must transfer from theNational to the Secondary Schools at an age when they will be youngenough to profit by Secondary instruction, or some sort of higherinstruction must be given in the National Schools so as to fit thechildren, when they leave the latter at rather a later age, for thecurriculum awaiting them in the Secondary system. It is the Treasury atthe present moment, and the Treasury alone, that blocks the way to thisreform. Since 1902 it has been asked to sanction the establishment ofhigher grade schools in large centres; the National Board also hasrepeatedly pleaded for the institution of a "higher top, " or advanceddepartments, in connection with selected Primary Schools in ruraldistricts. But all these requests, founded though they have been onintimate knowledge of the requirements of Irish Education and a ripeexperience ranging over many years, have been brushed aside by theofficials at the Exchequer, although the cost would be only about£25, 000 a year, on the very insufficient ground that the DevelopmentGrant has been depleted to defray the loss of flotation of stock for thepurposes of land purchase. What, in the name of common sense, has landpurchase to do with education? What indissoluble relationship is therebetween the two that the expenditure upon the one should be madedependent upon the requirements of the other? This niggardly andshort-sighted attitude is hardly worthy of one of the richest countriesin the world. It is but a matter of a few thousands, and surely theefficient training of the youth of Ireland is quite as important asbuying out the Irish landlords and placing the Irish tenant inpossession of the soil. The result of the present want of co-ordinationis that the clever pupil is now kept far too long in the lower school. There he remains, kicking his heels until he is sent up to theIntermediate School at 15 or 16--much too late an age at which to beginthe study of languages. The Primary teachers are, of course, only toopleased to retain the clever boys as long as possible in the NationalSchools, but it is unfair to the children, and is robbing the communityof services which might be rendered to it by these pupils in the futureif fair opportunities were afforded them of training themselves whilethere was yet time. Without higher grade schools, without scholarships, without at least some system of a "higher top" in connection with thePrimary Schools, there can never be proper co-ordination ofadministration, and education in Ireland will never be able to progressbeyond a certain point. The Christian Brothers have set the Treasury agood example in this matter. In their schools there is closeco-ordination of primary and intermediate education. Promising boys inthe fifth standard are removed when they are 11 or 12 years of age intothe higher schools and thus given an opportunity, at the most receptiveperiod of their lives, of acquiring knowledge which they will be able toturn to good account in after life. Over and over again has the NationalBoard attempted to persuade the Treasury to adopt a similar system, buthitherto without avail. The crust of the official mind has beenimpervious to every appeal. There seems, indeed, to be now some chanceof the establishment of scholarships for pupils in primary schools, butunless an intelligent mind is brought to bear upon it, and thescholarships limited, as in England and Scotland, to pupils under 12 or13 years of age, the same unfortunate result will follow, as in the caseof the Society for Promoting Protestant Schools and other similarbodies, where the scholarships have turned out to be a practicalfailure. An exception, however, as suggested by Dr. Starkie, and asallowed in Scotland, might be made in favour of the best PrimarySchools. That is to say, where satisfactory Secondary teaching is givenat a Primary School, the pupil might be relieved of one or two of thethree years he is obliged to spend in the Secondary School before he cancompete for the Intermediate Certificate which is awarded at 15 years ofage. 

The argument is sometimes used that the establishment of higher gradeschools would lead to unfair competition with the Intermediate Schoolsalready in existence. No one desires to do this. Where the IntermediateSchools already hold the field, such overlapping can easily be avoidedby proper administrative co-ordination between the National andSecondary systems. Where, on the other hand, there is a dearth ofIntermediate Schools, as in Connaught and Kerry, higher grade schoolscan, and should be established without any risk either of overlapping orcompetition. They would supply a want which is deplored by alleducational reformers, and make their influence felt far outside themere circle of the schoolroom. A private commercial school has alreadybeen founded in Kerry and has continued for some time without Statehelp, but, through want of encouragement, it has recently been compelledto adopt the programme of the Intermediate Board, which is entirelyunsuited to its particular aims. Surely, private enterprise of this kindought not only to be welcomed, but stimulated by a State grant, andeverything possible done to encourage schools to develop along their ownlines. At the present moment, they are bound hand and foot by theexamination rules of the Intermediate Board, and it is quite impossiblefor any central authority, however eagle-eyed and sympathetic, toappreciate the peculiar atmosphere and wants of every locality. In suchcases, local initiative is far more valuable than red tape, and morelikely to result in an intelligent interest in his pupils and subject onthe part of the teacher. 

