[Illustration: Stephen A. Douglas]

American Statesmen

STANDARD LIBRARY EDITION

[Illustration: _The Home of Abraham Lincoln_]

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ABRAHAM LINCOLN

BY

JOHN T. MORSE, JR. 

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOL. II. 

1899

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CONTENTS

 I. EMANCIPATION AND POLITICS II. THE SECOND ACT OF THE MCCLELLAN DRAMA III. THE THIRD AND CLOSING ACT OF THE MCCLELLAN DRAMA IV. THE AUTUMN ELECTIONS OF 1862, AND THE PROCLAMATION OF EMANCIPATION V. BATTLES AND SIEGES: DECEMBER, 1862-DECEMBER, 1863 VI. SUNDRIES VII. THE TURN OF THE TIDE VIII. RECONSTRUCTION IX. RENOMINATION X. MILITARY SUCCESSES, AND THE REËLECTION OF THE PRESIDENT XI. THE END COMES INTO SIGHT: THE SECOND INAUGURATION XII. EMANCIPATION COMPLETED XIII. THE FALL OF RICHMOND, AND THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN

 INDEX

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ILLUSTRATIONS

STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS

From a photograph by Brady in the Library of the State Department atWashington. 

Autograph from the Chamberlain collection, Boston Public Library. 

The vignette of Mr. Lincoln's home, corner Eighth and Jackson streets, Springfield, Ill. , is from a photograph. 

SIMON CAMERON

From a photograph by Mr. Le Rue Lemer, Harrisburg, Pa. 

Autograph from the Chamberlain collection, Boston Public Library. 

LINCOLN SUBMITTING THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION TO HIS CABINET

From the painting by Carpenter in the Capitol at Washington. 

ISAAC N. ARNOLD

From a photograph by Brady in the Library of the State Department atWashington. 

Autograph from one furnished by his daughter, Mrs. Mary A. Scudder, Chicago, Ill. 

MONTGOMERY BLAIR

From a photograph by Brady in the Library of the State Department atWashington. 

Autograph from the Chamberlain collection, Boston Public Library. 

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ABRAHAM LINCOLN

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CHAPTER I

EMANCIPATION AND POLITICS

During the spring and summer of 1861 the people of the North presentedthe appearance of a great political unit. All alleged emphatically thatthe question was simply of the Union, and upon this issue no Northernercould safely differ from his neighbors. Only a few of the morecross-grained ones among the Abolitionists were contemptuously allowedto publish the selfishness of their morality, and to declare that theywere content to see the establishment of a great slave empire, providedthey themselves were free from the taint of connection with it. If anyothers let Southern proclivities lurk in the obscure recesses of theirhearts they were too prudent to permit these perilous sentiments toappear except in the masquerade of dismal presagings. So in appearancethe Northern men were united, and in fact were very nearly so--for ashort time. 

This was a fortunate condition, which the President and all shrewdpatriots took great pains to maintain. It filled the armies and theTreasury, and postponed many jeopardies. But too close to the surface tobe long suppressed lay the demand that those who declared the Union tobe the sole issue should explain how it came about that the Union wasput in issue at all, why there was any dissatisfaction with it, and whyany desire anywhere to be rid of it. All knew the answer to thatquestion; all knew that if the war was due to disunion, disunion in turnwas due to slavery. Unless some makeshift peace should be quicklypatched up, this basic cause was absolutely sure to force recognitionfor itself; a long and stern contest must inevitably wear its way downto the bottom question. It was practical wisdom for Mr. Lincoln in hisinaugural not to probe deeper than secession; and it was well formultitudes to take arms and contribute money with the earnestasseveration that they were fighting and paying only for the integrityof the country. It was the truth, or rather it was _a_ truth; but therewas also another and a deeper truth: that he who fought for theintegrity of the country, also, by a necessity inherent in the case andfar beyond the influence of his volition, fought for the destruction ofslavery. Just as soon as this second truth came up and took distinctshape beside the other, angry political divisions sundered theUnionists. Abolition of slavery never displaced Union as a purpose ofthe war; but the two became mingled, in a duality which could notafterward be resolved into its component parts so that one could betaken and the other could be left. The union of the two issues meant thedisunion of the people of the Middle and even of the Northern States. 

In the Border States a considerable proportion of the people was bothpro-slavery and pro-Union. These men wished to retain their servilelaborers under their feet and the shelter of the Union over their heads. At first they did not see that they might as well hope to serve both Godand Mammon. Yet for the moment they seemed to hold the balance of powerbetween the contestants; for had all the pro-slavery men in the BorderStates gone over in a mass to the South early in the war, they mighthave settled the matter against the North in short order. The task ofholding and conciliating this important body, with all its Northernsympathizers, became a controlling purpose of the President, and causedthe development of his famous "border-state policy, " for which hedeserved the highest praise and received unlimited abuse. 

The very fact that these men needed, for their comfort, reiteratedassurances of a policy not hostile to slavery indicated the jeopardy oftheir situation. The distinct language of the President alleviated theiranxiety so far as the Executive was concerned, but they desired tocommit the legislative branch to the same doctrine. Among all those whomight have been Secessionists, but were not, no other could vie inrespect and affection with the venerable and patriotic John J. Crittenden of Kentucky. This distinguished statesman now became thespokesman for the large body of loyal citizens who felt deeply that thewar ought not to impinge in the least upon the great institution of theSouth. In the extra session of Congress, convened in July, 1861, heoffered a resolution pledging Congress to hold in mind: "That this waris not waged upon our part in any spirit of oppression, nor for anypurpose of conquest or subjugation, nor with any purpose of overthrowingor interfering with the rights or established institutions of those [therevolted] States; but to defend and maintain the supremacy of theConstitution, and to preserve the Union with all the dignity, equality, and rights of the several States unimpaired. " After the example of theConstitution, this resolution was carefully saved from the contaminationof a certain offensive word; but every one knew its meaning and itspurpose; and with this knowledge all the votes save two in the House ofRepresentatives, and all save five in the Senate, were given for it. [1]"It was, " says Mr. Blaine, "a fair reflection of the popular sentimentthroughout the North. " So Mr. Lincoln's inaugural was ratified. 

But events control. The Northern armies ran against slavery immediately. Almost in the very hours when the resolution of Mr. Crittenden wasgliding so easily through the House, thousands of slaves at Manassaswere doing the work of laborers and servants, and rendering all thewhites of the Southern army available for fighting. The handicap was sosevere and obvious that it immediately provoked the introduction of abill freeing slaves belonging to rebels and used for carrying on thewar. The Democrats and the men of the Border States generally opposedthe measure, with very strong feeling. No matter how plausible thereason, they did not wish slavery to be touched at all. They could notsay that this especial bill was wrong, but they felt that it wasdangerous. Their protests against it, however, were of no avail, and itbecame law on August 6. The extreme anti-slavery men somewhatsophistically twisted it into an assistance to the South. 

The principle of this legislation had already been published to thecountry in a very fortunate way by General Butler. In May, 1861, beingin command at Fortress Monroe, he had refused, under instructions fromCameron, to return three fugitive slaves to their rebel owner, and hehad ingeniously put his refusal on the ground that they were "contrabandof war. " The phrase instantly became popular. General Butler says that, "as a lawyer, [he] was never very proud of it;" but technical inaccuracydoes not hurt the force of an epigram which expresses a sound principle. "Contraband" underlay the Emancipation Proclamation. 

Thus the slaves themselves were forcing the issue, regardless ofpolities and diplomacy. With a perfectly correct instinctive insightinto the true meaning of the war, they felt that a Union camp ought tobe a place of refuge, and they sought it eagerly and in considerablenumbers. Then, however, their logical owners came and reclaimed them, and other commanders were not so apt at retort as General Butler was. Thus it came to pass that each general, being without instructions, carried out his own ideas, and confusion ensued. Democratic commandersreturned slaves; Abolitionist commanders refused to do so; many weresadly puzzled what to do. All alike created embarrassing situations forthe administration. 

General Fremont led off. On August 30, being then in command of theWestern Department, he issued an order, in which he declared that hewould "assume the administrative powers of the State. " Then, on thebasis of this bold assumption, he established martial law, andpronounced the slaves of militant or active rebels to be "free men. " Themischief of this ill-advised proceeding was aggravated by the "fires ofpopular enthusiasm which it kindled. " The President wrote to Fremont, expressing his fear that the general's action would "alarm our SouthernUnion friends, and turn them against us; perhaps ruin our rather fairprospect in Kentucky. " Very considerately he said: "Allow me, therefore, to ask that you will, as of your own motion, modify that paragraph so asto conform to" the Act of August 6. Fremont replied, in substance, thatthe President might do this, but that he himself would not! ThereuponMr. Lincoln, instead of removing the insubordinate and insolent general, behaved in his usual passionless way, and merely issued an order thatFremont's proclamation should be so modified and construed as "toconform with and not to transcend" the law. By this treatment, whichshould have made Fremont grateful and penitent, he was in fact renderedangry and indignant; for he had a genuine belief in the old proverbabout laws being silent in time of war, and he really thought thatdocuments signed in tents by gentlemen wearing shoulder-straps weredeserving of more respect, even by the President, than were mere Acts ofCongress. This was a mistaken notion, but Fremont never could see thathe had been in error, and from this time forth he became a vengefulthorn in the side of Mr. Lincoln. 

Several months later, on May 9, 1862, General Hunter proclaimed martiallaw in Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina, and said: "Slavery andmartial law in a free country are altogether incompatible. The personsin these States, heretofore held as slaves, are therefore declaredforever free. " At once, though not without reluctance, Mr. Lincolnrevoked this order, as unauthorized. He further said that, if he hadpower to "declare the slaves of any State or States free, " the proprietyof exercising that power was a question which he reserved exclusively tohimself. These words he fully made good. The whole country, wild withexcitement and teeming with opinions almost co-numerous with itscitizens, threatened to bury him beneath an avalanche of advice. Butwhile all talked and wrote madly and endlessly, he quietly held hispeace, did what he chose when he chose, and never delegated any portionof his authority over this most important business to any one. He tookemancipation for his own special and personal affair; it was a matterabout which he had been doing much thinking very earnestly for a longwhile, and he had no notion of forming now any partnership for managingit. 

The trend, however, was not all in one direction. While Butler, Fremont, and Hunter were thus befriending the poor runaways, Buell and Hookerwere allowing slave-owners to reclaim fugitives from within their lines;Halleck was ordering that no fugitive slave should be admitted withinhis lines or camp, and that those already there should be put out; andMcClellan was promising to crush "with an iron hand" any attempt atslave insurrection. Amid such confusion, some rule of universalapplication was sorely needed. But what should it be?

Secretary Cameron twice nearly placed the administration in anembarrassing position by taking very advanced ground upon the negroquestion. In October, 1861, he issued an order to General Sherman, thenat Port Royal, authorizing him to employ negroes in any capacity whichhe might "deem most beneficial to the service. " Mr. Lincoln prudentlyinterlined the words: "This, however, not to mean a general arming ofthem for military service. " A few weeks later, in the Report which thesecretary prepared to be sent with the President's message to Congress, he said: "As the labor and service of their slaves constitute the chiefproperty of the rebels, they should share the common fate of war. . . . Itis as clearly a right of the government to arm slaves, when it becomesnecessary, as it is to use gunpowder taken from the enemy. Whether it isexpedient to do so is purely a military question. " He added more to thesame purport. He then had his report printed, and sent copies, by mail, to many newspapers throughout the country, with permission to publish itso soon as the telegraph should report the reading before Congress. Atthe eleventh hour a copy was handed to Mr. Lincoln, to accompany hismessage; and then, for the first time, he saw these radical passages. Instantly he directed that all the postmasters, to whose offices theprinted copies had been sent on their way to the newspaper editors, should be ordered at once to return these copies to the secretary. Hethen ordered the secretary to make a change, equivalent to an omission, of this inflammatory paragraph. After this emasculation the paragraphonly stated that "slaves who were abandoned by their owners on theadvance of our troops" should not be returned to the enemy. 

When the Thirty-seventh Congress came together for the regular session, December 2, 1861, anti-slavery sentiment had made a visible advance. President Lincoln, in his message, advised recognizing the independenceof the negro states of Hayti and Liberia. He declared that he had beenanxious that the "inevitable conflict should not degenerate into aviolent and remorseless revolutionary struggle, " and that he had, therefore, "thought it proper to keep the integrity of the Unionprominent as the primary object of the contest on our part. " Referringto his enforcement of the law of August 6, he said: "The Union must bepreserved, and hence all indispensable means must be employed. " Theshadow which pro-slavery men saw cast by these words was very slightly, if at all, lightened by an admission which accompanied it, --that "weshould not be in haste to determine that radical and extreme measures, which may reach the loyal as well as the disloyal, are indispensable. "Further he said that already, by the operation of the Act of August 6, numbers of persons had been liberated, had become dependent on theUnited States, and must be provided for. He anticipated that some of theStates might pass similar laws for their own benefit; in which case herecommended Congress to "provide for accepting such persons from suchStates, according to some mode of valuation, in lieu, _pro tanto_, ofdirect taxes, or upon some other plan to be agreed on. " He desired thatthese negroes, being "at once deemed free, " should be colonized in some"climate congenial to them, " and he wished an appropriation foracquiring territory for this purpose. Thus he indicated with sufficientclearness the three cardinal points of his own theory for emancipation:voluntary action of the individual slave States by the exercise of theirown sovereign power; compensation of owners; and colonization. Congresssoon showed that it meant to strike a pace much more rapid than that setby the President; and the friends of slavery perceived an atmospherewhich made them so uneasy that they thought it would be well to have theCrittenden resolution substantially reaffirmed. They made the effort, and they failed, the vote standing 65 yeas to 71 nays. All which thissymptom indicated as to the temper of members was borne out during thesession by positive and aggressive legislation. Only a fortnight hadpassed, when Henry Wilson, senator from Massachusetts, introduced a billto emancipate the slaves in the District of Columbia, and to pay amoderate compensation to owners. The measure, rightly construed as theentering point of the anti-slavery wedge, gave rise to bitter debates inboth houses. The senators and representatives from the slave Statesmanifested intense feeling, and were aided with much spirit by theDemocrats of the free States. But resistance was useless; the billpassed the Senate by a vote of 29 to 14, and the House by 92 to 38. OnApril 16 the President signed it, and returned it with a message, inwhich he said: "If there be matters within and about this Act whichmight have taken a course or shape more satisfactory to my judgment, Ido not attempt to specify them. I am gratified that the two principlesof compensation and colonization are both recognized and practicallyapplied in the Act. " It was one of the coincidences of history that byhis signature he now made law that proposition which, as a member of theHouse of Representatives in 1849, he had embodied in a bill which thenhardly excited passing notice as it went on its quick way to oblivion. 

The confused condition concerning the harboring and rendition offugitive slaves by military commanders, already mentioned, was alsopromptly taken in hand. Various bills and amendments offered in theSenate and in the House were substantially identical in the main purposeof making the recovery of a slave from within the Union linespractically little better than impossible. The shape which the measureultimately took was the enactment of an additional article of war, whereby all officers in the military service of the United States were"prohibited from using any portion of the forces under their respectivecommands for the purpose of returning fugitives from service or labor;"any officer who should violate the article was to be dismissed from theservice. Again the men from the Border States, rallying their fewDemocratic allies from the North to their assistance, made vehementopposition, and again they were overwhelmed beneath an irresistiblemajority: 83 to 42 in the House, 29 to 9 in the Senate. The Presidentsigned the bill on March 13, 1862, and thereafter "nigger hunting" was adangerous sport in the Union camps. 

On March 24, Mr. Arnold[2] of Illinois introduced a bill ambitiouslypurporting "to render freedom national and slavery sectional. " Itprohibited slavery wherever Congress could do so, that is to say, in allTerritories, present and future, in all forts, arsenals, dockyards, etc. , in all vessels on the high seas and on all national highwaysbeyond the territory and jurisdiction of the several States. Both by itstitle and by its substance it went to the uttermost edge of theConstitution and, in the matter of Territories, perhaps beyond thatedge. Mr. Arnold himself supported it with the bold avowal that slaverywas in deadly hostility to the national government, and therefore mustbe destroyed. Upon a measure so significant and so defended, debatewaxed hot, so that one gentleman proposed that the bill should be sentback to the committee with instructions not to report it back "until thecold weather. " The irritation and alarm of the Border States renderedmodification necessary unless tact and caution were to be wholly thrownto the winds. Ultimately, therefore, the offensive title was exchangedfor the simple one of "An Act to secure freedom to all persons withinthe Territories of the United States, " and the bill, curtailed to accordwith this expression, became law by approval of the President on June19. 

A measure likely in its operation to affect a much greater number ofpersons than any other of those laws which have been mentioned wasintroduced by Senator Trumbull of Illinois. This was "for theconfiscation of the property of rebels, and giving freedom to thepersons they hold in slavery. " It made the slaves of all who had takenup arms against the United States "forever thereafter free. " It came upfor debate on February 25, and its mover defended it as "destroying to agreat extent the source and origin of the rebellion, and the only thingwhich had ever seriously threatened the peace of the Union. " The men ofthe Border States, appalled at so general a manumission, declared thatit would produce intolerable conditions in their States, leading eitherto reënslavement or extermination. So strenuous an anti-slavery man asSenator Hale also suggested that the measure was unconstitutional. Similar discussion upon similar propositions went forwardcontemporaneously in the House. For once, in both bodies, the Democratswon in many skirmishes. Ultimately, as the outcome of many amendments, substitutes, recommitments, and conferences, a bill was patched up, which passed by 27 to 12 in the Senate and 82 to 42 in the House, andwas approved by the President July 17. It was a very comprehensivemeasure; so much so, that Mr. Blaine has said of it: "Even if the warhad ended without a formal and effective system of emancipation, it isbelieved that this statute would have so operated as to render the slavesystem practically valueless. "

The possibility of enlisting negroes as soldiers received earlyconsideration. Black troops had fought in the Revolution; why, then, should not black men now fight in a war of which they themselves werethe ultimate provocation? The idea pleased the utilitarian side of theNorthern mind and shocked no Northern prejudice. In fact, as early asthe spring of 1862 General Hunter, in the Department of the South, organized a negro regiment. In July, 1862, pending consideration of abill concerning calling forth the militia, reported by the SenateCommittee on Military Affairs, amendments were moved declaring that"there should be no exemption from military service on account ofcolor, " permitting the enlistment of "persons of African descent, " andmaking "forever thereafter free" each person so enlisted, his mother, his wife, and his children. No other measure so aroused the indignationof the border-state men. Loyalty to the Union could not change theiropinion of the negro. To put arms into the hands of slaves, orex-slaves, was a terrible proposition to men who had too often vividlyconceived the dread picture of slave insurrection. To set black menabout the business of killing white men, to engage the inferior race todestroy the superior race, seemed a blasphemy against Nature. A fewalso of the Northerners warmly sympathized with this feeling. Black menshooting down white men was a spectacle which some who were friends ofthe black men could not contemplate without a certain shudder. Also manypersons believed that the white soldiers of the North would feeldegraded by having regiments of ex-slaves placed beside them in camp andin battle. Doubts were expressed as to whether negroes would fight, whether they would not be a useless charge, and even a source of perilto those who should depend upon them. Language could go no farther invehemence of protest and denunciation than the words of some of theslave-state men in the House and Senate. Besides this, Garrett Davis ofKentucky made a very effective argument when he said: "There is not arebel in all Secessia whose heart will not leap when he hears that theSenate of the United States is originating such a policy. It willstrengthen his hopes of success by an ultimate union of all the slaveStates to fight such a policy to the death. " It was, however, entirelyevident that, in the present temper of that part of the country whichwas represented in Congress, there was not much use in opposing anyanti-slavery measure by any kind of argument whatever; even though thespecial proposition might be distasteful to many Republicans, yet atlast, when pressed to the issue, they all faithfully voted Yea. In thiscase the measure, finally so far modified as to relate only to slavesof rebel owners, was passed and was signed by the President on July 17. Nevertheless, although it thus became law, the certainty that, by takingaction under it, he would alienate great numbers of loyalists in theBorder States induced him to go very slowly. At first actual authorityto enlist negroes was only extorted from the administration with mucheffort. On August 25 obstinate importunity elicited an order permittingGeneral Saxton, at Hilton Head, to raise 5, 000 black troops; but thiswas somewhat strangely accompanied, according to Mr. Wilson, with thesuggestive remark, that it "must never see daylight, because it was somuch in advance of public sentiment. " After the process had been ontrial for a year, however, Mr. Lincoln said that there was apparent "noloss by it in our foreign relations, none in our home popular sentiment, none in our white military force, --no loss by it anyhow or anywhere. " Onthe other hand, it had brought a reinforcement of 130, 000 soldiers, seamen, and laborers. "And now, " he said, "let any Union man whocomplains of this measure test himself by writing down in one line thathe is for subduing the rebellion by force of arms, and in the next thathe is for taking these 130, 000 men from the Union side, and placing themwhere they would be best for the measure he condemns. " Yet soineradicable was the race prejudice that it was not until the spring of1864, after all efforts for action by Congress had failed, that theattorney-general declared black soldiers to be entitled to the same payas white soldiers. Regarding a soldier merely as a marketable commodity, doubtless the white was worth more money; yet life was about the same toeach, and it was hard to see why one should be expected to sell his lifefor fewer dollars than satisfied the other. 

Besides these measures, Congress gave evidence of its sentiments bypassing an act for appointing diplomatic representatives to Hayti andLiberia; also further evidence by passing certain legislation againstthe slave trade. 

The recital of all these doings of the legislators sufficientlyindicates the hostility of Congress towards slavery. In fact, a largemajority both in the Senate and in the House had moved out against itupon nearly every practicable line to the extremity of theconstitutional tether. Neither arguments, nor the entreaties of theborder-state men, nor any considerations of policy, had exercised theslightest restraining influence. It is observable that this legislationdid not embody that policy which Mr. Lincoln had suggested, and to whichhe had become strongly attached. On the contrary, Congress had doneeverything to irritate, where the President wished to do everything toconciliate; Congress made that compulsory which the President hoped tomake voluntary. Mr. Lincoln remained in 1862, as he had been in 1858, tolerant towards the Southern men who by inheritance, tradition, andthe necessity of the situation, constituted a slaveholding community. Totreat slave-ownership as a crime, punishable by confiscation and ruin, seemed to him unreasonable and merciless. Neither does he seem ever tohave accepted the opinion of many Abolitionists, that the negro was theequal of the white man in natural endowment. There is no reason tosuppose that he did not still hold, as he had done in the days of theDouglas debates, that it was undesirable, if not impossible, that thetwo races should endeavor to abide together in freedom as a unifiedcommunity. In the inevitable hostility and competition he clearly sawthat the black man was likely to fare badly. It was by such feelingsthat he was led straight to the plan of compensation of owners andcolonization of freedmen, and to the hope that a system of gradualemancipation, embodying these principles, might be voluntarilyundertaken by the Border States under the present stress. If theexecutive and the legislative departments should combine upon the policyof encouraging and aiding such steps as any Border State could beinduced to take in this direction, the President believed that he couldmuch more easily extend loyalty and allegiance among the people of thoseStates, --a matter which he valued far more highly than other personswere inclined to do. Such were his views and such his wishes. To discusstheir practicability and soundness would only be to wander in theunprofitable vagueness of hypothesis, for in spite of all his effortsthey were never tested by trial. It must be admitted that generalopinion, both at that day and ever since, has regarded them asvisionary; compensation seemed too costly, colonization probably wasreally impossible. 

After the President had suggested his views in his message he waitedpatiently to see what action Congress would take concerning them. Threemonths elapsed and Congress took no such action. On the contrary, Congress practically repudiated them. Not only this, it wasindustriously putting into the shape of laws many other ideas, whichwere likely to prove so many embarrassments and obstructions to thatpolicy which the President had very thoughtfully and with deepconviction marked out for himself. He determined, therefore, to presentit once more, before it should be rendered forever hopeless. On March 6, 1862, he sent to Congress a special message, recommending the adoptionof a joint resolution: "That the United States ought to cooperate withany State which may adopt gradual abolishment of slavery, giving to suchState pecuniary aid, to be used by such State in its discretion, tocompensate for the inconvenience, both public and private, produced bysuch change of system. " The first paragraph in the message statedbriefly the inducements to the North: "The Federal government would findits highest interest in such a measure, as one of the most efficientmeans of self-preservation. The leaders of the existing insurrectionentertain the hope that this government will ultimately be forced toacknowledge the independence of some part of the disaffected region, andthat all the slave States north of such part will then say: 'The Unionfor which we have struggled being already gone, we now choose to go withthe Southern section. ' To deprive them of this hope substantially endsthe rebellion; and the initiation of Emancipation completely deprivesthem of it as to all the States initiating it. The point is that . . . Themore northern [States] shall, by such initiation, make it certain to themore southern that in no event will the former ever join the latter intheir proposed Confederacy. I say 'initiation, ' because in my judgmentgradual and not sudden emancipation is better for all. In the merefinancial or pecuniary view, any member of Congress, with the censustables and Treasury reports before him, can readily see for himself howvery soon the current expenditures of this war would purchase, at fairvaluation, all the slaves in any named State. "

The second paragraph hinted at that which it would have been poor tactto state plainly, --the reasons which would press the Border States toaccept the opportunity extended to them. "If resistance continues, thewar must also continue; and it is impossible to foresee all theincidents which may attend, and all the ruin which may follow it. Suchas may seem indispensable, or may obviously promise great efficiencytoward ending the struggle, must and will come. The proposition nowmade, though an offer only, I hope it may be esteemed no offense to askwhether the pecuniary consideration tendered would not be of more valueto the States and private persons concerned than are the institution andproperty in it, in the present aspect of affairs. " The suggestion, between the lines, to the border slave-owners could not bemisunderstood: that they would do better to sell their slaves now thanto be deprived of them later. The President's proposition was notcordially received. Pro-slavery men regarded it as an underhand movementagainst the institution. Mr. Crittenden expressed confidence in thePresident personally, but feared that the resolution "would stir up anemancipation party" in the loyal slave States. Thus the truth was madeplain that emancipation, by any process, was not desired. In a debateupon a cognate measure, another Kentuckian said that there was "nodivision of sentiment on this question of emancipation, whether it is tobe brought about by force, by fraud, or by purchase of slaves out of thepublic treasury. " Democrats from Northern States, natural allies of theborder-state men, protested vehemently against taxing their constituentsto buy slave property in other States. Many Republicans also joined theDemocracy against Mr. Lincoln, and spoke even with anger and insult. Thaddeus Stevens, the fierce and formidable leader of the Radicals, gavehis voice against "the most diluted milk-and-water gruel propositionthat had ever been given to the American nation. " Hickman ofPennsylvania, until 1860 a Democrat, but now a Republican, with thecharacteristic vehemence of a proselyte said: "Neither the message northe resolution is manly and open. They are both covert and insidious. They do not become the dignity of the President of the United States. The message is not such a document as a full-grown, independent manshould publish to the nation at such a time as the present, whenpositions should be freely and fully defined. " In the Senate, Mr. Powellof Kentucky translated the second paragraph into blunt words. He saidthat it held a threat of ultimate coercion, if the cooperative planshould fail; and he regarded "the whole thing" as "a pill of arsenic, sugar-coated. "

But, though so many insisted upon uttering their fleers in debate, yet, when it came to voting, they could not well discredit their President byvoting down the resolution on the sole ground that it was foolish andineffectual. So, after it had been abused sufficiently, it was passed byabout the usual party majority: 89 to 34 in the House; 32 to 10 in theSenate. Thus Congress somewhat sneeringly handed back to the Presidenthis bantling, with free leave to do what he could with it. 

Not discouraged by such grudging and unsympathetic permission, Mr. Lincoln at once set about his experiment. He told Lovejoy and Arnold, strenuous Abolitionists, but none the less his near friends, that theywould live to see the end of slavery, if only the Border States wouldcooperate in his project. On March 10, 1862, he gathered some of theborder-state members and tried to win them over to his views. Theylistened coldly; but he was not dismayed by their demeanor, and on July12 he again convened them, and this time laid before them a writtenstatement. This paper betrays by its earnestness of argument and itsalmost beseeching tone that he wrote it from his heart. The reasonswhich he urged were as follows:--

"Believing that you of the Border States hold more power for good thanany other equal number of members, I felt it a duty which I cannotjustifiably waive to make this appeal to you. 

"I intend no reproach or complaint when I assure you that, in myopinion, if you all had voted for the resolution in the gradualemancipation message of last March, the war would now be substantiallyended. 

"And the plan therein proposed is yet one of the most potent and swiftmeans of ending it. Let the States which are in rebellion see definitelyand certainly that in no event will the States you represent ever jointheir proposed Confederacy, and they cannot much longer maintain thecontest. But you cannot divest them of their hope to ultimately have youwith them as long as you show a determination to perpetuate theinstitution within your own States; beat them at election as you haveoverwhelmingly done, and, nothing daunted, they still claim you astheir own. You and I know what the lever of their power is. Break thatlever before their faces, and they can shake you no more forever. Mostof you have treated me with kindness and consideration; and I trust youwill not now think I improperly touch what is exclusively your own, when, for the sake of the whole country, I ask: can you, for yourStates, do better than to take the course I urge? Discarding punctilioand maxims adapted to more manageable times, and looking only to theunprecedentedly stern facts of our case, can you do better in anypossible event? You prefer that the constitutional relation of theStates to the nation shall be practically restored without disturbanceof the institution; and if this were done, my whole duty in this respectunder the Constitution and my oath of office would be performed. But itis not done, and we are trying to accomplish it by war. 

"The incidents of the war cannot be avoided. If the war continues long, as it must if the object be not sooner attained, the institution in yourStates will be extinguished by mere friction and abrasion, --by the mereincidents of the war. It will be gone, and you will have nothingvaluable in lieu of it. Much of its value is gone already. How muchbetter for you and your people to take the step which at once shortensthe war, and secures substantial compensation for that which is sure tobe wholly lost in any other event. How much better to thus save themoney which else we sink forever in the war. How much better to do itwhile we can, lest the war erelong render us pecuniarily unable to doit. How much better for you, as seller, and the nation, as buyer, tosell out and buy out that without which the war never could have been, than to sink both the thing to be sold and the price of it in cuttingone another's throats. I do not speak of emancipation at once, but of adecision at once to emancipate gradually. "

He closed with an ardent appeal to his hearers, as "patriots andstatesmen, " to consider his proposition, invoking them thereto as they"would perpetuate popular government for the best people in the world. "

Thirty gentlemen listened to this paper and took two days to considerit. Then twenty of them signed a response which was, in substance, theirrepudiation of the President's scheme. They told him that hitherto theyhad been loyal "under the most discouraging circumstances and in face ofmeasures most distasteful to them and injurious to the interests theyrepresented, and in the hearing of doctrines, avowed by those whoclaimed to be his friends, most abhorrent to themselves and theirconstituents. " They objected that the measure involved "interferencewith what exclusively belonged to the States;" that perhaps it wasunconstitutional; that it would involve an "immense outlay, " beyond whatthe finances could bear; that it was "the annunciation of a sentiment"rather than a "tangible proposition;" they added that the sole purposeof the war must be "restoring the Constitution to its legitimateauthority. " Seven others of the President's auditors said politely, butvery vaguely, that they would "ask the people of the Border Statescalmly, deliberately, and fairly to consider his recommendations. "Maynard, of the House, and Henderson, of the Senate, alone expressedtheir personal approval. 

Even this did not drive all hope out of Mr. Lincoln's heart. Hisproclamation, rescinding that order of General Hunter which purported tofree slaves in certain States, was issued on May 19. In it he said thatthe resolution, which had been passed at his request, "now stands anauthentic, definite, and solemn proposal of the nation to the States andpeople most interested in the subject-matter. To the people of theseStates I now earnestly appeal. I do not argue; I beseech you to make thearguments for yourselves. You cannot, if you would, be blind to thesigns of the times. I beg of you a calm and enlarged consideration ofthem, ranging, if it may be, far above personal and partisan politics. This proposal makes common cause for a common object, casting noreproaches upon any. It acts not the Pharisee. The change itcontemplates would come gently as the dews from Heaven, not rending orwrecking anything. Will you not embrace it? So much good has not beendone by one effort in all past time as in the providence of God it isnow your high privilege to do. May the vast future not have to lamentthat you have neglected it!"

This eloquent and beautiful appeal sounds deeply moving in the ears ofthose who read it in these days, so remote from the passions andprejudices of a generation ago; but it stirred little responsive feelingand no responsive action in 1862. In fact, the scheme was notpracticable. 

It may be--it probably must be--believed that compensated emancipationand colonization could never have been carried out even if NorthernRepublicans had been willing to pay the price and Southern slave-ownershad been willing to accept it, and if both had then cordially united inthe task of deporting the troublesome negro from the country. The vastproject was undoubtedly visionary; it was to be criticised, weighed, andconsidered largely as a business enterprise, and as such it must becondemned. But Mr. Lincoln, who had no capacity for business, was neverable to get at this point of view, and regarded his favorite planstrictly in political and humanitarian lights. Yet even thus the generalopinion has been that the unfortunate negroes, finding themselves amidthe hard facts which must inevitably have attended colonization, wouldhave heartily regretted the lost condition of servitude. Historicallythe merits of the experiment, which the Southern Unionists declined tohave put to the test of trial, are of no consequence; it is only as thescheme throws light upon the magnanimity of Mr. Lincoln's temperamentand upon certain limitations of his intellect, that the subject isinteresting. That he should rid himself of personal vindictiveness andshould cherish an honest and intense desire to see the question, whichhad severed the country, disposed of by a process which would makepossible a sincere and cordial reunion, may be only moderatelysurprising; but it is most surprising to note the depth and earnestnessof his faith that this condition could really be reached, and that itcould be reached by the road which he had marked out. This confidenceindicated an opinion of human nature much higher than human nature hasyet appeared entitled to. It also anticipated on the part of theSoutherners an appreciation of the facts of the case which few amongthem were sufficiently clear-minded to furnish. It is curious to observethat Lincoln saw the present situation and foresaw the coming situationwith perfect clearness, at the same time that he was entirely unable tosee the uselessness of his panacea; whereas, on the other hand, thosewho rejected his impracticable plan remained entirely blind to thosethings which he saw. It seems an odd combination of traits that healways recognized and accepted a fact, and yet was capable of beingwholly impractical. 

In connection with these efforts in behalf of the slaveholders, whichshow at least a singular goodness of heart towards persons who had doneeverything to excite even a sense of personal hatred, it may not beseriously out of place to quote a paragraph which does not, indeed, bear upon slavery, but which does illustrate the remarkable temper whichMr. Lincoln maintained towards the seceding communities. In December, 1861, in his annual message to this Congress, whose searchinganti-slavery measures have just been discussed, he said:--

"There are three vacancies on the bench of the Supreme Court. . . . I haveso far forborne making nominations to fill these vacancies for reasonswhich I will now state. Two of the outgoing judges resided within theStates now overrun by revolt; so that if successors were appointed inthe same localities, they could not now serve upon their circuits; andmany of the most competent men there probably would not take thepersonal hazard of accepting to serve, even here, upon the SupremeBench. I have been unwilling to throw all the appointments northward, thus disabling myself from doing justice to the South on the return ofpeace; although I may remark that to transfer to the North one which hasheretofore been in the South would not, with reference to territory andpopulation, be unjust. "[3] To comment upon behavior and motives soextraordinary is, perhaps, as needless as it is tempting. 

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Also in the House Thaddeus Stevens and Lovejoy, and in the SenateSumner, did not vote. 

[2] Lincoln's intimate personal and political friend, and afterward hisbiographer. 

[3] Annual Message to Congress, December, 1861. 

CHAPTER II

THE SECOND ACT OF THE MCCLELLAN DRAMA

It is time now to return to the theatre of war in Virginia, where, itwill be remembered, we left the Confederate forces in the act of rapidlywithdrawing southward from the line of intrenchments which they had solong held at Manassas. This unexpected backward movement upon their partdeprived the Urbana route, which McClellan had hitherto so strenuouslyadvocated, of its chief strategic advantages, and therefore reopened theold question which had been discussed between him and Mr. Lincoln. Tothe civilian mind a movement after the retreating enemy along the directline to Richmond, now more than ever before, seemed the natural scheme. But to this McClellan still remained unalterably opposed. In the letterof February 3 he had said: "The worst coming to the worst, we can takeFort Monroe as a base and operate with complete security, although withless celerity and brilliancy of results, up the Peninsula. " This route, low as he had then placed it in order of desirability, he now adopted asthe best resource, or rather as the only measure; and his judgment wasratified upon March 13 by unanimous approval on the part of his fourcorps commanders. They however made their approval dependent uponconditions, among which were: that, before beginning the advance alongthis line, the new rebel ram Merrimac (or Virginia), just finished atNorfolk on the James River, should be neutralized, and that a navalauxiliary force should silence, or be ready to aid in silencing, therebel batteries on the York River. In fact, and very unfortunately, theformer of these conditions was not fulfilled until the time of itsusefulness for this specific purpose was over, and the latter conditionwas entirely neglected. It was also distinctly stipulated that "theforce to be left to cover Washington shall be such as to give an entirefeeling of security for its safety from menace. " Keyes, Heintzelman andMcDowell conceived "that, with the forts on the right bank of thePotomac fully garrisoned, and those on the left bank occupied, acovering force, in front of the Virginia line, of 25, 000 men wouldsuffice. " Sumner said: "A total of 40, 000 for the defense of the citywould suffice. "[4] On the same day Stanton informed McClellan that thePresident "made no objection" to this plan, but directed that asufficient force should be left to hold Manassas Junction and to makeWashington "entirely secure. " The closing sentence was: "At all events, move . . . At once in pursuit of the enemy by some route. " Thus at lasttwo important facts were established: that the route up the Peninsulashould be tried; and that the patience of the administration wasexhausted. 

