[Illustration: PORTRAIT AND SIGNATURE OF A. LINCOLN. ] ABRAHAM LINCOLN A HISTORY BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY VOLUME TWO New YorkThe Century Co. 1890 ILLUSTRATIONS VOL. II ABRAHAM LINCOLN (_Frontispiece_)From an ambrotype taken for Marcus L. Ward (afterwards Governor ofNew Jersey) in Springfield, Ill. , May 20, 1860, two days after Mr. Lincoln's nomination. GENERAL JOHN W. GEARYFrom a photograph taken, in 1866, by Draper and Husted. MILLARD FILLMOREFrom a daguerreotype. CHARLES SUMNERFrom a daguerreotype. ROGER B. TANEYFrom a daguerreotype. SAMUEL NELSONFrom a photograph. ROBERT J. WALKERFrom a daguerreotype. FREDERICK P. STANTONFrom a photograph by Brady. JOHN CALHOUNFrom a painting by D. C. Fabronius, after a photograph by Brady. ANSON BURLINGAMEFrom a photograph by William Shaw. STEPHEN A. DOUGLASFrom a daguerreotype. DAVID COLBRETH BRODERICKFrom a photograph by Brady. JOHN BROWNFrom a photograph by J. W. Black & Co. HOUSE IN WHICH JOHN BROWN WAS BORN, TORRINGTON, CONNECTICUTFrom a photograph lent by Frank B. Sanborn. CALEB CUSHINGFrom a photograph by Brady. W. L. YANCEYFrom a photograph by Cook. GENERAL JOHN C. BRECKINRIDGEFrom a daguerreotype taken about 1850, lent by Anson Maltby. FACSIMILE OF LINCOLN'S LETTER OF ACCEPTANCE JOHN BELLFrom a photograph by Brady. GENERAL HENRY A. WISEFrom a photograph by Brady. THE WIGWAM AT CHICAGO IN WHICH LINCOLN WAS NOMINATED GENERAL ROBERT ANDERSONFrom a photograph by Brady. JAMES BUCHANANFrom a photograph by Brady. LEWIS CASSFrom a photograph by Brady. GENERAL ROBERT TOOMBSFrom a photograph. JUSTIN S. MORRILLFrom a photograph by Brady. TABLE OF CONTENTS VOL. II CHAPTER I. JEFFERSON DAVIS ON REBELLION Civil War in Kansas. Guerrillas dispersed by Colonel Sumner. GeneralP. F. Smith supersedes Sumner. Governor Shannon Removed. Missouri RiverBlockaded. Jefferson Davis's Instructions on Rebellion. Acting-GovernorWoodson Proclaims the Territory in Insurrection. Report of GeneralSmith. John W. Geary Appointed Governor. Inaugural Address. His MilitaryProclamations and Measures. Colonel Cooke's "Cannon" Argument. HickoryPoint Skirmish. Imprisonment of Free State Men. End of Guerrilla War. Removal and Flight of Governor Geary. CHAPTER II. THE CONVENTIONS OF 1856 Formation of the Republican Party in Illinois. The Decatur Convention. Action of the "Know-Nothing" Party. Nomination of Fillmore andDonelson. Democrats of Illinois Nominate William A. Richardson forGovernor. The Davis-Bissell Challenge. The Bloomington Convention. Bissell Nominated for Governor. Lincoln's Speech at Bloomington. ThePittsburgh Convention. The Philadelphia Convention. Nomination ofFrémont and Dayton. The Philadelphia Platform. Lincoln Proposed forVice-President. The Cincinnati Convention. The Cincinnati Platform. Nomination of Buchanan and Breckinridge. Buchanan Elected President. Bissell Elected Governor. Lincoln's Campaign Speeches. CHAPTER III. CONGRESSIONAL RUFFIANISM Sumner's Senate Speech on Kansas. Brooks's Assault on Sumner. Actionof the Senate. Action of the House. Resignation and Reelection ofBrooks. Wilson Challenged. Brooks Challenges Burlingame. Sumner'sMalady. Reelection of Sumner. Death of Butler and Brooks. Sumner'sRe-appearance in the Senate. CHAPTER IV. THE DRED SCOTT DECISION The Dred Scott Case. Its Origin. The Law of Slavery. PreliminaryDecisions of the Case. Appeal to the U. S. Supreme Court. The Case TwiceArgued. Opinion of Justice Nelson. Political Conditions. Mr. Buchanan'sAnnouncement. The Dred Scott Decision. Opinions by all the Judges. Opinion of the Court. Dred Scott Declared Not a Citizen. SlaveryProhibition Declared Unconstitutional. Language of Chief-Justice Taney. Dissenting Opinions. CHAPTER V. DOUGLAS AND LINCOLN ON DRED SCOTT Political Effects of the Dred Scott Decision. Douglas's SpringfieldSpeech on the Dred Scott Decision. He Indorses Chief-Justice Taney'sOpinion. Freeport Doctrine Foreshadowed. Lincoln's Speech in Reply toDouglas. Uses of Judicial Decisions. Prospects of the Colored Race inthe United States, Principles of the Declaration of Independence. CHAPTER VI. THE LECOMPTON CONSTITUTION Constitutional Convention Called by the Legislature. Resignation andFlight of Governor Geary. Walker Appointed Governor. Promises ofBuchanan and his Cabinet. Walker's Kansas Policy. Action of theFree-State Mass Meeting. Pro-slavery Convention at Lecompton. Electionof Delegates. Governor Walker favors Submission of the Constitution toPopular Vote. Protests from Southern States. The Walker-BuchananCorrespondence. Lecompton Constitutional Convention. The OctoberElection. The Oxford and McGee Frauds. The Lecompton Constitution. Extra Session of the Legislature. Secretary Stanton's Removal. Governor Walker's Resignation. CHAPTER VII. THE REVOLT OF DOUGLAS Douglas's Quarrel with Buchanan. Buchanan's Silliman Letter. His AnnualMessage. Douglas's Speech on Lecompton. Lecompton Constitution DeclaredAdopted. Buchanan's Special Message. The Pro-slavery Reaction. Buchanan's Views on Cuba. The Lecompton Constitution in Congress. TheCrittenden-Montgomery Substitute. The English Bill. The Opposition ofDouglas. The Administration Organ. CHAPTER VIII. THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES Growing Republican Chances. Illinois Politics in 1858. Candidates forSenator. The Senatorial Campaign. Lincoln's "House Divided AgainstItself" Speech. Republican Sympathy for Douglas. Horace Greeley'sAttitude. Lincoln on Greeley and Seward. Correspondence BetweenLincoln and Crittenden. The Lincoln-Douglas Debates. CHAPTER IX. THE FREEPORT DOCTRINE The Debate at Ottawa. The Debate at Freeport. The Freeport Doctrine. Benjamin's Speech on Douglas. The November Election, Douglas ReëlectedSenator. Cause of Lincoln's Defeat. Lincoln's Letters on the Result. Douglas Removed from the Chairmanship of the Senate Committee onTerritories. CHAPTER X. LINCOLN'S OHIO SPEECHES Douglas's Tour Through the South. His Advanced Views on Slavery. Senate Discussion Between Brown and Douglas. Douglas's Letter toDorr. Lincoln's Growing Prominence. Lincoln's Correspondence withSchuyler Colfax. Letter to Canisius. Letter to Pierce and Others. Douglas's "Harper's Magazine" Article. Lincoln's Ohio Speeches. TheDouglas-Black Controversy. Publication of the Lincoln-Douglas Debates. CHAPTER XI. HARPER'S FERRY John Brown. His Part in the Kansas Civil War. His Plan of SlaveLiberation. Pikes and Recruits. The Peterboro Council. The ChathamMeeting. Change of Plan. Harper's Ferry. Brown's Campaign. ColonelLee, and the U. S. Marines. Capture of Brown. His Trial and Execution. The Senate Investigation. Public Opinion. Lincoln on John Brown. Speakership Contest. Election of William Pennington. CHAPTER XII. LINCOLN'S COOPER INSTITUTE SPEECH Lincoln Invited to Lecture in New York. The Meeting in Cooper Institute. Public Interest in the Speaker. Lincoln's Speech. His Definition of"The Question. " Historical Analysis. His Admonition to the South. TheRight and Wrong of Slavery. The Duty of the Free States. Criticismsof the Address. Speeches in New England. CHAPTER XIII. THE CHARLESTON CONVENTION The Democratic Party. Its National Convention at Charleston. Sentiments of the Delegates. Differences North, and South. Douglas asa Candidate. The Jefferson Davis Senate Resolutions. Caleb Cushingmade Chairman. The Platform Committee. Majority and Minority Reports. Speech of William L. Yancey. Speech of Senator Pugh. Speech of SenatorBigler. Second Majority and Minority Reports. Minority Report Adopted. Cotton State Delegates Secede. Yancey's Prophecy. CHAPTER XIV. THE BALTIMORE NOMINATIONS Nomination of Douglas Impossible. Charleston Convention adjourned toBaltimore. Seceders' Convention in St. Andrew's Hall. Adjourns to meetat Richmond. Address of Southern Senators. The Davis-Douglas Debate. Charleston Convention Reassembles at Baltimore. A Second Disruption. Nomination of Douglas. Nomination of Breckinridge. The ConstitutionalUnion Convention. Nomination of John Bell. CHAPTER XV. THE CHICAGO CONVENTION The Republican Party. The Chicago Convention. Lincoln's Fairness toRivals. Chances of the Campaign. The Pivotal States. The Wigwam. Organization of the Convention. Chicago Platform. Contrast between theCharleston and Chicago Conventions. The Balloting. Lincoln Nominatedfor President. Hamlin Nominated for Vice-President. CHAPTER XVI. LINCOLN ELECTED The Presidential Campaign. Parties, Candidates, and Platforms. Pledgesto the Union. The Democratic Schism. Douglas's Campaign Tour. The"Illinois Rail-splitter. " The "Wide Awakes. " Lincoln during theCanvass. Letters about "Know-Nothings. " Fusion. The Vote of Maine. TheOctober States. The Election. The Electoral College. The PresidentialCount. Lincoln Declared Elected. CHAPTER XVII. BEGINNINGS OF REBELLION Early Disunion Sentiment. Nullification. The Agitation of 1850. TheConspiracy of 1856. The "Scarlet Letter. " "The 1860 Association. "Governor Gist's Letter to Southern Governors. Replies to GovernorGist. Conspiracy at Washington. CHAPTER XVIII. THE CABINET CABAL Mr. Buchanan's Cabinet. Extracts from Floyd's Diary. Cabinet Conferenceson Disunion. The Drayton-Gist Correspondence. Mr. Trescott's Letters. Floyd's Sale of Arms. Secretary Thompson's Mission. Jefferson Davis andthe Governor of Mississippi. Jefferson Davis and President Buchanan'sMessage. CHAPTER XIX. FROM THE BALLOT TO THE BULLET Governor Gist's Proclamation. Caucus of South Carolinians. GovernorGist's Message. The Disunion Cult. Presidential Electors Chosen. Effect of Lincoln's Election. Disunion Sentiment. MilitaryAppropriation. Convention Bill Passed. Charleston Mass-Meeting. CHAPTER XX. MAJOR ANDERSON Buchanan and Secession. General Scott and Nullification. "Views"Addressed to the President. The President's Criticism. Scott'sRejoinder. The Charleston Forts. Foster's Requisition. Colonel Gardnerasks for Reënforcements. Fitz-John Porter's Inspection Report. GardnerRelieved from Command. Anderson sent to Charleston. CHAPTER XXI. THE CHARLESTON FORTS Anderson's Arrival at Charleston. His Tour of Inspection. Report tothe War Department. The Forts and the Harbor. Anderson asksreënforcements. Discouraging Reply from Washington. InsurrectionarySentiment in Charleston. Floyd's Instructions to Anderson. ColonelHuger. Anderson's Visit to the Mayor of Charleston. CHAPTER XXII. THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE Mr. Buchanan's Opportunity. Cabinet Opinions on Disunion. Advice tothe President in Preparing his Message. The Message. Arguments onSlavery. Recommends a National Convention. Arguments on Disunion. ThePowers and Duties of Congress. Coercion Denied. Criticisms of theMessage. CHAPTER XXIII. THE CHARLESTON CONSPIRATORS Debate on the Message. Adverse Criticisms. Buchanan's Doctrines andPolicy. Movements of Secession. South Carolina Legislation. Magrath'sComments. Non-Coercion and Coercion. Fort Moultrie. Intrigue for itsCapture. Governor Gist's Letter. South Carolina's Complaints andDemands. CHAPTER XXIV. MR. BUCHANAN'S TRUCE Return of the _Brooklyn_. The President's Interview with the SouthCarolina Delegation. Mr. Buchanan's Truce. Major Buell's Visit toAnderson. The Buell Memorandum. Character of Instructions. CHAPTER XXV. THE RETIREMENT OF CASS Failure of the Concession Policy. Movements towards Secession. Resignation of Secretary Cobb. Cobb's Secession Address. Resignationof Secretary Cass. The Buchanan-Floyd Incident. The Conspiratorsadvise Buchanan. Cass demands Reënforcements. The Cass-BuchananCorrespondence. CHAPTER XXVI. THE SENATE COMMITTEE OF THIRTEEN Secession Debates in the Senate. Speeches of Clingman, Brown, Iverson, Wigfall, Mason, Jefferson Davis, Hale, Crittenden, Pugh, Douglas. Powell's Motion for a Select Committee. Speeches of King, Collamer, Foster, Green, Wade. Senate Committee of Thirteen Appointed. CHAPTER XXVII. THE HOUSE COMMITTEE OF THIRTY-THREE The President's Message in the House. Compromise Efforts. Motion toAppoint a Committee of Thirty-Three. Committee Appointed. Corwin madeChairman. Sickles's Speech. Vallandigham's Speech. McClernand'sSpeech. Compromise Propositions. Jenkins's Plan. Noell's Plan. AndrewJohnson's Plan. Vallandigham's Plan. CHAPTER XXVIII. THE CONSPIRACY PROCLAIMED Hopes of Compromise. Party Pledges to the Union. President Buchanan'sAdvice. Nullification and Secession. Estrangement between North andSouth. Cabinet Treachery and Intrigue. The Congressional Debates. Compromise Committees. The Conspirators' Strategy. Elements ofDisturbance. Hopes of Peaceable Secession. Dunn's Resolution. Mr. Buchanan's Proclamation. Secession Proclaimed. CHAPTER XXIX. THE FORTY MUSKETS Captain Foster. His Arrival in Charleston. Condition of Fort Moultrie. Temporary Defenses. Foster Requests Forty Muskets. The Question ofArming Workmen. Foster Receives Forty Muskets. Their Return Demanded. The Alleged Charleston Excitement. Floyd Orders the Muskets Returned. Foster's Compliance and Comment. CHAPTER I JEFFERSON DAVIS ON REBELLION [Sidenote] Sumner to Howard, May 16, 1856. Ibid. , p. 37. [Sidenote] Shannon to Sumner, May 21, 1856. Senate Ex. Doc. , 3d Sess. 34th Cong. Vol. III. , p. 38. [Sidenote] 1856. [Sidenote] Shannon to Sumner, June 4, 1856. Senate Ex. Doc. , 3d Sess. 34th Cong. Vol. III. , p. 45. While the town of Lawrence was undergoing burning and pillage, Governor Shannon wrote to Colonel Sumner to say that as the marshaland sheriff had finished making their arrests, and he presumed hadby that time dismissed the posse, he required a company of UnitedStates troops to be stationed at Lawrence to secure "the safety ofthe citizens in both, person and property, " asking also a like companyfor Lecompton and Topeka. The next day the citizens of Lawrence hadthe opportunity to smother their indignation when they saw the embersof the Free-State Hotel and the scattered fragments of theirprinting-presses patrolled and "protected" by the Federal dragoonswhose presence they had vainly implored a few days before. It was timethe Governor should move. The guerrilla bands with their booty spreadover the country, and the free-State men rose in a spirit of fierceretaliation. Assassinations, house-burnings, expulsions, andskirmishes broke out in all quarters. The sudden shower of lawlessnessfell on the just and the unjust; and, forced at last to deal out equalprotection, the Governor (June 4) issued his proclamation directingmilitary organizations to disperse, "without regard to party names, ordistinctions, "[1] and empowering Colonel Sumner to enforce the order. [Sidenote] Sumner to Cooper, June 23, 1856. Ibid. , p. 50. [Sidenote] Sumner to Cooper, August 11, 1856. Ibid. , p. 59. That careful and discreet officer, who had from the first counseledthis policy, at once proceeded to execute the command with hischaracteristic energy. He disarmed and dispersed the free-Stateguerrillas, --John Brown's among the earliest, --liberated prisoners, drove the Missourians, including delegate Whitfield and General Coffeeof the skeleton militia, back across their State line, and stationedfive companies along the border to prevent their return. He was sofortunate as to accomplish all this without bloodshed. "I do notthink, " he wrote, June 23, "there is an armed body of either party nowin the Territory, with the exception perhaps of a few freebooters. "The colonel found very soon that he was only too efficient andfaithful. "My measures have necessarily borne hard against bothparties, " wrote Sumner to the War Department, "for both have in manyinstances been more or less wrong. The Missourians were perfectlysatisfied so long as the troops were employed exclusively against thefree-State party; but when they found that I would be strictlyimpartial, that lawless mobs could no longer come from Missouri, andthat their interference with the affairs of Kansas was brought to anend, then they immediately raised a hue and cry that they wereoppressed by the United States troops. " The complaint had its usualprompt effect at Washington. By orders dated June 27 the colonel wassuperseded in his command, and Brigadier-General P. F. Smith was sentto Leavenworth. Known to be pro-slavery in his opinions, greatadvantage was doubtless expected by the conspiracy from this change. But General Smith was an invalid, and incapable of active service, and so far as the official records show, the army officers and troopsin Kansas continued to maintain a just impartiality. [Sidenote] 1856. The removal of Governor Shannon a few weeks after Colonel Sumneronce more made Secretary Woodson, always a willing instrument of theconspiracy, acting Governor. It was under this individual's promptingsand proclamation, Shannon being absent from the Territory, thatColonel Sumner, before the arrival of the orders superseding him, forcibly dispersed the free-State Legislature on the 4th of July, asnarrated. For this act the Secretary of War, Jefferson Davis, was notslow to send the colonel an implied censure, perhaps to justify hisremoval from command; but not a word of reproof went from Presidentor Secretary of State to the acting Governor. It has already been stated that for a considerable length of timeafter the organization of Kansas Territory the Missouri River was itsprincipal highway of approach from the States. To anti-slavery men whowere unwilling to conceal their sentiments, this had from the veryfirst been a route of difficulty and danger. Now that political strifeculminated in civil war, the Missourians established a completepractical blockade of the river against the Northern men and Northerngoods. Recently, however, the Northern emigration to Kansas hadgradually found a new route through Iowa and Nebraska. It was about this time that great consternation was created inpro-slavery circles by the report that Lane had arrived at the Iowaborder with a "Northern army, " exaggerated into fabulous numbers, intent upon fighting his way to Kansas. Parties headed by Lane andothers and aggregating some hundreds had in fact so arrived, and weremore or less provided with arms, though they had no open militaryorganization. While spies and patrols were on the lookout for marchingcompanies and regiments, they, concealing their arms, quietly slippeddown in detached parties to Lawrence. Thus reënforced and inspirited, the free-State men took the aggressive, and by several bold movementsbroke up a number of pro-slavery camps and gatherings. Greatlyexaggerated reports of these affairs were promptly sent to theneighboring Missouri counties, and the Border Ruffians rose for athird invasion of Kansas. Governor Shannon, not yet notified of his removal, reported to GeneralSmith that Lecompton was threatened with an attack. General Smith, becoming alarmed, called together all his available force for theprotection of the territorial capital, and reported the exigency tothe War Department. All the hesitation which had hithertocharacterized the instructions of Jefferson Davis, the Secretary ofWar, in the use of troops otherwise than as an officer's posse, instantly vanished. The whole Kansas militia was placed under theorders of General Smith, and requisitions were issued for tworegiments from Illinois and two from Kentucky. "The position of theinsurgents, " wrote the Secretary, "as shown by your letter and itsinclosures, is that of open rebellion against the laws andconstitutional authorities, with such manifestation of a purpose tospread devastation over the land as no longer justifies furtherhesitation or indulgence. To you, as to every soldier, whose habitualfeeling is to protect the citizens of his own country, and only to usehis arms against a public enemy, it cannot be otherwise than deeplypainful to be brought into conflict with any portion of hisfellow-countrymen. But patriotism and humanity alike require thatrebellion should be promptly crushed, and the perpetration of thecrimes which now disturb the peace and security of the good peopleof the Territory of Kansas should be effectually checked. You willtherefore energetically employ all the means within your reach torestore the supremacy of the law, always endeavoring to carry outyour present purpose to prevent the unnecessary effusion of blood. "[2] The Secretary had probably cast his eye upon the Platte Countybattle-call in the "Weston Argus Extra, " which formed one of thegeneral's inclosures: "So sudden and unexpected has been the attackof the abolitionists that the law-and-order party was unprepared toeffectually resist them. To-day the bogus free-State government, weunderstand, is to assemble at Topeka. The issue is distinctly made up;either the free-State or pro-slavery party is to have Kansas. .. . Citizens of Platte County! the war is upon you, and at your very doors. Arouse yourselves to speedy vengeance and rub out the bloodytraitors. "[3] [Sidenote] Woodson, proclamation, Aug. 25, 1856. Senate Ex. Doc. , 3d Sess. 34th Cong. Vol. III. , p. 80. It was perhaps well that the pro-slavery zeal of General Smith was lessardent than that of Secretary Jefferson Davis, or the American civilwar might have begun in Lawrence instead of Charleston. Upon fullerinformation and more mature reflection, the General found that he hadno need of either the four regiments from Illinois and Kentucky, orBorder-Ruffian mobs led by skeleton militia generals, neither of whichhe had asked for. Both the militia generals and the Missourians weretoo eager even to wait for an official call. General Richardson orderedout his whole division on the strength of the "Argus Extra" andneighborhood reports, [4] and the entire border was already in motionwhen acting Governor Woodson issued his proclamation declaring theTerritory "to be in a state of open insurrection and rebellion. "General Smith found it necessary to direct his first orders againstthe Border-Ruffian invaders themselves. "It has been rumored forseveral days, " he wrote to his second in command, "that large numbersof persons from the State of Missouri have entered Kansas, at variouspoints, armed, with the intention of attacking the opposite party anddriving them from the Territory, the latter being also represented tobe in considerable force. If it should come to your knowledge thateither side is moving upon the other with the view to attack, it willbecome your duty to observe their movements and prevent such hostilecollisions. "[5] [Sidenote] Woodson to Cooke, Sept. 1, 1856. Senate Ex. Doc. , 3d Sess. 34th Cong. Vol. III. , pp. 90, 91. [Sidenote] Cooke to Woodson, Sept. 1, 1856. Ibid. , pp. 91, 92. Lieutenant-Colonel P. St. George Cooke, upon whom this active fieldwork devolved, because of the General's ill health, concentrated hislittle command between Lawrence and Lecompton, where he could to someextent exert a salutary check upon the main bodies of both parties, and where he soon had occasion to send a remonstrance to the actingGovernor that his "militia" was ransacking and burning houses. [6] Tothe acting Governor's mind, such a remonstrance was not a proper wayto suppress rebellion. He, therefore, sent Colonel Cooke a requisitionto invest the town of Topeka, disarm the insurrectionists, hold themas prisoners, level their fortifications, and intercept aggressiveinvaders on "Lane's trail"; all of which demands the officer prudentlyand politely declined, replying that he was there to assist in servingjudicial process, and not to make war on the town of Topeka. If, as had been alleged, General Smith was at first inclined to regardthe pro-slavery side with favor, its arrogance and excesses soonremoved his prejudices, and he wrote an unsparing report of thesituation to the War Department. "In explanation of the position ofaffairs, lately and now, I may remark that there are more than twoopposing parties in the Territory. The citizens of the Territory whoformed the majority in the organization of the territorial government, and in the elections for its Legislature and inferior officers, formone party. The persons who organized a State government, and attemptedto put it in operation against the authority of that established byCongress, form another. A party, at the head of which is a formerSenator from Missouri, and which is composed in a great part ofcitizens from that State, who have come into this Territory armed, under the excitement produced by reports exaggerated in all cases, andin many absolutely false, form the third. There is a fourth, composedof idle men congregated from various parts, who assume to arrest, punish, exile, and even kill all those whom they assume to be badcitizens; that is, those who will not join them or contribute to theirmaintenance. Every one of these has in his own peculiar way (exceptsome few of the first party) thrown aside all regard to law, and evenhonesty, and the Territory under their sway is ravaged from one end tothe other. .. . Until the day before yesterday I was deficient in forceto operate against all these at once; and the acting Governor of theTerritory did not seem to me to take a right view of affairs. If Mr. Atchison and his party had had the direction of affairs, they couldnot have ordered them more to suit his purpose. "[7] All such truth and exposure of the conspiracy, however, wasunpalatable at Washington; and Secretary Jefferson Davis, whileapproving the conduct of Colonel Cooke and expressing confidencein General Smith, nevertheless curtly indorsed upon his report: "Theonly distinction of parties which in a military point of view it isnecessary to note is that which distinguishes those who respect andmaintain the laws and organized government from those who combine forrevolutionary resistance to the constitutional authorities and laws ofthe land. The armed combinations of the latter class come within thedenunciation of the President's proclamation and are proper subjectsupon which to employ the military force. "[8] [Sidenote] "Washington Union, " August 1, 1856. Such was the state of affairs when the third Governor of Kansas, newlyappointed by President Pierce, arrived in the Territory. The Kansaspro-slavery cabal had upon the dismissal of Shannon fondly hoped thatone of their own clique, either Secretary Woodson or Surveyor-GeneralJohn Calhoun, would be made executive, and had set on foot activeefforts in that direction. In principle and purpose they enjoyed theabundant sympathy of the Pierce Administration; but as the presidentialelection of 1856 was at hand, the success of the Democratic party couldnot at the moment be endangered by so open and defiant an act ofpartisanship. It was still essential to placate the wounded anti-slaverysensibilities of the Northern States, and to this end John W. Geary, ofPennsylvania, was nominated by the President and unanimously confirmedby the Senate. He was a man of character and decision, had gone to theMexican war as a volunteer captain, and had been made a colonel andintrusted with an important command for merit. Afterwards he hadserved as postmaster, as alcalde, and as mayor of the city of SanFrancisco in the turbulent gold excitements of 1848-9, and was made afunding commissioner by the California Legislature. Both by nature andexperience, therefore, he seemed well fitted to subdue the civilcommotions of Kansas. [Sidenote] Gihon, p. 131. But the pro-slavery leaders of the Territory were very far fromrelishing or desiring qualifications of this character. In one oftheir appeals calling upon the Missourians for "assistance in men, provisions, and munitions, that we may drive out the 'Army of theNorth, '" they had given the President and the public a piece of theirmind about this appointment. "We have asked the appointment of asuccessor, " said they, "who was acquainted with our condition, " with"the capacity to appreciate and the boldness and integrity requisitefaithfully to discharge his duty regardless of the possible effect itmight have upon the election of some petty politician in a distantState. In his stead we have one appointed who is ignorant of ourcondition, a stranger to our people; who, we have too much cause tofear, will, if no worse, prove no more efficient to protect us thanhis predecessors. .. . We cannot await the convenience in coming of ournewly appointed Governor. We cannot hazard a second edition ofimbecility or corruption!" Animated by such a spirit, they now bent all their energies uponconcentrating a sufficient force in Kansas to crush the free-Statemen before the new Governor could interfere. Acting Governor Woodsonhad by proclamation declared the Territory in a state of "openinsurrection and rebellion, "[9] and the officers of the skeletonmilitia were hurriedly enrolling the Missourians, giving them arms, and planting them in convenient camps for a final and decisivecampaign. [Sidenote] Gihon, p. 104. [Sidenote] Gihon, pp. 104-6. It was on September 9, 1856, that Governor Geary and his party landedat Leavenworth. Even on his approach he had already been compelled tonote and verify the evidences of civil war. He had met GovernorShannon fleeing from the Territory, who drew for him a direful pictureof the official inheritance to which he had come. While this interviewtook place, during the landing of the boat at Glasgow, a company ofsixty Missouri Border Ruffians was embarking, with wagons, arms, andcannon, and with the open declaration that they were bound for Kansasto hunt and kill "abolitionists. " Similar belligerent preparationswere in progress at all the river towns they touched. At Kansas Citythe vigilance committee of the blockade boarded and searched the boatfor concealed "abolitionists. " Finally arrived at Leavenworth, theGovernor saw a repetition of the same scenes--parades and militarycontrol in the streets, fugitives within the inclosure of the fort, and minor evidences of lawlessness and terror. [Sidenote] Geary to Marcy, Sept. 9, 1856. Senate Ex. Doc. , 3d Sess. 34th Cong. Vol. II. , p. 88. Governor Geary went at once to the fort, where he spent the day inconsultation with General Smith. That same evening he wrote to W. L. Marcy, Secretary of State, a report of the day's impressions which wasanything but reassuring--Leavenworth in the hands of armed mencommitting outrages under the shadow of authority; theft and murder inthe streets and on the highways; farms plundered and deserted;agitation, excitement, and utter insecurity everywhere, and the numberof troops insufficient to compel peace and order. All this was not theworst, however. Deep in the background stood the sinister apparition ofthe Atchison cabal. "I find, " wrote he, "that I have not simply tocontend against bands of armed ruffians and brigands whose sole aim andend is assassination and robbery--infatuated adherents and advocates ofconflicting political sentiments and local institutions--andevil-disposed persons actuated by a desire to obtain elevatedpositions; but worst of all, against the influence of men who have beenplaced in authority and have employed all the destructive agents aroundthem to promote their own personal interests at the sacrifice of everyjust, honorable, and lawful consideration. .. . Such is the condition ofKansas faintly pictured. .. . In making the foregoing statements I haveendeavored to give the truth and nothing but the truth. I deem itimportant that you should be apprised of the actual state of the case;and whatever may be the effect of such revelations, they will be givenfrom time to time without extenuation. " [Sidenote] Geary, proclamation, Sept. 11, 1856. Senate Ex. Doc. , 3d Sess. 34th Cong. Vol. II. , pp. 93-4. [Sidenote] Geary to Marcy, Sept. 12, 1856. Ibid. , p. 95. Discouraging as he found his new task of administration, Governor Gearygrappled with it in a spirit of justice and decision. The day followinghis interview with General Smith found him at Lecompton, the capital ofthe Territory, where the other territorial officials, Woodson, Calhoun, Donaldson, Sheriff Jones, Lecompte, Cato, and others, constituted theever-vigilant working force of the Atchison cabal, precisely as hadbeen so truthfully represented to him by General Smith, and as he hadso graphically described in his letter to Marcy of the day before. Paying little heed to their profusely offered advice, he adhered to hisdetermination to judge for himself, and at once issued an inauguraladdress, declaring that in his official action he would do justice atall hazards, that he desired to know no party and no section, andimploring the people to bury their past strifes, and devote themselvesto peace, industry, and the material development of the Territory. [10]As an evidence of his earnestness he simultaneously issued twoproclamations, one disbanding the volunteer or Missouri militia latelycalled into service by acting Governor Woodson, and the other commandingthe immediate enrollment of the true citizen militia of Kansas Territory, this step being taken by the advice of General Smith. He soon found that he could not govern Kansas with paper proclamationsalone. His sudden arrival at this particular juncture was evidently anunexpected _contretemps_. While he was preaching and printing his sageadmonitions about peace and prosperity at Lecompton, and laboring tochange the implements of civil war into plowshares and pruning-hooks, the Missouri raid against Lawrence, officially called into the field byWoodson's proclamation, was about to deal out destruction to that town. A thousand Border Ruffians (at least two eye-witnesses say 2500), ledby their recognized Missouri chiefs, were at that moment camped withinstriking distance of the hated "New Boston. " Their published address, which declared that "these traitors, assassins, and robbers must now bepunished, must now be taught a lesson they will remember, " that "Lane'sarmy and its allies must be expelled from the Territory, " left no doubtof their errand. This news reached Governor Geary about midnight of his second day inLecompton. One of the brigadiers of the skeleton militia was apparentlyin command, and not yet having caught the cue of the Governor'sintentions, reported the force for orders, "in the field, ready forduty, and impatient to act. "[11] At about the same hour the Governorreceived a message from the agent he had sent to Lawrence to distributecopies of his inaugural, that the people of that town were arming andpreparing to receive and repel this contemplated attack of theMissourians. He was dumfounded at the information; his promises andpolicy, upon which, the ink was not yet dry, were already in jeopardy. Instead of bringing peace his advent was about to open war. In this contingency the Governor took his measures with true militarypromptness. He immediately dispatched to the Missouri camp SecretaryWoodson with copies of his inaugural, and the adjutant-general of theTerritory with orders to disband and muster out of service the Missourivolunteers, [12] while he himself, at the head of three hundred dragoonsand a light battery, moved rapidly to Lawrence, a distance of twelvemiles. Entering that town at sunrise, he found a few hundred menhastily organized for defense in the improvised intrenchments andbarricades about the place, ready enough to sell their lives, butvastly more willing to intrust their protection to the Governor'sauthority and the Federal troops. [13] They listened to his speech andreadily promised to obey his requirements. Since the Missourians had officially reported themselves to him assubject to his orders, the Governor supposed that his injunctions, conveyed to them in writing and print, and borne by the secretary andthe adjutant-general of the Territory, would suffice to send themback at once to their own borders, and he returned to Lecompton totake up his thorny duties of administration. Though forewarned byex-Governor Shannon and by General Smith, Governor Geary did not yetrealize the temper and purpose of either the cabal conspirators orthe Border-Ruffian rank and file. He had just dispatched a militaryforce in another direction to intercept and disarm a raid about to bemade by a detachment of Lane's men, when news came to him that theMissourians were still moving upon Lawrence, in increased force, thathis officers had not yet delivered his orders, and that skirmishinghad begun between the outposts. [Sidenote] D. W. Wilder, "Annals of Kansas, " p. 108. Gihon, p. 152. Menaced thus with dishonor on one side and contempt on the other, hegathered all his available Federal troops, and hurrying forward postedthem between Lawrence and the invaders. Then he went to the Missouricamp, where the true condition of affairs began to dawn upon him. Allthe Border-Ruffian chiefs were there, headed by Atchison in person, who was evidently the controlling spirit, though a member of theLegislature of the State of Missouri, named Reid, exercised nominalcommand. He found his orders unheeded and on every hand mutterings ofimpatience and threats of defiance. These invading aliens had not theleast disposition to receive commands as Kansas militia; they invokedthat name only as a cloak to shield them from the legal penalties duetheir real character as organized banditti. The Governor called the chiefs together and made them an earnestharangue. He explained to them his conciliatory policy, read hisinstructions from Washington, affirmed his determination to keep peace, and appealed personally to Atchison to aid him in enforcing law andpreserving order. That wily chief, seeing that refusal would put him inthe attitude of a law-breaker, feigned a ready compliance, and he andReid, his factotum commander, made eloquent speeches "calculated toproduce submission to the legal demands made upon them. "[14] Some ofthe lesser captains, however, were mutinous, and treated the Governorto choice bits of Border-Ruffian rhetoric. Law and violence vibrated inuncertain balance, when Colonel Cooke, commanding the Federal troops, took the floor and cut the knot of discussion in a summary way. "I feltcalled upon to say some words myself, " he writes naïvely, "appealing tothese militia officers as an old resident of Kansas and friend to theMissourians to submit to the patriotic demand that they should retire, assuring them of my perfect confidence in the inflexible justice of theGovernor, and that it would become my painful duty to sustain him atthe cannon's mouth. "[15] This argument was decisive. The border chiefsfelt willing enough to lead their awkward squads against the slightbarricades of Lawrence, but quailed at the unlooked-for prospect ofencountering the carbines and sabers of half a regiment of regulardragoons and the grape-shot of a well-drilled light battery. Theyaccepted the inevitable; and swallowing their rage but still nursingtheir revenge, they consented perforce to retire and be "honorably"mustered out. But for this narrow contingency Lawrence would have beensacked a second time by the direct agency of the territorial cabal. [Illustration: GENERAL JOHN W. GEARY. ] [Sidenote] Examination, Senate Ex. Doc. , 3d Sess. 34th Cong. Vol. II. , pp. 156-69. Nothing could more forcibly demonstrate the unequal character of thecontest between the slave-State and the free-State men in Kansas, evenin these manoeuvres and conflicts of civil war, than the companionexploit to this third Lawrence raid. The day before Governor Geary, seconded by the "cannon" argument of Colonel Cooke, was convincing thereluctant Missourians that it was better to accept, as a reward fortheir unfinished expedition, the pay, rations, and honorable dischargeof a "muster out, " rather than the fine, imprisonment, or halter towhich the full execution of their design would render them liable, another detachment of Federal dragoons was enforcing the bogus lawsupon a company of free-State men who had just had a skirmish witha detachment of this same invading army of Border Ruffians, at aplace called Hickory Point. The encounter itself had all the usualcharacteristics of the dozens of similar affairs which occurredduring this prolonged period of border warfare--a neighborhood feud;neighborhood violence; the appearance of organized bands for retaliation;the taking of forage, animals, and property; the fortifying of two orthree log-houses by a pro-slavery company then on its way to join inthe Lawrence attack, and finally the appearance of a more numerousfree-State party to dislodge them. The besieging column, some 350 innumber, had brought up a brass four-pounder, lately captured from thepro-slavery men, and with this and their rifles kept up a long-rangefire for about six hours, when the garrison of Border Ruffians capitulatedon condition of being allowed "honorably" to evacuate their strongholdand retire. The casualties were one man killed and several wounded. [Sidenote] Gihon, p. 158. [Sidenote] Record of examination, Senate Ex. Doc. , 3d Sess. 34th Cong. Vol. II. , pp. 156-9. The rejoicing of the free-State men over this not too brilliantvictory was short-lived. Returning home in separate squads, they weresuccessively intercepted by the Federal dragoons acting as a posse tothe Deputy United States Marshal, [16] who arrested them on civil writsobtained in haste by an active member of the territorial cabal, and tothe number of eighty-nine[17] were taken prisoners to Lecompton. Sofar the affair had been of such frequent occurrence as to have becomecommonplace--a frontier "free fight, " as they themselves described andregarded it. But now it took on a remarkable aspect. Sterling G. Cato, one of the pro-slavery territorial judges, had been found by GovernorGeary in the Missouri camp drilling and doing duty as a soldier, readyand doubtless more than willing to take part in the projected sack ofLawrence. This Federal judge, as open a law-breaker as the HickoryPoint prisoners (the two affairs really forming part of one and thesame enterprise), now seated himself on his judicial bench andcommitted the whole party for trial on charge of murder in the firstdegree; and at the October term of his court proceeded to try andcondemn to penalties prescribed by the bogus laws some eighteen ortwenty of these prisoners, for offenses in which in equity and goodmorals he was personally _particeps criminis_--some of the convictsbeing held in confinement until the following March, when they werepardoned by the Governor. [18] _Inter arma silent leges_, say thepublicists; but in this particular instance the license of guerrillawar, the fraudulent statutes of the Territory, and the laws ofCongress were combined and perverted with satanic ingenuity infurtherance of the conspiracy. The vigorous proceedings of Governor Geary, the forced retirement ofthe Missourians on the one hand, and the arrest and conviction of thefree-State partisans on the other, had the effect to bring theguerrilla war to an abrupt termination. The retribution had fallenvery unequally upon the two parties to the conflict, [19] but this wasdue to the legal traps and pitfalls prepared with such artful designby the Atchison conspiracy, and not to the personal indifference orill-will of the Governor. He strove sincerely to restore impartialadministration; he completed the disbandment of the territorialmilitia, reënlisting into the Federal service one pro-slavery and onefree-State company for police duty. [20] By the end of September he wasenabled to write to Washington that "peace now reigns in Kansas. "Encouraged by this success in allaying guerrilla strife, he nextendeavored to break up the existing political persecution andintrigues. [Sidenote] Marcy to Geary, August 26, 1856. Gihon, p. 272. It was not long, however, before Governor Geary became conscious, tohis great surprise and mortification, that he had been nominated andsent to Kansas as a partisan manoeuvre, and not to instituteadministrative reforms; that his instructions, written during thepresidential campaign, to tranquillize Kansas by his "energy, impartiality, and discretion, " really meant that after Mr. Buchananwas elected he should satisfy the Atchison cabal. In less than six months after he went to the Territory, clothed withthe executive authority, speaking the President's voice, andrepresenting the unlimited military power of the republic, he, thethird Democratic Governor of Kansas, was, like his predecessors, insecret flight from the province he had so trustfully gone to rule, execrated by his party associates, and abandoned by the Administrationwhich had appointed him. Humiliating as was this local conspiracy toplant servitude in Kansas, a more aggressive political movement tonationalize slavery in all the Union was about to eclipse it. ----------[1] Shannon, proclamation, June 4, 1856. Senate Ex. Doc. , 3dSess. 34th Cong. Vol. III. , p. 47. [2] Jefferson Davis, Secretary of War, to General Smith, Sept. 3, 1856. Senate Ex. Doc. , 3d Sess. 34th Cong. Vol. III. , p. 29. [3] August 18, 1856. Senate Executive Documents, 3d Session 34thCongress. Vol. III. , pp. 76-7. [4] Richardson to General Smith, August 18, 1856. Senate Ex. Doc. , 3d Sess. 34th Cong. Vol. III. , p. 75. [5] George Deas, Assistant Adjutant-General to Lieut. -Colonel Cooke, August 28, 1856. Senate Executive Documents, 3d Session 34thCongress. Vol. III. , p. 85. [6] Cooke to Deas, August 31, 1856. Ibid. , p. 89. [7] Smith to Cooper, Sept. 10, 1856. Senate Executive Document, 3d Sess. 34th Cong. Vol. III. , pp. 80, 81. [8] Sec. War, indorsement, Sept. 23, on letter of Gen. Smith toAdjutant-General Cooper, Sept. 10, 1856. Senate ExecutiveDocuments, 3d Sess. 34th Cong. Vol. III. , p. 83. [9] Woodson, proclamation, August 25, 1856. Senate Executive Documents, 3d Sess. 34th Cong. Vol. III. , p. 80. [10] Geary, Inaugural Address, Sept. 11, 1856. Senate ExecutiveDocuments, 3d Sess. 34th Cong. Vol. III. , p. 116. [11] General Heiskell to Geary, Sept. 11 and 12, 1856. Senate Ex. Doc. , 3d Sess. 34th Cong. Vol. II. , p. 97. [12] Geary to Marcy, Sept. 16, 1856. Senate Ex. Doc. , 3d Sess. 34thCong. Vol. II. , p. 107. [13] Colonel Cook to Porter, A. A. G. , Sept. 13, 1856. Ibid. , Vol. III. , pp. 113, 114. [14] Colonel Cooke to F. J. Porter, Sept. 16, 1856. Senate Ex. Doc. , 3d Sess. 34th Cong. Vol. III. , p. 121. [15] Cooke to Porter, Sept. 16, 1856. Senate Ex. Doc. , 3d Sess. 34th Cong. Vol. III. , p. 122. [16] Captain Wood to Colonel Cooke, Sept. 16, 1856. Senate Ex. Doc. , 3d Sess. 34th Cong. Vol. III, pp. 123-6. [17] Geary to Marcy, October 1, 1856. Senate Executive Documents, 3d Sess. 34th Cong. Vol. II. , p. 156. [18] Gihon, pp. 142-3. Geary, Executive Minutes, Senate Ex. Doc. , No. 17, 1st Sess. 35th Cong. Vol. VI. , p. 195. [19] The Kansas Territorial Legislature, in the year 1859, by whichtime local passion had greatly subsided, by law empowered anon-partisan board of three commissioners to collect sworn testimonyconcerning the ravages of the civil war in Kansas, with a view ofobtaining indemnity from the general Government for the individualsufferers. These commissioners, after a careful examination, made anofficial report, from which may be gleaned an interesting summary innumbers and values of the harvest of crime and destruction which theKansas contest produced, and which report can be relied upon, sinceeye-witnesses and participants of both parties freely contributedtheir testimony at the invitation of the commissioners. The commissioners fixed the period of the war as beginning aboutNovember 1, 1855, and continuing until about December 1, 1856. Theyestimated that the entire loss and destruction of property, includingthe cost of fitting out the various expeditions, amounted to anaggregate of not less than $2, 000, 000. Fully one-half of this loss, they thought, was directly sustained by actual settlers of Kansas. They received petitions and took testimony in 463 cases. They reported417 cases as entitled to indemnity. The detailed figures and values ofproperty destroyed are presented as follows: "Amount of crops destroyed, $37, 349. 61; number of buildings burned and destroyed, 78; horses taken or destroyed, 368; cattle taken or destroyed, 533. Amount of property owned by pro-slavery men, $77, 198. 99; property owned by free-State men, $335, 779. 04; property taken or destroyed by pro-slavery men, $318, 718. 63; property taken or destroyed by free-State men, $94, 529. 40. " About the loss of life the commissioners say: "Although not within ourprovince, we may be excused for stating that, from the most reliableinformation that we have been able to gather, by the secret warfare ofthe guerrilla system, and in well-known encounters, the number oflives sacrificed in Kansas during the period mentioned probablyexceeded rather than fell short of two hundred. .. . That the excitementin the Eastern and Southern States, in 1856, was instigated and keptup by garbled and exaggerated accounts of Kansas affairs, published inthe Eastern and Southern newspapers, is true, most true; but the halfof what was done by either party was never chronicled!"--HouseReports, 2d Sess. 36th Cong. Vol. III. , Part I, pp. 90 and 93. [20] We quote the following from the executive minutes of GovernorGeary to show that border strife had not entirely destroyed thekindlier human impulses, which enabled him to turn a portion of thewarring elements to the joint service of peace and order: "September 24, 1856. For the purpose of obtaining information which was considered of great value to the Territory, the Governor invited to Lecompton, Captain [Samuel] Walker, of Lawrence, one of the most celebrated and daring leaders of the anti-slavery party, promising him a safe-conduct to Lecompton and back again to Lawrence. During Walker's visit at the Executive Office, Colonel [H. T. ] Titus entered, whose house was, a short time since, destroyed by a large force under the command of Walker; an offense which was subsequently retaliated by the burning of the residence of the latter. These men were, perhaps, the most determined enemies in the Territory. Through the Governor's intervention, a pacific meeting occurred, a better understanding took place, mutual concessions were made, and pledges of friendship were passed; and, late in the afternoon, Walker left Lecompton in company with and under the safeguard of Colonel Titus. Both these men have volunteered to enter the service of the United States as leaders of companies of territorial militia. "--Geary, Executive Minutes. Senate Executive Documents, 3d Session 34th Congress, Vol. II. , pp. 137-8. CHAPTER II THE CONVENTIONS OF 1856 [Sidenote] 1856. In the State of Illinois, the spring of the year 1856 saw an almostspontaneous impulse toward the formation of a new party. As alreadydescribed, it was a transition period in politics. The disorganizationof the Whig party was materially increased and hastened by thefailure, two years before, to make Lincoln a Senator. On the otherhand, the election of Trumbull served quite as effectively toconsolidate the Democratic rebellion against Douglas in hisdetermination to make the support of his Nebraska bill a test of partyorthodoxy. Many of the Northern counties had formed "Republican"organizations in the two previous years; but the name was entirelylocal, while the opposition, not yet united, but fighting in factionsagainst the Nebraska bill, only acknowledged political affinity underthe general term of the "Anti-Nebraska" party. [Sidenote] 1856. In the absence of any existing party machinery, some fifteen editorsof anti-Nebraska newspapers met for conference at Decatur on the 22dof February and issued a call for a delegate State convention of the"Anti-Nebraska party, " to meet at Bloomington on the 29th of May. Prominent leaders, as a rule, hesitated to commit themselves by theirpresence at Decatur. Not so with Mr. Lincoln. He could not attend thedeliberations as an editor; but he doubtless lent his suggestion andadvice, for we find him among the distinguished guests and speakers atthe banquet which followed the business session, and toasts to hiscandidacy as "the next United States Senator" show that his leadershiphad suffered no abatement. The assembled editors purposely set theBloomington Convention for a somewhat late day in the campaign, andbefore the time arrived the political situation in the State wasalready much more clearly defined. [Sidenote] Davidson and Stuvé, "History of Illinois, " p. 616. One factor which greatly baffled the calculations and forecast ofpoliticians was the Know-Nothing or American party. It was apparent toall that this order or affiliation had during the past two yearsspread into Illinois, as into other States. But as its machinery andaction were secret, and as no general election had occurred since 1854to exhibit its numerical strength, its possible scope and influencecould only be vaguely estimated. Still it was clearly present as apositive force. Its national council had in February at Philadelphianominated Fillmore and Donelson as a presidential ticket; but thepreponderating Southern membership forced an indorsement of theKansas-Nebraska act into its platform, which destroyed the unity andpower of the party, driving the Northern delegates to a bolt. Nevertheless many Northern voters, indifferent to the slavery issue, still sought to maintain its organization; and thus in Illinois theState Council met early in May, ratified the nomination of Fillmorefor President, and nominated candidates for Governor, and other Stateofficers. The Democratic party, or rather so much of that party as did notopenly repudiate the policy and principle of the Kansas-Nebraska act, made early preparations for a vigorous campaign. The great loss inprestige and numbers he had already sustained admonished Douglas thathis political fortunes hung in a doubtful balance. But he was a boldand aggressive leader, to whom controversy and party warfare wererather an inspiration than a discouragement. Under his guidance, theDemocratic State Convention nominated for Governor of Illinois WilliamA. Richardson, late a member of the House of Representatives, in whichbody as chairman of the Committee on Territories he had been theleader to whom the success of the Nebraska bill was speciallyintrusted, and where his parliamentary management had contributedmaterially to the final passage of that measure. Thus the attitude of opposing factions and the unorganized unfoldingof public opinion, rather than any mere promptings or combinations ofleaders, developed the course of the anti-Nebraska men of Illinois. Out of this condition sprung directly one important element of futuresuccess. Richardson's candidacy, long foreshadowed, was seen torequire an opposing nominee of unusual popularity. He was found in theperson of Colonel William H. Bissell, late a Democratic representativein Congress, where he had denounced disunion in 1850, and opposed theNebraska bill in 1854. He had led a regiment to the Mexican war, andfought gallantly at the battle of Buena Vista. His military laurelseasily carried him into Congress; but the exposures of the Mexicancampaign also burdened him with a disease which paralyzed his lowerlimbs, and compelled retirement from active politics after his secondterm. He was now, however, recovering; and having already exhibitedcivic talents of a high order, the popular voice made light of hisphysical infirmity, and his friends declared their readiness to matchthe brains of Bissell against the legs of his opponents. [Sidenote] January 23, 1850, Appendix, "Globe, " 1849-50, p. 78. One piece of his history rendered him specially acceptable to youngand spirited Western voters. His service in Congress began amidexciting debates over the compromise measures of 1850, when theSouthern fire-eaters were already rampant. Seddon, of Virginia, in hiseagerness to depreciate the North and glorify the South, affirmed in aspeech that at the battle of Buena Vista, "at that most criticaljuncture when all seemed lost save honor, " amid the discomfiture androut of "the brave but unfortunate troops of the North through amistaken order, " "the noble regiment of Mississippians" had snatchedvictory from the jaws of death. Replying some days later to Seddon'sinnuendo, Bissell, competent by his presence on the battle-field tobear witness, retorted that when the 2d Indiana gave way, it wasMcKee's 2d Kentucky, Hardin's 1st Illinois, and Bissell's 2d Illinoiswhich had retrieved the fortunes of the hour, and that the vauntedMississippi regiment was not within a mile and a half of the scene ofaction. Properly this was an issue of veracity between Seddon andBissell, of easy solution. But Jefferson Davis, who commanded theMississippi regiment in question, began an interchange of notes withBissell which from the first smelt of gunpowder. "Were his reportedremarks correct?" asked Davis in substance. Bissell answered, repeatingthe language of his speech and defining the spot and the time to whichit applied, adding: "I deem it due, in justice alike to myself and theMississippi regiment, to say that I made no charge against thatregiment. " Davis persisting, then asked, in substance, whether hemeant to deny General Lane's official report that "the regiment ofMississippians came to the rescue at the proper time to save thefortunes of the day. " Bissell rejoined: "My remarks had reference to adifferent time and place from those referred to by General Lane. " [Sidenote] Pamphlet, Printed correspondence. At this point both parties might with great propriety have ended thecorrespondence. Sufficient inquiry had been met by generousexplanation. But Davis, apparently determined to push Bissell to thewall, now sent his challenge. This time, however, he met his match, incourage. Bissell named an officer of the army as his second, instructing him to suggest as weapons "muskets, loaded with ball andbuckshot. " The terms of combat do not appear to have been formallyproposed between the friends who met to arrange matters, but they wereevidently understood; the affair was hushed up, with the simpleaddition to Bissell's first reply that he was willing to award theMississippi regiment "the credit due to their gallant anddistinguished services in that battle. " [Sidenote] 1856. The Bloomington Convention came together according to call on the 29thof May. By this time the active and observant politicians of the Statehad become convinced that the anti-Nebraska struggle was not a meretemporary and insignificant "abolition" excitement, but a deep andabiding political issue, involving in the fate of slavery the fate ofthe nation. Minor and past differences were therefore generouslypostponed or waived in favor of a hearty coalition on the singledominant question. A most notable gathering of the clans was theresult. About one-fourth of the counties sent regularly chosendelegates; the rest were volunteers. In spirit and enthusiasm it wasrather a mass-meeting than a convention; but every man present was insome sort a leader in his own locality. The assemblage was much morerepresentative than similar bodies gathered by the ordinary caucusmachinery. It was an earnest and determined council of five or sixhundred cool, sagacious, independent thinkers, called together by agreat public exigency, led and directed by the first minds of theState. Not only did it show a brilliant array of eminent names, but aremarkable contrast of former antagonisms: Whigs, Democrats, Free-Soilers, Know-Nothings, Abolitionists; Norman B. Judd, RichardYates, Ebenezer Peck, Leonard Swett, Lyman Trumbull, David Davis, OwenLovejoy, Orville H. Browning, Ichabod Godding, Archibald Williams, andmany more. Chief among these, as adviser and actor, was AbrahamLincoln. Rarely has a deliberative body met under circumstances more excitingthan did this one. The Congressional debates at Washington and thecivil war in Kansas were each at a culmination of passion andincident. Within ten days Charles Sumner had been struck down in theSenate Chamber, and the town of Lawrence sacked by the guerrilla posseof Atchison and Sheriff Jones. Ex-Governor Reeder, of that sufferingTerritory, addressed the citizens of Bloomington and theearliest-arriving delegates on the evening of the 28th, bringing intothe convention the very atmosphere of the Kansas conflict. The convention met and conducted its work with earnestness anddignity. Bissell, already designated by unmistakable popularindications, was nominated for governor by acclamation. The candidatefor lieutenant-governor was named in like manner. So little did theconvention think or care about the mere distribution of politicalhonors on the one hand, and so much, on the other, did it regard andprovide for the success of the cause, that it did not even ballot forthe remaining candidates on the State ticket, but deputed to acommittee the task of selecting and arranging them, and adopted itsreport as a whole and by acclamation. The more difficult task ofdrafting a platform was performed by another committee, with suchprudence that it too received a unanimous acceptance. It boldlyadopted the Republican name, formulated the Republican creed, and theconvention further appointed delegates to the coming RepublicanNational Convention. There were stirring speeches by eloquent leaders, eagerly listened toand vociferously applauded; but scarcely a man moved from his seat inthe crowded hall until Mr. Lincoln had been heard. Every one felt thefitness of his making the closing argument and exhortation, and rightnobly did he honor their demand. A silence full of emotion filled theassembly as for a moment before beginning his tall form stood incommanding attitude on the rostrum, the impressiveness of his themeand the significance of the occasion reflected in his thoughtful andearnest features. The spell of the hour was visibly upon him; andholding his audience in rapt attention, he closed in a brilliantperoration with an appeal to the people to join the Republicanstandard, to Come as the winds come, when forests are rended; Come as the waves come, when navies are stranded. The influence was irresistible; the audience rose and acknowledged thespeaker's power with cheer upon cheer. Unfortunately the speech wasnever reported; but its effect lives vividly in the memory of all whoheard it, and it crowned his right to popular leadership in his ownState, which thereafter was never disputed. [Sidenote] 1856. The organization of the Republican party for the nation at largeproceeded very much in the same manner as that in the State ofIllinois. Pursuant to separate preliminary correspondence and callsfrom State committees, a general meeting of prominent Republicans andanti-Nebraska politicians from all parts of the North, and even from afew border slave-States, came together at Pittsburgh on Washington'sbirthday, February 22. Ohio, New York, and Pennsylvania sent thelargest contingents; but around this great central nucleus weregathered small but earnest delegations aggregating between three andfour hundred zealous leaders, representing twenty-eight States andTerritories. It was merely an informal mass convention; but many ofthe delegates were men of national character, each of whose names wasitself a sufficient credential. Above all, the members were cautious, moderate, conciliatory, and unambitious to act beyond the requirementsof the hour. They contented themselves with the usual parliamentaryroutine; appointed a committee on national organization; issued a callfor a delegate convention; and adopted and put forth a stirringaddress to the country. Their resolutions were brief and formulatedbut four demands: the repeal of all laws which allow the introductionof slavery into Territories once consecrated to freedom; resistance byconstitutional means to slavery in any United States Territory; theimmediate admission of Kansas as a free-State, and the overthrow ofthe present national Administration. In response to the official call embodied in the Pittsburgh address, the first National Convention of the Republican party met atPhiladelphia on the 17th of June, 1856. The character and dignity ofthe Pittsburgh proceedings assured the new party of immediate prestigeand acceptance; with so favorable a sponsorship it sprang full-armedinto the political conflict. That conflict which opened the year withthe long congressional contest over the speakership, and which foundits only solution in the choice of Banks by a plurality vote, had beenfed by fierce congressional debates, by presidential messages andproclamations, by national conventions, by the Sumner assault, by theKansas war; the body politic throbbed with activity and excitement inevery fiber. Every free-State and several border States andTerritories were represented in the Philadelphia Convention; itsregular and irregular delegates counted nearly a thousand localleaders, full of the zeal of new proselytes; Henry S. Lane, ofIndiana, was made its permanent chairman. The party was too young and its prospect of immediate success tooslender to develop any serious rivalry for a presidential nomination. Because its strength lay evidently among the former adherents of thenow dissolved and abandoned Whig party, William H. Seward of coursetook highest rank in leadership; after him stood Salmon P. Chase asthe representative of the independent Democrats, who, bringing fewervoters, had nevertheless contributed the main share of the courageouspioneer work. It is a just tribute to their sagacity that both werewilling to wait for the maturer strength and riper opportunities ofthe new organization. Justice John McLean, of the Supreme Bench, aneminent jurist, a faithful Whig, whose character happily combined boththe energy and the conservatism of the great West, also had a largefollowing; but as might have been expected, the convention found amore typical leader, young in years, daring in character, brilliant inexploit; and after one informal ballot it nominated John C. Frémont, of California. The credit of the selection and its successfulmanagement has been popularly awarded to Francis P. Blair, senior, famous as the talented and powerful newspaper lieutenant of PresidentJackson; but it was rather an intuitive popular choice, which at themoment seemed so appropriate as to preclude necessity for artfulintrigue. [Illustration: MILLARD FILLMORE. ] There was a dash of romance in the personal history of Frémont whichgave his nomination a high popular relish. Of French descent, born inSavannah, Georgia, orphaned at an early age, he acquired a scientificeducation largely by his own unaided efforts in private study; a seavoyage as teacher of mathematics, and employment in a railroad surveythrough the wilderness of the Tennessee Mountains, developed the tasteand the qualifications that made him useful as an assistant inNicollet's scientific exploration of the great plateau where theMississippi River finds its sources, and secured his appointment assecond lieutenant of topographical engineers. These labors brought himto Washington, where the same Gallic restlessness which made therestraint of schools insupportable, brought about an attachment, elopement, and marriage with the daughter of Senator Thomas H. Benton, of Missouri. Reconciliation followed in good time; and the unexplored Great Westbeing Benton's peculiar hobby, through his influence Frémont was sentwith an exploring party to the Rocky Mountains. Under his commandsimilar expeditions were repeated again and again to that mysteriouswonderland; and never were the wildest fictions read with more aviditythan his official reports of daily adventure, danger and discovery, ofscaling unclimbed mountains, wrecking his canoes on the rapids ofunvisited rivers, parleying and battling with hostile Indians, andfacing starvation while hemmed in by trackless snows. One of thesejourneys had led him to the Pacific coast when our war with Mexico letloose the spirit of revolution in the Mexican province of California. With his characteristic restless audacity Frémont joined his littlecompany of explorers to a local insurrectionary faction of Americansettlers, and raised a battalion of mounted volunteers. Though actingwithout Government orders, he cooperated with the United States navalforces sent to take possession of the California coast, and materiallyassisted in overturning the Mexican authority and putting the remnantof her military officials to flight. At the close of the conquest hewas for a short time military governor; and when, through the famousgold discoveries, California was organized as a State and admitted tothe Union, Frémont became for a brief period one of her first UnitedStates Senators. So salient a record could not well be without strong contrasts, and ofthese unsparing criticism took advantage. Hostile journals delineatedFrémont as a shallow, vainglorious, "woolly-horse, " "mule-eating, ""free-love, " "nigger-embracing" black Republican; an extravagant, insubordinate, reckless adventurer; a financial spendthrift andpolitical mountebank. As the reading public is not always skillful inwinnowing truth from libel when artfully mixed in print, even thegrossest calumnies were not without their effect in contributing tohis defeat. But to the sanguine zeal of the new Republican party, the"Pathfinder" was a heroic and ideal leader; for, upon the vital pointat issue, his anti-slavery votes and clear declarations satisfied everydoubt and inspired unlimited confidence. However picturesquely Frémont for the moment loomed up as thestandard-bearer of the Republican party, historical interest centersupon the second act of the Philadelphia Convention. It shows us howstrangely to human wisdom vibrate the delicately balanced scales offate; or rather how inscrutable and yet how unerring are thefar-reaching processes of divine providence. The principal candidatehaving been selected without contention or delay, the conventionproceeded to a nomination for Vice-President. On the first informalballot William L. Dayton, of New Jersey, received 259 votes andAbraham Lincoln, of Illinois, 110; the remaining votes being scatteredamong thirteen other names. [1] The dominating thought of theconvention being the assertion of principle, and not the promotion ofmen, there was no further contest;[2] and though Mr. Dayton had notreceived a majority support, his nomination was nevertheless at oncemade unanimous. Those who are familiar with the eccentricities ofnominating conventions when in this listless and drifting mood knowhow easily an opportune speech from some eloquent delegate or a fewadroitly arranged delegation caucuses might have reversed this result;and imagination may not easily construct the possible changes inhistory which a successful campaign of the ticket in that form mighthave wrought. What would have been the consequences to America andhumanity had the Rebellion, even then being vaguely devised bySouthern Hotspurs, burst upon the nation in the winter of 1856, withthe nation's sword of commander-in-chief in the hand of the impulsiveFrémont, and Lincoln, inheriting the patient wariness and cool bloodof three generations of pioneers and Indian-fighters, wielding onlythe powerless gavel of Vice-President? But the hour of destiny had notyet struck. The platform devised by the Philadelphia Convention was unusually boldin its affirmations, and most happy in its phraseology. Not only didit "deny the authority of Congress, or of a territorial legislature, of any individual or association of individuals, to give legalexistence to slavery in any Territory of the United States"; itfurther "Resolved, That the Constitution confers upon Congresssovereign power over the Territories of the United States for theirgovernment, and that in the exercise of this power it is both theright and the duty of Congress to prohibit in the Territories thosetwin relics of barbarism--polygamy and slavery. " At Buchanan, recentlynominated by the Democratic National Convention in Cincinnati, itaimed a barbed shaft: "Resolved, That the highwayman's plea that'might makes right, ' embodied in the Ostend circular, was in everyrespect unworthy of American diplomacy, and would bring shame anddishonor upon any government or people that gave it their sanction. "It demanded the maintenance of the principles of the Declaration ofIndependence, of the Federal Constitution, of the rights of theStates, and the union of the States. It favored a Pacific railroad, congressional appropriations for national rivers and harbors; itaffirmed liberty of conscience and equality of rights; it arraignedthe policy of the Administration; demanded the immediate admission ofKansas as a State, and invited "the affiliation and coöperation of menof all parties, however differing from them in other respects, insupport of the principles declared. " The nominees and platform of the Philadelphia Convention were acceptedby the opposition voters of the free-States with an alacrity and anenthusiasm beyond the calculation of even the most sanguine; and inNovember a vote was recorded in their support which, though thenunsuccessful, laid the secure foundation of an early victory, andpermanently established a great party destined to carry the countrythrough trials and vicissitudes equal in magnitude and results to anywhich the world had hitherto witnessed. In that year none of the presidential honors were reserved for theState of Illinois. While Lincoln thus narrowly missed a nomination forthe second place on the Republican ticket, his fellow-citizen andcompetitor, Douglas, failed equally to obtain the nomination he somuch coveted as the candidate of the Democratic party. The DemocraticNational Convention had met at Cincinnati on the 2d day of June, 1856. If Douglas flattered himself that such eminent services as he hadrendered the South would find this reward, his disappointment musthave been severe. While the benefits he had conferred were lightlyestimated or totally forgotten, former injuries inflicted in his namewere keenly remembered and resented. But three prominent candidates, Buchanan, Pierce, and Douglas, were urged upon the convention. Theindiscreet crusade of Douglas's friends against "old fogies" in 1852had defeated Buchanan and nominated Pierce; now, by the turn ofpolitical fortune, Buchanan's friends were able to wipe out the doublescore by defeating both Pierce and Douglas. Most of the Southerndelegates seem to have been guided by the mere thought of presentutility; they voted to renominate Pierce because of his subservientKansas policy, forgetting that Douglas had not only begun it, but wastheir strongest ally to continue it. When after a day of fruitlessballoting they changed their votes to Douglas, Buchanan, the so-called"old fogy, " just returned from the English mission, and therefore nothandicapped by personal jealousies and heart-burnings, had secured thefirm adhesion of a decided majority mainly from the North. [3] The "two-thirds rule" was not yet fulfilled, but at this juncture thefriends of Pierce and Douglas yielded to the inevitable, and withdrewtheir favorites in the interest of "harmony. " On the seventeenthballot, therefore, and the fifth day of the convention, JamesBuchanan, of Pennsylvania, became the unanimous nominee of theDemocratic party for President, and John C. Breckinridge, of Kentucky, for Vice-President. The famous "Cincinnati platform" holds a conspicuous place in partyliterature for length, for vigor of language, for variety of topics, for boldness of declaration; and yet, strange to say, its chief meritand utility lay in the skillful concealment of its central thought andpurpose. About one-fourth of its great length is devoted to what tothe eye looks like a somewhat elaborate exposition of the doctrines ofthe party on the slavery question. Eliminate the verbiage and thereonly remains an indorsement of the "principles contained in theorganic laws establishing the Territory of Kansas and Nebraska"(non-interference by Congress with slavery in State and Territory, orin the District of Columbia); and the practical application of "theprinciples" is thus further defined: "Resolved, That we recognize theright of the people of all the Territories, including Kansas andNebraska, acting through the legally and fairly expressed will of amajority of actual residents, and whenever the number of theirinhabitants justifies it, to form a constitution with or withoutdomestic slavery, and be admitted into the Union upon terms of perfectequality with the other States. " We have already seen how deliberately the spirit and letter of "theprinciple" was violated by the Democratic National Administration ofPresident Pierce, and by nearly all the Democratic Senators andRepresentatives in Congress; and we shall see how the more explicitresolution was again even more flagrantly violated by the DemocraticNational Administration and party under President Buchanan. For the time, however, these well-rounded phrases were especiallyconvenient: first, to prevent any schism in the Cincinnati Conventionitself, and, secondly, to furnish points for campaign speeches;politicians not having any pressing desire, nor voters the requisitecritical skill, to demonstrate how they left untouched the whole broodof pertinent queries which the discussion had already raised, andwhich at its next national convention were destined to disrupt anddefeat the Democratic party. For this occasion the studied ambiguityof the Cincinnati platform made possible a last coöperation of Northand South, in the face of carefully concealed mental reservations, tosecure a presidential victory. It is not the province of this work to describe the incidents of thenational canvass, but only to record its results. At the election ofNovember, 1856, Buchanan was chosen President. The popular vote in thenation at large stood: Buchanan, 1, 838, 169; Frémont, 1, 341, 264;Fillmore, 874, 534. By States Buchanan received the votes of fourteenslave-States and five free-States, a total of 174 electors; Frémontthe vote of eleven free-States, a total of 114 electors; and Fillmorethe vote of one slave-State, a total of eight electors. [4] In the campaign which preceded Mr. Buchanan's election, Mr. Lincoln, at the head of the Frémont electoral ticket for Illinois, took aprominent part, traversing the State in every direction, and makingabout fifty speeches. Among the addresses which he thus delivered inthe different counties, it is interesting to read a fragment of aspeech he made at Galena, Illinois, discussing the charge of"sectionalism, " the identical pretext upon which the South inauguratedits rebellion against his Administration four years afterwards: You further charge us with being disunionists. If you mean that it is our aim to dissolve the Union, I for myself answer that it is untrue; for those who act with me I answer that it is untrue. Have you heard us assert that as our aim? Do you really believe that such is our aim? Do you find it in our platform, our speeches, our conventions, or anywhere? If not, withdraw the charge. But you may say that though it is not our aim, it will be the result, if we succeed, and that we are therefore disunionists in fact. This is a grave charge you make against us, and we certainly have a right to demand that you specify in what way we are to dissolve the Union. How are we to effect this? The only specification offered is volunteered by Mr. Fillmore in his Albany speech. His charge is that if we elect a President and Vice-President both from the free-States it will dissolve the Union. This is open folly. The Constitution provides that the President and Vice-President of the United States shall be of different States; but says nothing as to the latitude and longitude of those States. In 1828 Andrew Jackson, of Tennessee, and John C. Calhoun, of South Carolina, were elected President and Vice-President, both from slave-States; but no one thought of dissolving the Union then on that account. In 1840 Harrison, of Ohio, and Tyler, of Virginia, were elected. In 1841 Harrison died and John Tyler succeeded to the presidency, and William R. King, of Alabama, was elected acting Vice-President by the Senate; but no one supposed that the Union was in danger. In fact, at the very time Mr. Fillmore uttered this idle charge, the state of things in the United States disproved it. Mr. Pierce, of New Hampshire, and Mr. Bright, of Indiana, both from free-States, are President and Vice-President, and the Union stands and will stand. You do not pretend that it ought to dissolve the Union, and the facts show that it won't; therefore the charge may be dismissed without further consideration. [Sidenote] Galena "Advertiser, " copied into the Illinois "State Journal, " August 8, 1856. No other specification is made, and the only one that could be made is, that the restoration of the restriction of 1820 making the United States territory free territory would dissolve the Union. Gentlemen, it will require a decided majority to pass such an act. We, the majority, being able constitutionally to do all that we purpose, would have no desire to dissolve the Union. Do you say that such restriction of slavery would be unconstitutional, and that some of the States would not submit to its enforcement? I grant you that an unconstitutional act is not a law; but I do not ask and will not take your construction of the Constitution. The Supreme Court of the United States is the tribunal to decide such a question, and we will submit to its decisions; and if you do also, there will be an end of the matter. Will you? If not, who are the disunionists, you or we? We, the majority, would not strive to dissolve the Union; and if any attempt is made it must be by you, who so loudly stigmatize us as disunionists. But the Union, in any event, will not be dissolved. We don't want to dissolve it, and if you attempt it we won't let you. With the purse and sword, the army and navy and treasury in our hands and at our command, you could not do it. This government would be very weak indeed if a majority with a disciplined army and navy and a well-filled treasury could not preserve itself, when attacked by an unarmed, undisciplined, unorganized minority. All this talk about the dissolution of the Union is humbug, nothing but folly. We do not want to dissolve the Union; you shall not. With three presidential tickets in the field--with the Democratsseeking the election of Buchanan and Breckinridge, the Americans, orKnow-Nothings, asking votes for Fillmore and Donelson, and theRepublicans making proselytes for Frémont and Dayton--the politicalcampaign of 1856 was one of unabated activity and excitement. In theState of Illinois the contest resulted in a drawn battle. The Americanparty held together with tolerable firmness in its vote for President, but was largely disintegrated in its vote on the ticket for Stateofficers. The consequence was that Illinois gave a plurality of 9164for Buchanan, the Democratic candidate for President, while at thesame time it gave a plurality of 4729 for Bissell, the Republicancandidate for Governor. [5] Half victory as it was, it furnished the Illinois Republicans asubstantial hope of the full triumph which they achieved four yearslater. About a month after this election, at a Republican banquetgiven in Chicago on the 10th of December, 1856, Abraham Lincoln spokeas follows, partly in criticism of the last annual message ofPresident Pierce, but more especially pointing out the rising star ofpromise: We have another annual presidential message. Like a rejected lover making merry at the wedding of his rival, the President felicitates himself hugely over the late presidential election. He considers the result a signal triumph of good principles and good men, and a very pointed rebuke of bad ones. He says the people did it. He forgets that the "people, " as he complacently calls only those who voted for Buchanan, are in a minority of the whole people by about four hundred thousand votes--one full tenth of all the votes. Remembering this, he might perceive that the "rebuke" may not be quite as durable as he seems to think--that the majority may not choose to remain permanently rebuked by that minority. The President thinks the great body of us Frémonters, being ardently attached to liberty, in the abstract, were duped by a few wicked and designing men. There is a slight difference of opinion on this. We think he, being ardently attached to the hope of a second term, in the concrete, was duped by men who had liberty every way. He is the cat's-paw. By much dragging of chestnuts from the fire for others to eat, his claws are burnt off to the gristle, and he is thrown aside as unfit for further use. As the fool said of _King Lear_, when his daughters had turned him out-of-doors, "He's a shelled peascod. " [That's a sheal'd peascod. ] So far as the President charges us "with a desire to change the domestic institutions of existing States, " and of "doing everything in our power to deprive the Constitution and the laws of moral authority, " for the whole party on belief, and for myself on knowledge, I pronounce the charge an unmixed and unmitigated falsehood. [Sidenote] Illinois "State Journal, " December 16, 1856. Our government rests in public opinion. Whoever can change public opinion can change the government practically just so much. Public opinion, on any subject, always has a "central idea, " from which all its minor thoughts radiate. That "central idea" in our political public opinion at the beginning was, and until recently has continued to be, "the equality of men. " And although it has always submitted patiently to whatever of inequality there seemed to be as matter of actual necessity, its constant working has been a steady progress towards the practical equality of all men. The late presidential election was a struggle by one party to discard that central idea and to substitute for it the opposite idea that slavery is right in the abstract, the workings of which as a central idea may be the perpetuity of human slavery and its extension to all countries and colors. Less than a year ago the Richmond "Enquirer, " an avowed advocate of slavery, regardless of color, in order to favor his views, invented the phrase "State equality, " and now the President, in his message, adopts the "Enquirer's" catch-phrase, telling us the people "have asserted the constitutional equality of each and all of the States of the Union as States. " The President flatters himself that the new central idea is completely inaugurated; and so indeed it is, so far as the mere fact of a presidential election can inaugurate it. To us it is left to know that the majority of the people have not yet declared for it, and to hope that they never will. All of us who did not vote for Mr. Buchanan, taken together, are a majority of four hundred thousand. But in the late contest we were divided between Frémont and Fillmore. Can we not come together for the future? Let every one who really believes, and is resolved, that free society is not and shall not be a failure, and who can conscientiously declare that in the past contest he has done only what he thought best, let every such one have charity to believe that every other one can say as much. Thus let bygones be bygones; let past differences as nothing be; and with steady eye on the real issue, let us reinaugurate the good old "central ideas" of the republic. We can do it. The human heart is with us; God is with us. We shall again be able not to declare that "all States as States are equal, " nor yet that "all citizens as citizens are equal, " but to renew the broader, better declaration, including both these and much more, that "all men are created equal. " Though these fragments of addresses give us only an imperfectreflection of the style of Mr. Lincoln's oratory during this period, they nevertheless show its essential characteristics, a pervadingclearness of analysis, and that strong tendency to axiomaticdefinition which gives so many of his sentences their convincing forceand durable value. They also show us the combination, not often foundin such happy balance, of the politician's discernment of fact withthe statesman's wisdom of theory--how present forces of national lifeare likely to be moved by future impulses of national will. Thepolitician could see the four hundred thousand voters who would givevictory to some party in the near future. It required the wisdom ofthe statesman to divine that the public opinion which would directhow these votes were to be cast, could most surely be created by anappeal to those generous "central ideas" of the human mind whichfavor equality against caste and freedom against slavery. Perhapsthe most distinctively representative quality these addresses exhibitis the patriotic spirit and faith which led him to declare sodogmatically in this campaign of 1856, what the nation called uponhim a few years later to execute by the stern powers of war, "We donot want to dissolve the Union; you shall not. " ----------[1] For David Wilmot, of Pennsylvania, 43; Preston King, of New York, 9; Charles Sumner, of Massachusetts, 36; Thomas H. Ford, of Ohio, 7;Cassius M. Clay, of Kentucky, 3; Jacob Collamer, of Vermont, 15;William F. Johnston, of Pennsylvania, 2; Nathaniel P. Banks, ofMassachusetts, 46; Henry Wilson, of Massachusetts, 7; WilliamPennington, of New Jersey, 1; ---- Carey, of New Jersey, 3; S. C. Pomeroy, of Kansas, 8; J. R. Giddings, of Ohio, 2. The vote in detailfor Lincoln was: Maine, 1; New Hampshire, 8; Massachusetts, 7; RhodeIsland, 2; New York, 3; Pennsylvania, 11; Ohio, 2; Indiana, 26;Illinois, 33; Michigan, 5; and California, 12. [2] Mr. T. S. Van Dyke, son of one of the delegates, kindly writesus: "Nothing that Mr. Lincoln has ever written is more characteristicthan the following note from him to my father just after theconvention--not for publication, but merely as a private expressionof his feelings to an old acquaintance: "SPRINGFIELD, ILL. , "June 27, 1856. "Hon. JOHN VAN DYKE. "MY DEAR SIR: Allow me to thank you for your kind notice of me in the Philadelphia Convention. "When you meet Judge Dayton present my respects, and tell him I think him a far better man than I for the position he is in, and that I shall support both him and Colonel Frémont most cordially. Present my best respects to Mrs. V. , and believe me, "Yours truly, "A. LINCOLN. " [3] On the sixteenth ballot Buchanan received 168 votes, of which 121were from the free-States and 47 from the slave-States; Douglasreceived 122 votes, of which 49 were from the free-States and 73 fromthe slave-States; Cass received 6 votes, all from the free-States;Pierce had been finally dropped on the previous ballot. --"Proceedingsof the Cincinnati Convention, " p. 45. [4] The vote more in detail was as follows: For Buchanan, slave-States, Alabama, 9; Arkansas, 4; Delaware, 3;Florida, 3; Georgia, 10; Kentucky, 12; Louisiana, 6; Mississippi, 7;Missouri, 9; North Carolina, 10; South Carolina, 8; Tennessee, 12;Texas, 4; Virginia, 15. Free States, California, 4; Illinois, 11;Indiana, 13; New Jersey, 7; Pennsylvania, 27. Total, 174. For Frémont, free-States, Connecticut, 6; Iowa, 4; Maine, 8;Massachusetts, 13; Michigan, 6; New Hampshire, 5; New York, 35; Ohio, 23; Rhode Island, 4; Vermont, 5; Wisconsin, 5. Total, 114. For Fillmore, slave-State, Maryland, 8. [5] For President, Buchanan (Democrat), 105, 344; Frémont (Republican), 96, 180; Fillmore (American), 37, 451. For Governor, Richardson (Democrat), 106, 643; Bissell (Republican), 111, 372; Morris (American), 19, 241. CHAPTER III CONGRESSIONAL RUFFIANISM The official reports show that the proceedings of the AmericanCongress, while in the main conducted with becoming propriety anddecorum, have occasionally been dishonored by angry personalaltercations and scenes of ruffianly violence. These disordersincreased as the great political struggle over the slavery questiongrew in intensity, and reached their culmination in a series ofstartling incidents. Charles Sumner, one of the Senators from the State of Massachusetts, had become conspicuous, in the prevailing political agitation, forhis aggressive and radical anti-slavery speeches in the Senate andelsewhere. The slavery issue had brought him into politics; he hadbeen elected to the United States Senate by the coalition of a smallnumber of Free-soilers with the Democrats in the MassachusettsLegislature. The slavery question, therefore, became the dominant principle andthe keynote of his public career. He was a man of liberal culture, ofconsiderable erudition in the law, of high literary ability, and hehad attained an enviable social eminence. Of large physical frame andstrength, gifted with a fine presence and a sonorous voice, fearlessand earnest in his opposition to slavery, Charles Sumner was one ofthe favorite orators of the early declamatory period of the Republicanparty. He joined unreservedly in the exciting Senate debates, provoked by therival applications from Kansas for her admission as a State. On the19th and 20th of May, 1856, he delivered an elaborate speech in theSenate, occupying two days. It was one of his greatest efforts, andhad been prepared with his usual industry. In character it was aphilippic rather than an argument, strong, direct, and aggressive, inwhich classical illustration and acrimonious accusation were blendedwith great effect. It described what he called "The Crime against Kansas"; and theexcuses for the crime he denominated the apology tyrannical, theapology imbecile, the apology absurd, and the apology infamous. "Tyranny, imbecility, absurdity, and infamy, " he continued, "all uniteto dance, like the weird sisters, about this crime. " In the course of his speech he alluded, among others, to A. P. Butler, of South Carolina, and in reply to some severe strictures by thatSenator during preceding debates, indulged in caustic personalcriticism upon his course and utterance, as well as upon the Statewhich he represented. With regret [said Sumner], I come again upon the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. Butler], who, omnipresent in this debate, overflowed with rage at the simple suggestion that Kansas had applied for admission as a State; and with incoherent phrases discharged the loose expectoration of his speech, now upon her representative and then upon her people. There was no extravagance of the ancient parliamentary debate which he did not repeat; nor was there any possible deviation from truth which he did not make, with so much of passion, I am glad to add, as to save him from the suspicion of intentional aberration. But the Senator touches nothing which he does not disfigure--with error, sometimes of principle, sometimes of fact. He shows an incapacity of accuracy, whether in stating the Constitution or in stating the law, whether in details of statistics or the diversions of scholarship. He cannot open his mouth but out there flies a blunder. [Illustration: CHARLES SUMNER. ] Butler was not present in the Senate on either day; what he might havesaid or done, had he been there, can only be conjectured. The immediatereplies from Douglas and others were very bitter. Among pro-slaverymembers of both Houses there was an under-current of revengefulmurmurs. It is possible that this hostile manifestation may havedecided a young member of the House, Preston S. Brooks, a nephew ofSenator Butler, to undertake retaliation by violence. AcquaintingHenry A. Edmundson, another member, with his design, he waited on twodifferent occasions at the western entrance to the Capitol grounds toencounter Mr. Sumner, but without meeting him. [Sidenote] 1856. On the 22d of May, two days after the speech, Brooks entered theSenate Chamber on the same errand. The session had been short, andafter adjournment Sumner remained at his desk, engaged in writing. Thesessions were at that time held in the old Senate Chamber, nowoccupied by the Supreme Court. The seats were arranged in semicircles, with a railing to separate them from a narrow lobby or open space nextthe wall; a broad aisle ran from the main door to the desk of thepresiding officer. Mr. Sumner's seat was in the outside row next tothe railing, at the second desk to the right from the entrance and themain aisle. Occupied with his work, Mr. Sumner did not notice Mr. Brooks, sitting across the aisle to his left, and where inconversation with a friend he was manifesting his impatience that alady seated near Mr. Sumner did not take her departure from thechamber. Almost at that moment she arose and went out; quicklyafterwards Brooks got up and advanced to the front of Sumner's desk. The act attracted the attention of Brooks's friend; he was astonished, amid the bitterness of party feeling, to see a South CarolinaRepresentative talk to a Massachusetts Senator. His astonishment wasquickly corrected. Leaning upon the desk