(3) The position of the Secondary teachers, especially of lay assistantteachers, cries aloud for reform. In fact, their case is an acknowledgedscandal. How can any one expect that the training of the youth in theSecondary Schools can be really satisfactory when the teachers are somiserably underpaid, when the elements of self-respect are given no roomin which to develop, and the whole profession are treated rather asbeasts of burden than as a noble and responsible body to whom isentrusted much of the destiny of the race? The question of reform ishere largely a question of money. There are signs that this fact isbecoming more appreciated as the years go by, and it is devoutly to behoped that before long the teaching profession in the Secondary Schoolswill have no more to complain of than the Primary teachers, or than isusual in even the most cared-for and prosperous professions in this ourimperfect world. Salaries, pensions, a register, security of tenure, opportunities of proper training--these may be said to embody the chiefrequirements of Secondary teachers at the present moment. In existingcircumstances there is no attraction for competent men and women toenter the teaching profession so far as Intermediate education isconcerned. The most incompetent crowd into it, although there are manyexceptions, and teaching is regarded as a stop-gap during periods ofimpecuniosity rather than as a permanent career to be proud of and to beworked for. The salaries are beggarly--considerably lower than theincomes of the teachers in the Primary Schools. In 1908, the averagesalaries of principals in the Primary Schools were £112 for men and £90for women, and in the County Boroughs £163 and £126 respectively, whilstin the Secondary Schools lay assistants were paid about £80 _per annum. _In view of this, surely the demand that is being made on behalf ofhighly qualified Secondary teachers is not exorbitant, namely, salariesof £100 to £300 for men and of £80 to £220 for women. If the maximumrate were £150 for men and £100 for women the cost would be £220, 000 ayear. Where is the money to come from? Will a Nationalist Parliament beprepared to find it, and if so, from what source? Ireland is acomparatively poor country and is not in a position to bear much moretaxation. The Intermediate Board, with its present resources, cannotafford to step into the breach, and the only solution seems to be thatthe British Exchequer should come to the rescue and that the Boardshould be granted the means of dealing with this all-important matter, the neglect of which is having a most injurious effect upon theefficiency of the Intermediate Schools. It has been suggested that ahalf-way house might be found, that the Treasury should grant £60 foreach assistant master and £40 for each assistant mistress, and that theremainder should be raised by the authorities of the schools under thedirection of the Board. This alternative scheme would cost the Stateabout £88, 300 a year, but, like all makeshifts, would not effect a realsettlement of the difficulty, creating, as it would, a patchwork systemof payment which might break down at any moment. On the other hand, letthe settlement be a generous one, and the return will be a hundredfoldin added efficiency, a higher sense of duty, and an increased personalinterest on the part of the teacher in the class of which he has charge. 

In close connection with the question of salaries are those of pensionsand security of tenure. The pensions of the Primary teachers, inadequatethough they be, would be looked upon as a provision of the mostmunificent kind by the poor men and women who enter service under theIntermediate system. The Primary teachers, moreover, can fall back uponsubsidiary occupations if they find that their salaries are insufficientfor their maintenance. They can run a little farm or keep a shop or doother remunerative work, but the assistants in Secondary Schools aredebarred from these methods of supplementing their exiguous wage. Thoseterrible words might, without any extravagance, be inscribed for themover the doors of their schools: "All hope abandon ye who enter here. "Something must be done. A starvation wage, with an adequate pension tofollow, might be tolerable, a decent wage, without any pension, might beborne, but starvation at both ends is a disgrace to the Treasury whileit lasts and one of the things which should be taken in hand without anyfurther delay. 

Security of tenure is equally important. How can a teacher be expectedto devote the whole of his mental energies to his scholastic duties, howcan any one expect him to throw himself heart and soul into his work, ifthere is always lurking in his mind the haunting fear of dismissalthrough no fault of his own? It is unreasonable to suppose that anyhuman being can give of his best under these distracting conditions. Inthe National Schools a system of appeal has been in force for some time, and has been carried out with fairness on the part of those in authorityand to the apparent satisfaction of the teaching profession. Thedismissal order of every Roman Catholic manager has to be countersignedby the Bishop of the Diocese, and in the case of all teachers an appealis now allowed to the Board itself, and is often utilised byProtestants. In fact, so far as the National Schools are concerned, thetenure of the Primary teachers during good behaviour is practicallysecured. Why cannot similar safeguards be introduced into theIntermediate system? An appeal to the Board in this case is not proposedby those who know all the circumstances best; but teachers in RomanCatholic schools might have the right of appeal, in the case of DiocesanColleges, to the Bishop of the Diocese, or in the case of schools underreligious orders to the Provincials or Generals, and Protestant teachersmight be allowed to appeal to the Board of Governors of their schools, or they might sign an agreement, providing for a referee, such as theNo. 3 and 4 agreements under the National Board. 

A register of teachers is also required. Every existing teacher in theIntermediate Schools who satisfies the tests of efficiency should beplaced upon it without delay. As far as future appointments areconcerned, qualifications might be adopted similar to those which nowobtain in the Scotch Department, _e. G. _ (_a_) a degree in a University, orits equivalent; (_b_) a diploma following professional training for oneyear; and (_c_) two probationary years in a good school. Special termswould probably be demanded for those who, like Nuns, are precluded bytheir calling from attending lectures at a University. 

