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TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE: Every effort has been made to replicate this text asfaithfully as possible; please see detailed list of printing issues atthe end of the text. 

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ADMIRAL FARRAGUT

 Great Commanders

 _EDITED BY JAMES GRANT WILSON_

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The Great Commanders Series. 

EDITED BY GENERAL JAMES GRANT WILSON. 

 Admiral Farragut. By Captain A. T. Mahan, U. S. N. General Taylor. By General O. O. Howard, U. S. A. General Jackson. By James Parton. General Greene. By Captain Francis V. Greene, U. S. A. General J. E. Johnston. By Robert M. Hughes, of Virginia. General Thomas. By Henry Coppee, LL. D. General Scott. By General Marcus J. Wright. General Washington. By General Bradley T. Johnson. General Lee. By General Fitzhugh Lee. General Hancock. By General Francis J. Walker. General Sheridan. By General Henry E. Davies. General Grant. By General James Grant Wilson. 

_IN PREPARATION. _

 General Sherman. By General Manning F. Force. Admiral Porter. By James R. Soley, late Assist. Sec. Of Navy. General McClellan. By General Peter S. Michie. Commodore Paul Jones. By Admiral Richard W. Meade. 

New York: D. APPLETON & CO. , 72 Fifth Avenue. 

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 [Illustration: D. G. Farragut]

 D. Appleton & Co. 

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GREAT COMMANDERS

ADMIRAL FARRAGUT

BY CAPTAIN A. T. MAHAN, U. S. NAVY

 PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE AUTHOR OF THE GULF AND INLAND WATERS, AND OF THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, 1660-1783

_WITH PORTRAIT AND MAPS_

 NEW YORK D. APPLETON AND COMPANY 1897

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 Copyright, 1892, By D. APPLETON AND COMPANY. _All rights reserved. _

 Electrotyped and Printed at the Appleton Press, U. S. A. 

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PREFACE. 

In preparing this brief sketch of the most celebrated of our navalheroes, the author has been aided by the very full and valuablebiography published in 1878 by his son, Mr. Loyall Farragut, who hasalso kindly supplied for this work many additional details of interestfrom the Admiral's journals and correspondence, and from othermemoranda. For the public events connected with Farragut's career, either directly or indirectly, recourse has been had to the officialpapers, as well as to the general biographical and historical literaturebearing upon the war, which each succeeding year brings forth in booksor magazines. The author has also to express his thanks to Rear-AdmiralThornton A. Jenkins, formerly chief-of-staff to Admiral Farragut; toCaptain John Crittenden Watson, formerly his flag-lieutenant; and to hisfriend General James Grant Wilson, for interesting anecdotes andreminiscences. 

 A. T. M. 

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CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER PAGE

 I. --Family and Early Life, 1801-1811 1

 II. --Cruise of the Essex, 1811-1814 10

 III. --Midshipman to Lieutenant, 1814-1825 51

 IV. --Lieutenant, 1825-1841 69

 V. --Commander and Captain, 1841-1860 89

 VI. --The Question of Allegiance, 1860-1861 106

 VII. --The New Orleans Expedition, 1862 115

 VIII. --The First Advance on Vicksburg, 1862 177

 IX. --The Blockade, and the Passage of Port Hudson, 1862-1863 196

 X. --Mobile Bay Fight, 1864 237

 XI. --Later Years and Death, 1864-1870 294

 XII. --The Character of Admiral Farragut 308

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. FACING PAGE

 Portrait of Admiral Farragut _Frontispiece_

 General Map of the scene of Farragut's operations 115

 Passage of Mississippi Forts 127

 Passage of Vicksburg Batteries 187

 Passage of Port Hudson 213

 Battle of Mobile Bay 247

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ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

CHAPTER I. 

FAMILY AND EARLY LIFE. 

1801-1811. 

The father of Admiral Farragut, George Farragut, was of unmixed Spanishdescent, having been born on the 29th of September, 1755, in the islandof Minorca, one of the Balearic group, where the family had beenprominent for centuries. One of his ancestors, Don Pedro Ferragut, served with great distinction under James I, King of Aragon, in the warsagainst the Moors, which resulted in their expulsion from Majorca in1229, and from the kingdom of Valencia, in the Spanish Peninsula, in1238. As Minorca in 1755 was a possession of the British Crown, to whichit had been ceded in 1713 by the Treaty of Utrecht, George Farragut wasborn under the British flag; but in the following year a Frenchexpedition, fitted out in Toulon, succeeding in wresting from the handsof Great Britain both the island and its excellent fortified harbor, Port Mahon, one of the most advantageous naval stations in theMediterranean. It was in the course of the operations which resulted inthis conquest of Minorca by the French that the British fleet, underthe command of Admiral Byng, met with the check for which the admiralpaid the penalty of his life a few months later. At the close of theSeven Years' War, in 1763, the island was restored to Great Britain, inwhose hands it remained until 1782, when it was again retaken by theFrench and Spaniards. 

George Farragut, however, had long before severed his connection withhis native country. In March, 1776, he emigrated to North America, whichwas then in the early throes of the Revolutionary struggle. Having grownto manhood a subject to Great Britain, but alien in race and feeling, henaturally espoused the cause of the colonists, and served gallantly inthe war. At its end he found himself, like the greater part of hisadopted countrymen, called to the task of building up his own fortunes, neglected during its continuance; and, by so doing, to help in restoringprosperity to the new nation. A temper naturally adventurous led him tothe border lines of civilization; and it was there, in the region whereNorth Carolina and eastern Tennessee meet, that the years succeeding theRevolution appear mainly to have been passed. It was there also that hemet and married his wife, Elizabeth Shine, a native of Dobbs County, North Carolina, where she was born on the 7th of June, 1765. At the timeof their marriage the country where they lived was little more than awilderness, still infested by Indians; and one of the earliestrecollections of the future admiral was being sent into the loft, on theapproach of a party of these, while his mother with an axe guarded thedoor, which she had barricaded. This unsettled and dangerous conditionnecessitated a constant state of preparedness, with some organizationof the local militia, among whom George Farragut held the rank of amajor of cavalry, in which capacity he served actively for some time. 

While resident in Tennessee, George Farragut became known to Mr. W. C. C. Claiborne, at that time the member for Tennessee in the NationalHouse of Representatives. Mr. Claiborne in 1801 became governor ofMississippi Territory; and in 1803, when the United States purchasedfrom France the great region west of the Mississippi River, to which thename Louisiana was then applied, he received the cession of the newlyacquired possession. This was soon after divided into two parts by aline following the thirty-third parallel of north latitude, andClaiborne became governor of the southern division, which was called theTerritory of Orleans. To this may probably be attributed the removal ofthe Farraguts to Louisiana from eastern Tennessee. The region in whichthe latter is situated, remote both from tide-water and from the greatriver by which the Western States found their way to the Gulf of Mexico, was singularly unfitted to progress under the conditions ofcommunication in that day; and it long remained among the most backwardand primitive portions of the United States. The admiral's father, afterhis long experience there, must have seen that there was little hope ofbettering his fortunes. Whatever the cause, he moved to Louisiana in theearly years of the century, and settled his family in New Orleans. Hehimself received the appointment of sailing-master in the navy, and wasordered to command a gun-boat employed in the river and on the adjacentsounds. A dispute had arisen between the United States and the SpanishGovernment, to whom the Floridas then belonged, as to the line ofdemarcation between the two territories; and George Farragut was attimes employed with his vessel in composing disturbances and forwardingthe views of his own government. 

David Glasgow, the second son of George Farragut, and the future Admiralof the United States Navy, was born before the removal to Louisiana, onthe 5th of July, 1801, at Campbell's Station, near Knoxville, in easternTennessee. In 1808, while living in his father's house on the banks ofLake Pontchartrain, an incident occurred which led directly to hisentrance into the navy, and at the same time brought into curiouscoincidence two families, not before closely associated, whose names arenow among the most conspicuous of those in the annals of the navy. WhileGeorge Farragut was fishing one day on Lake Pontchartrain he fell inwith a boat, also engaged in fishing, in which was an old gentlemanprostrated by the heat of the sun. He took him to his own house, wherehe was cared for and nursed until he died, never having recoveredstrength sufficient to be removed. The sufferer was David Porter, thefather of the Captain David Porter who afterward commanded the frigateEssex in her adventurous and celebrated cruise in the Pacific during theyears 1813 and 1814, and grandfather of the still more distinguishedAdmiral David D. Porter, who, over half a century later, served withDavid Farragut on the Mississippi in the civil war, and in the endsucceeded him as second admiral of the navy. Captain, or rather, as hethen was, Commander Porter being in charge of the naval station at NewOrleans, his father, who had served actively afloat during theRevolution and had afterward been appointed by Washington asailing-master in the navy, had obtained orders to the same station, inorder to be with, though nominally under, his son. The latter deeplyfelt the kindness shown to his father by the Farraguts. Mrs. Farragutherself died of yellow fever, toward the end of Mr. Porter's illness, the funeral of the two taking place on the same day; and CommanderPorter soon after visited the family at their home and offered to adoptone of the children. Young David Farragut then knew little of theelement upon which his future life was to be passed; but, dazzled by thecommander's uniform and by that of his own elder brother William, whohad received a midshipman's warrant a short time before, he promptlydecided to accept an offer which held forth to him the same brilliantprospects. The arrangement was soon concluded. Porter promised to be tohim always a friend and guardian; and the admiral wrote in after life, "I am happy to have it in my power to say, with feelings of the warmestgratitude, that he ever was to me all that he promised. " The boyreturned to New Orleans with his new protector, in whose house hethenceforth resided, making occasional trips across Lake Pontchartrainto a plantation which his father had purchased on the Pascagoula River. A few months later Commander Porter appears to have made a visit toWashington on business connected with the New Orleans station, and tohave taken Farragut with him to be placed at school, for which therewere few advantages at that time in Louisiana. The boy then took whatproved to be a last farewell of his father. George Farragut continued tolive in Pascagoula, and there he died on the 4th of June, 1817, in hissixty-second year. 

The trip north was made by Porter and his ward in the bomb-ketchVesuvius, a stop being made at Havana; where the commander had businessgrowing out of the seizure by him in the Mississippi River of someFrench privateers, for which both Spain and the United States hadoffered a reward. At Havana the lad heard of an incident, only toocommon in those days, which set his heart, as those of his countrymenwere fast being set, against Great Britain. Presuming confidently uponthe naval weakness of the United States, and arguing from their longforbearance that insults to the flag would be indefinitely borne for thesake of the profitable commerce which neutrality insured, Great Britain, in order to support the deadly struggle in which she was engaged withFrance, had endeavored to shut off the intercourse of her enemy with therest of the world, by imposing upon neutral trade restrictions beforeunheard of and without justification in accepted international law. Boththe justice and policy of these restrictions were contested by a largeparty of distinguished Englishmen; but upon another principle men of allparties in the old country were practically agreed, and that was theright of the British Government to compel the services of British seamenwherever found. From this grew the claim, which few Englishmen thendared to disavow, that their ships of war could rightfully take from anyneutral merchant ship any seaman of British birth who was found onboard. In estimating this monstrous pretention, Americans have shownlittle willingness to allow for the desperate struggle in which GreatBritain was involved, and the injury which she suffered from the numberof her seamen who, to escape impressment in their home ports and theconfinement of ships of war, sought service in neutral merchant ships. Her salvation depended upon her navy; and seamen were so scarce asseriously to injure its efficiency and threaten paralysis. This wasnaturally no concern of the United States, which set up its simple, undeniable right to the protection the neutral flag should give to allpersons and goods under it, which were not involved in any infraction ofbelligerent rights. The straits of Great Britain, however, were too direto allow the voice of justice to override that of expediency. Had theUnited States Navy been a force as respectable in numbers as it was inefficiency, the same dictates of expediency might have materiallycontrolled the action of her opponent; might have prevented outrage andaverted war. As it was, right was set up against right--the right of theneutral flag on the one hand against the right of a country to theservice of all her citizens on the other. The United States protestedand wrote with all the conviction of a state upon whose side justicewas. She resorted to measure after measure of peaceable coercion; butshe had no military force to show upon the sea, and her utterances wereconsequently too uncertain to command respect. Great Britain continuedto take seamen from American merchant ships upon the plea of her rightto impress British seamen in any place; and, though the claim to detainor search ships of war had been explicitly disavowed after theChesapeake affair of 1807, scant deference was shown to the vessels of apower so little able to stand up for itself. In a day when most vesselscarried some guns for self-defense, it was a simple matter to ignore thenational character of an armed ship and to stop it unceremoniously. Ofsuch an insult Farragut heard during this stay in Havana. The brigVixen, of the United States Navy, had been fired into by a British shipof war. "This, " wrote Farragut in his journal, "was the first thing thatcaused in me bad feeling toward the English nation. I was too young toknow anything about the Revolution; but I looked upon this as an insultto be paid in kind, and was anxious to discharge the debt withinterest. " It is scarcely necessary to say how keenly this feeling wasshared by his seniors in the service, to whom the Vixen incident was butone among many bitter wrongs which the policy of their Government hadforced them humbly to swallow. 

After their arrival in Washington Farragut was put to school, where heremained until Porter was relieved from the New Orleans station. Duringhis stay at the capital he was presented by his guardian to theSecretary of the Navy, Paul Hamilton, of South Carolina; who, afterascertaining his wish to enter the service, promised him a midshipman'swarrant when he should be ten years old. The promise was more than kept, for the warrant, when issued, was dated December 17, 1810; the futureadmiral thus finding himself at least a titular officer, in the servicewhich he was afterward to adorn, when not quite nine and a half years ofage. Although at that time, and in earlier generations, boys, no olderthan Farragut then was, were not infrequently turned aboard ship tofight their own way in life, Porter did not so construe his duties tohis charge. In the latter part of 1810 he finally left New Orleans andwent North again, this time by the Mississippi River and in a gun-boat. The voyage to Pittsburg against the swift current took three months; andit was not till toward the close of the year that he and his family wereagain settled in their home at Chester, in Pennsylvania, the birthplaceof Mrs. Porter. Farragut was then removed from Washington and put toschool in Chester, there to remain until his guardian should be able totake him to sea under his own eyes, in a vessel commanded by himself. This opportunity was not long in arriving. 

CHAPTER II. 

CRUISE OF THE ESSEX. 

1811-1814. 

Child though Farragut was when he obtained his nominal admission to thenavy, he had but a short time to wait before entering upon its sternrealities--realities far harsher in that day than now. The difficultiesthat had existed between the United States and Great Britain, ever sincethe outbreak of war between the latter and France in 1793, were now fastdrifting both nations to the collision of 1812. The Non-intercourse Actof March, 1809, forbidding American merchant ships to enter any port ofFrance or Great Britain, as a retaliation for the outrages inflicted byboth upon American commerce, had expired by its own limitations in May, 1810, when commerce with the two countries resumed its natural course;but Congress had then passed a proviso to the effect that if eitherpower should, before March 3, 1811, recall its offensive measures, theformer act should, within three months of such revocation, reviveagainst the one that maintained its edicts. Napoleon had contrived tosatisfy the United States Government that his celebrated Berlin andMilan decrees had been recalled on the 1st of November; and, consequently, non-intercourse with Great Britain was again proclaimedin February, 1811. The immediate result was that two British frigatestook their station off New York, where they overhauled all merchantships, capturing those bound to ports of the French Empire, andimpressing any members of the crews considered to be British subjects. The United States then fitted out a squadron, to be commanded byCommodore John Rodgers; whose orders, dated May 6, 1811, were to cruiseoff the coast and to protect American commerce from unlawfulinterference by British and French cruisers. Ten days later occurred thecollision between the commodore's ship, the President, and the Britishcorvette Little Belt. Of Rodgers's squadron the frigate Essex, expectedshortly to arrive from Europe, was to be one; and Commander Porter, whodid not obtain his promotion to the grade of captain until the followingyear, was ordered to commission her. He took his ward with him, and thetwo joined the ship at Norfolk, Virginia, in August, 1811, when theyoung midshipman had just passed his tenth birthday. Long yearsafterward Mrs. Farragut was told by Commodore Bolton, one of thelieutenants of the Essex, that he remembered to have found the littleboy overcome with sleep upon his watch, leaning against a gun-carriage, and had covered him with his pea-jacket to protect him from the nightair. An amusing incident, however, which occurred during these firstmonths of his naval career showed that the spirit of battle was alreadystirring. Porter, probably with a view to keep the lad more immediatelyunder his own eye, had made him midshipman of his gig, as the captain'sspecial boat is called. On one occasion he was sent in to the wharf, towait for the captain and bring him to the ship when he came. A crowd ofdock-loungers gradually collected, and the youngster who stood erect inthe boat, doubtless looking pleasedly conscious of his new uniform andimportance, became the object of audible comment upon his personalappearance. The boat's crew sat silent but chafing, the bowman holdingon with his boat-hook, until one loafer proceeded from witticism topractical joking by sprinkling the midshipman with an old water-pot. Quick as look the bowman caught his boot-hook in the culprit's pocketand dragged him into the boat, while the rest of the crew, by this timespoiling for a fight, seized their stretchers, jumped ashore, and beganlaying on right and left. Farragut, so far from restraining, went withthem, waving his dirk and cheering them on. The victorious seamen foughttheir way up to Market Square, where the police interfered, arrestingall parties, and the little officer was formally bound over to keep thepeace. 

The Hartford, upon which Farragut first hoisted his admiral's flag, hasobtained a particular interest from its close association with the wholeof his course of victory; and the Essex, a ship of very different type, would attract attention as the one that cradled his career, andwitnessed the part of it which is only second in excitement to hisexploits as a commander-in-chief, had she no special claims of her ownto notice. But the Essex, both in her origin and through her subsequenthistory, especially when under Porter's command, was a marked ship. Shewas an offspring of the quarrel between the United States and the FrenchRepublic, which arose out of the extravagant demands made by the latterupon the compliance of her former ally, in consequence of the servicewhich it was claimed had been rendered during the Revolutionary War. Ignoring the weakness of the American Republic, and the dependence of alarge section of the country upon commerce, the French Government hadexpected that it should resist, even by force, the seizure by Britishcruisers of French property in American vessels, and thus bring onhostilities with Great Britain; and that, although the United StatesGovernment admitted the practice of capturing enemy's property inneutral ships, however objectionable in theory, to be part of thetraditional and recognized law of nations. Going on from step to step, in the vain endeavor by some means to injure the maritime predominanceof Great Britain, which defied the efforts both of their navy and oftheir privateers, the French Legislature in January, 1798, decreed thatany neutral vessel which should be found to have on board, not merelyBritish property, but property, to whomsoever belonging, which was grownor manufactured in England or her colonies, should be a lawful prize toFrench cruisers. This extravagant claim, which not only seized goodsthat had been heretofore and by all others accounted free, but also, contrary to precedent, confiscated the vessel as well as the cargo, broke down the patience of the United States, where the Government wasthen still in the hands of the Federalists, whose sympathies were ratherBritish than French. Nearly a year before, President Adams had called aspecial meeting of Congress and recommended an increase of the navy, tothe numerical weakness of which was due the recklessness with which bothGreat Britain and France inflicted insult and injury upon our seamenand upon our commerce. That the United States of that day, so inferiorin wealth and numbers to both belligerents, should dream of entering thelists with either singly, was perhaps hopeless; but through theindifference of Congress the navy of a people, then second only to theEnglish as maritime carriers, was left so utterly impotent that itcounted for naught, even as an additional embarrassment to those withwhich the contending powers were already weighted. When, therefore, inretaliation for the seizures made under the French decree of January, 1798, Congress, without declaring war, directed the capture of Frencharmed vessels, wherever found on the high seas, it became necessary tobegin building a navy which to some slight degree might carry out theorder. An act, intended to hasten the increase of the navy, was passedin June, 1798, authorizing the President to accept such vessels as mightbe built by the citizens for the national service, and to issuesix-per-cent stock to indemnify the subscribers. 

Under this law the Essex was built in Salem, Massachusetts, by asubscription raised among the citizens. As the project grew, and theamount likely to be obtained became manifest, the purpose to which itshould be devoted was determined to be the building of a frigate ofthirty-two guns; one of the well-recognized, but smaller, classes underwhich the vessels called frigates were subdivided. Except the work ofthe naval architect proper, the model and the superintendence, whichwere undertaken by a gentleman from Portsmouth, everything in thebuilding and equipment was portioned out among Salem men, and wassupplied from the resources of the town or of the surrounding country. During the winter of 1798 to 1799 the sleds of all the farmers in theneighborhood were employed bringing in the timber for the frames andplanking of the new ship. The rigging was manufactured by the threeropewalks then in the place, each undertaking one mast; and the sailswere of cloth so carefully selected and so admirably cut that it wasnoticed the frigate never again sailed so well as with this first suit. When the rope cables, which alone were then used by ships instead of thechains of the present day, were completed, the workmen took them upontheir shoulders and marched with them in procession to the vessel, headed by a drum and fife. The building of the Essex was thus an effortof city pride and local patriotism; and the launch, which took place onthe 30th of September, 1799, became an occasion of general rejoicing andholiday, witnessed by thousands of spectators and greeted by salutesfrom the battery and shipping. The new frigate measured 850 tons, andcost, independent of guns and stores, somewhat over $75, 000. Her batteryin her early history was composed of twenty-six long twelve-pounders onthe main deck, with sixteen thirty-two-pound carronades and two chaseguns on the deck above. At a later day, and during the cruise underPorter, this was changed to forty thirty-two-pound carronades and sixlong twelves. This battery, though throwing a heavier weight, was ofshorter range than the former; and therefore, though advantageous to aship able to choose her position, was a fatal source of weakness to aslow or crippled vessel, as was painfully apparent in the action wherethe Essex was lost. 

Notwithstanding the zeal and emulation aroused by the appeal to Salemmunicipal pride, and notwithstanding the comparative rapidity withwhich ships could then be built, the Essex in her day illustrated thefolly of deferring preparation until hostilities are at hand. The firstFrench prize was taken in June, 1798, but it was not till December 22dof the following year that the Essex sailed out of Salem harbor, commanded then by Edward Preble, one of the most distinguished officersof the early American navy. Newport was her first port of arrival. Fromthere she sailed again on the 6th of January, 1800, in company with thefrigate Congress, both being bound for Batavia, whence they were toconvoy home a fleet of merchant ships; for in the predatory warfareencouraged by the French Directory, the protection of our commerce fromits cruisers was a duty even more important than the retaliatory actionagainst the latter, to which the _quasi_ war of 1798 was confined. Whensix days out, the Congress was dismasted. The Essex went on alone, andwas thus the first ship-of-war to carry the flag of the United Statesaround the Cape of Good Hope into the Indian Ocean. A dozen years laterthe bold resolution of Porter to take her alone and unsupported into thePacific, during the cruise upon which young Farragut was now embarking, secured for this little frigate the singular distinction of being thefirst United States ship-of-war to double Cape Horn as well as that ofGood Hope. In the intervening period the Essex had been usefully, butnot conspicuously, employed in the Mediterranean in the operationsagainst Tripoli and in protecting trade. In 1811, however, she was againan actor in an event of solemn significance. Upon her return to theUnited States, where Porter was waiting to take command, she bore as apassenger William Pinkney, the late Minister to Great Britain; who, after years of struggle, on his part both resolute and dignified, toobtain the just demands of the United States, had now formally brokenoff the diplomatic relations between the two powers and taken anunfriendly leave of the British Government. 

Being just returned from a foreign cruise, the Essex needed a certainamount of refitting before again going to sea under her new commander;but in October, 1811, she sailed for a short cruise on the coast, infurtherance of the Government's orders to Commodore Rodgers to protectAmerican commerce from improper interference. Orders of such a characterwere likely at any moment to result in a collision, especially in thehands of a gallant, hasty officer scarcely out of his first youth; forPorter was at this time but thirty-one, and for years had felt, with thekeen resentment of a military man, the passive submission to insultshown by Jefferson's government. No meeting, however, occurred; nor werethe months that elapsed before the outbreak of war marked by any eventof special interest except a narrow escape from shipwreck on Christmaseve, when the Essex nearly dragged on shore in a furious northeast galeunder the cliffs at Newport. Farragut has left on record in his journal, with the proper pride of a midshipman in his ship, that the Essex wasthe smartest vessel in the squadron, and highly complimented as such byCommodore Rodgers. In acknowledgment of the skill and activity of hisseamen, Porter divided the ship's company into three watches, instead ofthe usual two--an arrangement only possible when the smaller number in awatch is compensated by their greater individual efficiency. Thisarrangement continued throughout the cruise, until the ship was capturedin 1814. 

On the 18th of June, 1812, war was at last declared against GreatBritain. The Essex had again been cruising during the spring months; butthe serious character of the new duties before her made a thorough refitnecessary, and she was not able to sail with the squadron underCommodore Rodgers, which put to sea from New York on the 21st of June. On the 3d of July, however, she got away, Porter having the day beforereceived his promotion to post-captain, then the highest grade in theUnited States Navy. The ship cruised off the coast, making severalprizes of vessels much inferior to herself in force, and on the 7th ofSeptember anchored within the capes of the Delaware. Much to Porter'ssurprise and annoyance, although ready to sail at once if furnished withprovisions, none reached him. The ship was therefore taken up theDelaware and anchored off Chester, where she was prepared for a long anddistant cruise directed against British commerce, the suggestion ofwhich Porter believed came first from himself. By this a squadronconsisting of the Constitution, Essex, and Hornet sloop-of-war, underthe command of Commodore Bainbridge in the first-named frigate, were toproceed across the Atlantic to the Cape Verde Islands, thence to theSouth Atlantic in the neighborhood of Brazil, and finally to thePacific, to destroy the British whale-fishery there. The plan was wellconceived, and particularly was stamped with the essential mark of allsuccessful commerce-destroying, the evasion of the enemy's cruisers;for, though the American cruisers were primed to fight, yet an action, even if successful, tended to cripple their powers of pursuit. A rapidtransit through the Atlantic, with an ultimate destination to the thenlittle-frequented Pacific, was admirably calculated to conceal for along time the purposes of this commerce-destroying squadron. As ithappened, both the Constitution and Hornet met and captured enemy'scruisers off the coast of Brazil, and then returned to the UnitedStates. Farragut thus lost the opportunity of sharing in any of thevictories of 1812, to be a partaker in one of the most glorious ofdefeats. 

The Constitution and Hornet being in Boston, and the Essex in theDelaware, it became necessary to appoint for the three a distant placeof meeting, out of the usual cruising grounds of the enemy, in orderthat the ships, whose first object was to escape crippling, could passrapidly through the belt of British cruisers then girding the coast ofthe United States. The brilliant record made by United States ships intheir single combats with the enemy during this war should not beallowed to blind our people to the fact that, from their numericalinferiority, they were practically prisoners in their own ports; and, like other prisoners, had to break jail to gain freedom to act. Thedistant and little frequented Cape Verde group, off the African coast, was therefore designated as the first rendezvous for Bainbridge'ssquadron, and the lonely island of Fernando Noronha, off the coast ofBrazil, close under the equator, as the second. Both of these placeswere then possessions of Portugal, the ally of Great Britain thoughneutral as to the United States. With these orders the Constitution andHornet sailed from Boston on the 26th of October, 1812, and the Essextwo days later from the capes of the Delaware. Their course in thepassage was to be so directed as to cross at the most favorable pointsthe routes of British commerce. 

On the 27th of November the Essex, after an uneventful voyage, anchoredat Porto Praya, in the Cape Verdes, where she remained five days. Receiving no news of Bainbridge, Porter sailed again for FernandoNoronha. On the 11th of December a British packet, the Nocton, wascaptured, and from her was taken $55, 000 in specie--an acquisition whichcontributed much to facilitate the distant cruise contemplated byPorter. Four days later the Essex was off Fernando Noronha, and sent aboat ashore, which returned with a letter addressed ostensibly to SirJames Yeo, of the British frigate Southampton; but between the lines, written in sympathetic ink, Porter found a message from Bainbridge, directing him to cruise off Rio and wait for the Constitution. On the29th of December he was in the prescribed station, and cruised in theneighborhood for some days, although he knew a British ship-of-the-line, the Montagu, was lying in Rio; but only one British prize was taken, themerchant vessels of that nation usually waiting in port until they couldsail under convoy of a ship-of-war. Attempting to get to windward in aheavy sea, the Essex was much racked and injured some of her spars, andher captain therefore decided to bear away for refit to St. Catherine's--a port five hundred miles south of Rio Janeiro, which hadbeen named in his instructions as a contingent rendezvous. On the 20thof January, 1813, the Essex anchored there, and began the work ofrefitting and filling with water and fresh provisions. A few days afterher arrival a small Portuguese vessel came in, bringing an account ofthe capture by the Montagu of an American corvette, which Portersupposed to be the Hornet, as well as a rumor of the action between theConstitution and the Java, and a report that re-enforcements werereaching the British naval force on the station. The history of pastwars convinced Porter that the neutrality of the Portuguese port inwhich he was lying would not be respected by the enemy. In a very fewdays his presence there must become known; any junction with hisconsorts was rendered most unlikely by the news just received, and hedetermined at once to undertake alone the mission for which the threeships had been dispatched. With admirable promptitude, both of decisionand action, the Essex sailed the same night for the Pacific. 

From the time of leaving the United States the crew of the ship had beenrestricted to that close and economical allowance of provisions andwater which was necessary to a vessel whose home ports were blocked byenemy's cruisers, and which in every quarter of the globe might expectto meet the fleets and influence of a powerful foe. The passage roundCape Horn, always stormy, was both a long and severe strain to a vesselbound from east to west, and dependent wholly upon sail; for the windsprevail from the westward. The utmost prudence was required inportioning out both food and water, and of bread there remained, onleaving St. Catherine's, only enough for three months at halfallowance--that is, at half a pound per day. The boy Farragut thus foundhimself, at the outset of his career, exposed to one of the severesttests of his arduous calling--a long and stormy passage, made in theteeth of violent gales, and with a crew reduced to the scantiestpossible allowance of food, under conditions when the system mostdemands support. In his journal he speaks, as Porter does in his, of thesevere suffering and dreadful weather experienced. For twenty-one daysthe Essex struggled with the furious blasts, the heavy seas, and thebitter weather, which have made the passage round Cape Horn proverbialfor hardship among seamen. On the 3d of March, he writes, a sea wasshipped which burst in, on one side of the ship and from one end to theother, all the ports through which the guns are fired, and which, forsuch a passage, are closed and securely fastened. One boat on theweather side was driven in on deck, and that on the opposite carriedoverboard; but with great difficulty the latter was saved. Largequantities of water rushed below, leading those there to imagine thatthe ship was sinking. "This was the only instance in which I ever saw areal good seaman paralyzed by fear at the dangers of the sea. Several ofthe sailors were seen on their knees at prayer; but most were foundready to do their duty. They were called on deck, and came promptly, ledby William Kingsbury, the boatswain's mate. Long shall I remember thecheering sound of his stentorian voice, which resembled the roaring of alion rather than that of a human being, when he told them: 'D--n theireyes, to put their best foot forward, as there was one side of the shipleft yet. '"

Cape Horn, however, was at last passed and enough ground gained to thewestward to allow the Essex again to head north. On the 11th of Marchshe was off the city of Valparaiso, in Chile. As far as Porter thenknew, Chile was still a province of Spain, and Spain was the ally ofGreat Britain; whose armies for four years past had been engaged in warin the Peninsula, to shake from it the grip of Napoleon. There had beentrouble also between Spain and the United States about the Floridas. Thefirst lieutenant of the Essex was therefore first sent ashore to seewhat reception would be given, and returned with the satisfactoryintelligence that Chile was in revolution against the mother country, and was ready heartily to welcome a ship-of-war belonging to theAmerican Republic. He also brought the news that the Viceroy of Spain inPeru had fitted out privateers against Chilian commerce; and that these, on the plea of being allies of Great Britain, had begun to captureAmerican whalers. It seemed, therefore, that the Essex had arrived asopportunely for the protection of United States interests as for theinjury of British commerce. 

Several days were lost in these preliminaries, so that it was not tillthe 15th that the anchor was dropped in Valparaiso. Despite the cordialreception given, Porter was in haste to reach his scene of action in theNorth and sailed again on the 22d. Four days later he met a Peruvianprivateer, the Nereyda, the captain of which was deceived by the Essexhoisting British colors. Coming on board the frigate, he stated freelythat the Spaniards considered themselves the allies of Great Britain, that he was himself cruising for American whalers, and had on board atthe moment the crews of two of these which he had taken. Havingextracted all the information he wanted, Porter undeceived theprivateersman, took possession of the ship, threw overboard her gunsand ammunition, and then released her, with a letter to the Viceroy;which, backed by the presence of the Essex, was calculated to insurepeaceable treatment to American vessels. 

There were at this time on the coast of Peru and in the neighboringwaters twenty-three American whalers, worth, with their cargoes, two anda half million dollars, and mostly unarmed, having left home in a timeof peace. Of English ships there were twenty; but, their country havingbeen long at war, these were generally armed, and in many cases providedwith letters of marque authorizing them to act as privateers and capturevessels hostile to their Crown. In this state of things, so unpromisingfor American interests, the arrival of the Essex entirely turned thescales, besides stopping the Spanish depredations which had but justbegun. 

On the 27th of March, off the harbor of Callao, the port of Lima, Porterrecaptured the Barclay, one of the American ships seized by the Nereyda;but, although the frigate again disguised her nationality by hoistingBritish colors, there was among the several vessels in the harbor onlyone that showed the same flag. With the Barclay in company, the Essexnow stood away for the Galapagos Islands. These are a group situatedjust south of the equator and some five hundred miles from the SouthAmerican coast. Uninhabited then, as for the most part they still are, they were in 1813 a favorite rendezvous for British whalers, who hadestablished upon one of the islands (Charles) a means of communicationby a box nailed to a tree, which was called the post-office. They aboundin turtle, some of which weigh several hundred pounds, and form a veryvaluable as well as acceptable change of diet to seamen long confined tosalt food. On the 17th of April the Essex came in sight of ChathamIsland, one of the largest, and remained cruising in the neighborhood ofthe group till the beginning of June, when want of water compelled herto go to Tumbez, a port on the continent just abreast of the Galapagos. In this period seven British whalers were taken; so that on the 24th ofJune there were anchored in Tumbez Bay, including the frigate and theBarclay, nine vessels under Porter's command. Of these, he commissionedone--the fastest and best, somewhat less than half the size of the Essexherself--as a United States cruiser, under his command. She was namedthe Essex Junior, carried twenty guns, of which half were longsix-pounders and half eighteen-pounder carronades, and was manned bysixty of the Essex's crew under her first lieutenant. 

The first service of the Essex Junior was to convoy to Valparaiso theBarclay and four of the British prizes. The occasion was one of greatimportance and interest to Farragut; for, though but a boy of twelve, hewas selected to command the party of seamen detailed to manage theBarclay during this long passage. The captain of the Barclay went withhis ship, but in great discontent that the command of the seamen wasgiven not to himself, but to such a lad from the ship-of-war. Being aviolent-tempered old man, he attempted by bluster to overawe the boyinto surrendering his authority. "When the day arrived for ourseparation from the squadron, " writes Farragut in his journal, "thecaptain was furious, and very plainly intimated to me that I would'find myself off New Zealand in the morning, ' to which I most decidedlydemurred. We were lying still, while the other ships were fastdisappearing from view, the commodore going north and the Essex Junior, with her convoy, steering to the south for Valparaiso. I considered thatmy day of trial had arrived (for I was a little afraid of the oldfellow, as every one else was). But the time had come for me at least toplay the man; so I mustered up courage and informed the captain that Idesired the maintopsail filled away, in order that we might close upwith the Essex Junior. He replied that he would shoot any man who daredto touch a rope without his orders; he 'would go his own course, and hadno idea of trusting himself with a d--d nutshell'; and then he wentbelow for his pistols. I called my right-hand man of the crew and toldhim my situation. I also informed him that I wanted the maintopsailfilled. He answered with a clear 'Ay, ay, sir!' in a manner which wasnot to be misunderstood, and my confidence was perfectly restored. Fromthat moment I became master of the vessel, and immediately gave allnecessary orders for making sail, notifying the captain not to come ondeck with his pistols unless he wished to go overboard, for I wouldreally have had very little trouble in having such an order obeyed. Imade my report to Captain Downes (of the Essex Junior), on rejoininghim; and the captain also told his story, in which he endeavored topursuade Downes that he only tried to frighten me. I replied byrequesting Captain Downes to ask him how he succeeded; and to show himthat I did not fear him, I offered to go back and proceed with him toValparaiso. He was informed that I was in command, he being simply myadviser in navigating the vessel in case of separation. So, this beingsettled and understood, I returned to the Barclay, and everything wenton amicably up to our arrival in Valparaiso. "

It was on the 30th of June that the little squadron sailed from Tumbez, standing to the westward till they should reach the trade-winds; and onthe 4th of July that the Essex Junior separated, with the prizes, andFarragut had his scene with the captain of the Barclay. As the winds onthe west coast of South America blow throughout the year from thesouthward, the passage of sailing vessels in that direction is alwayslong; but for the same reason the return is quickly made. When, therefore, the Essex Junior rejoined the Essex at the Galapagos, on the30th of September, she brought comparatively recent news, and that of avery important character. Letters from the American consul in BuenosAyres informed Porter that on the 5th of July the British frigatePhoebe, of thirty-six guns, a vessel in every way of superior force tothe Essex, had sailed from Rio Janeiro for the Pacific, accompanied bytwo sloops-of-war, the Cherub and Raccoon, of twenty-four guns each. This little squadron was charged with the double mission of checking theravages of the Essex and of destroying the fur trade of Americancitizens at the mouth of the Columbia River. From the date of theirleaving Rio these ships were not improbably now on the coast; andallowing for time to refit after the stormy passage round the Horn, theymight be expected soon to seek Porter at the Galapagos, the headquartersof the British whalers. 

The Essex Junior brought back the prize-crews and prize-masters who hadnavigated the captured ships to Valparaiso, and with the others Farragutnow rejoined the frigate. During their absence Porter had taken fourmore valuable vessels. According to his information, there remained butone uncaptured of the British whalers which centered around the islands. The Essex had taken eleven; and among these, six carried letters ofmarque from their Government, authorizing them to seize for their ownprofit vessels of a nation at war with Great Britain. These powers woulddoubtless have been exercised at the expense of the unprepared Americanwhalers but for the opportune appearance of the Essex, which had alsoreleased the vessels of her country from the ports to which, at the timeof her arrival, they had been driven by Peruvian privateers. Porter'swork in this region was therefore finished. He had entirely broken up animportant branch of British commerce, inflicting damage estimated atnearly three million dollars; but the coming of an enemy's forceconsiderably superior to his own, an event wholly beyond his control, reversed all the conditions and imposed upon him some new line ofaction. For this he was already prepared, and he took his decision withthe promptitude characteristic of the man. The commander of the Britishsquadron, Captain Hillyar, was personally well known to him, being anold acquaintance in the Mediterranean; and he doubtless realized fromobservation, as well as from his past record, that his enemy was not aman to throw away, through any carelessness or false feeling ofchivalry, a single advantage conferred by his superior force. On theother hand, Porter himself was not one quietly to submit to superioritywithout an effort to regain the control which the chances of naval warmight yet throw into his hands. He was determined to fight, if any fairchance offered; but to do so it was necessary to put his ship in thehighest state of efficiency, which could only be done by leaving thespot where he was known to be, and, throwing the enemy off his scent, repairing to one where the necessary work could be performed insecurity. Two days after the arrival of the Essex Junior all the vesselssailed from the Galapagos Islands for the Marquesas. On the 25th ofOctober they anchored at one of this group, called Nukahiva Island. 

During the six weeks the Essex lay at this anchorage her crew bore apart in several expeditions on shore, designed to protect the natives inthe neighborhood against hostile tribes in other parts of the island. Inthis land fighting Farragut and his younger messmates were not allowedto share; but were, on the contrary, compelled to attend a schoolestablished on board of one of the prizes, with the ship's chaplain forschool-master. They were, however, permitted out of school hours andafter the day's work, which for the ship's company ended at 4 P. M. , toramble freely in the island among the natives; considerable libertybeing allowed to all hands, who, during their year's absence from theUnited States, had had little opportunity to visit any inhabited places. Farragut here learned to swim, and the aptitude of the natives to thewater seems to have impressed him more than their other peculiaritieswhich have since then been so liberally described in books of travel. "It appears as natural, " he wrote, "for these islanders to swim as toeat. I have often seen mothers take their little children, apparentlynot more than two years old, down to the sea on their backs, walkdeliberately into deep water, and leave them to paddle for themselves. To my astonishment, the little creatures could swim like young ducks. "

On the 9th of December, 1813, the Essex and Essex Junior sailed forValparaiso with one of the prizes, leaving the others at the Marquesas. Nothing of interest occurred during the passage, but the crew were dailyexercised at all the arms carried by the ship--with the cannon, themuskets, and the single-sticks. The latter are for training in the useof the broadsword or cutlass, the play with which would be too dangerousfor ordinary drills. Porter had a strong disposition to resort toboarding and hand-to-hand fighting, believing that the very surprise ofan attack by the weaker party would go far to compensate for theinequality of numbers. On more than one occasion already, in thepresence of superior force, he had contemplated resorting to thisdesperate game; and to a ship the character of whose batterynecessitated a close approach to the enemy, the power to throw on board, at a moment's notice, a body of thoroughly drilled and equippedswordsmen was unquestionably of the first importance. "I have neversince been in a ship, " said Farragut at a later day, "where the crew ofthe old Essex was represented, but that I found them to be the bestswordsmen on board. They had been so thoroughly trained as boarders thatevery man was prepared for such an emergency, with his cutlass as sharpas a razor, a dirk made from a file by the ship's armorer, and apistol. " With a ship well refitted and with a crew thus perfectlydrilled, Porter had done all that in him lay in the way of preparationfor victory. If he did not win, he would at least deserve to do so. ForFarragut it is interesting to notice that, in his tender youth and mostimpressible years, he had before him, both in his captain and in hisship, most admirable models. The former daring to recklessness, yetleaving nothing to chance; fearless of responsibility, but eversagacious in its exercise; a rigid disciplinarian, who yet temperedrigor by a profound knowledge of and sympathy with the peculiarities ofthe men who were under him. The latter--the ship--became, as ships understrong captains tend to become, the embodiment of the commander'sspirit. Thoroughly prepared and armed at all points, she was nowadvancing at the close of her career to an audacious encounter with agreatly superior force. Whether the enterprise was justifiable or not, at least nothing that care could do to insure success was left to chanceor to favor. Porter might perhaps have quitted the Pacific in December, 1813, and, reaching the United States coast in the winter, have escapedthe blockade which at that season was necessarily relaxed. By doing sohe might have saved his ship; but the United States Navy would have lostone of the most brilliant pages in its history, and its future admiralone of the most glorious episodes in his own great career. 

On the 12th of January, 1814, the Essex arrived off the coast of Chile, making the land well to the southward--that is, to windward--ofValparaiso. From this point of arrival she ran slowly to the northward, looking into the old town of Concepción, between two and three hundredmiles from Valparaiso. In the latter port she anchored on the 3d ofFebruary. The ordinary salutes and civilities with the authoritieshaving been exchanged, every effort was made to get the ship ready forsea, the Essex Junior being employed cruising off the port so as to givetimely notice of the approach of an enemy; a precaution necessary at alltimes, even in a neutral port, but especially so at a period whenneutral rights were being openly disregarded in every direction by boththe great belligerents, France and Great Britain. Moreover, CaptainHillyar, though a brave and experienced officer, a favorite with Nelson, whose esteem could not be won without high professional merit, wasreputed to have shown scanty scruples about neutral rights on a previousoccasion, when the disregard of them procured an advantage to theenterprise he had in hand. Being sent with several armed boats to attacktwo Spanish corvettes lying in the port of Barcelona, in the year 1800, he had pulled alongside a neutral vessel, a Swede, which was standinginto the harbor; and after examining her papers in the due exercise ofhis right as a belligerent, his boats hooked on to her, thus using aneutral to tow them into the enemy's port, so that his men reached theirscene of exertion unfatigued by the oar, and for a great part of the wayprotected by such respect as the Spanish batteries might show to aneutral coerced into aiding a hostile undertaking. "Having approachedwithin about three quarters of a mile of the nearest battery, " says theBritish naval historian James, "and being reminded by two shots whichpassed over the galliot that it was time to retire from the shelter of aneutral vessel, Captain Hillyar pulled away. " Both the Spanish andSwedish Governments complained of this act, and their complaintsdelayed the promotion which Hillyar's gallantry would otherwise havewon. Whatever the strict propriety of his conduct in this case, it wassufficiently doubtful to excite a just suspicion that Hillyar would notbe deterred, by over-delicacy about the neutrality of the port, fromseizing any advantage offered him by the unwariness of his enemy; and sothe event proved. 

On the 7th of February a dance was given on board the Essex, whichlasted till midnight. In order that her officers might share in theentertainment, the Essex Junior was allowed to anchor, though in aposition to have a clear view of the sea; but, when the guests began todepart, her commander went on board and got under way to resume hisstation outside. Before the decorations of the ball-room had been takendown, a signal was made from her that two enemy's ships were in sight. Awhole watch--one third of the Essex's crew--were then on shore, but werequickly recalled by a gun. The ship was at once cleared for action, andthe men at their quarters, with all the rapidity to be expected from thecareful drilling they had had during their long commission. Porterhimself had gone to the lookout ship to reconnoitre the enemy. Upon hisreturn he found the frigate all ready for battle, it being then just anhour and a half since the alarm was given. The Essex Junior was thenanchored in a position to support the Essex should occasion arise. 

The strangers were the Phoebe and the Cherub. The third British ship, the Raccoon, had gone north to the Columbia. As has before been said, Captain Hillyar was an old friend of Porter's. The two men had beenthrown together in the Mediterranean, and the American had been afrequent visitor in the other's house at Gibraltar. On one occasionHillyar's family had made a passage from Malta to Gibraltar in anAmerican ship-of-war; for in those troubled times would-be voyagers hadto avail themselves of such opportunities as offered, and the courtesyof a large armed ship was among the most favorable. It was natural, therefore, that, as the Phoebe stood into the harbor, Captain Hillyarshould bring his ship, the wind allowing it, close to the Essex and hailthe latter with a polite inquiry after Captain Porter's health; but itwas going rather too far, under all the circumstances, not to be contentwith passing slowly under the Essex's stern, than which no morefavorable position could be found for an exchange of civil words. Instead of so doing, the helm of the Phoebe was put down and the shipluffed up into the wind between the Essex and the Essex Junior, thelatter lying now near the senior ship and on her starboard beam. WhetherHillyar counted upon his own seamanship to extricate his ship from theawkward position in which he had placed her, or whether, as theAmericans believed, he intended to attack if circumstances favored, hesoon saw that he had exposed himself to extreme peril. As the Phoebelost her way she naturally fell off from the wind, her bows being sweptround toward the Essex, while her stern was presented to the EssexJunior. Both her enemies had their guns trained on her; she could usenone of hers. At the same time, in the act of falling off, sheapproached the Essex; and her jib-boom, projecting far beyond her bows, swept over the forecastle of the latter. Porter, who had been watchingthe whole proceeding with great distrust, had summoned his boarders assoon as the Phoebe luffed. The Essex at the moment was in a state ofas absolute preparation as is a musket at full cock trained on the mark, and with the marksman's eye ranging over the sights; every man at hispost, every gun trained, matches burning, and boarders standing by. Theposition was one of extreme tension. The American captain had in hishand a chance such as in his most sanguine dreams he could scarcely havehoped. His guns, feeble at a distance, could tell with the greatesteffect at such short range; and even if his enemy dropped an anchor, inthe great depths of Valparaiso Bay he would not fetch up till far pastthe Essex. Until then he was for the moment helpless. Porter hailed thatif the ships touched he should at once attack. Hillyar kept his presenceof mind admirably at this critical juncture, replying in an indifferentmanner that he had no intention of allowing the Phoebe to fall onboard the Essex--an assurance that was well enough, and, coupled withhis nonchalant manner, served the purpose of keeping Porter in doubt asto whether a breach of neutrality had been intended. But the Britishfrigate was unquestionably in a position where a seaman should not haveplaced her unless he meant mischief. It is good luck, not goodmanagement, when a ship in the Phoebe's position does not foul one inthat of the Essex. While this was passing, Farragut was witness to acircumstance which shows by what a feather's weight scales are sometimesturned. Of all the watch that had been on shore when the enemy appeared, he says, one only, a mere boy, returned under the influence of liquor. "When the Phoebe was close alongside, and all hands at quarters, thepowder-boys stationed with slow matches ready to discharge the guns, theboarders, cutlass in hand, standing by to board in the smoke, as was ourcustom at close quarters, the intoxicated youth saw, or imagined that hesaw, through the port, some one on the Phoebe grinning at him. 'Myfine fellow, I'll stop your making faces, ' he exclaimed, and was justabout to fire his gun, when Lieutenant McKnight saw the movement andwith a blow sprawled him on the deck. Had that gun been fired, I amconvinced that the Phoebe would have been ours. " She probably would, for the Essex could have got in three broadsides of her twentythirty-two-pounder carronades before the enemy could effectively reply, a beginning which would have reversed the odds between the two ships. Farragut fully shared the belief of all his shipmates that an attack wasintended, in consequence of the information given to Captain Hillyar, ashe was entering, by the boat of an English merchant ship in the port, that half the crew of the Essex was on shore. As the Phoebe luffedthrough between the two Americans a turn of her helm would have landedher on the bows of the Essex, if the latter had been caught atdisadvantage. Instead of this, she was found fully prepared. The EssexJunior was also on the spot, while the Cherub, having drifted half amile to leeward, could not have taken any part till the action wasdecided. Under these conditions, although their force was inferior, theadvantage was with the Americans, whose ships were anchored and cleared, while the Phoebe still had her canvas spread and the anchoring to do, which is a troublesome operation in water so deep as that of ValparaisoBay. If men's motives can be judged by their acts, Captain Hillyarafforded Porter full justification for opening fire. He extricatedhimself from a false position with consummate coolness; but hisadversary, when taken later at disadvantage, had reason to regret thegenerosity with which he allowed him the benefit of the doubt as to hisintentions to respect the neutrality of the port. As it was, when thetwo ships were almost touching, the Englishman threw his sails to themast, and, backing clear of the Essex, anchored finally some distanceastern. 

The two British ships remained in port for a few days, during whichtheir captains called upon Captain Porter on shore, where he was thenliving in the house of a gentleman named Blanco; and an amicableintercourse also grew up between the officers and crews of the twoparties. Hillyar, however, told Porter frankly that he should not throwaway the advantage given by his superior force, for the event of a navalaction was ever uncertain, liable to be decided by the accidental lossof an important spar or rope; whereas, by keeping his two shipstogether, he thought he could effectually blockade the Essex and preventher renewing her depredations upon British commerce until the arrival ofother ships of war which were on their way. From this wary attitudePorter in vain tried to force his antagonist by varied provocations;but, although the exchange of official insults, verging closely at timesupon personal imputations, caused bitterness to take the place of thefirst friendly courtesies, Hillyar was too old an officer, and hisreputation for courage too well known, to allow his hand to be thusforced. 

After filling with provisions and refitting, the British ships left theanchorage and cruised off the approach to it, thus preventing theretreat of the Essex to the ocean, unless she could succeed in passingand then outsailing them. Valparaiso Bay is not an enclosed harbor, butsimply a recess in the coast, which, running generally north and south, here turns abruptly to the eastward for two or three miles and thentrends north again, leaving thus a concave beach facing the north. Alongthis beach lies the city of Valparaiso, stretching back and up on thehillsides, which rise to a height of twelve or fifteen hundred feetbehind it. The prevailing winds along this coast being from thesouthward throughout the year, this formation gives an anchoragesheltered from them; but during the winter months of the southernhemisphere, from May to October, there are occasional northerly galeswhich endanger shipping, more from the heavy sea that rolls in than fromthe violence of the wind. In ordinary weather, at the season when theEssex was thus blockaded, the harbor is quiet through the night untilthe forenoon, when the southerly wind prevailing outside works its wayin to the anchorage and blows freshly till after sundown. At times itdescends in furious gusts down the ravines which cleave the hillsides, covering the city with clouds of dust and whirling sand and pebblespainfully in the faces of those who walk the streets. 

On the 28th of March, 1814, such a blast descended upon the Essex, whosecaptain had by that time come to despair of forcing Hillyar to singlecombat. As the frigate straightened out her cables under the force ofthe wind, one of them broke, and the anchor of the other lost its holdupon the bottom. The Essex began to drift to sea, and it was apparentwould by this accident be carried out of reach of the port. Portertherefore ordered the cable cut and made sail on the ship, intending nowto escape. The British ships kept habitually close to the western pointof the bay; so that in case of such an attempt by their enemy he wouldhave to pass to leeward of them, giving them a fair wind to follow. AsPorter stood out, however, he thought possible, by keeping close to thewind, to pass to windward, which, with the superior sailing qualities ofthe Essex, would force the Phoebe to separate from the Cherub, unlessHillyar supinely acquiesced in his escape--an inadmissible supposition. If successful, he might yet have the single action he desired, and underconditions which would enable him to choose his distance and so profitby the qualities of his carronades. The Essex therefore hugged the wind;but as she was thus passing the western point of the bay, under a pressof sail, a violent squall came down from the highland above, bearing thevessel over on her side and carrying away the maintopmast, which fellinto the sea, drowning several of the crew. The loss of so important apart of her sail power made escape to sea impossible, and the Essextried to regain the port. The wind, however, was adverse to the attemptin her crippled condition, so that she was only able to reach the eastside of the bay, where she anchored about three miles from the city, butwithin pistol-shot of the shore, before the enemy could overtake her. Asthe conventional neutral line extends three miles from the beach, theEssex was here clearly under the protection of Chilian neutrality. Hillyar himself, in his official report of the action, says she was "sonear the shore as to preclude the possibility of passing ahead of herwithout risk to His Majesty's ships. " He seems, however, to havesatisfied his conscience by drawing a line between the neutrality of theport and the neutrality of the country. The Essex was, he implies, outside the former. "Not succeeding in gaining the limits of the part, she bore up and anchored near the shore, a few miles to leeward ofit. "[A] At all events, having his adversary at such seriousdisadvantage, he did not propose to imitate the weakness Porter hadshown toward himself six weeks before. 

The crucial feature in the approaching action was that the Essex wasarmed almost entirely with carronades, and her principal enemy with longguns. The carronade, now a wholly obsolete arm, was a short cannon, madeextremely light in proportion to the weight of the ball thrown by it. The comparative lightness of metal in each piece allowed a greaternumber to be carried, but at the same time so weakened the gun as tocompel the use of a small charge of powder, in consequence of which theball moved slowly and had but short range. In compensation, within itsrange, it broke up the hull of an enemy's ship more completely than thesmaller but swifter ball from a long gun of the same weight; for thesame reason that a stone thrown by hand demolishes a pane of glass, while a pistol-bullet makes a small, clean hole. It was this smashingeffect at close quarters which gave the carronade favor in the eyes ofone generation of seamen; but by 1812 it was generally recognized that, unless a vessel was able to choose her own position, the short range ofcarronades might leave her helpless, and, even when she had the greaterspeed, an enemy with long guns might cripple her as she approached. Porter had begged to change his carronades for long guns when he joinedthe Essex. The request was refused, and the ship in this action hadforty thirty-two-pounder carronades and six long twelve-pounders. ThePhoebe had twenty-six long eighteen-pounders, one long twelve, and onelong nine, besides eight carronades. The Essex being crippled and atanchor, Captain Hillyar, faithful, and most properly, to his principleof surrendering no advantage, chose his position beyond effectivecarronade range. The battle was therefore fought between the six longtwelves of the Essex and the broadside of the Phoebe, consisting ofthirteen long eighteens, one twelve, and one nine. Taking no account ofthe Cherub, the disparity of force is sufficiently obvious. 

 [Footnote A: Marshall's Naval Biography, article Hillyar, vol. Iv, p. 861. ]

Although, from the assurances Hillyar had made to him in conversation, Porter had hoped that the neutrality of the port might be regarded, themanner in which the enemy's vessels approached his new anchorage gaveserious reason to fear an attack. The ship was again got ready foraction, and a spring put on the cable to enable the guns to be turned onthe enemy in any position he might take. The desperateness of thesituation was, however, manifest to all. "I well remember, " wroteFarragut at a later day, "the feelings of awe produced in me by theapproach of the hostile ships; even to my young mind it was perceptiblein the faces of those around me, as clearly as possible, that our casewas hopeless. It was equally apparent that all were ready to die attheir guns rather than surrender; and such I believe to have been thedetermination of the crew, almost to a man. " A crippled ship, armed withcarronades, was indeed in a hopeless plight. At six minutes before fourin the afternoon the attack began. The Essex riding to an anchor with asoutherly wind, the Cherub took position on her starboard bow, orsouthwest from her; the Phoebe north, under her stern. Both Britishships began fighting under sail, not being yet ready to anchor. Thespring on the Essex's cable being shot away, she was unable to turn herbroadside as was wished; but the Americans ran out of the stern-portsthree of their long guns, which were so well served as to cut away someof the most important of the Phoebe's ropes and sails, and Hillyar fora moment feared his ship would be drifted out of action. The Cherub alsowas forced to leave her first position and join the Phoebe. Thelatter's damages being repaired, she regained her ground and anchored;both she and her consort placing themselves on the starboard quarter ofthe Essex, a position on which the American guns, neither from the sternnor the broadside, could be brought to bear unless by the springs on thecables. These, unfortunately, were three times shot away as soon as theyhad been placed. The first lieutenant of the Phoebe, a frank andgallant young Englishman, whose manly bearing had greatly attracted theofficers of the Essex, is said to have remarked to his captain that itwas no better than murder to go on killing men from such a position ofsafety, and to have urged him to close and make a more equal fight ofit. Hillyar, so the story goes, replied that his reputation wasestablished, and that as his orders were peremptory to capture theEssex, he was determined to take no risks. He might have added--probablydid--that it was open to the Americans to save their lives bysurrendering. The same view of the situation now impelled Porter, finding himself unable to give blow for blow, to try and close with hiswary enemy. Only one light sail was left to him in condition forsetting--the flying-jib. With it, the cable having been cut, the head ofthe Essex was turned toward the enemy; and, fanned along by the othersails hanging loose from the yards, she slowly approached her foes tillher carronades at last could reach. The wary Englishman then slipped hiscable and stood away till again out of range, when he resumed theaction, choosing always his own position, which he was well able to dofrom the comparatively manageable condition of his ship. Finding itimpossible to get into action, Porter next attempted to run the Essexaground, where the crew could escape and the vessel be destroyed. Shewas headed for the beach and approached within musket-shot of it, when aflaw of wind from the land cruelly turned her away. 

