AFGHANISTAN AND THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN DISPUTE

by THEO. F. RODENBOUGH

Bvt. Brigadier General, U. S. A

AN ACCOUNT OF RUSSIA'S ADVANCE TOWARD INDIA, BASED UPON THEREPORTS AND EXPERIENCES OF RUSSIAN, GERMAN, AND BRITISHOFFICERS AND TRAVELLERS; WITH A DESCRIPTION OFAFGHANISTAN AND OF THE MILITARY RESOURCESOF THE POWERS CONCERNED

[Illustration: Afghanistan: England versus Russia]

[Illustration: The Ruler of Afghanistan, Abdurrahman Khan, Ameer of Kabul]

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WITH THREE MAPS AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS

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CONTENTS. 

I. THROUGH THE GATES OF ASIA

II. ON THE THRESHOLD OF INDIA

III. THE BRITISH FORCES AND ROUTES

IV. THE RUSSIAN FORCES AND APPROACHES

V. REVIEW OF THE MILITARY SITUATIONLIST OF AUTHORITIESINDEX

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 

_MAPS_. 

Afghanistan and the Surrounding Territories (Drawn for this Work andCorrected by the Latest Military Surveys--end of vol. )

The Asiatic Territories Absorbed by Russia During the Past TwoCenturies, with the Dates of the Various Annexations

The Russian Lines of Advance from their Base of Supplies

_CUTS_. 

Abdurrahman Khan, Ameer of Kabul (Frontispiece)

Mahaz Khan (A Tajik), Khan of Pest BolakJehandad (Lohanir), from Ghazni

Wullie Mohammed, a Dahzungi HazaraPozai Khan, a Shinwarri (Musician)

Khan Baz, a Khumbhur Khel AfreediTooro Baz, a Kookie Khel Afreedi

Zool Kuddar, an Adam Khel AfreediMousa, a Kizilbash, Born in Peshawur

The City of Kandahar, Afghanistan

Castle of Zohak, First March from Bamian, Irak Road to Kabul

An Afghan Post-Chaise; Going to the Front

Gate of the Bazaar at Kabul

Major-General, Sir F. S. Roberts, V. C. , K. C. B. 

Khelat-i-Ghilzi, between Kandahar and Ghazni

Elephant with Artillery; on the Road to Ali Musjid

Detail of Elephant Saddle

Noah's Valley, Kunar River

Watch Tower in the Khaiber Pass

Fort of Ali Musjid, from the Heights above Lala Cheena, in theKhaiber Pass

Fort of Dakka, on the Kabul River

The Ishbola Tepe, Khaiber Pass

Entrance to the Bolan Pass, from Dadur

Entrance to the Khojak Pass, from Pishin, on the Road to Kandahar

The Order of March in Central Asia

Gorge in the Tirband-i-Turkestan, through which the Murghab flows

Jelalabad, from Piper's Hill

[Illustration: MAP Showing the Advances of RUSSIA towards INDIA1734-1884. ]

AFGHANISTANAND THEANGLO-RUSSIAN DISPUTE

I. 

THROUGH THE GATES OF ASIA. 

In universal history there is no more interesting subject for theconsideration of the political student than the record of Russianprogress through Central Asia. 

In one sense this advance is a practical reestablishment orextension of the influence of the Aryan race in countries longdominated by peoples of Turki or Mongolian origin; in anothersense it has resulted in a transition from the barbarism or rudeforms of Asiatic life to the enlightenment and higher moraldevelopment of a European age. In a religious sense it embodies acrusade against Oriental fanaticism; and it is a curious feature ofthe Anglo-Russian dispute, that upon a question of temporal gain, the greatest Christian nation finds itself allied with the followersof Buddha and Mahomet against Russia under the Banner of the Cross. 

The descendants of the great Peter have opened up in Central Asia anew region which, if as yet it has not been "made to blossom as therose, " has nevertheless profited by the introduction of law, order, and a certain amount of industrial prosperity. 

Russia commenced her relations with Central Asia as early as thesixteenth century. Not only through embassies sent, but by militaryexpeditions; these, however, at that time were private ventures byroving Cossacks and other inhabitants of Southern Russia. Authorizedgovernment expeditions commenced with Peter the Great, who in1716-17 sent two exploring parties into the Central Asian deserts--Bekovitch to Khiva, and Likhareff to the Black Irtish. Theseexpeditions were undertaken in search of gold, supposed to exist inthose regions, but failed in their object; the detachment underBekovitch being entirely destroyed after reaching Khiva. Peternext turned his attention to the country bordering upon thesouthern shores of the Caspian Sea; taking advantage of Persianembarrassments, with the consent of the Shah and of the Sultan heacquired, in 1722-3, the provinces of Gilan, Mazanderan, andAsterabad; but the great expense of maintaining a large garrison soremote from Russia, and the unhealthiness of the locality, inducedthe Russian Government, in 1732, to restore the districts to Persia. In the same year Abul-Khair, the Khan of the Little Kirghiz Horde, voluntarily submitted to Russia. Twenty years later a small strip ofthe kingdom of Djungaria, on the Irtish, was absorbed, and towardthe commencement of the reign of Catharine II, Russian authoritywas asserted and maintained over the broad tract from the Altai tothe Caspian. This occupation was limited to a line of outposts alongthe Ural, the Irtish, and in the intervening district. DuringCatharine's reign the frontier nomads became reduced in numbers, bythe departure from the steppe between the Ural and Volga of theCalmucks, who fled into Djungaria, and were nearly destroyed on theroad, by the Kirghiz. 

The connection between Russia and Central Asia at this time assumedanother character, that of complete tranquillity, in consequence ofthe development of trade through Orenburg and to some extent throughTroitsk and Petropaulovsk. The lines along the Ural and Irtishgradually acquired strength; the robber-raids into European Russiaand Western Siberia almost entirely ceasing. The allegiance of theKirghiz of the Little and Central Hordes was expressed in the factthat their Khans were always selected under Russian influence andfrom time to time appeared at St. Petersburg to render homage. Withthe Central Asian khanates there was no connection except that oftrade, but as regarded the Turcomans, who, it is said, hadfrequently asked for Russian protection, intercourse wasdiscouraged, as they could not be trusted "within the lines, " beingsimply bandits. 

The Emperor Paul imagined that the steppes offered a good road toSouthern Asia, and desiring to expel the English from India, in theyear 1800 he despatched a large number of Don Cossacks, underOrloff, through the districts of the Little Horde. At the time atreaty was concluded with Napoleon, then First Consul, by virtue ofwhich a combined Russo-French army was to disembark at Asterabad andmarch from thence into India by way of Khorassan and Afghanistan. The death of the Emperor of Russia put an end to this plan. 

During the reign of Alexander I, Central Asia was suffered to rest, and even the Chinese made raids into Russian territory withoutinterruption. In the third decade of the present century, however, several advanced military settlements of Cossacks were founded. "Thus, " says M. Veniukoff, "was inaugurated the policy whichafterward guided us in the steppe, the foundation of advancedsettlements and towns (at first forts, afterwards _stanitsas_[Footnote: Cossack settlements. ]) until the most advanced of themtouches some natural barrier. "

About 1840, it was discovered that the system of militarycolonization was more effectual in preserving order in the Orenburgdistrict than by flying detachments sent, as occasion required, fromSouthern Russia; and in 1845-6 the Orenburg and Ural (or Targai andIrgiz) forts were established. In 1846 the Great Kirghiz Hordeacknowledged its subjection to Russia on the farther side of theBalkash, while at the same time a fort was constructed on the lowerYaxartes. 

In 1847 the encroachments of Russia in Central Asia had brought herupon the borders of the important khanates of Khiva and Khokand, and, like some huge boa-constrictor, she prepared to swallow them. In 1852 the inevitable military expedition was followed by thecustomary permanent post. Another row of forts was planted on theLower Yaxartes, and in 1854 far to the eastward, in the midst of theGreat Horde, was built Fort Vernoye--the foundation of a new line, more or less contiguous to natural boundaries (mountains andrivers), but not a close line. Between Perovsky and Vernoye therewere upwards of four hundred and fifty miles of desert open to theincursions of brigands, and between the Aral and Caspian seas therewas a gap, two hundred miles in width, favorable for raids into theOrenburg Steppe from the side of Khiva. Finally, under the pretextof closing this gap, a general convergent movement of the Siberianand Orenburg forces commenced, culminating under General Tchernayeffin the capture of Aulieata and Chemkent in 1864, and of Tashkent in1865. 

Here, M. Veniukoff says: "The Government intended to halt in itsconquests, and, limiting itself to forming a closed line on thesouth of the Kirghiz steppes, left it to the sedentary inhabitantsof Tashkent to form a separate khanate from the Khokand so hostileto us. " And this historian tells us that the Tashkendees declinedthe honor of becoming the Czar's policemen in this way, evidentlyforeseeing the end, and, to cut the matter short, chose the Russiangeneral, Tchernayeff, as their Khan. The few Central Asian rulerswhose necks had so far escaped the Muscovite heel, made anineffectual resistance, and in 1866 Hodjeni and Jizakh were duly"annexed, " thus separating Bokhara and Khokand. 

Here we may glance at the method by which Russia took firmer root onthe shores of the Caspian, and established a commercial link withthe Khivan region. In 1869 a military post and seaport was plantedat Krasnovodsk, on that point of the east shore of the Caspian, which presents the greatest facilities for shipping, and as a baseof operations against the Turcomans, who were at that time verytroublesome. Several military expeditions set out from this point, and every year detachments of troops were despatched to keep theroads open toward Khiva, the Kepet Dagh, or the banks of the Attrek. Within five years (1870-'75) the nomads living within the routesnamed had become "good Turcomans, " carried the Czar's mails toKhiva, and furnished the Krasnovodsk-Khivan caravans with camels anddrivers. But the colonization scheme on the lower Caspian had oncemore brought the Russians to the Persian boundary. In 1869 the Shahhad been rather officiously assured that Russia would not think ofgoing below the line of the Attrek; yet, as Colonel Veniukoff shows, she now regrets having committed herself, and urges "geographicalignorance" of the locality when the assurance was given, and thefact that part of her restless subjects, on the Attrek, pass eightmonths of the year in Russian territory and four in "so-called"Persia; it is therefore not difficult to imagine the probable changeon the map of that quarter. 

The march continued toward Khiva, and after the usual iron-hand-in-velvet-glove introduction, General Kaufmann in 1873 pounced uponthat important khanate, and thus added another to the jewels of theEmpire. Nominally, Khiva is independent, but nevertheless collectsand pays to Russia a considerable contribution annually. 

In 1868 Russia seized Samarcand, and established over the khanate ofBokhara a similar supervision to that in Khiva. As the distinguishedRussian already quoted remarks: "The programme of the politicalexistence of Bokhara as a separate sovereignty was accorded to herby us in the shape of two treaties, in 1868 and 1873, which definedher subordinate relation to Russia. But no one looks at these actsas the treaties of an equal with an equal. They are instructions ina polite form, or programmes given by the civilized conqueror to theconquered barbarians, and the execution of which is guaranteed bythe immediate presence of a military force. "

The district of Khokand, whose ruler, Khudoyar Khan, submittedhimself to Russia in 1867, was for a number of years nominallyindependent, but becoming disturbed by domestic dissensions, wasultimately annexed under the name of the Fergana Province. 

To this point we have followed Colonel Veniukoff's account of theRussian advance. It will doubtless interest the reader to continuethe narrative from an English view, exceptionally accurate anddispassionate in its nature. 

In a lecture before the Royal United Service Institution in London, May 16, 1884, Lieut. -General Sir Edward Hamley, of the British Army, discussed the Central Asian question before an audience comprisingsuch Indian experts as Sir Henry Rawlinson, Lord Napier of Magdala, and Mr. Charles Marvin, and many distinguished officers, includingLord Chelmsford, Sir F. Haines, and Colonel Malleson. Among otherthings, General Hamley said:

"Probably England has never been quite free, during the presentcentury, from some degree of anxiety caused by the steady, gradualapproaches of Russia through Central Asia toward India. It was seenthat where her foot was planted it never went back. It was seen thatwith forces comparatively small she never failed to effect anyconquest she was bent on, and that the conquest, once effected, wasfinal. This security in possession was owing in great measure to thefact that the governments she displaced were bad governments, andthat she substituted one far better in itself and of a simplicitywhich was well adapted to the people with whom she was dealing. Sheaimed mainly at three things--the establishment of order and ofconfidence and the obtaining of some return for her own heavyexpenses. From the establishment of order and of confidence sprang aprosperity which enabled her to obtain a certain revenue, thoughentirely inadequate to her expenditure. Thus we beheld her pressingsolidly on, and we knew not where she might stop. Pretexts, such asit was difficult to find a flaw in, were never wanting on which toground a fresh absorption of territory. And seeing behind thisadvance a vast country--almost a continent--which was not merely agreat Asiatic Power, but a great European State, under autocratic, irresponsible rule, with interests touching ours at many points, itis not to be wondered at that we watched with anxiety her progressas she bore steadily down toward our Indian frontier. "

General Hamley says that England became particularly suspicious ofRussia in 1867 when she absorbed Turkestan, and this feeling wasintensified in 1878, while the Treaty of Berlin was still pending. General Kaufmann assembled a small army of about 12, 000 men andthirty-two guns on the frontier of Bokhara, and although upon thesigning of the treaty all threatening movements ceased, yet theBritish commander then operating in Afghanistan knew that Kaufmannhad proposed to march in the direction of Kabul, and menace theBritish frontier. 

It has ever been the practice of Russia, in her schemes ofaggrandizement, to combine her diplomatic with her militarymachinery; but, unlike other nations, the ambassador has generallybeen subordinate to the general. 

At the time that General Kaufmann sheathed his sword under theinfluence of the Treaty of Berlin, in 1878, there remained anotherrepresentative of Russia--General Stolietoff--who had been quietlynegotiating with the Ameer of Afghanistan, Shere Ali, the terms of a"Russian treaty, " whose characteristics have already been described. Hearing of this, the English Ambassador at St. Petersburg questionedthe Russian Minister, who answered him "that no mission had been, nor was intended to be, sent to Kabul, either by the ImperialGovernment or by General Kaufmann. " This denial was given on July3d, the day after Stolietoff and his mission had started fromSamarcand. After the envoy's arrival at Kabul, another remonstrancemet with the reply that the mission was "of a professional natureand one of simple courtesy, " and was not, therefore, inconsistentwith the pacific assurances already given. The real nature of thismission became known from papers found by General Roberts at Kabulin 1879. These showed that Shere Ali had been invited to form aclose alliance with the Russian Government. General Kaufmann hadadvised Shere Ali to try and stir up disaffection among the Queen'sIndian subjects, promising to aid him, eventually, with troops. Finding that this scheme was impracticable at the moment, Russiadropped the Ameer, who fled from the scene of his misfortunes, anddied soon after. 

For the moment England breathed more freely. There were still greatnatural obstacles between the empires of Russia and of India. Notonly the friendly state of Afghanistan, but on its northwesternborder the neutral territory of Merv, hitherto an independentprovince, and inhabited by warlike tribes of Turcomans difficult toreach through their deserts and likely to harass a Russian advanceto Herat to an embarrassing extent. It was seen that the possessionof this territory would at once free Russia from much difficulty incase of an advance and give her the means of threatening Herat aswell as Kabul from her base in Turkestan, and even to some extent tocarry forward that base beyond the Oxus. 

On the part of Russia, the success of General Skobeleff in capturingthe fortified position of Geok Tepe, January 24, 1880, marked thebeginning of negotiations with the Turcomans for the acquisition ofMerv. For a long while these were unsuccessful, but early in 1884 itwas cabled to London, that "The Queen of the World" had accepted theWhite Czar as her future liege lord. 

The immediate cause of this event was the effect produced upon theminds of the Turcoman deputation to Moscow by the spectacle of theCzar's coronation. The impression created by the gorgeous ceremonialwas heightened by the presence of so many Asiatic chiefs andkinglets at the ancient and historic capital of Russia. The talesthey brought back were well calculated to influence the minds of awild and primitive people; and when the Khan of Khiva proffered hisservices for the settlement of their relations with Russia, thatsection of the Tekke tribe in favor of peace accepted them. Thechiefs tendered their formal submission to the Czar, and promised toallow Russian merchants to reside among them, and pledged themselvesto maintain the security of the routes from the Oxus to the Tejend;also accepting the responsibilities of Russian subjects by renderingtribute either in money or by military service. To all intents andpurposes it is equivalent to the establishment of a Russian garrisonin Merv. 

The thorough way in which Russia seeks to bind her Asiatic subjectsis shown in the fact that in 1884, at the request of the Khan ofKhiva, a Russian tutor was selected to instruct his children. 

Soon after it was reported that the Russians had establishedthemselves at Sarakhs on the direct road to Herat and just over thePersian boundary of Afghanistan. These later movements again arousedthe distrust of England, and a joint commission of Russian andEnglish officials was appointed early in the year 1885. 

While the English members of the commission under Sir Peter Lumsdenwere awaiting the convenience of their foreign colleagues, thepresence of Russian troops was reported on the disputed territory inthe vicinity of Herat. 

This action alarmed the Afghans, and a collision seemed imminent. The English Government considered M. De Giers' explanation of thisencroachment unsatisfactory. Pending an adjustment of the newcomplication both nations prepared for the worst. 

Here we will leave the subject of the Russian advance through theGates of Asia and pass to the consideration of the present neutralground of Afghanistan. 

[Illustration: OUTLINE MAP Showing RUSSIAN-CAUCASIAN andTRANS-CASPIAN Territory, and NEW ODESSA-HERAT ROUTE. ]

II. 

ON THE THRESHOLD OF INDIA. 

From the Amu Daria and the Turcoman steppes to the deserts ofBeloochistan, from Persian Khorassan to the valley of the Indus, stretches the country of the Afghans. Men of renown and events ofworld-wide interest have been connected with its history. Itsrecords tell of the murder of Cavagnari in recent times; of thetragedy of Elphinstone's command (1838-42); of Shah Nadir, thebutcher of Delhi (1738-39); of Baber Khan, the founder of Mongolianrule in India (1520); of Timur, the assailer of the world (1398); ofGenghiz Khan, the annihilator of the civilization of ancient Asia(1218-24); of the great ruler, Sultan Mahmoud (A. D. 1000); and yetearlier, of Alexander, "the divinely favored Macedonian. " Afghanhistory dies away, in the hymns of the Indian Vedas, eighteenhundred years before the birth of Christ. 

The territory of Afghanistan--which is destined to be the arena of agreat international duel--covers an area of 12, 000 square miles, ora tract measuring from north to south 688 miles, and from east towest 736 miles. It is a mountainous country; a high plateau, 6, 000feet above the sea, overlooked by lofty mountain ranges which openout and sink toward the west and south. On the north it is borderedby the western ranges of the Himalayas, which reach to the AmuDaria; by the wall-like range of the Hindu Kush, some of whose peaksare 19, 000 feet high; and by several smaller ridges. Between theKabul and Kuram rivers rises the snow-capped Sufeid Koh, theprincipal peak of which, to the south of Jelalabad, attains analtitude of 15, 000 feet. To the south of this, in SouthernAfghanistan, the Suleiman range, of an average height of 9, 000 feet, falls rapidly toward the valley of the Indus. Between the Hindu Kushand the Suleiman ranges there are several lesser ones stretchingtoward the southwest, including the Auran Mountains (7, 000 feet). 