These are some of the reforms which could, and should be introduced tomake the teaching profession more efficient, more attractive forcompetent and clever men and women, and more of a permanent andhonourable career than it has been in the past. Once again, it is notunreasonable to ask--How will a Dublin Parliament be able to provide thenecessary funds? An extra annual sum of roughly £300, 000 is required, inaddition to a further sum of about £330, 000 to meet non-recurringexpenditure. These are, admittedly, moderate estimates. The matter, anyway, is now ripe for settlement, and procrastination can onlyaggravate the financial difficulty. So far as the educational problem isconcerned, it is a manifest obligation upon the Nationalist Party tooutline their proposals for the redress of these grievances, and toindicate the means by which they can be carried out, before a separateLegislature is set up for the people of Ireland. 

Within the scope of these few pages it is not possible to comprise allthe aspects of modern Irish Education which are worthy of discussion. What are most urgently needed to-day are the necessary funds to continuethe good work which is being done, and to introduce the reforms thathave been sketched above. Parsimony in educational matters is the mostwasteful of all misplaced thrift. Let the reformers be dealt with wiselyand generously, and the harvest will exceed even the expectations ofthose who are working most hopefully upon the problem. Withhold thefunds on some niggardly and mistaken principle of petty economy, and thepresent progress will be discouraged and the educational tree becomestunted in its growth. From an administrative point of view, nothing, finance apart, would contribute more to the efficiency of IrishEducation than the amalgamation of the National and Intermediatesystems, as well as of the Technical work at present administered by theDepartment of Agriculture and Technical Education, under one Board. Themethod of examination by the Department is far sounder than that whichis forced upon the Intermediate Board by the Acts of Parliament underwhich it works. In the case of science, the two are to be seen workingto-day side by side in the Secondary Schools, to the undoubted benefitof the scientific course, which enjoys a double subsidy from the State, and is subject to the superior method of examination by the Department, being treated as a detached subject and the candidates being passed _enbloc_. On the other hand, the obsolete method of examination by theBoard tends to the serious disadvantage of the classical curriculum, thegrants being made on the unprofitable results of a general examinationof individual candidates, the class not being regarded as a whole, as isthe case with the Department. By the repeal of the Intermediate Acts, and by the amalgamation of the various Boards into one, these anomalieswould rapidly disappear, and for the first time a genuine system ofco-ordination could be introduced into Irish Education, which would knittogether the strength of all the parts and overcome many of theprevailing weaknesses, making the whole system what it ought to be, aliving, growing, pulsating organism, developing and shaping itself withthe life of the nation. 

Is it conceivable that all this can he accomplished if the Union betweenthe countries is rent asunder? What chance will there be of effectingthis great settlement, which requires money and, above all, requirespeace, when Ireland is plunged once again into the old internecinestruggles of the eighteenth century? The warning is writ very large uponthe wall, so that he who runs may read. The best hope for education inIreland are the resources of Great Britain and a uniform policyundisturbed by party feuds. Neither of these can be looked for under aseparate Parliament. Under the Union Ireland can have both, for thewelfare of her children and the building of a noble history. 

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 89: In writing the above I should like to acknowledge myindebtedness to the address published by Dr. Starkie in 1911 for manyuseful facts and figures. ]

[Footnote 90: See the 76th and 77th Reports of the Commissioners ofNational Education in Ireland--Cd. 5340, 1910, and Cd. 5903, 1911. ]

[Footnote 91: The residential buildings of the Commissioners' TrainingCollege in Marlborough Street, Dublin, still require to be completed bythe addition of a new residence for women students, at a cost of about£50, 000 spread over three or four years. ]

XX

THE PROBLEM OF TRANSIT AND TRANSPORT IN IRELAND

BY AN IRISH RAILWAY DIRECTOR

Any scheme giving self-government to Ireland must seriously affect theproblem of local transit and transport, by rail and water, which allparties in Ireland agree to be pressing and important. Nor is it merelya local question. As recent returns show, the trade between Ireland andGreat Britain has of late years enormously increased, to the greatadvantage of both; for if Irish farmers profit by the export of beef, mutton, milk, eggs, butter, bacon and other articles, Great Britain hasthe benefit of a near food supply within the United Kingdom. Nor doesany one doubt that this trade is capable of enormous increase. Theimprovement of Irish agricultural methods, the growth in England of atown population, the increased price of the necessaries of life, aresome of the factors pointing in this direction. 

If this trade is to expand, Irish traffic routes and facilities withGreat Britain must be improved and increased, especially as the articlescarried are largely of a perishable kind. Moreover, the internal trafficof Ireland, by rail, waterways, and canals is capable of and needs greatdevelopment, as witness the recent Reports of the Viceregal Commissionon Irish Railways, and of the Royal Commission on Canals andWaterways. [92] The problem of inland navigation is again intimatelybound up with that of arterial drainage, as the Commissioners havereported. It is then strange to find, that on these pressing questionsof first importance, there is an almost absolute silence on the part ofthose who advocate Home Rule in and out of Parliament. 