and addressing Sumner with arapid sentence or two, to the effect that he had read his speech, thatit was a libel upon his absent relative, and that he had come topunish him for it, Brooks began striking him on the head with agutta-percha walking-cane, of the ordinary length and about an inch indiameter. Surprised, blinded and stunned by the blows, Sumner's first instinctwas to grapple with his assailant. This effort, however, was futile;the desk was between them, and being by his sitting posture partiallyunder it, Sumner was prevented from rising fully to his feet until hehad by main strength, in his struggles, wrenched it from itsfastenings on the floor. In his attempt to follow Brooks they becameturned, and from between the desks moved out into the main aisle. Bythis time, through the repetition of the heavy blows and loss ofblood, Sumner became unconscious. Brooks, seizing him by thecoat-collar, continued his murderous attack till Sumner, reeling inutter helplessness, sank upon the floor beside the desk nearest theaisle, one row nearer the center of the chamber than his own. Thewitnesses variously estimated the number of blows given at from ten tothirty. Two principal wounds, two inches long and an inch deep, hadbeen cut on the back of Sumner's head; and near the end of the attack, Brooks's cane was shivered to splinters. There were perhaps ten or fifteen persons in the chamber, and afterthe first momentary pause of astonishment half a dozen started tointerfere. Before they reached the spot, however, Lawrence M. Keitt, another South Carolina Representative, came rushing down the mainaisle, brandishing his cane, and with imprecations warning lookers-onto "let them alone. " Among those hastening to the rescue, Mr. Morganarrived first, just in time to catch and sustain the Senator as hefell. Another bystander, who had run round outside the railing, seizedBrooks by the arm about the same instant; and the wounded man wasborne to an adjoining room, where he was cared for by a hastilysummoned physician. Among Mr. Sumner's friends the event created a certain degree ofconsternation. The language which provoked the assault, whatever mightbe thought of its offensive character, was strictly parliamentary, uninterrupted either by the chair or by any member. The assault itselfwas so desperate and brutal that it implied a vindictiveness deeperthan mere personal revenge. This spirit of bullying, this resort toviolence, had recently become alarmingly frequent among members ofCongress, especially as it all came from the pro-slavery party. Since the beginning of the current session, a pro-slavery member fromVirginia had assaulted the editor of a Washington newspaper; anotherpro-slavery member, from Arkansas, had violently attacked HoraceGreeley on the street; a third pro-slavery member, from California, hadshot an unoffending waiter at Willard's Hotel. Was this fourth instancethe prelude of an intention to curb or stifle free Congressionaldebate? It is probable that this question was seriously considered atthe little caucus of Republican Senators held that night at the houseof Mr. Seward. The Republicans had only a slender minority in theSenate, and a plurality in the House; they could do nothing but resolveon a course of parliamentary inquiry, and agree on an attitude ofdefense. Sumner's colleague, Henry Wilson, made a very brief announcement ofthe occurrence to the Senate on the following day, and it at oncebecame apparent that the transaction would assume an almost strictlyparty character. As no Democratic Senator proposed an inquiry, Mr. Seward moved for a committee of investigation; upon which James M. Mason, of Virginia, proposed that the committee should be elected byballot. The result was that no Republican was chosen upon it; and thecommittee reached the conclusion that it had no power in the premises, except to report the occurrence to the House. In the House the usualcommittee from the three parties was raised, resulting in two reports. The minority, sustained by the vote of sixty members, pleaded a wantof jurisdiction. The majority recommended the expulsion of Brooks, andexpressed disapprobation by the House of the course of his colleague, Edmundson, in countenancing the assault, and of the act of Keitt inhis personal interference. But the necessary two-thirds vote for theexpulsion of Brooks could not be obtained; a vote of censure wastherefore passed by a large majority. The discussion of the report andresolutions occupied the House several days, and whatever effortmembers made to disguise their motives, their actions, either ofcondemnation or of excuse, arose in the main clearly enough from theirparty relations. Under the forms of parliamentary debate, the Southand the North were breathing mutual recrimination and defiance. The public of both sections took up the affair with equal party zeal. From the North came resolutions of legislatures, outbursts ofindignation in meetings and addresses, and the denunciation of Brooksand his deed in the newspapers. In the South the exactly oppositesentiment predominated. Brooks was defended and eulogized, andpresented with canes and pitchers as testimonials to his valor. Whenthe resolution of censure had been passed, he at once resigned hisseat in the House, and going home to his constituents, was immediatelyreëlected. Within three weeks he reappeared at the bar of the House, with a new commission from his Governor, and was sworn in andcontinued his service as before. The arrogant address which precededhis resignation contained the remarkable intimation that much moreserious results might have grown out of the incident. "No act ofmine, " he said, "on my personal account, shall inaugurate revolution;but when you, Mr. Speaker, return to your own home, and hear thepeople of the great North--and they are a great people--speak of me asa bad man, you will do me the justice to say that a blow struck by meat this time would be followed by a revolution; and this I know. " Under the state of public sentiment then prevailing at the South, itwould have been strange if the extraordinary event and the succeedingdebate had not provoked other similar affairs. Mr. Sumner's colleague, Senator Henry Wilson, of Massachusetts (afterwards Vice-President ofthe United States), in his speech characterized the assault as"brutal, murderous, and cowardly. " For this language Brooks sent him achallenge. Wilson wrote a reply declining the encounter, but in thesame letter announcing that "I religiously believe in the right ofself-defense, in its broadest sense. " One of the sharpest denunciations of the assault was made by AnsonBurlingame, a Massachusetts Representative (afterwards United StatesMinister to China, and still later Chinese Minister to the UnitedStates). "I denounce it, " he said, "in the name of the Constitution itviolates. I denounce it in the name of the sovereignty ofMassachusetts, which was stricken down by the blow. I denounce it inthe name of humanity. I denounce it in the name of civilization, whichit outraged. I denounce it in the name of that fair-play which bulliesand prize-fighters respect. " For this, after some efforts had beenmade by friends to bring about an amicable understanding, Brooks senthim also a challenge. Mr. Burlingame accepted the challenge, and hissecond designated the Clifton House in Canada as the rendezvous andrifles as weapons. Burlingame at once started on the journey; butBrooks declined to go, on the excuse that his life would not be safeon such a trip through the North. Broadened into national significance by all these attendantcircumstances, the Sumner assault became a leading event in the greatslavery contest between the South and North. It might well rank as oneof the episodes of the civil war then raging in Kansas, out of whichit had in reality grown, and with which it was intertwined in motive, act, and comment. In result the incident was extremely damaging to theSouth, for it tended more than any single Border-Ruffian crime inKansas to unite hesitating and wavering opinion in the North againstthe alarming flood of lawlessness and violence, which as a rule foundits origin and its defense in the ranks of the pro-slavery party. Certainly no phase of the transaction was received by the North withsuch popular favor as some of the bolder avowals by NorthernRepresentatives of their readiness to fight, and especially byBurlingame's actual acceptance of the challenge of Brooks. The shock of the attack, and the serious wounds received by Mr. Sumner, produced a spinal malady, from which he rallied with greatdifficulty, and only after severe medical treatment and years ofenforced abstinence from work. As the constituents of Brooks sent himback to the House, so also the Legislature of Massachusetts, inJanuary, 1857, with but few dissenting votes, reëlected Sumner to anew senatorial term, beginning the 4th of March. He came to Washingtonand was sworn in, but within a few days sailed for Europe, and duringthe greater part of the long interim between that time and thesucceeding Presidential campaign his seat in the Senate remainedvacant. It was on the 4th of June, 1860, that he again raised his voice indebate. Some changes had occurred: both Butler and Brooks weredead;[1] the Senate was assembled in its new hall in the north wingof the Capitol extension. But in the main the personnel and the spiritof the pro-slavery party still confronted him. "Time has passed, " hesaid, "but the question remains. " A little more than four yearsbefore, he had essayed to describe "The Crime against Kansas"; now, inan address free from offensive personalities but more unsparing inrhetoric and stronger in historical arraignment, he delineated what henamed the "Barbarism of Slavery. " Picturing to ourselves the orator, the circumstances, and the theme, we can comprehend the exaltationwith which he exclaimed in his exordium: "Slavery must be resisted notonly on political grounds, but on all other grounds, whether social, economical, or moral. Ours is no holiday contest; nor is it any strifeof rival factions--of White and Red Roses; of theatric Neri andBianchi; but it is a solemn battle between Right and Wrong, betweenGood and Evil. .. . Grander debate has not occurred in our history, rarely in any history; nor can this debate close or subside exceptwith the triumph of Freedom. " With this speech Sumner resumed his place as a conspicuous figure andan indefatigable energy in national politics and legislation, tirelessin attacking and pursuing slavery until its final overthrow. ----------[1] Preston S. Brooks died in Washington, January 27, 1857; Andrew P. Butler died in South Carolina, May 25, 1857. CHAPTER IV THE DRED SCOTT DECISION [Sidenote] 1854. [Sidenote] March 6, 1857. Deep and widespread as hitherto had been the slavery agitation createdby the repeal of the Missouri Compromise and by the consequent civilwar in Kansas, an event entirely unexpected to the public at largesuddenly doubled its intensity. This was the announcement, two daysafter Buchanan's inauguration, of the decision of the Supreme Court ofthe United States in the Dred Scott case. This celebrated case hadarisen as follows: Two or three years before the Nebraska bill was thought of, a suit wasbegun by a negro named Dred Scott, in a local court in St. Louis, Missouri, to recover the freedom of himself and his family fromslavery. He alleged that his master, one Dr. Emerson, an army surgeon, living in Missouri, had taken him as his slave to the military post atRock Island, in the State of Illinois, and afterwards to FortSnelling, situated in what was originally Upper Louisiana, but was atthat time part of Wisconsin Territory, and now forms part ofMinnesota. While at this latter post Dred Scott, with his master'sconsent, married a colored woman, also brought as a slave fromMissouri, and of this marriage two children were born. All thishappened between the years 1834 and 1838. Afterwards Dr. Emersonbrought Dred Scott and his family back to Missouri. In this suit theynow claimed freedom, because during the time of residence with theirmaster at these military posts slavery was there prohibited bypositive law; namely, at Bock Island by the ordinance of 1787, andlater by the Constitution of Illinois; at Fort Snelling by theMissouri Compromise acts of 1820, and other acts of Congress relatingto Wisconsin Territory. The local court in St. Louis before which this action was broughtappears to have made short work of the case. It had become settledlegal doctrine by Lord Mansfield's decision in the Somersett case, rendered four years before our Declaration of Independence, that "thestate of slavery is of such a nature that it is incapable of beingintroduced on any reasons, moral or political, but only positivelaw. .. . It is so odious that nothing can be suffered to support it butpositive law. " The learned chief-justice therefore ordered thatSomersett, being claimed as a Virginia slave brought by his masterinto England, when it was attempted to carry him away against hiswill, should be discharged from custody or restraint, because therewas no positive law in England to support slavery. The doctrine wassubsequently modified by another English chief-justice, Lord Stowell, in 1827, to the effect that absence of positive law to support slaveryin England only operates to suspend the master's authority, which isrevived if the slave voluntarily returns into an English colony whereslavery does exist by positive law. The States of the Union naturally inherited and retained the commonlaw of England, and the principles and maxims of English jurisprudencenot necessarily abrogated by the change of government, and amongothers this doctrine of Lord Mansfield. Unlike England, however, wherethere was no slavery and no law for or against it, some of theAmerican States had positive laws establishing slavery, otherspositive laws prohibiting it. Lord Mansfield's doctrine, therefore, enlarged and strengthened by American statutes and decisions, had cometo be substantially this: Slavery, being contrary to natural right, exists only by virtue of local law; if the master takes his slave forpermanent residence into a jurisdiction where slavery is prohibited, the slave thereby acquires a right to his freedom everywhere. On theother hand, Lord Stowell's doctrine was similarly enlarged andstrengthened so as to allow the master right of transit and temporarysojourn in free-States and Territories without suspension orforfeiture of his authority over his slave. Under the complex Americansystem of government, in which the Federal Union and the severalStates each claim sovereignty and independent action within certainlimitations, it became the theory and practice that towards each otherthe several States occupied the attitude of foreign nations, whichrelation was governed by international law, and that the principle ofcomity alone controlled the recognition and enforcement by any Stateof the law of any other State. Under this theory, the courts of slaveStates had generally accorded freedom to slaves, even when acquired bythe laws of a free-State, and reciprocally the courts of free-Stateshad enforced the master's right to his slave where that right dependedon the laws of a slave-State. In this spirit, and conforming to thisestablished usage, the local court of Missouri declared Dred Scott andhis family free. The claimant, loath to lose these four human "chattels, " carried thecase to the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri, where at its Marchterm, 1852, it was reversed, and a decree rendered that these negroeswere not entitled to freedom. Three judges formed the court, and twoof them joined in an opinion bearing internal evidence that it wasprompted, not by considerations of law and justice, but by a spirit ofretaliation growing out of the ineradicable antagonism of freedom andslavery. [Sidenote] Scott, J. , 15 Mo. Reports, pp. 582-6. Every State [says the opinion] has the right of determining how far, in a spirit of comity, it will respect the laws of other States. Those laws have no intrinsic right to be enforced beyond the limits of the State for which they were enacted. The respect allowed them will depend altogether on their conformity to the policy of our institutions. No State is bound to carry into effect enactments conceived in a spirit hostile to that which pervades her own laws. .. . It is a humiliating spectacle to see the courts of a State confiscating the property of her own citizens by the command of a foreign law. .. . Times now are not as they were when the former decisions on this subject were made. Since then not only individuals but States have been possessed with a dark and fell spirit in relation to slavery, whose gratification is sought in the pursuit of measures whose inevitable consequence must be the overthrow and destruction of our Government. Under such circumstances it does not behoove the State of Missouri to show the least countenance to any measure which might gratify this spirit. She is willing to assume her full responsibility for the existence slavery within her limits, nor does she seek to share or divide it with others. To this partisan bravado the third judge replied with a dignifiedrebuke; in his dissenting opinion he said: [Sidenote] Gamble, J. , 15 Mo. Reports, pp. 589-92. As citizens of a slave-holding State, we have no right to complain of our neighbors of Illinois, because they introduce into their State Constitution a prohibition of slavery; nor has any citizen of Missouri who removes with his slave to Illinois a right to complain that the fundamental law of the State to which he removes, and in which he makes his residence, dissolves the relation between him and his slave. It is as much his own voluntary act as if he had executed a deed of emancipation. .. . There is with me nothing in the law relating to slavery which distinguishes it from the law on any other subject, or allows any more accommodation to the temporary public excitements which are gathered around it. .. . In this State it has been recognized from the beginning of the government, as a correct position in law, that a master who takes his slave to reside in a State or Territory where slavery is prohibited thereby emancipates his slave. [Citing cases. ] . .. But the Supreme Court of Missouri, so far from standing alone on this question, is supported by the decisions of other slave-States, including those in which it may be supposed there was the least disposition to favor emancipation. [Citing cases. ] . .. Times may have changed, public feeling may have changed, but principles have not and do not change; and in my judgment there can be no safe basis for judicial decision but in those principles which are immutable. These utterances, it must be remembered, occurred in the year 1852, when all slavery agitation was supposed to have been forever settled. They show conclusively that the calm was superficial and delusive, andthat this deep-reaching contest was still, as before the adjustment of1850, actually transforming the various institutions of society. Gradually, and as yet unnoticed by the public, the motives disclosedin these opinions were beginning to control courts of justice, andpopular discussion and excitement were not only shaping legislation, but changing the tenor of legal decisions throughout the country. Not long after the judgment by the Supreme Court of Missouri, DredScott and his family were sold to a man named Sandford, who was acitizen of New York. This circumstance afforded a ground for bringinga similar action in a Federal tribunal, and accordingly Dred Scottonce more sued for freedom, in the United States Circuit Court at St. Louis. [1] The case was tried in May, 1854, and a decree rendered thatthey "were negro slaves, the lawful property" of Sandford. As a finaleffort to obtain justice, they appealed by writ of error to theSupreme Court of the United States, the highest judicial tribunal ofthe nation. Before this court of last resort the case was argued a first time inthe spring of 1856. The country had been for two years in a blaze ofpolitical excitement. Civil war was raging in Kansas; Congress was ina turmoil of partisan discussion; a Presidential election wasimpending, and the whole people were anxiously noting the varyingphases of party politics. Few persons knew there was such a thing asthe Dred Scott case on the docket of the Supreme Court; but those fewappreciated the importance of the points it involved, and severaldistinguished lawyers volunteered to take part in the argument. [2] Twoquestions were presented to the court: First, Is Dred Scott a citizenentitled to sue? Secondly, Did his residence at Rock Island and atFort Snelling, under the various prohibitions of slavery existingthere, work his freedom? The Supreme Court was composed of nine justices; namely, Chief-JusticeTaney and Associate Justices McLean, Wayne, Catron, Daniel, Nelson, Grier, Curtis, and Campbell. There was at once manifested among thejudges not only a lively interest in the questions presented, but awide difference of views as to the manner of treating them. Consultations of the Supreme Court are always shrouded in inviolablesecrecy, but the opinions afterwards published indicate that thepolitical aspects of slavery, which were then convulsing the country, from the very first found a certain sympathy and reflection in thesegrave judicial deliberations. The discussions yet turned upon certainmerely technical rules to be applied to the pleadings under review;and ostensibly to give time for further examination, the case waspostponed and a re-argument ordered for the next term. It may, however, be suspected that the nearness of the Presidential electionhad more to do with this postponement than did the exigencies of thelaw. [3] [Illustration: ROGER B. TANEY. ] The Presidential election came, and Mr. Buchanan was chosen. Soonafter, the court met to begin its long winter term; and about themiddle of December, 1856, the Dred Scott case was once moreelaborately argued. Again occupying the attention of the court forfour successive days, as it had also done in the first hearing, theeminent counsel, after passing lightly over mere technical subtleties, discussed very fully what was acknowledged to be the leading point inthe controversy; namely, whether Congress had power under theConstitution to prohibit slavery in the Federal Territories, as it haddone by the Missouri Compromise act and various other laws. It wasprecisely the policy, or impolicy, of this and similar prohibitionswhich formed the subject of contention in party politics. The questionof their constitutional validity was certain to take even a higherrank in public interest. When after the second argument the judges took up the case inconference for decision, the majority held that the judgment of theMissouri Federal tribunal should simply be affirmed on its merits. Inconformity to this view, Justice Nelson was instructed to prepare anopinion to be read as the judgment of the Supreme Court of the UnitedStates. Such a paper was thereupon duly written by him, of thefollowing import: It was a question, he thought, whether a temporaryresidence in a free-State or Territory could work the emancipation ofa slave. It was the exclusive province of each State, by itsLegislature or courts of justice, to determine this question foritself. This determined, the Federal courts were bound to follow theState's decision. The Supreme Court of Missouri had decided Dred Scottto be a slave. In two cases tried since, the same judgment had beengiven. Though former decisions had been otherwise, this must now beadmitted as "the settled law of the State, " which, he said, "isconclusive of the case in this court. " This very narrow treatment of the points at issue, having to do withthe mere lifeless machinery of the law, was strikingly criticised inthe dissenting opinion afterwards read by Justice McLean, a part ofwhich, by way of anticipation, may properly be quoted here. He deniedthat it was exclusively a Missouri question. [Sidenote] 19 Howard, pp. 555-64. It involves a right claimed under an act of Congress and the Constitution of Illinois, and which cannot be decided without the consideration and construction of those laws. .. . Rights sanctioned for twenty-eight years ought not and cannot be repudiated, with any semblance of justice, by one or two decisions, influenced, as declared, by a determination to counteract the excitement against slavery in the free-States. .. . Having the same rights of sovereignty as the State of Missouri in adopting a constitution, I can perceive no reason why the institutions of Illinois should not receive the same consideration as those of Missouri. .. . The Missouri court disregards the express provisions of an act of Congress and the Constitution of a sovereign State, both of which laws for twenty-eight years it had not only regarded, but carried into effect. If a State court may do this, on a question involving the liberty of a human being, what protection do the laws afford? [Sidenote] Campbell to Tyler, Samuel Tyler. "Life of Taney, " pp. 383-4. Had the majority of the judges carried out their original intention, and announced their decision in the form in which Justice Nelson, under their instruction, wrote it, the case of Dred Scott would, aftera passing notice, have gone to a quiet sleep under the dust of the lawlibraries. A far different fate was in store for it. The nation wasthen being stirred to its very foundation by the slavery agitation. The party of pro-slavery reaction was for the moment in the ascendant;and as by an irresistible impulse, the Supreme Court of the UnitedStates was swept from its hitherto impartial judicial moorings intothe dangerous seas of polities. [Sidenote] Campbell to Tyler, Tyler, p. 384. Before Judge Nelson's opinion was submitted to the judges inconference for final adoption as the judgment of the court a movementseems to have taken place among the members, not only to change theground of the decision, but also greatly to enlarge the field ofinquiry. It is stated by one of the participants in that memorabletransaction (Justice Campbell) that this occurred "upon a motion ofMr. Justice Wayne, who stated that the case had created publicinterest and expectation, that it had been twice argued, and that animpression existed that the questions argued would be considered inthe opinion of the court. " He further says that "the apprehension hadbeen expressed by others of the court, that the court would notfulfill public expectation or discharge its duties by maintainingsilence upon these questions; and my impression is, that severalopinions had already been begun among the members of the court, inwhich a full discussion of the case was made, before Justice Waynemade this proposal. " The exact time when this movement was begun cannot now be ascertained. The motives which prompted it can be inferred by recallingcontemporaneous political events. A great controversy divided publicopinion, whether slavery might be extended or should be restricted. The Missouri Compromise had been repealed to make such an extensionpossible. The terms of that repeal were purposely couched in ambiguouslanguage. Kansas and Nebraska were left "perfectly free to form andregulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only tothe Constitution of the United States. " Whether under the Constitutionslavery could be excluded from the Federal Territories was affirmed byNorthern and denied by Southern Democrats. Northern and SouthernDemocrats, acting together in the Cincinnati National Convention, hadingeniously avoided any solution of this difference. A twofold interpretation had enabled that party to elect Mr. Buchanan, not by its own popular strength, but by the division of its opponents. Notwithstanding its momentary success, unless it could develop newsources of strength the party had only a precarious hold upon power. Its majority in the Senate was waning. In Kansas free-State emigrationwas outstripping the South in numbers and checkmating her in borderstrife. According to the existing relative growth in sectionalrepresentation and sectional sentiment, the balance of power wasslowly but steadily passing to the North. Out of this doubt and difficulty there was one pathway that seemedeasy and certain. All the individual utterances from the Democraticparty agreed that the meaning of the words "subject to theConstitution" was a question for the courts. This was the originalcompact between Northern and Southern Democrats in caucus when Douglasconsented to repeal. Douglas, shorn of his prestige by his defeat forthe Presidential nomination, must accept conditions from hissuccessful rival. The Dred Scott case afforded the occasion for adecision. Of the nine judges on the Supreme Bench seven wereDemocrats, and of these five were appointed from slave-States. Abetter opportunity for the South to obtain a favorable dictum couldnever be expected to arise. A declaration by the Supreme Court of theUnited States that under the Constitution Congress possessed no powerto prohibit slavery in the Federal Territories would by a singlebreath end the old and begin a new political era. Congress was insession and the political leaders were assembled at Washington. Political topics excluded all other conversation or thought. Politicsreddened the plains of Kansas; politics had recently desecrated theSenate chamber with a murderous personal assault; politics contendedgreedily for the spoils of a new administration: politics nursed atacit conspiracy to nationalize slavery. The slavery sentiment ruledsociety, ruled the Senate, ruled the Executive Mansion. It is notsurprising that this universal influence flowed in at the open door ofthe national hall of justice--that it filtered through the very wallswhich surrounded the consulting-room of the Supreme Court. [Sidenote] Wayne, J. , Opinion in the Dred Scott case, 19 Howard, pp. 454-5. The judges were, after all, but men. They dined, they talked, theyexchanged daily personal and social courtesies with the politicalworld. Curiosity, friendship, patriotism, led them to the floors ofCongress to listen to the great debates. Official ceremony calledthem into the presence of the President, of legislators, of diplomats. They were feasted, flattered, questioned, reminded of their greatopportunity, tempted with the suggestion of their supreme authority. [4]They could render their names illustrious. They could honor theirStates. They could do justice to the South. They could perpetuatetheir party. They could settle the slavery question. They could endsectional hatred, extinguish civil war, preserve the Union, save theircountry. Advanced age, physical feebleness, party bias, the politicalardor of the youngest and the satiety of the eldest, all conspired todraw them under the insidious influence of such considerations. One ofthe judges in official language frankly avowed the motive and objectof the majority of the court. "The case, " he wrote, "involves privaterights of value, and constitutional principles of the highestimportance, about which there had become such a difference of opinionthat the peace and harmony of the country required the settlement ofthem by judicial decision. " This language betrays the confusion ofideas and misconception of authority which tempted the judges beyondtheir proper duty. Required only to decide a question of privaterights, they thrust themselves forward to sit as umpires in a quarrelof parties and factions. [Sidenote] Campbell to Tyler, Tyler, p. 384. [Sidenote] Nelson to Tyler, Tyler, p. 385. In an evil hour they yielded to the demands of "public interest, " andresolved to "fulfill public expectation. " Justice Wayne "proposed thatthe Chief-Justice should write an opinion on all of the questions asthe opinion of the court. This was assented to, some reserving tothemselves to qualify their assent as the opinion might require. Others of the court proposed to have no question, save one, discussed. "The extraordinary proceeding was calculated to touch the pride ofJustice Nelson. He appears to have given it a kind of sullenacquiescence. "I was not present, " he wrote, "when the majoritydecided to change the ground of the decision, and assigned thepreparation of the opinion to the Chief-Justice; and when advised ofthe change I simply gave notice that I should read the opinion I hadprepared as my own, and which is the one on file. " From this time thepens of other judges were busy, and in the inner political circles ofWashington the case of Dred Scott gradually became a shadowy andportentous _cause célèbre_. The first intimation which the public at large had of the coming newdictum was given in Mr. Buchanan's inaugural. The fact that he didnot contemplate such an announcement until after his arrival inWashington[5] leads to the inference that it was prompted from highquarters. In Congressional and popular discussions the question of themoment was at what period in the growth of a Territory its votersmight exclude or establish slavery. Referring to this Mr. Buchanansaid: "It is a judicial question, which legitimately belongs to theSupreme Court of the United States, before whom it is now pending, andwill, it is understood, be speedily and finally settled. To theirdecision, in common with all good citizens, I shall cheerfully submit, whatever this may be. " The popular acquiescence being thus invoked by the Presidential voiceand example, the court announced its decision two days afterwards--March6, 1857. The essential character of the transaction impressed itselfupon the very form of the judgment, if indeed it may be called at allby that name. Chief-Justice Taney read the opinion of the court. Justices Nelson, Wayne, Daniel, Grier, Catron, and Campbell each read aseparate and individual opinion, agreeing with the Chief-Justice onsome points, and omitting or disagreeing on others, or arriving at thesame result by different reasoning, and in the same manner differingone from another. The two remaining associate justices, McLean andCurtis, read emphatic dissenting opinions. Thus the collectiveutterance of the bench resembled the speeches of a town meeting ratherthan the decision of a court, and employed 240 printed pages of learnedlegal disquisition to order the simple dismissal of a suit. The opinionread by Chief-Justice Taney was long and elaborate, and the followingwere among its leading conclusions: That the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of theUnited States do not include nor refer to negroes otherwise than asproperty; that they cannot become citizens of the United States norsue in the Federal courts. That Dred Scott's claim to freedom byreason of his residence in Illinois was a Missouri question, whichMissouri law had decided against him. That the Constitution of theUnited States recognizes slaves as property, and pledges the FederalGovernment to protect it; and that the Missouri Compromise act andlike prohibitory laws are unconstitutional. That the Circuit Court ofthe United States had no jurisdiction in the case and could give nojudgment in it, and must be directed to dismiss the suit. This remarkable decision challenged the attention of the whole peopleto a degree never before excited by any act of their courts of law. Multiplied editions were at once printed, [6] scattered broadcast overthe land, read with the greatest avidity, and earnestly criticised. The public sentiment regarding it immediately divided, generally onexisting party lines--the South and the Democrats accepting andcommending, the North and the Republicans spurning and condemning it. The great anti-slavery public was not slow in making a practicalapplication of its dogmas: that a sweeping and revolutionaryexposition of the Constitution had been attempted when confessedlythe case and question had no right to be in court; that an evidentpartisan dictum of national judges had been built on an avowedpartisan decision of State judges; that both the legislative andjudicial authority of the nation had been trifled with; that thesettler's "sovereignty" in Kansas consisted only of a Southernplanter's right to bring his slaves there; and that if under the"property" theory the Constitution carries slavery to the Territories, it would by the same inevitable logic carry it into free-States. But much more offensive to the Northern mind than his conclusions oflaw were the language and historical assertions by which Chief-JusticeTaney strove to justify them. [Sidenote] 19 Howard, p. 407. In the opinion of the court [said he] the legislation and histories of the times, and the language used in the Declaration of Independence, show, that neither the class of persons who had been imported as slaves, nor their descendants, whether they had become free or not, were then acknowledged as a part of the people, nor intended to be included in the general words used in that memorable instrument. It is difficult at this day to realize the state of public opinion in relation to that unfortunate race which prevailed in the civilized and enlightened portions of the world at the time of the Declaration of Independence and when the Constitution of the United States was framed and adopted. But the public history of every European nation displays it in a manner too plain to be mistaken. They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit. He was bought and sold, and treated as an ordinary article of merchandise and traffic, whenever a profit could be made by it. Quoting the provisions of several early slave codes, he continued: [Sidenote] Ibid. , p. 409. They show that a perpetual and impassable barrier was intended to be erected between the white race and the one which they had reduced to slavery and governed as subjects with absolute and despotic power, and which they then looked upon as so far below them in the scale of created beings that intermarriages between white persons and negroes or mulattoes were regarded as unnatural and immoral, and punished as crimes, not only in the parties, but in the person who joined them in marriage. And no distinction in this respect was made between the free negro or mulatto and the slave, but this stigma, of the deepest degradation, was fixed upon the whole race. Referring to the phrase in the Declaration of Independence, whichasserts that all men are created equal, he remarked: [Sidenote] 19 Howard, p. 410. The general words above quoted would seem to embrace the whole human family, and if they were used in a similar instrument at this day would be so understood. But it is too clear for dispute, that the enslaved African race were not intended to be included, and formed no part of the people who framed and adopted this declaration; for if the language, as understood in that day, would embrace them, the conduct of the distinguished men who framed the Declaration of Independence would have been utterly and flagrantly inconsistent with the principles they asserted, and instead of the sympathy of mankind, to which they so confidently appealed, they would have deserved and received universal rebuke and reprobation. He then applied the facts thus assumed as follows: [Sidenote] Ibid. , pp. 425-6. The only two provisions which point to them and include them treat them as property, and make it the duty of the Government to protect it; no other power in relation to this race is to be found in the Constitution. .. . No one, we presume, supposes that any change in public opinion or feeling in relation to this unfortunate race, in the civilized nations of Europe or in this country, should induce the court to give to the words of the Constitution a more liberal construction in their favor than they were intended to bear when the instrument was framed and adopted. .. . It is not only the same in words, but the same in meaning, and delegates the same powers to the Government, and reserves and secures the same rights and privileges to the citizen; and as long as it continues to exist in its present form, it speaks not only in the same words but with the same meaning and intent with which it spoke when it came from the hands of its framers and was voted on and adopted by the people of the United States. This cold and pitiless historical delineation of the bondage, ignorance, and degradation of the unfortunate kidnaped Africans andtheir descendants in a by-gone century, as an immutable basis ofconstitutional interpretation, was met by loud and indignant protestfrom the North. The people and press of that section seized upon thesalient phrase of the statement, and applying it in the present tense, accused the Chief-Justice with saying that "a negro has no rightswhich a white man is bound to respect. " This was certainly adistortion of his exact words and meaning; yet the exaggeration wasmore than half excusable, in view of the literal and unbending rigorwith which he proclaimed the constitutional disability of the entireAfrican race in the United States, and denied their birthright in theDeclaration of Independence. His unmerciful logic made the blackbefore the law less than a slave; it reduced him to the status of ahorse or dog, a bale of dry-goods or a block of stone. Against such adebasement of any living image of the Divine Maker the resentment ofthe public conscience of the North was quick and unsparing. Had Chief-Justice Taney's delineation been historically correct, itwould have been nevertheless unwise and unchristian to embody it inthe form of a disqualifying legal sentence and an indelible politicalbrand. But its manifest untruth was clearly shown by Justice Curtis inhis dissenting opinion. He reminded the Chief-Justice that at theadoption of the Constitution: [Sidenote] 19 Howard, p. 582. In five of the thirteen original States colored persons then possessed the elective franchise, and were among those by whom the Constitution was ordained and established. If so, it is not true in point of fact that the Constitution was made exclusively by the white race, and that it was made exclusively for the white race is in my opinion not only an assumption not warranted by anything in the Constitution, but contradicted by its opening declaration that it was ordained and established by the people of the United States for themselves and their posterity; and as free colored persons were then citizens of at least five States, and so in every sense part of the people of the United States, they were among those for whom and whose posterity the Constitution was ordained and established. Elsewhere in the same opinion he said: [Sidenote] Ibid. , pp. 574-5. I shall not enter into an examination of the existing opinions of that period respecting the African race, nor into any discussion concerning the meaning of those who asserted in the Declaration of Independence that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. My own opinion is, that a calm comparison of these assertions of universal abstract truths, and of their own individual opinions and acts, would not leave these men under any reproach of inconsistency; that the great truths they asserted on that solemn occasion they were ready and anxious to make effectual; wherever a necessary regard to circumstances, which no statesman can disregard without producing more evil than good, would allow; and that it would not be just to them, nor true in itself, to allege that they intended to say that the Creator of all men had endowed the white race exclusively with the great natural rights which the Declaration of Independence asserts. Justice McLean, in his dissenting opinion, completed the outline ofthe true historical picture in accurate language: [Sidenote] 19 Howard, pp. 537-8. I prefer the lights of Madison, Hamilton, and Jay, as a means of construing the Constitution in all its bearings, rather than to look behind that period into a traffic which is now declared to be piracy, and punished with death by Christian nations. I do not like to draw the sources of our domestic relations from so dark a ground. Our independence was a great epoch in the history of freedom; and while I admit the Government was not made especially for the colored race, yet many of them were citizens of the New England States, and exercised the rights of suffrage when the Constitution was adopted, and it was not doubted by any intelligent person that its tendencies would greatly ameliorate their condition. Many of the States on the adoption of the Constitution, or shortly afterwards, took measures to abolish slavery within their respective jurisdictions; and it is a well-known fact that a belief was cherished by the leading men, South as well as North, that the institution of slavery would gradually decline until it would become extinct. The increased value of slave labor, in the culture of cotton and sugar, prevented the realization of this expectation. Like all other communities and States, the South were influenced by what they considered to be their own interests. But if we are to turn our attention to the dark ages of the world, why confine our view to colored slavery? On the same principles white men were made slaves. All slavery has its origin in power and is against right. To the constitutional theory advanced by the Chief-Justice, thatCongress cannot exercise sovereign powers over Federal Territories, and hence cannot exclude slave property from them, Justices McLean andCurtis also opposed a vigorous and exhaustive argument, which the mosteminent lawyers and statesmen of that day deemed conclusive. Thehistorical precedents alone ought to have determined the issue. "Thejudicial mind of this country, State and Federal, " said McLean, "hasagreed on no subject within its legitimate action with equal unanimityas on the power of Congress to establish Territorial governments. Nocourt, State or Federal, no judge or statesman, is known to have hadany doubts on this question for nearly sixty years after the power wasexercised. " [Sidenote] 19 Howard, p. 619. And Curtis added: "Here are eight distinct instances, beginning withthe first Congress, and coming down to the year 1848, in whichCongress has excluded slavery from the territory of the United States;and six distinct instances in which Congress organized governments ofTerritories by which slavery was recognized and continued, beginningalso with the first Congress, and coming down to the year 1822. Theseacts were severally signed by seven Presidents of the United States, beginning with General Washington, and coming regularly down as far asMr. John Quincy Adams, thus including all who were in public life whenthe Constitution was adopted. If the practical construction of theConstitution, contemporaneously with its going into effect, by menintimately acquainted with its history from their personalparticipation in framing and adopting it, and continued by themthrough a long series of acts of the gravest importance, be entitledto weight in the judicial mind on a question of construction, it wouldseem to be difficult to resist the force of the acts above advertedto. " [Illustration: SAMUEL NELSON. ] ----------[1] The declaration in the case of Dred Scott vs. John F. A. Sandfordwas filed in the clerk's office of the Circuit Court of the UnitedStates for the district of Missouri on the second day of November, 1853. The trespass complained of is alleged to have occurred on thefirst day of January, 1853. --Manuscript Records of the Supreme Courtof the United States. [2] At the first hearing Montgomery Blair argued the case for DredScott, and Senator Geyer, of Missouri, and ex-Attorney-General ReverdyJohnson, of Maryland, for the claimant. At the second hearing Mr. Blair and George Ticknor Curtis, of Boston, argued the case on behalfof Dred Scott, and Mr. Greyer and Mr. Johnson again made the argumentfor the claimant. All of them performed the service withoutcompensation. [3] "The court will not decide the question of the Missouri Compromiseline--a majority of the judges being of opinion that it is notnecessary to do so. (This is confidential. ) The one engrossing subjectin both Houses of Congress and with all the members is the Presidency;and upon this everything done and omitted, except the most ordinarynecessities of the country, depends. "--[Letter of Justice Curtis toMr. Ticknor, April 8, 1856. G. T. Curtis, "Life of B. R. Curtis, " Vol. I. , p. 180. ] [4] A striking example may be found in the utterance of Attorney-GeneralCaleb Cushing, of the retiring Pierce Administration, in a littleparting address to the Supreme Court, March 4, 1857: "Yours is not the gauntleted hand of the soldier, nor yours the voice which commands armies, rules cabinets, or leads senates; but though you are none of these, yet you are backed by all of them. Theirs is the external power which sustains your moral authority; you are the incarnate mind of the political body of the nation. In the complex institutions of our country you are the pivot point upon which the rights and liberties of all, government and people alike, turn; or, rather, you are the central light of constitutional wisdom around which they perpetually revolve. Long may this court retain the confidence of our country as the great conservators, not of the private peace only, but of the sanctity and integrity of the Constitution. "--"National Intelligencer, " March 5, 1857. [5] "Mr. Buchanan was also preparing his inaugural address with hisusual care and painstaking, and I copied his drafts and recopied themuntil he had prepared it to his satisfaction. It underwent no alterationafter he went to the National Hotel in Washington, except that he thereinserted a clause in regard to the question then pending in the SupremeCourt, as one that would dispose of a vexed and dangerous topic by thehighest judicial authority of the land. "--Statement of James BuchananHenry (President Buchanan's private secretary) in the "Life of JamesBuchanan, " by George Ticknor Curtis, Vol. II. , p. 187. [6] "It may not be improper for me here to add that so great aninterest did I take in that decision, and in its principles beingsustained and understood in the Commonwealth of Kentucky, that I tookthe trouble at my own cost to print or have printed a large edition ofthat decision to scatter it over the State; and unless the mails havemiscarried, there is scarcely a member elected to the Legislature whohas not received a copy with my frank. "--Vice-president Breckinridge, Frankfort Speech, December, 1859. CHAPTER V DOUGLAS AND LINCOLN ON DRED SCOTT Manifestly, when the educated intellects of the learned judgesdiffered so radically concerning the principles of law and the factsof history applicable to the Dred Scott question, the public at largecould hardly be expected to receive the new dogmas without similardivergence of opinion. So far from exercising a healing influence, the decision widened immensely the already serious breach betweenthe North and the South. The persons immediately involved in thelitigation were quickly lost sight of;[1] but the constitutionalprinciple affirmed by the court was defended by the South anddenounced by the North with zeal and acrimony. The Republican partydid not further question or propose to disturb the final judgment inthe case; but it declared that the Dred Scott doctrines of the SupremeCourt should not be made a rule of political action, and preciselythis the South, together with the bulk of the Northern Democrats, insisted should be done. [Sidenote] 19 Howard, pp. 460-1. A single phase of the controversy will serve to illustrate the generaldrift of the discussion throughout the Union. Some three months afterthe delivery of the opinion of the court, Senator Douglas foundhimself again among his constituents in Illinois, and although therewas no political campaign in progress, current events and the rousedstate of public feeling seemed to require that he should define hisviews in a public speech. It marks his acuteness as a politician thathe already realized what a fatal stab the Dred Scott decision hadgiven his vaunted principle of "Popular Sovereignty, " with which hejustified his famous repeal of the Missouri Compromise. He had eversince argued that Congressional prohibition of slavery was obsoleteand useless, and that the choice of slavery or freedom ought to beconfided to the local Territorial laws, just as it was confided tolocal State constitutions. But the Dred Scott decision announced thatslaves were property which Congress could not exclude from theTerritories, adding also the inevitable conclusion that what Congresscould not do a Territorial Legislature could not. Difficult as this made his task of reconciling his favorite theorywith the Dred Scott decision, such was his political boldness, andsuch had been his skill and success in sophistry, that he undertookeven this hopeless effort. Douglas, therefore, made a speech atSpringfield, Illinois, on the 12th of June, 1857, in which he broadlyand fully indorsed and commended the opinion of Chief-Justice Taneyand his concurring associates, declaring that "Their judicialdecisions will stand in all future time, a proud monument to theirgreatness, the admiration of the good and wise, and a rebuke to thepartisans of faction and lawless violence. If unfortunately anyconsiderable portion of the people of the United States shall so farforget their obligations to society as to allow the partisan leadersto array them in violent resistance to the final decision of thehighest judicial tribunal on earth, it will become the duty of all thefriends of order and constitutional government, without reference topast political differences, to organize themselves and marshal theirforces under the glorious banner of the Union, in vindication of theConstitution and supremacy of the laws over the advocates of factionand the champions of violence. " Proceeding then with a statement of the case, he continued: "Thematerial and controlling points in the case, those which have beenmade the subject of unmeasured abuse and denunciation, may be thusstated: 1st. The court decided that under the Constitution of theUnited States, a negro descended from slave parents is not and cannotbe a citizen of the United States. 2d. That the act of March 6, 1820, commonly called the Missouri Compromise act, was unconstitutional andvoid before it was repealed by the Nebraska act, and consequently didnot and could not have the legal effect of extinguishing a master'sright to his slave in that Territory. While the right continues infull force under the guarantees of the Constitution, and cannot bedivested or alienated by an act of Congress, it necessarily remains abarren and a worthless right, unless sustained, protected, andenforced by appropriate police regulations and local legislation, prescribing adequate remedies for its violation. These regulations andremedies must necessarily depend entirely upon the will and wishes ofthe people of the Territory, as they can only be prescribed by thelocal legislatures. Hence the great principle of popular sovereigntyand self-government is sustained and firmly established by theauthority of this decision. " It is scarcely possible that Douglas convinced himself by such aglaring _non sequitur_; but he had no other alternative. It was adesperate expedient to shield himself as well as he might from thedamaging recoil of his own temporizing statesmanship. The declarationmade thus early is worthy of historical notice as being the substanceand groundwork of the speaker's famous "Freeport doctrine, " or theoryof "unfriendly legislation, " to which Lincoln's searching interrogatoriesdrove him in the great Lincoln-Douglas debates of the following year. Repeated and amplified at that time, it became in the eyes of the Souththe unpardonable political heresy which lost him the Presidentialnomination and caused the rupture of the Democratic NationalConvention at Charleston in the summer of 1860. For the moment, however, the sophism doubtless satisfied his many warm partisans. He did notdwell on the dangerous point, but trusted for oratorical effect ratherto his renewed appeals to the popular prejudice against the blacks, sostrong in central Illinois, indorsing and emphasizing Chief-JusticeTaney's assertion that negroes were not included in the words of theDeclaration of Independence, and arguing that if the principle ofequality were admitted and carried out to its logical results, itwould necessarily lead not only to the abolition of slavery in theslave-States, but to the general amalgamation of the two races. The Republican party of Illinois had been greatly encouraged andstrengthened by its success in electing the State officers in theprevious autumn; and as their recognized leader and champion, Lincolnmade a reply to this speech some two weeks later, June 26, 1857, alsoat Springfield. Though embracing other topics, the question of thehour, the Dred Scott decision, was nevertheless its chief subject. Theextracts here presented from it will give the reader some idea of itspower of statement and eloquence: And now [said Mr. Lincoln] as to the Dred Scott decision. That decision declares two propositions--first, that a negro cannot sue in the United States courts; and secondly, that Congress cannot prohibit slavery in the Territories. It was made by a divided court--dividing differently on the different points. Judge Douglas does not discuss the merits of the decision, and in that respect I shall follow his example, believing I could no more improve on McLean and Curtis, than he could on Taney. He denounces all who question the correctness of that decision, as offering violent resistance to it. But who resists it? Who has, in spite of the decision, declared Dred Scott free, and resisted the authority of his master over him? Judicial decisions have two uses--first, to absolutely determine the case decided, and, secondly, to indicate to the public how other similar cases will be decided when they arise. For the latter use they are called "precedents" and "authorities. " We believe as much as Judge Douglas (perhaps more) in obedience to and respect for the judicial department of government. We think its decisions on constitutional questions, when fully settled, should control, not only the particular cases decided, but the general policy of the country, subject to be disturbed only by amendments of the Constitution as provided in that instrument itself. More than this would be revolution. But we think the Dred Scott decision is erroneous. We know the court that made it has often overruled its own decisions, and we shall do what we can to have it overrule this. We offer no resistance to it. Judicial decisions are of greater or less authority as precedents according to circumstances. That this should be so, accords both with common sense and the customary understanding of the legal profession. If this important decision had been made by the unanimous concurrence of the judges, and without any apparent partisan bias, and in accordance with legal public expectation, and with the steady practice of the departments throughout our history, and had been in no part based on assumed historical facts which are not really true; or, if wanting in some of these, it had been before the court more than once, and had there been affirmed and reaffirmed through a course of years, it then might be, perhaps would be, factious, nay, even revolutionary, not to acquiesce in it as a precedent. But when, as is true, we find it wanting in all these claims to the public confidence, it is not resistance, it is not factions, it is not even disrespectful, to treat it as not having yet quite established a settled doctrine for the country. Rising above all questions of technical construction to the broad anduniversal aspects of the issue, Mr. Lincoln continued: The Chief-Justice does not directly assert, but plainly assumes as a fact, that the public estimate of the black man is more favorable now than it was in the days of the Revolution. This assumption is a mistake. In some trifling particulars the condition of that race has been ameliorated; but as a whole, in this country, the change between then and now is decidedly the other way; and their ultimate destiny has never appeared so hopeless as in the last three or four years. In two of the five States--New Jersey and North Carolina--that then gave the free negro the right of voting, the right has since been taken away; and in a third--New York--it has been greatly abridged; while it has not been extended, so far as I know, to a single additional State, though the number of the States has more than doubled. In those days, as I understand, masters could, at their own pleasure, emancipate their slaves; but since then such legal restraints have been made upon emancipation as to amount almost to prohibition. In those days, legislatures held the unquestioned power to abolish slavery in their respective States; but now it is becoming quite fashionable for State constitutions to withhold that power from the legislatures. In those days, by common consent, the spread of the black man's bondage to the new countries was prohibited; but now Congress decides that it will not continue the prohibition, and the Supreme Court decides that it could not if it would. In those days, our Declaration of Independence was held sacred by all, and thought to include all; but now, to aid in making the bondage of the negro universal and eternal, it is assailed, and sneered at, and construed and hawked at, and torn, till if its framers could rise from their graves they could not at all recognize it. All the powers of earth seem rapidly combining against him. Mammon is after him, ambition follows, philosophy follows, and the theology of the day is fast joining the cry. They have him in his prison house, they have searched his person and left no prying instrument with him. One after another they have closed the heavy iron doors upon him; and now they have him, as it were, bolted in with a lock of a hundred keys, which can never be unlocked without the concurrence of every key; the keys in the hands of a hundred different men, and they scattered to a hundred different and distant places; and they stand musing as to what invention, in all the dominions of mind and matter, can he produced to make the impossibility of his escape more complete than it is. .. . There is a natural disgust in the minds of nearly all white people at the idea of an indiscriminate amalgamation of the white and black races; and Judge Douglas evidently is basing his chief hope upon the chances of his being able to appropriate the benefit of this disgust to himself. If he can by much drumming and repeating fasten the odium of that idea upon his adversaries, he thinks he can struggle through the storm. He therefore clings to this hope as a drowning man to the last plank. He makes an occasion for lugging it in, from the opposition to the Dred Scott decision. He finds the Republicans insisting that the Declaration of Independence includes _all_ men, black as well as white, and forthwith he boldly denies that it includes negroes at all, and proceeds to argue gravely that all who contend it does, do so only because they want to vote, and eat, and sleep, and marry with negroes. He will have it that they cannot be consistent else. Now I protest against the counterfeit logic which concludes that because I do not want a black woman for a slave I must necessarily want her for a wife. I need not have her for either. I can just leave her alone. In some respects she certainly is not my equal; but in her natural right to eat the bread she earns with her own hands, without asking leave of any one else, she is my equal and the equal of all others. Chief-Justice Taney, in his opinion in the Dred Scott case, admits that the language of the Declaration is broad enough to include the whole human family; but he and Judge Douglas argue that the authors of that instrument did not intend to include negroes, by the fact that they did not at once actually place them on an equality with the whites. Now this grave argument comes to just nothing at all by the other fact that they did not at once or ever afterwards actually place all white people on an equality with one another. And this is the staple argument of both the Chief-Justice and the Senator, for doing this obvious violence to the plain, unmistakable language of the Declaration. I think the authors of that notable instrument intended to include all men; but they did not intend to declare all men equal in all respects. They did not mean to say all were equal in color, size, intellect, moral development, or social capacity. They defined with tolerable distinctness in what respects they did consider all men created equal--equal with "certain inalienable rights, among which, are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. " This they said, and this they meant. They did not mean to assert the obvious untruth that all were then actually enjoying that equality, nor yet that they were about to confer it immediately upon them. In fact they had no power to confer such a boon. They meant simply to declare the right, so that the enforcement of it might follow as fast as circumstances should permit. They meant to set up a standard maxim for free society, which should be familiar to all, and revered by all; constantly looked to, constantly labored for, and even though never perfectly attained, constantly approximated, and thereby constantly spreading and deepening its influence and augmenting; the happiness and value of life to all people of all colors everywhere. The assertion that "all men are created equal" was of no practical use in effecting our separation from Great Britain; and it was placed in the Declaration, not for that but for future use. Its authors meant it to be, as, thank God, it is now proving itself, a stumbling-block to all those who in after times might seek to turn a free people back into the hateful paths of despotism. They knew the proneness of prosperity to breed tyrants, and they meant when such should reappear in this fair land and commence their vocation, they should find left for them at least one hard nut to crack. ----------[1] The ownership of Dred Scott and his family passed by inheritanceto the family of a Massachusetts Republican member of Congress. Thefollowing telegram, copied from the "Providence Post" into the"Washington Union, " shows the action of the new owner: "St. Louis, May26 [1857]. Dred Scott with his wife and two daughters were emancipatedto-day by Taylor Blow, Esq. They had been conveyed to him by Mr. Chaffee for that purpose. " CHAPTER VI THE LECOMPTON CONSTITUTION The year 1857 brings us to a decided change in the affairs of Kansas, but with occurrences no less remarkable. Active civil war graduallyceased in the preceding autumn--a result due to the vigorous andimpartial administration of Governor Geary and the arrival of theinclement winter weather. [Sidenote] Geary to Marcy, Jan. 19, 1857. Senate Ex. Doc. No. 17, 1st Sess. 35th Cong. Vol. VI. , p. 131. [Sidenote] Geary, Veto Message, Feb. 18, 1857. Senate Ex. Doc. No. 17, 1st Sess. 35th Cong. Vol. VI. , p. 167. On the evening of the day the Legislature met (January 12, 1857), thepro-slavery party held a large political convention, in which it wasconfessed that they were in a hopeless minority in the Territory, andthe general conclusion was reached that it was no longer worth whileto attempt to form a slave-State in Kansas. [1] Many of its hithertoactive leaders immediately and definitely abandoned the struggle. Butthe Missouri cabal, intrenched in the various territorial and countyoffices, held to their design, though their labors now assumed asomewhat different character. They denounced Governor Geary in theirresolutions, and devised legislation to further their intrigues. Bythe middle of February, under their inspiration, a bill providing fora convention to frame a State constitution was perfected and enacted. The Governor immediately sent the Legislature his message, remindingthem that the leading idea of the organic act was to leave the actual_bonâ fide_ inhabitants of the Territory "perfectly free to form andregulate their domestic institutions in their own way, " and vetoingthe bill because "the Legislature has failed to make any provision tosubmit the constitution when framed to the consideration of the peoplefor their ratification or rejection. " The Governor's argument waswasted on the predetermined legislators. They promptly passed the actover his veto. The cabal was in no mood to be thwarted, and under a show of outwardtoleration, if not respect, their deep hostility found such means ofmaking itself felt that the Governor began to receive insult fromstreet ruffians, and to become apprehensive for his personal safety. In such a contest he was single-handed against the whole pro-slaverytown of Lecompton. The foundation of his authority was graduallysapped; and finding himself no longer sustained at Washington, wherethe private appeals and denunciations of the cabal were moreinfluential than his official reports, he wrote his resignation onthe day of Buchanan's inauguration, and a week later left the Territoryin secrecy as a fugitive. Thus, in less than three years, threesuccessive Democratic executives had been resisted, disgraced, andoverthrown by the political conspiracy which ruled the Territory; andKansas had indeed become, in the phraseology of the day, "thegraveyard of governors. " The Kansas imbroglio was a political scandal of such largeproportions, and so clearly threatened a dangerous schism in theDemocratic party, that the new President, Buchanan, and his newCabinet, proceeded to its treatment with the utmost caution. Thesubject was fraught with difficulties not of easy solution. The South, to retain her political supremacy, or even her equality, needed moreslave-States to furnish additional votes in the United States Senate. To make a slave-State of Kansas, the Missouri Compromise had beenrepealed, and a bogus legislature elected and supported by thesuccessive Missouri invasions and the guerrilla war of 1856. All thesedevices had, however, confessedly failed of their object. Northernemigration and anti-slavery sentiment were clearly in possession ofKansas, and a majority of voters stood ready upon fair occasion toplace her in the column of free-States. It had become a game on thechess-board of national politics. The moving pieces stood in Missouriand Kansas, but the players sat in Washington. In reality it was adouble game. There was plot and under-plot. Beneath the strugglebetween the free-States and the slave-States were the intrigue anddeception carried on between Northern Democrats and SouthernDemocrats. The Kansas-Nebraska act was a double-tongued statute, andthe Cincinnati platform a Janus-faced banner. Momentary victory waswith the Southern Democrats, for they had secured the nomination andelection of President Buchanan--"a Northern man with Southernprinciples. " [Sidenote] Walker to Cass, July 15, 1857. Senate Ex. Doc. No. 8, 1st Sess. 35th Cong. Vol. I. , p. 32. [Sidenote] Walker to Cass, Dec. 15, 1857. Ibid. , p. 122. Determined to secure whatever prestige could be derived from highqualification and party influence, Buchanan tendered the vacantgovernorship of Kansas to his intimate personal and political friend, Robert J. Walker, of Mississippi, a man of great ability and nationalfame, who had been Senator and Secretary of the Treasury. Walker, realizing fully the responsibility and danger of the trust, afterrepeated refusals finally accepted upon two distinct conditions: first, that General Harney should be "put in special command in Kansas with alarge body of troops, and especially of dragoons and a battery, " andretained there subject to his military directions until the dangerwas over; and second, that he "should advocate the submission of theconstitution to the vote of the people for ratification or rejection. " [Sidenote] March 7, 1856. June 25, 1856. This latter had now become a vital point in the political game. Therecent action of the Territorial Legislature and Geary's alreadymentioned veto message were before the President and his Cabinet. [2]But much more important than these moves in Kansas was the priordetermination of prominent Washington players. During the Kansas civilwar and the Presidential campaign of the previous year, by way ofoffset to the Topeka Constitution, both Senator Douglas and SenatorToombs wrote and introduced in the Senate bills to enable Kansas toform a State constitution. The first by design, and the second byaccident, contained a clause to submit such constitution, when formed, to a vote of the people. Both these bills were considered not only bythe Senate Committee on Territories, of which Douglas was chairman, but also by a caucus of Democratic Senators. Said Senator Bigler: "Itwas held, by those most intelligent on the subject, that in view ofall the difficulties surrounding that Territory, [and] the danger ofany experiment at that time of a popular vote, it would be better thatthere should be no such provision in the Toombs bill; and it was myunderstanding, in all the intercourse I had, that that conventionwould make a constitution and send it here without submitting it tothe popular vote. "[3] [Sidenote] Douglas, Milwaukee Speech, October 13, 1860. This Toombs bill was, after modification in other respects, adopted byDouglas, and duly passed by the Senate; but the House with anopposition majority refused its assent. All these preliminaries werewell known to the Buchanan Cabinet, and of course also to Douglas. Itis fair to assume that under such circumstances Walker's emphaticstipulation was deliberately and thoroughly discussed. Indeed, extraordinary urging had been necessary to induce him to reconsiderhis early refusals. Douglas personally joined in the solicitation. Because of the determined opposition of his own family, Walker hadpromised his wife that he would not go to Kansas without her consent;and President Buchanan was so anxious on the point that he personallycalled on Mrs. Walker and persuaded her to waive her objections. [4]Under influences like these Walker finally accepted the appointment, and the President and Cabinet acquiesced in his conditions withoutreserve. He wrote his inaugural address in Washington, using thefollowing language: "I repeat then as my clear conviction that unlessthe convention submit the constitution to the vote of the actualresident settlers, and the election be fairly and justly conducted, the constitution will be and ought to be rejected by Congress. " [Sidenote] Douglas, Milwaukee Speech, October 13, 1860. He submitted this draft of his inaugural to President Buchanan, whoread and approved the document and the promise. Secretary Cass wrotehis official instructions in accordance with it. On Walker's journeyWest he stopped at Chicago and submitted his inaugural to Douglas, whoalso indorsed his policy. The new Governor fondly believed he hadremoved every obstacle to success, and every possibility ofmisunderstanding or disapproval by the Administration, such as hadbefallen his predecessors. But President Buchanan either deceived himat the beginning, or betrayed him in the end. [Sidenote] Walker, Testimony, Covode Committee Report, p. 109. With Governor Walker there was sent a new Territorial secretary. Woodson, who had so often abused his powers during his repeatedservice as acting Governor, was promoted to a more lucrative post tocreate the vacancy. Frederick P. Stanton, of Tennessee, formerly arepresentative in Congress, a man of talent and, as the event proved, also a man of courage, was made secretary. Both Walker and Stantonbeing from slave-States, it may be presumed that the slavery questionwas considered safe in their hands. Walker, indeed, entertainedsentiments more valuable to the South in this conjuncture. He believedin the balance of power; he preferred that the people of Kansas shouldmake it a slave-State; he was "in favor of maintaining the equilibriumof the Government by giving the South a majority in the Senate, whilethe North would always necessarily have a majority in the House ofRepresentatives. " Both also entered on their mission with the feelingsentertained by the President and Democratic party; namely, that thefree-State men were a mischievous insurrectionary faction, willfullydisturbing the peace and defying the laws. Gradually, however, theirpersonal observation convinced them that this view was a profounderror. [Sidenote] Walker to Buchanan, June 28, 1857. Ibid. , p. 115. [Sidenote] Walker, Testimony. Ibid. , p. 107. [Sidenote] Walker, Inaugural, May 27, 1857. Senate Ex. Doc. No. 8, 1st Sess. 35th Cong. Vol. I. , p. 11. Governor Walker arrived in the Territory late in May, and it requiredbut short investigation to satisfy him that any idea of making Kansasa slave-State was utterly preposterous. Had everything else beenpropitious, climate alone seemed to render it impossible. But popularsentiment was also overwhelmingly against it; he estimated that thevoters were for a free-State more than two to one. All the efforts ofthe pro-slavery party to form a slave-State seemed to be finallyabandoned. If he could not make Kansas a slave-State, his next desirewas to make her a Democratic State. "And the only plan to accomplishthis was to unite the free-State Democrats with the pro-slavery party, and all those whom I regarded as conservative men, against the moreviolent portion of the Republicans. " He, therefore, sought by fairwords to induce the free-State men to take part in the election ofdelegates to the constitutional convention. His inaugural address, quoting the President's instructions, promised that such electionshould be free from fraud and violence; that the delegates should beprotected in their deliberations; and that if unsatisfactory, "you mayby a subsequent vote defeat the ratification of the constitution. " [Illustration: ROBERT J. WALKER. ] [Sidenote] Walker, Topeka Speech, June 6, 1857, in "Washington Union" of June 27, 1857. This same policy was a few weeks later urged at Topeka, where a massmeeting of the free-State men was called to support and instructanother sitting of the "insurrectionary" free-State Legislatureelected under the Topeka Constitution. The Governor found a largeassemblage, and a very earnest discussion in progress, whether the"Legislature" should pursue only nominal action, such as would insubstance amount to a petition for redress of grievances, or whetherthey should actually organize their State government, and pass acomplete code of laws. The moderate free-State men favored the former, the violent and radical the latter, course. When their mass meetingadjourned, they called on the Governor at his lodgings; he made aspeech, in which he renewed the counsels and promises of his inauguraladdress. "The Legislature, " said he, "has called a convention toassemble in September next. That constitution they will or they willnot submit to the vote of a majority of the then actual residentsettlers of Kansas. If they do not submit it, I will join you, fellow-citizens, in lawful opposition to their course. And I cannotdoubt, gentlemen, that one much higher than I, the Chief Magistrateof the Union, will join you in that opposition. " His invitation tothem to participate in the election of a convention produced noeffect; they still adhered to their resolve to have nothing to dowith any affirmative proceedings under the bogus laws or TerritorialLegislature. But the Governor's promise of a fair vote on theconstitution was received with favor. "Although this mass convention, "reports the Governor, "did not adopt fully my advice to abandon thewhole Topeka movement, yet they did vote down by a large majority theresolutions prepared by the more violent of their own party in favorof a complete State organization and the adoption of a code of Statelaws. " [Sidenote] Walker to Cass, July 15, 1857. Senate Ex. Doc. No. 8, 1st Sess. 35th Cong. Vol. I. , p. 27. [Sidenote] Ibid. , p. 29. [Sidenote] Walker to Cass, July 15, 1857. Senate Ex. Doc. No. 8, 1st Sess. 35th Cong. Vol. I. , p. 30. If the Governor was gratified at this result as indicative of probablesuccess in his official administration, he rejoiced yet more in itssignificance as a favorable symptom of party politics. "The result ofthe whole discussion at Topeka, " he reported, "was regarded by thefriends of law and order as highly favorable to their cause, and asthe commencement of a great movement essential to success; viz. , theseparation of the free-State Democrats from the Republicans, who hadto some extent heretofore cooperated under the name of the free-Stateparty. " Another party symptom gave the Governor equal, if not greater, encouragement. On the 2d and 3d of July the "National Democratic" orpro-slavery party of the Territory met in convention at Lecompton. Theleaders were out in full force. The hopelessness of making Kansas aslave-State was once more acknowledged, the Governor's policyindorsed, and a resolution "against the submission of the constitutionto a vote of the people was laid on the table as a test vote byforty-two to one. " The Governor began already to look upon hiscounsels and influence as a turning-point in national destiny. "Indeed, " he wrote, "it is universally admitted here that the onlyreal question is this: whether Kansas shall be a conservative, constitutional, Democratic, and ultimately free-State, or whether itshall be a Republican and abolition State; and that the course pursuedby me is the only one which will prevent the last most calamitousresult, which, in my opinion, would soon seal the fate of therepublic. " [Sidenote] F. P. Stanton's Speech, Philadelphia, February 8, 1858. Pamphlet. In his eagerness to reform the Democratic party of Kansas, and tostrengthen the Democratic party of the nation against the assaults anddangers of "abolitionism, " the Governor was not entirely frank; elsehe would at the same time have reported, what he was obliged later toexplain, that the steps taken to form a constitution from which hehoped so much were already vitiated by such defects or frauds as torender them impossible of producing good fruit. The Territorial lawappointing the election of delegates provided for a census and aregistry of voters, to be made by county officers appointed by theTerritorial Legislature. These officers so neglected or failed todischarge their duty, that in nearly half the organized counties ofthe interior no attempt whatever was made to obtain the census orregistration; and in the counties lying on the Missouri border, wherethe pro-slavery party was strong, the work of both was exceedinglyimperfect, and in many instances with notorious discrimination againstfree-State voters. While the disfranchised counties had a comparativelysparse population, the number of voters in them was too considerableto be justly denied their due representation. [5] The apportionment ofdelegates was based upon this defective registration and census, andthis alone would have given the pro-slavery party a disproportionatepower in the convention. But at the election of delegates on the 15thof June, the free-State men, following their deliberate purpose andhitherto unvarying practice of non-conformity to the bogus laws, abstained entirely from voting. "The consequence was that out of the9250 voters whose names had been registered . .. There were in allabout 2200 votes cast, and of these the successful candidate received1800. " [Sidenote] Walker to Buchanan, June 28, 1857. Report Covode Committee, p. 118. "The black Republicans, " reported the Governor, "would not vote, andthe free-State Democrats were kept from voting by the fear that theconstitution would not be submitted by the convention, and that byvoting they committed themselves to the proceeding of the convention. But for my inaugural, circulated by thousands, and various speechesall urging the people to vote, there would not have been one thousandvotes polled in the Territory, and the convention would have been adisastrous failure. " But this was not the only evil. The apportionment of the members ofthe Territorial Legislature to be chosen the ensuing autumn was alsobased upon this same defective registry and census. Here againdisproportionate power accrued to the pro-slavery party, and thefree-State men loudly charged that it was a new contrivance for theconvenience of Missouri voters. Governor Walker publicly deplored allthese complications and defects; but he counseled endurance, andconstantly urged in mitigation that in the end the people should havethe privilege of a fair and direct vote upon their constitution. Thatpromise he held aloft as a beacon-light of hope and redress. Thisattitude and policy, frequently reported to Washington, was notdisavowed or discouraged by the President and Cabinet. The Governor, however, soon found a storm brewing in another quarter. When the newspapers brought copies of his inaugural address, hisTopeka speech, and the general report of his Kansas policy back to theSouthern States, there arose an ominous chorus of protest anddenunciation from the whole tribe of fire-eating editors andpoliticians. What right had the Governor to intermeddle? theyindignantly demanded. What call to preach about climate, what businessto urge submission of the constitution to popular vote, or to promisehis own help to defeat it if it were not submitted; what authority topledge the President and Administration to such a course! Theconvention was sovereign, they claimed, could do what it pleased, andno thanks to the Governor for his impertinent advice. The DemocraticState Convention of Georgia took the matter in hand, and by resolutiondenounced Walker's inaugural address, and asked his removal fromoffice. The Democratic State Convention of Mississippi followed suit, and called the inaugural address an unjust discrimination against therights of the South, and a dictatorial intermeddling with the highpublic duty intrusted to the convention. Walker wrote a private letter to Buchanan, defending his course, andadding: "Unless I am thoroughly and cordially sustained by theAdministration here, I cannot control the convention, and we shallhave anarchy and civil war. With that cordial support the convention(a majority of whose delegates I have already seen) will do what isright. I shall travel over the whole Territory, make speeches, rousethe people in favor of my plan, and see all the delegates. But yourcordial support is indispensable, and I never would have come here, unless assured by you of the cordial coöperation of all the Federalofficers. .. . The extremists are trying your nerves and mine, but whatcan they say when the convention submits the constitution to thepeople and the vote is given by them? But we must have a slave-Stateout of the south-western Indian Territory, and then a calm willfollow; Cuba be acquired with the acquiescence of the North; and yourAdministration, having in reality settled the slavery question, beregarded in all time to come as a re-signing and re-sealing of theconstitution. .. . I shall be pleased soon to hear from you. Cuba! Cuba!