Of the principal rivers noted here (the Helmund, Har-i-Rud, Kabul, Kuram, and the Gomal) the Helmund alone is navigable. The Helmundterminates in the swamps of Seistan, as also do the Kash, Farrah, and Herat rivers, running parallel to the Helmund across theKandahar-Herat roads, at 80, 150, and 200 miles, respectively, tothe west of it. These rivers are without bridges, but (with theexception of the Helmund--provided with ferry at Girishk) arefordable, save in the months of April and May. The country isotherwise open and easily traversable, but only on the main routescan water be readily obtained, and forage is scarce in the winter. 

The Turnuk valley, running northeast from Kandahar, is followed bythe great route to Ghazni and Kabul skirting the Guikok range--separated from the Hazaristan to its west by the parallel valley ofthe Argandab. The latter valley is also followed by a route whichenters it from Mooktur, the source of the Turnuk. This debouchesupon the Herat road about ten miles west of Kandahar, and there isno communication west of it between Herat and Kabul, save byimpracticable mountain routes across the Hazaristan. 

Three routes from Kandahar to Herat separate at Girishk on theHelmund, cross the Kash at different points, and meet at Sabzawar(280 miles from Kandahar) on the Herat; both of the southernmostpassing by the town of Farrah, which is 230 miles from Kandahar. From Girishk also a road follows the Helmund to Seistan and LashJowain, where it joins the Herat road at Farrah on the river of thatname, or at Sabzawar on the Herat. The southernmost of the routes toFarrah also branches from Kash down the river named Kash, joiningthe Seistan route at Lash. 

The general aspect of Afghanistan is that of a series of elevatedflat-bottomed valleys, in the vicinity of the streams, somewhatunder cultivation. The scenery is often wild and beautiful, and someof the defiles to the north of the Hindu Kush are said to be ofappalling grandeur, while the soft, still loveliness of thesheltered glens on the southern slope of that range stronglyimpresses the traveller who visits them. Some of the ranges in thenorth and northeast are well timbered with pine and oak. 

The eastern half of Afghanistan is generally cold and rugged, butsustains innumerable flocks and herds, and abounds in mineralwealth, especially lead and sulphur. In the more sheltered valleysconsiderable fruit is grown, but only grain enough for the actualconsumption of the inhabitants. Water and fodder abound, but fuel isdeficient; a serious matter, as the cold in the winter is extreme. The western part of Afghanistan is a more fertile region, interspersed, it is true, with lofty ranges, but comprising manypleasant valleys and pastures. 

The population is approximately estimated at eight millions. Afghanistan is a genuine society of different nations, although thegreater part are of Persian descent. The strongholds of the Germanself-protecting federations are here produced on a large scale. 

Thus the Duranis, Tajiks, Yusafzais, Ghilzais, Eimaks, Hazaris, Kaffirs, Hindus, Jats, Arabs, Kizilbashis, Uzbeks, Biluchis, arenear neighbors; of these about 3, 000, 000 may be real Afghans whoprofess the Suni faith and speak Indo-Persian Puchtu. There are overfour hundred inferior tribes known. The Duranis are numericallystrongest and live in the vicinity of Kandahar. Next in importanceare the Ghilzais, estimated at 30, 000 fighting men living in thetriangle--Kabul, Jelalabad, Khelat-i-Ghilzai; until 1747 theyfurnished the rulers of Afghanistan. To the south of the Ghilzaislive the Puchtu-speaking races who chiefly defend only their ownterritory; the mountainous eastern border is inhabited by theMomunds, Afridis, Arakzais, Zymukts, Waziris, who have never beensubdued. Their sense of independence, however, does not prevent themfrom selling their friendship for ready money to the highest bidder. On the watershed of the Helmund and Indus dwell the independentPathans and Biluchis. The Persian-speaking Kizilbashis in Kabul, comprise 3, 000, 000 of Shiahs, who are not Afghans, many of whose30, 000 fighting men are in the Ameer's regular army. The Tajiks--about 10, 000 men--are chiefly in the Kabul and Ghazni districts. The Hazaris and Eimaks are in the central section of Afghanistan, known as the Hazaristan, extending east and west from the Koushanpass over the Hindu-Kush range to Marchat on the Turcoman frontier, and north and south from Sirpool in Turkestan to Girishk, betweenKandahar and Herat; they are the descendants of the militarysettlers left by the Tartar hordes that swept Central Asia underGenghiz Khan, and still maintain a quasi-independence; theycordially detest the Afghan Government, but pay an annual tribute inmoney to its support. Finally there is a million of foreignnationalities, including Turks, Persians, Indians, Armenians, andKaffirs; the last-named are Hindus, and violent antagonists of theMohammedans living around them. 

[Illustration: Mahaz Khan (a Tajik), Khan of Pest Bolak. Jehandad (Lohanir), from Ghazni. ]

Thus it is seen that modern Afghanistan comprises three greatdistricts--Herat in the west, Kabul in the east, and Kandahar in thecentre, with the seat of government at the cities of the same namesrespectively. Within each district are, as already described, alarge number of tribes occupying sub-districts, closely connectedlike the cells of a honey-comb, but each with its destinctivemanners and customs and irregular military forces, in no instancenumbering less than 6, 000 men, and often twice that number, dividedabout equally into horse and foot. Many of these render militaryservice to the Ameer, many are bandits in the worst sense. Thenomadic tribes--like the Eimaks peopling the Heratic region--liveprincipally in tents, encamping in winter in the valleys, and insummer on the table-lands of the mountain ranges. They are ignorant, hospitable, and brave and ardent hunters. Their principal trade iswith Herat, and consists of woollen and camel-hair fabrics andclarified butter. 

[Illustration: Wullie Mohammed, a Dahzungi Hazara. Pozai Khan, a Shinwarri (Musician). ]

The farming population all live in small hamlets. The better classesof these live in villages surrounding or joined to the castle of aKhan. These castles are encompassed by a rude wall, havingfrequently turrets at the corners, and occasionally armed withswivel-guns or wall-pieces. The principal gardens are always on theoutside of the castle, and the herds of horses and camels belongingto the Khan are kept at distant pastures and attended by herders, who live in tents. In the Bori and Ghazgar valleys the houses are ofwood. In the Ghazgar valley they are all fortified, as alreadydescribed; the doors are generally mere man-holes, and the top ofthe towers are loopholes. The better class, and more modern ofthese, have flat roofs, from which the water is carried by spouts;the walls surrounding are at least twelve feet high, and covernearly an acre of ground. Three or four such houses usuallyconstitute a village. These semi-barbarians are noted for the lengthand ferocity of their feuds. Sometimes two branches of a family whoare neighbors become enemies. The distance between their "fortlets"may be two hundred yards, and on that space no one ventures. They goout at opposite gates and walk straight from their own fort in aline protected by its walls from the fire of the other, until out ofrange, then they turn around to their fields. Broadfoot relates that"once in Zurmat I saw a fort shut by rolling a stone against thedoor, instead of with the usual heavy chain. On inquiring as to thecause of such carelessness, the Malik, a fine old man with a plump, good-humored face, stretched his arms out toward the line of distantforts, and said: 'I have not an enemy!' It was a pleasing exceptionto the rule. "

[Illustration: Khan Baz, a Khumbhur Khel Afreedi. Tooro Baz, a Kookie Khel Afreedi. ]

These feuds are a system of petty warfare, carried on by long shots, stealing cattle, and burning crops. Samson, burning his neighbor'scorn, acted just like an Afghan. When the harvest is nearly ripe, neither party dare sleep. The remedy is sometimes for both to fightuntil an equal number are killed on each side, when the neighborsstep in and effect a reconciliation; another method is to payforfeit of a feast and some sheep or cloth; in exceptional cases, afew Afghan virgins are substituted for the sheep, but they are givenin marriage, and are well treated. 

Our space does not permit an extended reference to the manners andcustoms of this primitive people but a few characteristics may bebriefly noted. The love of war is felt much more among Afghans thanby other Eastern peoples, although but little effort has been madeby them to augment the means of resistance and aggression. Pillage, fighting, and disturbances are at times necessary to their veryexistence, and are followed by long days of idleness, during whichthey live on the fruits of their depredations. There is no shade ofdifference between the character of the nomad and the citizen; atown life does not soften their habits; they live there as they livein a tent, armed to the teeth and ready for the onslaught. Thoughfull of duplicity, one is nevertheless liable to be taken in bytheir apparent frankness. They are hospitable to strangers, but onlybecause this is an ancient custom which has the force of law and isnot a virtue which springs from the heart. The pride of the Afghansis a marked feature of their national character. They boast of theirdescent, their prowess in arms, their independence; and cap all by"Am I not a Puktan?"

The Afghan people, occupied with the defence of their homes, havefailed to assist the Ameer in the formation and maintenance of thatindispensable instrument--an organized, well-equipped, easilymobilized army. In regular battle the Afghans can have but littlehope of success; their strength lies in the petty warfare peculiarto a wild, mountainous country. As auxiliaries, as partisan troopsin their own country, they would be of great value to their alliesand extremely troublesome to their enemies. For outpost, courier, and scouting purposes, they would doubtless be most efficient. Thestrength of the organized army in the service of the Ameer ofAfghanistan is about 50, 000 men of all arms. The traveller Vambery, who visited Herat in 1863, says:

"The Afghan's national costume consists of a long shirt, drawers, and dirty linen clothes; or, if he is a soldier, he affects aBritish red coat. He throws it over his shirt, while he gets on hishead the picturesque Indo-Afghan turban. Others again--and these arethe _beau-monde_--are wont to assume a half-Persian costume. Weaponsare borne by all. Rarely does any one, whether civil or military, enter the bazar without his sword and shield. To be quite _a lamode_ one must carry about one quite an arsenal, consisting of twopistols, a sword, poniard, hand-jar, gun, and shield. " M. Vamberyalso describes a drill of some Afghan regulars. 

"The men had a very military bearing, far better than the Ottomanarmy that was so drilled forty years ago. These might have beenmistaken for European troops if most of them had not had on theirbare feet the pointed Kabuli shoe, and had not had their shorttrowsers so tightly stretched by their straps that they threatenedevery moment to burst and fly up above the knee. "

The adventurous O'Donovan thus describes an Afghan cavalryman whomhe met unexpectedly, near Herat, in 1880: "He wore a dark-coloredturban, one end of the cloth pulled up in front so as to resemble asmall cockade. His uniform was blue-black, and he wore long boots. Abroad black leather cross-belt, with two very large brass buckles, crossed his breast. He had sabre, pistols, and carbine. "

[Illustration: Zool Kuddar, an Adam Khel Afreedi. Mousa, a Kizilbash, Born in Peshawur. ]

The actual fighting strength of the army of Afghanistan cannot bedefinitely stated. Major Lumsden, who has represented the BritishGovernment in that country in various diplomatic capacities, stated(some years since) that the regular army of the Ameer consisted ofsixteen regiments of infantry, three of cavalry, and seventy-sixfield guns. The infantry regiments numbered about 800 men each; themen were obtained by compulsory levy. Their uniform consisted ofEnglish cast-off clothes purchased at auction. The pay, about fiverupees per mensem, was paid irregularly and often in kind; twomonths' pay was deducted for clothing. The cavalry and artillerywere badly horsed; and the horses were sent to graze in summer. ARussian report of 1868 estimates the infantry at 10, 000 men. Thearmament, equipment, and instruction of the troops have doubtlessimproved since that time, as ten years later the British Governmentsupplied the Afghan Government with 10, 000 Enfield and 5, 000 Sniderrifles and one field battery, and very recently (1885) it wasannounced that a present of Martini-Henry rifles and improved fieldguns had been sent to Abdurrahman by the Indian authorities. 

Besides the regular army there is a paid irregular mounted force ofabout 20, 000 men, active and formidable in "hill operations, " andknown as Jezailchis. 

The late General Colin Mackenzie, in an account of his experiencesin the Elphinstone disaster of 1842, says:

"The Jezailchis are so called from their jezails or long rifles. TheAfghans are said to be among the best marksmen in the world. Theyare accustomed to arms from early boyhood, live in a chronic stateof warfare with their neighbors, and are most skilful in takingadvantage of cover. An Afghan will throw himself flat, behind astone barely big enough to cover his head, and scoop a hollow in theground with his left elbow as he loads. Men like these only requiretraining to make first-rate irregular troops. 

"As a trait of Afghan character, I must mention that whenever theJezailchis could snatch five minutes to refresh themselves with apipe, one of them would twang a sort of a rude guitar as anaccompaniment to some martial song, which, mingling with the notesof war, sounded very strangely. "

The Russian General Staff have also estimated the Ameer's force, exclusive of the irregulars, at 66, 400 men with 30 guns. 

The efficiency of this body, by reason of their peculiarsurroundings, must vary with the character of the operations. Fordefence--particularly of their own section--they form an importantconsideration; for aggressive purposes their strength lies inpartisan operations, in small detachments, requiring great mobility. 

Just as it is difficult to understand the rapidity with whichlarge numbers are assembled in Afghanistan for fighting purposes, so the dispersing of an Afghan army together with its attendantmasses of tribal levies in flight is almost beyond comprehension;men who have been actually engaged in hand-to-hand combat dispose oftheir arms in the villages they pass through, and meet theirpursuers with melons or other fruit in their hands, While they adoptthe _role_ of peaceful inhabitants. 

A brief description of some of the more noted cities of Afghanistanmay be appropriate here. 

Sir Henry Rawlinson gives the following details respecting theso-called Key of India--the city of Herat:

"That which distinguishes Herat from all other Oriental cities, andat the same time constitutes its main defence, is the stupendouscharacter of the earthwork upon which the city wall is built. Thisearthwork averages 250 feet in width at the base and about 50 feetin height, and as it is crowned by a wall 25 feet high and 14 feetthick at the base, supported by about 150 semicircular towers, andis further protected by a ditch 45 feet in width and 16 feet indepth, it presents an appearance of imposing strength. Whether theplace is really as strong as it looks has been differentlyestimated. General Ferrier, who resided for some time in Herat, in1846, states that the city is nothing more than an immense redoubt, and gives it as his opinion that, as the line of wall is entirelywithout flanking defences, the place could not hold out for twentydays against a European army; and M. Khanikoff, who, although not aprofessional soldier, was a very acute observer, further remarksthat the whole interior of the city is dominated from the risingground 700 yards distant and covered with solid buildings at thenortheast angle, while the water supply both for the ditch and thecity would be at the mercy of an enemy holding the outside country;the wells and reservoirs inside the wall, which could then alone beavailable--being quite inadequate to the wants of the inhabitants:but on the other hand, all experience testifies to the defensibilityof the position. 

"Not to speak of the siege which Herat sustained at the hands ofGenghiz Khan, of Timur, and of Ahmed Shah, we have only to rememberthat in 1837 the Afghans of Herat, under Major Eldred Pottinger, beat off the continuous attacks, for nearly ten months, of a Persianarmy of 35, 000 regular troops supported by fifty pieces ofartillery, and in many cases directed and even commanded by Russianofficers. The truth seems to be that Herat, although in its presentstate quite unfit to resist a European army, possesses greatcapabilities of defence, and might by a skilful adaptation of theresources of modern science be made almost impregnable. MajorSaunders, a British engineer officer, calculated in 1840 that, at anoutlay of L60, 000, which would include the expenses of deepening theditch, clearing the glacis and esplanade, providing flankingdefences, and repairing the walls throughout, Herat might berendered secure against any possible renewal of the attack byPersia. "

The location of this city upon the principal thoroughfare betweenIndia, Persia, and Turkestan gives it a special importance in amilitary sense. It is also the principal mart of WesternAfghanistan, and comprises extensive manufactures in wool andleather. The natural fertility of the country near Herat has beenenhanced by irrigation. 

"The valley, or _julgah_ (as the Persians say), in which thecity lies is rich in the possession of a river. This valley is aboutthirty miles long by sixteen in breadth, exclusive of the groundtaken up by the fortress and the walls. Four of these miles separatethe town from the northern and twelve from the southern hills, whileat one quarter of the greater distance runs the Her-i-Rud or HeratRiver, which, rising near the Kuh-i-Baba, pursues a westerly coursetill, passing the city, it sweeps, first gradually, then decidedly, to the north, eventually to lose its identity in the environs ofSarakhs. It is of political as well as of geographical importance, for it passes between the Persian and Afghan frontier posts ofKahriz and Kusun respectively, and may be considered to mark thePerso-Afghan boundary at the Western Paropismus. The Plain, south ofthe walls, is watered by a net-work of eight or nine large and manyminor ditches. The aqueducts are stated to be superior to those ofBokhara, Samarcand, and Ispahan. The grain produced is abundant--beyond the requirements of town and suburbs together. The bread, thewater, and the vines have the merit of special excellence. Yet, withall this wealth of means and material, capable of subsisting an armyof 150, 000 men for some time, much of the legacy of past ages isdisregarded and nullified by the supineness of a present generation. The ruins visible on all sides are not all useless or obsoleteworks. As one conclusive instance may be cited the neglected'Pul-i-Malan. ' This bridge, of twenty-three arches, can scarcely beconsidered void of purpose or practical benefit. It is, however, rapidly falling into decay, and as the river has changed its bed, part of it remains, barren of object, on dry land. On the rising ofthe waters this state of things is inconvenient; for the river, atsuch time, is no longer fordable, and the Kandahar caravans, goingto and fro, have difficulty in crossing. " [Footnote: Sir F. J. Goldsmid, "Journeys Between Herat and Khiva. "]

In 1830 Conolly was of opinion that the city was one of the dirtiestin the world, being absolutely destitute of drainage; and Vambery, thirty-three years afterward, when the city was captured by DostMohammed, says the city was largely a heap of rubbish, havingsuffered the horrors of a long siege. 

The city of Kabul, from which the surrounding territory of EasternAfghanistan takes its name, stands in lat. 34 degrees 30' N. , andlong. 69 degrees 6' E. , near the point where the Kabul River iscrossed by three bridges. Its altitude is 6, 400 feet, and, within ashort distance to the north, is overtopped by pinnacles of the HinduKush about 14, 000 feet higher. 

The winters are severe, but the summers are very temperate--seldomgoing above 80 degrees. Kabul is fortified without and within; beingseparated into quarters by stone walls: the Bala Hissar, or citadelproper, being on the east, while the Persian quarter of the city isstrongly protected on the southwest. In the days of Sultan Baber, Kabul was the capital of the Mogul empire. In modern times, it hasbeen the scene of many Anglo-Indian struggles. It was taken by theBritish in 1839, and lost by them, through treachery, in 1841;in the following January, 4, 000 British soldiers and 12, 000camp-followers were massacred while retreating. 

Kandahar, the capital of Central Afghanistan, is about two hundredmiles S. W. Of Kabul, and three hundred and seventy-one miles E. OfHerat. It is said to have been founded by Alexander of Macedon. Thecity is laid out at right angles, and is watered from theneighboring rivers through canals, which send to every street anample supply. Sir Michael Biddulph describes the surroundings:"Kandahar stands on the western side of a plain, which wasoriginally a barren skirt of the mountain. Exactly opposite to thecity, and two miles to the westward, there is a wide break in thedividing ridge, through which the road to Herat leads, and by whichare conducted the many canals and watercourses, taken from theArgandab, to supply the town and fertilize its environs. The energyand skill displayed in these extensive water-works cannot be toohighly extolled. Brought from a point many miles distant in theArgandab valley, the chief canal, with its offshoots, conducts avast body of water, which is dispersed along the contours of thedeclining plain in innumerable channels, spreading a rich fertilityfor many miles in a fan-like form to the southeast of the gap. Villages cluster around the city on three sides; cornfields, orchards, gardens, and vineyards are seen in luxurious succession, presenting a veritable oasis within the girdle of rugged hills anddesert wastes all around. And if we turn to the aspect of thecountry beyond the gap, we see in the Argandab valley, along thecanals and the river banks, a fair and beautiful landscape ofvillage and cultivated ground, stretching for many miles in eachdirection. This productive character of the immediate neighborhoodof Kandahar, and its commanding position within reach of otherfertile districts, would give to this place, under a strong, stable, and just government, as much prosperity and happiness as falls tothe lot of any place in the world. "

[Illustration: City of Kandahar, Afghanistan. ]

Jelalabad stands on the Kabul River, about half-way between Kabuland the Khaiber Pass. It was the scene of the stubborn defence bySir Robert Sale in 1842, referred to elsewhere. It has a floatingpopulation of about three thousand souls. Our engraving is takenfrom the south and west. The stream in the west is the Kabul River. The Jati gate in the south wall is the exit from the Hindu quarter. The Kabul exit is on the west, while the road to Peshawur commencesat the gate of that name on the east wall of the city. The northerngate is known as the Pheel Khana, or elephant quarter. The walls ofthe town and of its houses are of mud, and the roofs generally ofwood. The city is laid out in the form of a parallelogramintersected by two main streets crossing in the centre. 