SOLUTION OF TRANSIT PROBLEM IMPOSSIBLE UNDER HOME RULE. 

It is true that the nationalisation of the Irish railways has in pastyears found the keenest advocates amongst individual members of the HomeRule Party; that the Majority Report of the late Viceregal Commissionfavouring State purchase of the Irish railways was formally approved ofby the Parliamentary Party, and that Mr. Redmond has named "transit" asone of the special matters that should be left to be dealt with by anIrish Legislature. But there the matter ends. We are not given theslightest inkling what is proposed to be done on this matter, or how itwill be done, or the slightest proof that under any system of Home Rule, the financial difficulties of the problem can be solved at all. 

The Reports of both the Commissions referred to are based, first on thecontinuance of the present system of laws and government, and secondly, on the use of Imperial credit to the tune of many millions. Yet amongstthe shoals of literature on Home Rule problems and finance, I can findno enlightenment as to how the transit problem is to be solved under thenew conditions; _i. E. _ how any Home Rule Government, whether it hascontrol of Customs and Excise or not, and however it economises, is tofind the money necessary to buy out the Irish railways and canals. AGovernment that is faced with the problems of poverty and congestion, ofhousing, of increased educational grants, of afforestation, and ofarterial land drainage, will have an almost impossible task in raisingmoney for these purposes alone. And, let those who can, inform us how anIrish Parliament and Executive (with all else they will have in hand), will be able to raise even the £5, 000, 000 necessary to improve the IrishLight Railway System; not to speak of the sum at least tenfold greaterwhich will be required for a complete purchase scheme. 

So far we are without that information. The Irish Parliamentary leadershave not touched upon the point. The pamphleteers are almost equallysilent. Professor Kettle, in his "Home Rule Finance, " mentions the"Nationalisation of Railways" in one line of print, merely stating that"the project will have to be financed by loans and not out of annualrevenue" (p. 41); and he further remarks, generally (p. 72), "that forthe development of any future policy, approved by her own people, Ireland relies absolutely on her own fiscal resources. " What fiscalresources, and under what conditions are they obtainable?

In the volume entitled "Home Rule Problems" issued by the Liberal HomeRule Committee, with a preface by Viscount Haldane, not one word is saidon the subject, though there are chapters on Irish finance, and on Irishcommercial and industrial conditions. Neither has Mr. Stephen Gwynn asingle word on the subject in his "Case for Home Rule, " though he makesthe large assertion that "there is no country in the world whereresources are more undeveloped than those of Ireland. "

Mr. Erskine Childers[93] merely refers to the Irish railway problem asone that is "obvious and urgent, " "which no Parliament but an IrishParliament can deal with, and which calls aloud for settlement. "

DETAILS OF RAILWAY TRANSIT PROBLEM. 

Let us now look at the problem in more detail; and first is the questionof the railways. The property to be dealt with consists of 3411 miles ofrailway, representing a total capital of £45, 163, 000, of which, at thedate of the Report of the Commission, £2, 873, 000 paid no dividend; thegross annual receipts of the whole system being £4, 255, 000 and the netreceipts £1, 690, 000, representing a return on the whole capital of 3. 77per cent. [94]

Of these lines, the railways constructed under the Tramways and LightRailways Acts cover 603 miles, of which 322 are narrow gauge, involvinga liability on various baronies which have guaranteed interest oncapital to the amount of £36, 000 per annum. To bring these lightrailways up to a proper standard and equipment; to widen the gauge inmany cases; to provide new sheds, stations, and rolling stock, andredeem the guarantees, a sum of about £5, 000, 000 would probably benecessary. In addition, projects for no less than eighty-three newrailways were brought before the Commission;[95] and it is admitted onall hands, and the Commission find, that practically none of theserailway extensions would be undertaken by private enterprise, and thatthese developments need the credit, help, and direction of the State. Even the necessary improvement of the existing light railways cannot nowbe undertaken, for under the system of legislation under which they wereconstructed, there is no means of raising new capital. [96]

Now, what is advocated by the Majority Report is the--

 "compulsory purchase by the State of these railway systems great and small, to be then worked and managed by an Irish elected authority as one concern, mainly with a view of developing Irish industries by reduction of rates and otherwise, and not strictly on commercial principles. "[97]

This was the scheme supported by the Parliamentary Party, written upunceasingly by the _Freeman's Journal_, and held out under the term"Nationalisation of Railways, " as one of the special boons which HomeRule will bring to Irish traders and farmers. 