The engagement had lasted nearly two hours when this disappointment wasencountered. As a last resort, Porter now ordered a hawser to be madefast to an anchor which was still left. This was let go in the hopethat, the Essex being held by it where she was, the enemy might driftout of action and be unable to return when the wind fell with theapproaching sunset. The hawser, however, parted, and with it the lasthope of escape. Great numbers of the crew had already been killed andwounded by the relentless pounding the ship had received from herenemies, for whom, toward the end, the affair became little more thansafe target practice, with a smooth sea. As yet no voice had been raisedin favor of submission; but now entreaty was made to Porter to spare thelives of the remnant that was left, by ceasing a resistance which hadbecome not only hopeless but passive, and which, however prolonged, could end only in the surrender of the ship. The latter had already beenon fire several times, and was now alarmingly so, the flames rushing upthe hatchways and being reported to be near the magazine. Porter thengave permission for such of the crew as wished, to swim ashore; thecolors being still flying, they were not yet prisoners of war. He nextcalled his officers together to inform him as to the condition of theship in the different parts where they served, but one only of thelieutenants was able to answer the summons. After consultation with him, satisfied that nothing more remained to be done, the order was given attwenty minutes past six to lower the flag of the Essex, after an actionwhich had lasted two hours and a half. She had gone into battle with twohundred and fifty-five men. Of these, fifty-eight were killed, sixty-sixwounded, and thirty-one missing. The last item is unusually large for anaval action, and was probably due to the attempt to escape to shore byswimming. 

Farragut lacked still three months of being thirteen years old when hepassed through this tremendous ordeal of slaughter, the most prolongedand the bloodiest of his distinguished career. At his tender years andin his subordinate position there could be, of course, no demand uponthe professional ability or the moral courage which grapples withresponsibility, of which he gave such high proof in his later life. Inthe Essex fight his was but to do and dare, perhaps it may rather besaid to do and bear; for no heavier strain can be laid upon the physicalcourage than is required by passive endurance of a deadly attack withoutthe power of reply. In the celebrated charge of the Six Hundred atBalaklava the magnificent display of courage was at least aided by theopportunity allowed for vehement action; the extreme nervous tensionexcited by such deadly danger found an outlet in the mad impetus of theforward rush. Farragut has himself recorded a singular instance in theEssex fight, which illustrates the sufficiently well-known fact that inthe excitement of approaching action the sense of danger is subdued, even in a man who has not the strong nerves that endure the passiveexpectation of death. "On one occasion Midshipman Isaacs came up to thecaptain and reported that a quarter-gunner named Roach had deserted hispost. The only reply of the captain, addressed to me, was: 'Do yourduty, sir!' I seized a pistol and went in pursuit of the fellow, but didnot find him. It appeared subsequently that when the ship was reportedto be on fire he had contrived to get into the only boat that could bekept afloat, and escaped, with six others, to the shore. The mostremarkable part of this affair was that Roach had always been a leadingman in the ship, and on the occasion previously mentioned, when thePhoebe seemed about to run into us in the harbor of Valparaiso and theboarders were called away, I distinctly remember this man standing in anexposed position on the cat-head, with sleeves rolled up and cutlass inhand, ready to board, his countenance expressing eagerness for thefight; which goes to prove that personal courage is a very peculiarvirtue. "

Of his own courage the boy, in this his first action, gave the mostmarked proof. He was constantly under the captain's eye, and conductedhimself so entirely to the satisfaction of that gallant officer as to bementioned particularly in the dispatches. "Midshipmen Isaacs, Farragut, and Ogden exerted themselves in the performance of their respectiveduties, and gave an earnest of their value to the service. " "They aretoo young, " Porter added, "to recommend for promotion"--a phrase whichFarragut thought had an ill-effect on his career, but which certainlyimplied that his conduct merited a reward that his years did notjustify. During the action he was employed in the most multifariousways, realizing the saying that whatever is nobody else's business is amidshipman's business; or, to use his own quaint expression, "I was like'Paddy in the catharpins'--a man on occasions. I performed the duties ofcaptain's aid, quarter-gunner, powder-boy, and, in fact, did everythingthat was required of me. I shall never forget the horrid impression madeupon me at the sight of the first man I had ever seen killed. He was aboatswain's mate and was fearfully mutilated. It staggered and sickenedme at first; but they soon began to fall around me so fast that it allappeared like a dream and produced no effect upon my nerves. I canremember well, while I was standing near the captain just abaft of themainmast, a shot came through the waterways and glanced upward, killingfour men who were standing by the side of the gun, taking the last onein the head and scattering his brains over both of us. But this awfulsight did not affect me half as much as the death of the first poorfellow. I neither thought of nor noticed anything but the working of theguns. .. . When my services were not required for other purposes, Igenerally assisted in working a gun; would run and bring powder from theboys and send them back for more, until the captain wanted me to carry amessage; and this continued to employ me during the action. "

Although included in the report of the slightly wounded, Farragutreceived no serious injury, but he was not without the narrow escapeswhich must have been undergone by all the survivors of so desperate anaction. One has just been related; and he has himself recorded two otherincidents which came near making an end of him. "An old quartermasternamed Francis Bland was standing at the wheel when I saw a shot comingover the fore yard in such a direction that I thought it would strikehim or me; so I told him to jump, at the same time pulling him towardme. At that instant the shot took off his right leg, and I afterwardfound that my coat-tail had been carried away. I helped the old fellowbelow, and inquired for him after the action, but he had died before hecould be attended to. " At another time "some gun-primers were wanted andI was sent after them. In going below, while I was on the ward-roomladder, the captain of the gun directly opposite the hatchway was struckfull in the face by an eighteen-pound shot and fell back on me; wetumbled down the hatch together. I struck on my head, and, fortunately, he fell on my hips. I say fortunately, for, as he was a man of at leasttwo hundred pounds' weight, I would have been crushed to death if hehad fallen directly across my body. I lay for some moments stunned bythe blow, but soon recovered consciousness enough to rush on deck. Thecaptain, seeing me covered with blood, asked if I were wounded, to whichI replied: 'I believe not, sir. ' 'Then, ' said he, 'where are theprimers?' This brought me completely to my senses, and I ran below andcarried the primers on deck. When I came up the second time I saw thecaptain fall, and in my turn ran up and asked if he were wounded. Heanswered me almost in the same words: 'I believe not, my son; but I felta blow on the top of my head. ' He must have been knocked down by thewind of a passing shot, as his hat was somewhat damaged. " The bruisesfrom this fall down the hatch were the only injuries Farragut received. 

When the surrender was determined, Farragut, at the captain's order, dropped the signal book overboard, watching it as it sank in the watertill out of sight; and then in company with another midshipman amusedhimself throwing overboard the pistols and other small arms, to keepthem out of the enemy's hands. The following morning he went on boardthe Phoebe, where the mortification of defeat drew tears from hiseyes; a state of dejection from which he was roused by seeing a pet pigbelonging to the Essex in the custody of one of the Phoebe'smidshipmen. Farragut at once set up a claim to the porker as beingprivate property, and as such to be respected by all civilized nations. The claim was resisted by the new owner; but his messmates, always readyfor a lark, insisted that so doubtful a question must be decided bytrial of battle. A ring being formed, Farragut, after a short contest, succeeded in thrashing his opponent and regaining the pig, and with it acertain amount of complacency in that one Briton at least had felt thepangs of defeat. His grief mastered him again soon afterward, when askedby Captain Hillyar to breakfast with himself and Captain Porter. Hillyar, seeing his discomfiture, spoke to him with great kindness, saying: "Never mind, my little fellow, it will be your turn nextperhaps"; to which, says Farragut, "I replied I hoped so, and left thecabin to hide my emotion. "

After the action Porter and Hillyar entered into an arrangement by whichthe Essex Junior was disarmed and allowed to proceed to the UnitedStates as a cartel, under the charge of Lieutenant Downes, who hadcommanded her while a United States cruiser. All the survivors of theEssex except two, whose wounds did not permit, embarked in her andsailed from Valparaiso on the 27th of April for the United States, arriving on the 7th of July in New York. On the 5th, off the coast ofLong Island, she was stopped by a British ship-of-war, whose captainquestioned the right of Hillyar to give her the passports she carried, and indicated an intention of detaining her. Porter construed thisviolation of the stipulation between himself and his captor as releasinghim from his obligations, and escaped to shore with a boat's crew. Aftera detention of nearly twenty-four hours the vessel was allowed toproceed; but was again overhauled by another British frigate as sheapproached Sandy Hook. There could be no serious question of detaining aship that had been given a safeguard, under such circumstances and withsuch deliberation, by so experienced an officer as Hillyar. But it isinstructive to Americans, who are accustomed to see in the war of 1812only a brilliant series of naval victories, to note that within a fewhours' sail of their principal port British cruisers were lying inperfect security, stopping whom they would. 

The Essex, upon which Farragut made his maiden cruise, and whoseinteresting career ended in so sad a catastrophe, remained, of course, in the hands of the victors. The little frigate was patched up and takento England, where she was bought into the British Navy, and was borne onits register until 1837, when she was sold. After that all trace of herhistory is lost. 

The Essex Junior, being a prize to the Essex and allowed to pass underHillyar's safeguard, was sold in New York for the benefit of thecaptors. 

 NOTE. --The spelling Chile (instead of Chili) used in this chapter is that adopted by the United States Board on Geographic Names, appointed by President Harrison, September 4, 1890, to settle a uniform usage for the Executive Departments of the Government. 

CHAPTER III. 

MIDSHIPMAN TO LIEUTENANT. 

1814-1825. 

In common with the other survivors of the Essex, Farragut landed in theUnited States as a paroled prisoner of war. Captain Porter took him atonce to Chester and put him again to school, this time to an oldgentleman named Neif, who had served in the guards of Napoleon. Themethod of instruction practiced by him seems to have been unsystematicand discursive; but Farragut, who was ever attentive to make the most ofsuch opportunities as offered for self-improvement, derived profit herealso, and said afterward that the time thus passed had been of serviceto him throughout his life. Until very lately there were residents ofthat neighborhood who could recall the young midshipman as he was atNeif's school; a lad short of stature and not very handsome in face, butwho bore himself very erect because, as he often declared, he could notafford to lose a fraction of one of his scanty inches. There was, andstill is, near the spot where he went to school a tavern called theSeven Stars, which has been a public house since the time of theRevolution, and which had sheltered Howe and Cornwallis as the Britisharmy advanced from the head of the Chesapeake toward Philadelphia, in1777. Upon its porch Farragut spent much of his leisure time, and withinits walls joined in the social gayeties of the neighboring families, whoafterward recalled with pride and interest this association with theyoung sailor before whom lay such a brilliant but unforeseen future. 

In November, 1814, Farragut was exchanged, and at once ordered to NewYork to join the brig Spark, which was intended to form one of asquadron of small vessels to cruise against British commerce under thecommand of Captain Porter. He was here for the first time separated fromhis guardian and thrown wholly upon his own force of character to guidehis steps; and this beginning was made with a set of messmates with whomhe was temporarily quartered on board the John Adams, among whom wereseveral very wild young men. Farragut evidently felt the force of thetemptation, for he speaks with warm thankfulness of thecounter-influence of the first lieutenant, to which he attributed muchof his deliverance from the dissipation by which he was surrounded. "When I have looked back with a feeling of horror to that period of mylife, " he wrote, "I have always remembered with gratitude Mr. Cocke'scounsels and kind-hearted forbearance. " It was indeed characteristic ofthe man that, while by no means insensible to the natural temptations ofyouth, he was ever more attracted to and influenced by the good than bythe evil around him. During the following year, on his cruise to theMediterranean, he was messmate with a midshipman named William Taylor, ayoung man of singularly fine character, which seems to have been thechief cause of the influence he exerted upon Farragut. "He took meunder his charge, counseled me kindly, and inspired me with sentimentsof true manliness, which were the reverse of what I might have learnedfrom the examples I saw in the steerage of the John Adams. Never havinghad any real love for dissipation, I easily got rid of the badinfluences which had assailed me in that ship. " He noted also that, ofthe twelve or thirteen midshipmen there associated with him, in lessthan two years all but one, his old messmate Ogden, of the Essex, haddisappeared from the navy. The habit of strict attention to duty whichhe had contracted under the rule of the Essex also contributed, bykeeping him occupied and attentive, to deter him from yielding topractices incompatible with its due discharge. 

The conclusion of peace put an end to the proposed cruise of the Spark, and Farragut was next ordered, in March, 1815, to the Independence, aseventy-four-gun ship, or ship-of-the-line, as such were commonlycalled. She was the flag-ship of a numerous squadron, composed mostly ofsmall vessels, destined to act against Algiers, with whom war hadrecently been declared. Upon arriving in the Mediterranean it was foundthat Commodore Decatur had already brought the Dey to terms, so thatFarragut saw here no more fighting, and the squadron returned home bywinter. The following spring he was ordered to the Washington, also aseventy-four, about to sail for Naples, bearing on board Mr. WilliamPinkney, our minister to that court. This cruise gave our youngmidshipman an experience of a kind he had not before had, and which inmore ways than one was useful to him. The Washington was one of thoseexceptional vessels which illustrated in the highest degree the kindand pitch of perfection to which, by unremitting severity and exaction, the appearance and drills of a ship-of-war could be brought. Hercommander, Captain Creighton, had the reputation of being the greatestmartinet in the navy; and being seconded by a singularly efficient andactive set of officers, the ship was made to realize the extreme idealof a naval officer of that day in smartness, order, and spotlesscleanliness. [B] "But, " says Farragut, "all this was accomplished at thesacrifice of the comfort of every one on board. My experience in thematter, instead of making me a proselyte to the doctrine of the oldofficers on this subject, determined me never to have 'a crack ship' ifit was only to be attained by such means. " His feeling on the matter wasdoubtless somewhat quickened by the personal discomfort which he, incommon with all subordinates, underwent under such a system, although hewas rather a favorite with the captain, whose aid he was; but it showsindependence of character to have thought so clearly for himself at suchan age, and to have ventured to differ from standards which were then, and for a long time afterward, implicitly accepted throughout theservice. The tradition of those days, being mainly oral, has nearlydisappeared; but fragments of it remain here and there in the minds ofthose who, as youngsters thirty or forty years ago, were brought incontact with men, then already elderly, who had had personal experienceof ships like the Washington. These stories, in their grotesqueseverities, have almost the air of an extravaganza. It must, however, bein justice remembered that they were the extravagances of a few amongthe men who had brought the United States Navy to the high efficiency inwhich it then was; and to whom, and not to either the people or theGovernment of that day, was due the glorious record of 1812. A few ofthem added to their military ardor and efficiency an undue amount ofthat spirit of the good housekeeper which makes a home unbearable. Farragut was aided to his wise conclusion by his previous experience inthe Essex, where a high state of efficiency was gained without wantonsacrifice of comfort; for Porter, though a man of hasty temper, was everconsiderate of his crew. But for the naval officers of that day Farragutthroughout his life retained a profound admiration. Talking about themat his dinner-table in New Orleans fifty years later, but a few daysbefore his famous passage of the Mobile forts, he said: "We have nobetter seamen in the service to-day than those gallant fellowsBainbridge, Decatur, Hull, Perry, Porter, and Charles Stewart; and, " headded, "I must not forget to mention McDonough, and poor unluckyLawrence, as splendid-looking a sailor as I ever saw. If I only hadtheir chance and could lay the Hartford alongside of an English ship, Ishould like it better than fighting our own people. " Some years later heagain expressed the same feelings to the same friend, to whom the authoris indebted for the communication of them. His own glorious career wasthen finished, and his life's work lay open to the mature reflection ofhis declining years, when he thus acknowledged his obligations to theheroes of his boyhood. "Isaac Hull, " he said, "was as good a seaman asever sailed a ship. If I have done the country any service afloat, it isin no small degree owing to the ambition and enthusiasm he created inme, when I was a youngster, by his fair fight with and capture of anEnglish frigate. I always envied Hull that piece of good work. " It is tobe suspected that the Admiral always felt that something was lacking tothe fullness of his cup, in that he had only been allowed to fightforts, and not ships like his own; and it is no small evidence of thegenerosity of his character that his enthusiasm was so aroused by thedeeds of others. He spoke of the fight between the Kearsarge and theAlabama in as glowing terms as were aroused by his recollection of theConstitution and the Guerrière. "I had sooner have fought that fight, "he wrote, "than any ever fought upon the ocean. "

 [Footnote B: The writer remembers to have heard in his early days in the service a tradition of a ship commanded by Creighton, which he believes to have been the Washington, and which illustrates the methods by which this extreme smartness was obtained. In each boat at the booms was constantly a midshipman in full dress, cocked hat included, so that no time might be lost in dropping alongside when called away. The full crew was probably also kept in her. ]

The Washington stopped a few days at Gibraltar, where the rest of thesquadron were then at anchor; and then sailed with all of them incompany to Naples. During the remainder of the year 1816 the shipcruised along the Barbary coast until the winter had fairly set in, whenshe with the other vessels repaired to Port Mahon. Although now so closeto the spot where his race originated, Farragut's journal betrays nointerest in the fact. He was still too young for the sentimentalconsiderations to weigh much in his mind; and it was not till many yearslater, in the height of his glory as a naval commander, that he visitedhis father's birthplace, Ciudadela, the capital city of Minorca. In thefollowing spring the squadron resumed its cruising and made quite around of the Mediterranean west of Italy; the journal mentioning visitsto Gibraltar, Malaga, Leghorn, Naples, Sicily, and the cities on theBarbary coast. Farragut made full and intelligent use of theopportunities thus afforded him for seeing the world; and his assiduoushabit of observation did much to store his mind with information, whichthe circumstances of his early life had prevented his gaining in theordinary ways of school and reading. He was fortunate also at this timein having the society of an intelligent and cultivated man, the chaplainof the Washington, Mr. Charles Folsom. The chaplain in those days wascommonly the only schoolmaster the midshipmen had; and theiropportunities of learning from him depended very much upon the pressureexercised by the captain to compel the attention of a set of boys. Mr. Folsom, however, was drawn to Farragut by the eager willingness of thelatter to acquire, and by his sense of his deficiencies. The manlycharacter which had resisted the temptations to low dissipation, andsought naturally the companionship of the better rather than the worseamong his associates, also attracted him. The friendship thus formedbecame, through a series of incidents, the cause of an unusualopportunity for improvement being offered to Farragut. In the autumn of1817 Mr. Folsom received the appointment of consul to Tunis, which hadjust been vacated. The summer cruising of the squadron was drawing to anend, and the winter quarters at Port Mahon about to be resumed. Therefore, while the Washington was lying in Gibraltar, Mr. Folsomwrote to the commander-in-chief, Commodore Chauncey, asking permissionto take the young midshipman to spend the winter with him in Tunis, topursue his education under his care. In the letter he spoke veryearnestly of his pupil's zeal for improvement, of his close attention, and ready response to any effort on the part of his instructor. Theletter is interesting also in its recognition of Farragut's stillexisting relations to Captain Porter, "to whose wishes this request cannot be repugnant. " The letter was dated October 14, 1817; and, therequired permission being given, the two friends in the following monthsailed from Gibraltar for Marseille as passengers in the sloop-of-warErie. At Marseille a slight incident occurred which, while not quitecreditable to our hero, may have interest as showing natural character. Spending the evening at the house of a Mr. Fitch, he was, much againsthis will, obliged to play whist, for which he had no fondness. "Notgetting along very well with my hand, the party showed great impatience, and I thought were rather insulting in their remarks. One individualwent so far as to dash his cards on the table in derision of my play, when I returned the compliment by throwing them at his head. Iapologized to Mr. Fitch and retired, much mortified, but my temper hadbeen sorely tried. " The display of temper was scarcely more than theprovocation justified; and it is noteworthy that during a period whendueling was so common Farragut, though quick to resent, appears never tohave been involved in a serious personal difficulty. 

Early in 1818 the Erie, carrying Mr. Folsom and his pupil, arrived inTunis, where the latter remained for nine months, pursuing his studieson the site of the ancient maritime empire of Carthage. He mentionsparticularly the subjects of mathematics, English literature, French, and Italian. For languages he had great natural aptitude, and in laterlife was able to converse in several. The monotony of study was variedby the society of the few but agreeable foreign families residing inTunis, and by occasional excursions in the neighborhood; when theinterest of the present was happily blended, under the guidance of sucha man as Mr. Folsom, with thoughts upon the past grandeur and history ofthe Carthaginian empire and the Roman province which had successivelyflourished on that soil. In one of these excursions Farragut received apartial stroke of the sun, from the effects of which he suffered formany years. 

The period of his stay in Tunis exceeded the original intention, butdoubtless with the approval of the commodore. It was brought to a closein the fall of 1818 by an outbreak of the plague, which increased tosuch an alarming extent that Mr. Folsom felt compelled to send hischarge away just when the approach of another winter of comparativeidleness for the squadron would have justified a longer stay. But deathsin Tunis had risen to a hundred a day, and all the families were livingin a state of complete isolation, the houses being barricaded againstoutsiders; therefore on the 9th of October Farragut departed in aGenoese brig for Leghorn. Thence, after a quarantine of forty days, hewent to Pisa; and from there to Messina, where the squadron hadassembled for the winter of 1818-'19. 

The friendship between Farragut and Mr. Folsom did not end with thisseparation. The latter survived to the end of the civil war, and wasthus privileged to follow the successful and great career of the admiralto whom, while yet an unformed boy, he had thoughtfully extended ahelping hand. As late as 1865 letters passed between the two, showingthat both cherished warm recollections of that early association; Mr. Folsom dating his, as though careful to make the coincidence, on theanniversary of the day when he parted with his pupil in the harbor ofTunis and returned alone to the plague-stricken city. 

The officers of the United States squadron passed a gay winter inMessina in 1819. Farragut was not yet eighteen years of age, but hisbodily development had kept pace with his mental, and he writes that healways held his own at this time in all athletic exercises. Thesucceeding spring and summer were again spent in routine cruising onboard the Franklin, seventy-four, which had taken the place of theWashington. In the fall of 1819 the squadron was in Gibraltar; andthere, "after much opposition, " Farragut was appointed an actinglieutenant on board the brig Shark. This promotion, coming at so earlyan age, he afterward looked upon as one of the most important events ofhis life. "It caused me to feel that I was now associated with men, onan equality, and must act with more circumspection. When I became firstlieutenant, my duties were still more important, for in truth I wasreally commander of the vessel, and yet I was not responsible (assuch)--an anomalous position which has spoiled some of our bestofficers. I consider it a great advantage to obtain command young, having observed, as a general rule, that persons who come into authoritylate in life shrink from responsibility, and often break down under itsweight. " This last sentence, coming from a man of such extensiveobservation, and who bore in his day the responsibility of such weightydecisions, deserves most serious consideration now, when command rank isreached so very late in the United States Navy. 

After a short year in the Shark Farragut was ordered to return to theUnited States, to pass the examination required of all midshipmen beforethey could be confirmed to the rank of lieutenant. No opportunityoffering for passage in a ship-of-war, he embarked in a merchant vesselcalled the America. On the passage he found himself, with the ship, confronted by an apparent danger, which occasioned a display of thefearlessness and energy always latent in his character. Those were dayswhen piracy was rife upon the seas in the neighborhood of the WestIndies and of the Spanish Main. The system was an outgrowth of theprivateering carried on by French and Spanish marauders, for they werelittle better, against both British and neutral commerce during the warsof the French Revolution and Empire; and it had received a fresh impulsefrom the quarrel then existing between Spain and her American colonies, which since 1810 had been in revolt against the mother country. Privateering, having booty as its sole motive, rapidly tends toindiscriminate robbery, if not held strictly responsible by the countryusing it; and the remote, extensive, and secluded shores of Cuba, Haïti, and the South American coast defied the careless supervision of the weakSpanish Government. When within a few days' sail of the United States, the America fell in with an armed brig showing the colors of the newColombian republic; but a flag was little guarantee for the character ofa vessel if other signs told against her. Farragut describes bothcaptain and crew of the America as being so overwhelmed with fear that, though expecting no mercy, they entertained no idea of resistance. Underthe circumstances he took command; and having, fortunately, aspassengers two seamen from the squadron going home sick, these formed anucleus around which rallied the courage of the others, paralyzed onlythrough disuse. It was, however, the firmness of the lad of eighteen, supported by his position as an officer and acting upon the two menprepared to recognize him as such, that redeemed the others fromimbecility to manhood. The incident had no results, the stranger provingto be a regularly commissioned cruiser, and treating them with civility. Farragut's thoughtful, not to say philosophical, turn of mind was shownin his recorded reflections upon the difference between the conduct ofthe man-of-war's men and the merchant seamen, which he justly attributednot to inherent difference of natural courage, but to the habit of armsand of contemplating danger under a particular form. 

On the 20th of November, 1820, Farragut again landed in the UnitedStates, having been absent four years and a half. He felt himself astranger, having left as a mere boy, and knowing no one but CommodorePorter and his family. His examination soon followed, and was passed;but apparently not quite to his own satisfaction. A period ofcomparative quiet followed, spent principally in Norfolk, Virginia, during which he formed the attachment which resulted in his firstmarriage. In May, 1822, he was again ordered to sea in the sloop-of-warJohn Adams, in which he made a short cruise in the Gulf of Mexico and toVera Cruz, where the Spanish power in Mexico was then making its laststand in the well-known fortress, San Juan de Ulloa. The ship returnedto the United States early in December, 1822, when Farragut found theMosquito fleet, as it was called, fitting out against the pirates of theCaribbean Sea. Learning that it was to be commanded by his old captain, Commodore David Porter, he asked for and obtained orders to theGreyhound, one of the small vessels composing it, commanded byLieutenant John Porter, a brother of the commodore. 

Since the peace with Great Britain, Captain Porter had been a member ofthe Board of Navy Commissioners; a body of three officers appointed byan act of Congress passed early in 1815, whose duties were to administerthe affairs of the navy under the supervision of the Secretary. Meanwhile the sufferings, not only of American property but of thepersons of American citizens, from the prevalence of piracy in theCaribbean Sea, had become unendurable. Ordinary naval vessels were, fromtheir size, unable to enforce a repression for which it was necessary tofollow the freebooters and their petty craft into their lairs among thelagoons and creeks of the West India islands. The general outcry rousingthe Government to the necessity of further exertion, Captain Porteroffered his services to extirpate the nuisance; with the understandingthat he was to have and fit out the kind of force he thought necessaryfor the service. He resigned his position on the board on the 31st ofDecember, 1822; but before that date he had bought and begun to equipeight Chesapeake schooners, of fifty to sixty tons burden, of which theGreyhound, Farragut's new vessel, was one. He also built five rowingbarges, unusually large, pulling twenty oars. With these, supported bythe ordinary man-of-war schooners, of which several were already in theservice, and by the sloops-of-war, he expected to drive the pirates notmerely off the sea, but out of their hiding-places. 

The commodore put to sea with all his squadron on the 14th of February, 1823. A northeast gale was at once encountered, but the tiny vessels ranthrough it without any harm. For the next six months Farragut wasactively employed in the operations of the little fleet, the Greyhoundbeing one of the five which were sent through the Mona Passage, betweenPorto Rico and Haïti, and thence ransacked the southern shores of thelatter island and of Cuba as far as Cape San Antonio, where Cuba ends. There were many encounters between the pirates and the squadron, sometimes afloat, sometimes ashore, in several of which our officerserved, forcing his way with his party through marsh and chaparral andcactus--a service often perilous, always painful and exhausting. Hishealth fortunately held out through it; nor did he take the yellowfever, which, as the summer wore on, made sad havoc among both officersand men. Toward the end of his time he obtained the command of one ofthe Mosquito schooners, which, however, he held but for a short period;for, not having yet received his lieutenant's commission, he wasrelieved by the arrival of an officer of that rank. An interestingincident of this cruise was a meeting with his brother William, thenalready a lieutenant, whom he had not seen for thirteen years. Soonafter that he obtained permission to visit New Orleans; and it is acurious coincidence that the vessel in which he took passage thither wascarrying the first load of bricks to build Fort Jackson, one of thedefenses of New Orleans, by the passage of which nearly forty yearslater he began his career as commander-in-chief. His father had thenbeen many years dead; but he met his sister, with whom he had to makeacquaintance after so long a separation. 

The service of the Mosquito fleet was one of great exposure andprivation. "I never owned a bed during my two years and a half in theWest Indies, " wrote Farragut, "but lay down to rest wherever I found themost comfortable berth. " It was, however, effectual, both directly andindirectly, to the suppression of piracy; seconded as it was by the navyof Great Britain, interested like our own country in the security ofcommerce. Driven off the water, with their lurking-places invaded, theirplunder seized, their vessels burned, their occupation afloat gone, themarauders organized themselves into bandits, and turned their predatorypractices against the towns and villages. This roused the Spanishgovernors from the indolent complacency with which they had watchedrobberies upon foreigners that brought profit rather than loss to theirdistricts. When the evil was thus brought home, the troops were put inmotion; and the pirates, beset on both sides, gradually but rapidlydisappeared. 

This Mosquito war had, however, one very sad result in depriving thenavy of the eminent services of Commodore Porter. In 1824 a gratuitousinsult, accompanied by outrage, offered to one of his officers, led himto land a party at the town of Foxardo, in Porto Rico, and force anapology from the guilty officials. Although no complaint seems to havebeen made by Spain, the United States Government took exception to hisaction and brought him to trial by court-martial. Porter confidentlyexpected an acquittal, having proof that the outrage was wanton, andthat the officials had engaged in it to protect some piratical plunderwhich had been taken into the place. He argued also that the wording ofhis orders from the department authorized his action. The court, however, found him guilty of an offense which was charged as"disobedience of orders, and conduct unbecoming an officer, " andsentenced him to six months' suspension. The sentence was accompanied bythe expression that the court "ascribes the conduct of the accused whichis deemed censurable to an anxious disposition, on his part, to maintainthe honor and advance the interest of the nation and of the service. "Indignant at the result, Porter resigned from the navy and took servicewith the Mexican Republic. After spending there four years of harassingdisappointments, the election of General Jackson to the presidency gavehim a friend in power. He returned to the United States in October, 1829, under the encouragement of letters from persons closely connectedwith the new administration. The President offered to nominate him tohis old position in the navy, but Porter declined "to associate with themen who sentenced me for upholding the honor of the flag. " This, striking a kindred chord in Jackson's breast, elicited a warm note ofapproval, and he appointed the commodore Consul-General to Algiers. Theconquest of that country by France put an end to the office before hecould assume the duties. The President then nominated him to be Chargéd'Affaires to Turkey. He went there in August, 1831, became MinisterResident in 1839, and died in this post in 1843. 

After his return from the Mosquito fleet, Farragut married, on the 24thof September, 1823, Miss Susan C. Marchant, the daughter of a gentlemanof Norfolk, Virginia. He was at this time far from well; fever, whichspared him while on that sickly service, having seized him upon arrivalin a healthier climate. It was probably due in part to this that twoyears passed after his marriage before he again joined a ship. Duringthis period he spent some weeks with his bride in the house of CommodorePorter, who had returned temporarily from his squadron to regain hisstrength after a severe attack of yellow fever. This was probably hislast close personal association with his early benefactor, whom theissue of the trial afterward separated from his country; but thecorrespondence between the two continued through life, Farragutmaintaining to the last a grateful recollection of kindness shown to himby one whom he termed his "most venerated friend and commander. " As lateas 1835, writing from Constantinople in reply to a letter received fromhis former ward, Porter, then an ailing and broken man, notices thistrait in him: "I have found in yours that treasure of a grateful heartwhich should be so much prized. I have never looked for any otherreturn than what my feelings gave me, and to find such sentiments ofgratitude from you, after all others had forgotten that they hadreceived any benefits from me, is truly refreshing to the feelings. " Therelations thus testified to are an honor to the memory of both. 

CHAPTER IV. 

LIEUTENANT. 

1825-1841. 

After the termination of his cruise in the Mosquito fleet, and up to thebeginning of the Civil War, the story of Farragut's life is for the mostpart but the record of the routine service of a naval officer in timesof peace--periods of distant foreign cruising succeeding to, and beingagain succeeded by, periods of employment on shore in some of the manyduties connected with the administration of the navy. But while in theirsuperficial aspect there is little to distinguish these monotonousyears, with their occasional breaks of exceptional incident, from theordinary experiences of all naval officers, the journal of Farragutshows an activity of mind, a constant habit of observation, especiallyin professional matters, and a painstaking diligence in embracing everypassing opportunity for improvement, which reveal to some extent thecauses of his subsequent great successes. It is not indeed alwayspossible to trace the precise connection between this or thatobservation, this or that course of study, and the later results; it israther in the constant habit of doing the best at every moment, and inthe gradual formation of mental character and correct professionalknowledge, that are to be found the fruits of the strenuous exertionmade throughout his life by Admiral Farragut. It is a noteworthy, thoughby no means unprecedented, circumstance that these characteristicsobtained little or no recognition during his early and middle career. Unlike the great British admiral, Nelson, no war occurred to bring hishigh qualities into notice; and, when lacking but a year of Nelson's agewhen he fell at Trafalgar, Farragut was vainly petitioning the NavyDepartment for the command of a sloop-of-war in the war with Mexico, although he alleged his intimate knowledge of the scene of operations, the close personal examination he had made of it, and the privilege hehad had of witnessing an attack by a French squadron but a few yearsbefore. 

The early age at which he had left his home, the long absences of hisyouth, and the death of his father, had all contributed to sever hisassociations with New Orleans; so that his marriage in Norfolk, as wasthe case with so many officers of his day, fixed that city as his placeof residence when not at sea. It is worthy of remembrance, in connectionwith his firm determination at a later day to stand by the Union ratherthan by a section of the country, that the only home Farragut had knownout of a ship-of-war was the Southern city where he had twice married, and where the general sentiment was contrary to the course he took. Theinterest of the fact lies not in its bearing upon the rights or wrongsof the great quarrel that all are now fain to forget, but in showing therare strength of character which, sustained only by its own clearconvictions, resisted the social and friendly influences that overcameso many others. 

In August, 1825, Farragut was promoted to be lieutenant, and at the sametime ordered to the frigate Brandywine, chosen to carry back to FranceLafayette, who was just drawing to a close his memorable visit to theUnited States. The ship sailed from the capes of the Chesapeake inSeptember, reaching Havre after a passage of twenty-five days. Fromthere she went to England, and thence to the Mediterranean, returning toNew York in May, 1826. After his arrival Farragut was detached and wentto New Haven with his wife, who had become a great sufferer fromneuralgia and continued to be an invalid during the remainder of theirmarried life. While living in New Haven he availed himself of theopportunity to attend lectures at Yale College. After his wife'streatment was finished they returned to Norfolk, where he remained untilOctober, 1828, attached to the receiving ship and living on board withMrs. Farragut. Here the interest which he had showed in the improvementof his own mind was transferred to the ship's boys, most of whom did noteven know their letters. Farragut organized a school for these waifs, who at that time were little accustomed to receive such care, and wasgratified to find very tangible results in the improvement shown bythem. He next received orders to the sloop-of-war Vandalia, which sailedfrom Philadelphia in the last days of 1828 for the Brazil station. Onthis cruise, which for him lasted but a year, he for the first timevisited the Rio de la Plata and Buenos Ayres, and came in contact withthe afterward celebrated dictator of that country, Rosas. The differentprovinces, whose union is now known by the political name of theArgentine Republic, had, under the later days of Spanish rule, constituted with Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay the Viceroyalty of BuenosAyres. On the 25th of May, 1810, a declaration of independence wasissued in the city of Buenos Ayres. A long period of disturbance, internal and external, followed. At the time of this first visit ofFarragut a contest had for some time been going on between two parties, representing two opposite political ideas, and striving in arms for thecontrol of the State. The ideal of one was a strong centralizedgovernment supported by a powerful standing army. This naturally foundits most numerous constituents among the wealthy and educatedinhabitants of the principal city, Buenos Ayres. The province of thesame name, however, and the other provinces generally, favored a looserform of confederation. The former party, known as the Unitarios, held abrief lease of power; but their opponents found an able leader in JuanManuel de Rosas, who personified the best and worst features of the_gaucho_ of the pampas and obtained unbounded popularity and followingamong those wild herdsmen. In 1828 Rosas and his allies forced theUnitarian president to resign, and installed one of themselves, namedDorrego, as governor of Buenos Ayres. This success was but one step inthe series of bloody struggles which ended in the establishment of thedictator; but it marked the point at which Farragut first saw BuenosAyres and Rosas himself, with whom he was at a later date thrown inintimate contact and who at that moment was in the full flush of hisearly popularity. 

In December, 1829, Farragut's eyes were in such bad condition that itwas found necessary to send him home. He arrived in February, 1830, andremained in Norfolk for a period of nearly three years, broken only byoccasional absences. During a part of this time he was again attached tothe receiving ship in the port; and, as before, manifested an interest, unusual in those days, in those under his command. One of these, then amidshipman, writes to the author that he still recalls, after the lapseof nearly sixty years, the kindness, consideration and hospitality shownhim by the future admiral, who was then known through the service as the"Little Luff" Farragut--luff being a naval abbreviation, now obsolete, for lieutenant. But with all his kindness there was no relaxation in theenforcement of necessary duty. In December, 1832, he was again orderedto sea in the sloop-of-war Natchez, as her first lieutenant; or, as theexpression now is, as executive officer. It was the time of thenullification troubles in South Carolina, and the ship was first sent toanchor near Charleston, where she would be prepared to support theauthority of the United States Government. Fortunately, no occasionarose for her to act; and a stay which began with taking precautionsagainst possible fire-ships from the city, ended in a series of ballsand general exchanges of courtesy between the officers and the citizens. In April, 1833, the Natchez returned to Hampton Roads; and the followingmonth sailed, carrying Farragut back again to the Brazils. On the 30thof July he was again at anchor, in his new ship, off Buenos Ayres. Sincehis former visit the country had passed through much trouble. Aconfederation had been formed between the principal provinces, inJanuary, 1831, based upon the loosest ties of union; but the army hadbecome dissatisfied with the progress of changes which arose largelyfrom jealousy of the military power, and had risen in revolt under theleadership of a general named Lavalle, who for a time had sided withRosas. He met at first with success, defeated Dorrego and Rosas, and putthe former to death; but Rosas rallied again, defeated Lavalle, andbecame in his place head of the army and governor of Buenos Ayres. Tothis position he was re-elected in 1832, and by virtue of it he was, atthe time of Farragut's second visit, in chief control of the externalpolicy and internal affairs of the confederation; the principal andseaboard province inevitably taking the lead and representing thecountry under even the loosest form of combination. Disturbed though theinternal state of affairs was, Rosas's strong hand appears to have sofar preserved the safety of foreigners as to give no cause for theinterference of their ships-of-war. Farragut's stay on the station was, however, again cut short. The schooner Boxer arrived in Rio Janeiro onher way home from the East Indies; and it becoming necessary to give hera new commanding officer, he received orders to take her to the UnitedStates. He sailed in her on the 8th of June, 1834, and on the 25th ofJuly reached Norfolk, where the vessel was put out of commission and heagain returned to his family. A period of nearly four years of shoreduty followed. During the latter two of these Farragut was a constantapplicant for sea service, which he could not obtain. His wife was atthis time becoming ever weaker and weaker. "I was necessarily confinedvery much to the house, " he writes, "for my wife was so helpless I wasobliged to lift her and carry her about like a child. " His tender anduntiring devotion to the suffering invalid was no less conspicuous thanhis careful attention to the other duties of life, and was the constantremark of those who were witnesses of this sorrowful period. 

In April, 1838, Farragut was again ordered to sea in the home squadron, and in the following August, though still only a lieutenant, tookcommand, in Pensacola, of the sloop-of-war Erie; a position that couldonly be temporary, because belonging naturally to an officer of higherrank. It fell to him, however, at a period of peculiar interest--whenFrance became involved with Mexico in one of those brief hostilities bywhich alone were broken the long years of peace between Waterloo and theCrimean War. The quarrel between the two was simply as to the reparationdue to French subjects for injuries received during the long years ofconfusion through which Mexico then had been and still was passing. As apolitical question it possesses no present interest whatever; but to anaval officer of Farragut's strong professional feeling and close habitsof observation it offered a peculiar opportunity for noting the silentprogress made during the long peace by the material of war among thenavies of Europe, where the necessity of constant preparation insures anadvance in which the United States then, as now, tended to lag behind. It supplied also a test, under certain conditions, of the much-vexedquestion of the power of ships against forts; for the French squadron, though few in numbers, deliberately undertook to batter by horizontalfire, as well as to bombard, in the more correct sense of the word, withthe vertical fire of mortars, the long renowned castle of San Juan deUlloa, the chief defense of Vera Cruz. It was still the day ofsailing-ships, both of war and of commerce. But a few years had elapsedsince a man of considerable scientific attainment had pronounced thecrossing of the Atlantic to be impossible to vessels depending uponsteam power alone; and only in the same year as the French attack onVera Cruz (1838) had been seen the falsification of the prediction bythe passage of the Sirius and Great Western from England to New York. 

As a first means of compulsion, the French Government had in 1837established a blockade of the Atlantic ports of Mexico. In two monthsthe Mexican treasury lost two million dollars in duties, which wouldhave been collected if the ships turned away had been permitted toenter; but the Government and people seemed little moved by a resultthat merely added one more to the many ills with which they were alreadyafflicted. The question was then raised by the French authorities, diplomatic and military, whether the possession of the fortress of SanJuan de Ulloa, which commanded the city of Vera Cruz, the most importantof the coast ports, would not also confer control of a great part of theseaboard, and thus enforce a security not otherwise obtainable for thepersons and property of French subjects. Blockade, though a less extrememeasure, was difficult, protracted, and productive of serious loss. Theviolent northerly gales of winter exposed the ships to peril, and theyellow fever of the summer months was deadly to the crews. Moreover, thedeprivation of commerce, though a bitter evil to a settled communitywhose members were accustomed to the wealth, luxury, and quiet lifeattendant upon uninterrupted mercantile pursuits, had been provedineffective when applied to a people to whom quiet and luxuries were theunrealized words of a dream. The French Government speedily determinedto abandon the half-measure for one of more certain results; and inOctober, 1838, began to arrive the ships of an expedition destined toproceed to open hostilities, under the command of Admiral Baudin, aveteran of the Napoleonic wars. Appointed in the navy in 1799, immediately after the return from Egypt and the establishment of theConsulate, by the direct intervention of Bonaparte, who was a friend ofhis father's, Baudin had served with distinction until the fall of theempire, losing his right arm in battle; and after Waterloo it was he whomade the proposition, familiar to all readers of Napoleon's life, tocover the escape of the Emperor from Rochefort by sacrificing the shipsunder his command in an heroic resistance to the English cruisers whilethe vessel bearing the fallen monarch escaped. "Sixteen years ago, " saidhe, "my father died of joy upon learning the return from Egypt ofGeneral Bonaparte; and I myself to-day would die of grief to see theEmperor leave France if I thought that by remaining he could again doaught for her. But he must leave her only to live honored in a freecountry, not to die a prisoner to our rivals. " Such was that career, belonging to an early and singular generation, which here for a momentcrossed and linked with that of the great naval hero of our own days. Farragut has recorded his impression of him. "Admiral Baudin, " hewrites, "would be undoubtedly a _rara avis_ in any navy. He is aboutfifty years of age (he was fifty-four), has lost his right arm, lookslike a North of Europe man, has a fine address, and speaks English well. He has every mark of a polished seaman and officer, with the expressionof great decision, with firmness and activity to execute hiswell-digested plans. These were my remarks the first time I saw him, andhis subsequent conduct soon proved I was right. " His French biographermakes a remark, commonplace enough, which yet notes the essentialdifference in the lot of the two gallant men who thus casually met. "Forthe few who allow occasions to escape them, how many could justlycomplain that a chance has never been offered them? Admiral Baudin neverhad the opportunity to which his capacities suited him; all hisaptitudes designated him for war on a great scale; a man such as he, succeeding Latouche-Tréville, would have saved us the sorrows ofTrafalgar. " Farragut was fortunate, for in him the opportunity and theman met in happy combination. 

When he reached his station, Admiral Baudin suffered no time to be lost. The wintry gales were approaching, while, on the other hand, his firstexperience showed the miseries of disease on that sickly coast. Of thetwo frigates there before he came, which had been blockading during thesummer, one had buried forty-five seamen and five officers out of aship's company of four hundred men; the other, at the time of hisarrival, had three hundred and forty-three sick among a crew of fivehundred. With such conditions, trifling is out of place. An ultimatumwas at once sent to the Mexican Government, a brief time only beingallowed for a reply, because the claims of the French cabinet werealready clearly understood. On the 25th of November the last of hissquadron, two bomb-vessels, arrived. On the 21st he had given noticethat he would wait till noon of the 27th for the final decision. On the28th the attack was made. 

The castle of San Juan de Ulloa lies half a mile east and to seaward ofthe city of Vera Cruz, which it commands, and from which it is separatedby water averaging from fifteen to twenty feet deep. It is built on theinner extremity of a reef that extends from it a little over a mile tothe eastward, in the general prolongation of the line connecting thecastle and the town. This shoal being covered by a foot or two of water, the builders of the fort counted upon it for protection in thatdirection against ships, and against attack, either by regularapproaches or by escalade. The work itself was in general outline aparallelogram, with bastions at the four angles. The longer sidesfronted the east and west; and of these the former, facing the shoal andthe open gulf, contained the gate of the fortress and was covered by ademi-lune and line of water batteries. There were mounted in the castleand dependent works, at the time of the French attacks, one hundred andeighty-six cannon. The strength of the fortifications, the number of theguns, and the character of the surroundings, had all contributed tobestow upon San Juan de Ulloa the reputation of being the strongestposition in Spanish America. It was, indeed, considered impregnable tonaval attack, for the best hope of ships under such circumstances is toapproach closely and drive the defenders from their guns by the superiornumber and weight of the pieces opposed to them; but in San Juan thiswas forbidden by the extent and formation of the reef. Like most coralbanks, this rises sheer from the bottom, making the approach verydangerous to vessels dependent only upon sail-power; and the groundabout it, though not too deep for anchorage, is rocky and foul. 

Admiral Baudin, however, was thoroughly acquainted with the weak pointsof the fortress, through information obtained from Madrid; where plansof the works, dating from the times of the Spanish occupancy, were onfile. He possessed also two steamers, the first to cross the Atlanticunder the French flag, by aid of which, though small and of weak power, he could count upon placing his sailing frigates exactly where he wishedthem. Finally, the wretched condition of the Mexican forces, demoralizedby years of irregular warfare and internal commotion, and miserablyprovided with material of war, gave additional chances of success. 

On the morning of November 28th the two steamers towed the bomb-vesselsto the eastern extremity of the reef, a little over a mile from thecastle. Next two of the frigates were taken by them and anchored closeto the reef, southeast from the works and distant from them half a mile. The third frigate, using her sails alone, succeeded in taking position alittle ahead of her consorts. These operations were all completed beforenoon and were conducted under the eyes of the Mexicans, who wererestrained from impeding them by the orders of their Government not tofire the first gun. A delay followed, owing to a flag of truce comingfrom the shore; but the proposition brought by it proved unacceptable, and the squadron opened fire at half-past two. Between that and sundownthe three frigates, aided only by a small corvette which attacked underway, poured upon the castle 7, 771 round shot and 177 shell, themortar-vessels at the same time throwing in 302 bombs. At eight thefire ceased, and negotiations began. The following day, at noon, thecastle was delivered into the hands of the French, who placed a garrisonin it. "It was high time, " said Admiral Baudin; "the wind wasfreshening, the sea getting up, and the anchors were breaking like glassupon the bottom, composed of sharp rocks. " But the loss among thedefenders had been so great, and the re-enforcements at hand were sofew, that further resistance was impracticable. 

The terms of the convention made by the commander of the Mexican forceshad stipulated that only a certain number of troops should constitutethe garrison of Vera Cruz until the affairs between the two nations weresettled; but upon the 4th of December the French admiral learned, to hisgreat indignation, that the Mexican Government had disavowed the actionof the general, declared war against France, and was throwingre-enforcements into the city. He immediately took measures to disarmthe works which might threaten his fleet at their anchorage, hoping atthe same time, by surprising the enemy, to gain possession of SantaAnna, the new commander of the troops and then the most prominent man inMexico. While the French were making their preparations in secret, Farragut went on shore and called upon Santa Anna, who promised to carefor the persons and property of American citizens, adding: "TellPresident Van Buren that we are all one family, and must be unitedagainst Europeans obtaining a foothold on this continent. "

The following morning, before daylight, the French embarked fifteenhundred seamen, accompanied by a few engineer soldiers, in the boats ofthe squadron; and, being covered by a thick fog, landed at six o'clockupon the beach before Vera Cruz. Formed in three divisions and unseen bythe enemy, they blew open the gates of the city and at the same timestormed the forts which at the north and south terminate the seawardwall. The Mexicans, taken wholly by surprise, retreated before theassailants. The center division of the French, which had enteredby the gates, pursued rapidly toward the quarters of Santa Anna. A short, vigorous resistance by a part of his guard enabled thecommander-in-chief to escape in shirt and trousers; but General Aristawas taken. Meanwhile the two flank divisions, having dismounted the gunsin the forts and chopped the carriages in pieces, moved along the wallstoward the gate. There they united with the center; and the whole body, having accomplished its object in disarming the sea face of the town, fell back upon their boats lying along the mole. Most had alreadyre-embarked when the Mexicans, led by Santa Anna in person, charged fromthe gate and down the mole at double-quick. Admiral Baudin himself wasstill on shore, waiting to see the last man off. Though scarcelyexpecting this gallant return from a force that had been so badlyworsted and was much inferior in numbers, the French were notunprepared. A six-pound gun on the extremity of the mole, belonging tothe Mexicans, had been turned so as to sweep the approach with grape;and five of the boats of the squadron, mounting small carronades, werealso disposed to repel attack. The admiral ordered the six-pounderfired, and entered his barge. The discharge swept away the head of theMexican column, and Santa Anna himself fell with three wounds, from oneof which he lost his left leg. Some of the broken column fell back uponthe town, from the loop-holes of whose walls a sharp fire of musketrybegan, while others continued down the mole and opened vigorously uponthe retreating French, directing their aim especially upon the admiral'sbarge. The admiral himself escaped, but narrowly; his cockswain and amidshipman standing by him being killed, and another midshipman wounded. "The Mexicans continued to fight with great gallantry, " wrote Farragut;and it was perhaps well for the assailants that the fog sweeping inagain covered their further retreat. 

Of all these incidents Farragut was a close and interested observer. Upon joining the Erie as her commander, he found that the ship was underorders to proceed with the utmost dispatch to the Mexican coast, toafford to American citizens and their property the protection so likelyto be needed in event of active hostilities. On the 26th of August shewas anchored under the island of Sacrificios, off Vera Cruz, which wasthen still undergoing the blockade which preceded recourse to strongermeasures. Farragut remained there till the 19th of September, when hereturned to Pensacola; but early in November he was again off theMexican coast at Tampico, where a revolution threatened, for Mexico atthe time was not only menaced with foreign attack, but also a prey tothe utmost internal disorder. On the 17th of this month the Erie randown again to Vera Cruz; and learning there that the 27th was fixed asthe day for a final conference and settlement of the questions at issue, her commander of course decided to remain throughout the affair, makingpreparations to receive on board Americans and their movable propertyin case the city was bombarded. 

In his journal, and afterward in a letter to Commodore Barron, then thesenior officer in the United States Navy, Farragut has preserved a veryfull and detailed account of the attack, the principal features of whichhave already been mentioned; and it is interesting to note, astestifying to the care and accuracy of his observations, that theaccount in his journal corresponds very closely with that given in theLife of Admiral Baudin, published in France within the last few years. He was particularly impressed with, and distinguishes as matters ofprincipal importance, the utility of the small French steamers in towingthe fighting ships into position, and the destructive effects of theshell upon the soft masonry of the fort. Admiral Baudin, in his reports, indulged in some of the pardonable grumbling of a seaman of the oldschool about the constant ailments of the little steam-vessels; but hewas too capable an officer to ignore their value, "and never, " wroteFarragut in his report, "was the utility of these vessels so apparent. Everything was done by them. The day was calm, or nearly so, and theships had no sails to manage. As soon as the anchor was let go they wereready for action. The bomb-vessels were next placed (for which the rangehad been calculated), and two sloops took position at right angles withthe range, to tell by signal the effect of the bombs. So you see all wasarranged with science and skill and without the slightest interruption, for the Mexicans had given an order to the commander of the fort not onany account to fire the first gun. " This order was, in Farragut'sopinion, the principal cause of the French sustaining so little loss. Awell directed fire from the fort would, he thought, have destroyed thesteamers and prevented the frigates from gaining the carefully chosenposition, where they were least exposed to the guns of the works. 

Immediately after the submission of the castle Farragut went ashore toexamine and note the effects of the fire, and especially of thehorizontal shell fire; which was then so much a novelty in naval warfarethat he speaks of the missiles continuously as shell-shot, apparently todistinguish them from the vertically thrown bombs. "Now it was seen forthe first time that the material of which Ulloa is built (soft coral)was the worst substance in the world for protection against the modernshell. The French threw almost entirely shell-shot, which entered thewall twelve or eighteen inches and then exploded, tearing out greatmasses of stone, and in some instances rending the wall from base totop. The damage done by these shell-shot was inconceivably greater thanthat by the shell from the bomb-vessels, owing to the former strikinghorizontally, while the latter fell vertically upon the bomb-proofs, doing but little damage. .. . I am satisfied of one fact--viz. , that theymight have bombarded with the bomb-vessels for a month without success, while the frigates would in four hours more, with their shell-shot, havereduced the fort to a heap of ruins. " This opinion as to the inefficacyof bomb-firing to destroy a work anticipated the experience of the CivilWar, where the conclusion was that it might wear out the endurance ofthe garrison by constant harassment, but not directly reduce the worksthemselves. It is only just to say that his estimate of the effect ofthe horizontal fire upon the walls is more favorable than that of theFrench engineers, who did not consider that the damage done necessarilyentailed a capitulation; but seamen and engineers have rarely agreed intheir opinions upon this subject. 

The same zeal which led Farragut to this minute inspection of thebattered fortress carried him also on board one of the French ships, while she still remained cleared for action, to note matters of detailwhich differed from those then prevalent in his own service. Of these hemade a very full representation, and one much in disparagement of theUnited States Navy; which, since the glories of 1812 and the firstre-organization and development procured for it by the popular favorconsequent upon its victories, had been allowed to drop into a state ofbackwardness, as regards the material, similar to that which followedthe Civil War, and from which it is but now beginning to emerge. Thepoints which he noted, though most important to that rapidity and orderupon which the efficient service of a ship's batteries depends, wouldhave now no attraction for the unprofessional reader; nor for theprofessional, except as matters of antiquarian interest. They showedthat spirit of system, of scientific calculation, of careful adaptationof means to ends, which have ever distinguished the French material fornaval war, except when the embarrassments of the treasury have preventedthe adoption of expensive improvements--a spirit which for over acentury made the French ships the models which their usually victoriousrivals were fain to copy. "The English and ourselves may affect todespise the French by sea, " wrote Farragut to Barron, "but depend uponit, sir, they are in science far ahead of us both, and when Englandnext meets France upon the ocean she will find a different enemy fromthat of the last war. Of all this I know you have seen much in theory, but I have seen it tested in practice. "

The substance of Farragut's letter to Barron deals with matters whichthe progress of time and the accompanying advances in naval science havenow made obsolete; but the spirit which inspired the letter andaccumulated the materials for it can never become obsolete. It was then, and it is now, the indication of a man keeping abreast of his time andawake to its necessities; it held then, as it does now, the promise ofone who, when occasion arose, would have his faculties in readiness, byconstant training, to exert all the powers with which nature had giftedhim. The conditions of 1861 were very different from those of 1838; butthe officer who was found awake to the first in their day would not bebehind the others in theirs. The letter concluded with a pregnantobservation, which deserves to be quoted as thoroughly characteristic ofthe writer: "I have already said too much for a letter to any otherperson of your rank; but I flatter myself that I know your love ofimprovement, and that my intentions will be duly appreciated. If we whowander about the world do not keep those at home informed of the dailyimprovements in other navies, how can we hope to improve, particularlywhen we see men impressed with the idea that because they once gained avictory, they can do it again? So they may, but I can tell them it mustbe with the means of 1838, and not those of 1812. " This transmission ofinformation concerning the progress of other navies, upon whichFarragut laid such just stress, is now systematized and perfected undera particular branch of the Navy Department, known as the Office of NavalIntelligence. Upon every ship afloat there is an officer whose duty isto observe and report to that office upon such matters, and upon all theexperiences of foreign navies which are open to the examination ofoutsiders. 