(and Porto Rico, if possible) should be the countersign of yourAdministration, and it will close in a blaze of glory. "[6] The Governor had reason to be proud of the full and completereëndorsement which this appeal brought from his chief. Under date ofJuly 12, 1857, the President wrote in reply: "On the question ofsubmitting the constitution to the _bonâ fide_ resident settlers ofKansas I am willing to stand or fall. In sustaining such a principlewe cannot fall. It is the principle of the Kansas-Nebraska bill; theprinciple of popular sovereignty; and the principle at the foundationof all popular government. The more it is discussed the stronger itwill become. Should the convention of Kansas adopt this principle, allwill be settled harmoniously, and with the blessing of Providence youwill return triumphantly from your arduous, important, and responsiblemission. The strictures of the Georgia and Mississippi Conventionswill then pass away and be speedily forgotten. In regard to Georgia, our news from that State is becoming better every day; we have not yethad time to hear much from Mississippi. Should you answer theresolution of the latter, I would advise you to make the greatprinciple of the submission of the constitution to the _bonâ fide_residents of Kansas conspicuously prominent. On this you will beirresistible. "[7] The delegates to the constitutional convention, chosen in June, metaccording to law at Lecompton, September 7, and, having spent fivedays in organization, adjourned their session to October 19. Theobject of this recess was to await the issue of the general electionof October 5, at which a full Territorial Legislature, a delegate toCongress, and various county officers were to be chosen. [Sidenote] Wilder, p. 133. By the action of the free-State men this election was now made aturning-point in Kansas politics. Held together as a compact partyby their peaceful resistance to the bogus laws, emigration from theNorth had so strengthened their numbers that they clearly formed amajority of the people of the Territory. A self-constituted andself-regulated election held by them for sundry officials under theirTopeka Constitution, revealed a numerical strength of more than seventhousand voters. Feeling that this advantage justified them inreceding from their attitude of non-conformity, they met in conventiontowards the end of August, and while protesting against the "wickedapportionment, " resolved that "whereas Governor Walker has repeatedlypledged himself that the people of Kansas should have a full and fairvote, before impartial judges, at the election to be held on the firstMonday in October, . .. We the people of Kansas, in mass conventionassembled, agree to participate in said election. " [Sidenote] Oct. 5, 1857. Governor Walker executed his public promises to the letter. A movementof United States troops to Utah was in progress, and about twothousand of these were detained by order until after election day. Stationed at ten or twelve different points in the Territory, theyserved by their mere presence to overawe disorder, and for the firsttime in the history of Kansas the two opposing parties measured theirstrength at the ballot-box. The result was an overwhelming triumph forthe free-State party. For delegate in Congress, Ransom, the Democraticcandidate, received 3799 votes; Parrott, the Republican candidate, 7888--a free-State majority of 4089. For the Legislature, even underthe defective apportionment, the council stood 9 free-State membersto 4 Democrats, and the House 24 free-State members to 15 Democrats. [Sidenote] Stanton, Speech at Philadelphia, February 8, 1858. [Sidenote] Walker, Proclamation, October 19, 1857. Senate Ex. Doc. No. 8, 1st Sess. 35th Cong. Vol. I. , p. 103. [Sidenote] Walker, Proclamation, Oct. 22, 1857. Ibid. , pp. 104-6. [Sidenote] Walker, Proclamation, October 19, 1857. Senate Ex. Doc. No. 8, 1st Sess. 35th Cong. Vol. I. , p. 104. That the pro-slavery cabal would permit power to slip from their graspwithout some extraordinary effort was scarcely to be expected. Whenthe official returns were brought from the various voting-places tothe Governor's office, there came from Oxford, a single precinct inJohnson County, "a roll of paper, forty or fifty feet long, containingnames as thickly as they could be written, " and a large part of whichwere afterwards discovered to have been literally copied from an oldCincinnati directory. This paper purported to be a return of 1628votes for the eleven pro-slavery candidates for the Legislature inthat district, and if counted it would elect eight members of theHouse and three of the council by a trifling majority, and therebychange the political complexion and power of the Legislature. Inspection showed the document to be an attempt to commit a stupendousfraud; and after visiting the locality ("a village with six houses, including stores, and without a tavern") and satisfying himself of theimpossibility of such a vote from such a place, Governor Walkerrejected the whole return from Oxford precinct for informality, andgave certificates of election to the free-State candidates elected asappeared by the other regular returns. A similar paper from McGeeCounty with more than 1200 names was treated in like manner. JudgeCato issued his writ of mandamus to compel the Governor to givecertificates to the pro-slavery candidates, but without success. Thelanguage of Governor Walker and Secretary Stanton in a proclamationannouncing their action deserves remembrance and imitation. "Theconsideration that our own party by this decision will lose themajority in the legislative assembly does not make our duty in thepremises less solemn and imperative. The elective franchise would beutterly valueless, and free government itself would receive a deadlyblow, if so great an outrage as this could be shielded under the coverof mere forms and technicalities. We cannot consent in any manner togive the sanction of our respective official positions to such atransaction. Nor can we feel justified to relieve ourselves of theproper responsibility of our offices, in a case where there is novalid return, by submitting the question to the legislative assembly, and in that very act giving the parties that might claim to be chosenby this spurious vote the power to decide upon their own election. " The decisive free-State victory, the Oxford and McGee frauds, [8] andthe Governor's fearless action in exposing and rejecting them, calledforth universal comment; and under the new political conditions whichthey revealed, created intense interest in the further proceedings ofthe Lecompton Constitutional Convention. That body reassembledaccording to adjournment on the 19th of October. Elected in thepreceding June without any participation by free-State voters, themembers were all of the pro-slavery party, and were presided over byJohn Calhoun, the same man who, as county surveyor of Sangamon County, Illinois, employed Abraham Lincoln as his deputy in 1832. At the June election, while he and his seven colleagues from DouglasCounty were yet candidates for the convention, they had circulated awritten pledge that they would submit the constitution to the peoplefor ratification. This attitude was generally maintained by them tillthe October election. But when by that vote they saw their factionoverwhelmed with defeat, they and others undertook to maintainthemselves in power by an unprecedented piece of political jugglery. Calhoun, who was surveyor-general of the Territory, employed a largenumber of subordinates, and was one of the most able and unscrupulousleaders in the pro-slavery cabal. A large majority of the conventionfavored the establishment of slavery; only the question of a popularvote on ratification or rejection excited controversy. An analysis shows that the principle of delegated authority had becomeattenuated to a remarkable degree. The defective registration excludeda considerable number (estimated at about one-sixth) of the legalvoters. Of the 9250 registered, only about 2200 voted, all told. Ofthese 2200, only about 1800 votes were given for the successfulcandidates for delegate. Of the whole sixty delegates alleged to havebeen chosen, "but forty-three, " says a Committee Report, "participatedin the work of the convention. Sessions were held without a quorum, and the yeas and nays often show that but few above thirty werepresent. It is understood, and not denied, that but twenty-eight ofthese--less than half of a full house of sixty--decided thepro-slavery or free-State question; and upon the question ofsubmission of their work to the will of the people, the pro-slaveryparty carried the point by a majority of two votes only. It is quitein keeping with the character of this body and its officers to findthe journal of its proceedings for the last days missing. "[9] Their allotted task was completed in a short session of about threeweeks; the convention adjourned November 7, forty-three of the fiftydelegates present having been induced to sign the constitution. Whenthe document was published the whole country was amazed to see whatperversity and ingenuity had been employed to thwart the unmistakablepopular will. Essentially a slave-State constitution of the mostpronounced type, containing the declaration that the right of propertyin slaves is "before and higher than any constitutional sanction, " itmade the right to vote upon it depend on the one hand on a test oathto "support this constitution" in order to repel conscientiousfree-State voters, and on the other hand on mere inhabitancy on theday of election to attract nomadic Missourians; it postponed the rightto amend or alter for a period of seven years; it kept the thenexisting territorial laws in force until abrogated by Statelegislation; it adopted the late Oxford fraud as a basis ofapportionment; it gave to Calhoun, the presiding officer, power todesignate the precincts, the judges of election, and to decide finallyupon the returns in the vote upon it, besides many other questionableor inadmissible provisions. Finally the form of submission to popularvote to be taken on the 21st of December was prescribed to be, "constitution with slavery" or "constitution with no slavery, " thuscompelling the adoption of the constitution in any event. [Sidenote] Walker, Testimony, Report Covode Committee, p. 110. [Sidenote] Martin, Testimony, Report Covode Committee, p. 159. [Sidenote] Ibid. , pp. 170-1. There is a personal and political mystery underlying this transactionwhich history will probably never solve. Only a few points ofinformation have come to light, and they serve to embarrass ratherthan aid the solution. The first is that Calhoun, although the friendand protégé of Douglas, and also himself personally pledged tosubmission, came to the Governor and urged him to join in the newprogramme as to slavery, --alleging that the Administration had changedits policy, and now favored this plan, --and tempted Walker with aprospect of the Presidency if he would concur. Walker declared such achange impossible, and indignantly spurned the proposal. The second isthat one Martin, a department clerk, was, after confidentialinstructions from Secretary Thompson and Secretary Cobb, of Buchanan'sCabinet, sent to Kansas in October, ostensibly on department business;that he spent his time in the lobby and the secret caucuses of theconvention. Martin testifies that these Cabinet members favoredsubmission, but that Thompson wished it understood that he wasunwilling to oppose the admission of Kansas "if a pro-slaveryconstitution should be made and sent directly to Congress by theconvention. " A wink was as good as a nod with that body, or ratherwith the cabal which controlled it; and after a virtuous dumb-show ofopposition, it made a pretense of yielding to the inevitable, andacted on the official suggestion. This theory is the more plausiblebecause Martin testifies further that he himself drafted the slaveryprovision which was finally adopted. The third point is that thePresident inexcusably abandoned his pledges to the Governor andadopted this Cobb-Thompson-Calhoun contrivance, instead of keeping hisword and dismissing Calhoun, as honor dictated. This course becomesespecially remarkable in view of the fact that the change did notoccur until after Walker's rejection of the fraudulent Oxford returns, which action placed the legislative power of the Territory in thehands of the newly elected free-State Legislature, as already related. On the same day (October 22, 1857) on which Walker and Stanton issuedtheir proclamation rejecting the fraudulent returns, PresidentBuchanan wrote another highly commendatory letter to Governor Walker. As it has never before been published, its full text will have specialhistorical interest. WASHINGTON CITY, 22d October, 1857. MY DEAR SIR: I have received your favor of the tenth instant by Captain Pleasonton and am rejoiced to learn from you, what I had previously learned from other less authentic sources, that the convention of Kansas will submit the constitution to the people. It is highly gratifying that the late election passed off so peacefully; and I think we may now fairly anticipate a happy conclusion to all the difficulties in that Territory. Your application for a month's leave of absence has been granted to commence after the adjournment of the convention. During its session your presence will be too important to be dispensed with. I shall be glad to see you before you publish anything. The whole affair is now gliding along smoothly. Indeed, the revulsion in the business of the country seems to have driven all thoughts of "bleeding Kansas" from the public mind. When and in what manner anything shall be published to revive the feeling, is a question of serious importance. I am persuaded that with every passing day the public are more and more disposed to do you justice. You certainly do injustice to Harris, the editor of the "Union. " In the beginning I paid some attention to the course of the paper in regard to yourself, and I think it was unexceptionable: I know he stood firm amidst a shower of abuse from the extremists. I never saw nor did I ever hear of the communication published in the "Union" to which you refer, and Harris has no recollection of it. I requested him to find me the number and send it to me; but this he has not done. He is not responsible in any degree for the non-publication of the letters to which you refer. [10] I knew nothing of them until after the receipt of yours; and upon inquiry I found their publication had been prevented by Mr. Cobb under a firm conviction that they would injure both yourself and the Administration. Whether he judged wisely or not I cannot say, for I never saw them. That he acted in fairness and friendship I have not a doubt. He was anxious that General Whitfield should publish a letter and prepared one for him, expecting he would sign it before he left. He sent this letter after him for his approval and signature; but it has not been returned. I know not what are its contents. General W. Doubtless has the letter in his possession. Beyond all question, the motives of Mr. Cobb were proper. Mrs. Walker and Mrs. Bache have just left me after a half hour's very agreeable conversation. Mrs. Walker desires me to inform you the family are all well and sends her love. From your friend, very respectfully, JAMES BUCHANAN. Hon. ROBERT J. WALKER. [11] [Sidenote] Report Covode Committee, p. 111. The question naturally occurs, for whom did Calhoun speak when heapproached Governor Walker, offering him the bribe of the Presidencyand assuring him that the Administration had changed its mind? Thatwas before, or certainly not long after, the probable receipt of thisletter in Kansas, for the Governor left the Territory (November 16)about one week after the adjournment of the Lecompton Convention. Thequestion becomes still more pressing owing to Governor Walker'stestimony that when he reached Washington, "the President himselfdistinctly and emphatically assured me that he had not authorizedanybody to say that he had approved of that [Lecompton] programme. " Onwhose authority, then, did Calhoun declare that the Administration hadchanged its mind? [Illustration: FREDERICK P. STANTON. ] [Sidenote] John Bell, Senate Speech, March 18, 1858. This query brings us to another point in President Buchanan's letterof October 22, in which he mentions that Secretary Cobb, of hisCabinet, had without his knowledge suppressed the publication ofcertain letters in the "Washington Union. " These were, as we learnelsewhere, the letters in which some of the Kansas pro-slavery leadersrepeated their declaration of the hopelessness of any further contestto make Kansas a slave-State. Why this secret suppression by SecretaryCobb? There is but one plausible explanation of this whole chain ofcontradictions. The conclusion is almost forced upon us that a Cabinetintrigue, of which the President was kept in ignorance, was beingcarried on, under the very eyes of Mr. Buchanan, by those whom hehimself significantly calls "the extremists"--a plot to supersede hisown intentions and make him falsify his own declarations. As in thecase of similar intrigues by the same agents a few years later, he hadneither the wit to perceive nor the will to resist. [Sidenote] Stanton, Philadelphia Speech, Feb. 8, 1858. The protest of the people of the Territory against the extraordinaryaction of the Lecompton Convention almost amounted to a popularrevolt. This action opened a wide door to fraud, and invited Missouriover to an invasion of final and permanent conquest. Governor Walkerhad quitted the Territory on his leave of absence, and SecretaryStanton was acting Governor. "The people in great masses, " he says, "and the Legislature that had been elected, with almost a unanimousvoice called upon me to convene the Legislature, in order that theymight take such steps as they could to counteract the misfortune whichthey conceived was about to befall them in the adoption of thisconstitution, " As already stated, Stanton had come to Kansas with thecurrent Democratic prejudices against the free-State party. But hiswhole course had been frank, sincere, and studiously impartial, andthe Oxford fraud had completely opened his eyes. "I now discovered forthe first time to my entire satisfaction why it was that the greatmass of the people of the Territory had been dissatisfied with theirgovernment, and were ready to rebel and throw it off. " Having, like Walker, frequently and earnestly assured the people oftheir ultimate right to ratify or reject the work of the convention, he was personally humiliated by the unfairness and trickery of whichthat body was guilty. Under the circumstances he could not hesitate inhis duty. By proclamation he convened the new Legislature in extrasession. The members respected the private pledge they had given him to engagein no general legislation; but provided by law for an investigation ofthe Oxford and McGee frauds, and for an election to be held on January4, 1858 (the day fixed by the Lecompton Constitution for the electionof State officers and a State legislature), at which the people mightvote for the Lecompton Constitution or against it. Thus in the courseof events two separate votes were taken on this notorious document. The first, provided for in the instrument itself, took place on the21st of December, 1857. Detachments of troops were stationed atseveral points; the free-State men abstained from voting; the electionwas peaceable; and in due time Calhoun proclaimed that 6143 ballotshad been cast "for the constitution with slavery, " and 589 "for theconstitution with no slavery. " But the subsequent legislativeinvestigation disclosed a gross repetition of the Oxford fraud, andproved the actual majority, in a onesided vote, to have been only3423. The second election occurred on January 4, 1858, under authorityof the legislative act. At this election the pro-slavery party votedfor the State officers, but in its turn abstained from voting on theconstitution, the result being--against the Lecompton Constitution, 10, 226; for the Lecompton Constitution with slavery, 138; for theLecompton Constitution without slavery, 24. [12] This emphatic rejection of the Lecompton Constitution by a direct voteof the people of Kansas sealed its fate. We shall see further on whatpersistent but abortive efforts were made in Congress once more togalvanize it into life. The free-State party were jubilant; but thepro-slavery cabal, foiled and checked, was not yet dismayed orconquered. For now there was developed, for the first time in its fullproportions, the giant pro-slavery intrigue which proved that thelocal conspiracy of the Atchison-Missouri cabal was but the image andfraction of a national combination, finding its headquarters in theAdministration, first of President Pierce, and now of PresidentBuchanan; working patiently and insidiously through successive effortsto bring about a practical subversion of the whole theory and policyof the American Government. It linked the action of Border Ruffians, presidential aspirants, senates, courts, and cabinets into efficientcoöperation; leading up, step by step, from the repeal of the MissouriCompromise, through the Nebraska bill, border conquest, the Dred Scottdecision, the suppression of the submission clause in the Toombs bill, and the extraordinary manipulation and machinery of the LecomptonConstitution, towards the final overthrow of the doctrine that "allmen are created equal, " and the substitution of the dogma of propertyin man; towards the judicial construction that property rights inhuman beings are before and above constitutional sanction, and thatslavery must find protection and perpetuity in States as well as inTerritories. [Sidenote] Cass to Stanton, December 2, 1857. Senate Ex. Doc. No. 8, 1st Sess. 35th Cong. Vol. I. , pp. 112-13. [Sidenote] Cass to Stanton, December 8, 1857. Ibid. , p. 113. [Sidenote] Cass to Denver, December 11th, 1857. Senate Ex. Doc. No. 8, 1st Sess. 35th Cong. Vol. I. , p. 120. The first weather-sign came from Washington. On the day after ActingGovernor Stanton convened the October Legislature in special session, and before news of the event reached him, Secretary Cass transmittedto him advance copies of the President's annual message, in which theLecompton Constitution was indorsed in unqualified terms. A week laterhe was admonished to conform to the views of the President in hisofficial conduct. At this point the State Department became informedof what had taken place, and the acting Governor had short shrift. OnDecember 11 Cass wrote to J. W. Denver, Esq. : "You have already beeninformed that Mr. Stanton has been removed from the office ofSecretary of the Territory of Kansas and that you have been appointedin his place. " Cass further explained that the President "wassurprised to learn that the secretary and acting Governor had, on the1st of December, issued his proclamation for a special session of theTerritorial Legislature on the 7th instant, only a few weeks inadvance of its regular time of meeting, and only fourteen days beforethe decision was to be made on the question submitted by theconvention. This course of Mr. Stanton, the President seriouslybelieves, has thrown a new element of discord among the excited peopleof Kansas, and is directly at war, therefore, with the peaceful policyof the Administration. For this reason he has felt it his duty toremove him. " Walker, already in Washington on leave of absence, could no longerremain silent. He was as pointedly abandoned and disgraced by theAdministration as was his subordinate. In a dignified letterjustifying his own course, which, he reminded them, had never beencriticized or disavowed, he resigned the governorship. "From theevents occurring in Kansas as well as here, " he wrote, "it is evidentthat the question is passing from theories into practice; and that asgovernor of Kansas I should be compelled to carry out newinstructions, differing on a vital question from those received at thedate of my appointment. Such instructions I could not executeconsistently with my views of the Federal Constitution, of the Kansasand Nebraska bill, or with my pledges to the people of Kansas. " "Theidea entertained by some that I should see the Federal Constitutionand the Kansas-Nebraska bill overthrown and disregarded, and that, playing the part of a mute in a pantomime of ruin, I should acquiesceby my silence in such a result, especially where such acquiescenceinvolved, as an immediate consequence, a disastrous and sanguinarycivil war, seems to me most preposterous. "[13] The conduct and the language of Walker and Stanton bear a remarkablesignificance when we remember that they had been citizens of slaveStates and zealous Democratic partisans, and that only hard practicalexperience and the testimony of their own eyes had forced them to jointheir predecessors in the political "graveyard. " "The ghosts on thebanks of the Styx, " said Seward, "constitute a cloud scarcely moredense than the spirits of the departed Governors of Kansas, wanderingin exile and sorrow for having certified the truth against falsehoodin regard to the elections between Freedom and Slavery in Kansas. " ----------[1] January 12, 1857, Wilder, p. 113. Bell, Speech in Senate, March18, 1858. Appendix "Globe, " p. 137. [2] Geary to Marcy, Feb. 21, 1857, Senate Ex. Doc. No. 17, 1st Sess. 35th Cong. Vol. VI. , p. 178. [3] Bigler, Senate Speech, Dec. 9, 1857. "Globe, " p. 21. See alsoBigler, Dec. 21, 1857. "Globe, " p. 113. [4] Walker, Testimony before the Covode Committee. Reports ofCommittees H. R. 1st Sess. 36th Cong. Vol. V. , pp. 105-6. [5] "These fifteen counties in which there was no registry gave amuch larger vote at the October election, even with the six months'qualification, than the whole vote given to the delegates who signedthe Lecompton Constitution on the 7th November last. "--[Walker toCass, December 15, 1857. Senate Ex. Doc. No. 8, 1st Sess. 35th Cong. Vol. I, p. 128. ] [6] Walker to Buchanan, June 28, 1857. Report Covode Committee, pp. 117-19. [7] Buchanan to Walker, July 12, 1857. Report Covode Committee, p. 112. [8] The ingenuity which evolved 1600 Kansas votes from an oldCincinnati directory and 1200 more from an uninhabited county, was notexhausted by that prodigious labor. The same influences, and perhapsthe same manipulators, produced a companion piece known by the nameof the "candle-box fraud. " At the election of January 4, 1858, forofficers under the Lecompton Constitution, the returns from DelawareAgency underwent such suspicious handling that an investigatingcommission of the Legislature, by aid of a search-warrant, found themsecreted in a candle-box buried under a woodpile near Calhoun's"surveyor-general's office" at Lecompton. A forged list of 379 voteshad been substituted for the original memorandum of only forty-threevotes which had been cut from the certificate of the judges; the voteson the forged list being intended for the pro-slavery candidates. During the investigation Calhoun was arrested, but liberated by JudgeCato on _habeas corpus_, after which he immediately went to Missouri, and from there to Washington. The details and testimony are found inHouse Com. Reports, 1st Sess. 35th Cong. Vol. III, Report No. 377. [9] Minority Report, Select Com. Of Fifteen. Report No. 377, page 109, Vol. III. , H. R. Reports, 1st Sess. 35th Cong. This "missing link, " no less than the remaining portion of the journalprinted in the proceedings of the investigating committee, is itselfstrong circumstantial proof of the imposture underlying the wholetransaction. Many sections of the completed constitution are not evenmentioned in the journal; it does not contain the submission clause ofthe schedule, and the authenticity of the document rests upon thesignature and the certificate of John Calhoun without otherverification. [10] "Dr. Tebbs and General Whitfield a month since left very strongletters for publication with the editor of the 'Union' which hepromised to publish. His breach of this promise is a gross outrage. Ifnot published immediately our success in convention materially dependson my getting an immediate copy at Lecompton. My friends here allregard now the 'Union' as an enemy and encouraging by its neutralitythe fire-eaters not to submit the constitution. Very well, the factsare so clear that I can get along without the 'Union, ' but he had noright to suppress Dr. Tebbs's letter. I shall in due time expose thattransaction. "--Extract from a letter of Robert J. Walker to JamesBuchanan, dated October, 1857. [11] For this autograph letter and other interesting manuscripts, weare indebted to General Duncan S. Walker, a son of the Governor, nowresiding in Washington, D. C. [12] Under an Act of Congress popularly known as the "English Bill, "this same Lecompton Constitution was once more voted upon by thepeople of Kansas on August 2, 1858, with the following result: for theproposition, 1788; against it, 11, 300. --Wilder, "Annals of Kansas, "pp. 186-8. [13] Walker to Cass, Dec. 16, 1857. Senate Ex. Doc. No. 8, 1st Sess. , 35th Cong. Vol. I. , pp. 131, 130. CHAPTER VII THE REVOLT OF DOUGLAS The language of President Buchanan's annual message, the summarydismissal of Acting Governor Stanton, and the resignation of GovernorWalker abruptly transferred the whole Lecompton question from Kansasto Washington; and even before the people of the Territory hadpractically decided it by the respective popular votes of December21, 1857, and January 4, 1858, it had become the dominant politicalissue in the Thirty-fifth Congress, which convened on December 7, 1857. The attitude of Senator Douglas on the new question claimeduniversal attention. The Dred Scott decision, affirming constitutionalsanction and inviolability for slave property in Territories, hadrudely damaged his theory. But we have seen how in his Springfieldspeech he ingeniously sought to repair and rehabilitate "popularsovereignty" by the sophism that a master's abstract constitutionalright to slave property in a Territory was a "barren and a worthlessright unless sustained, protected, and enforced by appropriate policeregulations, " which could only be supplied by the local TerritorialLegislatures; and that the people of Kansas thus still possessed thepower of indirect prohibition. [Sidenote] 1857. To invent and utter this sophism for home consumption among hisdistant constituents on the 12th of June (a few days before theLecompton delegates were elected), and in so unobtrusive a manner asscarcely to attract a ripple of public notice, was a light taskcompared with that which confronted him as Senator, at the meeting ofCongress in December, in the light of John Calhoun's doings andpowers, of the scandal of the Oxford fraud, and of the indignation ofNorthern Democrats against the betrayal of Walker and Stanton. One of his first experiences was a personal quarrel with Buchanan. When he reached Washington, three days before the session, he went tothe President to protest against his adopting the LecomptonConstitution and sending it to Congress for acceptance. Buchananinsisted that he must recommend it in his annual message. Douglasreplied that he would denounce it as soon as it was read. ThePresident, excited, told him "to remember that no Democrat ever yetdiffered from an administration of his own choice without beingcrushed. Beware of the fate of Tallmadge and Rives. " [Sidenote] Douglas, Milwaukee Speech, October 13, 1860. "Mr. President, " retorted Douglas, "I wish you to remember thatGeneral Jackson is dead. " In the election of Mr. Buchanan as President the South had secured amost important ally for the work of pro-slavery reaction. Trained inthe belief that the South had hitherto been wronged, he was ready onevery occasion to appear as her champion for redress; and Southernpoliticians were now eager to use his leadership to make their viewsof public policy and constitutional duty acceptable to the North. Respectable in capacity but feeble in will, he easily submitted tocontrol and guidance from a few Southern leaders of superiorintellectual force. In his inaugural, he sought to prepare publicopinion for obedience to the Dred Scott decision, and since itspublication he had undertaken to interpret its scope and effect. Replying to a memorial from certain citizens of New England, hedeclared in a public letter, "Slavery existed at that period, andstill exists in Kansas, under the Constitution of the United States. This point has at last been finally decided by the highest tribunalknown to our laws. How it could ever have been seriously doubted is amystery. "[1] In the same letter he affirmed the legality of theLecompton Convention, though he yet clearly expressed his expectationthat the constitution to be framed by it would be submitted to thepopular vote for "approbation or rejection. " [Sidenote] 1857. But when that convention adjourned, and made known its cunninglydevised work, the whole South instantly became clamorous to secure thesectional advantages which lay in its technical regularity, its strongaffirmance of the "property" theory, and the extraordinary power itgave to John Calhoun to control the election and decide the returns. This powerful reactionary movement was not lost upon Mr. Buchanan. Hereflected it as unerringly as the vane moves to the change of thewind. Long before the meeting of Congress, the Administration organ, the "Washington Union, " heralded and strongly supported the newdeparture. When, on the 8th of December, the President's annualmessage was transmitted and read, the Lecompton Constitution, asframed and submitted, was therein warmly indorsed and its acceptanceindicated as the future Administration policy. [Sidenote] Buchanan, Annual Message, December 8, 1857. The language of this message discloses with what subtle ingenuitywords, phrases, definitions, ideas, and theories were being inventedand plied to broaden and secure every conquest of the pro-slaveryreaction. An elaborate argument was made to defend the enormities ofthe Lecompton Constitution. The doctrine of the Silliman letter, that"slavery exists in Kansas under the Constitution of the UnitedStates, " was assumed as a conceded theory. "In emerging from thecondition of territorial dependence into that of a sovereign State, "the people might vote "whether this important domestic institutionshould or should not continue to exist. " "Domestic institutions" wasdefined to mean slavery. "Free to form and regulate their domesticinstitutions"--the phrase employed in the Kansas-Nebraska act--wasconstrued to mean a vote to continue or discontinue slavery. And "ifany portion of the inhabitants shall refuse to vote, a fairopportunity to do so having been presented, . .. They alone will beresponsible for the consequences. " "Should the constitution withoutslavery be adopted by the votes of the majority, the rights ofproperty in slaves now in the Territory are reserved. .. . These slaveswere brought into the Territory under the Constitution of the UnitedStates and are now the property of their masters. This point has atlength been finally decided by the highest judicial tribunal of thecountry. " However blind Buchanan might be to the fact that this extremeinterpretation shocked and alarmed the sentiment of the North; that ifmade before the late Presidential campaign it would have defeated hisown election; and that if rudely persisted in, it might destroy theDemocratic ascendency in the future, the danger was obvious andimmediately vital to Douglas. His senatorial term was about to expire. To secure a reelection he must carry the State of Illinois in 1858, which had on an issue less pronounced than this defeated his colleagueShields in 1854, and his lieutenant Richardson in 1856. But more thanthis, his own personal honor was as much involved in his pledges tothe voters of Illinois as had been that of Governor Walker to thevoters of Kansas. His double-dealing caucus bargain had thus placedhim between two fires--party disgrace at Washington and populardisgrace in Illinois. In such a dilemma his choice could not bedoubtful. At all risk he must endeavor to sustain himself at home. [Sidenote] Douglas, Senate Speech, December 9, 1857. "Globe, " p. 18. He met the encounter with his usual adroitness and boldness. Assumingthat the President had made no express recommendation, he devoted hisspeech mainly to a strong argument of party expediency, repellingwithout reserve and denouncing without stint the work of the LecomptonConvention. "Stand by the doctrine, " said he, "that leaves the peopleperfectly free to form and regulate their institutions for themselves, in their own way, and your party will be united and irresistible inpower. Abandon that great principle and the party is not worth saving, and cannot be saved after it shall be violated. I trust we are not tobe rushed upon this question. Why shall it be done? Who is to bebenefited? Is the South to be the gainer? Is the North to be thegainer? Neither the North nor the South has the right to gain asectional advantage by trickery or fraud. .. . But I am told on allsides, 'Oh! just wait; the pro-slavery clause will be voted down. 'That does not obviate any of my objections; it does not diminish any ofthem. You have no more right to force a free-State constitution onKansas than a slave-State constitution. If Kansas wants a slave-Stateconstitution she has a right to it; if she wants a free-Stateconstitution she has a right to it. It is none of my business whichway the slavery clause is decided. I care not whether it is voted downor voted up. Do you suppose, after the pledges of my honor that Iwould go for that principle and leave the people to vote as theychoose, that I would now degrade myself by voting one way if theslavery clause be voted down, and another way if it be voted up? Icare not how that vote may stand. .. . Ignore Lecompton; ignore Topeka;treat both those party movements as irregular and void; pass a fairbill--the one that we framed ourselves when we were acting as a unit;have a fair election--and you will have peace in the Democratic party, and peace throughout the country, in ninety days. The people want afair vote. They will never be satisfied without it. .. . But if thisconstitution is to be forced down our throats in violation of thefundamental principle of free government, under a mode of submissionthat is a mockery and insult, I will resist it to the last. " President Buchanan and the strong pro-slavery faction which wasdirecting his course paid no attention whatever to this proposal of acompromise. Shylock had come into court to demand his bond, and wouldheed no pleas of equity or appeals to grace. The elections of December21 and January 4 were held in due time, and with what result we havealready seen. John Calhoun counted the votes on January 13 anddeclared the "Lecompton Constitution with slavery" adopted, prudentlyreserving, however, any announcement concerning the State officers orLegislature under it. This much accomplished, he hurried away toWashington, where he was received with open arms by the President andhis advisers, who at once proceeded with a united and formidableeffort to legalize the transparent farce by Congressional sanction. On the second day of February, 1858, President Buchanan transmitted toCongress the Lecompton Constitution, "received from J. Calhoun, Esq. , "and "duly certified by himself. " The President's accompanying specialmessage argues that the organic law of the Territory conferred theessential rights of an enabling act; that the free-State party stoodin the attitude of willful and chronic revolution; that their variousrefusals to vote were a sufficient bar to complaint and objection;that the several steps in the creation and work of the LecomptonConvention were regular and legal. "The people of Kansas have, then, 'in their own way, ' and in strict accordance with the organic act, framed a constitution and State government, have submitted theall-important question of slavery to the people, and have elected agovernor, a member to represent them in Congress, members of the StateLegislature, and other State officers. They now ask admission into theUnion under this constitution, which is Republican in form. It is forCongress to decide whether they will admit or reject the State whichhas thus been created. For my own part I am decidedly in favor of itsadmission and thus terminating the Kansas question. " [Sidenote] 1858. The vote of January 4 against the constitution he declared to beillegal because it was "held after the Territory had been prepared foradmission into the Union as a sovereign State, and when no authorityexisted in the Territorial Legislature which could possibly destroyits existence or change its character. " His own inconsistency waslightly glossed over. "For my own part, when I instructed GovernorWalker in general terms, in favor of submitting the constitution tothe people, I had no object in view except the all-absorbing questionof slavery. .. . I then believed, and still believe, that under theorganic act, the Kansas Convention were bound to submit thisall-important question of slavery to the people. It was never, however, my opinion that independently of this act they would havebeen bound to submit any portion of the constitution to a popularvote, in order to give it validity. " To the public at large, the central point of interest in this specialmessage, however, was the following dogmatic announcement by thePresident: "It has been solemnly adjudged by the highest judicialtribunal known to our laws that slavery exists in Kansas by virtue ofthe Constitution of the United States. Kansas is, therefore, at thismoment as much a slave-State as Georgia or South Carolina. Withoutthis, the equality of the sovereign States composing the Union wouldbe violated, and the use and enjoyment of a territory acquired by thecommon treasure of all the States would be closed against the peopleand the property of nearly half the members of the Confederacy. Slavery can, therefore, never be prohibited in Kansas except by meansof a constitutional provision and in no other manner can this beobtained so promptly, if a majority of the people desire it, as byadmitting it into the Union under its present constitution. " In the light of subsequent history this extreme pro-slavery programmewas not only wrong in morals and statesmanship, but short-sighted andfoolhardy as a party policy. But to the eyes of President Buchananthis latter view was not so plain. The country was apparently in thefull tide of a pro-slavery reaction. He had not only been electedPresident, but the Democratic party had also recovered its control ofCongress. The presiding officer of each branch was a Southerner. Outof 64 members of the Senate, 39 were Democrats, 20 Republicans, andfive Americans or Know-Nothings. Of the 237 members of the House, 131were Democrats, 92 Republicans, and 14 Americans. Here was a clearmajority of fourteen in the upper and twenty-five in the lower House. This was indeed no longer the formidable legislative power whichrepealed the Missouri Compromise, but it seemed perhaps a sufficientforce to carry out the President's recommendation. His error was inforgetting that this apparent popular indorsement was secured to himand his party by means of the double construction placed upon theNebraska bill and the Cincinnati platform, by the caucus bargainbetween the leaders of the South and the leaders of the North. Themoment had come when this unnatural alliance needed to be exposed andin part repudiated. The haste with which the Southern leaders advanced step by step, forced every issue, and were now pushing their allies to the wall was, to say the least, bad management, but it grew logically out of theirsituation. They were swimming against the stream. The leading forcesof civilization, population, wealth, commerce, intelligence, werebearing them down. The balance of power was lost. Already there weresixteen free-States to fifteen slave-States. Minnesota and Oregon, inevitably destined also to become free, were applying for admissionto the Union. [Sidenote] Official Manifesto, Oct. 8, 1754. [Sidenote] Senator Brown to Adams, June 18, 1856. Greeley, "Am. Conflict, " Vol. I. , p. 278. [Sidenote] Official proceedings, Pamphlet. Still, the case of the South was not hopeless. Kansas was apparentlywithin their grasp. Existing law provided for the formation andadmission of four additional States to be carved out of Texas, whichwould certainly become slave-States. Then there remained the possibledivision of California, and a race for the possession of New Mexicoand Arizona. Behind all, or, more likely, before all except Kansas, inthe order of desired events, was the darling ambition of PresidentBuchanan, the annexation of Cuba. As United States Minister to Englandhe had publicly declared that if Spain refused to sell us that covetedisland we should be justified in wresting it from her by force; asPresidential candidate he had confidentially avowed, amid the firstblushes of his new honor, "If I can be instrumental in settling theslavery question upon the terms I have mentioned, and then add Cuba tothe Union, I shall, if President, be willing to give up the ghost, andlet Breckinridge take the government. " Thus, even excluding the moreproblematical chances which lay hidden in filibustering enterprises, there was a possibility, easily demonstrable to the sanguine, that adecade or two might change mere numerical preponderance from the freeto the slave-States. Nor could this possibility be waved aside by anyaffectation of incredulity. Not alone Mr. Buchanan but the wholeDemocratic party was publicly pledged to annexation. "Resolved, " saidthe Cincinnati platform, "that the Democratic party will expect of thenext Administration that every proper effort be made to insure ourascendency in the Gulf of Mexico"; while another resolution declaringsympathy with efforts to "regenerate" Central America was no lesssignificant. [Illustration: JOHN CALHOUN. ] But to accomplish such marvels, they must not sit with folded hands. The price of slavery was fearless aggression. They must build on adeeper foundation than Presidential elections, party majorities, oreven than votes in the Senate. The theory of the government must bereversed, the philosophy of the republic interpreted anew. In thissubtler effort they had made notable progress. By the Kansas-Nebraskaact they had paralyzed the legislation of half a century. By the DredScott decision they had changed the Constitution and blighted theDeclaration of Independence. By the Lecompton trick they would showthat in conflict with their dogmas the public will was vicious, and inconflict with their intrigues the majority powerless. They had thePresident, the Cabinet, the Senate, the House, the Supreme Court, and, by no means least in the immediate problem, John Calhoun with histechnical investiture of far-reaching authority. The country hadrecovered from the shock of the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, andrewarded them with Buchanan. Would it not equally recover from theshock of the Lecompton Constitution? It was precisely at this point that the bent bow broke. The great bulkof the Democratic party followed the President and his Southernadvisers, even in this extreme step; but to a minority sufficient toturn the scale the Lecompton scandal had become too offensive forfurther tolerance. In the Senate, with its heavy Democratic majority, the Administrationeasily secured the passage of a bill to admit Kansas with theLecompton Constitution. Out of eleven Democratic Senators from freeStates, only three--Douglas of Illinois, Broderick of California, andStuart of Michigan--took courage to speak and vote against themeasure. In the House of Representatives, however, with a narrowermargin of political power, the scheme, after an exciting discussionrunning through about two months, met a decisive defeat. A formidablepopular opposition to it had developed itself in the North, in whichspeeches and letters from Governor Walker and Secretary Stanton indenunciation of it were a leading feature and a powerful influence. The lower House of Congress always responds quickly to currents ofpublic sentiment; but in this case it caught direction all the morepromptly because its members were to be chosen anew in the ensuingautumn. However much they might have party subordination and successat heart, some of them felt that they could not defend before theiranti-slavery constituencies the Oxford frauds, the Calhoundictatorship, the theory that slave property is above constitutionalsanction, and the dogma that "Kansas is therefore at this moment asmuch a slave-State as Georgia or South Carolina. " When the test votewas taken on April 1, out of the 53 Democratic representatives fromthe free-States 31 voted for Lecompton; but the remaining 22, [2]joining their strength to the opposition, passed a substitute, originating with Mr. Crittenden of the Senate, which in substancedirected a resubmission of the Lecompton Constitution to the people ofKansas;--if adopted, the President to admit the new State by a simpleproclamation; if rejected, the people to call a convention and frame anew instrument. As the October vote had been the turning-point in the local popularstruggle in the Territory, this adoption of the Crittenden-Montgomerysubstitute, by a total vote of 120 to 112 in the House ofRepresentatives, was the culmination of the National intrigue tosecure Kansas for the South. It was a narrow victory for freedom; achange of 5 votes would have passed the Lecompton bill and admittedthe State with slavery, and a constitutional prohibition against anychange for seven years to come. With his authority to control electionreturns, there is every reason to suppose that Calhoun would have setup a pro-slavery State Legislature, to choose two pro-slaverysenators, whom in its turn the strong Lecompton majority in the UnitedStates Senate would have admitted to seats; and thus the whole chainof fraud and usurpation back to the first Border-Ruffian invasion ofKansas would have become complete, legal, and irrevocable, on plea ofmere formal and technical regularity. Foiled in its main object, the Administration made another effortwhich served to break somewhat the force and humiliation of its firstand signal defeat. The two Houses of Congress having disagreed asstated, and each having once more voted to adhere to its own action, the President managed to make enough converts among the anti-LecomptonDemocrats of the House to secure the appointment of a committee ofconference. This committee devised what became popularly known as the"English bill, " a measure which tendered a land grant to the newState, and provided that on the following August 3d the people ofKansas might vote "proposition accepted" or "proposition rejected. "Acceptance should work the admission of the State with the LecomptonConstitution, while rejection should postpone any admission until herpopulation reached the ratio of representation required for a memberof the House. "Hence it will be argued, " exclaimed Douglas, "in oneportion of the Union that this is a submission of the constitution, and in another portion that it is not. " The English bill became a law;but the people of Kansas once more voted to reject the "proposition"by nearly ten thousand majority. [Sidenote] Douglas, Senate Speech, March 22, 1858. App. "Globe, " pp. 199, 200. Douglas opposed the English bill as he had done the Lecompton bill, thus maintaining his attitude as the chief leader of theanti-Lecompton opposition. In proportion as he received encouragementand commendation from Republican and American newspapers, he fellunder the ban of the Administration journals. The "Washington Union"especially pursued him with denunciation. "It has read me out of theDemocratic party every other day, at least, for two or three months, "said he, "and keeps reading me out; and, as if it had not succeeded, still continues to read me out, using such terms as 'traitor, ''renegade, ' 'deserter, ' and other kind and polite epithets of thatnature. " He explained that this arose from his having voted in theSenate against its editor for the office of public printer; but healso pointed out that he did so because that journal had becomepro-slavery to the point of declaring "that the emancipation acts ofNew York, of New England, of Pennsylvania, and of New Jersey wereunconstitutional, were outrages upon the right of property, wereviolations of the Constitution of the United States. " "The propositionis advanced, " continued he, "that a Southern man has a right to movefrom South Carolina with his negroes into Illinois, to settle thereand hold them there as slaves, anything in the constitution and lawsof Illinois to the contrary notwithstanding. " Douglas furtherintimated broadly that the President and Cabinet were inspiring theseeditorials of the Administration organ, as part and parcel of the samesystem and object with which they were pushing the LecomptonConstitution with its odious "property" doctrine; and declared, "if myprotest against this interpolation into the policy of this country orthe creed of the Democratic party is to bring me under the ban, I amready to meet the issue. " He had not long to wait for the issue. The party rupture was radical, not superficial. It was, as he had himself pointed out, part of thecontest for national supremacy between slavery and freedom. From timeto time he still held out the olive-branch and pointed wistfully tothe path of reconciliation. But the reactionary faction which ruledMr. Buchanan never forgave Douglas for his part in defeating Lecompton, and more especially for what they alleged to be his treachery to hiscaucus bargain, in refusing to accept and defend all the logicalconsequences of the Dred Scott decision. ----------[1] Buchanan to Silliman and others, Aug. 15, 1857. Senate Ex. Doc. No. 8, 1st Sess. 35th Cong. Vol. I. , p. 74. [2] From California, 1; Illinois, 5; Indiana, 3; New Jersey, 1; NewYork, 2; Ohio, 6; Pennsylvania, 4. For Lecompton: California, 1;Connecticut, 2; Indiana, 3; New Jersey, 2; New York, 10; Ohio, 2;Pennsylvania, 11. CHAPTER VIII THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES The anti-Lecompton recusancy of Douglas baffled the plottingextremists of the South, and created additional dissension in theDemocratic ranks; and this growing Democratic weakness and theincreasing Republican ardor and strength presaged a possibleRepublican success in the coming Presidential election. While thiscondition of things gave national politics an unusual interest, theState of Illinois now became the field of a local contest which forthe moment held the attention of the entire country in such a degreeas to involve and even eclipse national issues. In this local contest in Illinois, the choice of candidates on bothsides was determined long beforehand by a popular feeling, strongerand more unerring than ordinary individual or caucus intrigues. Douglas, as author of the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, as aformidable Presidential aspirant, and now again as leader of theanti-Lecompton Democrats, could, of course, have no rival in his partyfor his own Senatorial seat. Lincoln, who had in 1854 gracefullyyielded his justly won Senatorial honors to Trumbull, and who alonebearded Douglas in his own State throughout the whole anti-Nebraskastruggle, with anything like a show of equal political courage andintellectual strength, was as inevitably the leader and choice of theRepublicans. Their State convention met in Springfield on the 16th ofJune, 1858, and, after its ordinary routine work, passed withacclamation a separate resolution, which declared "that AbrahamLincoln is the first and only choice of the Republicans of Illinoisfor the United States Senate as the successor of Stephen A. Douglas. "The proceedings of the convention had consumed the afternoon, and anadjournment was taken. At 8 o'clock that same evening, the conventionhaving reassembled in the State-house, Lincoln appeared before it, andmade what was perhaps the most carefully prepared speech of his wholelife. Every word of it was written, every sentence had been tested;but the speaker delivered it without manuscript or notes. It was notan ordinary oration, but, in the main, an argument, as sententious andaxiomatic as if made to a bench of jurists. Its opening sentencescontained a political prophecy which not only became the ground-workof the campaign, but heralded one of the world's great historicalevents. He said: [Sidenote] Lincoln-Douglas Debates, p. 1. "If we could first know where we are and whither we are tending, we could better judge what to do and how to do it. We are now far into the fifth year since a policy was initiated, with the avowed object and confident promise of putting an end to slavery agitation. Under the operation of that policy, that agitation has not only not ceased, but has constantly augmented. In my opinion it will not cease until a crisis shall have been reached and passed. 'A house divided against itself cannot stand. ' I believe this Government cannot endure permanently, half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to be dissolved--I do not expect the house to fall--but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in course of ultimate extinction; or its advocates will push it forward till it shall become alike lawful in all the States, old as well as new, North as well as South. " Then followed his demonstration, through the incidents of the Nebraskalegislation, the Dred Scott decision, and present political theoriesand issues, which would by and by find embodiment in new laws andfuture legal doctrines. The repeal of the Missouri Compromise, thelanguage of the Nebraska bill, which declared slavery "subject to theConstitution, " the Dred Scott decision, which declared that "subjectto the Constitution" neither Congress nor a Territorial Legislaturecould exclude slavery from a Territory--the argument presented pointby point and step by step with legal precision the silent subversionof cherished principles of liberty. "Put this and that together, " saidhe, "and we have another nice little niche, which we may ere long seefilled with another Supreme Court decision, declaring that theConstitution of the United States does not permit a State to excludeslavery from its limits. .. . Such a decision is all that slavery nowlacks of being alike lawful in all the States. .. . We shall lie down, "continued the orator, "pleasantly dreaming that the people of Missouriare on the verge of making their State free; and we shall awake to thereality instead, that the Supreme Court has made Illinois a slaveState. " His peroration was a battle-call: "Our cause, then, must be intrustedto and conducted by its own undoubted friends, those whose hands arefree, whose hearts are in the work, who do care for the result. Twoyears ago the Republicans of the nation mustered over thirteen hundredthousand strong. We did this under the single impulse of resistance toa common danger, with every external circumstance against us. Ofstrange, discordant, and even hostile elements we gathered from thefour winds, and formed and fought the battle through, under theconstant hot fire of a disciplined, proud, and pampered enemy. Did webrave all then to falter now?--now, when that same enemy is wavering, dissevered, and belligerent? The result is not doubtful. We shall notfail--if we stand firm we shall not fail. Wise counsels may accelerateor mistakes delay it, but sooner or later the victory is sure tocome. " [Sidenote] See O. J. Hollister, "Life of Colfax, " pp. 119-22. [Sidenote] J. Watson Webb to Bates, June 9, 1858. MS. Lincoln's declaration that the cause of slavery restriction "must beintrusted to its own undoubted friends" had something more than ageneral meaning. We have seen that while Douglas avowed he did notcare "whether slavery was voted down or voted up" in the Territories, he had opposed the Lecompton Constitution on the ground of itsnon-submission to popular vote, and that this opposition caused theBuchanan Democrats to treat him as an apostate. Many earnestRepublicans were moved to strong sympathy for Douglas in thisattitude, partly for his help in defeating the Lecompton iniquity, partly because they believed his action in this particular a preludeto further political repentance, partly out of that chivalricgenerosity of human nature which sides with the weak against thestrong. In the hour of his trial and danger many wishes for hissuccessful reëlection came to him from Republicans of nationalprominence. Greeley, in the New York "Tribune" as well as in privateletters, made no concealment of such a desire. Burlingame, in a fervidspeech in the House of Representatives, called upon the young men ofthe country to stand by the Douglas men. It was known that Colfax andother influential members of the House were holding confidentialinterviews with Douglas, the object of which it was not difficult toguess. There were even rumors that Seward intended to interfere in hisbehalf. This report was bruited about so industriously that he felt itnecessary to permit a personal friend to write an emphatic denial, sothat it might come to Lincoln's knowledge. On the other hand, newspapers ventured the suggestion that Lincoln might retaliate by acombination against Seward's Presidential aspirations. [Sidenote] Wentworth to Lincoln, April 19, 1858. MS. Rival politicians in Illinois were suspicious of each other, and didnot hesitate to communicate their suspicions to Lincoln. Personalfriends, of course, kept him well informed about these variouspolitical under-currents, and an interesting letter of his shows thathe received and treated the matter with liberal charity. "I have neversaid or thought more, " wrote he, "as to the inclination of some of ourEastern Republican friends to favor Douglas, than I expressed in yourhearing on the evening of the 21st April, at the State Library in thisplace. I have believed--do believe now--that Greeley, for instance, would be rather pleased to see Douglas reëlected over me or any otherRepublican; and yet I do not believe it is so because of any secretarrangement with Douglas--it is because he thinks Douglas's superiorposition, reputation, experience, and ability, if you please, wouldmore than compensate for his lack of a pure Republican position, and, therefore, his reëlection do the general cause of Republicanism moregood than would the election of any one of our better undistinguishedpure Republicans. I do not know how you estimate Greeley, but Iconsider him incapable of corruption or falsehood. He denies that hedirectly is taking part in favor of Douglas, and I believe him. [1]Still his feeling constantly manifests itself in his paper, which, being so extensively read in Illinois, is, and will continue to be, adrag upon us. I have also thought that Governor Seward, too, feelsabout as Greeley does; but not being a newspaper editor, his feelingin this respect is not much manifested. I have no idea that he is, byconversation or by letter, urging Illinois Republicans to vote forDouglas. " [Sidenote] Lincoln to Wilson, June 1, 1858. MS. "As to myself, let me pledge you my word that neither I nor myfriends, so far as I know, have been setting stake against GovernorSeward. No combination has been made with me, or proposed to me, inrelation to the next Presidential candidate. The same thing is true inregard to the next Governor of our State. I am not directly orindirectly committed to any one; nor has any one made any advance tome upon the subject. I have had many free conversations with JohnWentworth; but he never dropped a remark that led me to suspect thathe wishes to be Governor. Indeed it is due to truth to say that whilehe has uniformly expressed himself for me, he has never hinted at anycondition. The signs are that we shall have a good convention on the16th, and I think our prospects generally are improving some everyday. I believe we need nothing so much as to get rid of unjustsuspicions of one another. " [Sidenote] Lincoln to Crittenden, July 7, 1858. Mrs. Coleman, "Life of Crittenden, " Vol. II. , p. 162. [Sidenote] Crittenden to Lincoln, July 29, 1858. Ibid. , p. 163. [Sidenote] Crittenden to Dickey, August 1, 1858. Ibid. , p. 164. While many alleged defections were soon disproved by the ready andloyal avowals of his friends in Illinois and elsewhere, there came tohim a serious disappointment from a quarter whence he little expectedit. Early in the canvass Lincoln began to hear that Crittenden, ofKentucky, favored the reëlection of Douglas, and had promised so toadvise the Whigs of Illinois by a public letter. Deeming it well-nighincredible that a Kentucky Whig like Crittenden could take such apart against an Illinois Whig of his own standing and service, to helpa life-long opponent of Clay and his cherished plans, Lincolnaddressed him a private letter making the direct inquiry. "I do notbelieve the story, " he wrote, "but still it gives me some uneasiness. If such was your inclination, I do not believe you would so expressyourself. It is not in character with you as I have always estimatedyou. " Crittenden's reply, however, confirmed his worst fears. He saidhe and Douglas had acted together to oppose Lecompton. For thisDouglas had been assailed, and he thought his reëlection was necessaryto rebuke the Buchanan Administration. In addition Crittenden alsosoon wrote the expected letter for publication, in which phraseologyof apparent fairness covered an urgent appeal in Douglas's behalf. [Sidenote] Lincoln-Douglas Debates, pp. 4-5. In the evenly balanced and sensitive condition of Illinois politicsthis ungracious outside interference may be said to have insuredLincoln's defeat. While it gave him pain to be thus wounded in thehouse of his friends, he yet more deeply deplored the inexcusableblunder of leaders whose misplaced sympathy put in jeopardy thesuccess of a vital political principle. In his convention speech hehad forcibly stated the error and danger of such a step. "How can he[Douglas] oppose the advances of slavery? He don't care anything aboutit. His avowed mission is impressing the 'public heart' to carenothing about it. .. . For years he has labored to prove it a sacredright of white men to take negro slaves into the new Territories. Canhe possibly show that it is less a sacred right to buy them where theycan be bought cheapest? And unquestionably they can be bought cheaperin Africa than in Virginia. He has done all in his power to reduce thewhole question of slavery to one of a mere right of property. .. . Nowas ever, I wish not to misrepresent Judge Douglas's position, questionhis motives, or do aught that can be personally offensive to him. Whenever, if ever, he and we can come together on principle so thatour great cause may have assistance from his great ability, I hope tohave interposed no adventitious obstacle. But clearly he is not nowwith us--he does not pretend to be--he does not promise ever to be. " [Sidenote] Lincoln, Springfield Speech, July 17, 1858. Debates, p. 55. Lincoln in nowise underrated the severity of the political contest inwhich he was about to engage. He knew his opponent's strong points aswell as his weak ones--his energy, his adroitness, the blind devotionof his followers, his greater political fame. "Senator Douglas is ofworld-wide renown, " he said. "All the anxious politicians of hisparty, or who have been of his party for years past, have been lookingupon him as certainly at no distant day to be the President of theUnited States. They have seen in his round, jolly, fruitful facepost-offices, land-offices, marshalships, and cabinet appointments, chargé-ships and foreign missions, bursting and sprouting out inwonderful exuberance ready to be laid hold of by their greedy hands. And as they have been gazing upon this attractive picture so long, they cannot, in the little distraction that has taken place in theparty, bring themselves to give up the charming hope; but withgreedier anxiety they rush about him, sustain him, and give himmarches, triumphal entries, and receptions, beyond what even in thedays of his highest prosperity they could have brought about in hisfavor. On the contrary, nobody has ever expected me to be President. In my poor, lean, lank face, nobody has ever seen that any cabbageswere sprouting out. These are disadvantages all taken together, thatthe Republicans labor under. We have to fight this battle uponprinciple, and principle alone. " [Sidenote] 1858. Douglas and his friends had indeed entered upon the canvass with anunusual flourish of trumpets. Music, banners, salutes, fireworks, addresses, ovation, and jubilation with enthusiasm genuine andsimulated, came and went in almost uninterrupted sequence; so much ofthe noise and pomp of electioneering had not been seen since thefamous hard-cider campaign of Harrison. The "Little Giant, " as he wasproudly nicknamed by his adherents, arrived in Illinois nearmidsummer, after elaborate preparation and heralding, and madespeeches successively at Chicago, Bloomington, and Springfield on the9th, 16th, and 17th of July. The Republicans and their candidate wereequally alert to contest every inch of ground. Mr. Lincoln madespeeches in reply at Chicago on the 10th and at Springfield on theevening of Douglas's day address; and in both instances with suchforce and success as portended a fluctuating and long-continuedstruggle. [Illustration: ANSON BURLINGAME. ] For the moment the presence of Douglas not only gave spirit and freshindustry to his followers, but the novelty impressed the indifferentand the wavering. The rush of the campaign was substituting excitementfor inquiry, blare of brass bands and smoke of gunpowder forintelligent criticism. The fame and prestige of the "Little Giant" wasbeginning to incline the vibrating scale. Lincoln and his intimatepolitical advisers were not slow to note the signs of danger; and theremedy devised threw upon him the burden of a new responsibility. Itwas decided in the councils of the Republican leaders that Lincolnshould challenge Douglas to joint public debate. The challenge was sent by Lincoln on July 24; Douglas proposed thatthey should meet at the towns of Ottawa, Freeport, Jonesboro, Charleston, Galesburg, Quincy, and Alton, each speaker alternately toopen and close the discussion; Douglas to speak one hour at Ottawa, Lincoln to reply for an hour and a half, and Douglas to make a halfhour's rejoinder. In like manner Lincoln should open and close atFreeport, and so on alternately. Lincoln's note of July 31 acceptedthe proposal as made. "Although by the terms, " he wrote, "as youpropose, you take four openings and closes to my three, I accede andthus close the arrangement. " Meanwhile each of the speakers madeindependent appointments for other days and places than these seven;and in the heat and dust of midsummer traveled and addressed thepeople for a period of about one hundred days, frequently making thenecessary journeys by night, and often speaking two and sometimes eventhree times in a single day. Thus to the combat of intellectual skillwas added a severe ordeal of physical endurance. [2] Lincoln entered upon the task which his party friends had devised withneither bravado nor misgiving. He had not sought these publicdiscussions; neither did he shrink from them. Throughout his wholelife he appears to have been singularly correct in his estimate ofdifficulties to be encountered and of his own powers for overcomingthem. Each of these seven meetings, comprising both the Republican andDemocratic voters of the neighboring counties, formed a vast, eager, and attentive assemblage. It needed only the first day's experience toshow the wisdom of the Republican leaders in forcing a jointdiscussion upon Douglas. Face to face with his competitor, he could nolonger successfully assume airs of superiority, or wrap himself in hisSenatorial dignity and prestige. They were equal spokesmen, of equalparties, on an equal platform, while applause and encouragement on oneside balanced applause and encouragement on the other. In a merely forensic sense, it was indeed a battle of giants. In thewhole field of American politics no man has equaled Douglas in theexpedients and strategy of debate. Lacking originality andconstructive logic, he had great facility in appropriating byingenious restatement the thoughts and formulas of others. He wastireless, ubiquitous, unseizable. It would have been as easy to hold aglobule of mercury under the finger's tip as to fasten him to a pointhe desired to evade. He could almost invert a proposition by aplausible paraphrase. He delighted in enlarging an opponent'sassertion to a forced inference ridiculous in form and monstrous indimensions. In spirit he was alert, combative, aggressive; in manner, patronizing and arrogant by turns. Lincoln's mental equipment was of an entirely different order. Hisprincipal weapon was direct, unswerving logic. His fairness ofstatement and generosity of admission had long been proverbial. Forthese intellectual duels with Douglas, he possessed a power ofanalysis that easily outran and circumvented the "Little Giant's" mostextraordinary gymnastics of argument. But, disdaining mere quibbles, he pursued lines of concise reasoning to maxims of constitutional lawand political morals. Douglas was always forcible in statement andbold in assertion; but Lincoln was his superior in quaint originality, aptness of phrase, and subtlety of definition; and oftentimesLincoln's philosophic vision and poetical fervor raised him to flightsof eloquence which were not possible to the fiber and temper of hisopponent. It is, of course, out of the question to abridge the variousLincoln-Douglas discussions of which the text fills a good-sizedvolume. Only a few points of controversy may be stated. Lincoln'sconvention speech, it will be remembered, declared that in his beliefthe Union could not endure permanently half slave and half free, butmust become all one thing or all the other. Douglas in his firstspeech of the campaign attacked this as an invitation to a war ofsections, declaring that uniformity would lead to consolidation anddespotism. He charged the Republicans with intent to abolish slaveryin the States; said their opposition to the Dred Scott decision was adesire for negro equality and amalgamation; and prescribed his dogmaof popular sovereignty as a panacea for all the ills growing out ofthe slavery agitation. [Sidenote] Lincoln-Douglas Debates, p. 75. To this Lincoln replied that Republicans did not aim at abolition inthe slave-States, but only the exclusion of slavery from freeTerritories; they did not oppose the Dred Scott decision in so far asit concerned the freedom of Dred Scott, but they refused to accept itsdicta as rules of political action. He repelled the accusation thatthe Republicans desired negro equality or amalgamation, saying: "Thereis a physical difference between the two, which, in my judgment, willprobably forever forbid their living together upon the footing ofperfect equality; and inasmuch as it becomes a necessity that theremust be a difference, I, as well as Judge Douglas, am in favor of therace to which I belong having the superior position. I have never saidanything to the contrary, but I hold that notwithstanding all thisthere is no reason in the world why the negro is not entitled to allthe natural rights enumerated in the Declaration of Independence--theright to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. I hold that heis as much entitled to these as the white man. I agree with JudgeDouglas he is not my equal in many respects--certainly not in color, perhaps not in moral or intellectual endowment; but in the right toeat the bread without the leave of anybody else, which his own handearns, he is my equal, and the equal of Judge Douglas and the equal ofevery living man. " In return he pressed upon Douglas his charge of a political conspiracyto nationalize slavery, alleging that his "don't care" policy was butthe convenient stalking-horse under cover of which a new Dred Scottdecision would make slavery lawful everywhere. [Sidenote] Ibid. , p. 82. It is merely for the Supreme Court to decide that no State under the Constitution can exclude it, just as they have already decided that under the Constitution neither Congress nor the Territorial Legislature can do it. When that is decided and acquiesced in, the whole thing is done. This being true, and this being the way, as I think, that slavery is to be made national, let us consider what Judge Douglas is doing every day to that end. In the first place, let us see what influence he is exerting on public sentiment. In this and like communities public sentiment is everything. With public sentiment, nothing can fail; without it nothing can succeed. Consequently, he who molds public sentiment goes deeper than he who enacts statutes or pronounces decisions. He makes statutes and decisions possible or impossible to be executed. The Democratic policy in regard to that institution will not tolerate the merest breath, the slightest hint, of the least degree of wrong about it. Try it by some of Judge Douglas's arguments. He says he "don't care whether it is voted up or voted down" in the Territories. I do not care myself, in dealing with that expression, whether it is intended to be expressive of his individual sentiments on the subject, or only of the national policy he desires to have established. It is alike valuable for my purpose. Any man can say that who does not see anything wrong in slavery, but no man can logically say it who does see a wrong in it; because no man can logically say he don't care whether a wrong is voted up or voted down. He may say he don't care whether an indifferent thing is voted up or down, but he must logically have a choice between a right thing and a wrong thing. He contends that whatever community wants slaves has a right to have them. So they have, if it is not a wrong. But if it is a wrong, he cannot say people have a right to do wrong. He says that upon the score of equality slaves should be allowed to go into a new Territory, like other property. This is strictly logical if there is no difference between it and other property. If it and other property are equal, his argument is entirely logical. But if you insist that one is wrong and the other right, there is no use to institute a comparison between right and wrong. You may turn over everything in the Democratic policy from beginning to end, whether in the shape it takes on the statute book, in the shape it takes in the Dred Scott decision, in the shape it takes in conversation, or the shape it takes in short maxim-like arguments--it everywhere carefully excludes the idea that there is anything wrong in it. [Sidenote] Lincoln-Douglas Debates, pp. 233-4. That is the real issue. That is the issue that will continue in this country when these poor tongues of Judge Douglas and myself shall be silent. It is the eternal struggle between these two principles--right and wrong--throughout the world. They are the two principles that have stood face to face from the beginning of time; and will ever continue to struggle. The one is the common right of humanity and the other the divine right of kings. It is the same principle, in whatever shape it develops itself. It is the same spirit that says, "You work and toil and earn bread, and I'll eat it. " No matter in what shape it comes, whether from the mouth of a king who seeks to bestride the people of his own nation and live by the fruit of their labor, or from one race of men as an apology for enslaving another race, it is the same tyrannical principle. [Sidenote] Lincoln-Douglas Debates, p. 56. As to the vaunted popular sovereignty principle, Lincoln declared it"the most arrant Quixotism that was ever enacted before acommunity. .. . Does he mean to say that he has been devoting his lifeto securing to the people of the Territories the right to excludeslavery from the Territories? If he means so to say, he means todeceive; because he and every one knows that the decision of theSupreme Court, which he approves and makes especial ground of attackupon me for disapproving, forbids the people of a Territory to excludeslavery. This covers the whole ground from the settlement of aTerritory till it reaches the degree of maturity entitling it to forma State constitution. So far as all that ground is concerned, theJudge is not sustaining popular sovereignty, but absolutely opposingit. He sustains the decision which declares that the popular will ofthe Territories has no constitutional power to exclude slavery duringtheir territorial existence. " By no means the least interesting of the many points touched in thesedebates is Lincoln's own estimate of the probable duration of slavery, or rather of the least possible period in which "ultimate extinction"could be effected, even under the most favorable circumstances. [Sidenote] Lincoln-Douglas Debates, p. 157. Now, at this day in the history of the world [said he, in the Charleston debate], we can no more foretell where the end of this slavery agitation will be than we can see the end of the world itself. The Nebraska-Kansas bill was introduced four years and a half ago, and if the agitation is ever to come to an end, we may say we are four years and a half nearer the end. So too we can say we are four years and a half nearer the end of the world; and we can just as clearly see the end of the world as we can see the end of this agitation. The Kansas settlement did not conclude it. If Kansas should sink to-day, and leave a great vacant space in the earth's surface, this vexed question would still be among us. I say then there is no way of putting an end to the slavery agitation amongst us, but to put it back upon the basis where our fathers placed it, no way but to keep it out of our new Territories--to restrict it forever to the old States where it now exists. Then the public mind will rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction. That is one way of putting an end to the slavery agitation. The other way is for us to surrender and let Judge Douglas and his friends have their way and plant slavery over all the States; cease speaking of it as in any way a wrong; regard slavery as one of the common matters of property and speak of negroes as we do of our horses and cattle. But while it drives on in its state of progress as it is now driving, and as it has driven for the last five years, I have ventured the opinion, and I say to-day that we will have no end to the slavery agitation until it takes one turn or the other. I do not mean to say that when it takes a turn towards ultimate extinction it will be in a day, nor in a year, nor in two years. I do not suppose that in the most peaceful way ultimate extinction would occur in less than a hundred years at least; but that it will occur in the best way for both races, in God's own good time, I have no doubt. But the one dominating characteristic of Lincoln's speeches is theirconstant recurrence to broad and enduring principles, theirunremitting effort to lead public opinion to loftier and noblerconceptions of political duty; and nothing in his career stamps him sodistinctively an American as his constant eulogy and defense of thephilosophical precepts of the Declaration of Independence. Thefollowing is one of his indictments of his political opponents on thispoint: [Sidenote] Lincoln-Douglas Debates, p. 225. At Galesburg the other day, I said, in answer to Judge Douglas, that three years ago there never had been a man, so far as I knew or believed, in the whole world, who had said that the Declaration of Independence did not include negroes in the term "all men. " I re-assert it to-day. I assert that Judge Douglas and all his friends may search the whole records of the country, and it will be a matter of great astonishment to me if they shall be able to find that one human being three years ago had ever uttered the astounding sentiment that the term "all men" in the Declaration did not include the negro. Do not let me be misunderstood. I know that more than three years ago there were men who, finding this assertion constantly in the way of their schemes to bring about the ascendency and perpetuation of slavery, denied the truth of it. I know that Mr. Calhoun and all the politicians of his school denied the truth of the Declaration. I know that it ran along in the mouth of some Southern men for a period of years, ending at last in that shameful though rather forcible declaration of Pettit, of Indiana, upon the floor of the United States Senate, that the Declaration of Independence was in that respect "a self-evident lie" rather than a self-evident truth. But I say, with a perfect knowledge of all this hawking at the Declaration without directly attacking it, that three years ago there never had lived a man who had ventured to assail it in the sneaking way of pretending to believe it and then asserting it did not include the negro. I believe the first man who ever said it was Chief-Justice Taney in the Dred Scott case, and the next to him was our friend, Stephen A. Douglas. And now it has become the catchword of the entire party. I would like to call upon his friends everywhere to consider how they have come in so short a time to view this matter in a way so entirely different from their former belief; to ask whether they are not being borne along by an irresistible current, whither they know not? In the joint debates, however, argument and oratory were both hamperedby the inexorable limit of time. For the full development of histhought, the speeches Lincoln made separately at other places affordedhim a freer opportunity. A quotation from his language on one of theseoccasions is therefore here added, as a better illustration of hisstyle and logic, where his sublime theme carried him into one of hismore impassioned moods: The Declaration of Independence was formed by the representatives of American liberty from thirteen States of the Confederacy, twelve of which were slave-holding communities. We need not discuss the way or the reason of their becoming slave-holding communities. It is sufficient for our purpose that all of them greatly deplored the evil and that they placed a provision in the Constitution which they supposed would gradually remove the disease by cutting off its source. This was the abolition of the slave trade. So general was the conviction, the public determination, to abolish the African slave trade, that the provision which I have referred to as being placed in the Constitution declared that it should not be abolished prior to the year 1808. A constitutional provision was necessary to prevent the people, through Congress, from putting a stop to the traffic immediately at the close of the war. Now if slavery had been a good thing, would the fathers of the republic have taken a step calculated to diminish its beneficent influences among themselves, and snatch the boon wholly from their posterity? These communities, by their representatives in old Independence Hall, said to the whole world of men: "We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. " This was their majestic interpretation of the economy of the Universe. This was their lofty, and wise, and noble understanding of the justice of the Creator to his creatures. Yes, gentlemen, to all his creatures, to the whole great family of man. In their enlightened belief, nothing stamped with the Divine image and likeness was sent into the world to be trodden on and degraded, and imbruted by its fellows. They grasped not only the whole race of man then living, but they reached forward and seized upon the farthest posterity. They erected a beacon to guide their children, and their children's children, and the countless myriads who should inhabit the earth in other ages. Wise statesmen as they were, they knew the tendency of prosperity to breed tyrants, and so they established these great self-evident truths, that when in the distant future some man, some faction, some interest, should set up the doctrine that none but rich men, or none but white men, or none but Anglo-Saxon white men, were entitled to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, their posterity might look up again to the Declaration of Independence and take courage to renew the battle which their fathers began, so that truth and justice and mercy and all the humane and Christian virtues might not be extinguished from the land; so that no man would hereafter dare to limit and circumscribe the great principles on which the temple of liberty was being built. Now, my countrymen, if you have been taught doctrines conflicting with the great landmarks of the Declaration of Independence; if you have listened to suggestions which would take away from its grandeur and mutilate the fair symmetry of its proportions; if you have been inclined to believe that all men are not created equal in those inalienable rights enumerated by our chart of liberty, let me entreat you to come back. Return to the fountain whose waters spring close by the blood of the revolution. Think nothing of me--take no thought for the political fate of any man whomsoever--but come back to the truths that are in the Declaration of Independence. You may do anything with me you choose, if you will but heed these sacred principles. You may not only defeat me for the Senate, but you may take me and put me to death. While pretending no indifference to earthly honors, I do claim to be actuated in this contest by something higher than an anxiety for office. I charge you to drop every paltry and insignificant thought for any man's success. It is nothing; I am nothing; Judge Douglas is nothing. But do not destroy that immortal emblem of Humanity--the Declaration of American Independence. [3] ----------[1] It is interesting to compare with Lincoln's letter one from Greeleyto a Chicago editor on the same subject: "NEW YORK, "July 24, 1858. "MY FRIEND: You have taken your own course--don't try to throw the blame on others. You have repelled Douglas, who might have been conciliated and attached to our own side, whatever he may _now_ find, it necessary to say, or do, and instead of helping us in other States, you have thrown a load upon us that may probably break us down. You knew what was the almost unanimous desire of the Republicans of other States; and you spurned and insulted them. Now go ahead and fight it through. You are in for it, and it does no good to make up wry faces. What I have said in the 'Tribune' since the fight was resolved on, has been in good faith, intended to help you through. If Lincoln would fight up to the work also, you might get through--if he apologizes, and retreats, he is lost, and all others go down with him. His first Springfield speech (at the convention) was in the right key; his Chicago speech was bad; and I fear the new Springfield speech is worse. If he dare not stand on broad Republican ground, he cannot stand at all. That, however, is _his_ business; he is nowise responsible for what I say. I shall stand on the broad anti-slavery ground, which I have occupied for years. I cannot change it to help your fight; and I should only damage you if I did. You have got your Elephant--you would have him--now shoulder him! He is not so very heavy, after all. As I seem to displease you equally when I try to keep you out of trouble, and when, having rushed in in spite of me, I try to help you in the struggle you have unwisely provoked, I must keep neutral, so far as may be hereafter. Yours, (Signed) "HORACE GREELEY. "J. MEDILL, Esq. , Chicago, (very) Ill. "What have I ever said in favor of 'Negro equality' with reference to your fight? I recollect nothing. " The above is from a manuscript copy of Greeley's letter, but it bearsinternal evidence of genuineness. [2] "Last year in the Illinois canvass I made just 130 speeches. "--[Douglas, Wooster (O. ) Speech. ] This was between July 9 and November2, 1858, just 100 days, exclusive of Sundays. [3] Lincoln's Lewiston Speech, August 17, 1858. Chicago "Press andTribune. " CHAPTER IX THE FREEPORT DOCTRINE [Sidenote] Lincoln-Douglas Debates, p. 68. What has thus far been quoted has been less to illustrate the leadinglines of discussion, than to explain more fully the main historicalincident of the debates. In the first joint discussion at Ottawa, inthe northern or anti-slavery part of Illinois, Douglas read a series ofstrong anti-slavery resolutions which he erroneously alleged Lincolnhad taken part in framing and passing. He said: "My object in readingthese resolutions was to put the question to Abraham Lincoln this daywhether he now stands and will stand by each article in that creed andcarry it out. .. . I ask Abraham Lincoln to answer these questions inorder that when I trot him down to lower Egypt[1] I may put the samequestions to him. "[2] [Sidenote] Lincoln-Douglas Debates, p. 87. In preparing a powerful appeal to local prejudice, Douglas doubtlessknew he was handling a two-edged sword; but we shall see that helittle appreciated the skill with which his antagonist would wield theweapon he was placing in his hands. At their second joint meeting, atFreeport, also in northern Illinois, Lincoln, who now had the openingspeech, said, referring to Douglas's speech at Ottawa: "I do him noinjustice in saying that he occupied at least half of his reply indealing with me as though I had refused to answer his interrogatories. I now propose that I will answer any of the interrogatories, uponcondition that he will answer questions from me not exceeding the samenumber. I give him an opportunity to respond. The judge remainssilent. I now say that I will answer his interrogatories, whether heanswers mine or not; and that after I have done so, I shall propoundmine to him. " Lincoln then read his answers to the seven questions which, had beenasked him, and proposed four in return, the second one of which ran asfollows: "Can the people of a United States Territory, in any lawfulway, against the wish of any citizen of the United States, excludeslavery from its limits, prior to the formation of a Stateconstitution?"[3] To comprehend the full force of this interrogatory, the reader mustrecall the fact that the "popular sovereignty" of the Nebraska billwas couched in vague language, and qualified with the proviso that itwas "subject to the Constitution. " The caucus which framed thisphraseology agreed, as a compromise between Northern and SouthernDemocrats, that the courts should interpret and define theconstitutional limitations, by which all should abide. The Dred Scottdecision declared in terms that Congress could not prohibit slavery inTerritories nor authorize a Territorial Legislature to do so. The DredScott decision had thus annihilated "popular sovereignty, " WouldDouglas admit his blunder in law, and his error in statesmanship? He had already faced and partly evaded this dilemma in his Springfieldspeech of 1857, but that was a local declaration and occurred beforehis Lecompton revolt, and the ingenious sophism then put forth hadattracted little notice. Since that time things had materiallychanged. He had opposed Lecompton, become a party recusant, and beendeclared a party apostate. His Senatorial term was closing, and he hadto look to an evenly balanced if not a hostile constituency forreëlection. The Buchanan Administration was putting forth what feeblestrength it had in Illinois to insure his defeat. His Democraticrivals were scrutinizing every word he uttered. He stood before thepeople to whom he had pledged his word that the voters of Kansas mightregulate their own domestic concerns. They would tolerate no jugglingnor evasion. There remained no resource but to answer _Yes_, and hecould conjure up no justification of such an answer except the hollowsubterfuge he had invented the year before. [Sidenote] Lincoln to Asbury, July 31, 1858. Lincoln clearly enough comprehended the dilemma and predicted theexpedient of his antagonist. He had framed his questions and submittedthem to a consultation of shrewd party friends. This one especiallywas the subject of anxious deliberation and serious disagreement. Nearly a month before, Lincoln in a private letter accuratelyforeshadowed Douglas's course on this question. "You shall have hardwork to get him directly to the point whether a TerritorialLegislature has or has not the power to exclude slavery. But if yousucceed in bringing him to it--though he will be compelled to say itpossesses no such power--he will instantly take ground that slaverycannot actually exist in the Territories unless the people desire it, and so give it protection by Territorial legislation. If this offendsthe South, he will let it offend them, as at all events he means tohold on to his chances in Illinois. " There is a tradition that on thenight preceding this Freeport debate Lincoln was catching a few hours'rest, at a railroad center named Mendota, to which place theconverging trains brought after midnight a number of excitedRepublican leaders, on their way to attend the great meeting at theneighboring town of Freeport. Notwithstanding the late hour, Mr. Lincoln's bedroom was invaded by an improvised caucus, and the ominousquestion was once more brought under consideration. The whole drift ofadvice ran against putting the interrogatory to Douglas; but Lincolnpersisted in his determination to force him to answer it. Finally hisfriends in a chorus cried out, "If you do, you can never be Senator. ""Gentlemen, " replied Lincoln, "I am killing larger game; if Douglasanswers, he can never be President, and the battle of 1860 is worth ahundred of this. " When Lincoln had finished his opening speech in the Freeport debate, and Douglas in his reply came to interrogatory number two, whichLincoln had propounded, he answered as follows: [Sidenote] Lincoln-Douglas Debates, p. 95. The next question propounded to me by Mr. Lincoln is, Can the people of a Territory in any lawful way, against the wish of any citizen of the United States, exclude slavery from their limits, prior to the formation of a State constitution? I answer emphatically, as Mr. Lincoln has heard me answer a hundred times from every stump in Illinois, that in my opinion the people of a Territory can, by lawful means, exclude slavery from their limits, prior to the formation of a State constitution. Mr. Lincoln knew that I had answered that question over and over again. He heard me argue the Nebraska bill on that principle all over the State in 1854, in 1855, and in 1856, and he has no excuse for pretending to be in doubt as to my position on that question. It matters not what way the Supreme Court may hereafter decide as to the abstract question whether slavery may or may not go into a Territory under the Constitution, the people have the lawful means to introduce it or exclude it, as they please, for the reason that slavery cannot exist a day or an hour anywhere, unless it is supported by local police regulations. Those police regulations can only be established by the local Legislature, and if the people are opposed to slavery they will elect representatives to that body who will by unfriendly legislation effectually prevent the introduction of it into their midst. If, on the contrary, they are for it, their legislation will favor its extension. Hence, no matter what the decision of the Supreme Court may be on that abstract question, still the right of the people to make a slave Territory or a free Territory is perfect and complete under the Nebraska bill. I hope Mr. Lincoln deems my answer satisfactory on that point. [Illustration: STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS. ] The remarkable theory here proposed was immediately taken up andexhaustively discussed by the leading newspapers in all parts of theUnion, and thereby became definitely known under the terms "unfriendlylegislation" and "Freeport doctrine. " Mr. Lincoln effectually disposedof it in the following fashion in the joint debate at Alton: [Sidenote] Lincoln-Douglas Debates, pp. 234-5. I understand I have ten minutes yet. I will employ it in saying something about this argument Judge Douglas uses, while he sustains the Dred Scott decision, that the people of the Territories can still somehow exclude slavery. The first thing I ask attention to is the fact that Judge Douglas constantly said, before the decision, that whether they could or not, was a question for the Supreme Court. But after the court has made the decision he virtually says it is not a question for the Supreme Court, but for the people. And how is it he tells us they can exclude it? He said it needs "police regulations, " and that admits of "unfriendly legislation. " Although it is a right established by the Constitution of the United States to take a slave into a Territory of the United States and hold him as property, yet unless the Territorial Legislature will give friendly legislation, and, more especially, if they adopt unfriendly legislation, they can practically exclude him. Now, without meeting this proposition as a matter of fact, I pass to consider the real constitutional obligation. Let me take the gentleman who looks me in the face before me, and let us suppose that he is a member of the Territorial Legislature. The first thing he will do will be to swear that he will support the Constitution of the United States. His neighbor by his side in the Territory has slaves and needs Territorial legislation to enable him to enjoy that constitutional right. Can he withhold the legislation which his neighbor needs for the enjoyment of a right which is fixed in his favor in the Constitution of the United States, which he has sworn to support? Can he withhold it without violating his oath? and more especially, can he pass unfriendly legislation to violate his oath? Why this is a monstrous sort of talk about the Constitution of the United States! There has never been as outlandish or lawless a doctrine from the mouth of any respectable man on earth. I do not believe it is a constitutional right to hold slaves in a Territory of the United States. I believe the decision was improperly made, and I go for reversing it. Judge Douglas is furious against those who go for reversing a decision. But he is for legislating it out of all force, while the law itself stands. I repeat that there has never been so monstrous a doctrine uttered from the mouth of a respectable man. The announcement and subsequent defense by Douglas of his "Freeportdoctrine" proved, as Lincoln had predicted, something more importantthan a mere campaign incident. It was the turning-point in Douglas'spolitical fortunes. With the whole South, and with a few prominentpoliticians of the North, it served to put him outside the pale ofparty fellowship. Compared with this his Lecompton revolt had been avenial offense. In that case he had merely contended for the machineryof a fair popular vote. This was the avowal of a principle asobnoxious to the slavery propaganda as the unqualified abolitionism ofGiddings and Lovejoy. Henceforth all hope of reconciliation, atonement, or chance of Presidential nomination by the unitedDemocratic party was out of the question. Before this, newspaperzealots had indeed denounced him for his Lecompton recusancy as atraitor and renegade, and the Administration had endeavored to securehis defeat; now, however, in addition, the party high-priests put himunder solemn ban of excommunication. How they felt and from whatmotives they acted is stated with singular force and frankness in aSenate speech, soon after the Charleston Convention, by Senator JudahP. Benjamin, of Louisiana, one of the ablest and most persistent ofthe conspirators to nationalize slavery, and who, not long after, wasone of the principal actors in the great rebellion: Up to the years 1857 and 1858 no man in this nation had a higher or more exalted opinion of the character, the services, and the political integrity of the Senator from Illinois [Douglas] than I had. .. . Sir, it has been with reluctance and sorrow that I have been obliged to pluck down my idol from his place on high, and to refuse to him any more support or confidence as a member of the party. I have done so, I trust, upon no light or unworthy ground. I have not done so alone. The causes that have operated on me have operated on the Democratic party of the United States, and have operated an effect which the whole future life of the Senator will be utterly unable to obliterate. It is impossible that confidence thus lost can be restored. On what ground has that confidence been forfeited, and why is it that we now refuse him our support and fellowship? I have stated our reasons to-day. I have appealed to the record. I have not followed him back in the false issue or the feigned traverse that he makes in relation to matters that are not now in contest between him and the Democratic party. The question is not what we all said or believed in 1850 or in 1856. How idle was it to search ancient precedents and accumulate old quotations from what Senators may have at different times said in relation to their principles and views. The precise point, the direct arraignment, the plain and explicit allegation made against the Senator from Illinois is not touched by him in all of his speech. [Sidenote] Benjamin, Senate Speech, May 22, 1860. Pamphlet. We accuse him for this, to wit: that having bargained with us upon a point upon which we were at issue, that it should be considered a judicial point; that he would abide the decision; that he would act under the decision, and consider it a doctrine of the party; that having said that to us here in the Senate, he went home, and under the stress of a local election, his knees gave way; his whole person trembled. His adversary stood upon principle and was beaten; and lo! he is the candidate of a mighty party for the Presidency of the United States. The Senator from Illinois faltered. He got the prize for which he faltered; but lo! the grand prize of his ambition to-day slips from his grasp because of his faltering in his former contest, and his success in the canvass for the Senate, purchased for an ignoble price, has cost him the loss of the Presidency of the United States. [Sidenote] 1858. The Senatorial canvass in Illinois came to a close with the electionon the 2d of November and resulted in a victory for Douglas. TheRepublicans, on their State ticket, polled 125, 430 votes; the DouglasDemocrats, 121, 609; the Buchanan Democrats, 5071. By this pluralitythe Republican State officers were chosen. But in respect to membersof the Legislature the case stood differently, and when in thefollowing January the Senatorial election took place in joint sessionof the two Houses, Douglas received the vote of every Democrat, 54members, and Lincoln the vote of every Republican, 46 members, whereupon Douglas was declared elected Senator of the United Statesfor six years from the 4th of March, 1859. The main cause of Lincoln's defeat was the unfairness of the existingapportionment, which was based upon the census of 1850. A fairapportionment, based on the changes of population which had occurred, would have given northern Illinois a larger representation; and it wasthere the Republicans had recruited their principal strength in therecent transformation of parties. The Republicans estimated that thiscircumstance caused them a loss of six to ten members. [Sidenote] Lincoln, Cincinnati Speech, Sept. 17, 1859. Debates, p. 263. But the unusual political combinations also had a large influence onthe result. Lincoln, in an Ohio speech made in the following year, addressing himself to Kentuckians, thus summarized the politicalforces that contributed to his defeat: "Douglas had three or four verydistinguished men of the most extreme anti-slavery views of any men inthe Republican party expressing their desire for his reëlection to theSenate last year. That would of itself have seemed to be a littlewonderful, but that wonder is heightened when we see that Wise, ofVirginia, a man exactly opposed to them, a man who believes in thedivine right of slavery, was also expressing his desire that Douglasshould be reëlected; that another man that may be said to be kindredto Wise, Mr. Breckinridge, the Vice-President, and of your own State, was also agreeing with the anti-slavery men in the North, that Douglasought to be reëlected. Still to heighten the wonder, a Senator fromKentucky, whom I have always loved with an affection as tender andendearing as I have ever loved any man, who was opposed to theanti-slavery men for reasons which seemed sufficient to him and equallyopposed to Wise and Breckinridge, was writing letters to Illinois tosecure the reëlection of Douglas. Now that all these conflictingelements should be brought, while at daggers' points with one another, to support him, is a feat that is worthy for you to note and consider. It is quite probable that each of these classes of men thought, by thereëlection of Douglas, their peculiar views would gain something; itis probable that the anti-slavery men thought their views would gainsomething; that Wise and Breckinridge thought so too, as regards theiropinions; that Mr. Crittenden thought that his views would gainsomething although he was opposed to both these other men. It isprobable that each and all of them thought they were using Douglas, and it is yet an unsolved problem whether he was not using them all. " After a hundred consecutive days of excitement, of intense mentalstrain, and of unremitting bodily exertion, after speech-making andparades, music and bonfires, it must be something of a trial to faceat once the mortification of defeat, the weariness of intellectual andphysical reaction, and the dull commonplace of daily routine. Letterswritten at this period show that under these conditions Mr. Lincolnremained composed, patient, and hopeful. Two weeks after election hewrote thus to Mr. Judd, a member of the Legislature and Chairman ofthe Republican State Central Committee: "I have the pleasure to informyou that I am convalescing and hoping these lines may find you in thesame improving state of health. Doubtless you have suspected for sometime that I entertain a personal wish for a term in the United StatesSenate; and had the suspicion taken the shape of the direct charge Ithink I could not have truthfully denied it. But let the past asnothing be. For the future my view is that the fight must go on. Thereturns here are not yet complete, but it is believed that Dougherty'svote will be slightly greater than Miller's majority over Fondey. Wehave some 120, 000 clear Republican votes. That pile is worth keepingtogether. It will elect a State ticket two years hence. " [Sidenote] Lincoln to Judd, Nov. 15, 1858. "In that day I shall fight in the ranks, but shall be in no one's wayfor any of the places. I am especially for Trumbull's reëlection; and, by the way, this brings me to the principal object of this letter. Canyou not take your draft of an apportionment bill and carefully reviseit till it shall be strictly and obviously just in all particulars, and then by an early and persistent effort get enough of the enemies'men to enable you to pass it? I believe if you and Peck make a job ofit, begin early and work earnestly and quietly, you can succeed in it. Unless something be done, Trumbull is inevitably beaten two yearshence. Take this into serious consideration. " [Sidenote] Ibid. , Nov. 16, 1858. On the following day he received from Mr. Judd a letter informing himthat the funds subscribed for the State Central Committee did notsuffice to pay all the election bills, and asking his help to raiseadditional contributions. To this appeal Lincoln replied: "Yours ofthe 15th is just received. I wrote you the same day. As to thepecuniary matter, I am willing to pay according to my ability, but Iam the poorest hand living to get others to pay. I have been onexpenses so long without earning anything that I am absolutely withoutmoney now for even household purposes. Still, if you can put in $250for me towards discharging the debt of the committee, I will allow itwhen you and I settle the private matter between us. This, with what Ihave already paid, and with an outstanding note of mine, will exceedmy subscription of $500. This, too, is exclusive of my ordinaryexpenses during the campaign, all which being added to my loss of timeand business, bears pretty heavily upon one no better off in world'sgoods than I; but as I had the post of honor, it is not for me to beover-nice. You are feeling badly--'And this too shall pass away. 