But mark how the operation is to be carried out. The Commissionreported that the sum required should be raised by a railway stockcharged primarily on the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom, withrecourse to Irish rates to make up possible deficiencies, and further, that there should be an annual grant from the Exchequer of not less than£250, 000 to the Irish railway authority. Seeing that the Commissionersrefer to "the financial terms prescribed by the Act of 1844" (Regulationof Railways Act, 7 & 8 Vict. C. 85, ss. 2-4), and that a _cash_ paymentto shareholders was provided for by that Act, it is to be presumed thatthe Commissioners intended Irish shareholders to be paid in cash. TheAct of 1844 provided for payment to the companies of a sum in cash equalto twenty-five years' purchase of the previous three years' annualprofits; but this was the minimum only, for it was provided that thecompanies could, under arbitration, claim additional payment in respectof future "prospects. "

Now twenty-five years' purchase of the divisible profits, which at thedate of the Commission, were £1, 690, 000, would amount to over£42, 000, 000, and if in addition sums had to be raised for "prospects, "purchase of lines paying no dividend, special provision for prior stocksstanding at a premium, redemption of guarantees, and the large sumsrequired for the extensions and improvements we have mentioned, a sumnot less than £50, 000, 000, and probably nearer £55, 000, 000, would berequired. [98]

From the beginning to the end of the inquiry there was no suggestionthat this immense operation could be carried out except by the use ofImperial credit, involving the two conditions: (1) that the ConsolidatedFund of the United Kingdom be charged, and (2) that the British publicbe asked, and should be willing to find the money. Although theMajority Report contemplated an Irish elected authority to work therailways so purchased and amalgamated, it was never suggested that anysuch Irish authority could raise the necessary purchase capital, or, indeed, any portion of it. The whole scheme from beginning to endpre-supposed the continuance of the Union, with its advantages of creditand capital. Upset that Union, establish an Irish Parliament working outits own salvation, financially and otherwise, and the basis of the wholescheme of railway nationalisation vanishes. 

That the British Government should allow its credit to be used to thetune of fifty millions, after full legislative, executive and taxingpowers were handed over to an Irish Parliament, is too fantastic to beconsidered seriously. Whether an Irish or English authority controlledthe working of the railways would under such circumstances make littledifference, with the Courts of Law, the Executive, and Police in otherhands than that of the Government guaranteeing the interest. Thesecurity for the advance would be imperilled; and, indeed, it isdoubtful whether a tenth of the money required would be advanced, evenin London, on those terms. For a similar reason any formal pledge ofIrish rates and taxes, to make up deficiencies in working, would beillusory. At any rate, if Irish Land Purchase is to be continued underBritish credit (and it certainly will be a prior claim and charge), itis idle to expect Parliament to undertake the vast additionalobligations involved in Irish railway nationalisation. Parliament wouldpay the piper but could not call the tune. 

IRISH CREDIT NOT SUFFICIENT. 

There remains the alternative of the new Irish Parliament financing theoperation. This it must do by means of payment in cash to the sellingshareholders, for reasons which will be hereafter stated, unless itwishes to start its career by a scheme of spoliation, which would notmerely rob the shareholders (who are mostly Irish), but would destroythe credit of the Irish Government. Mr. Redmond has recentlyacknowledged that a large number of Irish railway shareholders are goodNationalists; and it is certain that a great portion of the ordinarystock is held by Irish farmers and traders; and much of the preferenceand debenture stocks are also held by Irish charities, convents, diocesan trustees, and monastic institutions. These persons will expect, and justly expect, cash on a compulsory purchase, on basis of marketvalue, or capitalisation of dividend, so as to secure the same return ofinterest. 

Could the Irish Government borrow £50, 000, 000, and at what rate? Toborrow at a higher rate than the present return on Irish railwaycapital, namely, 3. 77 per cent. , would be to incur a loss on working therailways, from the outset, which Irish ratepayers or taxpayers wouldhave to make up. The net receipts, at the time of the Commission'sReport, were, in round figures, £1, 600, 000, and thus to borrow£50, 000, 000, even at 4 per cent. , would mean an annual loss of £300, 000a year, even if there were no sinking fund. A 10_s. _ per cent sinking fundwould increase the total annual loss to £550, 000. 

But, could an Irish Government Guaranteed Railway Stock be issued at 4per cent. ? Would Ireland's credit stand better than that of Hungary, whose 4 per cent. Gold _rentes_ stand at 92, or of the Argentine, whichhas to borrow at nearly 5 per cent. ? There are grave doubts whether thelarge sum required would be subscribed at all, at even 4 1/4 per cent, or 4 1/2 per cent. Basis. It is not likely that English investors wouldtake up such a loan, seeing that they have consistently fought shy ofIrish investments, and they are not likely to change their views uponthe break up of the Union. 

It may be said that the sum required could be raised in Ireland--thatpatriotic feeling would stimulate the operation, and the large sum ofmoney (over £50, 000, 000), lying on deposit at the Irish banks may bereferred to as available. Patriotism that has not financed the IrishParliamentary Party will not be likely to finance a gigantic railwayloan. Nor is the large sum appearing as banking deposits really freemoney available for investment. With increase of deposits, the items ofloans and advances in banking accounts have also correspondinglyincreased, and they largely balance each other. Not only is the moneydeposited by one customer lent to another, and therefore alreadyutilized, but, to a large extent well known to bankers, the deposits, _i. E. _ the credits to particular accounts, represent money lent to thepersons having these accounts, and are not, in fact, their own freebalances. So also credits in the accounts of one bank, figure as debitson the balance sheet of another bank. There probably has been in recentyears considerable saving in Ireland, but it is also certain that thosesavings have largely gone, and will continue rightly to go inimprovements of farms, which the Land Acts and Land Purchase Acts havemade worth improving for their possessors. Those who have not savedenough borrow, and the bank advances represent largely the capitalrequired by farmers and traders. The deposits, therefore, are being wellused, and are not dead money. Divert them to any large extent to anotherpurpose, and there will probably be a contraction of banking credit, which Irish farming and industry will be the first to feel. 