Though the enemy upon his retreat was burning bridges and destroyingrailroads behind him, and making his possible return towards Washingtona slow, difficult process, which he obviously had no mind to undertake, still this security of the capital rested as weightily as ever uponLincoln's mind. His reiteration and insistence concerning it madeperfectly plain that he was still nervous and disquieted about it, though now certainly with much less reason than heretofore. But with oragainst reason, it was easy to see that he was far from resting in thetranquillity of conviction that Washington could never be so safe aswhen the army of Virginia was far away upon the Peninsula. Nevertheless, after the condition in its foregoing shape had been so strenuouslyimposed by Mr. Lincoln and tacitly accepted by McClellan, the matter wasleft as if definitely settled; and the President never demanded[5] fromthe general any distinct statement concerning the numerical or specificallotment of the available forces between the two purposes. The neglectwas disastrous in its consequences; and must also be pronounced bothblameworthy and inexplicable, for the necessity of a plain understandingon the subject was obvious. 

The facts seem to be briefly these: in his letter of February 3, McClellan estimated the force necessary to be taken with him for hiscampaign at 110, 000 to 140, 000 men, and said: "I hope to use the latternumber by bringing fresh troops into Washington. " On April 1 hereported[6] the forces left behind him as follows:--

 At Warrenton, there is to be 7, 780 men At Manassas, there is to be 10, 859 men In the Valley of the Shenandoah 35, 467 men On the Lower Potomac 1, 350 men ------------------------------------------------- In all 55, 456 men

He adds: "There will thus be left for the garrisons, and the front ofWashington, under General Wadsworth, 18, 000 men, exclusive of thebatteries under instruction. " New levies, nearly 4, 000 strong, were alsoexpected. He considered all these men as properly available "for thedefense of the national capital and its approaches. " The President, thepoliticians, and some military men were of opinion that only the 18, 000ought to be considered available for the capital. It was a questionwhether it was proper to count the corps of Banks in the ShenandoahValley. McClellan's theory was that the rebels, by the circumstancesattendant upon their present retreating movement, had conclusivelyannulled any chance of their own return by way of Manassas. Banksgreatly outnumbered Stonewall Jackson, who had only about 15, 000 men, orless, in the Shenandoah Valley. Also Washington was now entirelysurrounded by satisfactory fortifications. McClellan, therefore, wasentirely confident that he left everything in good shape behind him. Infact, it was put into even better shape than he had designed; for onMarch 31 the President took from him Blenker's division of 10, 000 men inorder to strengthen Fremont, who was in the mountain region westward ofthe Shenandoah Valley. "I did so, " wrote Mr. Lincoln, "with greatpain. . . . If you could know the full pressure of the case, I am confidentthat you would justify it. " It was unfortunate that the President couldnot stand against this "pressure, " which was not military, butpolitical. Fremont could do, and did, nothing at all, and to reinforcehim was sheer absurdity. [7] Against it McClellan protested almostindignantly, but was "partially relieved by the President's positive andemphatic assurance" that no more troops "should in any event be takenfrom" him, or "in any way detached from [his] command. "

Orders had been issued on February 27, to Mr. Tucker, assistantsecretary of war, to prepare means of transporting down the Potomac, troops, munitions, artillery, horses, wagons, food, and all the vastparaphernalia of a large army. He showed a masterly vigor in thisdifficult task, and by March 17 the embarkation began. On April 2McClellan arrived at Fortress Monroe. On the very next day he wasdisturbed by the revocation of the orders which had left him in commandof that place and had allowed him to "draw from the troops under GeneralWool a division of about 10, 000 men, which was to be assigned to theFirst Corps. " Another and a serious disappointment also occurred atonce; he found that the navy could not be utilized for assisting in anattack on Yorktown, or for running by it so as to land forces in rear ofit. He must therefore depend wholly upon his army to force a way up thePeninsula. This he had stated to be an unsatisfactory alternative, because it involved delay at Yorktown. Nevertheless, having no choice, he began his advance on April 4. He had with him only 58, 000 men; butmore were on the way, and McDowell's corps was to be brought forward tojoin him as rapidly as transportation would permit. His total nominalforce was smaller than the minimum which, on February 3, he had named asnecessary; yet it was a fine body of troops, and he had lately said tothem: "The army of the Potomac is now a real army, magnificent inmaterial, admirable in discipline, excellently equipped and armed. Yourcommanders are all that I could wish. "

In two days he was before the fortifications which the rebels haderected at Yorktown, and which stretched thence across the Peninsula tothe James River. He estimated the force behind these intrenchments, commanded by General Magruder, at 15, 000 to 20, 000 men, easily to bereinforced; in fact, it was much less. Thereupon, he set about elaboratepreparations for a siege of that city, according to the most thoroughand approved system of military science. He was afterward severelyblamed for not endeavoring to force his way through some point in therebel lines by a series of assaults. [8] This was what Mr. Lincoln wishedhim to do, and very nearly ordered him to do; for on April 6 he sentthis telegram: "You now have over 100, 000 troops with you. . . . I thinkyou better break the enemy's line from Yorktown to Warwick River atonce. " An entry in McClellan's "Own Story, " under date of April 8, comments upon this message and illustrates the unfortunate feeling ofthe writer towards his official superior: "I have raised an awful rowabout McDowell's corps. The President very coolly telegraphed meyesterday that he thought I had better break the enemy's lines at once!I was much tempted to reply that he had better come and do it himself. "Thus is made evident the lamentable relationship between the President, who could place no confidence in the enterprise and judgment of themilitary commander, and the general, who had only sneers for thePresident's incapacity to comprehend warfare. It so happened, however, that the professional man's sarcasm was grossly out of place, and thecivilian's proposal was shrewdly right, as events soon plainly proved. In fact what Mr. Lincoln urged was precisely what General Johnstonanticipated and feared would be done, because he knew well that if itwere done it would be of fatal effect against the Confederates. But, onthe other hand, even after the clear proof had gone against him, McClellan was abundantly supplied with excuses, and the vexation of thewhole affair was made the greater by the fact that these excuses reallyseemed to be good. His excuses always were both so numerous and sosatisfactory, that many reasonably minded persons knew not whether theyhad a right to feel so angry towards him as they certainly could nothelp doing. The present instance was directly in point. General Keyesreported to him that no part of the enemy's line could "be taken byassault without an enormous waste of life;" and General Barnard, chiefengineer of the army, thought it uncertain whether they could be carriedat all. Loss of life and uncertainty of result were two things soabhorred by McClellan in warfare, that he now failed to give due weightto the consideration that the design of the Confederates in interposingan obstacle at this point was solely to delay him as much as possible, whereas much of the merit of his own plan of campaign lay in rapidexecution at the outset. The result was, of course, that he did notbreak any line, nor try to, but instead thereof "presented plausiblereasons" out of his inexhaustible reservoir of such commodities. It wasunfortunate that the naval coöperation, which McClellan had expected, [9]could not be had at this juncture; for by it the Yorktown problem wouldhave been easily solved without either line-breaking or reason-giving. 

Precisely at this point came into operation the fatal effect of the lackof understanding between the President and the general as to thedivision of the forces. In the plan of campaign, it had been designed tothrow the corps of McDowell into the rear of Yorktown by such route asshould seem expedient at the time of its arrival, probably landing it atGloucester and moving it round by West Point. This would have madeMagruder's position untenable at once, long before the natural end ofthe siege. But at the very moment when McClellan's left, in its advance, first came into actual collision with the enemy, he received news thatthe President had ordered McDowell to retain his division beforeWashington--"the most infamous thing that history has recorded, " heafterward wrote. [10] Yet the explanation of this surprising news was sosimple that surprise was unjustifiable. On April 2, immediately afterMcClellan's departure, the President inquired as to what had been donefor the security of Washington. General Wadsworth, commanding thedefenses of the city, gave an alarming response: 19, 000 or 20, 000entirely green troops, and a woeful insufficiency of artillery. He saidthat while it was "very improbable" that the enemy would attackWashington, nevertheless the "numerical strength and the character" ofhis forces rendered them "entirely inadequate to and unfit for theirimportant duty. " Generals Hitchcock and Thomas corroborated this byreporting that the order to leave the city "entirely secure" had "notbeen fully complied with. " Mr. Lincoln was horror-struck. He had a rightto be indignant, for those who ought to know assured him that hisreiterated and most emphatic command had been disobeyed, and that whathe chiefly cared to make safe had not been made safe. He promptlydetermined to retain McDowell, and the order was issued on April 4. Thereby he seriously attenuated, if he did not quite annihilate, theprospect of success for McClellan's campaign. It seems incredible andunexplainable that amid this condition of things, on April 3, an orderwas issued from the office of the secretary of war, to stop recruitingthroughout the country!

This series of diminutions, says McClellan, had "removed nearly 60, 000men from my command, and reduced my force by more than one third. . . . Theblow was most discouraging. It frustrated all my plans for impendingoperations. It fell when I was too deeply committed to withdraw. . . . Itwas a fatal error. "

Error or not, it was precisely what McClellan ought to have foreseen aslikely to occur. He had not foreseen it, however, and nothing mitigatedthe disappointment. Unquestionably the act was of supreme gravity. WasMr. Lincoln right or wrong in doing it? The question has been answeredmany times both Yea and Nay, and each side has been maintained withintense acrimony and perfect good faith. It is not likely that it willever be possible to say either that the Yeas have it, or that the Nayshave it. [11] For while it is certain that what actually _did_ happencoincided very accurately with McClellan's expectations; on the otherhand, it can never be known what _might have_ happened if Lincoln hadnot held McDowell, and if, therefore, facts had not been what they were. 

So far as Mr. Lincoln is concerned, the question, what military judgmentwas correct, --that is, whether the capital really was, or was not, absolutely secure, --is of secondary consequence. The valuation which heset on that safety was undeniably correct; it certainly was of moreimportance than McClellan's success. If he had made a mistake in lettingMcClellan go without a more distinct understanding, at least thatmistake was behind him. Before him was the issue whether he should restsatisfied with the deliberate judgment given by McClellan, or whether, at considerable cost to the cause, he should make the assurance greaterout of deference to other advice. He chose the latter course. In sodoing, if he was not vacillating, he was at least incurring the evils ofvacillation. It would have been well if he could have found some quarterin which permanently to repose his implicit faith, so that oneconsistent plan could have been carried out without interference. Eitherhe had placed too much confidence in McClellan in the past, or he wasplacing too little in him now. If he could not accept McClellan'sopinion as to the safety of Washington, in preference to that ofWadsworth, Thomas, and Hitchcock, then he should have removed McClellan, and replaced him with some one in whom he had sufficient confidence tomake smooth coöperation a possibility. The present condition of thingswas illogical and dangerous. Matters had been allowed to reach a veryadvanced stage upon the theory that McClellan's judgment wastrustworthy; then suddenly the stress became more severe, and it seemedthat in the bottom of his mind the President did not thus implicitlyrespect the general's wisdom. Yet he did not displace him, but onlyopened his ears to other counsels; whereupon the buzz of contradictory, excited, and alarming suggestions which came to him were more thanenough to unsettle any human judgment. General Webb speaks well and withauthority to this matter: "The dilemma lay here, --whose plans and adviceshould he follow, where it was necessary for him to approve anddecide?. . . Should he lean implicitly on the general actually in commandof the armies, placed there by virtue of his presumed fitness for theposition, or upon other selected advisers? We are bold to say that itwas doubt and hesitation upon this point that occasioned many of theblunders of the campaign. Instead of one mind, there were many mindsinfluencing the management of military affairs. " A familiar culinaryproverb was receiving costly illustration. 

But, setting the dispute aside, an important fact remains: shorn as hewas, McClellan was still strong enough to meet and to defeat hisopponents. If he had been one of the great generals of the world hewould have been in Richmond before May Day; but he was at his old trickof exaggerating the hostile forces and the difficulties in his way. OnApril 7 he thought that Johnston and the whole Confederate army were atYorktown; whereas Johnston's advance division arrived there on the 10th;the other divisions came several days later, and Johnston himselfarrived only on the 14th. 

On April 9 Mr. Lincoln presented his own view of the situation in thisletter to the general:--

"Your dispatches complaining that you are not properly sustained, whilethey do not offend me, do pain me very much. 

. . . "After you left I ascertained that less than 20, 000 unorganized men, without a single field battery, were all you designed to be left for thedefense of Washington and Manassas Junction, and part of this even wasto go to General Hooker's old position. General Banks's corps, oncedesigned for Manassas Junction, was diverted and tied up on the line ofWinchester and Strasburg, and could not leave it without again exposingthe upper Potomac and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. This presented, or would present, when McDowell and Sumner should be gone, a greattemptation to the enemy to turn back from the Rappahannock and sackWashington. My implicit order that Washington should, by the judgment ofall the commanders of army corps, be left entirely secure, had beenneglected. It was precisely this that drove me to detain McDowell. 

"I do not forget that I was satisfied with your arrangement to leaveBanks at Manassas Junction; but when that arrangement was broken up, andnothing was substituted for it, of course I was constrained tosubstitute something for it myself. And allow me to ask, do you reallythink I should permit the line from Richmond, via Manassas Junction, tothis city, to be entirely open, except what resistance could bepresented by less than 20, 000 unorganized troops? This is a questionwhich the country will not allow me to evade. 

"There is a curious mystery about the number of troops now with you. When I telegraphed you on the 6th, saying you had over a hundredthousand with you, I had just obtained from the secretary of war astatement taken, as he said, from your own returns, making 108, 000 thenwith you and en route to you. You now say you will have but 85, 000 whenall en route to you shall have reached you. How can the discrepancy of23, 000 be accounted for?

"As to General Wool's command, [12] I understand it is doing for youprecisely what a like number of your own would have to do if thatcommand was away. 

"I suppose the whole force which has gone forward for you is with you bythis time. And if so, I think it is the precise time for you to strike ablow. By delay the enemy will relatively gain upon you, --that is, hewill gain faster by fortifications and reinforcements than you can byreinforcements alone. And once more let me tell you, it is indispensableto you that you strike a blow. I am powerless to help this. You will dome the justice to remember I always insisted that going down the bay insearch of a field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, was onlyshifting, and not surmounting, a difficulty; that we would find the sameenemy, and the same or equal intrenchments, at either place. The countrywill not fail to note, is now noting, that the present hesitation tomove upon an intrenched enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated. 

"I beg to assure you that I have never written you or spoken to you ingreater kindness of feeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose tosustain you, so far as, in my most anxious judgment, I consistently can. But you must act. "

McClellan, in consternation and almost despair at the repeated pruningof his force, now begged for at least a part of McDowell's corps, which, he said on April 10, was "indispensable;" "the fate of our cause dependsupon it. " Accordingly Franklin's division was sent to him; and then, after all this palaver, he kept it a fortnight on shipboard, untilYorktown was evacuated!

On May 1 the President, tortured by the political gadflies inWashington, and suffering painfully from the weariness of hope so longdeferred, telegraphed: "Is anything to be done?" A pitiful time of itMr. Lincoln was having, and it called for a patient fortitude surpassingimagination. Yet one little bit of fruit was at this moment ripe for theplucking! After about four weeks of wearisome labor the general hadbrought matters to that condition which was so grateful to his cautioussoul. At the beginning of May he had reduced success to a certainty, sothat he expected to open fire on May 5, and to make short work of therebel stronghold. But it so happened that another soldier also had atthe same time finished his task. General Magruder had delayed the Unionarmy to the latest possible hour, he had saved a whole valuable month;and now, quite cheerfully and triumphantly, in the night betwixt May 3and May 4, he quietly slipped away. As it had happened at Manassas, sonow again the Federals marched unopposed into deserted intrenchments;and a second time the enemy had so managed it that their retreat seemedrather to cast a slur upon Union strategy than to bring prestige to theUnion arms. 

McClellan at once continued his advance, with more or less fighting, therebels steadily drawing back without offering battle on a large scale, though there was a sharp engagement at Williamsburg. He had not even thesmaller number of men which he had originally named as his requirement, and he continued pertinaciously to demand liberal reinforcements. ThePresident, grievously harassed by these importunate appeals, declared toMcClellan that he was forwarding every man that he could, while tofriends nearer at hand he complained that sending troops to McClellanwas like shoveling fleas across a barnyard; most of them didn't getthere! At last he made up his mind to send the remainder of McDowell'scorps; not because he had changed his mind about covering Washington, but because the situation had become such that he expected to arrangethis matter by other resources. 

The fight at Williamsburg took place on May 5. McClellan pushed afterthe retiring enemy, too slowly, as his detractors said, yet by roadswhich really were made almost impassable by heavy rains. Two days later, May 7, Franklin's force disembarked and occupied West Point. Thisadvance up the Peninsula now produced one important result which hadbeen predicted by McClellan in his letter of February 3. On May 8 newscame that the Confederates were evacuating Norfolk, and two days later aUnion force marched into the place. The rebels lost many heavy guns, besides all the advantages of the navy yard with its workshops andstores; moreover, their awe-inspiring ram, the Merrimac, alias theVirginia, was obliged to leave this comfortable nestling-place, whenceshe had long watched and closed the entrance to the James River. Hercommander, Tatnall, would have taken her up that stream, but the pilotsdeclared it not possible to float her over the shoals. She was thereforeabandoned and set on fire; and early in the morning of May 11 she blewup, leaving the southern water-way to Richmond open to the Unionfleet. [13] It was a point of immense possible advantage. Later McClellanintimated that, if he had been left free to act upon his own judgment, he would probably have availed himself of this route; and some writers, with predilections in his favor, have assumed that he was prevented fromdoing so by certain orders, soon to be mentioned, which directed him tokeep the northerly route for the purpose of effecting a junction withMcDowell. But this notion seems incorrect; for though he doubtless hadthe James River route under consideration, yet dates are against thetheory that he wished to adopt it when at last it lay open. On thecontrary, he continued his advance precisely as before. On May 16 hisleading columns reached White House; headquarters were establishedthere, and steps were immediately taken to utilize it as a depot andbase of supplies. The York River route was thus made the definitivechoice. Also the advance divisions were immediately pushed out alongthe York River and Richmond Railroad, which they repaired as they went. On May 20 Casey's division actually crossed the Chickahominy at Bottom'sBridge, and the next day a large part of the army was in position uponthe north bank of that stream. Obviously these operations, each and all, ruled out the James River route, at least as a part of the present plan. Yet it was not until they were well under way, viz. , on May 18, that theintelligence reached McClellan, on the strength of which he and othersafterward assumed that he had been deprived of the power to select theJames River route. What this intelligence was and how it came to passmust now be narrated. 

By this time, the advance along the Peninsula had so completely"relieved the front of Washington from pressure, " that Mr. Lincoln andhis advisers, reassured as to the safety of that city, now saw their wayclear to make McDowell's corps, strengthened to a force of 41, 000 men, contribute actively to McClellan's assistance. They could not, indeed, bring themselves to move it by water, as McClellan desired; but thePresident ordered McDowell to move down from Fredericksburg, where henow lay, towards McClellan's right wing, which McClellan was ordered toextend to the north of Richmond in order to meet him. But, in the wordsof the Comte de Paris, "an absurd restriction revealed the old mistrustsand fears. " For McDowell was strictly ordered not to uncover thecapital; also, with a decisive emphasis indicative of an uneasysuspicion, McClellan was forbidden to dispose of McDowell's force incontravention of this still primary purpose. Whether McDowell was underMcClellan's control, or retained an independent command, was leftcuriously vague, until McClellan forced a distinct understanding. 

Although McClellan, writing to Lincoln, condemned rather sharply themethod selected for giving to him the aid so long implored, yet he feltthat, even as it came to him, he could make it serve his turn. Though hegrumbled at the President's unmilitary ways, he afterward admitted thatthe "cheering news" made him "confident" of being "sufficiently strongto overpower the large army confronting" him. There was no doubt of it. He immediately extended his right wing; May 24, he drove theConfederates out of Mechanicsville; May 26, General Porter took positionat Hanover Junction only fifteen miles from McDowell's head of column, which had advanced eight miles out of Fredericksburg. The situation wasnot unpromising; but unfortunately that little interval of fifteen mileswas never to be closed up. 

May 24, Mr. Lincoln wrote to McClellan, and after suggesting sundryadvisable movements, he said: "McDowell and Shields[14] both say theycan, and positively will, move Monday morning. " Monday was the 26th. Inpoint of fact, McDowell, feeling time to be of great value, urged thePresident to let him move on the morning of Sunday, the 25th; but Mr. Lincoln positively refused; the battle of Bull Run had been fought on aSunday, and he dreaded the omen. [15] This feeling which he had aboutdays was often illustrated, and probably the reader has observed that heseemed to like dates already marked by prestige or good luck; thus hehad convened Congress for July 4, and had ordered the general advance ofthe armies for February 22; it was an indication of the curious threadof superstition which ran through his strange nature, --a remnant of hisyouth and the mysterious influence of the wilderness. But worse than asuperstitious postponement arrived before nightfall on Saturday. Adispatch from Lincoln to McClellan, dated at four o'clock thatafternoon, said: "In consequence of General Banks's critical position, Ihave been compelled to suspend General McDowell's movements to join you. The enemy are making a desperate push upon Harper's Ferry, and we aretrying to throw General Fremont's force and part of General McDowell'sin their rear. " The brief words conveyed momentous intelligence. It isnecessary to admit that Mr. Lincoln was making his one grand blunder, for which there is not even the scant salvation of possible doubt. Allthat can be said in palliation is, that he was governed, or at leaststrongly impelled, by the urgent advice of the secretary of war, whosehasty telegrams to the governors of several States show that he wasterror-stricken and had lost his head. Mr. Blaine truly says thatMcDowell, thus suddenly dispatched by Mr. Lincoln upon a "fruitlesschase, " "was doing precisely what the President of the ConfederateStates would have ordered, had he been able to issue the orders of thePresident of the United States. " There is no way to mitigate the painfultruth of this statement, made by a civilian, but amply sustained by themilitary authorities on both sides. [16]

The condition was this. The retention of McDowell's corps beforeWashington published the anxiety of the administration. The Confederateadvantage lay in keeping that anxiety alive and continuing to neutralizethat large body of troops. Strategists far less able than the Southerngenerals could not have missed so obvious a point, neither could theyhave missed the equally obvious means at their disposal for achievingthese purposes. At the upper end of the valley of the ShenandoahStonewall Jackson had an army, raised by recent accretions to nearly orquite 15, 000 men. The Northern generals erelong learned to prognosticateJackson's movements by the simple rule that at the time when he wasleast expected, and at the place where he was least wanted, he was sureto turn up. [17] The suddenness and speed with which he could move a bodyof troops seemed marvelous to ordinary men. His business now was to makea vigorous dashing foray down the valley. To the westward, Fremont layin the mountains, with an army which checked no enemy and for theexistence of which in that place no reasonable explanation could begiven. In front was Banks, with a force lately reduced to about 5, 000men. May 14, Banks prudently fell back and took position inStrasburg. [18] Suddenly, on May 23, Jackson appeared at Front Royal; onthe next day he attacked Banks at Winchester, and of course defeatedhim; on the 25th Banks made a rapid retreat to the Potomac, and Jacksonmade an equally rapid pursuit to Halltown, within two miles of Harper'sFerry. The news of this startling foray threw the civilians ofWashington into a genuine panic, by which Mr. Lincoln was, at least fora few hours, not altogether unaffected. [19] Yet, though startled andalarmed, he showed the excellent quality of promptitude in decision andaction; and truly it was hard fortune that his decision and his actionwere both for the worst. He at once ordered McDowell to move 20, 000troops into the Shenandoah Valley, and instructed Fremont also to movehis force rapidly into the valley, with the design that the two shouldthus catch Jackson in what Mr. Lincoln described as a "trap. "[20]McDowell was dismayed at such an order. He saw, what every man havingany military knowledge at once recognized with entire certainty, andwhat every military writer has since corroborated, that the movement ofJackson had no value except as a diversion, that it threatened noserious danger, and that to call off McDowell's corps from marching tojoin McClellan in order to send it against Jackson was to do exactlythat thing which the Confederates desired to have done, though theycould hardly have been sanguine enough to expect it. It was swallowing abait so plain that it might almost be said to be labeled. For a generalto come under the suspicion of not seeing through such a ruse washumiliating. In vain McDowell explained, protested, and entreated withthe utmost vehemence and insistence. When Mr. Lincoln had made up hismind, no man could change it, and here, as ill fortune would have it, he had made it up. So, with a heavy heart, the reluctant McDowell setforth on his foolish errand, and Fremont likewise came upon his, --thoughit is true that he was better employed thus than in doing nothing, --andJackson, highly pleased, and calculating his time to a nicety, on May 31slipped rapidly between the two Union generals, --the closing jaws of Mr. Lincoln's "trap, "--and left them to close upon nothing. [21] Then he ledhis pursuers a fruitless chase towards the head of the valley, continuing to neutralize a force many times larger than his own, andwhich could and ought to have been at this very time doing fatal workagainst the Confederacy. Presumably he had saved Richmond, and therewithalso, not impossibly, the chief army of the South. The chagrin of theUnion commanders, who had in vain explained the situation with entireaccuracy, taxes the imagination. 

There is no use in denying a truth which can be proved. The blunder ofMr. Lincoln is not only undeniable, but it is inexcusable. Possibly fora few hours he feared that Washington was threatened. He telegraphed toMcClellan May 25, at two o'clock P. M. , that he thought the movement downthe valley a "general and concerted one, " inconsistent with "the purposeof a very desperate defense of Richmond;" and added, "I think the timeis near when you must either attack Richmond, or give up the job andcome to the defense of Washington. " How reasonable this view was at themoment is of little consequence, for within a few hours afterward thecharacter of Jackson's enterprise as a mere foray became too palpable tobe mistaken. Nevertheless, after the President was relieved from suchfear for the capital as he might excusably have felt for a very briefperiod, his cool judgment seemed for once in his life, perhaps for theonly time, to be disturbed. The truth is that Mr. Lincoln was a sure andsafe, almost an infallible thinker, when he had time given him; but hewas not always a quick thinker, and on this occasion he was driven tothink quickly. In consequence he not only erred in repudiating theopinions of the best military advisers, but even upon the basis of hisown views he made a mistake. The very fact that he was so energetic inthe endeavor to "trap" Jackson in retreat indicates his understanding ofthe truth that Jackson had so small a force that his prompt retreat wasa necessity. This being so, he was in the distinct and simple positionof making a choice between two alternatives, viz. : either to endeavor tocatch Jackson, and for this object to withhold what was needed by andhad been promised to McClellan for his campaign against Richmond; or, leaving Jackson to escape with impunity, to pursue with steadiness thatplan which it was Jackson's important and perfectly understood errand tointerrupt. It is almost incredible that he chose wrong. The statement ofthe dilemma involved the decision. Yet he took the little purpose andlet the great one go. Nor even thus did he gain this lesser purpose. Hehad been warned by McDowell that Jackson could not be caught, and he wasnot. Yet even had this been otherwise, the Northerners would have gotlittle more than the shell while losing the kernel. Probably Richmond, and possibly the Southern army, fell out of the President's hand whilehe tried without success to close it upon Jackson and 15, 000 men. 

The result of this civilian strategy was that McClellan, with hisprojects shattered, was left with his right wing and rear dangerouslyexposed. Jackson remained for a while a mysterious _bête noire_, aboutwhose force, whereabouts, and intentions many disturbing rumors flewabroad; at last, on June 26, he settled these doubts in his usual sharpand conclusive way by assailing the exposed right wing and threateningthe rear of the Union army, thus achieving "the brilliant conclusion ofthe operations which [he] had so successfully conducted in the Valley ofVirginia. "

Simultaneously with the slipping of Jackson betwixt his two pursuers onMay 31, General Johnston made an attack upon the two corps[22] which laysouth of the Chickahominy, in position about Seven Pines and Fair Oaks. Battle was waged during two days. Each side claimed a victory; theSoutherners because they had inflicted the heavier loss, theNortherners because ultimately they held their original lines and foiledJohnston's design of defeating and destroying the Northern army indetail. The result of this battle ought to have proved to McClellan twofacts: that neither in discipline nor in any other respect were theSouthern troops more formidable than his own; also that the Southernerswere clearly not able to overwhelm him with such superior numbers as hehad supposed; for in two days they had not been able to overwhelm muchless than half of his army. These considerations should have encouragedhim to energetic measures. But no encouragement could counteract thediscouragement inflicted by the loss of McDowell's powerful corps andthe consequent wrecking of his latest plan. Nearly to the end of June helay immovable. "June 14, midnight. All quiet in every direction, "--thushe telegraphed to Stanton in words intended to be reassuring, but infact infinitely vexatious. Was he, then, set at the head of this greatand costly host of the nation's best, to rest satisfied with preservingan eternal quietude, --like a chief of police in a disorderly quarter?Still he was indefatigable in declaring himself outnumbered, and indemanding more troops; in return he got assurances, with only the slightfulfillment of McCall's division. Every two or three days he cheeringlyannounced to the administration that he was on the verge of advancing, but he never passed over the verge. Throughout a season in whichblundering seemed to become epidemic, no blunder was greater than hisquiescence at this time. [23] As if to emphasize it, about the middle ofJune General Stuart, with a body of Confederate cavalry, actually rodeall around the Union army, making the complete circuit and crossing itsline of communication with White House without interruption. The forayachieved little, but it wore the aspect of a signal and unavengedinsult. 

In Washington the only powerful backing upon which McClellan could stillrely was that of the President, and he was surely wearing away thepatience of his only friend by the irritating attrition of promises everreiterated and never redeemed. No man ever kept his own counsel moreclosely than did Mr. Lincoln, and the indications of his innermostsentiments concerning McClellan at this time are rare. But perhaps alittle ray is let in, as through a cranny, by a dispatch which he sentto the general on June 2: "With these continuous rains I am very anxiousabout the Chickahominy, --so close in your rear, and crossing your lineof communication. Please look to it. " This curt prompting on so obviousa point was a plain insinuation against McClellan's military competence, and suggests that ceaseless harassment had at last got the better ofLincoln's usually imperturbable self-possession; for it lacked little ofbeing an insult, and Mr. Lincoln, in all his life, never insulted anyman. As a spot upon a white cloth sets off the general whiteness, sothis dispatch illustrates Lincoln's unweariable patience andlong-suffering without parallel. McClellan, never trammeled by respect, retorted sharply: "As the Chickahominy has been almost the only obstaclein my way for several days, your excellency may rest assured that it hasnot been overlooked. " When finally the general became active, it wasunder the spur of General Jackson, not of President Lincoln. Jacksoncompelled him to decide and act; and the result was his famous southwardmovement to the James River. Some, adopting his own nomenclature, havecalled this a change of base; some, less euphemistically, speak of it asa retreat. According to General Webb, it may be called either the one orthe other with equal propriety, for it partook of the features ofeach. [24] It is no part of the biographer of Lincoln to narrate thesuffering and the gallantry of the troops through those seven days ofcontinuous fighting and marching, during which they made their painfulway, in the face of an attacking army, through the dismal swamps of anunwholesome region, amid the fierce and humid heats of the Southernsummer. On July 1 they closed the dread experience by a brilliantvictory in the desperate, prolonged, and bloody battle of Malvern Hill. 

In the course of this march a letter was sent by McClellan to Stantonwhich has become famous. The vindictive lunge, visibly aimed at thesecretary, was really designed, piercing this lesser functionary, toreach the President. Even though written amid the strain and stress ofthe most critical and anxious moment of the terrible "Seven Days, " thewords were unpardonable. The letter is too long to be given in full, butthe closing sentences were:--

"I know that a few thousand more men would have changed this battle[25]from a defeat to a victory. As it is, the government must not and cannothold me responsible for the result. I feel too earnestly to-night. Ihave seen too many dead and wounded comrades to feel otherwise than thatthe government has not sustained this army. If you do not do so now, thegame is lost. If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe nothanks to you or to any other persons in Washington. You have done yourbest to sacrifice this army. "[26] It was safe to write thus to Mr. Lincoln, whose marvelous magnanimity was never soiled by a single actof revenge; but the man who addressed such language to Stanton secured amerciless and unscrupulous enemy forever. 

Though, at the close of this appalling week, the troops at last wereconquerors on the banks of the James, they were in a position notpermanently tenable, and before they could rest they had to fall backanother march to Harrison's Landing. The rear guard reached this havenon the night of July 3, and the army, thus at last safely placed and indirect communication with the fleet and the transports, was able torecuperate, [27] while those in authority considered of the future. Certain facts were established: first, concerning the army, --that beforeit met the baptism of heavy fighting it had been brought into a splendidcondition of drill and efficiency, and that by that baptism, so severeand so long continued, it had come as near as volunteers could come tothe excellence of veterans and regulars; also that it was at least amatch for its opponents; and, finally, strange to say, it was veryslightly demoralized, would soon again be in condition for an advance, and felt full confidence and strong affection for its commander. Brilliant and enthusiastic tributes have been paid to these men fortheir endurance amid disease and wounds and battle; but not one word toomuch has been said. It is only cruel to think of the hideous pricewhich they had paid, and by which they had bought only the capacity toendure further perils and hardship. Second, concerning McClellan; it wasto be admitted that his predictions as to points of strategy had beenfulfilled; that he had managed his retreat, or "change of base, " withskill, and had shown some qualities of high generalship; but it was alsoevident that he was of a temperament so unenterprising and apprehensiveas to make him entirely useless in an offensive campaign. Yet the burdenof conducting a successful offense lay upon the North. Must Mr. Lincoln, then, finally accept the opinion of those who had long since concludedthat McClellan was not the man for the place?

A collateral question was: What should be done next? McClellan, tenacious and stubborn, was for persisting in the movement against Lee'sarmy and Richmond. He admitted no other thought than that, having pausedto gather reinforcements and to refresh his army, he should assume theoffensive, approaching the city by the south and southwest from theJames River base. Holding this purpose, he was impolitic in sending verydolorous dispatches on July 4 and 7, intimating doubts as to his powerto maintain successfully even the defensive. Two or three days later, however, he assumed a better tone; and on July 11 and 12 he reported"all in fine spirits, " and urged that his army should be "promptlyreinforced and thrown again upon Richmond. If we have a little morethan half a chance, we can take it. " He continued throughout the monthto press these views by arguments which, though overruled at the time, have since been more favorably regarded. Whether or not they werecorrect is an item in the long legacy of questions left by the war to bedisputed over by posterity; in time, one side or the other may desistfrom the discussion in weariness, but, from the nature of the case, neither can be vanquished. 

Whether McClellan was right or wrong, his prestige, fresh as it stillremained with his devoted troops, was utterly gone at Washington, wherethe political host was almost a unit against him. The Committee on theConduct of the War had long been bitterly denouncing him; and he had soabused the secretary of war that even the duplicity of Mr. Stanton wasunequal to the strain of maintaining an appearance of goodunderstanding. New military influences also fell into the same scale. General Pope, the latest "favorite, " now enjoying his few weeks ofauthority, endeavored to make it clear to Mr. Lincoln that to bringMcClellan back from the Peninsula was the only safe and intelligentcourse. Further, on July 11, President Lincoln appointed General Halleckgeneral-in-chief. It may be said, in passing, that the appointmentturned out to be a very bad mistake; for Halleck was as dull a man asever made use of grand opportunities only to prove his ownincompetence. Now, however, he came well recommended before Lincoln, and amid novel responsibilities the merit of any man could only be knownby trial. Halleck did not arrive in Washington till near the end of themonth, then he seemed for a while in doubt, or to be upon both sides ofthe question as to whether the army should be advanced or withdrawn; butultimately, in the contemptuous language of Mr. Swinton, he "added hisstrident voice in favor of the withdrawal of the army from thePeninsula. " This settled the matter; for the President had decided toplace himself under the guidance of his new military mentor; and, moreover, his endurance was worn out. 

In the way of loyalty the President certainly owed nothing further tothe general. All such obligations he had exhaustively discharged. Inspite of the covert malicious suggestions and the direct injuriouscharges which tortured the air of the White House and vexed hisjudgment, he had sustained McClellan with a constancy which deservedwarm gratitude. This the general never gave, because he could neverforgive Mr. Lincoln for refusing to subordinate his own views to thoseof such a military expert as himself. This point, it is true, Lincolnnever reached; but subject only to this independence of opinion andaction, so long as he retained McClellan in command, he fulfilled towardhim every requirement of honor and generosity. The movement across thePeninsula, whatever construction might possibly be put upon it, seemedin Washington a retreat, and was for the President a disappointmentweighty enough to have broken the spirit of a smaller man. Yet Lincoln, instead of sacrificing McClellan as a scapegoat, sent to him on July 1and 2 telegrams bidding him do his best in the emergency and save hisarmy, in which case the people would rally and repair all losses; "westill have strength enough in the country and will bring it out, " hesaid, --words full of cheering resolution unshaded by a suspicion ofreproach, words which should have come like wine to the weary. The nextday, July 3, he sent a dispatch which even McClellan, in his formalreport, described as "kind:" "I am satisfied that yourself, officers, and men have done the best you could. All accounts say better fightingwas never done. Ten thousand thanks for it. " But when it came tojudgment and action the President could not alleviate duty withkindness. To get information uncolored by passage through the minds ofothers, he went down to Harrison's Landing on July 7, observed all thathe could see, and talked matters over. Prior to this visit it issupposed that he had leaned towards McClellan's views, and had inclinedto renew the advance. Nor is it clearly apparent that he learnedanything during this trip which induced him to change his mind. Ratherit seems probable that he maintained his original opinion until GeneralHalleck had declared against it, and that then he yielded to GeneralHalleck as he had before yielded to General McClellan, though certainlywith much less reluctance. At the same time the question was notconsidered wholly by itself, but was almost necessarily complicated withthe question of deposing McClellan from the command. For theinconsistency of discrediting McClellan's military judgment andretaining him at the head of the army was obvious. 