The town of Ghazni (the ancient Ghizni) is another historicallandmark in a region famous for its evidences of former grandeur. Itstands about 230 miles northeast of Kandahar on the road to Kabul;it is literally "founded upon a rock" at an elevation of 7, 726 feet, and its base is 280 feet above the adjacent plain. It has wallsthirty-five feet high, and a wet ditch, but is not considered in anysense formidable by modern engineers, as it is commanded byneighboring heights; it will always be a rendezvous for the natives, and forms a station or an important line of communication betweenthe Indus and the Murghab. In the tenth century it was the seat ofan empire comprising the present territory of Afghanistan, and whichhad in the space of seventy years absorbed thirty-eight degrees oflongitude and twenty degrees of latitude. Its decline dates from thetwelfth century, when the seat of government was transferred toLahore. From 1839 to 1880 it has been occupied alternately by theBritish and the Afghans. The climate is not exceptionally severe, although in winter the mercury drops to 25 degrees below zero attimes. The population averages about ten thousand. 

Peshawur is one of the most important towns, both in a military andcommercial sense, in the _Derajat_. It is the capital of a provinceof the same name on the N. W. Frontier of India, eighteen miles fromthe Khaiber Pass and one hundred and fifty miles S. E. Of Kabul. Ithas the usual bastioned defences, besides some detached works ofmore importance. It was once a rich and populous city, but has, likemany other like places in that region, fallen from its high estate. It is garrisoned by the British, and can boast of fair trade and apopulation of about fifty thousand. It is the centre of a fruitfuldistrict containing more than one million inhabitants. 

The fruitful valley and pass of Bamian lie on the road leading fromKabul to Turkestan. The pass, at an elevation of 8, 496 feet, is theonly known defile over the Hindu Kush practicable for artillery. This valley was one of the chief centres of Buddhist worship, asgigantic idols, mutilated indeed by fanatical Mussulmans, conclusively prove. Bamian, with its colossal statues cut out in therock, was among the wonders described by the Buddhist monks whotraversed Central Asia in the fourth century. The statues are foundon a hill about three hundred feet high, in which are a number ofcells excavated in the rock, not unlike those found in the Zunicountry in the western part of the United States. The male figure isabout 160 feet, the female 120 feet, in height; they are clothed inlight drapery, and a winding stair may be ascended to the head. 

Eight miles eastward of Bamian lies the ancient fortress of Zohak, attributed to the fabulous Persian serpent-king of that name. It isstill used as one of the defences of the pass. 

[Illustration: Castle of Zohak, First March from Bamian, on the IrakRoad to Kabul. ]

The animals of Afghanistan adapted to military transport purposesare the camel, the _yabu_ (mountain pony), and the donkey. 

From certain professional papers, on the camel, by Captain Yaldwynand other officers of the Indian Army, we learn that this beast ofburden has been often utilized by the British in Afghanistan, andthe supply of camels raised in that country has generally beenaugmented by drafts from India, although the last mentioned do notthrive under the transition. The camel is docile, capable ofabstinence in an emergency, well adapted for the imposition of loadsand for traversing over flat or sandy ground, adapts itself to roughroads, has acute sight and smell, and, during progression, movesboth feet on one side, simultaneously. Its flesh and milk arewholesome articles of food. It is deficient in muscular powerbehind, and cannot readily climb hills. Those found in Afghanistanare of the Arabian species. They are strong, thickset, withabundance of hair; are short in the leg, better climbers, and moreaccustomed to cold than others of the species. Their feedingrequires as much care as that of cavalry or artillery horses; theyare fond of green food, and certain trees and shrubs. In grazing, camels brought from India sometimes are poisoned by eating theoleander bush and other plants which the native camel avoids. Elphinstone's ill-fated expedition in 1841 lost 800 out of 2, 500camels from this cause alone. On the march, or where grazing doesnot abound, they are fed with grain and _bhoosa_ [Footnote:Chopped straw. ]; this is given them in one ration at the end of theday. The theory that camels do not require much watering is declareda fallacy; the Arabian species can take in five or six gallons, sufficient for as many days; they will not drink cold running water;but, where water can be had, they should be watered daily. The loadof the camel varies from 300 to 450 pounds, depending upon itscondition. It is admirably adapted for carrying long articles, asladders, tent-poles, and even light mountain guns. The marchingpower of camels depends on a number of conditions. They are goodgoers in loose sandy soil, and even over stony ground, if the stonesare not too large and sharp; in slippery places they are useless, asthey have no hold with their feet. They are very enduring, makingthe longest marches at an average speed of two miles an hour, andcan ford deep rivers with ease if the current is not too rapid. Whenthe bottom of the ford is shifting sand, the passage of a number ofcamels renders it firm. A string of 500 camels covers about one mileof road; 1, 250 mules, carrying the same weight of supplies, occupydouble the distance. Camels must be unladen at ferries. For militarypurposes these animals are purchased between the ages of five andnine years, and may be used up to the age of sixteen. They averageabout one thousand pounds in weight, seven feet in height to the topof the hump, and eight feet in length from nose to tail. In camp andwhen not at work they are arranged in lines facing each other, or incircles heads inward; the latter plan is the favorite formation atnight. The allowance of spare camels on service is ten per cent. 

[Illustration: An Afghan Post-Chaise; Going to the Front. ]

Lieut. Martin, R. E. , states that his company, of Sappers andMiners, was able to get an exceptional percentage of labor fromthe camels under his charge by attention to certain details; andsays further, that "camels are very quarrelsome and bite each otherbadly when grazing. They can ford four feet of moderately runningwater, easily, if the bed is good; but a yard of greasy mud, a fewinches deep, will throw many camels and delay a convoy for hours. Camel-bridges were carried on the leading camels, with a fewshovels and picks, in every convoy of the Kandahar Field Force, andall small cuts or obstructions were thus bridged in a few minutes;the camels remaining by their bridges (two gang-boards eight bythree feet) until the last baggage camel had passed. In perfectlyopen country, such as Kandahar to Girishk, it was found possible tomarch the camels on a broad front, the whole convoy being a roughsquare; camels starting at 3 A. M. Have been known to arrive at campten miles off as late as 5 P. M. "

Captain Yaldwyn says: "A camel's carrying-power is equal to that oftwo and a half mules or ponies, whilst his ration is only about thatof one mule or pony. Thus 500 camels only eat as much as 500 mulesor ponies, and whilst the latter can only carry 1, 000 _maunds_[Footnote: A _maund_ is 80 pounds. ] the former can carry 2, 500. Again, 500 camels only require 125 attendants to be paid, clothed, and fed, whilst 500 mules or ponies require 167 attendants. " But, onthe other hand, the immense losses of camels from excessive heat orcold, or over-exertion in mountainous or rough roads, and othercauses, greatly neutralize the force of this comparison. 

The _yabu_ is a hardy mountain pony used by the Afghans for thesaddle and packing purposes; they are very strong, active, andsure-footed, and have been frequently used by the British forces intheir military operations. In 1839 Captain (afterward General)Outram relates that his _yabu_, "although but thirteen hands high, carried me and my saddlebags, weighing altogether upward of sixteenstone, the whole distance from Kalat in seven days and a half (anaverage of nearly forty-seven miles a day), during which time I hadpassed 111 hours on its back; there was no saddle on the pony, merely a cloth over his back. "

They will carry from four to five _maunds_ with perfect ease, makingjourneys of thirty miles a day. Those which are ridden and whichamble, are called _yurgas_. The Afghans tie a knot in the middle ofthe long tails of their horses, which, they say, strengthens theanimal's backbone!

The Afghan donkey was severely tested in 1880 during the operationsof Sir Donald Stewart between Kabul and Kandahar, and this class ofcarriage was found very useful in the conveyance of provisions. Afghan donkeys will march with troops and carry loads of grain orflour, averaging ninety pounds, without difficulty. They keep pacewith mules or ponies in a baggage column, as they avoid the frequentchecks which retard the larger animals; they browse on the line ofmarch, and find their own forage easily in the neighborhood of camp;they are easily controlled and cared for, and are on all accountsthe most inexpensive transport in Eastern countries. [Footnote:Lieut. -Col. E. F. Chapman, C. B. , R. A. ]

The transport animals found in India and Turkestan will be describedin the parts of this book devoted to the military resources of thoseregions. 

In concluding this sketch of the "Threshold of India, " a mere glanceat the military history of the country will suffice. In fact, onlyso far as it may have a bearing upon the present, has reference tothe past any place in this volume. 

The early periods of eventful interest to Afghanistan have beenalready noted at the opening of this chapter. Its purely Orientalexperiences were beginning to fade with the death of Nadir Shah--variously termed the "Butcher of Delhi, " and the "Wallace ofPersia, " in 1747. His progress toward India, from which he was totear its choicest treasure and loot its greatest city, reminds oneof the Arabian Nights. A camp-follower from Jelalabad reported asfollows: "He has 36, 000 horsemen with himself . . . After morningprayers he sits on a throne, the canopy of which is in the form of adome and of gold. One thousand young men, with royal standards ofred silk and the lance tops and tassels of silver, are disposedregularly; and, at a proper distance, five hundred beautiful slaves, from twelve to twenty years old, stand--one half on his right andthe other on his left. All the great men stand fronting him; and theArzbegi stands between, in readiness to represent whatever he isdesired, and everybody has his cause decided at once: bribery is notso much as known here. He has particular information given him ofevery thing that passes; all criminals, great and small, rich andpoor, meet with immediate death. He sits till noon, after which hedines, then reposes a little; when afternoon prayers are over hesits till the evening prayers, and when they are over he shoots fivearrows into the _Khak Tudah_, and then goes into the women'sapartments. " [Footnote: Fraser's "Nadir Shah. "]

The splendor of the Robber King has departed, but his deeds of bloodand treachery have often been repeated in the country of theAfghans. 

A succession of struggles between Afghan and Persian leaders for thecontrol of Afghanistan marked the next fifty years. 

When the project of Russian invasion of India, suggested byNapoleon, was under consideration in Persia, a British envoy wassent, in 1809, to the then Shah Sujah, and received the most cordialreception at Peshawur. But Shah Sujah was, in 1810, superseded byhis brother, Mahmud, and the latter was pressed hard by the son ofhis Wazir to such an extent that Herat alone remained to him. In1823 his former kingdom passed to Dost Mohammed, who in 1826governed Kabul, Kandahar, Ghazni, and Peshawur. The last-named placefell into the hands of Runjeet Singh, the "Lion of the Punjab. " DostMohammed then applied to England for aid in recovering Peshawur, failing in which he threatened to turn to Russia. 

That Power was (1837) engaged in fomenting trouble in the westernpart of Afghanistan, encouraging an attack by 30, 000 Persians, ledby Russian officers, upon Herat. Instead of acceding to the requestof Dost Mohammed, the British Governor-General--Lord Auckland--declared war against that potentate, alleging in a proclamation that"the welfare of the English possessions in the East rendered itnecessary to have an ally on their western frontier who would be infavor of peace, and opposed to all disorders and innovations. "

This was the beginning of intrigues relating to Afghanistan on thepart, alternately, of England and Russia, in which John Bull has hadto pay, literally, "the lion's share" of the cost in blood andtreasure. In 1850, Sir John Cam Hobhouse, President of the Board ofControl in India confessed: "The Afghan war _was done by myself_;the Court of Directors had nothing to do with it. " The reasonalready mentioned was alleged as an excuse for hostilities. Theywere declared, notwithstanding that the British political agent atthe Court of Dost Mohammed reported that ruler as "entirely English"in his sympathies. This report was suppressed. Twenty years laterthe facts were given to Parliament, Russian letters were foundimplicating the Czar's ministers, and the English agent, Burnes, wasvindicated. 

The Anglo-Indian army--consisting of twenty thousand troops, fiftythousand followers, and sixty thousand camels--advanced in twocolumns, one from Bengal, and the other from Bombay by the Indus. Scinde, which had hitherto been independent, like the Punjab andLahore, was subjugated _en route_, and nine thousand men wereleft behind to occupy it. On the 23d of February, 1839, asimultaneous advance from Shikarpur, on the Bolan Pass, commenced. Kandahar was occupied April 25th, Ghazni July 23d, and Kabul August6th, and Shah Sujah was proclaimed Ameer by British authority. Bythe following September the greater part of the English forcesreturned to India. Only five regiments of infantry and one ofcavalry remained in Afghanistan, where suspicious symptoms ofdiscontent with the new order of things began very soon to showthemselves. During the summer of 1840 insurrections had to be putdown by force in several places. In November of the same year DostMohammed defeated the English in the Perwan Pass. From that timeuntil the autumn of 1841 a sultry calm reigned in the country. 

The English commanders, although fully aware of the state of mind ofthe people, neglected to take the most simple measures ofprecaution. 

The local control was vested in a mixed military and civil council, consisting of General Elphinstone, unfitted by disease and naturalirresolution from exercising the functions of command, and SirWilliam McNaghten, the British envoy, whose self-confidence andtrust in the treacherous natives made him an easy victim. In thecentre of an insurrection which was extending day by day under theireyes and under their own roofs, these representatives of a powerfulnation, with a small but effective force, deliberately buried theirheads in the sand of their credulity, not realizing the nature ofthe danger which for weeks was evident to many of theirsubordinates. 

Finally a force of the insurgents, under the direction of the son ofthe deposed ruler, Akbar Khan, threw off the disguise they hadassumed before the English, and taking possession of the Khurd KabulPass near the city, entirely cut off the retreat to India whichElphinstone had commenced. 

As there was no intelligent concert of action among the Britishleaders, the garrison melted away in detail, the Afghan auxiliariesrefused to fight, or turned their arms against the Europeans. SirWilliam McNaghten was murdered by Akbar, at a council in sight ofthe garrison. A few attempts to force a passage, or to defendthemselves, made by certain brave officers of the beleagured force, failed. 

On January 6, 1842, an agreement was made by which the Afghan leaderpromised to ensure to the British forces a safe withdrawal to India. This was violated with Afghan readiness, and the entire Anglo-Indiancontingent of seventeen thousand souls was destroyed; sacrificed tothe murderous brutality of the Afghan insurgents, or dying fromexposure to one of the most severe winters known to that region. Months after, heaps of dead bodies, preserved by the intense cold, obstructed the mountain passes. The horrors of Moscow were repeatedin the Khurd Kabul, and the noblest attributes of humanity wereexemplified in the acts of the officers and soldiers of the doomedparty. Only twenty of this entire force survived. The news of thishorrible disaster was brought to Jelalabad by the only man whopenetrated the Afghan environment, Dr. Brydon. 

On receipt of the news of this overwhelming catastrophe, the IndianGovernment endeavored to rescue the garrisons of Kandahar andGhazni, as well as that of Jelalabad; but the Mohammedan troopsrefused to march against their co-religionists, and the Sikhs alsoshowed great unwillingness. The garrison of Ghazni, thinking tosecure its safety by capitulation, was cut to pieces December 23, 1841. Jelalabad, held by 2, 400 men under General Sale, stillwithstood the storm like a rock of iron. General Nott, the energeticofficer commanding at Kandahar, on receiving the news of thedestruction of the British, blew up the citadel of the town, destroyed every thing not necessary to his object, and started, August 8, 1842, for Ghazni, which he also destroyed, September 6th. 

[Illustration: Gate of the Bazaar at Kabul. ]

Another British force of twelve thousand men, under General Pollock, was organized at Peshawur, to punish the Afghans, and, so far asmight be, retrieve the errors of Elphinstone and McNaghten. Pollock's operations were, in the sense of retaliation, successful. An eminent German authority wrote: "Kabul and other towns werelevelled with the ground; Akbar's troops were blown from guns, andthe people were collected together and destroyed like worms. "General Pollock carried the famous Khaiber Pass, in advancing to therelief of Jelalabad in April, 1842. This was the first time that thegreat defile--twenty-eight miles in length--had ever been forced byarms. Timur Lang and Nadir Shah, at the head of their enormoushosts, bought a safe passage through it from the Afridis. Akbar theGreat, in 1587, is said to have lost forty thousand men inattempting to force it, and Aurangzeb failed to get through. 

The misfortune of Elphinstone's command, great as it was, would havebeen much more humiliating to England, had it not been for thefirmness of the gallant General Pollock, who, ordered to withdrawwith his command to Peshawur, by Lord Ellenborough, withouteffecting one of the objects of the expedition--the deliverance ofthe English captives in Akbar's hands at Kabul, --protested againstsuch a suicidal act on the part of any Englishman or anyAdministration, and, at great personal risk, gained his point. 

In the forced march to Kabul, which Pollock made subsequently, theforce of about eight thousand men moved in as light order aspossible. After loading the commissariat camels to their utmostcarrying capacity, the General discovered that the mounted men hadin their kit a spare pair of pantaloons apiece, on which he orderedthe legs to be filled with grain and carried by the men in front ofthem, on their saddles. By the middle of December the British hadstarted on their return march, pursued as far as the Indus by theAfghans, and by this hurried conclusion to the war lessened theirprestige in Asia to an enormous degree. 

As Sir Henry Rawlinson wrote:

"It was not so much the fact of our retreat; disaster would havebeen diminished, if not altogether overcome; but retreating as wedid, pursued even through the last pass into the plains by animplacable enemy, the impression became universal in India as wellas in Central Asia, that we had simply been driven back across themountains. "

A very able Hindu gentleman, very loyal to the British, traced themutiny of 1857 in a great measure to the Afghan campaign of 1842. Hesaid: "It was a direct breach of faith to take the Sepoys out ofIndia. Practically they were compelled to go for fear of beingtreated as mutineers, but the double pay they received by no meanscompensated them for losing caste. The Sepoys mistrusted theGovernment from that time forward, and were always fearing thattheir caste would be destroyed; besides, the Kabul disaster taughtthem that Europeans were not invincible. "

The departure of the English forces was followed by thereestablishment of Dost Mohammed's authority in Afghanistan. Once, at the time of the Sikh insurrection, the Dost crossed the Indianborder with two thousand horsemen, and narrowly escaped falling intothe hands of the British in the affair of Gujrat, February 21, 1849, where the speed of his horse alone saved him from capture. In 1855 abetter understanding was effected between the son of Dost Mohammedand his powerful European neighbor. He reconquered Balkh in 1850, and gained Kandahar by inheritance in 1855, while he lost Herat tothe Persians in 1856. With the aid of Great Britain, in 1857, Persiarelinquished all claims to Herat, but the Dost had eventually tobesiege that city, occupied by a rebellious faction, in 1863, andafter a siege of ten months reduced the place, only to find a tombwithin its walls. After the usual struggle for the throne, peculiarto a change of dynasty in Afghanistan, Shere Ali, one of the Dost'ssons, prevailed, and was recognized in 1868. The next decade wasnotable for a series of diplomatic manoeuvres between England andRussia for Afghan friendship. Shere Ali now leaned toward the Lion, now in the direction of the Bear, with the regularity of a pendulum. The advances were received with presents and promises on the onehand, and promises, powerful embassies, and imposing militaryexpeditions on the other. On September 21, 1878, a Britishambassador was turned back by the Afghan commandant of the frontierfort of Ali Musjid, and on the 20th of November, of the same year, war was declared against Shere Ali by the Anglo-Indian Government. At that time the Russian General Kaufmann was operating on thenorthern border of Afghanistan with a force of fifteen thousand menand sixty guns, and the Ameer had reason to think that he could relyon Russian cooperation against the English, who, with a force offorty thousand men, promptly invaded his dominion. 