After the French affair at Vera Cruz the Erie returned to Pensacola, andthere on the 12th of January, 1839, Farragut gave up the command to anofficer of senior rank and went home. Upon his arrival in Norfolk, finding his wife's health to be very precarious, he remained unemployeduntil her death, which occurred on the 27th of December, 1840. "No morestriking illustration of his gentleness of character, " says hisbiography by his son, "is shown than in Farragut's attention to hisinvalid wife. His tenderness in contributing to her every comfort, andcatering to every whim, through sixteen years of suffering, forms one ofthe brightest spots in the history of his domestic life. When not atsea, he was constantly by her side, and proved himself a faithful andskillful nurse. It was the subject of remark by all who were thrown withhim; and a lady of Norfolk said, 'When Captain Farragut dies, he shouldhave a monument reaching to the skies, made by every wife in the citycontributing a stone. '"

CHAPTER V. 

COMMANDER AND CAPTAIN. 

1841-1860. 

Immediately after the death of his wife Farragut applied for seaservice; and on the 22d of February, 1841, he was ordered to theDelaware, a ship-of-the-line, which was fitting for sea in Norfolk anddestined to take him for the third time to the Brazil station. He wasthen among the senior lieutenants of the navy; but as it was inaccordance with custom that a commander should be the executive officerof a ship-of-the-line, his expected promotion would not, when itarrived, cause him to leave his position. Some time passed before theDelaware was fully ready for sea. Before sailing, she was sent up theChesapeake to the mouth of the Severn River, where she was visited bynumbers of people from the neighboring city of Annapolis, as well as bylarge parties of congressmen and public officials from Washington, amongwhom came the then Secretary of the Navy. It was while lying offAnnapolis, on the 27th of September, 1841, that Farragut received hiscommission as commander in the navy. His seniority as such was fromSeptember 8, 1841. A few days later the Delaware returned to HamptonRoads, and thence sailed for her station on the 1st of November. On the12th of January she anchored in Rio Janeiro. After a stay of six weeksthere, the whole squadron sailed for the Rio de la Plata, the usualresort of the ships on that station during the summer months of thesouthern hemisphere, when the yellow fever is apt to be prevalent in RioJaneiro. On the 1st of June, 1842, Farragut was ordered to command theDecatur, a small sloop-of-war, relieving Commander Henry W. Ogden; whoas a midshipman of the Essex had been his messmate nearly thirty yearsbefore, and was now compelled to leave his ship by an illness whichnever allowed him to resume the active pursuit of his profession. Thetransfer of the command appears to have been made in the harbor of RioJaneiro. In severing his connection with the Delaware, with his newrank, Farragut felt that he had parted finally with the subordinateduties of his calling; and, as rarely happens, he passed directly fromthe active exercise of the lower position to fill the higher. Hisjournal records the fact with a characteristic comment: "Thus closed myservice on board the Delaware as executive officer; to which I shallalways look back with gratification, as it was the last step in theladder of subordinate duties, and I feel proud to think I performed itwith the same zeal as the first. " He was then nearly forty-one yearsold. 

On the 2d of July the Decatur sailed for the La Plata in company withthe Delaware. Soon after reaching Montevideo, Commodore Morris embarkedon board the former, and went in her to Buenos Ayres; ships of the sizeof the Delaware not being able to approach that city on account of thegreat distance to which very shoal water extends from it. Afterexchanging the usual official civilities and transacting some businesswith Rosas, who then embodied in his own person all the powers of thestate, the commodore returned to Montevideo; but the Decatur was soonsent back, and Farragut spent most of the latter half of 1842 at BuenosAyres, in constant intercourse, both official and social, with Rosas andhis family. Of the latter he, in common with most American navalofficers who visited the La Plata at that time, received very agreeableimpressions; and since, as commanding officer, his duties were lessexacting and his time much more at his own command than as executive, hegave free play to the social disposition which was prominent in hischaracter. Much of his journal during his stay is taken up with theaccounts of social and official entertainments in which he shared. "During the month of September, " he writes, "I made it a rule to spendtwo or three evenings a week at the governor's" (Rosas). "On the 5th ofNovember I was invited to a ball at the Victoria Theatre, where, as onall similar occasions, I danced the first quadrille with the charming'Manuelita, " the daughter of Rosas. The pleasant and familiar relationsthus established enabled him to do many kind acts for the Unitarios, whose lives were in constant danger by political accusations, if notfrom actual offenses. 

Rosas himself was then in the full exercise of the dictatorial powerwith which he had been invested some years before, after refusing are-election as governor of Buenos Ayres. His rule, which lasted undersuccessive renewals of his office until 1852, was arbitrary and bloody;but in the disorganized condition of the provinces at that period a manof his force of character seems to have been necessary, to avert thegreater horrors of constant intestine strife. "We concluded from ourobservations, " notes Farragut in his journal, "that he was a man ofuncommon mind and energy, and, as a general thing, reasonable; but onthe subject of secret societies he was a madman, if we might judge fromhis furious denunciation of them. " They constituted, indeed, the oneresource of the cowed Unitarios, and were the chief danger thenthreatening him. "We had an excellent opportunity to form an idea of hischaracter, as he appeared to throw off all restraint while with us. Butthe commodore informed us that, as soon as he laid business mattersbefore him, Rosas was a different person; he was calm and measured inmanner and language. " The ladies of the family were amiable, intelligentand hospitable; but, like all the women of Buenos Ayres at that time, were perforce ardent Federalists and detesters of the "savageUnitarios. " Farragut mentions an incident occurring at an officialfestivity in honor of Rosas, which shows the savagery that lay closeunder the surface of the Argentine character at that time, and easilyfound revolting expression in the constant civil strife and in theuncontrolled rule of the dictator. "In the ball-room was a picture whichwould have disgraced even barbarian society. It was a full-sized figurerepresenting a Federal soldier, with a Unitarian lying on the ground, the Federal pressing his knees between the victim's shoulders, whosehead was pulled back with the left hand, and the throat cut from ear toear, while the executioner exultingly held aloft a bloody knife andseemed to be claiming the applause of the spectators. I am sure I do noterr in saying that every one of our party felt an involuntary shuddercome over him when his eye fell upon this tableau; nor did we afterwardrecover our spirits, everything in the way of gayety on our part duringthe night was forced and unnatural. "

It is a matter of some, though minor, interest to note that Farragut hasoccasion at this time to mention Garibaldi, in connection with the warsthen waging. The Italian patriot, whose name was then far from havingthe celebrity it has since attained, had for some time been engaged onthe popular side in revolutionary struggles in the southern provinces ofBrazil. Thence he had passed into Uruguay, and become a teacher ofmathematics in Montevideo. Rosas had the ambition to bring into theArgentine confederation all the provinces which once formed theviceroyalty of Buenos Ayres, of which Uruguay was one; and, finding apretext in the civil dissensions of the latter, had opened hostilitiesas the ally of one party in the State. Garibaldi, who began life as aseaman, had command of the Uruguayan naval forces, and in that capacityundertook to carry stores to Corrientes, an important point far up theriver Parana. "As he met with many obstacles in his course, " notesFarragut, "the Argentine admiral, Brown, was enabled to overtake him. Garibaldi ran his vessel into a creek and made a most desperateresistance; fought until he had expended everything in the way ofammunition, then landed his crew and set his vessel on fire. " On the17th of October a grand ball was given in honor of this success, whichCommander Farragut attended; as he did all the other gayeties during hisstay in Buenos Ayres. 

The Decatur had already been long on the station when Farragut assumedcommand, and the time had now arrived for her to return home. Afterleaving Buenos Ayres she made short stops at Montevideo, Rio Janeiro, Maranham, and Para, the latter being the seaport of the Amazon River. Onthe 18th of February, 1843, she arrived in Norfolk, and Farragut wasrelieved. His health being delicate at this time, he spent the followingsummer at Fauquier Springs, Virginia. 

From the mountains he returned in the autumn to Norfolk; and there onthe 26th of December, 1843, he married Miss Virginia Loyall, the eldestdaughter of Mr. William Loyall, a well-known and respected citizen ofNorfolk. 

In April, 1844, Commander Farragut was ordered as executive officer tothe receiving ship at Norfolk, the Pennsylvania, of one hundred andtwenty guns; which, in the days of sailing ships, was by far the largestvessel the United States ever had, and one of the largest in the world. Some time later he was transferred to the navy yard at the same place, on which duty he was employed when the war with Mexico arose. 

As soon as the already existing difficulties with that country began towear an ominous outlook, Farragut wrote to the Navy Department, askingfor service in the Gulf. In his application he stated the qualificationshe thought he possessed, from his knowledge and close study of theground, and from his acquaintance with the Spanish language. Heinstanced particularly the occasions on which he had been employed inthat neighborhood, and the close study he had been privileged to make onthe spot during Admiral Baudin's operations. Although the Secretary ofthe Navy at that time was the able and enlightened Mr. George Bancroft, this letter received no reply; and a second, sent after the beginning ofthe war, was barely acknowledged without any action being taken. AfterMr. Bancroft left the Department, Farragut renewed his application, expressing a decided opinion that the castle of San Juan de Ulloa couldbe taken either by artillery attack or by escalade; offering toundertake the task with the Pennsylvania and two sloops-of-war. If notthought to have rank enough for such a command, he was willing to goback to the position of executive officer of the Pennsylvania, in order, in that capacity, to organize the crew for the attack. The opinion thusexpressed ran counter to the routine prejudices of the day, and, comingfrom an officer who had as yet had no opportunity to establish hisparticular claim to be heard, rather hurt than improved his chances foremployment. It was not till February, 1847, nearly a year after the warbegan, and then with "much difficulty, " that he obtained command of thesloop-of-war Saratoga; but when he reached Vera Cruz in her, the castlehad already passed into the hands of the United States, havingsurrendered to the forces under General Scott on the 26th of March. Thatthis capture should have been made by the army rather than by the navywas a severe disappointment to Farragut, who had so long cherished thehope that its fall should have been the brilliant achievement of his ownservice. In his mortification he used an expression which, in the lightof his own subsequent career, seems a twofold prophecy. "The navy wouldstand on a different footing to-day if our ships had made the attack. Itwas all we could do, and should have been done at all hazards. Commodore Conner thought differently, however, and the old officers athome backed his opinion; but they all paid the penalty--_not one of themwill wear an admiral's flag_, which they might have done if that castlehad been taken by the navy, which must have been the result of anattack. " It was to such enterprise at the hands of the men of his owntime, among whom he was foremost, that the navy at a later day didobtain the admiral's flag which it had so long in vain desired. 

The frustration of this high ambition was not the only misfortune toFarragut arising out of the Mexican war. He contracted the yellow feveron the station, nearly losing his life; and subsequently became involvedin a controversy with the commodore of the squadron, who he believedhad, in the assignment of duty, treated him and his ship with unfairdiscrimination, due to personal ill-will toward himself. Thecorrespondence had no results; but such quarrels are rarely other thanhurtful to the junior officer engaged. It is not singular, therefore, that he speaks of this cruise as the most mortifying of all the servicehe had seen since entering the navy. "I have little, " he said again, "tolook back to with satisfaction or pleasure at this time, except theconsciousness of having done my duty. " Smarting under the belief that hewas being imposed upon, he wrote to the Navy Department complaining ofinjustice, and asking that either he himself should be relieved or theship sent home. He candidly admits that his letters were consideredimproper by the Secretary of the Navy, but the Saratoga was ordered toreturn to the United States, and was paid off at New York in February, 1848. In her short cruise there had been one hundred cases of yellowfever in her crew of one hundred and fifty, and her commander had beenobliged, to use his own expression, "to rid the service" of five of herjunior officers, and on the last day to bring the first lieutenant totrial for drunkenness. Altogether, the Mexican war and the cruise of theSaratoga seem to have marked the lowest point of disappointment andannoyance that Farragut was called upon to encounter during his navalcareer. 

Immediately after leaving the Saratoga, Farragut was again ordered toduty in his former position at the Norfolk navy yard. Two years later hewas called to Washington to draw up, in connection with some otherofficers, a book of Ordnance Regulations for the navy. This occupied himfor eighteen months. As when in New Haven, twenty-five years before, hehad improved the opportunity of hearing the lectures at Yale College, soat this later period he attended regularly those of the SmithsonianInstitution, losing, he records, but a single one. "You will rarely comeaway from such lectures, " he adds, "without being somewhat wiser thanyou went in. " Where precisely such knowledge might come into play hecould not, indeed, foresee, but he acted always on the principle thatany knowledge might at some time become useful; just as, when at VeraCruz, though he did not at the time look forward to a war with Mexico, he closely examined every point of interest, for "I have made it a ruleof my life to note these things with a view to the possible future. "

When the Ordnance Regulations were finished, in the spring of 1852, Farragut was again assigned to the Norfolk navy yard, and directed toutilize the experience he had gained in compiling them by giving weeklylectures on gunnery to the officers on the station. In prosecution ofthe same line of professional work, he was soon after ordered to conducta series of experiments at Old Point Comfort, near Norfolk, to determinecertain questions connected with the endurance of iron cannon; thedischarges being continued with one or two of each class of service gunsuntil they burst. Some very important results were obtained; but thecircumstance connected with this duty which has now most interest, isthat in it Farragut was associated with Lieutenant Percival Drayton, whowas afterward his flag-captain and chief-of-staff at the battle ofMobile Bay. The intimacy formed during this year of experimental duty atOld Point lasted throughout their lives. 

Soon after this the Crimean war broke out. Farragut's desire for his ownprofessional improvement and for the progress of the service led him tomake application to the Navy Department to be sent to the seat of war, "to visit the fleets of England and France, and ascertain whether in theoutfits and preparation for war they possess any advantages over our ownships-of-war, and, if so, in what they consist. " The utility of such amission can not be doubted, and his occupations of the past few yearsparticularly prepared him for such an inquiry. Had the Navy Departmentthen had any systematic record of the aptitude shown by individualofficers, and of the work done by them, it must have recognizedFarragut's peculiar fitness for duties of this kind; which have sincehis time been organized and given a most comprehensive scope under theIntelligence Office of the Navy Department. As it was, his applicationreceived no other reply than a polite acknowledgment. A commission, consisting of three officers of the Engineer Corps of the army, was sentby the War Department to visit Europe and the seat of war, and upon itsreturn made an elaborate report; but at this critical period of navalprogress, when sail was manifestly giving place to steam, when the earlyattempts at iron-clad batteries were being made, and the vast changes inarmament that have since taken place were certainly, though as yetdimly, indicated, it did not appear to the Government of the UnitedStates a matter of sufficient importance to inquire, on the spot, intothe practical working of the new instruments under the test of war. 

Although doubtless not so intended, the Navy Department emphasized itsdecision not to send Farragut to the East by assigning him to duty asfar west as the naval interests of the United States, within its ownborders, then allowed. In August, 1854, four months after hisapplication for the former employment, he was ordered to California asfirst commandant of the navy yard at Mare Island. The site had beenselected in the year 1852 by a commission of three officers, but as yetno navy yard existed. It was to be Farragut's particular duty to planand build it up under the general instructions of the Department. Hisselection for this difficult and onerous, but at the same time veryflattering, appointment was among the first evident results of thediligent, painstaking effort which had marked his professional career. By that, and by that only, had he as yet had any opportunity of markinghimself above the ordinary run of men; but he stood high in the esteemof Commodore Joseph Smith, then and for many years both before andafter, the chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks, under whose chargethe management and development of navy yards more particularly came. Atthe critical period when the selection of an officer to command in theattack upon New Orleans had to be made, Smith, who had closeconfidential relations with the Secretary of the Navy, always held thatFarragut was the man above all others for the place. 

The site of the new yard was in the extensive sheet of inland watersconnected with the bay of San Francisco, and some thirty miles from thecity. There being no accommodations upon the island, Farragut, with hisfamily, for some seven months lived on board an old sloop-of-waranchored near by. He remained at this station for four years, duringwhich great progress was made in the development of the yard; but theduty, though most important and particularly responsible, because of thelength of time required by correspondence to pass to and fromWashington, was not fruitful of incident. These were the troublous earlytimes of California--the days of the Vigilance Committee and the Law andOrder Party. With these intestine troubles of a State the militaryofficers of the United States had no proper concern; but there wascontinually a possibility that they might be forced to take a stand bythe interference of one side or the other with civil officials of theUnited States Government, or might be induced, by a request from theauthorities, to act upon the ground that there was no time to refer toWashington for instructions. It is unnecessary to enter into anyexamination of Farragut's course during this period, although theaffairs with which he had to deal became at times both critical anddelicate. It will be sufficient to say that the Navy Department, afterreceiving his reports, approved his conduct as having been prudent andyet marked by a proper spirit. 

In July, 1858, Farragut returned to the East by the only route thenavailable, the Isthmus of Panama. During his absence, on the 14th ofSeptember, 1855, he had been promoted to the rank of captain, which, prior to the Civil War, was the highest grade in the United States Navy;the title commodore, then so frequently applied to the older officers ofthe service, being simply one of courtesy given to a captain who hadcommanded a squadron of several vessels, but who did not thereby ceaseto be borne as a captain upon the Navy Register. Soon after his arrivalFarragut was ordered to command the Brooklyn, one of six steamsloops-of-war just being completed. She belonged to that new navy ofthirty years ago which the United States Government, most luckily foritself, had determined to build, and which became fairly available justin time for the exigencies of the Civil War. 

It has been said, and that on the floors of Congress by a politicianconspicuous in his party, that past history teaches that preparation forwar is unnecessary to the United States, and the conditions precedent tothe wars of 1812 and 1861 have been cited in support of the assertion. Certainly no one cognizant of the facts will deny that the United Stateswas most miserably unprepared for either war as regards the size of hernavy; but it so happened on both occasions, more by good luck than goodmanagement, that what navy it did have was of remarkably fine quality, and, to the extent to which its numbers permitted it to be employed, wasgenerally perfectly adequate to the work it had to do. It could not, however, begin to touch the full amount of service it ought to havedone. In 1812 it could not protect the Chesapeake nor the Mississippi;it was blockaded in its own ports, escaping only by evasion; it couldnot protect American commerce, which suffered more than did that ofGreat Britain. In 1861, had its numbers been at all adequate, it couldby prompt action have forestalled the preparations of the enemy, and byprevention secured immediate advantages which were afterward achievedonly by large expenditure of time and fighting. Such were the results ofunpreparedness. It was to the preparation, scanty as it was--to the fineships and superior armaments, both too few--that the successes of eitherera were due. The frigates and sloops of 1812 were among the finest oftheir class to be found anywhere, with powerful batteries andexcellently officered; while in the decade before the Civil War beganthere had been built eighteen or twenty new steamships, admirablyefficient for their day, and with armaments of an advanced and powerfultype. Upon these fell the principal brunt of the naval fighting thatensued. These ships, and particularly those of the Brooklyn class, werethe backbone of Farragut's fleet throughout all his actions, even in thelast at Mobile in 1864. Had there been thrice as many, the work wouldhave been sooner and therefore more cheaply done; but had the lack ofpreparation in 1861 equaled that of 1851 or 1881, it may be questionedwhether any of his successes could have been won. 

When Farragut took command of the Brooklyn, ten years had elapsed sincehe was last afloat--years pregnant with naval change. He had neverbefore served in a steamer, except for a very short time in a primitiveone belonging to Porter's Mosquito fleet, in 1823. The changes in thedisposition and handling of the guns had not been radical. They werestill arranged "in broadside, " along the two sides of the vessel; norwere the pivot guns--which, as their name implies, could be pivoted toone side or the other, according to the position of an enemy--a newidea. In these matters there had been improvement and development, butnot revolution. But while the mode of placing and handling wasessentially the same, the guns themselves had greatly increased in sizeand received important modifications in pattern. The system then invogue was that associated with the name of the late Admiral Dahlgren. The shape of the gun had been made to conform to the strains brought bythe discharge upon its various parts, as determined by carefulexperiment; and in place of the 32-pounder, or six-inch gun, which hadbeen the principal weapon of the earlier ships, the batteries of the newfrigates and sloops were composed chiefly of nine-inch guns, with one ormore pivots of ten- or eleven-inch bore. The shell-shot, whosedestructive effects had excited Farragut's comments in 1838, were nowthe recognized type of projectile; and the new guns were spoken ofdistinctively as shell-guns, because not expected to use solid shotunder ordinary circumstances. The Brooklyn and her fellows, among whichwas Farragut's future flag-ship, the Hartford, although screw steamers, had also the full sail power of the former sailing ship; and they werewooden, not iron vessels. 

The service of the Brooklyn, while under Farragut's command, was chieflyconfined to his old cruising ground in the West Indies and in Mexico. In the latter country, since the termination of the war with the UnitedStates in 1848, there had been a constant succession of revolutions; andat the time of the Brooklyn's cruise there was established in Vera Cruza constitutional party, at whose head was Benito Juarez, the lawfulclaimant of the presidency. Opposed to this, in the city of Mexico, wasthe party headed by General Miramon, who had succeeded by force to theauthority of Juarez's predecessor. The United States threw its influenceon the side of Juarez; and its minister, Robert McLane, was permitted touse the Brooklyn to carry him from point to point of the coast. While noforce was exerted, the support given to the minister's remonstrances bythe constant presence of a powerful ship-of-war served to emphasize thepolicy of the Government, which had recognized Juarez. This recognitionwas followed some time later by a similar step on the part of theministers of England, France, and Spain. Mr. McLane continued with theBrooklyn during great part of 1859, and in December of that yearreturned in her to the Mississippi, where he was landed at a plantationbelow New Orleans. This visit to his early home was marked by a sadcoincidence to Farragut. His elder brother, William, a lieutenant in thenavy, had long been retired from active service, for which he wasunfitted by rheumatism. In consequence he had not received promotion, remaining at the head of the list of lieutenants, and being assigned toduty at the naval rendezvous in New Orleans. When the Brooklyn enteredthe river he was lying at the point of death, but heard of his brother'sapproach, and expressed a hope that he might live long enough to seehim again after so many years of separation. The wish was not to befulfilled. Though ignorant of the danger, Captain Farragut hastened tothe city, himself also looking forward with pleasure to the meeting; buthe arrived only in time to see his brother dead, and to follow him tothe grave. 

Farragut remained attached to the Brooklyn for two years. In October, 1860, he was relieved by Captain W. S. Walker, and returned to his homein Norfolk. This ended his sea service prior to the Civil War, and asthe captain of a single ship. Thenceforward, during the brief butimportant remnant of his active career, he was to command great fleets. 

CHAPTER VI. 

THE QUESTION OF ALLEGIANCE. 

1860-1861. 

When Captain Farragut returned to Norfolk in October, 1860, he was, albeit unconsciously, rapidly approaching the turning point of his life, the tide in his affairs which taken at the flood should lead on tofortune. That he seized the opportunity was due to no dexterous weighingof the effects of either course upon his personal future, but to thatpreparedness of mind which has already been mentioned as one of hischaracteristic traits, and to the tenacity with which were held hisconvictions thus deliberately and maturely formed. For several years hehad watched with unquiet mind the gathering clouds which preceded theapproaching storm, and in common with others had felt the distress andperplexity which would attend the rupture of the Union. He did not, however, remain a merely passive spectator, agitated as such by hopesand fears, but trusting withal to the chapter of accidents. He hadconsidered the effect of the alternatives before the country, and whathis own duty should be in any case. He could not, in his modestposition, control the course of events; but, whatever befell, he wouldbe ready to take his stand, strengthened in so doing by the settledprinciples to which his conscientious meditation had led him. Thus hisfixed purpose, enlightened by reason, had in it nothing of obstinacy;yet resisted those appeals to affection, to interest, or to prejudice, under which so many succumbed. 

Within a month after his leaving the Brooklyn, on the 6th of November, 1860, the presidential election was held, and resulted, as had beenexpected, in the choice of Mr. Lincoln. On the 20th of December SouthCarolina seceded, and her course was followed within the next six weeksby the other cotton States. In February, 1861, delegates from theseStates met in convention at Montgomery, Alabama, adopted a constitution, and elected Jefferson Davis to be president of their confederation. Onthe 18th he was inaugurated, and the new government was thus formallyconstituted. 

Here for a moment the secession movement paused, and Farragut earnestlytrusted would stop. Born in a Southern State, and passing his childhoodin the extreme Southwest, his relations with both had been severed attoo early an age to establish any lasting hold upon his affections; but, though he was to the end carried upon the Navy Register as a citizen ofTennessee, the tenderest and most enduring ties of his life had beenformed in Virginia. Nowhere were local bonds stronger, nowhere Statepride greater or more justified, than in the famous Commonwealth, whichhad stood in the center of the line in the struggle for independence, and had given to the nation so many illustrious men from Washingtondownward. It was impossible that Farragut--who at so early an age, andwhen attached to no other spot, had married in Norfolk, andthenceforward gone in and out among its people--should be insensible tothese influences, or look without grief to a contingency which shouldforce him to sunder all these associations and go forth, on the verge ofold age, to seek elsewhere a new home. Nor is it possible to many, however conscious of right, to bear without suffering the alienation andthe contempt visited upon those who, in times of keen politicalexcitement, dare to differ from the general passion which sways the massaround them. 

Farragut therefore naturally hoped that this bitter trial might bespared him. The Virginian people had taken what seemed then to be aconservative attitude; and, although he was determined to abide by theUnion if it were severed by violent action, he was anxious to believethat his home might be saved to him. The Legislature of the State metearly in January and recommended all the States to appoint deputies to apeace convention, which accordingly met on the 4th of February; but thepropositions made by it were not such as the National Congress couldaccept. On the 13th of the same month there was assembled at Richmond aState convention, the majority of the delegates to which were Union men, in the then sense of the word in that State. This fact, and thecharacter of some of the speeches made, tended to encourage the beliefto which Farragut's wishes led him; but this hope was soon damped by thepassage of resolutions affirming the right of secession, and definingthe grounds upon which Virginia would be justified in exercising theright. Among these grounds were the adoption of any warlike measures bythe United States Government, the recapture of the forts which had beenseized by the States already seceded, or any attempt to exact dutiesfrom them. True, this was followed during the first week in April by therejection of a proposition to secede by a vote of eighty-nine toforty-five; but, as Farragut held that the President would be justifiedin calling out troops when the forts and property of the nation had beenviolently taken from it, the contrary avowal of the Legislature of hisState showed that he might soon be forced to choose between it and theNational Government. In that case his mind was fully made up; the choicewas painful, but not doubtful. "God forbid, " he said, "that I shouldhave to raise my hand against the South!" but the words themselvesshowed that, however bitter the decision, he was ready to make it. Ifseparation between the sections came peacefully, by mutual consent, hewould abide in the only home his manhood had known, and cast his lotthenceforth with the people to whom he was allied and among whom hisinterests lay; but if the rupture took the form of violent rebellionagainst the Central Government, whose claims he admitted and to which heowned allegiance, he was prepared to turn his arms even against thosewho in the other alternative would have been his countrymen. Theattitude thus held during those long months of suspense and anxiety washonorable alike to his heart, which responded warmly to the calls ofnatural affection, and to his conscience, which subordinated thedictates of the heart to his convictions of right; while theunhesitating character of his resolution, amid the uncertainties thatunsettled so many men, must be attributed to that habit of preparing foremergencies which characterized his career. 

On the 12th of April, 1861, the long period of waiting and watching wasbrought to an end by the attack upon Fort Sumter. On the 15th PresidentLincoln issued his proclamation formally announcing the condition ofaffairs which existed in the seceded States, the defiance of the CentralGovernment, and the seizure of its property. In consequence he calledfor seventy-five thousand men from the militia of the various States, and avowed clearly that "the first service assigned to the forces herebycalled forth will probably be to repossess the forts, places, andproperty which have been seized from the Union. " This was clearly anappeal to arms, provoked finally by the assault upon Fort Sumter, butwhich the convention then sitting in Richmond had pronounced to be alawful cause for secession. In the excitement of the hour the Union men, whose attitude toward the more violent party had been almost apologetic, were swept away by the current of feeling, and an ordinance of secessionwas passed by the convention on the 17th of April, 1861. 

During the previous winter Farragut had been residing in Norfolk, unemployed by the Government, but in daily association both withcitizens and naval officers; many of whom, like himself, were marriedand settled there. He and his friends met daily at one of those commonrendezvous which are to be found in every small town, and therediscussed the news which each day brought of change and excitement. Inthis way Farragut became acquainted with the views of most of theresident officers, and realized, without being himself swayed by, theinfluences to which all of them, and especially those of Southern birth, were subjected. With the conservatism common in seamen who have beenfor long periods separated by their profession from their native places, the great majority of these officers, already men of middle age, couldnot but feel keen sorrow at the prospect of changes, which would removethem from the navy and separate them from the flag which had hithertostood to them for country. But, moved by feeling and prejudice, wroughtupon by the strong appeals of those they loved, and unfortified by thewell-reasoned convictions which made the strength of Farragut, it wasequally impossible for the greater part of them to imitate his example. The sense of duty and official honor which they owed to their longtraining in a generous service stood by them, and few were the cases ofmen false to trusts actually in their charge; but theirs was not thatsense of personal allegiance to the Government which gave the light ofthe single eye, and enabled Farragut's final decision to be as prompt asit was absolute. 

On the 18th of April, the day after the ordinance of secession had beenpassed, Farragut went as usual to the place of meeting, and saw, immediately upon entering, by the faces of those there, that a greatchange had passed over the relations between them. He spoke with hisusual openness, and expressed his deliberate convictions. He did notbelieve that the action of the convention represented the sober judgmentof the people. The State had been, as he phrased it, "dragooned" out ofthe Union; and President Lincoln was perfectly justified in calling fortroops after the seizure of the forts and arsenals. One of those presentremarked impatiently that a person with such sentiments could not livein Norfolk, and this feeling was evidently shared by the bystanders;there was, indeed, some danger, in those excited moments, of personalviolence to those who dared gainsay the popular passion. "Very well, "replied Farragut, "I can live somewhere else. " No time was needed totake a decision already contingently formed, and for executing which hehad, with his customary foresight, been accumulating the necessaryfunds. He at once went to his house and told his wife the time had comefor her to decide whether she would remain with her own kinsfolk orfollow him North. Her choice was as instant as his own, and that eveningthey, with their only son, left Norfolk, never to return to it as theirhome. Mrs. Farragut's sister and her young family accompanied them inthe steamer to Baltimore. Upon reaching the latter city they found italso boiling over with excitement. The attack upon the Massachusettstroops had just taken place, and the railroad bridges over theSusquehanna were then burning. The usual means of communication beingthus broken off, Farragut and his party had to take passage forPhiladelphia in a canal boat, on which were crowded some three hundredpassengers, many of them refugees like themselves. It is a curiousillustration of the hardships attending a flight under such exigency, even in so rich a country as our own, that a baby in the company had tobe fed on biscuit steeped in brandy for want of proper nourishment. 

From Philadelphia the journey to New York was easy, and Farragut theresettled his family in a small cottage in the village of Hastings, on theHudson River. Here he awaited events, hoping for employment; but it isone of the cruel circumstances attending civil strife that confidence isshaken, and the suspicions that arise, however unjust, defy reason andconstrain the Government to defer to them. No man could have givenstronger proof than Farragut had of his perfect loyalty; but all shadesof opinion were known to exist among officers of Southern origin, evenwhen they remained in the service, and there were those who, thoughrefusing to follow the South, would willingly have avoided striking ablow against the seceding States. Men were heard to say that they wouldnot go with their State, but neither would they fight against her; orthat they would remain in the navy, but seek employment that might sparethem the pain of taking part in such a contest. These illogicalpositions were soon abandoned as the spirit of war gained more and morehold upon the feelings of men, but for Farragut they never existed afterthe first blow was struck. Through whatever struggles with himself hemay have passed in the earlier stages of the secession movement, hisdecision, when reached, admitted no half-measures, nor halted betweentwo opinions. "He stood on no neutral ground, he longed to take anactive part in the war. " Nevertheless, the Government could not at onceaccept, as a title to full and implicit confidence, even the sacrificeof home and life-long associations which he had made to the cause of theUnion. If given any duty, a man of Farragut's rank and attainments mustneeds have one involving much responsibility, failure in which wouldinvolve not only himself but those who had employed him. The cry oftreachery was sure to follow, and prudent officers of Southern birthfound it advisable to decline employments where they foresaw that delayswere unavoidable, because they felt that what might be explained in thecase of a Northern man would in them be stamped by public opinion as theresult of disaffection. In Hastings and its neighborhood the mostgrotesque suspicions were spread concerning the Southern captain who hadthus come to dwell among them, and who, for conscience and country, hadgiven up more than had been demanded of those who thus distrusted him. Time was needed to allow men's minds to reach a more reasonable frame, and for the Government itself to sift and test, not merely the fidelity, but the heartiness and the probable capacity of the officers at itscommand. 

Farragut's first employment was as a member of a board to recommendofficers for retirement from active service, under an act approvedAugust 3, 1861. The object of this act was to assist the Department inthe discrimination necessary to be made between the competent and thosedisabled by years or infirmity, for up to that time there had been noregular system of retirement, and men were retained on the active listpast the period of efficiency, because no provision for removing themexisted. The duty, though most important with war actually existing, wasdelicate and trying, and far from consonant to Farragut's active, enterprising character. More suitable employment was, however, fastapproaching. 

 [Illustration: SCENE OF FARRAGUT'S OPERATIONS, 1862-1864. ]

CHAPTER VII. 

THE NEW ORLEANS EXPEDITION. 1862. 

The necessity of controlling the Mississippi valley had been earlyrealized by the United States Government. In its hands the great streamwould become an impassable barrier between two large sections of theSouthern Confederacy; whereas in the possession of the latter itremained a link binding together all the regions through which itflowed, or which were penetrated by any of its numerous tributaries. Theextensive territory west of the river also produced a large part of theprovisions upon which depended the Southern armies, whose main field ofaction was, nevertheless, on the eastern side. In a country habituallyso unprepared for war as is the United States, and where, of course, such a contingency as an intestine struggle between the sections couldnot have been provided for, there seemed room to hope that the nationalforces might by rapid action seize the whole course of the river, beforethe seceding States were able to take adequate measures for its defense. The Government had the support of that part of the country which hadreceived the largest manufacturing development, and could, therefore, most quickly prepare the material for war, in which both sides werelamentably deficient; and, what was yet more important, it possessed inthe new navy built since 1855 an efficient weapon to which the South hadnothing to oppose. The hope was extravagant and doomed todisappointment; for to overrun and hold so extensive a territory as theimmediate basin of the Mississippi required a development of force onthe one side and a degree of exhaustion on the other which could not bereached so early in the war. The relative strengths, though unequal, were not yet sufficiently disproportioned to enable the gigantic work tobe accomplished; and the principal result of an effort undertakenwithout due consideration was to paralyze a large fraction of a navy toosmall in numbers to afford the detachment which was paraded gallantly, but uselessly, above New Orleans. Nor was this the worst; the time thusconsumed in marching up the hill in order at once to march down againthrew away the opportunity for reducing Mobile before its defenses werestrengthened. Had the navy been large enough, both tasks might have beenattempted; but it will appear in the sequel that its scanty numbers werethe reason which postponed the attack on Mobile from month to month, until it became the most formidable danger Farragut ever had toencounter. 

Despite the extensive sea-coast of the United States and the largemaritime commerce possessed by it at the opening of the war, the navyhad never, except for short and passing intervals, been regarded withthe interest its importance deserved. To this had doubtless contributedthe fixed policy of the Government to concentrate its attention uponthe internal development of the country, and to concern itself littlewith external interests, except so far as they promoted the views ofthat section which desired to give extension to slaveholding territory. The avoidance of entangling alliances had become perverted toindifference to the means by which alone, in the last resort, the nationcan assert and secure control in regions outside its borders, butvitally affecting its prosperity and safety. The power of navies wastherefore, then as now, but little understood. Consequently, when theimportance of the Mississippi Valley was realized, as it immediatelywas, there was but one idea as to the means of controlling it, and thatwas by a land invasion from the great Western and Northwestern States. To this a navy was indeed to be adjoined, but in a manner so distinctlysubsidiary that it was, contrary to all custom, placed under the ordersof the commander-in-chief of the Western army, and became simply adivision of the land forces. From this subordinate position it was soonraised by its own intrinsic value and the logic of facts; but thetransient experience is noteworthy, because illustrating the generalignorance of the country as to the powers of the priceless weapon whichlay ready, though unnoticed, to its hand. 

Happily, in the Navy Department itself juster views prevailed; and thegeneral indifference permitted it at least one compensation--to followits own ways. The Secretary himself was not a professional man, thoughhe had had official connection with the service in the past; but mostfortunately there was called to his assistance one who had been foreighteen years in the navy, had passed while in it to the command ofmail steamers, and only five years before the war had resigned andentered civil life. This gentleman, Mr. Gustavus V. Fox, thus combinedwith business experience and an extensive acquaintance with navalofficers the capacities of a seaman. He knew what ships could do andwhat they could not; but to this common knowledge of sea officers, gained by the daily habit of sea life, he had added the results of studyand reflection upon events passing elsewhere than under his ownobservation. The experiences of the allied navies in the Crimean War hadconvinced him that, if the wooden sides of ships could not be pitted inprolonged stand-up fight against the stone walls of fortresses, theywere capable of enduring such battering as they might receive in runningby them through an unobstructed channel. This conviction receivedsupport by the results of the attacks upon Hatteras Inlet and PortRoyal. He might, indeed, have gone much further back and confirmed hisown judgment as a seaman by the express opinion of an eminent soldier. Nearly a hundred years before, Washington, at the siege of Yorktown, hadurged the French Admiral De Grasse to send vessels past Cornwallis'sworks to control the upper York River, saying: "I am so well satisfiedby experience of the little effect of land batteries on vessels passingthem with a leading breeze that, unless the two channels near Yorktownshould be found impracticable by obstructions, I should have thegreatest confidence in the success of this important service. "[C]

 [Footnote C: _Washington's Letters_, October 1, 1781. ]

In this conviction of Mr. Fox's lay the inception of the expeditionagainst New Orleans. It was, in his view, to be a purely naval attack. Once over the bar at the mouth of the river, the channel as far as thecity had no natural obstruction, was clearly defined, and easilyfollowed, by day or night, without a pilot. The heavy current of theearly spring months, while it would retard the passage of the ships andso keep them longer under fire, would make it difficult for the enemy tomaintain in position any artificial barrier placed by him. The works tobe passed--the seaward defenses of New Orleans, Forts Jackson and St. Philip--were powerful fortifications; but they were ultimately dependentupon the city, ninety miles above them, for a support which could comeonly by the river. A fleet anchored above the forts lay across theironly line of communication, and when thus isolated, their fall becameonly a question of time. The work proposed to the United States Navywas, therefore, to turn the forts by passing their fire, seize theirline of communications--the upper river--and their base, New Orleans, and then to give over the latter to the army, which engaged to furnish aforce sufficient to hold the conquest. 

Having first taken the necessary, but strictly preliminary, step ofseizing as a depot Ship Island, in Mississippi Sound, about a hundredmiles from the mouth of the river, Mr. Fox's proposition, which had beenadopted by the Secretary of the Navy, was submitted to the President. Mr. Lincoln, himself a Western man, unfamiliar with maritime matters andengrossed with the idea of invasion from the north, was disposed to beincredulous of success; but with his usual open-mindedness consented toa full discussion before him by experts from both services. A meetingwas therefore held with General McClellan at his headquarters. Therewere present, besides the President, the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Fox, and Commander David D. Porter, who had recently returned from serviceoff the mouth of the Mississippi. The antecedents of General McClellanwere those of an officer of the engineers, who are generally disposed toexaggerate the powers of forts as compared with ships, and tocontemplate their reduction only by regular approaches; just as anofficer of the line of the army, looking to the capture of a place likeNew Orleans, will usually and most properly seek first a base ofoperations, from which he will project a campaign whose issue shall bethe fall of the city. To this cause was probably due the preferenceobserved by the Navy Department to exist in army circles, for an attackupon Mobile first. Being close to the sea, which was completely underthe control of the navy, the necessary land operations would begin underfar more favorable conditions, and could be more easily maintained thanin the alluvial soil of the Mississippi delta. McClellan, who was anaccomplished master of his profession in all its branches, received atfirst the impression that regular military operations against NewOrleans by way of the river were being proposed to him, and demurred;but, on learning that the only demand was for a force to hold the cityand surroundings in case of success, he readily consented to detail tenor fifteen thousand troops for the purpose. Though more hazardous, theproposition of the Navy Department was in principle strategically sound. The key of the position was to be struck for at once, and the outlyingdefenses were expected then to fall by the severance of theircommunications. The general might have his own opinion as to the powerof the navy to carry out the proposed passage of the forts, and as towhether its coal, when once above, would outlast the endurance of thehostile garrisons; but those were points upon which the Navy Department, which undertook the risk, might be presumed to have more accuratejudgment than himself. 

The conference, which was held about the middle of November, 1861, resulted in the adoption of Mr. Fox's plan in its main outlines; butwith an important addition, which threatened at one time to become avery serious modification. Commander Porter suggested that the navalvessels should be accompanied by a mortar flotilla, to subdue the fireof the forts by bombardment, and so to allow the fleet to pass withoutrisk, or with risk much diminished. This proposition approved itself tothe engineer instincts of McClellan, and was adopted. The general thendesignated Major Barnard, of the Engineer Corps, to represent him inadjusting the details of the expedition. Barnard also took strong groundin favor of the mortars, and to this added the opinion--in which Porterconcurred--that the forts should be not merely bombarded, but reducedbefore the passage. He summed up his conclusions in the followingperfectly clear words: "To pass those works (merely) with a fleet andappear before New Orleans is merely a raid--no capture. New Orleans andthe river can not be held until communications are perfectlyestablished. " The assertion of the last sentence can not be denied; itadmits of no difference of opinion. The point in dispute between the twoarguments was not this, but whether the fall of the city, which had nolocal defenses, would entail that of the forts, and so open thecommunications. Mr. Fox strongly held that it would; but although hestuck to his opinion, he had a deservedly high estimate of Porter'sprofessional ability--so much so that, had the latter's rank justified, he would have urged him for the command of the expedition. In thisdoubtful state of the argument, it will be seen of how great importancewas the choice of the officer to be put in charge of the wholeundertaking. Had he also taken the view of Barnard and Porter in favorof the more cautious, but--as it proved--more dangerous course, it couldscarcely have failed that Fox would have been overruled. 

The nomination of this officer could not be longer deferred. Secrecy andrapidity of action were large elements in the hoped-for achievement, andsecrecy depends much upon the length of time the secret must be kept. Among the officers whose length of service and professional reputationindicated them as suitable for the position, there was little to guidethe department to the man who would on emergency show the audacity andself-reliance demanded by the intended operations. The action proposed, though it falls within the limits of the methods which history hasjustified, and has, therefore, a legitimate place in the so-calledscience of war, was, nevertheless, as the opinions of Barnard and Portershow, contrary to the more usual and accepted practice. It disregardedthe safeguards commonly insisted upon, overleaped the successive stepsby which military achievement ordinarily advances to its end, and, looking only to the exceptional conditions, resorted fearlessly toexceptional methods. For such a duty the department needed a man of morethan average determination and vigor. 

Farragut's name was necessarily among those considered; but the finalchoice appears to have been determined by the impression made upon Mr. Fox, and through him upon the department, by his course in leavingNorfolk at the time and in the way he did. This, Fox argued, showed"great superiority of character, clear perception of duty, and firmresolution in the performance of it. " His conspicuous ability was notthen recognized, could not be until revealed by war; but it was evidentthat he stood well above the common run of simply accomplished officers. Still, further tests were required; in a matter of so much importancethe department had need to move warily. That Farragut was faithful couldnot be doubted; but was his heart so far in the contest that he could bedepended upon to exert his abilities to the full? Commander Porter wasordered to go to New York on duty connected with the mortar flotilla, and while there to make an opportunity to visit Farragut. There hadbeen, as is known, a close relation between the two families, and to himFarragut was likely to show how hearty he was in the cause. Porter'saccount was most favorable, and it then remained only to judge whetherhe was in sympathy with the military plan of the proposed expedition. 

For this object Farragut was ordered to report at the department, andFox undertook to meet him at the train and talk over the matterinformally. He arrived in Washington on the 21st of December, was met asarranged, and taken to the house of the Postmaster-General, MontgomeryBlair. The latter was brother-in-law to Fox, and the three breakfastedtogether. "After breakfast, Fox laid before Farragut the plan of attack, the force to be employed, and the object to be attained, and asked hisopinion. Farragut answered unhesitatingly that it would succeed. Foxthen handed him the list of vessels being fitted out, and asked if theywere enough. Farragut replied he would engage to run by the forts andcapture New Orleans with two thirds the number. Fox told him morevessels would be added, and that he would command the expedition. Farragut's delight and enthusiasm were so great that when he left us Foxasked if I did not think he was too enthusiastic. I replied I was mostfavorably impressed with him, and sure he would succeed. "[D] There couldbe no question, at any rate, that his whole heart was in the war and inthe expedition; whether he would rise equal to his task still remainedto be seen. He said, however, frankly, that had he been previouslyconsulted, he would have advised against the employment of the mortarflotilla. He had no faith in the efficacy of that mode of attack sincehis observations of the results at San Juan de Ulloa, twenty-three yearsbefore. He was convinced that the fleet could run by the forts, andanticipated nothing but delay from the bombardment. Nevertheless, sincethe arrangements had been made, he was willing to give the bombs atrial. "He was never profuse in promises, " writes Mr. Welles, theSecretary of the Navy, "but he felt complimented that he was selected, and I saw that in modest self-reliance he considered himself equal tothe emergency and to the expectation of the Government. "[E] To his homehe wrote: "Keep your lips closed and burn my letters, for perfectsilence is to be observed--the first injunction of the Secretary. I amto have a flag in the Gulf, and the rest depends upon myself. Keep calmand silent. I shall sail in three weeks. "

 [Footnote D: Montgomery Blair, in _The United Service_, January, 1881. ]

 [Footnote E: Gideon Welles, in the _Galaxy_, November, 1871. ]

On the 23d of December, 1861, Farragut received preparatory orders, andon the 9th of the following January was formally appointed to commandthe Western Gulf Blockading Squadron; the limits of which, on the coastof the Confederacy, were defined as from St. Andrew's Bay to the mouthof the Rio Grande. The coasts of Mexico and Yucatan were also embracedin them. The steam sloop-of-war Hartford was selected for his flag-ship. On the 20th of January final orders were issued to him. These weresomewhat discreetly worded, and, literally understood, must be concededto take from the department the credit of boldly adhering to, andassuming the responsibility of, the original plan--a credit Mr. Wellesseems desirous to claim. "When you are completely ready, " they read, "you will collect such vessels as can be spared from the blockade, andproceed up the Mississippi River _and reduce the defenses_ which guardthe approaches to New Orleans, _when_ you will appear off that city andtake possession of it under the guns of your squadron. " Understoodaccording to the plain meaning of the words, these orders prescribed thereduction of the works as a condition precedent to appearing off thecity, and so recur to the fears expressed by both Barnard and Porter asto the consequences of leaving the forts unreduced. There is not inthem even "the latitude and discretion in the employment of the meansplaced under his command" which Mr. Welles claimed. [F] Had Farragut, after leaving the forts unreduced, as he did, met with serious disaster, it can scarcely be doubted that the phrase quoted would have been usedto acquit the Government. 

 [Footnote F: Gideon Welles, in the _Galaxy_, December, 1871. ]

The steam-sloop Hartford, upon which Farragut now hoisted his flag, andin which he continued throughout the war, was a nearly new vessel, having sailed on her first cruise to China in the summer of 1859. Shebelonged to the early period of the transition from sails to steam forthe motive power of vessels; the steam being regarded as auxiliary only, and giving her a speed of but eight knots per hour, while the spars andsail area were those of a full-rigged ship. The deficiency ofhorse-power was a serious drawback in such an operation as passingforts, especially when, as in the Mississippi, the current was strongand always adverse to vessels ascending the river. The Hartford had, onthe other hand, a powerful battery of the best existent type. Shecarried twenty-two Dahlgren nine-inch shell guns, eleven on each side;and, owing to the lowness of the river banks, these guns would be on alevel with or even above those in the lower tier of the batteriesopposed to her. The Pensacola, Brooklyn, and Richmond were vessels ofthe same type as the Hartford, and built at the same time. 

 [Illustration: PASSAGE OF FORTS JACKSON AND ST. PHILIP, APRIL 24, 1862. 

 ORDER OF ATTACK. 

 FIRST DIVISION--_Leading under command of Captain Theodorus Bailey_. 

 1. Cayuga, Flag-Gunboat. Lieut. -Com. Harrison. 2. Pensacola, Captain H. W. Morris. 3. Mississippi, Captain M. Smith. 4. Oneida, Commander S. P. Lee. 5. Varuna, Commander C. S. Boggs. 6. Katahdin, Lieut. -Com. G. H. Preble. 7. Kineo, Lieut. -Com. Ransom. 8. Wissahickon, Lieut. -Com. A. N. Smith. 

 CENTER DIVISION--_Admiral Farragut_. 

 9. Hartford, Commander Wainwright. 10. Brooklyn, Captain T. T. Craven. 11. Richmond, Commander J. Alden. 

 THIRD DIVISION--_Captain H. H. Bell_. 

 12. Sciota, Lieut. -Com. Edward Donaldson. 13. Iroquois, Com. John De Camp. 14. Kennebec, Lieut. -Com. John H. Russell. 15. Pinola, Lieut. -Com. P. Crosby. 16. Itasca, Lieut. -Com. C. H. B. Caldwell. 17. Winona, Lieut. -Com. E. T. Nichols. 18. COMMANDER PORTER'S GUNBOATS. 19. Sloop Portsmouth, Commander S. Swartwout. ]

On the 2d of February, 1862, the Hartford sailed from Hampton Roads, andon the 20th reached Ship Island. The following day Farragut took overthe command of his district and squadron from Flag Officer McKean, whoup to that time had had charge of both the East and West Gulf. None ofthe other vessels of the expedition were yet there; but they came in oneby one and were rapidly assembled at the Southwest Pass, then theprincipal entrance to the river. Much difficulty was encountered ingetting the heavier ships over the bar, two weeks' work being needed todrag the Pensacola inside; but on the 7th of April she floated in theriver, and Farragut found his force complete. It then consisted, independently of the steamers attached to the mortar flotilla, of foursteam sloops-of-war of about two thousand tons each, three of half thatsize, one large side-wheel ship-of-war, the Mississippi, of seventeenhundred tons, and nine gun-boats of five hundred. The latter had beenhurriedly built to meet the special exigencies of this war, and werethen commonly known as the "ninety-day" gunboats. Each carried oneeleven-inch shell-gun and one thirty-pounder rifle. The aggregatebatteries of the seventeen vessels composing the squadron, excludingsome light brass pieces, amounted to one hundred and fifty-four cannon, of which one hundred and thirty-five were thirty-two pounders or above. 

The two forts which constituted the principal defenses of New Orleansagainst a naval attack from the sea were at Plaquemine Bend, abouttwenty miles above the Head of the Passes; by which name is known thepoint where the main stream of the Mississippi divides into severalchannels, called passes, through which its waters find their way to theGulf. The river, whose general course below New Orleans is southeast, turns at Plaquemine Bend northeast for a mile and three-quarters, andthen resumes its previous direction. The heavier of the two works, FortJackson, is on the right bank, at the lower angle of the Bend. It was acasemated brick structure, pentagonal in form, carrying in barbette overthe casemates twenty-seven cannon of and above the size of thirty-twopounders, besides eleven twenty-four pounders. In the casemates werefourteen of the latter caliber. Attached to this fort, but below it, wasa water battery carrying half a dozen heavy cannon. Fort St. Philip wasnearly opposite Fort Jackson, but somewhat below it, so as to commandnot only the stream in its front, but also the stretch down the river, being thus enabled to rake vessels approaching from below before theycame abreast. It comprised the fort proper and two water batteries, which together mounted forty-two guns. The sites of these fortificationshad been skillfully chosen; but their armaments, though formidable andgreatly superior to those of the fleet--regard being had to the commonlyaccepted maxim that a gun ashore is equivalent to four afloat--were notequal to the demands of the situation or to the importance of NewOrleans. Out of a total of one hundred and nine pieces, [G] of whichprobably over ninety could be used against a passing fleet, fifty-six, or more than half, were of the very old and obsolete caliber oftwenty-four pounders. 

 [Footnote G: There were some guns bearing inland and some flanking howitzers, besides those already enumerated. ]

This inadequate preparation, a year after the attack upon Fort Sumterand the outbreak of hostilities, is doubtless to be attributed tosurprise. The Southern authorities, like those of the NationalGovernment, were firmly possessed with the idea that the Mississippi, ifsubdued at all, must be so by an attack from the north. Despite thefrequency of spies and treason along the border line of the twosections, the steps of the Navy Department were taken so quietly, andfollowed so closely upon the resolve to act, that the alarm was notquickly taken; and when intimations of attack from the sea did filterthrough, they had to encounter and dislodge strong contrarypreoccupations in the minds of the Southern leaders. Only theConfederate general commanding the military division and his principalsubordinates seem to have been alive to the danger of New Orleans, andtheir remonstrances had no effect. Not only were additional guns deniedthem and sent North, but drafts were made on their narrow resources tosupply points considered to be in greater danger. A striking indicationof the prepossessions which controlled the authorities at Richmond waselicited by Commodore Hollins, of the Confederate Navy. That gallantveteran was ordered to take to Memphis several of the rams extemporizedat New Orleans. He entreated the Navy Department to allow him to remain, but the reply was that the main attack upon New Orleans would be fromabove, not from below. After the fleet entered the river he telegraphedfrom Memphis for permission to return, but received the answer that theproposition was wholly inadmissible. Before the Court of Inquiry uponthe loss of New Orleans, he testified that the withdrawal of his shipswas the chief cause of the disaster. [H]

 [Footnote H: _Official Records of the War of the Rebellion_, Series I, vol. Vi, p. 610. ]

While the heavy ships were being dragged over the bar at the SouthwestPass, the mortar flotilla had entered the river under the command ofCommander Porter. No time was avoidably lost, though there wereinevitable delays due to the magnitude of the preparations that in everyquarter taxed the energies of the Government. On the 16th of April, lessthan ten days after the Pensacola got safely inside, the fleet wasanchored just out of range of the forts. On the 18th the mortar vesselswere in position, and at 10 A. M. The bombardment by them began, continuing throughout the succeeding days till the passage of the fleet, and being chiefly directed upon Fort Jackson. From daylight to dark ashell a minute was fired, and as the practice was remarkably good agreat proportion of these fell within the fort. As Farragut hadpredicted, they did not in the course of six days' bombardment do harmenough to compel a surrender or disable the work; but they undoubtedlyharassed the garrison to an extent that exercised an appreciable effectupon the fire of Jackson during the passage. 

While the bombardment was progressing, the lighter vessels of thesquadron were continuously engaged by detachments in protecting themortar flotilla, steaming up above it and drawing upon themselves thefire of the forts. A more important duty was the removal of theobstructions that the enemy had thrown across the river, below theworks, but under their fire. Opinions differed, both in the UnitedStates squadron and in the counsels of the enemy, as to the power of theships to pass the forts; but it was realized on both sides that anybarrier to their passage which should force them to stop under fire, orshould throw confusion into their order, would materially increase thechances against them. Whatever the blindness or neglect of theConfederate Government, the Confederate officers of the department hadnot been remiss in this matter. The construction of a floating barrierhad early engaged their attention, and, despite the difficultiespresented by so rapid a current, a formidable raft had been placed earlyin the winter. It consisted of cypress logs forty feet long and four orfive feet in diameter, lying lengthwise in the river, with an intervalof three feet between them to allow drift to pass. The logs wereconnected by two and a half inch iron cables, stretching underneath fromone side of the stream to the other; and the whole fabric was held upagainst the current by some thirty heavy anchors and cables. So long asit stood, this constituted a very grave difficulty for an attackingfleet; but the water was deep and the holding ground poor, so that evenunder average conditions there was reason to fear its giving way. Thefleet arrived in the early spring, the season when the current, swollenby the melting snows about the head waters of the Mississippi and itstributaries, is at its strongest; and in 1862 the spring rise wasgreater than for many years. In February the raft began to show signs ofyielding under the pressure of the drift wood accumulating on it fromabove, and on the 10th of March the cables had parted, the sections oneither side being swept against the banks and leaving about a third ofthe river open. The gap was filled by anchoring in it eight heavyschooners of about two hundred tons burden. They were joined together asthe cypress logs had been, but with lighter chains, probably because noheavy ones were at hand; and, as a further embarrassment to theassailants, their masts were unstepped and allowed to drag astern withthe rigging attached, in the hopes that by fouling the screws theascending vessels might be crippled. 