'Never fear. " [Sidenote] Lincoln to Dr. Henry, Nov. 19, 1858. MS. The sting of personal defeat is painful to most men, and doubtless itwas so to Lincoln. Yet he regarded the passing struggle as somethingmore than a mere scramble for office, and drew from it the consolationwhich all earnest workers feel in the consciousness of a task welldone. Thus he wrote to a friend on November 19: "You doubtless haveseen ere this the result of the election here. Of course I wished, butI did not much expect, a better result. .. . I am glad I made the laterace. It gave me a hearing on the great and durable question of theage, which I could have had in no other way; and though I now sink outof view, and shall be forgotten, I believe I have made some markswhich will tell for the cause of civil liberty long after I am gone. " [Sidenote] Lincoln to Asbury, November 19, 1858. To these one other letter may be added, showing his never-failingfaith in the political future. To a personal friend in Quincy, Illinois, who had watched the campaign with unusual attention, Lincolnwrote that same day: "Yours of the 13th was received some days ago. The fight must go on. The cause of civil liberty must not besurrendered at the end of one or even one hundred defeats. Douglas hadthe ingenuity to be supported in the late contest, both as the bestmeans to break down and to uphold the slave interest. No ingenuity cankeep these antagonistic elements in harmony long. Another explosionwill soon come. " [Sidenote] 1858. Douglas was also greatly exhausted by the wearing labors of thecampaign; but he had the notable triumph of an assured reëlection tothe Senate and the congratulations of his enthusiastic friends tosustain and refresh him. Being an indefatigable worker, he was alreadyorganizing a new and more ambitious effort. Three weeks after electionhe started on a brief tour to the Southern States, making speeches atMemphis and New Orleans, of which further mention will be made in thenext chapter. Perhaps he deemed it wise not to proceed immediately toWashington, where Congress convened on the first Monday of December, and thus to avoid a direct continuance of his battle with the BuchananAdministration. If so, the device proved ineffectual. The Presidentand his partisans were determined to put the author of the "Freeportdoctrine" under public ban, and to that end, when Congress organized, one of the first acts of the Senate majority was to depose Douglasfrom his place as chairman of the Committee on Territories, which hehad held in that body for eleven years. ----------[1] A local nickname by which the southern or pro-slavery portion ofIllinois was familiarly known. [2] DOUGLAS'S QUESTIONS AND LINCOLN'S ANSWERS. "_Question_ 1. 'I desire to know whether Lincoln to-day stands, as he did in 1854, in favor of the unconditional repeal of the fugitive-slave law?' _Answer_. I do not now, nor ever did, stand in favor of the unconditional repeal of the fugitive-slave law. _Q_. 2. 'I desire him to answer whether he stands pledged to-day, as he did in 1854, against the admission of any more slave-States into the Union even if the people want them?' _A_. I do not now, nor ever did, stand pledged against the admission of any more slave-States into the Union. _Q_. 3. 'I want to know whether he stands pledged against the admission of a new State into the Union with such a constitution as the people of that State may see fit to make?' _A_. I do not stand pledged against the admission of a new State into the Union with such a constitution as the people of that State may see fit to make. _Q_. 4. 'I want to know whether he stands to-day pledged to the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia?' _A_. I do not stand to-day pledged to the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia. _Q_. 5. 'I desire him to answer whether he stands pledged to the prohibition of the slave trade between the different States?' _A_. I do not stand pledged to the prohibition of the slave trade between the different States. _Q_. 6. 'I desire to know whether he stands pledged to prohibit slavery in all the Territories of the United States, north as well as south of the Missouri Compromise line?' _A_. I am impliedly if not expressly pledged to a belief in the right and duty of Congress to prohibit slavery in all the United States Territories. _Q_. 7. 'I desire him to answer whether he is opposed to the acquisition of any new territory unless slavery is first prohibited therein?' _A_. I am not generally opposed to honest acquisition of territory; and, in any given case, I would or would not oppose such acquisition accordingly as I might think such acquisition would or would not aggravate the slavery question among ourselves. "--Lincoln-Douglas Debates, p. 88. [3] LINCOLN'S QUESTIONS. "_Question_ 1. If the people of Kansas shall, by means entirely unobjectionable in all other respects, adopt a State constitution, and ask admission into the Union under it, before they have the requisite number of inhabitants according to the English bill, --some 93, 000, --will you vote to admit them? _Q_. 2. Can the people of a United States Territory, in any lawful way, against the wish of any citizen of the United States, exclude slavery from its limits, prior to the formation of a State constitution? _Q_. 3. If the Supreme Court of the United States shall decide that States cannot exclude slavery from their limits, are you in favor of acquiescing in, adopting, and following such decision as a rule of political action? _Q_. 4. Are you in favor of acquiring additional territory, in disregard of how such acquisition may affect the nation on the slavery question?"--Lincoln-Douglas Debates, p. 90. CHAPTER X LINCOLN'S OHIO SPEECHES When Lincoln, in opening the Senatorial campaign of Illinois, declaredthat the Republican cause must be intrusted to its own undoubtedfriends "who do care for the result, " he displayed a much betterunderstanding of the character and aims of his opponent than thosewho, not so well informed, desired the adoption of a different course. Had the wishes of Greeley and others prevailed, had Douglas beenadopted by the Illinois Republicans, the party would have found itselfin a fatal dilemma, No sooner was the campaign closed than Douglas, having entered on his tour through the South, began making speeches, apparently designed to pave his way to a nomination for President bythe next Democratic National Convention. Realizing that he had lostground by his anti-Lecomptonism, and especially by his Freeportdoctrine, and having felt in the late campaign the hostility of theBuchanan Administration, he now sought to recover prestige bypublishing more advanced opinions indirectly sustaining and defendingslavery. Hitherto he had declared he did not care whether slavery was voteddown or voted up. He had said he would not argue the question whetherslavery was right or wrong. He had adopted Taney's assertion that thenegro had no share in the Declaration of Independence. He had assertedthat uniformity was impossible, but that freedom and slavery mightabide together forever. But now that the election was over and a newterm in the Senate secure, he was ready to conciliate pro-slaveryopinion with stronger expressions. Hence, in a speech at Memphis, hecunningly linked together in argument unfriendly legislation, slavery, and annexation. He said: "Whenever a Territory has a climate, soil, and production making it the interest of the inhabitants to encourageslave property, they will pass a slave code. " Wherever these preclude the possibility of slavery being profitable, they will not permit it. On the sugar plantations of Louisiana it wasnot a question between the white man and the negro, but between thenegro and the crocodile. He would say that between the negro and thecrocodile, he took the side of the negro; but between the negro andthe white man, he would go for the white man. The Almighty has drawnthe line on this continent, on the one side of which the soil must becultivated by slave labor; on the other by white labor. That line didnot run on 36º and 30' [the Missouri Compromise line], for 36º and 30'runs over mountains and through valleys. But this slave line, he said, meanders in the sugar-fields and plantations of the South, and thepeople living in their different localities and in the Territoriesmust determine for themselves whether their "middle bed" is bestadapted to slavery or free labor. [Sidenote] Douglas, Memphis Speech, Nov. 29, 1858. Memphis "Eagle and Enquirer. " Referring to annexation, he said our destiny had forced us to acquireFlorida, Louisiana, Texas, New Mexico, and California. "We have nowterritory enough, but how long will it be enough? One hive is enoughfor one swarm of bees, but a new swarm comes next year and a new hiveis wanted. " Men may say we shall never want anything more of Mexico, but the time would come when we would be compelled to take more. Central America was half-way to California and on the direct road. Thetime will come when our destiny, our institutions, our safety willcompel us to have it. "So it is, " concluded he, "with the island ofCuba. .. . It is a matter of no consequence whether we want it or not;we are compelled to take it, and we can't help it". [Sidenote] Douglas, New Orleans Speech, Dec. 6, 1858. Pamphlet. When Douglas reached New Orleans he substantially repeated thesedeclarations in another long speech, and, as if he had not yet placedhimself in entire harmony with Southern opinion, he added a sentimentalmost as remarkable as the "mudsill" theory of Hammond, or the later"cornerstone" doctrine of Stephens: "It is a law of humanity, " saidhe, "a law of civilization, that whenever a man or a race of men showthemselves incapable of managing their own affairs, they must consentto be governed by those who are capable of performing the duty. It ison this principle that you establish those institutions of charity forthe support of the blind, or the deaf and dumb, or the insane. Inaccordance with this principle, I assert that the negro race, underall circumstances, at all times, and in all countries, has shownitself incapable of self-government. " [Sidenote] Douglas, Baltimore Speech, Jan. 5, 1859. Pamphlet. Once more, in a speech at Baltimore, Douglas repeated in substancewhat he had said at Memphis and New Orleans, and then in the beginningof January, 1859, he reached Washington and took his seat in theSenate. Here he began to comprehend the action of the Democraticcaucus in deposing him from the chairmanship of the Committee onTerritories. His personal influence and prestige among the Southernleaders were gone. Neither his revived zeal for annexation, nor hisadvanced views on the necessity for slave labor, restored hisgood-fellowship with the extremists. Although, pursuant to arecommendation in the annual message, a measure was then pending inthe Senate to place thirty millions in the hands of President Buchananwith which to negotiate for Cuba, the attitude of the pro-slaveryfaction was not one of conciliation, but of unrelenting opposition tohim. [Sidenote] Brown, Senate Speech, Feb. 28, 1859. "Globe, " pp. 1241 _et seq_. Towards the close of the short session this feeling broke out in anopen demonstration. On February 23, while an item of the appropriationbill was under debate, Senator Brown, of Mississippi, said he wantedthe success of the Democratic party in 1860 to be a success ofprinciples and not of men. He neither wanted to cheat nor be cheated. Under the decision of the Supreme Court the South would demandprotection for slavery in the Territories. If he understood theSenator from Illinois, Mr. Douglas, he thought a TerritorialLegislature might by non-action or by unfriendly action rightfullyexclude slavery. He dissented from him, and now he would like to knowfrom other Senators from the North what they would do: "If theTerritorial Legislature refuses to act, will you act? If it passunfriendly acts, will you pass friendly? If it pass laws hostile toslavery, will you annul them and substitute laws favoring slavery intheir stead?. .. I would rather, " concluded he "see the Democraticparty sunk, never to be resurrected, than to see it successful onlythat one portion of it might practice a fraud on another. " [Sidenote] Brown, Senate Speech, Feb. 28, 1859. "Globe, " pp. 1246-7. Douglas met the issue, and defended his Freeport doctrine withoutflinching. The Democracy of the North hold, said he, that "if yourepudiate the doctrine of non-intervention, and form a slave code byact of Congress, where the people of a Territory refuse it, you muststep off the Democratic platform. I tell you, gentlemen of the South, in all candor, I do not believe a Democratic candidate can ever carryany one Democratic State of the North on the platform that it is theduty of the Federal Government to force the people of a Territory tohave slavery when they do not want it. " The discussion extended itself to other Senators; Jefferson Davis, ofMississippi, Clay, of Alabama, Mason, of Virginia, and Gwin, ofCalifornia, seconded the demands and arguments of Brown; while Pugh, of Ohio, Broderick, of California, and Stuart, of Michigan, came tothe help and defense of Douglas and non-intervention. SeveralRepublicans drifted into the debate on behalf of the position andprinciples of their party, which of course differed from those of bothBrown and Douglas. The discussion was continued to a late hour, andfinally came to an end through mere lapse of time, but not until anirreparable schism in the Democratic party had been opened. [Sidenote] Douglas to Dorr, June 22, 1859. Baltimore "Sun, " June 24, 1859. Silence upon so vital an issue could not long be maintained. In thefollowing June, an Iowa friend wrote to Douglas to inquire whether hewould be a candidate for the Presidential nomination at the comingCharleston Convention. Douglas replied that party issues must firstbe defined. If the Democracy adhered to their former principles, his friends would be at liberty to present his name. "If, on thecontrary, " continued he, "it shall become the policy of the Democraticparty, which I cannot anticipate, to repudiate these theirtime-honored principles, on which we have achieved so many patriotictriumphs, and in lieu of them the convention shall interpolate intothe creed of the party such new issues as the revival of the Africanslave-trade, or a Congressional slave-code for the Territories, or thedoctrine that the Constitution of the United States either establishesor prohibits slavery in the Territories beyond the power of the peoplelegally to control it, as other property--it is due to candor to saythat, in such an event, I could not accept the nomination if tenderedto me. " [Sidenote] Ray to Lincoln, July 27, 1858. MS. We must leave the career of Douglas for a while, to follow up thepersonal history of Lincoln. The peculiar attitude of nationalpolitics had in the previous year drawn the attention of the wholecountry to Illinois in a remarkable degree. The Senatorial campaignwas hardly opened when a Chicago editor, whose daily examination of alarge list of newspaper exchanges brought the fact vividly under hisobservation, wrote to Lincoln: "You are like Byron, who woke up onemorning and found himself famous. People wish to know about you. Youhave sprung at once from the position of a capital fellow, and aleading lawyer in Illinois, to a national reputation. " [Illustration: DAVID COLBRETH BRODERICK. ] [Sidenote] David Davis to Lincoln, Nov. 7, 1858. MS. The compliment was fully warranted; the personal interest in Lincolnincreased daily from the beginning to the end of the great debates. The Freeport doctrine and its effect upon the Democratic party gavethese discussions both present significance and a growing interest forthe future. Another friend wrote him, a few days after election: "Youhave made a noble canvass, which, if unavailing in this State, hasearned you a national reputation, and made you friends everywhere. " [Sidenote] Delahay to Lincoln, March 15, 1859. MS. [Sidenote] Dorsheimer to Chase, Sept. 12, 1859. MS. [Sidenote] Kasson to Lincoln, Sept. 13, 1859. MS. [Sidenote] Kirkpatrick to Lincoln, Sept. 15, 1859. MS. [Sidenote] Weed to Judd, Oct. 21, 1859. MS. [Sidenote] Dennison to Trumbull, July 21, 1859. MS. That this was not the mere flattery of partial friends became manifestto him by other indications; by an increased correspondence filledwith general commendation, and particularly by numerous invitations todeliver speeches in other States. The Republican Central Committee ofNew Hampshire wrote him that if Douglas came, as was expected, to thatState, they desired Lincoln to come and answer him. The CentralCommittee of Minnesota wished him to come there and assist in theircanvass. There was an incessant commotion in politics throughout thewhole North, and as the season advanced calls came from all quarters. Kansas wanted him; Buffalo, Des Moines, Pittsburgh wanted him; ThurlowWeed telegraphed: "Send Abraham Lincoln to Albany immediately. " Notonly his presence, but his arguments, and ideas, were in demand. Dennison, making the canvass for Governor of Ohio, asked for a reportof his debates for campaign "material. " That men in all parts of the Union were thus turning to him for helpand counsel was due, not alone to the publicity and credit he hadgained in his debates with Douglas in the previous year; it grew quiteas much out of the fact that by his sagacity and courage he had madehimself the safest, as well as the most available, rallying-point ofthe Republican party and exponent of Republican doctrine. TheLecompton quarrel in the Democratic party had led many prominentRepublicans on a false trail. In Douglas's new attitude, developed byhis Southern speeches and his claim to readmission into regularDemocratic fellowship, these leaders found themselves at fault, discredited by their own course. Lincoln, on the contrary, not onlyheld aloft the most aggressive Republican banner, but stood nearestthe common party enemy, and was able to offer advice to all theelements of the Republican party, free from any suspicion of intriguewith foe or faction. The causes of his Senatorial defeat thus gave hima certain party authority and leadership, which were felt if notopenly acknowledged. On his part, while never officious or obtrusive, he was always ready with seasonable and judicious suggestions, generous in spirit and comprehensive in scope, and which looked beyondmere local success. Thus he wrote from Springfield to Schuyler Colfax (afterwardsVice-President of the United States), July 6, 1859: "I much regret notseeing you while you were here among us. Before learning that you wereto be at Jacksonville on the 4th, I had given my word to be at anotherplace. Besides a strong desire to make your personal acquaintance, Iwas anxious to speak with you on politics a little more fully than Ican well do in a letter. My main object in such conversation would beto hedge against divisions in the Republican ranks generally, andparticularly for the contest of 1860. The point of danger is thetemptation in different localities to 'platform' for something whichwill be popular just there, but which, nevertheless, will be afirebrand elsewhere, and especially in a national convention. Asinstances, the movement against foreigners in Massachusetts; in NewHampshire, to make obedience to the fugitive-slave law punishable as acrime; in Ohio, to repeal the fugitive-slave law; and, squattersovereignty, in Kansas. In these things there is explosive matterenough to blow up half a dozen national conventions, if it gets intothem; and what gets very rife outside of conventions is very likely tofind its way into them. What is desirable, if possible, is that inevery local convocation of Republicans a point should be made to avoideverything which will disturb Republicans elsewhere. MassachusettsRepublicans should have looked beyond their noses, and then they couldnot have failed to see that tilting against foreigners would ruin usin the whole Northwest. New Hampshire and Ohio should forbear tiltingagainst the fugitive-slave law in such way as to utterly overwhelm usin Illinois with the charge of enmity to the Constitution itself. Kansas, in her confidence that she can be saved to freedom on'squatter sovereignty, ' ought not to forget that to prevent the spreadand nationalization of slavery is a national concern, and must beattended to by the nation. In a word, in every locality we should lookbeyond our noses; and at least say nothing on points where it isprobable we shall disagree. I write this for your eye only; hoping, however, if you see danger as I think I do, you will do what you canto avert it. Could not suggestions be made to leading men in the Stateand Congressional conventions, and so avoid, to some extent at least, these apples of discord. "[1] [Sidenote] Colfax to Lincoln, July 14, 1859. MS. By this time Colfax was cured of his late coquetting with Douglas, andhe replied: "The suggestions you make have occurred to me. .. . Nothingis more evident than that there is an ample number of voters in theNorthern States, opposed to the extension and aggressions of slaveryand to Democratic misrule, to triumphantly elect a President of theUnited States. But it is equally evident that making up this majorityare men of all shades and gradations of opinion, from the conservativewho will scarcely defend his principles for fear of imperiling peace, to the bold radical who strikes stalwart blows regardless of policy orpopularity. How this mass of mind shall be consolidated into avictorious phalanx in 1860 is the great problem, I think, of oureventful times. And he who could accomplish it is worthier of famethan Napoleon or Victor Emmanuel. .. . In this work, to achieve success, and to achieve it without sacrifice of essential principle, you can dofar more than one like myself, so much younger. Your counsel carriesgreat weight with it; for, to be plain, there is no political letterthat falls from your pen which is not copied throughout the Union. " [Sidenote] Lincoln to Canisius, May 17, 1859. This allusion was called out by two letters which Lincoln had writtenduring the year; one declaring his opposition to the waning fallacy ofknow-nothingism, in which he also defined his position on "fusion. "Referring to a provision lately adopted by Massachusetts to restrictnaturalization, he wrote: "Massachusetts is a sovereign andindependent State; and it is no privilege of mine to scold her forwhat she does. Still, if from what she has done, an inference issought to be drawn as to what I would do, I may, without impropriety, speak out, I say then, that, as I understand the Massachusettsprovision, I am against its adoption in Illinois, or in any otherplace where I have a right to oppose it. Understanding the spirit ofour institutions to aim at the elevation of men, I am opposed towhatever tends to degrade them. I have some little notoriety forcommiserating the oppressed condition of the negro; and I should bestrangely inconsistent if I could favor any project for curtailing theexisting rights of white men, even though born in different lands, andspeaking different languages from myself. As to the matter of fusion, I am for it, if it can be had on Republican grounds; and I am not forit on any other terms. A fusion on any other terms would be as foolishand unprincipled. It would lose the whole North, while the commonenemy would still carry the whole South. The question of men is adifferent one. There are good patriotic men and able statesmen in theSouth whom I would cheerfully support, if they would now placethemselves on Republican ground, but I am against letting down theRepublican standard a hair's breadth. " The other was a somewhat longer letter, to a Boston committee whichhad invited him to a festival in honor of Jefferson's birthday. "Bearing in mind that about seventy years ago two great politicalparties were first formed in this country; that Thomas Jefferson wasthe head of one of them, and Boston the headquarters of the other, itis both curious and interesting that those supposed to descendpolitically from the party opposed to Jefferson, should now becelebrating his birthday, in their own original seat of empire, whilethose claiming political descent from him have nearly ceased tobreathe his name everywhere. .. . " [Sidenote] Lincoln to Pierce and others, April 6, 1859. "But, soberly, it is now no child's play to save the principles ofJefferson from total overthrow in this nation. One would state withgreat confidence that he could convince any sane child that thesimpler propositions of Euclid are true; but nevertheless he wouldfail, utterly, with one who should deny the definitions and axioms. The principles of Jefferson are the definitions and axioms of freesociety. And yet they are denied and evaded, with no small show ofsuccess. One dashingly calls them 'glittering generalities. ' Anotherbluntly calls them 'self-evident lies. ' And others insidiously arguethat they apply only to 'superior races. ' These expressions, differingin form, are identical in object and effect--the supplanting theprinciples of free government, and restoring those of classification, caste, and legitimacy. They would delight a convocation of crownedheads plotting against the people. They are the van-guard--the minersand sappers of returning despotism. We must repulse them, or they willsubjugate us. This is a world of compensation; and he who would be noslave must consent to have no slave. Those who deny freedom to othersdeserve it not for themselves; and, under a just God, cannot longretain it. All honor to Jefferson--to the man who, in the concretepressure of a struggle for national independence by a single people, had the coolness, forecast, and capacity to introduce into a merelyrevolutionary document an abstract truth, applicable to all men andall times, and so to embalm it there that to-day and in all comingdays it shall be a rebuke and a stumbling-block to the very harbingersof re-appearing tyranny and oppression. " Lincoln's more important political work of the year 1859 was the parthe took in the canvass in the State of Ohio, where a governor was tobe chosen at the October election, and where the result would decidenot merely the present and local strength of the rival candidates, butalso to some extent indicate the prospects and probabilities of thePresidential campaign of 1860. The Ohio Democrats had called Douglasinto their canvass, and the Republicans, as soon as they learned thefact, arranged that Lincoln should come and answer him. There was afitness in this, not merely because Lincoln's joint debates with himin Illinois in the previous summer were so successful, but alsobecause Douglas in nearly every speech made since then, both in hisSouthern tour and elsewhere, alluded to the Illinois campaign, and toLincoln by name, especially to what he characterized as his politicalheresies. By thus everywhere making Lincoln and Lincoln's utterances apublic target, Douglas himself, in effect, prolonged and extended thejoint debates over the whole Union. Another circumstance added to themomentary interest of the general discussion. Douglas was by natureaggressive. Determined to hold his Northern followers in the newissues which had grown out of his Freeport doctrine, and the newantagonisms which the recent slave code debate in the Senate revealed, he wrote and published in "Harper's Magazine" for September, 1859, apolitical article beginning with the assertion that "Under our complexsystem of government it is the first duty of American statesmen tomark distinctly the dividing-line between Federal and Localauthority. " Quoting both the paragraph of Lincoln's Springfield speechdeclaring that "a house divided against itself cannot stand, " and theparagraph from Seward's Rochester speech, announcing the"irrepressible conflict, " Douglas made a long historical examinationof his own theory of "non-intervention" and "popular sovereignty, " andbuilt up an elaborate argument to sustain his course. The novelty ofthis appeal to the public occasioned general interest and variedcomment, and the expedient seemed so ingenious as to excite the envyof Administration Democrats. Accordingly, Attorney-General Black, ofPresident Buchanan's Cabinet, at "the request of friends, " wrote, printed, and circulated an anonymous pamphlet in answer, in which headmitted that Douglas was "not the man to be treated with a disdainfulsilence, " but characterized the "Harper" essay as "an unsuccessfuleffort at legal precision; like the writing of a judge who is tryingin vain to give good reasons for a wrong decision on a question of lawwhich he has not quite mastered. " Douglas, in a speech at Wooster, Ohio, criticized this performance of Black's. Reply and rejoinder onboth sides followed in due time; and this war of pamphlets was one ofthe prominent political incidents of the year. Thus Lincoln's advent in the Ohio campaign attracted much more thanusual notice. He made but two speeches, one at Columbus, and one atCincinnati, at each of which places Douglas had recently preceded him. Lincoln's addresses not only brought him large and appreciativeaudiences, but they obtained an unprecedented circulation in print. Inthe main, they reproduced and tersely re-applied the ideas andarguments developed in the Senatorial campaign in Illinois, adding, however, searching comments on the newer positions and points to whichDouglas had since advanced. There is only space to insert a fewdisconnected quotations: Now, what is Judge Douglas's popular sovereignty? It is as a principle no other than that, if one man chooses to make a slave of another man, neither that other man nor anybody else has a right to object. .. . If you will read the copyright essay, you will discover that Judge Douglas himself says, a controversy between the American Colonies and the Government of Great Britain began on the slavery question in 1699, and continued from that time until the Revolution; and, while he did not say so, we all know that it has continued with more or less violence ever since the Revolution. .. . Take these two things and consider them together; present the question of planting a State with the institution of slavery by the side of a question of who shall be Governor of Kansas for a year or two, and is there a man here, is there a man on earth, who would not say the governor question is the little one, and the slavery question is the great one? I ask any honest Democrat if the small, the local, the trivial and temporary question is not, Who shall be governor? while the durable, the important, and the mischievous one is, Shall this soil be planted with slavery? This is an idea, I suppose, which has arisen in Judge Douglas's mind from his peculiar structure. I suppose the institution of slavery really looks small to him. He is so put up by nature that a lash upon his back would hurt him, but a lash upon anybody else's back does not hurt him. .. . The Dred Scott decision expressly gives every citizen of the United States a right to carry his slaves into the United States Territories. And now there was some inconsistency in saying that the decision was right, and saying, too, that the people of the Territory could lawfully drive slavery out again. When all the trash, the words, the collateral matter was cleared away from it, all the chaff was fanned out of it, it was a bare absurdity; no less than that a thing may be lawfully driven away from where it has a lawful right to be. .. . The Judge says the people of the Territories have the right, by his principle, to have slaves if they want them. Then I say that the people in Georgia have the right to buy slaves in Africa if they want them, and I defy any man on earth to show any distinction between the two things--to show that the one is either more wicked or more unlawful; to show on original principles, that one is better or worse than the other; or to show by the Constitution, that one differs a whit from the other. He will tell me, doubtless, that there is no constitutional provision against people taking slaves into the new Territories, and I tell him that there is equally no constitutional provision against buying slaves in Africa. .. . Then I say, if this principle is established, that there is no wrong in slavery, and whoever wants it has a right to have it; that it is a matter of dollars and cents; a sort of question how they shall deal with brutes; that between us and the negro here there is no sort of question, but that at the South the question is between the negro and the crocodile; that it is a mere matter of policy; that there is a perfect right according to interest to do just as you please--when this is done, where this doctrine prevails, the miners and sappers will have formed public opinion for the slave trade. .. . [Sidenote] Lincoln, Columbus Speech, Sept. 16, 1859. Debates, pp. 253-54 Public opinion in this country is everything. In a nation like ours this popular sovereignty and squatter sovereignty have already wrought a change in the public mind to the extent I have stated. There is no man in this crowd who can contradict it. Now, if you are opposed to slavery honestly, as much as anybody, I ask you to note that fact, and the like of which is to follow, to be plastered on layer after layer, until very soon you are prepared to deal with the negro everywhere as with the brute. If public sentiment has not been debauched already to this point, a new turn of the screw in that direction is all that is wanting; and this is constantly being done by the teachers of this insidious popular sovereignty. You need but one or two turns further until your minds, now ripening under these teachings, will be ready for all these things; and you will receive and support, or submit to, the slave trade revived with all its horrors, a slave code enforced in our Territories, and a new Dred Scott decision to bring slavery up into the very heart of the free North. This Government is expressly charged with the duty of providing for the general welfare. We believe that the spreading out and perpetuity of the institution of slavery impairs the general welfare. We believe--nay, we know, that this is the only thing that has ever threatened the perpetuity of the Union itself. .. . [Sidenote] Lincoln Cincinnati Speech, Sept. 17, 1859. Debates, pp. 267-8. I say we must not interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists, because the Constitution forbids it, and the general welfare does not require us to do so. We must not withhold an efficient fugitive-slave law, because the Constitution requires us, as I understand it, not to withhold such a law. But we must prevent the outspreading of the institution, because neither the Constitution nor the general welfare requires us to extend it. We must prevent the revival of the African slave trade, and the enacting by Congress of a Territorial slave code. We must prevent each of these things being done by either congresses or courts. The people of these United States are the rightful masters of both congresses and courts, not to overthrow the Constitution, but to overthrow the men who pervert the Constitution. [Sidenote] Parsons and others to Lincoln, Dec. 7, 1859. Debates, preface. The Ohio Republicans gained a decided success at the October election. Ascribing this result in a large measure to the influence of Lincoln'sspeeches, the State Executive Committee resolved to publish in cheapbook form the full Illinois joint debates and the two Ohio addresses, to serve as campaign material for the ensuing year. "We regard them, "wrote the committee to Lincoln, "as luminous and triumphantexpositions of the doctrines of the Republican party, successfullyvindicated from the aspersions of its foes, and calculated to make adocument of great practical service to the Republican party in theapproaching Presidential contest. " [Sidenote] Lincoln to Parsons and others, Dec. 19, 1859. Ibid. Lincoln, thanking them for the flattering terms of their request, explained in his reply: "The copies I send you, are as reported andprinted by the respective friends of Senator Douglas and myself at thetime--that is, his by his friends, and mine by mine. It would be anunwarrantable liberty for us to change a word or a letter in his, andthe changes I have made in mine, you perceive, are verbal only, andvery few in number. I wish the reprint to be precisely as the copies Isend, without any comment whatever. " The enterprise proved a success beyond the most sanguine expectations. A Columbus firm undertook the publication, itself assuming allpecuniary risk. Three large editions were sold directly to the public, without any aid from or any purchase by the committee--the thirdedition containing the announcement that up to that date, June 16, 1860, thirty thousand copies had already been circulated. [2] ----------[1] Partly printed in Hollister, "Life of Colfax, " p. 146. We areindebted to Mrs. Colfax for the full manuscript text of this and othervaluable letters which we have used. [2] The preface to this third edition contains a letter from Douglas, alleging that injustice had been done him because, "the originalreports as published in the 'Chicago Times, ' although intended to befair and just, were necessarily imperfect, and in some respectserroneous"; charging at the same time that Lincoln's speeches had beenrevised, corrected, and improved. [A] To this the publishers replied:"The speeches of Mr. Lincoln were never 'revised, corrected, orimproved' in the sense you use those words. Remarks by the crowd whichwere not responded to, and the reporters' insertions of 'cheers, ''great applause, ' and so forth, which received no answer or commentfrom the speaker, were by our direction omitted, as well from Mr. Lincoln's speeches as yours, as we thought their perpetuation in bookform would be in bad taste, and were in no manner pertinent to, or apart of, the speech. "[B] And the publishers add a list of theircorrections. [A] Douglas to Follet, Foster & Co. , June 9, 1860. Debates, third edition, preface. [B] Follet, Foster & Co. To Douglas, June 16, 1860. Ibid. CHAPTER XI HARPER'S FERRY There now occurred another strange event which, if it had beenspecially designed as a climax for the series of great politicalsensations since 1852, could scarcely have been more dramatic. Thiswas John Brown's invasion of Harper's Ferry in order to create a slaveinsurrection. We can only understand the transaction as far as we canunderstand the man, and both remain somewhat enigmatical. Of Puritan descent, John Brown was born in Connecticut in the year1800. When he was five years old, the family moved to Ohio, at thattime a comparative wilderness. Here he grew up a strong, vigorous boyof the woods. His father taught him the tanner's trade; but a restlessdisposition drove him to frequent changes of scene and effort when hegrew to manhood. He attempted surveying. He became a divinity student. He tried farming and tanning in Pennsylvania, and tanning andspeculating in real estate in Ohio. Cattle-dealing was his nextventure; from this to sheep-raising; and by a natural transition tothe business of a wool-factor in Massachusetts. This not succeeding, he made a trip to Europe. Returning, he accepted from Gerrit Smith atract of mountain land in the Adirondacks, where he proposed to foundand foster colonies of free negroes. This undertaking proved abortive, like all his others, and he once more went back to the wool businessin Ohio. Twice married, nineteen children had been born to him, of whom elevenwere living when, in 1854, the Kansas-Nebraska bill plunged thecountry into the heat of political strife. Four of his sons moved awayto the new Territory in the first rush of emigrants; several otherswent later. When the Border-Ruffian hostilities broke out, John Brownfollowed, with money and arms contributed in the North. With his sonsas a nucleus, he gathered a little band of fifteen to twentyadventurers, and soon made his name a terror in the lawless guerrillawarfare of the day. His fighting was of the prevailing type, justifiable, if at all, only on the score of defensive retaliation, and some of his acts were as criminal and atrocious as the worst ofthose committed by the Border Ruffians. [1] His losses, one sonmurdered, another wounded to the death, and a third rendered insanefrom cruel treatment, are scarcely compensated by the transitorynotoriety he gathered in a few fool-hardy skirmishes. [Sidenote] James Redpath, "Life of John Brown, " p. 48. [Sidenote] Sanborn, in the "Atlantic, " April, 1872. These varied experiences give us something of a clue to his character:a strong will; great physical energy; sanguine, fanatical temperament;unbounded courage and little wisdom; crude, visionary ideality; theinspiration of biblical precepts and Old Testament hero-worship; andambition curbed to irritation by the hard fetters of labor, privation, and enforced endurance. In association, habit, language, and conduct, he was clean, but coarse; honest, but rude. In disposition he mingledthe sacrificing tenderness with the sacrificial sternness of hisprototypes in Jewish history. He could lay his own child on the altarwithout a pang. The strongest element of his character was religiousfanaticism. Taught from earliest childhood to "fear God and keep hiscommandments, " he believed firmly in the divine authenticity of theBible, and memorized much of its contents. His favorite texts becameliteral and imperative mandates; he came to feel that he bore thecommission and enjoyed the protection of the Almighty. In his Kansascamps he prayed and saw visions; believed he wielded the sword of theLord and of Gideon; had faith that the angels encompassed him. Hedesired no other safeguard than his own ideas of justice and his ownconvictions of duty. These ideas and convictions, however, refusedobedience to accepted laws and morals, and were mere fantastic andpernicious outgrowths of his religious fanaticism. His courage partookof the recklessness of insanity. He did not count odds. "What are fiveto one?" he asked; and at another time he said, "One man in the right, ready to die, will chase a thousand. " Perhaps he even believed he helda charmed life, for he boasted that he had been fired at thirty timesand only his hair had been touched. In personal appearance he was talland slender, with rather a military bearing. He had an impressive, half-persuasive, half-commanding manner. He was always very secretive, affected much mystery in movements, came and went abruptly, was directand dogmatic to bluntness in his conversation. His education wasscant, his reading limited; he wrote strong phrases in badorthography. If we may believe the intimations from himself and thosewho knew him best, he had not only acquired a passionate hatred of theinstitution of slavery, but had for twenty years nursed the longing tobecome a liberator of slaves in the Southern States. To this end heread various stories of insurrections, and meditated on thevicissitudes, chances, and strategy of partisan warfare. A year'sborder fighting in Kansas not only suddenly put thought into action, but his personal and family sacrifices intensified his visionaryambition into a stern and inflexible purpose. [Illustration: JOHN BROWN. ] It is impossible to trace exactly how and when the Harper's Ferryinvasion first took practical shape in John Brown's mind, but theindications are that it grew little by little out of his Kansasexperience. His earliest collisions with the Border Ruffians occurredthe spring and summer of 1856. In the autumn of that year the UnitedStates troops dispersed his band, and generally suppressed the civilwar. In January, 1857, we find him in the Eastern States, appealingfor arms and supplies to various committees and in various places, alleging that he desired to organize and equip a company of onehundred minute-men, who were "mixed up with the people of Kansas, " butwho should be ready on call to rush to the defense of freedom. Thisappeal only partly succeeded. From one committee he obtained authorityas agent over certain arms stored in Iowa, the custody and control ofwhich had been in dispute. From another committee he obtained aportion of the clothing he desired. From still other sources hereceived certain moneys, but not sufficient for his requirements. Twocircumstances, however, indicate that he was practicing a deceptionupon the committees and public. He entered into a contract with ablacksmith, in Collinsville, Connecticut, to manufacture him 1000pikes of a certain pattern, [2] to be completed in 90 days, and paid$550 on the contract. There is no record that he mentioned this matterto any committee. His proposed Kansas minute-men were only to be onehundred in number, and the pikes could not be for them; hisexplanation to the blacksmith, that they would be a good weapon ofdefense for Kansas settlers, was clearly a subterfuge. These pikes, ordered about March 23, 1857, were without doubt intended for hisVirginia invasion; and in fact the identical lot, finished after longdelay, under the same contract, were shipped to him in September, 1859, and were actually used in his Harper's Ferry attempt. The othercircumstance is that, about the time of his contract for the pikes, healso, without the knowledge of committees or friends, engaged anadventurer, named Forbes, to go West and give military instruction tohis company--a measure neither useful nor practicable for Kansasdefense. These two acts may be taken as the first preparation forHarper's Ferry. But merely to conceive great enterprises is not to perform them, andevery after-step of John Brown reveals his lamentable weakness andutter inadequacy for the heroic role to which he fancied himselfcalled. His first blunder was in divulging all his plans to Forbes, anutter stranger, while he was so careful in concealing them fromothers. Forbes, as ambitious and reckless as himself, of course soonquarreled with him, and left him, and endeavored first to supplant andthen betray him. [Sidenote] Realf, Testimony Mason Report, p. 91. Ibid. , pp. 91-4. Meanwhile, little by little, Brown gathered one colored and six whiteconfederates from among his former followers in Kansas, and assembledthem for drill and training in Iowa; four others joined him there. These, together with his son Owen, counted, all told, a band of twelvepersons engaged for, and partly informed of, his purpose. He left themthere for instruction during the first three months of the year 1858, while he himself went East to procure means. [Sidenote] "Atlantic, " July, 1872, p. 51. At the beginning of February, 1858, John Brown became, and remainedfor about a month, a guest at the house of Frederick Douglass, inRochester, New York. Immediately on his arrival there he wrote to aprominent Boston abolitionist, T. W. Higginson: "I now want to get, forthe perfecting of by far the most important undertaking of my wholelife, from $500 to $800 within the next sixty days. I have writtenRev. Theodore Parker, George L. Stearns, and F. B. Sanborn, Esquires, on the subject. " [Sidenote] Sanborn, "Life and Letters of John Brown, " p. 438. Correspondence and mutual requests for a conference ensued, andfinally these Boston friends sent Sanborn to the house of GerritSmith, in Peterboro, New York, where a meeting had been arranged. Sanborn was a young man of twenty-six, just graduated from college, who, as secretary of various Massachusetts committees, had been theactive agent for sending contributions to Kansas. He arrived on theevening of Washington's birthday, February 22, 1858, and took part ina council of conspiracy, of which John Brown was the moving will andchief actor. [Sidenote] "Atlantic, " July, 1872, p. 52. Sanborn in "Atlantic, " March, 1875, p. 329; also, Mason Report, pp. 48-59. Brown began by reading to the council a long document which he haddrafted since his stay in Rochester. It called itself a "ProvisionalConstitution and Ordinances for the People of the United States, "which, as it explained, looked to no overthrow of States ordissolution of the Union, but simply to "amendment and repeal. " It wasnot in any sense a reasonable project of government, but simply anill-jointed outline of rules for a proposed slave insurrection. Thescheme, so far as any comprehension of it may be gleaned from thevarious reports which remain, was something as follows: [Sidenote] Mason Report, p. 55. [Sidenote] Blair, Testimony, Mason Report, pp. 121-5. [Sidenote] Sanborn, "Life and Letters of John Brown, " p. 438. Somewhere in the Virginia mountains he would raise the standard ofrevolt and liberation. Enthusiasts would join him from the freeStates, and escaped blacks come to his help from Canada. From Virginiaand the neighboring slave-States of North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee, and Kentucky, fugitive slaves, with theirfamilies, would flock to his camps. He would take his supplies, provisions, and horses by force from the neighboring plantations. Money, plate, watches, and jewelry would "constitute a liberal safetyor intelligence fund. " For arms, he had 200 Sharps rifles, and 200revolvers, with which he would arm his best marksmen. His ruderfollowers, and even the women and children, he would arm with pikes todefend the fortifications. He would construct defenses of palisadesand earth-works. He would use natural strongholds; find secretmountain-passes to connect one with another; retreat from and evadeattacks he could not overcome. He would maintain and indefinitelyprolong a guerrilla war, of which the Seminole Indians in Florida andthe negroes in Hayti afforded examples. With success, he would enlargethe area of his occupation so as to include arable valleys andlow-lands bordering the Alleghany range in the slave-States; and herehe would colonize, govern, and educate the blacks he had freed, andmaintain their liberty. He would make captures and reprisals, confiscate property, take, hold, and exchange prisoners and especiallywhite hostages and exchange them for slaves to liberate. He wouldrecognize neutrals, make treaties, exercise humanity, prevent crime, repress immorality, and observe all established laws of war. Successwould render his revolt permanent, and in the end, through "amendmentand repeal, " abolish slavery. If, at the worst, he were driven fromthe mountains he would retreat with his followers through the freeStates to Canada. He had 12 recruits drilling in Iowa, and ahalf-executed contract for 1000 pikes in Connecticut; furnish him $800in money and he would begin operations in May. [Sidenote] Sanborn in "Atlantic, " March, 1875, p. 329. [Sidenote] Redpath, "Life of John Brown, " p. 206. [Sidenote] Sanborn in "Atlantic, " July, 1872, p. 52. This, if we supply continuity and arrangement to his vagaries, musthave been approximately what he felt or dreamily saw, and outlined invigorous words to his auditors. His listening friends were dumfoundedat the audacity as well as heart-sick at the hopelessness of such anattempt. They pointed out the almost certainty of failure anddestruction, and attempted to dissuade him from the mad scheme; but tono purpose. They saw they were dealing with a foregone conclusion; hehad convoked them, not to advise as to methods, but to furnish themeans. All reasonable argument he met with his rigid dogmaticformulas, his selected proverbs, his favorite texts of Scripture. Thefollowing, preserved by various witnesses as samples of his sayings atother times, indicate his reasoning on this occasion: "Give a slave apike and you make him a man. I would not give Sharps rifles to morethan ten men in a hundred, and then only when they have learned to usethem. A ravine is better than a plain. Woods and mountain-sides can beheld by resolute men against ten times their force. Nat Turner, withfifty men, held Virginia five weeks; the same number, well organizedand armed, can shake the system out of the State. " "A few men in theright, and knowing they are right, can overturn a king. Twenty men inthe Alleghanies could break slavery to pieces in two years. " "If Godbe for us, who can be against us? Except the Lord keep the city, thewatchman waketh but in vain. " [Sidenote] Ibid. , March, 1875, p. 329. [Sidenote] Sanborn, "Life and Letters of John Brown, " p. 439. [Sidenote] Sanborn, "Atlantic, " July, 1872, pp. 53-4. One of the participants relates, that--"When the agitated party brokeup their council for the night, it was perfectly plain that Browncould not be held back from his purpose. " The discussion of thefriends on the second day (February 23) was therefore only whetherthey should aid him, or oppose him, or remain indifferent. Againstevery admonition of reason, mere personal sympathy seems to havecarried a decision in favor of the first of these alternatives. "Yousee how it is, " said the chief counselor, Gerrit Smith; "our dear oldfriend has made up his mind to this course and cannot be turned fromit. We cannot give him up to die alone; we must support him. " Brownhas left an exact statement of his own motive and expectation, in aletter to Sanborn on the following day. "I have only had this oneopportunity in a life of nearly sixty years . .. God has honored butcomparatively a very small part of mankind with any possible chancefor such mighty and soul-satisfying rewards . .. I expect nothing butto endure hardness, but I expect to effect a mighty conquest, eventhough it be like the last victory of Samson. " [Sidenote] Realf, Testimony, Mason Report, p. 99. Nine days later Brown went to Boston, where the conspiracy wasenlarged and strengthened by the promises and encouragements of alittle coterie of radical abolitionists. [3] Within the next two monthsthe funds he desired were contributed and sent him. Meanwhile Brownreturned West, and moved his company of recruits from Iowa, by way ofChicago and Detroit, to the town of Chatham, in Canada West, arrivingthere about the 1st of May. By written invitations, Brown here calledtogether what is described as "a quiet convention of the friends offreedom, " to perfect his organization. On the 8th of May, 1858, theyheld a meeting with closed doors, there being present the originalcompany of ten or eleven white members and one colored, whom Brown hadbrought with him, and a somewhat miscellaneous gathering of negroresidents of Canada. Some sort of promise of secrecy was mutuallymade; then John Brown, in a speech, laid his plan before the meeting. One Delany, a colored doctor, in a response, promised the assistanceof all the colored people in Canada. The provisional constitutiondrafted by Brown at Rochester was read and adopted by articles, andabout forty-five persons signed their names to the "Constitution, " forthe "proscribed and oppressed races of the United States. " Two daysafterwards, the meeting again convened for the election of officers;John Brown was elected commander-in-chief by acclamation; othermembers were by the same summary method appointed secretary of war, secretary of state, secretary of the treasury, and two of them membersof congress. The election of a president was prudently postponed. This Chatham Convention cannot claim consideration as a seriousdeliberative proceeding. John Brown was its sole life and voice. Thecolored Canadians were nothing but spectators. The ten white recruitswere mere Kansas adventurers, mostly boys in years and waifs insociety, perhaps depending largely for livelihood on the employment orbounty, precarious as it was, of their leader. Upon this reckless, drifting material the strong despotic will, emotional enthusiasm, andmysterious rhapsodical talk of John Brown exercised an irresistiblefascination; he drew them by easy gradations into his confidence andconspiracy. The remaining element, John Brown's son in the Chathammeeting, and other sons and relatives in the Harper's Ferry attack, are of course but the long educated instruments of the father'sthought and purpose. [Sidenote] Stearns to Brown, May 14, 1858: Howe, Testimony, Mason Report, p. 177. With funds provided, with his plan of government accepted, and himselfformally appointed commander-in-chief, Brown doubtless thought hiscampaign about to begin; it was however destined to an unexpectedinterruption. The discarded and disappointed adventurer Forbes hadinformed several prominent Republicans in Washington City that Brownwas meditating an unlawful enterprise; and the Boston committee, warned that certain arms in Brown's custody, which had beencontributed for Kansas defense, were about to be flagrantly misused, dared not incur the public odium of complicity in such a deception andbreach of faith. The Chatham organization was scarcely completed whenBrown received word from the Boston committee that he must not use thearms (the 200 Sharps rifles and 200 revolvers) which had beenintrusted to him for any other purpose than for the defense of Kansas. Brown hurried to Boston; but oral consultation with his friendsconfirmed the necessity for postponement; and it was arranged that, tolull suspicion, he should return to Kansas and await a more favorableopportunity. He yielded assent, and that fall and winter performed theexploit of leading an armed foray into Missouri, and carrying awayeleven slaves to Canada--an achievement which, while to a certaindegree it placed him in the attitude of a public outlaw, neverthelessgreatly increased his own and his followers' confidence in the successof his general plan. Gradually the various obstacles melted away. Kansas became pacified. The adventurer Forbes faded out of sight andimportance. The disputed Sharps rifles and revolvers were transferredfrom committee to committee, and finally turned over to a privateindividual to satisfy a debt. He in turn delivered them to Brownwithout any hampering conditions. The Connecticut blacksmith finishedand shipped the thousand pikes. The contributions from the Bostoncommittee swelled from one to several thousands of dollars. Therecruits, with a few changes, though scattered in various parts of thecountry, were generally held to their organization and promise, andslightly increased in number. The provisional constitution and sundryblank commissions were surreptitiously printed, and captains andlieutenants appointed by the signature of John Brown "Commander-in-Chief, "countersigned by the "Secretary of War. " Gradually, also, the commander-in-chief resolved on an importantmodification of his plan: that, instead of plunging at once into theVirginia mountains, he would begin by the capture of the United Statesarmory and arsenal at Harper's Ferry. Two advantages seem to havevaguely suggested themselves to his mind as likely to arise from thiscourse: the possession of a large quantity of Government arms, and thewidespread panic and moral influence of so bold an attempt. But itnowhere appears that he had any conception of the increased risk anddanger it involved, or that he adopted the slightest precaution tomeet them. Harper's Ferry was a town of five thousand inhabitants, lying betweenthe slave-States of Maryland and Virginia, at the confluence of thePotomac and the Shenandoah rivers, where the united streams flowthrough a picturesque gap in the single mountain-range called the BlueRidge. The situation possesses none of the elements which would makeit a defensible fastness for protracted guerrilla warfare, such as wascontemplated in Brown's plan. The mountains are everywhereapproachable without difficulty; are pierced by roads and farms in alldirections; contain few natural resources for sustenance, defense, orconcealment; are easily observed or controlled from the plain bysuperior forces. The town is irregular, compact, and hilly; a bridgeacross each stream connects it with the opposite shores, and theGovernment factory and buildings, which utilized the water-power ofthe Potomac, lay in the lowest part of the point of land between thestreams. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad crosses the Potomac bridge. On the 4th of July, 1859, John Brown, under an assumed name, with twosons and another follower, appeared near Harper's Ferry, and soonafter rented the Kennedy Farm, in Maryland, five miles from town, where he made a pretense of cattle-dealing and mining; but in realitycollected secretly his rifles, revolvers, ammunition, pikes, blankets, tents, and miscellaneous articles for a campaign. His rather eccentricactions, and the irregular coming and going of occasional strangers athis cabin, created no suspicion in the neighborhood. Cautiouslyincreasing his supplies, and gathering his recruits, he appointed theattack for the 24th of October; but for some unexplained reason (fearof treachery, it is vaguely suggested) he precipitated his movement inadvance of that date. From this point the occurrences exhibit noforesight or completeness of preparation, no diligent pursuit of anintelligent plan, nor skill to devise momentary expedients; only ablind impulse to act. On Sunday evening, October 16, 1859, Brown gave his final orders, humanely directing his men to take no life where they could avoid it. Placing a few pikes and other implements in his one-horse wagon, hestarted with his company of eighteen followers at 8 o'clock in theevening, leaving five men behind. They cut the telegraph wires on theway, and reached Harper's Ferry about 11 o'clock. He himself brokeopen the armory gates, took the watchmen prisoners, and made thatplace his headquarters. Separating his men into small detachments, hetook possession of, and attempted to hold, the two bridges, thearsenal, and the rifle-factory. Next he sent six of his men five milesinto the country to bring in several prominent slaveowners and theirslaves. This was accomplished before daylight, and all were brought asprisoners to Brown at the armory. With them they also brought a largefour-horse farm wagon, which he now sent to transfer arms from theKennedy farm to a school-house on the Maryland side of the Potomac, about one mile from the town. Meanwhile, about midnight of Sunday, they detained the railroad trainthree hours, but finally allowed it to proceed. A negro porter wasshot on the bridge. The town began to be alarmed. Citizens werecaptured at various points, and brought to swell the number ofprisoners at the armory, counting forty or fifty by morning. Still, not until daylight, and even until the usual hour of rising on Mondaymorning, did the town comprehend the nature and extent of the trouble. What, now, did Brown intend to do? What result did he look for fromhis movement thus far? Amid his conflicting acts and contradictoryexplanations, the indications seem clear only on two or three points. Both he and his men gave everybody to understand without reserve thatthey had come not to kill whites, but only to liberate slaves. Soon, also, he placed pikes in the hands of his black prisoners. But thatceremony did not make soldiers of them, as his favorite maxim taught. They held them in their hands with listless indifference, remainingthemselves, as before, an incumbrance instead of a reënforcement. Hegave his white prisoners notice that he would hold them as hostages, and informed one or two that, after daylight, he would exchange themfor slaves. Before the general fighting began, he endeavored to effectan armistice or compromise with the citizens, to stop bloodshed, oncondition that he be permitted to hold the armory and retain theliberated negroes. All this warrants the inference that he expected tohold the town, first, by the effect of terror; secondly, by thedisplay of leniency and kindness; and supposed that he could remainindefinitely, and dictate terms at his leisure. The fallacy of thisscheme became quickly apparent. As the day dawned upon the town and the truth upon the citizens, hissituation in a military point of view was already hopeless--eighteenmen against perhaps 1000 adults, and these eighteen scattered in fouror five different squads, without means of mutual support, communication, or even contingent orders! Gradually, as the startledcitizens became certain of the insignificant numbers of theassailants, an irregular street-firing broke out between Brown'ssentinels and individuals with firearms. The alarm was carried toneighboring towns, and killed and wounded on both sides augmented theexcitement. Tradition rather than definite record asserts that some ofBrown's lieutenants began to comprehend that they were in a trap, andadvised him to retreat. Nearly all his eulogists have assumed thatsuch was his original plan, and his own subsequent excuses hint atthis intention. But the claim is clearly untenable. He had no means ofdefensive retreat--no provisions, no transportation for his arms andequipage, no supply of ammunition. The suggestion is an evidentafterthought. Whether from choice or necessity, however, he remained only to findhimself more and more closely pressed. By Monday noon the squad in therifle-works, distant one mile from the armory, had been driven out, killed, and captured. The other squads, not so far from their leader, joined him at the armory, minus their losses. Already he was driven totake refuge with his diminished force in the engine-house, a low, strong brick building in the armory yard, where they barricaded doorsand improvised loop-holes, and into which they took with them tenselected prisoners as hostages. But the expedient was one ofdesperation. By this movement Brown literally shut himself up in hisown prison, from which escape was impossible. A desultory fire was kept up through doors and loop-holes. But now thewhole country had become thoroughly aroused, and sundry militarycompanies from neighboring towns and counties poured into Harper'sFerry. Brown himself at length realized the hopelessness of hisposition, and parleyed for leave to retreat across the river oncondition of his giving up his prisoners; but it was too late. President Buchanan also took prompt measures; and on Monday night adetachment of eighty marines from the Washington navy-yard, undercommand of Brevet Colonel Robert E. Lee, of the United States army, the same who afterwards became the principal leader of the Confederatearmies in the rebellion, reached the scene of action, and werestationed in the armory yard so as to cut off the insurgents from allretreat. At daylight on Tuesday morning Brown was summoned tosurrender at discretion, but he refused. The instant the officer leftthe engine-house a storming-party of marines battered in the doors; infive minutes the conflict was over. One marine was shot dead in theassault; Brown fell under severe sword and bayonet wounds, two of hissons lay dead or dying, and four or five of his men were madeprisoners, only two remaining unhurt. The great scheme of liberationbuilt up through nearly three years of elaborate conspiracy, anddesigned to be executed in defiance of law, by individual enterprisewith pikes, rifles, forts, guerrilla war, prisoners, hostages, andplunder, was, after an experimental campaign of thirty-six hours, inutter collapse. Of Brown's total force of twenty-two men, ten werekilled, five escaped, and seven were captured, tried, and hanged. Ofthe townspeople, five had been killed and eight wounded. [Illustration: HOUSE IN WHICH JOHN BROWN WAS BORN, TORRINGTON, CONNECTICUT. ] [Sidenote] Sanborn in the "Atlantic, " Dec. 1875. P. 718. While John Brown's ability for military leadership was tooinsignificant even for comment, his moral and personal couragecompelled the admiration of his enemies. Arraigned before a Virginiacourt, the authorities hurried through his trial for treason, conspiracy, and murder, with an unseemly precipitancy, almostcalculated to make him seem the accuser, and the commonwealth thetrembling culprit. He acknowledged his acts with frankness, defendedhis purpose with a sincerity that betokened honest conviction, borehis wounds and met his fate with a manly fortitude. Eight yearsbefore, he had written, in a document organizing a band of coloredpeople in Springfield, Massachusetts, to resist the fugitive-slavelaw: "Nothing so charms the American people as personal bravery. Thetrial for life of one bold, and to some extent successful, man, fordefending his rights in good earnest, would arouse more sympathythroughout the nation than the accumulated wrongs and sufferings ofmore than three millions of our submissive colored population. " Evennow, when mere Quixotic knight-errantry and his own positive violationof the rights of individuals and society had put his life in forfeit, this sympathy for his boldness and misfortune came to him in largemeasure. Questioned by Governor Wise, Senator Mason, andRepresentative Vallandigham about his accomplices, he refused to sayanything except about what he had done, and freely took upon himselfthe whole responsibility. He was so warped by his religious trainingas to have become a fatalist as well as a fanatic. "All our actions, "he said to one who visited him in prison, "even all the follies thatled to this disaster, were decreed to happen ages before the world wasmade. " Perverted Calvinistic philosophy is the key which unlocks themystery of Brown's life and deeds. He was convicted, sentenced, and hanged on the 2d of December. Congress met a few days afterwards, and the Senate appointed aninvestigating committee to inquire into the seizure of the UnitedStates armory and arsenal. The long and searching examination of manywitnesses brought out with sufficient distinctness the varied personalplottings of Brown, but failed to reveal that half a dozen radicalabolition clergymen of Boston were party to the conspiracy; nor didthey then or afterwards justify their own conduct by showing thatChrist ever counseled treason, abetted conspiracy, or led rebellionagainst established government. From beginning to end, the whole actwas reprehensible, and fraught with evil result. Modern civilizationand republican government require that beyond the self-defensenecessary to the protection of life and limb, all coercive reformshall act by authority of law only. [Sidenote] Mason Report, p. 18. Upon politics the main effect of the Harper's Ferry incident was toaggravate the temper and increase the bitterness of all parties. Jefferson Davis, of Mississippi; Mason, of Virginia; and Fitch, ofIndiana, Democratic members of the Senate investigating committee, sought diligently but unsuccessfully to find grounds to hold theRepublican party at large responsible for Brown's raid. They feltobliged to report that they could not recommend any legislation tomeet similar cases in the future, since the "invasion" of Virginia wasnot of the kind mentioned in the Constitution, but was "simply the actof lawless ruffians, under the sanction of no public or politicalauthority. " Collamer, of Vermont, and Doolittle, of Wisconsin, Republican members of the committee, in their minority report, considered the affair an outgrowth of the pro-slavery lawlessness inKansas. Senator Douglas, of Illinois, however, apparently with theobject of still further setting himself right with the South, andatoning for his Freeport heresy, made a long speech in advocacy of alaw to punish conspiracies in one State or Territory against thegovernment, people, or property of another; once more quotingLincoln's Springfield speech, and Seward's Rochester speech ascontaining revolutionary doctrines. [Sidenote] Dec, 2, 1859. [Sidenote] James Redpath, "Echoes of Harper's Ferry, " p. 41. [Sidenote] George Willis Cooke, "Life of Emerson, " p. 140. In the country at large, as in Congress, the John Brown raid excitedbitter discussion and radically diverse comment--some execrating himas a deservedly punished felon, while others exalted him as a saint. His Boston friends particularly, who had encouraged him with voice ormoney, were extravagant in their demonstrations of approval andadmiration. On the day of his execution religious services were held, and funeral bells were tolled. "The road to heaven, " said TheodoreParker, "is as short from the gallows as from a throne; perhaps, also, as easy. " "Some eighteen hundred years ago, " said Thoreau, "Christwas crucified; this morning, perchance, Captain Brown was hung. Theseare the two ends of a chain which is not without its links. " Emerson, using a yet stronger figure, had already called him "a new saint, waiting yet his martyrdom, and who, if he shall suffer, will make thegallows glorious like the cross. " [Sidenote] Lecture at Brooklyn, November 1, 1859. [Sidenote] "Echoes of Harper's Ferry, " p. 48. [Sidenote] Letter to Committee of Merchants, December 20, 1859. Ibid. , p. 299. Amid this conflict of argument, public opinion in the free-Statesgravitated to neither extreme. It accepted neither the declaration ofthe great orator Wendell Phillips, that "the lesson of the hour isinsurrection, " nor the assertion of the great lawyer Charles O'Conor, that slavery "is in its own nature, as an institution, beneficial toboth races. " This chapter would be incomplete if we neglected to quote Mr. Lincoln's opinion of the Harper's Ferry attempt. His quiet andcommon-sense criticism of the affair, pronounced a few months afterits occurrence, was substantially the conclusion to which the averagepublic judgment has come after the lapse of a quarter of a century: [Sidenote] Lincoln, Cooper Institute Speech, Feb. 27, 1860. Slave insurrections are no more common now than they were before the Republican party was organized. What induced the Southampton insurrection, twenty-eight years ago, in which at least three times as many lives were lost as at Harper's Ferry? You can scarcely stretch your very elastic fancy to the conclusion that Southampton was "got up by Black Republicanism. " In the present state of things in the United States, I do not think a general or even a very extensive slave insurrection is possible. The indispensable concert of action cannot be attained. The slaves have no means of rapid communication; nor can incendiary freemen, black or white, supply it. The explosive materials are everywhere in parcels; but there neither are nor can be supplied the indispensable connecting trains. Much is said by Southern people about the affection of slaves for their masters and mistresses; and a part of it, at least, is true. A plot for an uprising could scarcely be devised and communicated to twenty individuals before some one of them, to save the life of a favorite master or mistress, would divulge it. This is the rule; and the slave revolution in Hayti was not an exception to it, but a case occurring under peculiar circumstances. The gunpowder plot of British history, though not connected with slaves, was more in point. In that ease, only about twenty were admitted to the secret; and yet one of them, in his anxiety to save a friend, betrayed the plot to that friend, and, by consequence, averted the calamity. Occasional poisonings from the kitchen, and open or stealthy assassinations in the field, and local revolts extending to a score or so, will continue to occur as the natural results of slavery; but no general insurrection of slaves, as I think, can happen in this country for a long time. Whoever much fears or much hopes for such an event will be alike disappointed. .. . John Brown's effort was peculiar. It was not a slave insurrection. It was an attempt by white men to get up a revolt among slaves, in which the slaves refused to participate. In fact, it was so absurd that the slaves, with all their ignorance, saw plainly enough it could not succeed. That affair, in its philosophy, corresponds with the many attempts related in history, at the assassination of kings and emperors. An enthusiast broods over the oppression of a people till he fancies himself commissioned by Heaven to liberate them. He ventures the attempt, which ends in little else than his own execution. Orsini's attempt on Louis Napoleon, and John Brown's attempt at Harper's Ferry were, in their philosophy, precisely the same. The eagerness to cast blame on old England in the one ease, and on New England in the other, does not disprove the sameness of the two things. [Sidenote] "Tribune Almanac, " 1860. The aggravation of partisan temper over the Harper's Ferry incidentfound a manifestation in a contest over the Speakership in the Houseof Representatives as prolonged and bitter as that which attended theelection of Banks. In the Congressional elections of 1858, followingthe Lecompton controversy, the Democrats had once more lost control ofthe House of Representatives; there having been chosen 113Republicans, 93 Administration Democrats, 8 anti-Lecompton Democrats, and 23 South Americans, as they were called; that is, members, mainlyfrom the slave-States, opposed to the Administration. [Sidenote] "Globe, " December 5, 1859, p. 3. This Thirty-sixth Congress began its session three days after theexecution of John Brown, and the election of a Speaker was the firstwork of the new House of Representatives. The Republicans, not havinga majority, made no caucus nomination; but John Sherman, of Ohio, hadthe largest following on the first ballot, and thereafter receivedtheir united efforts to elect him. At this point a Missouri memberintroduced a resolution declaring: "That the doctrines and sentimentsof a certain book called 'The Impending Crisis of the South--How toMeet It, ' purporting to have been written by one Hinton R. Helper [ofNorth Carolina], are insurrectionary and hostile to the domestic peaceand tranquillity of the country, and that no member of this House whohas indorsed and recommended it, or the compend from it, is fit to beSpeaker of this House. " This resolution was aimed at Sherman, who with some seventyRepublicans of the previous Congress had signed a circular indorsingand recommending the book upon the general statement that it was ananti-slavery work, written by a Southerner. The book addressed itselfto non-slaveholding Southern whites, and was mainly made up ofstatistics, but contained occasional passages of intolerant andvindictive sentiment against slaveholders. Whether it could beconsidered "insurrectionary" depended altogether on the pro-slavery oranti-slavery bias of the critic. Besides, the author had agreed thatthe obnoxious passages should not be printed in the compendium whichthe Republicans recommended in their circular. When interrogated, Mr. Sherman replied that he had never seen the book, and that "I amopposed to any interference whatever by the people of the free-Stateswith, the relations of master and slave in the slave-States. " But thedisavowal did not relieve him from Southern enmity. The fire-eatersseized the pretext to charge him with all manner of "abolition"intentions, and by violent debate and the utterance of threats ofdisunion made the House a parliamentary and almost a revolutionarybabel for nearly two months. Certain appropriations were exhausted, and the treasury was in great need of funds. Efforts were made toadopt the plurality rule, and to choose a Speaker for a limitedperiod; but every such movement was resisted for the purpose ofdefeating Sherman, or rather, through his defeat to force the Northinto unconditional submission to extreme pro-slavery sentiment. Thestruggle, nominally over an incident, was in reality over a policy. On January 30, 1860, Mr. Sherman withdrew his name, and the solidRepublican vote was given to William Pennington, of New Jersey, another Republican, who, on February 1, was elected Speaker by 117votes, 4 opposing members having come to his support. The South gainednothing by the obstructionist policy of its members. During the longcontest, extending through forty-four ballots, their votes werescattered among many candidates of different factions, while theRepublicans maintained an almost unbroken steadiness of partydiscipline. On the whole, the principal results of the struggle were, to sectionalize parties more completely, ripen Southern sentimenttowards secession, and combine wavering voters in the free-States insupport of Republican doctrines. ----------[1] On the night of May 24-25, 1856, five pro-slavery men living onPottawatomie Creek, in Kansas, were mysteriously and brutallyassassinated. The relatives and friends of the deceased charged JohnBrown and his band with these murders, which the relatives and friendsof Brown persistently denied. His latest biographer, however, unreservedly admits his guilt: "For some reason he [John Brown] chosenot to strike a blow himself; and this is what Salmon Brown meant whenhe declared that his father 'was not a participator in the deed. ' Itwas a very narrow interpretation of the word 'participator' whichwould permit such a denial; but it was no doubt honestly made, although for the purpose of disguising what John Brown's real agencyin the matter was. He was, in fact, the originator and performer ofthese executions, although the hands that dealt the wounds were thoseof others. "--Frank B. Sanborn, "Life and Letters of John Brown, " pp. 263-4. [2] "He was exhibiting to a number of gentlemen, who happened to becollected together in a druggist's store, some weapons which heclaimed to have taken from Captain Pate in Kansas. Among them was atwo-edged dirk, with a blade about eight inches long, and he remarkedthat if he had a lot of those things to attach to poles about six feetlong, they would be a capital weapon of defense for the settlers ofKansas. .. . When he came to make the contract, he wrote it to havemalleable ferrules, cast solid, and a guard to be of malleable iron. That was all the difference. .. . After seeing the sample he made aslight alteration. One was, to have a screw to put in, as the one herehas, so that they could be unshipped in case of necessity. "--Blair, Testimony before Investigating Committee, Senate Report No. 278, 1stSess. 