Thus at last it came about that McClellan's plan lost its only remainingfriend, and on August 3 came the definite order for the removal of thearmy across the Peninsula to Acquia Creek. The campaign against Richmondwas abandoned. McClellan could not express his indignation at a policy"almost fatal to our cause;" but his strenuous remonstrances had noeffect; his influence had passed forever. The movement of the army wassuccessfully completed, the rear guard arriving at Yorktown on August20. Thus the first great Peninsula campaign came to its end indisappointment and almost in disaster, amid heart-burnings andcriminations. It was, says General Webb, "a lamentable failure, --nothingless. " There was little hope for the future unless some master handcould control the discordant officials who filled the land with the dinof their quarreling. The burden lay upon the President. Fortunately hisgood sense, his even judgment, his unexcitable temperament had saved himfrom the appearance or the reality of partisanship and from anyentangling or compromising personal commitments. 

In many ways and for many reasons, this story of the Peninsula has beenboth difficult and painful to write. To reach the truth and soundconclusions in the many quarrels which it has provoked is never easy, and upon some points seems impossible; and neither the truth nor theconclusions are often agreeable. Opinion and sympathy have gradually butsurely tended in condemnation of McClellan and in favor of Lincoln. Theevidence is conclusive that McClellan was vain, disrespectful, andhopelessly blind to those non-military but very serious considerationswhich should have been allowed to modify the purely scientific strategyof the campaign. Also, though his military training was excellent, itwas his misfortune to be placed amid exigencies for which neither hismoral nor his mental qualities were adapted. Lincoln, on the other hand, displayed traits of character not only in themselves rare and admirable, but so fitted to the requirements of the times that many persons havebeen tempted to conceive him to have been divinely led. But against thisview, though without derogating from the merits which induce it, is tobe set the fact that he made mistakes hardly consistent with the theoryof inspiration by Omniscience. He interfered in military matters; and, being absolutely ignorant of military science, while the problems beforehim were many and extremely perplexing, he blundered, and on at leastone occasion blundered very badly. After he has been given the benefitof all the doubt which can be suggested concerning the questions whichhe disposed of, the preponderance of expert authority shows a residuumof substantial certainty against him. It is true that many civilianwriters have given their judgments in favor of the President's strategy, with a tranquil assurance at least equal to that shown by the militarycritics. But it seems hardly reasonable to suppose that Mr. Lincolnbecame by mere instinct, and instantly, a master in the complex scienceof war, and it is also highly improbable that in the military criticismof this especial campaign, the civilians are generally right and themilitary men are generally wrong. On the whole it is pleasanter as wellas more intelligent to throw out this foolish notion of miraculousknowledge suddenly illuminating Mr. Lincoln with a thorough mastery ofthe art of war. It is better not to believe that he became at onceendowed with acquirements which he had never had an opportunity toattain, and rather to be content with holding him as a simple humanbeing like the rest of us, and so to credit our common humanity with theinspiring excellence of the moral qualities displayed by him in thosemonths of indescribable trial. 

How much of expectation had been staked upon that army of the Potomac!All the Northern people for nearly a year kept their eyes fastened withaching intensity upon it; good fortunes which befell elsewhere hardlyinterrupted for a moment the absorption in it. The feeling was wellillustrated by the committee of Congress, which said that in thehistory of this army was to be found all that was necessary for framinga report on the Conduct of the War; and truly added that this army hadbeen "the object of special care to every department of the government. "It occurred to many who heard this language, that matters would havegone better with the army if the political and civil departments hadbeen less lavish of care and attention. None the less the fact remainedthat the interest and anticipation of the whole loyal part of the nationwere concentrated in the Virginia campaign. Correspondingly cruel wasthe disappointment at its ultimate miscarriage. Probably, as a singletrial, it was the most severe that Mr. Lincoln ever suffered. Hope thenwent through the painful process of being pruned by failure, and it wasnever tortured by another equal mutilation. Moreover, the vastness ofthe task, the awful cost of success, were now, for the first time, appreciated. The responsibility of a ruler under so appalling a destinynow descended with a weight that could never become greater upon theshoulders of that lonely man in the White House. A solitary man, indeed, he was, in a solitude impressive and painful to contemplate. Having noneof those unofficial counselors, those favorites, those privy confidantsand friends, from whom men in chief authority are so apt to seek relief, Mr. Lincoln secretively held his most important thoughts in his ownmind, wrought out his conclusions by the toil of his own brain, carriedhis entire burden wholly upon his own shoulders, and in every part andway met the full responsibility of his office in and by himself alone. It does not appear that he ever sought to be sustained or comforted orencouraged amid disaster, that he ever endeavored to shift upon otherseven the most trifling fragment of the load which rested upon himself;and certainly he never desired that any one should ever be a sharer inany ill repute attendant upon a real or supposed mistake. Silent as tomatters of deep import, self-sustained, facing alone all grave duties, solving alone all difficult problems, and enduring alone allconsequences, he appears a man so isolated from his fellow men amid suchtests and trials, that one is filled with a sense of awe, almost beyondsympathy, in the contemplation. 

FOOTNOTES:

[4] This language was too vague to make known to us now what Sumner'sdemand was; for one of the questions bitterly in dispute soon became:what forces were properly to be regarded as available "for the defenseof the city. "

[5] McClellan says that he offered to General Hitchcock, "who at thattime held staff relations with his excellency, the President, and thesecretary of war, " to submit a list of troops, to be left for thedefense of Washington, with their positions; but Hitchcock replied thatMcClellan's judgment was sufficient in the matter. McClellan's _Report_, 683. VOL. II. 

[6] By letter to the adjutant-general, wherein he requested thetransmission of the information to the secretary of war. _Report ofComm. On Conduct of the War_, ii. Pt. I. 13. The addition in the_Report_ is erroneous, being given as 54, 456 instead of 55, 456. 

[7] See Comte de Paris, _Civil War in America_, i. 626, 627. 

[8] See discussion by Swinton, _Army of Potomac_, 108 _et seq. _

[9] Perhaps he was not justified in counting upon it with such apparentassurance as he had done. Webb, _The Peninsula_, 37-42. 

[10] General Webb says that this question is "the leading point ofdispute in the campaign and may never be satisfactorily set at rest. "But he also says: "To allow the general to remain in command, and thencut off the very arm with which he was about to strike, we hold to havebeen inexcusable and unmilitary to the last degree. " Swinton condemnsthe withholding McDowell (_Army of the Potomac_, 104), adding, with finemagnanimity, that it is not necessary to impute any "really unworthymotive" to Mr. Lincoln!

[11] It seems to me that military opinion, so far as I can get at it, inclines to hold that the government, having let McClellan go to thePeninsula with the expectation of McDowell's corps, ought to have sentit to him, and not to have repaired its own oversight at his cost. Butthis does not fully meet the position that, oversight or no oversight, Peninsula-success or Peninsula-defeat, blame here or blame there, whenthe President had reason to doubt the safety of the capital, he wasresolved, and rightly resolved, to put that safety beyond _possibilityof question_, by any means or at any cost. The truth is that to the endof time one man will think one way, and another man will think anotherway, concerning this unendable dispute. 

[12] General Wool was in command at Fortress Monroe. It had beenoriginally arranged that General McClellan should draw 10, 000 men fromhim. But this was afterward countermanded. The paragraph in thePresident's letter has reference to this. 

[13] A slight obstruction by a battery at Drury's Bluff must have beenabandoned instantly upon the approach of a land force. 

[14] Whose command had been added to McDowell's. 

[15] Colonel Franklin Haven, who was on General McDowell's staff at thetime, is my authority for this statement. He well remembers the reasongiven by Mr. Lincoln, and the extreme annoyance which the general andhis officers felt at the delay. 

[16] "The expediency of the junction of this [McD. 's] large corps withthe principal army was manifest, " says General Johnston. _Narr. 131. _

[17] Jackson used to say: "Mystery, mystery, is the secret of success. "

[18] The Comte de Paris is very severe, even to sarcasm, in his commentson the President's orders to Banks (_Civil War in America_, ii. 35, 36, and see 44); and Swinton, referring to the disposition of the armies, which was well known to have been made by Mr. Lincoln's personal orders, says: "One hardly wishes to inquire by whose crude and fatuousinspiration these things were done. " _Army of Potomac_, 123. Latercritics have not repeated such strong language, but have not takendifferent views of the facts. 

[19] Observe the tone of his two dispatches of May 25 to McClellan. McClellan's _Report_, 100, 101. 

[20] The Comte de Paris prefers to call it a "chimerical project. "_Civil War in America_, ii. 45. Swinton speaks of "the skill of theConfederates and the folly of those who controlled the operations of theUnion armies. " _Army of Potomac_, 122. 

[21] Yet, if Fremont had not blundered, the result might have beendifferent. Comte de Paris, _Civil War in America_, ii. 47. 

[22] The Third, under Heintzelman, and the Fourth, under Keyes. 

[23] Even his admirer, Swinton, says that any possible course would havebeen better than inaction. _Army of Potomac_, 140, 141. 

[24] _The Peninsula_, 188. Swinton seems to regard it in the same light. _Army of Potomac_, 147. 

[25] Gaines's Mill, contested with superb courage and constancy by theFifth Corps, under Porter, against very heavy odds. 

[26] McClellan's _Report_, 131, 132. See, also, his own comments on thisextraordinary dispatch; _Own Story_, 452. He anticipated, not withoutreason, that he would be promptly removed. The Comte de Paris says thatthe two closing sentences were suppressed by the War Department, whenthe documents had to be laid before the Committee on the Conduct of theWar. _Civil War in America_, ii. 112. Another dispatch, hardly lessdisrespectful, was sent on June 25. See McClellan's _Report_, 121. 

[27] For a vivid description of the condition to which heat, marching, fighting, and the unwholesome climate had reduced the men, see statementof Comte de Paris, an eye-witness. _Civil War in America, _ ii. 130. 

CHAPTER III

THE THIRD AND CLOSING ACT OF THE MCCLELLAN DRAMA

As it seems probable that Mr. Lincoln did not conclusively determineagainst the plan of McClellan for renewing the advance upon Richmond byway of Petersburg, until after General Halleck had thus decided, so itis certain that afterward he allowed to Halleck a control almost whollyfree from interference on his own part. Did he, perchance, feel that alesson had been taught him, and did he think that those critics had notbeen wholly wrong who had said that he had intermeddled ignorantly andhurtfully in military matters? Be this as it might, it was in accordancewith the national character to turn the back sharply upon failure anddisappointment, and to make a wholly fresh start; and it was inaccordance with Lincoln's character to fall in with the popular feeling. Yet if a fresh start was intrinsically advisable, or if it was madenecessary by circumstances, it was made in unfortunate company. One doesnot think without chagrin that Grant, Sherman, Sheridan lurkedundiscovered among the officers at the West, while Halleck and Pope werepulled forth to the light and set in the high places. Halleck washopelessly incompetent, and Pope was fit only for subordinate command;and by any valuation which could reasonably be put upon McClellan, itwas absurd to turn him out in order to bring either of these men in. Butit was the experimental period. No man's qualities could be known exceptby testing them; and these two men came before Lincoln with recordssufficiently good to entitle them to trial. The successes at the Westhad naturally produced good opinions of the officers who had achievedthem, and among these officers John Pope had been as conspicuous as anyother. For this reason he was now, towards the close of June, 1862, selected to command the "Army of Virginia, " formed by uniting the corpsof Fremont, McDowell, and Banks. [28] Fremont resigned, in a pet athaving an officer who was his junior in the service placed over hishead; but he was no loss, since his impetuous temperament did not fithim for the duties of a corps commander. He was succeeded by GeneralSigel. The fusing of these independent commands, whose separateexistence had been a wasteful and jeopardizing error, was an excellentmeasure. 

General Pope remained in Washington a few weeks, in constantconsultation with the administration. How he impressed Lincoln one wouldgladly know, but cannot. He had unlimited self-confidence, and he gaveit to be understood at once that he was a fighting man; but it showed anastounding lack of tact upon his part that, in notifying the troops ofthis, his distinguishing characteristic, he also intimated that it wouldbehoove them to turn over a new leaf now that he had come all the wayfrom the West in order to teach Eastern men how to win victories! Themanifesto which he issued has become famous by its folly; it wasarrogant, bombastic, little short of insulting to the soldiers of hiscommand, and laid down principles contrary to the established rules ofwar. Yet it had good qualities, too; for it was designed to bestimulating; it certainly meant fighting; and fortunately, though Popewas not a great general, he was by no means devoid of military knowledgeand instincts, and he would not really have committed quite suchblunders as he marked out for himself in his rhetorical enthusiasm. Onthe whole, however, the manifesto did harm; neither officers norsoldiers were inclined to receive kindly a man who came presumably ontrial with the purpose of replacing McClellan, whom they loved with deeployalty; therefore they ridiculed part of his address and took offenseat the rest of it. Mr. Lincoln could hardly have been encouraged; but hegave no sign. 

On July 29 Pope left Washington and joined his army, near Culpepper. Hehad not quite 45, 000 men, and was watched by Jackson, who lay nearGordonsville with a scant half of that number. On August 9 Banks waspushed forward to Cedar Mountain, where he encountered Jackson andattacked him. In "a hard-fought battle, fierce, obstinate, sanguinary, "the Federals were worsted; and such consolation as the people got fromthe gallantry of the troops was more than offset by the fact, whichbecame obvious so soon as the whole story was known, that our generalsought to have avoided the engagement and were outgeneraled both in thebringing it on and in the conducting it. 

Greatly as Jackson was outnumbered by Pope, he could hope for noreinforcements from Lee so long as McClellan, at Harrison's Landing, threatened Richmond. But when gratifying indications showed the purposeto withdraw the Northern army from the Peninsula the Southern generalventured, August 13, to dispatch General Longstreet northward with astrong force. Soon afterward he himself followed and took command. Thenfor two or three days ensued a sharp matching of wits betwixt the twogenerals. By one of those audacious plans which Lee could dare to makewhen he had such a lieutenant as Jackson to carry it out, Jackson wassent upon a rapid march by the northward, around the army of Pope, tocut its communications. He did it brilliantly; but in doing it henecessarily offered to Pope such an opportunity for fighting theSouthern forces in detail as is rarely given by a good general to anadversary whom he fears. Pope would fain have availed himself of thechance, and in the effort to do so he hurried his troops hither andthither, mingled wise moves with foolish ones, confused hissubordinates, fatigued his men, and finally accomplished nothing. Jackson retired safely from his dangerous position, rejoined the rest ofthe Southern army, and then the united force had as its immediatepurpose to fight Pope before he could receive reinforcements fromMcClellan's army, now rapidly coming forward by way of Washington. _Econverso_, Pope's course should have been to retire a day's march acrossBull Run and await the additional troops who could at once join himthere. Unfortunately, however, he still felt the sting of the ridiculewhich his ill-starred manifesto had called forth, and was furtherirritated by the unsatisfactory record of the past few days, andtherefore was in no temper to fall back. So he did not, but stayed andfought what is known as the second battle of Bull Run. In the conflicthis worn-out men showed such constancy that the slaughter on both sideswas great. Again, however, the bravery of the rank and file was the onlyfeature which the country could contemplate without indignation. Thearmy was beaten; and retired during the evening of August 30 to a safeposition at Centreville, whither it should have been taken without losstwo days earlier. [29] Thus was fulfilled, with only a triflinginaccuracy in point of time, the prediction made by McClellan on August10, that "Pope will be badly thrashed within ten days. "[30]

In all this manoeuvring and fighting the commanding general had shownsome capacity, but very much less than was indispensable in a commanderwho had to meet the generals of the South. Forthwith, also, there brokeout a series of demoralizing quarrels among the principal officers as towhat orders had been given and received, and whether or not they hadbeen understood or misunderstood, obeyed or disobeyed. Also the enemiesof General McClellan tried to lay upon him the whole responsibility forthe disaster, on the ground that he had been dilatory, first, in movinghis army from Harrison's Landing, and afterward, in sending his troopsforward to join Pope; whereas, they said, if he had acted promptly, theNorthern army would have been too strong to have been defeated, regardless of any incompetence in the handling of it. Concerning theformer charge, it may be said that dispatches had flown to and frobetween Halleck and McClellan like bullets between implacable duelists;Halleck ordered the army to be transported, and McClellan retorted thathe was given no transports; it is a dispute which cannot be discussedhere. Concerning the other charge, it was also true that the same twogenerals had been for some days exchanging telegrams, but had beenentirely unable to understand each other. Whose fault it was cannoteasily be determined. The English language was giving our generalsalmost as much trouble as were the Southerners at this time; so that ina few short weeks material for endless discussion was furnished by theorders, telegrams, and replies which were bandied between Pope andPorter, McClellan and Halleck. A large part of the history of the periodconsists of the critical analysis and construing of these documents. What did each in fact mean? What did the writer intend it to mean? Whatdid the recipient understand it to 'mean? Did the writer make hismeaning sufficiently clear? Was the recipient justified in hisinterpretation? Historians have discussed these problems as theologianshave discussed puzzling texts of the New Testament, with not lessacerbity and with no more conclusive results. Unquestionably thecapacity to write two or three dozen consecutive words so as toconstitute a plain, straightforward sentence would have been for themoment a valuable adjunct to military learning. 

The news of the defeat brought dismay, but not quite a panic, to theauthorities in Washington. In fact, there was no immediate danger forthe capital. The army from the Peninsula was by this time distributed atvarious points in the immediate neighborhood; and a force could bepromptly brought together which would so outnumber the Confederate armyas to be invincible. Yet the situation demanded immediate and vigorousaction. Some hand must seize the helm at once, and Pope's hand would notdo; so much at least was entirely certain. He had been given his ownway, without interference on the part of President or secretary, and hehad been beaten; he was discredited before the country and the army;nothing useful could now be done with him. Halleck was utterlydemoralized, and was actually reduced to telegraphing to McClellan: "Ibeg of you to assist me, in this crisis, with your ability andexperience. " It was the moment for a master to take control, and thePresident met the occasion. There was only one thing to be done, andcircumstances were such that not only must that thing be done by him, but also it must be done by him in direct opposition to the strenuousinsistence of all his official and most of his self-constitutedadvisers. It was necessary to reinstate McClellan. 

It was a little humiliating to be driven to this step. McClellan hadlately been kept at Alexandria with no duty save daily to disintegratehis own army by sending off to Washington and to the camp of his ownprobable successor division after division of the troops whom he had solong commanded. Greatly mortified, he had begged at least to be"permitted to go to the scene of battle. " But he was ignored, as if hewere no longer of any consequence whatsoever. In plain truth it was madeperfectly obvious to him and to all the world that if General Pope couldwin a victory the administration had done with General McClellan. Mr. Lincoln described the process as a "snubbing. " Naturally those who wereknown to be the chief promoters of this "snubbing, " and to have beenhighly gratified by it, now looked ruefully on the evident necessity ofsuddenly cutting it short, and requesting the snubbed individual toassume the role of their rescuer. McClellan's more prominent enemiescould not and would not agree to this. Three members of the cabinet evenwent so far as formally to put in writing their protest againstrestoring him to the command of any army at all; while Stanton actuallytried to frighten the President by a petty threat of personalconsequences. But this was foolish. The crisis was of the kind whichinduced Mr. Lincoln to exercise power, decisively. On this occasion hisimpersonal, unimpassioned temperament left his judgment free to workwith evenness and clearness amid the whirl of momentous events and theclash of angry tongues. No one could say that he had been a partisaneither for or against McClellan, and his wise reticence in the past gavehim in the present the privilege of untrammeled action. So he settledthe matter at once by ordering that McClellan should have commandwithin the defenses of Washington. 

By this act the President gave extreme offense to the numerous andstrenuous band with whom hatred of the Democratic general had become asort of religion; and upon this occasion even Messrs. Nicolay and Hayseem more inclined to apologize for their idol than to defend him. Inpoint of fact, nothing can be more misplaced than either apology ordefense, except criticism. Mr. Lincoln could have done no wiser thing. He was simply setting in charge of the immediate business the man whocould do that especial business best. It was not a question of a battleor a campaign, neither of which was for the moment imminent; but it wasa question of reorganizing masses of disorganized troops and gettingthem into shape for battles and campaigns in the future. Only theintensity of hatred could make any man blind to McClellan's capacity forsuch work; and what he might be for other work was a matter of noconsequence just now. Lincoln simply applied to the instant need themost effective help, without looking far afield to study remoteconsequences. Two remarks, said to have been made by him at this time, indicate his accurate appreciation of the occasion and the man: "Thereis no one in the army who can man these fortifications and lick thesetroops of ours into shape half so well as he can. " "We must use thetools we have; if he cannot fight himself, he excels in making othersready to fight. "

On September 1 Halleck verbally instructed McClellan to take command ofthe defenses of Washington, defining this to mean strictly "the worksand their garrisons. " McClellan says that later on the same day he hadan interview with the President, in which the President said that he had"always been a friend" of the general, and asked as a favor that thegeneral would request his personal friends among the principal officersof the army to give to General Pope a more sincere and hearty supportthan they were supposed to be actually rendering. [31] On the morning ofSeptember 2, McClellan says, "The President informed me that ColonelKeelton had returned from the front; that our affairs were in a badcondition; that the army was in full retreat upon the defenses ofWashington, the roads filled with stragglers, etc. He instructed me totake steps at once to stop and collect the stragglers; place the worksin a proper state of defense, and go out to meet and take command of thearmy, when it approached the vicinity of the works, then to place thetroops in the best position, --committing everything to my hands. " Bythis evidence, Mr. Lincoln intrusted the fate of the country and with ithis own reputation absolutely to the keeping of McClellan. 

McClellan was in his element in fusing into unity the disjointedfragments of armies which lay about in Virginia like scattered ruins. His bitterest tractors have never denied him the gift of organization, and admit that he did excellent service just now for a few days. Butcircumstances soon extended his field of action, and gave detractionfresh opportunities. General Lee, in a bold and enterprising mood, perhaps attributable to the encouraging inefficiency of his Northernopponents, moved up the banks of the Potomac and threatened an irruptioninto Maryland and even Pennsylvania. It was absolutely necessary towatch and, at the right moment, to fight him. For this purpose McClellanwas ordered to move along the north bank of the river, but under strictinjunctions at first to go slowly and cautiously and not to uncoverWashington. For General Halleck had not fully recovered his nerve, andwas still much disquieted, especially concerning the capital. Thus thearmies drew slowly near each other, McClellan creeping forward, as hehad been bidden, while Lee, with his usual energy, seemed able to dowith a thousand men more than any Northern general could do with thriceas many, and ran with exasperating impunity those audacious risks which, where they cannot be attributed to ignorance on the part of a commander, indicate contempt for his opponent. This feeling, if he had it, musthave received agreeable corroboration from the clumsy way in which theFederals just at this time lost Harper's Ferry, with General Miles'sgarrison. The Southern troops, who had been detailed against it, rapidlyrejoined General Lee's army; and again the people saw that the Southhad outmarched and outgeneraled the North. 

With all his troops together, Lee was now ready to fight at theconvenience or the pleasure of McClellan, who seemed chivalrously tohave deferred his attack until his opponent should be prepared for it!The armies were in presence of each other near where the Antietamempties into the Potomac, and here, September 17, the bloody conflicttook place. 

The battle of Antietam has usually been called a Northern victory. Boththe right and the left wings of the Northern army succeeded in seizingadvanced positions and in holding them at the end of the fight; and Leeretreated to the southward, though it is true that before doing so helingered a day and gave to his enemy a chance, which was not used, torenew the battle. His position was obviously untenable in the face of anoutnumbering host. But though upon the strength of these facts a victorycould be claimed with logical propriety, yet the President and thecountry were, and had a right to be, indignant at the veryunsatisfactory proportion of the result to the means. Shortly before thebattle McClellan's troops, upon the return to them of the commander whomthey idolized, had given him a soul-stirring reception, proving thespirit and confidence with which they would fight under his orders; andthey went into the fight in the best possible temper and condition. Onthe day of the battle the Northern troops outnumbered the Southernersby nearly two to one; in fact, the Southern generals, in their reports, insisted that they had been simply overwhelmed by enormous odds againstwhich it was a marvel of gallantry for their men to stand at all. Theplain truth was that in the first place, by backwardness in bringing onthe battle, McClellan had left Lee to effect a concentration of forceswhich ought never to have been permitted. Next, the battle itself hadnot been especially well handled, though perhaps this was due rather tothe lack of his personal attention during its progress than to errors inhis plan. Finally, his failure, with so large an army, of which a partat least was entirely fresh, to pursue and perhaps even to destroy thereduced and worn-out Confederate force seemed inexplicable and wasinexcusable. 

The South could never be conquered in this way. It had happened, onSeptember 12, that President Lincoln heard news apparently indicatingthe withdrawal of Lee across the Potomac. He had at once sent it forwardto McClellan, adding: "Do not let him get off without being hurt. " Threedays later, he telegraphed: "Destroy the rebel army if possible. " ButMcClellan had been too self-restrained in his obedience. He had, indeed, hurt Lee, but he had been very careful not to hurt him too much; and asfor destroying the rebel army, he seemed unwilling to enter so lightlyon so stupendous an enterprise. The administration and the countryexpected, and perfectly fairly expected, to see a hot pursuit ofGeneral Lee. They were disappointed; they saw no such thing, but onlysaw McClellan holding his army as quiescent as if there was nothing moreto be done, and declaring that it was in no condition to move!

It was intolerably provoking, unintelligible, and ridiculous that aragged, ill-shod, overworked, under-fed, and beaten body of Southernersshould be able to retreat faster than a great, fresh, well-fed, well-equipped, and victorious body of Northerners could follow. Jacksonsaid that the Northern armies were, kept in too good condition; anddeclared that he could whip any army which marched with herds of cattlebehind it. But the North preferred, and justly, to attribute theinefficiency of their troops to the unfortunate temperament of thecommander. Mr. Lincoln looked at the unsatisfactory spectacle and heldhis hand as long as he could, dreading perhaps again to seem too forwardin assuming control of military affairs. Patience, however, could notendure forever, nor common sense be always subservient to technicalscience. Accordingly, on October 6, he ordered McClellan to cross thePotomac, and either to "give battle to the enemy, or to drive himsouth. " McClellan paid no attention to the order. Four days later theConfederate general, Stuart, with 2000 cavalry and a battery, crossedinto Maryland and made a tour around the Northern army, with the sameinsolent success which had attended his like enterprise on thePeninsula. On October 13 the President wrote to McClellan a letter, soadmirable both in temper and in the soundness of its suggestions that itshould be given entire:--

"MY DEAR SIR, --You remember my speaking to you of what I called yourover-cautiousness. Are you not over-cautious when you assume that youcannot do what the enemy is constantly doing? Should you not claim to beat least his equal in prowess, and act upon the claim?

"As I understand, you telegraphed General Halleck that you cannotsubsist your army at Winchester, unless the railroad from Harper's Ferryto that point be put in working order. But the enemy does now subsisthis army at Winchester at a distance nearly twice as great from railroadtransportation as you would have to do without the railroad last named. He now wagons from Culpepper Court House, which is just about twice asfar as you would have to do from Harper's Ferry. He is certainly notmore than half as well provided with wagons as you are. I certainlyshould be pleased for you to have the advantage of the railroad fromHarper's Ferry to Winchester; but it wastes all the remainder of autumnto give it to you, and, in fact, ignores the question of _time_, whichcannot and must not be ignored. 

"Again, one of the standard maxims of war, as you know, is 'to operateupon the enemy's communications as much as possible without exposingyour own. ' You seem to act as if this applies _against_ you, but cannotapply in your _favor_. Change positions with the enemy, and think younot he would break your communication with Richmond within the nexttwenty-four hours? You dread his going into Pennsylvania. But if he doesso in full force, he gives up his communication to you absolutely, andyou have nothing to do but to follow and ruin him; if he does so withless than full force, fall upon and beat what is left behind, all theeasier. 

"Exclusive of the water line, you are now nearer Richmond than the enemyis, by the route that you _can_, and he _must_ take. Why can you notreach there before him, unless you admit that he is more than your equalon a march? His route is the arc of a circle, while yours is the chord. The roads are as good on yours as on his. 

"You know I desired, but did not order you, to cross the Potomac below, instead of above, the Shenandoah and Blue Ridge. The idea was that thiswould at once menace the enemy's communications, which I would seize, ifhe would permit. If he should move northward, I would follow himclosely, holding his communications. If he should prevent our seizinghis communications, and move towards Richmond, I would press closely tohim, fight him if a favorable opportunity should present, and at leasttry to beat him to Richmond on the inside track. I say, try; if we nevertry, we shall never succeed. If he makes a stand at Winchester, movingneither north nor south, I would fight him there, on the idea that ifwe cannot beat him when he bears the wastage of coming to us, we nevercan when we bear the wastage of going to him. This proposition is asimple truth, and is too important to be lost sight of for a moment. Incoming to us, he tenders us an advantage which we should not waive. Weshould not so operate as to merely drive him away. As we must beat himsomewhere, or fail finally, we can do it, if at all, easier near to usthan far away. If we cannot beat the enemy where he now is, we nevercan, he again being within the intrenchments of Richmond. 

"Recurring to the idea of going to Richmond on the inside track, thefacility for supplying from the side away from the enemy is remarkable, as it were by the different spokes of a wheel extending from the hubtowards the rim; and this, whether you moved directly by the chord or onthe inside arc, hugging the Blue Ridge more closely. The chord line, asyou see, carries you by Aldie, Haymarket, and Fredericksburg, and yousee how turnpikes, railroads, and finally the Potomac, by Acquia Creek, meet you at all points from Washington. The same, only the lineslengthened a little, if you press closer to the Blue Ridge part of theway. The Gaps through the Blue Ridge, I understand to be about thefollowing distances from Harper's Ferry, to wit: Vestala, five miles;Gregory's, thirteen; Snicker's, eighteen; Ashby's, twenty-eight;Manassas, thirty-eight; Chester, forty-five; and Thornton's, fifty-three. I should think it preferable to take the route nearest theenemy, disabling him to make an important move without your knowledge, and compelling him to keep his forces together for dread of you. TheGaps would enable you to attack if you should wish. For a great part ofthe way you would be practically between the enemy and both Washingtonand Richmond, enabling us to spare you the greatest number of troopsfrom here. When, at length, running for Richmond ahead of him enableshim to move this way, if he does so, turn and attack him in rear. But Ithink he should be engaged long before such point is reached. It is alleasy if our troops march as well as the enemy, and it is unmanly to saythey cannot do it. This letter is in no sense an order. "

A general who failed to respond to such a spur as this was not the manfor offensive warfare; and McClellan did not respond. Movement was asodious to him now as it ever had been, and by talking about shoes andovercoats, and by other dilatory pleas, he extended his delay until theclose of the month. It was actually the second day of November beforehis army crossed the Potomac. Another winter of inaction seemed about tobegin. It was simply unendurable. Though it was true that he hadreorganized the army with splendid energy and skill, and had shown tothe Northern soldiers in Virginia the strange and cheerful spectacle ofthe backs of General Lee's soldiers, yet it became a settled fact thathe must give place to some new man. He and Pope were to be succeeded bya third experiment. Therefore, on November 5, 1862, the Presidentordered General McClellan to turn over the command of the army toGeneral Burnside; and on November 7 this was done. 

This action, taken just at this time, called forth a much more severecriticism than would have attended it if the removal had been madesimultaneously with the withdrawal from the Peninsula. By what motivewas Mr. Lincoln influenced? Not very often is the most eager searchrewarded by the sure discovery of his opinions about persons. From whatwe know that he did, we try to infer why he did it, and we gropinglyendeavor to apportion the several measures of influence between thosemotives which we choose to put by our conjecture into his mind; andafter our toilful scrutiny is over we remain painfully conscious of thegreatness of the chance that we have scarcely even approached the truth. Neither diary nor letters guide us; naught save reports of occasionalpithy, pointed, pregnant remarks, evidence the most dubious, liable tobe colored by the medium of the predilections of the hearer, and to bereshaped and misshaped by time, and by attrition in passing through manymouths. The President was often in a chatting mood, and then seemed notremote from his companion. Yet while this was the visible manifestationon the surface, he was the most reticent of men as to grave questions, and no confidant often heard his inmost thoughts. Especially it wouldbe difficult to name an instance in which he told one man what hethought of another; a trifling criticism concerning some single traitwas the utmost that he ever allowed to escape him; a full and carefulestimate, never. 

Such reflections come with peculiar force at this period in his career. What would not one give for his estimate of McClellan! It would be worththe whole great collection of characters sketched by innumerable friendsand enemies for that much-discussed general. While others think thatthey know accurately the measure of McClellan's real value andusefulness, Lincoln really knew these things; but he never told hisknowledge. We only see that he sustained McClellan for a long while inthe face of vehement aspersions; yet that he never fully subjected hisown convictions to the educational lectures of the general, and that heseemed at last willing to see him laid aside; then immediately in acrisis restored him to authority in spite of all opposition; and shortlyafterward, as if utterly weary of him, definitively displaced him. Still, all these facts do not show what Lincoln thought of McClellan. Many motives besides his opinion of the man may have influenced him. Thepressure of political opinion and of public feeling was very great, andmight have turned him far aside from the course he would have pursued ifit could have been neglected. Also other considerations have beensuggested as likely to have weighed with him, --that McClellan could dowith the army what no other man could do, because of the intensedevotion of both officers and men to him; and that an indignity offeredto McClellan might swell the dissatisfaction of the Northern Democracyto a point at which it would seriously embarrass the administration. These things may have counteracted, or may have corroborated, Mr. Lincoln's views concerning the man himself. He was an extraordinaryjudge of men in their relationship to affairs; moreover, of all the menof note of that time he alone was wholly dispassionate and non-partisan. Opinions tinctured with prejudices are countless; it is disappointingthat the one opinion that was free from prejudice is unknown. [32]

FOOTNOTES:

[28] The consolidation, and the assignment of Pope to the command, boredate June 26, 1862. 

[29] This campaign of General Pope has been the topic of very bittercontroversy and crimination. In my brief account I have eschewed theview of Messrs. Nicolay and Hay, who seem to me if I may say it, to havewritten with the single-minded purpose of throwing everybody's blundersinto the scale against McClellan, and I have adopted the view of Mr. John C. Ropes in his volume on _The Army under Pope_, in the Campaignsof the Civil War Series. In his writing it is impossible to detectpersonal prejudice, for or against any one; and his account is so clearand convincing that it must be accepted, whether one likes hisconclusions or not. 

[30] _Own Story_, 466. 

[31] Pope retained for a few days command of the army in camp outsidethe defenses. 

[32] McClure says: "I saw Lincoln many times during the campaign of1864, when McClellan was his competitor for the presidency. I neverheard him speak of McClellan in any other than terms of the highestpersonal respect and kindness. " _Lincoln and Men of War-Times_, 207. 

CHAPTER IV

THE AUTUMN ELECTIONS OF 1862, AND THE PROCLAMATION OF EMANCIPATION

The chapter which has been written on "Emancipation and Politics" showsthat while loyalty to the Union operated as a bond to hold together thepeople of the North, slavery entered as a wedge to force them asunder. It was not long before the wedge proved a more powerful force than thebond, for the wedge was driven home by human nature; and it wasinevitable that the men of conservative temperament and the men ofprogressive temperament should erelong be easily restored to theirinstinctive antagonism. Of those who had been stigmatized as "Northernmen with Southern principles, " many soon found their Southernproclivities reviving. These men, christened "Copperheads, " became moreodious to loyal Northerners than were the avowed Secessionists. Inreturn for their venomous nickname and the contempt and hatred withwhich they were treated, they themselves grew steadily more rancorous, more extreme in their feelings. They denounced and opposed every measureof the government, harangued vehemently against the war and against allthat was done to prosecute it, reviled with scurrilous and passionateabuse every prominent Republican, filled the air with dishearteningforecasts of defeat, ruin, and woe, and triumphed whenever the miserableprophecies seemed in the way of fulfillment. General Grant trulydescribed them as auxiliaries to the Confederate army, and said that theNorth would have been much better off with a hundred thousand of thesemen in the Southern ranks, and the rest of their kind at home thoroughlysubdued, as the Unionists were at the South, than was the case as thestruggle was actually conducted. In time the administration found itselfforced, though reluctantly, to arrest and imprison many of theringleaders in this Northern disaffection. Yet all the while theCopperheads resolutely maintained their affiliations with the Democraticparty, and though they brought upon it much discredit which it did notdeserve, yet they could not easily be ejected from it. Differences ofopinion shaded into each other so gradually that to establish a line ofdivision was difficult. 

Impinging upon Copperheadism stood the much more numerous body of thosewho persistently asserted their patriotism, but with equal persistencecriticised severely all the measures of the government. These menbelonged to that well-known class which is happily described as being"for the law, but ag'in the enforcement of it. " They were for the Union, but against saving it. They kept up a disapproving headshaking overpretty much everything that the President did. With much grandiloquentargument, in the stately, old-school style, they bemoaned the breacheswhich they charged him with making in the Constitution. They also hotlyassumed the role of champions of General McClellan, and bewailed theimbecility of an administration which thwarted and deposed him. Protesting the purest and highest patriotism, they were more evasivethan the outspoken Copperheads, and as their disaffection was lessconspicuous and offensive, so also it was more insidious and almostequally hurtful. They constituted the true and proper body of Democracy. 

In a fellowship, which really ought not to have existed, with theseobstructionists, was the powerful and respectable body of war Democrats. These men maintained a stubborn loyalty to the old party, but pridedthemselves upon being as hearty and thorough-going war-men as any amongthe Republicans. A large proportion of the most distinguished generals, of the best regimental officers, of the most faithful soldiers in thefield, were of this political faith. The only criticism that Republicanscould reasonably pass upon them was, that they did not, in a politicalway, strengthen the hands of the government, that they would not upholdits authority by swelling its majorities, nor aid its prestige by givingit their good words. 

Over against this Democracy, with its two very discordant wings, wasarrayed the Republican party, which also was disturbed by the ill-willof those who should have been its allies; for while the moderateAbolitionists generally sustained the President, though only imperfectlysatisfied with him, the extreme Abolitionists refused to be soreasonable. They were a very provoking body of pure moralists. Theyworried the President, condemned his policy, divided the counsels of thegovernment, and introduced injurious personal enmities and partisanshipwith reckless disregard of probable consequences. To a considerableextent they had the same practical effect as if they had been avowedopponents of the Republican President. They wished immediately to placethe war upon the footing of a crusade for the abolition of slavery. Among them were old-time Abolitionists, with whom this purpose was areligion, men who had hoped to see Seward the Republican President, andwho said that Lincoln's friends in the nominating convention hadrepresented a "superficial and only half-hearted Republicanism. " Besidethese men, though actuated by very different and much less honorablemotives, stood many recruits, some even from the Democracy, who were sovindictive against the South that they desired to inflict abolition as apunishment. 