This force moved into Afghanistan in four columns, under thecommand, respectively, of Generals Browne, Roberts, Biddulph, andStewart, with reserves under Generals Maude and Primrose. 

We shall have occasion later to consider some of the details of theprotracted operations which followed. They embraced severaladmirably conducted marches, exposure to excessively severe winterweather, the successful surmounting of great natural obstacles, thedevelopment of the usual weakness in the department of transport, with unnecessary losses in animals, a considerable sick-list, and aninconsiderable proportion of killed and wounded in action. 

The military benefits were those resulting from a long and arduousfield experience in a rough country. The interruption to theseactual "field manoeuvres, " this "fire-drill, " by the enemy, wascomparatively feeble, --as a rule, stimulating the Anglo-Indian forceto put its best foot foremost. Under this system, at the end of thetwo years' campaign, all departments of the army had become mouldedinto the efficient machines essential to success in any militaryventure. 

Politically, the campaign had been a failure. The fate of thegallant Major Cavagnari and his mission, murdered at Kabul, September 3, 1879, made a deeper impression on the Afghan mind thanthe British occupation of Afghan cities or the Afghan losses inbattle. 

In the same year the British Secretary for India, in London, wroteto the Governor-General that: "It appears that as the result of twosuccessful campaigns, of the employment of an immense force, and ofthe expenditure of large sums of money, all that has yet beenaccomplished has been the disintegration of the State which it wasdesired to see strong, friendly, and independent, the assumption offresh and unwelcome liabilities in regard to one of its provinces, and a condition of anarchy throughout the remainder of the country. "

Early in the year 1880, the British Government prepared to make adignified withdrawal from Afghanistan. That volcanic region was byno means tranquil, although the chief rebel, Yakoub Khan, had beendriven out of Kabul by General Roberts, and had retired to thedistant country of the Her-i-rud. At this time appeared theexiled Abdurrahman Khan, who had long resided at Tashkend, and whowas welcomed warmly by the local sirdars on the northern frontier ofAfghanistan. As he approached Kabul his authority and influenceincreased, and the British political officers, acting underinstructions, formally recognized him as Ameer of that district. Inthe meanwhile Yakoub advanced westward from Herat with a strongforce, encountered a British brigade, under General Burrows, nearthe Helmund, and utterly routed it. The remnant of the Europeanforce took refuge in Kandahar, where General Primrose was incommand. Surrounding the city, Yakoub succeeded in effectually"bottling up" the British garrison for some time. Sir FrederickRoberts, however, made a rapid march from Kabul on Kandahar, andafter a successful and decisive battle with the Afghans, completelydispersed the native force, and relieved the beleaguered garrison. Soon after, Abdurrahman was formally installed as Ameer ofAfghanistan, and the British army withdrew from the country. 

III. 

THE BRITISH FORCES AND ROUTES. 

A sketch of the military resources of Great Britain, more especiallythose available for field service in Afghanistan, with notes uponthe strength and composition of the forces, means of transport andsupply, nature of important lines of communication, and of certainstrategic points in the probable theatre of operations, will beattempted in this chapter. 

_Organization_. --The military system of Great Britain is basedupon voluntary enlistment instead of the usual European plan ofuniversal liability to service. Recruits may enlist either for the"short-service" or "long-service" term; the first being for sixyears in the ranks and six on furlough, and the last for twelveyears in the ranks; the furlough of short-service men is passed inthe army reserve, and then, in consideration of liability to berecalled to the colors, the men are paid sixpence a day. 

The troops of the Standing Army, (United Kingdom, ) March, 1885, wereproportionately distributed as follows: forty-three per cent. InEngland, two per cent. In Scotland, twenty-five per cent. InIreland, and thirty-five per cent. Abroad, not including India. 

[Illustration: Major-General, Sir F. S. Roberts, V. C. , K. C. B. ]

 AVAILABLE BRITISH LAND FORCES. [Footnote: Approximately, from late returns (1885), but short of authorized "establishment" by 90, 000. ]

 ENGLAND. ================================================================== Army Army Militia Yeomanry Volunteers Reserve ================================================================== Class: Engineers Officers 423 Men 4, 762

 Cavalry Officers 559 Men 11, 840 11, 441

 Royal Horse Artillery Officers 108 Men 2, 426

 Royal Artillery Officers 690 Men 18, 351

 Infantry Officers 2, 862 Men 80, 324

 Aggregate ------- ------- ------- ------ ------- All Ranks 122, 345 44, 503 108, 462 11, 441 209, 365 ================================================================== Grand Aggregate 469, 116 ==================================================================

 INDIA. [Native Contingents, Independent States of India, [2] about 349, 831. ] ================================================================== Army (E'r'p'n) (Native) ================================================================== Engineers Officers 436 Men [3] 232 3, 109 Cavalry Officers 198 304 Men 4, 086 18, 071 Royal Horse Artillery Officers Men Royal Artillery Officers 453 19 Men 10, 809 1, 842 Infantry Officers 1, 400 1, 068 Men 44, 106 102, 648 ------- ------- Aggregate All Ranks 61, 488 127, 263 ================================================================= Grand Aggregate 188, 751 =================================================================

 [Footnote 2: Cashmere 27, 000, Nepaul 100, 000, Hyderabad 44, 000. ]

 [Footnote 3: Sappers and Miners. ]

For purposes of administration, instruction, and mobilization, GreatBritain and Ireland are partitioned into thirteen military districtscommanded by general officers. These are sub-divided as follows: forthe infantry one hundred and two sub-districts under regimentalcommanders; for the artillery there are twelve sub-districts, and for the cavalry two districts. The brigade of an infantrysub-district comprises usually two line battalions, two militiabattalions, the brigade depot, rifle volunteer corps, and infantryof the army reserve. Of the line battalions one is generally at homeand one abroad. In an artillery sub-district are comprised aproportion of the royal artillery and artillery of the militia, volunteers, and army reserve respectively. In like manner a cavalrysub-district includes the yeomanry and army reserve cavalry. 

The officers on duty in the Adjutant-General's and Quartermaster'sdepartments of the British army are, as a rule, detailed for a termof five years from the Line, but must rejoin their regimentsimmediately upon orders for foreign service. 

The Royal Engineers then were and are organized into forty-threecompanies. 

The cavalry is divided into the Household Cavalry and Cavalry of theLine. The first named comprises the 1st and 2d Life Guards and RoyalHorse Guards, --three regiments. The Line is composed of twenty-eightregiments, as follows: seven of dragoon guards, three of dragoons, thirteen of hussars, five of lancers. The strength of regimentsvaries from 450 to 625 men with from 300 to 400 troop horses each. 

The artillery--under the title of the Royal Regiment of Artillery--is divided into three classes; the Royal Horse Artillery of twobrigades of twelve batteries each, making a brigade total of sixtyguns; the Field Artillery of four, brigades of seventy-sixbatteries, and the Garrison Artillery of eleven brigades. For thenon-professional reader it may be well to say that, in the horseartillery, all the _personnel_ of a battery is mounted, the betterto act with cavalry or mounted infantry; under the general term"field artillery" may be classed mountain batteries (only maintainedin India), field batteries proper, in which the guns are somewhatheavier, and served by gunners who are not mounted, but on occasionare carried on the limbers and on seats attached to the axles, andin an emergency may be carried on the "off" horses of teams. Underthe class "field artillery, " also, would come such large guns as arerequired in war for siege or other heavy operations, and which inIndia or Afghanistan would be drawn by bullocks. 

The infantry is composed of the Guards, the Line, and the Rifles. The Guards consist of three regiments--Grenadier Guards, ColdstreamGuards, and Scots Fusilier Guards; in all seven battalions. The Linecomprises 102 regiments (204 battalions); the Rifles fourbattalions. Besides these there are two regiments of Colonial (WestIndia) colored troops. 

The Militia is intended for local defence, but can be orderedanywhere within the United Kingdom, and is available for garrisonduty in the Mediterranean. Enlistment in the militia is for sixyears. The officers are commissioned by the Queen, and, as beforenoted, all the details of control and recruitment are entrusted todistrict commanders. For instruction this force may be called out, for a period not to exceed eight weeks annually, with regularofficers as instructors. There are 212 battalions of infantry, 25brigades of garrison artillery, and 3 regiments of engineerscomprised in this force. 

The Militia Reserve, limited to one fourth of the active militia, isliable to army service in case of an emergency, and for the term ofsix years is entitled to L1 per annum. 

The Volunteers represent "the bulwark" in case of invasion; they areorganized principally as garrison artillery and infantry. Theofficers are commissioned by the county lieutenants, subject to theapproval of the Queen. The men are recruited, armed, and instructedby the Government. Recruits are required to attend thirty drills, and afterward not less than nine drills annually. The volunteerforce is composed of 278 battalions of infantry, 46 brigades ofgarrison artillery and 15 battalions of engineers. 

The Yeomanry Cavalry are equipped as light cavalry, drill eight daysper year, and are subject to call in case of riot and insurrection, when each man with a horse receives seven pence a day. There arethirty-eight regiments. 

The Army of India differs from that of the United Kingdom, not onlyin its composition, but in the character of its organization. Thisorganization dates from 1858, when the government passed from theEast India Company to the Crown. 

The European regiments serving in India are in all respectsorganized and maintained, as in England. In each presidency formingthe three political subdivisions, and among which the Anglo-Indianarmy is distributed, exists a staff corps which supplies allEuropean officers, permitted to serve with native troops. Theseofficers must pass certain examinations before they can be assignedto any of the following vacancies in any native regiment. 

 INDIAN REGIMENT. 

 EUROPEANS

 1 Commandant, 1 Second-in-command and wing officer, 1 Wing-officer, 2 Wing-subalterns, 1 Adjutant, 1 Quartermaster, 1 Medical officer. 

 NATIVES

 2 Subadars (captains), 1st class, 2 " " 2d " 4 " " 3d " 4 Jemandars (lieuts. ), 1st " 4 " " 2d " 1 Havildar (sergt. -major), 40 Havildars (sergeants), 40 Naicks (corporals), 16 Drummers, 600 Sepoys (privates). 

The duties of the commandant of a native regiment correspond ingeneral to those of a similar officer in a European corps. Threetimes a week he holds a "durbar, " for the trial of offenders andtransaction of general regimental business. The men are paid by thenative officers in presence of the European "Wing-officer, " who isresponsible for all public property issued to his half battalion, orwing. 

The native officers are commissioned by the Indian Government, and, as a rule, are promoted from the ranks, and are of the same caste asthe privates. Certain native officers of the engineers and artillerymay be eligible to appointment in the corresponding European corps;one is always assigned as an aide-de-camp to the Viceroy. When ondetailed service, a native officer is allowed to command hiscompany, but "no battalion parades should take place without thepresence of a British officer. " [Footnote: Indian Army Regulations. ]In each regiment there is a drill-sergeant and drill-corporal, whoreceive extra pay for their services. Corporals are promoted fromprivates who know how to read and write in at least one character, or who have displayed extraordinary courage. The pay per month of asepoy is equal to $3. 50; havildar, $7; jemandar, $17. 50; subadar, $33. 50 to $50. European officers with native regiments: commandant, $620; wing-officers, $302 to $322; adjutant, $237. 86; quartermaster, $187. 86; medical officers, $300, monthly. The annual pay-roll of anative regiment of 720 combatants and 45 non-combatants amounts toabout $69, 114. In consideration of the pay each sepoy is required toprovide his rations and clothing, except one coat and one pair oftrousers issued by the Government every two years; in consequence, each regiment is accompanied by a native village called a bazaar, containing tradesmen of all kinds; this bazaar is under strictdiscipline and is managed by the quartermaster. The entire outfitfollows the regiment into the field. 

Colonel Gordon of the Indian army testifies: "With regard to nativetroops under a cannonade I may say that I saw our native infantrytwice under the fire of the Afghan mountain guns, and they behavedvery steadily and coolly. Ammunition was economically expended. Iattributed much the small loss sustained by the troops inAfghanistan to our excellent straight shooting. "

The cavalry of India has in certain instances borne an excellentreputation for efficiency in action, is well set up, and in itsinstruction and discipline is modelled after the British system. Theartillery comprises well-instructed native organizations, but itsprincipal experience has been with light field guns againstirregular troops. The Achilles heel of the Indian army consists inthis, that there are but eight European officers to each regiment, and of these but six would be available to lead in battle: thequartermaster and surgeon being at such a time otherwise engaged. The native officers, seldom having an opportunity to command inPeace, would be unreliable leaders in such an emergency. At theaction of Ali Musjid, November 21, 1878, the day before theoccupation of that fort, six British officers of a native battalionwere placed _hors de combat_, so that on the first day aftercrossing the Afghan frontier there was but one European officer tomanage the regiment. 

Besides the regular establishment there are about 10, 000 Europeanvolunteers (including 4, 000 railway officials and employes)available for local defence. 

The feudatory chiefs of India enjoy an aggregate revenue of someL15, 000, 000, equal to more than one third of the income of theBritish Government of India. They maintain forces aggregating350, 000 men with 4, 000 guns to perform the duties of courtceremonial, garrison, military police, guards, and escorts, throughout territories aggregating nearly 600, 000 square miles with50, 000, 000 of inhabitants. These forces are unreservedly held at thedisposal of the Crown by the native Princes. 

_Transport and Supply_. --This essential feature of all wars will bebriefly considered in the light of the Anglo-Afghan War of 1879-80. Large quantities of supplies were transported from the main base ofoperations on the Indus, and distributed to the troops in the fieldover four or five distinct lines of communication, and over roads, and mountain paths of varied degrees of ruggedness. The country onboth sides of the Indo-Afghan frontier was severely taxed to furnishthe necessary animals. Part of the transport was hired--and as inthe case of the Brahuis camels--with the services of the owners, whowere easily offended and likely to decamp with their property in anight. During the first year the system was under the direct controlof the commissariat department; but as this proved unsatisfactory, in the subsequent campaign it was entirely reorganized andsuperintended by an officer of engineers, with a large number ofofficers from the Line to assist. This gave better satisfaction. Immense numbers of camels died from heat, [Footnote: Of a train ofeighteen hundred unloaded camels on the road from Dadur toJacobabad, for six days in June, six hundred died of exhaustion. InMarch, 1855 Col. Green, C. B. , lost one hundred and seventeen horsesout of four hundred, from the heat, during a march of thirty miles. ]overwork, irregular food, and neglect. Owing to the dryness of theclimate and intense heat of the summer the bullock-carts wereperpetually falling to pieces. The mules, donkeys, and ponies gavethe best results, but do not abound in sufficient quantities toenable an army in Afghanistan to dispense with camels. A successfulexperiment in rafting, from Jelalabad to Dakka, was tried. The raftsconsisted of inflated skins lashed together with a light framework;between June 4-13, seven thousand skins were used, and, in all, 885soldiers and one thousand tons of stores were transported fortymiles down the Kabul River, the journey taking five hours. A greatdeal of road-making and repairing was done under the supervision ofthe transport corps. A system of "stages" or relays of pack-animalsor carts was organized, by which a regular quantity of supplies wasforwarded over the main lines, daily, with almost the regularity, ifnot the speed, of rail carriage. The great number of animalsemployed required a corresponding force of attendants, inspectors, and native doctors, all of whom served to make up that excessivearmy of "followers" for which Anglo-Indian expeditions are famous. Drivers were required at the following rate: one driver for eachpair of bullocks, every four camels, every three mules and ponies, every six donkeys. [Footnote: The average carrying power of certainkinds of transport, in pounds, is as follows: _bullock-carts_ (withtwo pairs), on fairly level ground, 1, 400; on hilly ground, 1, 000;(with one pair) on fairly level ground, 850; on hilly ground, 650;_camels_, 400; _mules_, 200; _ponies_, 175; _men_, 50. ]

[Illustration: Khelat-i-Ghilzi, between Kandahar and Ghazni. ]

The great obstacle to the satisfactory operation of the transportsystem was its novelty and experimental character, and that itsorganization had to be combined with its execution. Besides which, cholera broke out in June and swept away three hundred employes. Grazing camps were established in the neighborhood of the Bolan Passfor the bullocks, and aqueducts built for the conveyance of a watersupply; one of these was of masonry, more than a mile in length, from Dozan down to the Bolan. It has been stated that grazing wasscarce in the region of the Bolan: in 1879 more than four thousandbullocks were grazed there during the summer, and large quantitiesof forage were cut for winter use. 

Any prolonged military operations in Afghanistan must, to a certainextent, utilize hired transport, although there are many objectionsurged. 

Sir Richard Temple said (1879): "That the amount of transportrequired for active service, such as the late campaign inAfghanistan, is so great that to hire transport is synonymous topressing it from the people of the district from which it is hired, and impressment of the means of transport must lead to impressmentof drivers, who naturally (having no interest whatever in thecampaign in which they are called upon to serve) render the mostunwilling service and take the earliest opportunity of renderingtheir animals unserviceable in hopes of escaping a distasteful duty. This service is frequently so unpopular that, sooner than leave theboundaries of their native country, the impressed drivers desert, leaving their animals in the hands of the transport authorities ortake them away with them. . . . For the above reasons I shouldrecommend that all transport for a campaign should be the propertyof Government. "

In commenting on this subject, Lord Wolseley relates that whenserving in China with Indian troops he "awoke one morning and foundthat all our drivers had bolted. Our transport consisted of cartssupplied by the Chinese Government, by contractors, and by thecountry generally. I do not think that the carts had been carriedaway, but all the mules and men had disappeared except three driverswho belonged to me. I was very much astonished that these men hadnot bolted also. I had a small detachment of cavalry with me and avery excellent duffadar in charge of it. I asked him how he hadmanaged to keep these drivers--having some time before said thatunless he looked after them well he would never get to Pekin. Hereplied, with some hesitation: 'I remember what you told me, and thefact is I tied the tails of those three men together, overnight, andthen tied them to the tent pole, and put a man over them. '"

The Elephant, like the stage coach, finds his field of usefulness, as a means of transport, growing smaller by degrees. He is still afeature in India, and has been used for military purposes to someextent in the eastern part of Afghanistan. He will doubtless formpart of the means of transportation employed by the British forcesnear their present base, and in rear of the Kabul-Kandahar line, andfor that reason is noticed here. [Footnote: The use of elephants intransporting field guns in Afghanistan is emphatically discouragedby those who served with it last; very few flankers were employed toprotect the Elephant artillery used in the Kuram valley, and itssuccess can only be interpreted by supposing the directinterposition of Providence or the grossest stupidity to our feebleenemy. ]

The Superintendent of the Government Elephant Kheddahs at Dakka hasgiven us, in a recent paper, much information concerning theelephant in freedom and captivity. He does not claim a high order ofintelligence, but rather of extraordinary obedience and docility forthis animal Very large elephants are exceptional. Twice round theforefoot gives the height at the shoulder; few females attain theheight of eight feet; "tuskers, " or male elephants, vary from eightto nine feet; the Maharajah of Nahur, Sirmoor, possesses onestanding ten feet five and one half inches. The age varies from 80to 150 years, according to the best authorities, and it is recordedthat those familiar with the haunts of the wild elephant have neverfound the bones of an elephant that had died a natural death. Infreedom they roam in herds of thirty to fifty, always led by afemale; mature about twenty-five. In India the males only havetusks; in Ceylon only the females. They are fond of the water, swimwell, [Footnote: Elephants have been known to swim a river threehundred yards wide with the hind legs tied together. ] but canneither trot nor gallop; their only pace is a walk, which may beIncreased to a _shuffle_ of fifteen miles an hour for a very shortdistance; they cannot leap, and a ditch eight by eight feet would beimpassable. 