36th Cong. , pp. 121-2. [3] "Meantime I had communicated his plans at his request to TheodoreParker, Wentworth Higginson, and Dr. Howe, and had given Mr. Stearnssome general conception of them . .. No other person in New Englandexcept these four was informed by me of the affair, though there weremany who knew or suspected Brown's general purpose . .. Brown's firstrequest, in 1858, was for a fund of $1000 only; with this in hand hepromised to take the field either in April or May. Mr. Stearns actedas treasurer of this fund, and before the 1st of May nearly the wholeamount had been paid in or subscribed. "--Frank B. Sanborn, "Atlantic, "April, 1875, pp. 456-7. CHAPTER XII LINCOLN'S COOPER INSTITUTE SPEECH [Sidenote] Lincoln to McNeill, April 6, 1860. Lamon, "Life of Lincoln, " p. 441. [Sidenote] Jas. A. Briggs to Lincoln, November 1, 1859. MS. Jas. A. Briggs in New York "Evening Post, " August 16, 1867. Among the many invitations to deliver addresses which Lincoln receivedin the fall of 1859, was one from a committee asking him to lecture inPlymouth Church, Brooklyn, in a course then in progress there, designed for popular entertainment. "I wrote, " said Lincoln, "that Icould do it in February, provided they would take a political speech, if I could find time to get up no other. " "Your letter was dulyreceived and handed over to the committee, " was the response, "andthey accept your compromise. You may lecture at the time you mention, and they will pay you $200. I think they will arrange for a lecture inNew York also, and pay you $200 for that. " [Sidenote] C. C. Nott to Lincoln, February 9, 1860. MS. Financial obstacles, or other reasons, brought about the transfer ofthe engagement to a new committee, and the invitation was repeated ina new form: "The Young Men's Central Republican Union of this city[New York] very earnestly desire that you should deliver what I mayterm a political lecture during the ensuing month. The peculiaritiesof the case are these: A series of lectures has been determined upon. The first was delivered by Mr. Blair, of St. Louis, a short time ago;the second will be in a few days, by Mr. Cassius M. Clay, and thethird we would prefer to have from you rather than any other person. Of the audience I should add that it is not that of an ordinarypolitical meeting. These lectures have been contrived to call out ourbetter, but busier citizens, who never attend political meetings. Alarge part of the audience will consist of ladies. " [Sidenote] Lincoln to McNeill, April 6, 1860. Lamon, "Life of Lincoln. " p. 441. Lincoln, however, remained under the impression that the lecture wasto be given in Brooklyn, and only learned after he reached New York tofulfill his engagement that he was to speak in the Cooper Institute. When, on the evening of February 27, 1860, he stood before hisaudience, he saw not only a well-filled house, but an assemblage oflisteners in which were many whom, by reason of his own modestestimate of himself, he would have been rather inclined to ask advicefrom than to offer instruction to. William Cullen Bryant presided overthe meeting; David Dudley Field escorted the speaker to the platform;ex-Governor John A. King, Horace Greeley, James W. Nye, James A. Briggs, Cephas Brainerd, Charles C. Nott, Hiram Barney, and others satamong the invited guests. "Since the days of Clay and Webster, " saidthe "Tribune" next morning, "no man has spoken to a larger assemblageof the intellect and mental culture of our city. " Of course thepresence of such a gathering was no mere accident. Not only hadLincoln's name for nearly two years found constant mention in thenewspapers, but both friendly and hostile comment had coupled it withthe two ranking political leaders in the free-States--Seward andDouglas. The representative men of New York were naturally eager tosee and hear one who, by whatever force of eloquence or argument, hadattracted so large a share of the public attention. We may also fairlyinfer that, on his part, Lincoln was no less curious to test theeffect of his words on an audience more learned and critical thanthose collected in the open-air meetings of his Western campaigns. This mutual interest was an evident advantage to both; it secured aclose attention from the house, and insured deliberation and emphasisby the speaker, enabling him to develop his argument with perfectprecision and unity, reaching perhaps the happiest general effect everattained in any one of his long addresses. He took as his text a phrase uttered by Senator Douglas in the lateOhio campaign--"Our fathers, when they framed the government underwhich we live, understood this question just as well, and even betterthan we do now. " Lincoln defined "this question, " with a lawyer'sexactness, thus: Does the proper division of local from Federal authority, or anything in the Constitution, forbid our Federal Government to control as to slavery in our Federal Territories? Upon this Senator Douglas holds the affirmative, and the Republicans the negative. This affirmation and denial form an issue, and this issue--this question--is precisely what the text declares our fathers understood "better than we. " From this "precise and agreed starting-point" Lincoln next traced withminute historical analysis the action of "our fathers" in framing "thegovernment under which we live, " by their votes and declarations inthe Congresses which preceded the Constitution and in the Congressesfollowing which proposed its twelve amendments and enacted variousTerritorial prohibitions. His conclusions were irresistiblyconvincing. The sum of the whole is [said he] that of our thirty-nine fathers who framed the original Constitution, twenty-one--a clear majority of the whole--certainly understood that no proper division of local from Federal authority, nor any part of the Constitution, forbade the Federal Government to control as to slavery in the Federal Territories; while all the rest probably had the same understanding. Such unquestionably was the understanding of our fathers who framed the original Constitution; and the text affirms that they understood the question "better than we". .. . It is surely safe to assume that the thirty-nine framers of the original Constitution and the seventy-six members of the Congress which framed the amendments thereto, taken together, do certainly include those who may be fairly called "our fathers who framed the Government under which we live. " And so assuming, I defy any man to show that any one of them ever, in his whole life, declared that in his understanding any proper division of local from Federal authority, or any part of the Constitution, forbade the Federal Government to control as to slavery in the Federal Territories. I go a step further. I defy any one to show that any living man in the whole world ever did, prior to the beginning of the present century (and I might almost say prior to the beginning of the last half of the present century), declare that in his understanding any proper division of local from Federal authority, or any part of the Constitution, forbade the Federal Government to control as to slavery in the Federal Territories. To those who now so declare, I give, not only "our fathers who framed the government under which we live, " but with them all other living men within the century in which it was framed, among whom to search, and they shall not be able to find the evidence of a single man agreeing with them. Now, and here, let me guard a little against being misunderstood. I do not mean to say we are bound to follow implicitly in whatever our fathers did. To do so would be to discard all the lights of current experience--to reject all progress, all improvement. What I do say is, that if we would supplant the opinions and policy of our fathers in any case, we should do so upon evidence so conclusive, and argument so clear, that even their great authority, fairly considered and weighed, cannot stand; and most surely not in a case, whereof we ourselves declare they understood the question better than we. If any part of the audience came with the expectation of hearing therhetorical fire-works of a Western stump-speaker of the "half-horse, half-alligator" variety, they met novelty of an unlooked for kind. InLincoln's entire address he neither introduced an anecdote nor essayeda witticism; and the first half of it does not contain even anillustrative figure or a poetical fancy. It was the quiet, searchingexposition of the historian, and the terse, compact reasoning of thestatesman, about an abstract principle of legislation, in languagewell-nigh as restrained and colorless as he would have employed inarguing a case before a court. Yet such was the apt choice of words, the easy precision of sentences, the simple strength of propositions, the fairness of every point he assumed, and the force of everyconclusion he drew, that his listeners followed him with the interestand delight a child feels in its easy mastery of a plain sum inarithmetic. With the sympathy and confidence of his audience thus enlisted, Lincoln next took up the more prominent topics in popular thought, andby words of kindly admonition and protest addressed to the people ofthe South, showed how impatiently, unreasonably, and unjustly theywere charging the Republican party with sectionalism, with radicalism, with revolutionary purpose, with the John Brown raid, and kindredpolitical offenses, not only in the absence of any acts to justifysuch charges, but even in the face of its emphatic and constantdenials and disavowals. The illustration with which he concluded thisbranch of his theme could not well be surpassed in argumentativeforce. But you will not abide the election of a Republican President! In that supposed event, you say, you will destroy the Union; and then you say, the great crime of having destroyed it will be upon us! That is cool. A highwayman holds a pistol to my ear, and mutters through his teeth, "Stand and deliver, or I shall kill you, and then you will be a murderer!" To be sure what the robber demanded of me--my money--was my own; and I had a clear right to keep it; but it was no more my own than my vote is my own; and the threat of death to me to extort my money, and the threat of destruction to the Union to extort my vote, can scarcely be distinguished in principle. But the most impressive, as well as the most valuable, feature ofLincoln's address was its concluding portion, where, in advicedirected especially to Republicans, he pointed out in dispassionatebut earnest language that the real, underlying conflict was in thedifference of moral conviction between the sections as to the inherentright or wrong of slavery, and in view of which he defined the properduty of the free-States. A few words now [said he] to Republicans. It is exceedingly desirable that all parts of this great Confederacy shall be at peace and in harmony one with another. Let us Republicans do our part to have it so. Even though much provoked, let us do nothing through passion and ill temper. Even though the Southern people will not so much, as listen to us, let us calmly consider their demands, and yield to them if, in our deliberate view of our duty, we possibly can. Judging by all they say and do, and by the subject and nature of their controversy with us, let us determine, if we can, what will satisfy them. Will they be satisfied if the Territories be unconditionally surrendered to them? We know they will not. In all their present complaints against us the Territories are scarcely mentioned. Invasions and insurrections are the rage now. Will it satisfy them if, in the future, we have nothing to do with invasions and insurrections? We know it will not. We so know, because we know we never had anything to do with invasions and insurrections; and yet this total abstaining does not exempt us from the charge and the denunciation. The question recurs. What will satisfy them? Simply this: We must not only let them alone, but we must, somehow, convince them that we do let them alone. This, we know by experience, is no easy task. We have been so trying to convince them from the very beginning; of our organization, but with no success. In all our platforms and speeches we have constantly protested our purpose to let them alone; but this has had no tendency to convince them. Alike unavailing to convince them is the fact that they have never detected a man of us in any attempt to disturb them. These natural and apparently adequate means all failing, what will convince them? This, and this only: cease to call slavery wrong, and join them in calling it right. And this must be done thoroughly--done in acts as well as in words. Silence will not be tolerated; we must place ourselves avowedly with them. Senator Douglas's new sedition law must be enacted and enforced, suppressing all declarations that slavery is wrong, whether made in politics, in presses, in pulpits, or in private. We must arrest and return their fugitive slaves with greedy pleasure. We must pull down our free-State constitutions. The whole atmosphere must be disinfected from all taint of opposition to slavery before they will cease to believe that all their troubles proceed from us. I am quite aware they do not state their case precisely in this way. Most of them would probably say to us, "Let us alone, do nothing to us, and say what you please about slavery. " But we do let them alone--have never disturbed them; so that, after all, it is what we say which dissatisfies them. They will continue to accuse us of doing until we cease saying. I am also aware they have not, as yet, in terms, demanded the overthrow of our free-State constitutions. Yet those constitutions declare the wrong of slavery, with more solemn emphasis than do all other sayings against it, and when all these other sayings shall have been silenced, the overthrow of these constitutions will be demanded and nothing be left to resist the demand. It is nothing to the contrary that they do not demand the whole of this just now. Demanding what they do, and for the reason they do, they can voluntarily stop nowhere short of this consummation. Holding, as they do, that slavery is morally right, and socially elevating, they cannot cease to demand a full national recognition of it, as a legal right and a social blessing. Nor can we justifiably withhold this on any ground, save our conviction that slavery is wrong. If slavery is right, all words, acts, laws, and constitutions against it are themselves wrong, and should be silenced and swept away. If it is right, we cannot justly object to its nationality--its universality! if it is wrong, they cannot justly insist upon its extension--its enlargement. All they ask we could readily grant, if we thought slavery right; all we ask they could as readily grant, if they thought it wrong. Their thinking it right, and our thinking it wrong, is the precise fact upon which depends the whole controversy. Thinking it right, as they do, they are not to blame for desiring its full recognition, as being right; but thinking it wrong, as we do, can we yield to them? Can we cast our votes with their view and against our own! In view of our moral, social, and political responsibilities, can we do this? Wrong as we think slavery is, we can yet afford to let it alone where it is, because that much is due to the necessity arising from its actual presence in the nation; but can we, while our votes will prevent it, allow it to spread into the national Territories, and to overrun us here in the free-States? If our sense of duty forbids this, then let us stand by our duty, fearlessly and effectively. Let us be diverted by none of those sophistical contrivances wherewith we are so industriously plied and belabored, contrivances such as groping for some middle ground between the right and the wrong, vain as the search for a man who should be neither a living man nor a dead man, such as a policy of "don't care, " on a question about which all true men do care, such as Union appeals beseeching true Union men to yield to Disunionists; reversing the divine rule, and calling, not the sinners, but the righteous to repentance; such as invocations to Washington, imploring men to unsay what Washington said, and undo what Washington did. Neither let us be slandered from our duty by false accusations against us, nor frightened from it by menaces of destruction to the Government nor of dungeons to ourselves. Let us have faith that right makes might, and in that faith, let us, to the end, dare to do our duty as we understand it. [Sidenote] "New York Tribune, " February 28, 1860. The smiles, the laughter, the outburst of applause which greeted andemphasized the speaker's telling points, showed Mr. Lincoln that hisarguments met ready acceptance. The next morning the four leading NewYork dailies printed the speech in full, and bore warm testimony toits merit and effect. "Mr. Lincoln is one of nature's orators, " saidthe "Tribune, " "using his rare powers solely to elucidate andconvince, though their inevitable effect is to delight and electrifyas well. We present herewith a very full and accurate report of thisspeech; yet the tones, the gestures, the kindling eye, and themirth-provoking look defy the reporter's skill. The vast assemblagefrequently rang with cheers and shouts of applause, which wereprolonged and intensified at the close. No man ever before made suchan impression on his first appeal to a New York audience. " [Illustration: CALEB CUSHING. ] [Sidenote] Pamphlet edition with notes and preface by Charles C. Nott and Cephas Brainerd, September, 1860. A pamphlet reprint was at once announced by the same paper; and later, in the Presidential campaign, a more careful edition was prepared andcirculated, to which were added copious notes by two members of thecommittee under whose auspices the address was delivered. Theircomment, printed in the preface, is worth quoting as showing itsliterary value under critical analysis. "No one who has not actuallyattempted to verify its details can understand the patient researchand historical labor which it embodies. The history of our earlierpolitics is scattered through numerous journals, statutes, pamphlets, and letters; and these are defective in completeness and accuracy ofstatement, and in indices and tables of contents. Neither can any onewho has not traveled over this precise ground appreciate the accuracyof every trivial detail, or the self-denying impartiality with whichMr. Lincoln has turned from the testimony of 'the fathers' on thegeneral question of slavery, to present the single question which hediscusses. From the first line to the last, from his premises to hisconclusion, he travels with a swift, unerring directness which nologician ever excelled, an argument complete and full, without theaffectation of learning, and without the stiffness which usuallyaccompanies dates and details. A single, easy, simple sentence ofplain Anglo-Saxon words, contains a chapter of history that, in someinstances, has taken days of labor to verify, and which must have costthe author months of investigation to acquire. " From New York Lincoln went to fill other engagements to speak atseveral places in New England, where he met the same enthusiasticpopular reception and left the same marked impression, especially uponhis more critical and learned hearers. They found no little surprisein the fact that a Western politician, springing from the class ofunlettered frontiersmen, could not only mold plain strong words intofresh and attractive phraseology, but maintain a clear, sustained, convincing argument, equal in force and style to the best examples intheir college text-books. CHAPTER XIII THE CHARLESTON CONVENTION The great political struggle between the North and the South, betweenFreedom and Slavery, was approaching its culmination. The"irrepressible conflict" had shifted uneasily from caucus to Congress;from Congress to Kansas; incidentally to the Supreme Court and to theCongressional elections in the various States; from Kansas it had comeback with renewed intensity to Congress. The next stage of developmentthrough which it was destined to pass was the Presidential election of1860, where, necessarily, the final result would depend largely uponthe attitude and relation of parties, platforms, and candidates asselected and proclaimed by their National conventions. The first of these National conventions was that of the Democraticparty, long appointed to meet at Charleston, South Carolina, on April23, 1860. The fortunes of the party had greatly fluctuated. The repealof the Missouri Compromise had brought it shipwreck in 1854; it hadregained victory in the election of Buchanan, and a majority of theHouse of Representatives in 1856; then the Lecompton imbroglio oncemore caused its defeat in the Congressional elections of 1858. Butworse than the victory of its opponents was the irreconcilable schismin its own ranks--the open war between President Buchanan and SenatorDouglas. In a general way the Southern Democracy followed Buchanan, while the Northern Democracy followed Douglas. Yet there was justenough local exception to baffle accurate calculation. Could theCharleston Convention heal the feud of leaders, and bridge the chasmin policy and principle? As the time approached, and delegation afterdelegation was chosen by the States, all hope of accommodationgradually disappeared. Each faction put forth its utmost efforts, rallied its strongest men. Each caucus and convention only accentuatedand deepened existing differences. When the convention met, itsmembers brought not the ordinary tricks and expedients of politicianswith _carte blanche_ authority, but the precise formulated terms towhich their constituencies would consent. They were only messengers, not arbitrators. The Charleston Convention was the very opposite ofits immediate predecessor, the Cincinnati Convention. At Cincinnati, concealment and ambiguity had been the central thought and purpose. Everybody was anxious to be hoodwinked. Delegates, constituencies, andleaders had willingly joined in the game of "cheat and be cheated. "Availability, harmony, party success, were the paramount objects. [Sidenote] Douglas, Reply to Black, Pamphlet, Oct. , 1859. No similar ambiguity, concealment, or bargain was possible atCharleston. There was indeed a whole brood of collateral issues to beleft in convenient obscurity, but the central questions must not beshirked. The Lecompton quarrel, the Freeport doctrine, the propertytheory, the "slave-State" dogma, the Congressional slave codeproposal, must be boldly met and squarely adjusted. Even if thedelegates had been disposed to trifle with their constituents, theleaders themselves would tolerate no evasion on certain cardinalpoints. Douglas, in his Dorr letter, had announced that he wouldsuffer no interpolation of new issues into the Democratic creed. Inhis pamphlet reply to Judge Black he repeated his determination withemphasis. "Suppose it were true that I am a Presidential aspirant;does that fact justify a combination by a host of other Presidentialaspirants, each of whom may imagine that his success depends upon mydestruction, and the preaching a crusade against me for boldly avowingnow the same principles to which they and I were pledged at the lastPresidential election! Is this a sufficient excuse for devising a newtest of political orthodoxy?. .. I prefer the position of Senator oreven that of a private citizen, where I would be at liberty to defendand maintain the well-defined principles of the Democratic party, toaccepting a Presidential nomination upon a platform incompatible withthe principle of self-government in the Territories, or the reservedrights of the States, or the perpetuity of the Union under theConstitution. " [Sidenote] "Globe, " p. 658. [Sidenote] Jefferson Davis, Senate Speech, "Globe, " May 17, 1860, p. 2155. [Sidenote] "Globe", March 1, 1860, p. 935. This declaration very clearly defined the issue on one side. On theother side it was also formulated with equal distinctness. JeffersonDavis, already recognized as the ablest leader of the Buchanan wing ofthe Democratic Senators, wrote and submitted to the United StatesSenate, on February 2, 1860, a series of resolutions designed toconstitute the Administration or Southern party doctrines, which wereafterwards revised and adopted by a caucus of Democratic Senators. These resolutions expressed the usual party tenets; and on two of thecontroverted points asserted dogmatically exactly that which Douglashad stigmatized as an intolerable heresy. The fourth resolutiondeclared "That neither Congress nor a Territorial Legislature, whetherby direct legislation or legislation of an indirect and unfriendlycharacter, possesses power to annul or impair the constitutional rightof any citizen of the United States to take his slave property intothe common Territories, and there hold and enjoy the same while theTerritorial condition remains. " While the fifth resolution declared"That if experience should at any time prove that the judiciary andexecutive authority do not possess means to insure adequate protectionto constitutional rights in a Territory, and if the Territorialgovernment shall fail or refuse to provide the necessary remedies forthat purpose, it will be the duty of Congress to supply suchdeficiency. " Party discipline was so strong among the Democrats that publicexpectation looked confidently to at least a temporary agreement orcombination which would enable the factions, by a joint effort, tomake a hopeful Presidential campaign. But no progress whatever wasmade in that direction. As the clans gathered at Charleston, thenotable difference developed itself, that while one wing was filledwith unbounded enthusiasm for a candidate, the other was animated byan earnest and stubborn devotion to an idea. [Sidenote] Murat Halstead, "Conventions of 1860. " "Douglas was the pivot individual of the Charleston Convention, " wrotean observant journalist; "every delegate was for or against him; everymotion meant to nominate or not nominate him; every parliamentary warwas _pro_ or _con_ Douglas. " This was the surface indication, and, indeed, it may be said with truth, it was the actual feeling of theNorthern faction of the Democratic party. Douglas was a genuinelypopular leader. He had the power to inspire a pure personalenthusiasm. He had aroused such hero-worship as may be possible inmodern times and in American polities. Beyond this, however, theLecompton controversy, and his open persecution by the BuchananAdministration, made his leadership and his candidacy a necessity tothe Northern Democrats. With Southern Democrats the feeling went somewhat deeper. Forgettinghow much they owed him in the past, and how much they might still gainthrough him in the future, they saw only that he was now theirstumbling-block, the present obstacle to their full and final success. It was the Douglas doctrine, squatter sovereignty, and "unfriendlylegislation, " rather than the _man_, which they had come to oppose, and were determined to put down. Any other individual holding theseheresies would have been equally obnoxious. They had no candidate oftheir own; they worshiped no single leader; but they followed aprinciple with unfaltering devotion. They clung unswervingly not onlyto the property theory, but advanced boldly to its logicalsequence--Congressional protection to slavery in the Territories. Of the convention's preliminary work little is worth recording--therewere the clamor and protest of contesting delegations and small fireof parliamentary skirmishes, by which factions feel and measure eachother's strength. Caleb Cushing was made permanent chairman, for thetriple reason that he was from Massachusetts, that he was the ablestpresiding officer in the body, and was for the moment filled withblind devotion to Southern views. The actual temper of the conventionwas made manifest by the ready agreement of both extremes to joinbattle in making the platform before proceeding to the nomination ofcandidates. The usual committee of one member from each State wasappointed, and to it was referred the deluge of resolutions which hadbeen showered upon the convention. Had an amicable solution of the slavery issue been possible, thisplatform committee would have found it, for it labored faithfully toaccomplish the miracle. But after three days and nights of fruitlesssuggestion and persuasion, the committee reappeared in convention. Upon four points they had come to either entire or substantialagreement. In addition to re-affirming formally the Cincinnatiplatform of 1856, they advised the convention to favor, 1. Thefaithful execution of the fugitive-slave law. 2. The protection ofnaturalized citizens. 3. The construction of a Pacific railroad. 4. The acquisition of the Island of Cuba. But upon the principal topic, the question of slavery in the Territories, they felt compelled toreport that even an approximate unanimity was impossible. Inundisguised sorrow they proceeded to present two radically differentreports. The convention, not yet in the least realizing that the greatDemocratic party had suffered fatal shipwreck in the secretcommittee-room, listened eagerly to the reports and explanatoryspeeches of the majority and minority of the committee. The majority report[1] planted itself squarely upon the propertytheory and Congressional protection. Mr. Avery, of North Carolina, said it was presented in the name of 17 States with 127 electoralvotes, every one of which would be cast for the nominee. He arguedthat in occupying new Territories Southern men could not compete withemigrant-aid societies at the North. These could send a voter to theTerritories for the sum of $200, while it would cost a Southern man$1500. Secure political power by emigration, and permit theTerritorial Legislatures to decide the slavery question, and the Southwould be excluded as effectually as by the Wilmot proviso. Cuba mustbe acquired, and the flag of this great country must float over Mexicoand the Central American States. But if you apply this doctrine ofpopular sovereignty, and establish a cordon of free-States from thePacific to the Atlantic, where in the future are the South toemigrate? They asked the equal right to emigrate with their property, and protection from Congress during the Territorial condition. Theywould leave it to the people in convention assembled, when framing aState constitution, to determine the question of slavery forthemselves. They had no purpose but to have a vexed question settled, and to put the Democratic party on a clear unclouded platform, not adoubled-faced one--one face to the North and one face to the South. Henry B. Payne, of Ohio, presented and defended the report of theminority. [2] It asserted that all questions in regard to property inStates or Territories were judicial in their character, and that theDemocratic party would abide by past and future decisions of theSupreme Court concerning them. Mr. Payne explained that while themajority report was supported by 15 slave and two free-States, [3]representing 127 electoral votes, the minority report was indorsed by15 free-States, [4] representing 176 electoral votes. He argued that, by the universal consent of the Democratic party, the Cincinnatiplatform referred this question of slavery to the people of theTerritories, declaring that Congress should in no event intervene oneway or the other, and that all controversies should be settled by thecourts. Now the proposition of the majority report was to make acomplete retraction of those two cardinal doctrines of the Cincinnatiplatform. The Northern mind had become thoroughly imbued with thisgreat doctrine of popular sovereignty. You could not tear it out oftheir hearts unless you tore out their heart-strings themselves. "Irepeat, that upon this question of Congressional non-intervention weare committed by the acts of Congress, we are committed by the acts ofNational Democratic Conventions; we cannot recede without personaldishonor, and, so help us God, we never will recede!" Between these extremes of recommendation another member of theplatform committee--Benjamin F. Butler, of Massachusetts--proposed amiddle course. He advocated the simple reaffirmance of the Cincinnatiplatform. If it had suffered a double interpretation, so had the Bibleand the Constitution of the United States. But beyond serving toconsume time and amuse the convention, Mr. Butler's speech made noimpression. The real tournament of debate followed, between William L. Yancey, of Alabama, and Senator George E. Pugh, of Ohio. [Sidenote] Halstead, "Conventions of 1860, " pp. 5, 48. It turned out in the end that Mr. Yancey was the master-spirit of theCharleston Convention, though that body was far from entertaining anysuch suspicion at the beginning. In exterior appearance he did notfill the portrait of the traditional fire-eater. He is described as "acompact middle-sized man, straight-limbed, with a square-built headand face, and an eye full of expression"; "a very mild and gentlemanlyman, always wearing a genuinely good-humored smile, and looking as ifnothing in the world could disturb the equanimity of his spirits. " Hehad, besides, a marvelous gift of persuasive oratory. He was theWendell Phillips of the South, for, like his Northern rival, he was aborn agitator. Above all his colleagues, he was the brain and soul andirrepressible champion of the pro-slavery reaction throughout theCotton States. He was tireless and ubiquitous; traveling, talking, writing, lecturing, animating every intrigue, directing every caucus, making speeches and drafting platforms at every convention. To defend, propagate, and perpetuate African slavery was his mission. He was theultra of the ultras, accepting the institution as morally right anddivinely sanctioned, desiring its extension and inclined to favor, though not then himself advocating, the re-opening of the Africanslave-trade. He held that all Federal laws prohibiting such tradeought to be repealed so that each State might decide the question foritself. Still more, Mr. Yancey was not only an agitator andfire-eater, but for years an insidious, persevering conspirator topromote secession. Occupying such a position, he was naturally thechampion of the Cotton States at Charleston. The defense of the ultrademands of the South was by common consent devolved upon him, [5] andit was understood long beforehand that he was prepared with theprincipal speech from that side. In full consciousness of the fact that he and his colleagues were thenat Charleston with a predetermination to force a programme ofdisruption expressly designed as a prelude to intended disunion, Mr. Yancey stood up and with smiling face and silvery tones assured hishearers that he and his colleagues from Alabama were not disunionists_per se_. Then he proceeded with his speech. Only its key-note wasnew, but the novelty was of startling import to Northern delegates. The Northern Democrats, he stated, were losing ground and fallingbefore their victorious adversaries. Why? Because they had tamperedwith, and pandered to, the anti-slavery sentiment. They had admittedthat slavery was wrong. This was surrendering the very citadel oftheir argument. They must re-form their lines and change theirtactics. They must come up to the high requirements of the occasionand take a new departure. The remainder of his speech was aninsinuating plea for the property doctrine and Congressionalintervention, for which the galleries and convention rewarded him withlong and earnest applause. Even if the great Southern agitator'sspeech had been wanting in point and eloquence, success was suppliedby the unmistakable atmosphere and temper of this great Charlestonaudience. The more astute of the Douglas delegates were struck with the dismayof a new revelation. Their cause was lost--their party was gone. Senator Pugh, of Ohio, resented the dictation of the advocates ofslavery in a warmth of just indignation. He thanked God that at last abold and honest man had told the whole truth of the demands of theSouth. It was now before the country that the South did demand anadvanced step from the Democratic party. He accurately traced thedownfall of the Northern Democracy to her changing and growingexactions. Taunted with their weakness, they were now told they mustput their hands on their mouths and their mouths in the dust. "Gentlemen of the South, " said Mr. Pugh, "you mistake us--we will notdo it. " Such language had never been heard in a Democratic NationalConvention, and the hall was as still as a funeral. This was Fridaynight, the fifth day of the convention. "A crisis" had long beenwhispered of as the skeleton in the party closet. It seemed to be athand, and in a parliamentary uproar the "question" was vehementlydemanded, but the chairman skillfully managed at length to secure anadjournment. The "crisis" had in reality come on Thursday night, in thecommittee-room, in the hopeless first double report of its platformcommittee. The dissolution of the convention did not take place tillthe Monday following. A great party, after a vigorous and successfullife of thirty years, could not die easily. The speeches of Avery andPayne, of Yancey and Pugh, on Friday, were recognized as cries ofdefiance, but not yet accepted as moans of despair. On Saturdaymorning. President Buchanan's lieutenant, William Bigler, ofPennsylvania, essayed to ride the storm and steer to a Southernvictory. But he only succeeded in securing a recommittal of bothplatforms to the committee. Nothing, however, was gained by themanoeuvre. Saturday afternoon the committee once more reported thesame disagreement in slightly changed phraseology;[6] two antagonisticplatforms, presenting the same sharp difference of principle--onedemanding Congressional intervention, the other declaring against it. Then the parliamentary storm was unloosed for the remainder of thatday with such fury that the chairman declared his physical inabilityto continue a contest with six hundred gentlemen as to who should crythe loudest, and threatened to leave the chair. On Monday, April 30, the seventh day of the convention, a final decision was reached. Theproposal of Butler's report simply to reaffirm the Cincinnati platformwas supported by only 105 ayes to 198 noes. Then, by 165 to 138, theconvention voted to substitute the minority report for that of themajority; in other words, to adopt the Douglas non-interventionplatform. [Illustration: W. L. YANCEY. ] The explosion was near, but still delayed, and the delegates of theCotton States sat sullenly through a tangle of routine voting. Finally, the question was renewed on Butler's proposition to adopt theCincinnati platform pure and simple. This was the red flag to the madbull. Mississippi declared that the Cincinnati platform was a greatpolitical swindle on one half the States of the Union; and from thattime on the Cotton States ceased to act as a part of the convention. As soon as a lull in the proceedings permitted, Mr. Yancey put inexecution his programme of demand, disruption, disunion, andrebellion, labored for through long years, and announced by himself, with minute distinctness, nine months before. [7] Led by the Alabamadelegation, the Cotton States, --Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, SouthCarolina, Florida, Texas, and Arkansas, --with protests and speeches, with all the formality and "solemnity" which the occasion allowed, seceded from the Charleston Convention, and withdrew from thedeliberations in Institute Hall. That same Monday night the city of Charleston expressed its satisfactionby a grand jubilee. Music, bonfires, and extravagant declamation heldan excited crowd in Court-house Square till a late hour; and in ahigh-wrought peroration Yancey prophesied, with all the confidence andexultation of a triumphant conspirator, that "perhaps even now the penof the historian is nibbed to write the story of a new revolution. " ----------[1] MAJORITY REPORT. "Resolved, That the platform adopted at Cincinnati be affirmed, withthe following resolutions: "Resolved, That the Democracy of the United States hold these cardinalprinciples on the subject of slavery in the Territories: First. ThatCongress has no power to abolish slavery in the Territories. Second. That the Territorial Legislature has no power to abolish slavery inany Territory, nor to prohibit the introduction of slaves therein, norany power to exclude slavery therefrom, nor any power to destroy orimpair the right of property in slaves "by any legislationwhatever. .. . "Resolved, That it is the duty of the Federal Government to protect, when necessary, the rights of persons and property on the high seas, in the Territories, or wherever else its constitutional authorityextends. " [2] MINORITY REPORT. "Resolved, That we, the Democracy of the Union, in conventionassembled, hereby declare our affirmance of the resolutionsunanimously adopted and declared as a platform of principles by theDemocratic Convention at Cincinnati in the year 1856, believing thatDemocratic principles are unchangeable in their nature when applied tothe same subject-matters; and we recommend, as the only furtherresolutions, the following: "Resolved, That all questions in regard to the rights of property inStates or Territories arising under the Constitution of the UnitedStates are judicial in their character, and the Democratic party ispledged to abide by and faithfully carry out such determination ofthese questions as has been, or may be made by the Supreme Court ofthe United States. " [3] Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, Arkansas, Missouri, Tennessee, Kentucky, California, Oregon. [4] Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island, Connecticut, NewYork, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Iowa, Minnesota, and Massachusetts. As Mr. Butler, whorepresented Massachusetts on the platform committee, had submitted aseparate report, Mr. Payne seems not to have included her in his totalof free-States, though he does appear to have included her electoralvote in his estimate. [5] "The leadership at Charleston, in this attempt to divide anddestroy the Democratic party, was intrusted to appropriate hands. Noman possessed the ability, or the courage, or the sincerity in hisobject for such a mission in a higher degree than the giftedYancey. "--Stephen A. Douglas, Senate Speech, May 16, 1860; Appendix to"Congressional Globe, " p. 313. [6] SECOND MAJORITY REPORT. "_Resolved_, That the platform adopted by the Democratic party atCincinnati be affirmed with the following explanatory resolutions: "_First_. That the government of a Territory organized by an act ofCongress is provisional and temporary, and, during its existence, allcitizens of the United States have an equal right to settle with theirproperty in the Territory without their rights, either of person orproperty, being destroyed or impaired by Congressional or Territoriallegislation. "_Second_. That it is the duty of the Federal Government in all itsdepartments, to protect, when necessary, the rights of persons andproperty in the Territories, and wherever else its constitutionalauthority extends. "_Third_. That when the settlers in a Territory having an adequatepopulation form a State constitution, the right of sovereigntycommences, and, being consummated by admission into the Union, theystand on an equal footing with the people of other States, and theState thus organized ought to be admitted into the Federal Union, whether its constitution prohibits or recognizes the institution ofslavery. " SECOND MINORITY REPORT. "1. _Resolved_, That we, the Democracy of the Union, in conventionassembled, hereby declare our affirmance of the resolutionsunanimously adopted and declared as a platform of principles by theDemocratic Convention at Cincinnati, in the year 1856, believing thatdemocratic principles are unchangeable in their nature when applied tothe same subject-matters; and we recommend as the only furtherresolutions the following: "Inasmuch as differences of opinion exist in the Democratic party asto the nature and extent of the powers of a Territorial Legislatureand as to the powers and duties of Congress under the Constitution ofthe United States over the institution of slavery within theTerritories: "2. _Resolved_, That the Democratic party will abide by the decisionsof the Supreme Court of the United States on the questions ofconstitutional law. " [7] "To obtain the aid of the Democracy in this contest, it isnecessary to make a contest in its Charleston Convention. In that bodyDouglas's adherents will press his doctrines to a decision. If theStates-Rights men keep out of that convention, that decision mustinevitably be against the South, and that either in direct favor ofthe Douglas doctrine, or by the indorsement of the Cincinnatiplatform, under which Douglas claims shelter for his principles. " "TheStates-Rights men should present in that convention their demands fora decision, and they will obtain an indorsement of their demands, or adenial of these demands. If indorsed, we shall have greater hope oftriumph within the Union. If denied, in my opinion, the States-Rightswing should secede from the convention, and appeal to the whole peopleof the South; without distinction of parties, and organize anotherconvention upon the basis of their principles, and go into theelection with a candidate nominated by it, as a grand constitutionalparty. But in the Presidential contest a black Republican may beelected. If this dire event should happen, in my opinion the only hopeof safety for the South is in a withdrawal from the Union before heshall be inaugurated; before the sword and treasury of the FederalGovernment shall be placed in the keeping of that party. I wouldsuggest that the several State legislatures should by law require theGovernor, when it shall be made manifest that the black Republicancandidate for the Presidency shall receive a majority of the electoralvotes, to call a convention of the people of the State, to assemble inample time to provide for their safety before the 4th of March, 1861. If, however, a black Republican should not be elected, then, inpursuance of the policy of making this contest within the Union, weshould initiate measures in Congress which should lead to a repeal ofall the unconstitutional acts against slavery. If we should fail toobtain so just a system of legislation, then the South should seek herindependence out of the Union. "--Speech of W. L. Yancey, delivered atColumbia, S. C. , July 8, 1859. Copied in The New York "Tribune, " July20, 1859. The corroboration and fulfillment of the plot here indicated are foundin the official proceedings of the Alabama Convention and the AlabamaLegislature. The convention on January 13, 1860, expressly instructedits delegation at Charleston to secede in case the ultra-Southerndoctrines were not incorporated in the National Democratic platform, and sent Mr. Yancey as a delegate to execute their instructions, whichhe did as the text states. The Alabama Legislature, on its part, passed a joint resolution, whichthe Governor approved, February 24, 1860, providing "that upon theelection of a President advocating the principles and action of theparty in the Northern States calling itself the Republican party, " theGovernor should forthwith call a convention of the State. Thisconvention was duly called after the election of Mr. Lincoln, andpassed the secession ordinance of Alabama. CHAPTER XIV THE BALTIMORE NOMINATIONS Though the compact voting body of the South had retired from theCharleston Convention, her animating spirit yet remained in thenumbers and determination of the anti-Douglas delegates. When onTuesday morning, May 1, the eighth day, the convention once more met, the Douglas men, with a view to making the most of the dilemma, resolved to force the nomination of their favorite. But there was alion in the path. Usage and tradition had consecrated the two-thirdsrule. Charles E. Stuart, of Michigan, tried vainly to obtain theliberal interpretation, that this meant "two-thirds of the votesgiven, " but Chairman Cushing ruled remorselessly against him, and atthe instance of John B. Howard, of Tennessee, the convention voted(141 to 112) that no person should be declared nominated who did notreceive two-thirds of all the votes the full convention was entitledto cast. This sealed the fate of Douglas. The Electoral College numbered 303;202 votes therefore were necessary to a choice. Voting for candidateswas begun, and continued throughout all the next day (Wednesday, May2). Fifty-seven ballots were taken in all; Douglas received 145-1/2 onthe first, and on several subsequent ballots his strength rose to152-1/2. The other votes were scattered among eight differentcandidates with no near approach to agreement. [1] The dead-lock having become unmistakable and irremediable, and thenomination of Douglas under existing conditions impossible, allparties finally consented to an adjournment, especially as it wasevident that unless this were done the sessions would come to an endby mere disintegration. Therefore, on the tenth day (May 3), theCharleston Convention formally adjourned, having previously resolvedto reassemble on the 18th of June, in the city of Baltimore, with arecommendation that the several States make provision to fill thevacancies in their delegations. Mr. Yancey and his seceders had meanwhile organized another conventionin St. Andrew's Hall. Their business was of course to reportsubstantially the platform rejected by the Douglas men, and for therejection of which they had retired. Mr. Yancey then explained to themthat the adoption of this platform was all the action they proposed totake until the "rump democracy" should make their nomination, when, hesaid, "it may be our privilege to indorse the nominee, or our duty toproceed to make a nomination. " Other seceders were more impatient, anddesired that something be done forthwith; but as the sessions werecontinued to the second and third day, their overflowing zeal found asafety-valve in their speeches. Mr. Yancey's programme prevailed, andthey also adjourned to meet again in Richmond on the 11th of June. At the time of the disruption, rumors were current in Charleston thatthe movement, if not prompted, was at least encouraged and sustainedby telegrams from leading Senators and Representatives then at theirCongressional duties in Washington. As the day for reassembling inBaltimore drew near, the main fact was abundantly proved by thepublication of an address, signed by Jefferson Davis, Toombs, Iverson, Slidell, Benjamin, Mason, and some fourteen others, in which theyundertook to point out a path to union and harmony in the Democraticparty. They recited the withdrawal of eight States at Charleston, andindorsed the step without qualification. "We cannot refrain, " said theaddress, "from expressing our admiration and approval of this loftymanifestation of adherence to principle, rising superior to allconsiderations of expediency, to all trammels of party, and lookingwith an eye single to the defense of the constitutional rights of theStates. " They then alleged that the other Democratic States remainedin the convention only to make a further effort to secure "somesatisfactory recognition of sound principles, " declaring, however, their determination also to withdraw if their just expectation shouldbe disappointed. The address then urged that the seceders should defertheir meeting at Richmond, but that they should come to Baltimore andendeavor to effect "a reconciliation of differences on a basis ofprinciple. " If the Baltimore Convention should adopt "a satisfactoryplatform of principles, "--and their votes might help secure it, --thencause of dissension would have ceased. "On the other hand, " continuedthe address, "if the convention, on reassembling at Baltimore, shalldisappoint the just expectations of the remaining Democratic States, their delegations cannot fail to withdraw and unite with the eightStates which have adjourned to Richmond. " The address, in anotherparagraph, explained that the seventeen Democratic States which hadvoted at Charleston for the seceders' platform, "united withPennsylvania alone, comprise a majority of the entire electoral voteof the United States, able to elect the Democratic nominees againstthe combined opposition of all the remaining States. " This was a shrewd and crafty appeal. Under an apparent plea forharmony lurked an insidious invitation to Delaware, Virginia, NorthCarolina, Missouri, Tennessee, Kentucky, California, Oregon, andPennsylvania to join the seceders, reconstruct the Democratic party, cut off all the "popular sovereignty" recusants, and secure perpetualascendency in national politics through the consolidated South. Thesigners of this address, forgetting their own constant accusation of"sectionalism" against the Republicans, pretended to see noimpropriety in proposing this purely selfish and sectional alliance. If it succeeded, their triumph in the Union was irresistible andpermanent; if it failed, it served to unite the South for secessionand a slave confederacy. If any Democrat harbored a doubt that the proposed reconciliationmeant simply a reunion on the Davis-Yancey platform, the doubt wassoon removed. In the Senate of the United States, Jefferson Davis waspressing to a vote his caucus resolutions, submitted in February, toserve as a model for the Charleston platform; and this brought on afinal discussion between himself and Douglas. [Sidenote] "Globe, " May 7, 1860, p. 1940. [Sidenote] Appendix. "Globe, " May 15 and 16, 1860, pp. 312, 313, and 316. [Sidenote] "Globe, " May 17, 1860, p. 2151. [Sidenote] Ibid. , p. 2153. [Sidenote] Ibid. , p. 2155. Davis had begun the debate on the 7th of May by a savage onslaught on"Squatter Sovereignty"--a fallacy, he said, fraught with mischiefmore deadly than the fatal upas, because it spread its poison over thewhole Union. Douglas took up the gauntlet, and, replying on May 15 and16, said he could not recognize the right of a caucus of the Senate orthe House to prescribe new tests for the Democratic party. Senatorswere not chosen for the purpose of making platforms. That was the dutyof the Charleston Convention, and it had decided in his favor, platform, organization, and least of all the individual, by giving hima majority of fifty votes over all the other candidates combined. Hereprobated the Yancey movement as leading to dissolution and aSouthern confederacy. The party rejected this caucus platform. Shouldthe majority, he asked, surrender to the minority? Davis, replying onthe 17th, contended that Douglas had, on the Kansas policy of theAdministration, put himself outside the Democratic organization. Hedesired no divided flag for the party. He preferred that the Senator'sbanner should lie in its silken folds to feed the moth; "but if itimpatiently rustles to be unfurled in opposition to ours, we willplant our own on every hill. " Douglas retorted, and again attacked thecaucus dictation. "Why, " he asked, "are all the great measures for thepublic good made to give place to the emergency of passing someabstract resolutions on the subject of politics to reverse theDemocratic platform, under the supposition that the representatives ofthe people are men of weak nerve who are going to be frightened by thethunders of the Senate Chamber?" Davis rejoined, that they wanted anew article in the creed because they could not get an honestconstruction of the platform as it stood. "If you have been beaten ona rickety, double-construed platform, kick it to pieces, and lay onebroad and strong, on which men can stand. " "We want nothing more thana simple declaration that negro slaves are property, and we want therecognition of the obligation of the Federal Government to protectthat property like all other. " A somewhat restrained undertone ofpersonal temper had been running through the debate, and JeffersonDavis could not resist an expression of contempt for his opponent. "The fact is, " said he, "I have a declining respect for platforms. Iwould sooner have an honest man on any sort of a rickety platform thatyou could construct, than to have a man I did not trust on the bestplatform which could be made. " Douglas promptly called attention to the inconsistency of Davis'smethod of forcing his resolutions with one breath and avowing hisindifference to a platform with another, especially as Yancey and hisown followers had seceded on the platform and not on the man; but hedid not press his adversary to the wall, as he might have done, on theinsincerity which Davis's sneer exposed. He was hampered by his ownattitude as a candidate. Douglas, who had received 150 votes atCharleston, and who expected the whole at Baltimore, could not let histongue wag as freely as Davis, who had received only one vote and ahalf at Charleston, and could count on none at Baltimore; else hemight have denounced him on the score of patriotism. For JeffersonDavis, like Yancey, only not so constantly, and like so many others ofthat secession coterie, blew hot and cold about disunion as occasiondemanded. This same debate of May 17 furnished an instructive example. [Sidenote] "Globe, " May 17, 1860, p. 2151. In the beginning of the day's discussion Davis indulged in arepetition of the old alarm-cry: "And so, sir, when we declare ourtenacious adherence to the Union, it is the Union of the Constitution. If the compact between the States is to be trampled into the dust; ifanarchy is to be substituted for the usurpation which threatened theGovernment at an earlier period; if the Union is to become powerlessfor the purposes for which it was established, and we are vainly toappeal to it for protection--then, sir, conscious of the rectitude ofour course, and self-reliant within ourselves, we look beyond theconfines of the Union for the maintenance of our rights. " [Sidenote] "Globe, " May 17, 1860, p. 2156. But after Douglas had made a damaging exposure of Yancey's disunionintrigues, which had come to light, and had charged their animus onthe Charleston seceders, Davis changed his tone. He said there werenot more than seventy-five men in the lodges of the Southern Leagues. He did not think the Union was in danger from them. "I have greatconfidence, " said he, "in the strength of the Union. Every now andthen I hear that it is about to tumble to pieces; that somebody isgoing to introduce a new plank into the platform, and if he does, theUnion must tumble down; until at last I begin to think it is such arickety old platform that it is impossible to prop it up. But then Ibring my own judgment to bear, instead of relying on witnesses, and Icome to the conclusion that the Union is strong and safe--strong inits power as well as in the affections of the people. " The debate made it very plain that it was not reconciliation butdomination which the South wanted. So in due time (May 25) theJefferson Davis resolutions, affirming the "property" theory and the"protection" doctrine, were passed by a large majority of theDemocratic Senators. [Sidenote] June 18, 1860. When the Charleston Convention proper reassembled at Baltimore, it wasseen that the programme laid out by Jefferson Davis and others in theirpublished address had been adopted. The seceders had met at Richmond, taken a recess, and now appeared at Baltimore making application forreadmission. But some of the States that withdrew at Charleston hadsent contesting delegations, and it resolved itself into tangledrivalry and quarrel of platforms, candidates, and delegations allcombined. For four days a furious debate raged in the convention duringthe day, while rival mass-meetings in the streets at night called eachother "disorganizes, " "bolters, " "traitors, " "disunionists, " and"abolitionists. " When Douglas, before a test-vote was reached, sent adispatch suggesting that the party and the country might be saved bydropping his name and uniting upon some other candidate, his followerssuppressed the dispatch. On the fifth day at Baltimore the Democratic National Conventionunderwent its second "crisis, " and suffered its second disruption. This time the secession was somewhat broadened; Chairman Cushingresigned his seat, and Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and California withdrew wholly or in part to jointhe States which had gone out at Charleston. For the time the disunion extremists were keeping their scheme toowell masked for us to establish clearly its historical record. Butthe signs and footprints of their underplot are evident. Here atBaltimore, as at Charleston, and as on every critical occasion, Mr. Yancey was conspicuously present. Here, as elsewhere, he was no doubtpersistently intriguing for disunion in secret while ostentatiouslydenying disunion purposes in public. [Sidenote] Halstead, "Conventions of 1860. " But little remained to do after the disruption at Baltimore, and thatlittle was quickly done. The fragments of the original conventioncontinued their session in the Front-street Theater, where they hadmet, and on the first ballot nominated Stephen A. Douglas forPresident by an almost unanimous vote. The seceders organized, underthe chairmanship of Caleb Cushing, in Maryland Institute Hall, andalso by a nearly unanimous ballot nominated as their candidate forPresident, John C. Breckinridge, of Kentucky. Then Mr. Yancey, who ina street mass-meeting had declared that he was neither for the Union_per se_ nor for disunion _per se_, but for the Constitution, announcedthat the Democracy, the Constitution, and, through them, the were yetsafe. A month prior to the reassembling of the Charleston "Rumps" abovedescribed, Baltimore had already witnessed another Presidentialconvention and nomination, calling itself peculiarly "National, " incontradistinction to the "sectional" character which it charged uponthe Democratic and Republican parties alike. This was a third party, made up mainly of former Whigs whose long-cherished party antagonismskept them aloof from the Democrats in the South and the Republicans inthe North. In the South, they had been men whose moderate anti-slaveryfeelings were outraged by the repeal of the Missouri Compromise andthe Lecompton trick. In the North, they were those whose traditions andaffiliations revolted at the extreme utterances of avowed abolitionists. In both regions many of them had embraced Know-Nothingism, more as analternative than from original choice. The Whig party was dissolved;Know-Nothingism had utterly failed--their only resource was to form anew party. In the various States they had, since the defeat of Fillmore in 1856, held together a minority organization under names differing inseparate localities. All these various factions and fragments sentdelegations to Baltimore, where they united themselves under thedesignation of the Constitutional Union Party. They proposed to take amiddle course between Democrats and Republicans, and to allaysectional strife by ignoring the slavery question. [Sidenote] 1860. Delegates of this party, regular and irregular, from some twenty-twoStates, convened at Baltimore on the 9th of May. John J. Crittenden, of Kentucky, called the meeting to order, and Washington Hunt, of NewYork, was made temporary and permanent chairman. On Thursday, May 10, they adopted as their platform a resolution declaring in substancethat they would "recognize no other political principle than theConstitution of the country, the Union of the States, and theenforcement of the laws. " They had no reasonable hope of directsuccess at the polls in November; but they had a clear possibility ofdefeating a popular choice, and throwing the election into the Houseof Representatives; and in that case their nominee might stand on highvantage-ground as a compromise candidate. This possibility gave somezest to the rivalry among their several aspirants. On their secondballot, a slight preponderance of votes indicated John Bell, ofTennessee, as the favorite, and the convention made his nominationunanimous. Mr. Bell had many qualities desirable in a candidate forPresident. He was a statesman of ripe experience, and of fair, if notbrilliant, fame. Though from the South, his course on the slaveryquestion had been so moderate as to make him reasonably acceptable tothe North on his mere personal record. He had opposed the repeal ofthe Missouri Compromise and the Lecompton outrage. But upon thisplatform of ignoring the political strife of six consecutive years, inwhich he had himself taken such vigorous part, he and his followerswere of course but as grain between the upper and nether millstones. Edward Everett, one of the most eminent statesmen and scholars of NewEngland, was nominated for Vice-President. This party becomes historic, not through what it accomplished, but byreason of what a portion of it failed to perform. Within one year fromthese pledges to the Constitution, the Union, and the enforcement ofthe laws, Mr. Bell and most of his Southern adherents in the secedingStates were banded with others in open rebellion. On the other hand, Mr. Everett and most of the Northern members, together with many nobleexceptions in the border slave-States, like Mr. Crittenden, ofKentucky, kept the faith announced in their platform, and withpatriotic devotion supported the Government in the war to maintain theUnion. ----------[1] The first ballot stood: Stephen A. Douglas, of Illinois, 145-1/2;James Guthrie, of Kentucky, 35-1/2; Daniel S. Dickinson, of New York, 7; R. M. T. Hunter, of Virginia, 42; Andrew Johnson, of Tennessee, 12;Joseph Lane, of Oregon, 6; Jefferson Davis, of Mississippi, 1-1/2;Isaac Toncey, of Connecticut; 2-1/2; Franklin Pierce, of New Hampshire, 1. CHAPTER XV THE CHICAGO CONVENTION [Sidenote] 1860. In recognition of the growing power and importance of the great West, the Republican National Convention was called to meet in Chicago onthe 16th of May. The former Presidential canvass, though resulting inthe defeat of Frémont, had nevertheless shown the remarkable popularstrength of the Republican party in the country at large; since then, its double victory in Congress against Lecompton, and at theCongressional elections over the Representatives who supportedLecompton, gave it confidence and aggressive activity. But now itreceived a new inspiration and impetus from the Charleston disruption. Former possibility was suddenly changed to strong probability ofsuccess in the coming Presidential election. Delegates were not onlyquickened with a new zeal for their principles; the growing chancesspurred them to fresh efforts in behalf of their favorite candidates. Those who had been prominently named were diverse in antecedents andvaried in locality, each however presenting some strong point ofpopular interest. Seward, of New York, a Whig of preeminent fame;Chase, of Ohio, a talented and zealous anti-slavery Democrat, anoriginal founder of the new party; Dayton, of New Jersey, an old Whighigh in personal worth and political service; Cameron, of Pennsylvania, a former Democrat, now the undisputed leader of an influential tariffState; Bates, of Missouri, an able and popular anti-slavery Whig froma slave-State; and last, but by no means least in popular estimation, Lincoln, of Illinois. [Sidenote] Pickett to Lincoln, April 13, 1859. MS. The idea of making Lincoln a Presidential candidate had occurred tothe minds of many during his growing fame. The principle of naturalselection plays no unimportant part in the politics of the UnitedStates. There are always hundreds of newspapers ready to "nail tothe mast-head" the name of any individual which begins to appearfrequently in dispatches and editorials. A few months after the closeof the Lincoln-Douglas debates, and long before the Ohio speeches andthe Cooper Institute address, a warm personal friend, the editor ofan Illinois newspaper, wrote him an invitation to lecture, and addedin his letter: "I would like to have a talk with you on politicalmatters, as to the policy of announcing your name for the Presidency, while you are in our city. My partner and myself are about addressingthe Republican editors of the State on the subject of a simultaneousannouncement of your name for the Presidency. " [Sidenote] Lincoln to Pickett, April 16, 1859. MS. To this Lincoln replied: "As to the other matter you kindly mention, Imust in candor say I do not think myself fit for the Presidency. Icertainly am flattered and gratified that some partial friends thinkof me in that connection; but I really think it best for our causethat no concerted effort, such as you suggest, should be made. " [Illustration: GENERAL JOHN C. BRECKINRIDGE. ] [Sidenote] Lincoln to Judd, Dec. 9, 1859. MS. A much more hopeful ambition filled his mind. Notwithstanding hisrecent defeat, he did not think that his personal contest with Douglaswas yet finished. He had the faith and the patience to wait six yearsfor a chance to repeat his political tournament with the "LittleGiant. " From his letter quoted in a previous chapter we know he hadresolved to "fight in the ranks" in 1860. From another, we know howgenerously he kept faith with other Republican aspirants. "If Trumbulland I were candidates for the same office you would have a right toprefer him, and I should not blame you for it; but all my acquaintancewith you induces me to believe you would not pretend to be for mewhile really for him. But I do not understand Trumbull and myself tobe rivals. You know I am pledged not to enter a struggle with him forthe seat in the Senate now occupied by him; and yet I would ratherhave a full term in the Senate than in the Presidency. " [Sidenote] Lincoln to Frazer, Nov. 1, 1859. MS. This spirit of fairness in politics is also shown by the followingletter, written apparently in response to a suggestion that Cameronand Lincoln might form a popular Presidential tickets "Yours of the24th ult. Was forwarded to me from Chicago. It certainly is importantto secure Pennsylvania for the Republicans in the next Presidentialcontest; and not unimportant to also secure Illinois. As to the ticketyou name, I shall be heartily for it after it shall have been fairlynominated by a Republican National Convention; and I cannot becommitted to it before. For my single self, I have enlisted for thepermanent success of the Republican cause; and for this object I shalllabor faithfully in the ranks, unless, as I think not probable, thejudgment of the party shall assign me a different position. If theRepublicans of the great State of Pennsylvania shall present Mr. Cameron as their candidate for the Presidency, such an indorsement ofhis fitness for the place could scarcely be deemed insufficient. Still, as I would not like the public to know, so I would not likemyself to know, I had entered a combination with any man to theprejudice of all others whose friends respectively may consider thempreferable. " [Sidenote] Lincoln to Judd, Feb. 9, 1860. MS. Also printed in a pamphlet. Not long after these letters, at some date near the middle of thewinter 1859-60, the leaders of the Republican party of Illinois met atSpringfield, the capital of the State, and in a more pressing andformal manner requested him to permit them to use his name as aPresidential candidate, more with the idea of securing his nominationfor Vice-President than with any further expectation. To this he nowconsented. His own characteristic language, however, plainly revealsthat he believed this would be useful to him in his future Senatorialaspirations solely, and that he built no hopes whatever on nationalpreferment. A quarrel was going on among rival aspirants to theIllinois governorship, and Lincoln had written a letter to relieve afriend from the imputation of treachery to him in the recentSenatorial contest. This act of justice was now used to hisdisadvantage in the scramble for the Illinois Presidential delegates, and he wrote as follows: "I am not in a position where it would hurtmuch for me not to be nominated on the national ticket; but I am whereit would hurt some for me not to get the Illinois delegates. What Iexpected when I wrote the letter to Messrs. Dole and others is nowhappening. Your discomfited assailants are most bitter against me; andthey will for revenge upon me, lay to the Bates egg in the South, andto the Seward egg in the North, and go far towards squeezing me out inthe middle with nothing. Can you not help me a little in this matterin your end of the vineyard?" The extra vigilance of his friends thus invoked, it turned out thatthe Illinois Republicans sent a delegation to the Chicago Conventionfull of personal devotion to Lincoln and composed of men of thehighest standing, and of consummate political ability, and theirenthusiastic efforts in his behalf among the delegations from otherStates contributed largely to the final result. [Sidenote] 1860. The political campaign had now so far taken shape that its elementsand chances could be calculated with more than usual accuracy. TheCharleston Convention had been disrupted on the 30th of April, andadjourned on May 3; the nomination of John Bell by the ConstitutionalUnion party occurred on May 10. The Chicago Convention met on May 16;and while there was at that date great uncertainty as to whom thedissevered fragments of the Democratic party would finally nominate, little doubt existed that both the Douglas and Buchanan wings wouldhave candidates in the field. With their opponents thus divided, theplain policy of the Republicans was to find a candidate on whom athorough and hearty union of all the elements of the opposition couldbe secured. The party was constituted of somewhat heterogeneousmaterial; a lingering antagonism remained between former Whigs andDemocrats, protectionists and free-traders, foreign-born citizens andKnow-Nothings. Only on a single point were all thus faragreed--opposition to the extension of slavery. But little calculation was needed to show that at the November pollsfour doubtful States would decide the Presidential contest. Buchananhad been elected in 1856 by the vote of all the slave States (saveMaryland), with the help of the free States of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Indiana, Illinois, and California, Change the first fouror even the first three of these free-States to the Republican side, and they, with the Frémont States of 1856, would elect the Presidentagainst all the others combined. The Congressional elections of 1858demonstrated that such a change was possible. But besides this, Pennsylvania and Indiana were, like Ohio, known as "October States, "because they held elections for State officers in that month; and theywould at that early date give such an indication of sentiment as wouldforecast their November vote for President, and exert a powerful, perhaps a decisive, influence on the whole canvass. What candidatecould most easily carry New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Indiana, andIllinois, became therefore the vital question among the Chicagodelegates, and especially among the delegates from the four pivotalStates themselves. William H. Seward, of New York, was naturally the leading candidate. He had been longest in public life, and was highest in official rank. He had been Governor of the greatest State of the Union, and hadnearly completed a second term of service in the United States Senate. Once a prominent Whig, his antecedents coincided with those of thebulk of the Republican party. His experience ran through two greatagitations of the slavery question. He had taken important part in theSenate discussions which ended in the compromise measures of 1850, andin the new contest growing out of the Nebraska bill his voice had beenheard in every debate. He was not only firm in his anti-slaveryconvictions, but decided in his utterances. Discussing the admissionof California, he proclaimed the "higher law" doctrine in 1850;[1]reviewing Dred Scott and Lecompton, he announced the "irrepressibleconflict" in 1858. [2] He had tact as well as talent; he was aconsummate politician, as well as a profound statesman. Such a leadercould not fail of a strong following, and his supporters came toChicago in such numbers, and of such prominence and character, asseemed to make his nomination a foregone conclusion. The delegationfrom New York, headed by William M. Evarts, worked and votedthroughout as a unit for him, not merely to carry out theirconstituents' wishes, but with, a personal zeal that omitted noexertion or sacrifice. They showed a want of tact, however, incarrying their street demonstrations for their favorite to excess;they crowded together at the Richmond House, making that hotel theSeward headquarters; with too much ostentation they marched every dayto the convention with music and banners; and when mention was made ofdoubtful States, their more headlong members talked altogether toomuch of the campaign funds they intended to raise. All this occasioneda reaction--a certain mental protest among both Eastern and Westerndelegates against what have come to be characterized as "machine"methods. The positive elements in Seward's character and career had developed, as always happens, strong antagonisms. One of the earliest symptomsamong the delegates at Chicago was the existence of a strongundercurrent of opposition to his nomination. This opposition was asyet latent, and scattered here and there among many State delegations, but very intense, silently watching its opportunity, and ready tocombine upon any of the other candidates. The opposition soon made adiscovery: that of all the names mentioned, Lincoln's was the only oneoffering any chance for such a combination. It needed only theslightest comparison of notes to show that Dayton had no strength savethe New Jersey vote; Chase little outside of the Ohio delegation;Cameron none but that of Pennsylvania, and that Bates had only hisMissouri friends and a few in border slave-States, which could cast noelectoral vote for the Republicans. The policy of the anti-Sewarddelegates was therefore quickly developed--to use Lincoln's popularityas a means to defeat Seward. The credit of the nomination is claimed by many men, and by severaldelegations, but every such claim is wholly fictitious. Lincoln waschosen not by personal intrigue, but through political necessity. TheRepublican party was a purely defensive organization; the South hadcreated the crisis which the new party was compelled to overcome. Theascendency of the free-States, not the personal fortunes of Seward, hung in the balance. Political victory at the ballot-box or atransformation of the institutions of government was the immediatealternative before the free-States. Victory could be secured only by help of the electoral votes of NewJersey, Pennsylvania, Indiana, and Illinois. It was therefore a simpleproblem: What candidate could carry these States? None could answerthis question so well as their own delegates, and these, wheninterrogated, still further reduced the problem by the reply thatSeward certainly could not. These four States lay on the border landnext to the South and to slavery. Institutions inevitably mold publicsentiment; and a certain tenderness towards the "property" ofneighbors and friends infected their people. They shrunk from thereproach of being "abolitionized. " They would vote for a conservativeRepublican; but Seward and radicalism and "higher law" would bringthem inevitable defeat. [Sidenote] N. Y. "Tribune, " May 18, 1860. Who, then, could carry these doubtful and pivotal States? This secondbranch of the question also found its ready answer. The contest inthese States would be not against a Territorial slave code, but against"popular sovereignty "; not with Buchanan's candidate, but withDouglas; and for Douglas there was only a single antagonist, tried andtrue--Abraham Lincoln. Such, we may reasonably infer, was the substanceof the discussion and argument which ran through the caucus-rooms ofthe delegates, day and night, during the 16th and 17th of May. Meanwhile the Seward men were not idle; having the large New Yorkdelegation to begin with, and counting the many positive committalsfrom other States, their strength and organization seemed impregnable. The opposing delegations, each still nursing the chances of its owncandidate, hesitated to give any positive promises to each other. Atmidnight of May 17, Horace Greeley, [3] one of Seward's strongestopponents, and perhaps better informed than any other single delegate, telegraphed his conclusion "that the opposition to Governor Sewardcannot concentrate on any candidate, and that he will be nominated. " Chicago was already a city of a hundred thousand souls. Thirty to fortythousand visitors, full of life, hope, ambition, most of them from theprogressive group of encircling North-western States, and strung to thehighest tension of political excitement had come to attend theconvention. Charleston had shown a great party in the ebbtide ofdisintegration, tainted by the spirit of disunion. Chicago exhibited agreat party springing to life and power, every motive and forcecompelling coöperation and growth. The rush and spirit of the greatcity, and the enthusiasm and hope of its visitors, blended and reactedupon each other as if by laws of chemical affinity. Something of thefreshness and sweep of the prairie winds exhilarated the delegates andanimated the convention. No building in the city of Chicago at that time contained a hall withsufficient room for the sittings of the great assemblage. A temporaryframe structure, which the committee of arrangements christened "TheWigwam, " was therefore designed and erected for this special use. Itwas said to be large enough to hold ten thousand persons, and whetheror not that estimate was entirely accurate, a prodigious concoursecertainly gathered each day within its walls. The first day's session (May 16) demonstrated the successful adaptationof the structure to its uses. Participants and spectators alike weredelighted with the ease of ingress and egress, the comfortable divisionof space, the perfection of its acoustic qualities. Every celebritycould be seen, every speech could be heard. The routine oforganization, the choice of officers and committees, and thepresentation of credentials were full of variety and zest. GovernorEdwin D. Morgan, of New York, as Chairman of the National RepublicanCommittee, called the convention to order; and when he presented thehistoric name of David Wilmot, of Pennsylvania, for temporary chairman, the faith of the audience in the judgment of the managers was alreadywon. The report of the committee on organization in the afternoon madeGeorge Ashmun, of Massachusetts, a most skillful parliamentarian readyin decision and felicitous in his phrases, the permanent presidingofficer. One thing was immediately and specially manifest: anoverflowing heartiness and deep feeling pervaded the whole house. Noneed of a _claque_, no room for sham demonstration here! The gallerieswere as watchful and earnest as the platform. There was somethinggenuine, elemental, uncontrollable in the moods and manifestations ofthe vast audience. Seats and standing-room were always packed inadvance, and, as the delegates entered by their own separate doors, thecrowd easily distinguished the chief actors. Blair, Giddings, Greeley, Evarts, Kelley, Wilmot, Schurz, and others were greeted withspontaneous applause, which, rising at some one point, grew and rolledfrom side to side and corner to corner of the immense building, brightening the eyes and quickening the breath of every inmate. [4] With the second day's proceedings the interest of delegates andspectators was visibly increased, first by some sharp-shooting speechesabout credentials, and secondly by the main event of the day--thereport from the platform committee. Much difficulty was expected onthis score, but a little time had smoothed the way with almost magicaleffect. The great outpouring of delegates and people, the self-evidentsuccess of the gathering, the harmonious, almost joyous, beginning ofthe deliberations in the first day's session, were more convincing thanlogic in solidifying the party. These were the premonitions of success;before such signs of victory all spirit of faction was fused into agenerous glow of emulation. The eager convention would have accepted a weak or defective platform;the committee, on the contrary, reported one framed with remarkableskill. It is only needful to recapitulate its chief points. Itdenounced disunion, Lecomptonism, the property theory, the dogma thatthe Constitution carries slavery to Territories, the reopening of theslave-trade, the popular sovereignty and non-intervention fallacies, and denied "the authority of Congress, of a Territorial Legislature, orof any individuals to give legal existence to slavery in any Territoryof the United States. " It opposed any change in the naturalizationlaws. It recommended an adjustment of import duties to encourage theindustrial interests of the whole country. It advocated the immediateadmission of Kansas, free homesteads to actual settlers, river andharbor improvements of a national character, and a railroad to thePacific Ocean. Bold on points of common agreement, it was unusuallysuccessful in avoiding points of controversy among its followers, oroffering points for criticism to its enemies. It is not surprising that Charleston and Chicago should furnish manystriking contrasts. At the Charleston Convention, the principalpersonal incident was a long and frank speech from one Gaulden, aSavannah slave-trader, in advocacy of the reopening of the Africanslave-trade. [5] In the Chicago Convention, the exact and extremeopposite of such a theme created one of the most interesting of thedebates. The platform had been read and received with tremendouscheers, when Mr. Giddings, of Ohio, who was everywhere eager to insistupon what he designated as the "primal truths" of the Declaration ofIndependence, moved to amend the first resolution by incorporating init the phrase which announces the right of all men to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. " The convention was impatient to adoptthe platform without change; several delegates urged objections, one ofthem pertinently observing that there were also many other truthsenunciated in the Declaration of Independence. "Mr. President, " saidhe, "I believe in the ten commandments, but I do not want them in apolitical platform. " Mr. Giddings's amendment was voted down, and theanti-slavery veteran, feeling himself wounded in his most cherishedphilosophy, rose and walked out of the convention. [Sidenote] Murat Halstead, "Conventions of 1860, " p. 138. Personal friends, grieved that he should feel offended, and doublysorry that the general harmony should be marred by even a singledissent, followed Mr. Giddings, and sought to change his purpose. Whilethus persuading him, the discussion had passed to the secondresolution, when George William Curtis, of New York, seized the chanceto renew substantially Mr. Giddings's amendment. There were newobjections, but Mr. Curtis swept them away with a captivating burst oforatory. "I have to ask this convention, " said he, "whether they areprepared to go upon the record before the country as voting down thewords of the Declaration of Independence?. .. I rise simply to askgentlemen to think well before, upon the free prairies of the West, inthe summer of 1860, they dare to wince and quail before the assertionsof the men in Philadelphia, in 1776--before they dare to shrink fromrepeating the words that these great men enunciated. " "This was astrong appeal, and took the convention by storm, " wrote a recordingjournalist. A new vote formally embodied this portion of theDeclaration of Independence in the Republican platform; and Mr. Giddings, overjoyed at his triumph, had already returned to his seatwhen the platform as a whole was adopted with repeated and renewedshouts of applause that seemed to shake the wigwam. The third day of the convention (Friday, May 18) found the doorsbesieged by an excited multitude. The preliminary business was disposedof, --the platform was made, --and every one knew the balloting wouldbegin. The New York delegation felt assured of Seward's triumph, andmade an effort to have its march to the convention, with banners andmusic, unusually full and imposing. It proved a costly display; forwhile the New York "irregulars" were parading the streets, theIllinoisans were filling the wigwam: when the Seward processionarrived, there was little room left except the reserved seats for thedelegates. New York deceived itself in another respect: it counted onthe full New England strength, whereas more than half of it had alreadyresolved to cast its vote elsewhere. This defection in advancevirtually insured Seward's defeat. New York and the extreme North-westwere not sufficiently strong to nominate him, and in the nature ofthings he could not hope for much help from the conservative middle andborder States. But this calculation could not as yet be so accuratelymade. Caucusing was active up to the very hour when the convention met, and many delegations went to the wigwam with no definite programmebeyond the first ballot. What pen shall adequately describe this vast audience of ten thousandsouls? the low, wavelike roar of its ordinary conversation; the rollingcheers that greeted the entrance of popular favorites; the solemn hushwhich fell upon it during the opening prayer? There was just enough ofsome unexpected preliminary wrangle and delay to arouse the fullimpatience of both convention and spectators; but at length the namesof candidates were announced. This ceremony was still in itssimplicity. The more recent custom of short dramatic speeches fromconspicuous and popular orators to serve as electrifying preludes hadnot yet been invented. "I take the liberty, " said Mr. Evarts, of NewYork, "to name as a candidate to be nominated by this convention forthe office of President of the United States, "William H. Seward. " "Idesire, " followed Mr. Judd, "on behalf of the delegation from Illinois, to put in nomination as a candidate for President of the United States, Abraham Lincoln of Illinois. " Then came the usual succession ofpossible and alternative aspirants who were to be complimented by thefirst votes of their States--"William L. Dayton, Simon Cameron, SalmonP. Chase, Edward Bates, Jacob Collamer, John McLean. The fifteenminutes required by this formality had already indisputably marked outand set apart the real contestants. The "complimentary" statesmen werelustily cheered by their respective State delegations; but at the namesof Seward and Lincoln the whole wigwam seemed to respond together. [Sidenote] Halstead, "Conventions of 1860, " p. 145. There is something irresistibly exciting in the united voice of a greatcrowd. For a moment the struggle appeared to resolve itself into acontest of throats and lungs. Indiana seconded the nomination ofLincoln, and the applause was deafening. Michigan seconded thenomination of Seward; the New York delegation rose _en masse_, wavedtheir hats, and joined the galleries in a shout which doubled thevolume of any yet given. Then a portion of the Ohio delegates once moreseconded Lincoln, and his adherents, feeling themselves put upon theirmettle, made an effort. "I thought the Seward yell could not besurpassed, " wrote a spectator; "but the Lincoln boys were clearlyahead, and, feeling their victory, as there was a lull in the storm, took deep breaths all round, and gave a concentrated shriek that waspositively awful, and accompanied it with stamping that made everyplank and pillar in the building quiver. " The tumult gradually died away, and balloting began. Here we may noteanother contrast. The Charleston Convention was reactionary andexclusive; it followed the two-thirds rule. The Chicago Convention wasprogressive and liberal; it adopted majority rule. Liberal even beyondthis, it admitted the Territories and border slave-States, containingonly a minority or fraction of Republican sentiment, to seats and tovotes. It was throwing a drag-net for success. Under differentcircumstances, these sentimental delegations might have become powerfulin intrigue; but dominated as they were by deeper political forces, they afforded no distinct advantage to either candidate. [6] Though it was not expected to be decisive, the first ballotforeshadowed accurately the final result. The "complimentary"candidates received the tribute of admiration from their respectiveStates. Vermont voted for Collamer, and New Jersey for Dayton, eachsolid[7]. Pennsylvania's compliment to Cameron was shorn of six votes, four of which went at once for Lincoln. Ohio divided her compliment, 34for Chase, 4 for McLean, and at once gave Lincoln her 8 remainingvotes. Missouri voted solid for her candidate, Bates, who also receiveda scattering tribute from other delegations. But all these complimentswere of little avail to their recipients, for far above each toweredthe aggregates of the leading candidates: Seward, 173-1/2; Lincoln, 102. [8] In the groundswell of suppressed excitement which pervaded theconvention there was no time to analyze this vote; nevertheless, delegates and spectators felt the full force of its premonition; to allwho desired the defeat of Seward it pointed out the winning man with, unerring certainty. Another little wrangle over some disputed andprotesting delegate made the audience almost furious at the delay, and"Call the roll!" sounded from a thousand throats. A second ballot was begun at last, and, obeying a force as sure as thelaw of gravitation, the former complimentary votes came rushing toLincoln. The whole 10 votes of Collamer, 44 from Cameron, 6 from Chaseand McLean, were now cast for him, followed by a scatter of additionsalong the roll-call. In this ballot Lincoln gained 79 votes, Sewardonly 11. The faces of the New York delegation whitened as the ballotingprogressed and the torrent of Lincoln's popularity became a river. Theresult of the second ballot was: Seward, 184-1/2; Lincoln, 181;scattering, 99-1/2[9]. When the vote of Lincoln was announced, therewas a tremendous burst of applause, which the chairman prudently butwith difficulty controlled and silenced. The third ballot was begun amid a breathless suspense; hundreds ofpencils kept pace with the roll-call, and nervously marked the changeson their tally-sheets. The Lincoln figures steadily grew. Votes came tohim from all the other candidates--4-1/2 from Seward, 2 from Cameron, 13 from Bates, 18 from Chase, 9 from Dayton, 3 from McLean, 1 fromClay. Lincoln had gained 50-1/2, Seward had lost 4-1/2. Long before theofficial tellers footed up their columns, spectators and delegatesrapidly made the reckoning and knew the result: Lincoln, 231-1/2;Seward, 180. [10] Counting the scattering votes, 465 ballots had beencast, and 233 were necessary to a choice; only 1-1/2 votes more wereneeded to make a nomination. A profound stillness suddenly fell upon the wigwam; the men ceased totalk and the ladies to flutter their fans; one could distinctly hearthe scratching of pencils and the ticking of telegraph instruments onthe reporters' tables. No announcement had been made by the chair;changes were in order, and it was only a question of seconds who shouldspeak first. While every one was leaning forward in intense expectancy, David K. Cartter sprang upon his chair and reported a change of fourOhio votes from Chase to Lincoln. There was a moment's pause, --a tellerwaved his tally-sheet towards the skylight and shouted a name, --andthen the boom of a cannon on the roof of the wigwam announced thenomination to the crowds in the streets, where shouts and salutes tookup and spread the news. In the convention the Lincoln river now becamean inundation. Amid the wildest hurrahs, delegation after delegationchanged its vote to the victor. [Illustration: FAC-SIMILE OF LINCOLN'S LETTER OF ACCEPTANCE. ] A graceful custom prevails in orderly American conventions, that thechairman of the vanquished delegation is first to greet the nomineewith a short address of party fealty and promise of party support. Mr. Evarts, the spokesman for New York, essayed promptly to perform thiscourteous office, but was delayed a while by the enthusiasm andconfusion. The din at length subsided, and the presiding officerannounced that on the third ballot Abraham Lincoln, of Illinois, received 364 votes, and "is selected as your candidate for President ofthe United States. " Then Mr. Evarts, in a voice of unconcealed emotion, but with admirable dignity and touching eloquence, speaking for Sewardand for New York, moved to make the nomination unanimous. The interest in a National Convention usually ceases with theannouncement of the principal nomination. It was only afterwards thatthe delegates realized how fortunate a selection they made by addingHannibal Hamlin, of Maine, to the ticket as candidate forVice-President. Mr. Hamlin was already distinguished in public service. He was born in 1809, and became a lawyer by profession. He served manyyears in the Maine Legislature and four years as a Representative inCongress. In 1848 he was chosen to fill a vacancy in the United StatesSenate, and in 1851 was reelected for a full term. When in 1856 theCincinnati Convention indorsed the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, which he had opposed, Mr. Hamlin formally withdrew from the Democraticparty. In November of that year the Republicans elected him Governor ofMaine, and in January, 1857, reelected him United States Senator. [Sidenote] Halstead, "Conventions of 1860, " p. 154. For the moment the chief self-congratulation of the convention was thatby the nomination of Lincoln it had secured the doubtful vote of theconservative States. Or rather, perhaps, might it be said that it washardly the work of the delegates--it was the concurrent product ofpopular wisdom. Political evolution had with scientific precisionwrought "the survival of the fittest. " The delegates leaving Chicago onthe various homeward-bound railroad trains that night, saw that alreadythe enthusiasm of the convention was transferred from the wigwam to thecountry. "At every station where there was a village, until after 2o'clock, there were tar-barrels burning, drums beating, boys carryingrails, and guns great and small banging away. The weary passengers wereallowed no rest, but plagued by the thundering of the cannon, theclamor of drums, the glare of bonfires, and the whooping of boys, whowere delighted with the idea of a candidate for the Presidency whothirty years before split rails on the Sangamon River--classic streamnow and for evermore--and whose neighbors named him 'honest. '" ----------[1] "It is true indeed that the national domain is ours. It is trueit was acquired by the valor and with the wealth of the whole nation. But we hold, nevertheless, no arbitrary power over it. We hold noarbitrary authority over anything, whether acquired lawfully orseized by usurpation. The Constitution regulates our stewardship;the Constitution devotes the domain to union, to justice, to defense, to welfare, and to liberty. But there is a higher law than theConstitution which regulates our authority over the domain, anddevotes it to the same noble purposes. The territory is a part, noinconsiderable part, of the common heritage of mankind, bestowed uponthem by the Creator of the universe. We are his stewards, and must sodischarge our trust as to secure in the highest attainable degreetheir happiness. "--William H. Seward, Senate Speech, March 11, 1850. App. "Globe, " p. 265. [2] "Shall I tell you what this collision means? They who think thatit is accidental, unnecessary, the work of interested or fanaticalagitators, and therefore ephemeral, mistake the case altogether. It isan irrepressible conflict between opposing and enduring forces, and itmeans that the United States must and will, sooner or later, becomeeither entirely a slave-holding nation, or entirely a free-labornation. "--Seward, Rochester Speech, October 25, 1858. [3] Mr. Greeley sat in the convention as a delegate for Oregon. [4] One of the authors of this history was a spectator at all thesessions of the convention, and witnessed the scenes in the Wigwamwhich he has endeavored to describe. [5] "I tell you, fellow-Democrats, that the African slave-trader is thetrue Union man [cheers and laughter], I tell you that the slave-tradingof Virginia is more immoral, more unchristian in every possible pointof view, than that African slave-trade which goes to Africa and bringsa heathen and worthless man here, christianizes him, and sends him andhis posterity down the stream of time to enjoy the blessings ofcivilization. .. . It has been my fortune to go into that noble old Stateto buy a few darkies, and I have had to pay from $1000 to $2000 a head, when I could go to Africa and buy better negroes for $50 apiece. .. . Iadvocate the repeal of the laws prohibiting the African slave-trade, because I believe it to be the true Union movement. I do not believethat sections whose interests are so different as the Southern andNorthern States can ever stand the shocks of fanaticism unless they beequally balanced. I believe that by reopening this trade, and givingus negroes to populate the Territories, the equilibrium of the twosections will be maintained. "--Speech of W. B. Gaulden, of Georgia, inthe Charleston Democratic National Convention, May 1, 1860. [6] These sentimental delegations were: Maryland, 11; Delaware, 6;Virginia, 23; Kentucky, 23; Texas, 6; Kansas, 6; Nebraska, 6; Districtof Columbia, 2. Total, 83 votes. Of these the leading candidatesreceived as follows: 1st ballot Seward, 30 Lincoln, 212d ballot Seward, 35 Lincoln, 303d ballot Seward, 33 Lincoln, 43. Missouri might be counted in the same category; but, as she votedsteadily for Bates through all the ballots, she did not in any wiseinfluence the result. [7] Each State was entitled to cast a vote equal to double the numberof its Electoral College. [8] FIRST BALLOT IN DETAIL. _For Seward_. --Maine 10, New Hampshire 1, Massachusetts 21, New York70, Pennsylvania 1-1/2, Maryland 3, Virginia 8, Kentucky 5, Michigan12, Texas 4, Wisconsin 10, Iowa 2, California 8, Minnesota 8, Kansas6, Nebraska 2, District of Columbia 2. --Total for Seward, 173-1/2. _For Lincoln_. --Maine 6, New Hampshire 7, Massachusetts 4, Connecticut2, Pennsylvania 4, Virginia 14, Kentucky 6, Ohio 8, Indiana 26, Illinois 22, Iowa 2, Nebraska 1. --Total for Lincoln, 102. _Scattering_. --New Hampshire, Chase 1, Frémont 1; Vermont, Collamer10; Rhode Island, Bates 1, McLean 5, Reed 1, Chase 1; Connecticut, Wade 1, Bates 7, Chase 2; New Jersey, Dayton 14; Pennsylvania, Cameron47-1/2, McLean 1; Maryland, Bates 8; Delaware, Bates 6; Virginia, Cameron 1; Kentucky, Wade 2, McLean 1, Chase 8, Sumner 1; Ohio, McLean4, Chase 34; Missouri, Bates 18; Texas, Bates 2; Iowa, Cameron 1, Bates 1, McLean 1, Chase 1; Oregon, Bates 5; Nebraska, Cameron 1, Chase 2. --Totals, for Bates, 48; for Cameron, 50-1/2; for McLean, 12;for Chase, 49; for Wade, 3; for Dayton, 14; for Reed, 1; for Collamer, 10; for Sumner, 1; for Frémont, 1. [9] SECOND BALLOT IN DETAIL. _For Seward_. --Maine 10, New Hampshire 1, Massachusetts 22, New York70, New Jersey 4, Pennsylvania 2-1/2, Maryland 3, Virginia 8, Kentucky7, Michigan 12, Texas 6, Wisconsin 10, Iowa 2, California 8, Minnesota8, Kansas 6, Nebraska 3, District of Columbia 2. --Total for Seward, 184-1/2. _For Lincoln_. --Maine 6, New Hampshire 9, Vermont 10, Massachusetts 4, Rhode Island 3, Connecticut 4, Pennsylvania 48, Delaware 6, Virginia14, Kentucky 9, Ohio 14, Indiana 26, Illinois 22, Iowa 5, Nebraska1. --Total for Lincoln, 181. _Scattering_. --Rhode Island, McLean 2, Chase 3; Connecticut, Bates 4, Chase 2, Clay 2; New Jersey, Dayton 10; Pennsylvania, Cameron 1, McLean 2-1/2; Maryland, Bates 8; Virginia, Cameron 1; Kentucky, Chase6; Ohio, McLean 3, Chase 29; Missouri, Bates 18; Iowa, McLean 1/2, Chase 1/2; Oregon, Bates 5; Nebraska, Chase 2. --Totals, for Bates, 35;for Cameron, 2; for McLean, 8; for Chase, 42-1/2; for Dayton, 10; forClay, 2. [10] THIRD BALLOT IN DETAIL. _For Seward_. --Maine 