This central barrier of schooners was not intrinsically strong, but itwas not to be despised, considering the very moderate speed possessed bythe ships and the strength of the current which they had to stem. It wasdoubtful whether they could break through with so little loss of way asto produce no detention; and the mere presence of so many hulls on adark night and under the added gloom of the battle's smoke was liable toincrease a confusion which could redound only to the advantage of thedefense. It became necessary, therefore, to remove the schooners inwhole or in part. This was effected in a very daring manner by twogunboats, the Itasca and Pinola, Captains Caldwell and Crosby; the fleetcaptain, Henry H. Bell, an officer in whom Farragut had the mostunbounded confidence, being placed in command of both. The work had tobe done, of course, within range of the hostile batteries, which, through some culpable negligence, failed to molest it. The Pinolacarried an electrician with a petard, by which it was hoped to shatterthe chains. This attempt, however, failed, owing to the wires of theelectrical battery parting before the charge could be exploded. TheItasca, on the other hand, ran alongside one of the schooners andslipped the chains; but, unfortunately, as the hulk was set adriftwithout Captain Caldwell being notified, and the engines of the gunboatwere going ahead with the helm a-port, the two vessels turned inshoreand ran aground under fire of the forts. In this critical position theItasca remained for some time, until the Pinola could be recalled to herassistance; and then several attempts had to be made before she finallyfloated. Caldwell then did an exceedingly gallant thing, the importanceof which alone justified, but amply justified, its temerity. Instead ofreturning at once to the squadron, satisfied with the measure of successalready attained, he deliberately headed up the river; and then, havinggained sufficient ground in that direction to insure a full developmentof his vessel's speed, he turned and charged full upon the line ofhulks. As she met the chains, the little vessel rose bodily three orfour feet from the water, sliding up on them and dragging the hulks downwith her. The chains stood the strain for an instant, then snapped, andthe Itasca, having wrought a practicable breach, sped down to the fleet. 

While these various accessory operations were going on, AdmiralFarragut's mind was occupied with the important question of carrying outthe object of his mission. The expedient of reducing or silencing thefire of the enemy's forts, in which he himself had never feltconfidence, was in process of being tried; and the time thus employedwas being utilized by clearing the river highway and preparing the shipsto cut their way through without delay, in case that course should beadopted. Much had been done while at the Head of the Passes, waiting forthe Pensacola to cross the bar; but the work was carried onunremittingly to the last moment. The loftier and lighter spars of allthe vessels had already been sent ashore, together with all unnecessaryencumbrances, several of the gunboats having even unstepped their lowermasts; and the various ordinary precautions, known to seamen under thename of "clearing ship for action, " had been taken with reference tofighting on anchoring ground. These were particularized in a generalorder issued by the admiral, and to them he added special instructions, rendered necessary by the force of the current and its constancy in thesame direction. "Mount one or two guns on the poop and top-gallantforecastle, " he said; "in other words, be prepared to use as many gunsas possible ahead and astern to protect yourself against the enemy'sgunboats and batteries, bearing in mind that you will always have toride head to the current, and can only avail yourself of the sheer ofthe helm to point a broadside gun more than three points (thirty-fourdegrees) forward of the beam. .. . Trim your vessel also a few inches bythe head, so that if she touches the bottom she will not swing head downthe river, " which, if the stern caught the bottom, would infalliblyhappen, entailing the difficult manoeuvre and the perilous delay ofturning round under the enemy's fire in a narrow river and in the dark. The vessels generally had secured their spare iron cables up and downtheir sides in the line of the boilers and engines; and these vitalparts were further protected by piling around them hammocks, bags ofsand or ashes, and other obstructions to shot. The outsides of the hullswere daubed over with Mississippi mud, to be less easily discerned inthe dark; while the decks were whitewashed, so as to throw in strongerrelief articles lying upon them which needed to be quickly seen. 

Having given his general instructions, the flag officer could intrustthe details of preparation to his subordinates; but no one could relievehim of the momentous decision upon which the issues of the campaign mustturn. The responsibility of rejecting one course of action and adoptinganother was his alone; and as has already been remarked, the wording ofthe department's order, literally understood, imposed upon him the taskof reducing the forts before approaching the city. The questionsinvolved were essentially the same as those presented to every generalofficer when the course of a campaign has brought him face to face witha strong position of the enemy. Shall it be carried by direct attack, and, until so subdued, arrest the progress of the army? or can it berendered impotent or untenable by severing its communications and byoperations directed against the district in its rear, which it protects, and upon which it also depends? The direct attack may be by assault, byinvestment, or by regular siege approaches; but whatever the method, theresult is the same--the assailant is detained for a longer or shortertime before the position. During such detention the post fulfills itsmission of securing the region it covers, and permits there theuninterrupted prosecution of the military efforts of every characterwhich are designed to impede the progress of the invader. 

To such cases no general rule applies; each turns upon particularconditions, and, although close similarities may exist between variousinstances, probably no two are entirely identical. It is evident, however, that very much will depend upon the offensive power shut up inthe position under consideration. If it be great walled town, such asare found on the Continent of Europe, behind whose defenses aresheltered numerous troops, the assailant who advances beyond it therebyexposes his communications to attack; and, to guard against this danger, must protect them by a force adequate to hold the garrison in check. If, again, there be but a single line by which the communications can bemaintained, by which supplies and re-enforcements can go forward, andthat line passes close under the work and is commanded by it, thegarrison may be small, incapable of external action, and yet may vitallyaffect the future operations of the venturesome enemy who dares to leaveit unsubdued behind him. Such, to some extent, was the Fort of Bard, inthe narrow pass of the Dora Baltea, to Napoleon's crossing of the St. Bernard in 1800; and such, to some extent, would be Forts Jackson andSt. Philip to Farragut's fleet after it had fought its way above. TheMississippi was the great line of communication for the fleet; no otherwas comparable to it--except as a by-path in a mountain is comparable toa royal highway--and the forts commanded the Mississippi. Their ownoffensive power was limited to the range of their guns; their garrisonswere not fitted, either by their number or their aptitudes, foroffensive action upon the water; but so long as their food andammunition lasted, though an occasional vessel might run by them, nosteady stream of supplies, such as every armed organization needs, couldpass up the Mississippi. Finally, though the garrison could not move, there lay behind or under the forts a number of armed vessels, whoseprecise powers were unknown, but concerning which most exaggeratedrumors were current. 

The question, therefore, looming before Farragut was precisely thatwhich had been debated before the President in Washington; preciselythat on which Fox had differed from Porter and Barnard. It was, again, closely analogous to that which divided Sherman and Grant when thelatter, a year after Farragut ran by the forts, made his famous decisionto cut adrift from his communications by the upper Mississippi, to marchpast Vicksburg by the west bank of the river, to cross below the works, and so cut off the great stronghold of the Mississippi from the countryupon which it depended for food and re-enforcements. [I] But as Grant'sdecision rested upon a balance of arguments applicable to the problembefore him, so did Farragut's upon a calculation of the risks andadvantages attendant, respectively, upon the policy of waiting for theforts to fall, or of speeding by them to destroy the resources uponwhich they depended. 

 [Footnote I: The following is Grant's account of a matter which, but for Sherman's own zeal in proclaiming the merits of his commander-in-chief, would probably have always remained unknown. It would be difficult to find a closer parallel to the difference of judgment existing between Farragut and Porter at New Orleans: "When General Sherman first learned of the move I proposed to make, he called to see me about it. I was seated on the piazza, engaged in conversation with my staff, when he came up. After a few moments' conversation, he said he would like to see me alone. We passed into the house together and shut the door after us. Sherman then expressed his alarm at the move I had ordered, saying that I was putting myself voluntarily in a position which an enemy would be glad to manoeuvre a year--or a long time--to get me in. I was going into the enemy's country, with a large river behind me, and the enemy holding points strongly fortified above and below. He said that it was an axiom in war that when any great body of troops moved against an enemy they should do so from a base of supplies which they would guard as the apple of the eye, etc. He pointed out all the difficulties that might be encountered in the campaign proposed, and stated in turn what would be the true campaign to make. This was, in substance, to go back until high ground could be reached on the east bank of the river, fortify there and establish a depot of supplies, and move from there, being always prepared to fall back upon it in case of disaster. I said this would take us back to Memphis. Sherman then said that was the very place he should go to, and would move by railroad from Memphis to Granada. To this I replied, the country is already disheartened over the lack of success on the part of our armies, . .. And if we went back so far as Memphis, it would discourage the people so much that bases of supplies would be of no use; neither men to hold them nor supplies to put in them would be furnished. The problem was to move forward to a decisive victory, or our cause was lost. .. . Sherman wrote to my adjutant-general embodying his views of the campaign that should be made, and asking him to advise me at least to get the views of my generals upon the subject. Rawlins showed me the letter, but I did not see any reasons for changing my plans. "--_Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant_, vol. I, p. 542 (note). ]

The reasons in favor of waiting for the fall of the works were ablypresented by Commander Porter in a paper which he asked to have read ina council of commanding officers of the fleet, assembled on board theflag-ship on the third day of the bombardment, April 20. Farragut wasalready familiar with the arguments on both sides, and Porter's papercan be regarded only as an expression of views already uttered, but nowinvested with a formality becoming the seriousness of the occasion. Inits finality it has somewhat the character of a protest, though indirectand couched in perfectly becoming language, against a decision whichFarragut had now reached and which Porter had always combated. Thelatter does not appear to have doubted the ability of the fleet to passthe works, but he questioned the utility and expediency of so doing. Hiswords were as follows:[J]

 "The objections to running by the forts are these: It is not likely that any intelligent enemy would fail to place chains across above the forts, and raise such batteries as would protect them against our ships. Did we run the forts we should leave an enemy in our rear, and the mortar vessels would have to be left behind. We could not return to bring them up without going through a heavy and destructive fire. If the forts are run, part of the mortars should be towed along, which would render the progress of the vessels slow against the strong current at that point. If the forts are first captured, the moral effect would be to close the batteries on the river and open the way to New Orleans; whereas, if we don't succeed in taking them, we shall have to fight our way up the river. Once having possession of the forts, New Orleans would be hermetically sealed, and we could repair damages and go up on our own terms and in our own time. .. . Nothing has been said about a combined attack of army and navy. Such a thing is not only practicable, but, if time permitted, should be adopted. Fort St. Philip can be taken with two thousand men covered by the ships, the ditch can be filled with fascines, and the wall is easily to be scaled with ladders. It can be attacked in front and rear. "

 [Footnote J: The paper being long, only those parts are quoted which convey the objections to running by. ]

In summoning his captains to meet him on this occasion, Farragut had noidea of calling a council-of-war in the sense which has brought thatname into disrepute. He sent for them, not because he wanted to make uphis mind, but because it was made up, and he wished at once to impart tothem his purposes and receive the benefit of any suggestion they mightmake. Bell, the chief-of-staff, who was present, has left a memorandumof what passed, which is interesting as showing that the members werenot called to express an opinion as to the propriety of the attack, butto receive instructions as to the method, on which they could suggestimprovements. 

"April 20, 10 A. M. Signal was made for all captains commanding torepair on board the flag-ship. All being present except the three onguard to-day, viz. , Commander De Camp and Lieutenants-Commanding Nicholsand Russell, the flag-officer unfolded his plan of operations, assigningthe places for every vessel in the fleet in the attack, and exhibitedhis charts of the river and of the forts. Some discussion was hadthereupon, and Commander Alden read a written communication to theflag-officer from Commander Porter at his request, expressing his viewsas to the operation against the forts. Having read them, Commander Aldenfolded up the paper and returned it to his pocket, whereupon I suggestedthe propriety of the document being left with the flag-officer, and thepaper was accordingly left in his hands. It was therein stated that theboom being a protection to the mortars against attacks of all kinds fromabove, the boom should not be destroyed until the forts were reduced. Upon this the flag-officer remarked that the commander had this morningassented to the propriety of the boom being broken to-night--which Iheard--and, again, that the fleet should not go above the forts, as themortar fleet would be left unprotected. The flag-officer thought themortars would be as well protected above as below the forts, and thatco-operation with the army, which entered into the plans of bothparties, could not be effectual unless some of the troops wereintroduced above the forts at the same time that they are below. Onceabove, he intended to cover their landing at Quarantine, five milesabove, they coming to the river through the bayou there. Once above, theforts were cut off and his propellers intact for ascending the river tothe city. And in passing the forts, if he found his ships able to copewith them, he should fight it out. Some of the captains and commandersconsidered it a hazardous thing to go above, as being out of the reachof supplies. To this it may be said that the steamers can pass down atthe rate of twelve miles an hour. The flag-officer remarked that ourammunition is being rapidly consumed without a supply at hand, and thatsomething must be done immediately. He believed in celerity. It wasproposed by myself and assented to by the flag-officer, that threesteamers should go up the river shortly after dark, under my ownguidance, to break the boom. "

It appears from this account, supported by the general order issuedimmediately after it and given a few pages further on, that Farragut haddefinitely determined not to await the reduction of the forts, becausethe bombardment so far did not indicate any probability of effectualresults. It was his deliberate opinion that the loss of time and thewaste of effort were entailing greater risks than would be caused bycutting adrift from his base and severing his own communications inorder to strike at those of the enemy. It is commonly true that in theeffort to cut the communications of an opponent one runs the risk ofexposing his own; but in this case the attacking force was onepre-eminently qualified to control the one great medium of communicationthroughout that region--that is, the water. Also, although insurrendering the river Farragut gave up the great line of travel, hekept in view that the bayou system offered an alternative, doubtlessgreatly inferior, but which, nevertheless, would serve to plant abovethe forts, under the protection of the navy, such troops as should bedeemed necessary; and that the combined efforts of army and navy couldthen maintain a sufficient flow of supplies until the forts fell fromisolation. Finally, a fleet is not so much an army as a collection offloating fortresses, garrisoned, provisioned, and mobile. It carries itscommunications in its hulls, and is not in such daily dependence uponexternal sources as is the sister service. 

In deciding, therefore, against awaiting the reduction of the forts bydirect attack, and in favor of attempting the same result by striking atthe interests they defended and the base on which they rested, Farragutwas guided by a calculation of the comparative _material_ risks andadvantages of the two courses, and not mainly by consideration of themoral effect produced upon the defenders by a successful stroke, as hasbeen surmised by Lord Wolseley. This eminent English authorityattributes the success of the expedition against New Orleans to threecauses. "First, the inadequate previous preparation of the naval partof the New Orleans defenses; second, the want of harmonious workingbetween the Confederate naval and military forces; and, lastly, Farragut's clear appreciation of the moral effect he would produce byforcing his way past the defenses of Fort Jackson and Fort St. Philip, and by his appearance before New Orleans. For, after all, the forts werenever captured by actual attack. .. . This brilliant result is a strikinginstance of the due appreciation by a commander of the effect whichdaring achievements exert on men's minds, although, _as in this case_, those daring acts _do not actually, directly, or materially_ makecertain the end or surrender they may have secured. " And, again, inanother place: "Admiral Farragut's success was mainly due to the moraleffect produced by his gallant passage of the forts. .. . He never reducedthe forts, and seems to have done them but little harm. "[K]

 [Footnote K: Lord Wolseley in _North American Review_, vol. Cxlix, pp. 32-34, 597. The italics are the author's. ]

The moral effect produced in war upon men's minds, and through the mindupon their actions, is undeniable, and may rightly count for much in thecalculations of a commander; but when it becomes the sole, or even thechief reliance, as in Bonaparte's advance into Carinthia in 1797, thespirit displayed approaches closely to that of the gambler who countsupon a successful bluff to disconcert his opponent. The seriousobjection to relying upon moral effect alone to overcome resistance isthat moral forces do not admit of as close knowledge and measurement asdo material conditions. The insight and moral strength of the enemy maybe greater than you have means of knowing, and to assume that they areless is to fall into the dangerous error of despising your enemy. Toattribute to so dubious a hope, alone, the daring act of AdmiralFarragut in passing the forts and encountering the imperfectly knowndangers above, is really to detract from his fame as a capable as wellas gallant leader. That there were risks and accidents to be met he knewfull well; that he might incur disaster he realized; that the dangersabove and the power of the enemy's vessels might exceed his expectationswas possible; war can not be stripped of hazard, and the anxiety of thedoubtful issue is the penalty the chieftain pays for his position. ButFarragut was convinced by experience and reflection that his fleet couldforce its passage; and he saw that once above the material probabilitieswere that army and navy could be combined in such a position of vantageas would isolate the forts from all relief, and so "actually, directly, and materially make certain their surrender, " and secure his end ofcontrolling the lower Mississippi. There was only one road practicableto ships to pass above, and that led openly and directly under the fireof the forts; but having passed this, they were planted across thecommunications as squarely as if they had made a circuit of hundreds ofmiles, with all the secrecy of Bonaparte in 1800 and in 1805. Arestrongholds never "captured" unless by "actual attack"? Did Ulm andMantua yield to blows or to isolation?

Such, certainly, was the opinion of the able officers who conducted theConfederate defense, and whose conduct, except in matters of detail, wasapproved by the searching court of inquiry that passed upon it. "In myjudgment, " testified General M. L. Smith, who commanded the interiorline of works and was in no way responsible for the fall of Forts St. Philip and Jackson, "the forts were impregnable _so long as they were infree and open communication with the city_. This communication was notendangered while the obstruction existed. The conclusion, then, isbriefly this: While the obstruction existed the city was safe; when itwas swept away, as the defenses then existed, it was in the enemy'spower. "[L] General Lovell, the commander-in-chief of the militarydepartment, stated that he had made preparations to evacuate New Orleansin case the fleet passed the fort by sending out of the city severalhundred thousand rations and securing transport steamers. He continued:"In determining upon the evacuation of the city I necessarily, as soonas the enemy's fleet had passed the forts, regarded the position _thesame as if both their army and navy were present before the city_, making due allowance simply for the time it would take them to transporttheir army up. Inasmuch as their ships had passed Forts Jackson and St. Philip, _they could at once place themselves in open and uninterruptedcommunication with their army at points from six to twenty miles abovethe forts through various small water communications from the Gulf_, made more available by the extraordinary height of the river, and which, while they (we?) were in possession of the latter, I had easily andwithout risk defended with launches and part of the river-defense fleet. I had also stationed Szymanski's regiment at the Quarantine for the sameobject. These were, however, all destroyed or captured by the enemy'sfleet after they got possession of the river between the forts and thecity. "[M] Colonel Szymanski testified: "After the forts had been passed, it was practicable for the enemy to transport his army through thebayous and canals to New Orleans, without encountering the forts. Aportion of the enemy did come that way. I have for many years owned aplantation fifteen miles below the city, and am very familiar with thewhole country. I have never known the river as high as it was in 1862. Also, above English Turn (five miles below the city) there is watercommunication through Lake Borgne with the Gulf of Mexico by otherbayous and canals of the same character. "[N]

 [Footnote L: _Official Records of the War of the Rebellion. _ Series I, vol. Vi, p. 583. ]

 [Footnote M: _Official Records of the War of the Rebellion. _ Series I, vol. Vi, p. 566. ]

 [Footnote N: Ibid. , p. 578. ]

It is evident, therefore, that competent military men on the spot, andin full possession of all the facts, considered, as did Farragut, thatwith the passage of the forts by the fleet the material probabilities ofsuccess became in favor of the United States forces. The only moraleffect produced was the mutiny of the half-disciplined alien troops thatgarrisoned the forts; and surely it will not be contended that any suchwild anticipation as of that prompted Farragut's movement. The officersof the forts were trained and educated soldiers, who knew their duty andwould not be crushed into submission by adverse circumstances. Theywould doubtless have replied, as did the commander of Fort Morgan twoyears later, that they looked upon the United States fleet above them astheir prisoners, and they would have held out to the bitter end; but theend was certain as soon as the fleet passed above them. They hadprovisions for two months; then, if not reduced by blows, they mustyield to hunger. 

Immediately after the conference with his captains, Farragut issued thefollowing general order, from which it appears that, while his opinionremained unchanged as to the expediency of running by the forts, hecontemplated the possibility, though not the probability, of their beingsubdued by the fire of the fleet, and reserved to himself freedom to actaccordingly by prescribing a simple signal, which would be readilyunderstood, and would convert the attempt to pass into a sustained anddeadly effort to conquer:

 "UNITED STATES FLAG-SHIP HARTFORD, MISSISSIPPI RIVER, _April 20, 1862_. 

 "The flag-officer, having heard all the opinions expressed by the different commanders, is of the opinion that whatever is to be done will have to be done quickly, or we shall be again reduced to a blockading squadron, without the means of carrying on the bombardment, as we have nearly expended all the shells and fuses and material for making cartridges. He has always entertained the same opinions which are expressed by Commander Porter--that is, there are three modes of attack, [O] and the question is, which is the one to be adopted? His own opinion is that a combination of two should be made, viz. , _the forts should be run, and when a force is once above the forts to protect the troops they should be landed at Quarantine from the Gulf side by bringing them through the bayou_, and then our forces should move up the river, mutually aiding each other as it can be done to advantage. 

 "When in the opinion of the flag-officer the propitious time has arrived, the signal will be made to weigh and advance to the conflict. If, in his opinion, at the time of arriving at the respective positions of the different divisions of the fleet we have the advantage, he will make the signal for close action, No. 8, and abide the result--conquer or be conquered--drop anchor or keep under way, as in his opinion is best. 

 "_Unless the signal above mentioned is made_, it will be understood that the first order of sailing will be formed after leaving Fort St. Philip, and we will proceed up the river _in accordance with the original opinion expressed_. 

 "The programme of the order of sailing accompanies this general order, and the commanders will hold themselves in readiness for the service as indicated. 

 D. G. FARRAGUT, _Flag-officer Western Gulf Blockading Squadron_". 

 [Footnote O: Those three were: First, a direct naval attack upon the works; second, running by the works; third, a combined attack by army and navy. ]

Nothing can be clearer than that the opinion expressed and maintained bythe flag-officer from the beginning was the one carried out, resultingin a complete success. 

The bombardment by the mortar flotilla was continued three days longer, at the end of which time the provision of bombs immediately obtainablewas becoming exhausted. Enough, however, remained to sustain a veryvigorous fire during the period of the passage, and as the cover ofdarkness was desired the delay was not without its advantages, for thewaning moon grew daily less and rose an hour later each succeedingnight. On the 23d notice was given to the ships that the attempt to passwould be made that night, and that, as half-past three was the hour ofmoon-rise, the signal, two red lights, would be hoisted at 2 A. M. During that afternoon Farragut personally visited each ship, in order toknow positively that each commander understood his orders for theattack, and to see that all was in readiness. 

The original intention of the flag-officer was to attack in two parallelcolumns, a more compact formation than one long one, less liable tostraggling, and in which the heavy batteries of the larger ships wouldmore effectually cover the lighter vessels by keeping down the fire ofthe enemy. In this arrangement, which remained unaltered until the 23d, the second in command, Captain Theodorus Bailey, whose divisional flagwas flying in the gunboat Cayuga, would have had the right column, andthe flag-officer himself the left in the Hartford. The latter was to befollowed by the Brooklyn and Richmond, and upon these three heavy shipswould fall the brunt of the engagement with Fort Jackson, the morepowerful of the enemy's works. The right column also had its heaviestships in the lead; the exceptional station of the Cayuga being due tosome natural unwillingness on the part of other commanding officers toreceive on board, as divisional commander and their own superior, anofficer whose position in the fleet was simply that of captain of asingle ship. [P] The Cayuga led, not in virtue of her armament, butbecause she bore on board the commander of one column. 

 [Footnote P: Captain Bailey commanded the Colorado frigate, which drew too much water to cross the bar. Anxious to share in the fight, he obtained from the flag-officer the divisional appointment. ]

On the 23d Farragut, considering the narrowness of the opening in theobstructions through which the fleet must pass, decided that the risk ofcollision with the hulks on either side, or between the columnsthemselves, would be too great if he adhered to his written programme;and he accordingly gave a verbal order that the right column shouldweigh first, and be followed closely by the other under his ownguidance. To facilitate the departure and avoid confusion, the ships ofthe right shifted their berth after dark to the east side of the river, anchoring in the order prescribed to them. 

As some doubts had been expressed as to the actual rupture of the chainsbetween the hulks on either side the breach, although they had evidentlybeen dragged from their position by the efforts made on the night of the20th, Lieutenant Caldwell was again chosen, at his own request, to makean examination of the actual conditions. This he did in the early partof the night, before the ships got under way; and it is a singularconfirmation of the slackness and inefficiency that has been chargedagainst the water service of the Confederates that he effected this dutythoroughly and without molestation. Twice he pulled above the hulks andthence allowed his boat to drift down between them, a heavy lead withsixty feet of line hanging from her bows. As this line caught on nothingit was clear that within the narrow limits of the breach no impedimentto the passage of a vessel existed. By 11 P. M. Caldwell was on hisreturn with this decisive and encouraging report. 

At 2 A. M. The appointed signal was made, and at once was heard in everydirection the clank-clank of the chains as the seamen hove the anchorsto the bows. The strength of the current and the tenacity of the bottomin some spots made this operation longer than had been expected, and nottill half-past three did the leading vessel reach the line of hulks, followed closely by the rest of her division. There is somethingsingularly impressive in the thought of these moments of silent tension, following the active efforts of getting under way and preceding thefurious strife, for whose first outburst every heart on board waswaiting; and the impression is increased by the petty size of the littlevessel in the lead, which thus advanced with steady beating of theengines to bear the first blast of the storm. Favored partly by hersize, and yet more by the negligence of those among the enemy whose dutyit was to have kept the scene alight with the numerous fire-raftsprovided for that very purpose, the Cayuga passed the hulks and was wellon her way up river before she was seen. "Although it was a starlightnight, " wrote Lieutenant Perkins, who by her commander's direction waspiloting the ship, "we were not discovered until well under the forts;then they opened upon us a tremendous fire. " It was the prelude to adrama of singular energy and grandeur, for the Confederates in the fortswere fully on their guard, and had anticipated with unshaken courage, but with gloomy forebodings, an attack during that very night. "Therewill be no to-morrow for New Orleans, " had said the undaunted commanderof Fort Jackson the day before, "if the navy does not at once move theLouisiana to the position assigned to her, " close to the obstructions. The Louisiana was a powerful ironclad battery, not quite complete whenFarragut entered the river. She had been hurried down to the forts fourdays before the passage of the fleet, but her engines could not driveher, and the naval commander refused to take up the position, asked ofhim by the military authorities, below St. Philip, where he would have across fire with the forts, a close command of the line of obstructions, and would greatly prolong the gantlet of fire through which the fleetmust run. To support the movement of the latter by drawing the fire andharassing the gunners of the enemy, Commander Porter moved up with thesteamers of the mortar flotilla to easy range of the water battery underFort Jackson, which he engaged; while the mortar schooners, as soon asthe flash of the enemy's guns showed that the head of the column hadbeen discovered, opened a furious bombardment, keeping two shellsconstantly in the air. Except for the annoyance of the bombs, thegunners of the forts had it much their own way until the broadsides ofthe Pensacola, which showed eleven heavy guns on either side, drew upabreast of them. "The Cayuga received the first fire, " writes Perkins, "and the air was filled with shells and explosives which almost blindedme as I stood on the forecastle trying to see my way, for I had neverbeen up the river before. I soon saw that the guns of the forts were allaimed for midstream, so I steered close under the walls of Fort St. Philip; and although our masts and rigging got badly shot through ourhull was but little damaged. " Small as she was--five hundred tons--andwith the scanty top hamper of a schooner, the Cayuga was struckforty-two times, below and aloft. 

"After passing the last battery, " continues Perkins, "and thinking wewere clear, I looked back for some of our vessels, and my heart jumpedup into my mouth when I found I could not see a single one. I thoughtthey all must have been sunk by the forts. " This seeming desertion wasdue to the fact that the heavy ships--the Pensacola, Mississippi, andOneida--had been detained by the resolute manner in which the firststopped to engage Fort St. Philip. Stopping to fire, then moving slowly, then stopping again, the reiterated broadsides of this big ship, delivered at such close range that the combatants on either sideexchanged oaths and jeers of defiance, beat down the fire of the exposedbarbette batteries, and gave an admirable opportunity for slipping by tothe light vessels, which brought up the rear of the column and werewholly unfit to contend with the forts. The Mississippi and Oneidakeeping close behind the Pensacola and refusing to pass her, the Cayugawas thus separated from all her followers. 

The isolation of the Cayuga was therefore caused by her anomalousposition at the head of the column, a post proper only to a heavy ship. It was impossible for her petty battery of two guns to pause before thenumerous pieces of the enemy; it was equally impossible for the powerfulvessels following her to hasten on, leaving to the mercy of theConfederates the gunboats of the same type that succeeded them in theorder. That the Cayuga was thus exposed arose from the amiable desire ofthe admiral to gratify Bailey's laudable wish to share in the battle, without compelling an officer of the same grade, and junior only innumber, to accept a superior on his own quarter-deck in the day ofbattle, when the harvest of distinction is expected to repay the patientsowing of preparation. The commander of the Cayuga, who was only alieutenant, had reconciled these conflicting claims by volunteering tocarry Bailey's divisional flag. As there is no reason to suppose thatFarragut deliberately intended to offer the gunboat up as a forlorn hopeby drawing the first fire of the enemy, always the most deadly, and thussaving the more important vessels, the disposition of her constitutesthe only serious fault in his tactical arrangements on this occasion--afault attributable not to his judgment, but to one of those concessionsto human feelings which circumstances at times extort from all men. Hisfirst intention, an advance in two columns, the heavy ships leading andclosely engaging the forts with grape and canister, while the two-gunvessels slipped through between the columns, met the tactical demands ofthe proposed operation. The decision to abandon this order in favor ofone long, thin line, because of the narrowness of the opening, can notbe challenged. This formation was distinctly weaker and more liable tostraggling, but nothing could be so bad as backing, collision, orstoppage at the obstructions. In such an attack, however, as in all ofFarragut's battles, it seems eminently fitting that the commander of thecolumn should lead. The occasion is one for pilotage and example; andinasmuch as the divisional commander can not control, except by example, any ship besides the one on board which he himself is, that ship shouldbe the most powerful in his command. These conclusions may hereafter bemodified by conditions of submarine warfare, though even under them itseems likely that in forcing passage into a harbor the van ship shouldcarry the flag of the officer commanding the leading division; but underthe circumstances of Farragut's day they may be accepted as representinghis own convictions, first formed by the careful deliberation of a manwith a genius for war, and afterward continually confirmed by hisever-ripening experience. 

Left thus unsupported by the logical results of her false position, theCayuga found herself exposed to an even greater danger than she hadalready run from the guns of the stationary works. "Looking ahead, " saysPerkins's letter, already quoted, "I saw eleven of the enemy's gunboatscoming down upon us, and it seemed as if we were 'gone' sure. " Thevessels thus dimly seen in the darkness of the night were aheterogeneous, disorganized body, concerning which, however, veryimperfect and very exaggerated particulars had reached the United Statesfleet. They were freely spoken of as ironclad gunboats and ironcladrams, and the Confederates had done all in their power to increase themoral effect which was attendant upon these names, then new to maritimewarfare. None of them had been built with any view to war. Three onlywere sea-going, with the light scantling appropriate to their calling asvessels for freight and passenger traffic. Another had been a largetwin-screw tugboat that began her career in Boston, and thence, shortlybefore the war, had been sent to the Mississippi. After the outbreak ofhostilities she had been covered with an arched roof andthree-quarter-inch iron; a nine-inch gun, capable only of firingdirectly ahead, had been mounted in her bows, and, thus equipped, shepassed into notoriety as the ram Manassas. With the miserable speed ofsix knots, to which, however, the current of the river gave a veryimportant addition, and with a protection scarcely stronger than thebuckram armor of the stage, the Manassas, by her uncanny appearance andby the persistent trumpeting of the enemy, had obtained a veryformidable reputation with the United States officers, who could get noreliable information about her. 

The remainder of the force were river steamboats, whose machinery wasprotected with cotton, and their stems shod with one-inch iron, clampedin place by straps of the same material extending a few feet aft. Thusstrengthened, it was hoped that with the sharpness of their bows and theswiftness of the current they could, notwithstanding the exceedinglightness of their structure, penetrate the hulls of the United Statesships. Resolutely and vigorously handled, there can be little doubt thatthey might have sunk one or two of their assailants; but there is noprobability that they could under all the circumstances have done more. The obscurity of the night, the swiftness of the stream, and the numberof actors in the confusing drama being played between the two banks ofthe Mississippi, would have introduced into the always delicate fencingof the ram extraordinary difficulties, with which the inexperience oftheir commanders was in no degree qualified to deal. The generallysteady approach, bows on, of the United States ships, presented thesmallest target to their thrust and gave to the threatened vessel theutmost facilities for avoiding the collision or converting it into aglancing blow; while, as for rounding-to, to ram squarely on the beam ofa ship stemming the current, the assailant, even if he displayed theremarkable nicety of judgment required, was not likely to find thenecessary room. 

These difficulties received illustration by the career of the Manassasthat night. Her commander, Lieutenant Warley, was a former officer ofthe United States Navy, and he handled her with judgment and the utmostdaring. Rushing nearly bows on upon the Pensacola, the thrust was whollyavoided by the quick moving of the latter's helm, which Warleycharacterized as beautiful; while the attempt made immediately afterwardupon the Mississippi resulted in a merely glancing blow, which took adeep and long shaving out of the enemy's quarter, but did no seriousdamage. Not till a much later period of the action did the Manassas findan opportunity to charge squarely upon the beam of the Brooklyn. She didso across the current, striking therefore only with her own speed of sixknots. But little shock was felt on board the rammed ship, and noapprehension of damage was experienced; but it was afterward found thatthe enemy's stem had entered between two frames, and crushed both theouter and inner planking. A few moments earlier the Brooklyn had beenthrown across the current by the chances of the night. Had the ram thenstruck her in the same place, carrying the four knots additionalvelocity of the current, it is entirely possible that the mortificationof the Confederate defeat would have derived some consolation from thesinking of one of Farragut's best ships. Such were the results obtainedby a man of singular and resolute character, who drove his tiny vesselthrough the powerful broadsides of the hostile fleet, and daredafterward to follow its triumphant course up the river, in hopes ofsnatching another chance from the jaws of defeat. 

Another example, equally daring and more successful, of the power of theram, was given that same night by Kennon, also an ex-officer of theUnited States Navy; but the other ram commanders did not draw from theirantecedent training and habits of thought the constancy and pride, whichcould carry their frail vessels into the midst of ships that had thusvictoriously broken their way through the bulwarks of the Mississippi. The River-Defense Fleet, as it was called, was a separate organization, which owned no allegiance and would receive no orders from the navy; andits absurd privileges were jealously guarded by a government whoseessential principle was the independence of local rights from allcentral authority. Captains of Mississippi River steamboats, theircommanders held to the full the common American opinion that theprofession of arms differs from all others in the fact that it requiresno previous training, involves no special habits of thought, ischaracterized by no moral tone which only early education or years ofcustom can impart. Rejecting all suggestion and neglecting allpreparation, they cherished the most inordinate confidence in the rawnative valor which they were persuaded would inspire them at thecritical moment; and, incredible as it would seem, some of the men whoin the battle could find no other use for their boats but to run themashore and burn them, ventured to tell Warley the night before thattheir mission was to show naval officers how to fight. They did notlack courage, but that military habit upon whose influence Farragut hadso acutely remarked when a youth, returning in 1820 from the Europeanstation. [Q] "Had regular naval officers, " said Kennon bitterly, "insteadof being kept in the mud forts on the creeks in Virginia, and in thewoods of Carolina cutting timbers to build ironclads, been sent tocommand these vessels, even at the eleventh hour, they would have provedvery formidable. "

 [Footnote Q: See page 62. ]

Steaming into the midst of such as these, the peril of the Cayuga, realenough, was less than it seemed; but she had to do at once with Warley'sManassas and with the Governor Moore, the vessel that Kennon commanded, and which afterward sunk the Varuna. "Three made a dash to board us, "records Lieutenant Perkins, agreeing therein with the official reportsof Captain Bailey and of his own commander, Lieutenant Harrison; "but aheavy charge from our eleven-inch gun settled the Governor Moore, whichwas one of them. A ram, the Manassas, in attempting to butt us justmissed our stern, and we soon settled the third fellow's 'hash. ' Justthen some of our gunboats which had passed the forts came up, and thenall sorts of things happened. " This last expression is probably as terseand graphic a summary of a _mêlée_, which to so many is the ideal of anaval conflict, as ever was penned. "There was the wildest excitementall round. The Varuna fired a broadside into us instead of into theenemy. Another of our gunboats attacked one of the Cayuga's prizes; Ishouted out, 'Don't fire into that ship, she has surrendered. ' Three ofthe enemy's ships had surrendered to us before any of our vesselsappeared; but when they did come up we all pitched in, and settled theeleven rebel vessels in about twenty minutes. " Besides the eleven armedboats known to have been above, there were several unarmed tugs andother steamers, some of which probably shared in this wild confusion. One at least came into conflict with the Hartford. 

The second column, led by the flag-ship, was promptly away and after thefirst; following, indeed, so closely that the head of the one lapped therear of the other. The Brooklyn and Richmond, close behind the Hartford, formed with her a powerful "body of battle, " to use the strong Frenchexpression for the center of a fleet. Though called sloops-of-war, thetonnage and batteries of these ships were superior to those of themedium ships-of-the-line of the beginning of this century, with whichNelson fought his celebrated battles. As the flag-ship reached the hulksthe night, which, though very dark, was fairly clear, had becomeobscured by the dense clouds of smoke that an almost breathlessatmosphere suffered to settle down upon the water. Only twenty minuteshad elapsed since the forts opened upon the Cayuga, when Farragut's flagentered the battle. Soon after passing the obstructions, and when aboutto sheer in toward Fort Jackson, upon which was to be concentrated herown battery and that of her two formidable followers, a fire-raft wasobserved coming down the river in such a way as to make contact probableif the course were not changed. Heading across the river, and edgedgradually over by the raft continuing to work toward her, the ship tookthe ground a little above Fort St. Philip, but still under itsbatteries. While in this dangerous position, the raft, whose movementsproved to be controlled not by the current but by a small tugboat, waspushed against her port quarter. The flames caught the side of the ship, spread swiftly along it, leaped into the rigging and blazed up towardthe tops. The danger was imminent, and appeared even more so than itwas; for the body of heat, though great, was scarcely sufficient toaccount for such a rapid spread of the flames, which was probably duemainly to the paint. The thoroughly organized fire department soonsucceeded in quenching the conflagration, its source being removed bytraining some of the after-guns upon the daring pygmy, which with suchreckless courage had well-nigh destroyed the commander-in-chief of herenemy's fleet. The tug received a shot in her boilers and sunk. TheHartford backed clear, but in so doing fell off broadside to the stream, thereby affording another chance to the hostile rams, had there been oneprepared to dare the hazard. Watson, the flag-lieutenant, remarks thatthe flag-officer stood during this critical period giving his orders andwatching the ship slowly turn, referring occasionally to a littlecompass which was attached to his watch-chain. During most of theengagement, however, he was forward observing the conflict. 

The Brooklyn and Richmond, with the Sciota and the Iroquois, whichfollowed immediately after them, fought their way through with more orless of adventure, but successfully reached the river above the forts. It is to be observed, however, that these, as well as the Hartford, suffered from the embarrassment of the smoke, which had inconveniencedthe ships of the first column to a much less degree. This was to beexpected, and doubtless contributed to the greater loss which theysuffered, by delaying their progress and giving uncertainty to theiraim; the result of the latter being naturally to intensify the action ofthe hostile gunners. Four gunboats brought up the rear of the column, ofwhich but one got through, and she with a loss greater than any vesselof her class. The three last failed to pass. Blinded by smoke andfurther delayed by the tendency to open out, which is observable in alllong columns, they came under the fire of the forts at a time when, thelarger vessels having passed, they were no longer covered or supportedby their fire, and when day was about to break. The Itasca, commanded bythe gallant Caldwell, who had so nobly broken through the obstructions, opposing only her puny battery to the concentrated wrath of the forts, was knocked about by them at will, received a shot through her boilerand drifted down the river out of action. The Winona likewiseencountered almost alone, or perhaps in company with the Itasca, thefire of the enemy. After nearly running ashore in the smoke, daylightsurprised her while still under fire below the works; and her commandervery properly decided not to risk the total destruction and possiblecapture of his vessel for the sake of adding her insignificant force tothat above. Admirably as the gunboats were officered, perhaps their mostuseful service on this night was to demonstrate again the advantage ofbig ships, as of big battalions. 

Thirteen out of his seventeen vessels having rallied around his flagabove the forts, and the three below being of the least efficient type, the flag-officer could congratulate himself upon a complete victory, won with but little loss. One vessel only was sacrificed, and she tothat inconsiderate ardor which in so many cases of pursuit leads men, without any necessity, out of reach of support. The Varuna, the fifth inthe order, and the only merchant-built vessel in the fleet, afterclearing the forts had steamed rapidly through the Confederate flotilla, firing right and left, but not stopping. She soon passed above it, andgetting sight of a small steamer heading for New Orleans, sped awayafter her. Kennon, in the Governor Moore, happened to have noticed thismovement; and, finding by the rapid accessions to the number of hisenemies that he was likely to be soon overwhelmed, he determined tofollow this one which, whatever her strength, he might tackle alone. Stealing out of the _mêlée_ he started up the river, hoisting lightssimilar to those he had observed the enemy's ships to carry. Deceived bythis ruse, the Varuna at the first paid no attention to her pursuer, some distance behind whom followed one of the River-Defense boats, theStonewall Jackson. When Kennon at last opened fire, the Varuna, havingby then run down her steam in her headlong speed, was being rapidlyovertaken. The second shot from the Moore raked the Varuna's deck, killing and wounding twelve men. The Union vessel's helm was then puthard-a-port, swinging her broadside to bear upon her approaching foe, who was naturally expected to imitate the movement, opposing side toside to avoid being raked. Instead of so doing Kennon kept straight on, and, while receiving a deadly raking fire from his antagonist's battery, which struck down many of his men, he succeeded in driving the sharpstem of the Moore through the side of the Varuna. A few moments afterthe Stonewall Jackson coming up also rammed the disabled enemy, whosecommander then drove her ashore on the east side of the river, where shesank. By this time the corvette Oneida had made out the state of thecase. Steaming rapidly ahead, she overhauled the Confederate vessels;which, finding they could not escape, ran ashore, the Jackson on thewest bank, the Moore on the east, and in those positions they weresurrendered. 

Farragut had undertaken this daring exploit with the expectation that, after passing the forts, he could obtain the co-operation of the army, and that the action of the two services, combined in mutual support, would suffice to force the way to New Orleans. The occupation of theland by the army, and of the water by the navy, interposing by thenature of their operations between the city and the forts, wouldeffectually isolate the latter. In accordance with this plan he at oncesent Captain Boggs, of the Varuna, through the Quarantine Bayou withmessages to Commander Porter and General Butler. The latter was notifiedthat the way was now clear to land his troops through the bayou, inaccordance with the previous arrangements, and that gunboats would beleft there to protect them against those of the enemy, of which three orfour were seen to be still at the forts. Boggs passed successfullythrough the country and streams which a day before had been in quietpossession of the enemy, though it took him twenty-six hours to do so;but General Butler, who from a transport below had witnessed the successof the fleet, had waited for no further tidings. Hurrying back to histroops, he collected them at Sable Island, twelve miles in rear of FortSt. Philip, whence they were transported and landed at a point on theriver five miles above the work, where the Kineo and Wissahickon awaitedthem. 

During the remainder of the 24th the fleet stayed at anchor off theQuarantine station, to repose the crews after the excessive labor andexcitement of the previous night. Early the next morning all got underway except the two gunboats left to support Butler's troops, and movedup stream; but slowly, owing to the indifferent speed of some and towant of knowledge of the river. At half-past ten they reached EnglishTurn, five miles below the city; the point where the British forces hadin 1815 been so disastrously repelled in their assault upon theearth-works held by Jackson's riflemen. The Confederates had fortifiedand armed the same lines on both sides of the Mississippi, as part ofthe interior system of defenses to New Orleans; the exterior line beingconstituted by Forts Jackson and St. Philip, together with severalsmaller works at different points, commanding the numerous subsidiaryapproaches through the Mississippi delta. The interior lines at EnglishTurn, known as the Chalmette and McGehee batteries, were, however, intended only to check an approach of troops from down the river. Theirgeneral direction was perpendicular to the stream; and along its banksthere ran only a short work on either side to protect the mainentrenchments from an enfilading fire by light vessels, which might, incompany with an invading army, have managed to turn the lower forts bypassing through the bayous. These river batteries, mounting respectivelynine and five guns, were powerless to resist the ships that hadsuccessfully passed the main defenses of the city. After a few shots, fired rather for the honor of the flag than in any hope of successfulresult, the guns were forsaken; and both lines of entrenchments, beingturned and taken in the rear, were abandoned. 

Meanwhile, in New Orleans a scene of fearful confusion was growinghourly more frenzied. Whatever the fears of the military commanders asto the result of the attack upon the forts, they had very properlyconcealed them from the inhabitants; and these, swayed by the boastfultemper common to mobs, had been readily led to despise the efforts ofthe enemy and to trust implicitly in the power of their defenses. General Lovell, commanding the department, had gone down to the fortsthe evening before the attack, and was still there when the UnitedStates fleet was breaking its way through; he was, in fact, on board thelittle steamer, the pursuit of which lured the Varuna into the isolationwhere she met her fate. The news of the successful forcing of theexterior and principal defenses thus reached the city soon after it waseffected; and at the same time Lovell, satisfied from the first that ifthe forts were passed the town was lost, prepared at once to evacuateit, removing all the Government property. This in itself was a serviceof great difficulty. New Orleans is almost surrounded by water or marsh;the only exit was to the northward by a narrow strip of dry land, notover three quarters of a mile wide, along the river bank, by whichpassed the railroad to Jackson, in the State of Mississippi. As hasalready been said, Lovell had by this road been quietly removing armyrations for some time, but had abstained from trying to carry off anynoticeable articles by which his apprehensions would be betrayed to thepopulace. The latter, roused from its slumber of security with suchappalling suddenness, gave way to an outburst of panic and fury; whichwas the less controllable because so very large a proportion of thebetter and stronger element among the men had gone forth to swell theranks of the Confederate army. As in a revolution in a South Americancity, the street doors were closed by the tradesmen upon the property intheir stores; but without began a scene of mad destruction, which hassince been forcibly portrayed by one, then but a lad of fourteen years, who witnessed the sight. 

Far down the stream, and throughout their ascent, the ships were passingthrough the wreckage thus made. Cotton bales, cotton-laden ships andsteamers on fire, and working implements of every kind such as are usedin ship-yards, were continually encountered. On the piers of the levees, where were huge piles of hogsheads of sugar and molasses, a mob, composed of the scum of the city, men and women, broke and smashedwithout restraint. Toward noon of the 25th, as the fleet drew round thebend where the Crescent City first appears in sight, the confusion anddestruction were at their height. "The levee of New Orleans, " saysFarragut in his report, "was one scene of desolation. Ships, steamers, cotton, coal, etc. , were all in one common blaze, and our ingenuity wasmuch taxed to avoid the floating conflagration. The destruction ofproperty was awful. " Upon this pandemonium, in which the fierce glare ofburning property lit up the wild passions and gestures of an infuriatedpeople, the windows of heaven were opened and a drenching rain poureddown in torrents. The impression produced by the ships as they came insight around the bend has been graphically described by the boy beforementioned, who has since become so well-known as an author--Mr. GeorgeW. Cable. "I see the ships now, as they come slowly round SlaughterHouse Point into full view, silent, grim, and terrible; black with men, heavy with deadly portent, the long-banished Stars and Stripes flyingagainst the frowning sky. Oh! for the Mississippi! for the Mississippi!"(an iron-clad vessel nearly completed, upon which great hopes had beenbased by the Confederates). "Just then she came down. But how? Driftinghelplessly, a mass of flames. 

"The crowds on the levee howled and screamed with rage. The swarmingdecks answered never a word; but one old tar on the Hartford, standinglanyard in hand beside a great pivot gun, so plain to view that youcould see him smile, silently patted its big black breech and blandlygrinned. And now the rain came down in torrents. "

That same morning, as though with the purpose of embarrassing the victorwhom he could not oppose, the Mayor of New Orleans had ordered the Stateflag of Louisiana to be hoisted upon the City Hall. His secretary, whowas charged with this office, waited to fulfill it until the cannonadeat English Turn had ceased, and it was evident the fleet had passed thelast flimsy barrier and would within an hour appear before the city. Theflag was then run up; and the Mayor had the satisfaction of creating aposition of very unnecessary embarrassment for all parties by hisuseless bravado. 

To Captain Bailey, the second in command, who had so gallantly led bothin the first assault and in the attack at Chalmette, was assigned thehonor of being the first to land in the conquered city and to demand itssurrender. It was no barren honor, but a service of very sensiblepersonal danger to which he was thus called. General Lovell having todevote his attention solely to his military duties, the city which hadso long been under martial law was escaping out of the hands of thecivil authorities and fast lapsing into anarchy. Between one and two inthe afternoon Bailey landed, accompanied by Perkins, the firstlieutenant of the Cayuga; who, having shared his former perils, waspermitted to accompany him in this one also. "We took just a boat and aboat's crew, " writes Perkins, "with a flag of truce, and started off. When we reached the wharf there were no officials to be seen; no onereceived us, although the whole city was watching our movements, and thelevee was crowded in spite of a heavy rainstorm. Among the crowd weremany women and children, and the women were shaking rebel flags andbeing rude and noisy. They were all shouting and hooting as we steppedon shore. .. . As we advanced the mob followed us in a very excited state. They gave three cheers for Jeff Davis and Beauregard and three groansfor Lincoln. Then they began to throw things at us, and shout 'Hangthem!' 'Hang them!' We both thought we were in a bad fix, but there wasnothing for us to do but just to go on. " Mr. Cable has given hisdescription of the same scene: "About one or two in the afternoon, Ibeing in the store with but one door ajar, came a roar of shoutings andimprecations and crowding feet down Common Street. 'Hurrah for JeffDavis!' 'Shoot them!' 'Kill them!' 'Hang them!' I locked the door ofthe store on the outside and ran to the front of the mob, bawling withthe rest, 'Hurrah for Jeff Davis!' About every third man had a weaponout. Two officers of the United States navy were walking abreast, unguarded and alone, not looking to the right or left, never frowning, never flinching, while the mob screamed in their ears, shook cockedpistols in their faces, cursed, crowded, and gnashed upon them. Sothrough those gates of death those two men walked to the City Hall todemand the town's surrender. It was one of the bravest deeds I ever sawdone. "

Farragut's demand, made through Bailey, was that the flag of Louisianashould be hauled down from the City Hall, and that of the United Stateshoisted over the buildings which were its property, namely, the CustomHouse, Post Office, and Mint. This the Mayor refused to do; and, asFarragut had no force with which to occupy the city, it became asomewhat difficult question to carry on an argument with the authoritiesof a town protected by the presence of so many women and children. Thesituation was for three days exceedingly critical, from the temper andcharacter of the mob and from the obstinacy and powerlessness of theofficials. It was doubtless as much as the life of any citizen of theplace was worth to comply with the admiral's demands. On the other hand, while there could be no difficulty in hoisting the United States flag, there would be much in protecting it from insult with the means at theflag-officer's disposal; for to open fire upon a place where there wereso many helpless creatures, innocent of any greater offense thanbehaving like a set of spoiled children, was a course that could not becontemplated unless in the last necessity, and it was undesirable toprovoke acts which might lead to any such step. The United Statesofficers who were necessarily sent to communicate with the authoritiesdid so, in the opinion of the authorities themselves, at the peril oftheir lives from a mob which no one on shore could control. On the 28thof April, however, Forts Jackson and St. Philip surrendered to CommanderPorter in consequence of a mutiny in their garrisons, which refused tofight any longer, saying further resistance was useless; and thefollowing day Farragut sent ashore a body of two hundred and fiftymarines with two howitzers manned by seamen from the Hartford, the wholeunder the command of the fleet-captain, Captain Henry H. Bell. The forcewas formally drawn up before the City Hall, the howitzers pointing upand down the street, which was thronged with people. Fearing still thatsome rash person in the crowd might dare to fire upon the men who werehauling down the flag, the Mayor took his stand before one of thehowitzers; a sufficient intimation to the mob that were murder done hewould be the first victim to fall in expiation. The United States flagwas then hoisted over the Custom House, and left flying under theprotection of a guard of marines. 

Thus was timely and satisfactorily completed an act, by which Farragutsignalized and sealed the fact that the conquest of New Orleans and ofits defenses, from the original conception of the enterprise to itscomplete fulfillment by the customary tokens of submission and takingpossession, was wholly the work of the United States Navy; of which he, by his magnificent successes, became the representative figure. It was atriumph won over formidable difficulties by a mobile force, skillfullydirected and gallantly fought. By superior promptitude and a correctappreciation of the true strategic objective had been reduced topowerlessness obstacles not to be overcome by direct assault, except bya loss of time which would have allowed the enemy to completepreparations possibly fatal to the whole undertaking. Forts Jackson andSt. Philip, which the fleet could not have reduced by direct attack, fell by the severance of their communications. 

It is not to be questioned that the moral effect of the passage of theforts, succeeded, as it was, by the immediate fall of the great city ofthe Mississippi, was very great; but it was not upon the fortsthemselves, nor in the unexpected mutiny of the garrison, that thateffect was chiefly manifested. Great as was the crime of the men, theyshowed by their act a correct appreciation of those results to theforts, from the passage of the fleet, which some have sought toignore--results physical, undeniable, fatal. It was not moral effect, but indisputable reasoning which sapped the further resistance ofmen--brave till then--to whom were wanting the habit of discipline andthe appreciation of the far-reaching effects upon the fortunes of acampaign produced by a prolonged, though hopeless, resistance. They sawthat the fate of the forts was sealed, and beyond that they recognizedno duties and no advantages. On the scene of his exploit Farragut reapedthe material fruits of the celerity in which he believed; and which hehad reluctantly for a space postponed, at the bidding of superiorauthority, in order to try the effect of slower methods. These beingexhausted, he owed to the promptness of his decision and action that theLouisiana, on whose repairs men were working night and day, did not takethe advantageous position indicated to her by the officers of the forts;and that the Mississippi, the ironclad upon which not only thedesigners, but naval officers, founded extravagant hopes, was neithercompleted nor towed away, but burned where she lay. The flaming mass, asit drifted hopelessly by the Hartford, was a striking symbol ofresistance crushed--of ascendency established over the mighty riverwhose name it bore; but it was a symbol not of moral, but of physicalvictory. 

It was elsewhere, far and wide, that were felt the moral effects whichechoed the sudden, unexpected crash with which the lower Mississippifell--through the length and breadth of the South and in the cabinets offoreign statesmen, who had believed too readily, as did their officerson the spot, that the barrier was not to be passed--that the Queen Cityof the Confederacy was impregnable to attack from the sea. Whatever mayhave been the actual purposes of that mysterious and undecidedpersonage, Napoleon III, the effect of military events, whether on seaor shore, upon the question of interference by foreign powers issufficiently evident from the private correspondence which, a few monthsafter New Orleans, passed between Lords Palmerston and Russell, then theleading members of the British Cabinet. [R] Fortunately for the cause ofthe United States, France and Great Britain were not of a mind tocombine their action at the propitious moment; and the moral effect ofthe victory at New Orleans was like a cold plunge bath to the Frenchemperor, at the time when he was hesitating whether to act alone. Itproduced upon him even more impression than upon the British Government;because his ambitions for French control and for the extension of theLatin races on the American continent were especially directed towardLouisiana, the former colony of France, and toward its neighbors, Texasand Mexico. 

 [Footnote R: See Walpole's _Life of Lord John Russell_, vol. Ii, pp. 349-351. ]

The sympathies, however, of the classes from whom were chiefly drawn thecabinets of the two great naval States were overwhelmingly with theSouth; and the expressions alike of the emperor and of his principalconfidants at this time were designedly allowed to transpire, both tothe Southern commissioners and to the British Government. On the veryday that Porter's mortar schooners opened on Fort Jackson, LouisNapoleon unbosomed himself to a member of the British Parliament, whovisited him as an avowed partisan of the Confederate cause. He said thatwhile he desired to preserve a strict neutrality, he could not consentthat his people should continue to suffer from the acts of the FederalGovernment. He thought the best course would be to make a friendlyappeal to it, either alone or concurrently with England, to open theports; but to accompany the appeal with a proper demonstration of forceupon our coasts, and, should the appeal seem likely to be ineffectual, to back it by a declaration of his purpose not to respect the blockade. The taking of New Orleans, which he did not then anticipate, mightrender it inexpedient to act; that he would not decide at once, butwould wait some days for further intelligence. [S] Similar semi-officialassurances came from different persons about the emperor; and themembers of the Cabinet, with a single exception, showed little reservein their favorable expressions toward the Confederacy. 