[Illustration: Elephant with Artillery; on the Road to Ali Musjid. ]

In Bengal and Southern India elephants particularly abound, and seemto be increasing in numbers. In the Billigurungan Hills, a range ofthree hundred square miles on the borders of Mysore, they made theirappearance about eighty years ago; yet prior to that time thisregion was under high cultivation, traces of orchards, orangegroves, and iron-smelting furnaces remaining in what is now ahowling wilderness. Elephants are caught in stockades or kraals. TheGovernment employs hunting parties of 350 natives trained to thework, and more than 100 animals are sometimes secured in a singledrive. 

New elephants are trained by first rubbing them down with bamboorods, and shouting at them, and by tying them with ropes; they aretaught to kneel by taking them into streams about five feet deep, when the sun is hot, and prodding them on the back with sharpsticks. 

The total number of elephants maintained is eight hundred, of whichone half are used for military purposes. They consume about 400pounds of green, or 250 pounds of dry fodder daily, and are alsogiven unhusked rice. An elephant is expected to carry about 1, 200pounds with ease. In the Abyssinian Expedition elephants travelledmany hundreds of miles, carrying from 1, 500 to 1, 800 pounds(including their gear), but out of forty-four, five died fromexhaustion; they are capable of working from morning to night, or ofremaining under their loads for twenty hours at a stretch. [Footnote: There is no "elephant gun-drill" laid down in theImperial Regulations, but when the gun goes into action the elephantis made to kneel, and long "skids" are placed against the cradleupon which the gun rests, so as to form an inclined plane to theground. The gun is then lifted off the cradle and down the skids bylevers and tackle. ]

An elephant's gear consists of a _gaddela_, or quilted cloth, 1-1/2inches thick, reaching half-way down his sides and from the neck tothe croup. On this is placed the _guddu_, or pad, 6x5 feet and 9inches thick, formed of stout sacking stuffed with dried grass. Thewhole is girthed with a long rope passed twice around the body, round the neck as a breast-strap, and under the tail as a crupper. The whole weighs 200 pounds. An improvement upon this has been madeby our authority (Mr. Sanderson), which seems to bear the samerelation to the old gear that the open McClellan saddle does to theordinary British hunting saddle. It consists (see illustration) oftwo pads entirely detached, each 4 feet long, 15 inches wide, and 6inches thick, made of blanket covered with tarpaulin, and encased instout sacking. One is placed on each side of the elephant's spine, and retained there by two iron arches. There is no saddle-cloth, theload rests on the ribs; the breast-strap and crupper hook into ringson the saddle; there are rings to fasten the load to; it weighs 140pounds. With foot-boards it is convenient for riding; a cradle canalso be attached for carrying field guns. Recent experiments haveshown the practicability of conveying elephants by rail in ordinaryopen cattle-trucks; they were indifferent to the motion, noises, orbridges; it is said that 32 elephants could be thus carried on onetrain. 

[Illustration: Detail of Elephant Saddle. ]

The excellent railway facilities for moving troops and supplies tothe Indo-Afghan frontier were described in 1880, by Traffic ManagerRoss, of the Scinde, Punjab, and Delhi Railway, before the UnitedService Institution of India. 

He stated that experiments had been made by the military and railwayauthorities in loading and disembarking troops and war _materiel_, and that much experience had been afforded by the Afghan operationsof 1878-9. 

The movement of troops to and from the frontier commenced inOctober, 1878, and ended June, 1879. During that period wereconveyed over his road 190, 000 men, 33, 000 animals, 500 guns, 112, 000, 000 pounds of military stores. The maximum number carried inany one month was in November--40, 000 men, 8, 000 animals, and20, 800, 000 pounds of stores. The greatest number of special trainsrun in one day was eight, carrying 4, 100 men, 300 animals, and800, 000 pounds of stores. As an instance of rapid loading, when theboth Bengal Cavalry left for Malta, 80 horses were loaded on a trainin 10 minutes appears to have been clean forgotten. The Politicalswere by no means silent, and the amount of knowledge they possessedof border statistics was something marvellous. Did any step appearto the military sense advisable, there was a much better, thoughless comprehensible, _political_ reason why it should not beundertaken. The oracle has spoken and the behest must be obeyed. Anenemy in sight who became afterwards hostile, must not be kept at adistance; through political glasses they appear as 'children ofnature, ' while the country out of sight must not be explored, thesusceptibilities of the sensitive 'Tammizais' having to berespected. That much valuable service was performed by politicalofficers there can be no doubt, but that they caused greatexasperation among soldiers cannot be denied, and the example of theWar of 1839-40 causes them to be looked upon as a very possiblesource of danger. 

_Anglo-Afghan Operations_. --The observations of a participant[Footnote: Lieut. Martin, R. E. (_Journal U. S. I. Of India_). ]in the last British campaign in Afghanistan will be found of valuein the study of future operations in that country. Of the Afghantactics he says: "The enemy (generally speaking, a race ofHighlanders) vastly preferred the attack, and usually obtained theadvantage of superior numbers before risking an attack; . . . Beingable to dispense (for the time) with lines of communication andbaggage and commissariat columns, the Afghan tribes were often ableto raise large gatherings on chosen ground. They could always attackus; we were rarely able (except when they chose) to find them athome. " This observer says the regular troops of the Ameer werenot so formidable as the tribal gatherings. The presence of atactically immovable artillery hinders the action of an Asiaticarmy. The mounted men are usually the first to leave when thefight is going against their side in a general engagement. One ofthe best specimens of their tactics was at Ahmed-Kheyl, on theGhazni-Kandahar road, when the British division was one hundredmiles from any support. The Afghans assembled a force outnumberingthe British ten to one. The attack was made in a series of rushes, twice dispersing the British cavalry, and once driving back theinfantry. Exposed to a constant fire of field guns, the Afghansstood their ground, although poorly armed with a variety of obsoleteweapons--from an Enfield to a handjar or a stick. Trouble mayalways be expected from the night attacks of certain tribes like theAlizais and Waziris. 

The English infantry formation was an objectionably close one, andLieut. Martin says that the bayonets and rifle-barrels of the frontrank were sometimes struck and jammed _by bullets from the rearrank_. The action of the English cavalry, as at Ahmed-Kheyl, wassuicidal in receiving the enemy's charge--practically at a halt. Occasionally shelter trenches were used, but disapproved. 

In the Kuram valley column, under General Roberts, the cavalry(principally native, with one regular squadron and a battery ofhorse artillery) formed a brigade, but was never used independently, nor was it instructed (although well equipped) for modern cavalrywork. The opposition to dismounted cavalry duty is still so great, in the British army, that the mounted arm is paralyzed for effectiveservice. 

Very little was done by the horse artillery with the Kuram column. In the case of the field artillery it was found necessary on twooccasions to transfer the ammunition boxes from the bullock-carts tothe backs of elephants, on account of the steepness of the hills. The mountain artillery (native) was the most serviceable; a Gatlingbattery, packed on ponies, and in charge of a detachment ofHighlanders, was never used however. 

The armament of the infantry included both Martini and Sniderrifles, requiring two kinds of ammunition, but, as the service bypack-mules was ample, no confusion ensued, although Lieut. Martinsays: "In one case I heard a whisper that a regimental reserve ofammunition was found to be _blank cartridges_, but this must bea heavy joke. " Intrenching tools were carried on camels. A mixtureof military and civil-engineer administration and operationis mentioned as unsatisfactory in results. There was greatdifficulty in getting tools and materials at the opening of thecampaign--particularly those required for road and bridge work, although a railroad within two hundred miles had a large stock onhand. 

[Illustration: Noah's Valley, Kunar River. ]

The art of camping and rough fortification was well practised. Thebest defended camp was surrounded by bush abatis and flankedby half-moon _sungas_ of boulder-stone work, which held thesentries. The most approved permanent camps or "posts" were mud_serais_ flanked by bastions at the alternate angles and overlookinga yard or "kraal. " These were established about ten miles apart, toprotect communications, and furnished frequent patrols. During thelatter part of the campaign these outposts were manned by the nativecontingents of the Punjab who volunteered. 

The rapid march of General Roberts from Kabul to Kandahar in August, 1880, and the final dispersion of the forces of Ayoub Khan, illustrated British operations in Afghanistan under the mostfavorable circumstances. The forces included 2, 800 European and7, 000 Indian troops; no wheeled artillery was taken; one regiment ofnative infantry, trained to practical engineering work, did the workof sappers and miners; for the transportation of sick and wounded2, 000 doolie-bearers, 286 ponies, and 43 donkeys; for transport ofsupplies a pack-train of 1, 589 yabus, 4, 510 mules, 1, 224 Indianponies, 912 donkeys--a total of 10, 148 troops, 8, 143 nativefollowers, and 11, 224 animals, including cavalry horses; 30 days'rations, of certain things, and dependence on the country for freshmeat and forage. The absence of timber on this route rendered itdifficult to obtain fuel except by burning the roofs of the villagesand digging up the roots of "Southern-wood" for this purpose. Themanner of covering the movement rested with the cavalry commander. Usually the front was covered by two regiments, one regiment on eachflank, at a mile from the column, detaching one or more troops asrear-guard; once movement had commenced, the animals, moving atdifferent gaits were checked as little as possible. With such anumber of non-combatants the column was strung out for six or sevenmiles, and the rear-guard leaving one camp at 7 A. M. Rarely reachedthe next--fifteen to twenty miles distant--before sundown. 

[Illustration: Watch-Tower in the Khaiber Pass. ]

_Routes_. --For operations in Afghanistan the general British base isthe frontier from Kurrachee to Peshawur. These points are connectedby a railway running east of the Indus, which forms a naturalboundary to the Indian frontier, supplemented by a line of postswhich are from north to south as follows: Jumrud, Baru, Mackeson, Michni, Shub Kadar, Abazai, and Kohut; also by fortified postsconnected by military roads, --Thull, Bunnoo, and Doaba. 

From the Indus valley into the interior of Afghanistan there areonly four lines of communication which can be called military roads:first, from _Peshawur_ through the Khaiber Pass to _Kabul_; second, from _Thull_, over the Peiwar and Shuturgurdan passes to _Kabul_;third, from _Dera Ismail Khan_ through the Guleir Surwandi and Sargopasses to _Ghazni_; fourth, by _Quetta_ to Kandahar and thence to_Herat_, or by Ghazni to _Kabul_. Besides these there are manysteep, difficult, mule tracks over the bleak, barren, Sulimanirange, which on its eastern side is very precipitous and impassablefor any large body of troops. 

[Illustration: Fort of Ali Musjid, from the Heights above LalaCheena in the Khaiber Pass. ]

The Peshawur-Kabul road, 170 miles long, was in 1880 improved andput in good order. From Peshawur the road gradually rises, and after7 miles reaches Jumrud (1, 650 feet elevation), and 44 miles furtherwest passes through the great Khaiber Pass. This pass, 31 mileslong, can, however, be turned by going to the north through theAbsuna and Tartara passes; they are not practicable for wheels, andthe first part of the road along the Kabul River is very difficultand narrow, being closed in by precipitous cliffs. 

As far as Fort Ali Musjid the Khaiber is a narrow defile betweenperpendicular slate rocks 1, 460 feet high; beyond that fort the roadbecomes still more difficult, and in some of the narrowest parts, along the rocky beds of torrents, it is not more than 56 feet wide. Five miles further it passes through the valley of Lalabeg 1-1/2miles wide by 6 miles long, and then after rising for four miles itreaches the top of the Pass, which from both sides offers verystrong strategical positions. From thence it descends for 2-1/2miles to the village of Landi Khana (2, 463 feet), which lies in agorge about a quarter of a mile wide; then on to Dakka (altitude1, 979 feet). This pass, 100 to 225 feet wide and 60 feet long, isshut in by steep but not high slopes, overgrown with bushes. 

[Illustration: Fort of Dakka, on the Kabul River. ]

On the eleven miles' march from Dakka to Hazarnao, the Khurd Khaiberis passed, a deep ravine about one mile long, and in many places sonarrow that two horsemen cannot pass each other. Hazarnao is wellcultivated, and rich in fodder; 15 miles farther is Chardeh (1, 800feet altitude), from which the road passes through a well-cultivatedcountry, and on through the desert of Surkh Denkor (1, 892 feetaltitude), which is over 8-1/2 miles from Jelalabad. From this city(elsewhere described) onward as far as Gundamuck the route presentsno great difficulties; it passes through orchards, vineyards, andcornfields to the Surkhab River; but beyond this three spurs of theSafed Koh range, running in a northeastern direction, have to besurmounted. 

[Illustration: The Ishbola Tepe, Khaiber Pass. ]

Between Jelalabad [Footnote: The heat at Jelalabad from the end ofApril is tremendous--105 degrees to 110 degrees in the shade. ] andKabul two roads can be followed: the first crosses the range overthe Karkacha Pass (7, 925 feet alt. ) at the right of which is AssinKilo, thence through the Kotul defile, and ascending the Khurd Kabul[Footnote: The Khurd Kabul Pass is about five miles long, withan impetuous mountain torrent which the road (1842) crossedtwenty-eight times. ] (7, 397 feet alt. ) to the north reaches thehigh plateau on which Kabul is situated; the other leads over theshort but dangerous Jagdallak Pass to Jagdallak, from which thereare three roads to Kabul--the northernmost over the Khinar and thethird over the Sokhta passes; all these, more difficult than theKhaiber, are impassable during the winter. It was here, as alreadyrelated, that the greater part of Elphinstone's command, in 1842, perished. There is a dearth of fuel and supplies by this line ofcommunication. The second, or Thull-Kuram-Kabul, route, was taken byGeneral Roberts in 1878-9. It extends from Thull, one of thefrontier posts already mentioned, some forty miles into the Kuramvalley, and then inclining towards the west leads to the Kuram fort(Mohammed Azim's), a walled quadrangular fortress with flankingtowers at an elevation of 6, 000 feet. The Kuram valley is, up tothis point, well cultivated and productive; wood, water, and forageabound. Winter only lasts with any severity for six weeks, and theSpring and Autumn are delightful. 

A short distance above the fort commences the ascent toward thePeiwar Pass (8, 000 feet alt. ), twenty-four miles distant. The road, thickly bordered with cedar and pine trees, is covered with bouldersand is very difficult, and from the village of Peiwar--one of many_en route_, of the usual Afghan fortified type--it leads through awinding defile to the top of the pass. Here the road is confined byperpendicular chalk rocks, the summits of which are covered withscrub timber and a luxurious growth of laurel. On the farther sideof the pass the road ascends to the height of the Hazardarakht, (which is covered with snow in the winter), and then climbs to theShuturgurdan Pass (11, 375 feet alt. ), reaching a plateau on whichthe snow lies for six months of the year; thence it descends intothe fertile Logar valley and reaches Akton Khel, which is onlyfifty-one miles from Kabul. The total length of this route is about175 miles. 

The third, or Dera-Ismail-Khan-Sargo-Ghazni, route passes through aregion less frequented than those mentioned, and is not thoughtsufficiently difficult for detailed description. Passing due west, through seventy miles of mountain gorges destitute of supplies orforage, it debouches, through the Gomal Pass, into a more promisingcountry, in which forage may be obtained. At this point it branchesto Ghazni, Kandahar, and Pishin respectively. A road exists fromMooltan, crossing the Indus at Dera-Ghazi-Khan, Mithunkot, Rajanpur, Rojan, Lalgoshi, Dadur to Quetta, and was utilized by GeneralBiddulph, from whose account of his march from the Indus to theHelmund, in 1879, is gleaned the following. The main point ofconcentration for the British forces, either from India or fromEngland via Kurrachee is thus minutely described. 

"The western frontier of India is, for a length of 600 miles, bounded by Biluchistan and territories inhabited by Biluch tribes, and for 300 miles Biluch country intervenes between our border andAfghanistan. The plains of the Punjab and Sind run along theboundary of Biluchistan, and at a distance of from 25 to 50 milesthe Indus pursues a course, as far down as Mithunkot, from north tosouth, and then winds south-west through a country similar to thatof Egypt. A belt of cultivation and beyond that the desert . . . This line of hills (the Eastern Sulimani) extends as a continuousrampart with the plains running up to the foot of the range, andhaving an elevation of 11, 000 feet at the Tukl-i-Suliman, and of7, 400 near Fort Munro (opposite Dera-Ghazi-Khan), graduallydiminishes in height and dwindles away till it is lost in the plainsnear Kusmore, at a point 12 miles from the Indus. The strip oflow-land country on the west bank of the Indus up to the foot ofthe hills is called the _Derajat_. It is cut up and broken bytorrents, the beds of which are generally dry wastes, and thecountry is, except at a few places where permanent water is found, altogether sterile and hot. If we view the physical aspect lookingnorth and north-west from Jacobabad, we notice a wide bay of plainsextending between the broken spur of the Sulimani, and a secondrange of hills having a direction parallel to the outer range. Thisplain is called the Kachi, extends in an even surface for 150 milesfrom the Indus at Sukkur, and is bounded on the north by successivespurs lying between the two great ranges. The Kachi, thus bounded bybarren hills on all sides but the south, is one of the hottestregions in the world. Except where subject to inundations or withinreach of irrigation it is completely sterile--a hard clay surfacecalled _Pat_, --and this kind of country extends around to the eastof the spur of the Suliman into the Derajat country. Subject toterrific heats and to a fiercely hot pestilential wind, the Kachi isat times fatal even to the natives. "

[Illustration: Entrance to the Bolan Pass, from Dadur. ]

The range of mountains bounding the Kachi to the westward is acontinuous wall with imperceptible breaks only, and it bearsthe local names of Gindari, Takari, and Kirthar. Through thisuniform rampart there are two notable rents or defiles, viz. : the_Mulla_ opening opposite Gundana, leading to Kelat; and the _Bolan_entering near Dadur, leading to Quetta, Kandahar, and Herat. TheBolan is an abrupt defile--a rent in the range, --the bottom filledwith the pebbly bed of a mountain torrent. This steep ramp formsfor sixty miles the road from Dadur, elevation 750 feet, to theDasht-i-Bedowlat, elevation 6, 225 feet. This inhospitable plateauand the upper portion of the Bolan are subject to the mostpiercingly cold winds and temperature; and the sudden change fromthe heat of the Kachi to the cold above is most trying to thestrongest constitutions. Notwithstanding the difficulties of theroad, the absence of supplies and fuel, and the hostile character ofthe predatory tribes around, this route has been always most infavor as the great commercial and military communication fromPersia, Central Asia, and Khorassan to India. 