10, New Hampshire 1, Massachusetts 18, RhodeIsland 1, Connecticut 1, New York 70, New Jersey 5, Maryland 2, Virginia 8, Kentucky 6, Michigan 12, Texas 6, Wisconsin 10, Iowa 2, California 8, Minnesota 8, Oregon 1, Kansas 6, Nebraska 3, District ofColumbia 2. --Total for Seward, 180. _For Lincoln_. --Maine 6, New Hampshire 9, Vermont 10, Massachusetts 8, Rhode Island 5, Connecticut 4, New Jersey 8, Pennsylvania 52, Maryland9, Delaware 6, Virginia 14, Kentucky 13, Ohio 29, Indiana 26, Illinois22, Iowa 5-1/2, Oregon 4, Nebraska 1. --Total for Lincoln, 231-1/2. _Scattering_. --Rhode Island, Chase 1, McLean 1; Connecticut, Bates 4, Chase 2, Clay 1; New Jersey, Dayton 1; Pennsylvania, McLean 2;Kentucky, Chase 4; Ohio, Chase 15, McLean 2; Missouri, Bates 18; Iowa, Chase 1/2; Nebraska, Chase 2. --Total, for Bates, 22; for Chase, 24-1/2; for McLean, 5; for Dayton, 1; for Clay, 1. CHAPTER XVI LINCOLN ELECTED Thus the Presidential canvass in the United States for the year 1860began with the very unusual condition of four considerable parties, and four different tickets for President and Vice-President. In theorder of popular strength, as afterwards shown, they were: _First_. The Republican party, which at the Chicago Convention hadnominated as its candidate for President, Abraham Lincoln, ofIllinois, and for Vice-President, Hannibal Hamlin, of Maine. Itsanimating spirit was a belief and declaration that the institution ofslavery was wrong in morals and detrimental to society; its avowedpolicy was to restrict slavery to its present limits in the Stateswhere it existed by virtue of local constitutions and laws. _Second_. The Douglas wing of the Democratic party, which at Baltimorenominated Stephen A. Douglas, of Illinois, for President, and whosecandidate for Vice-President was Herschel V. Johnson, of Georgia. [1]It declared indifference as to the moral right or wrong of slavery, and indifference to its restriction or extension. Its avowed policywas to permit the people of a Territory to decide whether they wouldprevent or establish slavery, and it further proposed to abide by thedecisions of the Supreme Court on all questions of constitutional lawgrowing out of it. _Third_. The Buchanan wing of the Democratic party, which at Baltimorenominated John C. Breckinridge, of Kentucky, for President, and JosephLane, of Oregon, for Vice-President. Its animating spirit was a beliefand declaration that slavery was morally right and politicallybeneficial; its avowed policy was the extension of slavery into theTerritories, and the creation of new slave States, whereby it mightprotect and perpetuate itself by a preponderance, or at least aconstant equality, of political power, especially in the Senate of theUnited States. As one means to this end, it proposed the immediateacquisition of the island of Cuba. _Fourth_. The Constitutional Union party, which in its convention atBaltimore nominated John Bell, of Tennessee, for President, and EdwardEverett, of Massachusetts, for Vice-President. It professed to ignorethe question of slavery, and declared that it would recognize nopolitical principle other than "the Constitution of the Country, theUnion of the States, and the enforcement of the Laws. " [Sidenote] Curtis, "Life of Buchanan, " Vol. II. , p. 294. The first, most striking feature of the four-sided Presidentialcanvass which now began, was the personal pledge by every one of thecandidates of devotion to the Union. Each of the factions was in someform charging disunion motives or tendencies upon part or all of theothers; but each indignantly denied the allegation as to itself. Toleave no possible doubt, the written letters of acceptance of each ofthe candidates emphasized the point. Lincoln invoked "theinviolability of the Constitution, and the perpetual union, harmony, and prosperity of all. " Douglas made his pledge broad and full. "TheFederal Union, " wrote he, "must be preserved. The Constitution must bemaintained inviolate in all its parts. Every right guaranteed by theConstitution must be protected by law in all cases where legislationis necessary to its enjoyment. The judicial authority, as provided inthe Constitution, must be sustained, and its decisions implicitlyobeyed and faithfully executed. The laws must be administered, and theconstituted authorities upheld, and all unlawful resistance to thesethings must be put down with firmness, impartiality, and fidelity. ""The Constitution and the equality of the States, " wrote Breckinridge, "these are symbols of everlasting union. Let these be the rallyingcries of the people. " Bell declared that, if elected, all his ability, strength of will, and official influence should be employed "for themaintenance of the Constitution and the Union against all opposinginfluences and tendencies. " Even President Buchanan, in a littlecampaign speech from the portico of the Executive mansion, hastened topurge himself of the imputation of suspicion or fear on this point. Hedeclared that neither of the Democratic conventions was "regular, " andthat therefore every Democrat was at liberty to vote as he thoughtproper. For himself, he preferred Breckinridge. The Democratic party, when divided for the moment, "has always closed up its ranks, andbecome more powerful even from defeat. It will never die whilst theConstitution and the Union survive. It will live to protect and defendboth. " No progress was made, however, towards a reunion of the Democraticparty. The Buchanan faction everywhere waged unrelenting war onDouglas, both in public discussion and in the use of officialpatronage. The contest was made with equal obstinacy and bitterness inthe Northern and the Southern States. Douglas, on his part, was notslow to retaliate. He immediately entered on an extensive campaigntour, and made speeches at many of the principal cities of theNorthern States, and a few in the slave-States. Everywhere hestigmatized the Breckinridge wing of the Democracy as an extremist anddisunion faction, [2] charging that it was as obnoxious and dangerousas the Republicans. Whatever be his errors, it must be recorded to hislasting renown that he boldly declared for maintaining the Union byforce. At Norfolk, Virginia, the question was put to him in writing. "I answer emphatically, " replied Douglas, "that it is the duty of thePresident of the United States, and all others in authority under him, to enforce the laws of the United States passed by Congress, and asthe courts expound them, and I, as in duty bound by my oath offidelity to the Constitution, would do all in my power to aid theGovernment of the United States in maintaining the supremacy of thelaws against all resistance to them, come from what quarter it might. In other words, I think the President, whoever he may be, should treatall attempts Douglas, to break up the Union by resistance to the laws, as Old Hickory treated the nullifiers in 1832. " [Sidenote] Douglas, Norfolk Speech, August 25, 1860. All parties entered upon the political canvass with considerablespirit; but the chances of the Republicans were so manifestly superiorthat their enthusiasm easily outran that of all their competitors. Thecharacter and antecedents of Mr. Lincoln appealed directly to thesympathy and favor of the popular masses of the Northern States. Aspioneer, farm-laborer, flat-boatman, and frontier politician, they sawin him a true representative of their early if not their presentcondition. As the successful lawyer, legislator, and public debater inquestions of high statesmanship, he was the admired ideal of their ownaspirations. While the Illinois State Republican Convention was in session atDecatur (May 10), about a week before the Chicago Convention, theballoting for State officers was interrupted by the announcement, madewith much mystery, that "an old citizen of Macon County" had somethingto present to the convention. When curiosity had been sufficientlyaroused, John Hanks, Lincoln's fellow-pioneer, and a neighbor ofHanks, were suddenly marched into the convention, each bearing uprightan old fence-rail, and displaying a banner with an inscription to theeffect that these were two rails from the identical lot of threethousand which, when a pioneer boy, Lincoln had helped to cut andsplit to inclose his father's first farm in Illinois, in 1830. Theseemblems of his handiwork were received by the convention withdeafening shouts, as a prelude to a unanimous resolution recommendinghim for President. Later, these rails were sent to Chicago; there, during the sittings of the National Republican Convention, they stoodin the hotel parlor at the Illinois headquarters, lighted up bytapers, and trimmed with flowers by enthusiastic ladies. Their historyand campaign incidents were duly paraded in the newspapers; andthroughout the Union Lincoln's ancient and local _sobriquet_ of"Honest Old Abe" was supplemented by the national epithet of "TheIllinois Bail-splitter. " Of the many peculiarities of the campaign, one feature deserves special mention. Political clubs, for parades andpersonal campaign work, were no novelty; now, however, the expedientsof a cheap yet striking uniform and a half-military organization weretried with marked success. When Lincoln made his New England trip, immediately after the Cooper Institute speech, a score or two ofactive Republicans in the city of Hartford appeared in close andorderly ranks, wearing each a cap and large cape of oil-cloth, andbearing over their shoulders a long staff, on the end of which blazeda brilliant torch-light. This first "Wide Awake" [3] Club, as itcalled itself, marching with soldierly step, and military music, escorted Mr. Lincoln, on the evening of March 5, from the hall where headdressed the people, to his hotel. The device was so simple and yetso strikingly effective that it immediately became the pattern forother cities. After the campaign opened, there was scarcely a countyor village in the North without its organized and drilled associationof "Wide Awakes, " immensely captivating to the popular eye, andforming everywhere a vigilant corps to spread the fame of, and solicitvotes for, the Republican Presidential candidate. On several occasionstwenty to thirty thousand "Wide Awakes" met in the larger cities andmarched in monster torch-light processions through the principalstreets. His nomination also made necessary some slight changes in Mr. Lincoln'sdaily life. His law practice was transferred entirely to his partner, and instead of the small dingy office so long occupied by him, he wasnow given the use of the Governor's room in the State-house, which wasnot needed for official business during the absence of the Legislature. This also was a room of modest proportions, with scanty and plainfurniture. Here Mr. Lincoln, attended only by his private secretary, Mr. Nicolay, passed the long summer days of the campaign, receiving theconstant stream of visitors anxious to look upon a real Presidentialcandidate. There was free access to him; not even an usher stood at thedoor; any one might knock and enter. His immediate personal friendsfrom Sangamon County and central Illinois availed themselves largelyof this opportunity. With men who had known him in field and foresthe talked over the incidents of their common pioneer experience withunaffected sympathy and interest, as though he were yet the flat-boatman, surveyor, or village lawyer of the early days. The letters which cameto him by hundreds, the newspapers, and the conversation of friends, kept him sufficiently informed of the progress of the campaign, inwhich personally he took a very slight part. He made no addresses, wrote no public letters, held no conferences. Political leaders severaltimes came to make campaign speeches at the Republican wigwam inSpringfield. But beyond a few casual interviews on such occasions, thegreat Presidential canvass went on with scarcely a private suggestionor touch of actual direction from the Republican candidate. It is perhaps worth while to record Lincoln's expression on one point, which adds testimony to his general consistency in political action. The rise of the Know-Nothing or the American party, in 1854-5 (whichwas only a renewal of the Native-American party of 1844), has beenelsewhere mentioned. As a national organization, the new factionceased with the defeat of Fillmore and Donelson in 1856; its fragmentsnevertheless held together in many places in the form of localminorities, which sometimes made themselves felt in contests formembers of the Legislature and county officers; and citizens offoreign birth continued to be justly apprehensive of its avowedjealousy and secret machinery. It was easy to allege that anyprominent candidate belonged to the Know-Nothing party, and attendedthe secret Know-Nothing lodges; and Lincoln, in the late Senatorial, and now again in the Presidential, campaign, suffered his full shareof these newspaper accusations. [Sidenote] Lincoln to Edward Lusk, October 30, 1858. MS. We have already mentioned that in the campaign of 1844 he put onrecord, by public resolutions in Springfield, his disapprobation of, and opposition to, Native-Americanism. In the later campaigns, whilehe did not allow his attention to be diverted from the slaverydiscussion, his disapproval of Know-Nothingism was quite as decidedand as public. Thus he wrote in a private letter, dated October 30, 1858: "I understand the story is still being told and insisted uponthat I have been a Know-Nothing. I repeat what I stated in a publicspeech at Meredosia, that I am not, nor ever have been, connected withthe party called the Know-Nothing party, or party calling themselvesthe American party. Certainly no man of truth, and I believe no man ofgood character for truth, can be found to say on his own knowledgethat I ever was connected with that party. " [Sidenote] Lincoln to Hon. A. Jonas, July 21, 1860. MS. So also in the summer of 1860, when his candidacy for President didnot permit his writing public letters, he wrote in a confidential noteto a friend: "Yours of the 20th is received. I suppose as good or evenbetter men than I may have been in American or Know-Nothing lodges;but, in point of fact, I never was in one, at Quincy or elsewhere. .. . And now a word of caution. Our adversaries think they can gain a pointif they could force me to openly deny the charge, by which some degreeof offense would be given to the Americans. For this reason it mustnot publicly appear that I am paying any attention to the charge. " [Sidenote] Lincoln to Dr. Theodore Canisius, May 17, 1859. His position on the main question involved was already sufficientlyunderstood; for in his elsewhere quoted letter of May 17, 1859, he haddeclared himself against the adoption by Illinois, or any other placewhere he had a right to oppose it, of the recent Massachusettsconstitutional provision restricting foreign-born citizens in theright of suffrage. It is well to repeat the broad philosophicalprinciple which guided him to this conclusion: "Understanding thespirit of our institutions to aim at the elevation of men, I amopposed to whatever tends to degrade them. " [Illustration: JOHN BELL. ] As the campaign progressed the chances of the result underwent animportant fluctuation, involving some degree of uncertainty. TheDemocratic disruption, and the presence of four tickets in the field, rendered it possible that some very narrow plurality in one or more ofthe States might turn the scale of victory. Calculating politicians, especially those belonging to the party hitherto in power, and who hadenjoyed the benefits of its extensive Federal patronage, seizedeagerly upon this possibility as a means of prolonging their officialtenure, and showed themselves not unwilling to sacrifice theprinciples of the general contest to the mere material and localadvantage which success would bring them. [Sidenote] Greeley, "American Conflict, " Vol. I. , p. 324. Accordingly, in several States, and more notably in the great State ofNew York, there was begun a quiet but unremitting effort to bringabout a coalition or "fusion, " as it was termed, of the warringDemocratic factions, on the basis of a division of the spoils whichsuch a combination might hope to secure. Nor did the efforts stopthere. If the union of the two factions created the probability, theunion of three seemed to insure certainty, and the negotiations for acoalition, therefore, extended to the adherents of Bell and Everett. Amid the sharp contest of ideas and principles which divided thecountry, such an arrangement was by no means easy; yet in a largevoting population there is always a percentage of party followers onwhom the obligations of party creeds sit lightly. Gradually, from talkof individuals and speculations of newspapers, the intrigue proceededto a coquetting between rival conventions. Here the formal proceedingsencountered too much protest and indignation, and the scheme washanded over to standing committees, who could deliberate and bargainin secret. It must be stated to the credit of Douglas, that hepublicly rejected any alliance not based on his principle of"non-intervention";[4] but the committees and managers cared littlefor the disavowal. In due time they perfected their agreement that theNew York electoral ticket (numbering thirty-five) should be made up ofadherents of the three different factions in the following proportion:Douglas, eighteen; Bell, ten; Breckinridge, seven. This agreement wascarried out, and the fusion ticket thus constituted was voted for atthe Presidential election by the combined opponents of Lincoln. In Pennsylvania, notwithstanding that Douglas disapproved the scheme, an agreement or movement of fusion also took place; but in this caseit did not become complete, and was not altogether carried out by theparties to it, as in New York. The electoral ticket had been nominatedby the usual Democratic State Convention (March 1) prior to theCharleston disruption, and, as it turned out, about one-third of thesenominees were favorable to Douglas. After the disruption, the Douglasmen also formed a straight, or Douglas, electoral ticket. In order tounite the two wings at the October State election, the ExecutiveCommittee of the original convention recommended (July 2) that theelectors first nominated should vote for Douglas if his election werepossible; if not, should vote for Breckinridge. A subsequentresolution (August 9) recommended that the electors should vote foreither Douglas or Breckinridge, as the preponderance of Douglas orBreckinridge votes in the State might indicate. On some impliedagreement of this character, not clearly defined or made public, theDouglas, Breckinridge, and Bell factions voted together for governorin October. Being beaten by a considerable majority at that election, the impulse to fusion was greatly weakened. Finally, the originalDemocratic State Committee rescinded (October 12) all its resolutionsof fusion, and the Douglas State Committee withdrew (October 18) itsstraight Douglas ticket. This action left in the field the originalelectoral ticket nominated by the Democratic State Convention atReading, prior to the Charleston Convention, untrammeled by anyinstructions or agreements. It was nevertheless a fusion ticket inpart, because nine of the candidates (one-third of the whole number)were pledged to Douglas. What share or promise the Bell faction had init was not made public. At the Presidential election it was voted forby a large number of fusionists; but a portion of the Douglas menvoted straight for Douglas, and a portion of the Bell men straight forBell. [5] [Sidenote] Greeley, "American Conflict, " Vol. I. , p. 328. [Sidenote] Ibid. , p. 328. In New Jersey also a definite fusion agreement was reached between theBell, Breckinridge, and Douglas factions. An electoral ticket wasformed, composed of two adherents of Bell, two of Breckinridge, andthree of Douglas. This was the only State in which the fusion movementproduced any result in the election. It turned out that a considerablefraction of the Douglas voters refused to be transferred by theagreement which their local managers had entered into. They would notvote for the two Bell men and the two Breckinridge men on the fusionticket, but ran a straight Douglas ticket, adopting the three electorson the fusion ticket. By this turn of the canvass the three Douglaselectors whose names were on both tickets were chosen, but theremainder of the fusion ticket was defeated, giving Lincoln fourelectoral votes out of the seven in New Jersey. Some slight effortstowards fusion were made in two or three other States, butaccomplished nothing worthy of note, and would have had no influenceon the result, even had it been consummated. All these efforts to avert or postpone the grave political changewhich was impending were of no avail. In the long six years' agitationpopular intelligence had ripened to conviction and determination. Every voter substantially understood the several phases of the greatslavery issue, its abstract morality, its economic influence onsociety, the intrigue of the Administration and the Senate to makeKansas a slave-State, the judicial status of slavery as expounded inthe Dred Scott decision, the validity and the effect of thefugitive-slave law, the question of the balance of political power asinvolved in the choice between slavery extension and slaveryrestriction--and, reaching beyond even this, the issue so clearlypresented by Lincoln whether the States ultimately should become allslave or all free. In the whole history of American polities thevoters of the United States never pronounced a more deliberatejudgment than that which they recorded upon these grave questions atthe Presidential election in November, 1860. From much doubt and uncertainty at its beginning, the campaign sweptonward through the summer months, first to a probability, then to anassurance of Republican success. In September the State of Maineelected a Republican governor by 18, 000 majority. In October thepivotal States gave decisive Republican majorities: Pennsylvania32, 000 for governor, Indiana nearly 10, 000 for governor, and Ohio12, 000 for State ticket and 27, 000 on Congressmen. Politiciansgenerally conceded that the vote in these States clearly foreshadowedLincoln's election. The prophecy not only proved correct, but the tideof popular conviction and enthusiasm, rising still higher, carried tohis support other States which were yet considered uncertain. The Presidential election occurred on November 6, 1860. In seventeen ofthe free-States--namely, Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, RhodeIsland, Connecticut, Vermont, New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, California, andOregon--all the Lincoln electors were chosen. In one of thefree-States (New Jersey) the choice resulted in 4 electors for Lincolnand 3 for Douglas, as already explained. This assured Lincoln of thevotes of 180 Presidential electors, or a majority of 57 in the wholeelectoral college. The 15 slave-States were divided between the otherthree candidates. Eleven of them--Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Texas--chose Breckinridge electors, 72 in all. Three of them--Kentucky, Tennessee, and Virginia--chose Bell electors, 39 in all; and one of them--Missouri--Douglas electors, 9 in number, which, together with the 3 he received in the free-State of NewJersey, gave him 12 in all: the aggregate of all the electors opposedto Lincoln being 123. The will of the people as expressed in this popular vote was in duetime carried into execution. As the law prescribes, the Presidentialelectors met in their several States on the 5th of December, and casttheir official votes according to the above enumeration. And on the13th of February, 1861, the Congress of the United States in jointsession made the official count, and declared that Abraham Lincoln, having received a majority of the votes of Presidential electors, wasduly elected President of the United States for four years, beginningMarch 4, 1861. One feature of the result must not be omitted. Many careless observersfelt at the time that the success of Lincoln was due entirely to thefact of there having been three opposing candidates in the field; or, in other words, to the dissensions in the Democratic party, whichdivided its vote between Breckinridge and Douglas. What merely moralstrength the Democratic party would have gained had it remainedunited, it is impossible to estimate. Such a supposition can only bebased on the absence of the extreme Southern doctrines concerningslavery. Given the presence of those doctrines in the canvass, nohypothesis can furnish a result different from that which occurred. Inthe contest upon the questions as they existed, the victory of Lincolnwas certain. If all the votes given to all the opposing candidates hadbeen concentrated and cast for a "fusion ticket, " as was wholly orpartly done in five States, the result would have been changed nowhereexcept in New Jersey, California, and Oregon; Lincoln would still havereceived but 11 fewer, or 169 electoral votes--majority of 35 in theentire electoral college. It was a contest of ideas, not of persons orparties. The choice was not only free, but distinct and definite. Thevoter was not, as sometimes happens, compelled to an imperfect orpartial expression of his will. The four platforms and candidatesoffered him an unusual variety of modes of political action. Amongthem the voters by undisputed constitutional majorities, in orderly, legal, and unquestioned proceedings, chose the candidate whoseplatform pronounced the final popular verdict that slavery should notbe extended, and whose election unchangeably transferred the balanceof power to the free-States. ----------[1] Benjamin Fitzpatrick, of Alabama, had been nominated at Baltimore, but he declined the nomination, and the National Committee substitutedthe name of Herschel V. Johnson. [2] "In my opinion there is a mature plan throughout the SouthernStates to break up the Union. I believe the election of a Republicanis to be the signal for that attempt, and that the leaders of thescheme desire the election of Lincoln so as to have an excuse fordisunion. I do not believe that every Breckinridge man is adisunionist, but I do believe that every disunionist in America is aBreckinridge man. "--Douglas, Baltimore Speech, Sept. 6, 1860. [3] We condense the following account of the origin of the "WideAwakes" from memoranda kindly furnished us by William P. Fuller, oneof the editors of the Hartford "Courant" in 1860, Major J. C. Kinney, at present connected with the paper, and General Joseph R. Hawley, theprincipal editor, now United States Senator from Connecticut, and whoin 1860 marched in the ranks in the first "Wide Awake" parades. The "Wide Awake" organization grew out of the first campaign meetingin Hartford on February 25, 1860--State election campaign. Hon. CassiusM. Clay was the speaker, and after the meeting was escorted to theAllyn House by a torch-light parade. Two of the young men who were tocarry torches, D. G. Francis and H. P. Blair, being dry goods clerks, inorder to protect their clothing from dust and the oil liable to fallfrom the torches, had prepared capes of black cambric, which they worein connection, with the glazed caps commonly worn at the time. ColonelGeorge P. Bissell, who was marshal, noticing the uniform, put thewearers in front, where the novelty of the rig and its doubleadvantage of utility and show attracted much attention. It was at onceproposed to form a campaign club of fifty torch-bearers with glazedcaps and oil-cloth capes instead of cambric; the torch-bearing club tobe "auxiliary to the Young Men's Republican Union. " A meeting toorganize formally was appointed for March 6; but before the newuniforms were all ready, Abraham Lincoln addressed a meeting inHartford on the evening of March 5. After his speech, the cape-wearersof the previous meeting with a number of others who had secured theiruniforms escorted Mr. Lincoln to the hotel. The club was definitely organized on the following night. WilliamP. Fuller, city editor, had, in noticing this meeting for organization, written in the "Courant" of March 3: "THE WIDE AWAKES. --The Republicanclub-room last evening was filled as usual with those who are going topartake in the great Republican triumph, in this State in April next, "etc. , etc. The name "Wide Awakes" was here applied to the RepublicanYoung Men's Union, torch-bearers included; but at the meeting of March6, the torch-bearers appropriated it by making it the distinctivetitle to their own special organization, which almost immediately, there as elsewhere, swallowed up the names and the memberships ofother Republican clubs. Just one year after they escorted Mr. Lincolnin their first parade, he was inaugurated President of the UnitedStates. [4] "I will give you my opinion as to fusion. I think that every man[_sic_] who believes that slavery ought to be banished from the hallsof Congress, and remanded to the people of the Territories subject tothe Constitution, ought to fuse and act together; but that no Democratcan, without dishonor, and forfeiture of self-respect and principle, fuse with anybody who is in favor of intervention, either for slaveryor against slavery. Lincoln and Breckinridge might fuse, for theyagree in principle. I can never fuse with either of them, because Idiffer from both. I am in favor of all men acting together who areopposed to this slavery agitation, and in favor of banishing it fromCongress forever; but as Democrats we can never fuse, either withNorthern abolitionists, or Southern bolters and secessionists. "--Douglas, Speech at Erie, Penn. , New York "Tribune, " October 3, 1860, p. 4. [5] The vote in Pennsylvania stood: Lincoln, 268, 030; Breckinridge(nominally), 178, 871; Douglas, 16, 765; Bell, 12, 776. CHAPTER XVII BEGINNINGS OF REBELLION Disunion was not a fungus of recent growth in American politics. Talkof disunion, threats of disunion, accusations of intentions ofdisunion, lie scattered rather plentifully through the politicalliterature of the country from the very formation of the Government. In fact, the present Constitution of the United States was strenuouslyopposed by large political factions, and, it may almost be said, succeeded by only a hair's-breadth. That original oppositionperpetuated itself in some degree in the form of doubts of itsduration and prophecies of its failure. The same dissatisfaction andrestlessness resulted in early and important amendments, but these didnot satisfy all dissenters and doubters. Immediate and profoundconflict of opinion sprang up over the administration and policy ofthe new Government; active political parties and hot discussion arose, the one side proclaiming that it was too strong, the other assertingthat it was too weak, to endure. Before public opinion was well consolidated, the war of 1812 producednew complaints and new opposition, out of which grew the famousHartford Convention. It has been charged and denied that this was amovement of disunion and rebellion. The exact fact is not important inour day; it is enough that it was a sign of deep political unrest andof shallow public faith. Passing by lesser manifestations of the samecharacter, we come to the eventful nullification proceeding in SouthCarolina in the year 1832. Here was a formal legislative repudiationof Federal authority with a reserved threat of forcible resistance. Atthis point disunion was in full flower, and the terms nullification, secession, treason, rebellion, revolution, coercion, constitute thecurrent political vocabulary. Take up a political speech of thatperiod, change the names and dates, and the reader can easily imaginehimself among the angry controversies of the winter of 1860. Nullification was half-throttled by Jackson's proclamation, half-quieted by Clay's compromise. But from that time forward thephraseology and the spirit of disunion became constant factors inCongressional debate and legislation. In 1850, it broke out to anextent and with an intensity never before reached. This time itenveloped the whole country, and many of the wisest and best statesmenbelieved civil war at hand. The compromise measures of 1850 finallysubdued the storm; but not till the serious beginning of a secessionmovement had been developed and put down, both by the generalcondemnation of the whole country, and the direct vote of a unionmajority in the localities where it took its rise. Among these compromise acts of 1850 was the admission of California asa free-State. The gold discoveries had suddenly filled it withpopulation, making the usual probation as a Territory altogetherneedless. A considerable part of the State lay south of the line of36º, 30', and the pro-slavery extremists had demanded that it shouldbe divided into two States--one to be a free and the other to be aslave-State--in order to preserve the political balance between thesections, in the United States Senate. This being refused, they notonly violently opposed the compromise measures, but organized amovement for resistance in South Carolina, Georgia, and Mississippi, demanding redress, and threatening secession if it were not accorded. A popular contest on this issue followed in 1851 in these States, inwhich the ultra-secession party was signally overthrown. It submittedsullenly to its defeat; leaving, as always before, a considerablefaction unsatisfied and implacable, only awaiting a new opportunity tostart a new disturbance. This new opportunity arose in the slaveryagitation, beginning with the repeal of the Missouri Compromise in1854, and ending with the election of Lincoln. Daring this six years'controversy, disunion was kept in the background because thepro-slavery party had continual and sanguine hope of ultimate triumph. It did not despair of success until the actual election of Lincoln, onthe 6th of November, 1860; consequently, even in the Southern States, as a rule, disunion was frowned upon till near the end of thePresidential campaign, and only paraded as an evil to be feared, notas a thing to be desired. This aspect, however, was superficial. Under the surface, a small butdetermined disunion conspiracy was actively at work. It has left fewhistorical traces; but in 1856 distinct evidence begins to crop out. There was a possibility, though not a probability, that Frémont mightbe elected President; and this contingency the conspirators proposedto utilize by beginning a rebellion. A letter from the Governor ofVirginia to the Governors of Maryland and other States is sufficientproof of such an intent, even without the evidence of later history. RICHMOND, VA. , Sept. 15, 1856. DEAR SIR: Events are approaching which address themselves to your responsibilities and to mine as chief Executives of slave-holding States. Contingencies may soon happen which would require preparation for the worst of evils to the people. Ought we not to admonish ourselves by joint council of the extraordinary duties which may devolve upon us from the dangers which so palpably threaten our common peace and safety? When, how, or to what extent may we act, separately or unitedly, to ward off dangers if we can, to meet them most effectually if we must? I propose that, as early as convenient, the Governors of Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, Mississippi, and Tennessee shall assemble at Raleigh, N. C. , for the purpose generally of consultation upon the state of the country, upon the best means of preserving its peace, and especially of protecting the honor and interests of the slave-holding States. I have addressed the States only having Democratic Executives, for obvious reasons. This should be done as early as possible before the Presidential election, and I would suggest Monday, the 13th of October next. Will you please give me an early answer, and oblige, Yours most truly and respectfully, HENRY A. WISE. His Excellency Thomas W. Ligon, Governor of Maryland. If any explanation were needed of the evident purpose of this letter, or of the proposed meeting, it may be found in the following fromSenator Mason, of Virginia, to Jefferson Davis, of Mississippi, whowas at the time Secretary of War under President Pierce: [Sidenote] O. J. Victor, "American Conspiracies, " p. 520. SELMA, NEAR WINCHESTER, Va. , Sept. 30, 1856. MY DEAR SIR: I have a letter from Wise, of the 27th, full of spirit. He says the Governors of North Carolina, South Carolina, and Louisiana have already agreed to rendezvous at Raleigh, and others will--this in your most private ear. He says, further, that he had officially requested you to exchange with Virginia, on fair terms of difference, percussion for flint muskets. I don't know the usage or power of the department In such cases, but if it can be done, even by liberal construction, I hope you will accede. Was there not an appropriation at the last session for converting flint into percussion arms? If so, would it not furnish good reason for extending such facilities to the States? Virginia probably has more arms than the other Southern States, and would divide, in case of need. In a letter yesterday to a committee in South Carolina, I give it as my judgment, in the event of Frémont's election, the South should not pause, but proceed at once to "immediate, absolute, and eternal separation. " So I am a candidate for the first halter. Wise says his accounts from Philadelphia are cheering for old Buck in Pennsylvania. I hope they be not delusive. _Vale et Salute_ [sic]. J. M. MASON. Colonel Davis. In these letters we have an exact counterpart of the later andsuccessful efforts of these identical conspirators, conjointly withothers, to initiate rebellion. When the Senatorial campaign of 1858between Lincoln and Douglas was at its height, there was printed inthe public journals of the Southern States the following extraordinaryletter, which at once challenged the attention of the whole readingpublic of the country, and became known by the universal stigma of"The Scarlet Letter. " In the light of after events it was both arevelation and a prophecy: [Sidenote] Quoted in Appendix to "Globe" for 1859-60, p. 313. MONTGOMERY, June 15, 1858. DEAR SIR: Your kind favor of the 15th is received. I heartily agree with you that [no] general movement can be made that will clean out the Augean stable. If the Democracy were overthrown, it would result in giving place to a greater and hungrier swarm of flies. The remedy of the South is not in such a process. It is in a diligent organization of her true men for prompt resistance to the next aggression. It must come in the nature of things. No national party can save us; no sectional party can ever do it. But if we could do as our fathers did--organize "committees of safety" all over the Cotton States (it is only in them that we can hope for any effective movement)--we shall fire the Southern heart, instruct the Southern mind, give courage to each other, and at the proper moment, by one organized concerted action, we can precipitate the Cotton States into a revolution. The idea has been shadowed forth in the South by Mr. Ruffin; has been taken up and recommended in the "Advertiser" (published at Montgomery, Alabama), under the name of "League of United Southerners, " who, keeping up their old party relations on all other questions, will hold the Southern issue paramount, and will influence parties, legislatures, and statesmen. I have no time to enlarge, but to suggest merely. In haste, yours, etc. , WM. L. YANCEY To James Slaughter, Esq. The writer of this "Scarlet Letter" had long been known to the countryas a prominent politician of Alabama, affiliated with the Democraticparty, having once represented a district of that State in Congress, and of late years the most active, pronounced, and conspicuousdisunionist in the South. In so far as this publication concernedhimself, it was no surprise to the public; but the project of anorganized conspiracy had never before been broached with suchmatter-of-fact confidence. [1] An almost universal condemnation by the public press reassured thestartled country that the author of this revolutionary epistle was oneof the confirmed "fire-eaters" who were known and admitted to existin the South, but whose numbers, it was alleged, were too insignificantto excite the most distant apprehension. The letter was everywhere copied, its author denounced, and hisproposal to "precipitate the Cotton States into a revolution" held upto public execration. Mr. Yancey immediately printed a statementdeploring the betrayal of personal confidence in its publication, andto modifiy[2] the obnoxious declaration by a long and laboredargument. But in the course of this explanation he furnishedadditional proof of the deep conspiracy disclosed by the "ScarletLetter. " He made mention of "A well-considered Southern policy, apolicy which has been digested, and understood, and approved by theablest men in Virginia, as you yourselves must be aware, " to theeffect that while the Cotton States should begin rebellion, "Virginiaand the other border States should remain in the Union, " where, bytheir position and their counsels, they would form a protectingbarrier to the proposed separation. "In the event of the movementbeing successful, " he continued, "in time Virginia and the otherborder States that desired it could join the Southern Confederacy. " Less than ordinary uncertainty hung over the final issue of thePresidential campaign of 1860. To popular apprehension the election ofLincoln became more and more probable. The active competition forvotes by four Presidential tickets greatly increased his chances ofsuccess; and the verdict of the October elections appeared to allsagacious politicians to render his choice a practical certainty. Sanguine partisans, however, clung tenaciously to their favorites, andcontinued to hope against hope, and work against fate. Thiscircumstance produced a deplorable result in the South. Under theshadow of impending defeat the Democrats of the Cotton States made thefinal months of the canvass quite as much a threat against Lincoln asa plea for Breckinridge. This preaching of secession seemed to shallowminds harmless election buncombe; but when the contingency finallyarrived, and the choice of Lincoln became a real event, they foundthemselves already in a measure pledged to resistance. They had vowedthey would never submit; and now, with many, the mere pride ofconsistency moved them to adhere to an ill-considered declaration. Thesting of defeat intensified their resentment, and in this irritatedframe of mind the secession demagogues among them lured them onskillfully into the rising tide of revolution. In proportion to her numbers, the State of South Carolina furnishedthe largest contingent to the faction of active conspirators; and toher, by a common consent, were accorded the dangers and honors ofleadership. Since conspiracies work in secret, only fragmentary proofsof their efforts ever come to light. Though probably only one of themany early agencies in organizing the rebellion, the followingcircular reveals in a startling light what labor and system wereemployed to "fire the Southern heart" after the November election: [Illustration: GENERAL HENRY A. WISE. ] [Sidenote] O. J. Victor, "History of the Southern Rebellion. " Vol. I. , p. 203. CHARLESTON, Nov. 19, 1860. EXECUTIVE CHAMBER, "The 1860 Association. " In September last, several gentlemen of Charleston met to confer in reference to the position of the South in the event of the accession of Mr. Lincoln and the Republican party to power. This informal meeting was the origin of the organization known in this community as "The 1860 Association. " The objects of the Association are: _First_. To conduct a correspondence with leading men in the South and by an interchange of information and views prepare the slave-States to meet the impending crisis. _Second_. To prepare, print, and distribute in the slave States, tracts, pamphlets, etc. , designed to awaken them to a conviction of their danger, and to urge the necessity of resisting Northern and Federal aggression. _Third_. To inquire into the defenses of the State, and to collect and arrange information which may aid the Legislature to establish promptly an effective military organization. To effect these objects a brief and simple Constitution was adopted, creating a President, a Secretary and Treasurer, and an Executive Committee specially charged with conducting the business of the Association. One hundred and sixty-six thousand pamphlets have been published, and demands for further supplies are received from every quarter. The Association is now passing several of them through a second and third edition. The conventions in several of the Southern States will soon be elected. The North is preparing to soothe and conciliate the South by disclaimers and overtures. The success of this policy would be disastrous to the cause of Southern Union and Independence, and it is necessary to resist and defeat it. The Association is preparing pamphlets with this special object. Funds are necessary to enable it to act promptly. "The 1860 Association" is laboring for the South, and asks your aid. I am, very respectfully your obedient servant, ROBERT N. GOURDIN, Chairman of the Executive Committee. The half-public endeavors of "The 1860 Association" to create publicsentiment were vigorously seconded by the efforts of high officialpersonages to set on foot concerted official action in aid ofdisunion. In this also, with becoming expressions of modesty, SouthCarolina took the initiative. On the 5th of October, Governor Gistwrote the following confidential letter, which he dispatched by asecret agent to his colleagues, the several Governors of the CottonStates, whom the bearer, General S. R. Gist, visited in turn duringthat month of October. The responses to this inquiry given by the Executives of the otherCotton States were not all that so ardent a disunionist could havewished, but were yet sufficient to prompt him to a further advance. [Sidenote] MS. Confederate Archives, U. S. War Department. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, UNIONVILLE, S. C. , Oct. 5, 1860. His EXCELLENCY GOVERNOR MOORE. DEAR SIR: The great probability, nay almost certainty, of Abraham Lincoln's election to the Presidency renders it important that there should be a full and free interchange of opinion between the Executives of the Southern, and more especially the Cotton, States, and while I unreservedly give you my views and the probable action of my State, I shall be much pleased to hear from you; that there may be concert of action, which is so essential to success. Although I will consider your communication confidential, and wish you so to consider mine so far as publishing in the newspapers is concerned, yet the information, of course, will be of no service to me unless I can submit it to reliable and leading men in consultation for the safety of our State and the South; and will only use it in this way. It is the desire of South Carolina that some other State should take the lead, or at least move simultaneously with her. She will unquestionably call a convention as soon as it is ascertained that a majority of the electors will support Lincoln. If a single State secedes, she will follow her. If no other State takes the lead, South Carolina will secede (in my opinion) alone, if she has any assurance that she will be soon followed by another or other States; otherwise it is doubtful. If you decide to call a convention upon the election of a majority of electors favorable to Lincoln, I desire to know the day you propose for the meeting, that we may call our convention to meet the same day, if possible. If your State will propose any other remedy, please inform me what it will probably be, and any other information you will be pleased to give me. With great respect and consideration, I am yours, etc. , Wm. H. Gist. Governor Thos. O. Moore. [Sidenote] MS. Confederate Archives. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, RALEIGH, N. C. , Oct. 18, 1860. DEAR SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your favor of the 5th, which reached me on the 12th inst. In compliance with your request, I will give as accurately as it is in my power to do the views and feelings of the people of North Carolina upon the important subject of your communication. Political differences and party strife have run so high in this State for some years past, and particularly during the past nine months, that anything like unanimity upon any question of a public nature could scarcely be expected; and such is the case with the one under consideration. Our people are very far from being agreed as to what action the State should take in the event of Lincoln's election to the Presidency. Some favor submission, some resistance, and others still would await the course of events that might follow. Many argue that he would be powerless for evil with a minority party in the Senate, and perhaps in the House of Representatives also; while others say, and doubtless with entire sincerity, that the placing of the power of the Federal Government in his hands would prove a fatal blow to the institution of negro slavery in this country. None of our public speakers, I believe, have taken the ground before the people that the election of Lincoln would, of itself, be a cause of secession. Many have said it would not, while others have spoken equivocally. Upon the whole I am decidedly of opinion that a majority of our people would not consider the occurrence of the event referred to as sufficient ground for dissolving the union of the States. For which reason I do not suppose that our Legislature, which will meet on the 19th prox. , will take any steps in that direction--such, for instance, as the calling of a convention. Thus, sir, I have given you what I conceive to be the sentiment of our people upon the subject of your letter, and I give it as an existing fact, without comment as to whether the majority be in error or not. My own opinions, as an individual, are of little moment. It will be sufficient to say, that as a States-Rights man, believing in the sovereignty and reserved powers of the States, I will conform my actions to the action of North Carolina, whatever that may be. To this general observation I will make but a single qualification--it is this: I could not in any event assent to, or give my aid to, a political enforcement of the monstrous doctrine of coercion. I do not for a moment think that North Carolina would become a party to the enforcement of this doctrine, and will not therefore do her the injustice of placing her in that position, even though hypothetically. With much respect, I have the honor to be, Your ob't. Serv't, JOHN W. ELLIS. His Excellency William H. Gist, Governor of South Carolina [Sidenote] MS. Confederate Archives. ALEXANDRIA, LA. , 26th October, 1860. His EXCELLENCY GOVERNOR GIST. DEAR SIR: Your favor of the 5th inst. Was received a few days ago at this place. I regret my inability to consult with as many of our leading citizens as I wished, but I will not delay in replying any longer. You will (of course) consider my letter as private, except for use in consultation with friends. I shall not call a convention in this State if Lincoln is elected, because I have no power or authority to do so. I infer from your letter that an authority has been vested in you by your Legislature to call a convention in a specified contingency. Our Legislature has taken no action of that or any similar kind. That body will meet in regular annual session about the middle of January; but it is not improbable that I may consider it necessary to convene it at an earlier day, if the complexion of the electoral colleges shall indicate the election of Lincoln. Even if that deplorable event shall be the result of the coming election, I shall not advise the secession of my State, and I will add that I do not think the people of Louisiana will ultimately decide in favor of that course. I shall recommend that Louisiana meet her sister slaveholding States in council to consult as to the proper course to be pursued, and to endeavor to effect a complete harmony of action. I fear that this harmony of action, so desirable in so grave an emergency, cannot be effected. Some of the Cotton States will pursue a more radical policy than will be palatable to the border States, but this only increases the necessity of convening the consultative body of which I have spoken. I believe in the right of secession for just cause, of which the sovereignty must itself be the judge. If therefore the general Government shall attempt to coerce a State, and forcibly attempt the exercise of this right, I should certainly sustain the State in such a contest. There has never been any indication made by Louisiana, or by any public body within her limits, of her probable course in the event of an election of a Black Republican President, and she is totally unprepared for any warlike measures. Her arsenals are empty. While some of her sister States have been preparing for an emergency, which I fear is now imminent, she has been negligent in this important matter. If coming events should render necessary the convocation of the Southern Convention, I shall endeavor to compose the representation of Louisiana of her ablest and most prudent men, if the power shall be vested in me to appoint them. However, I presume the Legislature will adopt some other course in the appointments. The recommendations of such a body assembled in such a crisis must necessarily carry great weight, and if subsequently ratified and adopted by each State by proper authority, will present the South in united and harmonious action. I have the honor to be your Excellency's ob't serv't THOS. O. MOORE. [Sidenote] MS. Ibid. MACON, Oct. 26, 1860. His EXCELLENCY Gov. GIST. DEAR SIR: Your letter of Oct. 5 was handed me by General Gist. Having but few moments to reply, I write this more to acknowledge its receipt than to reply to its contents. Our friends in this State are willing to do anything they may have the power to do to prevent the State from passing under the Black Republican yoke. Our people know this, and seem to approve such sentiments, yet I do not believe Mississippi can move alone. I will call our Legislature in extra session as soon as it is known that the Black Republicans have carried the election. I expect Mississippi will ask a council of the Southern States, and if that council advise secession, Mississippi will go with them. If any State moves, I think Mississippi will go with her. I will write at length from Jackson. Yours respectfully, JOHN J. PETTUS. [Sidenote] MS. Confederate Archives. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, MILLEDGEVILLE, GA. , Oct. 31, 1860. His EXCELLENCY W. H. GIST. DEAR SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your favor by the hand of General Grist, with whom I have had a free interchange of opinions. In the event of the election of Mr. Lincoln to the Presidency I have no doubt that Georgia will determine her action by a convention of the people, which will probably be held before the 4th day of March next. Her Legislature, which convenes here next Wednesday, will have to determine on the time when the convention shall be held. My opinion is that the people of Georgia will, in case of the election of Lincoln, decide to meet all the Southern States in convention and take common action for the protection of the rights of all. Events not yet foreseen may change their course and might lead to action on the part of Georgia without waiting for all the Southern States, if it should be found necessary to her safety. I have handed General Gist a copy of my message on our Federal relations, which will be sent to our Legislature on the first day of the session. I send only the forms from the press as it is just being put in type. I may make some immaterial alterations before it is completed. If your State remains in the Union, I should be pleased that she would adopt such retaliatory measures as I recommend in the message, or others which you may determine to be more appropriate. I think Georgia will pass retaliatory laws similar to those I recommend, should Lincoln be defeated. Should the question be submitted to the people of Georgia, whether they would go out of the Union on Lincoln's election without regard to the action of other States, my opinion is they would determine to wait for an overt act. The action of other States may greatly influence the action of the people of this State. This letter is not intended for publication in the newspapers, and has been very hastily prepared. I have the honor to be your Excellency's Ob't serv't, JOSEPH E. BROWN. [Sidenote] MS. Confederate Archives. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, MONTGOMERY, ALA. , October 25, 1860. His EXCELLENCY W. H. GIST. DEAR SIR: Your letter of the 5th inst. Was handed me a few days since by General Gist. I fully concur with you in the opinion that Lincoln will be elected President, and that a full and free interchange of opinion between the Executives of the Southern States, and especially of the Cotton States, should be had as to what ought to be done and what will be done by them to protect the interest and honor of the slave-holding States in the event he should be elected. My opinion is, that the election of Lincoln alone is not sufficient cause for a dissolution of the Union; but that fact, when taken in connection with the avowed objects and intentions of the party whose candidate he is, and the overt acts already committed by that party in nullifying the fugitive-slave law, and the enactment of personal liberty bills in many of the non-slave-holding States, with other acts of like kind, is sufficient cause for dissolving every tie which binds the Southern States to the Union. It is my opinion that Alabama will not secede alone, but if two or more States will coöperate with her, she will secede with them; or if South Carolina or any other Southern State should go out alone and the Federal Government should attempt to use force against her, Alabama will immediately rally to her rescue. The opinions above expressed are predicated upon observation and consultation with a number of our most distinguished statesmen. The opinion thus expressed is not intended as a positive assurance, but is my best impression as to what will be the course of Alabama. Should Lincoln be elected, I shall certainly call a convention under the provisions of the resolutions of the last General Assembly of the State. The convention cannot be convened earlier than the first Monday in February next, and I have fixed upon that day (in my own mind). The vote of the electors will be cast for President on the 5th day of December, after which it will require a few days to ascertain the result. Thirty days' notice will have to be given after the day upon which, the delegates to the convention will be elected, and the convention is required to convene in two weeks after the election. This is not a matter of discretion with me, but is fixed by law. I regret that earlier action cannot be had, as it may be a matter of much importance that all the States that may determine to withdraw from the Union should act before the expiration of Mr. Buchanan's term of service. The facts and opinions herein communicated you are at liberty to make known to those with whom you may choose to confer, but they are not to be published in the newspapers. I have had a full and free conversation with General Gist, the substance of which is contained in this letter. He will, however, give it to you more in detail. It is my opinion that all the States that may determine to take action upon the election of Lincoln should call a convention as soon as practicable after the result is known. With great respect, your ob't serv't, B. MOORE. [Sidenote] MS. Confederate Archives. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, Nov. 9, 1860. His EXCELLENCY GOVERNOR GIST. DEAR SIR: Your communication of the 5th ultimo reached me per last mail under cover from General States Rights Gist, with an explanatory note from that gentleman in relation to the subject-matters thereof. The mode employed by your Excellency to collect authoritatively the views of several of the Executives of the Southern States as to their plan of action in the event of the election of Lincoln, commends itself warmly to my judgment. Concert of action can alone be arrived at by a full and free interchange of opinion between the Executives of the Cotton States, by whom it is confidently expected that the ball will be put in motion. We are in the midst of grave events, and I have industriously sought to learn the public mind in this State in the event of the election of Lincoln, and am proud to say Florida is ready to wheel into line with the gallant Palmetto State, or any other Cotton State or States, in any course which she or they may in their judgment think proper to adopt, looking to the vindication and maintenance of the rights, interest, honor, and safety of the South. Florida may be unwilling to subject herself to the charge of temerity or immodesty by leading off, but will most assuredly cooperate with or follow the lead of any single Cotton State which may secede. Whatever doubts I may have entertained upon this subject have been entirely dissipated by the recent elections in this State. Florida will most unquestionably call a convention as soon as it is ascertained that a majority of the electors favor the election of Lincoln, to meet most likely upon a day to be suggested by some other State. I leave to-day for the capital, and will write you soon after my arrival, but would be pleased in the mean time to hear from you at your earliest convenience. If there is sufficient manliness at the South to strike for our rights, honor, and safety, in God's name let it be done before the inauguration of Lincoln. With high regard, I am yours, etc. , M. S. PERRY Direct to Tallahassee. P. S. I have written General Gist at Union C. H. Two agencies have thus far been described as engaged in the work offomenting the rebellion: the first, secret societies of individuals, like "The 1860 Association, " designed to excite the masses and createpublic sentiment; the second, a secret league of Southern governorsand other State functionaries, whose mission it became to employ thegovernmental machinery of States in furtherance of the plot. These, though formidable and dangerous, would probably have failed, eithersingly or combined, had they not been assisted by a third of stillgreater efficacy and certainty. This was nothing less than a conspiracyin the very bosom of the National Administration at Washington, embracing many United States Senators, Representatives in Congress, three members of the President's Cabinet, and numerous subordinateofficials in the several Executive departments. The special workwhich this powerful central cabal undertook by common consent, andsuccessfully accomplished, was to divert Federal arms and forts to theuse of the rebellion, and to protect and shield the revolt from anyadverse influence, or preventive or destructive action of the generalGovernment. ----------[1] As an evidence of the disunion combination which lay like smolderingembers under the surface of Southern politics, it is instructive to readan extract from a hitherto unpublished letter from Governor Henry A. Wise, of Virginia, to a gentleman in Philadelphia, for a copy of whichwe are indebted to General Duncan S. Walker. The other letter ofWise--previously quoted--shows us his part and interest in the proposedconspiracy against Frémont; but the erratic Governor had, after thelapse of nearly two years, become an anti-Lecompton-Douglasite, and wasready to give confidential warning of designs with which he was onlytoo familiar. As this was written nearly three weeks before Yancey's"Scarlet Letter, " its concurrent testimony is of special significanceas proof of the chronic conspiracy: "RICHMOND, VA. , "May 28, 1858. "To WM. SERGEANT, ESQ. : ". .. The truth is that there is in the South an organized, active, and dangerous faction, embracing most of the Federal politicians, who are bent upon bringing about causes of a dissolution of the Union. They desire a united South, "but not a united country. Their hope of embodying a sectional antagonism is to secure a sectional defeat. At heart, they do not wish the Democracy to be any longer national, united, or successful. In the name of Democracy they propose to make a nomination for 1860, at Charleston; but an ultra nomination of an extremist on the slavery issue alone, to unite the South on that one idea, and on that to have it defeated by a line of sectionalism which will inevitably draw swords between fanatics on one side and fire-eaters on the other. Bear it in mind, then, that they desire to control a nomination for no other purpose than to have it defeated by a line of sections. They desire defeat, for no other end than to make a pretext for the clamor of dissolution. .. . "Yours truly, "HENRY A. WISE. " MS. [2] "I am a secessionist and not a revolutionist, and would not'precipitate, ' but carefully prepare to meet an inevitable dissolution. "--Yancey to Pryor, "Richmond South, " copied in "National Intelligencer, "September 4, 1858. CHAPTER XVIII THE CABINET CABAL Very soon after the effort to unite the Cotton-State governors in therevolutionary plot, we find the local conspiracy at Charleston incommunication with the central secession cabal at Washington. JamesBuchanan, of Pennsylvania, was still President of the United States, and his Cabinet consisted of the following members: Lewis Cass, ofMichigan, Secretary of State; Howell Cobb, of Georgia, Secretary ofthe Treasury; John B. Floyd, of Virginia, Secretary of War; IsaacToucey, of Connecticut, Secretary of the Navy; Jacob Thompson, ofMississippi, Secretary of the Interior; Joseph Holt, of Kentucky, Postmaster-General; and Jeremiah S. Black, of Pennsylvania, Attorney-General. It was in and about this Cabinet that the centralcabal formed itself. Even if we could know in detail the successivesteps that led to the establishment of this intercourse, which soquickly became "both semi-official and confidential, " it could addnothing to the force of the principal fact that the conspiracy was inits earliest stages efficient in perverting the resources andinstrumentalities of the Government of the United States to itsdestruction. That a United States Senator, a Secretary of War, anAssistant Secretary of State, and no doubt sundry minor functionaries, were already then, from six to eight weeks before any pretense ofsecession, with, "malice aforethought" organizing armed resistance tothe Constitution and laws they had sworn to support, stands forth inthe following correspondence too plainly to be misunderstood. As afitting preface to this correspondence, a few short paragraphs may bequoted from the private diary of the Secretary of War, from whichlonger and more important extracts appear in a subsequent chapter. Those at present quoted are designed more especially to show the namesof the persons composing the primary group of this central cabal, andthe time and place of their early consultations and activity. EXTRACTS FROM FLOYD'S DIARY. [1] November 8, 1860 . .. I had a long conversation to-day with GeneralLane, the candidate for Vice-President on the ticket withMr. Breckinridge. He was grave and extremely earnest; said thatresistance to the anti-slavery feeling of the North was hopeless, andthat nothing was left to the South but "resistance or dishonor"; thatif the South failed to act with promptness and decision in vindicationof her rights, she would have to make up her mind to give up first herhonor and then her slaves. He thought disunion inevitable, and saidwhen the hour came that his services could be useful, he would offerthem unhesitatingly to the South. I called to see the President thisevening, but found him at the State Department engaged upon hismessage, and did not see him. Miss Lane returned last evening fromPhiladelphia, where she had been for some time on a visit. Mr. W. H. Trescott, Assistant Secretary of State, called to see me this evening, and conversed at length upon the condition of things in SouthCarolina, of which State he is a native. He expressed no sort of doubtwhatever of his State separating from the Union. He brought me aletter from Mr. Drayton, the agent of the State, proposing to buy tenthousand muskets for the use of the State. .. . November 10 . .. Beach, Thompson, and Cobb came over with me fromCabinet and staid, taking informally a family dinner. The party wasfree and communicative; Toucey would not stay for dinner. Mr. Pickens, late Minister to Russia, came in after dinner with Mr. Trescott, Assistant Secretary of State, and sat an hour, talking about thedistracted state of public feeling at the South. He seemed to thinkthe time had come for decisive measures to be taken by the South. November 11 . .. I spent an hour at the President's, where I metThompson, Robert McGraw, and some others; we sat around the tea-tableand discussed the disunion movements of the South. This seems to bethe absorbing topic everywhere. November 12 . .. Dispatched the ordinary business of the department;dined at 5 o'clock; Mr. Pickens, late Minister to Russia, Mr. Trescott, Mr. Secretary Thompson, Mr. McGraw, Mr. Browne, editor ofthe "Constitution, " were of the party. The chief topic of discussionwas, as usual, the excitement in the South. The belief seemed to bethat disunion was inevitable; Pickens, usually very cool andconservative, was excited and warm. My own conservatism seems in thesediscussions to be unusual and almost misplaced. [Sidenote] Benson J. Lossing, "The Civil War in America, " Vol. I. , p. 44. (Note. ) W. H. TRESCOTT TO E. BARNWELL RHETT. WASHINGTON, Nov. 1, 1860. DEAR RHETT: I received your letter this morning. As to my views oropinions of the Administration, I can, of course, say nothing. As toMr. Cobb's views, he is willing that I should communicate them to you, in order that they may aid you in forming your own judgment; but, youwill understand that this is confidential--that is, neither Mr. Cobbnor myself must be quoted as the source of your information. I willnot dwell on this, as you will, on a moment's reflection, see theembarrassment which might be produced by any _authorized_ statement ofhis opinions. I will only add, by way of preface, that after the veryfullest and freest conversations with him, I feel sure of hisearnestness, singleness of purpose, and resolution in the wholematter. Mr. Cobb believes that the time is come for resistance; that upon theelection of Lincoln, Georgia ought to secede from the Union, and thatshe will do so; that Georgia and every other State should, as far assecession, act for herself, resuming her delegated powers, and thusput herself in position to consult with other sovereign States whotake the same ground. After the secession is effected, then will bethe time to consult. But he is of opinion, most strongly, thatwhatever action is resolved on should be consummated on the 4th ofMarch, not before. That while the action determined on should be decisive andirrevocable, its initial point should be the 4th of March. He isopposed to any Southern convention, merely for the purpose ofconsultation. If a Southern convention is held, it must be ofdelegates empowered to _act_, whose action is at once binding on theStates they represent. But he desires me to impress upon you his conviction, that any attemptto precipitate the actual issue upon this Administration will be mostmischievous--calculated to produce differences of opinion and destroyunanimity. He thinks it of great importance that the cotton cropshould go forward at once, and that the money should be in the handsof the people, that the cry of popular distress shall not be heard atthe outset of this move. My own opinion is that it would be well to have a discreet man, onewho knows the value of silence, who can listen wisely, present inMilledgeville, at the meeting of the State Legislature, as there willbe there an outside gathering of the very ablest men of that State. And the next point, that you should, at the earliest possible day ofthe session of our own Legislature, elect a man as governor whose nameand character will conciliate as well as give confidence to all themen of the State, --if we do act, I really think this half thebattle, --a man upon whose temper the State can rely. I say nothing about a convention, as I understand, on all hands, thatthat is a fixed fact, and I have confined myself to answering yourquestion. I will be much obliged to you if you will write me soon andfully from Columbia. It is impossible to write to you, with the constant interruption ofthe office, and as you want Cobb's opinions, not mine, I send this toyou. Yours, W. H. T. [Sidenote] MS. Confederate Archives. THOS. F. DRAYTON TO GOVERNOR GIST. CHARLESTON, 3d Nov. , 1860. On the 22d of last month I was in Washington, and called upon theSecretary at War, in company with Senator Wigfall, of Texas, to makeinquiries as to the efficiency and price of certain muskets belongingto the United States, which had been altered by the OrdnanceDepartment from flint to percussion. They will shoot for 200 yards aswell as any smooth-bored gun in the service, and if _rifled_ will beeffective at 500 yards. But if the conical ball will be made lighterby enlarging the hollow at the base of the cone, the effective rangemay be increased to seven hundred yards. Should your Excellency give afavorable consideration to the above, I can have the whole of what Ihave stated authenticated by the board of ordnance officers, whoinspected and reported to the Secretary at War upon these muskets. Iften thousand or more of these muskets are purchased, the price will betwo ($2) dollars each; for a less quantity the charge will be $2. 50each. If a portion or all of them are to be rifled, the Secretary sayshe will have it done for the additional cost of one ($1) dollar perbarrel. As this interview with Mr. Secretary Floyd was bothsemi-official and confidential, your Excellency will readily see thenecessity, should this matter be pursued further, of appointing anagent to negotiate with him, rather than conduct the negotiationdirectly between the State and the Department . .. I unhesitatinglyadvise purchasing several thousand of them . .. There are many otherimportant facts in connection with the above that I could disclose, but will reserve them for some other occasion, that I may give themverbally as soon as I can find a day to wait upon your Excellency inColumbia. The State of Texas has engaged twenty thousand (20, 000) of thesemuskets, and the State of Kentucky purchased several thousand lastsummer. [Sidenote] Ibid. THOS. F. DRAYTON TO GOVERNOR GIST. CHARLESTON, 6th Nov. , 1860. I have only within a few hours received yours of the 5th inst. , authorizing me to purchase from the War Department at Washington tenthousand rifles of pattern and price indicated in my letter to yourExcellency of the 3d inst. I accept the appointment and will discharge the duty assigned to thebest of my ability and with the least possible delay. For I feel thatthe past and present agitation are ruinous to our peace and prosperityand that our only remedy is to break up with dispatch the presentConfederacy and construct a new and better one. I will communicatewith Mr. Secretary Floyd to-night and have the rifles put inpreparation so as to have them for use at an early day. .. . I would wish that my agency in this transaction be kept private _untilI reach Washington_, or indeed till I write to say the arms are ontheir way to Columbia. .. . [Sidenote] Ibid. THOS. F. DRAYTON TO GOVERNOR GIST. CHARLESTON, 8th Nov. , 1860. I have just received your letter of the 7th inst. , and I think I canrender you all the information you desire, without resorting to anyagent. If my ability can only be made to keep pace with my zeal, Ihope yet to render some service to the dear old State of SouthCarolina. [Illustration: THE WIGWAM AT CHICAGO IN WHICH LINCOLN WAS NOMINATED. ] [Sidenote] MS. Confederate Archives. THOS. F. DRAYTON TO GOVERNOR GIST. CHARLESTON, 16th Nov. , 1860. I have been most reluctantly detained here by an accidental fall, andalso by business of an urgent kind associated with the railroad. Myabsence from Washington, however, has not delayed the execution ofyour order for the rifles; the Secretary of War has had the preparationof them in hand for some time. When I write to you from Washington, had I not better address youthrough your private secretary . .. Please address me at Washington tothe care of Wm. H. Trescott, Esq. . .. I will give strict attention toyour letter of the 7th inst. , and hope to furnish you with much of theinformation you desire, for I am quite sensible of the importance ofknowing the views and policy of the President at this juncture. [Sidenote] MS. Confederate Archives. THOS. F. DRAYTON TO GOVERNOR GIST. WASHINGTON, 19th Nov. , 1860. . .. I called this morning upon the Secretary of War to makearrangements for the immediate transmission of the rifles to Columbia, but much to my astonishment he informed me that since he had lookedover the report of "Small Fire-arms" (now inclosed) that he found hehad labored under an error in stating to me that the ten thousandrifles I had engaged were ready for delivery when called for by me. Hesaid he could have them rifled, but it would take three or four monthsto execute the contract, but suggested that we should purchase the10, 000 smooth-bored muskets instead, as a more efficient arm, particularly if large-sized buckshot should be used, which, put up inwire case capable of containing 12 of them, would go spitefullythrough an inch plank at 200 yards. I was much astonished at theresult of my interview with Governor Floyd to-day, for he had not onlyinformed me that the rifles would be ready for me on my arrival, buttold Mr. Trescott so likewise, and that if I had been in Washingtonlast Saturday I could have got them. .. . If you will be satisfied withthe smooth-bored muskets like the specimen forwarded to you, I willpurchase them. Better do this, although not the best pattern, than bewithout arms at a crisis like the present. Colonel Benjamin Huger cangive you much information about these muskets. This is derived notonly from Mr. Floyd, but also from General J. E. Johnston, Quartermaster-General, who was President of the Ordnance Board who hadthese muskets changed from flint to percussion, and also fromsmooth-bore to rifle, and he says that for our purposes thesmooth-bored musket is preferable to the altered rifle. The why Icannot explain to-day. .. . I also send you a letter from Mr. Trescott, in reply to certain inquiries from me. I am unable to make anycomments upon them nor to add other facts which I will forward youmore leisurely to-morrow. .. . [Sidenote] MS. Confederate Archives. W. H. TRESCOTT TO THOS. F. DRAYTON. WASHINGTON, Nov. 19, 1860. (Private, Confidential. ) MY DEAR DRAYTON: It is difficult to reply specifically to yourinquiries, partly because I do not believe that the exact course ofthe Administration has been yet determined on, and partly because myknowledge, or rather my inference, of its intentions is derived fromintercourse with its members which I am bound to considerconfidential. I do not regard it of serious importance to you to knowthe individual opinions of either the President or the Cabinet. Noaction of any sort will be taken until the message has been sentindicating the opinions of the Executive, and that message, whateverit be, will find our Legislature in session, and the convention on thepoint of meeting. I think it likely that the President will stateforcibly what he considers the grievances of the South, that he willadd that he does not think, if the right of secession existed, itwould be a wise policy for the State to adopt, and that he does notthink the right to secede does exist, and then refer the whole matterto Congress; what he will do when the State does secede, he has notsaid, and I do not know, nor any man, I believe. He will do, as wewill, what he believes to be his duty, and that duty, I suppose, willbe discharged in full view of the consequences following any line ofaction that may be determined on. But I think that, as long as Cobband Thompson retain seats in the Cabinet, you may feel confident thatno action has been taken which seriously affects the position of anySouthern State. I think that I may safely rely upon my knowledge of what will be done, and you may rely upon my resignation as soon as that knowledgesatisfies me of any move in a direction positively injurious to us, oraltering the present condition of things to our disadvantage. When youpass through on Wednesday, however, I will speak to you more fully. Yours, W. H. T. [Sidenote] Ibid. THOS. F. DRAYTON TO GOVERNOR GIST. WASHINGTON, 19th Nov. , 1860. Mr. Buchanan, while he can discover no authority under theConstitution to justify secession by a State, on the other hand he canfind no power to coerce one to return after the right of secession hasbeen exercised. He will not allow entry or clearance of a vesselexcept through the Custom-house, to be established as soon assecession is declared, upon the deck of a man-of-war off the harbor ofCharleston. He will enforce the collection of duties, not by navy, butby a revenue cutter, as our collector now would do if his authoritywas resisted. I will write to you more fully when I return from NewYork, where I go to-morrow at daylight, at the suggestion of theSecretary of War, who deems it important that I should go there tomake arrangements for shipping the arms (should you still want them)from that point instead of this city . .. Do send a copy of the list ofarms at the arsenals to H. R. Lawton, Milledgeville, Ga. I am gettingsome smooth-bored muskets for Georgia, like the specimen I sent you. [Sidenote] MS. Confederate Archives. THOS. F. DRAYTON TO GOVERNOR GIST. WASHINGTON, 23d Nov. , 1860. I arrived here at 6 A. M. From New York, where I had gone at thesuggestion of Mr. Floyd to engage Mr. G. B. Lamar, President of theBank of the Republic, to make an offer to the Secretary for such anumber of muskets as we might require. The Secretary at War wasreluctant to dispose of them to me, preferring the intermediateagency. Mr. Lamar has consented to act accordingly, and to-day theSecretary has written to the commanding officer [at] WatervlietArsenal to deliver five or ten thousand muskets (altered from flint topercussion) to Mr. Lamar's order. Mr. Lamar will pay the United Statespaymaster for them, and rely upon the State to repay him. I have beenmost fortunate in having been enabled to meet the payments for thearms through Mr. L. , for I feel satisfied that without hisintervention we could not have effected the purchase at this time. .. . I expect to return at daylight to-morrow to New York, for I am veryanxious about getting possession of the arms at Watervliet, andforward them to Charleston. The Cabinet may break up at any moment, ondifferences of opinion with the President as to the rights ofsecession, and a new Secretary of War might stop the muskets goingSouth, if not already on their way when he comes into office. I will write to you again by the next mail. The impression here andelsewhere among many Southern men is, that our Senators have beenprecipitate in resigning; they think that their resignations shouldhave been tendered from their seats after they had announced to theSenate that the State had seceded. Occupying their seats up to thisperiod would have kept them in communication with Senators from theSouth and assisted very powerfully in shaping to our advantage comingevents. If any further quotation be necessary to show the audacity with whichat least three Secretaries and one Assistant Secretary of Mr. Buchanan's Cabinet engaged in flagrant conspiracy in the early stagesof rebellion, it may be found in an interview of Senator Clingman withthe Secretary of the Interior, which the former has recorded in his"Speeches and Writings" as an interesting reminiscence. It may bedoubted whether Secretary Thompson correctly reported the President aswishing him success in his North Carolina mission, but the Secretaryis, of course, a competent witness to his own declarations and acts. [Sidenote] T. L. Clingman, "Speeches and Writings, " pp. 526, 527. About the middle of December [1860] I had occasion to see theSecretary of the Interior on some official business. On my enteringthe room, Mr. Thompson said to me, "Clingman, I am glad you havecalled, for I intended presently to go up to the Senate to see you. Ihave been appointed a commissioner by the State of Mississippi to godown to North Carolina to get your State to secede, and I wished totalk with you about your Legislature before I start down in themorning to Raleigh, and to learn what you think of my chance ofsuccess. " I said to him, "I did not know that you had resigned. " Heanswered; "Oh, no, I have not resigned. " "Then, " I replied, "I supposeyou resign in the morning. " "No, " he answered, "I do not intend toresign, for Mr. Buchanan wished us all to hold on, and go out with himon the 4th of March. " "But, " said I, "does Mr. Buchanan know for whatpurpose you are going to North Carolina?" "Certainly, " he said, "heknows my object. " Being surprised by this statement, I told Mr. Thompson that Mr. Buchanan was probably so much perplexed by hissituation that he had not fully considered the matter, and that as hewas already involved in difficulty, we ought not to add to hisburdens; and then suggested to Mr. Thompson that he had better see Mr. Buchanan again, and by way of inducing him to think the matter over, mention what I had been saying to him. Mr. Thompson said, "Well, I cando so, but I think he fully understands it. " In the evening I met Mr. Thompson at a small social party, and as soon as I approached him, hesaid, "I knew I could not be mistaken. I told Mr. Buchanan all yousaid, and he told me that he wished me to go, and hoped I mightsucceed. " I could not help exclaiming, "Was there ever before anypotentate who sent out his own Cabinet ministers to excite aninsurrection against his Government!" The fact that Mr. Thompson didgo on the errand, and had a public reception before the Legislature, and returned to his position in the Cabinet is known, but thisincident serves to recall it. To this sketch of the Cabinet cabal it is necessary to add the testimonyof his participation, by one who, from first to last, was a principaland controlling actor. Jefferson Davis records that: [Sidenote] Jefferson Davis, "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, " Vol. I. , pp. 57, 58, 59. In November, 1860, after the result of the Presidential election wasknown, the Governor of Mississippi, having issued his proclamationconvoking a special session of the Legislature to consider thepropriety of calling a convention, invited the Senators andRepresentatives of the State in Congress to meet him for consultationas to the character of the message he should send to the Legislaturewhen assembled. .. . While engaged in the consultation with the Governorjust referred to, a telegraphic message was handed to me from twomembers of Mr. Buchanan's Cabinet, urging me to proceed "immediately"to Washington. This dispatch was laid before the Governor and themembers of Congress from the State who were in conference with him, and it was decided that I should comply with, the summons . .. Onarrival at Washington, I found, as had been anticipated, that mypresence there was desired on account of the influence which it wassupposed I might exercise with the President (Mr. Buchanan) inrelation to his forthcoming message to Congress. On paying my respectsto the President, he told me that he had finished the rough draft ofhis message, but that it was still open to revision and amendment, andthat he would like to read it to me. He did so and very kindlyaccepted all the modifications which I suggested. The message was, however, afterwards somewhat changed. In the documents we have presented, though they manifestly form butthe merest fragment of the secret correspondence which passed betweenthe chief conspirators, and of the written evidence recorded by themin various forms, then and afterwards, we have a substantial unmaskingof the combined occult influences which presided over the initiatorysteps of the great American Rebellion--its central council--the masterwheel of its machinery--and the connecting relation which caused allits subordinate parts to move in harmonious accord. With the same mind to dictate a secession message to a Legislature anda non-coercion message to Congress--to assemble insurrectionary troopsto seize Federal forts and withhold Government troops from theirprotection--to incite governors to rebellion and overawe a weakPresident to a virtual abdication of his rightful authority, historyneed not wonder at the surprising unity and early success of theconspiracy against the Union. ----------[1] Printed on pages 791 to 794 in "The Life and Times of Robert E. Lee, " etc. By a distinguished Southern journalist. (E. A. Pollard, author of "The Lost Cause. ") CHAPTER XIX FROM THE BALLOT TO THE BULLET The secret circular of Governor Gist, of South Carolina, heretoforequoted, inaugurated the great American Rebellion a full month before asingle ballot had been cast for Abraham Lincoln. This was butrepeating in a bolder form the action taken by Governor Wise, ofVirginia, during the Frémont campaign four years before. But, instead, as in that case, of confining himself to a proposed consultation amongslave-State executives, Governor Gist proceeded almost immediately toa public and official revolutionary act. On the 12th of October, 1860, he issued his proclamation convening theLegislature of South Carolina in extra session, "to appoint electorsof President and Vice-President . .. And also that they may, ifadvisable, take action for the safety and protection of the State. "There was no external peril menacing either the commonwealth or itshumblest citizen; but the significance of the phrase was soonapparent. [Sidenote] South Carolina "House Journal, " Called Session, 1860, pp. 10, 11. A caucus of prominent South Carolina leaders is said to have been heldon October 25, at the residence of Senator Hammond. Theirdeliberations remained secret, but the determination arrived atappears clearly enough in the official action of Governor Gist, whowas present, and who doubtless carried out the plans of theassemblage. When the Legislature met on November 5 (the day before thePresidential election) the Governor sent them his opening message, advocating both secession and insurrection, in direct and undisguisedlanguage. He recommended that in the event of Lincoln's election, aconvention should be immediately called; that the State should secedefrom the Federal Union; and "if in the exercise of arbitrary power andforgetful of the lessons of history, the Government of the UnitedStates should attempt coercion, it will be our solemn duty to meetforce by force. " To this end he recommended a reorganization of themilitia and the raising and drilling an army of ten thousandvolunteers. He placed the prospects of such a revolution in a mosthopeful and encouraging light. "The indications from many of theSouthern States, " said he, "justify the conclusion that the secessionof South Carolina will be immediately followed, if not adoptedsimultaneously, by them, and ultimately by the entire South. Thelong-desired coöperation of the other States having similarinstitutions, for which the State has been waiting, seems to be nearat hand; and, if we are true to ourselves, will soon be realized. " Governor Gist's justification of this movement as attempted was (inhis own language) "the strong probability of the election to thePresidency of a sectional candidate by a party committed to thesupport of measures, which if carried out will inevitably destroy ourequality in the Union, and ultimately reduce the Southern States tomere provinces of a consolidated despotism to be governed by a fixedmajority in Congress hostile to our institutions. " This campaign declamation, used throughout the whole South with greatskill and success, to "fire the Southern heart, " was wholly defectiveas a serious argument. As to the alleged destruction of equality, the North proposed to denyto the slave-States no single right claimed by the free-States. Thetalk about "provinces of a consolidated despotism to be governed by afixed majority" was, in itself an absurd contradiction in terms, whichrepudiated the fundamental idea of republican government. Theacknowledgment that any danger from anti-slavery "measures" was onlyin the future, negatived its validity as a present grievance. Hostility to "our institutions" was expressly disavowed by fullconstitutional recognition of slavery under State authority. Thecharge of "sectionalism" came with a bad grace from a State whosenewspapers boasted that none but the Breckinridge ticket was toleratedwithin her borders, and whose elsewhere obsolete "institution" ofchoosing Presidential electors by the Legislature instead of by thepeople, combined with such a dwarfed and crippled public sentiment, made it practically impossible for a single vote to be cast for eitherLincoln or Douglas or Bell--a condition mathematically four times as"sectional" as that of any State of the North. Finally, the avowed determination to secede because a Presidentialelection was about to be legally gained by one of the three opposingparties, after she had freely and fully joined in the contest, was anindulgence of caprice utterly incompatible with any form of governmentwhatever. There is no need here to enter upon a discussion of the many causeswhich, had given to the public opinion of South Carolina so radicaland determined a tone in favor of disunion. Maintaining persistence, and gradually gathering strength almost continuously since thenullification furor of 1832, it had become something more than asentiment among its devotees: it had grown into a species of cult orparty religion, for the existence of which no better reason can beassigned than that it sprang from a blind hero-worship locallyaccorded to John C. Calhoun, one of the prominent figures of Americanpolitical history. As representative in Congress, Secretary of Warunder President Monroe, Vice-President of the United States underPresident John Quincy Adams, for many years United States Senator fromSouth Carolina, and the radical champion of States Rights, Nullification, and Slavery, his brilliant fame was the pride, but hisfalse theories became the ruin, of his State and section. [Sidenote] South Carolina "House Journal, " Called Session, 1860, pp. 16, 17. Governor Gist and his secession coadjutors had evidently still alingering hope that the election might by some unforeseen contingencyresult in the choice of Breckinridge. On no other hypothesis can weaccount for the fact that on the 6th of November, when Northernballots were falling in such an ample shower for Lincoln, the SouthCarolina Legislature, with due decorum and statute regularity, appointed Presidential electors for the State, and formally instructedthem to vote for Breckinridge and Lane. The dawn of November 7dispelled these hopes. The "strong probability" had become a stubbornfact. When the certain news of Lincoln's election finally came, it washailed with joy and acclamation by both the leaders and the people ofSouth Carolina. They had at length their much coveted pretext fordisunion; and they now put into the enterprise a degree ofearnestness, frankness, courage, and persistency worthy of a bettercause. Public opinion, so long prepared, responded with enthusiasm tothe plans and calls of the leaders. Manifestations of disloyaltybecame universal. Political clubs were transformed into militarycompanies. Drill-rooms and armories were alive with nightly meetings. Sermons, agricultural addresses, and speeches at railroad banquetswere only so many secession harangues. The State became filled withvolunteer organizations of "minute men. " The Legislature, remaining in extra session, and cheered and urged onby repeated popular demonstrations and the inflamed speeches of thehighest State