PURCHASE BY STATE PAPER. 

It may be said that the nationalisation of railways could be carriedout, not by a cash payment, but by a paper exchange of existing RailwayStocks into newly created Irish Government Stock, the amount of theexisting net receipts being guaranteed. But, unless the Irish Governmentcould actually borrow in cash the sum required, at a rate equal to thatnominally put on the new stock, the shareholders would be robbed of acapital sum equal to the amount of the discount on the stock, _i. E. _ theamount of the market quotation below par, or issue price. There will besellers of the new stock from the beginning, and what the public willgive for it, and not the nominal figure put upon it by the IrishGovernment, will be its real value. The Irish Government may issue theRailway Stock at 3-1/2 per cent. , but if they could borrow the sumrequired only at 4-1/2 per cent. , the new stock will at once find itslevel at about 77 instead of 100, and the capital value of Irishrailways will be reduced from, say, £45, 000, 000 to £35, 000, 000, and thedifference, £10, 000, 000, would come out of the pockets of Irishshareholders. The Irish Government would be, however, in this unpleasantdilemma, that if they issued the stock at a rate per cent, nominallyhigher than the present return in railway capital, namely, 3. 77 percent. , the annual charge for interest would be greater than the netreceipts, and so from the beginning there would be an annual loss; andthe fact of this annual loss would be another factor tending todepreciate the new Railway Stock. The alternatives before an Irish PrimeMinister, pressed to carry out a "Nationalisation" policy, are notenviable. He will either have to provide by taxation for the annual lossinvolved in taking over the railways on a fair basis, or to deprive themost thrifty and industrious classes of his fellow-countrymen of a largeslice of their savings and investments. In either event, the newGovernment will have received a serious blow to its credit at the outsetof its career. 

EFFECT OF REDUCTION OF RAILWAY RATES. 

There is, moreover, a special reason why such a stock, from itsinception, would tend to depreciate in value; namely, that from themoment the Irish Government or their nominees became the owners, therewould be almost irresistible pressure put upon them to reduce therailway rates, and generally (as indeed the Majority Report recommends)to work the railways on other than commercial lines. [99] A reduction ofrates has been held out as the great resulting boon of nationalisationever since the Irish Parliamentary Party specifically raised thequestion in Parliament in 1899. A 25 per cent. Reduction in rates andfares (suggested by Nationalist witnesses) would involve an annualdiminution of net receipts to the Government of over £1, 000, 000 perannum, and if the reduction were in goods rates alone, the loss would be£568, 000 per annum. It would be years, if ever, before such a loss couldbe recouped, however the traffic was increased. Experience has shownthat in recent years running expenses tend to increase nearly parallelwith the gross receipts, and a large increase in gross traffic wouldinvolve enormous capital outlay for rolling stock, engines, sidings, etc. It is unnecessary to comment upon the suggestion that the railwaysshould not be run on "commercial principles. " The Irish ratepayers andtaxpayers, who would have to bear the loss, would loudly call out forbusiness management when it was too late. 

It is hardly necessary to add that another result of such an operationwould be to prevent the Irish Government raising the very large sumnecessary for improving and standardising the light railways and forextensions, except at an unremunerative rate of interest. Even ifshareholders be put off with State paper, contractors will have to bepaid with cash. Moreover the creation of such a large amount of debt atthe beginning of the new regime would render it difficult, if notimpossible, for the Irish Government to raise sums necessary for otherpublic works and services of a pressing character, arterial drainage, canals, education, and other objects, not to speak of migration, congestion, and land purchase. The conclusion, in fact, is inevitable, that without the security of the United Kingdom, and the market ofBritish investors willing to lend, it is idle to think that either Statepurchase of railways, or any other of the boons mentioned, arereasonably possible. Mr. Erskine Childers, though a Home Ruler, does notfail to perceive, to use his own words, "that financial independencewill now mean a financial sacrifice to Ireland. "[100]

EFFECT OF NATIONALISATION ON TRADE RELATIONS. 

There are other important considerations which confirm the view that, ifthe control of Irish railways were taken away from the ImperialParliament, and placed under a Parliament sitting in Dublin, and if thegeneral code of railway legislation now binding on both countries couldbe altered by a Home Rule legislature, results disastrous to the tradebetween the two countries would probably follow, whether"Nationalisation" were carried out or not. 