All these critics and dissatisfied persons soon began to speak withseverity, and sometimes with contempt, against the President. He hadsaid that the war was for the Union; but they scornfully retorted thatthis was to reduce it to "a mere sectional strife for ascendency;" that"a Union, with slavery spared and reinstated, would not be worth thecost of saving it. " It was true that to save the Union, without alsoremoving the cause of disunion, might not be worth a very great price;yet both Union and abolition were in serious danger of being thrown awayforever by these impetuous men who desired to pluck the fruit before itwas ripe, or rather declared it to be ripe because they so wanted topluck it. 

It is not, here and now, a question of the merits and the usefulness ofthese men; undoubtedly their uncompromising ardor could not have beendispensed with in the great anti-slavery struggle; it was what the steamis to the engine, and if the motive power had been absent no one can sayhow long the United States might have lain dormant as a slave-country. But the question is of their present attitude and of its influence andeffect in the immediate affairs of the government. Their demand was foran instant and sweeping proclamation of emancipation; and they wereangry and denunciatory against the President because he would not giveit to them. Of course, by their ceaseless assaults they hampered him andweakened his hands very seriously. It was as an exercise of thePresident's war-power that they demanded the proclamation; and thedifficulty in the way of it was that Mr. Lincoln felt, and the greatmajority of Northern men were positive in the opinion, that such aproclamation at this time would not be an honest and genuine exercise ofthe war-power, that it would be only falsely and colorably so called, and that in real truth it would be a deliberate and arbitrary change ofthe war from a contest for Union to a contest for abolition. Mr. Lincolncould not _make_ it a war measure merely by _calling_ it so; it was nomere matter of political christening, but distinctly a very grave andsubstantial question of fact. It may be suspected that very many even ofthe Abolitionists themselves, had they spoken the innermost convictionof their minds, would have admitted that the character of the measure asa wise military transaction, pure and simple, was very dubious. It wascertain that every one else in all the country which still was or everhad been the United States would regard it as an informal and misnamedbut real change of base for the whole war. No preamble, no _Whereas_, inMr. Lincoln's proclamation, reciting as a fact and a motive that whichhe would have known, and ninety-nine out of every hundred loyal menwould have believed, not to be the true fact and motive, could make therest of his proclamation lawful, or his act that of an honest ruler. Accordingly no pressure could drive him to the step; he preferred toendure, and long did endure, the abuse of the extreme Abolitionists, andall the mischief which their hostility could inflict upon hisadministration. Yet, in truth, there was not in the North anAbolitionist who thought worse of the institution of slavery than didthe man who had repeatedly declared it to be "a moral, a social, and apolitical evil. " Referring to these times, and the behavior of theAbolitionists, he afterward wrote:[33]--

"I am naturally anti-slavery. If slavery is not wrong, nothing is wrong. I cannot remember when I did not so think and feel, and yet I have neverunderstood that the presidency conferred upon me an unrestricted rightto act officially upon this judgment and feeling. It was in the oath Itook that I would, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, anddefend the Constitution of the United States. I could not take theoffice without taking the oath. Nor was it my view that I might take anoath to get power, and break the oath in using the power. I understood, too, that in ordinary civil administration this oath even forbade me topractically indulge my primary abstract judgment on the moral questionof slavery. I had publicly declared this many times, and in many ways. And I aver that, to this day, I have done no official act in meredeference to my abstract judgment and feeling on slavery. I didunderstand, however, that my oath to preserve the Constitution to thebest of my ability imposed upon me the duty of preserving, by everyindispensable means, that government, --that nation, of which thatConstitution was the organic law. Was it possible to lose the nation andyet preserve the Constitution? By general law, life and limb must beprotected, yet often a limb must be amputated to save a life; but alife is never wisely given to save a limb. I felt that measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become lawful by becomingindispensable to the preservation of the Constitution through thepreservation of the nation. Right or wrong, I assumed this ground, andnow avow it. I could not feel that, to the best of my ability, I hadeven tried to preserve the Constitution, if, to save slavery or anyminor matter, I should permit the wreck of government, country, andConstitution all together. When, early in the war, General Fremontattempted military emancipation, I forbade it, because I did not thenthink it an indispensable necessity. When, a little later, GeneralCameron, then secretary of war, suggested the arming of the blacks, Iobjected because I did not yet think it an indispensable necessity. When, still later, General Hunter attempted military emancipation, Iagain forbade it, because I did not yet think the indispensablenecessity had come. "

None could deny that the North could abolish slavery in the South onlyby beating the South in the pending war. Therefore, by his duty asPresident of the Union and by his wishes as an anti-slavery man, Mr. Lincoln was equally held to win this fight. Differing in opinion fromthe Abolitionists, he believed that to turn it, at an early stage, intoa war for abolition rather than to leave it a war for the Union would beto destroy all hope of winning. The step would alienate great numbers atthe North. The "American Society for promoting National Unity" hadlately declared that emancipation "would be rebellion against Providenceand destruction to the colored race in our land;" and it was certainthat this feeling was still widely prevalent in the loyal States. InJuly, 1862, General McClellan said, warningly, that a declaration ofradical views on the slavery question would rapidly disintegrate anddestroy the Union armies. Finally, it seemed hardly doubtful that fataldefections would take place in the Border States, even if they shouldnot formally go over to the Confederacy. No man saw the value of thoseBorder States as Mr. Lincoln did. To save or to lose them was probablyto save or lose the war; to lose them and the war was to establish apowerful slave empire. Where did abolition come in among these events?It was not there!

[Illustration: Simon Cameron]

Painfully, therefore, untiringly, with all the skill and tact in hispower, Mr. Lincoln struggled to hold those invaluable, crucial States. His "border-state policy" soon came to be discussed as the mostinteresting topic of which men could talk wherever they came together. Savage were the maledictions which emancipationists uttered against it, and the intensity of their feeling is indicated by the fact that, thoughthat policy was carried out, and though the nation, in due time, gathered the ripe and perfect fruit of it both in the integrity of thecountry and the abolition of slavery, yet even at the present day manyold opponents of President Lincoln, survivors of the Thirty-seventhCongress, remain unshaken in the faith that his famous policy was "acruel and fatal mistake. "

By the summer of 1862 the opinions and the action of Mr. Lincoln in allthese matters had brought him into poor standing in the estimation ofmany Republicans. The great majority of the politicians of the party andsundry newspaper editors, that is to say, those persons who chiefly makethe noise and the show before the world, were busily engaged incondemning his policy. The headquarters of this disaffection were inWashington. It had one convert even within the cabinet, where thesecretary of the treasury was thoroughly infected with the notion thatthe President was fatally inefficient, laggard, and unequal to theoccasion. The feeling was also especially rife in congressional circles. Mr. Julian, than whom there can be no better witness, says: "No one at adistance could have formed any adequate conception of the hostility ofRepublican members toward Mr. Lincoln at the final adjournment [themiddle of July], while it was the belief of many that our last sessionof Congress had been held in Washington. Mr. Wade said the country wasgoing to hell, and that the scenes witnessed in the French Revolutionwere nothing in comparison with what we should see here. " If most of thepeople at the North had not had heads more cool and sensible than wasthe one which rested upon the shoulders of the ardent "Ben" Wade, thealarming prediction of that lively spokesman might have been fulfilled. Fortunately, however, as Mr. Julian admits, "the feeling in Congress wasfar more intense than [it was] throughout the country. " The experienceddenizens of the large Northern cities read in a critical temper thetirades of journalist critics, who assumed to know everything. Thepopulation of the small towns and the village neighborhoods, though alittle bewildered by the echoes of denunciation which reached them fromthe national capital, yet by instinct, or by a divine guidance, heldfast to their faith in their President. Thus the rank and file of theRepublican party refused to follow the field officers in a revoltagainst the general. No better fortune ever befell this very fortunatenation. If the anti-slavery extremists had been able to reinforce theirown pressure by the ponderous impact of the popular will, and so hadpushed the President from his "border-state policy" and from his generalscheme of advancing only very cautiously along the anti-slavery line, itis hardly conceivable either that the Union would have been saved orthat slavery would have been destroyed. 

On August 19, 1862, the good, impulsive, impractical Horace Greeleypublished in his newspaper, the New York "Tribune, " an address to thePresident, to which he gave an awe-inspiring title, "The Prayer of20, 000, 000 of People. " It was an extremely foolish paper, and its title, like other parts of it, was false. Only those persons who were agitatorsfor immediate emancipation could say amen to this mad prayer, and theywere far from being even a large percentage of "20, 000, 000 of people. "Yet these men, being active missionaries and loud preachers in behalf ofa measure in which they had perfect faith, made a show and exerted aninfluence disproportioned to their numbers. Therefore their prayer, [34]though laden with blunders of fact and reasoning, fairly expressedmalcontent Republicanism. Moreover, multitudes who could not quite joinin the prayer would read it and would be moved by it. The influence ofthe "Tribune" was enormous. Colonel McClure truly says that by means ofit Mr. Greeley "reached the very heart of the Republican party in everyState in the Union;" and perhaps he does not greatly exaggerate when headds that through this same line of connection the great Republicaneditor "was in closer touch with the active loyal sentiment of thepeople than [was] even the President himself. " For these reasons itseemed to Mr. Lincoln worth while to make a response to an assaultwhich, if left unanswered, must seriously embarrass the administration. He therefore wrote:--

"DEAR SIR, --I have just read yours of the 19th instant, addressed tomyself through the New York 'Tribune. '

"If there be in it any statements or assumptions of fact which I mayknow to be erroneous, I do not now and here controvert them. 

"If there be any inferences which I believe to be falsely drawn, I donot now and here argue against them. 

"If there be perceptible in it an impatient and dictatorial tone, Iwaive it in deference to an old friend, whose heart I have alwayssupposed to be right. 

"As to the policy 'I seem to be pursuing, ' as you say, I have not meantto leave any one in doubt. I would save the Union. I would save it inthe shortest way under the Constitution. 

"The sooner the national authority can be restored, the nearer the Unionwill be, --the Union as it was. 

"If there be those who would not save the Union, unless they could atthe same time save slavery, I do not agree with them. 

"If there be those who would not save the Union, unless they could atthe same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. 

"_My paramount object is to save the Union, and not either to save ordestroy slavery_. 

"If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it. And if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it. And ifI could save it by freeing some, and leaving others alone, I would alsodo that. 

"What I do about slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe ithelps to save the Union, and what I forbear, I forbear because I do notbelieve it would help to save the Union. 

"I shall do less whenever I believe what I am doing hurts the cause, andshall do more whenever I believe doing more will help the cause. 

"I shall try to correct errors when shown to be errors, and I shalladopt new views so fast as they shall appear to be true views. 

"I have here stated my purpose, according to my view of official duty, and I intend no modification of my oft-expressed personal wish, that allmen everywhere could be free. "

This reply, placing the Union before all else, did "more to steady theloyal sentiment of the country in a very grave emergency than anythingthat ever came from Lincoln's pen. " It was, very naturally, "particularly disrelished by anti-slavery men, " whose views were notmodified by it, but whose temper was irritated in proportion to thedifficulty of meeting it. Mr. Greeley himself, enthusiastic andwoolly-witted, allowed this heavy roller to pass over him, and arosebehind it unaware that he had been crushed. He even published a retort, which was discreditably abusive. A fair specimen of his rhetoric was hisdemand to be informed whether Mr. Lincoln designed to save the Union "byrecognizing, obeying, and enforcing the laws, or by ignoring, disregarding, and in fact defying them. " Now the precise fact which soincensed Mr. Greeley and all his comrades was that the President wasstudiously and stubbornly insisting upon "recognizing, obeying, andenforcing the laws;" and the very thing which they were crying for was astep which, according to his way of thinking, would involve that heshould "ignore, disregard, and defy" them. They had not shrunk fromtaking this position, when pushed toward it. They had contemned theConstitution, and had declared that it should not be allowed to stand inthe way of doing those things which, in their opinion, ought to be done. Their great warrior, the chieftain of their forces in the House ofRepresentatives, Thaddeus Stevens, was wont to say, in his defianticonoclastic style, that there was no longer any Constitution, and thathe was weary of hearing this "never-ending gabble about the sacrednessof the Constitution. " Yet somewhat inconsistently these same men held asan idol and a leader Secretary Chase; and he at the close of 1860 haddeclared: "At all hazards and against all opposition, the laws of theUnion should be enforced. . . . The question of slavery should not bepermitted to influence my action, one way or the other. " Later, perhapshe and his allies had forgotten these words. Still many persons hold tothe opinion that the emancipationists did not give Mr. Lincoln fairplay. [35]

On September 13 a body of clergymen from Chicago waited upon Mr. Lincolnto urge immediate and universal emancipation. The occasion was madenoteworthy by his remarks to them. 

"I am approached with the most opposite opinions and advice, and that byreligious men, who are equally certain that they represent the Divinewill. I am sure that either the one or the other class is mistaken inthat belief, and perhaps, in some respect, both. I hope it will not beirreverent for me to say that, if it is probable that God would revealhis will to others on a point so connected with my duty, it might besupposed He would reveal it directly to me; for, unless I am moredeceived in myself than I often am, it is my earnest desire to know thewill of Providence in this matter. And if I can learn what it is, I willdo it! These are not, however, the days of miracles, and I suppose itwill be granted that I am not to expect a direct revelation. I muststudy the plain physical facts of the case, ascertain what is possible, and learn what appears to be wise and right. The subject is difficult, and good men do not agree. 

. . . "What good would a proclamation of emancipation from me do, especially as we are now situated? I do not want to issue a documentthat the whole world will see must necessarily be inoperative, like thePope's bull against the comet! Would my word free the slaves, when Icannot even enforce the Constitution in the rebel States? Is there asingle court, or magistrate, or individual that would be influenced byit there? And what reason is there to think it would have any greatereffect upon the slaves than the late law of Congress, which I approved, and which offers protection and freedom to the slaves of rebel masterswho come within our lines? Yet I cannot learn that that law has caused asingle slave to come over to us. 

. . . "Now, then, tell me, if you please, what possible result of goodwould follow the issuing of such a proclamation as you desire?Understand, I raise no objections against it on legal or constitutionalgrounds, for, as commander-in-chief of the army and navy, in time ofwar, I suppose I have a right to take any measure which may best subduethe enemy; nor do I urge objections of a moral nature, in view ofpossible consequences of insurrection and massacre at the South. I viewthis matter as a practical war measure, to be decided on according tothe advantages or disadvantages it may offer to the suppression of therebellion. 

. . . "Do not misunderstand me because I have mentioned these objections. They indicate the difficulties that have thus far prevented my action insome such way as you desire. I have not decided against a proclamationof liberty to the slaves, but hold the matter under advisement. And Ican assure you that the subject is on my mind, by day and night, morethan any other. Whatever shall appear to be God's will I will do. Itrust that in the freedom with which I have canvassed your views I havenot in any respect injured your feelings. "

Whether or not the clerical advisers winced under the President's irony, at least they must have appreciated the earnestness and sincerity withwhich he considered the subject. 

All this while that newspaper writers, religious teachers, members ofCongress, and political busy-bodies generally were tirelesslyenlightening Mr. Lincoln concerning what was right, what was wise, whatwas the will of the people, even what was the will of God, he was againquietly making good that shrewd Southerner's prophecy: he was "doing hisown thinking;" neither was he telling to anybody what this thinking was. Throngs came and went, and each felt called upon to leave behind himsome of his own wisdom, a precept, advice, or suggestion, for the use ofthe President; perhaps in return he took away with him a story which wasmuch more than full value for what he had given; but no one found outthe working of the President's mind, and no one could say that he hadinfluenced it. History is crowded with tales of despots, but it tells ofno despot who thought and decided with the tranquil, taciturnindependence which was now marking this President of the free AmericanRepublic. It is a little amusing for us, to-day, to know that while theemancipationists were angrily growling out their disgust at the rulerwho would not abolish slavery according to their advice, the rough draftof the Emancipation Proclamation had already been written. It wasactually lying in his desk when he was writing to Greeley that letterwhich caused so much indignation. It had been communicated to hiscabinet long before he talked to those Chicago clergymen, and showedthem that the matter was by no means so simple as they, in theirone-sided, unworldly way, believed it to be. 

It is said to have been on July 8 that the President wrote this roughdraft, on board the steamboat which was bringing him back from his visitto McClellan at Harrison's Landing. He then laid it away for the daysand events to bring ripeness. By his own statement he had for some timefelt convinced that, if compensated emancipation should fail, emancipation as a war measure must ensue. Compensated emancipation hadnow been offered, urged, and ill received; therefore the question in hismind was no longer _whether_, but _when_ he should exercise his power. This was more a military than a political question. His right toemancipate slaves was strictly a war-power; he had the right to exerciseit strictly for the purpose of weakening the enemy or strengthening hisown generals; he had not the right to exercise it in the cause ofhumanity, if it would not either weaken the enemy or strengthen his ownside. If by premature exercise he should alienate great numbers ofborder-state men, while the sheet of paper with his name at its footwould be ineffectual to give actual liberty of action to a single blackman in the Confederacy, he would aid the South and injure theNorth, --that is to say, he would accomplish precisely the reverse ofthat which alone could lawfully form the basis of his action. Thequestion of _When_, therefore, was a very serious one. At what stage ofthe contest would a declaration of emancipation be hurtful to theSouthern and beneficial to the Northern cause?

Schuyler Colfax well said that Mr. Lincoln's judgment, when settled, "was almost as immovable as the eternal hills. " A good illustration ofthis was given upon a day about the end of July or beginning of August, 1862, when Mr. Lincoln called a cabinet meeting. To his assembledsecretaries he then said, with his usual simple brevity, that he wasgoing to communicate to them something about which he did not desirethem to offer any advice, since his determination was taken; they mightmake suggestions as to details, but nothing more. After this imperiousstatement he read the preliminary proclamation of emancipation. Theministers listened in silence; not one of them had been consulted; notone of them, until this moment, knew the President's purpose; not evennow did he think it worth while to go through any idle form of askingthe opinion of any one of them. [36] He alone had settled the matter, andsimply notified them that he was about to do the most momentous thingthat had ever been done upon this continent since thirteen Britishcolonies had become a nation. Such a presentation of "one-man-power"certainly stood out in startling relief upon the background of populargovernment and the great free republican system of the world!

One or two trifling verbal alterations were made. The only importantsuggestion came from Mr. Seward, who said that, in the "depression ofthe public mind consequent upon our repeated adverses, " he feared thatso important a step might "be viewed as the last measure of an exhaustedgovernment, a cry for help; the government stretching forth its hands toEthiopia, instead of Ethiopia stretching forth her hands to thegovernment. " He dreaded that "it would be considered our last shriek onthe retreat. " Therefore he thought it would be well to postpone issuingthe proclamation till it could come before the country with the supportof some military success. Mr. Lincoln, who had not committed himselfupon the precise point of time, approved this idea. In fact, he hadalready had in mind this same notion, that a victory would be anexcellent companion for the proclamation. In July Mr. Boutwell had saidto him that the North would not succeed until the slaves wereemancipated, and Mr. Lincoln had replied: "You would not have it donenow, would you? Had we not better wait for something like a victory?"This point being accordingly settled to the satisfaction of all, themeeting then dissolved, with the understanding that the secret was to beclosely kept for the present; and Mr. Lincoln again put away his paperto await the coming of leaden-footed victory. 

For the moment the prospects of this event were certainly sufficientlygloomy. Less than three weeks, however, brought the battle of Antietam. As a real "military success" this was, fairly speaking, unsatisfactory;but it had to serve the turn; the events of the war did not permit theNorth to be fastidious in using the word victory; if the President hadimprudently been more exacting, the Abolitionists would have had to waitfor Gettysburg. News of the battle reached Mr. Lincoln at the Soldiers'Home. "Here, " he says, "I finished writing the second draft. I came toWashington on Saturday, called the cabinet together to hear it, and itwas published on the following Monday, the 22d of September, 1862. "

The proclamation was preliminary or monitory only, and it did notpromise universal emancipation. It stated that, on January 1, 1863, "allpersons held as slaves within any State or designated part of a State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the UnitedStates, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free;" also, that "theExecutive will, on the first day of January aforesaid, by proclamation, designate the States and parts of States, if any, in which the peoplethereof respectively shall then be in rebellion against the UnitedStates. "

The measure was entirely Mr. Lincoln's own. Secretary Chase reports thatat the cabinet meeting on September 22 he said: "I must do the best Ican, and bear the responsibility of taking the course which I feel Iought to take. " It has been said that he acted under a severe specificpressure, emanating from the calling of the famous conference ofgovernors at Altoona. This, however, is not true. On September 14Governor Curtin invited the governors of loyal States to meet onSeptember 24 to discuss the situation and especially the emergencycreated by the northward advance of General Lee. But that this meetingwas more than a coincidence, or that the summons to it had any influencein the matter of the proclamation, is disproved by all that is knownconcerning it. [37] The connection with the battle is direct, avowed, andreasonable; that with the gubernatorial congress is supposititious andimprobable. Governor Curtin says distinctly that the President, beinginformed by himself and two others that such a conference was inpreparation, "did not attempt to conceal the fact that we were upon theeve of an emancipation policy, " in response to which statement hereceived from his auditors the "assurance that the Altoona conferencewould cordially indorse such a policy. " As matter of fact, at themeeting, most of the governors, in a sort of supplementary way, declaredtheir approval of the proclamation; but the governors of New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri would not unite in thisaction. If further evidence were needed upon this point, it is furnishedby the simple statement of President Lincoln himself. He said: "Thetruth is, I never thought of the meeting of the governors at all. WhenLee came over the Potomac I made a resolve that, if McClellan drove himback, I would send the proclamation after him. The battle of Antietamwas fought Wednesday, but I could not find out until Saturday whether wehad won a victory or lost a battle. It was then too late to issue it onthat day, and on Sunday I fixed it up a little, and on Monday I let themhave it. " Secretary Chase, in his Diary, under date of September 22, 1862, gives an account in keeping with the foregoing sketch, but castsabout the proclamation a sort of superstitious complexion, as if it werethe fulfillment of a religious vow. He says that at the cabinet meetingthe President said: "When the rebel army was at Frederick, I determined, as soon as it should be driven out of Maryland, to issue a proclamationof emancipation, such as I thought most likely to be useful. I saidnothing to any one; but I made the promise to myself, and (hesitating alittle) to my Maker. The rebel army is now driven out, and I am going tofulfill that promise. " About an event so important and so picturesquesmall legends will cluster and cling like little barnacles on the solidrock; but the rock remains the same beneath these deposits, and in thiscase the fact that the proclamation was determined upon and issued atthe sole will and discretion of the President is not shaken by anytestimony that is given about it. He regarded it as a most gravemeasure, as plainly it was; to a Southerner, who had begged him not tohave recourse to it, he replied: "You must not expect me to give up thisgovernment without playing my last card. "[38] So now, on this momentoustwenty-second day of September, the President, using his own judgment inplaying the great game, cast what he conceived to be his ace of trumpsupon the table. 

The measure took the country by surprise. The President's secret hadbeen well kept, and for once rumor had not forerun execution. Doubtlessthe reader expects now to hear that one immediate effect was theconciliation of all those who had been so long reproaching Mr. Lincolnfor his delay in taking this step. It would seem right and natural thatthe emancipationists should have rallied with generous ardor to sustainhim. They did not. They remained just as dissatisfied and distrustfultowards him as ever. Some said that he had been _forced_ into thispolicy, some that he had drifted with the tide of events, some that hehad waited for popular opinion at the North to give him the cue, insteadof himself guiding that opinion. To show that he was false to theresponsibility of a ruler, there were those who cited against him hisown modest words: "I claim not to have controlled events, but confessplainly that events have controlled me. " Others, however, put upon thislanguage the more kindly and more honest interpretation, that Mr. Lincoln appreciated that both President and people were moved by thedrift of events, which in turn received their own impulse from an agencyhigher than human and to which they must obediently yield. But whateveringenious excuses were devised by extremists for condemning the man whohad done the act, the Republican party faithfully supported the actitself. In the middle of December the House passed a resolutionratifying the President's policy as "well adapted to hasten therestoration of peace, " and "well chosen as a war measure. "

The President himself afterward declared his "conviction" that, had theproclamation been issued six months earlier, it would not have beensustained by public opinion; and certainly it is true thatcontemporaneous political occurrences now failed to corroborate thesoundness of those assertions by which the irreconcilableemancipationist critics of Mr. Lincoln had been endeavoring to inducehim to adopt their policy earlier. They themselves, as Mr. Wilsonadmits, "had never constituted more than an inconsiderable fraction" ofthe whole people at the North. He further says: "At the other extreme, larger numbers received it [the proclamation] with deadly and outspokenopposition; while between these extremes the great body even of Unionmen doubted, hesitated. . . . Its immediate practical effect did perhapsmore nearly answer the apprehensions of the President than theexpectations of those most clamorous for it. It did, as charged, verymuch 'unite the South and divide the North. '"

In the autumn of 1862 there took place the elections for Representativesto the Thirty-eighth Congress. The most ingenious sophist could hardlymaintain that strenuous anti-slavery voters, who had been angry with thegovernment for backwardness in the emancipation policy, ought now tomanifest their discontent by voting the Democratic ticket. If thereshould be a Democratic reaction at the polls it could not possibly beconstrued otherwise than as a reaction against anti-slavery; it wouldundeniably indicate that Congress and the administration had been toohostile rather than too friendly towards that cause of the strife, thatthey had outstripped rather than fallen behind popular sympathy. It soonbecame evident that a formidable reaction of this kind had taken place, that dissatisfaction with the anti-slavery measures and discouragementat the military failures, together, were even imperiling Republicanascendency. Now all knew, though some might not be willing to say, thatthe loss of Republican ascendency meant, in fact, the speedy settlementof the war by compromise; and the South was undoubtedly in earnest indeclaring that there could be no compromise without disunion. Therefore, in those elections of the autumn months in 1862 the whole question ofUnion or Disunion had to be fought out at the polls in the loyal States, and there was an appalling chance of its going against the Unionistparty. "The administration, " says Mr. Blaine, "was now subjected to afight for its life;" and for a while the fortunes of that mortal combatwore a most alarming aspect. 

The Democracy made its fight on the ground that the anti-slaverylegislation of the Republican majority in the Thirty-seventh Congresshad substantially made abolition the ultimate purpose of the war. Here, then, they said, was a change of base; were or were not the voters ofthe loyal States willing to ratify it? Already this ground had beentaken in the platforms of the party in the most important NorthernStates, before Mr. Lincoln issued his proclamation. Was it unreasonableto fear that this latest and most advanced step would intensify thathostility, stimulate the too obvious reaction, and aggravate the dangerwhich, against his judgment, [39] as it was understood, Congress hadcreated? Was it not probable that Mr. Blair was correct when he warnedthe President that the proclamation would "cost the administration thefall elections"? Naturally it will be asked: if this was a reasonableexpectation, why did the President seize this critical moment to allythe administration with anti-slavery? Mr. Blaine furnishes a probableexplanation: "The anti-slavery policy of Congress had gone far enough toarouse the bitter hostility of all Democrats, who were not thoroughlycommitted to the war, and yet not far enough to deal an effective blowagainst the institution. " The administration stood at a point wheresafety lay rather in defying than in evading the ill opinion of themalcontents, where the best wisdom was to commit itself, the party, andthe nation decisively to the "bold, far-reaching, radical, andaggressive policy, " from which it would be impossible afterward to turnback "without deliberately resolving to sacrifice our nationality. "Presumably the President wished to show the people that their onlychoice now lay between slavery on the one hand and nationality on theother, so that, of the two things, they might take that one which theydeemed the more worthy. The two together they could never again have. This theory tallies with the well-known fact that Mr. Lincoln was alwayswilling to trust the people upon a question of right and wrong. He neverwas afraid to stake his chance upon the faith that what wasintrinsically right would prove in the long run to be politically safe. While he was a shrewd politician in matters of detail, he had the wisdomalways in a great question to get upon that side where the inherentmorality lay. Yet, unfortunately, it takes time--time which cannotalways be afforded--for right to destroy prejudice; the slow-grindingmill of God grinds sometimes so slowly that man cannot help fearing thatfor once the stint will not be worked out; and in this autumn of 1862there was one of these crises of painful anxiety among patriots at theNorth. 

Maine held her election early in September, and upon the vote forgovernor a Republican majority, which usually ranged from 10, 000 to19, 000, was this year cut down to a little over 4000; also, for thefirst time in ten years, a Democrat secured a seat in the national Houseof Representatives. Then came the "October States. " In that dreary monthOhio elected 14 Democrats and 5 Republicans; the Democrats casting, inthe total, about 7000 more votes than the Republicans. Indiana sent 8Democrats, 3 Republicans. In Pennsylvania the congressional delegationwas divided, but the Democrats polled the larger vote by about 4000;whereas Mr. Lincoln had had a majority in the State of 60, 000! In NewYork the famous Democratic leader, Horatio Seymour, was elected governorby a majority of nearly 10, 000. Illinois, the President's own State, showed a Democratic majority of 17, 000, and her congressional delegationstood 11 Democrats to 3 Republicans. New Jersey turned fromRepublicanism to Democracy. Michigan reduced a Republican majority from20, 000 to 6000. Wisconsin divided its delegation evenly. [40] When thereturns were all in, the Democrats, who had had only 44 votes in theHouse in the Thirty-seventh Congress, found that in its successor theywould have 75. Even if the non-voting absentees in the army[41] had beenall Republicans, which they certainly were not, such a reaction wouldhave been appalling. 

Fortunately some other Northern States--New England's six, and Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, California, and Oregon--held better to theirRepublican faith. But it was actually the border slave States which, inthese dark and desperate days, came gallantly to the rescue of thePresident's party. If the voters of these States had seen in him aradical of the stripe of the anti-slavery agitators, it is notimaginable that they would have helped him as they now did. Thus was hismuch maligned "border-state policy" at last handsomely vindicated; andthanks to it the frightened Republicans saw, with relief, that theycould command a majority of about twenty votes in the House. Mr. Lincolnhad saved the party whose leaders had turned against him. 

Beneath the dismal shadow of these autumnal elections theThirty-seventh Congress came together for its final session, December 1, 1862. The political situation was peculiar and unfortunate. There wasthe greatest possible need for sympathetic coöperation in the Republicanparty; but sympathy was absent, and coöperation was imperfect andreluctant. The majority of the Republican members of Congressobstinately maintained their alienation from the Republican President;an enormous popular defection from Republicanism had taken place in itsnatural strongholds; and Republican domination had only been saved bythe aid of States in which Republican majorities had been attainableactually because a large proportion of the population was so disaffectedas either to have enlisted in the Confederate service, or to haverefrained from voting at elections held under Union auspices. Therefore, whether Mr. Lincoln looked forth upon the political or the militarysituation, he beheld only gloomy prospects. But having made fast to whathe believed to be right, he would not, in panic, cast loose from it. Inthe face of condemnation he was not seen to modify his course in orderto conciliate any portion of the people; but, on the contrary, in hismessage he returned to his plan which had hitherto been so coldlyreceived, and again strenuously recommended appropriations for gradual, compensated emancipation and colonization. The scheme had three especialattractions for him: 1. It would be operative in those loyal States andparts of States in which military emancipation would not take effect. 2. In its practical result it would do away with slavery by the year1900, whereas military emancipation would now free a great number ofindividuals, but would leave slavery, as an institution, untouched andliable to be revived and reinvigorated later on. 3. It would makeemancipation come as a voluntary process, leaving a minimum ofresentment remaining in the minds of slaveholders, instead of being aviolent war measure never to be remembered without rebellious anger. This last point was what chiefly moved him. He intensely desired to haveemancipation effected in such a way that good feeling between the twosections might be a not distant condition; the humanity of histemperament, his passion for reasonable dealing, his appreciation of themischief of sectional enmity in a republic, all conspired to establishhim unchangeably in favor of "compensated emancipation. "

For the accomplishment of his purpose he now suggested three articles ofamendment to the Constitution. He spoke earnestly; for "in times likethe present, " he said, "men should utter nothing for which they wouldnot willingly be responsible through time and eternity. " Beneath thesolemnity of this obligation he made for his plan a very elaborateargument. Among the closing sentences were the following:--

"The plan would, I am confident, secure peace more speedily, andmaintain it more permanently, than can be done by force alone; whileall it would cost, considering amounts, and manner of payment, and timesof payment, would be easier paid than will be the additional cost of thewar, if we rely solely upon force. It is much, very much, that it wouldcost no blood at all. 

. . . "Is it doubted, then, that the plan I propose, if adopted, wouldshorten the war, and thus lessen its expenditure of money and of blood?Is it doubted that it would restore the national authority and nationalprosperity, and perpetuate both indefinitely? Is it doubted that wehere--Congress and Executive--can secure its adoption? Will not the goodpeople respond to a united and earnest appeal from us? Can we, can they, by any other means so certainly or so speedily assure these vitalobjects? We can succeed only by concert. It is not 'Can _any_ of us_imagine_ better?' but; 'Can we _all do_ better?' Object whatsoever ispossible, still the question recurs, 'Can we do better?' The dogmas ofthe quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion ispiled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As ourcase is new, so we must think anew and act anew. We must disenthrallourselves, and then we shall save our country. 

"Fellow citizens, _we_ cannot escape history. We, of this Congress andthis administration, will [shall] be remembered in spite of ourselves. No personal significance, or insignificance, can spare one or anotherof us. The fiery trial through which we pass will light us down, inhonor or dishonor, to the latest generation. We _say_ we are for theUnion. The world will not forget that we say this. We know how to savethe Union. The world knows we do know how to save it. We--even _wehere_--hold the power and bear the responsibility. In _giving_ freedomto the _slave_ we _assure_ freedom to the _free_, --honorable alike inwhat we give and what we preserve. We shall nobly save, or meanly lose, the last, best hope of earth. Other means may succeed; this could notfail. The way is plain, peaceful, generous, just, --a way which, iffollowed, the world will forever applaud, and God must forever bless. "

Beautiful and impressive as was this appeal, it persuaded few or none. In fact, no effort on the President's part now, or at any time, couldwin much approval for his plan. Not many were ever pleased by it; butafterward, in the winter of 1863, many members of the Thirty-eighthCongress were willing, without believing in it, to give him a chance totry it in Missouri. Accordingly a bill then passed the Houseappropriating $10, 000, 000 to compensate slave-owners in that State, ifabolition of slavery should be made part of its organic law. The Senatemade the sum $15, 000, 000 and returned the bill to the House forconcurrence. But the representatives from Missouri were tireless intheir hostility to the measure, and finally killed it by parliamentaryexpedients of delay. 

This was a great disappointment to Mr. Lincoln. While the measure waspending he argued strenuously with leading Missourians to induce them toput their State in the lead in what he hoped would then become aprocession of slave States. But these gentlemen seemed to fear that, ifthey should take United States bonds in payment, they might awake somemorning in these troublous times to find their promiser a bankrupt or arepudiationist. On the other hand, such was the force of habit that aslave seemed to them very tangible property. Mr. Lincoln shrewdlysuggested that, amid present conditions, "_bonds_ were better than_bondsmen_, " and "two-legged property" was a very bad kind to hold. Timeproved him to be entirely right; but for the present his argument, entreaty, and humor were all alike useless. Missouri would have nothingto do with "compensated emancipation;" and since she was regarded as atest case, the experiment was not tried elsewhere. So it came to passafterward that the slaveholders parted with their slaves for nothinginstead of exchanging them for the six per cent. Bonds of the UnitedStates. 

 * * * * *

The first day of January, 1863, arrived, and no event had occurred todelay the issue of the promised proclamation. It came accordingly. Byvirtue of his power as commander-in-chief, "in time of actual armedrebellion, . . . And as a fit and necessary war measure for suppressingsaid rebellion, " the President ordered that all persons held as slavesin certain States and parts of States, which he designated as being thenin rebellion, should be thenceforward free, and declared that theExecutive, with the army and navy, would "recognize and maintain thefreedom of said persons. " The word "maintain" was inserted at Seward'ssuggestion, and somewhat against Mr. Lincoln's wish. He said that he hadintentionally refrained from introducing it, because it was not his wayto promise what he was not entirely _sure_ that he could perform. Thesentence invoking the favor of God was contributed by Secretary Chase. The paper was signed after the great public reception of New Year's Day. Mr. Lincoln, as he took the pen, remarked to Mr. Seward that hismuch-shaken hand was almost paralyzed, so that people who, in time tocome, should see that signature would be likely to say: "He hesitated, "whereas, in fact, his whole soul was in it. The publication took placelate in the day, and the anti-slavery critics grumbled because it wasnot sent out in the morning. 

The people at large received this important step with some variety offeeling and expression; but, upon the whole, approval seems to have faroutrun the dubious prognostications of the timid and conservative class. For the three months which had given opportunity for thinking hadproduced the result which Mr. Lincoln had hoped for. It turned out thatthe mill of God had been grinding as exactly as always. Very many whowould not have advised the measure now heartily ratified it. Later, after men's minds had had time to settle and the balance could be fairlystruck, it appeared undeniable that the final proclamation had been ofgood effect; so Mr. Lincoln himself said. 

It is worth noting that while many Englishmen spoke out in generouspraise, the rulers of England took the contrary position. Earl Russellsaid that the measure was "of a very strange nature, " "a veryquestionable kind, " an act of "vengeance on the slave-owner, " and thatit did no more than "profess to emancipate slaves, where the UnitedStates authorities cannot make emancipation a reality. " But the Englishpeople were strongly and genuinely anti-slavery, and the danger ofEnglish recognition of the Confederacy was greatly diminished when theproclamation established the policy of the administration. 