officials, proceeded without delay to carry out theGovernor's programme. In fact, the members needed no great incitement. They had been freshly chosen within the preceding month; many of themon the well-understood "resistance" issue. Their election took placeon the 8th and 9th days of October, 1860. Since there was but oneparty in South Carolina, there could be no party drill; but atyrannical and intolerant public sentiment usurped its place andfunctions. On the sixteen different tickets paraded in one of theCharleston newspapers, the names of the most pronounced disunionistswere the most frequent and conspicuous. "Southern rights at allhazards, " was the substance of many mottoes, and the palmetto and therattlesnake were favorite emblems. There was neither mistaking noravoiding the strong undercurrent of treason and rebellion heremanifested, and the Governor's proclamation had doubtless been largelybased upon it. [Sidenote] South Carolina, "House Journal, " Called Session, 1860, pp. 13, 14. The first day's session of the Legislature (November 5) developed oneof the important preparatory steps of the long-expected revolution. The Legislature of 1859 had appropriated a military contingent fund ofone hundred thousand dollars, "to be drawn and accounted for asdirected by the Legislature. " The appropriation had been allowed toremain untouched. It was now proposed to place this sum at the controlof the Governor to be expended in obtaining improved small arms, inpurchasing a field battery of rifled cannon, in providingaccouterments, and in furnishing an additional supply of tents; and aresolution to that effect was passed two days later, The chief measureof the session, however, was a bill to provide for calling theproposed State Convention, which it was well understood would adopt anordinance of secession. There was scarcely a ripple of opposition tothis measure. One or two members still pleaded for delay, to securethe coöperation of Georgia, but dared not record a vote against theprevailing mania. The chairman of the proper committee on November 10reported an act calling a convention "for the purpose of taking intoconsideration the dangers incident to the position of the State in theFederal Union, " which unanimously became a law November 13, and theextra session adjourned to meet again in regular annual session on the26th. Meanwhile public excitement had been kept at fever heat by all mannerof popular demonstrations. The two United States Senators and theprincipal Federal officials resigned their offices with a publicflourish of their insubordinate zeal. An enthusiastic ratificationmeeting was given to the returning members of the Legislature. To givestill further emphasis to the general movement a grand mass meetingwas held at Charleston on the 17th of November. The streets werefilled with the excited multitude. Gaily dressed ladies crowdedbalconies and windows, and zealous mothers decorated their childrenwith revolutionary badges. There was a brisk trade in fire-arms andgunpowder. The leading merchants and prominent men of the city cameforth and seated themselves on platforms to witness and countenance aformal ceremony of insurrection. A white flag, bearing a palmetto treeand the legend _Animis opibusque parati_ (one of the mottoes on theState seal), was, after solemn prayer, displayed from a pole ofCarolina pine. Music, salutes, and huzzahs filled the air. Speecheswere addressed to "citizens of the Southern Republic. " Orations andprocessions completed the day, and illuminations and bonfires occupiedthe night. The preparations were without stint. The proceedings andceremonies were conducted with spirit and abandon. The rejoicings weredeep and earnest. And yet there was a skeleton at the feast; theFederal flag, invisible among the city banners, and absent from thegay bunting and decorations of the harbor shipping, still floated fardown the bay over a faithful commander and loyal garrison in FortMoultrie. CHAPTER XX MAJOR ANDERSON President Buchanan and his Administration could not, if they would, shut their eyes to the treasonable utterances and preparations atCharleston and elsewhere in the South; but so far neither the speechesnor bonfires nor palmetto flags, nor even the secession message ofGovernor Gist or the Convention bill of the South CarolinaLegislature, constituted a statutory offense. For twelve years thethreat of disunion had been in the mouths of the Southern slaveryextremists and their Northern allies the most potent and formidableweapon of national politics. It was declaimed on the stump, elaboratedin Congressional speeches, set out in national platforms, and paradedas a solemn warning in executive messages. Mr. Buchanan had profited by the disunion cry both as politician andfunctionary; and now when disunion came in a practical and undisguisedshape he was to a degree powerless to oppose it, because he wasdisarmed by his own words and his own acts. The disunionists were hispartisans, his friends, and confidential counselors; they constituteda remnant of the once proud and successful party which, by hiscompliance and coöperation in their interest, he had disrupted anddefeated. Their programme hitherto had been the policy upon which hehad staked the success or failure of his Administration, so that inaddition to every other tie he was bound to them by the common sorrowof political disaster. [Illustration: GENERAL ROBERT ANDERSON. ] Being in such intimate relations and intercourse with the leaders ofthe Breckinridge wing of the Democratic party during the progress ofthe Presidential canvass, and that party being made up so exclusivelyof the extreme Southern Democrats, the President must have had constantinformation of the progress and development of the disunion sentimentand purpose in the South. He was not restricted as the other partiesand the general public were to imperfect reports and doubtful rumorscurrent in the newspapers. But in addition there now came to him an official warning which it wasa grave error to disregard. On October 29, one week before the election, the veteran Lieutenant-General Winfield Scott, General-in-Chief ofthe Army, communicated to him in writing his serious apprehensionsof coming danger, and suggested such precautions as were then in thepower of the Administration. Beginning life as a farmer's boy, collegian, and law student, General Scott from choice became asoldier, devoting himself to the higher aims of the profession ofarms, and in a brilliant career of half a century had achievedworld-wide renown as a great military captain. In the United States, however, the military is subordinated to the civic ambition, and Scottall his life retained a strong leaning to diplomacy and statesmanship, and on several important occasions gave his country valuable servicein essentially civic functions. He had been the unsuccessfulPresidential candidate of the Whig party in 1852, a circumstance whichno doubt greatly increased his personal attention to current politics, then and afterwards. As the first military officer of the nation, hewas also the watchful guardian of the public peace. [Sidenote] Lieut. -General Winfield Scott, "Autobiography, " Vol. I. , p. 234. The impending rebellion was not to him, as it was to the nation atlarge, a new event in politics. Many men were indeed aware, throughtradition and history, that it was but the Calhoun nullificationtreason revived and pushed to a bolder extreme. To General Scott itwas almost literally the repetition of an old experience. A generationbefore, he was himself a prominent actor in opposing the nullificationplot. About the 4th of November, 1832, upon special summons, he wastaken into a confidential interview by President Jackson, who, afterasking Scott's military views upon the threatened rebellion of thenullifiers in Charleston harbor, by oral orders charged him with theduty of enforcing the laws and maintaining the supremacy of the Union;the President placing at his orders the troops and vessels necessaryfor this purpose. Scott accepted the trust and went to Charleston, andwhile humoring the nullification Quixotism existing there, he executedthe purpose of his mission, by strengthening the defenses andreenforcing; the Federal forts. [1] His task was accomplished with theutmost delicacy, but with firmness. The rebellion was indeed abandonedupon pretense of compromise; but had a conflict occurred at that timethe flag of the Union would probably not have been the first to belowered in defeat. It was, therefore, most fitting that in these new complicationsLieutenant-General Scott should officially admonish PresidentBuchanan. He addressed to him a paper entitled "Views suggested by theimminent danger (October 29, 1860) of a disruption of the Union by thesecession of one or more of the Southern States"; and also certainsupplementary memoranda the day after, to the Secretary of War, thetwo forming in reality but a single document. General Scott was atthis time residing in New York City, and the missives were probablytwenty-four hours in reaching Washington. This letter of the commanderof the American armies written at such a crisis is full of seriousfaults, and is a curious illustration of the temper of the times, showing as it does that even in the mind of the first soldier of therepublic the foundations of political faith were crumbling away. Thesuperficial and speculative theories of Scott the politician stand outin unfavorable contrast to the practical advice of Scott the soldier. Once break the Union by political madness, reasons Scott the politician, and any attempt to restore it by military force would establishdespotism and create anarchy. A lesser evil than this would be to formfour new confederacies out of the fragments of the old. [2] And on thistheme he theorizes respecting affinities and boundaries and the follyof secession. [Sidenote] "Mr. Buchanan's Administration, " Appendix, p. 289. The advice of Scott the soldier was wiser and more opportune. Theprospect of Lincoln's election, he says, causes threats of secession. There is danger that certain forts of national value and importance, six totally destitute of troops, and three having only feeble andinsufficient garrisons, may be seized by insurgents. "In my opinionall these works should be immediately so garrisoned as to make anyattempt to take any one of them, by surprise or _coup de main_, ridiculous. " There were five companies of regulars within reach, available for this service. This plan was provisional only; iteschewed the idea of invading a seceded State; and he suggested thecollection of customs duties, outside of the cities. [Sidenote] "Mr. Buchanan's Administration, " p. 104. [Sidenote] Buchanan, in the "National Intelligencer, " Oct. 1, 1862. Eight to ten States on the verge of insurrection--nine principalsea-coast forts within their borders, absolutely at the mercy of thefirst handful of street rabble that might collect, and only about fourhundred men, scattered in five different and distant cities, availableto reënforce them! It was a startling exhibit of national danger fromone professionally competent to judge and officially entitled toadvise. His timely and patriotic counsel President Buchanan treatedwith indifference and neglect. "From the impracticable nature of the'Views, ' and their strange and inconsistent character, the Presidentdismissed them from his mind without further consideration. " Such isMr. Buchanan's own confession. He indulges in the excuse that to havethen attempted to put these five companies in all or part of thesenine forts "would have been a confession of weakness instead of anexhibition of imposing and overpowering strength. " "None of the CottonStates had made the first movement towards secession. Even SouthCarolina was then performing all her relative duties, though mostreluctantly, to the Government, " etc. "To have attempted such amilitary operation with so feeble a force, and the Presidentialelection impending, would have been an invitation to collision andsecession. Indeed, if the whole American army, consisting then of onlysixteen thousand men, had been 'within reach' they would have beenscarcely sufficient for this purpose. " The error of this reasoning was well shown by General Scott in anewspaper controversy which subsequently ensued. [3] He pointed outthat of the nine forts enumerated by him, six, namely, Forts Moultrieand Sumter in Charleston harbor, Forts Pickens and McRae in Pensacolaharbor, and Forts Jackson and St. Philip guarding the Mississippibelow New Orleans, were "twin forts" on opposite sides of a channel, whose strength was more than doubled by their very position and theirability to employ cross and flanking fire in mutual support anddefense. These works, together with the three others mentioned byGeneral Scott, namely, Fort Morgan in Mobile harbor, Fort Pulaskibelow Savannah, and Fortress Monroe at Hampton Roads, were all, because of their situation at vital points, not merely works of localdefense, but of the highest strategical value. The reënforcementsadvised would surely have enabled the Government to hold them untilfurther defensive measures could have been arranged; and the effect ofsuch possession on the incipient insurrection may be well imaginedwhen we remember the formidable armaments afterwards employed in thereduction of such of them as were permitted, without an effort on thepart of President Buchanan to prevent it, to be occupied by theinsurgents. But the warning to the Administration that the Southern forts were indanger came not alone from General Scott. Two of the works mentionedby him as of prime importance were Forts Moultrie and Sumter inCharleston harbor. There was still a third fort there, CastlePinckney, in a better condition of repair and preparation than eitherof the former, and much nearer the city. Had it been properly occupiedand manned, its guns alone would have been sufficient to controlCharleston. But there was only an ordnance sergeant in CastlePinckney, only an ordnance sergeant in Fort Sumter, and a partialgarrison in Fort Moultrie. Both Sumter and Moultrie were greatly andCastle Pinckney slightly out of repair. During the summer of 1860Congress made an appropriation for these works; and the engineercaptain who had been in charge for two years had indeed been orderedto begin and prosecute repairs in the two forts. [Sidenote] Report, F. J. Porter. W. R. [4] Vol. I. , pp. 70-72. [Sidenote] Craig to Floyd, Oct. 31, 1860, with Floyd's indorsement. W. R. Vol. I. , pp. 67-8. Captain J. G. Foster, the engineer to whom this duty was confided, wasof New England birth and a loyal and devoted soldier. He began work onthe 12th of September; and not foreseeing the consequences involved, employed in the different works between two and three hundred men, partly hired in Charleston, partly in Baltimore. There were in theseveral forts not only the cannon to arm them, but also considerablequantities of ammunition and other government property; and aware ofthe hum of secession preparation which began to fill the air inCharleston, Captain Foster in October asked the Ordnance Bureau atWashington for forty muskets, with which to arm twenty workmen in FortSumter and twenty in Castle Pinckney. "If, " wrote the Chief ofOrdnance to the Secretary of War, "the measure should on beingcommunicated meet the concurrence of the commanding officer of thetroops in the harbor, I recommend that I may be authorized to issueforty muskets to the engineer officer. " Upon this recommendation, Secretary of War Floyd wrote the word "approved. " Under the usualroutine of peaceful times the questions went by mail to ColonelGardner, then commander of the harbor, "Is it expedient to issue fortymuskets to Captain Foster? Is it proper to place arms in the hands ofhired workmen? Is it expedient to do so?" [Sidenote] Gardner to Craig, November 5, 1860. W. R. Vol. I. , pp. 68-9. To this Colonel Gardner replied, under date of November 5, that, repeating what he had already written, his fears were not of anyattack on the works, authorized by the city or State, but there wasdanger of such an attempt from a sudden tumultuary force; and thatwhile in such an event forty muskets would be desirable, he felt"constrained to say that the only proper precaution--that which has noobjection--is to fill these two companies with drilled recruits (sayfifty men) at once, and send two companies from Old Point Comfort tooccupy, respectively, Fort Sumter and Castle Pinckney. " [Sidenote] Dawson, "Historical Magazine, " January, 1872, p. 37. [Sidenote] F. J. Porter to Cooper, November 11, 1860. W. R. Vol. I. , pp. 70-72. His answer and recommendation were both business-like and soldierly, and contained no indications that justify any suspicion of his loyaltyor judgment. Meanwhile, on the heels of this official call forreënforcements, came a still more urgent one. It is alleged on the onehand that complaints of the inefficiency of Colonel Gardner hadreached Washington, and that, in consequence thereof, either theSecretary of War or the President sent for specific information inregard to it. Major Fitz John Porter, then Assistant Adjutant-General, on duty in the War Department, went in person to Charleston, and madethe examination. There are, on the other hand, several vagueallegations by the insurgents, to the substantial effect that thiscall for reënforcements was Colonel Gardner's real offense; leavingthe implication that Major Fitz John Porter's inspection was purposelyinstituted to find reasons for removing the Colonel and thusfrustrating the obligation to send him additional troops. The orderfor Major Porter's visit was made on November 6; he returned toWashington and made an oral statement, and on the 11th of Novemberwrote out his report for the Department in due form. [Sidenote] Doubleday, "Forts Sumter and Moultrie, " p. 19. According to this report, while Colonel Gardner had been remiss in afew minor details, he had in reality been vigilant, loyal, andefficient in main and important matters. He had foreseen the comingdanger, had advised the Government, and called for reënforcements; hadrecommended not only strengthening the garrison of Moultrie, but theeffective occupation of both Sumter and Castle Pinckney; and had madean effort in good faith to remove the public arms and goods from theirexposed situation in the arsenal in the city of Charleston, to thesecurity of the fort. Though Southern in feeling and pro-slavery insentiment, he was true to his oath and his flag; and had he beenproperly encouraged and supported by his Government, would evidentlyhave merited no reproach for inefficiency or indifference. [Sidenote] 1860. But the fatal entanglement of Buchanan's Administration with theslavery extremists had the double effect of weakening loyalty in armyofficers and building up rebellion among the Southern people. Insteadof heeding the advice of Colonel Gardner to reënforce the forts, itremoved him from command, and within two months the Presidentsubmitted silently to the taunt of the South Carolina rebelcommissioners that it was in punishment for his loyal effort to savethe Government property. Whatever the motive may have been, theGovernment was now fully warned, as early as November 11, a weekbefore the first secession jubilee in Charleston, and more than amonth before the passage of the secession ordinance, of the imminenceof the insurrection and danger to the forts. General Scott had warnedit, Colonel Gardner had warned it, and now again Major Porter, itsspecial and confidential agent, had not only repeated that warning, but his report had been made the basis of Government discussion in thechange of commanders. The action of the Government was unusually prompt. On November 11, aswe have seen, Major Porter made his written report, and on the 13th hedelivered to Major Robert Anderson in New York the order to takecommand of the forts and forces in Charleston harbor. Major Anderson, suitably qualified by meritorious service, age, and rank, was deemedespecially acceptable for the position because he was a Kentuckian bybirth, and related by marriage to a prominent family of Georgia. Suchsympathies as might influence him were supposed to be with the South, and his appointment would not, therefore, grate harshly on thesusceptibilities of the Charlestonians. The statement, many times repeated, that he owned a plantation in theSouth is incorrect. He never owned a plantation in Georgia or anywhereelse. On the death of his father he came into possession of a smallnumber of slaves. These he liberated as soon as the proper paperscould be executed and sent to him at his distant post; and he alwaysafterwards helped them when they were in need and applied to him. [5] [Sidenote] F. J. Porter to Dawson. "Historical Magazine, " January, 1872, pp. 37, 38. The army headquarters being then in New York, Major Anderson on thesame day called on General Scott, and in conversation with the veteranGeneral-in-Chief learned that army affairs were being carried on atWashington by Secretary Floyd, without consulting him. Under thesecircumstances Scott did not deem himself authorized to interfere evenby suggestion. Nevertheless, the whole Charleston question seems tohave been fully discussed, and the relative strength of the forts, andthe possible necessity of occupying Sumter commented upon in suchmanner as no doubt produced its effect in the subsequent action ofAnderson. Major Anderson next went to Washington, and received thepersonal instructions of Secretary Floyd, and returning thereafter toNew York, General Scott in that city gave him on November 15th formalwritten orders to proceed to Fort Moultrie and take command of thepost. ----------[1] His policy, frankly written in a friendly letter to a prominentnullifier, could scarcely provoke the most captious criticism: "You have probably heard of the arrival of two or three companies atCharleston in the last six weeks, and you may hear that as many morehave followed. There is nothing inconsistent with the President'smessage in these movements. The intention simply is that the forts inthe harbor shall not be wrested from the United States. .. . ThePresident, I presume, will stand on the defensive, thinking it betterto discourage than to invite an attack--better to prevent than torepel one. "--Lieut. -Gen. Winfield Scott, "Autobiography. " Vol. I. , p. 242. [2] "All the lines of demarkation between the new Unions cannot beaccurately drawn in advance, but many of them approximately may. Thus, looking to natural boundaries and commercial affinities, some of thefollowing frontiers, after many waverings and conflicts, might perhapsbecome acknowledged and fixed: "1. The Potomac River and the Chesapeake Bay to the Atlantic. 2. FromMaryland along the crest of the Alleghany (perhaps the Blue Ridge)range of mountains, to some point on the coast of Florida. 3. The linefrom say the head of the Potomac to the west or north-west, which itwill be most difficult to settle. 4. The crest of the Rocky Mountains. "The South-east Confederacy would, in all human probability, in lessthan five years after the rupture, find itself bounded by the firstand second lines indicated above, the Atlantic, and the Gulf ofMexico, with its capital at say Columbia, South Carolina. The countrybetween the second, third, and fourth of those lines would, beyond adoubt, in about the same time, constitute another Confederacy, withits capital at probably Alton or Quincy, Illinois. The boundaries ofthe Pacific Union are the most definite of all, and the remainingStates would constitute the Northeast Confederacy with its capital atAlbany. "--Scott, "Views, " printed in "Mr. Buchanan's Administration, "pp. 287-288, Appendix. [3] "But the ex-President sneers at my weak device for saving theforts. He forgets what the gallant Anderson did with a handful of menin Fort Sumter, and leaves out of the account what he might have donewith a like handful in Fort Moultrie, even without further augmentationof men to divide between the garrisons. Twin forts on the oppositesides of a channel not only give a cross fire on the head of attack, but the strength of each is more than doubled by the flanking fire ofthe other. "--Gen. Scott, in the "National Intelligencer" of November12, 1862. [4] (As reference to the Government publication, "War of the Rebellion:Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, " will be sofrequent in the course of this work, and under its full title wouldrequire so much space, the authors have decided to adopt the simpleabbreviation "W. R. , " as above. Where the number of the series is notmentioned, Series I. Will always be implied. ) [5] We are indebted to Mrs. Anderson, not only for the correction ofthis error, but for permission to examine many private papers relatingto Major Anderson's experience in Fort Sumter. It affords us thehighest pleasure to add that though all her relatives in Georgiabecame secessionists, she remained enthusiastically and devotedlyloyal to the Union, and that her letters carried constant cheer andencouragement to her husband during the months he was besieged inCharleston harbor. CHAPTER XXI THE CHARLESTON FORTS [Sidenote] Foster to De Russey, November 24, 1860. W. R. Vol. I. , p. 76. Major Anderson reached Fort Moultrie and assumed command on the 21stof November, 1860. Having from his several interviews with thePresident, Secretary of War, and Lieutenant-General Scott become fullyimpressed with the importance of his trust, he proceeded as a firstduty to acquaint himself thoroughly with his situation and resources. The great Charleston secession celebration on the 17th had been heldwhile he was on his way; the glare of its illumination wasextinguished, the smoke of its bonfires had been dissipated by thefresh Atlantic breezes, and its holiday insurgents had returned tothe humdrum of their routine employments. It was, therefore, inuninterrupted quiet that on the 23d of November he in company withCaptain Foster made a tour of inspection to the different forts, andon the same day wrote out and transmitted to the War Department asomewhat detailed report of what he saw with eyes fresh to the scenesand surroundings, which, as he already felt, were to become thesubjects of his most intense solicitude. On the main point, indeed, there was no room for doubt. Agreeing with General Scott, with ColonelGardner, and with Major Porter, he gave the Government its fourthwarning that the harbor must be immediately and strongly reenforced. [Sidenote] Anderson to Adjutant-General, November 23, 1860. W. R. Vol. I. , p. 74. . .. The garrison now in it [Moultrie] is so weak as to invite an attack, which is openly and publicly threatened. We are about sixty, and have a line of rampart of 1500 feet in length to defend. If beleaguered, as every man of the command must be either engaged or held on the alert, they will be exhausted and worn down in a few days and nights of such service as they would then have to undergo. Such, in brief, was the condition of the fort he had been sent tohold. Moultrie was clearly the weak point of the situation. Alreadyinformed, to some extent at least, by the superior military genius ofGeneral Scott, in his recent interviews with that distinguishedcommander, Major Anderson now more forcibly, from personal inspection, comprehended its strong points. What was then perfectly obvious to thetrained military insight of Scott and Anderson is now in the light ofhistorical events quite as obvious to the civilian. Look at any goodmap of Charleston harbor, and it will be seen that the city lies onthe extreme point of a tongue of land between the Ashley and Cooperrivers, every part being within easy range under the guns of CastlePinckney, on a small island, three-quarters of a mile distant. Fourmiles to seaward is the mouth of the harbor, and nearly midway thereinstood the more extensive and imposing work of Fort Sumter, its gunsnot only sweeping all the approaches and ship-channels, but the shoresand islands on either hand. It needs but a glance at the map to seethat with proper garrisons and armaments Fort Sumter commanded theharbor. And Castle Pinckney commanded the city. If the Government could hitherto plead ignorance of these advantagesagainst the rising insurrection, that excuse was no longer left afterthe report of Major Anderson. In this same report he calls attentionto them in detail. Though not in a complete state of defense, he givesnotice that Fort Sumter "is now ready for the comfortableaccommodation of one company, and indeed for the temporary receptionof its proper garrison. Captain Foster states that the magazines(four) are done and in excellent condition; that they now containforty thousand pounds of cannon-powder and a full supply of ammunitionfor one tier of guns. This work [Sumter] is the key to the entrance ofthis harbor; its guns command this work [Moultrie], and could soondrive out its occupants. It should be garrisoned at once. " Still more strenuously does he insist upon the value of CastlePinckney. "Castle Pinckney, a small casemated work, perfectlycommanding the city of Charleston, is in excellent condition with theexception of a few repairs, which will require the expenditure ofabout five hundred dollars. .. . It is, in my opinion, essentiallyimportant that this castle should be immediately occupied by agarrison, say, of two officers and thirty men. The safety of ourlittle garrison would be rendered more certain, and our fort would bemore secure from an attack by such a holding of Castle Pinckney, thanit would be from quadrupling our force. The Charlestonians would notventure to attack this place [Moultrie] when they knew that their citywas at the mercy of the commander of Castle Pinckney. .. . If my forcewas not so very small I would not hesitate to send a detachment atonce to garrison that work. " So full of zeal was Major Anderson thatthe Government should without delay augment its moral and materialstrength, that in default of soldiers he desired to improvise agarrison for it by sending there a detachment of thirty laborers incharge of an officer, vainly hoping to supply them with arms andinstruct them in drill, and hold the work until reënforcements shouldcome. Having in detail proposed protective measures, he again, in thesame letter, forcibly presents the main question of the hour to theSecretary of War, whose weakness and treachery were as yetunsuspected. [Sidenote] Anderson to Adjutant General, Nov. 23, 1860. W. R. Vol. I. , pp. 75-6. Fort Sumter and Castle Pinckney must be garrisoned immediately if the Government determines to keep command of this harbor. I need not say how anxious I am--indeed determined, so far as honor will permit--to avoid collision with the citizens of South Carolina. Nothing, however, will be better calculated to prevent bloodshed than our being found in such an attitude that it would be madness and folly to attack us. .. . The clouds are threatening and the storm may break upon us at any moment. I do, then, most earnestly entreat that a reënforcement be immediately sent to this garrison, and that at least two companies be sent at the same time to Fort Sumter and Castle Pinckney--half a company, under a judicious commander, sufficing, I think, for the latter work. .. . With these three works garrisoned as requested, and with a supply of ordnance stores, for which I shall send requisitions in a few days, I shall feel that, by the blessing of God, there may be a hope that no blood will be shed, and that South Carolina will not attempt to take these forts by force, but will resort to diplomacy to secure them. If we neglect, however, to strengthen ourselves, she will, unless these works are surrendered on their first demand, most assuredly immediately attack us. [Sidenote] Adjutant-General to Anderson, Nov. 24, 1860. W. R. Vol. I. , p. 76. [Sidenote] Ibid. , Nov 28, 1860, W. R. Vol. I. , p. 77. If Major Anderson had added no further word to the clear andstraightforward statement and recommendation thus far quoted, hisprofessional judgment and manly sense of duty would stand honorablyvindicated before posterity. But his language of loyalty, of wisdom, of humanity, of soldierly devotion, which ought to have elicited areply as inspiring as a drum-roll or a trumpet-blast, brought him nokindred echo. There was fear in the Executive Mansion, conspiracy inthe Cabinet, treason and intrigue in the War Department. Chillinginstructions came that he might employ civilians in fatigue and policeduty, and that he might send his proposed party of laborers to CastlePinckney. Meanwhile some of his suggestions would be underconsideration; besides, he was cautioned to send his communications tothe Adjutant-General or Secretary of War, with the evident purpose toforestall and prevent any patriotic order or suggestion which mightotherwise reach him from General Scott. Nevertheless, Anderson did not weary in his manifest duty. His lettersof November 28 and December 1, though perhaps not as full and urgent, are substantial repetitions of his former recommendations. The growingexcitement of the Charleston populace and the increasing danger to theforts are restated with emphasis. He says that there appears to be aromantic desire urging the South Carolinians to have possession ofFort Moultrie. Various reports come, that as soon as the State shouldsecede the forts would be demanded, and if not surrendered, they wouldbe taken. All rumors and remarks indicate a fixed purpose to havethese works. The Charlestonians are drilling nightly, and making everypreparation for the fight which they say must take place. [Sidenote] Anderson to Adjutant-General, Nov. 28, 1860. W. R. Vol. I. , pp. 78-9. [Sidenote] Ibid. , Dec. 1, 1860. W. R. Vol. I. Pp. 81-2. Once more he repeated that the security of Fort Moultrie would be moregreatly increased by throwing garrisons into Castle Pinckney and FortSumter than by anything that could be done in strengthening its owndefenses. He sent a detailed report of his command to force again uponthe attention of the Department his fatal deficiency in numbers, andto show the practical impossibility of repelling an assault, orresisting a siege with any reasonable hope of success. His lettersreached the same inevitable conclusion: "The question for theGovernment to decide--and the sooner it is done the better--is, whether, when South Carolina secedes, these forts are to besurrendered or not. If the former, I must be informed of it, andinstructed what course I am to pursue. If the latter be thedetermination, no time is to be lost in either sending troops, asalready suggested, or vessels of war to this harbor. Either of thesecourses may cause some of the doubting States to join South Carolina. I shall go steadily on preparing for the worst, trusting hopefully inthe God of battles to guard and guide me in my course. " While Anderson was thus penning the plain issue, as it lay in theclear light of a soldier's conception of right and conviction of duty, another pen was framing the reply agreed upon by the President andhis advisers at Washington. Major Anderson might have faith in theGod of battles, but what faith could he have in a Government holdingone-third of a vast continent peopled by thirty millions of freemenwhich could not or would not, in face of the most urgent reiteratedappeals and the most imminent and palpable necessity, send him two orthree companies of recruits, when the possession of three forts, thepeace of a city, the allegiance of a State, if not the tremendousalternative of civil war, hung in the balance? [Sidenote] Adjutant-General to Anderson, Dec. 1, 1860. W. R. Vol. I. , pp. 82, 83. "It is believed, "--so ran the reply, and apparently the final decisionof the Government, --"from information thought to be reliable, that anattack will not be made on your command, and the Secretary has only torefer to his conversation with you, and to caution you that should hisconvictions unhappily prove untrue, your actions must be such as to befree from the charge of initiating a collision. If attacked, you are, of course, expected to defend the trust committed to you to the bestof your ability. The increase of the force under your command, howevermuch to be desired, would, the Secretary thinks, judging from therecent excitement produced on account of an anticipated increase, asmentioned in your letter, but add to that excitement and might lead toserious results. " This renunciation by the War Department of the proper show of authorityand power, demanded by plain necessity and repeatedly urged by itstrusted agents, must have touched the pride of Anderson and his brotherofficers. But a still deeper humiliation was in store for them, Thesame letter brought him the following notice: "The Secretary of War hasdirected Brevet Colonel Huger to repair to this city as soon as he cansafely leave his post, to return there in a short time. He desires youto see Colonel Huger, and confer with him prior to his departure on thematters which have been confided to each of you. " [Sidenote] Abner Doubleday, "Reminiscences of Forts Sumter and Moultrie, " p. 42. Colonel Huger was an ordnance officer of the army, then stationed forduty in Charleston, of distinguished connections in that city, andhaving on that account as well as personally great local influence. What the precise nature of the instructions were, which the Departmentsent him, does not appear from any accessible correspondence. Theresult of the action which the two officers took thereunder is, however, less doubtful. It appears to have been, in effect, a mission by two army officers ofhonorable rank, in obedience to direct commands from the Secretary ofWar, to humbly beg the Charlestonians not to assault the forts. MajorAnderson on his part dismisses the distasteful mission with asignificantly curt report: "I have the honor to acknowledge thereceipt on the 4th of your communication of the 1st instant. Incompliance therewith I went yesterday to the city of Charleston toconfer with Colonel Huger, and I called with him upon the Mayor of thecity, and upon several other prominent citizens. All seemeddetermined, as far as their influence or power extends, to prevent anattack by a mob on our fort; but all are equally decided in theopinion that the forts must be theirs after secession. " What a bitter confession for a brave and sensitive soldier, who knewthat with half a company of artillerymen in Castle Pinckney, as he hadvainly demanded, the Charleston mob, with the conspiring Governor andinsurgent secession convention, would have been compelled to acceptfrom him, as the representative of a forbearing Government, the safetyof their roof-trees and the security of their hearthstones. [Sidenote] Anderson to Adjutant-General, Dec. 6, 1860. W. R. Vol. I. , pp. 87, 88. But, his duty was to obey, and so he resigned himself without amurmur to the hard conditions which had fallen to his lot. "I shall, nevertheless, " adds Anderson, "knowing how excitable this communityis, continue to keep on the _qui vive_ and, as far as is in my power, steadily prepare my command to the uttermost to resist any attack thatmay be made. .. . Colonel Huger designs, I think, leaving Charleston forWashington to-morrow night. He is more hopeful of a settlement ofimpending difficulties without bloodshed than I am. " CHAPTER XXII THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE Less than a month intervened between the November election at whichLincoln had been chosen and the annual session of Congress, which wouldmeet on the first Monday of December, and it was necessary at once tobegin the preparation of the annual message. A golden opportunitypresented itself to President Buchanan. The suffrages of hisfellow-citizens had covered his political theories, his party measures, and his official administration with condemnation, in an avalanche ofballots. [1] But the Charleston conspirators had within a very few dayscreated for him a new issue overshadowing all the questions on whichhe had suffered political wreck. Since the 6th of November the campaignof the Border Ruffians for the conquest of Kansas, and the widerCongressional struggle for the possession of the Territories, might betreated as things of the past. Even had they still been pending issues, they paled into insignificance before the paramount question ofdisunion. Face to face with, this danger, the adherents of Lincoln, ofDouglas, of Bell, and the fraction of the President's own partisans inthe free-States would be compelled to postpone their discords and asone man follow the constitutional ruler in a constitutional defense ofthe laws, the flag, and the territory of the Union. Without change of position, without recantation of principle, withoutabatement even of declared party doctrine, honestly executing only thehigh mandate of the Constitution, he could turn from the old issues andtake up the new. A single stride, and from the flying leader of adiscomfited rout he might become the mailed hero of an overpoweringhost. Tradition, patriotism, duty, the sleepless monition of a solemnofficial oath, all summoned him to take this step, and the brilliantexample set by President Jackson--an incident forever luminous inAmerican history--assured him of the plaudits of posterity. Unfortunately for himself and for his country, President Buchanan hadneither the intellectual independence nor the courage required for suchan act of moral heroism. Of sincere patriotism and of blamelesspersonal rectitude, he had reached political eminence by slow promotionthrough seniority, not by brilliancy of achievement. He was apolitician, not a statesman. Of fair ability, and great industry in hisearlier life, the irresolution and passiveness of advancing age andphysical infirmity were now upon him. Though from the free-State ofPennsylvania, he saw with Southern eyes and heard with Southern ears, and had convinced himself that the South was acting under the impulseof resentment arising from deliberate and persistent injuries from theNorth. The fragment of an autograph diary of John B. Floyd, Secretary ofWar, [2] affords the exact evidence of the temper in which PresidentBuchanan officially confronted the rebellion of the Southern States. The following are extracts from entries, on several days, beginningwith November 7, 1860, the day following the Presidential election: WASHINGTON CITY, November 7, 1860. . .. The President wrote me a note this evening, alluding to a rumor which reached the city to the effect that an armed force had attacked and carried the forts in Charleston harbor. He desired me to visit him, which I did, and assured him that the rumor was altogether without foundation, and gave it as my opinion that there was no danger of such an attempt being made. We entered upon a general conversation upon the subject of disunion and discussed the probabilities of it pretty fully. We concurred in the opinion that all indications from the South looked as if disunion was inevitable. He said that whilst his reason told him there was great danger, yet his feelings repelled the conviction of his mind. Judge Black, the Attorney-General, was present during a part of the conversation, and indicated an opinion, that any attempt at disunion by a State should be put down by all the power of the Government. [3] November 9 . .. A Cabinet meeting was held as usual at I o'clock; all the members were present, and the President said the business of the meeting was the most important ever before the Cabinet since his induction into office. The question, he said, to be considered and discussed, was as to the course the Administration should advise him to pursue in relation to the threatening aspect of affairs in the South, and most particularly in South Carolina. After a considerable amount of desultory conversation, he asked the opinions of each member of the Cabinet as to what should be done or said relative to a suggestion which he threw out. His suggestion was that a proposition should be made for a general convention of the States as provided for under the Constitution, and to propose some plan of compromising the angry disputes between the North and the South. He said if this were done, and the North or non-slaveholding States should refuse it, the South would stand justified before the whole world for refusing longer to remain in a confederacy where her rights were so shamefully violated. He said he was compelled to notice at length the alarming condition of the country, and that he would not shrink from the duty. General Cass spoke with earnestness and much feeling about the impending crisis--admitted fully all the great wrongs and outrages which had been committed against the South by Northern fanaticism, and deplored it. But he was emphatic in his condemnation of the doctrine of secession by any State from the Union. He doubted the efficacy of the appeal for a convention, but seemed to think it might do well enough to try it. He spoke warmly in favor of using force to coerce a State that attempted to secede. Judge Black, the Attorney-General, was emphatic in his advocacy of coercion, and advocated earnestly the propriety of sending at once a strong force into the forts in Charleston harbor, enough to deter, if possible, the people from, any attempt at disunion. He seemed to favor the idea of an appeal for a general convention of all the States. Governor Cobb, the Secretary of the Treasury, declared his very decided approbation of the proposition for two reasons--first, that it afforded the President a great opportunity for a high and statesmanlike treatment of the whole subject of agitation, and the proper remedies to prevent it; secondly, because, in his judgment, the failure to procure that redress which the South would be entitled to and would demand (and that failure he thought certain), would tend to unite the entire South in a decided disunion movement. He thought disunion inevitable, and under present circumstances most desirable. Mr. Holt, the Postmaster-General, thought the proposition for the convention dangerous, for the reason that if the call should be made and it should fail to procure redress, those States which now are opposed to secession might find themselves inclined, from a feeling of honor, to back the States resolving on disunion. Without this common demand and common failure he thought there would be no such danger of united action, and therefore a stronger prospect of some future plan of reconciliation. Mr. Thompson, the Secretary of the Interior, thought well of the plan of calling for a general convention--thought his State (Mississippi) about equally divided between the union and disunion men. He deprecated the idea of force, and said any show of it by the Government would instantly make Mississippi a unit in favor of disunion. Mr. Toucey, Secretary of the Navy, thought well of the appeal for the convention--coincided in an opinion I had expressed, that retaliatory State measures would prove most availing for bringing the Northern fanatics to their senses. I expressed myself decidedly opposed to any rash movement, and against the idea of secession at this time. I did so because I think that Lincoln's administration will fail, and be regarded as impotent for good or evil within four months after his inauguration. We are to meet to-morrow at 1 o'clock. [Sidenote] Pollard, "Life and Times of Robert E. Lee, " etc. , pp. 790-94. November 10 . .. We had a Cabinet meeting to-day, at which the President read a very elaborate document, prepared either as a part of his message or as a proclamation. It was well written in the main, and met with extravagant commendation from General Cass, Governor Toucey, Judge Black, and Mr. Holt. Cobb, Thompson, and myself found much to differ from in it, --Cobb because it inculcated submission to Lincoln's election and intimated the use of force to coerce a submission to his rule, and because it reprehended the policy of the Kansas-Nebraska bill; Thompson because of the doctrine of acquiescence and the hostility to the secession doctrine. I objected to it because I think it misses entirely the temper of the Southern people and attacks the true State-Rights doctrine on the subject of secession. I do not see what good can come of the paper, as prepared, and I do see how much mischief may flow from it. It is an open question whether we may accept these extracts at theirfull literal import. Either the words "coerce, " "submission, " "use offorce, " and so on, are written down by the diarist in a sensedifferent from that in which they were spoken, or the President andseveral of his counselors underwent an amazing change of sentiment. But in a general way they show us that on the fourth day afterLincoln's election the Buchanan Cabinet was already divided intohostile camps. Cass of Michigan, Secretary of State, Toucey ofConnecticut, Secretary of the Navy, Black of Pennsylvania, Attorney-General, and Holt of Kentucky, Postmaster-General, wereemphatic Unionists; while Cobb of Georgia, Secretary of the Treasury, Thompson of Mississippi, Secretary of the Interior, and Floyd ofVirginia, Secretary of War, were secessionists--the latter yetprofessing devotion to the Union, but with such ifs and buts as leftsufficiently clear evidence of his inevitable drift to disloyalty. All impulses of prudence and patriotism ought to have moved thePresident to reconstruct his Cabinet. But instead of some energeticexecutive act of this character, he seems to have applied himself tothe composition of a political essay to teach the North its duty; asif his single pen had power to change the will of the people of theUnited States upon a point which they had decided by their votes onlyfour days previously after six years of discussion. In the draft ofthis document, which he read to his Cabinet on November 10, we havethe important record that "it inculcated submission to Lincoln'selection, and intimated the use of force to coerce a submission to hisrule"--positions which Floyd records were "met with extravagantcommendations from General Cass, Governor Toucey, Judge Black, and Mr. Holt. " This was a true touchstone; it instantly brought out not onlythe open secessionism of Cobb and Thompson, but the disguiseddisloyalty of Floyd. It is a strange historical phenomenon that, with the President and amajority of the Cabinet in this frame of mind, the South should havebeen permitted to organize rebellion. The solution seems to lie in thetemporizing feebleness of Buchanan and in the superior finesse anddaring conspiracy of Cobb, Thompson, and Floyd. Many indications make it evident that a long factional struggle tookplace over the preparation of the President's message. The telegraphannounced several protracted Cabinet sessions; and as early as the21st of November the points under discussion and the attitude of thePresident and his several official advisers were accuratelyforeshadowed in the newspapers. Nor were these momentous deliberationsconfined to the Cabinet proper. All the varieties of suggestion andcontradictory counsels which were solicited or tendered we may neverlearn, and yet we know enough to infer the highest extremes andantagonisms of doctrine and policy. Jefferson Davis, the future chiefof the rebellion, came on the one hand at the urgent call of hisfellow-conspirators; Edwin M. Stanton, afterwards Buchanan'sAttorney-General and Lincoln's Secretary of War, [4] was on the otherhand called in by Mr. Buchanan himself, to help him through, theintricate maze of his perplexed opinions and inclinations. How manyothers may have come voluntarily or by summons it is impossible toguess. Many brains and hands, however, must have joined in the work, since the document is such a heterogeneous medley of conflictingtheories, irreconcilable doctrines, impracticable and irrelevantsuggestions. For at length the hesitating and bewildered President, unable to decide and impotent to construct, seems to have made hismessage a patchwork from the contributions of his advisers, regularand irregular, with the inevitable effect, not to combine andstrengthen, but to weaken and confuse the warring thoughts and aliensystems. Aside from the mere recapitulation of department reports, the messageof President Buchanan delivered to Congress on the 4th of Decemberoccupied itself mainly with two subjects--slavery and disunion. On thequestion of slavery it repeated the assertions and arguments of theBuchanan faction of the Democratic party during the late Presidentialcampaign, charging the present peril entirely upon the North. As aremedy it recommended an amendment to the Federal Constitutionexpressly[5] recognizing slavery in States which had adopted or mightadopt it, and also expressly giving it existence and protection in theFederal Territories. The proposal was simply childish. Precisely thisissue had been decided at the Presidential election; to do this wouldbe to reverse the final verdict of the ballot-box. [6] On the question of disunion or secession, the message raised a vagueand unwarrantable distinction between the infractions of law andallegiance by individuals, and the infractions of law and allegianceby the commonwealth, or body politic denominated a State. Under thefirst head it held: That the Union was designed to be perpetual; thatthe Federal Government is invested with sovereign powers on specialsubjects, which can only be opposed or abrogated by revolution; thatsecession is unconstitutional, and is, therefore, neither more norless than revolution; that the Executive has no right to recognize thesecession of a State; that the Constitution has established a perfectgovernment in all its forms, legislative, executive, and judicial, andthis government, to the extent of its powers, acts directly upon theindividual citizen of every State and executes its own decrees by theagency of its own officers; and, finally, that the Executive cannot beabsolved from his duty to execute the laws. But, continued the President, the laws can only be executed in certainprescribed methods, through the agency of courts, marshals, _possecomitatus_, aided, if necessary, by the militia or land and navalforces. The means and agencies, therefore, fail, and the performanceof this duty becomes impraticable, when, as in South Carolina, universal public sentiment has deprived him of courts, marshals, and_posse_. Present laws being inadequate to overcome a unitedopposition, even in a single State, Congress alone has the power todecide whether they can be effectually amended. [7] It will be seen from the above summary, that the whole of thePresident's rambling discussion of the first head of the disunionquestion resulted logically in three ultimate conclusions: (1) ThatSouth Carolina was in revolt; (2) that the Constitution, the laws, andmoral obligation all united gave the Government the right to suppressthis revolt by executing the laws upon and against the citizens ofthat State; (3) that certain defects in the laws paralyzed theirpractical enforcement. Up to this point in his argument, his opinions, whatever may bethought of their soundness, were confined to the legitimate field ofexecutive interpretation, and such as in the exercise of his officialdiscretion he might with undoubted propriety communicate to Congress. But he had apparently failed to satisfy his own conscience in thussummarily reasoning the executive and governmental power of a young, compact, vigorous, and thoroughly organized nation of thirty millionsof people into sheer nothingness and impotence. How supremely absurdwas the whole national panoply of commerce, credit, coinage, treatypower, judiciary, taxation, militia, army and navy, and Federal fag, if, through the mere joint of a defective law, the hollow reed of asecession ordinance could inflict a fatal wound! [Illustration: JAMES BUCHANAN. ] [Sidenote] Appendix, "Globe, " Dec. 3, 1860, p. 3. The President proceeds, therefore, to discuss the second head of thedisunion question, by an attempt to formulate and define the powersand duties of Congress with reference to the threatened rebellion. Hewould not only roll the burden from his own shoulders upon theNational Legislature, but he would by volunteer advice instruct thatbody how it must be borne and disposed of. Addressing Congress, hesays in substance: "You may be called upon to decide the momentousquestion, whether you possess the power by force of arms to compel aState to remain in the Union. .. . The question, fairly stated, is: Hasthe Constitution delegated to Congress the power to coerce a Stateinto submission which is attempting to withdraw, or has actuallywithdrawn, from the Confederacy! If answered in the affirmative, itmust be on the principle that the power has been conferred uponCongress to declare and make war against a State. After much seriousreflection I have arrived at the conclusion that no such power hasbeen delegated to Congress, or to any other department of the FederalGovernment. .. . It may be safely asserted that the power to make waragainst a State is at variance with the whole spirit and intent of theConstitution. .. . But if we possessed this power, would it be wise toexercise it under existing circumstances?. .. Our Union rests uponpublic opinion, and can never be cemented by the blood of its citizensshed in civil war. .. . Congress possesses many means of preserving itby conciliation; but the sword was not placed in their hand topreserve it by force. " Why did the message thus leap at one bound without necessary connectionor coherence from the discussion of executive to those of legislativepowers? Why waste words over doubtful theories when there was pressingneed to suggest practical amendments to the statute whose real orimaginary defects Mr. Buchanan had pointed out? Why indulge inlamentations over the remote possibility that Congress might violatethe Constitution, when the occasion demanded only prompt preventiveorders from the Executive to arrest the actual threatened violation oflaw by Charleston mobs? Why talk of war against States when the dutyof the hour was the exercise of acknowledged authority againstinsurrectionary citizens? The issue and argument were wholly false and irrelevant. No State hadyet seceded. Execute such laws of the United States as were inacknowledged vigor, and disunion would be impossible. Buchanan neededonly to do what he afterwards so truthfully asserted Lincoln haddone. [8] But through his inaction, and still more through his declaredwant of either power or right to act, disunion gained two importantadvantages--the influence of the Executive voice upon public opinion, and especially upon Congress; and the substantial pledge of theAdministration that it would lay no straw in the path of peaceful, organized measures to bring about State secession. [Sidenote] Correspondence, N. Y. "Evening Post". [Sidenote] Washington "Constitution" of December 19, 1860. [Sidenote] London "Times, " Jan. 9, 1851. The central dogma of the message, that while a State has no right tosecede, the Union has no right to coerce, has been universallycondemned as a paradox. The popular estimate of Mr. Buchanan'sproposition and arguments was forcibly presented at the time by ajesting criticism attributed to Mr. Seward. "I think, " said the NewYork Senator, "the President has conclusively proved two things: (1)That no State has the right to secede unless it wishes to; and (2)that it is the President's duty to enforce the laws unless somebodyopposes him. " No less damaging was the explanation put upon hislanguage by his political friends. The recognized organ of theAdministration said: "Mr. Buchanan has increased the displeasure ofthe Lincoln party by his repudiation of the coercion theory, and hisfirm refusal to permit a resort to force as a means of preventing thesecession of a sovereign State. " Nor were intelligent lookers-on inforeign lands less severe in their judgment: "Mr. Buchanan's message, "said the London "Times, " a month later, "has been a greater blow tothe American people than all the rant of the Georgian Governor or the'ordinances' of the Charleston Convention. The President hasdissipated the idea that the States which elected him constitute onepeople. " ----------[1] There were 3, 832, 240 opposition popular votes against 847, 953 forBreckinridge and Lane, the Presidential ticket championed by Mr. Buchanan and his adherents. [2] Printed in "The Early Life, Campaigns, and Public Services ofRobert E. Lee, with a record of the campaigns and heroic deeds of hiscompanions in arms, by a distinguished Southern journalist. " 8vo. E. B. Treat, publisher, New York, 1871; p. 789; article, Major-General JohnB. Floyd. It says: "Among his private papers examined after his deaththe fragment of a diary was found, written in his own hand, and whichis here copied entire. " The diary also bears internal evidence ofgenuineness. [3] The astounding mysteries and eccentricities of politics findillustration in the remarkable contrast between this recorded impulsiveand patriotic expression of Attorney-General Black on November 7, andhis labored official opinion of an apparently opposite tenor, certifiedto the President under date of November 20. See "Opinions of theAttorneys-General. " Vol. IX. , p. 517. [4] "It was while these plans for a _coup d'état_ before the 4th ofMarch were being matured in the very Cabinet itself and in the presenceof a President too feeble to resist them and too blind oven to see them, that Mr. Stanton was sent for by Mr. Buchanan to answer the question, 'Can a State be coerced?' For two hours he battled, and finallyscattered for the time being the heresies with which secession hadfilled the head of that old broken-down man. He was requested to preparean argument in support of the power, to be inserted in the forthcomingmessage. "--Hon. H. L. Dawes, in the "Boston Congregationalist. " See "Atlantic Monthly, " October, 1870, p. 468. [5] Slavery existed by virtue of express enactments in the severalconstitutions of the slave States, but the Constitution of the UnitedStates gave it only implied recognition and toleration. [6] "It was with some surprise, I confess, that I read the message ofthe President. The message laid down certain conditions as those uponwhich alone the great Confederacy of the United States could bepreserved from disruption. In so doing the President appeared to bepreparing beforehand an apology for the secession. Had the conditions, indeed, been such as the Northern States would be likely to accept, themessage might have been considered one of peace. But it seems veryimprobable that the Northern States should now, at the moment of theirtriumph, and with large majorities of Republicans in their assemblies, submit to conditions which, during many years of struggle, they haverejected or evaded. "--Lord John Russell to Lord Lyons, December 26, 1860. British Blue Book. [7] The logic of the message breaks down by the palpable omission tostate the well-known fact that, though every citizen of SouthCarolina, or any other State, might refuse to accept or execute theoffice of United States marshal, or, indeed, any Federal office, thewant could be immediately lawfully supplied by appointing any qualifiedcitizen of any other State, who might lawfully and properly lead eithera _posse_, or Federal forces, or State militia, to put down obstructionof the Federal laws, insurrection, or rebellion. President Buchananadmitted his own error, and repudiated his own doctrine, when onJanuary 2, following, he nominated a citizen of Pennsylvania for theoffice of collector of the port of Charleston, South Carolina. Sections two and three of the Act of February 28, 1795, authorize thePresident, when the execution of the laws is obstructed by insurrectiontoo powerful for courts and marshals, to call forth the militia of anyand all the States, first and primarily to "suppress suchcombinations, " and, secondly, "to cause the laws to be duly executed, and the use of militia so to be called forth may be continued, ifnecessary, until the expiration of thirty days after the commencementof the then next session of Congress. " In performing this duty the actimposes but a single condition or prerequisite on the Executive: heshall "by proclamation command the insurgents to disperse. " Thesesections are complete, harmonious, self-sufficient, and, in their chiefprovisions, nowise dependent upon or connected with any other sectionor clause of the act. They place under the President's command thewhole militia, and by a subsequent law (March 3, 1807) also the entirearmy and navy of the Union, against rebellion. The assertion that thearmy can only follow a marshal and his writ in case of rebellion, isnot only unsupported by the language of the act, but utterly refuted bystrong implication. The last section repeals a former provisionlimiting the President's action to cases of insurrection of whichUnited States judges shall have given him notice, and thereby remitshim to any and all of his official sources of information. Jackson'sfamous force bill only provided certain supplementary details; itdirectly recognized and invoked the great powers of the Act of 1795, and expiring by limitation, left its wholesome plenitude and broadoriginal grant of authority unrepealed and unimpaired. [8] "Happily our civil war was undertaken and prosecuted in self-defense, not to coerce a State, but to enforce the execution of the laws withinthe States against individuals, and to suppress an unjust rebellionraised by a conspiracy among them against the Government of the UnitedStates. "--Buchanan, in "Mr. Buchanan's Administration, " p. 129. CHAPTER XXIII THE CHARLESTON CONSPIRATORS As President Buchanan might have foreseen, his inconsistent messageproved satisfactory to neither friend nor foe. The nation was on theeve of rebellion and had urgent need of remedial acts, not oftemporizing theories, least of all theories which at the latePresidential election had been rejected as errors and dangers. Themessage served as a topic to initiate debate in Congress; but thisdebate, resting only on the main subject long enough to cover theChief Magistrate's views and recommendations as a whole, with almostunanimous expressions of dissent, and even of contempt, passed on towords of mutual defiance and open declarations of revolutionarypurpose. The conspirators in the Cabinet had done their work. By the officialdeclarations of the President of the United States, the Government hadtied its own hands--had resolved and proclaimed the duty and policy ofnon-resistance to organized rebellion. Henceforth disunionists, secessionists, nullifiers, and conspirators of every kind had but tocombine under alleged State action, and through the instrumentalitiesof State Legislatures and State conventions cast off without let orhinderance their Federal obligations by resolves and ordinances. Thesemblance of a vote, a few scratches of the pen, a proclamation, and anew flag, and at once without the existence of a corporal's squad, orthe smell of burnt powder, there would appear on the horizon ofAmerican politics, if not a _de jure_ at least a _de facto_ State! If there had hitherto been any doubt or hesitation in the minds of theprincipal secession leaders of the South, it vanished under thedeclared policy of inaction of the Federal Administration. ThePresident's message was a practical assurance of immunity from arrestand prosecution for treason. It magnified their grievances, specifically pointed out a contingent right and duty of revolution, acknowledged that mere public sentiment might override and nullifyFederal laws, and pointedly bound up Federal authority in narrow legaland Constitutional restrictions. It was blind as a mole to findFederal power, but keen-eyed as a lynx to discover Federal impotence. The leaders of secession were not slow to avail themselves of thefavorable situation. Between the date of the message and the incomingof the new and possibly hostile Administration there intervened threefull months. It was the season of political activity--the periodduring which legislatures meet, messages are written, and lawsenacted. It afforded ample time to authorize, elect, and hold Stateconventions. Excitement was at fever heat in the South, and publicsentiment paralyzed, despondent, and divided at the North. Accordingly, as if by a common impulse, the secession movement spranginto quick activity and united effort. Within two months the States ofSouth Carolina, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, andTexas, in the order named, by formal ordinances of conventions, declared themselves separated from the Union. The recommendation ofYancey's "scarlet letter" had been literally carried out; the CottonStates were precipitated into revolution. In this movement of secession the State of South Carolina was theenthusiastic pioneer. At the date of the President's message she hadalready provided by law for the machinery of a convention, though nodelegates had been elected. Nevertheless, her Legislature at onceplunged pell-mell into the task of making laws for the new conditionof independent sovereignty which by common consent the convention wasin a few days to declare. Questions of army and navy, postalcommunication, and foreign diplomacy, for the moment eclipsed thebaser topics of estray laws or wolf-scalp bounties, and the littlewould-be Congress fully justified the reported sarcasm of one of herleading citizens that "the Palmetto State was too small for a republicand too large for a lunatic asylum. " But, with all their outward fire and zeal for nationality, herpoliticians were restrained by an undercurrent of prudence. Arevolution even under exceptional advantages is a serious thing. [Sidenote] Speech of Mr. Magrath in the South Carolina Convention, Dec. 19, 1860. "Annual Cyclopedia, " 1861, p. 619. Therefore the agitators of South Carolina scanned the President'smessage with unconcealed eagerness. In that paradox of assertions anddenials, of purposes to act and promises to refrain, they found muchto assure them, but also something to cause doubt. "As I understandthe message of the President of the United States, " explained Mr. Magrath to the South Carolina Convention, "he affirms it as his right, and constitutional duty, and high obligation to protect the propertyof the United States within the limits of South Carolina, and toenforce the laws of the Union within the limits of South Carolina. Hesays he has no constitutional power to coerce South Carolina, while atthe same time he denies to her the right of secession. It may be, andI apprehend it will be, Mr. President, that the attempt to coerceSouth Carolina will be made under the pretense of protecting theproperty of the United States within the limits of South Carolina. Iam disposed, therefore, at the very threshold to test the accuracy ofthis logic, and test the conclusions of the President of the UnitedStates. " [Sidenote] "Mr. Buchanan's Administration, " p. 126. President Buchanan had indeed declared in his message that theConstitution gave the Federal Government no power to coerce a State. He had further said that the laws gave him no authority to executecivil or criminal process or suppress an insurrection with the help ofthe militia, or the army and navy, "in a State where no judicialauthority exists to issue process, and where there is no marshal toexecute it, and where, even if there were such an officer, the entirepopulation would constitute one solid combination to resist him. " So far as mere political theories could go, this was certainly animportant concession to the conspirators. In virtue of thesedoctrines, they could proceed, without danger to life and property, tohold conventions, pass secession ordinances, resign and refuse Federaloffices, repudiate Northern debts, and effectively stop all Federalmails at the State line. But reading another passage in thisparadoxical message of President Buchanan, they found these otherpropositions and purposes, involving a flat contradiction, and whichwith sufficient reason excited the apprehensions of Mr. Magrath andhis fellow-conspirators. Said the message: "The same insuperable obstacles do not lie in the way of executing the laws for the collection of the customs. The revenue still continues to be collected as heretofore at the custom-house in Charleston, and should the collector unfortunately resign, a successor may be appointed to perform this duty. " [Sidenote] "Mr. Buchanan's Administration, " p. 126. "Then in regard to the property of the United States in South Carolina. This has been purchased for a fair equivalent 'by the consent of the Legislature of the State, ' 'for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, ' etc. , and over these the authority 'to exercise exclusive legislation' has been expressly granted by the Constitution to Congress. It is not believed that any attempt will be made to expel the United States from this property by force; but if in this I should prove to be mistaken, the officer in command of the forts has received orders to act strictly on the defensive. In such a contingency the responsibility for consequences would rightfully rest upon the heads of the assailants. " It was, of course, in vain that Mr. Magrath and other South Carolinaconstitutional expounders protested against this absurd want of logic. It was in vain that they could demonstrate that protecting theproperty of the Union was but another name for coercion; that if thePresident could lawfully from another State appoint a successor to theFederal collector, he could in the same manner appoint a successor tothe Federal judge, district attorney, and marshal; that if he couldexecute the revenue laws he could execute the steamboat laws, thepostal laws, or the criminal laws; that if, with Federal bayonets, hecould stop a mob at the door of the custom-house, he could do the sameat the door of the court-room; that it would be no more offensive warto employ a regiment to protect a bonded warehouse than a jail; ashipping dock than a post-office; a dray-load of merchandise passingacross a street than a mail car _in transitu_ across a State; thatcoercing a Charleston belle to pay the custom duties on her silk gown, and a Palmetto orator to suffer the imposition of foreign tribute onhis champagne was in fact destroying the whole splendid theory ofexclusive State sovereignty. It followed, therefore, that the issue was not one of constitutionaltheory, but of practical administration; not of legislation, but ofwar. The argument of the President's message was palpably illogicaland ridiculous, but there in black and white stood his intention tocollect the revenue and protect the public property; yonder in the baywere Pinckney, Moultrie, and Sumter; under the flag of the Union was adevoted band of troops and a brave officer, with orders to hold thefort. For the present, then, the wall of Fort Moultrie was the iron collararound the neck of the coveted "sovereignty" of South Carolina. How tobreak that fetter was the narrow, simple problem. A half-finishedinclosure of brick walls, standing in the midst of sand-hills whichgave commanding elevations, and buildings which effectually masked theapproach of an assaulting column, and containing, all told, but sixtymen to guard 1500 feet of rampart. The street rabble of Charlestoncould any night clamber over the thinly defended walls, and at least ascore of companies of minute men, drilled and equipped, could bebrought by rail from the interior of the State to garrison and holdit. But what then? That would bring Federal troops in Federal ships ofwar, and in a short, quick struggle the substantial standingpreparations of the Government would overcome the extemporizedpreparations of the State, and the insurrection would be hopelesslyquelled. [Sidenote] Trescott's Narrative, Samuel Wylie Crawford, "Story of Sumter. " pp. 28-30. To prevent reënforcement was the vital point, and this had beenclearly perceived and acted upon from the beginning. While thepreparation of President Buchanan's message was yet under discussionthe Cabinet cabal had earnestly deliberated upon the most effectiveintrigue to be employed to deter the President from sending additionaltroops to Charleston harbor. In pursuance of the scheme agreed upon bythem in caucus, Trescott wrote a letter to Governor Gist suggestingthat the Governor should write a letter "assuring the President thatif no reënforcements were sent, there would be no attempt upon theforts before the meeting of the convention, and that then commissionerswould be sent to negotiate all the points of difference; that theirhands would be strengthened, the responsibility of provoking collisionwould be taken from the State, and the President would probably berelieved from the necessity of pursuing this policy. " Governor Gistacted upon the suggestion and wrote, under date of November 29, backto Trescott (giving him liberty to show the letter to the President): [Sidenote] Gist to Trescott, Nov. 29, 1860. Crawford, p. 31. Although South Carolina is determined to secede from the Federal Union very soon after her convention meets, yet the desire of her constituted authorities is, not to do anything that will bring on a collision before the ordinance of secession has been passed and notice has been given to the President of the fact; and not then, unless compelled to do so by the refusal of the President to recognize our right to secede, by attempting to interfere with our exports or imports, or by refusal to surrender the forts and arsenals in our limits. I have found great difficulty in restraining the people of Charleston from seizing the forts, and have only been able to restrain them by the assurance that no additional troops would be sent to the forts, or any munitions of war. .. . If President Buchanan takes a course different from the one indicated and sends on a reënforcement, the responsibility will rest on him of lighting the torch of discord, which will only be quenched in blood. [Sidenote] Trescott's Narrative, Crawford, pp. 34 (line 16) and 42 (lines 13-16). Mr. Trescott showed this letter to the President on the evening ofSunday, December 2, and while his narrative does not mention anyexpression by Mr. Buchanan of either approval or dissent, hissubsequent acts show a tacit acquiescence in Governor Gist'spropositions. There immediately followed by the leaders in Charleston, and theiragents and spokesmen in Washington, the daily repetition of threats andcomplaints (thus originated by the latter), which were continued fornearly three and a half months. The purpose was twofold: first, byalternately exciting the fears and hopes of the Government to induce itto withhold reënforcement as a prudential measure of magnanimity andconciliation; secondly, to make it a cloak to hide, as far as might be, their own preparations for war. Had the Federal Government been in acondition of normal health and vigor, the farce would not have beeneffective for even a single day; but, with capital alarmed, with, parties divided into factions, with three traitors in the Cabinet, anda timid and vacillating Executive, by successive, almost imperceptible, degrees, the farce produced a policy and the policy led to an openingdrama of civil war. Leaving out of view anterior political doctrines and discussions, thefirst false step had been taken by the Administration in its doctrineof non-coercion, announced in the message; the second false step halflogically resulting from the first, in its refusal on the first day ofDecember to send Major Anderson the reënforcements he so urgentlydemanded. The Charlestonians clung to the concession with a tenacitywhich demonstrated their full appreciation of its value. Immediatelythere began to flow in upon Mr. Buchanan and his advisers, on the onehand magnified reports of the daily clamors of the Charleston mob, onthe other hand encouraging intimations from the Charleston authoritiesthat they, while adhering to their political heresies and demands, wereyet averse to disorder and bloodshed, and to this end desired andinvoked the utmost forbearance of the Government. Put in truthfullanguage, their request would have been, "Help us keep the peace whilewe are preparing to break the law. Let the Government send no ships, men or supplies to the forts, in order that we may without danger orcollision build batteries to take them. Armament by the Federalsovereignty is war, armament by State authority is peace. " And it willforever remain a marvel that a President of the United States consentedto this certain process of national suicide. CHAPTER XXIV MR. BUCHANAN'S TRUCE [Sidenote] 1860. The concession yielded by Mr. Buchanan, instead of tending toconciliate the conspirators only brought upon him additional demands. It so happened that the principal Federal ships of war were absentfrom the harbors of the Atlantic coast on service in distant waters. But now, as a piece of good fortune amid many untoward occurrences, the steam sloop-of-war _Brooklyn_, a new and formidable vessel oftwenty-five guns, which had been engaged in making preliminary surveysin the Chiriqui Lagoon to test the practicability of one of theproposed interoceanic ship canals, unexpectedly returned to the Norfolknavy yard on the 28th of November, less than a week before the meetingof Congress. She had until recently been under the command of CaptainFarragut, afterwards famous in the war of the rebellion, and was, withtrifling exceptions, ready for sea. In the Cabinet, where the feasibility of collecting the customs revenueat Charleston on shipboard had already been discussed as a possiblecontingency, and especially where the forcible protection of the publicproperty had also received serious consideration, this suddenappearance of the _Brooklyn_ must have furnished a conclusive reason infavor of both these propositions. Be this as it may, when the Presidentaffirmed these duties in his message, the conspirators realized that heheld the means of practical enforcement at instantaneous command. Witha ship of war ready at Norfolk, with troops at Fortress Monroe, mightnot a careless _émeute_ at Charleston bring the much-dreadedreënforcements to Moultrie, Sumter, and Pinckney, precipitate a_dénouement_, and prematurely ruin all their well-concocted schemes?There was urgent need to prevent the sailing of the steamer on such anerrand. [Sidenote] Buchanan to Burnwell, Adams, and Orr, Dec. 31, 1860. W. R. Vol. I. , p. 116. On Saturday, December 8, four of the Representatives in Congress fromSouth Carolina requested an interview of President Buchanan, which hegranted them, in which they rehearsed their well-studied prediction ofa collision at Charleston. One of their number has related thesubstance of their address with graphic frankness: [Sidenote] Hon. Wm. Porcher Miles, Statement before the South Carolina Convention, "Annual Cyclopedia, " 1861, pp. 649-50. "Mr. President, it is our solemn conviction that if you attempt to send a solitary soldier to these forts, the instant the intelligence reaches our people (and we shall take care that it does reach them, for we have sources of information in Washington so that no orders for troops can be issued without our getting information) these forts will be forcibly and immediately stormed. "We all assured him that if an attempt was made to transport reënforcements, our people would take these forts, and that we would go home and help them to do it; for it would be suicidal folly for us to allow the forts to be manned. And we further said to him that a bloody result would follow the sending of troops to those forts, and that we did not believe that the authorities of South Carolina would do anything prior to the meeting of this convention, and that we hoped and believed that nothing would be done after this body met until we had demanded of the general Government the recession of these forts. " Here was an avowal to the President himself, not only of treason atCharleston, but of conspiracy in the Executive departments atWashington; a demand coupled with a menace; a proposal for a ten days'truce supplemented by a declaration of intention to proceed toextremities after its expiration. Instead of meeting these with astern rebuke and dismissal, the President cowered and yielded to theirdemand. The sanctity of the Constitution, the majesty of the law, thepower of the nation, the patriotism of the people, all faded from hisbewildered vision; his irresolute will shrank from his declaredpurpose to protect the public property and enforce the revenue laws. He saw only the picture of strife and bloodshed which the glib tonguesof his persecutors conjured up, and failed to detect the theatricpurpose for which it was employed. [Sidenote] Buchanan to Commissioners, Dec. 31, 1860. W. R. Vol. I. , p. 117. He hastened to assure his visitors that it was his determination "notto reënforce the forts in the harbor, and thus produce a collision, until they had been actually attacked, " or until he had "certainevidence that they were about to be attacked. " Though this was onlyanother concession, much like the first in outward semblance, it wasnevertheless in its vital essence a fatal hurt to the rapidlyshrinking Federal authority. The conspiracy had won the choice ofposition; when the combat should come it was in the attitude necessaryto deal the first blow. [Illustration: LEWIS CASS. ] The main point secured, there was an exhibition of abundant diplomaticpoliteness between the parties. The President suggested that "forprudential reasons" it would be best to put in writing what they hadsaid to him verbally. This they readily promised, and on Monday, the10th, gave him, duly signed by five of the South CarolinaRepresentatives, this important paper: [Sidenote] W. R. Vol. I. , p. 116. WASHINGTON, December 9, 1860. In compliance with our statement to you yesterday, we now express to you our strong convictions that neither the constituted authorities nor any body of the people of the State of South Carolina will either attack or molest the United States forts in the harbor of Charleston previously to the action of the convention, and we hope and believe not until an offer has been made through an accredited representative to negotiate for an amicable arrangement of all matters between the State and Federal Government, provided that no reënforcements shall be sent into those forts, and their relative military status shall remain as at present. [Sidenote] Buchanan to Commissioners, Dec. 31, 1860. Ibid. When President Buchanan came to look at the explicit language of thisdocument, he shrank from the definite programme to which it committedhim. "I objected to the word 'provided, ' as it might be construed intoan agreement on my part which I never would make. They said nothingwas further from their intention; they did not so understand it, and Ishould not so consider it. " There followed mutual protestations thatthe whole transaction was voluntary, informal, and in the nature of amediation; that neither party possessed any delegated authority orbinding power. They were not frank enough to explain to one anotherthat the true object of each was delay--of the President, "that timemight be gained for reflection"; of the Members, that time might begained for the unmolested meeting of the convention, for passing theordinance of secession, for further organizing public sentiment, andpushing forward military preparations at Charleston. [Sidenote] Buchanan to Commissioners, Dec. 31, 1860. W. R. Vol. I. , p. 117. The mask of official propriety worn over this pernicious intrigue, thedisclaimers, the implications and mental reservations of which it wasmade up--all became absurd in view of the results it produced. ThePresident, indeed, explains that it was no pledge or agreement. "But Iacted, " he naïvely admits, "in the same manner as I would have, donehad I entered into a positive and formal agreement with partiescapable of contracting, although such an agreement would have been, onmy part, from the nature of my official duties, impossible. The worldknows that I have never sent any reënforcements to the forts inCharleston harbor, and I have certainly never authorized any change tobe made in their 'relative military status. '" While the conspirators were thus taking effectual steps to bind thefuture acts of the Executive in respect to the forts in Charlestonharbor, and to make sure that the rising insurrection in SouthCarolina should not be crippled or destroyed by any surprise or suddenmovement emanating from Washington, they were not less watchful tocounteract and prevent any possible hostile movement against them onthe part of Major Anderson and his handful of officers and troops inFort Moultrie, undertaken on his own discretion. Their boast of secretsources of information in Washington, coupled with subsequent events, furnish presumptive evidence that Mr. Floyd, Secretary of War, thoughyet openly opposing disunion, was already in their confidence andcouncils, and was lending them such active coõperation as might bedisguised or perhaps still excused to his own conscience as tending toavert collision and bloodshed. Shortly before, or about the time of the truce we have described, Secretary Floyd sent an officer of the War Department to Fort Moultriewith special verbal instructions to Major Anderson, which were dulycommunicated, and the substance of them reduced to writing anddelivered to that officer on the 11th of December, the day followingthe conclusion of the President's unofficial truce at Washington. Theimportance of this document renders it worthy of reproduction incomplete form. Memorandum of verbal instructions to Major Anderson, 1st Artillery, commanding at Fort Moultrie, South Carolina: You are aware of the great anxiety of the Secretary of War that a collision of the troops with the people of this State shall be avoided, and of his studied determination to pursue a course with reference to the military force and forts in this harbor which shall guard against such a collision. He has, therefore, carefully abstained from increasing the force at this point, or taking any measures which might add to the present excited state of the public mind, or which would throw any doubt on the confidence he feels that South Carolina will not attempt by violence to obtain possession of the public works or interfere with their occupancy. But as the counsel and acts of rash and impulsive persons may possibly disappoint these expectations of the Government, he deems it proper that you shall be prepared with instructions to meet so unhappy a contingency. He has, therefore, directed me verbally to give you such instructions. [Sidenote] Buchanan to Commissioners, Dec. 31, 1860. W. R. Vol. I. , p. 117. You are carefully to avoid every act which would needlessly tend to provoke aggression, and for that reason you are not, without evident and imminent necessity, to take up any position which could be construed into the assumption of a hostile attitude. But you are to hold possession of the forts in this harbor, and if attacked you are to defend yourself to the last extremity. The smallness of your force will not permit you, perhaps, to occupy more than one of the three forts, but an attack on or attempt to take possession of either one of them will be regarded as an act of hostility, and you may then put your command into either of them which you may deem most proper, to increase its power of resistance. You are also authorized to take similar defensive steps whenever you have tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act. D. C. BUELL, Assistant Adjutant-General. FORT MOULTRIE, S. C. , December 11, 1860. This is in conformity to my instructions to Major Buell. JOHN B. FLOYD, Secretary of War. [Sidenote] Doubleday, "Forts Sumter and Moultrie, " p. 51. Upon mere superficial inspection these instructions disclosed only thethen dominant anxiety of the Administration to prevent collision. Butif we remember that they were sent to Major Anderson without thePresident's knowledge, and without the knowledge of General Scott, [1]and especially if we keep in sight the state of public sentiment ofboth Charleston and Washington and the paramount official influenceswhich had taken definite shape in the President's truce, we can easilyread between the lines that they were most artfully contrived to lullsuspicion while effectually restraining Major Anderson from any act ormovement which might check or control the insurrectionary preparations. He must do nothing to provoke aggression; he must take no hostileattitude without evident and imminent necessity; he must not move histroops into Fort Sumter, unless it were attempted to attack or takepossession of one of the forts or such a design were tangiblymanifested. Practically, when the attempt to seize the vacant fortsmight come it would be too late to prevent it, and certainly too lateto move his own force into either of them. Practically, too, anyserious design of that nature would never be permitted to come to hisknowledge. Supplement these literal negations and restrictions by theunrecorded verbal explanations and comments said to have been made byMajor Buell, by his disapproval of the meager defensive preparationswhich had been made, such as his declaration that a few loop-holes"would have a tendency to irritate the people, " and we can readilyimagine how a faithful officer, whose reiterated calls for help hadbeen refused, felt, that under such instructions, such surroundings, and such neglect "his hands were tied, " and that he and his littlecommand were a foredoomed sacrifice. [2] ----------[1] "The President has listened to him [General Scott] with duefriendliness and respect, but the War Department has been littlecommunicative. Up to this time he has not been shown the writteninstructions of Major Anderson, nor been informed of the purport ofthose more recently conveyed to Fort Moultrie verbally by MajorBuell. "--Gen. Scott (by G. W. Lay) to Twiggs, Dec. 28, 1860. W. R. Vol. I. , p. 580. [2] In a Senate speech, January 10, 1861, "Globe, " page 307, JeffersonDavis, commenting on these orders, while admitting that they empoweredMajor Anderson to go from one post to another, said, "Though hisorders were not so designed, as I am assured. " CHAPTER XXV THE RETIREMENT OF CASS Thus far Mr. Buchanan's policy of conciliation through concession hadbrought him nothing but disappointment, and whatever faint hope hisloyal Cabinet advisers may have had at the outset in its savingefficacy was by practical experiment utterly destroyed. Thenon-coercion doctrine had been adopted as early as November 20, inthe Attorney-General's opinion of that date. The fact was rumored, not only in the political circles of the capital, but in the chiefnewspapers of the country; and the three secession members of theCabinet had doubtless communicated it confidentially to all theirprominent and influential confederates. Since that time South Carolinahad continued her preparation for secession with unremitting industry;Mississippi had authorized a convention and appointed commissionersto visit all the slave-States and propagate disunion, among them Mr. Thompson, Buchanan's Secretary of the Interior, who afterwardsexercised this insurrectionary function while yet remaining in theCabinet; the North Carolina Legislature had postponed the election ofUnited States Senator; Florida had passed a convention bill; Georgiahad instituted legislative proceedings to bring about a conference ofthe Southern States at Atlanta; both houses of the National Congresshad rung with secession speeches, while frequent caucuses of theconspirators took place at Washington. [Sidenote] Cobb to Buchanan, "Washington Constitution, " Dec. 12, 1860. Mr. Buchanan's truce with the South Carolina Representatives had aslittle effect in arresting the secession intrigues as his non-coerciondoctrine officially announced in the annual message. On the evening ofthe day (December 8)[1] on which he received the South Carolinapledge, the Secretary of the Treasury, Howell Cobb, of Georgia, tendered his resignation, announcing in the same letter his intentionto embark in the active work of disunion. It had been generallyunderstood that the non-coercion theories of the message were adoptedby the President in deference to the wishes and under the influence ofCobb, Thompson, and Floyd, and undoubtedly they had also been largelyinstrumental in bringing about the unofficial truce at Charleston. If, amid all his fears, Mr. Buchanan