 [Footnote S: _North American Review_, vol. Cxxix, p. 347. ]

A few weeks later Mr. Slidell had a conversation with M. Billault, theminister _sans portefeuille_, one of the most conservative and cautiousmen in the Cabinet, who represented the Government in the Chambers uponall subjects connected with foreign affairs. Slidell read a note whichhe had received from Sir Charles Wood, a leading Southern sympathizer inEngland, denying that the British Government was unwilling to act inAmerican affairs--a denial to which some color is given by thecorrespondence of Palmerston and Russell before mentioned. In answer, M. Billault declared that the French Cabinet, with the possible exceptionof M. Thouvénel, had been unanimously in favor of the South, and addedthat if New Orleans had not fallen its recognition would not have beenmuch longer delayed; but, even after that disaster, if decided successeswere obtained in Virginia and Tennessee, or the enemy were held at bayfor a month or two, the same result would follow. After an interviewwith M. Thouvénel, about the same time, Slidell reported that, thoughthat minister did not directly say so, his manner gave fair reason toinfer that if New Orleans had not been taken, and no very seriousreverses were suffered in Virginia and Tennessee, recognition would verysoon have been declared. [T]

 [Footnote T: Ibid. , vol. Cxxix, p. 348. ]

In its moral effect, therefore, the fall of the river forts and of NewOrleans, though not absolutely and finally decisive of the question offoreign intervention, corresponded to one of those telling blows, bywhich a general threatened by two foes meets and strikes down one beforethe other comes up. Such a blow may be said to decide a campaign; notbecause no chance is left the enemy to redeem his misfortune, butbecause without the first success the weaker party would have beenoverwhelmed by the junction of his two opponents. The heart-rendingdisasters to our armies during the following summer does but emphasizethe immense value to the Union cause of the moral effect produced byFarragut's victory. Those disasters, as it was, prompted the leaders ofthe British ministry to exchange confidences in which they agreed on theexpediency of mediation. They did not carry all their colleagues withthem; but who can estimate the effect, when the scales were thusbalancing, if the navy had been driven out of the Mississippi as thearmy was from Virginia?

CHAPTER VIII. 

THE FIRST ADVANCE ON VICKSBURG. 

1862. 

The purpose of the Navy Department, as expressed in the original ordersto Farragut, had been to send his squadron up the river immediatelyafter the capture of New Orleans. The words were: "If the Mississippiexpedition from Cairo shall not have descended the river, you will takeadvantage of the panic to push a strong force up the river to take alltheir defenses in the rear. " When New Orleans fell, the Cairoexpedition, more commonly known as the Mississippi flotilla, so far fromhaving descended the river to the neighborhood of New Orleans, was stilldetained before Fort Pillow, one of the outlying defenses of Memphis, forty miles above the latter city and over eight hundred from NewOrleans. It was not until the end of May that the evacuation of Corinthby the Confederates made Memphis untenable, leading to the abandonmentof the forts on the 4th of June and the surrender of the city on thefollowing day. It became therefore incumbent upon Farragut, afterturning over the command of New Orleans to Butler on the 1st of May, togo up the river as soon as he possibly could. 

Although the flag-officer seems to have acquiesced in this programme inthe beginning, it was probably with the expectation that the advance, upriver and against the current, required of his heavy-draught andslow-moving ships would not be very far; that the Cairo expedition, which at the date of the orders quoted, January 20th, had not begun tomove, would, from the character of the vessels composing it, many beingironclad, and from the advantage of the current, have progressed veryfar by the time he had taken New Orleans. Moreover, at that date theupper river flotilla was still a branch of the army, and its prospectivemovements were to be in combination with, and a part of, a greatmilitary enterprise, securing control both of the stream and of theland; whereas Farragut's was a purely naval operation, to which the armycontributed only a force sufficient to hold the points which were firstreduced by the fleet. 

Under the actual conditions, the proposed ascent of the river bore avery different aspect to the commanding naval officer on the spot fromthat which presented itself to the fond imaginations of the officials inWashington. The question now was not one of fighting batteries, forthere was no reason as yet to expect anything heavier than the fleet hadalready overcome with ease; it was the far more difficult matter ofcommunications, in the broadest scope of the word, to be maintained overa long, narrow, tortuous, and very difficult road, passing in manyplaces close under the guns of the enemy. "As I stated in my lastdispatch, " wrote Farragut to the department after his first visit toVicksburg, "the dangers and difficulties of the river have proved to us, since we first entered it, much greater impediments to our progress, and more destructive to our vessels, than the enemy's shot. Betweengetting aground, derangement of the machinery, and want of coal, thedelays in getting up the river are great. " To take the defenses in therear, and in their then state to drive the enemy out of them, was onething; but to hold the abandoned positions against the return of thedefenders, after the fleet had passed on, required an adequate forcewhich Butler's army, calculated by McClellan for a much narrower sphere, could not afford. Coal and supply ships, therefore, must either run thegantlet for the four hundred miles which separated Vicksburg from NewOrleans, or be accompanied always by armed vessels. The formeralternative was incompatible with the necessary security, and for thelatter the numbers of the fleet were utterly inadequate. In fact, tomaintain the proposed operations, there would be needed so many ships toguard the communications that there would be none left for theoperations to which they led. 

It must also be observed that not only was this line of communicationsfour times as long as that which led from the sea to New Orleans, and offar more difficult pilotage, but that the natural character of theenemy's positions upon it was essentially different. They were as yetundeveloped by art; but by nature they were high and commanding bluffs, having secure land communications with an extensive enemy's country intheir rear over which our troops exercised no control whatever--wherethey had not even been seen. To speak of "taking them in the rear" wasto beg the question--to assume that their front was then, as in June, 1863, toward an enemy investing them on the land side. New Orleans andthe region below, including its defenses and the communicationstherewith, were low-lying and intersected with numerous water-courses;over such a navy naturally exercises a preponderating control. Above NewOrleans the low delta of the Mississippi extends, indeed, on the westbank as far as the Red River, if it may not be said to reach toVicksburg and beyond; but on the east bank it ceases one hundred andfifty miles from the city. From thence to Vicksburg, a distance of twohundred and fifty miles, the stream is bordered by a series of bluffsbacking on a firm country of moderate elevation. Such positions are notto be reduced from the water alone. On the contrary, if the water be anarrow strip swept by their guns, they command it; while, from theextent of country in their rear, they are not susceptible of isolationby fleets above and below, as were Forts Jackson and St. Philip. 

This series of bluffs became, therefore, the line upon which theConfederates based their control of the Mississippi and maintained theirvital communications with Texas and the Red River region. It could bereduced only by a military force; and to think of subduing it by a fleettaking advantage of the panic following the fall of New Orleans, wastruly to rely upon moral effect without adequate physical force tosupport it. It is due to the Navy Department to say that they expectedthe army from the North to advance more rapidly than it did; but, without seeking to assign the blame, the utterly useless penetration ofthe United States fleet four hundred miles into the heart of the enemy'scountry and its subsequent mortifying withdrawal, when contrasted withthe brilliant success resulting from Farragut's dash by the forts, afford a very useful lesson in the adaptation of means to ends and theselection of a definite objective, upon compassing which somethinghappens. The object of the United States Government being to control thelower Mississippi, that was effected by means of isolating its defenses, which then fell. When the further object was sought of controlling thecourse of the stream above, the mere perambulation of a body of shipseffected nothing, because it aimed at nothing in particular, and couldhave no effect upon the decisive points. 

Of all these considerations Farragut was fully sensible; and, while heobeyed his orders, he showed in his dispatches to the Department, and inprivate letters of the same period, how much against his judgment wereoperations conceived on such erroneous military principles andundertaken with such inadequate force. The Department was forward topress him on, and as early as the 17th of May sent a dispatch intimatingthat he had forgotten his orders on the subject; and he was urged andrequired to open up the Mississippi to Flag-officer Davis's command (theMississippi flotilla), then still above Memphis. This and other lettersof the same date must have been peculiarly exasperating; for they werereceived early in June, when he had been up the river as far asVicksburg and satisfied himself that without an adequate force of troopsnothing could be accomplished. "The Department, " he replies, "seems tohave considered my fleet as having escaped all injury, and that whenthey arrived off New Orleans they were in condition to be pushed up theriver. This was not the case; but, the moment the vessels could begotten ready, the gunboats were all sent up under the command ofCommander S. P. Lee, with directions to proceed to Vicksburg, take thatplace, and cut the railroad. .. . From all I could hear it was notconsidered proper, even with pilots, to risk the ships beyondNatchez. .. . By the time Commander Lee arrived at Vicksburg (May 18th) hewas satisfied that the force of the enemy was too great for him toventure to take the town, or even to pass it. The land in the rear ofVicksburg is about two hundred feet high, on which are placed some eightand ten inch columbiads, which are perfectly secure from our fire. .. . Idetermined to get the heavy ships up there if possible, which I did aday or two after. General Williams arrived in the mean time with fifteenhundred men, when I proposed to him, if he could carry the battery onthe hill, I would attack the town. He made a careful reconnaissance, andreturned to me in the afternoon, when I had all the (naval) commandersassembled. He reported that it would be impossible for him to land, andthat he saw no chance of doing anything with the place so long as theenemy were in such force, having at their command thirty thousand menwithin one hour by railroad. A large majority of the commandersconcurred with him in the opinion. "

Writing to his home about this council, in which, contrary to hisindependent decision when below Fort Jackson, he yielded to the adviceof his captains, he said: "I did not pass Vicksburg; not because it wastoo strongly fortified; not because we could not have passed it easilyenough, _but we would have been cut off from our supplies of coal andprovisions_. We would have been placed between two enemies (Vicksburgand Memphis), and so the captains advised me not to do it. I was verysick at the time, and yielded to their advice, _which I think was good_;but I doubt if I would have taken it had I been well. " Here is seen, transpiring vividly enough, the uncertainty and indecision arising fromthe conflict between the orders of the Department and his own sounderjudgment. He would fain obey; yet no orders could override, though theymight cruelly embarrass, the responsibility of the officer in command onthe spot. "Fighting is nothing, " he adds, "to the evils of theriver--getting on shore, running foul of one another, losing anchors, etc. " "The army, " he resumes in his dispatch to the Department, "hadbeen sent up early with a few days' rations, and I was compelled tosupply them from the squadron, thereby reducing our own supplies, whichwere barely sufficient to bring the ships back to New Orleans, makingallowance for probable delays. The river was now beginning to fall, andI apprehended great difficulty in getting down should I delay muchlonger. In the mean time coal vessels had been towed up the river justabove Natchez (a hundred miles below Vicksburg), which vessels I wasobliged to bring down and keep in company with the vessels of war, forfear of their being captured by the guerrilla bands which appear toinfest almost the entire banks of the river wherever there are rapidsand bluffs. "

Such were some of the difficulties being experienced when theAssistant-Secretary of the Navy was writing: "The _only_ anxiety _we_feel is to know if you have followed up your instructions and pushed astrong force up the river to meet the Western flotilla. " "I had noconception, " replied Farragut, "that the Department ever contemplatedthat the ships of this squadron were to attempt to go to Memphis, abovewhich the Western flotilla then was; nor did I believe it waspracticable for them to do so, unless under the most favorablecircumstances, in time of peace, when their supplies could be obtainedalong the river. The gunboats are nearly all so damaged that they arecertainly not in condition to contend with ironclad rams coming downupon them with the current. .. . We consider the advantage entirely infavor of the vessel that has the current added to her velocity. " Inconclusion he adds: "I arrived in New Orleans with five or six days'provisions and one anchor, and am now trying to procure others. As soonas provisions and anchors are obtained we will take our departure for upthe river, and endeavor to carry out, as far as practicable, the ordersconveyed in your different dispatches. " Writing home, he expressedhimself more freely and unmistakably: "They will keep us in this riveruntil the vessels break down and all the little reputation we have madehas evaporated. The Government appears to think that we can do anything. They expect me to navigate the Mississippi nine hundred miles in theface of batteries, ironclad rams, etc. , and yet with all the ironcladvessels they have North they could not get to Norfolk or Richmond. .. . Well, I will do my duty to the best of my ability, and let the rest takecare of itself. .. . They can not deprive me and my officers of thehistorical fact that we took New Orleans. Now they expectimpossibilities. "

Enough has been quoted to show that Farragut was in no way responsiblefor, nor approved of, the ill-timed tenacity with which the Governmentheld to its original plan, when the conditions had turned out entirelydifferent from those at first expected. The Secretary of the Navy at alater date endeavored to throw the blame of failure entirely upon theWar Department, which was either unwilling or unable to support thenaval movement with adequate troops. It is not necessary, in a life ofthe admiral, to attempt to decide upon the degree of remissness, if any, shown by the military service, nor upon whose shoulders it falls. It issufficient to point out that the Navy Department required of Farragut togo up to meet the Western flotilla when it was near nine hundred milesfrom the mouth of the Mississippi, for no better reason, apparently, than that it had determined upon the junction at a time when it supposedit would be effected much lower down. In so doing it left nothing to thejudgment of the officer commanding on the spot. "I think, " said Farragutquietly, "that more should have been left to my discretion; but I hopefor the best, and pray God to protect our poor sailors from harm. " Hisown opinion was that Mobile should be the next point attacked. Thedifficulties there were not so great as those encountered at theMississippi forts; and his success at the latter might not improbablyhave considerable moral effect upon the other works, whose position hadsome strong features of resemblance to those already subdued, and whichwere not yet in the strong state of defense which they afterwardreached. The blockade of the coast was part of his charge; and in no waydid he think it could be so thoroughly maintained as by occupying theharbors themselves, or their entrances. 

In obedience to his peremptory orders Farragut again started up theriver, with the apprehension that if he once got above Vicksburg hewould not be able to return before the next spring rise; for the seasonof lowest water in the Mississippi was now at hand. The Hartford did runashore on the way up, and remained hard and fast for the better part oftwenty-four hours. "It is a sad thing to think of having your ship on amud bank, five hundred miles from the natural element of a sailor, "wrote the flag-officer; "but I knew that I had done all I could toprevent her being up the river so high, and was commanded to go. " Shehad to take out her coal and shot, and had even removed two guns beforeshe floated. 

On the 18th of June the squadron was assembled just below Vicksburg, having in company also seventeen schooners of the mortar flotilla, stillunder Porter's command. These were placed as rapidly as possible insuitable positions on the two sides of the river, opened fire on the26th, and continued it through the 27th. Upon the evening of the latterday Porter notified the flag-officer that he was ready to cover, by asteady bombardment, the intended passage of the fleet before thebatteries. 

 [Illustration: PASSAGE OF VICKSBURG BATTERIES, JUNE 28, 1862. ORDER OF ATTACK. ]

Vicksburg is situated on the first high land met on the east bank of theMississippi after leaving Memphis, from which it is four hundred milesdistant. The position was one of peculiar strength and importance forcommanding the navigation of the river. Not only was it exceptionallylofty, and on one flank of that series of bluffs which has beforebeen mentioned as constituting the line upon which the Confederate gripof the stream was based, but the tortuous character of the channel gaveparticular facilities for an enfilading fire on vessels both before andafter they came abreast the works. They were thus exposed to a longerand more dangerous cannonade than is the case where the stream flowsstraight past the front of a battery. The channel has now changed; butin 1862 the river, which from Memphis had pursued its winding coursethrough an alluvial country, made when abreast of Vicksburg a sharp turnto the northeast, as though determined to reach the bluffs but fourmiles distant. As it neared them it swung round with a sharp turn to thesouthwest, parallel to its recent direction, flowing for the most partclose to the foot of the hills. Between the two reaches, and formed bythem, immediately opposite the town, there was a low tongue of land, orpromontory, four miles long and less than one wide. The squadron, beingbelow, had to steam up through the lower reach against the current, makethe sharp turn at the bend, and then pass through the upper reach. Inthe bend it was followed by a fire from the highest part of the bluffs, to which it could make no reply. 

At 2 A. M. Of June 28th the signal was given, and at three the squadronwas under way--eleven vessels, of which three were the heavy shipsHartford, Richmond, and Brooklyn; two, the corvettes Iroquois andOneida; and six gunboats. At four, the ships in their slow progress, stemming the current, had passed the mortar schooners; and the latterthen opened fire, as did the steamers connected with them, which werenot to attempt the passage. Owing to a misunderstanding, the threevessels which formed the rear of the column, the Brooklyn and twogunboats, did not get by. The others, at 6 A. M. , anchored aboveVicksburg. Though exposed much of the time to a raking fire, to whichthey were not able to reply, the vessels suffered less than would havebeen expected, owing to the enemy falling into the common mistake ofgiving too much elevation to his guns. Having thus accomplished hisinstructions, Farragut reported coldly to the Department that, inobedience to the orders "and the command of the President, I proceededup to Vicksburg with the Brooklyn, Richmond, and Hartford, with thedetermination to carry out my instructions to the best of my ability. .. . The Department will perceive from this report that the forts can be_passed_, and _we have done it_, and can _do it again as often as may berequired_ of us. It will not, however, be an easy matter for us to domore than silence the batteries for a time, as long as the enemy has alarge force behind the hills to prevent our landing and holding theplace. " "I am satisfied, " he says again, "it is not possible to takeVicksburg without an army of twelve or fifteen thousand men. General VanDorn's division (Confederate) is here, and lies safely behind the hills. The water is too low for me to go over twelve or fifteen miles aboveVicksburg. " The last sentence reveals clearly enough the madness ofattempting to take three of the best ships of the navy to the upperriver in falling water. Fortunately the insufficient depth now wasabove--not below--them, and they were not utterly cut off from the sea. Commander Porter, however, who started down river a week later, incompliance with orders summoning him to Washington, and than whom thenavy had no more active nor enterprising officer, wrote back to theflag-officer that if the big ships did not soon return he feared theywould have to remain till next year. 

Three days after Farragut passed the batteries of Vicksburg, on the 1stof July, the Mississippi flotilla, under the command of Flag-officerCharles H. Davis, joined him from above; having left Memphis only twodays before, but favored in their voyage by the current, by competentpilots, and by a draught suited to the difficulties of river navigation. The united squadrons continued together until the 15th of July, lying atanchor near the neck of the promontory opposite Vicksburg; with theexception of the Brooklyn and the two gunboats which had not passed upon the 28th of June. These remained below the works, and on the oppositeside of the promontory. 

The position of the two flag-officers was about four miles below themouth of the Yazoo River, a tributary of the Mississippi, which entersthe main stream on the east side not far above Vicksburg. It was knownto them that there was somewhere in the Yazoo an ironclad ram called theArkansas; which, more fortunate than the Mississippi at New Orleans, hadbeen hurried away from Memphis just before that city fell into the handsof the United States forces. She was a vessel of between eight hundredand a thousand tons burden, carrying ten guns, which were protected bythree inches of railroad iron, backed by bales of compressed cottonfirmly braced. Her most dangerous weapon, however, was her ram; but, owing to the lightness and bad construction of the engines, this was notas formidable as it otherwise might have been to the enemy's ships. 

So little injury had thus far been done to the United States vessels bythe rams of the Confederates that the two flag-officers were probablylulled into a state of over-security, and they allowed their squadronsto lie with too low fires. To this doubtless contributed the morepowerful motive of the difficulty to the coal supply incurred by theexcessively long line of exposed communications, imposed upon bothsquadrons by the stubborn persistence of the Navy Department in hurryingthe fleets far in advance of any support by the army. Beyond the reachof their guns they could not control the river banks; and, unless theycould be present everywhere along the eight hundred miles whichseparated Memphis from New Orleans, even the narrow strip on either sideswept by their cannon was safe at any point only while they were abreastit. The moral effect of their promenade up and down and of their meetingat Vicksburg was accurately weighed by the enemy; and, however it mayhave imposed upon the Northern people, did nothing to insure the safetyof the unarmed vessels upon which supplies depended. This essentiallyvicious military situation resulted necessarily in a degree ofinsecurity which could have but one issue--a retreat by both squadronstoward their respective bases, which soon after followed. 

Convinced of the inutility of his own presence at Vicksburg, andpreoccupied with the risks threatening his squadron from the unguardedstate of the river and its dangerous navigation, it is not wonderfulthat Farragut, who was the senior of the two flag-officers, thoughtlittle of the single ironclad vessel in his neighborhood. He was notprone to exaggerate danger, and his experience had not led him toentertain any high opinion of the enemy's rams. To these circumstanceshe owed one of the most mortifying incidents of his career. 

On the 15th of July a reconnoitering expedition was sent into the Yazoo, composed of two vessels of Davis's squadron, accompanied by one of therams which at that time formed an independent organization upon theupper Mississippi under the command of Colonel Ellet. It was a fortunatemove, for to this circumstance was due that the squadrons had any noticeof the approach of the Arkansas. The detached vessels met her about sixmiles within the Yazoo, when a running fight ensued between her and theCarondelet, to the disadvantage of the United States vessel; but thesustained cannonade attracted betimes the attention of the fleet, andthe Tyler, a small unarmored boat, after supporting the Carondelet tothe best of her ability through the action, preceded the combatants downstream, bringing tidings of the ram's approach. There was not time toraise steam--only to cast loose the guns for action. When the Arkansasreached the fleet her smoke-stack had been so often perforated by theCarondelet's shot that her boilers could scarcely supply any steam. Herspeed was thereby reduced to one knot, powerless to ram and scarcelysufficient to steer. At that rate, with the favor also of the current, she passed through the United States vessels, suffering from theirsuccessive fires much injury, though not of a vital kind, and tookrefuge under the guns of Vicksburg. It was a most gallant exploit, fairly comparable in daring to the passage of the Mississippi forts, butresulting in no decisive effect upon the issues of the war. 

It became immediately advisable for Farragut to rejoin the three shipswhich lay below the town, and were consequently in a condition favoringan attack by the ram, whose apparent immunity under the fire of the twosquadrons showed her an enemy not to be despised. He determined tofollow her down at once, again passing the batteries, and endeavoring todestroy her with the guns of his squadron as it went by. The executionof the plan was set for the late afternoon, and the Mississippi flotillatook up a position to support the movement by engaging the upperbatteries. Unfortunately, time was lost in forming the order of battle, and the passage was effected in the dark. The uncertainty of aim thuscaused was increased by the precaution of the enemy, who shifted hisposition after nightfall. Two shots only found her, injuring several ofher people and setting fire to the cotton bulwarks. Beyond this shereceived no injury at this time, but she had been severely shaken by thehammering of the morning. A week later, on the 22d of July, Davis sentdown the Essex, one of his heavy ironclads, accompanied by one ofEllet's rams, to attack the Arkansas at her moorings. The effort wasunsuccessful, although the enemy's vessel received some further injury. The ram rejoined the upper squadron; but the Essex, from her indifferentspeed, was unable to return against the current, exposed unsupported tothe fire of all the batteries. She therefore became thenceforth a memberof the lower squadron, together with a ram called the Sumter, which hadrun down with Farragut on the 15th. 

On the 20th of the month Farragut had received orders from the NavyDepartment, dated July 14th, directing him to get the part of his fleetabove Vicksburg below that place with as little injury and loss of lifeas possible. The circumstances that have been narrated caused him toreceive this dispatch below the town; and on the 24th, two days afterthe descent of the Essex, he departed for New Orleans. Davis assured himthat the Essex and Sumter should look out for the river betweenVicksburg and Baton Rouge. To them were joined three of Farragut'sgunboats; and the five vessels took an active part in supporting thegarrison of Baton Rouge when an attack was made upon the place by theConfederates on the 5th of August. In this the Arkansas was to haveco-operated with the enemy's troops, and she left Vicksburg on the 3dfor that purpose; but her machinery broke down, and while lying helplessagainst the river bank the Essex came in sight. Resistance in her thenplight was hopeless. She was set on fire by her commander, the crewescaping to the shore. Farragut himself reached Baton Rouge shortlyafter this happened. He had with much difficulty succeeded in gettingthe heavier ships to New Orleans on the 28th of July; and there he hadlingered, unwilling to leave the river, though desirous of doing so, until affairs seemed on a reasonably secure basis. The chief element ofanxiety was the Arkansas, concerning whose power to harm quiteexaggerated notions prevailed. While thus lying before New Orleans wordwas brought him of the attack on Baton Rouge, and he at once retracedhis steps with the Hartford, Brooklyn, and some smaller ships. On the7th he reached the scene of action, and learned the destruction of theConfederate vessel. The same day he wrote to the Department: "It is oneof the happiest moments of my life that I am enabled to inform theDepartment of the destruction of the ram Arkansas; not because I heldthe iron-clad in such terror, but because the community did. " It musthave been an additional element of satisfaction to him that thedisappearance from the waters of the Mississippi of the last hostilevessel capable of offensive action released him from the necessity ofremaining himself, or of keeping a large force there, during theunhealthy season. 

Before leaving Vicksburg the crews of the fleet had suffered severelyfrom the sickness common in that climate. The Brooklyn had sixty-eightsick out of a total of three hundred; and as this proportion was lessthan in the upper river flotilla, where the sick numbered forty per centof the total force, it is probable that it fairly represents the generalcondition of Farragut's ships. Among the troops accompanying theexpedition there were but eight hundred fit for duty out of over threethousand. It was not considered well to maintain for a longer time inBaton Rouge the small garrison hitherto stationed there. It hadhonorably repulsed the enemy's attack; but, in the general cessation ofoffensive movements by the United States army, the Confederates werecontinually strengthening their forces on the line of bluffs south ofVicksburg, to the importance of which their attention, never entirelydiverted, had been forcibly drawn by the advance of the fleet in theprevious months. Fruitless as that ill-judged advance had been, itreminded the enemy of the serious inconvenience they would suffer if theUnited States ships could freely patrol that part of the Mississippi, and impressed upon them the necessity of securing a section of it, bywhich they could have undisturbed communication between the two shores. This could be done by fortifying two points in such strength that topass them from either direction would involve a risk too great to belightly undertaken. The points chosen were Vicksburg and Port Hudson, two hundred miles apart, and embracing between them the mouth of the RedRiver. The latter is the great artery of the region west of theMississippi, and also, by means of the Atchafalaya Bayou, offers directcommunication for light-draught vessels with the Gulf of Mexico. PortHudson being less than twenty miles from Baton Rouge, the presence inthe latter of a small garrison, which could undertake no offensivemovement and which there were no troops to re-enforce, becamepurposeless. On the 16th of August, 1862, the post was abandoned, andthe troops occupying it withdrew to New Orleans. 

CHAPTER IX. 

THE BLOCKADE AND PORT HUDSON. 

1862-1863. 

Operations in the Mississippi having now temporarily ceased, Farragutwas at liberty to give his undivided attention for a time to the coastblockade. The important harbor of Pensacola had been evacuated by theConfederates in May, less than a month after the capture of New Orleans. Its abandonment was due to want of troops to garrison it properly; thepressure of the United States armies in Kentucky and Tennessee, afterthe fall of Fort Donelson in the previous February, having necessitatedthe withdrawal of all men that could be spared from other points. Beforethe war Pensacola had been the seat of a well-equipped navy yard with agood dry-dock, the only naval station of the United States in the Gulfof Mexico. At the time of the evacuation the buildings in the yard hadbeen destroyed and the dry-dock injured; but the fine harbor, the depthof water--twenty-two feet--that could be carried over the bar, and thenearness of the port to Mobile, the most important center of blockaderunning, all combined to make it the headquarters of the fleet forrepairs and supplies. Farragut arrived there on the 20th of August. Justbefore leaving New Orleans he received his commission as rear admiral, dated July 16, 1862. Three other officers were promoted at the same timeto the active list of this grade, which had never before existed in theUnited States; but as Farragut was the senior in rank of the four, hemay be said to have been the first officer of the navy to hoist anadmiral's flag. 

The admiral remained in Pensacola for three months, superintending fromthere the affairs of his squadron. During this period the harbors ofGalveston and of various other smaller ports on the coast of Texas andLouisiana were occupied by detachments of vessels, as the surest way ofenforcing the blockade. The admiral had early announced that he shouldcarry on the blockade as far as possible inside; and these successesenabled him to say in December, 1862, that he now held the whole coastexcept Mobile. During his stay in Pensacola he received a visit from hisson, who found him in the best of spirits, all having gone well on thecoast; the only mishap having been the success of a Confederate cruiser, the Oreto, in running into Mobile. She had availed herself of her closeresemblance to some of the British cruisers in the Gulf to hoist theBritish flag; and as visits of these vessels to the blockaded ports wereauthorized and not infrequent, the ruse induced the United States shipthat overhauled her to withhold its fire for a few critical moments. During these the Oreto gained so far on the other that, although struckthree times by heavy projectiles, she received no vital injury andsucceeded in gaining the shelter of the forts. 

The period of the admiral's stay in Pensacola was one of the deepestdepression to the Union cause, and his letters bear evidence of theanxiety which he shared with all his fellow-countrymen in that time ofdistress. The reverses of McClellan in the peninsula, followed by thewithdrawal of his army from thence and its transference to northernVirginia, the defeats suffered by Pope, and the first invasion ofMaryland, occurred either immediately before or during the time thatFarragut was in Pensacola. His own bootless expedition up theMississippi and subsequent enforced retirement conspired also to swellthe general gloom; for, although thinking military men could realizefrom the first that the position into which the fleet was forced was soessentially false that it could not be maintained, the unreflectingmultitude saw only the conversion into repulse and disaster of asubstantial success, of a conquest as apparently real as it was actuallyphantasmal. In the West, Grant was so stripped of troops that he fearedthe possibility of the Union forces being obliged to withdraw behind theOhio, as they had in the East recrossed the Potomac. "The most anxiousperiod of the war to me, " he afterward wrote, "was during the time thearmy of the Tennessee was guarding the territory acquired by the fall ofCorinth and Memphis, and before I was sufficiently re-enforced to takethe offensive"--from July 15 to October 15, 1862. 

The Confederate forces which confronted Grant in northern Mississippiduring these anxious months interposed between him and Vicksburg, andbelonged to the department charged with the defenses of the Mississippiriver. As they touched Grant, therefore, on the one side, on the otherthey were in contact with Farragut's command. The summer passed invarious movements by them, threatening Grant's position at Corinth, which culminated on the 3d of October in an attack in force. This wasrepulsed after hard fighting, and re-enforcements to Grant beginning tocome in, the Confederates themselves were thrown on the defensive. Theapproach of winter, bringing with it higher water and healthier weatheron the line of the Mississippi, warned them also that the time was athand when they might have to fight for the control of the watercommunications, upon which they no longer had, nor could hope to have, anaval force. Reports therefore began to reach the admiral in Pensacola, from the senior naval officer in the river, that the Confederates werewith renewed energy building batteries above Baton Rouge and stronglyfortifying Port Hudson. 

As there seemed no speedy prospect of obtaining the land force, withoutwhose co-operation an attack upon Mobile would be a fruitlessenterprise, Farragut felt his proper position was now in the Mississippiitself. Important as was the blockade service, it was of a charactersafely to be trusted to a subordinate; whereas the strictly militaryoperations of the approaching campaign, whatever shape they mightfinally take, would be for the control of the river. It thereforebehooved the commander-in-chief of the naval forces to be at hand, readyto support in any way that might offer the effort to obtain control of aregion of which the water communications were so characteristic afeature. To push far up a narrow and intricate river a force of ships, whose numbers are insufficient even to protect their own communicationsand insure their coal supplies, is one thing; it is quite another torepair to the same scene of action prepared to support the army bycontrolling the water, and by establishing in combined action a securesecondary base of operations from which further advances can be madewith reasonable certainty of holding the ground gained. There was noinconsistency between Farragut's reluctance of the spring and hisforwardness in the autumn. The man who, to secure New Orleans andcompass the fall of the forts, had dared to cut adrift from his base andthrow his communications to the winds, because he had an object adequateto the risk, was the same who, six weeks later, had testified hisanxiety about communications stretched too far and to no purpose; andnow, half a year after that reluctant ascent of the river against hisbetter judgment, we find him eagerly planning to go up again, establishing under the protection of the army an advanced base, fromwhich, with the supplies accumulated at it, further movements may becontemplated with a good chance of final success. 

On the 14th of November Farragut reported to the Navy Department hisreturn to New Orleans. The Government, however, had taken warning by thefiasco of the previous season; and, far from urging the admiral on, nowsought to impress him with the need for caution. As the great object ofopening the Mississippi and obtaining control of it remained, andnecessarily must remain, the first of the Government's aims in theSouthwest, the result of these instructions was to give Farragut thediscretion which had before been denied him. He retained fully hisconvictions of the summer. "I am ready for anything, " he writes to theDepartment, "but desire troops to hold what we get. General Butler urgesme to attack Port Hudson first, as he wishes to break up thatrendezvous before we go outside. It will take at least five thousand mento take Port Hudson. " In the same spirit he writes home, "I am stilldoing nothing but waiting for the tide of events, and doing all I can tohold what I have"; and again, a week later, "As Micawber says, I amwaiting for something to turn up, and in the mean time having patiencefor the water to rise. " Readiness to act, but no precipitation; waitingfor circumstances, over which he had no control, to justify acting, maybe described as his attitude at this moment. 

On the 16th of December the arrival from the north of General Banks torelieve General Butler--an event which took Farragut much bysurprise--gave him the opportunity to show at once his own ideas of theproper military steps to be taken. Banks had brought re-enforcementswith him; and three days after his coming the admiral writes to theDepartment: "I have recommended to General Banks the occupation of BatonRouge. .. . It is only twelve or fifteen miles from Port Hudson, and istherefore a fine base of operations. He has approved of the move, andordered his transports to proceed directly to that point. I orderedCommander James Alden, in the Richmond, with two gunboats, to accompanythem and cover the landing. " Baton Rouge is on the southernmost of thebluffs which in rapid succession skirt the Mississippi below Vicksburg. With an adequate garrison it became a base of operations from which thearmy could move against Port Hudson when the time came; and under itsprotection the colliers and supplies necessary for the naval vessels inthe advance could safely remain. 

While waiting for the new commander of the army to get fairly settled towork and ready for the combined movement which Farragut was eager tomake, the latter was called upon to endure some sharp disappointments. On the 1st of January, 1863, the military forces in Galveston wereattacked by Confederate troops, and the naval vessels by a number ofriver steamboats barricaded with cotton to resist shells fired againstthem, and loaded with riflemen. The garrison was captured, one of thegunboats blown up by her own officers, and another surrendered after hercaptain and first lieutenant had been killed on her decks. The othervessels abandoned the harbor. The affair was not only a disaster; it wasattended with discreditable circumstances, which excited in the admiralindignation as well as regret. Shortly afterward, two sailing vessels ofthe squadron, charged with the blockade of Sabine Pass, were also takenby cotton-clad steamers; which to attack availed themselves of a calmday, when the ships were unable to manoeuvre. An unsuccessful attemptwas made after this to take Sabine Pass; but both that place andGalveston remained in the power of the enemy, and were not regaineduntil the final collapse of the Confederacy. Farragut dispatched one ofhis most trusted and capable officers, Commodore Henry H. Bell, formerlyhis chief-of-staff, to re-establish the blockade of Galveston. Arrivingoff the port toward night, Bell sent one of his detachment, theHatteras, a light side-wheel iron steamer bought from the merchantservice, to overhaul a sail in the offing. Unfortunately, the strangerproved to be the Confederate steamer Alabama, far superior in force tothe Hatteras, and after a short engagement the latter was sunk. 

All this bad news came in rapid succession, and was closely followed bytidings of the escape from Mobile of the Oreto, which a few monthsbefore had eluded the blockading squadron through the daring rusepracticed by her commander. Known now as the Florida, and fitted as aConfederate cruiser, she ran out successfully during the night ofJanuary 15th. Here again, though the discredit was less than atGalveston, the annoyance of the admiral was increased by the knowledgethat carelessness, or, at the best, bad judgment, had contributed to theenemy's success. From a letter written home at this time by his son, whohad not yet returned from the visit begun at Pensacola, it appears thatin the intimacy of family life he admitted, and showed by his manner, how keenly he felt the discredit to his command from these events. Though conscious that they were not due to failure on his part to do hisutmost with the force given to him, and seeing in the escape of theOreto a further justification of his own opinion that the lower harborof Mobile should have been early seized, he nevertheless was "very muchworried. " This inside view of the effect, visible to those from whom hehad no concealments, is supplemented by the description of the admiral'sbearing under these reverses given by Captain (now Rear-Admiral)Jenkins, who at this time became his chief-of-staff. "These disasters, "he writes, "were sore trials to the admiral, and a less well-poised manwould have given way; but they seemed only to give him greater strengthof will and purpose. .. . I myself had the misfortune, after months ofwatching, to see the Oreto run out the first night after I had beenrelieved of the command of the Oneida and ordered to report to theadmiral as his fleet-captain. I had to bear him these bad tidings. Though no stoic, he bore the news as one accustomed to misfortune. " Itmay seem, indeed, that these events, considered individually, were butinstances of the hard knocks to be looked for in war, of which everygeneral officer in every campaign must expect to have his share; andthis view is undoubtedly true. Nevertheless, occurring in such rapidsuccession, and all in that part of his extensive command, the blockade, to which at that moment it seemed impossible to give his principalattention, the effect was naturally staggering. His first impulse was toleave the river and repair in person to the scene of disaster in Texas;but reflection soon convinced him that, however unfortunate theoccurrences that had taken place there and elsewhere on the coast, theyhad not the same vital bearing on the issues of the war as the controlof the Mississippi, and therefore not an equal claim upon thecommander-in-chief. 

At the same time, the effect was to intensify the desire to act--toredeem by success the blot which failures had brought upon his command;and the state of affairs elsewhere on the river was becoming such as tojustify enterprise by the reasonable hope of substantial results. Aseries of circumstances which have been often narrated, and nowhere in amore interesting manner than by General Grant in his personal memoirs, had led to the abandonment of the movement by land upon Vicksburg by theArmy of the Tennessee, following the Mississippi Central Railroad. Instead of this original plan of campaign, the Mississippi River was nowadopted as the line of advance and of communications. The first movealong this new line had been made by General Sherman, who brought withhim 32, 000 troops, and on the 26th of December, 1862, had landed on thelow ground between the mouth of the Yazoo and Vicksburg. On the 29th thearmy assaulted the works on the hills before them, but were repulsed. Sherman, satisfied that the position there was too strong to be carried, had determined to change his point of attack to the extreme right of theenemy's line, higher up the Yazoo; but the heavy rains whichcharacterized the winter of 1862-'63 in the Mississippi Valley madeuntenable the ground on which the troops were, and it became necessaryto re-embark them. The transports were then moved out into theMississippi, where they were joined by General McClernand, the seniorgeneral officer in the department under Grant himself. 

McClernand now decided to attack Arkansas Post, on the Arkansas River, which enters the Mississippi from the west about two hundred miles aboveVicksburg. The Post was primarily intended to close the Arkansas and theapproach to the capital of the State of the same name; but althoughfifty miles from the mouth of the river, it was, by the course of thestream, but fifteen by land from the Mississippi. The garrison, beingfive thousand strong, was thus dangerously placed to threaten thecommunications by the latter river, upon which the army was to dependduring the approaching campaign; and it had already given evidence ofthe fact by the capture of a valuable transport. This post was reducedon the 11th of January, and McClernand next day started troops up theWhite River, a tributary of the Arkansas. From this ex-centric movement, which seemed wholly to ignore that Vicksburg and the Mississippi werethe objective of the campaign, McClernand was speedily and peremptorilyrecalled by Grant. The latter, having absolutely no confidence in thecapacity of his senior subordinate, could dispossess him of the chiefcommand only by assuming it himself. This he accordingly did, and on the30th of January joined the army, which was then encamped on the leveesalong the west bank of the river above Vicksburg. 

Serious action on the part of the army, directed by a man of whosevigorous character there could be no doubt, though his conspicuousability was not yet fully recognized, was evidently at hand; and thiscircumstance, by itself alone, imparted a very different aspect to anynaval enterprises, giving them reasonable prospect of support and ofconducing substantially to the great common end. Never in the history ofcombined movements has there been more hearty co-operation between thearmy and navy than in the Vicksburg campaign of 1863, under theleadership of Grant and Porter. From the nature of the enemy's positionstheir forcible reduction was necessarily in the main the task of theland forces; but that the latter were able to exert their full strength, unweakened, and without anxiety as to their long line of communicationsfrom Memphis to Vicksburg, was due to the incessant vigilance andactivity of the Mississippi flotilla, which grudged neither pains norhard knocks to support every movement. But, besides the care of our owncommunications, there was the no less important service of harassing orbreaking up those of the enemy. Of these, the most important was withthe States west of the Mississippi. Not to speak of cereals and sugar, Texas alone, in the Southwest, produced an abundance of vigorous beefcattle fit for food; and from no other part of the seceded States couldthe armies on the east banks of the Mississippi be adequately supplied. Bordering, moreover, upon Mexico, and separated from it only by a shoalriver into which the United States ships could not penetrate, therepoured across that line quantities of munitions of war, which foundthrough the Mexican port of Matamoras a safe entry, everywhere elseclosed to them by the sea-board blockade. For the transit of these thenumerous streams west of the Mississippi, and especially the mighty RedRiver, offered peculiar facilities. The principal burden of breaking upthese lines of supply was thrown upon the navy by the character of thescene of operations--by its numerous water-courses subsidiary to thegreat river itself, and by the overflow of the land, which, in itsdeluged condition during the winter, effectually prevented the movementof troops. Herein Farragut saw his opportunity, as well as that of theupper river flotilla. To wrest the control of the Mississippi out of theenemy's hands, by reducing his positions, was the great aim of thecampaign; until that could be effected, the patrol of the sectionbetween Vicksburg and Port Hudson would materially conduce to the sameend. 

Over this Farragut pondered long and anxiously. He clearly recognizedthe advantage of this service, but he also knew the difficultiesinvolved in maintaining his necessary communications, and, above all, his coal. At no time did the enemy cease their annoyance from the riverbanks. Constant brushes took place between their flying batteries andthe different gunboats on patrol duty; a kind of guerrilla warfare, which did not cease even with the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, butnaturally attained its greatest animation during the months when theirfate was hanging in the balance. The gunboats could repel such attacks, though they were often roughly handled, and several valuable officerslost their lives; but not being able to pursue, the mere frustration ofa particular attack did not help to break up a system of very greatannoyance. Only a force able to follow--in other words, troops--couldsuppress the evil. "You will no doubt hear more, " the admiral writes onthe 1st of February, 1863, "of 'Why don't Farragut's fleet move up theriver?' Tell them, Because the army is not ready. Farragut waits uponBanks as to when or where he will go. "

Still, even while thus dancing attendance upon a somewhat dilatorygeneral, his plans were maturing; so that when occasion arose he was, asalways, ready for immediate action--had no unforeseen decision to make. "The evening of the day (about January 20th) that I reported to him atNew Orleans, " writes Admiral Jenkins, "he sent everybody out of thecabin, and said: 'I wish to have some confidential talk with you upon asubject which I have had in mind for a long time. .. . I have never hintedit to any one, nor does the department know anything of my thoughts. Thefirst object to be accomplished, which led me to think seriously aboutit, is to cripple the Southern armies by cutting off their suppliesfrom Texas. Texas at this time is, and must continue to the end of thewar to be, their main dependence for beef cattle, sheep, and Indiancorn. If we can get a few vessels above Port Hudson the thing will notbe an entire failure, and I am pretty confident it can be done. '"Jenkins naturally suggested that the co-operation of the army by anactive advance at the same time would materially assist the attempt. Tothis, of course, the admiral assented, it being in entire conformitywith his own opinion; and several interviews were held, without, however, their leading to any definite promise on the part of GeneralBanks. 

Meantime Admiral Porter, who after leaving the mortar flotilla had beenappointed to the command of the Mississippi squadron, with the rank ofacting rear-admiral, realized as forcibly as Farragut the importance ofplacing vessels in the waters between Vicksburg and Port Hudson. In themiddle of December he was before Vicksburg, and had since then beenactively supporting the various undertakings of the land forces. Threedays after Grant joined the army, on the 2d of February, the ram Queenof the West ran the Vicksburg batteries from above, and successfullyreached the river below. Ten days later, Porter sent on one of hisnewest ironclads, the Indianola, which made the same passage under coverof night without being even hit, although twenty minutes under fire. Thelatter vessel took with her two coal barges; and as the experiment hadalready been successfully tried of casting coal barges loose above thebatteries, and trusting to the current to carry them down to the Queenof the West, the question of supplies was looked upon as settled. TheIndianola was very heavily armed, and both the admiral and her commanderthought her capable of meeting any force the enemy could send againsther. 

Unfortunately, on the 14th of February, two days only after theIndianola got down, the Queen of the West was run ashore under a batteryand allowed to fall alive into the hands of the enemy. The latter atonce repaired the prize, and, when ready, started in pursuit of theIndianola with it and two other steamers; one of which was a ram, theother a cotton-protected boat filled with riflemen. There was also withthem a tender, which does not appear to have taken part in the fight. Onthe night of February 24th the pursuers overtook the Indianola, and asharp action ensued; but the strength of the current and her ownunwieldiness placed the United States vessel at a disadvantage, whichher superior armament did not, in the dim light, counterbalance. She wasrammed six or seven times, and, being then in a sinking condition, hercommander ran her on the bank and surrendered. This put an end toPorter's attempts to secure that part of the river by a detachment. Theprospect, that had been fair enough when the Queen of the West was sentdown, was much marred by the loss of that vessel; and the subsequentcapture of the Indianola transferred so much power into the hands of theConfederates, that control could only be contested by a force which hecould not then afford to risk. 

The up-river squadron having failed to secure the coveted command of theriver, and, besides, transferred to the enemy two vessels which mightbecome very formidable, Farragut felt that the time had come when he notonly might but ought to move. He was growing more and more restless, more and more discontented with his own inactivity, when such animportant work was waiting to be done. The news of the Queen of theWest's capture made him still more uneasy; but when that was followed bythe loss of the Indianola, his decision was taken at once. "The time hascome, " he said to Captain Jenkins; "there can be no more delay. I mustgo--army or no army. " Another appeal, however, was made to Banks, representing the assistance which the squadron would derive in itsattempt to pass the batteries from a demonstration made by the army. Thepermanent works at Port Hudson then mounted nineteen heavy cannon, manyof them rifled; but there were reported to be in addition as many asthirty-five field-pieces, which, at the distance the fleet would have topass, would be very effective. If the army made a serious diversion inthe rear, many of these would be withdrawn, especially if Farragut'spurpose to run by did not transpire. The advantage to be gained by thisnaval enterprise was so manifest that the general could scarcely refuse, and he promised to make the required demonstration with eight or tenthousand troops. 

On the 12th of March, within a fortnight after hearing of the Indianolaaffair, Farragut was off Baton Rouge. On the 14th he anchored just aboveProfit's Island, seven miles below Port Hudson, where were alreadyassembled a number of the mortar schooners, under the protection of theironclad Essex, formerly of the upper squadron. The admiral brought withhim seven vessels, for the most part essentially fighting ships, unfitted for blockade duty by their indifferent speed, but carryingheavy batteries. If the greater part got by, they would present a forcecalculated to clear the river of every hostile steamer and absolutelyprevent any considerable amount of supplies being transferred from oneshore to the other. 

For the purpose of this passage Farragut adopted a somewhat noveltactical arrangement, which he again used at Mobile, and which presentsparticular advantages when there are enemies only on one side to beengaged. Three of his vessels were screw steamers of heavy tonnage andbattery; three others comparatively light. He directed, therefore, thateach of the former should take one of the latter on the side opposite tothe enemy, securing her well aft, in order to have as many guns aspossible, on the unengaged side, free for use in case of necessity. Inthis way the smaller vessels were protected without sacrificing theoffensive power of the larger. Not only so; in case of injury to theboilers or engines of one, it was hoped that those of her consort mightpull her through. To equalize conditions, to the slowest of the bigships was given the most powerful of the smaller ones. A furtheradvantage was obtained in this fight, as at Mobile, from thisarrangement of the vessels in pairs, which will be mentioned at the timeof its occurrence. The seventh ship at Port Hudson, the Mississippi, wasa very large side-wheel steamer. On account of the inconveniencepresented by the guards of her wheel-houses, she was chosen as the oddone to whom no consort was assigned. 

 [Illustration: ORDER OF ATTACK ON BATTERIES AT PORT HUDSON, MARCH 14, 1863. 

 A. Hartford (flag-ship), Captain James S. Palmer. _a. _ Albatross, Lieut. -Com. John E. Hart. B. Richmond, Commander James Alden. _b. _ Genesee, Commander W. H. Macomb. C. Monongahela, Captain J. P. McKinstry. _c. _ Kineo, Lieut. -Com. John Waters. D. Mississippi, Captain Melancton Smith. E. Essex, Commander C. H. B. Caldwell. F. Sachem, Act. Vol. Lieut. Amos Johnson. G. G. Mortar schooners. H. Spot where Mississippi grounded. ]

Going up the river toward Port Hudson the course is nearly north; then abend is reached of over ninety degrees, so that after making the turnthe course for some distance is west-southwest. The town is on the eastside, just below the bend. From it the batteries extended a mile and ahalf down the river, upon bluffs from eighty to a hundred feet high. Between the two reaches, and opposite to the town, is a low, narrowpoint, from which a very dangerous shoal makes out. The channel runsclose to the east bank. 

The squadron remained at its anchorage above Profit's Island but a fewhours, waiting for the cover of night. Shortly before 10 P. M. It gotunder way, ranged as follows: Hartford, Richmond, Monongahela, each withher consort lashed alongside, the Mississippi bringing up the rear. Justas they were fairly starting a steamer was seen approaching from downthe river, flaring lights and making the loud puffing of thehigh-pressure engines. The flag-ship slowed down, and the new arrivalcame alongside with a message from the general that the army was thenencamped about five miles in rear of the Port Hudson batteries. Irritated by a delay, which served only to attract the enemy's attentionand to assure himself that no diversion was to be expected from thearmy, the admiral was heard to mutter: "He had as well be in New Orleansor at Baton Rouge for all the good he is doing us. " At the same momentthe east bank of the river was lit up, and on the opposite point hugebonfires kindled to illumine the scene--a wise precaution, the neglectof which by the enemy had much favored the fleet in the passage of thelower forts. 

The ships now moved on steadily, but very slowly, owing to the force ofthe current. At 11 P. M. The Hartford had already passed the lowerbatteries, when the enemy threw up rockets and opened fire. This wasreturned not only by the advancing ships, but also by the ironclad Essexand the mortar schooners, which had been stationed to cover the passage. The night was calm and damp, and the cannonade soon raised a dense smokewhich settled heavily upon the water, covering the ships from sight, butembarrassing their movements far more than it disconcerted the aim oftheir opponents. The flag-ship, being in the advance, drew somewhatahead of the smoke, although even she had from time to time to stopfiring to enable the pilot to see. Her movements were also facilitatedby placing the pilot in the mizzen-top, with a speaking tube tocommunicate with the deck, a precaution to which the admiral largelyattributed her safety; but the vessels in the rear found it impossibleto see, and groped blindly, feeling their way after their leader. Hadthe course to be traversed been a straight line, the difficulty wouldhave been much less; but to make so sharp a turn as awaited them at thebend was no easy feat under the prevailing obscurity. As the Hartfordattempted it the downward current caught her on the port bow, swung herhead round toward the batteries, and nearly threw her on shore, her stemtouching for a moment. The combined powers of her own engine and that ofthe Albatross, her consort, were then brought into play as an oarsmanuses the oars to turn his boat, pulling one and backing the other; thatof the Albatross was backed, while that of the Hartford went aheadstrong. In this way their heads were pointed up stream and they wentthrough clear; but they were the only ones who effected the passage. 

The Richmond, which followed next, had reached the bend and was about toturn when a plunging shot upset both safety valves, allowing so muchsteam to escape that the engines could not be efficiently worked. Thinking that the Genesee, her companion, could not alone pull the twovessels by, the captain of the Richmond turned and carried them bothdown stream. The Monongahela, third in the line, ran on the shoalopposite to the town with so much violence that the gunboat Kineo, alongside of her, tore loose from the fastenings. The Monongahelaremained aground for twenty-five minutes, when the Kineo succeeded ingetting her off. She then attempted again to run the batteries, but whennear the turn a crank-pin became heated and the engines stopped. Beingnow unmanageable, she drifted down stream and out of action, having lostsix killed and twenty-one wounded. The Mississippi also struck on theshoal, close to the bend, when she was going very fast, and defied everyeffort to get her off. After working for thirty-five minutes, findingthat the other ships had passed off the scene leaving her unsupported, while three batteries had her range and were hulling her constantly, thecommanding officer ordered her to be set on fire. The three boats thatalone were left capable of floating were used to land the crew on thewest bank; the sick and wounded being first taken, the captain and firstlieutenant leaving the ship last. She remained aground and in flamesuntil three in the morning, when she floated and drifted down stream, fortunately going clear of the vessels below. At half-past five she blewup. Out of a ship's company of two hundred and ninety-seven, sixty-fourwere found missing, of whom twenty-five were believed to be killed. 

In his dispatch to the Navy Department, written the second day afterthis affair, the admiral lamented that he had again to report disasterto a part of his command. A disaster indeed it was, but not of the kindwhich he had lately had to communicate, and to which the word "again"seems to refer; for there was no discredit attending it. The sternresolution with which the Hartford herself was handled, and thesteadiness with which she and her companion were wrenched out of thevery jaws of destruction, offer a consummate example of professionalconduct; while the fate of the Mississippi, deplorable as the loss of sofine a vessel was, gave rise to a display of that coolness andefficiency in the face of imminent danger which illustrate the annals ofa navy as nobly as do the most successful deeds of heroism. 

Nevertheless, it must be admitted that the failure to pass thebatteries, by nearly three fourths of the force which the admiral hadthought necessary to take with him, constituted a very serious check tothe operations he had projected. From Port Hudson to Vicksburg is overtwo hundred miles; and while the two ships he still had were sufficientto blockade the mouth of the Red River--the chief line by which suppliesreached the enemy--they could not maintain over the entire district thewatchfulness necessary wholly to intercept communication between the twoshores. Neither could they for the briefest period abandon their stationat the river's mouth, without affording an opportunity to the enemy; whowas rendered vigilant by urgent necessities which forced him to seizeevery opening for the passage of stores. From the repulse of five out ofthe seven ships detailed for the control of the river, it resulted thatthe enemy's communications, on a line absolutely vital to him, andconsequently of supreme strategic importance, were impeded only, notbroken off. It becomes, therefore, of interest to inquire whether thisfailure can be attributed to any oversight or mistake in thearrangements made for forcing the passage--in the tactical dispositions, to use the technical phrase. In this, as in every case, thosedispositions should be conformed to the object to be attained and to theobstacles which must be overcome. 

The purpose which the admiral had in view was clearly stated in thegeneral order issued to his captains: "The captains will bear in mindthat the object is _to run the batteries at the least possible damage toour ships_, and thereby secure an efficient force above, for the purposeof rendering such assistance as may be required of us to the army atVicksburg, or, if not required there, to our army at Baton Rouge. " Suchwas the object, and the obstacles to its accomplishment were twofold, viz. , those arising from the difficulties of the navigation, and thosedue to the preparations of the enemy. To overcome them, it was necessaryto provide a sufficient force, and to dispose that force in the mannerbest calculated to insure the passage, as well as to entail the leastexposure. Exposure is measured by three principal elements--the size andcharacter of the target offered, the length of time under fire, and thepower of the enemy's guns; and the last, again, depends not merely uponthe number and size of the guns, but also upon the fire with which theyare met. In this same general order Farragut enunciated, in terse andvigorous terms, a leading principle in warfare, which there is now atendency to undervalue, in the struggle to multiply gun-shields andother defensive contrivances. It is with no wish to disparage defensivepreparations, nor to ignore that ships must be able to bear as well asto give hard knocks, that this phrase of Farragut's, embodying theexperience of war in all ages and the practice of all great captains, ishere recalled, "The best protection against the enemy's fire is awell-directed fire from our own guns. "

The disposition adopted for the squadron was chiefly a development ofthis simple principle, combined with an attempt to form the ships insuch an order as should offer the least favorable target to the enemy. Adouble column of ships, if it presents to the enemy a battery formidableenough to subdue his fire, in whole or in part, shows a smaller targetthan the same number disposed in a single column; because the latterorder will be twice as long in passing, with no greater display ofgun-power at a particular point. The closer the two columns aretogether, the less chance there is that a shot flying over the nearership will strike one abreast her; therefore, when the two are lashedside by side this risk is least, and at the same time the near shipprotects the off one from the projectile that strikes herself. Theseremarks would apply, in degree, if all the ships of the squadron had hadpowerful batteries; the limitation being only that enough guns must bein the near or fighting column to support each other, and to preventseveral of the enemy's batteries being concentrated on a single ship--acontingency dependent upon the length of the line of hostile guns to bepassed. But when, as at Port Hudson, several of the vessels are offeeble gun-power, so that their presence in the fighting column wouldnot re-enforce its fire to an extent at all proportionate to the risk tothemselves, the arrangement there adopted is doubly efficacious. 

The dispositions to meet and overcome the difficulties imposed by theenemy's guns amounted, therefore, to concentrating upon them thebatteries of the heavy ships, supporting each other, and at the sametime covering the passage of a second column of gunboats, which wasplaced in the most favorable position for escaping injury. In principlethe plan was the same as at New Orleans--the heavy ships fought whilethe light were to slip by; but in application, the circumstances at thelower forts would not allow one battery to be masked as at Port Hudson, because there were enemy's works on both sides. For meeting thedifficulties of the navigation on this occasion, Farragut seems not tohave been pleased with the arrangement adopted. "With the exception ofthe assistance they might have rendered the ships, if disabled, theywere a great disadvantage, " he wrote. The exception, however, isweighty; and, taken in connection with his subsequent use of the sameorder at Mobile, it may be presumed the sentence quoted was writtenunder the momentary recollection of some inconvenience attending thispassage. Certainly, with single-screw vessels, as were all his fleet, itwas an inestimable advantage, in intricate navigation or in closequarters, to have the help of a second screw working in opposition tothe first, to throw the ship round at a critical instant. In the suprememoment of his military life, at Mobile, he had reason to appreciate thisadvantage, which he there, as here, most intelligently used. 