The proclamation contained a statement that ex-slaves would be "receivedinto the armed service of the United States. " Up to this time not muchhad been done in the way of enlisting colored troops. The negroesthemselves had somewhat disappointed their friends by failing to takethe initiative, and it became evident that they must be stirred byinfluences outside their own race. The President now took the matter inhand, and endeavored to stimulate commanders of Southern departments toshow energy concerning it. By degrees successful results were obtained. The Southerners formally declared that they would not regard eithernegro troops or their officers as prisoners of war; but that they wouldexecute the officers as ordinary felons, and would hand over the negroesto be dealt with by the state authorities as slaves in insurrection. Painful and embarrassing questions of duty were presented by thesemenaces. To Mr. Lincoln the obvious policy of retaliation seemedabhorrent, and he held back from declaring that he would adopt it, inthe hope that events might never compel him to do so. But on July 30 hefelt compelled, in justice to the blacks and those who led them, toissue an order that for every Union soldier killed in violation of thelaws of war a rebel soldier should be executed; and for every oneenslaved a rebel soldier should be placed at hard labor on the publicworks. Happily, however, little or no action ever became necessary inpursuance of this order. The Southerners either did not in fact wreaktheir vengeance in fulfillment of their furious vows, or else coveredtheir doings so that they could not be proved. Only the shockingincident of the massacre at Fort Pillow seemed to demand sternretaliatory measures, and even this was, too mercifully, allowedgradually to sink away into neglect. [42]

[Illustration: Lincoln Submitting the Emancipation Proclamation to HisCabinet. ]

FOOTNOTES:

[33] To A. G. Hodges, April 4, 1864, N. And H. Vi. 430; and see Lincolnto Chase, September 2, 1863; _ibid. _ 434. 

[34] "It was, " says Mr. Arnold, "full of errors and mistaken inferences, and written in ignorance of many facts which it was the duty of thePresident to consider. " _Life of Lincoln_, 254. But, _per contra_, Hon. George W. Julian says: "It was one of the most powerful appeals evermade in behalf of justice and the rights of man. " _Polit. Recoil. _ 220. Arnold and Julian were both members of the House, and boththorough-going Abolitionists. Their difference of opinion upon thisletter of Mr. Greeley illustrates well the discussions which, like theinternecine feuds of Christian sects, existed between men who ought tohave stood side by side against the heretics and unbelievers. 

[35] For views contrary to mine, see Julian, _Polit. Recoil. _ 221. 

[36] The story that some members of the cabinet were opposed to themeasure was distinctly denied by the President. Carpenter, _Six Monthsin the White House_, 88. 

[37] For interesting statements about this Altoona conference seeMcClure, _Lincoln and Men of War-Times_, 248-251. 

[38] Blaine, i. 439. 

[39] It was understood that he had not favored the principalanti-slavery measures of the Thirty-seventh Congress, on the groundmeasures of the Thirty-seventh Congress, on the ground that they werepremature. 

[40] The foregoing-statistics have been taken from Mr. Elaine, _TwentyYears of Congress_, i. 441-444. 

[41] Later, legislation enabled the soldiers in the field to vote; butat this time they could not do so. 

[42] For account of these matters of retaliation and protection ofnegroes, see N. And H. Vol. Vi. Ch. Xxi. 

CHAPTER V

BATTLES AND SIEGES: DECEMBER, 1862-DECEMBER, 1863

The clouds of gloom and discouragement, which shut so heavily about thePresident in the autumn of 1862, did not disperse as winter advanced. That dreary season, when nearly all doubted and many despaired, isrecognized now as an interlude between the two grand divisions of thedrama. Before it, the Northern people had been enthusiastic, united, andhopeful; after it, they saw assurance of success within reach of areasonable persistence. But while the miserable days were passing, mencould not see into the mysterious future. Not only were armies beaten, but the people themselves seemed to be deserting their principles. Theface and the form of the solitary man, whose position brought every partof this sad prospect fully within the range of his contemplation, showedthe wear of the times. The eyes went deeper into their caverns, andseemed to send their search farther than ever away into a recedingdistance; the furrows sank far into the sallow face; a stoop bent theshoulders, as if the burden of the soul had even a physical weight. Yetstill he sought neither counsel, nor strength, nor sympathy from anyone; neither leaned on any friend, nor gave his confidence to anyadviser; the problems were his and the duty was his, and he acceptedboth wholly. "I need success more than I need sympathy, " he said; for itwas the cause, not his own burden, which absorbed his thoughts. Theextremists, who seemed to have more than half forgotten to hate theSouth in the intensity of their hatred of McClellan, had apparentlycherished a vague faith that, if this procrastinating spirit could beexorcised, the war might then be trusted to take care of itself. Butafter they had accomplished their purpose they were confronted by factswhich showed that in this matter, as in that of emancipation, thePresident's deliberation was not the unpardonable misdoing which theyhad conceived it to be. In spite of McClellan's insolent arrogance andfault-finding, his unreasonable demands, and his tedious squandering ofinvaluable time, Mr. Lincoln, being by nature a man who contemplated theconsequence of an action, did not desire to make a vacancy till he couldfill it with a better man. "I certainly have been dissatisfied, " hesaid, "with Buell and McClellan; but before I relieved them I had greatfears I should not find successors to them who would do better; and I amsorry to add I have seen little since to relieve those fears. " Onebloody and costly experiment had already failed at Manassas. Two otherswere soon to result even more disastrously; and still another leaderwas to be superseded, before the "man of destiny" came. McClellan hadthrown away superb opportunities; but to turn him out was not to fillhis place with an abler man. 

On the evening of November 7, 1862, the dispatch came which relievedMcClellan and put Burnside in command. The moment was not well chosen. McClellan seemed in an unusually energetic temper. He had Lee's armydivided, and was conceivably on the verge of fighting it in detail. [43]On the other hand, Burnside assumed the charge with reluctance andself-distrust. A handsome, popular gentleman, of pleasing manners andwith the prestige of some easily won successes, he had the misfortune tobe too highly esteemed. 

The change of commanders brought a change of scheme, which was now toadvance upon Richmond by way of Fredericksburg. When this was submittedto the President he said that it might succeed if the movement wasrapid, otherwise not. The half of this opinion which concerned successwas never tested; the other half was made painfully good. Instead ofrapidity there was great delay, with the result that the early days ofDecember found Lee intrenching strongly upon the heights behindFredericksburg on the south bank of the Rappahannock, having his armynow reunited and reinforced to the formidable strength of 78, 288 men"present for duty. " Burnside lay upon the north bank, with 113, 000 men, but having exchanged the promising advantages which had existed when hetook command for very serious disadvantages. He had the burden ofattacking a position which he had allowed his enemy not only to selectbut to fortify. Happily it is not our task to describe the cruel andsanguinary thirteenth day of December, 1862, when he undertook thisdesperate task. When that night fell at the close of a fearful combat, which had been rather a series of blunders than an intelligent plan, 10, 208 Federal soldiers were known to be lying killed or wounded, while2145 more were "missing. " Such was the awful price which the braveNorthern army had paid, and by which it had bought--nothing! Nothing, save the knowledge that General Burnside's estimate of his capacity forsuch high command was correct. Even the mere brutal comparison of"killed and wounded" showed that among the Confederates the number ofmen who had been hit was not quite half that of the Federal loss. Thefamiliar principle, that in war a general should so contrive as to dothe maximum of injury to his adversary with a minimum of injury tohimself, had been directly reversed; the unfortunate commander had donethe maximum of injury to himself with the minimum of injury to his foe. 

The behavior of Burnside in so bitter a trial was such as to attractsympathy. Yet his army had lost confidence in his leadership, andtherefore suffered dangerously in morale. Many officers whispered theiropinions in Washington, and, as usual, Congress gave symptoms of adesire to talk. Influenced by these criticisms and menacings, onDecember 30 the President ordered Burnside not to enter again uponactive operations without first informing him. Burnside, much surprised, hastened to see Mr. Lincoln, and learned what derogatory strictures werein circulation. After brief consideration he proposed to resign. But Mr. Lincoln said: "I do not yet see how I could profit by changing thecommand of the army of the Potomac; and, if I did, I should not wish todo it by accepting the resignation of your commission. " So Burnsideundertook further manoeuvres. These, however, did not turn out well, andhe conceived that a contributing cause lay in the half-heartedness ofsome of his subordinates. Thereupon he designed against them a defensiveor retaliatory move in the shape of an order dismissing from the serviceof the United States four generals, and relieving from command fourothers, and one colonel. This wholesale decapitation was startling, yetwas, in fact, soundly conceived. In the situation, either the general, or those who had lost faith in the general, must go. Which it should bewas conclusively settled by the length of the list of condemned. ThePresident declined to ratify this, and Burnside's resignation inevitablyfollowed. His successor was the general whose name led the list of thosemalcontent critics whom he had desired to displace, and was also thesame who had once stigmatized McClellan as "a baby. " Major-GeneralJoseph Hooker, a graduate of West Point, was now given the opportunityto prove his own superiority. 

The new commander was popularly known as "Fighting Joe. " There wasinspiration in the nickname, and yet it was not quite thus that a greatcommander, charged with weighty responsibility, should be appropriatelydescribed. Upon making the appointment, January 26, 1863, the Presidentwrote a letter remarkable in many points of view:--

"GENERAL, --I have placed you at the head of the army of the Potomac. Ofcourse, I have done this upon what appears to me to be sufficientreasons; and yet I think it best for you to know that there are somethings in regard to which I am not quite satisfied with you. I believeyou to be a brave and skillful soldier, --which, of course, I like. Ialso believe you do not mix politics with your profession, --in which youare right. You have confidence in yourself, --which is a valuable, if notan indispensable quality. You are ambitious, --which, within reasonablebounds, does good rather than harm; but I think that, during GeneralBurnside's command of the army, you have taken counsel of your ambitionand thwarted him as much as you could, in which you did a great wrong tothe country, and to a most meritorious and honorable brother officer. Ihave heard, in such way as to believe it, of your recently saying thatboth the army and the government needed a dictator. Of course, it wasnot for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the command. Only those generals who gain successes can set up as dictators. What Inow ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship. The government will support you to the utmost of its ability, --which isneither more nor less than it has done and will do for all commanders. Imuch fear that the spirit which you have aided to infuse into the army, of criticising their commander and withholding confidence from him, willnow turn upon you. I shall assist you as far as I can to put it down. Neither you nor Napoleon, if he were alive again, could get any good outof an army while such a spirit prevails in it. And now, beware ofrashness. Beware of rashness, but, with energy and sleepless vigilance, go forward and give us victories. "

Hooker was of that class of generals who show such capacity aslieutenants that they are supposed to be capable of becoming independentchiefs, until their true measure is ascertained by actual trial. In twomonths he had restored to good shape an army which he had founddemoralized and depleted by absenteeism, and at the end of April he hadunder him about 124, 500 men. He still lay on the north bank of thePotomac, facing Lee's army in its intrenchments about Fredericksburg. His plan of campaign, says General Doubleday, was "simple, efficacious, and should have been successful. " Diverting the attention of Lee, hethrew the chief part of his army across the Rappahannock several milesabove Fredericksburg; then, marching rapidly to Chancellorsville, hethreatened the left flank and rear of the Confederates. Pushing a shortdistance out upon the three roads which led from Chancellorsville toFredericksburg, he came to the very edge and brink, as it were, ofbeginning a great battle with good promise of success. But just at thispoint his generals at the front were astounded by orders to draw back toChancellorsville. Was it that he suddenly lost nerve in the crisis ofhis great responsibility?[44] Or was it possible that he did notappreciate the opportunity which he was throwing away? No one can say. Only the fact can be stated that he rejected the chance which offendedFortune never offers a second time. Back came the advanced columns, andtook position at Chancellorsville, while Lee, who had not the Northernhabit of repudiating fair opportunity, pressed close upon them. 

On May 1 manoeuvring for position and some fighting took place. OnSaturday, May 2, a brilliant flanking movement by "Stonewall" Jacksonwrecked the Federal right. But the dangerous Southerner, accidentallyshot by his own soldiers, was carried from the field a dying man. UponSunday, May 3, there was a most sanguinary conflict. "The Federalsfought like devils at Chancellorsville, " said Mahone. Still it was againthe sad and wearisome story of brave men so badly handled that theirgallantry meant only their own slaughter. The President had expresslyurged Hooker to be sure to get all his troops at work. Yet he actuallylet 37, 000 of them stand all day idle, not firing a shot, while theircomrades were fighting and falling and getting beaten. On May 4, Hooker, whose previous "collapse" had been aggravated by a severe personal hurt, "seemed disposed to be inactive;" and Lee seized the chance to turn uponSedgwick, who was coming up in the rear of the Confederates, and todrive him across the river. General Hooker now made up his mind that hehad been beaten; and though a majority of his corps commanders wereotherwise minded and were for renewing the conflict, he returned to thenorthern bank, leaving behind him his wounded soldiers, 14 guns, and20, 000 stand of arms. Another ghastly price had been paid to settleanother experiment and establish the value of another general. The Northlost in killed and wounded 12, 197 men, with 5000 others "missing, " andfound out that General Hooker was not the man to beat General Lee. TheConfederate loss was 10, 266 killed and wounded, 2753 missing. 

The days in which the news from Chancellorsville was spreading among thecities and villages of the North were the darkest of the war. In thosecountless households, by whose generous contributions the armies hadbeen recruited, the talk began to be that it was folly, and evencruelty, to send brave and patriotic citizens to be slaughtereduselessly, while one leader after another showed his helplessincompetence. The disloyal Copperheads became more bodeful than everbefore; while men who would have hanged a Copperhead as gladly as theywould have shot a Secessionist felt their hearts sink before theundeniable Southern prestige. But the truth was that Pope and Burnsideand Hooker, by their very defeats, became the cause of victory; for theelated Southerners, beginning to believe that their armies wereinvincible, now clamored for "invasion" and the capture of Washington. Apparently General Lee, too, had drunk the poison of triumph, anddreamed of occupying the national capital, Baltimore, and Philadelphia, and dictating the terms of peace to a disheartened North. Thefascinating scheme--the irretrievable and fatal blunder--was determinedupon. 

To carry out this plan Swell's corps was covertly moved early in Juneinto the Shenandoah Valley. Hooker, anticipating some such scheme, hadsuggested to Mr. Lincoln that, if it were entered upon, he should liketo cross the river and attack the Southern rear corps in Fredericksburg. The President suggested that the intrenched Southerners would be likelyto worst the assailants, while the main Southern army "would in some waybe getting an advantage northward. " "In one word, " he wrote, "I wouldnot take any risk of being entangled upon the river, like an ox jumpedhalf over a fence and liable to be torn by dogs front and rear, withouta fair chance to gore one way or kick the other. " Yet, very soon, whenthe attenuation of Lee's line became certain, Lincoln sent to Hooker oneof his famous dispatches: "If the head of Lee's army is at Martinsburg, and the tail of it on the plank road between Fredericksburg andChancellorsville, the animal must be very slim somewhere. Could you notbreak him?" But the "animal" was moving rapidly, and the breakingprocess did not take place. 

Hooker now conceived a plan seductive by its audacity and its possibleresults. He proposed by a sudden movement to capture Richmond, presumably garrisoned very scantily, and to get back before Lee couldmake any serious impression at the North. It _might_ have been done, and, if done, it would more than offset all the dreary past; yet therisk was great, and Mr. Lincoln could not sanction it. He wrote: "Ithink Lee's army, and not Richmond, is your sure objective point. If hecomes towards the Upper Potomac, follow on his flank and on his insidetrack, shortening your lines while he lengthens his; fight him, too, when opportunity offers. If he stays where he is, _fret him, and frethim_. "

This was good strategy and was adopted for the campaign. Ewell's corpscrossed the Upper Potomac, and on June 22 was in Pennsylvania. Thecorps of Longstreet and Hill quickly followed, and Lee's triumphantarmy, at least 70, 000 strong, marched through the Cumberland Valley toChambersburg and Carlisle, gathering rich booty of herds and grain asthey went, with Harrisburg as an immediate objective, Philadelphia in noremote distance, Baltimore and Washington in a painfully distinctbackground. The farmers of western Pennsylvania, startled by thespectacle of gray-coated cavalry riding northward towards their statecapital, cumbered the roads with their wagons. The President called fromthe nearest States 120, 000 militia. General Hooker, released from hiswaiting attitude by the development of his adversary's plan, manoeuvredwell. He crossed the Potomac at Edwards' Ferry, June 25-26, and drew hisforces together at Frederick. It was then decided to move northward andto keep Lee as well to the westward as possible, thereby reserving, forthe bearing of future events, the questions of cutting the Confederatecommunications or bringing on a battle. 

An unfortunate element in these critical days was that Halleck andHooker disliked each other, and that their ideas often clashed. Mr. Lincoln was at last obliged to say to Hooker: "To remove allmisunderstanding, I now place you in the strict military relation toGeneral Halleck of a commander of one of the armies to thegeneral-in-chief of all the armies. I have not intended differently; butas it seems to be differently understood, I shall direct him to giveyou orders, and you to obey them. " At the same time he wrote him a"private" letter, endeavoring to allay the ill-feeling. He closed itwith words of kindness, of modesty, and with one of his noble appealsfor subjection of personal irritation and for union of effort on behalfof the country:--

"I believe you are aware that, since you took command of the army, Ihave not believed you had any chance to effect anything till now. As itlooks to me, Lee's now returning towards Harper's Ferry gives you backthe chance that I thought McClellan lost last fall. Quite possibly I waswrong both then and now; but, in the great responsibility resting uponme, I cannot be entirely silent. Now, all I ask is that you will be insuch mood that we can get into our action the best cordial judgment ofyourself and General Halleck, with my poor mite added, if, indeed, heand you shall think it entitled to any consideration at all. "

The breach, however, could not be closed. Hooker, finding his armyseriously weakened by the withdrawal of the two years' and the ninemonths' troops, asked for the garrison of Harper's Ferry, which seemeduseless where it was. Halleck refused it, and, June 27, Hooker requestedto be relieved of the command. His request was instantly granted, andMajor-General George G. Meade was appointed in his place. Swinton saysthat command was given to Meade "without any lets or hindrances, thePresident expressly waiving all the powers of the executive and theConstitution, so as to enable General Meade to make, untrammeled, thebest dispositions for the emergency. " One would like to know theauthority upon which so extraordinary a statement is based; probably itis a great exaggeration, and the simple fact would prove to be that, since the situation was such that new developments were likely to occurwith much suddenness, the President wisely and even necessarily placedthe general in full control, free from requirements of communication andconsultation. But to represent that Mr. Lincoln abdicated hisconstitutional functions is absurd! Be this as it may, the fact is thatthe appointment brought no change of plan. For three days the armiesmanoeuvred and drew slowly together. Finally it was betwixt chance andchoice that the place and hour of concussion were determined. The placewas the village of Gettysburg, and the time was the morning of July 1. 

Then ensued a famous and most bloody fight! During three long, hot daysof midsummer those two great armies struggled in a desperate grapple, and with not unequal valor, the Confederates fiercely assailing, theFederals stubbornly holding, those historic ridges, and both alike, whether attacking or defending, whether gaining or losing ground, alwaysfalling in an awful carnage of dead and wounded. It was the mostdetermined fighting that had yet taken place at the East, and the namesof Cemetery Ridge, Little Round Top, and Culp's Hill are written deepin blood in American memories. When the last magnificent charge of theSoutherners was hurled back in the afternoon of July 3, the victory wasdecided. The next day Lee began to send away his trains, his wounded andprisoners. It is indeed true that during the day he held his army inposition on Seminary Ridge, hoping that Meade would attack, and that, with an exchange of their relative parts of assailants and defenders, achange of result also might come about. But Meade made no advance, andwith the first hours of darkness on the evening of July 4 the Southernhost began its retreat. 

The losses at Gettysburg were appalling. The estimate is 2834 killed, 13, 709 wounded, 6643 missing, a total of 23, 186 on the Federal side; thefigures were only a trifle less on the Confederate side. But if suchbloodshed carried grief into many a Northern household, at least therewas not the cruel thought that life and limb, health and usefulness, hadbeen sacrificed through incompetence and without advantage to the cause. It was true that the Northern general ought to have won, for hecommanded more troops, [45] held a very strong defensive position, andfought a strictly defensive battle. But such had been the history of thewar that when that which _ought_ to be done _was_ done, the people feltthat it was fair cause for rejoicing. Later there was fault-finding andcriticism; but that during so many days so many troops on unfamiliarground should be handled in such a manner that afterward no critic cansuggest that something might have been done better, hardly falls amongpossibilities. The fact was sufficient that a most important andsignificant victory had been won. On the battlefield a stone nowundertakes to mark the spot and to name the hour where and when theflood tide of rebellion reached its highest point, and where and when itbegan its slow and sure ebb. Substantially that stone tells the truth. Nevertheless the immediately succeeding days brought keen, counteractingdisappointment. Expectation rose that the shattered army of Lee wouldnever cross the Potomac; and the expectation was entirely reasonable, and ought to have been fulfilled. But Meade seemed to copy McClellanafter Antietam. Spurred on by repeated admonitions from the Presidentand General Halleck, he did, on July 10, catch up with the retreatingarmy, which was delayed at Williamsport on the north bank of the riverby the unusually high water. He camped close by it, and receivedstrenuous telegrams urging him to attack. But he did not, [46] and onthe night of July 13 the Southern general successfully placed thePotomac between himself and his too tardy pursuer. Bitter then was theresentment of every loyal man at the North. For once the Presidentbecame severe and sent a dispatch of such tenor that General Meadereplied by an offer to resign his command. This Mr. Lincoln did notaccept. Yet he was too sorely pained not to give vent to words which infact if not in form conveyed severe censure. He was also displeasedbecause Meade, in general orders, spoke of "driving the invaders fromour soil;" as if the whole country was not "_our soil_"! Under theinfluence of so much provocation, he wrote to General Meade a letterreproduced from the manuscript by Messrs. Nicolay and Hay. It is truethat on cooler reflection he refrained from sending this missive, but itis in itself sufficiently interesting to deserve reading:--"I have justseen your dispatch to General Halleck, asking to be relieved of yourcommand because of a supposed censure of mine. I am very grateful to youfor the magnificent success you gave the cause of the country atGettysburg; and I am sorry now to be the author of the slightest pain toyou. But I was in such deep distress myself that I could not restrainsome expression of it. I have been oppressed nearly ever since thebattle of Gettysburg by what appeared to be evidences that yourself andGeneral Couch and General Smith were not seeking a collision with theenemy, but were trying to get him across the river without anotherbattle. What these evidences were, if you please, I hope to tell you atsome time when we shall both feel better. The case, summarily stated, isthis: You fought and beat the enemy at Gettysburg; and, of course, tosay the least, his loss was as great as yours. He retreated; and you didnot, as it seemed to me, pressingly pursue him; but a flood in the riverdetained him till, by slow degrees, you were again upon him. You had atleast twenty thousand veteran troops directly with you, and as many moreraw ones within supporting distance, all in addition to those who foughtwith you at Gettysburg, while it was not possible that he had received asingle recruit; and yet you stood and let the flood run down, bridges bebuilt, and the enemy move away at his leisure without attacking him. AndCouch and Smith, --the latter left Carlisle in time, upon all ordinarycalculation, to have aided you in the last battle at Gettysburg, but hedid not arrive. At the end of more than ten days, I believe twelve, under constant urging, he reached Hagerstown from Carlisle, which is notan inch over fifty-five miles, if so much; and Couch's movement was verylittle different. 

"Again, my dear general, I do not believe you appreciate the magnitudeof the misfortune involved in Lee's escape. He was within your easygrasp, and to have closed upon him would, in connection with our otherlate successes, have ended the war. As it is, the war will be prolongedindefinitely. If you could not safely attack Lee last Monday, how canyou possibly do so south of the river, when you can take with you veryfew more than two thirds of the force you then had in hand? It would beunreasonable to expect, and I do not expect [that] you can now effectmuch. Your golden opportunity is gone, and I am distressed immeasurablybecause of it. 

"I beg you will not consider this a prosecution or persecution ofyourself. As you had learned that I was dissatisfied, I have thought itbest to kindly tell you why. "

 * * * * *

There was an odd coincidence during this momentous first week in July. During the preceding winter Mr. Lincoln had been exceedingly bothered bycertain Democrats, notably that gentleman of unsavory repute, FernandoWood, who had urged upon him all sorts of foolish schemes for"compromising" or "settling the difficulties, "--phrases which wereeuphemisms of the peace Democracy to disguise a concession of success tothe South. The President endured these sterile suggestions with hiswonted patience. But toward the close of June, Alexander H. Stephens, Vice-President of the Confederacy, was seized with the notion that, ifhe should go to Washington on a personal mission to Mr. Lincoln, purporting to be about prisoners of war, he might then "indirectly . . . Turn attention to a general adjustment. " Accordingly he set forth on hisway to Fortress Monroe; but very inopportunely for his purposes it fellout that the days of his journey were the very days in which GeneralLee was getting so roughly worsted at Gettysburg. So it happened that itwas precisely on the day of the Southern retreat, July 4, that henotified the admiral in Hampton Roads that he was the "bearer of acommunication in writing from Jefferson Davis, commander-in-chief of theland and naval forces of the Confederate States, to Abraham Lincoln, commander-in-chief of the land and naval forces of the United States;"and he asked for leave to proceed to Washington. But his ingeniousphraseology was of no avail. Mr. Lincoln said: "The request of A. H. Stephens is inadmissible. The customary agents and channels are adequatefor all needful communication and conference between the United Statesforces and the insurgents. " Thus the shrewd instinct of the Northernerbrought to naught a scheme conceived in the spirit of the old-timeSouthern politics, a scheme which was certainly clever, but which, without undue severity, may also be called a little artful andinsidious; for Mr. Stephens himself afterward confessed that it had, forits ulterior purpose, "not so much to act upon Mr. Lincoln and the thenruling authorities at Washington as through them, when thecorrespondence should be published, upon the great mass of the people inthe Northern States. " The notion, disseminated among the people, thatMr. Lincoln would not listen to proposals for peace, would greatly helpmalcontents of the Fernando Wood school. 

It is necessary now to turn from the Eastern field of operations to theMiddle and Western parts of the country, where, however, the controlexercised by Mr. Lincoln was far less constant than at the East. Afterthe series of successes which culminated at Corinth, the Federal goodfortune rested as if to recuperate for a while. A large part of thepowerful army there gathered was carried away by Buell, and was soongiven occupation by General Bragg. For Jefferson Davis had long chosento fancy that Kentucky was held in an unwilling subjection to the Union, and from this thralldom he now designed to relieve her, and to make theOhio River the frontier of Secession. Accordingly cavalry raids inconsiderable force were made, Cincinnati was threatened, and GeneralBragg, with a powerful army, started northward from Gainesville. At thesame time the Federals left Murfreesboro', and the two armies raced forLouisville. Bragg, with a handsome start, should have won, but onSeptember 29, 1862, Buell entered the city ahead. The winning of thegoal, however, was not the end. Two hostile armies, which had come sofar and got so close together, were bound to have a fight. This tookplace at Perryville, October 8, with the result that on the next dayBragg began a rapid retreat. He had brought 20, 000 stand of arms for theKentuckians who were to flock to his camp; but they had not flocked, andthe theory of Kentuckian disloyalty was no longer tenable. 

So soon as Bragg was out of Kentucky, Halleck, probably at theinstigation of the President, recurred to the project of a campaign inEastern Tennessee. Buell said that it was not feasible, and since bythis opinion he placed himself at odds with the authorities atWashington, he asked to be relieved from his command. At the close ofOctober, Major-General William S. Rosecrans succeeded him. But the newcommander would not, any more than his predecessor, fall in withHalleck's schemes, and what Cist contemptuously describes as "Halleck'sbrilliant paper campaign into East Tennessee" did not take place. 

General Rosecrans took command of the army at Bowling Green, November 2, 1862. Bragg fell back to Murfreesboro', in Tennessee, and the city ofNashville, now in Federal possession, became the gage of battle. OnDecember 26 Rosecrans moved out from that city towards Murfreesboro', and on January 2, 1863, the battle of Stone's River took place. It wasdesperately contested, and the losses were heavy. At the close of theday the advantage rested with the Confederates; but it wasinconsiderable, and both sides considered the battle only begun. On thenext day, however, Bragg found such dangerous demoralization among histroops that he decided to withdraw. Although he always persisted indescribing himself as the victor in the engagement, yet he now left hiswounded in the hospitals, and fell back to Shelbyville. In thesepositions, not far apart, the two armies lay for a long while watchingeach other; there were a few raids and small encounters, butsubstantially, during the first six months of 1863, quietude reigned inthe region which they dominated. 

But quietude was not what the government wished, and Mr. Lincoln andGeneral Halleck soon fell into much the same relationship with Rosecranswhich they had previously occupied towards McClellan. Whenever Rosecranshad taken the field he had shown himself a skillful strategist and anable commander in battle; but his propensity seemed to be to remain inquarters, and thence to present extravagant exactions, and to conductendless disputes with the President and the general-in-chief. He seemedlike a restive horse, the more he was whipped and spurred the moreimmovably he retained his balking attitude. Mr. Lincoln was sorely triedby this obstinacy, and probably had been pushed nearly to the limits ofhis patience, when at last Rosecrans stirred. It was on June 24 that heset his army in motion to settle with Bragg those conclusions which hadbeen left open for half a year. With this purpose he moved uponShelbyville, but when he arrived there he found that Bragg had gone backto Tullahoma; and when he pushed on to Tullahoma, Bragg had left therealso. Thus it came to pass that on the same famous Fourth of July onwhich Lee started to get out of Pennsylvania, Bragg in like manner wasgetting over the southern boundary line of Tennessee and putting themountain range between himself and the pursuing Federal commander. Theconverging lines of Federal good luck came together on this great day ofthe nation, in a way that touches the superstitious chord; for stillfarther west another and a momentous event was taking place. 

General Grant, at Corinth, had been pondering a great scheme which hemeant to undertake so soon as his scanty army should be sufficientlyreinforced. If Richmond had an artificial value as a token of finaltriumph, the Mississippi River had scarcely less value of a practicalcharacter. Vicksburg and Port Hudson cut out a mid-section of about 200miles of the great stream, which section still remained underConfederate control. Vicksburg was General Grant's objective point. Evento conceive the capture of this stronghold seemed in itself evidence ofgenius; no mere pedant in warfare could have had the conception. Everydifficulty lay in the way of the assailant. The Confederates had sparedno skill, no labor, no expense in fortifying the town; yet after all hadbeen done that military science could do, human achievement counted forlittle in comparison with the surpassing arrangements of Nature. If whatshe intended could be inferred from what she had done, she clearly haddesigned this town to be through all time a veritable "virgin fortress;"she had made for its resting-place a great bluff, which juttedinsolently out into the channel of the Mississippi River, and upon thesummit of which the cluster of buildings resembled rather an eyrie ofeagles than a place of human habitation; the great stream, as ifconfounded by the daring obstruction, before it could recover itsinterrupted course spread itself far over the surrounding country in atangle of bayous and a vast expanse of unwholesome, impassable swamp;the high ridges which lay inland around the place were intersected byfrequent long, deep, and precipitous ravines, so that by this side alsohostile approach had apparently been rendered impossible. Nevertheless, that one of the Northern generals to whom nothing ever seemedimpossible, having cast the eye of desire upon this especial spot, nowadvanced upon it, and began operations in his silent, enduring, pertinacious way, which no men and no intrenchments could permanentlywithstand. His lieutenant, Sherman, made one desperate assault, --not, asit seemed, because there was a possibility of taking the place, butrather to demonstrate that it could not be taken. Then slower and moretoilsome methods were tried. It was obvious that a siege must beresorted to; yet it was not easy to get near enough even to establish asiege. 

General Grant had early decided that the city would remain impregnableuntil by some means he could get below it on the river and approach itfrom the landward side. Ingenious schemes of canals were tried, andfailed. Time passed; the month of April was closing, and all that hadbeen done seemed to amount to nothing better than an accumulation ofevidence that the Confederacy had one spot which the Federals couldnever touch. At last ingenuity was laid aside for sheer daring. Thefleet, under Admiral Porter, transported the army down-stream, athwartthe hostile batteries, and set it ashore on the east bank, below thefortifications. Yet this very success seemed only to add peril todifficulty. The Confederates, straining every nerve to save the place, were gathering a great force in the neighborhood to break up thebesieging army. With a base of supplies which was substantially useless, in a hostile country, with a powerful army hovering near him, and anunapproachable citadel as his objective, Grant could save himself fromdestruction only by complete and prompt success. Desperate, indeed, wasthe occasion, yet all its exorbitant requirements were met fully, surely, and swiftly by the commander and the gallant troops under him. In the task of getting a clear space, by driving the Confederates fromthe neighborhood for a considerable distance around, the army penetratedeastward as far as Jackson, fighting constantly and living off thecountry. Then, returning westward, they began the siege, which, amidhardship and peril and infinite difficulty, was pushed with therelentless vigor of the most relentless and most vigorous leader of thewar. At last, on July 3, General Pemberton, commanding within the city, opened negotiations for a surrender. He knew that an assault would bemade the next day, and he knew that it must succeed; he did not want toillustrate the Fourth of July by so terrible a Confederate loss, somagnificent a Federal gain. Yet he haggled over the terms, and by thisdelay brought about a part of that which he had wished to avoid. It wasdue to his fretfulness about details, that the day on which the Southernarmy marched out and stacked their arms before the fortifications ofVicksburg, and on which the Northern army, having generously watched theoperation without a cheer, then marched in and took possession of theplace, was that same Fourth of July on which two other defeated generalswere escaping from two other victorious Northern armies. 

In a military point of view this campaign and siege have been pronouncedby many competent critics the greatest achievement of the war; but themagnificent and interesting story must, with regret, be yielded to thebiographer of Grant; it does not belong to the biographer of Lincoln. The whole enterprise was committed to Grant to be handled by him withoutlet or hindrance, and it was conducted by him from beginning to endwithout interference, and almost even without suggestion. Yet this veryfact was greatly to the credit of the administration. In the outset thePresident passed judgment upon the man; and it was a correct judgment. Afterward he stood to it gallantly. In the middle of the business, whenthe earlier expedients went wrong, a great outcry against Grant arose. Editors and politicians, even the secretary of the treasury himself, began to hound the President with importunate demands for thedisplacement of a general whom they fervently alleged to be another ofthe incompetents; in short, there was the beginning of just such acrusade as that which had been made against McClellan. But by this timethe President had had opportunity to measure the military capacity ofeditors and politicians, and he was not now so much disquieted by theirclamor as he once had been. He simply, in his quiet way, paid noattention to them whatsoever. Only when one of them reiterated thegossip about Grant being drunk at Shiloh, he made his famous reply, thathe should like to send to some other generals a barrel of the whiskeywhich Grant drank. In a word, the detractors of the silent general madelittle impression on the solitary President, who told them shortly anddecisively: "I can't spare this man; he fights. " They wholly failed topenetrate the protecting fence which the civilian threw around thesoldier, and within the shelter of which that soldier so admirablyperformed the feat which more than any other illustrates the nationalarms. Certainly the President comes in for his peculiar share of thepraise. When the news came to Mr. Lincoln he wrote to General Grant thisletter:--

"July 16, 1863. 

"My DEAR GENERAL, --I do not remember that you and I ever met personally. I write this now as a grateful acknowledgment for the almostinestimable services you have done the country. 

"I wish to say a word further. When you reached the vicinity ofVicksburg, I thought you should do what you finally did, --march thetroops across the neck, run the batteries with the transports, and thusgo below; and I never had any faith, except in a general hope that youknew better than I, that the Yazoo Pass expedition and the like wouldsucceed. 

"When you got below and took Port Gibson, Grand Gulf, and vicinity, Ithought you should go down the river and join General Banks; and whenyou turned northward, east of the Big Black, I feared it was a mistake. I now wish to make a personal acknowledgment that you were right and Iwas wrong. "

Immediately after the ceremony of surrender was over Sherman marchedaway with a strong force to find and fight Johnston's army. But thatgeneral, shunning the conflict, moved so far southward into Mississippithat pursuit was imprudent during the hot season. 

While Grant was finishing the siege of Vicksburg, General Banks wasbesieging Port Hudson, which lay at the southern end of the rebelsection of the river. The fall of the northern post rendered thesouthern one untenable, and it was surrendered on July 9. Henceforth thegreat river was a safe roadway for unarmed craft flying the stars andstripes. 

It is time now to go back to Tennessee. By the close of the first weekin July, 1863, the Confederate force was established in Chattanooga, andthus the hostile armies were "placed back in the relative positionsoccupied by them prior to Bragg's advance into Kentucky, a little lessthan one year previous. " But though the Southern general had reached hispresent position by a retreat at the end of a disappointing enterprise, the issue of final success was still an open one between him andRosecrans, with many advantages on his side. He had a large army in theheart of a mountainous region, with the opportunity to post it inpositions which ought to be impregnable. Moreover, he received freshtroops under Johnston; and later the inaction of Meade in Virginiaencouraged Lee to send to him a considerable force under Longstreet, himself no small reinforcement. These arrived just on the eve of theimpending battle. 

Meantime Mr. Lincoln was sorely exercised at his inability to make hisgenerals carry out his plans. He desired that Burnside should move downfrom the north and unite with Rosecrans, and that then the combinedforce should attack Bragg promptly. But Rosecrans lay still for aboutsix weeks, to repair losses and fatigue, and again played the part ofthe restive steed, responding to the President's spur only withfractious kickings. It was August 16 when he moved, but then he showedhis usual ability in action. The march was difficult; yet, on September6, he had his whole force across the Tennessee and in the mountainssouth of Chattanooga. Burnside, meanwhile, had advanced to Knoxville, but had stopped there, and was now, greatly to Mr. Lincoln'sbewilderment and annoyance, showing activity in every direction exceptprecisely that in which he was directed to move. 