retained any sensibility, he musthave been profoundly shocked at the cool dissimulation with which Mr. Cobb, everywhere recognized as a Cabinet officer of great ability, hadassisted in committing the Administration to these fatal doctrines andmeasures, and then abandoned it in the moment of danger. "Mywithdrawal, " he wrote to the President, "has not been occasioned byanything you have said or done. Whilst differing from your messageupon some of its theoretical doctrines, as well as from the hope soearnestly expressed that the Union can be preserved, there was nopractical result likely to follow which required me to retire fromyour Administration. That necessity is created by what I feel it myduty to do; and the responsibility of the act, therefore, rests aloneupon myself. " Ignoring the fact that the Treasury was prosperous andsolvent when he took charge of it, and that at the moment of hisleaving it could not pay its drafts, Mr. Cobb, five days later, published a long and inflammatory address to the people of Georgia, concluding with this exhortation: "I entertain no doubt either of yourright or duty to secede from the Union. Arouse, then, all your manhoodfor the great work before you, and be prepared on that day to announceand maintain your independence out of the Union, for you will neveragain have equality and justice in it. " [Sidenote] G. T. Curtis, "Life of James Buchanan. " Vol. II. , p. 399. The President had scarcely found a successor for Mr. Cobb when thehead of his Cabinet, Lewis Cass, Secretary of State, tendered hisresignation also, and retired from the Administration. Mr. Cass hadheld many offices of distinction, had attained high rank as aDemocratic leader, and had once been a Presidential candidate. Hisresignation was, therefore, an event of great significance from apolitical point of view. The incident brings into bold relief themental reservations under which Buchanan's paradoxical theories hadbeen concurred in by his Cabinet. A private memorandum, in Mr. Buchanan's handwriting, commenting on the event, makes the followingemphatic statement: "His resignation was the more remarkable onaccount of the cause he assigned for it. When my late message (ofDecember, 1860) was read to the Cabinet before it was printed, GeneralCass expressed his unreserved and hearty approbation of it, accompanied by every sign of deep and sincere feeling. He had but oneobjection to it, and this was, that it was not sufficiently strongagainst the power of Congress to make war upon a State for the purposeof compelling her to remain in the Union; and the denial of this powerwas made more emphatic and distinct upon his own suggestion. " [Sidenote] See proceedings of convention in "Charleston Courier, " Dec. , 1860. But this position was probably qualified and counterbalanced in hismind by the President's direct promise that he would collect theFederal revenue and protect the Federal property. In the nature ofthings the execution of this policy must not only precede but excludeall other theories and abstractions, and the Secretary of Stateprobably waited in good faith to see the President "execute the laws. "Little by little, however, delay and concession rendered thisimpossible. The collector at Charleston still nominally exercisedhis functions as a Federal officer; but it was an open secret amongthe Charleston authorities, and one which, must also by this timehave become known to the Government at Washington, that he was onlyholding the place in trust for the coming secession convention. As toprotecting the Federal property, the refusal to send Anderson troops, the President's truce, the gradual development of Mr. Buchanan'sirresolution and lack of courage, and finally Mr. Cobb's open defectionmust have convinced Mr. Cass that, under existing determinations, orders, and influences, it was a hopeless prospect. [Sidenote] Floyd's Richmond Speech, N. Y. "Herald, " Jan. 17, 1861, p. 2. The whole question seems to have been finally decided in a long andstormy Cabinet session held on December 13. The events of the fewpreceding days had evidently shaken the President's confidence in hisown policy. He startled his dissembling and conspiring Secretary of Warwith the sudden questions, "Mr. Floyd, are you going to send recruitsto Charleston to strengthen the forts?" "Don't you intend to strengthenthe forts at Charleston?" The apparent change of policy alarmed theSecretary, but he replied promptly that he did not. "Mr. Floyd, "continued Mr. Buchanan, "I would rather be in the bottom of the Potomacto-morrow than that these forts in Charleston should fall into thehands of those who intend to take them. It will destroy me, sir, and, Mr. Floyd, if that thing occurs it will cover your name with an infamythat all time can never efface, because it is in vain that you willattempt to show that you have not some complicity in handing over thoseforts to those who take them. " The wily Secretary replied, "I will risk my reputation, I will trust mylife that the forts are safe under the declarations of the gentlemen ofCharleston. " "That is all very well, " replied the President, "but doesthat secure the forts?" "No, sir; but it is a guaranty that I am inearnest, " said Floyd. "I am not satisfied, " said the President. Thereupon the Secretary made the never-failing appeal to the fears andtimidity of Mr. Buchanan. He has himself reported the language he used:"I am sorry for it, " said he; "you are President, it is for you toorder. You have the right to order and I will consider your orders whenmade. But I would be recreant to you if I did not tell you that thispolicy of garrisoning the forts will lead to certain conflicts; it isthe inauguration of civil war, and the beginning of the effusion ofblood. If it is a question of property, why not put an ordnancesergeant into them--a man who wears worsted epaulets on his shouldersand stripes down his pantaloons--as the representative of the propertyof the United States. That will be enough to secure the forts. If it isa question of property, he represents it, [2] and let us wait until theissue is made by South Carolina. She will go out of the Union and sendher commissioners here. Up to that point the action is insignificant. Action after this demands the attention of the great council of thenation. Let us submit the question to Congress--it is for Congress todeal with the matter. " [Sidenote] Floyd's Richmond Speech, N. Y. "Herald, " Jan. 17, 1861, p. 2. This crafty appeal to the President's hesitating inclinations, and inaccord with his policy hitherto pursued, was seconded by the activepersuasions of the leading conspirators of Congress whom Floyd promptlycalled to his assistance. "I called for help from that bright Saladinof the South, Jefferson Davis, of Mississippi--and I said, 'Come tomy rescue; the battle is a little more than my weak heart can support. Come to me;' and he came. Then came that old jovial-looking, noble-hearted representative from Virginia, James M. Mason. Here camethat anomaly of modern times, the youthful Nestor, here came Hunter. .. . From the north, the south, the east, and the west there came up thepatriots of the country, the champions of constitutional liberty, andthey talked with the President of the United States, and they quietedhis fears and assured him in the line of duty. They said, 'Let there beno force'; and the President said to me, 'I am content with yourpolicy'; and then it was that we determined that we would send no moretroops to the harbor in Charleston. " Strip this statement of its oratorical exaggeration, and the readercan nevertheless see, in the light of after occurrences, a vivid andtruthful picture of a conspiring cabal, stooping to arts and devicesdifficult to distinguish from direct personal treachery, flattering, threatening, and coaxing by turns, and finally lulling the fears of thePresident, through his vain hope that they would help him tide over amagnified danger, and shift upon Congress a responsibility he had notthe courage to meet. Mr. Cass, however, could no longer be quieted. Through all the rhetoric, sophistry, and bluster of the conspirators he saw the diminishingresources of the Government and the rising power of the insurrection. With a last bold effort to rouse the President from his lethargy, hedemanded, in the Cabinet meeting of the 13th, that the forts should bestrengthened. But he was powerless to break the spell. Says Floyd: "ThePresident said to him in reply, with a beautiful countenance and with aheroic decision that I shall never forget, in the council chamber, 'Ihave considered this question. I am sorry to differ from the Secretaryof State; I have made up my mind. The interests of the country do notdemand a reënforcement of the forces in Charleston. I cannot do it--andI take the responsibility of it upon myself. '" The letters which were exchanged between the President and his premierset out the differences between them with the same distinctness. Mr. Cass, after premising that he concurred with the general principleslaid down in the message, says: [Sidenote] Cass to Buchanan, Dec. 12, 1860. Curtis, "Life of Buchanan, " Vol. II. , p. 397. In some points which I deem of vital importance, it has been my misfortune to differ from you. It has been my decided opinion, which for some time past I have urged at various meetings of the Cabinet, that additional troops should be sent to reënforce the forts in the harbor of Charleston, with a view to their better defense, should they be attacked, and that an armed vessel should likewise be ordered there, to aid, if necessary, in the defense, and also, should it be required, in the collection of the revenue; and it is yet my opinion that these measures should be adopted without the least delay. I have likewise urged the expediency of immediately removing the custom-house at Charleston to one of the forts in the port, and of making arrangements for the collection of the duties there, by having a collector and other officers ready to act when necessary, so that when the office may become vacant the proper authority may be there to collect the duties on the part of the United States. I continue to think that these arrangements should be immediately made. While the right and the responsibility of deciding belong to you, it is very desirable that at this perilous juncture there should be, as far as possible, unanimity in your councils, with a view to safe and efficient action. To this statement the President replied: [Sidenote] Buchanan to Cass, Dec. 15, 1860. Curtis, "Life of Buchanan, " Vol. II, p. 398. The question on which we unfortunately differ is that of ordering a detachment of the army and navy to Charleston, and is correctly stated in your letter of resignation. I do not intend to argue this question. Suffice it to say that your remarks upon the subject were heard by myself and the Cabinet, with all the respect due to your high position, your long experience, and your unblemished character; but they failed to convince us of the necessity and propriety, under existing circumstances, of adopting such a measure. The Secretaries of War and of the Navy, through, whom the orders must have issued to reenforce the forts, did not concur in your views; and whilst the whole responsibility for the refusal rested upon myself, they were the members of the Cabinet more directly interested. You may have judged correctly on this important question, and your opinion is entitled to grave consideration; but under my convictions of duty, and believing as I do that no present necessity exists for a resort to force for the protection of the public property, it was impossible for me to have risked a collision of arms in the harbor of Charleston, and thereby defeated the reasonable hope which I cherish of the final triumph, of the Constitution and of the Union. [Sidenote] Holt, conversation with J. G. N. , 1874. The other Union members of the Cabinet received the rumor of Mr. Cass'sresignation with gloomy apprehensions. Postmaster-General Holt, withwhom by reason of their kindred opinions he had been on intimateterms, hastened to him to learn whether it were indeed true andwhether his determination were irrevocable. Cass confirmed the report, saying that representing the Northern and loyal constituency which hedid, he could no longer without dishonor to himself and to them remainin such treasonable surroundings. Holt endeavored to persuade him thatunder the circumstances it was all the more necessary that the loyalmembers of the Cabinet should remain at their posts, in order toprevent the country's passing into the hands of the secessionists bymere default. But Cass replied, No; that the public feeling andsentiment of his section would not tolerate such a policy on his part. "For you, " he said, "coming from a border State, where a modified, perhaps a divided, public sentiment exists, that is not only apossible course, but it is a true one; it is your duty to remain, tosustain the Executive and counteract the plots of the traitors. But myduty is otherwise; I must adhere to my resignation. " In this honorable close of a long public career, General Cass gaveevidence of the spirit which was to actuate many patriotic Democratswhen the final ordeal came. It was to be regretted that he had nottaken issue with his chief when his paradoxical message was read tothe Cabinet, but much is to be allowed to the inertness of a man inhis seventy-ninth year. Life-long placeman and unflinching partisanthat he was, there was still so much of patriotic conscience in himthat he could not stand by and see premeditated dishonor done to theflag he had followed in his youth and as Jackson's Secretary of Warupheld in his maturer years. If Mr. Buchanan had been capable ofamendment, he might have learned a salutary lesson from the manner inwhich this veteran politician ended his half century of publicservice. ----------[1] Cobb to Buchanan, "Washington Constitution, " Dec. 12, 1860. ThePresident's reply says: "I have received your communication ofSaturday evening, resigning, " etc. [2] Jefferson Davis in his "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, "Vol. I. , page 215, also lays claim to this artful suggestion: "The President's objection to this was, that it was his bounden dutyto preserve and protect the property of the United States. To this Ireplied, with all the earnestness the occasion demanded, that I wouldpledge my life that, if an inventory were taken of all the stores andmunitions in the fort, and an ordnance sergeant with a few men left incharge of them, they would not be disturbed. " CHAPTER XXVI THE SENATE COMMITTEE OF THIRTEEN The President's message provoked immediate and heated controversyin Congress. In the Senate the battle was begun by the radicalsecessionists, who at once avowed their main plans and purposes. Mr. Clingman, of North Carolina, opening the debate, predicted that thesame political organization which had elected Lincoln must sooncontrol the entire Government, and being guided by a sentiment hostileto the Southern States would change the whole character of theGovernment without abolishing its forms. A number of States wouldsecede within the next sixty days. Mr. Brown, of Mississippi, said the accumulating wrongs of years hadfinally culminated in the triumph of principles to which they couldnot and would not submit. All they asked was to be allowed to departin peace. [Illustration: GENERAL ROBERT TOOMBS. ] [Sidenote] "Globe, " Dec. 5 1860, p. 11. Mr. Iverson, of Georgia, invoking not only secession, but revolutionand assassination, announced specifically the hopes of the conspirators. "I am satisfied that South Carolina will resolve herself into a separatesovereign and independent State before the Ides of January; that Floridaand Mississippi, whose conventions are soon to meet, will follow theexample of South Carolina, and that Alabama . .. Will go out of theUnion on the 7th of January. Then the Georgia Convention follows on the16th of that month; and if these other surrounding sisters shall takethe step, Georgia will not be behind . .. I speak what I believe on thisfloor, that before the 4th of March five of the Southern States atleast will have declared their independence; and I am satisfied thatthree others of the Cotton States will follow as soon as the action ofthe people can be had. Arkansas, whose Legislature is now in session, will in all probability call a convention at an early day. Louisianawill follow. Her Legislature is to meet; and although there is a clogin the way of the lone star State of Texas, in the person of herGovernor, . .. If he does not yield to public sentiment, some TexanBrutus will arise to rid his country of the hoary-headed incubus thatstands between the people and their sovereign will. We intend, Mr. President, to go out peaceably if we can, forcibly if we must. " [Sidenote] "Globe, " Dec. 5, 1860, p. 14. Senator Wigfall, of Texas, took a high revolutionary attitude. "Wesimply say that a man who is distasteful to us has been elected and wechoose to consider that as a sufficient ground for leaving the Union. "He said he should "introduce a resolution at an early moment toascertain what are the orders that have gone from the War Department tothe officers in command of those forts" at Charleston. If the people ofSouth Carolina believed that this Government would hold those forts, and collect the revenues from them, after they had ceased to be one ofthe States of this Union, his judgment was that the moment they becamesatisfied of that fact they would take the forts, and blood would thenbegin to flow. [Sidenote] Ibid. , Dec. 10, 1860, p. 35. Mr. Mason, of Virginia, said he looked upon the evil as a war ofsentiment and opinion by one form of society against another form ofsociety. The remedy rested in the political society and State councilsof the several States and not in Congress. His State and a great manyothers of the slaveholding States were going into convention with aview to take up the subject for themselves, and as separate sovereigncommunities to determine what was best for their safety. [Sidenote] Ibid. , Dec. 5, 1860, p. 12. Senator Jefferson Davis, of Mississippi, was more reticent and politic, though no less positive and significant in his brief expressions. As aSenator of the United States he said he was there to perform hisfunctions as such; that before a declaration of war was made againstthe State of which he was a citizen he expected to be out of theChamber; that when that declaration was made his State would be foundready and quite willing to meet it. [Sidenote] "Globe, " Dec. 5, 1860, p. 9. The Republican Senators maintained for the greater part a discreetsilence. To exult in their triumph would be undignified; to hastenforward officiously with offers of pacification or submission, andbarter away the substantial fruits of their victory, would not onlymake them appear pusillanimous in the eyes of their own party, butbring down upon them the increased contempt of their assailants. Thereremained therefore nothing but silence and the feeble hope that thisfirst fury of the disunion onset might spend itself in angry words, andbe followed by calmer counsels. Nevertheless, it was difficult to keepentirely still under the irritating provocation. On the third day ofthe session, Senator Hale, of New Hampshire, replied to both thePresident's message and Clingman's speech. Mr. Hale thought "this stateof affairs looks to one of two things; it looks to absolute submission, not on the part of our Southern friends and the Southern States but ofthe North--to the abandonment of their position; it looks to asurrender of that popular sentiment which has been uttered through theconstituted forms of the ballot-box; or it looks to open war. We neednot shut our eyes to the fact. It means war, and it means nothing else;and the State which has put herself in the attitude of secession solooks upon it. .. . If it is preannounced and determined that the voiceof the majority expressed through the regular and constituted forms ofthe Constitution will not be submitted to, then, sir, this is not aUnion of equals; it is a Union of a dictatorial oligarchy on the oneside, and a herd of slaves and cowards on the other. That is it, sir;nothing more, nothing less. " While the Southern Democratic party and the Republican party thusdrifted into defiant attitudes the other two parties to the latePresidential contest naturally fell into the rôle of peacemakers. Inthis work they were somewhat embarrassed by their party record, forthey had joined loudly in the current charge of "abolitionism" againstthe people of the North, and especially against the Republican party. Nevertheless, they not only came forward to tender the olive branch, and to deprecate and rebuke the threats and extreme measures of thedisunionists, but even went so far as to deny and disapprove the staplecomplaints of the conspirators. [Sidenote] "Globe, " Dec. 4, 1860, p. 5. It must be remembered to the lasting honor of Senator Crittenden thatat the very outset of the discussion he repudiated the absurd theory ofnoncoercion. "I do not agree that there is no power in the President topreserve the Union; I will say that now. If we have a Union at all, andif, as the President thinks, there is no right to secede on the part ofany State (and I agree with him in that), I think there is a right toemploy our power to preserve the Union. " [Sidenote] Ibid. , Dec. 11, 1860, pp. 51, 52. Senator Pugh, of Ohio, saying that he lived on the border of theslave-holding and non-slave-holding States, contended that thefugitive-slave law was executed every day, or nearly every day. It wasin constant operation. He would venture to say that the slave-Stateshad not lost $100, 000 worth of slave property since they had been inthe Union, through negligence or refusal to execute it. [Sidenote] "Globe, " Dec. 11, 1860, p. 52. Senator Douglas, of Illinois, said he supposed the fugitive-slave lawwas enforced with quite as much fidelity as that in regard to theAfrican slave trade or the laws on many other subjects. "It so happensthat there is the greatest excitement upon this question just inproportion as you recede from the line between the free and theslave-States. .. . If you go North, up into Vermont where they scarcelyever see a slave and would not know how he looked, they are disturbedby the wrongs of the poor slave just in proportion as they are ignorantof the South. When you get down South, into Georgia and Alabama, wherethey never lose any slaves, they are disturbed by the outrages andlosses under the non-fulfillment of the fugitive-slave law just inproportion as they have no interest in it, and do not know what theyare talking about. " [Sidenote] Ibid. , Dec. 10, 1860, p. 24. Meanwhile, Senator Powell, of Kentucky, having given notice on the 5th, had on the 6th of December introduced a resolution to raise a specialcommittee (afterwards known as the Senate Committee of Thirteen) toconcert measures of compromise or pacification, either throughlegislation or Constitutional amendments. He said, however, he did notbelieve any legislation would be a remedy. Unequivocal constitutionalguarantees upon the points indicated in the resolution underconsideration were in his judgment the only remedies that would reachand eradicate the disease, give permanent security, and restorefraternal feeling between the people, North and South, and save theUnion from speedy dissolution. "Let us never despair of the republic, but go to work promptly and so amend the Constitution as to givecertain and full guarantees to the rights of every citizen, in everyState and Territory of the Union. " [Sidenote] "Globe, " Dec. 10, 1860, p. 25. [Sidenote] Ibid. [Sidenote] Ibid. , p. 28. [Sidenote] Ibid. , p. 34. The Republicans on this resolution generally offered only verbalcriticisms or expressed their full approbation of its provisions. Senator King, of New York, offering an amendment, explained that whilewe hear occasionally of a mob destroying property, we also hearoccasionally of a mob which assails an individual. He thought thesecurity of person as important as that of property, and wouldtherefore extend the inquiry to all these objects, if made at all. Senator Collamer, of Vermont, suggested striking out all about thecondition of the country and the rights of property, and simplyreferring that part of the message which relates to the state of theUnion to a special committee. Senator Foster, of Connecticut, said ifthere was a disposition here to promote the peace and harmony of thecountry, the resolution was a most appropriate one under which to makethe effort. Senator Hale, of New Hampshire, said he was willing to meetany and everybody and say that if there can be pointed out anything inwhich the State that he represented had come short of her wholeconstitutional duty in letter and in spirit, she will do what she neverdid in the face of an enemy, and that is take a backward step. She wasready to perform her whole constitutional duty, and to stand there. [Sidenote] "Globe, " Dec. 1860, pp. 25, 26. Senator Green, of Missouri, while he joined in the general cry ofNorthern anti-slavery aggression and neglect of constitutionalobligations, deemed it his duty to assist in making a united effort tosave the Union. If he believed the present state of public sentiment ofthe North was to be enduring, he would say it is folly to talk aboutpatching up the Union; but he looked forward to a reaction of publicsentiment. Amendments to the Constitution, legal enactments, or repealof personal liberty laws are not worth a straw unless the popularsentiment or the strong arm of the Government goes with them. Heproposed to employ adequate physical force to maintain existingconstitutional rights. He did not want any additional constitutionalrights. He offered a resolution to inquire into the propriety ofproviding by law for establishing an armed police force, upon allnecessary points along the line separating the slave-holding Statesfrom the non-slave-holding States, for the purpose of maintaining thegeneral peace between those States; of preventing the invasion of oneState by the citizens of another, and also for the efficient executionof the fugitive-slave law. [Sidenote] Ibid. , pp. 28-30. Senator Jefferson Davis, of Mississippi, denounced this proposition asa quack nostrum. He feared it was to rear a monster which would breakthe feeble chain provided, and destroy the rights it was intended toguard. Establishing military posts along the borders of Statesconferred a power upon this Federal Government, which it does not nowpossess, to coerce a State; it was providing, under the name of Union, to carry on war against States. From the history and nature of ourgovernment no power of coercion exists in it. [Sidenote] Ibid. , p. 33. Senator Brown, also of Mississippi, was no less emphatic in hiscondemnation of the scheme. He said, that a Southern Senatorrepresenting a State as much exposed as Missouri should deliberately, in times like these, propose to arm the Federal Government for thepurpose of protecting the frontier, to establish military posts allalong the line, struck him with astonishment. He saw in thisproposition the germ of a military despotism. He did not know what wasto become of these armies, or what was to be done with these militaryposts. He feared in the hands of the enemy they might be turned againstthe South; they would hardly ever be turned against the North. [Sidenote] "Globe, " Dec. 10, 1860, pp. 30, 31. Senator Green, in his reply, justly exposed the whole animus and thinlyconcealed import of these rough criticisms, by retorting that, to callthat a military despotism amounts to just this: we are going out of theUnion, right or wrong, and we will misrepresent every proposition madeto save the Union. Who has fought the battles of the South for the lasttwenty-five years, and borne the brunt of the difficulty upon theborder? Missouri, Kentucky, Virginia, and Maryland, while Mississippiand Louisiana have been secure; and while you have lost but oneboxed-up negro, sent on board a vessel, that I remember, we have lostthousands and thousands. He knew it was unpopular in some sections tosay a word for the Union. He hoped that feeling would react. Means toenforce and carry out the Constitution ought not to be ridiculed bycalling it a quack remedy. It is more likely that we may find in the response of Senator Iverson, of Georgia, the true reason which actuated the Cotton-State leaders indriving their people into revolution, regardless of the remonstrancesof the border States. Sir, the border slave-States of this Union complain of the Cotton States for the movement which is now in progress. They say that we have no right to take them out of the Union against their will. I want to know what right they have to keep us in the Union against our will. If we want to go out let us go. If they want to stay let them stay. They are sovereign and independent States, and have a right to decide these questions for themselves. For one, I shall not complain when, where, or how they go. I am satisfied, however, that they will go, when the time comes for them to decide. But, sir, they complain of us that we make so much noise and confusion on the subject of fugitive slaves, when we are not affected by the vitiated public sentiment of the Northern States. They say that we do not lose fugitive slaves; but they suffer the burden. We heard that yesterday. I know that we do not suffer in this respect; it is not the want of good faith in the Northern people, so far as the reclamation of fugitive slaves is concerned, that is causing the Southern States around the Gulf of Mexico and the Southern Atlantic coast to move in this great revolution now progressing. Sir, we look infinitely beyond this petty loss of a few negroes. We know what is coming in this Union. It is universal emancipation and the turning loose upon society in the Southern States of the mass of corruption which will be made by emancipation. We intend to avoid it if we can. These border States can get along without slavery. Their soil and climate are appropriate to white labor; they can live and nourish without African slavery; but the Cotton States cannot. We are obliged to have African slavery to cultivate our cotton, our rice, and our sugar fields. African slavery is essential not only to our prosperity, but to our existence as a people. .. . [Sidenote] "Globe, " Dec. 11, 1860, pp. 49-51. I understand one of the motives which influence the tardy action of these two States [Virginia and Maryland], They are a little afraid of the opening of the African slave trade, and the cheapening of negroes. Now, sir, while I state here that I am opposed to the opening of the African slave-trade, because our negroes will increase fast enough, God knows, for our interest and protection and security; and while I believe that the great masses of the Southern people are opposed to it, yet I will not stand security that if the Cotton States alone form a confederacy they will not open the African slave-trade; and then what will become of the great monopoly of the negro market which Virginia and Maryland and North Carolina now possess? The disunion Senators, while indulging in the violent and uncompromisinglanguage already quoted, had nevertheless here and there interjectedphrases indicating a willingness to come to an understanding andadjustment, but their object in this seemed to be twofold: for a fewdays longer it would serve as a partial screen to their more activeconspiracy, and in the possible event (which they evidently did notexpect) of a complete surrender and abdication of their politicalvictory by the Republican party, it would leave them in theadvantageous condition of accepting triumph as a fruit of compromise. [Sidenote] "Globe, " Dec. 4, 1860, p. 4. [Sidenote] Ibid. , Dec. 10, 1860, p. 29. [Sidenote] Ibid. , p. 34. [Sidenote] Ibid. , Dec. 12, 1860, p. 72. Thus, Senator Clingman said, "If gentlemen on the other side haveanything to propose of a decisive and satisfactory character, I have nodoubt the section from which I come would be willing to hear it. "Senator Davis said, "If we are mistaken as to your feelings andpurposes, give a substantial proof, that here may begin that circlewhich hence may spread out and cover the whole land with proofs offraternity, of a reaction in public sentiment, and the assurance of afuture career in conformity with the principles and purposes of theConstitution. " Senator Brown said he never intimated they would notlisten to appeals; he never said this case could not be adjusted; buthe said there was no disposition on the Republican side to do it. Senator Wigfall said, "What is the use of our discussing on this sideof the Chamber what we would be satisfied with when nothing has beenoffered us!" It requires a minute search to find these scattered words of moderationin the torrent of defiance which characterized the speeches of theextreme disunionists during the first ten days of the session ofCongress, and indications were not lacking that even these were whollyinsincere, and meant only to mislead their opponents and the public. Strong proof of this is found in the careful speech of SenatorJefferson Davis, in which he lays down the issue without reserve, atthe same time dealing in such vague and intangible complaints as showedintention and desire to remain unanswered and unsatisfied. . He saidhe believed the danger to be that a sectional hostility had beensubstituted for the general fraternity, and thus the Governmentrendered powerless for the ends for which it was instituted. The hearts of a portion of the people have been perverted by that hostility, so that the powers delegated by the compact of union are regarded not as means to secure the welfare of all, but as instruments for the destruction of a part--the minority section. How, then, have we to provide a remedy? By strengthening this Government? By instituting physical force to overawe the States, to coerce the people living under them as members of sovereign communities to pass under the yoke of the Federal Government?. .. [Sidenote] "Globe, " Dec. 10, 1860, p. 29. Then where is the remedy, the question may be asked. In the hearts of the people is the ready reply; and therefore it is that I turn to the other side of the Chamber, to the majority section, to the section in which have been committed the acts that now threaten the dissolution of the Union. .. . These are offenses such as no people can bear; and the remedy for these is in the patriotism and the affection of the people, if it exists; and if it does not exist, it is far better, instead of attempting to preserve a forced and therefore fruitless union, that we should peacefully part, and each pursue his separate course. .. . States in their sovereign capacity have now resolved to judge of the infractions of the Federal compact and of the mode and measure of redress. .. . I would not give the parchment on which the bill would be written which is to secure our constitutional rights within the limits of a State where the people are all opposed to the execution of that law. It is a truism in free governments that laws rest upon public opinion, and fall powerless before its determined opposition. To all that had so far been said, Senator Wade, of Ohio, made, on the17th day of December, a frank and direct as well as strong and eloquentreply, which was at once generally accepted by the Republican party ofthe Senate and the country as their well-considered and unalterableposition on the crisis. Said he: I have already said that these gentlemen who make these complaints have for a long series of years had this Government in their own keeping. They belong to the dominant majority. .. . Therefore, if there is anything in the legislation of the Federal Government that is not right, you and not we are responsible for it. .. . You have had the legislative power of the country, and you have had the executive of the country, as I have said already. You own the Cabinet, you own the Senate, and I may add, you own the President of the United States, as much as you own the servant upon your own plantation. I cannot see then very clearly why it is that Southern men can rise here and complain of the action of this Government. .. . Are we the setters forth of any new doctrines under the Constitution of the United States? I tell you nay. There is no principle held to-day by this great Republican party that has not had the sanction of your Government in every department for more than seventy years. You have changed your opinions. We stand where we used to stand, That is the only difference. .. . Sir, we stand where Washington stood, where Jefferson stood, where Madison stood, where Monroe stood. We stand where Adams and Jackson and even Polk stood. That revered statesman, Henry Clay, of blessed memory, with his dying breath asserted the doctrine that we hold to-day. .. . As to compromises, I had supposed that we were all agreed that the day of compromises was at an end. The most solemn compromises we have ever made have been violated without a _whereas_. Since I have had a seat in this body, one of considerable antiquity, that had stood for more than thirty years, was swept away from your statute books. .. . We nominated our candidates for President and Vice-President, and you did the same for yourselves. The issue was made up and we went to the people upon it; . .. And we beat you upon the plainest and most palpable issue that ever was presented to the American people, and one that they understood the best. There is no mistaking it; and now when we come to the capitol, I tell you that our President and our Vice-President must be inaugurated and administer the government as all their predecessors have done. Sir, it would be humiliating and dishonorable to us if we were to listen to a compromise [only] by which he who has the verdict of the people in his pocket should make his way to the Presidential chair. When it comes to that you have no government. .. . If a State secedes, although we will not make war upon her, we cannot recognize her right to be out of the Union, and she is not out until she gains the consent of the Union itself; and the chief magistrate of the nation, be he who he may, will find under the Constitution of the United States that it is his sworn duty to execute the law in every part and parcel of this Government; that he cannot be released from that obligation. .. . Therefore, it will be incumbent on the chief magistrate to proceed to collect the revenue of ships entering their ports precisely in the same way and to the same extent that he does now in every other State of the Union. We cannot release him from that obligation. The Constitution in thunder tones demands that he shall do it alike in the ports of every State. What follows? Why, sir, if he shuts up the ports of entry so that a ship cannot discharge her cargo there, or get papers for another voyage, then ships will cease to trade; or, if he undertakes to blockade her, and thus collect it, she has not gained her independence by secession. What must she do? If she is contented to live in this equivocal state, all would be well perhaps; but she could not live there. No people in the world could live in that condition. What will they do? They must take the initiative and declare war upon the United States; and the moment that they levy war, force must be met by force; and they must, therefore, hew out their independence by violence and war. There is no other way under the Constitution, that I know of, whereby a chief magistrate of any politics could be released from this duty. If this State, though seceding, should declare war against the United States, I do not suppose there is a lawyer in this body but what would say that the act of levying war is treason against the United States. That is where it results. We might just as well look the matter right in the face. .. . [Sidenote] "Globe, " Dec. 17, 1860, pp. 100-104. I say, sir, I stand by the Union of these States. Washington and his compatriots fought for that good old flag. It shall never be hauled down, but shall be the glory of the Government to which I belong, as long as my life shall continue. .. . It is my inheritance. It was my protector in infancy, and the pride and glory of my riper years; and although it may be assailed by traitors on every side, by the grace of God, under its shadow I will die. [Sidenote] Ibid. , Dec. 20, 1860, p. 158. The Senate Committee of Thirteen was duly appointed on December 20 asfollows: Lazarus W. Powell and John J. Crittenden, of Kentucky; R. M. T. Hunter, of Virginia; Wm. H. Seward, of New York; Robert Toombs, ofGeorgia; Stephen A. Douglas, of Illinois; Jacob Collamer, of Vermont;Jefferson Davis, of Mississippi; Benjamin F. Wade, of Ohio; WilliamBigler, of Pennsylvania; Henry M. Rice, of Minnesota; James E. Doolittle, of Wisconsin, and James W. Grimes, of Iowa. It was a strong and representative committee, chosen from the fourgreat political parties to the late Presidential election, andembracing recognized leaders in each, We shall see in a future chapterhow this eminent committee failed to report a compromise, which was theobject of its appointment. But compromise was impossible, because theconspiracy had resolved upon disunion, as already announced in theproclamation of a Southern Confederacy, signed and published a weekbefore by Jefferson Davis and others. CHAPTER XXVII THE HOUSE COMMITTEE OF THIRTY-THREE [Sidenote] Compare Boteler's statement of origin of his resolution, "Globe, " Jan. 10, 1861, p. 316. [Sidenote] "Globe, " Dec. 4, 1860, p. 6. While this discussion was going on in the Senate, very similarproceedings were taking place in the House of Representatives, exceptthat declarations of revolutionary purpose were generally of a morepractical and decisive character. The President's message had no soonerbeen received and read, and the usual formal motion made to refer andprint, than the friends of compromise, representing here, as in theSenate, the substantial sentiment of the border slave-States, made asincere effort to take control and bring about the peaceablearrangement and adjustment of what they assumed to be the extremedifferences between the South and the North. Mr. Boteler, of Virginia, seizing the momentary leadership, moved to amend by referring so muchof the message "as relates to the present perilous condition of thecountry" to a special committee of one from each State. The Union beingat that time composed of thirty-three States, this committee becameknown as the Committee of Thirty-three. Several other amendments wereoffered but objected to, and the previous question having been ordered, the amendment was agreed to and the committee raised by a vote of 145yeas to 38 nays; the negative vote coming, in the main, from the morepronounced anti-slavery men. [Sidenote] "Globe, " Dec. 4, 1860, p. 7. [Sidenote] Ibid. [Sidenote] Ibid. [Sidenote] Ibid. [Sidenote] Ibid. [Sidenote] "Globe, " Dec. 4, 1860. P. 7. [Illustration: JUSTIN S. MURPHY. ] Though this was the first roll-call of the session, the disunionconspirators, one after another, made haste to declare the treasonableattitude of their States. Pending the vote, Mr. Singleton declinedrecording his name for the reason that Mississippi had called aconvention to consider this subject. He was not sent here for thepurpose of making any compromise or to patch up existing difficulties. Mr. Jones, of Georgia, said he did not vote on this question becausehis State, like Mississippi, had called a convention to decide allthese questions of Federal relations. Mr. Hawkins, of Florida, said hispeople had resolved to determine, in convention in their sovereigncapacity, the time, place, and manner of redress. It was not for him totake any action on the subject. His State was opposed to all and everycompromise. The day of compromise was past. Mr. Clopton, of Alabama, declined voting because the State of Alabama is proceeding to considerin a convention what action is required to maintain her rights, honor, and safety. Believing that a State has the right to secede, and thatthe only remedy for present evils is secession, he would not hold outany delusive hope or sanction any temporizing policy. Mr. Miles, ofSouth Carolina, said "the South Carolina delegation have not voted onthis question because they conceive they have no interest in it. Weconsider our State as already withdrawn from the confederacy ineverything except form. " Mr. Pugh, of Alabama, said: "As my State ofAlabama intends following South Carolina out of the Union by the 10thof January next, I pay no attention to any action taken in this body. " [Sidenote] "Globe, " Dec. 10, 1860, p. 36, 37. These proceedings occurred on the second day of the session, December4; two days later the Speaker announced the committee, placing at thehead, as chairman, Thomas Corwin, of Ohio, and appointing such membersfrom the different States as to make it of marked influence andability; the disunion faction being distinctly recognized by severalextreme representatives. The names were announced on Thursday, December6;[1] and at the close of the day's session the House adjourned to thefollowing Monday, the 10th, on which day the general discussion wasfairly launched on the request of Mr. Hawkins, of Florida, to beexcused from serving on the committee. He said he had asked theopinions of many Southern Members, and, with one or two exceptions, they most cordially agreed with the course he had taken. To serve onthe committee would place him in a false position. Florida had takenthe initiative; her Legislature had ordered an election to choosemembers to a convention to be convened on the 3d day of January, 1861. The committee was a Trojan horse to gain time and demoralize the South;he regretted that it emanated from a Virginia Representative. He wouldtell the North that Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and SouthCarolina were certain to secede from the Union within a short period. Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas were certain to follow within theensuing six months. Three Democratic Representatives responded to this outburst, theRepublican members of the House, as in the Senate, remaining discreetlysilent. These Democratic speakers alleged an unfair composition of thecommittee, and joined in denouncing the Republican party. But upon thevital and practical question of disunion their utterances were widelydivergent. As the name of each of them will assume a degree ofhistorical prominence in the further development of the rebellion, short quotations from their remarks made at that early period will beread with interest. Daniel E. Sickles, of New York, said: [Sidenote] "Globe, " Dec. 10, 1860, pp. 40, 41. The city of New York will cling to the Union to the last; while she will look upon the last hour of its existence as we would upon the setting sun if we were never to see it more, yet when the call for force comes--let it come when it may--no man will ever pass the boundaries of the city of New York for the purpose of waging war against any State of this Union which, through its constituted authorities and sustained by the voice of its people, solemnly declares its rights, its interests, and its honor demand that it should seek safety in a separate existence. .. . The city of New York is now a subjugated dependency of a fanatical and puritanical State government that never thinks of the city except to send its tax-gatherers among us or to impose upon us hateful officials, alien to our interests and sympathies, to eat up the substance of the people by their legalized extortions. .. . Nothing has prevented the city of New York from asserting her right to govern herself, except that provision of the Federal Constitution which prohibits a State from being divided without its own consent. .. . When that restraint shall no longer exist, when the obligation of those constitutional provisions, which forbid the division of a State without its own consent, shall be suspended, then I tell you that imperial city will throw off the odious government to which she now yields a reluctant allegiance; she will repel the hateful cabal at Albany, which has so long abused its power over her, and with her own flag sustained by the courage and devotion of her own gallant sons, she will, as a free city, open wide her gates to the civilization and commerce of the world. Doubtless the secessionists drew hopeful auguries and fresh inspirationfrom this and other visionary talk frequent amid the unsteady politicalthought of that day. But, if so, it would have been wiser to ponderdeeply the significance of the following utterances coming from adifferent quarter, and representing a more persistent influence, a moreextended geographical area, and a greater numerical force. Clement L. Vallandigham, of Ohio, said: [Sidenote] "Globe, " Dec. 10, 1860, p. 38. I speak now as a Western man; and I thank the gentleman from Florida heartily for the kindly sentiments towards that great West to which he has given utterance. Most cordially I reciprocate them, one and all. Sir, we of the North-west have a deeper interest in the preservation of this Government in its present form than any other section of the Union. Hemmed in, isolated, cut off from the seaboard upon every side; a thousand miles and more from the mouth of the Mississippi, the free navigation of which under the law of nations we demand and will have at every cost; with nothing else but our other great inland seas, the lakes, and their outlet, too, through a foreign country--what is to be our destiny? Sir, we have fifteen hundred miles of Southern frontier, and but a little narrow strip of eighty miles, or less, from Virginia to Lake Erie bounding us upon the East. Ohio is the isthmus that connects the South with the British possessions, and the East with the West. The Rocky Mountains separate us from the Pacific. Where is to be our outlet! What are we to do when you shall have broken up and destroyed this government? We are seven States now, with fourteen Senators and fifty-one Representatives, and a population of nine millions. We have an empire equal in area to the third of all Europe, and we do not mean to be a dependency or province either of the East or of the South; nor yet an inferior or secondary power upon this continent; and if we cannot secure a maritime boundary upon other terms, we will cleave our way to the seacoast with the sword. A nation of warriors we may be; a tribe of shepherds never. No less outspoken were the similar declarations of John A. McClernand, of Illinois, who said the question of secession disclosed to his visiona boundless sea of horrors. [Sidenote] "Globe, " Dec. 10, 1860, p. 39. Peaceable secession, in my judgment, is a fatal, a deadly illusion. .. . If I am asked, Why so? I retort the question. How can it be otherwise? How are questions of public debt, public archives, public lands, and other public property, and, above all, the questions of boundary to be settled? Will it be replied that, while we are mutually unwilling now to yield anything, we will be mutually willing, after awhile, to concede everything? That, while we mutually refuse to concede anything now for the sake of national unity, we will be mutually ready to concede everything by and by for the sake of national duality? Who believes this? What, too, would be the fate of the youthful but giant Northwest in the event of a separation of the slave-holding from the non-slave-holding States? Cut off from the main Mississippi and the Gulf of Mexico on one hand, or from the eastern Atlantic ports on the other, she would gradually sink into a pastoral state, and to a standard of national inferiority. This the hardy and adventurous millions of the North-west would be unwilling to consent to. This they would not do. Rather would they, to the last man, perish upon the battlefield. No power on earth could restrain them from freely and unconditionally communicating with the Gulf and the great mart of New York. [Sidenote] Ibid. , Dec. 10, 1860, p. 59. No further noteworthy discussion occurred for a time, except thedeclaration of Mr. Cobb, of Alabama, that if anything were done to savehis State it must be done immediately. The election for delegates tothe convention would take place on the 24th of that month, and theconvention would meet on the 7th of the next month. His State would notremain in this Confederacy longer than the 15th of January unlesssomething were done. [Sidenote] Ibid. The House refused to excuse the several objecting members from servingon the committee; and the temper in which they proceeded to thedischarge of their duty is perhaps best illustrated by the remarks ofRepresentative Reuben Davis, of Mississippi. He said he could "butregard this committee as a tub thrown out to the whale, to amuse only, until the 4th of March next, and thus arrest the present noble andmanly movements of the Southern States to provide by that day for theirsecurity and safety out of the Union. With these views I take my placeon the committee for the purpose of preventing it being made a means ofdeception by which the public mind is to be misled and misguided; yetintending honestly and patriotically to entertain any fair propositionfor adjustment of pending evils which the Republican members maysubmit. " On Wednesday, December 12, the morning hour was by agreement set apartfor receiving all bills and resolutions to be submitted to theCommittee of Thirty-three. They were duly read and referred, withoutdebate, to the number of twenty-three. [2] They came principally fromNorthern members, though all four parties of the late Presidentialcampaign were represented, the attitude of which they mainly reflected. In substance, therefore, they embodied the same medley of affirmationsand denials, of charges and countercharges, of evasions and subterfugeswhich party discussion had worn threadbare. These twenty-three propositions, which were by subsequent additionsincreased to forty or fifty, exhibit such a variety of legislativeplans that it is impossible to subject them to any classification. Theygive us an abstract of the divergent views which Members of Congressentertained concerning the cause of the crisis and its remedy. Theyrange in purport from a mere assertion of the duty of preserving andadministering the government as then existing, in its simple form andsymmetrical structure, to proposals to destroy and change it to acomplex machine, fantastic in proportion and impracticable in itsworkings. They afford us evidence of the bewilderment which besetCongress as well as the outside public, and not so much the absence ofreasonable political principles as the absence of a simple and directpolitical will, which would resolutely insist that recognizedprinciples and existing laws should be respected and obeyed. [Sidenote] "Globe, " Dec. 12, 1860, p. 77. [Sidenote] Ibid. , p. 78. Among the propositions submitted then and afterwards were several wildand visionary projects of government. Thus Mr. Jenkins, a Virginiamember, proposed an arrangement requiring separate sanction of theslave-holding interest to each and every operation of government; adual executive; a dual senate, or dual majority of the senate, or otheradvisory body or council. Mr. Noell, of Missouri, proposed to abolishthe office of President, create an executive council of three members, from districts of contiguous States, give each member the veto power, and establish equilibrium between the free and the slave-States in theSenate by voluntary division of some of the slave-States. [Sidenote] Ibid. , Dec. 13, 1860, pp. 82, 83. Stronger minds were not entirely free from the infection of this maniafor innovation and experiment. On the 13th of December, 1860, AndrewJohnson, of Tennessee, afterwards President of the United States, submitted to the Senate a proposal to amend the Constitution insubstance as follows: That the Presidential election should take placein August; that a popular plurality in each district should count asone vote; that Congress should count the votes on the second Monday ofOctober; that the President chosen in 1864 be from a slave-holdingState, and the Vice-President from a free-State; and in 1868 thePresident be from a free-State and the Vice-President from a slaveState, and so alternating every four years. Senators to be elected byvote of the people. Federal judges to be divided so that one-third ofthe number would be chosen every fourth year; the term of office to betwelve years; also all vacancies to be filled, half from free and halffrom slave States, the Territories to be divided, establishing slaverysouth and prohibiting it north of a fixed line, and providing thatthree-fifths representation and inter-State slave trade shall not bechanged. [Sidenote] "Globe, " Feb. 7, 1861, pp. 794, 795. Perhaps the most complicated project of government was that gravelysuggested in the House on the 7th of February, 1861, by Clement L. Vallandigham, of Ohio, who, not content with the clogs of a dual form, proposed the following absurd quadruple machinery: The Union to bedivided into four sections: North, West, Pacific, and South. On demandof one-third of the Senators from any section, for any action to whichthe concurrence of the House of Representatives may be necessary, --excepton adjournment, --a vote shall be by sections, and a majority ofSenators from each section shall be necessary to the validity of suchaction. A majority of all the electors in each of the four sections tobe necessary to choice of President and Vice-President; they shouldhold the office six years; not to be eligible to reëlection except byvote of two-thirds of the electors of each section; or of the States ofeach section whenever the choice devolved upon the Legislature;Congress to provide for the election of President and Vice-Presidentwhen electors failed. No State might secede without consent of theLegislatures of all States of that section, the President to have powerto adjust differences with seceding States, the terms of agreement tobe submitted to Congress; neither Congress nor Territorial Legislaturesshould have power to interfere with citizens immigrating--on equalterms--to the Territories, nor to interfere with the rights of personor property in the Territories. New States to be admitted on an equalfooting with old ones. The adoption of any or all of the legislative nostrums which wereseverally suggested, presupposed a willingness on the part of the Southto carry them out and be governed thereby. The authors of theseprojects lost sight of the vital difficulty, that if the South refusedobedience to laws in the past she would equally refuse obedience to anyin the future when they became unpalatable. It was not temporarysatisfaction, but perpetual domination which she demanded. She did notneed an amendment of the fugitive-slave act, or a repeal of personalliberty bills, but a change in the public sentiment of the free-States. Give her the simple affirmation that slaves are property, to berecognized and protected like other property, embody the proposition inthe Constitution, and secure its popular acceptance, and she would snapher fingers at an enumeration of other details. Fugitive-slave laws, inter-State slave trade, a Congressional slave code, right of transitand sojourn in the free States, compensation for runaways, new slaveStates, and a majority in the United States Senate would follow, asinevitably as that the well planted acorn expands by the forces ofnature into roots, trunk, limbs, twigs, and foliage. This was whatJefferson Davis formulated in discussing his Senate resolutions ofFebruary, 1860, [3] and the doctrine for which Yancey rent theCharleston Convention in twain. This is what Jefferson Davis wouldagain demand of the Senate Committee of Thirteen; and, knowing theNorth would never concede it, he would, even prior to the demand, joinin instigating and proclaiming secession. ----------[1] The following were members of the Committee of Thirty-three:Messrs. Thomas Corwin, of Ohio; John S. Millson, of Virginia; CharlesF. Adams, of Massachusetts; Warren Winslow, of North Carolina; JamesHumphrey, of New York; William W. Boyce, of South Carolina; James H. Campbell, of Pennsylvania; Peter E. Love, of Georgia; Orris S. Ferry, of Connecticut; Henry Winter Davis, of Maryland; Christopher Robinson, of Rhode Island; William G. Whiteley, of Delaware; Mason W. Tappan, ofNew Hampshire; John L. N. Stratton, of New Jersey; Francis M. Bristow, of Kentucky; Justin S. Morrill, of Vermont; Thomas A. R. Nelson, ofTennessee; William McKee Dunn, of Indiana; Miles Taylor, of Louisiana;Reuben Davis, of Mississippi; William Kellogg, of Illinois; George S. Houston, of Alabama; Freeman H. Morse, of Maine; John S. Phelps, ofMissouri; Albert Rust, of Arkansas; William A. Howard, of Michigan;George S. Hawkins, of Florida; Andrew J. Hamilton, of Texas; CadwaladerC. Washburn, of Wisconsin; Samuel E. Curtis, of Iowa; John C. Burch, ofCalifornia; William Windom, of Minnesota; and Lansing Stout, ofOregon. --"Globe, " December 6, 1860, page 22. [2] Below are brief extracts of the salient points of twenty-one ofthem; the other two, are given in the text: 1. By Eli Thayer, of Massachusetts: No further acquisition ofterritory. No Congressional legislation about slavery. Presidentialelectors to be chosen by districts. 2. By John Cochrane, of New York: Divide the Territories on the line of36º 30', prohibiting slavery north and permitting it south. Noprohibition of inter-State slave trade. Unrestricted right of transitand sojourn with slaves in free States. Personal liberty laws to benull and void. 3. By Garnett B. Adrain, of New Jersey: Non-intervention by Congress. Repeal of personal liberty laws. Fraternity, conciliation, andcompromise. 4. By Edward Joy Morris, of Pennsylvania: To investigate personalliberty laws, and suggest amendments to fugitive-slave law. 5. By James A. Stewart, of Maryland: Investigation to secureconstitutional rights of States in the Union. If this be impracticable, to investigate best mode of separation. 6. By Shelton F. Leake, of Virginia: No constitutional power to abolishslavery or slave-trade in the States, Territories, or District ofColumbia. Protection to slavery in Territories, and in transit throughor sojourn in free-States. Fugitive slaves lost through Statelegislation, or by act of State authorities, to be paid for. 7. By William Smith, of Virginia: Declare out of the Union every Statewhich shall by her legislation aim to nullify an act of Congress. 8. By Samuel S. Cox, of Ohio: Punishment of executives, judges, attorney-general, or other officers who obstruct the execution of thefugitive-slave law. 9. By John Hutchins, of Ohio: Laws against kidnaping, lynching, orunreasonable search or seizure. 10. By John Sherman, of Ohio: Laws to enforce all obligations imposedby the Constitution. Division of all Territory into States, and theirprompt admission into the Union. 11. By John A. Bingham, of Ohio: Laws to suppress rebellion, to protectUnited States property against unlawful seizure and citizens againstunlawful violence. 12. By Robert Mallory, of Kentucky: Prohibit slavery north and protectit south of the line of 30º 36'. Admit States with or without slavery. No prohibition or abolition of the inter-State slave trade or slaveryin the District of Columbia, or in arsenals, dockyards, etc. , of theUnited States. 13. By John W. Stevenson, of Kentucky: Declare resistance tofugitive-slave law, or rescue of slaves from custody of officers, felony. 14. By William H. English, of Indiana: Divide Territories. Congressshall not impair right of property in slaves. Double compensation fromcities, counties, or townships for slaves rescued by mob violence orState legislation. 15. By David Kilgore, of Indiana: Trial by jury and writ of error underfugitive-slave law. Criminal prosecution against forcible hindrance orrescue of fugitives. Payment by the United States for fugitives rescuedby force. 16. By William S. Holman, of Indiana: The Constitution is a compact ofmutual and permanent obligation. No right of secession. Laws should beenforced in good faith and with temperate firmness. Ample legalprovision against any attempt to nullify the laws. 17. By William E. Niblack, of Indiana: Payment by offending cities, counties, or districts for fugitive slaves rescued. 18. By John A. McClernand, of Illinois: Indemnity for fugitive slavesrescued. A special Federal police to execute United States laws, andsuppress unlawful resistance thereof. 19. By Thomas C. Hindman, of Arkansas: Right of property in slaves inslave-States. No interdiction of inter-State slave trade. Protection ofslavery in all Territories. Admission of States with or withoutslavery. Right to hold slaves in transit through free-States. DepriveStates enacting personal liberty laws of representation in Congress. Give slave-holding States an absolute negative upon all action ofCongress relating to slavery. States to appoint the officers exercisingFederal functions within their limits. Make these provisions, togetherwith three-fifths representation, unrepealable. 20. By Charles H. Larrabee, of Wisconsin: A convention to amendConstitution. 21. By Thomas L. Anderson, of Missouri: Submit to the Supreme Court ofthe United States the questions at issue between the slave-holding andnon-slave-holding States. Carry into effect by law the opinion of saidCourt as a final settlement. (Submitted Dec. 13. )--"Globe, " Dec. 12 and13, 1860, pp. 76-79, and 96. [3] "We want nothing more than a simple declaration that negro slavesare property, and we want the recognition of the obligation of theFederal Government to protect that property like all other. " SenateSpeech, "Globe, " May 17, 1860, p. 2155. CHAPTER XXVIII THE CONSPIRACY PROCLAIMED To a great majority of the people the hopes and chances of a successfulcompromise seemed still cheering and propitious. There was indeed aprevailing agitation in the Southern part of the Union, but it hadtaken a virulent form in less than half a dozen States. In most ofthese a decided majority still deprecated disunion. Three of the greatpolitical parties of the country were by the voice of their leaderspledged to peace and order; the fourth, apparently controlled as yet bythe powerful influences of official subordination and patronage, must, so it seemed, yield to the now expressed and public advice of thePresident in favor of Union and the enforcement of the law; especiallyin view of the forbearance and kindness he was personally exercisingtowards the unruly elements of his faction. Throughout the NorthernStates the folly and evils of disunion appeared so palpable that it wasnot generally regarded as an imminent danger, but rather as merely apossible though not probable event. The hasty and seemingly earnestaction of the people and authorities of South Carolina was looked uponas a historical repetition of the nullification crisis of 1831-32; andwithout examining too closely the real present condition of affairs, men hoped, rather than intelligently expected, that the parallel wouldcontinue to the end. Some sort of compromise of the nature of that of1850 was the prevailing preoccupation in politics. This was the popular view of the situation. But it was an erroneousview, because it lacked the essential information necessary to form acorrect and solid judgment. The deep estrangement between the sectionswas imperfectly realized. The existence of four parties, a very unusualoccurrence in American politics, had seriously weakened party cohesion, and more than quadrupled party prejudice and mistrust. There was astrong undercurrent of conviction and purpose, not expressed inspeeches and platforms. But the most serious ignorance was in respectto the character and fidelity of the high officers of the Government. Of the timidity of Mr. Buchanan, of the treachery of three members ofthe Cabinet, of the exclusion of General Scott from military councils, of the President's refusal to send troops to Anderson, of hisstipulation with the South Carolina Members, of the intrigue whichdrove General Cass from the head of the State Department and from theCabinet, the people at large knew nothing, or so little that they couldput no intelligent construction upon the events. The debates ofCongress shed the first clear light upon the situation, but the veryviolence and bitterness of the secession speeches caused the multitudeto doubt their sincerity, or placed their authors in the category offanatics who would gain no followers. While, therefore, the Republicans in Congress and in the countrymaintained, as a rule, an expectant and watchful silence, theconservatives, made up for the greater part of the supporters of Belland Everett, were active in setting on foot a movement for compromise, in the final success of which they had the fullest confidence; and itis but justice to their integrity and ability to add that thisconfidence was warranted by the delusive indications of surfacepolitics. Highly patriotic in purpose and prudent in act, their leadingmen in Congress had promptly opposed secession, had moved a SenateCommittee of Thirteen, and secured the appointment and the organizationof the House Committee of Thirty-three. Already some twenty-threedifferent propositions of adjustment had been submitted to thiscommittee, and under the circumstances it actually seemed as if only alittle patience and patriotic earnestness were needed to find acompromise, --perhaps an amendment of the Constitution, --which thefeverish unrest and impatience of the nation would compel Congress toenact or propose, and the different States and sections, willing orunwilling, to accept arid ratify. Superior political wisdom and more thorough information, as well as afiner strategy, a quicker enthusiasm, and a more unremitting industry, must be accorded to the conspirators who now labored night and day inthe interest of disunion. They discerned more clearly than theiropponents the demoralization of parties at the North, the latentrevolutionary discontent at the South, the influence of brilliant andcombined leadership, and the social, commercial, and politicalconditions which might be brought into action. They recognized thatthey were but a minority, a faction; but they also realized that assuch they had a substantial control of from six to eleven Stateswhenever they chose to make that control effective, and that, forpresent uses at least, the President was, under their influence, but asclay in the hands of the potter. Better than the Republicans from the North, or even the conservativesfrom the border States, they knew that in the Cotton States awidespread change of popular sentiment was then being wrought and mightvery soon be complete. Except upon the extreme alternative of disunion, the people of the border States were eager to espouse their quarrel, and join them in a contest for alleged political rights. Nearly halfthe people of the North were ready to acknowledge the justness of theircomplaints. The election of Lincoln was indeed a flimsy pretext forseparation, but it had the merit of universal publicity, and ofrankling irritation among the unthinking masses of the South. Agriculture was depressed, commerce was in panic, manufacturingpopulations were in want, the national treasury was empty, the army wasdispersed, the navy was scattered. The national prestige was humbled, the national sentiment despondent, the national faith disturbed. Meanwhile their intrigues had been successful beyond hope. TheGovernment was publicly committed to the fatal doctrine ofnon-coercion, and was secretly pursuing the equally fatal policy ofconcession. Reënforeements had been withheld from Charleston, and must, from motives of consistency, be withheld from all other forts andstations. An unofficial stipulation, with the President, and aperemptory order to Anderson, secured beyond chance the safe and earlysecession of South Carolina, and the easy seizure of the Governmentproperty. The representatives of foreign governments were alreadysecretly coquetting for the favor of a free port and an advantageouscotton-market. Friendly voices came to the South from the North, inprivate correspondence, in the public press, even in the open debatesof Congress, promising that cities should go up in flames and the faircountry be laid waste before a single Northern bayonet should molestthem in their meditated secession. Upon such a real or assumed state of facts the conspirators based theirtheory, and risked their chances of success in dismembering therepublic, --and it must be admitted that they chose their opportunitywith a skill and foresight which for a considerable period of time gavethem immense advantages over the friends of the Union. One vitalcondition of success, however, they strangely overlooked, or rather, perhaps, deliberately crowded out of their problem--the chance of civilwar, without foreign intervention. For the present their whole plandepended upon the assumption that they could accomplish their end bymeans of the single instrumentality of peaceable secession; and withthis view they proceeded to put their scheme into prompt execution. [Sidenote] Correspondence New York "Tribune", Dec. 10, 1860. The House Committee of Thirty-three had been organized by the selectionof Thomas Corwin as its chairman, and had entered hopefully upon thetask confided to it. A caucus of active conspirators was said to havebeen held the week previous, to intimidate the members from the CottonStates and induce them to refuse to serve on the committee, but thiscoercive movement only partly succeeded. The Committee of Thirty-threeheld a long meeting on December 12, and now, on the morning of the13th, was once more convened for work. The informal propositions anddiscussions of the day previous were renewed, but resulted only incalling out views and schemes too vague on the one hand or too extremeon the other. The subject was about to be laid over to the followingSaturday, when Albert Rust, of Arkansas, startled the committee withthe information that the extremists were obtaining signatures to apaper to announce to the South that no further concession was expectedfrom the North, and that any adjustment of pending difficulties hadbecome impossible. He, therefore, offered a resolution to meet thisunexpected crisis, but accepted the following substitute, offered byWilliam McKee Dunn, of Indiana: _Resolved_, That in the opinion of this Committee, the existing discontent among the Southern people and the growing hostility among them to the Federal Government are greatly to be regretted, and that whether such discontent and hostility are without just cause or not, any reasonable, proper, and constitutional remedies and effectual guarantees of their peculiar rights and interests, as recognized by the Constitution, necessary to preserve the peace of the country and the perpetuation of the Union, should be promptly and cheerfully granted. [Sidenote] Proceedings of the committee and card of Hon. Reuben Davis, "National Intelligencer, " Dec. 14 and 15, 1860. [Sidenote] Gen. Scott, "Autobiography, " Vol. II. , p. 613. Other amendments were voted down, and this proposition was adopted by avote of twenty-two to eight, and thus, in good faith, a tender ofreasonable concession and honorable and satisfactory compromise wasmade by the North to the South. But the peace-offering was a waste ofpatience and good-will. Caucus after caucus of the secession leadershad only grown more aggressive, and deepened and strengthened theirinflexible purpose to push the country into disunion. The presence ofGeneral Scott, who after a long illness had come from New York toWashington, on December 12, to give his urgent advice to the work ofcounteracting secession by vigorous military preparation, did notdisconcert or hinder the secession leaders. His patriotic appeal to theSecretary of War on the 13th naturally fell without effect upon theears of one of their active confederates. Neither the temporizingconcession of the President nor the conciliatory and half-apologeticresolution of the Committee of Thirty-three for one instant changed oraffected the determination to destroy the Government and dissolve theUnion. Friday, December 14, 1860, was a day of gloom and despondency in Mr. Buchanan's office, bringing to his mind more forcibly than he had everbefore realized the utter wreck into which he had guided hisAdministration. To the jubilant secessionists it was not only a day oftriumph achieved, but also of apparently assured successes yet to come. The hitherto official organ of the Administration in its issue of thefollowing morning contained two publications which gave startlingnotice to the country of the weakness of the right and the strength ofthe wrong in the swiftly approaching struggle for national existence. The first of these documents was a proclamation from the President ofthe United States, saying that in response to numerous appeals hedesignated the fourth day of January, proximo, as a day of humiliation, fasting, and prayer. The "dangerous and distracted condition of ourcountry" was therein thus set forth: [Sidenote] Washington "Constitution, " Dec. 15, 1860. The Union of the States is at the present moment threatened with alarming and immediate danger--panic and distress of a fearful character prevail throughout the land--our laboring population are without employment, and consequently deprived of the means of earning their bread--indeed, hope seems to have deserted the minds of men. All classes are in a state of confusion and dismay, and the wisest counsels of our best and purest men are wholly disregarded. .. . Humbling ourselves before the Most High, . .. Let us implore him to remove from our hearts that false pride of opinion which would impel us to persevere in wrong for the sake of consistency, rather than yield a just submission to the unforeseen exigencies by which we are now surrounded. .. . An omnipotent Providence may overrule existing evils for permanent good. The second manifesto was more practical and resolute. As the firstpublic and combined action of the conspirators, it forms the hinge uponwhich they well-nigh turned the fate of the New World Republic. It wasa brief document, but contained and expressed all the essentialpurposes of the conspiracy. It was signed by about one-half theSenators and Representatives of the States of North Carolina, SouthCarolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Florida, Texas, andArkansas. It precedes every ordinance of secession, and is the"official" beginning of the subsequent "Confederate States, " just asGovernor Gist's October circular was the "official" beginning of SouthCarolina secession. [Sidenote] Washington "Constitution, " Dec. 15, 1860. ADDRESS OF CERTAIN SOUTHERN MEMBERS OF CONGRESS. TO OUR CONSTITUENTS. WASHINGTON, Dec. 14, 1860. The argument is exhausted. All hope of relief in the Union through the agency of committees, Congressional legislation, or constitutional amendments is extinguished, and we trust the South will not be deceived by appearances or the pretense of new guarantees. In our judgment the Republicans are resolute in the purpose to grant nothing that will or ought to satisfy the South. We are satisfied the honor, safety, and independence of the Southern people require the organization of a Southern Confederacy--a result to be obtained only by separate State secession--that the primary object of each slave-holding State ought to be its speedy and absolute separation from a Union with hostile States. J. L. Pugh of Alabama. David Clopton of Alabama. Sydenham Moore of Alabama. J. L. M. Curry of Alabama. J. A. Stallworth of Alabama. J. W. H. Underwood of Georgia. L. J. Gartrell of Georgia. James Jackson of Georgia. John J. Jones of Georgia. Martin J. Crawford of Georgia. Alfred Iverson, U. S. Senator, Georgia. George S. Hawkins of Florida. T. C. Hindman of Arkansas. Jefferson Davis, U. S. Senator, Mississippi. A. G. Brown, U. S. Senator, Mississippi. Wm. Barksdale of Mississippi. O. R. Singleton of Mississippi. Reuben Davis of Mississippi. Burton Craige of North Carolina. Thomas Ruffin of North Carolina. John Slidell, U. S. Senator, Louisiana. J. P. Benjamin, U. S. Senator, Louisiana. J. M. Landrum of Louisiana. Louis T. Wigfall, U. S. Senator, Texas. John Hemphill, U. S. Senator, Texas. J. H. Reagan of Texas. M. L. Bonham of South Carolina. Wm. Porcher Miles of South Carolina. John McQueen of South Carolina. John D. Ashmore of South Carolina. This proclamation of revolution, when analyzed, reveals with sufficientclearness the design and industry with which the conspirators were stepby step building up their preconcerted movement of secession andrebellion. Every justifying allegation in the document was notoriouslyuntrue. Instead of the argument being exhausted, it was scarcely begun. So farfrom Congressional or constitutional relief having been refused, theSouthern demand for them had not been formulated. Not only had nocommittee denied hearing or action, but the Democratic Senate, at theinstance of a Southern State, had ordered the Committee of Thirteen, which the Democratic and Southern Vice-President had not yet evenappointed; and when the names were announced a week later, JeffersonDavis, one of the signers of this complaint of non-action, was the onlyman who refused to serve on the committee--a refusal he withdrew whenpersuaded by his co-conspirators that he could better aid their designsby accepting. On the other hand, the Committee of Thirty-three, raisedby the Republican House, appointed by a Northern Speaker, and presidedover by a Northern chairman, had the day before by more than atwo-thirds vote distinctly tendered the Southern people "any reasonable, proper, and constitutional remedies and effectual guarantees. " Outside of Congressional circles there was the same absence of any newcomplications, any new threats, any new dangers from the North. Sincethe day when Abraham Lincoln was elected President there had beenabsolutely no change of word or act in the attitude and intention ofhimself or his followers. By no possibility could they exert a particleof adverse political power, executive, legislative, or judicial, fornearly three months. Not only was executive authority in the hands of aDemocratic Administration, which had made itself the peculiar championof the Southern party, but it had yielded every successive demand ofadministrative policy made by the conspirators themselves. The signersof this address to their Southern constituents had not one singleexcuse. CHAPTER XXIX THE FORTY MUSKETS Like the commandant of Fort Moultrie, the other officers of thegarrison keenly watched the development of hostile public sentiment, and the steady progress of the secession movement. Some had their wivesand families with them, and to the apprehensions for the honor of theirflag, and the welfare of their country, was added a tenderer solicitudethan even that which they felt for their own lives and persons. Hostility from the constituted authorities of South Carolina or atumultuary outbreak of the Charleston rabble was liable to bringoverwhelming numbers down upon them at any hour of the day or night. The special study of this danger, or rather of the means to meet andcounteract it, fell to Captain J. G. Foster, of the engineer corps, whohad been assigned to the charge of these fortifications on the 1st ofSeptember. But his services were also in demand elsewhere, and for morethan two months afterwards the works at Baltimore appear to haveclaimed the larger part of his time. On the day after the Presidentialelection he was directed to give the Charleston forts his personalsupervision, and he arrived there on the 11th of November, remainingthenceforward till the surrender of Sumter. [Sidenote] Lieut. Breck to Major Deas, June 18, 1860. In time of peace, the administration of military affairs in the UnitedStates is somewhat spasmodic, resulting directly and unavoidably fromthe fact of our maintaining only the merest skeleton of a standing armycompared to the vast territorial extent of the Union. As an incident ofthis system, Fort Moultrie had been allowed to become defenseless. "Achild ten years old can easily come into the fort over the sand-banks, "wrote an officer June 18, 1860, "and the wall offers little or noobstacle. " "The ease with which the walls can now be got over withoutany assistance renders the place more of a trap, in which the garrisonmay be shot down from the parapet, than a means of defense. To personslooking on it appears strange, not to say ridiculous, that the onlygarrisoned fort in the harbor should be so much banked in with sand, that the walls in some places are not one foot above the tops of thebanks. " [Sidenote] Foster to De Russy, Nov. 14, 1860, W. R. Vol. I. , p. 73. By the 14th of November Captain Foster had removed the sand which haddrifted against the walls, repaired the latter, and supplied certainexpedients in the way of temporary obstructions and defenses which weresuggested by his professional skill, and available within hisresources. "I have made these temporary defenses as inexpensive aspossible, " he writes, "and they consist simply of a stout board fenceten feet high, surmounted by strips filled with nail-points, with a drybrick wall two bricks thick on the inside, raised to the height of aman's head, and pierced with embrasures and a sufficient number ofloop-holes. Their immediate construction has satisfied and gratifiedthe commanding officer, Colonel Gardiner, and they are, I think, adequate to the present wants of the garrison. " Of what avail, however, all the resources of engineering science, whereforts were absolutely soldierless, and their walls without even asolitary sentinel? This was the condition of Fort Sumter and CastlePinckney, after weeks of warning and positive entreaty to theGovernment at Washington, by engineer, inspectors, and commandantsalike, all without having brought one word of encouragement or a singlerecruit. But though the President and Secretary of War neglected their properduty, Captain Foster did not remit his efforts. The exposed conditionof these two priceless forts was the daily burden of his thoughts. Under Colonel Gardiner he had asked for forty muskets to arm hisworkmen to defend Sumter. The engineer bureau at Washington, secondingthe suggestion, had obtained the approval of the Secretary of War, andhad issued the order to the storekeeper of the Charleston arsenal. Butwhen the matter was brought to the notice of Colonel Gardiner heobjected. He was unwilling that this expedient, of doubtful utility atbest, should serve as an excuse to the Secretary of War to refuse tosend him the substantial reënforcement of two regular companies andfifty drilled recruits which he had requested. [Sidenote] Foster to De Russy, Nov. 24, 1860. W. R. Vol. I. , p. 77. [Sidenote] Ibid. , Dec. 2, 1860. [Sidenote] Indorsement, Dec. 6 and 7. W. R. Vol. I. , pp. 83, 84. [Sidenote] Wright to Foster, Nov. 28, 1860. W. R. Vol. I. , p. 78. [Sidenote] Foster to De Russy, Dec. 2, 1860. [Sidenote] Indorsement, Dec. 6 and 7. It has already been stated how Colonel Gardiner, instead of obtaininghis reënforcements, lost his command, and as a consequence CaptainFoster's order for the forty muskets was duly put to slumber in apigeon-hole at the arsenal. When Major Anderson arrived and assumedcontrol he not only, as we have seen, repeated the demand foradditional troops, but recognizing at a glance the immense interests atstake had himself renewed to Captain Foster the suggestion about armingsome engineer workmen. Captain Foster promptly made the application tothe department for permission, and soon after for arms. Permission camein due course of mail; but by this time Secretary Floyd would issue noorder for the hundred muskets asked for. [Sidenote] Foster to De Russy, Dec. 4, 1860, W. R. Vol. I. , p. 85. Nevertheless, the working party of thirty was quartered in CastlePinckney as quietly as possible, in order not to irritate the sensitiveCharlestonians, and the officers and overseers in the two forts wereinstructed to sound and test the loyalty and trustworthiness of themechanics and laborers. Those in Sumter had been brought fromBaltimore, and in them Captain Foster placed his greatest hopes; butthey disappointed him. On December 3 his overseer informed him thatwhile they professed a willingness to resist a mob, they weredisinclined to fight any organized volunteer force, and he wasreluctantly compelled to abandon the scheme, at least as to FortSumter. But he still clung to the hope that the thirty men sent toCastle Pinckney, having been chosen with more care, might prove of someservice in the hour of need. He gave orders to his officers to resistto the utmost any demands or attempts on the works, "Having done thusmuch, " he wrote to the department, "which is all I can do in thisrespect, I feel that I have done my duty, and that if any overt acttakes place, no blame can properly attach to me. I regret, however, that sufficient soldiers are not in this harbor to garrison these twoworks. The Government will soon have to decide the question whether tomaintain them or to give them up to South Carolina. If it be decided tomaintain them, troops must instantly be sent and in large numbers. " Though neither Major Anderson nor Captain Foster could obtain anyofficial replies to distinct and vital questions involving the issue ofpeace or war, a trivial episode soon furnished them a very broad hintas to what the Secretary of War would ultimately do about the forts. [Sidenote] Ibid. , Dec. 20, 1860. W. R. Vol. I. , p. 100. On the same day on which, the South Carolina secession convention metat Columbia, the State capital, Captain Foster had occasion to go tothe United States arsenal in the city of Charleston to procure somemachinery used in mounting heavy guns. While there he remembered thattwo ordnance sergeants, respectively in charge of Fort Sumter andCastle Pinckney, had applied to him for the arms to which they were byregulations entitled. He therefore asked the military storekeeper incharge of the arsenal for two muskets and accouterments for those twosergeants. The storekeeper replied that he had no authority for theissue of two muskets for this purpose, but that the old order for fortymuskets was on file, and the muskets and accouterments were readypacked for delivery to him. Foster received them, and after issuing twomuskets to the ordnance sergeants at Fort Sumter and Castle Pinckney, placed the remainder in the magazines of those two forts. [Sidenote] Humphreys to Foster, Dec. 18, 1860. W. R. Vol. I. , p. 96. Whether the vigilance of a spy or the subservient fear or zeal of thestorekeeper gave the Charleston authorities information of thistrifling removal of arms, cannot now be ascertained. The muskets hadscarcely reached their destination when Captain Foster was astonishedby receiving a letter from the military storekeeper saying that theshipment of the forty muskets had caused intense excitement; thatGeneral Schnierle, the Governor's principal military officer, hadcalled upon him, with the declaration that unless the excitement couldbe allayed some violent demonstration would be sure to follow; thatColonel Huger had assured the Governor that no arms should be removedfrom the arsenal. He (Captain Humphreys) had pledged his word that theforty muskets and accouterments should be returned "by to-morrownight, " and he therefore asked Captain Foster to make good his pledge. Captain Foster wrote a temperate reply to the storekeeper, which, insubstance, he embodied in the more vigorous and outspoken report heimmediately made to the Ordnance Department at Washington: "I have noofficial knowledge (or positive personal evidence either) that ColonelHuger assured the Governor that no arms should be removed from thearsenal, nor that, if he did so, he spoke by authority of theGovernment; but on the other hand I do know that an order was given toissue to me forty muskets; that I actually needed them to protectGovernment property and the lives of my assistants, and the ordnancesergeants under them at Fort Sumter and Castle Pinckney, and that Ihave them in my possession. To give them up on a demand of this kindseems to me as an act not expected of me by the Government, and asalmost suicidal under the circumstances. It would place the two fortsunder my charge at the mercy of a mob. Neither of the ordnancesergeants at Fort Sumter and Castle Pinckney had muskets until I gotthese, and Lieutenants Snyder and Meade were likewise totally destituteof arms. " [Sidenote] Foster to De Russy, Dec. 18, 1860. W. R. Vol. I. , pp. 95, 96. "I propose to refer the matter to Washington, and am to see severalgentlemen, who are prominent in this matter, to-morrow. I am notdisposed to surrender these arms under a threat of this kind, especially when I know that I am only doing my duty to the Government. " [Sidenote] Foster to De Russy, Dec. 20, 1860. W. R. Vol. I. , p. 101. [Sidenote] Foster to De Russy, Dec. 19, 1860. W. R. Vol. I. , pp. 97, 98. According to his promise, Captain Foster went to the city on the 19thto hold an interview with General Schnierle and "several otherprominent citizens of Charleston" on the subject of the alleged"intense excitement" which was again paraded as a menace to induce himto return the arms. If he was originally surprised at the reportedexcitement he was now still more astonished to find that it did notexist except in the insurrectionary zeal of those who were performingthis farcical rôle purely for its theatrical effect. A majority of the"prominent citizens, " who had been convoked as a part of the stageretinue to intimidate him by the threat of a mob, had not yet evenheard of the affair. Detecting readily the sham and pretense of theperformance, he seems to have at least accorded them the merit of anhonest delusion. He quietly and politely explained to them theregularity of his orders and proceedings, and the good faith of himselfand his brother officers. But he firmly declined to return the musketsuntil he should be directed to do so by the Government. Yet willing togo to the verge of his discretion to allay irritation, he agreed toappeal immediately by telegraph to the Ordnance Bureau for a decision. He had not long to wait for a solution of the question. The Governmentwas in all appearance deaf to the advice of its Secretary of State, General Cass, of its General-in-Chief, Lieutenant-General Scott, of itsCharleston Commander, Major Anderson, of its engineer, Captain Foster, so long as the problem was the safety of three great forts. But whenthe question became the possession of forty muskets, and the arming oftwo ordnance sergeants, "men with worsted epaulettes on their shouldersand stripes down their pantaloons" in the language of the Secretary ofWar, that eminent functionary could sacrifice his rest and slumber tothe crisis. Captain Foster, who had returned from the city to FortMoultrie, was awakened a little after midnight to receive the followingperemptory instruction: [Sidenote] W. R. Vol. I. , p. 100. I have just received a telegraphic dispatch informing me that you have removed forty muskets from Charleston arsenal to Fort Moultrie. If you have removed any arms return them instantly. JOHN B. FLOYD, Secretary of War. [Sidenote] Foster to De Russy, Dec. 20, 1860. W. R. Vol. I. , p. 101. It was probably in no hopeful mood nor with enviable feelings that thisbrave officer returned by telegraph the strict routine answer of aloyal subordinate: "I received forty muskets from the arsenal on the17th, I shall return them in obedience to your order. "[1] The necessaryconsequence he embodied in his report to the department on the nextday: "The order of the Secretary of War of last night I must consideras decisive upon the question of any efforts on my part to defend FortSumter and Castle Pinckney. The defense now can only extend to keepingthe gates closed and shutters fastened and must cease when these areforced. " ----------[1] "Although this would place my officers and Forts Sumter andPinckney entirely at the mercy of any mob, I considered myself boundas an officer to obey the order, which I did by the prompt returnof the muskets by 10 o'clock that morning. "--Foster, Report to TheCommittee on Conduct of the War. END OF VOL. II.