The Majority Report recommends, as one of the chief objects of"Nationalisation" under an Irish authority, the reduction of _export_rates, both local and through rates, on the Irish railways, as"essential to the development of Irish industry, " and this seems the petproject of a large number of witnesses, and of Irish local authorities. Import and export railway rates are now the same for the same classes ofproduce, and no Irish railway company could now differentiate betweenthem, without being pulled up by the Railway Commission at the suit ofBritish traders, or British railway companies. The policy suggested ispractically to use railway rates as a system of local protection, similar to the existing practice and policy on the continental, andnotably the Prussian State Railways. It is easy to see that without anyCustoms barrier between the two countries, such a policy wouldinaugurate practically a tariff war between Ireland and Great Britain, which would be disastrous to both. That such a policy should besubscribed to by Free-traders, and that a Free-trade Government shouldadvocate a change in the relations between the two countries, underwhich such a system could be possible, is indeed surprising. To useImperial credit for such a purpose would be midsummer madness. Evenwithout any scheme of nationalisation, the establishment of a separateExecutive and Legislature in Ireland might have sinister effects ontraffic arrangements between Great Britain and Ireland and on theharmonious administration of the railways. 

THE RIGHT SOLUTION. 

The truth of the matter, and the inference to be drawn from the aboveconsiderations and the whole trend of modern trade, is that to break upthe railway systems of Great Britain and Ireland into two rival andhostile systems of transit, working for different objects and bydifferent methods, would be to stop a natural and healthy process ofuniform working and harmony, which has enormously advanced in the lastdecade, to the great advantage of Ireland. 

Almost every scheme of amalgamation in Ireland has been connected withthe opening or development of a new cross-Channel route, as the historyof the Fishguard and Rosslare and the new Heysham routes fully shows. Aspart of this process, English companies, like the Midland and the GreatWestern, are either acquiring Irish lines or making special trafficarrangements with them. Enormous sums have been spent on harbours andsteamers by English companies for the purpose of developing traffic withIreland, and the increased interchange of goods has been of greatadvantage to both countries. The ideal put forward by advocates ofrailway nationalisation and Irish independence, that in respect of tradeand traffic Ireland should be a sort of watertight compartment, self-supporting and self-contained, is, I submit, a mischievous delusionwhich, if put into practice, would undo much of the good progressIreland has recently made. Such an ideal would also be the exactcontrary of the line of national development as based on transit andtransport followed in almost every other civilized country. In Germany, Canada, the United States, and Australia, we see the policy consistentlypursued of amalgamation, consolidation, and facilities for long-distancetraffic, so that between all parts of each State and Empire there shallbe the freest and most perfect interchange of traffic. Canada and theUnited States have been so far inspired by this principle as to spendcountless millions first on East and West (and now on North and South)lines, even before there was traffic to carry, and in order to createtraffic; and the principle has been justified in its results. 

From this point of view St. George's Channel and the Irish Sea should bea means of communication, constant and in every direction, between thetwo Islands, and not a sort of boundary ditch to be deepened andrendered difficult of passage. 

If Ireland wishes to share England's prosperity she must not build up awall against the credit, trade, and special products of her richersister. If England wishes to have and to foster a magnificent source offood supply, well and strategically secured against continental foes, she also must do all that can be done to encourage intercourse. Todevelop traffic between Great Britain and Ireland is the policy whichboth experience and theory point to as advantageous to both countries;to subvert this policy and make Ireland's commerce local andself-sufficing, seems to be the narrow and mistaken ideal of Nationalistaspirations. 

UNIONIST POLICY. 

It follows that the Unionist Party must oppose any plan for"nationalising" the Irish railways, whether by the credit of the UnitedKingdom, or otherwise. The policy we advocate is to be found in theMinority Report of the Viceregal Commission, signed by Sir HerbertJekyll, Mr. W. M. Acworth, and Mr. John Aspinall, not as politicians, butexperts; and in the Report of the Royal Commission on Canals and InlandNavigation dealing with the question of canals and water transport inIreland. 

In the case of railways, the aim should be to amalgamate them into twoor three large companies to standardise as far as possible the lightrailways, and level them in respect of gauge, gradients, works, androlling stock with the larger companies. Unquestionably many of thesmaller railways to be amalgamated, though not light railways, needlarge expenditure for the purpose of duplication of running lines, straightening of curves, stations, stores, and conveniences, and manyextensions and cross-lines will also be needed to connect them with thetrunk lines, and to open out districts now unprovided with railwayfacilities. Many of these projects, though industrially remunerative toIreland and advantageous to England also as tapping new sources of foodsupply, would not be, in strictness, commercially remunerative in thesense of giving fair return on capital over working expenses, and it isidle to expect that private capital will ever be subscribed for thesepurposes. They can only be undertaken either directly by State funds, orby money provided by the State, and lent to the large amalgamated linesat low interest. This is the policy inaugurated by Mr. Arthur Balfour, which has been of untold benefit to many districts in Ireland. Probablya public grant of, say, £2, 000, 000, and loanable money available to theextent of £8, 000, 000, would largely solve the problem. For the reasonsalready given it is only by Imperial credit, and under the ęgis of aunited Parliament and Government, that capital on this large scale canbe available for these purposes. 