The causes which led to the establishment of a British garrison atQuetta are not unlike those which are urged as good Russian reasonsfor the occupation of territory in certain parts of Central Asia. Briefly stated, it seems that after the conquest of the Punjab, theproximity of certain disturbed portions of Biluchistan, and theannoyance suffered by various British military expeditions, in1839-1874, from certain tribes of Biluchis--notably the Maris andBugtis, --made it desirable that more decisive measures should beadopted. In 1876 a force of British troops was marched to Kelat, andby mutual agreement with the Khan a political agency was establishedat Quetta, ostensibly to protect an important commercial highway, but at the same time securing a military footing of great value. Butthe character of the lords of the soil--the Maris, for instance--hasnot changed for the better, and the temporary general Europeanoccupation of the country would afford an opportunity to gratifytheir predatory instincts, which these bandits would not hesitate toutilize. The Maris can put 2, 000 men into the field and march 100miles to make an attack. When they wish to start upon a raid theycollect their wise men together and tell the warriors where thecattle and the corn are. If the reports of spies, sent forward, confirm this statement, the march is undertaken. They ride uponmares which make no noise; they travel only at night. They are themost excellent outpost troops in the world. When they arrive at thescene of action a perfect watch is kept and information by singlemessengers is secretly sent back. Every thing being ready a rush ofhorsemen takes place, the villages are surrounded, the cattle sweptaway, the women and children hardly used--fortunate if they escapewith their lives. The villagers have their fortlets to retreat to, and, if they reach them, can pull the ladders over after them andfire away from their towers. 

Dadur is an insignificant town at the foot of the Bolan. From herethe Kandahar road leads for sixty miles through the Pass--a gradualascent; in winter there is not a mouthful of food in the entirelength of the defile. 

Quetta, compared with the region to the south, appears a very Gardenof Eden. It is a small oasis, green and well watered. 

From Quetta to Pishin the road skirts the southern border of a vastplain, interspersed with valleys, which extend across the easternportion of Afghanistan toward the Russian dominion. A study of thePishin country shows that it is, on its northwestern side supportedon a limb of the Western Sulimani. This spur, which defines the westof the Barshor valley, is spread out into the broad plateau of Toba, and is then produced as a continuous ridge, dividing Pishin from theplains of Kadani, under the name of Khoja Amran. The Barshor is adeep bay of the plain, and there is an open valley within the outerscreen of hills. A road strikes off here to the Ghilzai country andto Ghazni. Though intersected by some very low and unimportant hillsand ridges, the Pishin plains and those of Shallkot may be lookedupon as one feature. We may imagine the Shall Valley the vestibule, the Kujlak-Kakur Vale the passage, the Gayud Yara Plain anantechamber, and Pishin proper the great _salle_. Surrounded bymountains which give forth an abundant supply of water, the landsbordering on the hills are studded with villages, and there is muchcultivation; there is a total absence of timber, and the cultivationof fruit-trees has been neglected. The Lora rivers cutting into theplain interferes somewhat with the construction of roads. 

[Illustration: Entrance to the Khojak Pass, from Pishin, on the Roadto Kandahar. ]

The Plain of Pishin possesses exceptional advantages for theconcentration and rendezvous of large bodies of troops, and hasalready been utilized for that purpose by the British. 

From the Khoja Amran, looking toward Kandahar, the plains, severalthousand feet below, are laid out like a sea, and the mountains runout into isolated promontories; to the left the desert is seen likea turbulent tide about to overflow the plains. 

The rivers on the Quetta-Kandahar route do not present muchimpediment to the passage of troops in dry weather, but in floodthey become serious obstacles and cannot be passed until the watersretire. 

The ascent from the east through the Khojak Pass is easy, thedescent on the west very precipitous. A thirteen-foot cart road wasmade, over the entire length of twenty miles, by General Biddulph in1878-9, by which the first wheeled vehicles, which ever reachedKhorassan from India, passed. 

From Kandahar (elsewhere described)--which is considered by GeneralHamley and other authorities, one of the most important strategicpoints in any scheme of permanent defence for India--diverge twomain roads: one a continuation of the Quetta-Herat route bearingN. W. , and one running N. E. To Kabul. 

Gen. Biddulph says: "The position of Kandahar near to the slopes ofthe range to the westward of the city renders it impossible toconstruct works close at hand to cover the road from Herat. The highridge and outlying hills dividing Kandahar and its suburbs from theArgandab valley completely command all the level ground between thecity and the pass. Beyond the gap a group of detached mountainsextends, overlooking the approaches, and follows the left bank ofthe Argandab as far down as Panjwai, fifteen miles distant. Positions for defensive works must be sought, therefore, in front ofthat place on the right bank of the river. To the N. E. Of Kandaharthe open plain affords situations for forts, well removed from thehills, at a short distance, and at Akhund Ziarut, thirty miles onthe road to Ghazni, there is a gorge which would, if held, add tosecurity on that quarter. "

The country between Kandahar and the Helmund has the same generalcharacteristics--plains and mountain spurs alternately, --and whilegenerally fit for grazing is, except in a few spots, unfit forcultivation. 

According to the eminent authority just quoted, the great naturalstrategic feature of this route is the elevated position of AttaKarez, thirty-one miles from Kandahar. He says: "On the whole roadthis is the narrowest gateway, and this remarkable feature and theconcentration of roads [Footnote: The roads which meet at Atta Karezare: the great Herat highway passing through Kokeran and crossingthe Argandab opposite Sinjari, whence it lies along the open plainall the way to Atta Karez; the road which crosses the Argandab atPanjwai; and the road from Taktipul towards Herat. ] here, give toAtta Karez a strategic importance unequalled by any other spotbetween India and Central Asia. "

General Biddulph examined this position carefully in 1879, anddiscovered a site for a work which would command the valley of theArgandab and sweep the elevated open plain toward the west andnorthwest. 

Abbaza is a village at the crossing of the Herat road over theHelmund, forty-six miles west of Atta Karez. On the west bank liesthe ancient castle of Girishk. The country between the Argandab andthe Helmund is rolling and inclining gradually from the hills towardthe junction of these rivers. The plateau opposite Girishk is 175feet above the river, which it commands. 

The Helmund has already been described. There are numerous fords, but, at certain times, bridges would be required for militarypurposes. The land in the vicinity of the Helmund is very fertileand seamed with irrigating canals. 

From Girishk a road _via_ Washir runs through the hills to Herat;this is said to be cool, well supplied with water and grazing, andis a favorite military route. A road, parallel, to the south, goesthrough Farrah, beyond which both roads blend into one main road tothe "Key. " Still another road, by Bost, Rudbar, and Lash, along thecourse of the river, exists. Although not so direct, it is animportant route to Herat; upon this road stand the ruins of theancient city of Bost in a wonderful state of preservation; here, aselsewhere in this region, the remains of fortifications testify tothe former military importance of the spot. The citadel of Bost isbuilt on the debris of extensive works and rises 150 feet above theriver. 

_British Generals_. --Perhaps the most prominent of modern Britishcommanders, next to Lord Wolseley--is the young and successfulsoldier, Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Roberts, G. C. B. , C. I. E. , commanding the Anglo-Indian Army of the Madras Presidency. He hasalready seen service in Afghanistan and elsewhere, and has beenappointed to the command of one of the principal divisions of theBritish forces intended to oppose the threatened advance of theRussians on Herat. It was said of him by one of the most brilliantmilitary leaders of the age, --Skobeleff: "For General Roberts I havea great admiration. He seems to me to possess all the qualities of agreat general. That was a splendid march of his from Kabul toKandahar. I think more highly of him than I do of Sir GarnetWolseley, but there is this to be said of _all_ your generals, theyhave only fought against Asiatic and savage foes. They have notcommanded an army against a European enemy, and we cannot tell, therefore, what they are really made of. "

The Commander-in-chief of the Army of India, General Sir Donald M. Stewart, G. C. B. , C. I. E. , to whom has been intrusted the conduct ofthe British forces in Afghanistan, is also a very distinguished andexperienced officer--probably more familiar with the nature of theprobable field of operations than any other in Her Majesty'sService. 

Like the United States, the great latent power of England isindisputable, and so long as superiority at sea is maintained, timeis given to render that latent power active. For the first year ofthe coming struggle England must lean heavily upon her navy. Nearlyall the regiments of infantry are below the average peace limit, andif filled up simultaneously to a maximum war strength will includemore than fifty per cent, of imperfectly trained men, and as thepractice has been to fill up those corps ordered abroad with mentransferred from other small regiments, it may come to pass thatso-called "regular" regiments will consist largely of raw material. Colonel Trench of the British Army says "the organization of theregular cavalry is very defective, " and especially complains of themaladministration we have just noted. Demands for cavalry for theSoudan were met by a heavy drain on the already depleted strength ofregiments in England. The Fifth Dragoon Guards, which stood next onthe roster for foreign service, gave away nearly two hundred horsesand one hundred men. Colonel Trench says that the reserve cavalryhave no training, and that there is no reserve of horses. It isdoubtful if more than seventy per cent. Of the enlisted strength andfifty per cent. Of the horses, on paper, could be put in the fieldnow. 

Allusion has already been made to the notorious weakness of theBritish transport system. [Footnote: Captain Gaisford, who commandedthe Khaiber Levies in the Afghan campaign, recommended reforms inthe system of transport and supply. He advocated certain Americanmethods, as wind and water-mills to crush and cleanse the petrifiedand gravelled barley, often issued, and to cut up the inferior hay;the selection of transport employes who understand animals; and morecare in transporting horses by sea. ] If this has been the case inthe numerous small wars in which her forces have been engaged forthe last twenty-five years, what may be expected from the strain ofa great international campaign. 

On the other hand, Great Britain can boast of an inexhaustiblecapital, not alone of the revenues which have been accumulatingduring the last quarter of a century, but of patriotism, physicalstrength, courage, and endurance, peculiar to a race of conquerors. 

IV. 

THE RUSSIAN FORCES AND APPROACHES. 

A mere glance at the ponderous military machine with which Russiaenforces law and order within her vast domain, and by which shepreserves and extends her power, is all that we can give here. 

No army in the world has probably undergone, within the last thirtyyears, such a succession of extensive alterations in organization, in administrative arrangements, and in tactical regulations, as thatof Russia. The Crimean War surprised it during a period oftransition. Further changes of importance were carried out afterthat war. Once more, in 1874, the whole military system wasremodelled, while ever since the Peace of San Stefano, radicalreforms have been in progress, and have been prosecuted with suchfeverish haste, that it is difficult for the observer to keep pacewith them. [Footnote: Sir L. Graham (_Journal Royal U. S. Institution_). ]

The military system of Russia is based upon the principles ofuniversal liability to serve and of territorial distribution. Thisapplies to the entire male population, with certain exemptions ormodifications on the ground, respectively, of age or education. Annually there is a "lot-drawing, " in which all over twenty, whohave not already drawn lots, must take part. Those who draw blanksare excused from service with the colors, but go into the lastreserve, or "Opoltschenie. "

The ordinary term of service is fifteen years, --six with the colorsand nine with the reserves; a reduction is made for men serving atremote Asiatic posts; the War Office may send soldiers into thereserve before the end of their terms. Reduction is also made, fromeleven to thirteen years and a half, for various degrees ofeducational acquirement. Exemptions are also made for family reasonsand on account of peculiar occupation or profession. Individuals whopersonally manage their estates or direct their own commercialaffairs (with the exception of venders of strong liquors) may havetheir entry into service postponed two years. Men are permitted tovolunteer at seventeen (with consent of parents or guardians); allvolunteers serve nine years in the reserve; those joining the Guardsor cavalry must maintain themselves at their own expense. The totalcontingent demanded for army and navy in 1880 was 235, 000, and231, 961 were enrolled; of this deficit of 3, 039, the greater number, 3, 000, were Jews. 

_Organization_. --The Emperor is the Commander-in-Chief, who issuesorders through the War Ministry, whose head is responsible forthe general efficiency of the Army. There is also the "ImperialHead-quarters, " under a general officer who, in the absence of theWar Minister, takes the Emperor's orders and sees to theirexecution. The War Council, presided over by the War Minister, supervises all financial matters in connection with the army. Thereare also a High Court of Appeals, and the Head-quarters Staff, whosupervise the execution of all military duties. Commissariat, artillery, engineer, medical, military education, Cossack, andjudge-advocate departments complete the list of bureaus. 

The military forces are arranged into nineteen army corps: fivecomprise three divisions of infantry; one, two divisions of cavalry;the remainder, two divisions of cavalry and one of infantry; with adue proportion of light artillery and engineers the war strength ofan army corps is 42, 303 combatants, 10, 755 horses, and 108 guns. 

When war is declared an army is formed of two or more corps. Thegeneral commanding exercises supreme control, civil and military, ifthe force enters the enemy's country. His staff are detailed much asusual at an American army head-quarters in the field. 

There are in the active army--_Infantry_: 768 battalions (192regiments, 48 divisions), 54 batt. Riflemen. _Cavalry_: 56 regularregiments (4 cuirassiers, 2 uhlans, 2 hussars, 48 dragoons); 29regt. Cossacks, divided into 20 divisions, kept in time of peace at768 men (864 with sub-officers) per regiment. _Artillery_: 51brigades, or 303 batteries of 8 guns each; 30 horse-batteries of 6guns each; besides 14 batteries with Cossack divisions. Fifty"parks" and 20 sections of "parks" supply each infantry brigade andcavalry division with cartridges. 

THE LAND FORCES OF RUSSIA. [Footnote: Approximately from latest (1884-85) returns. (Combatantsonly. )]

 EUROPE. Field Troops PEACE. Engineers. 21, 335 Cavalry. 52, 902 Infantry. 49, 581 Artillery. 323, 701 Total. 447, 519 Horses. 71, 565 Guns. 1, 188 WAR. Total. 821, 243 Horses. 155, 149 Guns. 2, 172

 Reserve, Fortress, and Depot Troops PEACE. Engineers. - Cavalry. 10, 504 Infantry. 23, 704 Artillery. 54, 995 Total. 89, 203 Horses. 8, 703 Guns. 144 WAR. Total. 891, 404 Horses. 109, 822 Guns. 1, 236

 CAUCASUS. Field Troops PEACE. Engineers. 1, 548 Cavalry. 12, 364 Infantry. 8, 442 Artillery. 59, 254 Total. 81, 608 Horses. 15, 927 Guns. 198 WAR. Total. 150, 313 Horses. 31, 700 Guns. 366

 Reserve Fortress Troops PEACE. Engineers. - Cavalry. 5, 480 Infantry. 2, 860 Artillery. 2, 270 Total. 10, 610 Horses. 6, 137 Guns. 8 WAR. Total. 51, 776 Horses. 36, 862 Guns. 12

 TURKESTAN. PEACE. Engineers. 496 Cavalry. 6, 744 Infantry. 2, 468 Artillery. 12, 522 Total. 22, 230 Horses. 8, 246 Guns. 48 WAR. Total. 34, 125 Horses. 12, 780 Guns. 76

 SIBERIA. PEACE. Engineers. 244 Cavalry. 2, 606 Infantry. 1, 273 Artillery. 7, 752 Total. 11, 875 Horses. 3, 412 Guns. 24 WAR. Total. 29, 779 Horses. 14, 745 Guns. 58

 _Grand Aggregate of the Empire_. PEACE. Engineers. 23, 623 Cavalry. 90, 600 Infantry. 83, 328 Artillery. 460, 494 Total. 663, 045 Horses. 113, 990 Guns. 1, 610 WAR. Total. 1, 978, 640 Horses. 367, 089 Guns. 3, 920

During 1884 the engineer corps was reorganized. Henceforward thepeace establishment will consist of seventeen battalions of sappers;eight battalions of pontoniers; sixteen field-telegraph companies, each of which is mounted, so as to maintain telegraphiccommunication for forty miles, and have two stations; sixengineering parks or trains, each ten sections, carrying eachsufficient tools and material for an infantry division; fourbattalions of military railway engineers; four mine companies; twosiege trains, and one telegraph instruction company. The whole isdivided into six brigades, and provisions are taken for trainingrecruits and supplying the losses during war. The fortress troops, for the defence of fortresses, consist of forty-three battalions oftwelve hundred men each in time of war, and nine companies of threehundred men each. The depot troops, for garrison service, consist ofthirteen battalions and three hundred detachments. 

The reserve troops supply 204 battalions of infantry, 56 squadronsof cavalry, 57 batteries of artillery, and 34 companies of sappers. If mobilized, they are intended to supply 544 battalions, 56squadrons, 144 batteries, and 34 companies of engineers. The secondreserve, or "Zapas, " consists of "cadres" for instruction, organizedin time of war. 

The training of the Russian infantry comprises that of skirmishingas of most importance; the whistle is used to call attention; thetouch is looser in the ranks than formerly; squares to resistcavalry are no longer used; [Footnote: A British officer, who hashad good opportunities, says the infantry drill is second to none. ]the Berdan breech-loader is the infantry arm; sergeant-majors wearofficers' swords, and together with musicians carry revolvers. 

A great stimulus has been given to rifle practice in the Russianarmy, with fair results, but complaint is made of want of goodinstructors. The dress and equipment of the infantry is noted for anabsence of ornament, and hooks are substituted for buttons. Everything has been made subordinate to comfort and convenience. Woollenor linen bandages are worn instead of socks. The entire outfit ofthe soldier weighs about fifty pounds. The Guards, alone, are yetpermitted to wear their old uniform with buttons. The arms of theTurkestan troops are mixed Berdan and Bogdan rifles. The fieldclothing is generally linen blouse with cloth shoulder-straps, chamois-leather trousers, dyed red, and a white kepi. Officers wearthe same trousers in the field. Cossacks wear gray shirts of camel'shair. 

The artillery is divided into field artillery and horse artillery, of which the strength is given elsewhere. The horse batteries havethe steel four-pound gun. 

Col. Lumley, of the British army, says: "In Russia it is believedthat the field artillery is equal to that of any other Power, andthe horse artillery superior. " Lieut. Grierson, R. A. , from hispersonal observation, confirms this opinion. 

It is not too much to say that, in any European conflict in the nearfuture, the Russian cavalry will be conspicuous and extraordinarilyeffective. In a war with England, in Asia, the use of large bodiesof cavalry, organized, instructed, and equipped after the Americanplan, must become the main feature. 

From the wonderful reforms instituted by Russia in her huge army ofhorsemen, which have put her before all other nations, not exceptingGermany, we may expect to hear of wonderful mobility, stunning blowsat the enemy's depots, and the appropriation of choice positionsunder his nose: of stubborn contests with the Anglo-Indian infantry, the only weapon a Berdan carbine; of communications destroyed byhigh explosives: especially, of the laying waste smiling Afghanvalleys, inexpedient to occupy:--these are a few of the surprises towhich we may be treated if Russia gets the chance. In this mannershe is doubtless prepared to take the initiative in her next war. 

[Footnote: The bold operations of General Gourko in theRusso-Turkish war of 1878, afford the best illustration of theversatile qualities of the progressive military horseman since theAmerican war, 1861-5. An Austrian officer says: "The Russian cavalryreconnoitred boldly and continuously, and gave proof of aninitiative very remarkable. Every one knows that Russian dragoonsare merely foot soldiers mounted, and only half horsemen: however, that it should come to such a point as making dragoons charge withthe bayonet, such as took place July 16th near Twardista, seemsstrange. Cossacks and Hussars dismounted on the 30th, formedskirmishing lines, coming and going under the fire of infantry, protecting their battery, and conducting alone an infantry fightagainst the enemy. At Eski Zagra, July 31st, the dragoons did notleave the field until all their cartridges were exhausted. On theother hand, the _offensive_ action, and the spirit of enterprise anddash, which are the proper qualifications of cavalry, were notwanting in the Russians. "]

The whole of the regular cavalry of the line has been converted intodragoons armed with Berdan rifle and bayonet; the Guard regimentsmust adopt the same change when ordered into the field, and theCossacks have been deprived of the lance (excepting for the frontrank); new musketry regulations have been prescribed. Great stressis now laid upon the training of both horses and men in thedirection of long marches, and the passage of obstacles. Forcedmarches are also made to cover the greatest possible distances inthe shortest possible time. 