At last, after much fruitless manoeuvring, the collision took place, andfor two days there was fierce and stubborn fighting on the famousbattlefield of Chickamauga. On the second day, September 20, Longstreet, commanding the Confederate left, thoroughly defeated the Federal rightand centre and sent them in precipitate flight to Chattanooga. Rosecrans, overwhelmed amid the rush of fugitives, and thinking that allwas lost, also hastened thither to take charge of the fragments. Intruth all would have been lost, had it not been for Thomas. This ableand resolute commander won in this fight the rhetorical but well meritedname of "the Rock of Chickamauga. " Under him the Federal left stoodimmovable, though furiously assailed by odds, and tried by the rout oftheir comrades. At nightfall these troops, still in position, coveredthe withdrawal to Chattanooga. 

Rosecrans, badly demoralized, gave the President to understand thatthere had been a terrible disaster, and the President, according to hiscustom in such trying moments, responded with words of encouragement andan instant effort to restore morale. Mr. Lincoln always cheered hisgenerals in the hour of disaster, which he seemed to regard only as thestarting-point for a new advance, the incentive to a fresh exertion. Yet, in fact, there had not been a disaster, but only a moderateworsting of the Federal army, resulting in its retirement a triflingdistance to the place whence its opponents had just marched out. Theissue between the two generals was still as open after Rosecrans'smisfortune as it had been after the previous misfortunes of Bragg. Already there was a new question, who would win that coming battle whichplainly was close at hand. The curtain had only gone down on an act; thedrama itself had not been played out. 

Bragg advanced to besiege Chattanooga, and Rosecrans's communicationswere so imperfect that his troops were put on short rations. On theother hand, Mr. Lincoln bestirred himself vigorously. He promptly sentSherman from the West, and Hooker from the East, each with considerablereinforcements, en route for the beleaguered town. Also he saw plainlythat, whether by fault or misfortune, the usefulness of Rosecrans wasover, and on October 16 he put Thomas in place of Rosecrans, [47] andgave to General Grant the command of the Military Division of theMississippi, including the Departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, andthe Tennessee. Grant at once telegraphed to Thomas to hold Chattanoogaat all hazards; to which Thomas replied: "We will hold the town till westarve!" Grant well knew that they were already getting very hungry. Heshowed his usual prompt energy in relieving them; and a little fightingsoon opened a route by which sufficient food came into the place. 

It was now obvious that the decisive conflict between the two armies, which had so long been striving for the advantage of strategic position, and fighting in hostile competition, was at last to occur. Each had itsdistinctive advantage. The Federals were led by Grant, with Sherman, Thomas, Sheridan, and Hooker as his lieutenants, --a list which mayfairly recall Napoleon and his marshals. On the other hand, theSoutherners, lying secure in intrenched positions upon the precipitoussides and lofty summits of Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge, seemedinvulnerably placed. It does not belong to this narrative to describethe terrific contest in which these two combatants furiously lockedhorns on November 24 and 25. It was Hooker's brave soldiers whoperformed the conspicuous feat which was conclusive of victory. Having, by command, stormed the first line of rifle-pits on the ascent, upon theConfederate left, they suddenly took the control into their own hands;without orders they dashed forward, clambered upward in a sudden andresistless access of fighting fury, and in an hour, emerging above themists which shrouded the mid-mountain from the anxious view of GeneralGrant, they planted the stars and stripes on top of Lookout Mountain. They had fought and won what was poetically christened "the battle abovethe clouds. " Sherman, with seven divisions, had meanwhile been makingdesperate and bloody assaults upon Missionary Ridge, and had gained thefirst hilltop; but the next one seemed impregnable. It was, however, notnecessary for him to renew the costly assault; for Hooker's victory, which was quickly followed by a handsome advance by Sheridan, onSherman's right, so turned the Confederate position as to make ituntenable. 

The Northerners were exasperated to find, among the Confederate troopswho surrendered as captives in these two battles, prisoners of war takenat Vicksburg and Port Hudson, who had been paroled and never exchanged. 

On the eve of this battle Longstreet had started northward to cut offand destroy Burnside in Knoxville, and no sooner was the actual fightingover than Grant sent Sherman in all haste to Burnside's assistance. Thereupon Longstreet fell back towards Virginia, and came to aresting-place midway, where he afterward lay unharmed and unharming formany months. Thus at last the long-deferred wish of the President wasfulfilled, and the chief part of East Tennessee was wrested fromConfederate occupation. Among the loyal inhabitants the great rejoicingwas in proportion to the sufferings which they had so long beenundergoing. 

Meanwhile, since Gettysburg, no conspicuous event had attractedattention in Virginia. The President had been disappointed that Meadehad not fought at Williamsport, but soon afterward he gave decisiveadvice against forcing a fight at a worse place in order to cure theblunder of having let go the chance to fight at the right place. Aboutthe middle of September, however, when Lee had reduced his army byleaves of absence and by dispatching Longstreet to reinforce Bragg, Mr. Lincoln thought it a good time to attack him. Meade, on the other hand, now said that he did not feel strong enough to assault, and thisalthough he had 90, 000 men "between him and Washington, " and by hisestimate the whole force of the enemy, "stretching as far as Richmond, "was only 60, 000. "For a battle, then, " wrote Mr. Lincoln, "General Meadehas three men to General Lee's two. Yet, it having been determined thatchoosing ground and standing on the defensive gives so great advantagethat the three cannot safely attack the two, the three are left simplystanding on the defensive also. If the enemy's 60, 000 are sufficient tokeep our 90, 000 away from Richmond, why, by the same rule, may not40, 000 of ours keep their 60, 000 away from Washington, leaving us 50, 000to put to some other use?. . . I can perceive no fault in this statement, unless we admit we are not the equal of the enemy man for man. " Butwhen, a few days later, Stanton proposed to detach 30, 000 men from Meadeto Rosecrans, Mr. Lincoln demurred, and would agree only to let go13, 000, whom Hooker took with him to Chattanooga. Probably he did notwish to diminish the Federal strength in Virginia. 

Late in October, Lee, overestimating the number of troops thuswithdrawn, endeavored to move northward; but Meade outmanoeuvred andoutmarched him, and he fell back behind the Rapidan. General Meade nexttook his turn at the aggressive. Toward the close of November he crossedthe Rapidan with the design of flanking and attacking Lee. But anuntoward delay gave the Southerners time to intrench themselves sostrongly that an attack was imprudent, and Meade returned to the northbank of the stream. The miscarriage hurt his reputation with the people, though he was not to blame for it. 

Now, as the severe season was about to begin, all the armies both of theNorth and of the South, on both sides of the mountain ranges, turnedgladly into winter quarters. Each had equal need to rest and recuperateafter hard campaigns and bloody battles. For a while the war news wasinfrequent and insignificant; and the cessation in the thunder of cannonand the rattle of musketry gives opportunity again to hear the voices ofcontending politicians. For a while we must leave the warriors and giveear to the talkers. 

FOOTNOTES:

[43] Palfrey, _The Antietam and Fredericksburg_, 132. 

[44] Swinton says: "The moment he confronted his antagonist he seemed tosuffer a collapse of all his powers. " _Army of Potomac_, 280. 

[45] But, says Swinton, there was less disproportion than usual; for thegreat army which Hooker had had before Chancellorsville had been greatlyreduced, both by casualties and by the expiration of terms of service. On May 13 he reported that his "marching force of infantry" was "about80, 000 men. " A little later the cavalry was reported at 4677. _Army ofPotomac_, 310. 

[46] Swinton says that whether Meade should have attacked or not, "willprobably always remain one of those questions about which men willdiffer. " He inclines to think that Meade was right. _Army of Potomac_, 369, 370. 

[47] Grant disliked Rosecrans, and is said to have asked for thischange. 

CHAPTER VI

SUNDRIES

It has been pleasant to emerge from the dismal winter of 1862-63 intothe sun-gleam of the Fourth of July of the latter year. But it isnecessary to return for a while into that dusky gloom, for the career ofa "war president" is by no means wholly a series of campaigns. Domesticpolitics, foreign relations, finance, make their several demands. 

Concerning one of these topics, at least, there is little to be said. One day, in a period of financial stress, Mr. Chase expressed a wish tointroduce to the President a delegation of bankers, who had come toWashington to discuss the existing condition with regard to money. "Money!" exclaimed Mr. Lincoln, "I don't know anything about 'money'! Inever had enough of my own to fret me, and I have no opinion about itany way. " Accordingly, throughout his administration he left the wholesubject in the hands of the secretary of the treasury. The tariffs andinternal revenue bills, the legal tender notes, the "five-twenties, " the"ten-forties, " and the "seven-thirties, " all the loans, the nationalbanking system, in short, all the financial schemes of theadministration were adopted by Mr. Lincoln upon the recommendation ofMr. Chase, with little apparent study upon his own part. Satisfied ofthe ability of his secretary, he gave to all the Treasury measures hisloyal support. In return, he expected the necessary funds to beforthcoming; for he had implicit confidence in the willingness of thepeople to pay the bills of the Union; and he expected the secretary toarrange methods by which they could do so with reasonable convenience. Mr. Chase was cast for the role of magician, familiar with thoseincantations which could keep the Treasury ever full. It was well thus, for in fact no word or incident in Mr. Lincoln's life indicates that hehad any capacity whatsoever in financiering. To live within his incomeand pay his dues with a minute and careful punctuality made the limit ofhis dealings and his interest in money matters. 

 * * * * *

Foreign affairs, less technical, could not in like easy manner becommitted to others, and in these Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Seward laboredtogether. The blackest cloud was the Trent affair, yet after that hadpassed the sky by no means became clear. In the spring of 1862 the Oretowent out from Liverpool to become the rebel privateer Florida. Beforeher departure Mr. Adams complained concerning her to the Englishgovernment, but was assured that the vessel was designed for theSicilian fruit trade! As it is not diplomatic to say that gentlemen inoffice are telling lies, the American minister could push the matter nofarther. The Florida, therefore, escaped, not to conduct commerce withSicily, but to destroy the commerce of the United States. At the sametime that she was fitting out, a mysterious craft, oddly known only asthe "290, " was also building in the Liverpool docks, and against her Mr. Adams got such evidence that the queen's ministers could not helpdeciding that she must be detained. Unfortunately, however, and by astrange, if not a significant chance, they reached this decision on theday after she had sailed! She became the notorious Alabama. Earl Russelladmitted that the affair was "a scandal, " but this did not interferewith the career of Captain Semmes. In these incidents there was bothcause and provocation for war, and hot-headed ones cried out for it, while prudent men feared it. But the President and the secretary wereunder the bonds of necessity to keep their official temper. Just at thisjuncture England would have found it not only very easy, but also verycongenial to her real sympathies, to play for the South a part like thatwhich France had once played for certain thirteen revolted colonies, andthereby to change a rebellion into a revolution. So Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Seward, not willing to give the unfriendly power this opportunity, onlywrote down in the national ledger sundry charges against Great Britain, which were afterward paid, not promptly, yet in full!

Another provoking thing was the placing of

Confederate loans in London. This could not be interfered with. Theonly comfort was that the blockaded South had much difficulty in layinghands upon the proceeds of the bonds which English friends of the SlaveEmpire were induced to buy. Yet time, always the faithful auxiliary ofthe North, took care of this matter also. When the news of Gettysburgand Vicksburg came, the investors, who had scarcely finished writing thecheques with which to pay their subscriptions, were obliged to face adrop of thirty per cent, in the market price of their new securities. For many years after the war was over British strong boxes wasted spacein accommodating these absurd documents, while the idea of theirworthlessness was slowly filtering through the minds of their owners. 

Another thing, which did no harm at all, but was exceedingly vexatious, was the constant suggestion of European mediation. For a couple ofyears, at least, the air was full of this sort of talk. Once, in spiteof abundant discouragement, the French emperor actually committed thefolly of making the proposal. It came inopportunely on February 3, 1863, after the defeat of Fredericksburg, like a carrion bird after a battle. It was rejected very decisively, and if Napoleon III. Appreciated Mr. Seward's dispatch, he became aware that he had shown gross lack ofdiscernment. Yet he was not without some remarkable companions in thisincapacity to understand that which he was observing, as if from aloft, with an air of superior wisdom. One would think that the condition offeeling in the United States which had induced Governor Hicks, in theearly stage of the rebellion, to suggest a reference to Lord Lyons, asarbitrator, had long since gone by. But it had not; and it is thesurprising truth that Horace Greeley had lately written to M. Mercier, the French minister at Washington, suggesting precisely the step whichthe emperor took; and there were other less conspicuous citizens whomanifested a similar lack of spirit and intelligence. 

All this, however, was really of no serious consequence. Talk aboutmediation coming from American citizens could do little actual injury, and from foreigners it could do none. If the foreigners had only beeninduced to offer it by reason of a friendly desire to help the countryin its hour of stress, the rejection might even have been accompaniedwith sincere thanks. Unfortunately, however, it never came in thisguise; but, on the contrary, it always involved the offensive assumptionthat the North could never restore the integrity of the Union by force. Northern failure was established in advance, and was the unconcealed, ifnot quite the avowed, basis of the whole transaction. Now though mereunfriendliness, not overstepping the requirements of international law, could inflict little substantial hurt, yet there was something verydiscouraging in the unanimity and positiveness with which all theseexperienced European statesmen assumed the success of the Confederacyas the absolutely sure outcome; and in this time of extreme trial todiscourage was to injure. Furthermore, the undisguised pleasure withwhich this prospect was contemplated was sorely trying to men oppressedby the burdens of anxiety and trouble which rested on the President andhis ministers. The man who had begun life as a frontiersman had need ofmuch moral courage to sustain him in the face of the presagings, thecondemnations, and the hostility of nearly all the sage and well-trainedstatesmen of Europe. In those days the United States had not yet fullythrown off a certain thralldom of awe before European opinion. Nevertheless, at whatever cost in the coin of self-reliance, thePresident and the secretary maintained the courage of their opinions, and never swerved or hesitated in the face of foreign antipathy orcontempt. The treatment inflicted upon them was only so much added tothe weight under which they had to stand up. 

 * * * * *

Rebellion and foreign ill-will, even Copperheadism, presenteddifficulties and opposition which were in a certain sense legitimate;but that loyal Republicans should sow the path of the administrationthick with annoyances certainly did seem an unfair trial. Yet, on sundryoccasions, some of which have been mentioned, these men did this thing, and they did it in the very uncompromising and exasperating manner whichis the natural emanation from conscientious purpose and intenseself-faith. An instance occurred in December, 1862. The blacker theprospect became, the more bitter waxed the extremists. Such is thefashion of fanatics, who are wont to grow more warm as their chancesseem to grow more desperate; and some of the leaders of the anti-slaverywing of the Republican party were fanatics. These men by no meansconfined their hostility to the Democratic McClellan; but extended it toso old and tried a Republican as the secretary of state himself. It hadalready come to this, that the new party was composed of, if not splitinto, two sections of widely discordant views. The conservative bodyfound its notions expressed in the cabinet by Seward; the radical bodyhad a mouthpiece in Chase. The conservatives were not aggressive; butthe radicals waged a genuine political warfare, and denounced Seward, not, indeed, with the vehemence which was considered to be appropriateagainst McClellan, yet very strenuously. Finally this hostility reachedsuch a pass that, at a caucus of Republican senators, it was actuallyvoted to demand the dismission of this long-tried and distinguishedleader in the anti-slavery struggle. Later, in place of this blunt vote, a more polite equivalent was substituted, in the shape of a request fora reconstruction of the cabinet. Then a committee visited the Presidentand pressed him to have done with the secretary, whom they thoughtlukewarm. Meanwhile, Seward had heard of what was going forward, and, in order to free Mr. Lincoln from embarrassment, he had already tenderedhis resignation before the committee arrived. 

The crisis was serious. The recent elections indicated that even while, as now, the government represented all the sections of Republicanism, still the situation was none too good; but if it was to be controlled bythe extremist wing of a discordant party, the chance that it couldendure to the end the tremendous strain of civil war was reduced almostto hopelessness. The visitors who brought this unwelcome suggestion tothe President received no immediate response or expression of opinionfrom him, but were invited to come again in the evening; they did so, and were then much surprised to meet all the members of the cabinetexcept Mr. Seward. An outspoken discussion ensued, in which Mr. Chasefound his position embarrassing, if not equivocal. On the followingmorning, he, with other members of the cabinet, came again for furthertalk with the President; in his hand he held a written resignation ofhis office. He "tendered" it, yet "did not advance to deliver it, "whereupon the President stepped forward and took it "with alacrity. "[48]

Having now in his hands the resignations of the chiefs of the twoprincipal factions of the party, the President had made the first steptowards relieving the situation of dangerous one-sidedness. At once hetook the next step by sending to each this note:--

December 20, 1862. 

HON. WILLIAM H. SEWARD and HON. SALMON P. CHASE:

_Gentlemen_, --You have respectively tendered me your resignations assecretary of state and secretary of the treasury of the United States. Iam apprised of the circumstances which render this course personallydesirable to each of you; but, after most anxious consideration, mydeliberate judgment is, that the public interest does not admit of it. 

I therefore have to request that you will resume the duties of yourdepartments respectively. 

Your obedient servant, A. LINCOLN. 

The next morning Mr. Seward wrote briefly: "I have cheerfully resumedthe functions of this department, in obedience to your command. " Mr. Chase seemed to hesitate. On December 20, in the afternoon, he hadwritten a letter, in which he had said that he thought it desirable thathis resignation should be accepted. He gave as his reason that recentevents had "too rudely jostled the unity" of the cabinet; and heintimated that, with both himself and Seward out of it, an improvedcondition might be reached. He had not, however, actually dispatchedthis, when the President's note reached him. He then, though feelinghis convictions strengthened, decided to hold back the letter which hehad prepared and "to sleep on" the matter. Having slept, he wrote, onthe morning of December 22, a different letter, to the effect that, though reflection had not much, if at all, changed his original opinionas to the desirability of his resignation, yet he would conform to thejudgment and wishes of the President. If Mr. Chase was less graciousthan Mr. Seward in this business, it is to be remembered that he wasvery much more dissatisfied with the President's course than was Mr. Seward, who, indeed, for the most part was not dissatisfied at all. 

Thus a dangerous crisis was escaped rather than overcome. For thoughafter the relief given by this plain speaking the situation did notagain become quite so strained as it had previously been, yetdisagreement between men naturally prudent and men naturally extremistwas inevitable. Nevertheless it was something that the two sections hadencountered each other, and that neither had won control of thegovernment. The President had restrained dissension within safe limitsand had saved himself from the real or apparent domination of a faction. When it was all over, he said: "Now I can ride; I have got a pumpkin ineach end of my bag. " Later on he repeated: "I do not see how it couldhave been done better. I am sure it was right. If I had yielded to thatstorm and dismissed Seward, the thing would all have slumped over oneway, and we should have been left with a scanty handful of supporters. "Undoubtedly he had managed very skillfully a very difficult affair, buthe ought never to have been compelled to arrange such quarrels in thecamp of his own party. 

 * * * * *

Those counties of Virginia which lay west of the Alleghanies contained apopulation which was, by an overwhelming majority, strenuously loyal. There had long been more of antagonism than of friendship between themand the rest of the State, and now, as has been already mentioned, thesecession of Virginia from the Union stimulated them, in turn, to secedefrom Virginia. In the summer of 1861 they took measures to formthemselves into a separate State; and in April, 1862, they adopted astate Constitution by a vote of 18, 862 yeas against 514 nays. A bill forthe admission of "West Virginia" was passed by the Senate in July, andby the House in December, and was laid before the President forsignature. There were nice questions of constitutional law about this, and some doubt also as to whether the move was altogether well advised. Mr. Lincoln asked the opinions of the cabinet as to whether he shouldsign the bill. Three said Yea, and three Nay; and it was noteworthy thatthe three who thought it expedient also thought it constitutional, andthat the three who thought it inexpedient also thought itunconstitutional. Mr. Lincoln, not much assisted, then decided in theaffirmative, and signed the bill December 31, 1862. A statement of thereasons[49] which led him to this decision concludes thus: "It is saidthat the admission of West Virginia is secession, and tolerated onlybecause it is _our_ secession. Well, if we call it by that name, thereis still difference enough between secession against the Constitutionand secession in favor of the Constitution. " Mr. Elaine says that thecreation of this State was sustained by "legal fictions;" and ThaddeusStevens declared that it was a measure entirely outside of any provisionof the Constitution, yet said that he should vote for it in accordancewith his general principle: that none of the States in rebellion wereentitled to the protection of the Constitution. The Republicansthemselves were divided in their views as to the lawfulness of themeasure. However the law may have stood, it is evident to us, lookingbackward, that for practical purposes the wisdom of the President'sjudgment cannot be impugned. The measure was the amputation of so muchterritory from that which the Confederates, if they should succeed, could claim as their own; and it produced no inconvenience at all when, instead of succeeding, they failed. 

 * * * * *

Many causes conspired to induce an obstreperous outbreak of"Copperheadism" in the spring of 1863. The Democratic successes in theelections of the preceding autumn were in part a premonition of this, in part also a cause. Moreover, reaction was inevitable after theintense outburst of patriotic enthusiasm which had occurred during theearlier part of the war. But more than all this, Mr. Lincoln wrote, andevery one knew, that, "if the war fails, the administration fails, " andthus far the war had been a failure. So the grumblers, the malcontents, and the Southern sympathizers argued that the administration also, atleast so far as it had gone, had been a failure; and they fondlyconceived that their day of triumph was dawning. 

That which was due, punctually arrived. There now came into prominencethose secret societies which, under a shifting variety of names, continued to scheme and to menace until the near and visible end of thewar effected their death by inanition. The Knights of the Golden Circle, The Order of American Knights, the Order of the Star, The Sons ofLiberty, in turn enlisted recruits in an abundance which is nowremembered with surprise and humiliation, --sensations felt perhaps mostkeenly by the sons of those who themselves belonged to theorganizations. Mr. Seward well said: "These persons will be trying toforget, years hence, that they ever opposed this war. " These societiesgave expression to a terrible blunder, for Copperheadism was even morestupid than it was vicious. But the fact of their stupidity made themharmless. Their very names labeled them. Men who like to enrollthemselves in Golden Circles and in Star galaxies seldom accomplish muchin exacting, especially in dangerous, practical affairs. Mr. Lincolntook this sensible view of these associations. His secretaries, whodoubtless speak from personal knowledge, say that his attitude "was oneof good-humored contempt. "

As a rule these "Knights" showed their valor in the way of mischief, plotting bold things, but never doing them. They encouraged soldiers todesert; occasionally they assassinated an enrolling officer; theymaintained communications with the Confederates, to whom they gaveinformation and occasionally also material aid; they were tireless incaucus work and wire-pulling; in Indiana, in 1863, they got sufficientcontrol of the legislature to embarrass Governor Morton quite seriously;they talked much about establishing a Northwestern Confederacy; a few ofthem were perhaps willing to aid in those cowardly efforts atincendiarism in the great Northern cities, also in the poisoning ofreservoirs, in the distribution of clothing infected with disease, andin other like villainies which were arranged by Confederate emissariesin Canada, and some of which were imperfectly carried out in New Yorkand elsewhere; they also made great plans for an uprising and for therelease of Confederate prisoners in Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana. But noactual outbreak ever occurred; for when they had come close to thedanger line, these associates of mediaeval tastes and poeticappellatives always stopped short. 

The President was often urged to take decisive measures against thesedevisers of ignoble treasons. Such men as Governor Morton and GeneralRosecrans strove to alarm him. But he said that the "conspiracy meritedno special attention, being about an equal mixture of puerility andmalice. " He had perfect information as to all the doings and plottings, and as to the membership, of all the societies, and was able to measureaccurately their real power of hurtfulness; he never could be induced totreat them with a severity which was abundantly deserved, but whichmight not have been politic and would certainly have added to the labor, the expense, and the complications of the government. "Nothing can makeme believe, " he once charitably said, "that one hundred thousand IndianaDemocrats are disloyal!" His judgment was proved to be sound; for hadmany of these men been in grim earnest in their disloyalty, they wouldhave achieved something. In fact these bodies were unquestionablycomposed of a small infusion of genuine traitors, combined with a vastlylarger proportion of bombastic fellows who liked to talk, and foolishpeople who were tickled in their shallow fancy by the element of secrecyand the fineness of the titles. 

The man whose name became unfortunately preeminent for disloyalty atthis time was Clement L. Vallandigham, a Democrat, of Ohio. GeneralBurnside was placed in command of the Department of the Ohio, March 25, 1863, and having for the moment no Confederates to deal with, he turnedhis attention to the Copperheads, whom he regarded with even greateranimosity. His Order No. 38, issued on April 13, brought these hornetsabout his ears in impetuous fury; for, having made a long schedule oftheir favorite offenses, which he designed for the future severely toproscribe, he closed it by saying that "the habit of declaring sympathyfor the enemy will not be allowed in this Department;" and he warnedpersons with treasonable tongues that, unless they should keep thatlittle member in order, they might expect either to suffer death astraitors, or to be sent southward within the lines of "their friends. "Now Mr. Vallandigham had been a member of Congress since 1856, and wasat present a prominent candidate for any office which the Democrats ofhis State or of the United States might be able to fill; he was thepopular and rising leader of the Copperhead wing of the Democracy. Suchwas his position that it would have been ignominious for him to allowany Union general to put a military gag in his mouth. Nor did he. On thecontrary, he made speeches which at that time might well have madeUnionists mad with rage, and which still seem to have gone far beyondthe limit of disloyalty which any government could safely tolerate. Therefore on May 4 he was arrested by a company of soldiers, brought toCincinnati, and thrown into jail. His friends gathered in anger, and ariot was narrowly avoided. At once, by order of General Burnside, he wastried by a military commission. He was charged with "publicly expressingsympathy for those in arms against the government of the United States, and declaring disloyal sentiments and opinions, with the object andpurpose of weakening the power of the government in its efforts tosuppress an unlawful rebellion. " Specifications were drawn from a speechdelivered by him on or about May 1. The evidence conclusively sustainedthe indictment, and the officers promptly pronounced him guilty, whereupon he was sentenced by Burnside to confinement in Fort Warren. Aneffort to obtain his release by a writ of habeas corpus was ineffectual. 

The rapidity of these proceedings had taken every one by surprise. Butthe Democrats throughout the North, rapidly surveying the situation, seized the opportunity which perhaps had been too inconsiderately giventhem. The country rang with plausible outcries and high-sounding oratoryconcerning military usurpation, violation of the Constitution, andstifling freedom of speech. It was painfully obvious that thiscombination of rhetoric and argument troubled the minds of manywell-affected persons. If the President had been consulted in theoutset, it is thought by some that he would not have allowed matters toproceed so far. Soon afterward, in his reply to the New York Democrats, he said: "In my own discretion, I do not know whether I would haveordered the arrest of Mr. Vallandigham. " On the other hand, Mr. Blainestates that Burnside "undoubtedly had confidential instructions inregard to the mode of dealing with the rising tide of disloyalty which, beginning in Ohio, was sweeping over the West. "

In a very short time the violence of the fault-finding reached soexcessive a measure that Burnside offered his resignation; but Mr. Lincoln declined to accept it, saying that, though all the cabinetregretted the necessity for the arrest, "some perhaps doubting there wasa real necessity for it, yet, being done, all were for seeing youthrough with it. " This seems to have been his own position. In fact itwas clear that, whether what had been done was or was not a mistake, toundo it would be a greater mistake. Accordingly Mr. Lincoln only showedthat he felt the pressure of the criticism and denunciation by commutingthe sentence, and directing that Vallandigham should be released fromconfinement and sent within the Confederate lines, --which was, indeed, avery shrewd and clever move, and much better than the imprisonment. Accordingly the quasi rebel was tendered to and accepted by aConfederate picket, on May 25. He protested vehemently, declared hisloyalty, and insisted that his character was that of a prisoner of war. But the Confederates, who had no objection whatsoever to his peculiarmethods of demonstrating "loyalty" to their opponents, insisted upontreating him as a friend, the victim of an enemy common to themselvesand him; and instead of exchanging him as a prisoner, they facilitatedhis passage through the blockade on his way to Canada. There he arrivedin safety, and thence issued sundry manifestoes to the Democracy. OnJune 11 the Democratic Convention of Ohio nominated him as theircandidate for governor, and it seems that for a while they reallyexpected to elect him. 

In the condition of feeling during the months in which these events wereoccurring, they undeniably subjected the government to a very severestrain. They furnished the Democrats with ammunition far better than anywhich they had yet found, and they certainly used it well. Since theearliest days of the war there had never been quite an end of theprotestation against arbitrary military arrests and the suspension ofthe sacred writ of habeas corpus, and now the querulous outcry wasrevived with startling vehemence. Crowded meetings were held everywhere;popular orators terrified or enraged their audiences with pictures ofthe downfall of freedom, the jeopardy of every citizen; resolutions andvotes without number expressed the alarm and anger of the greatassemblages; learned lawyers lent their wisdom to corroborate therhetoricians, and even some Republican newspapers joined the croakingprocession of their Democratic rivals. Erelong the assaults appeared tobe producing effects so serious and widespread that the President wasobliged to enter into the controversy. On May 16 a monster meeting of"the Democrats of New York" was told by Governor Seymour that thequestion was: "whether this war is waged to put down rebellion at theSouth, or to destroy free institutions at the North. " Excited by suchinstigation, the audience passed sundry damnatory resolutions and sentthem to the President. 

Upon receiving these, Mr. Lincoln felt that he must come down into thearena, without regard to official conventionality. On June 12 he repliedby a full presentation of the case, from his point of view. He had oncemore to do the same thing in response to another address of likecharacter which was sent to him on June 11 by the Democratic StateConvention of Ohio. In both cases the documents prepared by theremonstrants were characterized, to more than the usual degree, by thatdignified and _ore rotundo_ phraseology, that solemnity in thepresentation of imposing generalities, which are wont to be so dear tocommittees charged with drafting resolutions. The replies of thePresident were in striking contrast to this rhetorical method alike insubstance and in form; clear, concise, and close-knit, they were modelsof good work in political controversy, and like most of his writing theysorely tempt to liberal transcription, a temptation which mustunfortunately be resisted, save for a few sentences. The openingparagraph in the earlier paper was cleverly put:--

"The resolutions are resolvable into two propositions, --first, theexpression of a purpose to sustain the cause of the Union, to securepeace through victory, and to support the administration in everyconstitutional and lawful measure to suppress the rebellion; and, secondly, a declaration of censure upon the administration for supposedunconstitutional action, such as the making of military arrests. And, from the two propositions, a third is deduced, which is, that thegentlemen composing the meeting are resolved on doing their part tomaintain our common government and country, despite the folly orwickedness, as they may conceive, of any administration. This positionis eminently patriotic, and, as such, I thank the meeting, andcongratulate the nation for it. My own purpose is the same, so that themeeting and myself have a common object, and can have no difference, except in the choice of means or measures for effecting that object. "

Later on followed some famous sentences:--

"Mr. Vallandigham avows his hostility to the war on the part of theUnion; and his arrest was made because he was laboring, with someeffect, to prevent the raising of troops, to encourage desertion fromthe army, and to leave the rebellion without an adequate military forceto suppress it. He was not arrested because he was damaging thepolitical prospects of the administration or the personal interests ofthe commanding general, but because he was damaging the army, upon theexistence and vigor of which the life of the Nation depends. . . . 

"I understand the meeting whose resolutions I am considering to be infavor of suppressing the rebellion by military force, by armies. Longexperience has shown that armies cannot be maintained unless desertionshall be punished by the severe penalty of death. 

"The case requires, and the law and the Constitution sanction, thispunishment. Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who deserts, whileI must not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to desert?This is none the less injurious when effected by getting a father, orbrother, or friend, into a public meeting, and there working upon hisfeelings until he is persuaded to write the soldier boy that he isfighting in a bad cause, for a wicked administration of a contemptiblegovernment, too weak to arrest and punish him if he shall desert. Ithink that, in such a case, to silence the agitator, and save the boy, is not only constitutional, but withal a great mercy. "

The Ohio Democrats found themselves confronted with this:--

"Your nominee for governor . . . Is known to you and to the world todeclare against the use of an army to suppress the rebellion. Your ownattitude therefore encourages desertion, resistance to the draft, andthe like, because it teaches those who incline to desert and to escapethe draft to believe it is your purpose to protect them, and to hopethat you will become strong enough to do so. "

The arguments of the President called out retort rather than reply, forin fact they really could not be answered, and they were too accuratelyput to be twisted by sophistry; that they reached the minds of thepeople was soon made evident. The Democratic managers had made a fatalblunder in arraying the party in a position of extreme hostility to thewar. Though there were at the North hosts of grumblers who weremaliciously pleased at all embarrassments of the administration, and whowere willing to make the prosecution of the war very difficult, therewere not hosts who were ready to push difficulty to the point ofimpossibility. On the other hand the fight was made very shrewdly by theUnion men of Ohio, who nominated John Brough, a "war Democrat, " as theircandidate. Then the scales fell from the eyes of the people; they sawthat in real fact votes for Brough or for Vallandigham were, respectively, votes for or against the Union. The campaign became adirect trial of strength on this point. Freedom of speech, habeascorpus, and the kindred incidents of the Vallandigham case were laidaside as not being the genuine and fundamental questions. It was one ofthose instances in which the common sense of the multitude suddenlytakes control, brushes away confusing details, and gets at the great andtrue issue. The result was that Vallandigham was defeated by a majorityof over 100, 000 votes; and thus a perilous crisis was well passed. Thisincident had put the Republican ascendency in extreme peril, but whenthe administration emerged from the trial with a success so brilliant, it was thereafter much stronger than if the test had never been made. The strain was one of that kind to which the war was subjecting thewhole nation, a strain which strengthens rather than weakens the bodywhich triumphantly encounters it. The credit for the result wasgenerally admitted to be chiefly due to Mr. Lincoln's effectivepresentation of the Republican position. 

 * * * * *

As the second year of the war drew towards its close, the administrationhad to face a new and grave difficulty in the recruitment of the army. Serious errors which had been made in calling and enlisting troops nowbegan to bear fruit. Under the influence of the first enthusiasm a largeproportion of the adult male population at the North would readily haveenlisted "for the war;" but unfortunately that opportunity had not beenseized by the government, and it soon passed, never to return. That thePresident and his advisers had been blameworthy can hardly be said; butwhether they had been blameworthy or excusable became an immaterialissue, when they found that the terms of enlistment were soon to expire, and also that just when the war was at its hottest, the patriotism ofthe people seemed at its coldest. Defeats in the field and Copperheadismat home combined in their dispiriting and deadly work. Voluntaryenlistment almost ceased. Thereupon Congress passed an act "forenrolling and calling out the national forces. " All able-bodiedcitizens between twenty and forty-five years of age were to "performmilitary duty in the service of the United States, when called on by thePresident for that purpose. "[50] This was strenuous earnest, for itportended a draft. 

The situation certainly was not to be considered without solicitudewhen, in a war which peculiarly appealed to patriotism, compulsion mustbe used to bring involuntary recruits to maintain the contest. Yet therelaxation of the patriotic temper was really not so great as this factmight seem to indicate. Besides many partial and obvious explanations, one which is less obvious should also be noted. During two years of warthe people, notoriously of a temperament readily to accept new facts andto adapt themselves thereto, had become accustomed to a state of war, and had learned to regard it as a _condition_, not normal and permanent, yet of indefinite duration. Accordingly they were now of opinion thatthe government must charge itself with the management of this condition, that is to say, with the conduct of the war, as a strict matter ofbusiness, to be carried on like all other public duties and functions. In the first months of stress every man had felt called upon tocontribute, personally, his own moral, financial, and even physicalsupport; but that crisis had passed, and it was now conceived that theadministration might fairly be required to arrange for getting men andmoney and supplies in the systematic and business-like fashion in which, as history taught, all other governments had been accustomed to getthese necessaries in time of war. 

At any rate, however it was to be explained or commented upon, the factconfronted Mr. Lincoln that he must institute enrollment and drafting. The machinery was arranged and the very disagreeable task was enteredupon early in the summer of 1863. If it was painful in the firstinstance for the President to order this, the process was immediatelymade as hateful as possible for him. Even loyal and hearty"war-governors" seemed at once to accept as their chief object theprotection of the people of their respective States from the operationof the odious law. The mercantile element was instantly and fullyaccepted by them. The most patriotic did not hesitate to make everyeffort to have the assigned quotas reduced; they drew jealouscomparisons to show inequalities; and they concocted all sorts ofschemes for obtaining credits. Not marshaling recruits in the field, butfilling quotas upon paper, seemed a legitimate purpose; for the matterhad become one of figures, of business, of competition, and all theshrewdness of the Yankee mind was at once aroused to gain for one'sself, though at the expense of one's neighbors. Especially theDemocratic officials were viciously fertile in creating obstacles. Thefact that the Act of Congress was based on the precedent of an Act ofthe Confederate Congress, passed a year before, did not seem in theleast to conciliate the Copperheads. Governor Seymour of New Yorkobtained a discreditable preeminence in thwarting the administration. Hegathered ingenious statistics, and upon them based charges of dishonestapportionments and of fraudulent discrimination against Democraticprecincts. He also declared the statute unconstitutional, and asked thePresident to stay all proceedings under it until it could be passed uponby the Supreme Court of the United States, --an ingenuous proposition, which he neglected to make practicable by arranging with General Lee toremain conveniently quiescent while the learned judges should bediscussing the methods of reinforcing the Northern armies. 