Thus analyzed, there is found no ground for adverse criticism in thetactical dispositions made by Farragut on this memorable occasion. Thestrong points of his force were utilized and properly combined formutual support, and for the covering of the weaker elements, whichreceived all the protection possible to give them. Minor matters ofdetail were well thought out, such as the assignment to the morepowerful ship of the weaker gunboat, and the position in which the smallvessels were to be secured alongside. The motto that "the bestprotection against the enemy's fire is a well-directed fire by our ownguns" was in itself an epitome of the art of war; and in pursuance of itthe fires of the mortar schooners and of the Essex were carefullycombined by the admiral with that of the squadron. Commander Caldwell, of the Essex, an exceedingly cool and intelligent officer, reported that"the effect of the mortar fire (two hundred bombs being thrown in onehundred and fifty minutes, from eleven to half-past one) seemed to be toparalyze the efforts of the enemy at the lower batteries; and weobserved that their fire was quite feeble compared to that of the upperbatteries. " Nor had the admiral fallen into the mistake of many generalofficers, in trusting too lightly to the comprehension of his orders byhis subordinates. Appreciating at once the high importance of the objecthe sought to compass, and the very serious difficulties arising from theenemy's position at Port Hudson and the character of the navigation, hehad personally inspected the ships of his command the day before theaction, and satisfied himself that the proper arrangements had been madefor battle. His general order had already been given to each commandingofficer, and he adds: "We conversed freely as to the arrangements, and Ifound that all my instructions were well understood and, I believe, concurred in by all. After a free interchange of opinions on thesubject, every commander arranged his ship in accordance with his ownideas. "

In this point the admiral appears to have made a mistake, in not makingobligatory one detail which he employed on board the flag-ship. "I haddirected a trumpet fixed from the mizzen-top to the wheel on board thisship, as I intended the pilot to take his station in the top, so that hemight see over the fog, or smoke, as the case might be. To this idea, and to the coolness and courage of my pilot, Mr. Carrell, I am indebtedfor the safe passage of this ship past the forts. " It may be that theadmiral counted upon the vessels being so closed up that the flag-shipwould practically serve as the pilot for all. If so, he reckoned withouthis host, and in this small oversight or error in judgment is possiblyto be found a weak point in his preparations; but it is the only one. The failure of the Richmond, his immediate follower, was not in any waydue to pilotage, but to the loss of steam by an accidental shot; and itis still a matter of doubt whether the Genesee, her consort, might nothave pulled her by. The third in the order, the Monongahela, also failedfinally from the heating of a bearing; but as this occurred after beingaground for half an hour, with the vigorous working of the engines thatnaturally ensues under such circumstances, it seems as if her failuremust ultimately be traced to the smoke. "The firing had so filled theatmosphere with smoke, " wrote her captain, "as to prevent distinguishingobjects near by. " The loss of the Mississippi was due entirely to anerror of the pilot, whatever may have been the cause. 

The effect of the appearance above Port Hudson of the Hartford andAlbatross is abundantly testified in the correspondence of the day, bothUnion and Confederate, and justifies beyond dispute this fine conceptionof Farragut's and the great risk which he took entirely upon his ownresponsibility. He found, indeed, a ground for his action in an order ofthe Department dated October 2, 1862, [U] directing him "to guard thelower part of the Mississippi, especially where it is joined by the RedRiver, " until he heard from Admiral Porter that the latter, inconjunction with the army, had opened the river; but he distrusted theconsent of the Secretary to his running the great risk involved in thepassage of Port Hudson. As Grant was ordered to take Vicksburg, so wasFarragut ordered to blockade the Red River; and as Grant did not notifythe commander-in-chief of his final great resolve to cut loose from hisbase, until it was too late to stop him, so did Farragut keep within hisown breast a resolve upon which he feared an interdict. For even aftertwo years of war the department was embarrassed for ships, and thepolicy of economy, of avoiding risks, the ever fatal policy of a haltingwarfare, was forced upon it--an impressive illustration of the effectexerted by inadequate preparation upon the operations of war. For lackof ships, Mobile was in 1863 still in the hands of the enemy. "I wouldhave had it long since or been thrashed out of it, " wrote Farragut sixweeks before Port Hudson. "I feel no fears on the subject; _but they donot wish their ships risked, for fear we might not be able to hold theMississippi_. " A similar reluctance might be anticipated to expose suchvaluable vessels as attacked Port Hudson, when their loss was so hard torepair; for only men of the temper of Farragut or Grant--men with anatural genius for war or enlightened by their knowledge of thepast--can fully commit themselves to the hazard of a greatadventure--can fully realize that a course of timid precaution mayentail the greatest of risks. 

 [Footnote U: The full text of this order was as follows. It committed the department to nothing. 

 "NAVY DEPARTMENT, _October 2. 1862_. 

 "SIR: While the Mississippi River continues to be blockaded at Vicksburg, and until you learn from Commander D. D. Porter, who will be in command of the Mississippi squadron, that he has, in conjunction with the army, opened the river, it will be necessary for you to guard the lower part of that river, especially where it is joined by the Red River, the source of many of the supplies of the enemy. I am respectfully, etc. , "GIDEON WELLES. "_Secretary of the Navy. _"

 That five months elapsed between the date of this order and Farragut's action, without anything more definite, shows clearly that the department took no responsibility. On the other hand, it is right to say that it showed a generous appreciation of the effort, and did not complain about the losses. ]

"Your services at Red River, " wrote Admiral Porter to Farragut uponhearing of his arrival above Port Hudson, "will be a godsend; it isworth to us the loss of the "Mississippi, " and is at this moment theseverest blow that could be struck at the South. They obtain all theirsupplies and ammunition in that way. .. . The great object is to cut offsupplies. For that reason I sent down the Queen of the West and theIndianola. I regret that the loss of the Indianola should have been thecause of your present position. " These utterances, which bespeak therelief afforded him at the moment by Farragut's bold achievement, areconfirmed by the words written many years later in his History of theNavy. "Farragut in the Hartford, with the Albatross, reached the mouthof the Red River, and Port Hudson was as completely cut off fromsupplies as if fifty gunboats were there. .. . It was soon seen that theobject aimed at had been gained--the works at Port Hudson were cut offfrom supplies and the fate of the garrison sealed. " "I look upon it asof vast importance, " wrote General Grant, "that we should hold the riversecurely between Vicksburg and Port Hudson"; and he undertook tocontribute anything that the army could furnish to enable vessels fromabove to run by Vicksburg, and so supply to Farragut the numbers heneeded through the repulse of his own ships. 

"The Mississippi is again cut off, " wrote to Richmond the ConfederateGeneral Pemberton, who commanded the district in which are Vicksburg andPort Hudson, "neither subsistence nor ordnance can come or go"; and thefollowing day, March 20th, the sixth after Farragut's passage, he sendsword to General Richard Taylor, on the west shore, "Port Hudson dependsalmost entirely for supplies upon the other side of the river. " "GreatGod! how unfortunate!" writes, on March 17th, a Confederate commissaryin Taylor's department. "Four steamers arrived to-day from Shreveport. One had 300, 000 pounds of bacon; three others are reported coming downwith loads. Five others are below with full cargoes designed for PortHudson, but it is reported that the Federal gunboats are blockading theriver. " As to passing by other points, "it is doubtful whether manycattle ever get through the swamps and bayous through which they arerequired to pass on this side. As the water declines, I think likelycattle in large quantities can be crossed by swimming, but _at presentyour prospect of getting supplies from this side is gloomy enough_. ""Early in February, " writes Pemberton again, "the enemy succeeded inpassing two of his gunboats by our batteries at Vicksburg" (theIndianola and Queen of the West). "This at once rendered the navigationof the Mississippi and Red River dangerous, and from that time it wasonly by watching opportunities, and at great risk of capture, thatsupplies could be thrown into Port Hudson and Vicksburg. Nevertheless, large amounts were successfully introduced into both places. "

This success, partial as it was, was due, first, to the capture ofPorter's detachment, which opened the river again until Farragut came;and, secondly, to the repulse of so large a portion of the latter'ssquadron. The Hartford and Albatross, though they could close the RedRiver, could not multiply themselves to cover the great stretch whichthe admiral had purposed to occupy with seven vessels. Neither was theAlbatross of sufficient force to be left by herself at the mouth of theRed River. Farragut therefore moved slowly up the Mississippi, destroying a quantity of stores accumulated upon the levees awaitingtransportation, as well as a number of flat-boats; and on the afternoonof the 19th of March he anchored twelve miles below Vicksburg. Thefollowing day he moved further up and communicated with General Grant, informing him of the events that had just befallen him and offering anyassistance in the power of the two ships. If not needed, he purposedreturning to Red River, and asked for coal from either army or navy. Porter was then absent on the Deer Creek expedition, an attempt to getthe Mississippi gunboats through the bayou of that name into the Yazoo;whereby, if successful, the Confederate position at Vicksburg would beturned. Grant accordingly undertook to send down coal, which was done byturning adrift in the current of the Mississippi a barge carrying somefour hundred tons. This floated by night clear of the enemy's positions, and was picked up by boats from the Hartford. 

Farragut had written to Porter of his wish to receive some vessels fromabove, specifying two rams and an ironclad, with which and his own twovessels he could better carry out his purpose of closing the wholestretch in which he was. He intimated this wish to Grant, who highlyapproved of it. "I see by Southern papers received yesterday, " he wroteto Farragut, "that Vicksburg must depend upon Louisiana, or west of theMississippi, for supplies. Holding Red River from them is a great stepin the direction of preventing this, but it will not entirely accomplishthe object. New Carthage (twenty miles below Vicksburg, on the westbank) should be held, and it seems to me that in addition we should havesufficient vessels below to patrol the whole river from Warrenton (tenmiles below Vicksburg) to the Red River. I will have a consultation withAdmiral Porter on this subject. I am happy to say the admiral and myselfhave never yet disagreed upon any policy. " In the absence of Porter, General Ellet determined to send down two of the Ellet rams, which madetheir dash on the morning of March 25, displaying all the daring, butunfortunately also much of the recklessness, which characterized thatremarkable family. Starting near dawn, on a singularly clear night, theywere surprised by daylight still under fire. One, being very rotten, wasshattered to pieces by a shell exploding her boilers. The other wasdisabled, also by a shell in the boilers, but, being stronger, drifteddown with the current and reached Farragut safely. She was soonrepaired, and was an addition to his force. 

While lying below Vicksburg the admiral transferred to Porter's care, for passage north by the Mississippi River, his son and only child, whohad been with him since the summer stay in Pensacola. They had passedthe batteries at Port Hudson together, the bearing of the boy in thathot contest approving itself to the father, who, despite his anxiety, could not bring himself to accept the surgeon's suggestion to send himbelow, out of harm's way. "I am trying to make up my mind to part withLoyall, " he wrote to his wife, "and to let him go home by way of Cairo. I am too devoted a father to have my son with me in troubles of thiskind. The anxieties of a father should not be added to those of thecommander. "

On the 27th of March the Hartford started again down river, accompaniedby the Albatross and the Ellet ram Switzerland. On the 2d of April thelittle squadron anchored off the mouth of the Red River, having on itspassage down again destroyed a number of skiffs and flat-boats used fortransporting stores. Warned by the fate of the Indianola, the admiralleft nothing undone to ensure the absolute safety of the flag-ship; for, though her powerful armament and numerous crew gave her a greatsuperiority over any number of river vessels, granting her room tomanoeuvre, the difficulties of the river and the greatness of thestake to both parties made it imperative to take no needless risks. As aprotection against rams, large cypress logs were hung around the shipabout a foot above the water line, where they would both resistpenetration and also give time for the elasticity of the frame of awooden vessel to take up the blow. Against boarding, elaboratepreparations were made, which would prevent a steamer attempting it fromgetting nearer than twenty feet to the side, where she would remain aneasy victim to the shell and grape of the Hartford's guns. 

From the 2d to the 30th of April Farragut remained in the neighborhoodof the Red River, between its mouth and Port Hudson. Cut off by thebatteries of the place, and by the prevalence of guerrillas on the westbank, from all usual means of communication with General Banks and hisown squadron, he contrived to get a letter down by the daring of hissecretary, Mr. Edward C. Gabaudan; who was set adrift one night in askiff ingeniously covered with drift brush, and, thus concealed, floatedundiscovered past the enemy's guards. The small number of his vesselsprevented his extending his blockade as far as he wished; but in closingthe Red River he deprived the enemy of by far the best line theypossessed, and he destroyed a quantity of stores and boats. 

In the mean time diverse and important events were concurring to releasehim from his position of isolation. Toward the end of March GeneralGrant, who had for some time abandoned all expectation of turningVicksburg by its right flank, began the celebrated movement down thewest side of the Mississippi; whence he crossed to the east bank atBruinsburg, and fought the campaign which ended by shutting up Pembertonand his army within the lines of the place. In furtherance of this plan, Porter himself, with a large body of his ships, ran the batteries atVicksburg on the night of April 16. The fleet then kept pace with thenecessarily slow progress of the army, encumbered with trains, throughthe roads heavy with the mire of the recent overflow. On the 29th ofApril the Mississippi squadron fought a sharp engagement with theConfederate batteries at Grand Gulf, which they could not reduce; andthe following day Grant's army crossed the river. 

While these events were bringing the Mississippi squadron into that partof the river which Farragut had aimed to control, other movements wereleading to his assistance some of the lighter vessels of his owncommand. After the naval action at Port Hudson, Banks had temporarilyabandoned his designs upon that post in favor of operations west of theMississippi by the Bayous Teche and Atchafalaya, the latter of whichcommunicates with the Red River a few miles above its mouth. Thismovement was accompanied by a force of four gunboats, under the commandof Lieutenant-Commander A. P. Cooke, of the Estrella, which captured apost on the Atchafalaya called Butte à la Rose, on the 20th of April, the same day that Opelousas, sixty miles from Alexandria, was entered bythe army. The latter pressed on toward Alexandria, while the gunboatspushed their way up the Atchafalaya. On the first of May two of them, the Estrella and Arizona, passed into the Red River, and soon afterwardjoined the Hartford. 

Three days later Admiral Porter arrived with several of his fleet andcommunicated with Farragut. The next day, May 5th, Porter went up theRed River and pushed rapidly toward Alexandria, which was evacuated, itsstores being removed to Shreveport, three hundred and fifty milesfarther up. 

Farragut now felt that his personal presence above Port Hudson was nolonger necessary. The Mississippi was ultimately to become the commandof Porter, whose vessels were especially fitted for its waters; and thatadmiral was now at liberty to give his full attention below Vicksburg. On the other hand, his own squadron in the lower river and on theblockade demanded a closer attention than he could give from hisisolated station. Accordingly, on the 6th of May he transferred thecommand to Commodore Palmer, of the Hartford, with whom he left theAlbatross, Estrella, and Arizona to intercept communications between thetwo banks of the Mississippi below Red River; while he himself returnedby one of the bayous to New Orleans, reaching there on the 11th. 

Thus ended Farragut's brilliant strategic movement against thecommunications of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, and through them againstthe intercourse of the Confederacy with its great Western storehouse, over which the two fortresses stood guard. It was a movement which, though crippled from the beginning by a serious disaster on thebattle-field, was conceived in accordance with the soundest principlesof the art of war. Its significance has been obscured and lost in thegreat enterprise initiated a month later by General Grant, and solidlysupported by the navy under Porter; whose co-operation, Grant avows, wasabsolutely essential to the success--nay, even to the contemplation ofsuch an undertaking. [V] In this combined movement, identical inprinciple with that of Farragut, Porter, in executing his part, had thecurrent with instead of against him. Had circumstances delayed orprevented Grant's advance by the west bank of the Mississippi--had he, for instance, been enabled by one of the abortive bayou expeditions topenetrate north of Vicksburg--Farragut's action would have been no moresound nor bold, but its merits would have been far more perceptible tothe common eye. Re-enforcements must have been sent him; and around hisflag-ship would have centered a force that would have choked the lifeout of Vicksburg and Port Hudson. 

 [Footnote V: _Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant_, vol. I, p. 461. ]

Because rightly aimed, this daring campaign was not frustrated even bythe disasters of the night action. It is distinguished from the unhappyfiasco of the year before by all the difference between a fitting and anunfitting time--by all that separates a clear appreciation of facts froma confused impression of possibilities. In 1862 Farragut was driven upthe river against his own judgment, seeing no prospect of tangible orpermanent results. In 1863 he went on his own responsibility, because hesaw that in the then condition of affairs, with the armies gathering atboth ends of the line, the movement he made would not only be successfulin itself, but would materially conduce to the attainment of the commonend. It is significant of his true military insight that neitherdepreciation nor disaster shook his clear convictions of the importanceof his work. "Whether my getting by Port Hudson was of consequence ornot, " he wrote chaffingly in reference to some slighting comments in aSouthern newspaper, "if Pollard's stomach were as tightly pinched forfood as theirs at Port Hudson and Vicksburg have been since I shut upRed River, he would know how to value a good dinner and a little peace. "In soberer style he wrote to his home: "We have done our part of thework assigned to us, and all has worked well. _My last dash past PortHudson was the best thing I ever did_, except taking New Orleans. Itassisted materially in the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson. "

Farragut remained but a short time in New Orleans, and was soon again atthe front; joining the vessels of his squadron lying near, but below, Port Hudson. After entering Alexandria on the 7th of May, General Banksmoved down with his army to the Mississippi, which he crossed five orsix miles above Port Hudson. General Augur, of his command, at the sametime moved up from Baton Rouge, the two divisions meeting on the 23d ofMay, and immediately investing Port Hudson. An assault was made on the27th; but proving unsuccessful, regular siege operations were begun. Themortar schooners and the Essex supported them by constant bombardment, and the navy furnished and manned a battery of four nine-inch Dahlgrenguns. 

While contributing thus conspicuously to the immediate furtherance ofthe siege, the most essential work of the navy, here as in the upperMississippi, was in the maintenance of the communications, which werewholly by the river, as well as in assuring the safety of New Orleans, then stripped of all the troops that could be spared. The danger of twopoints like Vicksburg and Port Hudson, both of such vital importance, and both being besieged at the same time, aroused every latent energy ofthe Confederacy, and set in motion every armed man of whom it coulddispose. To divert and distract the attention of the Union generals, toinduce them to abandon their efforts or diminish the forces at thefront, no means were so ready nor so sure as an attack upon theircommunications, or a threat directed against their base. To make theseinsecure, is like mining the foundations of a building. Here the navyremoved every substantial cause of anxiety by its firm support, and bythe rapidity with which its heavy guns were brought to sustain everypoint attacked. Under such diligent guardianship the barrier of theMississippi remained impassable; and although a transport might now andagain be arrested and forced to surrender, such an occasional annoyancecould not by the most uneasy general be magnified into a serious menaceto his communications. The active Confederate general, Richard Taylor, in command of the district west of the river, stripped all his posts toconcentrate an effort along the right bank, which, by disturbing Banks, might make a favorable diversion for Port Hudson; and loud talk was madeof an attack upon New Orleans itself, favored by a rising among thecitizens, still heartily attached to the Southern cause. The powerfulvessels kept before the city by Farragut effectually disposed of anychance of such an attempt, although much anxiety was felt by GeneralEmory, in command of the station, and confident expectation was plainlydiscernible on the faces of the towns-people. The Confederates, however, did for a season control the west side of the river, appearing beforeDonaldsonville and Plaquemine, where were posts of United States troops. These were saved by the prompt appearance of gunboats, which followedthe movements of the enemy; but the report of them brought Farragut downin person, and elicited from him a remonstrance to Banks for leavingupon the west bank, inadequately sustained, heavy guns which, if theyfell into the hands of the Confederates, might convert a menace into aserious embarrassment. A few days later, at midnight of June 27th, theenemy attacked Donaldsonville in force. The storming party succeeded inentering the works, but the three gunboats which Farragut had stationedthere opened so heavy a fire upon the supports that these broke andfled; and those in advance, being unsustained, were made prisoners. 

A few days later Farragut summoned his chief-of-staff, Captain ThorntonA. Jenkins, to relieve him at Port Hudson, as he felt his own presencenecessary at New Orleans. Jenkins started up in the Monongahela, a heavycorvette commanded by Captain Abner Read, having in company two smalltransports with needed supplies. The enemy, despite the repulse atDonaldsonville, remained in the neighborhood, and had established abattery of field-guns a few miles below at a bend in the river. By thesethe Monongahela was attacked and pretty severely handled for a fewmoments. Her captain, an officer of distinguished courage andenterprise, was mortally wounded, and Captain Jenkins slightly so. Thesetwo affairs sufficiently indicate the character of the enemy'soperations on the west bank of the Mississippi at this time. They didnot in the least succeed in shaking the grip of the Union army beforePort Hudson, nor did they entirely cease with the surrender of theplace. That they did so little harm, with the enemy in nearly undisputedcommand in the regions west of the river, was due to the navy, whosemobility exceeded that of their troops. 

Vicksburg surrendered on the 4th of July, 1863, and its fall wasfollowed by that of Port Hudson on the 9th of the same month. Farragutthen wrote to Porter, and turned over to him the command in all theMississippi Valley above New Orleans. On the 1st of August Porterhimself arrived off the city in his flag-ship, and the two admirals hadan interview on the scene of their former exploits. The same afternoonFarragut sailed in the Hartford for the North, to enjoy a brief respitefrom his labors during the enervating autumn months of the Gulf climate. Though now sixty-two years old, he retained an extraordinary amount ofvitality, and of energy both physical and moral; but nevertheless at hisage the anxieties and exposure he had to undergo tell, and had drawnfrom him, soon after his return from above Port Hudson, the expressivewords, "I am growing old fast, and need rest. " On the 10th of August theflag-ship anchored in New York, after a passage of nine days. 

The admiral remained in the North until the first of the following year. His own ship, and her powerful sisters, the Richmond and Brooklyn, werein need of extensive repairs before they could be considered again fitfor winter service in the Gulf. The Hartford was in better conditionthan the other two, being uninjured below the water line, but the severeactions through which she had passed were proved by the scars, twohundred and forty in number, where she had been struck by shot orshell. 

CHAPTER X. 

MOBILE. 

1864. 

By the fall of the last and most powerful of the Confederate strongholdsupon the Mississippi, and the consequent assertion of control by theUnited States Government over the whole of the great water course, wasaccomplished the first and chief of the two objects toward whichFarragut was to co-operate. After manifold efforts and failures, thecombined forces of the United States had at last sundered theConfederacy in twain along the principal one of those natural strategiclines which intersected it, and which make the strength or the weaknessof States according as they are able or unable to hold them against anenemy. Of the two fragments, the smaller was militarily important onlyas a feeder to the other. Severed from the body to which they belonged, the seceded States west of the Mississippi sank into insignificance; thefire that had raged there would smoulder and die of itself, now that abroad belt which could not be passed interposed between it and thegreater conflagration in the East. 

It next became the task of the Union forces to hold firmly, by adequatedefensive measures, the line they had gained; while the great mass oftroops heretofore employed along the Mississippi in offensiveoperations were transferred farther east, to drive yet another columnthrough a second natural line of cleavage from Nashville, throughGeorgia, to the Gulf or to the Atlantic seaboard. How this new work wasperformed under the successive leadership of Rosecrans, Grant, andSherman, does not fall within the scope of the present work. Althoughthe light steamers of the Mississippi squadron did good and oftenimportant service in this distant inland region, the river work ofFarragut's heavy sea-going ships was now over. In furtherance of thegreat object of opening the Mississippi, they had left their nativeelement, and, braving alike a treacherous navigation and hostilebatteries, had penetrated deep into the vitals of the Confederacy. Thisgreat achievement wrought, they turned their prows again seaward. Theformal transfer to Admiral Porter of the command over the wholeMississippi and its tributaries, above New Orleans, signalized the factthat Farragut's sphere of action was to be thenceforth on the coast; forNew Orleans, though over a hundred miles from the mouth of a tidelessriver, whose waters flow ever downward to the sea, was neverthelesssubstantially a sea-coast city. 

As the opening of the Mississippi was the more important of the twoobjects embraced in Farragut's orders, so did it also offer him theampler field for the display of those highest qualities of a generalofficer which he abundantly possessed. The faculty of seizing upon thereally decisive points of a situation, of correctly appreciating theconditions of the problem before him, of discerning whether the propermoment for action was yet distant or had already arrived, and of movingwith celerity and adequate dispositions when the time did come--allthese distinctive gifts of the natural commander-in-chief had beencalled into play, by the difficult questions arising in connection withthe stupendous work of breaking the shackles by which the Confederatesheld the Mississippi chained. The task that still remained before him, the closing of the Confederate seaports within the limits of hiscommand, though arduous and wearisome, did not make the same demand uponthese more intellectual qualities. The sphere was more contracted, moreisolated. It had fewer relations to the great military operations goingon elsewhere, and, being in itself less complex, afforded less interestto the strategist. It involved, therefore, less of the work of themilitary leader which was so congenial to his aptitudes, and more ofthat of the administrator, to him naturally distasteful. 

Nevertheless, as the complete fulfilment of his orders necessitated thereduction of a fortified seaport, he found in this undertaking theopportunity for showing a degree of resolution and presence of mindwhich was certainly not exceeded--perhaps not even equaled--in hisprevious career. At Mobile it was the tactician, the man of instantperception and ready action, rather than he of clear insight and carefulplanning, that is most conspicuous. On the same occasion, with actualdisaster incurred and imminent confusion threatening his fleet, combinedwith a resistance sturdier than any he had yet encountered, theadmiral's firmness and tenacity rose equal to the highest demand evermade upon them. In the lofty courage and stern determination whichplucked victory out of the very jaws of defeat, the battle of MobileBay was to the career of Farragut what the battle of Copenhagen was tothat of Nelson. Perhaps we may even say, borrowing the words of aneloquent French writer upon the latter event, the battle of Mobile willalways be in the eyes of seamen Farragut's surest claim to glory. [W]

[Footnote W: "The campaign of the Baltic will always be in the eyes ofseamen Nelson's fairest claim to glory. He alone was capable ofdisplaying such boldness and such perseverance; he alone could face theimmense difficulties of that enterprise and triumph over them. "--Juriende la Gravière, _Guerres Maritimes_. ]

Up to the time of Farragut's departure for the North, in August, 1863, the blockade of the Gulf sea-coast within the limits of his command, though technically effective, had for the most part only been enforcedby the usual method of cruising or anchoring off the entrances of theports. Such a watch, however, is a very imperfect substitute for theiron yoke that is imposed by holding all the principal harbors, thegateways for communication with the outer world. This was clearly enoughrealized; and the purpose of Farragut, as of his Government, had been soto occupy the ports within his district. At one time, in December, 1862, he was able to say exultingly that he did so hold the whole coast, except Mobile; but the disasters at Galveston and Sabine Pass quicklyintervened, and those ports remained thenceforth in the hands of theenemy. On the Texas coast, however, blockade-running properly socalled--the entrance, that is, of blockaded Confederate harbors--was asmall matter compared with the flourishing contraband trade carried onthrough the Mexican port Matamoras and across the Rio Grande. WhenFarragut's lieutenant, Commodore Henry H. Bell, visited this remote andordinarily deserted spot in May, 1863, he counted sixty-eight sails atanchor in the offing and a forest of smaller craft inside the river, some of which were occupied in loading and unloading the outsideshipping; to such proportions had grown the trade of a town whichneither possessed a harbor nor a back country capable of sustaining sucha traffic. Under proper precautions by the parties engaged, this, thoughclearly hostile, was difficult to touch; but it also became ofcomparatively little importance when the Mississippi fell. 

Not so with Mobile. As port after port was taken, as the lines of thegeneral blockade drew closer and closer, the needs of the Confederacyfor the approaching death-struggle grew more and more crying, and thepracticable harbors still in their hands became proportionately valuableand the scenes of increasing activity. After the fall of New Orleans andthe evacuation of Pensacola, in the spring of 1862, Mobile was by farthe best port on the Gulf coast left to the Confederates. Thoughadmitting a less draught of water than the neighboring harbor ofPensacola, it enjoyed the advantage over it of excellent watercommunications with the interior; two large rivers with extensivetributary systems emptying into its bay. Thanks to this circumstance, ithad become a place of very considerable trade, ranking next to NewOrleans in the Gulf; and its growing commerce, in turn, reacted upon thecommunications by promoting the development of its railroad system. Theregion of which Mobile was the natural port did not depend for itsimportance only upon agricultural products; under somewhat favorableconditions it had developed some manufacturing interests in which theSouthern States were generally very deficient, and which afterward foundactive employment in the construction of the Tennessee, the mostformidable ironclad vessel built by the Confederates. 

For all these reasons the tenure of Mobile became a matter of seriousconsequence to the enemy; and, as Farragut had from the first foreseen, they made active use of the respite afforded them by the unfortunateobstinacy of the Navy Department in refusing him permission to attackafter New Orleans fell. The enterprise then was by no means as difficultas the passage of the Mississippi forts just effected; and oncecaptured, the holding of the harbor would require only the small numberof troops necessary to garrison the powerful masonry fort whichcommanded the main ship channel, supported by a naval force much lessnumerous than that required to blockade outside. The undertaking wastherefore not open to the objection of unduly exposing the troops andships placed in unfortified or poorly fortified harbors, which receivedsuch a sad illustration at Galveston; but it was dropped, owing, first, to the preoccupation of the Government with its expectations ofimmediately reducing the Mississippi, and afterward to the fear oflosing ships which at that time could not be replaced. Hesitation torisk their ships and to take decisive action when seasonable opportunityoffers, is the penalty paid by nations which practise undue economy intheir preparations for war. When at last it became urgent to captureMobile before the powerful ironclad then building was completed, thepreparations of the defense were so far advanced that ironclad vesselswere needed for the attack; and before these could be, or at leastbefore they were, supplied, the Tennessee, which by rapid action mighthave been forestalled like the similar vessel at New Orleans, was readyfor battle. Had she been used with greater wisdom by those who directedher movements, she might have added very seriously to the embarrassmentof the United States admiral. 

When Farragut, after an absence of nearly six months, returned to hisstation in January, 1864, it was with the expectation of a speedy attackupon Mobile. On his way to New Orleans he stopped off the bar, and onthe 20th of January made a reconnaissance with a couple of gunboats, approaching to a little more than three miles from the forts commandingthe entrance. He then reported to the department that he was satisfiedthat, if he had one ironclad, he could destroy the whole of the enemy'sforce in the bay, and then reduce the forts at leisure with theco-operation of about five thousand troops. "But without ironclads, " headded, "we should not be able to fight the enemy's vessels of that classwith much prospect of success, as the latter would lie on the flats, where our ships could not get at them. By reference to the chart youwill see how small a space there is for the ships to manoeuvre. Woodenvessels can do nothing with the ironclads, unless by getting within oneor two hundred yards, so as to ram them or pour in a broadside. " Herepeats the information given by a refugee, that the ironclad Nashvillewould not be ready before March, and that the Confederate admiralannounced that when she was he would raise the blockade. "It isdepressing, " he adds, "to see how easily false reports circulate, andin what a state of alarm the community is kept by the most absurdrumors. If the Department could get one or two ironclads here, it wouldput an end to this state of things and restore confidence to the peopleof the ports now in our possession. I feel no apprehension aboutBuchanan's raising the blockade; but, with such a force as he has in thebay, it would be unwise to take in our wooden vessels without the meansof fighting the enemy on an equal footing. " Having made thisreconnaissance, he went on to New Orleans, arriving there January 22d. 

It appears, therefore, that, regarded as a naval question, Farragutconsidered the time had gone by for an attempt to run the forts ofMobile Bay, and that it would not return until some ironclads werefurnished him by the Department. The capture of the forts he at no timeexpected, except by the same means as he had looked to for the reductionof those in the Mississippi--that is, by a combined military and navaloperation. In both cases the navy was to plant itself across the enemy'scommunications, which it could do by running the gantlet of his guns. Itthen remained for the land forces either to complete the investment andawait their fall by the slow process of famine, or to proceed with aregular siege covered by the fleet. Without the protection of the shipsin the bay, the army would be continually harassed by the light gunboatsof the enemy, and very possibly exposed to attack by superior force. Without the troops, the presence of the ships inside would be powerlessto compel the surrender of the works, or to prevent their receiving somesupplies. But in the two years that had very nearly elapsed sinceFarragut, if permitted his own wish, would have attacked, thestrengthening of the works and the introduction of the ironclads hadmaterially altered the question. He was, it is true, misinformed as tothe readiness of the latter. The vessels that were dignified by thatname when he first returned to his station, took no part in the defense, either of the bay or, later, of the city. He was deceived, probably, from the fact that the Confederates themselves were deceived, with theexception of a few who had more intimate knowledge of their real value;and consequently the reports that were brought off agreed in giving thema character which they did not deserve. 

An attack upon Mobile had been a cherished project with General Grantafter the fall of Vicksburg. It was to that--and not to the unfortunateRed River expedition of 1864--that he would have devoted Banks's army inthe Southwest; moving it, of course, in concert with, so as to supportand be supported by, the other great operations which took place thatyear--Sherman's advance upon Atlanta and his own against Richmond. Itwas to Mobile, and not to Savannah, that he first looked as the pointtoward which Sherman would act after the capture of Atlanta; the linefrom Atlanta to Mobile would be that along which, by the control of theintervening railroad systems, the Confederacy would again be cleft intwain, as by the subjugation of the Mississippi. For this reason chieflyhe had, while still only commander of the Army of the Tennessee, andbefore he succeeded to the lieutenant-generalship and the command of allthe armies, strenuously opposed the Red River expedition; which helooked upon as an ex-centric movement, tending rather to keep alive thewar across the Mississippi, which would fade if left alone, and likelyto result in the troops engaged not getting back in time or in conditionto act against Mobile. 

As Grant feared, so it happened. The expedition being already organizedand on the point of starting when he became commander-in-chief, heallowed it to proceed; but it ended in disaster, and was the cause offorty thousand good troops being unavailable for the decisive operationswhich began two months later. Not until the end of July could a force bespared even for the minor task of reducing the Mobile forts; and untilthen Farragut had to wait in order to attack to any purpose. By the timethe army in the Southwest, in the command of which General Canbyrelieved Banks on the 20th of May, was again ready to move, Sherman hadtaken Atlanta, Hood had fallen upon his communications with Chattanooga, and the famous march to the sea had been determined. Farragut's battlein Mobile Bay therefore did not prove to be, as Grant had hoped, and ashis passage of the Mississippi forts had been, a step in a series ofgrand military operations, by which the United States forces should gaincontrol of a line vital to the Confederacy, and again divide it into twofragments. It remained an isolated achievement, though one of greatimportance, converting Mobile from a maritime to an inland city, puttinga stop to all serious blockade-running in the Gulf, and crushing finallythe enemy's ill-founded hopes of an offensive movement by ironcladsthere equipped. 

 [Illustration: Entrance of Rear-Admiral Farragut's Fleet into Mobile Bay, August 5, 1864. 

 REFERENCE

 1. Tecumseh. 2. Manhattan. 3. Winnebago. 4. Chickasaw. 5. Brooklyn. 6. Octorora. 7. Hartford, Flag-ship. 8. Metacomet. 9. Richmond. 10. Port Royal. 11. Lackawanna. 12. Seminole. 13. Admiral's barge Loyall. 14. Monongahela. 15. Kennebec. 16. Ossipee. 17. Itasca. 18. Oneida. 19. Galena. ------ Course of chasing vessels. . .. .. . Course of chased vessels. 

 EXPLANATION OF DIAGRAM FROM THE FIVE STANDPOINTS OF THE MOBILE FIGHT. 

 No. 1. Ships lashed together and running in from sea and the monitors running out of Monitor Bay to take their station inside or eastward of the line. 

 No. 2. Running up the channel in line of battle, and engaging Fort Morgan, leading ship Brooklyn encounters what she supposes to be torpedoes; monitor Tecumseh is struck by one and sinks; Brooklyn backs astern, causing confusion; Flag-ship takes the lead and passes up and engages the ram Tennessee and the gunboats of the enemy. 

 No. 3. Running fight with the enemy's fleet, which ends in the capture of one, destruction of another, and the ram and one gunboat take shelter again under Fort Morgan. 

 No. 4. Fleet pass up and are in the act of anchoring when the ram Tennessee is seen coming out to attack them. 

 No. 5. Shows the manner the attack was made by the fleet upon the ram by ramming her in succession and keeping up a constant fire upon her at the same time. 

 The points of contact are shown by the sketch in the northeast corner of the plate. 

 D. G. Farragut. _Washington, D. C. March 1, 1865. _

 De Krafft's flotilla bombarding Fort Powell. ]

The city of Mobile is itself some thirty miles from the Gulf, near thehead of a broad but generally shallow bay which bears the same name. The principal entrance from the Gulf is between Mobile Point--a long, narrow, sandy beach which projects from the east side of the bay--andDauphin Island, one of a chain which runs parallel to the coast ofMississippi and encloses Mississippi Sound. At the end of Mobile Pointstands Fort Morgan, the principal defense of the bay, for the main shipchannel passes close under its guns. At the eastern end of DauphinIsland stood a much smaller work, called Fort Gaines. Between this andFort Morgan the distance is nearly three miles; but a bank of hard sandmaking out from the island prevents vessels of any considerable sizeapproaching it nearer than two miles. Between Dauphin Island and themainland there are some shoal channels, by which vessels of very lightdraft can pass from Mississippi Sound into the bay. These were notpracticable for the fighting vessels of Farragut's fleet; but a smallearthwork known as Fort Powell had been thrown up to command the deepestof them, called Grant's Pass. 

The sand bank off Dauphin Island extends south as well as east, reachingbetween four and five miles from the entrance. A similar shoal stretchesout to the southward from Mobile Point. Between the two lies the mainship channel, varying in width from seven hundred and fifty yards, threemiles outside, to two thousand, or about a sea mile, abreast FortMorgan. Nearly twenty-one feet can be carried over the bar; and afterpassing Fort Morgan the channel spreads, forming a hole or pocket ofirregular contour, about four miles deep by two wide, in which the depthis from twenty to twenty-four feet. Beyond this hole, on either sidethe bay and toward the city, the water shoals gradually butconsiderably, and the heavier of Farragut's ships could not act outsideof its limits. The Confederate ironclad Tennessee, on the contrary, drawing but fourteen feet, had a more extensive field of operations opento her, and, from the gradual diminution of the soundings, was able totake her position at a distance where the most formidable of heropponents could neither follow her nor penetrate her sides with theirshot. 

Between the city and the lower bay there were extensive flats, overwhich not even the fourteen feet of the Tennessee could be taken; andthese in one part, called Dog River Bar, shoaled to as little as ninefeet. To bring the Tennessee into action for the defense of the entranceand of the lower bay, it was necessary to carry her across theseflats--an undertaking requiring both time and mechanical appliances, neither of which would be available if an enemy were inside to molestthe operations. As the Tennessee was distinctly the most formidableelement in the dangers Farragut had to encounter, and as the characterof the soundings gave her a field of action peculiarly suited to utilizeher especial powers, which consisted in the strength of her sides andthe long range of her heavy rifled guns, it was particularly desirableto anticipate her crossing the upper bar by the fleet itself crossingthe lower. That done, the Tennessee was reduced to impotence. It was notdone, for two reasons. First, the Navy Department did not send theironclads which Farragut demanded; and second, the army in theSouthwest, having wasted its strength in a divergent operation, wasunable to supply the force necessary to reduce Fort Morgan. That thedelay was not productive of more serious consequences was due to theimpatience or recklessness of the Confederate admiral, and to the energywith which Farragut seized the opportunity afforded by his mistake. 

Six months passed before the moment for decisive action arrived. Thoughdevoid of military interest, they were far from being months of idlenessor enjoyment. The administrative duties of so large a command drewheavily upon the time and energies of the admiral, and, as has beensaid, they were not congenial to him. When the Tennessee crossed DogRiver Bar, which she did on the 18th of May, Farragut felt that he mustbe on the spot, in case she attempted to execute her threat of comingout to break up the blockade; but up to that time he was moving activelyfrom point to point of his command, between New Orleans on the one side, and Pensacola, now become his principal base, on the other. From time totime he was off Mobile, and for more than two months preceding thebattle of the Bay he lay off the port in all the dreary monotony ofblockade service. The clerical labor attaching to the large force andnumerous interests entrusted to him was immense. Every mail brought him, of course, numerous communications from the Department. "I received yourletter last evening, " he writes to a member of his family, "but at thesame time received so many from the Department that my eyes were used upbefore I came to yours, so that mine to you will be short and badlywritten. " A very large part of this correspondence consisted of lettersfrom United States consuls abroad, forwarded through the StateDepartment, giving particulars of vessels fitting or loading for theConfederacy or to break the blockade. "Nearly all my clerical force isbroken down, " he writes on another occasion. "The fact is, I never sawso much writing; and yet Drayton, who does as much as any of them, saysit is all necessary. So I tell them to go on. I do not mind signing myname. Although I write all my own letters, some one has to copy them. Myfleet is so large now that it keeps us all at work the whole time. "

But while he spoke thus lightly of his own share in these labors, theconfinement, the necessary attention to and study of larger details, even while he intrusted the minor to others, and the unavoidableanxieties of a man who had so many important irons in the fire, and atthe same time was approaching his sixty-fourth year, told upon him. Tothis he bore witness when, after the capture of the Mobile forts, theDepartment desired him to take command of the North Atlantic fleet, witha view to the reduction of Wilmington, North Carolina. "They must thinkI am made of iron, " he wrote home. "I wrote the Secretary a long letter, telling him that my health was not such as to justify my going to a newstation to commence new organizations; that I must have rest for my mindand exercise for my body; that I had been down here within two months offive years, out of six, and recently six months on constant blockade offthis port, _and my mind on the stretch all the time_; and now tocommence a blockade again on the Atlantic coast! Why, even the routineof duty for a fleet of eighty sail of vessels works us all to death; andbut that I have the most industrious fleet-captain and secretary, itwould never be half done. It is difficult to keep things straight. " "Iknow, " he writes on another occasion, "that few men could have gonethrough what I have in the last three years, and no one ever will knowexcept yourself perhaps. .. . What the fight was to my poor brains, neither you nor any one else will ever be able to comprehend. Six monthsconstantly watching day and night for an enemy; to know him to be asbrave, as skilful, and as determined as myself; who was pledged to hisGovernment and the South to drive me away and raise the blockade, andfree the Mississippi from our rule. While I was equally pledged to myGovernment that I would capture or destroy the rebel. "

Besides his labors and the official anxieties due to his individualcommand, he again, as in 1862, felt deeply the misfortunes with whichthe general campaign of 1864 opened, and especially in the Southwest. There was continually present to the minds of the leaders of the UnitedStates forces during the war the apprehension that the constancy of thepeople might fail; that doubtful issues might lead to a depression thatwould cause the abandonment of the contest, in which success wasnevertheless assured to perseverance and vigor. Grant's memoirs bearcontinual testimony to the statesmanlike regard he had, in planning hisgreater military operations, to this important factor in the war, thevacillation under uncertainty of that popular support upon which successdepended. The temperament of Farragut reflected readily the ups anddowns of the struggle, and was saddened by the weaknesses andinconsistencies of his own side, which he keenly appreciated. "I am_depressed_, " he writes, "by the bad news from every direction. Theenemy seem to be bending their whole soul and body to the war andwhipping us in every direction. What a disgrace that, with their slendermeans, they should, after three years, contend with us from one end ofthe country to the other!. .. _I get right sick_, every now and then, atthe bad news. " "The victory of the Kearsarge over the Alabama, " on amore auspicious occasion, "raised me up. I would sooner have fought thatfight than any ever fought on the ocean"; and his exultation was thegreater that the first lieutenant of the Kearsarge had been with him inthe same capacity when the Hartford passed the Mississippi forts. 

But, while thus sensitive to the vicissitudes of his country's fortunes, he did not readily entertain the thought of being himself defeated. "Asto being prepared for defeat, " he wrote before New Orleans, "I certainlyam not. Any man who is prepared for defeat would be half defeated beforehe commenced. I hope for success; shall do all in my power to secure it, and trust to God for the rest. " And again: "The officers say I don'tbelieve anything. I certainly believe very little that comes in theshape of reports. They keep everybody stirred up. I mean to be whippedor to whip my enemy, and not to be scared to death. " "I hope for thebest results, " he wrote a week before forcing the passage into MobileBay, "as I am always hopeful; put my shoulder to the wheel with my bestjudgment, and trust to God for the rest"; or, in more homely language:"Everything has a weak spot, and the first thing I try to do is to findout where it is, and pitch into it with the biggest shell or shot that Ihave, and repeat the dose until it operates. " "The Confederates at FortMorgan are making great preparations to receive us. That concerns me butlittle"--words used not in a spirit of mere light-heartedness, butbecause it was a condition he had from the first accepted, and overwhich he hoped to triumph; for he continues, "I know they will do all intheir power to destroy us, and we will reciprocate the compliment. Ihope to give them a fair fight if once I get inside. I expect nothingfrom them but that they will try to blow me up if they can. "

Amid such cares and in such a spirit were spent the six months ofmonotonous outside blockade preceding the great victory that crowned hisactive career. The only relief to its weariness was a bombardment ofFort Powell, undertaken by the light-draft steamers of the squadron fromMississippi Sound in February, to create a diversion in favor ofSherman's raid from Vicksburg upon Meridian, which was then in progress. The boats could not get nearer to the work than four thousand yards, andeven then were aground; so that no very serious effect was produced. Agreater and more painful excitement was aroused by the misfortunes ofthe Red River expedition in April and May. Begun on unsound militaryprinciples, but designed politically to assert against French intriguesthe claim of the United States to Texas, that ill-omened enterpriseculminated in a retreat which well-nigh involved the Mississippisquadron in an overwhelming disaster. The Red River was unusually lowfor the season, and falling instead of rising. There was not, when thearmy retired, water enough to enable the gun-boats which had ascendedthe river to repass the rapids at Alexandria. The army could delay butfor a limited time, at the end of which, if the boats had not passed, they must be left to their fate. Farragut, who was in New Orleans whenthe news arrived, wrote bitterly about the blunders made, and was sorelydistressed for the issue to the navy. "I have no spirit to write, " hesays. "I have had such long letters from Porter and Banks, and findthings so bad with them that I don't know how to help them. I am afraidPorter, with all his energy, will lose some of his finest vessels. Ihave just sent him some boats to help him. " The boats, however, weresaved by the skill and energy of Colonel Joseph Bailey, thechief-of-engineers in Franklin's corps of Banks's army; by whom wasthrown across the river a dam, which raised the water on the shoalssufficiently for the boats to cross. 

A more pleasant incident occurred to vary the sameness of the blockadedays, in the presentation to the admiral, by the Union League Club ofNew York, of a very handsome sword, with scabbard of massive gold andsilver, the hilt set in brilliants. The gift was accompanied by a letterexpressive of the givers' appreciation of the brilliant servicesrendered to the nation, and was a grateful reminder to Farragut, thenwatching before Mobile for his last grapple with the enemy in his front, that his fellow-countrymen in their homes were not wanting inrecognition of the dangers he had incurred, nor of those he was stillfacing on their behalf. 

The time was now close at hand when the weary and anxious waiting, whichthe admiral afterward so feelingly described, was to be exchanged forthe more vigorous action he had so long desired. The co-operation of adivision from Canby's army was assured toward the end of July; and atthe same time the long-promised, long-delayed monitor ironclads began toarrive. As the want of these and the presence of the enemy's ironcladshad been the reasons which, in Farragut's opinion, had made necessarythe postponement of the purely naval part of the combined operation, ashort description of the vessels which formed so potent an element inhis calculations will not be out of place. 

The idea of the monitor type of ironclads, which was then the prevalentone in the United States Navy, was brought by John Ericsson from hishome in Sweden, where it had been suggested to him by the sight of therafts with a house upon them crossing the waters with which he wasfamiliar. In its conception, the monitor was simply a round fort, heavily plated with iron, resting upon a raft nearly flush with thewater, and provided with the motive power of steam. The forts, orturrets, as they are commonly called, might be one or more in number;and each carried usually two heavy guns, standing side by side andpointing in exactly the same direction, so that if discharged togetherthe projectiles would follow parallel courses. Within the turret theguns could be turned neither to the right nor to the left; if such achange of aim were wished, the turret itself was revolved by steammachinery provided for the purpose. When loading, the port through whichthe gun was fired was turned away from the enemy; so that if a shothappened to strike at that time it fell on the solid armor. Above thegun-turret there was a second of much smaller diameter, which did notrevolve. It was also heavily plated and designed to shelter thecommanding officer and those charged with the steering of the ship. Somuch inconvenience was, however, experienced from smoke and fromconcussion when these steering turrets were struck, and their dimensionswere so contracted, that many captains preferred to remain outside, where they could see better, their orders being transmitted to thehelmsmen through the sight-holes pierced in the armor. Of theseironclads, four accompanied Farragut in his attack upon Mobile Bay. Two, the Tecumseh and Manhattan, came from the Atlantic coast, and weresea-going monitors. They had each but one turret, in which they carriedtwo fifteen-inch guns, the heaviest then in use afloat. The other twowere river monitors, built at St. Louis for service in the Mississippi. They were consequently of light draught, so much so that to obtain thenecessary motive power they each had four screw propellers of smalldiameter, and they carried four eleven-inch guns in two turrets. Theirnames were the Winnebago and the Chickasaw. The armor of the twosingle-turreted monitors was ten inches thick, and that of the rivermonitors eight and a half inches. 

The Tennessee, to which these were to be opposed, was a vessel ofdifferent type, and one to which the few ironclads built by theConfederates for the most part conformed--called commonly the broadsideironclad, because the guns, like those of ships-of-war generally, weredisposed chiefly along the sides. Her hull was built at Selma, on theAlabama River, and thence towed to Mobile to be plated; it beingdesirable to take her down the river while as light as possible. She wastwo hundred and nine feet long and forty-eight feet wide, drawing, ashas been said, fourteen feet when loaded. Upon her deck, midway betweenthe bow and the stern, was a house seventy-nine feet long, whose sidesand ends sloped at an angle of thirty-four degrees and were covered withiron plating, six inches thick on the forward end and five inches thickon the other end and the sides. With the inclination given, a cannonball striking would be likely to be turned upward by the iron surface, instead of penetrating. The sloping sides of the house were carried downbeyond the point where they met those of the vessel, until two feetbelow the water. There they turned and struck in at the same angletoward the hull, which they again met six or seven feet under water. Thus was formed all round the ship a knuckle, which, being filled-insolid and covered with iron, was a very perfect protection against anybut the most powerful ram. The Tennessee herself was fitted with a beakand intended to ram, but, owing to the slender resources of theConfederacy, her engines were too weak to be effective for that purpose. She could only steam six knots. Her battery, however, was well selectedand powerful. She carried on each side two six-inch rifles, and at eachend one seven-inch rifle--six guns in all. There were, besides theTennessee, three wooden gunboats, and Farragut was informed that therewere also four ironclads; but this, as regards the lower bay at least, was a mistake. 

It will be seen from this account, and from the description before givenof Mobile Bay, that the advantages of the Tennessee were her greatprotective strength, a draught which enabled her to choose her ownposition relatively to the heaviest of the enemy's ships, and thesuperior range and penetrative power of her guns, being rifles; forwhile there were cannon of this type in the United States fleet, thegreat majority of them were smooth bores. The ironclads opposed to herhad only smooth-bore guns, incapable of penetrating her side, andtherefore only able to reduce her by a continued pounding, which mightshake her frame to pieces. The chief defects of the Tennessee as aharbor-defense ship, for which she was mainly intended, were her veryinferior speed, and the fact that, by an oversight, her steering chainswere left exposed to the enemy's shot. This combination of strong andweak points constituted her tactical qualities, which should havedetermined the use made of her in the impending battle. 

Although the ironclads were, as Farragut esteemed them, the controllingfactors in the defense and attack, the Tennessee was by no means theonly very formidable obstacle in the way of his success. Except theironclads, the fleet he carried into Mobile Bay was not substantiallystronger than that with which he fought his way up the Mississippi; butsince that time the enemy had done much to strengthen the works which henow had to encounter. The number of heavy guns in Fort Morgan bearingupon the channel was thirty-eight. In Fort Jackson, excluding theobsolete caliber of twenty-four pounders, there were twenty-seven, andin St. Philip twenty-one--total, forty-eight; but in caliber andefficiency those of Morgan were distinctly superior to those of theriver forts, and it may be considered an advantage that the power washere concentrated in a single work under a single hand. The gunners ofFort Morgan, moreover, had not been exposed to the exhaustingharassment of a most efficient bombardment, extending over the six daysprior to the final demand upon their energies. They came fresh to theirwork, and suffered during its continuance from no distraction exceptthat caused by the fire of the fleet itself. While, therefore, FortGaines could not be considered to support Morgan by any deterrent orinjurious influence upon the United States fleet, the latter work was byitself superior in offensive power to the two Mississippi forts. 

To the general defense the Confederates had here brought two otherfactors, one of a most important and as yet unknown power. As the sandbank extending eastward from Dauphin Island was to some extent passableby light gunboats, a line of piles was driven in the direction of FortMorgan nearly to the edge of the channel. Where the piles stopped atriple line of torpedoes began, following the same general course, andending only at a hundred yards from Fort Morgan, where a narrow openingwas left for the passage of friendly vessels--blockade runners andothers. Had the electrical appliances of the Confederacy been at thattime more highly developed, this narrow gap would doubtless also havebeen filled with mines, whose explosion depended upon operators ashore. As it was, the torpedo system employed at Mobile, with some few possibleexceptions, was solely mechanical; the explosion depended upon contactby the passing vessel with the mine. To insure this, the line wastriple; those in the second and third rows not being in the alignment ofthe first, but so placed as to fill the interstices and make almostimpracticable the avoidance of all three torpedoes belonging to thesame group. 

These arrangements were sufficiently well known to Farragut throughinformation brought by refugees or deserters. They--the power of theworks, the disposition of the torpedoes, the Tennessee and hercompanions--constituted the elements of the problem which he had tosolve to get his fleet safely past the obstacles into the bay. Althoughnot disposed to lay as much stress as others upon the torpedoes, whichwere then but an imperfectly developed weapon, prudence dictated to himthe necessity of passing between them and the fort; and this wasfortunately in accordance with the sound policy which dictates thatwooden vessels engaging permanent works, less liable than themselves topenetration, should get as close as possible to the enemy, whose firethey may then beat down by the rapidity of their own. There were certainblack buoys floating across the channel, between the piles and FortMorgan, and it was understood that these marked the position of thetorpedoes. The admiral's flag-lieutenant, Lieutenant (now Captain) JohnC. Watson, had examined these buoys in several nightly reconnaissances;but, although he had not been able to discover any of the mines, theassurances of their existence could not be disregarded. His examinationdoubtless had some effect upon the admiral's instant determination, inthe unforeseen emergency that arose during the action, to pass over thespot where the hidden dangers were said to lie; but in the dispositionsfor battle the order was given for the fleet to pass eastward of theeasternmost buoy, where no torpedoes would be found. 

The closeness of this approach, however, and the fact that the line ofthe channel led in at right angles to the entrance, had the disadvantageof obstructing the fire of the broadside wooden vessels, in which theoffensive strength of the fleet, outside the monitors, consisted. Theguns of those ships, being disposed along the sides, were for the mostpart able to bear only upon an enemy abreast of them, with a smalladditional angle of train toward ahead or astern. It was not, therefore, until nearly up with the fort that these numerous cannon would come intoplay, and exercise that preponderating effect which had driven off thegunners at Forts St. Philip and Jackson. This inconvenience results fromthe construction of such ships, and can only be overcome by a movementof the helm causing the ship to diverge from her course; a resort whichled a witty Frenchman to say that a ship-of-war so situated is like ashark, that can only bite by turning on its back. The remedy, howeverapplicable under certain circumstances and in the case of a single ship, causes delay, and therefore is worse than the evil for a fleet advancingto the attack of forts, where the object must be to close as rapidly aspossible. There are, however, on board such vessels a few guns, mountedforward and called chase guns, which, from the rounding of the bows, bear sooner than the others upon the enemy toward whom they are moving. To support these and concentrate from the earliest moment as effective afire as possible upon the works, Farragut brought his ironclads insideof the wooden vessels, and abreast the four leaders of that column. Theheavy guns of the monitors could fire all around the horizon, from rightahead to right astern; and the disposition had the additional greatadvantage that, in the critical passage inside the torpedo buoys, theseall-important vessels would be on the safer side, the wooden shipsinterposing between them and the sunken dangers, which threatened aninjury far more instantaneous and vital than any to be feared from theenemy's shot and shell. 