[Footnote: Among other experiments are noted that of 7 officers and14 men of the Orenburg Cossacks who in November last in bad weathertravelled 410 versts between Niji Novgorod and Moscow in 5 days--about 53 miles a day; then covering 685 versts from Moscow to St. Petersburg in 8 days--56 miles a day; on arrival an inspectorreported horses fresh and ready for service; the party was mentionedin orders, and presented to the Czar. A month before, in snow andintense cold, 7 officers and 7 men of the cavalry school covered 370versts in 4 days--60 miles a day. It is asserted that the bestRussian cavalry can travel 70 miles a day, continuously, withoutinjury. General Gourko recently inspected two sotnias of DonCossacks who had cleared 340 versts in 3 days, or 74 miles a day. ]

Swimming was practised in the Warsaw, Odessa, and Moscow districts, the horses being regularly taught with the aid of inflated bags tiedunder them. The Suprasl was crossed by the entire 4th CavalryDivision swimming. In order to acquire a thorough knowledge ofpioneer duty, both the officers and non-commissioned officers ofcavalry are attached to the engineer camp for a short course ofinstruction. In one division a regular pioneer squadron has beenformed for telegraphic and heliographic duty. The mounted force, provided for in the Russian establishment, comprises twenty-onedivisions of 3, 503 sabres and 12 guns each, or an aggregate of73, 563 men and 252 field guns. 

A feature of the Russian cavalry equipment is the pioneer outfit, consisting of tools for construction or destruction, as they desireto repair a bridge or destroy a railroad; this outfit for eachsquadron is carried on a pack-mule; dynamite is carried in a cartwith the ammunition train. 

The Cossack (except of the Caucasus) is armed with a long lance(front rank only), a sabre without guard, and a Berdan rifle. Thoseof the Caucasus have in addition pistol and dagger, besides a_nagaska_ or native whip. The uniform is blue, high boots, fur cap, cloak with cape. The snaffle-bit is universally used, even by theofficers, although the average Russian troop-horse is noted for hishard mouth. 

In the mounted drill of the Cossacks there is a charge asskirmishers (or "foragers") called the "lava, " which is executed ata great pace and with wild yells of "Hourra!"

Lieut. Grierson, of the British army, writes that: "A big fine manmounted on a pony, with his body bent forward and looking verytop-heavy, always at a gallop, and waving his enormous whip, theCossack presents an almost ludicrous appearance to one accustomedto our stately troopers. But this feeling is dashed with regret thatwe possess no such soldiers. "

_Transport and Supply_. --The Russian system of transport is in avery experimental and unsatisfactory state. It is the only armywhich provides regimentally for the _personnel_ and _materiel_ ofthis department. In each regiment is a non-combatant company, inwhich all men required for duty without arms are mustered. 

All military vehicles required for the regiment are under charge ofthis company. The intention of the system now developing is toreduce the quantity of transportation required. [Footnote: In 1878the head-quarters baggage of the Grand Duke Nicholas required fivehundred vehicles and fifteen hundred horses to transport it. ]Besides the wagons and carts used for ordinary movements of troops, Russia will, in Afghanistan, depend upon the animals of the countryfor pack-trains and saddle purposes. After the _Camel_, of whichlarge numbers exist in the region bordering Afghanistan on thenorth, the most important aid to Russian military mobility is theremarkable _Kirghiz Horse_. The accounts of the strength, speed, endurance, and agility of this little animal are almost incredible, [Footnote: In 1869 a Russian detachment of five hundred men, mountedon Kirghiz horses, with one gun and two rocket-stands, traversed inone month one thousand miles in the Orenburg Steppe, and only lostthree horses; half of this march was in deep sand. In October, M. Nogak (a Russian officer) left his detachment _en route_, and rodeone horse into Irgiz, 166-2/3 miles in 34 hours. ] but they areofficially indorsed in many instances. He is found in Turkestan, andis more highly prized than any other breed. The Kirghiz horse isseldom more than fourteen hands, and, with the exception of itshead, is fairly symmetrical; the legs are exceptionally fine, andthe hoofs well formed and hard as iron. It is seldom shod, and withbare feet traverses the roughest country with the agility of achamois, leaping across wide fissures on the rocks, climbing thesteepest heights, or picking its way along mere sheep-tracks by theside of yawning precipices, or covering hundreds of versts throughheavy sand, with a heavier rider, day after day. Its gaits are arapid and graceful walk of five and one half to six miles an hour, and an amble [Footnote: Moving both feet on a side almostsimultaneously. ] at the maximum rate of a mile in two minutes. Thisanimal crosses the most rapid streams not over three and one halffeet deep, lined with slippery boulders, with ease. They are goodweight carriers. [Footnote: The mounted messengers (pony express)over the steppes, use these horses, and carry with them, over stagesof 350 miles in 8 days, an equipment and supplies for man and horseof nearly 300 pounds. ] With a view of stimulating horse-breeding inTurkestan, the government in 1851 offered prizes for speed. [Footnote: The greatest speed recorded (1853. ) was 13-1/2 miles (ona measured course) in 27 minutes and 30 seconds. ] Kirghiz horseshave been thoroughly tested in the Russian army. For modern cavalryand horse-artillery purposes they are unsurpassed. The average priceis L6, but an ambler will bring L12. Great Britain is said topossess 2, 800, 000 horses, while Russia, in the Kirghiz steppesalone, possesses 4, 000, 000 saddle or quick-draught horses. 

The supply of the Russian army is carefully arranged under thecentral Intendance. The ration in the field was, in 1878, 14. 3ounces of meat, 14. 9 black bread, preserved vegetables and tea, withan issue of brandy in the winter. Immense trains follow eachdivision, at intervals, forming consecutive mobile magazines offood. A division provision train can carry ten days' supply for230, 000 men. 

Forage is now supplied for transport in compressed cakes, of which20, 000, 000 were used by Russia in her last war. [Footnote: Acompressed ration of forage was extensively used by the Russians in1878, weighing 3-1/2 pounds; 5 days' supply could be carried on thesaddle with ease. ]

Clothing is furnished by the supply bureau of certain regions inwhich there are large government factories; it is usual to keep onhand for an emergency 500, 000 sets of uniform clothing. 

_Routes_. --Having devoted a share of our limited space to an accountof the roads leading to Herat, from India, we may consider, briefly, certain approaches to Afghanistan or India from the northwest. Thissubject has been so clearly treated in a recent paper read beforethe Royal United Service Institution by Captain Holdich, R. E. , whosurveyed the region referred to, in 1880, that we quote liberally asfollows:

 In improving our very imperfect acquaintance, both with the present military resources and position of Russia in Central Asia, and of the difficulties presented both geographically and by the national characteristics of the races that she would have to encounter in an advance south of the Oxus, a good deal has been already learned from the Afghans themselves. Among the turbulent tribes dwelling in and around Kabul, whose chief and keenest interest always lies in that which bears, more or less directly, on their chances of success in mere faction fights, which they seem to regard as the highest occupation in life, the Russian factor in the general game must be a matter of constant discussion. Thus it may possibly arise from their individual interest in their national position that there is no better natural geographer in the world than the Afghan of the Kabul district. There is often an exactness about his method of imparting information (sometimes a careful little map drawn out with a pointed stick on the ground) which would strike one as altogether extraordinary, but for the reflection that this one accomplishment is probably the practical outcome of the education of half a lifetime. 

 Russia's bases of military operations towards India are two: one on the Caspian Sea at Krasnovodsk, and Chikishliar, with outposts at Chat and Kizil Arvat; and the other on the line of Khiva, Bokhara, Samarcand, and Margillan, which may roughly be said to represent the frontier held (together with a large extent of boundary south of Kuldja) by the Army of Tashkend, under General Kaufmann. But between this latter line and the Oxus, Russia is undoubtedly already the dominant Power. The mere fact of Russia having already thoroughly explored all these regions, gives her the key to their future disposal. There is no doubt that in all matters relating to the acquirement of geographical knowledge, where it bears on possible military operations, Russian perceptions are of the keenest. Her surveying energies appear to be always concentrated on that which yet lies beyond her reach, rather than in the completion of good maps to aid in the right government of that which has already been acquired. 

 With what lies north of the Oxus we can have very little to say or to do; therefore it matters the less that in reality we know very little about it. The Oxus is not a fordable river. At Khoja Saleh, which is the furthest point supposed to have been reached by the Aral flotilla, it is about half a mile wide, with a slow current. At Charjui it is about the same width, only rapid and deep. At Karki it is said to be one thousand yards wide, and at Kilif perhaps a quarter of a mile. But at all these places there are ferries, and there would be ample means of crossing an army corps, if we take into account both the Aral flotilla and the native material, in the shape of large flat-bottomed boats, capable of containing one hundred men each, used for ferrying purposes, of which there are said to be three hundred between Kilif and Hazarasp. These boats are drawn across the river by horses swimming with ropes attached to their manes. But under any circumstances it seems about as unlikely that any British force would oppose the passage of a Russian army across the Oxus as that it would interfere with the Russian occupation of the trans-Oxus districts; but once south of the Oxus, many new conditions of opposition would come into play, arising principally from the very different national characteristics of the southern races to those farther north. It would no longer be a matter of pushing an advance through sandy and waterless deserts, or over wild and rugged mountains, difficulties which in themselves have never yet retarded the advance of a determined general, but there would be the reception that any Christian foe would almost certainly meet at the hands of a warlike and powerful people, who can unite with all the cohesion of religious fanaticism, backed up by something like military organization and a perfect acquaintance with the strategical conditions of their country. Most probably there would be no serious local opposition to the occupation by Russia of a line extending from Balkh eastwards through Khulm and Kunduz to Faizabad and Sarhadd, all of which places can be reached without great difficulty from the Oxus, and are connected by excellent lateral road communications. But the occupation of such a line could have but one possible object, which would be to conceal the actual line of further advance. Each of these places may be said to dominate a pass to India over the Hindoo Kush. Opposite Sarhadd is the Baroghil, leading either to Kashmir or to Mastuj and the Kunar valley. Faizabad commands the Nuksa Pass. Khulm looks southwards to Ghozi and the Parwan Pass into Kohistan, while from Balkh two main routes diverge, one to Bamian and Kabul, the other to Maimana and Herat. 

 It would be a great mistake to suppose that this short list disposes of all the practicable passes over the Hindoo Kush. The range is a singularly well-defined one throughout its vast length; but it is not by any means a range of startling peaks and magnificent altitudes. It is rather a chain of very elevated flattish-topped hills, spreading down in long spurs to the north and south, abounding in warm sheltered valleys and smiling corners, affording more or less pasture even in its highest parts, and traversed by countless paths. Many of these paths are followed by Kuchis in their annual migrations southward, with their families and household goods piled up in picturesque heaps on their hardy camels, or with large herds of sheep and goats, in search of fresh pasturage. South of the Hindoo Kush we find most of the eastern routes to our northwest frontier to converge in one point, very near to Jelalabad. There are certain routes existing between the Russian frontier and India which pass altogether east of this point. There is one which can be followed from Tashkend to Kashgar, and over the Karakoram range, and another which runs by the Terek Pass to Sarhadd, and thence over the Baroghil into Kashmir; but these routes have justly, and by almost universal consent, been set aside as involving difficulties of such obvious magnitude that it would be unreasonable to suppose that any army under competent leadership could be committed to them. The same might surely be said of the route by the Nuksan Pass into the valley of Chitral and the Kunar, which joins the Khyber route not far from Jelalabad. Its length and intricacy alone, independently of the intractable nature of the tribes which border it on either side, and of the fact that the Nuksan Pass is only open for half the year, would surely place it beyond the consideration of any general who aspired to invade India after accomplishing the feat of carrying an army through it. West of Kafirstan across the Hindoo Kush are, as we have said, passes innumerable, but only three which need be regarded as practicable for an advancing force, all the others more or less converging into these three. These are the Khak, the Kaoshan (or Parwan, also called Sar Alang), and the Irak. The Khak leads from Kunduz _via_ Ghori and the valley of the Indarab to the head of the Panjshir valley. Its elevation is about thirteen thousand feet. It is described as an easy pass, probably practicable for wheeled artillery. The Panjshiris are Tajaks, and, like the Kohistanis generally, are most bigoted Suniu Mohammedans. The rich and highly cultivated valley which they inhabit forms a grand highway into Kohistan and Koh Dahman; but all this land of terraced vineyards and orchards, watered by snow-cold streams from the picturesque gorges and mountain passes of the Hindoo Kush and Paghman mountains, --this very garden of Afghanistan, stretching away southwards to the gates of Kabul, is peopled by the same fierce and turbulent race who have ever given the best fighting men to the armies of the Amirs, and who have rendered the position of Kabul as the ruling capital of Afghanistan a matter of necessity; with their instincts of religious hostility, it will probably be found that the Kohistani, rather than the Hindoo Kush, is the real barrier between the north and the south. The Sar Alang or Parwan Pass leads directly from Kunduz and Ghori to Charikar and Kabul. It is the direct military route between Afghan Turkestan and the seat of the Afghan Government, but is not much used for trade. It cannot be much over eleven thousand feet elevation, and it is known to be an easy pass, though somewhat destitute of fuel and forage. The next route of importance is that which leads from Balkh, _via_ Bamian, to the Irak Pass on the Hindoo Kush, and into the upper watercourse of the Helmund River, and thence by the Unai over the Paghman range to Kabul. This is the great trade route from the markets of Turkestan and Central Asia generally to Kabul and India. The Irak, like the Parwan, is not nearly so high as has been generally assumed, while the Unai is a notoriously easy pass. This route is at present very much better known to the Russians, who have lately frequently traversed it, than to ourselves. Like the Parwan and the Khak, it is liable to be closed for three or four months of the year by snow. During the winter of 1879-80 they were open till late in December, and appear to be again free from snow about the middle of April. Between these main passes innumerable tracks follow the "durras, " or lines of watercourse, over the ridges of the Hindoo Kush and Paghman, which afford easy passage to men on foot and frequently also to "Kuchi" camels. These passes (so far as we can learn) could, any of them, be readily made available for mountain artillery with a very small expenditure of constructive labor and engineering skill. In Koh Dahman nearly every village of importance lying at the foot of the eastern slopes of the Paghman (such as Beratse, Farza, Istalif, etc. ) covers a practicable pass over the Paghman, which has its continuation across the Shoreband valley and over the ridge of the Hindoo Kush beyond it. But between the Khak Pass and the Irak, the various routes across the Hindoo Kush, whether regarded as routes to India or to Kandahar, although they by no means converge on Kabul City, must necessarily pass within striking distance of an army occupying Kabul. Such a force would have, first of all, thoroughly to secure its communication with the Oxus, and a strong position at Kabul itself. 

Having the official statement of a military engineer with referenceto the Oxus-Hindu-Kush line, as a barrier or base or curtain, we maypass to the principal approach to Herat from the northwest. 

There are four distinct lines by which Russia could move on Herat:

I. From the _Caspian_ base a trans-Caucasian army corps could move(only with the concurrence and alliance of Persia) by the Mashedroute direct;

II. Or it could move outside Persian territory, from _Chikishliar_by the Bendessen Pass to Asterabad, and would then have to passthrough Persian territory to Sarakhs, or across the desert to Merv;

III. From the _Tashkend-Bokhara_ base a route exists _via_ Charjui, the Oxus, direct to Merv; and there is

IV. Also the well-known road by _Balkh_ and Mamiana, direct toHerat. 

Routes III. And IV. Having just been discussed, let us look atRoutes I. And II. 

Referring to the small outline map of the trans-Caspian region, herewith, it will be seen that troops could embark from Odessa inthe fleet of merchant steamers available, and, if not molested _enroute_ by hostile cruisers, would reach Batum in from 2 to 3 days, thence by rail to Baku in 24 hours, another 24 hours through theCaspian Sea to Krasnovodsk, a transfer in lighters to the landing atMichaelovsk, and the final rail transportation to the presentterminus of the track beyond Kizil Arvat; this, it is said, willsoon reach Askabad, 310 miles from Herat. The Secretary of the RoyalAsiatic Society, Mr. Cust, with his wife, passed over this route in1883, and testifies to the ease and comfort of the transit and tothe great number of vessels engaged in the oil trade, which areavailable for military purposes, both on the Black and Caspian seas. He estimates that they could easily carry 8, 000 men at a trip. [Footnote: Mr. Cust says: "There are three classes of steamers onthe Caspian. 1, the Imperial war steamers with which Russia keepsdown piracy; 2, the steamers of the Caucasus and Mercury Company, very numerous and large vessels; 3, petroleum vessels--each steamerwith a capacity of 500 men. "]

General Hamley [Footnote: Lecture before R. U. S. Institution(London), 1884. ] says: "We may assume that if on the railway (singletrack) the very moderate number of 12 trains a day can run at therate of 12 miles an hour, the journey would occupy 40 hours. Thesuccessive detachments would arrive, then, easily in two days atSarakhs. A division may be conveyed, complete, in 36 trains. Thus, in six days a division would be assembled at Sarakhs ready to moveon the advanced guard. An army corps, with all its equipments anddepartments, would be conveyed in 165 trains in 17 days. It wouldthen be 200 miles--another 17 days' march--from Herat. Thus, addinga day for the crossing of the Caspian, the army corps from Bakuwould reach Herat in 35 days. Also the advance of a corps fromTurkestan upon Kabul is even more practicable than before. "[Footnote: In his plan of invasion, Skobeleff thought 50, 000 menmight undertake the enterprise without fear of disaster. This forcecould be doubled from the Caucasus alone. ]

The route from Tchikishliar _via_ Asterabad (where it strikes themain Teheran-Mashed-Herat road) would be an important auxiliary tothe railway line, _via_ Asterabad. There is also a more directcaravan track running south of this across the Khorassan, fromAsterabad (through Shahrud, Aliabad, Khaf, Gurian) to Herat; or, atShahrud, an excellent road running between the two already describedstraight (_via_ Sabzawar and Nishapar) to Mashed. 

From Sarakhs to Merv the road is said to be good and fairly suppliedwith water. From Merv to Herat the well-worn expression "coach andfour" has been used to denote the excellent condition of the road. [Footnote: For the first 100 miles the road follows the Murghab, which Abbott describes as "a deep stream of very pure water, about60 feet in breadth, and flowing in a channel mired to the depth of30 feet in the clay soil of the valley; banks precipitous andfringed with lamarisk and a few reeds. "] Yalatun is described asfertile, well populated, and unhealthy. [Footnote: Band-i-Yalatun, or "bank which throws the waters of the Murghab into the canal ofYalatun. "] From Penjdeh, where the river is sometimes fordable, theroad follows the Khusk River, and, ascending the Koh-i-Baber Pass, descends into the Herat valley, immediately beneath it. [Footnote:Before closing the chapter on the "Russian Forces, " a briefdescription of the order of march customary in Central Asia may beproper. From a translation by Major Clarke, R. A. , from Kotensko's"Turkestan, " it appears that the horses accompanying Central Asiandetachments are so considerable that the latter form, as it were, the escort of the former. As an Asiatic enemy nearly always attacksfrom every side, the distribution of the troops, during the march, must be such that they may be able to repulse the enemy no matterwhere he may appear. Usually, a half sotnia (70 men) of cavalrymarches in advance at a distance from 3/4 to 1-1/3 miles, so as tobe in view of main body. Immediately in front of main body marches adetachment of sappers and a company or two of infantry; then part ofthe artillery; then more infantry; the train; behind the train, remainder of artillery and infantry; as a rear guard, a sotnia ofcavalry. Bivouacs in the Steppe are usually chosen at wells, andare, in many respects, similar to those customary in the Indiancountry in America. First, an outer line of carts or wagons; thenthe troops; and inside, all the animals. The accompanying diagram isfrom _The Journal Royal United Service Institution_ (London). ]

[Illustration: NORMAL ORDER OF MARCH IN CENTRAL ASIA. NORMAL BIVOUAC IN CENTRAL ASIA. ]

V. 