In a word, Mr. Lincoln was confronted by every difficulty thatRepublican inventiveness and Democratic disaffection could devise. Yetthe draft must go on, or the war must stop. His reasonableness, hispatience, his capacity to endure unfair trials, received in thisbusiness a demonstration more conspicuous than in any other during hispresidency. Whenever apportionments, dates, and credits were questioned, he was liberal in making temporary, and sometimes permanent allowances, preferring that any error in exactions should be in the way ofmoderation. But in the main business he was inflexible; and at last itcame to a direct issue between himself and the malcontents, whether thedraft should go on or stop. In the middle of July the mob in New Yorkcity tested the question. The drafting began there on Saturday morning, July 11. On Monday morning, July 13, the famous riot broke out. It wasan appalling storm of rage on the part of the lower classes; duringthree days terror and barbarism controlled the great city, and in itsstreets countless bloody and hideous massacres were perpetrated. Negroesespecially were hanged and otherwise slain most cruelly. The governorwas so inefficient that he was charged, of course extravagantly, withbeing secretly in league with the ringleaders. A thousand or more lives, as it was roughly estimated, were lost in this mad and brutal fury, before order was again restored. The government gave the populace ashort time to cool, and then sent 10, 000 troops into the city andproceeded with the business without further interruption. A smalleroutbreak took place in Boston, but was promptly suppressed. In otherplaces it was threatened, but did not occur. In spite of all, thePresident continued to execute the law. Yet although by this means thearmies might be kept full, the new men were very inferior to those whohad responded voluntarily to the earlier calls. Every knave in thecountry adopted the lucrative and tolerably safe occupation of"bounty-jumping, " and every worthless loafer was sent to the front, whence he escaped at the first opportunity to sell himself anew and tobe counted again. The material of the army suffered great depreciation, which was only imperfectly offset by the improvement of the militarymachine, whereby a more effective discipline, resembling that ofEuropean professionalism, was enforced. [51]

FOOTNOTES:

[48] N. And H. Vi. 268; this account is derived from their twelfthchapter. 

[49] N. And H. Vi. 309, from MS. 

[50] The act was signed by the President, March 3, 1863. 

[51] Concerning the deterioration of the army, in certain particulars, see an article, "The War as we see it now, " by John C. Ropes, _Scribner's Magazine_, June, 1891. 

CHAPTER VII

THE TURN OF THE TIDE

The winter of 1862-63 was for the Rebellion much what the winter ofValley Forge was for the Revolution. It passed, however, and the nationstill clung fast to its purpose. The weak brethren who had becomedismayed were many, but the people as a whole was steadfast. This beingso, ultimate success became assured. Wise and cool-headed men, in aframe of mind to contemplate the situation as it really was, saw thatthe tide was about at its turning, and that the Union would not driftaway to destruction in this storm at any rate. They saw that the North_could_ whip the South, if it chose; and it was now sufficiently evidentthat it would choose, --that it would endure, and would finish its task. It was only the superficial observers who were deceived by the Virginiandisasters, which rose so big in the foreground as partially to concealthe real fact, --that the Confederacy was being at once strangled andstarved to death. The waters of the Atlantic Ocean and of the Gulf ofMexico were being steadily made more and more inaccessible, as oneposition after another along the coast gradually passed into Federalhands. The Mississippi River, at last a Union stream from its source toits mouth, now made a Chinese wall for the Confederacy on the west. Uponthe north the line of conflict had been pushed down to the northernborders of Mississippi and Georgia, and the superincumbent weight of thevast Northwest lay with a deadly pressure upon these two States. 

It was, therefore, only in Virginia that the Confederates had held theirown, and here, with all their victories, they had done no more than justhold their own. They had to recognize, also, that from such battlefieldsas Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville they gathered no sustenance, however much they might reap in the way of glory. Neither had theygained even any ground, for the armies were still manoeuvring along thesame roads over which they had been tramping and swaying to and fro formore than two years. By degrees the Southern resources in the way ofmen, money, food, and supplies generally, were being depleted. TheConfederacy was like a lake, artificially inclosed, which was fed by noinflux from outside, while it was tapped and drained at many points. 

On the other hand, within the North, affairs were coming into a moresatisfactory condition. It was true that all the military successes ofJuly had not discouraged the malcontents; and during the summer they hadbeen busily preparing for the various state elections of the autumn, which they hoped would strongly corroborate their congressional triumphsof 1862. But when the time came they were exceedingly disappointed. Thelaw now, fairly enough, permitted soldiers in the field to vote, andthis was, of course, a reinforcement for the Republican party; but evenamong the voters at home the Democratic reaction of the preceding yearhad spent its force. In October Pennsylvania gave Governor Curtin, theRepublican candidate for reëlection, a majority of 15, 000. In the samemonth, under the circumstances described in the preceding chapter, Ohioburied Vallandigham under a hostile majority of more than 100, 000. Thelead thus given by the "October States" was followed by the "NovemberStates. " In New York no governor was to be elected; but the Republicanstate ticket showed a majority of 30, 000, whereas the year beforeSeymour had polled a majority of 10, 000. The Northwest fell into theprocession, though after a hard fight. A noteworthy feature of thestruggle, which was fierce and for a time doubtful in Illinois, was aletter from Mr. Lincoln. He was invited to attend a mass meeting atSpringfield, and with reluctance felt himself obliged to decline; but inplace of a speech, which might not have been preserved, the good fortuneof posterity caused him to write this letter:--

August 26, 1863. 

HON. JAMES C. CONKLING:

_My dear Sir_, --Your letter inviting me to attend a mass meeting ofunconditional Union men, to be held at the capital of Illinois, on thethird day of September, has been received. It would be very agreeablefor me thus to meet my old friends at my own home, but I cannot just nowbe absent from here as long as a visit there would require. 

The meeting is to be of all those who maintain unconditional devotion tothe Union, and I am sure my old political friends will thank me fortendering, as I do, the nation's gratitude to those other noble men whomno partisan malice or partisan hope can make false to the nation's life. 

There are those who are dissatisfied with me. To such I would say: youdesire peace, and you blame me that we do not have it. But how can weattain it? There are but three conceivable ways: First, to suppress therebellion by force of arms. This I am trying to do. Are you for it? Ifyou are, so far we are agreed. If you are not for it, a second way is togive up the Union. I am against this. Are you for it? If you are, youshould say so plainly. If you are not for _force_, nor yet for_dissolution_, there only remains some imaginable _compromise_. 

I do not believe that any compromise embracing the maintenance of theUnion is now possible. All that I learn leads to a directly oppositebelief. The strength of the rebellion is its military, its army. Thatarmy dominates all the country and all the people within its range. Anyoffer of terms made by any man or men within that range, in oppositionto that army, is simply nothing for the present; because such man or menhave no power whatever to enforce their side of a compromise, if onewere made with them. 

To illustrate: suppose refugees from the South and peace men of theNorth get together in convention, and frame and proclaim a compromiseembracing a restoration of the Union. In what way can that compromise beused to keep Lee's army out of Pennsylvania? Meade's army can keep Lee'sarmy out of Pennsylvania, and, I think, can ultimately drive it out ofexistence. But no paper compromise, to which the controllers of Lee'sarmy are not agreed, can at all affect that army. In an effort at suchcompromise we would [should] waste time, which the enemy would improveto our disadvantage, and that would be all. 

A compromise, to be effective, must be made either with those whocontrol the rebel army, or with the people, first liberated from thedomination of that army by the success of our own army. Now, allow me toassure you that no word or intimation from that rebel army, or from anyof the men controlling it, in relation to any peace compromise, has evercome to my knowledge or belief. All charges and insinuations to thecontrary are deceptive and groundless. And I promise you that if anysuch proposition shall hereafter come, it shall not be rejected and kepta secret from you. I freely acknowledge myself to be the servant of thepeople, according to the bond of service, the United StatesConstitution; and that, as such, I am responsible to them. But to beplain, you are dissatisfied with me about the negro. Quite likely thereis a difference of opinion between you and myself upon that subject. Icertainly wish that all men could be free, while you, I suppose, do not. Yet I have neither adopted nor proposed any measure which is notconsistent with even your views, provided that you are for the Union. Isuggested compensated emancipation, to which you replied: you wished notto be taxed to buy negroes. But I had not asked you to be taxed to buynegroes, except in such a way as to save you from greater taxation tosave the Union exclusively by other means. 

You dislike the emancipation proclamation, and perhaps would have itretracted. You say it is unconstitutional. I think differently. I thinkthe Constitution invests its commander-in-chief with all the law of warin time of war. The most that can be said, if so much, is, that slavesare property. Is there, has there ever been, any question that by thelaw of war, property, both of enemies and friends, may be taken whenneeded? And is it not needed whenever it helps us and hurts the enemy?Armies, the world over, destroy enemies' property when they cannot useit, and even destroy their own to keep it from the enemy. 

. . . But the proclamation, as law, either is valid or is not valid. If itis not valid it needs no retraction. If it is valid, it cannot beretracted, any more than the dead can be brought to life. Some of youprofess to think its retraction would operate favorably for the Union. Why better after the retraction than before the issue? There was morethan a year and a half of trial to suppress the rebellion before theproclamation was issued, the last one hundred days of which passed underan explicit notice that it was coming, unless averted by those in revoltreturning to their allegiance. The war has certainly progressed asfavorably for us since the issue of the proclamation as before. I know, as fully as one can know the opinion of others, that some of thecommanders of our armies in the field, who have given us our mostimportant victories, believe the emancipation policy and the use ofcolored troops constitute the heaviest blows yet dealt to the rebellion, and that at least one of those important successes could not have beenachieved, when it was, but for the aid of black soldiers. 

Among the commanders who hold these views are some who have never had anaffinity with what is called "abolitionism, " or with "Republican partypolitics, " but who hold them purely as military opinions. I submit theiropinions as entitled to some weight against the objections often urgedthat emancipation and arming the blacks are unwise as military measures, and were not adopted as such in good faith. 

You say that you will not fight to free negroes. Some of them seemwilling to fight for you; but no matter. Fight you, then, exclusively tosave the Union. I issued the proclamation on purpose to aid you insaving the Union. Whenever you shall have conquered all resistance tothe Union, if I shall urge you to continue fighting it will be an apttime then for you to declare you will not fight to free negroes. Ithought that, in your struggle for the Union, to whatever extent thenegroes should cease helping the enemy, to that extent it weakened theenemy in his resistance to you. Do you think differently?

I thought that whatever negroes can be got to do as soldiers, leavesjust so much less for white soldiers to do in saving the Union. Does itappear otherwise to you? But negroes, like other people, act uponmotives. Why should they do anything for us, if we will do nothing forthem? If they stake their lives for us, they must be prompted by thestrongest motive, even the promise of freedom. And the promise, beingmade, must be kept. 

The signs look better. The Father of Waters again goes unvexed to thesea. Thanks to the great Northwest for it; nor yet wholly to them. Threehundred miles up they met New England, Empire, Keystone, and Jersey, hewing their way right and left. The sunny South, too, in more colorsthan one, also lent a helping hand. On the spot their part of thehistory was jotted down in black and white. The job was a great nationalone, and let none be slighted who bore an honorable part in it. Andwhile those who have cleared the great river may well be proud, eventhat is not all. It is hard to say that anything has been more bravelyor well done than at Antietam, Murfreesboro', Gettysburg, and on manyfields of less note. Nor must Uncle Sam's web-feet be forgotten. At allthe watery margins they have been present, not only on the deep sea, thebroad bay, and the rapid river, but also up the narrow muddy bayou, andwherever the ground was a little damp, they have been and made theirtracks. Thanks to all. For the great Republic, --for the principle itlives by and keeps alive, --for man's vast future, --thanks to all. 

Peace does not appear so distant as it did. I hope it will come soon, and come to stay, and so come as to be worth the keeping in all futuretime. It will then have been proved that among free men there can be nosuccessful appeal from the ballot to the bullet, and that they who takesuch appeal are sure to lose their case and pay the cost. And there willbe some black men who can remember that with silent tongue, and clinchedteeth, and steady eye, and well-poised bayonet, they have helped mankindon to this great consummation; while I fear there will be some white menunable to forget that with malignant heart and deceitful speech theyhave striven to hinder it. 

Still, let us not be over-sanguine of a speedy final triumph. Let us bequite sober. Let us diligently apply the means, never doubting that ajust God, in his own good time, will give us the rightful result. 

Yours very truly, A. LINCOLN. 

This was a fair statement of past facts and of the present condition;and thus the plain tokens of the time showed that the menace ofdisaffection had been met and sufficiently conquered. The President hadlet the nation see the strength of his will and the immutability of hispurpose. He had faced bullying Republican politicians, a Democraticreaction, Copperheadism, and mob violence, and by none of these had hebeen in the least degree shaken or diverted from his course. On thecontrary, from so many and so various struggles he had come out thevictor, a real ruler of the country. He had shown that whenever and bywhomsoever, and in whatever part of the land he was pushed to use power, he would use it. Temporarily the great republic was under a "stronggovernment, " and Mr. Lincoln was the strength. Though somewhat cloakedby forms, there was for a while in the United States a condition of"one-man power, " and the people instinctively recognized it, though theywould on no account admit it in plain words. In fact every malcontentknew that there was no more use in attempting to resist the AmericanPresident than in attempting to resist a French emperor or a Russianczar; there was even less use, for while the President managed on oneplausible ground or another to have and to exercise all the power thathe needed, he was sustained by the good-will and confidence of amajority of the people, which lay as a solid substratum beneath all thedisturbance on the surface. It was well that this was so, for a warconducted by a cabinet or a congress could have ended only in disaster. This peculiar character of the situation may not be readily admitted; itis often convenient to deny and ignore facts in order to assert populartheories; and that there was a real _master_ in the United States is aproposition which many will consider it highly improper to make and verypatriotic to contradict. None the less, however, it is true, and by theautumn of 1863 every intelligent man in the country _felt_ that it wastrue. Moreover, it was because this was true, and because that masterwas immovably persistent in the purpose to conquer the South, that theconquest of the South could now be discerned as substantially acertainty in the future. 

Some other points should also be briefly made here. The war is to bedivided into two stages. The first two years were educational;subsequently the fruits of that education were attained. The men who hadstudied war as a profession, but had had no practical experience, foundmuch to learn in warfare as a reality after the struggle began. Butbefore the summer of 1863 there were in the service many generals, thanwhom none better could be desired. "Public men" were somewhat slow indiscovering that their capacity to do pretty much everything did notinclude the management of campaigns. But by the summer of 1863 these"public" persons made less noise in the land than they had made in thedays of McClellan; and though political considerations could never bewholly suppressed, the question of retaining or displacing a general nolonger divided parties, or superseded, and threatened to wreck, thevital question of the war. Moreover, as has been remarked in anotherconnection, the nation began to appreciate that while war was a scienceso far as the handling of armies in the field was concerned, it wasstrictly a business in its other aspects. By, and in fact before, thesummer of 1863 this business had been learned and was being efficientlyconducted. 

Time and experience had done no less for the President than for others. A careful daily student of the topography of disputed regions, of everyproposed military movement, of every manoeuvre, every failure, everysuccess, he was making himself a skillful judge in the questions of thecampaigns. He had also been studying military literature. Yet as hisknowledge and his judgment grew, his modesty and his abstention frominterference likewise grew. He was more and more chary of endeavoring tocontrol his generals. The days of such contention as had thwarted theplans of McClellan without causing other plans to be heartily and fullyadopted had fortunately passed, never to return. Of course, however, this was in part due to the fact that the war had now been going on longenough to enable Mr. Lincoln to know pretty well what measure ofconfidence he could place in the several generals. He had tried hisexperiments and was now using his conclusions. Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, Thomas, Hancock, and Meade were no longer undiscoveredgenerals; while Fremont, McClellan, Halleck--and perhaps two or threemore might be named--may be described in a counter-phrase as generalswho were now quite thoroughly discovered. The President and the countrywere about to get the advantage of this acquired knowledge. 

A consequence of these changed conditions, of the entrance upon this newstage of the war, becomes very visible in the life of Mr. Lincoln. Thedisputation, the hurly-burly, the tumultuous competition of men, opinions, and questions, which made the first eighteen months of hispresidency confusing and exciting as a great tempest on the sea, havegone by. For the future his occupation is rather to keep a broad, general supervision, to put his controlling touch for the moment nowhere, now there. He ceases to appear as an individual contestant; hispersonality, though not less important, is less conspicuous; hisinfluence is exerted less visibly, though not less powerfully. In short, the business-like aspect affects him and his functions as it does allelse that concerns the actual conduct of the war; he too feels, thoughhe may not formulate, the change whereby a crisis has passed into acondition. This will be seen from the character of the remainder of thisnarrative. There are no more controversies which call for other chapterslike those which told of the campaigns of McClellan. There are no morefierce intestine dissensions like those which preceded the Proclamationof Emancipation, --at least not until the matter of reconstruction comesup, and reconstruction properly had not to do with the war, but with thelater period. In a word, the country had become like the steed who hasceased fretfully to annoy the rider, while the rider, though exercisingan ever-watchful control, makes less apparent exertion. 

 * * * * *

By one of the odd arrangements of our governmental machine, it was notuntil December 7, 1863, that the members of the Thirty-eighth Congressmet for the first time to express those political sentiments which hadbeen in vogue more than a year before that time, that is to say duringthe months of October and November, 1862, when these gentlemen had beenelected, at the close of the summer's campaign. It has been said andshown that a very great change in popular feeling had taken place andmade considerable advance during this interval. The autumn of 1863 wasvery different from the autumn of 1862! A Congress coming more newlyfrom the people would have been much more Republican in its complexion. Still, even as it was, the Republicans had an ample working majority, and moreover were disturbed by fewer and less serious dissensions amongthemselves than had been the case occasionally in times past. McClellanand the Emancipation Proclamation had not quite yet been succeeded byany other questions of equal potency for alienating a large section ofthe party from the President. Not that unanimity prevailed by any means;that was impossible under the conditions of human nature. The extremistsstill distrusted Mr. Lincoln, and regarded him as an obstruction tosound policies. Senator Chandler of Michigan, a fine sample of theradical Republican, instructed him that, by the elections, Conservativesand traitors had been buried together, and begged him not to exhumethem, since they would "smell worse than Lazarus did after he had beenburied three days. " Apparently he ranked Seward among these defunct anddecaying Conservatives; certainly he regarded the secretary as a"millstone about the neck" of the President. [52] Still, in spite of suchdenunciations, times were not in this respect so bad as they had been, and the danger that the uncompromising Radicals would make wreck of thewar was no longer great. 

 * * * * *

Another event, occurring in this autumn of 1863, was noteworthy becausethrough it the literature of our tongue received one of its mostdistinguished acquisitions. On November 19 the national militarycemetery at Gettysburg was to be consecrated; Edward Everett was todeliver the oration, and the President was of course invited as a guest. Mr. Arnold says that it was actually while Mr. Lincoln was "in the carson his way from the White House to the battlefield" that he was toldthat he also would be expected to say something on the occasion; thatthereupon he jotted down in pencil the brief address which he delivereda few hours later. [53] But that the composition was quite soextemporaneous seems doubtful, for Messrs. Nicolay and Hay transcribethe note of invitation, written to the President on November 2 by themaster of the ceremonies, and in it occurs this sentence: "It is thedesire that, after the oration, you, as Chief Executive of the Nation, formally set apart these grounds to their sacred use, by a fewappropriate remarks. " Probably, therefore, some forethought went to thepreparation of this beautiful and famous "Gettysburg speech. " When Mr. Everett sat down, the President arose and spoke as follows:[54]--

"Fourscore and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on thiscontinent a new nation, conceived in liberty, and dedicated to theproposition that all men are created equal. Now we are engaged in agreat civil war, testing whether that nation, or any nation so conceivedand so dedicated, can long endure. We are met on a great battlefield ofthat war. We have come to dedicate a portion of that field as a finalresting-place for those who here gave their lives that that nation mightlive. It is altogether fitting and proper that we should do this. But ina larger sense we cannot dedicate, we cannot consecrate, we cannothallow, this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled herehave consecrated it far above our poor power to add or detract. Theworld will little note, nor long remember, what we say here, but it cannever forget what they did here. It is for us, the living, rather, to bededicated here to the unfinished work which they who fought here havethus far so nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated tothe great task remaining before us;--that from these honored dead, wetake increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last fullmeasure of devotion;--that we here highly resolve that these dead shallnot have died in vain, that this nation, under God, shall have a newbirth of freedom, and that government of the people, by the people, forthe people, shall not perish from the earth. "

FOOTNOTES:

[52] N. And H. Vii. 389. 

[53] Arnold, _Lincoln_, 328. This writer gives a very vivid descriptionof the delivery of the speech, derived in part from Governor Dennison, afterward the postmaster-general, who was present on the occasion. 

[54] Mr. Arnold says that in an unconscious and absorbed manner, Mr. Lincoln "adjusted his spectacles" and read his address. 

CHAPTER VIII

RECONSTRUCTION

In his inaugural address President Lincoln said: "The union of theseStates is perpetual. . . . No State, upon its own mere motion, can lawfullyget out of the Union; resolves and ordinances to that effect are legallyvoid. " In these words was imbedded a principle which later on he showedhis willingness to pursue to its logical conclusions concerning thereconstruction of the body politic. If no State, by seceding, had gotitself out of the Union, there was difficulty in maintaining that thosecitizens of a seceding State, who had not disqualified themselves byacts of treason, were not still lawfully entitled to conduct the publicbusiness and to hold the usual elections for national and stateofficials, so soon as the removal of hostile force should render itphysically possible for them to do so. Upon the basis of this principle, the resumption by such citizens of a right which had never been lost, but only temporarily interfered with by lawless violence, couldreasonably be delayed by the national government only until the loyalvoters should be sufficient in number to relieve the elections from theobjection of being colorable and unreal. This philosophy of"reconstruction" seemed to Mr. Lincoln to conform with law and goodsense, and he was forward in meeting, promoting, almost even in creatingopportunities to apply it. From the beginning of the war he had been ofopinion that the framework of a state government, though it might bescarcely more than a skeleton, was worth preservation. It held at leastthe seed of life. So after West Virginia was admitted into statehood, the organization which had been previously established by the loyalcitizens of the original State was maintained in the rest of the State, and Governor Pierpoint was recognized as the genuine governor ofVirginia, although few Virginians acknowledged allegiance to him, andoften there were not many square miles of the Old Dominion upon whichthe dispossessed ruler could safely set his foot. For the present hecertainly was no despot, but in the future he might have usefulness. Hepreserved continuity; by virtue of him, so to speak, there still was aState of Virginia. 

Somewhat early in the war large portions of Tennessee, Louisiana, andArkansas were recovered and kept by Union forces, and beneath suchprotection a considerable Union sentiment found expression. ThePresident, loath to hold for a long time the rescued parts of theseStates under the sole domination of army officers, appointed "militarygovernors. "[55] The anomalous office found an obscure basis among those"war powers" which, as a legal resting-place, resembled a quicksand, andas a practical foundation were undeniably a rock; the functions andauthority of the officials were as uncertain as anything, even in law, possibly could be. Legal fiction never reached a droller point than whenthese military governorships were defended as being the fulfillment bythe national government "of its high constitutional obligation toguarantee to every State in this Union _a republican form ofgovernment_!"[56] Yet the same distinguished gentleman, who daredgravely to announce this ingenious argument, drew a picture of factswhich was in itself a full justification of almost any scheme ofrehabilitation; he said: "The state government has disappeared. TheExecutive has abdicated; the Legislature has dissolved; the Judiciary isin abeyance. " In this condition of chaos Mr. Lincoln was certainly boundto prevent anarchy, without regard to any comicalities which might creepinto his technique. So these hermaphrodite officials, with civil dutiesand military rank, were very sensibly and properly given a vagueauthority in the several States, as from time to time these were in partredeemed from rebellion by the Union armies. So soon as possible theywere bidden, in collaboration with the military commanders in theirrespective districts, to make an enrollment of loyal citizens, with aview to holding elections and organizing state governments in thecustomary form. The President was earnest, not to say pertinacious, inurging forward these movements. On September 11, 1863, immediately afterthe battle of Chattanooga, he wrote to Andrew Johnson that it was "thenick of time for reinaugurating a loyal state government" in Tennessee;and he suggested that, as touching this same question of "time when, " itwas worth while to "remember that it cannot be known who is next tooccupy the position I now hold, nor what he will do. " He warned thegovernor that reconstruction must not be so conducted "as to givecontrol of the State, and its representation in Congress, to the enemiesof the Union. . . . It must not be so. You must have it otherwise. Let thereconstruction be the work of such men only as can be trusted for theUnion. Exclude all others; and trust that your government, so organized, will be recognized here as being the one of republican form to beguaranteed to the State. "[57]

At the same time these expressions by no means indicated that thePresident intended to have, or would connive at, any sham or colorableprocess. Accordingly, when some one suggested a plan for setting up ascandidates in Louisiana certain Federal officers, who were not citizensof that State, he decisively forbade it, sarcastically remarking toGovernor Shepley: "We do not particularly want members of Congress fromthere to enable us to get along with legislation here. What we do wantis the conclusive evidence that respectable citizens of Louisiana arewilling to be members of Congress, and to swear support to theConstitution, and that other respectable citizens there are willing tovote for them and send them. To send a parcel of Northern men here asrepresentatives, elected, as would be understood (and perhaps reallyso), at the point of the bayonet, would be disgraceful and outrageous. "Again he said that he wished the movement for the election of members ofCongress "to be a movement of the people of the district, and not amovement of our military and quasi-military authorities there. I merelywish our authorities to give the people a chance, --to protect themagainst secession interference. " These instructions were designed asgenuine rules of action, and were not to be construed away. Whatevermight be said against the theory which the President was endeavoring toestablish for state restoration, no opponent of that theory was to begiven the privilege of charging that the actual conduct of theproceedings under it was not rigidly honest. In December, 1862, twomembers of Congress were elected in Louisiana, and in February, 1863, they were admitted to take seats in the House for the brief remnant ofits existence. This was not done without hesitation, but the fact thatit was done at all certainly was in direct line with the President'splan. Subsequently, however, other candidates for seats, coming fromrehabilitated States, were not so fortunate. 

As reorganizations were attempted the promoters generally desired thatthe fresh start in state life should be made with new stateConstitutions. The conventions chosen to draw these instruments wereinstructed from Washington that the validity of the EmancipationProclamation and of all the legislation of Congress concerning slaverymust be distinctly admitted, if their work was to receive recognition. Apart from this, so strenuous were the hints conveyed to these bodiesthat they would do well to arrange for the speedy abolition of slavery, that no politician would have been so foolish as to offer aconstitution, or other form of reorganization, without some provision ofthis sort. This practical necessity sorely troubled many, who stillhoped that some happy turn of events would occur, whereby they would beable to get back into the Union with the pleasant and valuable group oftheir slaves still about them, as in the good times of yore. Moreover, in other matters there were clashings between the real militarycommanders and the quasi-military civilian officials; and it wasunfortunately the case that, in spite of Mr. Lincoln's appeal to loyalmen to "eschew cliquism" and "work together, " there were abundantrivalries and jealousies and personal schemings. All these vexationswere dragged before the President to harass him with their pettinessamid his more conspicuous duties; they gave him infinite trouble, anddevoured his time and strength. Likewise they were obstacles to theadvancement of the business itself, and, coming in addition to thedelays inevitable upon elections and deliberations, they ultimately keptall efforts towards reconstruction dallying along until a late period inthe war. Thus it was February 22, 1864, when the state election was heldin Louisiana; and it was September 5 in the same year when the newConstitution, with an emancipation clause, was adopted. It was not untilJanuary, 1865, that, in Tennessee, a convention made a constitution, forpurposes of reconstruction, and therein abolished slavery. 

Pending these doings and before practical reconstruction had madenoticeable progress, Mr. Lincoln sent in, on December 8, 1863, his thirdannual message to Congress. To this message was appended something whichno one had anticipated, --a proclamation of amnesty. In this thePresident recited his pardoning power and a recent act of Congressspecially confirmatory thereof, stated the wish of certain repentantrebels to resume allegiance and to restore loyal state governments, andthen offered, to all who would take a prescribed oath, full pardontogether with "restoration of all rights and property, except as toslaves, and . . . Where rights of third parties shall have intervened. "The oath was simply to "support, protect, and defend" the Constitutionand the Union, and to abide by and support all legislation and allproclamations concerning slavery made during the existing rebellion. There were, of course, sundry exceptions of persons from this amnesty;but the list of those excepted was a moderate and reasonable one. Healso proclaimed that whenever in any seceded State "a number of personsnot less than one tenth in number of the votes cast in such State at thepresidential election of the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundredand sixty, each having taken the oath aforesaid and not having sinceviolated it, and being a qualified voter by the election law of theState existing immediately before the so-called act of secession, andexcluding all others, shall reëstablish a state government which shallbe republican, and in no wise contravening said oath, such shall berecognized as the true government of the State, and the State shallreceive thereunder the benefits of the constitutional provision whichdeclares that 'the United States shall guarantee to every State in thisUnion a republican form of government, and shall protect each of themagainst invasion; and, on application of the legislature, or theexecutive (when the legislature cannot be convened), against domesticviolence. '"

Also further: "that any provision that may be adopted by such stategovernment, in relation to the freed people of such State, which shallrecognize and declare their permanent freedom, provide for theireducation, and which may yet be consistent, as a temporary arrangement, with their present condition as a laboring, landless, and homelessclass, will not be objected to by the national executive. And it issuggested as not improper that, in constructing a loyal state governmentin any State, the name of the State, the boundary, the subdivisions, theconstitution, and the general code of laws, as before the rebellion, bemaintained, subject only to the modifications made necessary by theconditions hereinbefore stated, and such others, if any, notcontravening said conditions, and which may be deemed expedient by thoseframing the new state government. "

Concerning this proclamation, the message which communicated it noted:that it did not transcend the Constitution; that no man was coerced totake the oath; and that to make pardon conditional upon taking it wasstrictly lawful; that a test of loyalty was necessary, because it wouldbe "simply absurd" to guarantee a republican form of government in aState "constructed in whole, or in preponderating part, from the veryelement against whose hostility and violence it is to be protected;"that the pledge to maintain the laws and proclamations as to slavery wasa proper condition, because these had aided and would further aid theUnion cause; also because "to now abandon them would be not only torelinquish a lever of power, but would also be a cruel and astoundingbreach of faith. "

He continued: "But why any proclamation, now, upon the subject? Thisquestion is beset with the conflicting views that the step might bedelayed too long or be taken too soon. In some States the elements forresumption seem ready for action, but remain inactive, apparently forwant of a rallying point, --a plan of action. Why shall A adopt the planof B rather than B that of A? And if A and B should agree, how can theyknow but that the general government here will reject their plan? By theproclamation a plan is presented which may be accepted by them as arallying point, and which they are assured in advance will not berejected here. This may bring them to act sooner than they otherwisewould. 

"The objection to a premature presentation of a plan by the nationalexecutive consists in the danger of committals on points which could bemore safely left to further developments. 

"Care has been taken to so shape the document as to avoid embarrassmentsfrom this source. Saying that, on certain terms, certain classes will bepardoned, with rights restored, it is not said that other classes orother terms will never be included. Saying that reconstruction will beaccepted if presented in a specified way, it is not said it will neverbe accepted in any other way. 

"The movements, by state action, for emancipation in several of theStates, not included in the emancipation proclamation, are matters ofprofound gratulation. And while I do not repeat in detail what I haveheretofore so earnestly urged upon this subject, my general views andfeelings remain unchanged; and I trust that Congress will omit no fairopportunity of aiding these important steps to a great consummation. 

"In the midst of other cares, however important, we must not lose sightof the fact that the war power is still our main reliance. To that poweralone we can look yet for a time, to give confidence to the people inthe contested regions, that the insurgent power will not again overrunthem. Until that confidence shall be established, little can be doneanywhere for what is called reconstruction. 

"Hence our chiefest care must be directed to the army and navy, who havethus far borne their harder part so nobly and well. And it may beesteemed fortunate that in giving the greatest efficiency to theseindispensable arms, we do also honorably recognize the gallant men, fromcommander to sentinel, who compose them, and to whom, more than toothers, the world must stand indebted for the home of freedomdisenthralled, regenerated, enlarged, and perpetuated. "

This step, this offer of amnesty and pardon, and invitation to statereconstruction, took every one by surprise. As usual the President hadbeen "doing his own thinking, " reaching his own conclusions and actingupon them with little counsel asked from any among the multitudes ofwise men who were so ready to furnish it. For a moment his actionreceived a gratifying welcome of praise and approval. The firstimpulsive sentiment was that of pleasure because the offer was in soliberal, so conciliatory, so forgiving a spirit; moreover, people wereencouraged by the very fact that the President thought it worth while toinitiate reconstruction; also many of the more weak-kneed, who desiredto see the luring process tried, were gratified by a generous measure. Then, too, not very much thought had yet been given, at least by thepeople in general, to actual processes of reconstruction; for while manydoubted whether there would ever be a chance to reconstruct at all, veryfew fancied the time for it to be nearly approaching. Therefore thePresident occupied vacant ground in the minds of most persons. 

But in a short time a very different temper was manifested among membersof Congress, and from them spread forth and found support among thepeople. Two reasons promoted this. One, which was avowed with thefrankness of indignation, was a jealousy of seeing so important abusiness preempted by the executive department. The other was a naturalfeeling of mingled hostility and distrust towards rebels, who had causedso much blood to be shed, so much cost to be incurred. In this point ofview, the liberality which at first had appeared admirable now began tobe condemned as extravagant, unreasonable, and perilous. 

Concerning the first of these reasons, it must be admitted that it wasentirely natural that Congress should desire to take partial or, ifpossible, even entire charge of reconstruction. Which department had thebetter right to the duty, or how it should be distributed between thelegislative and executive departments, was uncertain, and could bedetermined only by inference from the definite functions of each asestablished by the Constitution. The executive unquestionably had thepower to pardon every rebel in the land; yet it was a power which mightconceivably be so misused as to justify impeachment. The Senate and theHouse had the power to give or to refuse seats to persons claiming tohave been elected to them. Yet they could not dare to exercise thispower except for a cause which was at least colorable in each case. Furthermore, the meaning of "recognition" was vague. Exactly what was"recognition" of a state government, and by what specific process couldit be granted or withheld? The executive might recognize statehood insome matters; Congress might refuse to recognize it in other matters. Every one felt that disagreement between the two departments would bemost unfortunate and even dangerous; yet it was entirely possible; andwhat an absurd and alarming condition might be created, if thePresident, by a general amnesty, should reinstate the ex-rebels of aState as citizens with all their rights of citizenship, and Congressshould refuse to seat the senators and representatives elected by theseconstituents on the alleged ground of peril to the country by reason oftheir supposed continuing disloyalty. Even worse still might be thecase; for the Senate and the House might disagree. There was nothing inlaw or logic to make this consummation impossible. 

People differed much in feeling as well as opinion upon this difficultsubject, this problem which was solved by no law. Treason is a crime andmust be made odious, said Andrew Johnson, sternly uttering thesentiments of many earnest and strenuous men in Congress and in thecountry. Others were able to eliminate revengefulness, but felt that itwas not safe in the present, nor wise for the future, to restore torebels all the rights of citizenship upon the moment when they shouldconsent to abandon rebellion, more especially when all knew and admittedthat the abandonment was made not in penitence but merely in despair ofsuccess. It was open to extremists to argue that the whole seceded areamight logically, as conquered lands, be reduced to a territorialcondition, to be recarved into States at such times and upon suchconditions as should seem proper. But others, in agreement with thePresident, insisted that if no State could lawfully secede, it followedthat no State could lawfully be deprived of statehood. These personsreinforced their legal argument with the sentimental one that lenity wasthe best policy. As General Grant afterward put it: "The people who hadbeen in rebellion must necessarily come back into the Union, and beincorporated as an integral part of the nation. Naturally the nearerthey were placed to an equality with the people who had not rebelled, the more reconciled they would feel with their old antagonists, and thebetter citizens they would be from the beginning. They surely would notmake good citizens if they felt that they had a yoke around theirnecks. " The question, in what proportions mercy and justice should be, or safely could be, mingled, was clearly one of discretion. In the widedistance betwixt the holders of extreme opinions an infinite variety ofschemes and theories was in time broached and held. Very soon thegravity of the problem was greatly enhanced by its becoming complicatedwith proposals for giving the suffrage to negroes. Upon this Mr. Lincolnexpressed his opinion that the privilege might be wisely conferred upon"the very intelligent, and especially those who have fought gallantly inour ranks, " though apparently he intended thus to describe no very largepercentage. Apparently his confidence in the civic capacity of the negronever became very much greater than it had been in the days of the jointdebates with Douglas. 

Congress took up the matter very promptly, and with much display offeeling. Early in May, 1864, Henry Winter Davis, a vehement opponent ofthe President, introduced a bill, of which the anti-rebel preamble wastruculent to the point of being amusing. His first fierce _Whereas_declared that the Confederate States were waging a war so glaringlyunjust "that they have no right to claim the mitigation of the extremerights of war, which are accorded by modern usage to an enemy who has aright to consider the war a just one. " But Congress, though hotlyirritated, was not quite willing to say, in terms, that it would eschewcivilization and adopt barbarism, as its system for the conduct of thewar; and accordingly it rejected Mr. Davis's fierce exordium. The wordshad very probably only been used by him as a sort of safety valve togive vent to the fury of his wrath, so that he could afterward approachthe serious work of the bill in a milder spirit; for in fact the actualeffective legislation which he proposed was by no means unreasonable. After military resistance should be suppressed in any rebellious State, the white male citizens were to elect a convention for the purpose ofreëstablishing a state government. The new organization mustdisfranchise prominent civil and military officers of the Confederacy, establish the permanent abolition of slavery, and prohibit the paymentby the new State of any indebtedness incurred for Confederate purposes. After Congress should have expressed its assent to the work of theconvention, the President was to recognize by proclamation thereorganized State. This bill, of course, gave to the legislativedepartment the whole valuable control in the matter of recognition, leaving to the President nothing more than the mere empty function ofissuing a proclamation, which he would have no right to hold back; butin other respects its requirements were entirely fair andunobjectionable, from any point of view, and it finally passed the Houseby a vote of 74 to 59. The Senate amended it, but afterward receded fromthe amendment, and thus the measure came before Mr. Lincoln on July 4, 1864. Congress was to adjourn at noon on that day, and he was at theCapitol, signing bills, when this one was brought to him. He laid itaside. Zachariah Chandler, senator from Michigan, a dictatorialgentleman and somewhat of the busybody order, was watchfully standingby, and upon observing this action, he asked Mr. Lincoln, with some showof feeling, whether he was not going to sign that bill. Mr. Lincolnreplied that it was a "matter of too much importance to be swallowed inthat way. " Mr. Chandler warned him that a veto would be very damaging atthe Northwest, and said: "The important point is that one prohibitingslavery in the reconstructed States. " "This is the point, " said Mr. Lincoln, "on which I doubt the authority of Congress to act. " "It is nomore than you have done yourself, " said the senator. "I conceive, "replied Mr. Lincoln, "that I may in an emergency do things on militarygrounds which cannot be done constitutionally by Congress. " A fewmoments later he remarked to the members of the cabinet: "I do not seehow any of us now can deny and contradict what we have always said: thatCongress has no constitutional power over slavery in the States. . . . Thisbill and the position of these gentlemen seem to me, in asserting thatthe insurrectionary States are no longer in the Union, to make the fataladmission that States, whenever they please, may of their own motiondissolve their connection with the Union. Now we cannot survive thatadmission, I am convinced. If that be true, I am not President; thesegentlemen are not Congress. I have laboriously endeavored to avoid thatquestion ever since it first began to be mooted. . . . It was to obviatethis question that I earnestly favored the movement for an amendment tothe Constitution abolishing slavery. . . . I thought it much better, if itwere possible, to restore the Union without the necessity for a violentquarrel among its friends as to whether certain States have been in orout of the Union during the war, --a merely metaphysical question, andone unnecessary to be forced into discussion. "[58] So the bill remaineduntouched at his side. 