CANALS AND NAVIGATION. 

The problem of canals and inland navigation in Ireland is a minor one, but the same principles largely apply. The Royal Commission[101]recommended that all the chief waterways, canals, and rivers necessaryfor inland transport should be purchased and remain under the control ofthe State, the controlling authority, however, not themselves, to becomecarriers on any waterways. At the same time, they strongly urged thatthe problem of arterial drainage and relief from floods should not betreated separately, but that the control of drainage works should beunder the same central authority as that which is to control waterwaysand navigation. 

It is not necessary to refer in detail to the Report. Apart from thesum necessary to buy out the existing owners of canals and waterways, towards which £2, 451, 346 had been contributed from private sources, theCommissioners contemplated a further expenditure of about £200, 000 onnew works. In addition the sum of £500, 000 would be required, on amoderate estimate for drainage and the prevention of floods. Thepressing nature of the latter problem is once more emphaticallyevidenced by the wholesale injury to property and the public health bythe recent flooding of the basins of the Shannon, Barrow, Bann, andother rivers. Here, again, we have problems which it is idle to expectan Irish Parliament to solve satisfactorily for years to come, or, indeed, ever. Ways and means must be an effectual bar. Drainage andnavigation form only one problem out of a dozen facing a Home RuleGovernment needing the raising of enormous capital. Probably theCommissioners conducting the Canals inquiry, who were persons of allshades of political opinion, were well aware that only under the presentsystem of State credit could the financial difficulties be overcome. According to their report, the State (_i. E. _ the Government of the UnitedKingdom) were to acquire the control, which was to be carried out by anAct of Parliament, naming the Waterways Commissioners, "who should bepersons disassociated from party politics. "

The one dissentient out of twenty-one signatories, Lord Farrer, significantly adds that he does not favour a "charge on the public purseand new Boards of Management _until a purely Irish elected authority hasagreed to pay for them_. " Precisely; Lord Farrer has looked ahead. Willan Irish elected authority agree to pay for these boons, and will theybe able to pay? That is a question which will cause some searching ofhearts amongst all interested in Ireland's welfare;--in these pages wehave attempted to give an answer. 

CONCLUSION. 

The conclusion is in fact inevitable. Ireland cannot have it both ways. She cannot have financial independence and financial dependence at thesame time. No Colony has ever claimed or been granted these inconsistentconditions. If Colonial precedents are cited, their essentiallimitations should also be borne in mind. Colonial loans are not chargedon the Consolidated Fund. Nor have Colonial railways been nationalisedwith the money and credit of the United Kingdom, in order to favourlocal exports at the expense of imports from England. 

Our examination of the question brings us to the clear conclusion thatit is only under the existing system of a single Parliament andExecutive for the United Kingdom that the problems of transit andtransport in Ireland, or between Great Britain and Ireland, can besatisfactorily solved, whether from the point of view of finance, justice to shareholders, or advantage to the trade and convenience ofboth countries. 

 NOTE. --It has been suggested, since the above was written, that the balance in the Irish Post Office Savings Banks (now about £12, 500, 000) might be available to the new Irish Government, for advances to farmers and other public purposes. The suggestion involves the applicability of such advances for the purchase or amalgamation of the Irish railways under an Irish public authority. Such a proposal will not bear close examination. 

 It is an essential condition of the existence of Savings Bank deposits that the deposits should be always available on the call of depositors; and this condition would no longer be fulfilled if the balances were locked up in Irish railways. In fact, if there was any suggestion that these balances should be used for the purpose of enabling the Irish Government to run the railways on uncommercial principles, the deposits would very soon diminish or disappear--and this apart from the question whether under Home Rule, the deposits would in any event remain at anything like their present high figure. 

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 92: Viceregal Commission on Irish Railways, Final Report, 1910(Cd. 5247). Final Report on the Canals and Inland Navigations ofIreland, 1911 (Cd. 5626). ]

[Footnote 93: "The Framework of Home Rule, " p. 174. ]

[Footnote 94: Figures are taken from Viceregal Commission Reports, p. 78, Report. ]

[Footnote 95: Page 78, Report. ]

[Footnote 96: Page 58, Report. ]

[Footnote 97: Final Report, pp. 76-83. ]

[Footnote 98: We have taken the Act of 1844 as the basis referred to bythe Commissioners, though it is very doubtful (having regard to thegreat variety of railway share and loan capital), if the terms of sect. 2 are now suitable; moreover sect. 4 requires a special Act ofParliament to be passed to raise the money, and settle the specialconditions of the purchase option. ]

[Footnote 99: Majority Report, p. 76. ]

[Footnote 100: "Framework of Home Rule, " p. 281. ]

[Footnote 101: Final Report on the Canals and Navigations of Ireland. 1911. (Cd. 5626. )]