REVIEW OF THE MILITARY SITUATION. 

The purpose of this volume has been to give as much reliableinformation upon the cause of the Anglo-Russian dispute, the natureof the probable theatre of operations in case of war, and of thearmies of the Powers concerned, as could be obtained and printedwithin a single fortnight. The richness of the available materialmade this especially difficult, comprising as it did the record ofrecent campaigns in Afghanistan, as well as the opinions of thosewho, like Vambery, Veniukoff, Rawlinson, Napier, and Cust, areauthorities upon Asiatic topics. 

As these lines are written [Footnore: April 18, 1885. ] the civilizednations of the world await with bated breath the next scene upon theAfghan stage. 

Seldom when two gladiators, armed and stripped, enter the arena doesa doubt exist as to their purpose. Yet such an exceptionaluncertainty attends the presence of England and Russia on the borderof Afghanistan. 

[Illustration: Gorge in the Tirband-i-Turkestan through which theMurghab Flows. ]

At least 50, 000 British soldiers are drawn up in front of the Indusawaiting a signal from their Queen. Nearly twice that number ofRussian troops are massed on or near the northwestern angle of theAmeer's country. [Footnote: Since the events noted in our firstchapter (page 12) transpired, another page has been added toAfghanistan's blood-stained record. After confronting each other onthe Khusk River for some weeks a large Russian force under GeneralKomaross attacked (March 30, 1885) the Afghan troops at Penjdeh, andafter a gallant resistance on the part of the native garrison it wasutterly routed and the town occupied by the victors. The Russiancasualties were inconsiderable, but the Afghans lost nearly 1, 000men. ]

It is impossible to eliminate, altogether, from a study of thepresent military situation, certain political elements. 

It is apparent that the Russians near Herat stand practically at"the forks of the road"; it is a three-pronged fork--one branchrunning due south to the sea and two branches due east to India. Thefirst-named requires but passing comment and only as it relates toHerat, planted on a route which cannot be controlled without itspossession, for military and commercial reasons well understood. 

As already explained, the routes to India, available to Russia, enable her to move from her base on the Merv-Herat line, both _via_Balkh and Kabul, for the purpose of flanking a British column movingfrom Quetta westward, or of raiding the rich valley of the Helmund;from Turkestan above this route, a British force moving from Kabulto Balkh could also be threatened. By the main Herat-Kandahar routean advance from the east could also be directly opposed; thecrossing of the Helmund by either army would probably be contested. 

In case of war, whether Anglo-Russian or Russo-Afghan, the firstgreat battle would doubtless be fought on the Kandahar-Ghazni-Kabulline. 

[Illustration: Jelalabad from Piper's Hill. ]

General Hamley, the leading British military authority, [Footnote:Lieut. -General Sir. E. Hamley, K. C. B. ] shows that this line is, ofall proposed, at once the most practicable and desirable line forthe defence of India. [Footnote: Three lines had been considered:first, the line of the Eastern Sulimani, but this would leave theseaport of Kurrachee unprotected; second, from Pishin northeast toKabul. ] He says: "We should have a strong British governor inKandahar, and a strong British force on the Helmund and on the roadto Kabul; the railway completed to Kandahar, and, in case of amovement from Turkestan against Kabul, a force on our side on itsway to occupy that city, and new recruiting grounds open to us amidwarlike populations. Surely there can be no question as to which ofthese two sets of circumstances would give us most influence inAfghanistan, most power to oppose Russia and to maintain confidencein India. " [Footnote: Gen. Hamley's remarks were made before theRoyal United Service Institution (May 18, 1884), and, in thediscussion which followed, Colonel Malleson said: "Recently in Indiasome influential natives said to me: 'Russia will continue heradvance; she will not stop until she has gained the fertile countryof Herat, and then she will intrigue with the native princes behindthe Indus, and when you send an army to meet her, you will findthose native princes rising in your rear. ' I may fortify my ownexperience by what was told me by an Austrian gentleman who visitedIndia about seven years ago. He paid a visit to the Maharaja, ofCashmere, who said to him: 'From you I hope to get the truth; youare not an Englishman nor a Russian. Tell me which is the stronger--the English power or the Russian; because it will be necessarily myduty, if Russia should advance, and if I should find Russia strongerthan England, to go for the defence of my throne on the side ofRussia. '"]

The same authority approves Sir Michael Biddulph's recommendation toutilize the strong natural positions near Girishk on the Helmund. Asto Afghanistan he testifies: "With a power like Russia closing onit, holding Persia and Persian resources subject to its will, it isin vain to think that Afghanistan will be long independent even inname. It is between hammer and anvil, or, to use a still moreexpressive metaphor, between the devil and the deep sea. Bound to usby no traditions, by no strong political influences such as mighthave been used to constrain them, the Afghan tribes, mercenary andperfidious to a proverb, an aggregate of tribes--not a nation, --willlose no time, when the moment occurs, in siding with the great powerwhich promises most lavishly, or which can lay strongest hold onthem. "

The burning words with which General Hamley closed his lecture oneyear ago are singularly true to-day, and form a fitting terminationto this sketch:

"I do not undervalue the many influences which will always opposeany policy entailing expense. But if the present question is foundto be--How shall we guard against a terrible menace to our IndianEmpire? any cost to be incurred can hardly be admitted as a reasonwhich ought to influence our course. Magnanimous trustfulness in thevirtue and guilelessness of rival states; distrust and denunciationof all who would chill this inverted patriotism by words of warning;refusal of all measures demanding expense which do not promise apecuniary return:--such is the kind of liberality of sentiment whichmay ruin great nations. The qualities of the lamb may be veryexcellent qualities, but they are specially inapplicable to dealingswith the wolf. Do those who shrink from expense think that thepresence of Russia in Afghanistan will be inexpensive to us? Willthe weakness which will be the temptation and the opportunity ofRussia be less costly than effectual defence? When we enter thecouncils of Europe to assert our most vital interests, shall wespeak as we have been accustomed to speak, when our free action isfettered by the imminent perpetual menace to India? These arequestions which, now put forth to this limited audience, will, perhaps, within the experience of most of us, be thundered in theears of the nation. England is just now not without seriousperplexities, but none are so fraught with possibilities of mischiefas the storm which is now gathering on the Afghan frontier. "

LIST OF AUTHORITIES. 

[Footnote: Unless otherwise designated, the authors named areofficers of the British Army, and nearly all the works are in theLibrary of the Military Service Institution of the United States, (Governor's Island, N. Y. H. ). ]

[Source 1: Journal Royal United Service Institution (London). ]

[Source 2: Journal of the United Service Institution of India(Simla). ]

ANDERSON, Capt. "A Scheme for Increasing the Strength of the NativeArmies, " etc. [2]

ARMY LIST, British Official, 1885. 

BIDDULPH, Gen. "The March from the Indus to the Helmund. " [2]

BELLEW, H. W. , C. S. I. "A New Afghan Question. " [2]

BENGOUGH, Lieut-Col. "Mounted Infantry. " [2] (From the Russian. )

BISCHOFF, Major. "The Caucasus and its Significance to Russia. "(Ger. ) [2]

BLUNDELL, Col. "British Military Power with Reference to WarAbroad. " [1]

BAKER, Col. "The Military Geography of Central Asia. " [1]

COLQUHOUN, Capt. "On the Development of the Resources of India in aMilitary Point of View. " [2]

CANTLEY, Major. "Reserves for the Indian Army. " [2]

CALLEN, Major. "The Volunteer Force of India, " etc. [2]

CAVENAGH, Gen. "Our Indian Army. " [1]

CHAPMAN, Lieut-Col. "The March from Kabul to Kandahar in 1880. " [1]

CLARKE, Capt, "Recent Reforms in the Russian Army. " [1]

CUST, R. , Sec. R. A. S. "The Russians on the Caspian and Black Seas. "[1]

DAVIDSON, Major. "The Reasons why Difficulty is Experienced inRecruiting for the Native Army. " [2]

DALTON, Capt. "Skobeleff's Instructions for the Reconnaisance andBattle of Geok-Tepe. " [1] (From the French. )

ELIAS, Capt. "A Streak of the Afghan War. " [1]

ESME-FORBES, Lieut. "Cavalry Reform. " [2]

FURSE, Major. "Various Descriptions of Transport. " [1]

GAISFORD, Capt. "New Model Transport Cart for Ponies and Mules. " [2]

GLOAG, Col. "Military Reforms in India. " [2]

GOWAN, Major. "Progressive Advance of Russia in Central Asia. " [2]"The Army of Bokhara. " [2] "Russian Military Manoeuvres in theProvince of Jaxartes. " [2] (From the Russian. )

GRAHAM, Col. "The Russian Army in 1882. " [1]

GORDON, Capt. "Bengal Cavalry in Egypt. " [2]

GRIERSON, Lieut. "The Russian Cavalry, " and "The Russian MountedTroops in 1883. " [2]

GREENE, Capt. "Sketches of Army Life in Russia. " (New York, 1881. )

GRIFFITHS, Major. "The English Army. " (London. )

GREY, Major. "Military Operations in Afghanistan. " [2]

GERARD, Capt. "Rough Notes on the Russian Army in 1876. " [2]

GOLDSMID, Gen. "From Bamian to Sonmiani. " [1] "On Certain Roadsbetween Turkistan and India. " [1]

HEYLAND, Major. "Military Transport Required for Rapid Movements. "[1]

HOLDICH, Capt. "Between Russia and India. " [1]

HENNEKEN, Gen. "Studies on the Probable Course and Result of a Warbetween Russia and England. " [2] (From the Russian. )

HILDYARD, Lieut. -Col. "The Intendance, Transport, and Supply Servicein Continental Armies. " [2]

HASKYNS, Capt. "Notice of the Afghan Campaigns in 1879-81. From anEngineer's View. " [1]

HAMLEY, Lieut. -Gen. , Sir E. "Russia's Approaches to India. " (1884. )[1]

JOURNAL of the Military Service Institution of the United States. 

KELTIE, J. S. "The Statesman's Year-Book. " (London, 1885. )

KIRCHHAMMER, A. "The Anglo-Afghan War. " [2] (From the German. )

KOTENSKO. "The Horses and Camels of Central Asia. " [2] "Turkestan. "[1] (From the Russian. )

LITTLE, Col. "Afghanistan and England in India. " [2] (From theGerman. )

LEVERSON, Lieut. "March of the Turkistan Detachment across theDesert, " etc. [1] (From the Russian. )

MARTIN, Capt. "Tactics in the Afghan Campaign, " [2] "Notes on theOperations in the Kurrum Valley. " [2] "Horse-Breeding in Australiaand India. " [2] "Notes on the Management of Camels in the 10thCompany Sappers and Miners on Field Service. " [2] "British Infantryin the Hills and Plains of India. " [2]

MORGAN, D. "A Visit to Kuldja, and the Russo-Chinese Frontier. " [1]

MORTON, Capt. "Gourko's Raid. " [2] (From the French. )

MACKENZIE, Lieut. -Gen. "Storms and Sunshine of a Soldier's Life. "

MOSA, P. "The Russian Campaign of 1879, " etc. [2] (From theRussian. )

MEDLEY, Col. "The Defence of the Northwest Frontier. " [2]

NEWALL, Lieut. -Col. "On the Strategic Value of Cashmere inConnection with the Defence of Our Northwest Frontier. " [2]

O'DONOVAN, E. "The Merv Oasis. " (New York, 1883. )

PRICE, Capt. "Notes on the Sikhs as Soldiers for Our Army. " [2]

PITT, Lieut. "A Transport Service for Asiatic Warfare, " etc. [1]

ROSS, D. , (Delhi Railway). "Transport by Rail of Troops, Horses, Guns, and War Materials. " [2]

ST. JOHN, Major. "Persia: Its Physical Geography and People. " [2]

STRONG, Capt. "The Education of Native Officers in the Indian Army. "[2]

STEEL, Veterinary-Surgeon. "Camels in Connection with the SouthAfrican Expedition, 1878-1879. " [2]

SHAW, Major. "Army Transport. " [1]

SANDERSON, G. P. "The Elephant in Freedom and in Captivity. " [2]

TEMPLE, Lieut. "An Historical Parallel--The Afghans and Mainotes. "[2]

TYRRELL, Lieut. -Col. "The Races of the Madras Army. " [2]

TROTTER, Capt. "The Tribes of Turkistan. " [2]

TRENCH, Col. "Cavalry in Modern War. " (London, 1884. )

UPTON, Gen. "The Armies of Asia and Europe. " (New York, 1878. )

VENIUKOFF, Col. "The Progress of Russia in Central Asia. " [2] (Fromthe Russian. )

YALDWYN, Capt. "Notes on the Camel. " [2]

INDEX. 

A

Abazai, mil. PostAbbaza, villageAbdurrahman, the AmeerAbsuna, passAbul-KhairAfghanistan: Territory; mountains; rivers; roads, animals; people; army; cities; military historyAhmed-Kheil, cityAhmed-ShahAkbar KhanAkbar, the GreatAkhunt Ziarut, cityAkton Khel, cityAlexander I. Alexander, CzarAlexander of MacedonAli Musjid, fortAltai, riverAliabadAmu Daria (Oxus), riverAral, seaArgandab, valley; riverArmy, British: Strength; organization; transport; supply; routes; operations IndianArmy, Russian: Strength; organization; transport; supply; routesAryan, raceAskabadAssin Killo, cityAsterabadAtta Karez, mountainAttreck, riverAuckland, LordAulicata, cityAuran, mountainAurangzebAyoub Khan

B

Baber KhanBakuBalkash, mountainBalkh, cityBamian, passBaroghil, passBarshor, valleyBaru, military postBatumBekovitch, Gen. Beloochistan, stateBendessen, passBengal, cityBeratse, villageBerlin, cityBiddulph, Sir M. Billigarungan, hillsBolan, passBokhara, provinceBombay, cityBori, valleyBost, cityBroadfoot, Capt. Browne, Gen. Brydon, Dr. Bunnoo, mil. PostBurnes, agentBurrows, Gen. 

C

CalmucksCamelCashmere, MaharajaCaspian, seaCatharine II. Cavagnari, MajorCeylon, islandChapman, Col. Charikar, townChat, townCharjui, townChelmsford, LordChemkent, cityChikishliar, townChitral, townClarke, MajorConolly, M. CossacksCust, Mr. 

D

Dadur, cityDakka, cityDasht-i-Bedowlat, mountainDelhi, cityDera Ghazi Khan, villageDera Ismail Khan, cityDerajat, districtDjungaria, provinceDoaba, military postDost, MohammedDozan, city

E

ElephantEllenborough, LordElphinstone, Gen. Eski Zagra, town

F

Faizabad, cityFarrah, townFarza, villageFergana, provinceFerrier, Gen. 

G

Gaisford, Capt. Gayud Yara, plainGeok Tepe, fortGenghiz KhanGhazgar, valleyGhazni, cityGhilzai, districtGhori, valleyGilan, provinceGindari, mountainGirishk, cityGordon, Col. Gourko, Gen. Graham, Sir L. Green, Col. Grierson, Lieut. Guikok, rangeGujrat, cityGuleir Surwandi, passGundamuck, cityGundana, townGurian, city

H

Haines, Sir F. Hamley, Gen. Har-i-RudHazaristan, riverHazarasp, cityHazardarakht, mountainHazarnao, cityHelmund, riverHerat, city; riverHimalayas, mountainHindu Kush, mountainHobhouse, Sir J. C. Hodjeni, provinceHoldich, Capt. Horse, yabu; khirgiz

I

Inderabad, riverIndia, On the threshold ofIndus, riverIrak, passIrgiz, fortIrtish, riverIspahan, cityIstalif, village

J

Jacobadad, cityJagdallack, passJamrud, cityJelalabad, cityJizakh, provinceJumrud, military post

K

Kabul, city; riverKachi, plainsKadani, plainsKafristan, provinceKabriz, fortkalat, cityKandahar, cityKarakoran, mountainKarkacha, passKarki, townKash, river; cityKashgarKashmir, cityKaufmann, Gen. Kelat, townKhaiber, passKhanikoff, M. KhafKhak, passKhinar, passKhiva, provinceKhoja-Saleh, cityKhokand, provinceKhoja-Amran, mountain ridgeKhorassan, provinceKhulm, cityKhurd-Kabul, passKhurd-Khaiber, passKhusk', riverKhirtar, mountainKilif, cityKizil Arvat, cityKoh Daman, mountainKohut, mil. PostKohistan, provinceKoh-i-Baber, mountainKokiran, districtKomaroff, Gen. KotenskoKrasnovodsk, cityKuh-i-Baba, mountainKujlak-Kekur, valleyKuldja, cityKunar valleyKunduz, cityKurrachee, cityKuram, river; valley; fortKusmore, villageKussun, fort

L

Lalaberg, valleyLalgoshi, villageLahore, cityLandi Khana, villageLash Jowain, cityLakhareff, Gen. Logar, valleyLondon, cityLora, riverLumsden, Sir P. Lumley, Col. 

M

Mackenzie, Gen. C. Mackeson, fortMcNaghten, Sir W. Mahmoud, sultanMahometMahommed AzimMaimana, townMalleson, Col. MaltaMargilan, townMaris, tribeMartin, Lieut. Marvin, C. Mashed, cityMastuj, townMaude, Gen. Mazanderan, provinceMcClellan, saddleMerv, provinceMichaelovsk, townMichni, fortMithunkot, townMogulMooktur valleyMooltan, cityMoscow, cityMulla, passMunro, fortMurchat, townMurghab, riverMysore, province

N

Nadir, ShahNahur, Maharajah ofNapier, LordNapoleonNicholas, Grand DukeNijni Novgorod, townNishuper, town--Nogak, M. Nott, Gen. Nuksan, pass

O

Odessa, cityO'Donovan, M. Orenburg, provinceOrloff, Gen. Outram, Capt. Oxus, (See Amer. Daria)

P

Paghman, mountainsPanjshir, valleyPanjwai, townParopismus, mountainsParwan, passPat, clayPaul, EmperorPeiwar, passPekinPenjdeh, townPersiaPerwan, passPerovsky, fortPeter the GreatPetropanlovsk, provincePeshawur, cityPishin, village; plainPollock, Gen. Pottinger, MajorPrimrose, Gen. 

Q

Quetta, city

R

Raganpur, cityRawlinson, Sir H. Roberts, Gen. Rogan, villageRoss, railway managerRudbar, townRussian Army: strength; organization; transport; supply; routes

S

Sabzawar, citySale, Sir R. Samarcand, citySamsonSan StefanoSarahks, townSargo, passSarhadd, townSaunders, MajorScinde, provinceSeistan, districtShahrud, townShere AliShikapur, townShul Kadar, fortShurtargurdan, passSingh RunjitSirpul, townSkobeleff, Gen. Stewart, Sir D. Stolietoff, Gen. St. PetersburgSufed Koh, mountainSujah ShahSulimani, mountainsSuprasl, riverSurkh DenkorSurkhab river

T

Takwir, mountainTaktipul, townTargai, fortTartara, passTashkend, cityTeheranTehernayeff, Gen. Tejend, riverTemple, Sir R. Terek, passTimwiTrench, Col. Troitsk, provinceTurkestanTurnak, valleyTwarditsa, town

U

Unai, riverUral, mountains

V

Vambery, M. Veniukoff, M. Vernoye, fortVolga, river

W

Warsaw, cityWashir, townWolseley, Lord

Y

Yakoub, KhanYalatun, townYaldwin, Capt. Yaxartes, river

Z

Zurmat, districtZohak, fort