The position of the ironclads being determined by these considerations, the arrangement of the wooden ships for the attack conformed to theadmiral's principle, that the greatest security was to be found inconcentrating upon the enemy the heaviest fire attainable from his ownguns. As at Port Hudson, a large proportion of the fourteen vessels hepurposed to take in with him were of the gunboat class, or a littleabove it. Resort was accordingly again had to the double column adoptedthere; the seven ships that had the most powerful batteries forming theright column to engage Fort Morgan. The lighter ones were distributed inthe other column, and lashed each to one of the heavier ships, in anorder probably designed, though it is not expressly so stated, to makethe combined steam power of the several pairs as nearly equal aspossible. Among the gunboats there were three that had side-wheelengines, the machinery of which is necessarily more above water, and somore exposed than that of a screw--a condition which, although theirbatteries were powerful for their tonnage, emphasized the necessity ofsheltering them behind other ships during the furious few minutes ofpassing under the guns of the fort. 

The sum of these various considerations thus resulted in the fleetadvancing into action in a column of pairs, in which the heaviest shipsled in the fighting column. To this the admiral was probably induced bythe reflection that the first broadsides are half the battle, and thefreshest attack of the enemy should be met by the most vigorousresistance on his own part; but it is open to doubt whether one of thesepowerful vessels would not have been better placed in the rear. Upon aresolute enemy, the effect of each ship is simply to drive him to coverwhile she passes, to resume his activity when relieved from the pressureof her fire. The case is not strictly similar to the advance of a columnof troops upon a fortified position, where the head does the most of thefighting, and the rear mainly contributes inertia to the movement of themass. It is at least open to argument that a fire progressivelydiminishing from van to rear is not, for the passage of permanent works, a disposition as good as a weight of battery somewhat more equallydistributed, with, however, a decided preponderance in the van. The lastof the ships in this column received a shot in the boiler, whichentirely disabled her--an accident that may have been purely fortuitous, and to which any one of her predecessors was in a degree liable, butalso possibly due to the greater activity of the enemy when no longerscourged by the more powerful batteries which preceded. She was savedfrom the more serious results of this disaster, and the squadron sparedthe necessity of rallying to her support, by the other admirableprecautions dictated by Farragut's forethought. 

Subjected thus to analysis, there seems much to praise and very littleto criticise in the tactical dispositions made by the admiral on thismomentous occasion. But the tactical dispositions, though mostimportant, are not the only considerations; it is the part of thecommander-in-chief to take advantage of any other circumstances that maymake in his favor. Until the forts were passed the character of thebottom left Farragut no choice as to the direction of his attack. Therewas but one road to take, and the only other question was the order inwhich to arrange his ships. But there were two conditions not entirelywithin his control, yet sure to occur in time, which he considered tooadvantageous to be overlooked. He wanted a flood tide, which would helpa crippled vessel past the works; and also a west wind, which would blowthe smoke from the scene of battle and upon Fort Morgan, thereby givingto the pilots, upon whom so much depended, and to the gunners of theships, the advantage of clearer sight. The time of the tide, in mostquarters a matter of simple calculation, is in the Gulf often affectedby the wind. The wind, on the other hand, in the summer months, blowsfrom the south during the early morning, and then works round to thewestward; so that the chances were in favor of his obtaining his wishes. 

The dispositions taken by the Confederates to meet the assault whichthey saw to be impending were more simple; they having but a smallmobile force, and their fortifications being tied to their places. Aseaport liable to attack is a battle-field, in utilizing whose naturalfeatures, so as to present the strongest tactical combination againstentrance or subjection by an enemy, the skill of the engineer is shown;but, unlike battle-fields in general, much time and study is allowed todevelop his plans. In the case of Mobile Bay, the narrow and directcharacter of the approach by the main ship channel left littleopportunity for skill to display itself. To place at the end of MobilePoint the heaviest fort, enfilading the channel, and to confine thelatter to the narrowest bed, compelling the assailant into the mostunfavorable route, were measures too obvious to escape the mostincapable. To obtain the utmost advantage from this approach of theenemy, the little naval force was advanced from Mobile Point, so as tostretch at right angles across the channel just within the torpedo line. There, without being incommoded by the fire of the fort, or in any wayembarrassing it, they secured a clear sweep for their guns, raking theiropponents; who, being for the time unable to deviate from their course, could not reply to this galling attack. By gradually retiring, theConfederate gunboats could retain this superiority during the advance oftheir foes, until the latter reached the wide hole within, where therewas room to manoeuvre. This position and the subsequent course ofaction described comprise the tactical management of the Southernvessels during the engagement. It was well devised, and made probablythe best use of the advantages of the ground possible to so inferior aforce. The Tennessee took position with them, but her after action wasdifferent. 

As the day of the last and, with the exception of the Essex fight of hisboyhood, the most desperate battle of his life drew near, a certainsolemnity--one might almost say depression--is perceptible in the homeletters of the admiral. Had the action proved fatal to him it couldscarcely have failed to attract the attention which is similarlyarrested by the chastened tone of Nelson's life and writing immediatelybefore Trafalgar; and although there is certainly none of that outspokenforeboding which marked the last day of the English hero, Farragut'swritten words are in such apparent contrast to the usual buoyant, confident temper of the man, that they would readily have been construedinto one of those presentiments with which military annals abound. "Withsuch a mother, " he writes to his son a week before the battle, "youcould not fail to have proper sentiments of religion and virtue. I feelthat I have done my duty by you both, as far as the weakness of mynature would allow. I have been devoted to you both, and when it pleasesGod to take me hence I shall feel that I have done my duty. I am notconscious of ever having wronged any one, and have tried to do as muchgood as I could. Take care of your mother if I should go, and may Godbless and preserve you both!" The day before the action he wrote thefollowing letter to his wife, which, as his son remarks in his Life ofthe admiral, shows that he appreciated the desperate work before him:

 "FLAG-SHIP HARTFORD, "OFF MOBILE, _August 4, 1864_. 

 "MY DEAREST WIFE: I write and leave this letter for you. I am going into Mobile in the morning, if God is my leader, as I hope he is, and in him I place my trust. If he thinks it is the proper place for me to die, I am ready to submit to his will in that as in all other things. My great mortification is that my vessels, the ironclads, were not ready to have gone in yesterday. The army landed last night, and are in full view of us this morning, and the Tecumseh has not yet arrived from Pensacola. 

 "God bless and preserve you, my darling, and my dear boy, if anything should happen to me; and may his blessings also rest upon your dear mother, and all your sisters and their children. 

 "Your devoted and affectionate husband, who never for one moment forgot his love, duty, or fidelity to you, his devoted and best of wives, "D. G. FARRAGUT. "

A more touching and gratifying testimony of unwavering attachment, aftermore than twenty years of marriage, no wife could desire. It was anattachment also not merely professed in words, but evidenced by thewhole course of his life and conduct. Infidelity or neglect of a wifewas, in truth, in the estimation of Admiral Farragut, one of the mostserious of blots upon a man's character, drawing out always hisbitterest condemnation. 

A pleasing glimpse is at this same period afforded of his relations tothe surviving members of his father's family, who still remained in ornear New Orleans, and from whom by the conditions of his profession hehad been separated since his childhood. "My dear sister, " he writes, "has sent me a Holy Virgin like the one Rose gave me. She said it wasblessed by the archbishop, who said I was good to the priests. I onlytell you this, " adds the admiral dryly, "to show you that they did notsucceed in impressing the bishop with the idea that I had robbed thechurch at Point Coupée. " This is not the only mention of his sisterduring this time, and it is evident that two years' occupation of NewOrleans by the Union forces had done much to mollify public sentiment;for immediately after the surrender he had written home, "It is astrange thought that I am here among my relatives, and yet not one hasdared to say 'I am happy to see you. '"

On the 8th of July General Canby, accompanied by General Granger, whowas to have immediate charge of the land operations against the Mobileforts, had called upon the admiral to make the preliminary arrangements. Somewhat later Canby sent word that he could not spare men enough toinvest both Gaines and Morgan at the same time; and at Farragut'ssuggestion it was then decided to land first upon Dauphin Island, heundertaking to send a gunboat to cover the movement. Granger visited himagain on the 1st of August, and as the admiral then had reason to expectthe last of his monitors by the 4th, that day was fixed for the attackand landing. Granger was up to time, and his troops were put ashore onthe evening of the 3d; but the Tecumseh had not arrived from Pensacola. The other three had been on hand since the 1st, anchored under theshelter of Sand Island, three miles from Fort Morgan. 

To Farragut's great mortification he was unable to carry out his part ofthe programme; but on the evening of the 4th the Tecumseh arrived, together with the Richmond, which had been for a few days at Pensacolapreparing for the fight. "I regret to have detained you, admiral, " saidCraven, the commander of the monitor, "but had it not been for CaptainJenkins (of the Richmond), God knows when I should have been here. Whenyour order came I had not received an ounce of coal. " In his report ofthe battle, Farragut warmly acknowledged the zeal and energy of Jenkins, to which he owed the seasonable arrival of this importantre-enforcement. "He takes, " he said, "as much interest in the fleet nowas formerly when he was my chief-of-staff. He is also commanding officerof the second division of my squadron, and as such has shown ability andthe most untiring zeal. .. . I feel I should not be doing my duty did Inot call the attention of the Department to an officer who has performedall his various duties with so much zeal and fidelity. " Farragut hasbeen charged with failure to notice adequately the services of thoseunder him; but the foregoing words, which are not by any meansunparalleled in his dispatches, show that he could praise cordially whenhe saw fitting occasion. 

The night of August 4th was quiet, the sea smooth, with a light air justrippling the surface of the water. At sundown it had been raining hard, but toward midnight cleared off, the weather becoming hot and calm. Later on a light air again sprang up from the southwest. The admiral wasnot well, and slept restlessly. About three in the morning he called hisservant and sent him to find out how the wind was. Learning that it wasfrom the quarter he wished, he said, "Then we will go in in themorning. " Between four and five the lighter vessels got under way andwent alongside those to which they were to be lashed. When daybreak wasreported Farragut was already at breakfast with the captain of theHartford, Percival Drayton, and the fleet-surgeon, Dr. James C. Palmer, who had left his usual post at the hospital in Pensacola to superintendthe care of those wounded in the approaching battle. It was then abouthalf-past five; the couples were all formed, and the admiral, stillsipping his tea, said quietly, "Well, Drayton, we might as well getunder way. " The signal was made and at once acknowledged by the vessels, which had all been awaiting it, and the seamen began to heave round onthe cables. The taking their assigned positions in the column by thedifferent pairs consumed some time, during which the flag-ship crossedthe bar, at ten minutes past six. At half-past six the column of woodenvessels was formed, and the monitors were standing down from Sand Islandinto their stations, in gaining which some little further delay wascaused. At this time all the ships hoisted the United States flag, notonly at the peak where it commonly flies, but at every mast-head aswell. 

It had been the intention of the admiral to lead the column of woodenvessels with his own ship; but at the earnest request of many officers, who thought the fleet should not incur the greater risk consequent uponhaving its commander in so exposed a position, he reluctantly consentedto waive his purpose, and the Brooklyn was appointed to this post ofhonor. To this selection contributed also the fact that the Brooklyn hadmore than the usual number of chase guns, the advantage of which hasbeen explained, and also an arrangement for picking up torpedoes. Bitterly afterward did Farragut regret his yielding on this occasion. "Ibelieve this to be an error, " he wrote in his official report of thebattle; "for, apart from the fact that exposure is one of the penaltiesof rank in the navy, it will _always_ be the aim of the enemy to destroythe flag-ship, and, as will appear in the sequel, such attempt was verypersistently made. " "The fact is, " he said in one of his letters home, "had I been the obstinate man you sometimes think me, I would have ledin the fleet and saved the Tecumseh"--meaning, doubtless, that, byinterposing between that important vessel and the buoy which marked thetorpedo line, he would have prevented the error which caused her loss. Some notes upon the action found afterward among his papers contain thesame opinion, more fully and deliberately expressed. "Allowing theBrooklyn to go ahead was a great error. It lost not only the Tecumseh, but many valuable lives, by keeping us under the fire of the forts forthirty minutes; whereas, had I led, as I intended to do, I would havegone inside the buoys, and all would have followed me. " The Hartfordtook the second place in the column, having secured on her port or offside the side-wheel gunboat Metacomet, Lieutenant-Commander James E. Jouett. 

While the monitors were taking their stations, the Tecumseh, which ledtheir column, fired two shots at the fort. At five minutes before seven, the order of battle now being fully formed, the fleet went ahead. Tenminutes later Fort Morgan opened fire upon the Brooklyn, which at oncereplied with her bow guns, followed very soon by those of the fightingcolumn of wooden ships; a brisk cannonade ensuing between them, themonitors, and the fort. In order to see more clearly, and at the sametime to have immediately by him the persons upon whom he most dependedfor governing the motions of the ship, Farragut had taken his positionin the port main-rigging. Here he had near him Captain Jouett, standingon the wheel-house of the Metacomet, and also the pilot, who, as atPort Hudson, had been stationed aloft, on this occasion in the maintop, so as to see well over the smoke. As this increased and rose higher, Farragut went up step by step until he was close under the maintop. Here, without losing touch with Jouett, he was very near the pilot, hadthe whole scene of battle spread out under his eyes, and at the sametime, by bracing himself against the futtock shrouds, was able to usehis spy-glass more freely. Captain Drayton, however, being alarmed lesthe might be thrown to the deck, directed a seaman to carry a lashingaloft and secure him to the rigging, which the admiral, after a moment'sremonstrance, permitted. By such a simple and natural train of causeswas Farragut brought to and secured in a position which he, like anyother commander-in-chief, had sought merely in order better to see theoperations he had to direct; but popular fancy was caught by thecircumstance, and to his amusement he found that an admiral lashed tothe rigging was invested with a significance equivalent to that ofcolors nailed to the mast. "The illustrated papers are very amusing, " hewrote home. "Leslie has me lashed up to the mast like a culprit, andsays, 'It is the way officers will hereafter go into battle, etc. ' Youunderstand, I was only standing in the rigging with a rope, that dearboy Watson had brought me up, " (this was later in the action, when theadmiral had shifted his position), "saying that if I would stand there Ihad better secure myself against falling; and I thanked him for hisconsideration, and took a turn around and over the shrouds and around mybody for fear of being wounded, as shots were flying rather thickly. "

Shortly after the monitors and the bow guns of the fleet began firing, the enemy's gunboats and the Tennessee moved out from behind Morgan andtook their position enfilading the channel. Twenty minutes later, through the advance of the column, the broadsides of the leading shipsbegan to bear upon the fort; and as these heavy batteries vomited theiriron rain the fire of the defense visibly slackened. Amid the scene ofuproar and slaughter, in which the petty Confederate flotilla, thanks toits position of vantage, was playing a deadly part quite out ofproportion to its actual strength, the Tecumseh alone was silent. Afterthe first two shots fired by her, which were rather the signal ofwarning than the opening of the battle, she had loaded her two guns withsteel shot, backed by the heaviest charge of powder allowed, and, thusprepared, reserved her fire for the Tennessee alone. "I believe, " wroteFarragut in a private letter, "that the Tecumseh would have gone up andgrappled with and captured the Tennessee. Craven's heart was bent uponit. "

The two columns, of ironclads and of wooden vessels lashed together inpairs, were now approaching the line of torpedoes and the narrowentrance through which lay the path of safety; and the broadsides of theheavy sloops which led--the Brooklyn, the Hartford, theRichmond--supported by the less numerous but still powerful batteriesfollowing, and by the guns of the turreted ironclads, overbore the fireof the works. All promised fairly, provided the leaders of the twocolumns pushed rapidly and unhesitatingly in the direction assignedthem. But almost at the same moment doubt seized them both, and led to adouble disaster. As Craven, leading the monitor column, and then aboutthree hundred yards in advance of the Brooklyn, drew up to the buoy, tothe eastward of which he had been directed to go, he saw it so nearly inline with the point beyond that he could not believe it possible topass. "It is impossible that the admiral means us to go inside thatbuoy, " he said to the pilot; "I can not turn my ship. " Just then theTennessee moved a little ahead, to the westward; and Craven, under thedouble impulse of his doubt and of his fear lest the hostile ironcladshould escape him, changed his course to the left and pushed straightfor her, the Tecumseh heading to pass the buoy on the wrong side. 

The movement thus indicated, if followed by the succeeding monitors, would throw that column across the path of the wooden ships if thelatter endeavored to obey their orders to pass east of the buoy. At thesame moment there were seen from the Brooklyn, in the water ahead, certain objects which were taken to be buoys for torpedoes. The ship wasat once stopped and backed, coming down upon the Hartford, her nextastern, which also stopped, but did not reverse her engines. TheRichmond followed the Hartford's movements, and the two ships drifted upwith the young flood tide, but with their heads still pointed in theright direction, toward the Brooklyn; the stern of the latter vessel, asshe backed, coming up into the wind so that her bows turned toward thefort. Fortunately, the rear ships were some little distance off; butFarragut, ignorant of the cause of the Brooklyn's action, saw his lineof battle doubling up and threatened with an almost inextricableconfusion, in the most difficult and exposed part of the passage, undera cross-fire from the fort and the enemy's vessels. Immediately uponthis frightful perplexity succeeded the great disaster of the day. Craven, pursuing his course across the suspected line of danger, hadreached within two hundred yards of the Tennessee, and the crews of bothvessels were waiting with tense nerves for the expected collision, whena torpedo exploded under the Tecumseh, then distant a little over fivehundred yards from the Hartford. From his elevated post of observationFarragut saw her reel violently from side to side, lurch heavily over, and then go down head foremost, her screw revolving wildly in the air asshe disappeared. 

It was the supreme moment of his life, in which the scales of hisfortunes wavered in the balance. All the long years of preparation, offaithful devotion to obscure duty awaiting the opportunity that mightnever come--all the success attending the two brief years in which hisflag had flown--all the glories of the river fights--on the one side;and on the other, threatening to overbear and wreck all, a danger hecould not measure, but whose dire reality had been testified by thecatastrophe just befallen under his own eyes. Added to this was thecomplication in the order of battle ahead of him, produced by the doublemovements of the Brooklyn and Tecumseh, which no longer allowed him toseize the one open path, follow his own first brave thought, and leadhis fleet in person through the narrow way where, if at all, safety lay. The Brooklyn, when she began to back, was on the starboard bow of theflag-ship, distant one or two hundred yards, and falling off tostarboard lay directly in the way athwart the channel. The secondmonitor, Manhattan, of the same class as the Tecumseh, had passedahead; but the two light-draughts, the Winnebago and Chickasaw, weredrawing up abreast of the three ships thus massed together. As theypassed, the admiration of the officers of the flag-ship was stirred tosee Captain Stevens, of the Winnebago, pacing calmly from turret toturret of his unwieldy vessel, under the full fire of the fort; while ofPerkins, in the Chickasaw, the youngest commander in the fleet, and thenabout twenty-seven years of age, an officer of high position in theflag-ship says, "As he passed the Hartford he was on top of the turret, waving his hat and dancing about with delight and excitement. "

But as they went thus gallantly by, the position of these vessels, combined with that of the Brooklyn relatively to the flag-ship, forbadethe latter's turning in that direction unless at the risk of adding to aconfusion already sufficiently perilous. A signal was made and repeatedto the Brooklyn to go ahead; but that vessel gave no sign of moving, hercommander being probably perplexed between his orders to pass east ofthe buoy and the difficulty of doing so, owing to the position intowhich his ship had now fallen and the situation of the monitors. But toremain thus motionless and undecided, under the fire of the fort withthe other ships coming up to swell the size of the target offered to itsgunners and to increase the confusion, was out of the question. Toadvance or to recede seemed alike dangerous. Ahead lay the dreaded lineof torpedoes; behind was the possibility of retreat, but beaten, baffled, and disastrous. All depended upon the prompt decision of theadmiral. If he failed himself, or if fortune failed him now, hisbrilliant career of success ended in the gloom of a defeat the degree ofwhich could not be foreseen. In later days, Farragut told that in theconfusion of these moments, feeling that all his plans had beenthwarted, he was at a loss whether to advance or retreat. In thisextremity the devout spirit that ruled his life, and so constantlyappears in his correspondence, impelled him to appeal to Heaven forguidance, and he offered up this prayer: "O God, who created man andgave him reason, direct me what to do. Shall I go on?" "And it seemed, "said the admiral, "as if in answer a voice commanded, 'Go on!'"

To such a prompting his gallant temper and clear intuitions in allmatters relating to war were quick to respond. Personal danger could notdeter him; and if it was necessary that some one ship should set theexample and force a way through the torpedo line by the sacrifice ofherself, he was prepared by all his habits of thought to accept thatduty for the vessel bearing his flag. Describing the spirit in which hebegan an arduous enterprise, after once deciding that it should beundertaken, he said: "I calculate thus: The chances are that I shalllose some of my vessels by torpedoes or the guns of the enemy, but withsome of my fleet afloat I shall eventually be successful. I can not loseall. I will attack, regardless of consequences, and never turn back. " Toa mind thus disciplined and prepared, the unforeseen dilemma presentedbefore the barriers of Mobile Bay caused but a passing perplexity. Likethe Puritan soldier who trusted in God and kept his powder dry, Farragutmet the overthrow of his carefully arranged plans and the suddendecision thrust upon him with the calm resolution of a man who hascounted the cost and is strengthened by a profound dependence upon thewill of the Almighty. He resolved to go forward. 

The Hartford was now too near the Brooklyn to go clear by a simplemovement of her helm. Backing hard, therefore, the wheels of theMetacomet, while turning her own screw ahead, her bows were twistedshort round, as in a like strait they had been pointed fair under thebatteries of Port Hudson; then, going ahead fast, the two ships passedclose under the stern of the Brooklyn and dashed straight at the line ofthe buoys. As they thus went by the vessel which till then had led, awarning cry came from her that there were torpedoes ahead. "Damn thetorpedoes!" shouted the admiral, in the exaltation of his high purpose. "Four bells![X] Captain Drayton, go ahead! Jouett, full speed!" TheHartford and her consort crossed the line about five hundred yards fromMobile Point, well to the westward of the buoy and of the spot where theTecumseh had gone down. As they passed between the buoys, the cases ofthe torpedoes were heard by many on board knocking against the copper ofthe bottom, and many of the primers snapped audibly, but no torpedoexploded. The Hartford went safely through, the gates of Mobile Bay wereforced, and as Farragut's flag cleared the obstructions his last andhardest battle was virtually won. The Brooklyn got her head round, theRichmond supporting her by a sustained fire from her heavy broadside;and, after a delay which allowed the flag-ship to gain nearly a mileupon them, the other ships in order followed the Hartford, "believing, "wrote the admiral in his dispatch, "that they were going to a nobledeath with their commander-in-chief. "

 [Footnote X: The signal in the United States Navy for the engines to be driven at high speed. ]

After the flag-ship had passed the torpedo line the enemy's threegunboats began retreating slowly up the bay, keeping ahead and on herstarboard bow, where her guns could not bear while their own raked her. The conditions of the channel did not yet allow her to deviate from hercourse in order to return their fire. At no period of the battle did theHartford suffer so much as during the fifteen minutes she had to endurethis galling punishment. The Tennessee, being inferior in speed to herconsorts as well as to the Hartford, could not accompany this movement;and, moreover, Buchanan, the Confederate admiral, had set his heart uponramming the vessel that bore the flag of his old friend Farragut. TheTennessee therefore stood toward the Hartford, but failed in her thrust, the Union vessel avoiding it easily with a movement of her helm. The ramthen fired two shots at very short range, but singularly enough bothmissed. "I took no further notice of her, " wrote Farragut, "than toreturn her fire. " The Tennessee followed some little distance up thebay, and then, changing her mind, turned toward the column of woodenvessels that was now approaching, with the three monitors covering theirright flank and somewhat in the rear; these having delayed to engage thefire of the fort while their more vulnerable companions went by. TheConfederate ironclad passed along the column from van to rear, exchanging shots with most of the vessels in it. The Monongahelaattempted to ram her, but, being embarrassed by the gunboat lashedalongside, succeeded only in giving a glancing blow; while the Oneida, the ship on the fighting side of the rear couple, already completelydisabled in her motive power by a shot through the boiler, received araking broadside, by which her captain, Mullany, lost an arm. 

At the time the Tennessee went about to encounter the remaining vesselsof the fleet, which was about eight o'clock, the course of the channelenabled the Hartford to turn sufficiently to bring her broadside to bearon her puny assailants. By the fire she then opened, one, the Gaines, was so much injured as to be with difficulty kept afloat until she couldtake refuge under Fort Morgan, where she was that night burned by hercommander. All three retreated rapidly toward the shoal water on theeast side of the bay. Farragut then signaled for the gunboats of hisfleet to chase those of the enemy. Jouett, being alongside, received theorder by word of mouth, and the admiral often afterward spoke withenthusiasm of the hearty "Ay, ay, sir!" he received in reply, and of thepromptness with which the fasts were cut, the men being already by them, hatchet in hand. The Metacomet backed clear at once and started rapidlyin pursuit. The gunboats in the rear followed as soon as the signal wasmade out; but, both from their position and from the inevitable delay inreading signals, they were at a disadvantage. A thick rain squall comingup soon after hid both pursuers and pursued from each other's sight. TheMorgan and the Gaines took advantage of it to change their course forFort Morgan; the third Confederate, the Selma, kept straight on, as didthe Metacomet. When the squall cleared, the latter found herself aheadof her chase. One shot was fired, killing the first lieutenant and someof the crew of the Selma, whose flag was then hauled down. The Morganmade good her retreat under the fort, and that night succeeded inescaping up the bay to the city, although she was seen and fired upon byseveral of Farragut's vessels. 

At half-past eight o'clock, three hours after the first signal was madeto get under way and an hour and a half after the action began, theflag-ship anchored in the upper part of the deep pocket into which thechannel expands after passing the entrance. She was then about fourmiles from Fort Morgan, and the crew were sent to breakfast. The admiralhad come down from his post in the main rigging and was standing on thepoop, when Captain Drayton came up to him and said: "What we have donehas been well done, sir; but it all counts for nothing so long as theTennessee is there under the guns of Morgan. " "I know it, " repliedFarragut, "and as soon as the people have had their breakfasts I amgoing for her. " These words were exchanged in the hearing of the firstlieutenant of the Hartford, now Rear-Admiral Kimberly, and at presentthe senior officer upon the active list of the United States Navy. Inwriting home a few weeks later, the admiral said: "If I had not capturedthe Tennessee as I did, I should have taken her that night with themonitors, or _tried_ it. " The latter undoubtedly represents the moredeliberate opinion, that would have guided him had Buchanan not playedinto his hands by attacking the fleet; for if the Tennessee hadremained under Morgan and there been sought by the monitors, the fightwould have been at such close quarters that in the darkness the fortcould scarcely have joined without imminent risk of hurting friend aswell as foe. 

As it was, the Confederate admiral seems never to have contemplated anymore prudent or sagacious course than a single-handed free fight withthe fleet. As soon as the Tennessee had passed the rear of the enemy'scolumn, Buchanan said to the captain of the ram: "Follow them up, Johnston; we can't let them off that way. " In turning, the Tennesseetook much room, appearing from the fleet to have gone back under theguns of Fort Morgan; and the various ships, as they came up, wereanchoring near the Hartford, expecting a few quiet hours. They were soonundeceived. The brief conversation above reported between Farragut andhis flag-captain had scarcely ended when the ram was seen to be movingout from under the fort. Captain Drayton reported the fact to theadmiral, saying that she was going outside to attack the United Statesvessels still remaining there. "Then, " said Farragut, "we must followhim out. " The remark indicates an alternative to the course actuallyadopted by Buchanan, and one whose issue would depend less upon theUnited States commander-in-chief than upon the conduct of the vesselsoutside. If these were so imprudent as not to retire, Farragut mighthave been forced to run twice again the gantlet of Fort Morgan and ofthe torpedo line--once to protect them, and afterward to regain theposition he had just achieved. 

It must be admitted that the question before the Confederate admiral, what to do with one unwieldy though powerful vessel opposed to fourteenenemies, was hard to solve; nor did he have, in a precise knowledge ofthe speed, battery, and other qualities of his opponents, the dataneeded for an accurate solution. In a general way, however, he must haveknown that the guns of the United States fleet were mainly smooth-bores, with but moderate penetrative power upon iron-plating such as theTennessee's; and during the morning's encounter he had acquiredexperimental knowledge of their impotence against her sides, unless by acontinuous pounding such as he was now about to invite. He knew alsothat several of the hostile vessels were of too heavy draught to takeany efficient part, if he refused, as was in his power, to enter thepocket in which they were now anchored; while the general gentleshelving of the bottom enabled a foot's difference in draught to securea very considerable separation in distance. Every wooden ship wasvulnerable to him and impotent against him at the ranges which hisrifles permitted him to use. 

With the monitors Buchanan had not yet come into collision; but one ofthe most formidable was sunk, and until he had learned something abouttheir endurance and the power of their guns relatively to those of hisown vessel, it would seem that his action, though immediate, should havebeen only tentative. If it proved on trial that the speed of theTennessee was greater than that of the monitors, she might yet provemaster of the situation. Despite the beak, which her wretched speed andexposed steering chains rendered untrustworthy, her great defensivestrength and the fact of carrying rifled guns indicated that long range, and not close quarters, was the first game of the Tennessee. There shecould hurt, and she could not be hurt. Had she, for instance, hovered ata distance, firing deliberately at the Union vessels, Farragut must haveattacked; and she could then have retired either into shoaler water, retaining her advantage in range, or else under the guns of Morgan, which would have strongly re-enforced her fight. The fact that Farragut, whose instinct for war was commonly accurate, proposed to attack her atclose quarters and by night, is the best argument that Buchanan shouldhave sought long range and daylight for his action. As it was, hisheadlong charge into the Union fleet was a magnificent display ofinconsiderate bravery, in which such advantages as he had wererecklessly thrown away. Its purpose is not clear. If, as Farragutthought, it was to sink his flag-ship, it can only be replied that anadmiral's flag is not a red rag for a bull to charge. Had the Hartfordbeen sunk when the column doubled up an hour or so before, the loss ofthe leader at so critical a moment might have decided the day; but tosink her in the _mêlée_ within would have been a barren, thoughbrilliant, feat of arms. 

As soon as it was ascertained that the Tennessee was really coming up toattack, the mess-gear was hurried aside and the orders given to getunder way. Some of the fleet had not yet anchored, and the monitors werenot yet arrived at the place where the others were gathered. Dr. Palmer, the fleet surgeon, was just leaving the flag-ship in a steam-launch, forthe purpose of making a round among the other vessels to see to thecondition of their wounded. Farragut called him alongside and directedhim to go to the monitors with orders to attack the Tennessee. ThesePalmer delivered in person to each ironclad. "Happy as my friend Perkins(of the Chickasaw) habitually is, " he wrote in his diary, "I thought hewould turn a somersault overboard with joy when I told him, 'The admiralwants you to go at once and fight that Tennessee. '" The wooden vesselsat the same time were directed to charge the ram, bows on, at fullspeed, as well as to attack her with their guns. 

The monitors being, like the Tennessee herself, very slow, the rammingcontest first began. The first to reach the hostile ironclad was theMonongahela, Captain Strong, which struck her squarely amidships on thestarboard side, when she was still four hundred yards distant from thebody of the fleet. Five minutes later the Lackawanna, Captain Marchand, going at full speed, delivered her blow also at right angles on the portside, abreast the after end of the armored superstructure. As they swunground, both United States vessels fired such guns as would bear, but theshot glanced harmlessly from the armor; nor did the blow of the shipsthemselves produce any serious injury upon the enemy, although their ownstems were crushed in for several feet above and below the water line. Upon them followed the Hartford, approaching, like the Lackawanna, onthe port side; but toward her the Tennessee turned, so that the two metnearly, though not exactly, bows on. The Hartford's anchor, which therehad not been time to cat, was hanging at the water's edge; it took thebrunt of the collision, which doubled it up, and the two antagonistsscraped by, their port sides touching. At that close range sevennine-inch guns were discharged against the sloping sides of theironclad, but without effect. The admiral had clambered again into therigging, on this occasion into the port mizzen-rigging, whence hewatched the effects of this encounter. Both the Lackawanna and theHartford now made a circuit to get a position whence they could againcharge the enemy; but in the midst of their sweep the Lackawanna ransquare into the flag-ship, striking near where Farragut stood, andcutting the vessel down to within two feet of the water. The immediateimpression among the ship's company was that the injury was fatal; andthe general cry that arose, "Save the admiral! Get the admiral on boardthe Lackawanna!" by its ignoring of their own danger, testified howFarragut's martial and personal qualities had won a way into theaffections of his subordinates. With an activity for which he had beenremarkable in middle life, and retained even now when in his sixties, the admiral jumped into the chains to ascertain the extent of theinjury; then, finding that the ship was in no present danger, he orderedher again to be headed for the Tennessee. 

Meanwhile the monitors had come up, and the battle had begun betweenthem and the enemy. One of the Manhattan's fifteen-inch guns had beendisabled; and the slow firing of those unwieldy weapons, with theimperfect mechanical appliances then used for loading them, preventedher doing the injury that might have been expected. One shot strucksquare, breaking through the port side of the armor; but even so themissile itself did not enter the vessel, a strong evidence of the powerof the Tennessee to resist a single shot. But she was not equallyinvulnerable to the sustained and continuous hammering of even lighterprojectiles. The Winnebago's turrets, being out of order, could not beturned, and consequently the guns could be brought to bear only bymoving the helm; a circumstance which materially reduced her fire. TheChickasaw, however, was in better case. Lieutenant-Commander Perkins gother into position under the stern of the Tennessee just after thelatter's collision with the Hartford; and there he stuck to the end, never over fifty yards distant, and keeping up a steady rapping ofeleven-inch shot upon the fabric which they could not at once penetrate, but which they visibly shook. Fifty-two of these projectiles were firedfrom the Chickasaw in the short half-hour of her attack. The exposedrudder-chains were shot away, and at nearly the same time thesmoke-stack came down. Admiral Buchanan was wounded by an iron splinter, which broke his leg and otherwise injured it to such an extent that thelimb was with difficulty saved. He turned over the command to CaptainJohnston, who stood the pounding for twenty minutes longer and thenreported to his superior that the ship was helpless, could not besteered, and that for half an hour he had not been able to bring a gunto bear. "Well, " replied Buchanan, "if you can not do them any furtherdamage you had better surrender. "

The Tennessee's flag had been several times shot away, and was nowflying from a boat-hook. Not being very conspicuous, its removal was notimmediately noticed, and Johnston had to show a white flag to put a stopto the firing. "She was at this time sore beset, " said Farragut in hisdispatch to the Navy Department; "the Chickasaw was pounding away at herstern, the Ossipee was approaching her at full speed, and theMonongahela, Lackawanna, and Hartford were bearing down upon her, determined upon her destruction. Her smoke-stack had been shot away, hersteering chains were gone, compelling a resort to her relieving tackles, and several of her port shutters were jammed. Indeed, from the time theHartford struck her until her surrender she never fired a gun. " Nostronger evidence can be offered than this last sentence, whichJohnston's account corroborates, of how completely Buchananmiscalculated, or disregarded, the capabilities of the important vesselhe controlled. Great as was her power to resist a single shot, or theend-on charge of a heavy vessel, when she surrendered nearly all theplating on the after side of the casemate was found to be started, andthe after gun-carriage was disabled; there being distinct marks of nineeleven-inch solid shot having struck within a few square feet of thatport. Three of her port shutters also were so damaged that their gunscould not be fired. 

Thus ended the great battle of Mobile Bay, the crowning achievement ofFarragut's naval career; "one of the hardest-earned victories of mylife, " to quote his own words, "and the most desperate battle I everfought since the days of the old Essex. " "You may pass through a longcareer and see many an action, " he remarked to one of the juniorofficers of the Hartford, in the interval between first anchoring andthe conflict with the Tennessee, "without seeing as much bloodshed asyou have this day witnessed. " The loss of the flag-ship herself hadbeen twenty-five killed and twenty-eight wounded out of a ship's companyof some three hundred souls. The Brooklyn, a ship of the same force, hadalmost exactly the same number of casualties--eleven killed andforty-three wounded. Contrasting the equal suffering of thelatter--delayed so long under the numerous guns of the fort, butsupported by the fire of the other vessels--with that of the flag-ship, inflicted by the batteries of the enemy's gun-boats, few in number, butworked for the time with impunity, we find an excellent illustration ofFarragut's oft-repeated maxim, that "to hurt your enemy is the best wayto keep him from hurting you. " The total loss of the United States fleetin the battle was three hundred and thirty-five; of whom one hundred andthirteen were at the bottom of the bay, coffined in the iron hull of theTecumseh. 

Not quite three hours elapsed from the time that Morgan fired its firstgun to the moment when the Tennessee hauled down her flag and confessedthe United States fleet mistress of the bay. The forts still stood withthe Confederate flag flying from them in defiance; and it is reportedthat the commander of Morgan retorted to a summons to surrender, that helooked upon Farragut's fleet as practically prisoners in a port whosekeys he held. If so, it was the high-hearted resolve of a man determinedto hold his charge to the last, and not the sober conviction of asoldier, that spoke. Like the river forts when Farragut's fleet forcedits way past and stood between them and their base of supplies, thedefenses of Mobile were isolated by the results of the morning's fight, and their fall became but a question of time. There was no mutiny of thegarrison, as on the former occasion, for the stern experience of war hadbetter taught the men the business of a soldier; but it was at oncepracticable here to begin siege operations, which in the river wouldperhaps have been for a time postponed, owing to the overflowed state ofthe country. The preparations for these were pushed with vigor, and thenavy also took a hand against the works. Four hours after the surrenderof the Tennessee, the Chickasaw weighed her anchor and steamed downtoward Grant's Pass to shell Fort Powell. Built to resist an attack fromMississippi Sound, the work was weak in the direction of the bay. "Theironclad's fire, " reported the officer in command, "made it impossibleto man the two guns in the rear, and I made no attempt to do so. " Thatnight the fort was evacuated and blown up. The following day theChickasaw threw some shells into Fort Gaines, in consequence of which, and of the progress made by General Granger in his approaches, that workwas surrendered on the 7th of August. Morgan still standing out, thearmy was transferred from Dauphin Island to Mobile Point, batteries wereconstructed, and on the 17th a siege train from New Orleans was landed. On the 22d, at daylight, the siege guns, the three monitors, thecaptured Tennessee, and the ships, both outside and inside the bay, opened together. The following day Fort Morgan capitulated. 

A gratifying feature in these operations, as well as in all Farragut'sofficial association with the army, was the cordial good feeling andco-operation which existed between the two services, and which wereequally manifested in the upper Mississippi between Grant and Porter. General Butler, Farragut's first colleague in the Gulf and at NewOrleans, but who had long since left the department, wrote him a mostenthusiastic letter of congratulation upon receiving the news of thebattle of Mobile Bay; and General Granger, in concluding his report ofthe siege operations against Gaines and Morgan, said: "I am pleased torecord the perfect harmony existing between these two branches of theservice. For my own part, I can not sufficiently acknowledge theassistance rendered by the fleet and the admiral in command intransporting and disembarking the troops, guns, and materials employedby me in the operations. In brief, during all our relations, theofficers of the fleet, with their distinguished commander, displayed ina high degree those qualities which mark their gallant service. " To theofficers of the navy the testimonies thus given can not but be mostgrateful; not merely as acknowledgments of the important part played bya service whose work is too often ignored by historians, but chiefly asgiving an added lustre to the brilliant reputation of its two mostdistinguished representatives, who successively filled the high positionof admiral of the navy. 

After the capitulation of the forts, Admiral Farragut remained in MobileBay until the following November. The lower bay was cleared of torpedoesand reconnoissances made toward Mobile; but he wrote adversely to anyattempt against the city, now that it was sealed as a port to blockaderunners. "It would be an elephant, " he wrote, "and take an army to holdit. And besides, all the traitors and rascally speculators would flockto that city and pour into the Confederacy the wealth of New York. " Heconfesses also his dislike to operations in very shoal water. "I am inno way diffident about going anywhere in the Hartford, but when I haveto leave her and take to a craft drawing six feet of water I feelbadly. "

The admiral's health was now suffering much from the combined effects ofhis labors, his anxieties, and the climate. "I am as well as a man canbe who can neither sit, walk, nor stand five minutes at a time onaccount of Job's comforters. But, thank God (I have so much to bethankful for that I am thanking him all the time), I am otherwise inpretty good condition. " Despite this brave effort at cheerfulness, hisletters from time to time began to show symptoms of depression, and helonged for rest. "This is the last of my work, " he said, "and I expect alittle respite. " His enfeebled condition drew the attention and excitedthe alarm of those about him. "I was talking to the admiral to-day, "wrote Perkins, of the Chickasaw, the day after Morgan surrendered, "whenall at once he fainted away. He is not very well and is all tired out. It gave me quite a shock, and shows how exhausted he is, and his healthis not very good, any way. He is a mighty fine old fellow. " CaptainDrayton also wrote home to his family that, if the admiral remainedlonger in the Gulf, he feared for the consequences. 

Under these circumstances an order from the Navy Department, dated the5th of September, assigning him to the command of the Fort Fisherexpedition, greatly upset him. He had about a week before written to theSecretary to say that his strength was almost exhausted. "I amwilling, " he concluded, "to do the bidding of the department as long asI am able to the best of my abilities. I fear, however, that my healthis giving way. I have now been down in the Gulf five years out of six, with the exception of the short time at home last fall; the last sixmonths have been a severe drag upon me, and I want rest, if it is to behad. "

To so reasonable a request, after such distinguished and valuableservice, the department could not have closed its ears had it been sodisposed. Farragut was authorized to leave his squadron in charge ofCommodore James S. Palmer, a very gallant and efficient officer, and tocome north in the Hartford. On the 30th of November, 1864, he sailedfrom Pensacola, and on the 12th of December the flag-ship again anchoredin New York Harbor. 

CHAPTER XI. 

LATER YEARS AND DEATH. 

1864-1870. 

With the strong national and patriotic feeling that had been arousedthroughout the Northern States by the war of secession, Farragut had nocause to complain of ingratitude or indifference on the part either ofthe Government or of his fellow-countrymen. As the flag-ship entered theNarrows, on his final return from the Gulf, she was met by arepresentative committee from the city officials and citizens of NewYork. Enthusiastic crowds greeted him as he landed at the Battery, and areception given him the same afternoon at the Custom House was throngedby the leading men of the city. This eager manifestation of good-willand admiration was followed, a few days later, by a flattering requestthat the admiral would honor the city by taking up his abode in it andbecoming thenceforth one of its citizens. After reciting the deeds whichhad won for him universal applause and thankfulness, the committee said:"The citizens of New York can offer no tribute equal to your claim ontheir gratitude and affection. Their earnest desire is to receive you asone of their number, and to be permitted, as fellow-citizens, to sharein the renown you will bring to the metropolitan city. This desire isfelt in common by the whole community. "

This graceful tribute of words was accompanied by the gift of fiftythousand dollars, to facilitate Farragut's complying with the request. The letter was addressed to Vice-Admiral Farragut; the United StatesGovernment, not to be behindhand in acknowledging its debt to its mostdistinguished seaman, having created for him that grade soon after hisarrival. The bill for the purpose was introduced on the 22d of December, 1864, immediately passed by both houses, and became law by thePresident's signature the following day. Farragut's nomination andconfirmation followed of course and at once; so that his promotion cameto him in the Christmas holidays. The admiral gratefully acknowledgedthe warm welcome of the New Yorkers, while modestly disavowing, as faras he could, his claim to extraordinary merit in the brilliant serviceswhich he asserted were but the performance of his duty; and hethankfully accepted, as the spontaneous offering of hisfellow-countrymen, the recompense which in older countries is the usualreward of distinguished military success, but conferred there throughthe formal medium of the central government. 

Toward the end of January, 1865, the Confederate vessels in the Jamesmade an attempt to descend the river, destroy the pontoon bridges of theUnited States armies, and cut off both the Army of the James and that ofthe Potomac from their base of supplies at City Point. Rear-AdmiralDavid D. Porter, who then commanded the North Atlantic Squadron, wasfully occupied at the time with the bombardment of Fort Fisher andcapture of Wilmington, North Carolina; and as the hostile attemptthreatened a very serious annoyance to the communications of the army, Farragut, who was then in Washington, was ordered to proceed to thespot. He accordingly hoisted his flag on a small steamer and ran down tothe James; but, finding upon his arrival that the enemy had beenrepulsed, and satisfactory measures taken to prevent a renewal of theeffort, he returned to Washington. This slight episode concluded hisactive service in the war. 

When Richmond was evacuated on the 2d of April, 1865, Farragut was amongthe first to visit the fallen capital of the Confederacy. From there afew days later he visited his old home in Norfolk. Many of his formerfriends still retained strong feelings of resentment against him, as aSouthern man who had taken arms against the South. The impression hadobtained among some that, though leaving his old home, he would remainneutral; and it was even reported that he had said he would take no partin the war. That Farragut never passed through that phase of feeling, inthe struggle between life-long affections and the sense of duty, wouldbe too much to affirm; but it was a position in which a man of hisdecided and positive character could not have stopped when civil strifewas upon the land. It was inconsistent with his general habits ofthought; and it is evident that, before leaving Norfolk, his convictionson the particular crisis had already left far behind any such temporaryhalting place between two opinions. When he justified to his excitedneighbors President Lincoln's call for troops, on the ground that theUnited States Government could do no less, when its arsenals and navyyards were seized and its flag fired upon, it is inconceivable that theman who then had such courage of his opinions entertained any furtherdoubt as to his future course; though it may well be that he did notimperil his personal liberty and safety by any irritating avowal of hispurpose. In a reception given to him, when he thus revisited the placewhich should no longer be his home, he recalled those days and said: "Iwas told by a brother officer that the State had seceded, and that Imust either resign and turn traitor to the Government which hadsupported me from my childhood, or I must leave this place. Thank God! Iwas not long in making my decision. I have spent half my life inrevolutionary countries, and I know the horrors of civil war, and I toldthe people what I had seen and what they would experience. They laughedat me, and called me 'granny' and 'croaker'; and I said: 'I can not livehere, and will seek some other place where I can live, and on two hours'notice. ' I suppose they said I left my country for my country's good, and thank God I did! I was unwilling to believe that this difficultywould not have been settled; but it was all in vain, and as every manmust do in a revolution, as he puts his foot down, so it marks hislife. "

In the summer of 1865, following the close of the war, Farragut visitedseveral of the New England cities, receiving everywhere marks of loveand admiration similar to those tendered to him in New York; but hislife for the next two years was passed in comparative retirement, seeking the re-establishment of his health, which had been severelyshaken by the exposures and anxieties of the war. Though for the mostpart unassigned to any special duties, the winding up of the affairs ofthe West Gulf Squadron fully occupied his time. 

On the 25th of July, 1866, Congress passed a law creating the grade ofadmiral in the United States Navy, a position which was of course givenat once to Farragut, and has been held by but one other--the lateAdmiral David D. Porter. The following year he was appointed to commandthe European Squadron, his flag being hoisted on board the steam frigateFranklin on the 17th of June, 1867. Without any request, and indeedwithout any expectation, on his part, the Government sent the admiralpermission for Mrs. Farragut and a kinswoman to accompany him during thecruise. On the 28th of June the ship sailed from New York, [Y] and on the14th of July anchored in Cherbourg, France. 

 [Footnote Y: Before the admiral's departure from New York he gave a grand reception on board the flag-ship, which was attended by the President and his Cabinet and by many of the most prominent people of the Metropolis, including several hundred ladies. --EDITOR. ]

After passing a fortnight there, during which the admiral visited Parisand dined with the Emperor, the Franklin sailed for the Baltic, wherethe months of August and September were passed in visiting the ports ofRussia, Sweden, and Denmark. Everywhere Farragut was received with theenthusiasm and distinguished consideration that were aroused among navalofficers, by the presence of the man who had bestowed upon theirprofession a lustre unequaled by any other deeds of that generation. Toward the end of September he arrived in England, where a month wasspent in a similar gratifying manner; attentions being lavished upon himby men not only of his own calling, but of all positions. Here, as inthe Baltic, every opportunity was given Farragut for visiting allobjects of general interest, as well as for examining the professionalimprovements of the day. 

From England the Franklin went to the Mediterranean, which Farragut hadnot seen since the flying trip made by the Brandywine in the winter of1825, after landing Lafayette in France. Between October, 1867, andApril, 1868, were visited Lisbon, Gibraltar, and several ports of thewestern Mediterranean belonging to Spain, France, and Italy. Everywherethe same cordial welcome was extended, and the most ample facilitiesenjoyed for seeing thoroughly the points of interest in which theMediterranean abounds. At Nice he was the object of especial attentionsfrom the numerous Americans who throng that attractive winter resort;and while at Naples a special excavation was made at Pompeii for hisbenefit. Nowhere, however, did he have a more elaborate and, from theprofessional point of view, more interesting reception than in Malta, the great British stronghold in the central Mediterranean; where theMediterranean fleet, then on the point of sailing for the Levant, wasdetained especially to meet him. 

The incidents of this cruise which most nearly touch Farragut himself, and have the greatest interest for his biographer, occurred in theisland of Minorca, where his family originated. Over forty years hadpassed since, as midshipman and lieutenant, he had wintered at PortMahon. During those early visits he had received messages from personsliving in the interior of the island who claimed relationship; but withboyish indifference he had not responded to any of these advances. Sincethat time he had become imbued with the interest men commonly feel, inadvancing years, in collecting all traces of family history which theycan find; especially when, as in his case, they have been early andcompletely separated from the home of their childhood and of their race. The late George Ticknor had sent him an old Spanish book, the poems ofMossen Jaime Febrer, in which he read the account of his earliestcelebrated ancestor, Pedro Ferragut. Among several escutcheons of thefamily that have been preserved, bearing diverse ecclesiastical andmilitary emblems indicative of the individual's profession, all containthe common distinguishing device of a horseshoe; and this the admiral, moved by the feeling of kinship, had adopted for his plate. Drawn bythese ties of blood and by curiosity, it was a matter of course thatFarragut should visit the famous harbor for which British, French, andSpaniards had battled, and which lay within the limits of his command. The renown of his achievements had carried his name to Ciudadela, theremote inland city where his father was born over a century before; andthe quiet islanders, who had exulted in the fame of one sprung fromtheir race, were ready to greet him and claim him as their own. Inresponse to an invitation given by them, the admiral, in December, 1867, paid a visit to Ciudadela, of which the following account is given byhis secretary, Mr. Montgomery, who accompanied him on the trip:

"The day after Christmas had been designated by the admiral for hispromised visit to Ciudadela, in response to the cordial invitation ofthe authorities and people of that city. The news of this tour ofpleasure had spread rapidly to all parts of the island, and occasioned ageneral rest from labor and a popular concentration upon the lines oftravel. At the towns of Alayor and Mercadal flocks of people of bothsexes had assembled on the roadside to unite with the authorities intendering our naval chieftain a cordial welcome, and in expressing theirdelight at his advent. 

"Although unable to accept the offers of hospitality which even in theseunpretending villages were showered upon him, the admiral heartilyacknowledged the gratification he felt at their demonstrations ofpersonal regard, and, passing along the excited lines, he underwent asiege of hand-shaking. At these points and elsewhere along the routesoldiers had been stationed to pay him proper honors, and to tender himany assistance he might require throughout his journey. 

"On his arrival within four miles of Ciudadela he was formally receivedby the Alcalde; and a large committee, comprising many prominentcitizens, tendered the hospitalities of the city, and cordially welcomedhim as its guest. After a brief interchange of courtesies, he wastransferred to a very handsome barouche, and conducted forward in thevan of a quite formidable-looking procession, demonstrations of everykind increasing as he approached this ancient capital of Minorca, thepresent residence of many of those who prefer the quiet seclusion oftheir island home to the more dazzling notoriety incident to many of theolder and gayer provinces of the mainland. Outside the walls of the cityhis appearance was no sooner heralded than masses of people of everyage, sex, and condition rushed forward to greet him, filling the airwith cheers and acclamations. As he passed the gates of the city, thewalls, house-tops, and balconies were crowded with anxious spectators, uniting demonstrations of welcome with equally expressive shouts fromthe swaying multitude who had taken possession of the principalthoroughfares. One old man of threescore years and ten, with tearsstreaming down his weather-beaten face, stamped sincerity itself uponthe nature of the welcome by shouting aloud: 'He is ours! he is ours!but I shall never see him more. '

"The avenue leading to the residence of Señor Don Gabriel Squella, whichhad been kindly placed by that gentleman at the disposal of the admiraland his suite, was literally blocked with people, and the excitementrose rapidly to fever heat as the head of the column appeared in viewendeavoring to make a breach in a body absolutely closed in mass. It waswith no little difficulty that the procession forced a passage; andalthough policemen did their utmost, and jostled, and crowded, andthreatened, accompanying their language with all the vocabulary ofSpanish expletives, it was found necessary to disembark at some distancefrom the hospitable mansion and trust to the humanity of ourentertainers to afford an entrance on foot. But the temporaryconcealment of the admiral within the delightful headquarters which hadbeen assigned him seemed to be the signal for a renewed outburst, whichbrought him to the balcony, upon which he stood bowing his thanks andacknowledging in every possible way his heartfelt appreciation of thecordial welcome extended him, until it appeared that there was noprospect of a cessation of hostilities, when, for the first time in hislife, he was persuaded to retreat in the face of superior numbers. 

"The excitement continued unabated, however, throughout the entireevening, and it was not until near midnight that the crowd slowlydispersed, and the peaceful little city of Ciudadela resumed its wontedquiet, and its order-loving citizens, unaccustomed to all such sounds ofrevelry by night, retired to their own little homesteads. 

"During this time a fine band of music was stationed in the capaciousvestibule on the first floor of Señor Squella's mansion, and almost allthe prominent citizens of the place, with their families, called to paytheir respects to the city's guest, making the scene of excitementwithin as pleasant as that without was tumultuous. 

"On the following morning enthusiasm arose with the sun, once more tookfirm possession of the street fronting the headquarters of the admiral, and there kept anxious watch. I am confident that, had there been anelection that day for Governor of the Balearic Islands, or for King ofSpain itself, the admiral would have been chosen without opposition. 

"At an early hour, accompanied by his entire suite, all surrounded andfollowed by an admiring and excited throng, he was escorted by thecommittee and other citizens to all the places of interest in and aboutthe city, and finally to the cathedral, in which he had scarcely beenseated before it was literally packed in every part by people, theirhundreds of eyes being riveted upon the pleasant countenance of theunappalled admiral, who withstood the onslaught with as much _sangfroid_ as if accustomed to such trying ordeals. 

"Soon after, the great organ pealed forth our own national melodies, recalling our far-off land even to those whose knowledge of its powerand glory was limited to its history, and the sparse information derivedfrom the few Americans who have visited this secluded city. "

After leaving the Mediterranean in April, 1868, the Franklin went toHolland and Belgium, and thence made a second visit to England, in thecourse of which Farragut was presented to Queen Victoria, and visitedScotland and the north of England. In July he returned to theMediterranean and made a round of the Levant, visiting Constantinople; aspecial indulgence to anchor before the city being accorded to the shipbearing the flag of an admiral, whose exceptional achievements made itunlikely that the privilege would shortly be construed into a precedent. After a short stay in Athens, and a run up to Trieste at the head of theAdriatic, the Franklin returned to Gibraltar, and thence sailed for NewYork, which she reached on the 10th of November, 1868; thus concluding acruise which, from the beginning to the end, had resembled a triumphalprogress in the enthusiastic recognition everywhere extended to thehero, whose battle-won blue flag she carried at her main. 

Less than two years of life remained to Admiral Farragut when hereturned from the Mediterranean. The following summer of 1869 he visitedthe California coast, where he had not been since he gave up the commandof the Mare Island Navy Yard in 1858. The welcome here accorded him wasas hearty as that extended in foreign countries, and mingled with theadmiration due to the conquering admiral was the recollection of warmmutual affection and esteem engendered by four years of closeintercourse. Returning from San Francisco to the East, Farragut wasseized at Chicago with a violent illness, in which the heart wasaffected. For some days his life was despaired of; and although bycareful nursing he recovered so as to resume his journey, it is doubtfulwhether he ever regained the ground then lost. Several severe attacksfollowed this one; and although he rallied with extraordinary rapidity, thanks to a vigorous constitution, it was apparent that his health wasfailing. A few months later, in the middle of winter, he consented totake charge of the naval ceremonies in honor of the remains of Mr. George Peabody, whose body had been brought to the United States in theBritish ship-of-war Monarch, in recognition of his benevolence to thepoor of London. It was his last official duty, and the exposureattendant upon funeral ceremonies in that bleak season was much to bedeprecated in a man of his years and failing vigor. 

The following summer the Navy Department placed at his disposal thedispatch steamer Tallapoosa, which took him and his family toPortsmouth, New Hampshire; where he became the guest of the lateRear-Admiral Pennock, then commandant of the Navy Yard at that place anda connection by marriage of Mrs. Farragut. It was his last sea voyage, and he appeared to have a presentiment that it was so; for as the shipdrew near the yard he arose from his sick bed at the sound of the salutebeing fired in his honor, dressed himself in full uniform, and went ondeck. Looking up with a sad smile at his flag flying from the mast-head, he said: "It would be well if I died _now_, in harness. " Shortly afterhis arrival, an old sailor who had charge of the sloop-of-war Dale, thenlying dismantled at the wharf, met there the admiral, who had wanderedon board. He looked about the ship and, as he left her to go ashore, said: "This is the last time I shall ever tread the deck of aman-of-war. " This prediction proved true. He passed quietly away at thecommandant's house, on the 14th of August, 1870, aged sixty-nine years;surrounded by his family and loving friends, including many of his oldcompanions in arms. The body was laid temporarily in Portsmouth, thenaval officers and citizens of the place uniting to pay every respect tohis memory. 

In September the Navy Department sent the steam frigate Guerrière tobring the admiral's body to New York. This ship running aground onNantucket Shoal, the remains were transferred to another vessel and soconveyed to the city. The final and public funeral ceremonies were heldon the 30th of September; the day being observed as one of generalmourning, the city edifices draped, bells tolled, and minute guns fired. In the procession was General Grant, then President of the UnitedStates, with the members of his Cabinet, many military and navalofficers, ten thousand soldiers, and a large number of societies. Bythese the coffin of the admiral was escorted to the railroad station, whence it was transported to Woodlawn Cemetery, in Westchester County, where the body now lies. 

To his memory the United States Government has erected a colossal bronzestatue in the national capital, in Farragut Square, the work of MissVinnie Ream. A committee of New York citizens have placed a similarmemorial, by Mr. St. Gauden, at the northwest corner of Madison Squarein that city. There is also a mural tablet, with a likeness of theadmiral, in the Protestant Episcopal Church of the Incarnation; of whichhe was a communicant after taking up his residence in New York. 

CHAPTER XII. 

THE CHARACTER OF ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

The brilliant and victorious career which has secured for Farragut aleading place among the successful naval commanders of all time was ofbrief duration, and began at an age when men generally are thinkingrather of relaxing their efforts than of undertaking new andextraordinary labors. The two great leaders of the United States armiesduring the civil war--Grant and Sherman--were not over forty-five whenthe return of peace released them from their cares; while Nelson andNapoleon were but a year older than these when Trafalgar and Waterlooterminated their long careers. Farragut was nearly sixty-one at the timeof passing the Mississippi forts, and his command of the Western GulfSquadron lasted not quite three years, or rather less than the ordinaryduration of a naval cruise in times of peace. Though not unprecedented, the display of activity and of sustained energy made by him at such anadvanced period of life is unusual; and the severity of the strain uponthe mental and physical powers at that age is evidenced by theprostration of Farragut himself, a man of exceptional vigor of body andof a mental tone which did not increase his burdens by an imaginativeexaggeration of difficulties. He never committed the error, againstwhich Napoleon cautioned his generals, "_de se faire un tableau_. " Onthe other hand, the study of his operations shows that, while alwayssanguine and ready to take great risks for the sake of accomplishing agreat result, he had a clear appreciation of the conditions necessary tosuccess and did not confound the impracticable with the merelyhazardous. Of this, his reluctance to ascend the Mississippi in 1862, and his insistence in 1864 upon the necessity of ironclads, despite hisinstinctive dislike to that class of vessel, before undertaking theentrance to Mobile Bay, are conspicuous illustrations; and must becarefully kept in view by any one desirous of adequately appreciatinghis military character. 

As in the case of Nelson, there is a disposition to attribute Farragut'ssuccesses simply to dash--to going straight at the enemy regardless ofmethod and of consequences. In the case of the great British admiral thetendency of this view, which has been reproduced in successivebiographies down to the latest, is to sink one of the first of navalcommanders beneath the level of the pugilist, who in his fighting doesnot disdain science, to that of the game-cock; and it is doubtless to beattributed to the emphasis he himself laid upon that direct, rapid, andvigorous action without which no military operations, however wiselyplanned, can succeed. In the want of this, rather than of greatprofessional acquirements, will be most frequently found the differencebetween the successful and the unsuccessful general; and consequentlyNelson, who had seen so much of failure arising from slowness andover-caution, placed, and rightly placed, more stress upon vigor andrapidity, in which most are found deficient, than upon the methods whichmany understand, however ill they may apply them. Like the distinguishedFrenchman, Suffren, who is said to have stigmatized tactics as "the veilof timidity, " yet illustrated in his headlong dashes the leadingprinciples of all sound tactics, Nelson carefully planned the chiefoutlines of operations, in the execution of which he manifested theextremes of daring and of unyielding firmness. There was in him nofailure to comprehend that right direction, as well as vigor and weight, is necessary to a blow that would tell; but experience had taught himthat the average man wants to be much too sure of success beforeventuring to move, and hence the insistence upon that one among thefeatures of his military character which to the superficial observer hasgradually obscured all others. Vigor even to desperateness of actionboth Nelson and Farragut on occasion showed--recklessness never. Neitherfought as one who beateth the air; and while for neither can be claimedan entire exemption from mistakes, the great outlines of their actioncan safely challenge hostile criticism. 

While, however, both in their respective spheres illustrated the greatleading principles of war, the circumstances under which they werecalled to practice them were too diverse to permit any close comparison, or parallel, to be instituted between their actions. Nelson, for themost part, shone upon the battle-field--by his tactical combinations, bythe rapidity and boldness with which he carried out plans previouslylaid, or, on occasion, by the astonishing _coup d'oeil_ and daringwith which, in unforeseen crises, he snatched and secured escapingvictory. Farragut in actual battle showed that careful adaptation ofmeans to ends which has a just claim to be considered tactical science;but his great merit was in the clearness with which he recognized thedecisive point of a campaign, or of a particular operation, and threwupon it the force under his direction. Nelson acted chiefly againstships, against forces of a type essentially the same as his own, andaccessible in all parts to his attack, because belonging to the sameelement; he might therefore hope to overcome them by the superiorquality of his crews or by his better tactical dispositions. Farragutcontended with fortifications, whose military powers, offensive anddefensive, were essentially different from those of a fleet. Theirendurance so greatly exceeded that of his ships as to exclude any hopeof reducing them by direct attack; and their advantages of position, deliberately chosen and difficult of approach, could not be outweighedby any tactical arrangement open to him to adopt. He was thereforecompelled to seek their fall by indirect means, by turning and isolatingthem, by acting against their communications--a conception not tactical, but strategic. 

It is not meant to imply that the military talents of either admiralwere confined to the particular field ascribed to him, but simply thatin general they were led by circumstances to illustrate that chiefly. Nelson in his fine campaign in the Baltic evinced his profoundintuitions in the science of strategy; and Farragut, as has been said, showed no mean tactical ability in the provisions made for his severalbattles. The dispositions to be adopted were with him the subject ofvery careful consideration; and before Mobile he spent hours with hisflag lieutenant studying, by the aid of little wooden models, thedifferent positions in which the ships might be placed. Afterward he hadthe squadron get under way several times to practice keeping closeorder, and changing formation and course. 

Like all men who have achieved eminence, the secret of AdmiralFarragut's success is to be found in natural aptitudes carefullyimproved, and in a corresponding opportunity for action. How much he wasindebted to the latter, is evident from the fact that he had passed hissixtieth year before his great qualities were manifested to the world. He was fortunate also, as was Nelson, in the conditions which he wascalled to meet. Great as were the difficulties confronting each, andbrilliantly as they rose to the demand made upon their energies, it maysafely be said that more perfect preparation upon the part of theirenemies would either have detracted from the completeness of theirvictories; or else, by imposing greater deliberation and more methodicalexecution, would have robbed their exploits of that thunderboltcharacter which imparts such dramatic brilliancy to the Nile andTrafalgar, to New Orleans and Mobile Bay. A modern torpedo line wouldnot leave the gap by which Farragut first meant to profit, nor would itbe crossed with the impunity he found; nor could Nelson in his day, without courting destruction, have used against a thoroughly efficientenemy the tactics that admirably suited the conditions in Aboukir Bayand off Cape Trafalgar. But these considerations do not diminish thecredit of either admiral, though they help to explain the fullness oftheir success, and justify proceedings which under differentcircumstances would be unjustifiable. Rather, it may be said that, inthe adaptation of their measures to the conditions opposed to them, whatwould otherwise invite condemnation as rashness, demands recognition asgenius. 

For Farragut had a natural genius for war, to which scarcely any openinghad been offered before the unexpected calamity of the great civilstrife burst upon the country. In estimating his military character andrightly apportioning the credit due to his great achievements, muchstress must be laid upon the constant effort for professionalimprovement made by him from his early life. "Without the opportunityand the environment which enabled him to develop himself, " writes onewho knew him for over forty years, "Farragut might have gone to his restcomparatively unknown; yet among his comrades and contemporaries in thenavy he would have been recognized as no ordinary man, no merely routinenaval officer, who kept his watch and passed through life as easily ashe could. " "He told me, " writes another, who first met him after hisflag was flying, "that there are comparatively few men from whom onecould not learn something, and that a naval officer should always beadding to his knowledge; it might enable him to be more useful some day;that it was hard to say what a naval officer might not have to do. " Evenafter the war, when his reputation was at its height, in visitingEuropean ports he never for a moment lost sight of this duty ofprofessional acquirement. Not a harbor was visited that he did notobserve critically its chances for defense by sea or land. "Who knows, "said he, "but that my services may be needed here some day?" "Ah, Mr. Tucker, " said Earl St. Vincent to his secretary when planning an attackupon Brest, "had Captain Jervis[Z] surveyed Brest when he visited it in1774, in 1800 Lord St. Vincent would not have been in want of hisinformation. "

 [Footnote Z: Captain Jervis and Earl St. Vincent were the same officer under different appellations. ]

It was not merely in the acquisition of knowledge, commonly so called, that this practice contributed to prepare Farragut for his great missionas a naval commander-in-chief, but also in the discipline of characterand in the development of natural capacities admirably suited for thatposition. It should not be overlooked that before the war, and now againin our own day, the idea of professional improvement in the UnitedStates Navy has fastened for its fitting subject upon the development ofthe material of war, to the comparative exclusion of the study of navalwarfare. This naturally results from the national policy, which does notpropose to put afloat a fleet in the proper sense of the word; and whoseideal is a number, more or less small, of cruisers neither fitted norintended for combined action. Under these circumstances, the details ofthe internal economy of the single ship usurp in the professional mindan undue proportion of the attention which, in a rightly constitutednavy, might far better be applied to the study of naval tactics, in thehigher sense of that word, and of naval campaigns. Farragut could notbut feel the influence of this tendency, so strongly marked in theservice to which he belonged; the more so, as it is a thoroughly goodtendency when not pushed to an exclusive extent. But here the habit ofstudy, and stretching in every direction his interest in mattersprofessional, stood him in good stead, and prepared him unconsciouslyfor destinies that could not have been foreseen. The custom of readinghad made him familiar with the biography and history of his profession, the school to which the great Napoleon recommended all who would fitthemselves for high military command; and of which a recentdistinguished authority has said that it may be questioned whether aformulated art of war can be said to exist, except as the embodiment ofthe practice of great captains illustrated in their campaigns. 

From these, with his great natural aptitudes for war, Farragut quicklyassimilated its leading principles, which he afterward so signallyillustrated in act and embodied in maxims of his own that have alreadybeen quoted. He did not employ the terminology of the art, which, thoughpossibly pedantic in sound, is invaluable for purposes of discussion;but he expressed its leading principles in pithy, homely phrases of hisown, which showed how accurate his grasp of it was. "If once you get ina soldier's rear, he is gone, " was probably in part a bit ofgood-natured chaff at the sister profession; but it sums up in a fewwords the significance and strategic importance of his course in passingthe batteries of the river forts, of Port Hudson and of Mobile, andbrings those brilliant actions into strict conformity with the soundestprinciples of war. The phrases, whose frequent repetition shows how deepa hold they had taken upon him--"The more you hurt the enemy the less hewill hurt you"--"The _best_ protection against the enemy's fire is awell-directed fire from our own guns"--sum up one of the profoundest ofall military truths, easily confessed but with difficulty lived up to, and which in these days of armor protection needs to be diligentlyrecalled as a qualifying consideration. It is, in fact, a restatement ofthe oft-admitted, readily-forgotten maxim that offense is the bestdefense. "I believe in celerity, " said he, when announcing hisdetermination soon to pass the Mississippi forts; and good reason had heto congratulate himself that this faith showed itself in his works belowNew Orleans, and to lament before Mobile the failure of his Governmentto observe the maxim which all acknowledge. "Five minutes, " said Nelson, "may make the difference between victory and defeat. " "False(circuitous) routes and lost moments, " wrote Napoleon, "are thedetermining elements of naval campaigns. " All admit the value of time;but with what apathetic deliberation is often watched the flight ofhours which are measuring the race between two enemies!

The personal character of Admiral Farragut afforded the firm naturalfoundation upon which alone a great military character can be built; forwhile no toleration should be shown to the absurd belief that militaryeminence leaps fully grown into the arena, like Minerva from the head ofJupiter--that, unlike every other kind of perfection, it grows wild andowes nothing to care, to arduous study, to constant preparation--it isstill true that it can be developed only upon great natural aptitudes. The distinction conveyed by a phrase of Jomini, applied to Carnot, thegreat war minister of the French Revolution, is one that it is well formilitary and naval officers to bear constantly in mind. "Carnot, " hesays, although a soldier by profession, "was rather a man with a naturalgenius for war than an accomplished (_instruit_) officer;" and to thelack of that studious preparation which marked Napoleon he attributesthe mistakes which characterized some of Carnot's projects, although asa whole his career showed profound intuitions in the conduct of war. Itis open to many able men to be accomplished and valuable officers; a fewonly--how few, the annals of the past show--receive the rare naturalgifts which in their perfect combination make the great captain thehighest manifestation of power attainable by human faculties. 

The acquirements of the accomplished officer may enable him to see theright thing to be done under given conditions, and yet fail to lift himto the height of due performance. It is in the strength of purpose, inthe power of rapid decision, of instant action, and, if need be, ofstrenuous endurance through a period of danger or of responsibility, when the terrifying alternatives of war are vibrating in the balance, that the power of a great captain mainly lies. It is in the courage toapply knowledge under conditions of exceptional danger; not merely tosee the true direction for effort to take, but to dare to follow it, accepting all the risks and all the chances inseparable from war, facingall that defeat means in order thereby to secure victory if it may behad. It was upon these inborn moral qualities that reposed the conductwhich led Farragut to fame. He had a clear eye for the true key of amilitary situation, a quick and accurate perception of the right thingto do at a critical moment, a firm grip upon the leading principles ofwar; but he might have had all these and yet miserably failed. He was aman of most determined will and character, ready to tread down or fightthrough any obstacles which stood in the path he saw fit to follow. Ofthis a conspicuous instance was given in the firmness with which hewithstood the secession clamor of Norfolk, his outspoken defense of theunpopular Government measures, and the promptitude with which he leftthe place, sundering so many associations at the call of duty; and tothis exhibition of strength of purpose, through the impression made uponMr. Fox, was largely due his selection for command in the Gulf. 

One of the greatest of naval commanders, whose experience of menextended through an unusually long and varied career--Earl St. Vincent--has declared that the true test of a man's courage is his powerto bear responsibility; and Farragut's fearlessness of responsibility inorder to accomplish necessary ends, while yet captain of a single ship, was the subject of admiring comment among his subordinates, who are notusually prone to recognize that quality in their commanders. "I have asmuch pleasure in running into port in a gale of wind, " he wrote, "asever a boy did in a feat of skill. " The same characteristic was markedlyshown under the weight of far greater issues in his determination topass the river forts, in spite of remonstrances from his most ablelieutenant, of cautious suggestions from other commanding officers, andwith only the ambiguous instructions of the Navy Department to justifyhis action. It was not that the objections raised were trivial. Theywere of the most weighty and valid character, and in disregarding themFarragut showed not only the admirable insight which fastened upon thetrue military solution, but also the courage which dared to accept onhis sole responsibility the immense risks of disaster which had to betaken. 

The same moral force showed itself again, in combination with the mostrapid decision and strength of purpose, when his ship was nearly thrownon shore under the batteries of Port Hudson; and yet more in the highestdegree at that supreme moment of his life when, headed off from the pathhe had himself laid down, he led his fleet across the torpedo line inMobile Bay. To the same quality must also be attributed the resolutionto take his ships above Port Hudson, without orders, at the criticalperiod of the campaign of 1863; and it is to be regretted in theinterest of his renown that the merit of that fine decision, both in itsmilitary correctness and in the responsibility assumed, has not beenmore adequately appreciated. For the power to take these momentousdecisions, Farragut was indebted to nature. He indeed justified them andhis general course of action by good and sufficient reasons, but thereasons carried instant conviction to him because they struck a kindredchord in his breast. Speaking on one occasion of his gallant andaccomplished fleet captain, Percival Drayton, he said: "Drayton does notknow fear, and would fight the devil himself, but he believes in actingas if the enemy can never be caught unprepared; whereas I believe injudging him by ourselves, and my motto in action, " he continued, quotingthe celebrated words of Danton, "is, 'L'audace, et encore de l'audace, et toujours de l'audace. '"

With all his fearlessness and determination, severity was not one ofAdmiral Farragut's characteristics. He was easily approachable, entering readily into conversation with all; and added much to thelabors of his position as commanding officer by his great patience inlistening to matters to which a subordinate might have attended. "Hiskindness was what most impressed me, " says one officer who was a veryyoung man when first reporting to him for duty. Another, who as amidshipman saw much of him, writes: "He had a winning smile and a mostcharming manner, and was jovial and talkative. If any officer or man hadnot spontaneous enthusiasm, he certainly infused it into him. " CaptainDrayton, who had many opportunities of observing, once said of him: "Idid not believe any man could be great if he did not know how to say'No, ' but I see he can; for certainly here is a great man, and he is tookind-hearted to say 'No' in some cases where it should be said. "

In person, Admiral Farragut was not above the medium size--about fivefeet six and a half inches high, upright in carriage, well-proportioned, alert and graceful in his movements. In early and middle life he wasrather slight than heavy in frame; and it was not until the war, withthe prolonged physical inactivity entailed by the river and blockadeservice, that he took on flesh. Up to that time his weight was not overone hundred and fifty pounds. He was very expert in all physicalexercises, and retained his activity to the verge of old age. Even afterhis fiftieth year it was no unusual thing for him to call up some of thecrew of the ship under his command and have a bout with thesingle-sticks. He felt great confidence in his mastery of his sword, which he invariably wore ashore; and when returning to the wharves atnight, through low parts of a town where there was danger ofmolestation, he relied upon it to defend himself. "Any one wearing asword, " he used to say, "ought to be ashamed not to be proficient in itsuse. "

For many years it was his habit on his birthday to go through certainphysical exercises, or, as he worded it to a young officer of the fleetshortly before passing the river forts, to take a handspring; until hefailed in doing this he should not, he said, feel that he was growingold. This practice he did not discontinue till after he was sixty. Ajunior officer of the Hartford writes: "When some of us youngsters weregoing through some gymnastic exercises (which he encouraged), hesmilingly took hold of his left foot, by the toe of the shoe, with hisright hand, and hopped his right foot through the bight without lettinggo. " The lightness with which he clambered up the rigging of theflag-ship when entering Mobile Bay, and again over the side to see theextent of injury inflicted by the collision with the Lackawanna, sufficiently prove that up to the age of sixty-three he was capable ofshowing upon occasion the agility of a young man. This bodily vigorpowerfully supported the energy of his mind, and carried him fromdaylight to dark, and from vessel to vessel of his fleet, in seasons ofemergency, to see for himself that necessary work was being done withoutslackness; illustrating the saying attributed to Wellington, that ageneral was not too old when he could visit the outposts in person andon horseback. 

The features of the admiral can best be realized from the admirablefrontispiece. As a young man he had the sallow, swarthy complexionusually associated with his Spanish blood. His hair at the same periodwas dark brown, becoming in middle life almost black. In his later yearshe was partially bald--a misfortune attributed by him to the sunstrokefrom which he suffered in Tunis, and which he to some extent concealedby the arrangement of the hair. The contour of the face was oval, thecheek-bones rather prominent, until the cheeks filled out as he becamefleshier during the war; the eyes hazel, nose aquiline, lips small andcompressed. At no time could he have been called handsome; but his facealways possessed the attraction given by animation of expression and bythe ready sympathy which vividly reflected his emotions, easily stirredby whatever excited his amusement, anger, or sorrow. To conceal hisfeelings was to him always difficult, and, when deeply moved, impossible. The old quartermaster who lashed him in the rigging atMobile Bay told afterward how the admiral came on deck again as the poorfellows who had been killed were being laid out on the port side of thequarter-deck. "It was the only time I ever saw the old gentleman cry, "he said, "but the tears came in his eyes like a little child. " A casualbut close observer, who visited him on board the flag-ship in NewOrleans, wrote thus: "His manners are mild and prepossessing, but thereis nothing striking in his presence, and the most astute physiognomistwould scarcely suspect the heroic qualities that lay concealed beneathso simple and unpretending an exterior; unless, indeed, one might chanceto see him, as we did shortly afterward, just on receipt of the newsfrom Galveston, or again on the eve of battle at Port Hudson. On suchoccasions the flashing eye and passionate energy of his manner revealedthe spirit of the ancient vikings. "

Throughout his life, from the time that as a lad still in his teens heshowed to Mr. Folsom his eagerness to learn, Farragut was ever diligentin the work of self-improvement, both professional and general. His eyeswere weak from youth, but he to some extent remedied this disability byemploying readers in the different ships on board which he sailed; andto the day of his death he always had some book on hand. Having anexcellent memory, he thus accumulated a great deal of informationbesides that gained from observation and intercourse with the world. Hobart Pasha, a British officer in the Turkish Navy and an accomplishedseaman, wrote: "Admiral Farragut, with whom I had many conversations, was one of the most intelligent naval officers of my acquaintance. " Heloved an argument, and, though always good-tempered in it, was tenaciousof his own convictions when he thought the facts bore out his way ofinterpreting their significance. When told by a phrenologist that he hadan unusual amount of self-esteem, he replied: "It is true, I have; Ihave full confidence in myself and in my judgment"--a trait of supremeimportance to a man called to high command. But against the defects ofthis quality he was guarded by the openness of mind which results fromthe effort to improve and to keep abreast of the times in which onelives. 

Farragut was naturally conservative, as seamen generally tend to be; butwhile averse to sudden changes, and prone to look with some distrustupon new and untried weapons of war, he did not refuse them, nor didthey find in him that prejudice which forbids a fair trial and rejectsreasonable proof. Of ironclads and rifled guns, both which in his daywere still in their infancy, he at times spoke disparagingly; but hisobjection appears to have arisen not from a doubt of their efficacy--theone for protection, the other for length of range--but from an opinionas to their effect upon the spirit of the service. In this there is anelement of truth as well as of prejudice; for the natural tendency ofthe extreme effort for protection undoubtedly is to obscure thefundamental truth, which he constantly preached, that the bestprotection is to injure the enemy. Nor was his instinct more at fault inrecognizing that the rage for material advance, though a good thing, carries with it the countervailing disposition to rely upon perfectedmaterial rather than upon accomplished warriors to decide the issue ofbattle. To express a fear such as Farragut's, that a particulardevelopment of the material of war would injure the tone of the service, sounds to some as the mere echo of Lever's commissary, who reasoned thatthe abolition of pig-tails would sap the military spirit of thenation--only that, and nothing more. It was, on the contrary, theaccurate intuition of a born master of war, who feels, even withoutreasoning, that men are always prone to rely upon instruments ratherthan upon living agents--to think the armor greater than the man. 

The self-confidence which Farragut exhibited in his militaryundertakings was not only a natural trait; it rested also upon areasonable conviction of his mastery of his profession, resulting fromlong years of exclusive and sustained devotion. He did not carry thesame feeling into other matters with which he had no familiarity; and hewas jealously careful not to hazard the good name, which was the honorof his country as well as of himself, by attaching it to enterpriseswhose character he did not understand, or to duties for which he did notfeel fitted. Accordingly, he refused a request made to him to allow hisname to be used as director of a company, accompanied by an intimationthat stock representing one hundred thousand dollars had been placed inhis name on the books. "I have determined, " he replied, "to declineentering into any business which I have neither the time nor perhaps theability to attend to. " In like manner he refused to allow his name to beproposed for nomination as a presidential candidate. "My entire life hasbeen spent in the navy; by a steady perseverance and devotion to it Ihave been favored with success in my profession, and to risk thatreputation by entering a new career at my advanced age, and that careerone of which I have little or no knowledge, is more than any one has aright to expect of me. "

Farragut was essentially and unaffectedly a religious man. Thethoughtfulness and care with which he prepared for his greaterundertakings, the courage and fixed determination to succeed with whichhe went into battle, were tempered and graced by a profound submissionto the Almighty will. Though not obtruded on the public, his homeletters evince how constantly the sense of this dependence was presentto his thoughts; and he has left on record that, in the moment ofgreatest danger to his career, his spirit turned instinctively to Godbefore gathering up its energies into that sublime impulse, whoselustre, as the years go by, will more and more outshine his other deedsas the crowning glory of them all--when the fiery admiral rallied hisstaggered column, and led it past the hostile guns and the lost Tecumsehinto the harbor of Mobile. 

INDEX. 

 Anecdotes of Admiral Farragut, 11, 12, 22, 26, 35, 45-49, 58, 92, 112, 124, 168-170, 267, 281, 286, 288, 292, 297, 306, 313, 318, 319, 321, 322, 323, 325; lashed in rigging at Mobile, 272; visit to Ciudadela, his father's birthplace, 300. 

 Arkansas, Confederate ironclad, description of, 189; dash through United States fleet at Vicksburg, 191; destruction of, 193. 

 Bailey, Captain Theodorus, U. S. N. , leads the fleet at the passage of Mississippi forts, 149, 151-155; demands surrender of New Orleans, 168 _et seq. _

 Banks, General Nathaniel P. , relieves Butler in command in the Southwest, 201; movement in support of Farragut's passage of Port Hudson, 211; operations west of the Mississippi, 229, 232; Port Hudson surrenders to, 235. 

 Barnard, Major J. G. , U. S. Engineers, opinion as to effect of passing Mississippi forts, 121. 

 Battles: Essex with Phoebe and Cherub, 38-44; passage of New Orleans forts, 149 _et seq. _; passage of batteries at Vicksburg, 187, 192; Port Hudson, 211 _et seq. _; Mobile Bay, 269 _et seq. _

 Baudin, French admiral, sketch of, 77; attack on Vera Cruz by, 79-83. 

 Bell, Commodore Henry H. , U. S. N. , fleet captain to Farragut in 1862, 132, 140; breaking barrier below river forts, 132; extract from journal of, 140; hoists U. S. Flag over New Orleans, 171; at Galveston, 202; at Rio Grande, 240. 

 Blair, Montgomery, account of interview with Farragut concerning New Orleans expedition, 124. 

 Boggs, Commander Charles S. , U. S. N. , commands Varuna at passage of Mississippi forts, 163, 164. 

 Brooklyn, U. S. Steamer, Farragut commands, 1858-'60, in Gulf, 103-105. 

 Buchanan, Franklin, Confederate admiral, at Mobile, 244, 279, 281-288. 

 Butler, General Benjamin F. , commands New Orleans expedition, 164, 179, 291. 

 Caldwell, Lieut. C. H. B. , U. S. N. , commands Itasca in Mississippi River, 132, 162; daring action in breaking chain below forts, 133, 150; commands ironclad Essex at Port Hudson, 220. 

 Craven, Commander Tunis A. M. , U. S. N. , commands monitor Tecumseh at Mobile, 268; eagerness to engage Tennessee, and consequent error, 273, 274; goes down with his ship, 275. 

 Drayton, Captain Percival, U. S. N. , Farragut's chief of staff at Mobile, 98, 250, 269, 270, 272, 278, 281, 282, 292, 319, 320. 

 Essex, U. S. Frigate, building of, 14; armament, 15; history of, 16; cruise under Porter, 17-44; capture of, by Phoebe and Cherub, 44; fate of, 50. 

 Essex, U. S. Ironclad, 192, 193, 211, 220, 232. 

 Essex Junior, prize to Essex, and equipped as a tender to her, 25; mentioned, 26, 27, 30, 32, 33, 34, 36; conveys to the United States the survivors of the action, 49, 50. 

 Farragut, Admiral David G. : family history, 1-6, 300; birth, 4; appointed midshipman, 8; joins frigate Essex, 11; cruise in Essex, 11-50; first battle, between Essex and two British ships, 38-44; returns to United States, 49; service in Mediterranean, 1815-'20, 53-62; returns to United States, 62; serves in Mosquito fleet in West Indies, 1823, 63-67; first marriage, 67; promoted to lieutenant, 71; Brazil station, 1828-'34, 71-74; witnesses French attack on Vera Cruz, 1838, 75-88; death of first wife, 88; promoted to commander, 89; Brazil station again, 1841, 90-94; second marriage, 94; Mexican war, 94-97; ordnance duties, 97-98; commandant Mare Island yard, 99-101; promoted to captain, 101; commands Brooklyn in Gulf, 1858-'60, 101-105; question of secession, 107-112; abandons his home in Norfolk and settles in New York, 112; chosen to command New Orleans expedition, 122-125; appointed to command West Gulf squadron, December, 1861, 125; assumes command at Ship Island, 127; operations below Mississippi forts, 127-149; passage of the forts, 149-165; surrender of New Orleans, 166-176; operations above New Orleans, 1862, 177-195; promoted to rear-admiral, 197; blockade operations, 1862-'63, 196-204; operations above New Orleans, 1863, 203-235; passage of batteries at Port Hudson, 211-216; effect of this passage, 222-229; relinquishes to Porter command above New Orleans, 235; return North, Aug. , 1863, 235; resumes command in Gulf, Jan. , 1864, 243; blockade duties, 249-254; battle of Mobile Bay, 268-289; final return North, 293; enthusiastic reception in New York, 294; promoted to vice-admiral, 295; temporary service in James River, 296; promoted to admiral, 298; commands European station, 298-304; visit to his father's birthplace in Minorca, 299-304; return to United States, 304; declining health, 305; death and obsequies, 306; monuments of, 307; analysis of character, 308-326. Military characteristics: Personal courage, 44-46, 61, 62, 161, 277, 317-319; moral courage in assuming responsibility, 26, 60, 124-126, 135, 137-140, 144, 147, 222, 223, 276-280, 318; hopefulness, 124, 252, 277; strategic insight, 137, 138, 141 _et seq_. , 147, 172, 178-185, 200, 207, 208, 231, 238, 311, 315; tactical skill, 149, 150, 154, 217-220, 239, 260-263, 311; self-reliance, 323; comparison with Nelson, 309-312. Personal characteristics: Appearance and bodily strength, 51, 60, 320-322; gratefulness, 5, 52, 60, 67; self-improvement, 51, 57-59, 69, 71, 87, 97, 313-315, 323; habits of observation, 57, 69, 75, 83-88, 94, 98, 99, 124, 313, 314; thoughtfulness and decision, 54, 70, 106 _et seq_. , 113, 123, 124, 139-141, 147, 208, 211, 216, 239, 260, 264, 277; family relations, 65, 74, 88, 107-109, 227, 265-268; kindliness, 320, 322; religious feelings, 252, 266, 277, 292, 325. See also "Anecdotes. "

 Farragut, George, father of Admiral Farragut: birth, 1; history, 2-5; death, 6. 

 Florida, Confederate ship of war (first called Oreto), runs blockade into Mobile, 197; escapes, 203; effect on Farragut, 204. 

 Folsom, Chaplain Charles, U. S. Navy, influence on Farragut's early life, 57-60. 

 Fox, Gustavus V. , assistant secretary of the navy, 1861-'65, 118; relations to New Orleans expedition, 118-124, 318; urges Farragut to ascend the Mississippi, 183. 

 Gaines, Fort, defense of Mobile Bay, 247, 259, 268; surrender of, 290. 

 Garibaldi, services in war between Argentine and Uruguay, 93. 

 Granger, United States General, commands at siege of Forts Gaines and Morgan, 268, 290, 291. 

 Grant, General Ulysses S, analogy between his turning the position of Vicksburg and Farragut's turning the Mississippi forts, 135-138 (and note, 137); anxieties of, in 1862, 198; connection between his command and Farragut's, 198, 199; takes the line of the Mississippi, 205; takes chief command at Vicksburg, 206; responsibility assumed in cutting loose from his base before Vicksburg, 223; opinion as to importance of Farragut's passage of Port Hudson, 224, 226; begins turning movement against Vicksburg, 229; views as to Red River expedition and Mobile, 1864, 245, 246; statesmanlike regard to political conditions in military operations, 137 (note), 251; present at Farragut's funeral, 306. 

 Harrison, Lieutenant N. B. , commands Cayuga, leading fleet at passage of Mississippi forts, 159. 

 Hartford, U. S. Steamer, Farragut's flag-ship, description of, 126. 

 Hillyar, James, British naval captain, commands Phoebe in battle with Essex, 38-44; disregard of neutral rights, 32, 39, 40; relations with Porter, etc. , 33-37. 

 Incident: Farragut being lashed in rigging at Mobile, 272. 

 Indianola, U. S. Iron-clad, capture of, and effect upon Farragut's movements, 209-211, 224. 

 Jackson, Fort, defense of New Orleans, mentioned, 65; description of, 119, 127, 258; surrender of, 171; causes of the fall of, 141-147. 

 Jenkins, Rear-Admiral Thornton A. , chief of staff to Farragut, 1863, 203, 208, 211, 234; commands Richmond at battle of Mobile, 268, 269. 

 Jouett, Lieutenant-Commander James E. (now Rear-Admiral), commands Metacomet at battle of Mobile Bay, 271, 272, 278; captures Confederate gunboat Selma, 280. 

 Kennon, Beverley, Lieutenant, Confederate navy, commands Governor Moore at New Orleans and sinks U. S. Steamer Varuna, 158, 159, 163. 

 Kimberley, Lieutenant-Commander Lewis A. (now Rear-Admiral), executive officer of Farragut's flag-ship, 281. 

 Lovell, Mansfield, Confederate general, opinion as to cause of fall of Mississippi forts, 145. 

 Manassas, Confederate ram, description of, 156; part at battle of New Orleans, 157, 159. 

 Mare Island, Farragut's command of, 1854-'58, 99-101; visit to, 304. 

 Matamoras, Mexican port, importance to blockade-running, 207, 240. 

 McClellan, General George B. , relations to New Orleans expedition, 120, 121. 

 Minorca, Island of, birthplace of George Farragut, 1; Farragut's visits to, 56, 57, 300; enthusiastic reception given to Admiral Farragut, 300-304. 

 Mississippi River, importance of, in civil war, 115-117, 199, 200, 207, 222, 223, 237, 238. 

 Mobile, Farragut's wish to attack, in 1862, 185; blockade of, 196, 197, 203, 204, 249, 250; importance of, 241, 242; description of approaches to, from the sea, and defenses of, 246-248, 258, 259, 260, 264, 265; battle of Mobile Bay, 269-289. 

 Monitors, description of, 255. 

 Morgan, Fort, defense of Mobile Bay, 247, 258, 259, 271, 290; surrender of, 290. 

 Mosquito fleet, origin and service of, 63-66. 

 Napoleon I, Emperor of the French, mentioned, 77, 136, 143, 308, 309, 315, 317. 

 Napoleon, Louis, Emperor of the French: Purpose to recognize Confederacy, 173; effect upon, of fall of New Orleans, 175, 176; Farragut dines with, 298. 

 Navy, United States, inadequate strength of, at different periods, 6, 13, 86, 101, 116, 117, 314; consequent bad results, 6-8, 11, 13, 14, 16, 19, 50, 102, 223, 242, 314; reasons for partial successes of 1812, and delayed action in 1861, 101, 102; character and importance of services, in civil war, 135-137, 142, 146, 171-176, 180-182, 199, 206, 207, 222-225, 231 (and note), 233-235, 238, 242, 244, 291. 

 Nelson, Horatio, British Admiral, mentioned, 70, 160, 240 (and note), 266, 308; military character contrasted with that of Farragut, 309-312. 

 New Orleans, expedition against, 115-176; defenses of, 127-129, 131, 136, 145, 146, 165; scenes at surrender of, 166-172; effect of fall of, 172-176; Confederate demonstrations against, 1863, 233. 

 Oreto, see FLORIDA. 

 Pemberton, Confederate general, opinion as to effect of Farragut's passage by Port Hudson, 224, 225. 

 Pensacola, evacuated by Confederates, 196; importance to navy as base of operations, 196, 249, 268. 

 Perkins, Lieutenant-Commander George H. , U. S. N. , account of Cayuga at passage of Mississippi forts, 151-155, 159; accompanies Captain Bailey to demand surrender of New Orleans, 169; commands Chickasaw at Mobile, 276, 285, 287, 288. 

 Porter, Captain David, U. S. N. , commands naval station at New Orleans, 4; adopts David Farragut, 5; commands frigate Essex, 11-44; professional character, 31, 55; battle with Phoebe and Cherub, 38-44; navy commissioner, 63; commands Mosquito fleet, 63-66; court-martialed, 66; leaves navy, 66; Minister to Constantinople, 67; death, 67. 

 Porter, Admiral David D. , U. S. N. , commanding mortar flotilla, 121-123, 130, 152, 171, 186, 188; opinion on passing the Mississippi forts, 138, 139; commanding Mississippi squadron, 206, 209, 210, 226, 229, 230, 231; opinion on Farragut's dash past Port Hudson, 223, 224; takes over from Farragut command of Mississippi above New Orleans, 235; Red River expedition, 254; harmonious co-operation with Grant, 206, 291. 

 Port Hudson, position of, 195; importance of, to Confederates, 199, 201, 207, 209, 222-225, 232, 233; armament of, 211; passage of, by Farragut, 211-216; surrender of, 235. 

 Queen of the West, U. S. Ram, capture of, and effect on Farragut's movements, 209-211. 

 Red River expedition, purpose of, 253; militarily erroneous, 245, 246; disastrous termination, 254; consequences, 246. 

 River-defense fleet, Confederate, description of, 156, 158. 

 Rosas, Argentine Dictator, 72, 74, 91, 92. 

 St. Philip, Fort, defense of New Orleans, 119, 128, 148, 153, 258; surrender of, 171, causes of fall of, 141-147. 

 San Juan de Ulloa, Mexican fort, description of, 79; French attack on, 80; Farragut's opinion as to attack on, by U. S. Navy in 1846, 95. 

 Sherman, General W. T. , difference of opinion with Grant, 137 (and note); attack on Vicksburg, 205; raid upon Meridian, 253. 

 Smith, Martin L. , Confederate general, opinion as to cause of fall of Mississippi forts, 145. 

 Szymanski, Confederate colonel, opinion as to effect of Farragut's passage of the Mississippi forts, 146. 

 Tecumseh, U. S. Monitor, sunk at Mobile, 256, 268, 271, 273, 274, 275. 

 Tennessee, Confederate iron-clad, description of, 248, 256-258; part taken by, in battle of Mobile Bay, 265, 273, 274, 275, 279-288. 

 Texas, importance of, to Confederacy, 207, 209, 237. 

 Varuna, U. S. Steamer, sunk at passage of Mississippi forts, 163. 

 Vera Cruz, French attack on, 75-83; Farragut's report on, 83-88. 

 Vicksburg, Farragut's first advance against, 181, 182; his reluctance to a second advance, 182-184; second advance, 186; situation of, 186; Farragut passes batteries, 187; return below, 192; importance of Vicksburg to Confederacy, 180, 187, 194, 195, 233; Farragut's third advance to, 226; surrender of, 235. 

 Warley, A. F. , Lieut. , Confederate navy, commands Manassas at battle of New Orleans, 157, 158. 

 Watson, Lieut. John C. , (now captain), U. S. N. , Farragut's flag-lieutenant, 1862-'65, 161, 260, 272. 

 Welles, Gideon, Secretary of the Navy, 1861-'69, 117; connection with New Orleans expedition, 119, 120, 121, 125, 126; impressions of Farragut, 124; urges Farragut up the Mississippi, 177, 181; letter of, 222 (note). 

 Wolseley, Lord, views as to the cause of reduction of Mississippi forts criticised, 142-147. 

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 "A book which every one should read over and over again. .. . We have carefully run through it, and laid it down with the feeling that some such book ought to find its way into every household. "--_New York Herald. _

 "A monumental volume, which no American who cares for the memory of the public men of his country can afford to be without. "--_New York Mail and Express. _

 "Just the sort of book that the American who wishes to fix in his mind the varying phases of his country's history as it is woven on the warp of the administrations will find most useful. Everything is presented in a clear-cut way, and no pleasanter excursions into history can be found than a study of 'The Presidents of the United States. '"--_Philadelphia Press. _

 "A valuable addition to both our biographical and historical literature, and meets a want long recognized. "--_Boston Advertiser. _

 "So scholarly and entertaining a presidential biography has never before appeared in this country. .. . It is bound to become the standard of its kind. "--_Binghamton Herald. _

 "It is precisely the book which ought to have a very wide sale in this country--a book which one needs to own rather than to read and lay aside. No common-school library or collection of books for young readers should be without it. "--_The Churchman. _

 "General Wilson has performed a public service in presenting this volume to the public in so attractive a shape. It is full of incentive to ambitious youth; it abounds in encouragement to every patriotic heart. "--_Charleston News and Courier. _

 "There is an added value to this volume because of the fact that the story of the life of each occupant of the White House was written by one who made a special study of him and his times. .. . An admirable history for the young. "--_Chicago Times. _

 "Such a work as this can not fail to appeal to the pride of patriotic Americans. "--_Chicago Dial. _

 "These names are in themselves sufficient to guarantee adequacy of treatment and interest in the presentation, and it is safe to say that such succinct biographies of the complete portrait gallery of our Presidents, written with such unquestioned ability, have never before been published. "--_Hartford Courant. _

 "A book well worth owning, for reading and for reference. .. . A complete record of the most important events in our history during the past one hundred and five years. "--_The Outlook. _

 * * * * *

THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL SERIES. 

NOW READY. 

_THE BEGINNINGS OF ART. _ By ERNST GROSSE, Professor of Philosophy in theUniversity of Freiburg. A new volume in the Anthropological Series, edited by Professor FREDERICK STARR. Illustrated. 12mo. Cloth, $1. 75. 

 This is an inquiry into the laws which control the life and development of art, and into the relations existing between it and certain forms of civilization. The origin of an artistic activity should be sought among the most primitive peoples, like the native Australians, the Mincopies of the Andaman Islands, the Botocudos of South America, and the Eskimos; and with these alone the author studies his subject. Their arts are regarded as a social phenomenon and a social function, and are classified as arts of rest and arts of motion. The arts of rest comprise decoration, first of the body by scarification, painting, tattooing, and dress; and then of implements--painting and sculpture; while the arts of motion are the dance (a living sculpture), poetry or song, with rhythm, and music. 

_WOMAN'S SHARE IN PRIMITIVE CULTURE. _ By OTIS TUFTON MASON, A. M. , Curator of the Department of Ethnology in the United States NationalMuseum. With numerous Illustrations. 12mo. Cloth, $1. 75. 

 "A most interesting _résumé_ of the revelations which science has made concerning the habits of human beings in primitive times, and especially as to the place, the duties, and the customs of women. "--_Philadelphia Inquirer. _

_THE PYGMIES. _ By A. DE QUATREFAGES, late Professor of Anthropology atthe Museum of Natural History, Paris. With numerous Illustrations. 12mo. Cloth, $1. 75. 

 "Probably no one was better equipped to illustrate the general subject than Quatrefages. While constantly occupied upon the anatomical and osseous phases of his subject, he was none the less well acquainted with what literature and history had to say concerning the pygmies. .. . This book ought to be in every divinity school in which man as well as God is studied, and from which missionaries go out to convert the human being of reality and not the man of rhetoric and text-books. "--_Boston Literary World. _

_THE BEGINNINGS OF WRITING. _ By W. J. HOFFMAN, M. D. With numerousIllustrations. 12mo. Cloth, $1. 75. 

 This interesting book gives a most attractive account of the rude methods employed by primitive man for recording his deeds. The earliest writing consists of pictographs which were traced on stone, wood, bone, skins, and various paperlike substances. Dr. Hoffman shows how the several classes of symbols used in these records are to be interpreted, and traces the growth of conventional signs up to syllabaries and alphabets--the two classes of signs employed by modern peoples. 

IN PREPARATION. 

 _THE SOUTH SEA ISLANDERS. _ By Dr. SCHMELTZ. _THE ZUÑI. _ By FRANK HAMILTON CUSHING. _THE AZTECS. _ By Mrs. ZELIA NUTTALL. 

 * * * * *

_HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES_, from the Revolution to theCivil War. By JOHN BACH McMASTER. To be completed in six volumes. Vols. I, II, III, and IV now ready. 8vo. Cloth, gilt top, $2. 50 each. 

 ". .. Prof. McMaster has told us what no other historians have told. .. . The skill, the animation, the brightness, the force, and the charm with which he arrays the facts before us are such that we can hardly conceive of more interesting reading for an American citizen who cares to know the nature of those causes which have made not only him but his environment and the opportunities life has given him what they are. "--_N. Y. Times. _

 [Illustration: JOHN BACH McMASTER. ]

 "Those who can read between the lines may discover in these pages constant evidences of care and skill and faithful labor, of which the old-time superficial essayists, compiling library notes on dates and striking events, had no conception; but to the general reader the fluent narrative gives no hint of the conscientious labors, far-reaching, world-wide, vast and yet microscopically minute, that give the strength and value which are felt rather than seen. This is due to the art of presentation. The author's position as a scientific workman we may accept on the abundant testimony of the experts who know the solid worth of his work; his skill as a literary artist we can all appreciate, the charm of his style being self-evident. "--_Philadelphia Telegraph. _

 "The third volume contains the brilliantly written and fascinating story of the progress and doings of the people of this country from the era of the Louisiana purchase to the opening scenes of the second war with Great Britain--say a period of ten years. In every page of the book the reader finds that fascinating flow of narrative, that clear and lucid style, and that penetrating power of thought and judgment which distinguished the previous volumes. "--_Columbus State Journal. _

 "Prof. McMaster has more than fulfilled the promises made in his first volumes, and his work is constantly growing better and more valuable as he brings it nearer to our own time. His style is clear, simple, and idiomatic, and there is just enough of the critical spirit in the narrative to guide the reader. "--_Boston Herald. _

 "Take it all in all, the History promises to be the ideal American history. Not so much given to dates and battles and great events as in the fact that it is like a great panorama of the people, revealing their inner life and action. It contains, with all its sober facts, the spice of personalities and incidents, which relieves every page from dullness. "--_Chicago Inter-Ocean. _

 "History written in this picturesque style will tempt the most heedless to read. Prof. McMaster is more than a stylist; he is a student, and his History abounds in evidences of research in quarters not before discovered by the historian. "--_Chicago Tribune. _

 "A History _sui generis_ which has made and will keep its own place in our literature. "--_New York Evening Post. _

 "His style is vigorous and his treatment candid and impartial. "--_New York Tribune. _

 * * * * *

_THE BEGINNERS OF A NATION. _ A History of the Source and Rise of theEarliest English Settlements in America, with Special Reference to theLife and Character of the People. The first volume in A History of Lifein the United States. By EDWARD EGGLESTON. Small 8vo. Cloth, gilt top, uncut, with Maps, $1. 50. 

 "Few works on the period which it covers can compare with this in point of mere literary attractiveness, and we fancy that many to whom its scholarly value will not appeal will read the volume with interest and delight. "--_New York Evening Post. _

 "Written with a firm grasp of the theme, inspired by ample knowledge, and made attractive by a vigorous and resonant style, the book will receive much attention. It is a great theme the author has taken up, and he grasps it with the confidence of a master. "--_New York Times. _

 "Mr. Eggleston's 'Beginners' is unique. No similar historical study has, to our knowledge, ever been done in the same way. Mr. Eggleston is a reliable reporter of facts; but he is also an exceedingly keen critic. He writes history without the effort to merge the critic in the historian. His sense of humor is never dormant. He renders some of the dullest passages in colonial annals actually amusing by his witty treatment of them. He finds a laugh for his readers where most of his predecessors have found yawns. And with all this he does not sacrifice the dignity of history for an instant. "--_Boston Saturday Evening Gazette. _

 "The delightful style, the clear flow of the narrative, the philosophical tone, and the able analysis of men and events will commend Mr. Eggleston's work to earnest students. "--_Philadelphia Public Ledger. _

 "The work is worthy of careful reading, not only because of the author's ability as a literary artist, but because of his conspicuous proficiency in interpreting the causes of and changes in American life and character. "--_Boston Journal. _

 "It is noticeable that Mr. Eggleston has followed no beaten track, but has drawn his own conclusions as to the early period, and they differ from the generally received version not a little. The book is stimulating and will prove of great value to the student of history. "--_Minneapolis Journal. _

 "A very interesting as well as a valuable book. .. . A distinct advance upon most that has been written, particularly of the settlement of New England. "--_Newark Advertiser. _

 "One of the most important books of the year. It is a work of art as well as of historical science, and its distinctive purpose is to give an insight into the real life and character of people. .. . The author's style is charming, and the history is fully as interesting as a novel. "--_Brooklyn Standard-Union. _

 "The value of Mr. Eggleston's work is in that it is really a history of 'life, ' not merely a record of events. .. . The comprehensive purpose of his volume has been excellently performed. The book is eminently readable. "--_Philadelphia Times. _

 * * * * *

YOUNG HEROES OF OUR NAVY. 

_MIDSHIPMAN FARRAGUT. _ By JAMES BARNES, author of "For King or Country, "etc. Illustrated by Carlton T. Chapman. 12mo. Cloth, $1. 00. 

 The adventures of Farragut's first years in the navy and the brilliant cruise of the Essex under Captain Porter are pictured by an author who has had exceptional advantages in the preparation of his graphic and stirring story. 

_DECATUR AND SOMERS. _ By MOLLY ELLIOT SEAWELL, author of "Paul Jones, ""Little Jarvis, " etc. With 6 full-page Illustrations by J. O. Davidsonand Others. 12mo. Cloth, $1. 00. 

 "The tale is exceedingly well told. It is full of interesting incidents, and the interest is maintained throughout. It is in every way a book which boys will enjoy, and which it will be well for them to read. "--_Milwaukee Journal. _

_PAUL JONES. _ By MOLLY ELLIOT SEAWELL. With 8 full-page Illustrations. 12mo. Cloth, $1. 00. 

 "It is both romance and history, and will retain the attention of either the boy or man who begins to read this account of the most dashing sailor that ever wore a uniform. "--_St. Louis Republic. _

 "A concise, clear sketch of the ranking officer of the Continental marine, who in his day played a large part and did it so well as to command the applause of every patriotic American. To forget the name of Paul Jones would be an act of national ingratitude. "--_Chicago Inter-Ocean. _

_MIDSHIPMAN PAULDING. _ A true story of the War of 1812. By MOLLY ELLIOTSEAWELL. With 6 full-page Illustrations. 12mo. Cloth, $1. 00. 

 "The story is told in a breezy, pleasant style that can not fail to capture the fancy of young readers, and imparts much historical knowledge at the same time, while the illustrations will help the understanding of the events described. It is an excellent book for boys, and even the girls will be interested in it. "--_Brooklyn Standard-Union. _

_LITTLE JARVIS. _ The story of the heroic midshipman of the frigate"Constellation. " By MOLLY ELLIOT SEAWELL. With 6 full-pageIllustrations. 12mo. Cloth, $1. 00. 

 "Not since Dr. Edward Everett Hale's classic, 'The Man without a Country, ' has there been published a more stirring lesson in patriotism. "--_Boston Beacon. _

 "It is what a boy would call 'a real boy's' book. "--_Charleston News and Courier. _

_THE RISE AND GROWTH OF THE ENGLISH NATION. _ With Special Reference toEpochs and Crises. A History of and for the People. By W. H. S. AUBREY, LL. D. In Three Volumes, 12mo. Cloth, $4. 50. 

 "The merit of this work is intrinsic. It rests on the broad intelligence and true philosophy of the method employed, and the coherency and accuracy of the results reached. The scope of the work is marvelous. Never was there more crowded into three small volumes. But the saving of space is not by the sacrifice of substance or of style. The broadest view of the facts and forces embraced by the subject is exhibited with a clearness of arrangement and a definiteness of application that render it perceptible to the simplest apprehension. "--_New York Mail and Express. _

 "A useful and thorough piece of work. One of the best treatises which the general reader can use. "--_London Daily Chronicle. _

 "Conceived in a popular spirit, yet with strict regard to the modern standards. The title is fully borne out. No want of color in the descriptions. "--_London Daily News. _

 "The plan laid down results in an admirable English history. "--_London Morning Post. _

 "Dr. Aubrey has supplied a want. His method is undoubtedly the right one. "-_Pall Mall Gazette. _

 "It is a distinct step forward in history writing; as far ahead of Green as he was of Macaulay, though on a different line. Green gives the picture of England at different times--Aubrey goes deeper, showing the causes which led to the changes. "--_New York World. _

 "A work that will commend itself to the student of history, and as a comprehensive and convenient reference book. "--_The Argonaut. _

 "Contains much that the ordinary reader can with difficulty find elsewhere unless he has access to a library of special works. "--_Chicago Dial. _

 "Up to date in its narration of fact, and in its elucidation of those great principles that underlie all vital and worthy history. .. . The painstaking division, along with the admirably complete index, will make it easy work for any student to get definite views of any era, or any particular feature of it. .. . The work strikes one as being more comprehensive than many that cover far more space. "--_The Christian Intelligencer. _

 "One of the most elaborate and noteworthy of recent contributions to historical literature. "--_New Haven Register. _

 "As a popular history it possesses great merits, and in many particulars is excelled by none. It is full, careful as to dates, maintains a generally praiseworthy impartiality, and it is interesting to read. "--_Buffalo Express. _

 "These volumes are a surprise and in their way a marvel. .. . They constitute an almost encyclopædia of English history, condensing in a marvelous manner the facts and principles developed in the history of the English nation. .. . The work is one of unsurpassed value to the historical student or even the general reader, and when more widely known will no doubt be appreciated as one of the remarkable contributions to English history published in the century. "--_Chicago Universalist. _

 "In every page Dr. Aubrey writes with the far reaching relation of contemporary incidents to the whole subject. The amount of matter these three volumes contain is marvelous. The style in which they are written is more than satisfactory. .. . The work is one of unusual importance. "--_Hartford Post. _

 * * * * *

STEPHEN CRANE'S BOOKS. 

_THE THIRD VIOLET. _ 12mo. Cloth, $1. 00. 

 Mr. Crane's new novel is a fresh and delightful study of artist life in the city and the country. The theme is worked out with the author's characteristic originality and force, and with much natural humor. In subject the book is altogether different from any of its predecessors, and the author's marked success proves his breadth and the versatility of his great talent. 

_THE LITTLE REGIMENT, and Other Episodes of the American Civil War. _12mo. Cloth, $1. 00. 

 "In 'The Little Regiment' we have again studies of the volunteers waiting impatiently to fight and fighting, and the impression of the contest as a private soldier hears, sees, and feels it, is really wonderful. The reader has no privileges. He must, it seems, take his place in the ranks, and stand in the mud, wade in the river, fight, yell, swear, and sweat with the men. He has some sort of feeling, when it is all over, that he has been doing just these things. This sort of writing needs no praise. It will make its way to the hearts of men without praise. "--_New York Times. _

 "Told with a _verve_ that brings a whiff of burning powder to one's nostrils. .. . In some way he blazons the scene before our eyes, and makes us feel the very impetus of bloody war. "--_Chicago Evening Post. _

_MAGGIE: A GIRL OF THE STREETS. _ 12mo. Cloth, 75 cents. 

 "By writing 'Maggie' Mr. Crane has made for himself a permanent place in literature. .. . Zola himself scarcely has surpassed its tremendous portrayal of throbbing, breathing, moving life. "--_New York Mail and Express. _

 "Mr. Crane's story should be read for the fidelity with which it portrays a life that is potent on this island, along with the best of us. It is a powerful portrayal, and, if somber and repellent, none the less true, none the less freighted with appeal to those who are able to assist in righting wrongs. "--_New York Times. _

_THE RED BADGE OF COURAGE. An Episode of the American Civil War. _ 12mo. Cloth, $1. 00. 

 "Never before have we had the seamy side of glorious war so well depicted. .. . The action of the story throughout is splendid, and all aglow with color, movement, and vim. The style is as keen and bright as a sword-blade, and a Kipling has done nothing better in this line. "--_Chicago Evening Post. _

 "There is nothing in American fiction to compare with it. .. . Mr. Crane has added to American literature something that has never been done before, and that is, in its own peculiar way, inimitable. "--_Boston Beacon. _

 "A truer and completer picture of war than either Tolstoy or Zola. "--_London New Review. _

New York: D. APPLETON & CO. , 72 Fifth Avenue. 

 * * * * *

TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE:

Every effort has been made to replicate this text as faithfully aspossible, including obsolete and variant spellings, and inconsistenthyphenation. Obvious typographical errors in punctuation have beenfixed. Corrections [in brackets] in the text are noted below:

page 31: typo fixed

 looking into the old town of Concepion[Concepción], between two and three hundred miles from Valparaiso. In the

page 197: typo fixed

 coast of Texas and Lousiana[Louisiana] were occupied by detachments of vessels, as the surest way of enforcing

page 317: typo fixed

 genius for war than an acccomplished[accomplished] (_instruit_) officer;" and to the lack of that studious

page 331: typo fixed

 Navy, United States, indequate[inadequate] strength of

Table of Contents and Chapter Titles that do not match were not changed:

page 196: THE BLOCKADE AND PORT HUDSON. 

 TOC says: THE BLOCKADE, AND THE PASSAGE OF PORT HUDSON, 1862-1863

page 237: MOBILE. 

 TOC says: MOBILE BAY FIGHT, 1864