A few days after the adjournment, having then decided not to sign thebill, he issued a proclamation in which he said concerning it, that hewas "unprepared by a formal approval of [it] to be inflexibly committedto any single plan of restoration;" that he was also "unprepared todeclare that the free-state constitutions and governments, alreadyadopted and installed in Arkansas and Louisiana, [should] be set asideand held for naught, thereby repelling and discouraging the loyalcitizens, who have set up the same, as to further effort;" also that hewas unprepared to "declare a constitutional competency in Congress toabolish slavery in the States. " Yet he also said that he was fullysatisfied that the system proposed in the bill was "_one_ very properplan" for the loyal people of any State to adopt, and that he should beready to aid in such adoption upon any opportunity. In a word, hisobjection to the bill lay chiefly in the fact that it established onesingle and exclusive process for reconstruction. The rigid exclusivenessseemed to him a serious error. Upon his part, in putting forth his ownplan, he had taken much pains distinctly to keep out thischaracteristic, and to have it clearly understood that his propositionwas not designed as "a procrustean bed, to which exact conformity was tobe indispensable;" it was not _the only_ method, but only _a_ method. 

So soon as it was known that the President would not sign the bill, avehement cry of wrath broke from all its more ardent friends. H. W. Davisand B. F. Wade, combative men, and leaders in their party, who expectedtheir opinion to be respected, published in the New York "Tribune" anaddress "To the Supporters of the Government. " In unbridled languagethey charged "encroachments of the executive on the authority ofCongress. " They even impugned the honesty of the President's purpose inwords of direct personal insult; for they said: "The President, bypreventing this bill from becoming a law, holds the electoral votes ofthe rebel States at the dictation of his personal ambition. . . . Ifelectors for president be allowed to be chosen in either of those States[Louisiana or Arkansas], a sinister light will be cast on [his]motives. " They alleged that "a more studied outrage on the legislativeauthority of the people has never been perpetrated. " They stigmatizedthis "rash and fatal act" as "a blow at the friends of theadministration, at the rights of humanity, and at the principles ofrepublican government. " They warned Mr. Lincoln that, if he wished thesupport of Congress, he must "confine himself to his executiveduties, --to obey and execute, not make the laws; to suppress by armsarmed rebellion, and leave political reorganization to Congress. " Ifthey really meant what they said, or any considerable part of it, theywould have been obliged to vote "Guilty" had the House ofRepresentatives seen fit to put these newspaper charges of theirs intothe formal shape of articles of impeachment against the President. 

To whatever "friends" Mr. Lincoln might have dealt a "blow, " it iscertain that these angry gentlemen, whether "friends" or otherwise, weredealing him a very severe blow at a very critical time; and if itshurtfulness was diminished by the very fury and extravagance of theirinvective, they at least were entitled to no credit for the salvationthus obtained. They were exerting all their powerful influence toincrease the chance, already alarmingly great, of making a Democrat thenext President of the United States. Nevertheless Mr. Lincoln, with hiswonted imperturbable fixedness when he had reached a conviction, did notmodify his position in the slightest degree. 

Before long this especial explosion spent its force, and thereafter veryfortunately the question smouldered during the rest of Mr. Lincoln'slifetime, and only burst forth into fierce flame immediately after hisdeath, when it became more practical and urgent as a problem of theactually present time. The last words, however, which he spoke inpublic, dealt with the matter. It was on the evening of April 11, and hewas addressing in Washington a great concourse of citizens who hadgathered to congratulate him upon the brilliant military successes, thenjust achieved, which insured the immediate downfall of the Confederacy. In language as noteworthy for moderation as that of his assailants hadbeen for extravagance, he then reviewed his course concerningreconstruction and gave his reasons for still believing that he hadacted for the best. Admitting that much might justly be said against thereorganized government of Louisiana, he explained why he thought thatnevertheless it should not be rejected. Concede, he said, that it is towhat it should be only what the egg is to the fowl, "we shall soonerhave the fowl by hatching the egg than by smashing it. " He conceivedthat the purpose of the people might be fairly stated to be therestoration of the proper practical relations between the secededStates and the Union, and he therefore argued that the question properlytook this shape: Whether Louisiana could "be brought into properpractical relation with the Union _sooner_ by _sustaining_ or by_discarding_ her new state government. "[59]

By occurrences befalling almost immediately after Mr. Lincoln's deathhis opinions were again drawn into debate, when unfortunately he couldneither explain nor develop them further than he had done. One of theimportant events of the war was the conference held on March 28, 1865, at Hampton Roads, between the President, General Grant, General Sherman, and Admiral Porter, and at which no other person was present. It issufficiently agreed that the two generals then declared that one greatfinal battle must yet take place; and that thereupon Mr. Lincoln, inview of the admitted fact that the collapse of the rebellion wasinevitably close at hand, expressed great aversion and pain at theprospect of utterly useless bloodshed, and asked whether it could not bysome means be avoided. It is also tolerably certain that Mr. Lincolngave very plainly to be understood by his remarks, and also as usual bya story, his desire that Jefferson Davis and a few other of the leadingrebels should not be captured, but rather should find it possible toescape from the country. It is in other ways well known that he hadalready made up his mind not to conclude the war with a series ofhangings after the historic European fashion of dealing with traitors. He preferred, however, to evade rather than to encounter the problem ofdisposing of such embarrassing captives, and a road for them out of thecountry would be also a road for him out of a difficulty. What else wassaid on this occasion, though it soon became the basis of importantaction, is not known with accuracy; but it may be regarded as beyond adoubt that, in a general way, Mr. Lincoln took a very liberal toneconcerning the terms and treatment to be accorded to the rebels in thefinal arrangement of the surrendering, which all saw to be close athand. It is beyond doubt that he spoke, throughout the conference, inthe spirit of forgetting and forgiving immediately and almost entirely. 

From this interview General Sherman went back to his army, and receivedno further instructions afterward, until, on April 18, he establishedwith General Johnston the terms on which the remaining Confederateforces should be disbanded. This "Memorandum or basis of agreement, "[60]then entered into by him, stipulated for "the recognition by theexecutive of the United States, of the several state governments, ontheir officers and legislatures taking the oaths prescribed by theConstitution of the United States;" also that the inhabitants of theSouthern States should "be guaranteed, so far as the executive can, their political rights and franchises, as well as their rights of personand property;" also that the government would not "disturb any of thepeople by reason of the late war, " if they should dwell quiet for thefuture; and, in short, that there should be "a general amnesty, " so faras it was within the power of the executive of the United States togrant it, upon the return of the South to a condition of peace. 

No sooner were these engagements reported in Washington than they wererepudiated. However they might have accorded with, or might havetranscended, the sentiments of him who had been president only a fewdays before, they by no means accorded with the views of Andrew Johnson, who was president at that time, and still less with the views of thesecretary of war, who well represented the vengeful element of thecountry. Accordingly Mr. Stanton at once annulled them by an order, which he followed up by a bulletin containing ten reasons in support ofthe order. This document was immediately published in the newspapers, and was so vituperative and insulting towards Sherman[61] that thegeneral, who naturally did not feel himself a fitting object forinsolence at this season of his fresh military triumphs, soon afterwardshowed his resentment; at the grand parade of his army, in Washington, he conspicuously declined, in the presence of the President and thenotabilities of the land, to shake the hand which Secretary Stanton didnot hesitate then and there to extend to him, --for Stanton had thatpeculiar and unusual form of meanness which endeavors to force acivility after an insult. But however General Sherman might feel aboutit, his capitulation had been revoked, and another conference becamenecessary between the two generals, which was followed a little later bystill another between Generals Schofield and Johnston. At these meetingsthe terms which had been established between Generals Grant and Lee weresubstantially repeated, and by this "military convention" the war cameto a formal end on April 26, 1865. 

By this course of events General Sherman was, of course, placed in avery uncomfortable position, and he defended himself by alleging thatthe terms which he had made were in accurate conformity with theopinions, wishes, and programme expressed by Mr. Lincoln on March 28. Hereiterates this assertion strongly and distinctly in his "Memoirs, " andquotes in emphatic corroboration Admiral Porter's account of thatinterview. [62] The only other witness who could be heard on this pointwas General Grant; he never gave his recollection of the expressions ofPresident Lincoln concerning the matters in dispute; but on April 21 hedid write to General Sherman that, after having carefully read the termsaccorded to Johnston he felt satisfied that they "could not possibly beapproved. "[63] He did not, however, say whether or not they seemed tohim to contravene the policy of the President, as he had heard orunderstood that policy to be laid down in the famous interview. In theobscurity which wraps this matter, individual opinions find ample roomto wander; it is easy to believe that what General Sherman undertook toarrange was in reasonable accordance with the broad purposes of thePresident; but it certainly is not easy to believe that the Presidentever intended that so many, so momentous, and such complex affairsshould be conclusively disposed of, with all the honorable sacrednessattendant upon military capitulations, by a few hasty strokes of GeneralSherman's pen. The comprehensiveness of this brief and sudden documentof surrender was appalling! Mr. Lincoln had never before shown anyinclination to depute to others so much of his own discretionaryauthority; his habit was quite the other way. 

It is not worth while to discuss much the merits or demerits ofPresident Lincoln's schemes for reconstruction. They had been onlyroughly and imperfectly blocked out at the time of his death; and inpresenting them he repeatedly stated that he did not desire to rule outother schemes which might be suggested; on the contrary, he distinctlystated his approval of the scheme developed in the bill introduced bySenator Davis and passed by Congress. Reconstruction, as it was actuallyconducted later on, was wretchedly bungled, and was marked chiefly bybitterness in disputation and by clumsiness in practical arrangements, which culminated in that miserable disgrace known as the regime of the"carpet-baggers. " How far Lincoln would have succeeded in saving thecountry from these humiliating processes, no one can say; but that hewould have strenuously disapproved much that was done is not open toreasonable doubt. On the other hand, it is by no means certain that histheories, at least so far as they had been developed up to the time ofhis death, either could have been, or ought to have been carried out. This seems to be generally agreed. Perhaps they were too liberal;perhaps he confided too much in a sudden change of heart, an immediategrowth of loyalty, among persons of whom nearly all were stillembittered, still believed that it was in a righteous cause that theyhad suffered a cruel defeat. 

But if the feasibility of Mr. Lincoln's plan is matter of fruitlessdisputation, having to do only with fancied probabilities, and havingnever been put to the proof of trial, at least no one will deny that itwas creditable to his nature. A strange freak of destiny arranged thatone of the most obstinate, sanguinary wars of history should beconducted by one of the most humane men who ever lived, and that bloodshould run in rivers at the order of a ruler to whom bloodshed wasrepugnant, and to whom the European idol of military glory seemed asymbol of barbarism. During the war Lincoln's chief purpose was therestoration of national unity, and his day-dream was that it should beachieved as a sincere and hearty reunion in feeling as well as in fact. As he dwelt with much earnest aspiration upon this consummation, heperhaps came to imagine a possibility of its instant accomplishment, which did not really exist. His longing for a genuinely reunited countrywas not a pious form of expression, but an intense sentiment, and an endwhich he definitely expected to bring to pass. Not improbably this frameof mind induced him to advance too fast and too far, in order to meetwith welcoming hand persons who were by no means in such a condition offeeling that they could grasp that hand in good faith, or could fulfillat once the obligations which such a reconciliation would have imposedupon them, as matter of honor, in all their civil and politicalrelations. The reaction involved in passing from a state of hostilitiesto a state of peace, the deep gratification of seeing so mortal astruggle determined in favor of the national life, may have carried himsomewhat beyond the limitations set by the hard facts of the case, andby the human nature alike of the excited conquerors and the impenitentconquered. On the other hand, however, it is dangerous to say that Mr. Lincoln made a mistake in reading the popular feeling or in determininga broad policy. If he did, he did so for the first time. Among thosesuppositions in which posterity is free to indulge, it is possible tofancy that if he, whom all now admit to have been the best friend of theSouth living in April, 1865, had continued to live longer, he might havealleviated, if he could not altogether have prevented, the writing ofsome very painful chapters in the history of the United States. 

NOTE. --In writing this chapter, I have run somewhat ahead of thenarrative in point of time; but I hope that the desirability of treatingthe topic connectedly, as a whole, will be obvious to the reader. 

FOOTNOTES:

[55] These appointments were as follows: Andrew Johnson, Tennessee, February 23, 1862; Edward Stanley, North Carolina, May 19, 1862; Col. G. F. Shepley, Louisiana, June 10, 1862. 

[56] So said Andrew Johnson, military governor of Tennessee, March 18, 1862. 

[57] In a contest in which emancipation was indirectly at stake, inMaryland, he expressed his wish that "all loyal qualified voters" shouldhave the privilege of voting. 

[58] N. And H. Ix. 120-122, quoting from the diary of Mr. John Hay. 

[59] He had used similar language in a letter to General Canby, December12, 1864; N. And H. Ix. 448; also in his letter to Trumbull concerningthe Louisiana senators, January 9, 1865; _ibid. _ 454. Colonel McClure, on the strength of conversations with Lincoln, says that his singlepurpose was "the speedy and cordial restoration of the disseveredStates. He cherished no resentment against the South, and every theoryof reconstruction that he ever conceived or presented was eminentlypeaceful and looking solely to reattaching the estranged people to thegovernment. " _Lincoln and Men of War-Times_, 223. 

[60] Sherman, _Memoirs_, ii. 356. 

[61] Grant stigmatizes this as "cruel and harsh treatment . . . Unnecessarily . . . Inflicted, " _Mem. _ ii. 534, and as "infamous, " Badeau, _Milit. Hist. Of Grant_, iii. 636 n. 

[62] Sherman, _Memoirs_, ii. 328. The admiral says that, if Lincoln hadlived, he "would have shouldered all the responsibility" for Sherman'saction, and Secretary Stanton would have "issued no false telegraphicdispatches. " See also Senator Sherman's corroborative statement;McClure, _Lincoln and Men of War-Times_, 219 n. 

[63] Sherman, _Memoirs_, ii. 360. 

CHAPTER IX

RENOMINATION

In a period of fervid political feeling it was natural that thoseRepublicans who were dissatisfied with President Lincoln should begin, long before the close of his term of office, to seek consolation byarrangements for replacing him by a successor more to their taste. Expressions of this purpose became definite in the autumn of 1863. Mr. Arnold says that the coming presidential election was expected to bringgrave danger, if not even anarchy and revolution. [64] Amid existingcircumstances, an opposition confined to the legitimate antagonism ofthe Democracy would, of course, have brought something more than thecustomary strain inherent in ordinary times in government by party; andit was unfortunate that, besides this, an undue gravity was importedinto the crisis by the intestinal dissensions of the Republicansthemselves. It seemed by no means impossible that these disagreementsmight give to the friends of peace by compromise a victory which theyreally ought not to have. Republican hostility to Mr. Lincoln wasunquestionably very bitter in quality, whatever it might be in quantity. It was based in part upon the discontent of the radicals and extremists, in part upon personal irritation. In looking back upon those times thereis now a natural tendency to measure this opposition by the weaknesswhich it ultimately displayed when, later on, it was swept out of sightby the overwhelming current of the popular will. But this weakness wasby no means so visible in the winter of 1863-64. On the contrary, thecry for a change then seemed to come from every quarter, and to comeloudly; for it was echoed back and forth by the propagandists andpoliticians, and as these persons naturally did most of the talking andwriting in the country, so they made a show delusively out of proportionto their following among the people. 

The dislike toward the President flourished chiefly in two places, andwith two distinct bodies of men. One of these places was Missouri, whichwill be spoken of later on. The other was Washington, where the class of"public men" was for the most part very ill-disposed towards him. [65]Mr. Julian, himself a prominent malcontent, bears his valuable testimonyto the extent of the disaffection, saying that, of the "more earnest andthorough-going Republicans in both Houses of Congress, probably not onein ten really favored"[66] the renomination of Mr. Lincoln. In fact, there were few of them whom the President had not offended. They hadbrought to him their schemes and their policies, had made theirarguments and demands, and after all had found the President keeping hiscounsel to himself and acting according to his own judgment. This seemedexasperatingly unjustifiable in a country where anybody might happen tobe president without being a whit abler than any other one who had nothappened to fall into the office. In a word, the politicians had, andhated, a master. Mr. Chase betrayed this when he complained that therewas no "administration, in the true sense of the word;" by which heunderstood, "a president conferring with his cabinet and _taking theirunited judgments_. " The existence of that strange moat which seems toisolate the capital and the political coteries therein gathered, and toshut out all knowledge of the feelings of the constituent people, isnotorious, and certainly was never made more conspicuous than in thisbusiness of selecting the Republican candidate for the campaign of 1864. When Congress came together the political scheming received a strongimpetus. Everybody seemed to be opposed to Mr. Lincoln. ThaddeusStevens, the impetuous leader of the House of Representatives, declaredthat, in that body, Arnold of Illinois was the only member who was apolitical friend of the President; and the story goes that the Presidenthimself sadly admitted the fact. Visitors at Washington, who got theirimpressions from the talk there, concluded that Mr. Lincoln's chance ofa second term was small. 

This opposition, which had the capital for its headquarters and thepoliticians for its constituents, found a candidate ready for use. Secretary Chase was a victim to the dread disease of presidentialambition. With the usual conventional expressions of modesty he admittedthe fact. Thereupon general talk soon developed into politicalorganization; and in January, 1864, a "Committee of prominent Senators, Representatives, and Citizens, " having formally obtained his approval, set about promoting his interests in business-like fashion. 

The President soon knew what was going forward; but he gave no sign ofdisquietude; on the contrary, he only remarked that he hoped the countrywould never have a worse president than Mr. Chase would be. Not that hewas indifferent to renomination and reëlection. That would have beenagainst nature. His mind, his soul, all that there was of force andfeeling in him had been expended to the uttermost in the cause and thewar which were still pending. At the end of that desperate road, alongwhich he had dared stubbornly and against so much advice to lead thenation, he seemed now to discern the goal. That he should be permittedto guide to the end in that journey, and that his judgment andleadership should receive the crown of success and approval, was areward, almost a right, which he must intensely desire and which hecould not lose without a disappointment that outruns expression. Yet hewas so self-contained that, if he had cared not at all about the issue, his conduct would have been much the same that it was. 

[Illustration: Isaac N. Arnold]

Besides his temperament, other causes promoted this tranquillity. WhatMr. Lincoln would have been had his career fallen in ordinary times, amid commonplace political business, it is difficult to say. The worldnever saw him as the advocate or assailant of a tariff, or other suchaffair. From the beginning he had bound himself fast to a great moralpurpose, which later became united with the preservation of the nationallife. Having thus deliberately exercised his judgment in a question ofthis kind, he seemed ever after content to have intrusted his fortunesto the movement, and always to be free from any misgiving as to itshappy conclusion. Besides this, it is probable that he accuratelymeasured the narrow limits of Mr. Chase's strength. No man ever moreshrewdly read the popular mind. A subtle line of communication seemed torun between himself and the people. Nor did he know less well thepoliticians. His less sagacious friends noted with surprise and anxietythat he let the work of opposition go on unchecked. In due time, however, the accuracy of his foresight was vindicated; for when thesecretary's friends achieved a sufficient impetus they tumbled over, inmanner following:--

Mr. Pomeroy, senator from Kansas, was vindictive because the Presidenthad refused to take his side in certain quarrels between himself and hiscolleague. Accordingly, early in 1864, he issued a circular, statingthat the efforts making for Mr. Lincoln's nomination required counteraction on the part of those unconditional friends of the Union whodisapproved the policy of the administration. He said that Mr. Lincoln'sreëlection was "practically impossible;" that it was also undesirable, on account of the President's "manifest tendency towards compromises andtemporary expedients of policy, " and for other reasons. Therefore, hesaid, Mr. Chase's friends had established "connections in all theStates, " and now invited "the hearty coöperation of all those in favorof the speedy restoration of the Union upon the basis of universalfreedom. " The document, designed to be secret, of course was quicklyprinted in the newspapers. [67] This was awkward; and Mr. Chase at oncewrote to the President a letter, certainly entirely fair, in which heexpressed his willingness to resign. Mr. Lincoln replied kindly. He saidthat he had heard of the Pomeroy circular, but had not read it, and didnot expect to do so. In fact, he said, "I have known just as little ofthese things as my friends have allowed me to know. " As to the proposedresignation, that, he said, "is a question which I will not allow myselfto consider from any standpoint other than my judgment of the publicservice, and in that view I do not perceive occasion for a change. "There was throughout a quiet undertone of indifference to the wholebusiness, which was significant enough to have puzzled the secretary, had he noticed it; for it was absolutely impossible that Mr. Lincolnshould be really indifferent to dangerous competition. The truth wasthat the facts of the situation lay with the President, and that theenterprise, which was supposed by its friends to be only in its earlystage, was really on the verge of final disposition. Mr. Chase had saiddecisively that he would not be a candidate unless his own State, Ohio, should prefer him. To enlighten him on this point the Republican membersof the Ohio legislature, being in much closer touch with the people thanwere the more dignified statesmen at Washington, met on February 25, andin the name of the people and the soldiers of their State renominatedMr. Lincoln. The nail was driven a stroke deeper into the coffin byRhode Island. Although Governor Sprague was Mr. Chase's son-in-law, thelegislature of that State also made haste to declare for Mr. Lincoln. Sothe movement in behalf of Mr. Chase came suddenly and utterly to an end. Early in May he wrote that he wished no further consideration to begiven to his name; and his wish was respected. After this collapse Mr. Lincoln's renomination was much less opposed by the politicians ofWashington. Being naturally a facile class, and not so narrowly weddedto their own convictions as to be unable to subordinate them to thepopular will or wisdom, they now for the most part gave theirsuperficial and uncordial adhesion to the President. They liked him nobetter than before, but they respected a sagacity superior to their own, bowed before a capacity which could control success, and, in presence ofthe admitted fact of his overwhelming popularity, they played the partwhich became wise men of their calling. 

However sincerely Mr. Chase might resolve to behave with magnanimitybeneath his disappointment, the disappointment must rankle all the same. It was certainly the case that, while he professed friendship towardsMr. Lincoln personally, he was honestly unable to appreciate him as apresident. Mr. Chase's ideal of a statesman had outlines of imposingdignity which Mr. Lincoln's simple demeanor did not fill out. It was nowinevitable that the relationship between the two men should soon besevered. The first strain came because Mr. Lincoln would not avenge anunjustifiable assault made by General Blair upon the secretary. Then Mr. Chase grumbled at the free spending of the funds which he had succeededin providing with so much skill and labor. "It seems as if there were nolimit to expense. . . . The spigot in Uncle Abe's barrel is made twice asbig as the bung-hole, " he complained. Then ensued sundry irritationsconcerning appointments in the custom-houses, one of which led to anoffer of resignation by the secretary. On each occasion, however, thePresident placated him by allowing him to have his own way. Finally, inMay and June, 1864, occurred the famous imbroglio concerning the choiceof a successor to Mr. Cisco, the assistant treasurer at New York. ThoughMr. Chase again managed to prevail, yet he was made so angry by thecircumstances of the case, that he again sent in his resignation, whichthis time was accepted. For, as Mr. Lincoln said: "You and I havereached a point of mutual embarrassment in our official relation, whichit seems cannot be overcome or longer sustained consistently with thepublic service. " This occurrence, taking place on June 29-30, at thebeginning of the difficult political campaign of that anxious summer, alienated from the President's cause some friends in a crisis when allthe friends whom he could muster seemed hardly sufficient. 

The place of Mr. Chase was not easy to fill. Mr. Lincoln first nominatedDavid Tod of Ohio. This was very ill received; but fortunately thedifficulty which might have been caused by it was escaped, becauseGovernor Tod promptly declined. The President then named William PittFessenden, senator from Maine, and actually forced the office upon himagainst that gentleman's sincere wish to escape the honor. A betterchoice could not have been made. Mr. Fessenden was chairman of theCommittee on Finance, and had filled the position with conspicuousability; every one esteemed him highly; the Senate instantly confirmedhim, and during his incumbency in office he fully justified theseflattering opinions. 

There were other opponents of the President who were not so easilydiverted from their purpose as the politicians had been. In Missouri anold feud was based upon his displacement of Fremont; the State had eversince been rent by fierce factional quarrels, and amid them thisgrievance had never been forgotten or forgiven. Emancipation by stateaction had been chief among the causes which had divided the Unioncitizens into Conservatives and Radicals. Their quarrel was bitter, andin vain did Mr. Lincoln repeatedly endeavor to reconcile them. TheRadicals claimed his countenance as a matter of right, and Mr. Lincolnoften privately admitted that between him and them there was closecoincidence of feeling. Yet he found their specific demandsinadmissible; especially he could not consent to please them by removingGeneral Schofield. So they, being extremists, and therefore of the typeof men who will have every one against them who is not for them, turnedvindictively against him. They found sympathizers elsewhere in thecountry, sporadic instances of disaffection rather than indications ofan epidemic; but in their frame of mind they easily gained faith in theexistence of a popular feeling which was, in fact, the phantasm oftheir own heated fancy. As spring drew on they cast out lines ofaffiliation. Their purpose was not only negatively against Lincoln, butpositively for Fremont. Therefore they made connection with the CentralFremont Club, a small organization in New York, and issued a call for amass convention at Cleveland on May 31. They expressed their disgust forthe "imbecile and vacillating policy" of Mr. Lincoln, and desired the"immediate extinction of slavery . . . By congressional action, "contemning the fact that Congress had no power under the Constitution toextinguish slavery. Their call was reinforced by two or three others, ofwhich one came from a "People's Committee" of St. Louis, representingGermans under the lead of B. Gratz Brown. 

The movement also had the hearty approval of Wendell Phillips, who wasvery bitter and sweeping in his denunciations of an administration whichhe regarded "as a civil and military failure. " Lincoln's reëlection, hesaid, "I shall consider the end of the Union in my day, or itsreconstruction on terms worse than disunion. " But Mr. Phillips'sfriendship ought to have been regarded by the Fremonters as ominous, forit was his custom always to act with a very small minority. Moreover hehad long since ceased to give voice to the intelligence of his party oreven fairly to represent it. How far it had ever been proper to call theAbolitionists a party may be doubted; before the war they had beencompressed into some solidity by encompassing hostility; but they wouldnot have been Abolitionists at all had they not been men of exceptionalindependence both in temper and in intellect. They had often dared todiffer from each other as well as from the mass of their fellowcitizens, and they had never submitted to the domination of leaders inthe ordinary political fashion. The career of Mr. Lincoln had of coursebeen watched by them keenly, very critically, and with intense andvarious feeling. At times they had hopefully applauded him, and at timesthey had vehemently condemned what had seemed to them his halting, half-hearted, or timid action. As the individual members of the partyhad often changed their own minds about him, so also they had sometimesand freely disagreed with each other concerning his character, hisintentions, his policies. In the winter and spring of 1864, however, itseemed that, by slow degrees, observation, their own good sense, and thedevelopment of events had at last won the great majority of the party torepose a considerable measure of confidence in him, both in respect ofhis capacity and of his real anti-slavery purposes. Accordingly in thepresent discussions such men as Owen Lovejoy, [68] William LloydGarrison, and Oliver Johnson came out fairly for him, --not, indeed, because he was altogether satisfactory to them, but because he was ingreat part so; also because they easily saw that as matter of fact hispersonal triumph would probably lead to abolition, that he was the onlycandidate by whom the Democracy could be beaten, and that if theDemocracy should not be beaten, abolition would be postponed beyondhuman vision. Lovejoy said that, to his personal knowledge, thePresident had "been just as radical as any of his cabinet, " and in viewof what the Abolitionists thought of Chase, this was a strongindorsement. The old-time charge of being impractical could not properlybe renewed against these men, now that they saw that events which theycould help to bring about were likely to bring their purpose to thepoint of real achievement in a near future. In this condition of thingsthey were found entirely willing to recognize and accept the bestpractical means, and their belief was clear that the best practicalmeans lay in the renomination and reëlection of Abraham Lincoln. Theiradhesion brought to him a very useful assistance, and beyond this italso gave him the gratification of knowing that he had at last won theapproval of men whose friendly sympathy he had always inwardly desired. Sustained by the best men in the party, he could afford to disregard thesmall body of irreconcilable and quarrelsome fault-finders, who wentover to Fremont, factious men, who were perhaps unconsciously controlledmore by mere contradictoriness of temperament than by the higher motiveswhich they proclaimed. 

At Cleveland on the appointed day the "mass convention" assembled, onlythe mass was wanting. It nominated Fremont for the presidency andGeneral John Cochrane for the vice-presidency; and thus again theConstitution was ignored by these malcontents; for both these gentlemenwere citizens of New York, and therefore the important delegation fromthat State could lawfully vote for only one of them. Really the bestresult which the convention achieved was that it called forth a bit ofwit from the President. Some one remarked to him that, instead of theexpected thousands, only about four hundred persons had assembled. Heturned to the Bible which, say Nicolay and Hay, "commonly lay on hisdesk, "[69] and read the verse: "And every one that was in distress, andevery one that was in debt, and every one that was discontented, gathered themselves unto him; and he became a captain over them: andthere were with him about four hundred men. "[70]

The Fremonters struck no responsive chord among the people. Thenomination was received by every one with the same tranquilindifference, tinged with ridicule, which the President had shown. Invain did Fremont seek to give to his candidacy a serious and dignifiedcharacter. Very few persons cared anything about it, except theDemocrats, and their clamorous approval was as unwelcome as it wassignificant. Under this humiliation the unfortunate candidate at lastdecided to withdraw, and so notified his committee about the middle ofSeptember. He still stood by his principles, however, and asserted thatMr. Lincoln's administration had been "politically, militarily, andfinancially a failure;" that the President had paralyzed the generousunanimity of the North; and that, by declaring that "slavery should beprotected, " he had "built up for the South a strength which otherwisethey could have never attained. " The nation received the statementplacidly and without alarm. 

A feeble movement in New York to nominate General Grant deservesmention, chiefly for the purpose of also mentioning the generous mannerin which the general decisively brushed it aside. Mr. Lincoln quietlysaid that if Grant would take Richmond he might also have thepresidency. But it was, of course, plain to every one that for thepresent it would be ridiculous folly to take Grant out of his tent inorder to put him into the White House. 

During this same troubled period a few of the Republican malcontentswent so far as to fancy that they could put upon Mr. Lincoln a pressurewhich would induce him to withdraw from the ticket. They never learnedthe extreme absurdity of their design, for they never got enoughencouragement to induce them to push it beyond the stage of preliminarydiscussion. 

All these movements had some support from newspapers in different partsof the country. Many editors had the like grievance against Mr. Lincolnwhich so many politicians had. For they had told him what to do, and toooften he had not done it. Horace Greeley, it is needless to say, wasconspicuous in his unlimited condemnation of the President. 

The first indications of the revolt of the politicians and the radicalsagainst Mr. Lincoln were signals for instant counteracting activityamong the various bodies which more closely felt the popular impulse. State conventions, caucuses, of all sizes and kinds, and gatherings ofthe Republican members of state legislatures, overstepped their regularfunctions to declare for the renomination of Mr. Lincoln. Clubs andsocieties did the same. Simon Cameron, transmitting to the President acircular of this purport, signed by every Unionist member of thePennsylvania legislature, said: "Providence has decreed yourreëlection;" and if it is true that the _vox populi_ is also the _voxDei_, this statement of the political affiliations of Providence wasentirely correct. Undoubtedly the number of the President's adherentswas swelled by some persons who would have been among the disaffectedhad they not been influenced by the reflection that a change ofadministration in the present condition of things must be disastrous. This feeling was expressed in many metaphors, but in none other sofamous as that uttered by Mr. Lincoln himself: that it was not wise toswap horses while crossing the stream. The process was especiallydangerous in a country where the change would involve a practicalinterregum of one third of a year. The nation had learned this lesson, and had paid dearly enough for the schooling, too, in the four months ofits waiting to get rid of Buchanan, after it had discredited him and allhis ways. In the present crisis it was easy to believe that to leave Mr. Lincoln to carry on for four months an administration condemned by thepeople, would inflict a mortal injury to the Union cause. Nevertheless, though many persons not wholly satisfied with him supported him for thisreason, the great majority undeniably felt implicit faith and intenseloyalty towards him. He was the people's candidate, and they would nothave any other candidate; this present state of popular feeling, whichsoon became plain as the sun in heaven, settled the matter. 

Thereupon, however, the malcontents, unwilling to accept defeat, broached a new scheme. The Republican nominating convention had beensummoned to meet on June 7, 1864; the opponents of Mr. Lincoln nowsought to have it postponed until September. William Cullen Bryantfavored this. Mr. Greeley also artfully said that a nomination made soearly would expose the Union party to a dangerous and possibly asuccessful flank movement. But deception was impossible; all knew thatthe postponement itself was a flank movement, and that it was desiredfor the chance of some advantage turning up for those who now hadabsolutely nothing to lose. 

Mr. Lincoln all the while preserved the same attitude which he had heldfrom the beginning. He had too much honesty and good sense to commit thevulgar folly of pretending not to want what every one knew perfectlywell that he did want very much. Yet no fair enemy could charge him withdoing any objectionable act to advance his own interests. He declined togive General Schurz leave of absence to make speeches in his behalf. "Speaking in the North, " he said, "and fighting in the South at the sametime are not possible; nor could I be justified to detail any officer tothe political campaign during its continuance, and then return him tothe army. " When the renomination came to him, he took it with cleanhands and a clear conscience; and it did come surely and promptly. Thepostponers were quenched by general disapproval; and promptly on theappointed day, June 7, the Republican Convention met at Baltimore. AsMr. Forney well said: the body had not to originate, but simply torepublish, a policy; not to choose a candidate, but only to adopt theprevious choice of the people. Very wisely the "Radical-union, " oranti-Lincoln, delegation from Missouri was admitted, as against thecontesting pro-Lincoln delegates. The delegations from Tennessee, Arkansas and Louisiana were also admitted. The President had desiredthis. Perhaps, as some people charged, he thought that it would be auseful precedent for counting the votes of these States in the electionitself, should the Republican party have need to do so. The platform, besides many other things, declared against compromise with the rebels;advocated a constitutional amendment to abolish slavery; and praised thePresident and his policy. The first ballot showed 484 for Lincoln, 22for Grant. The Missouri radicals had cast the vote for Grant; they roseand transferred it to Lincoln, and thus upon the first ballot he wasnominated unanimously. 

There was some conflict over the second place. A numerous body felt, andvery properly, that Mr. Hamlin deserved the approval of renomination. But others said that policy required the selection of a war Democrat. The President's advice was eagerly and persistently sought. Messrs. Nicolay and Hay allege that he not only ostensibly refused any response, but that he would give no private hint; and they say that therefore itwas "with minds absolutely untrammeled by even any knowledge of thePresident's wishes, that the convention went about its work of selectinghis associate on the ticket. " Others assert, and, as it seems to me, strongly sustain their assertion, that the President had a distinct andstrong purpose in favor of Andrew Johnson, --not on personal, but onpolitical grounds, --and that it was due to his skillful but occultinterference that the choice ultimately fell upon the energetic andaggressive war Democrat of Tennessee. [71] The first ballot showed forMr. Johnson 200, for Mr. Hamlin 150, and for Daniel S. Dickinson, a warDemocrat of New York, 108. The nomination of Mr. Johnson was at oncemade unanimous. 

To the committee who waited upon Mr. Lincoln to notify him formally ofhis nomination, he replied briefly. His only noteworthy remark was madeconcerning that clause in the platform which proposed the constitutionalabolition of slavery; of which he said, that it was "a fitting andnecessary conclusion to the final success of the Union cause. "

During the ensuing summer of 1864 the strain to which the nation wassubjected was excessive. The political campaign produced intenseexcitement, and the military situation caused profound anxiety. TheDemocrats worked as men work when they anticipate glorious triumph; andeven the Republicans conceded that the chance of their opponents wasalarmingly good. The frightful conflict which had devoured men and moneywithout stint was entering upon its fourth year, and the weary peoplehad not that vision which enabled the leaders from their watch-tower tosee the end. Wherefore the Democrats, stigmatizing the war policy as afailure, and crying for peace and a settlement, held out an alluringpurpose, although they certainly failed to explain distinctly their planfor achieving this consummation without sacrificing the Union. Skillfully devoting the summer to assaults on the Republicans, theyawaited the guidance of the latest phase of the political situationbefore making their own choice. Then, at the end of August, theirconvention nominated General George B. McClellan. At the time it seemedprobable that the nomination was also the gift of the office. Sounpromising was the outlook for the Republicans during these summermonths that many leaders, and even the President himself, felt thattheir only chance of winning in November lay in the occurrence beforethat time of some military success great enough to convince the peoplethat it was not yet time to despair of the war. 

It was especially hard for the Republicans to make head against theirnatural enemies, because they were so severely handicapped by the badfeeling and division among themselves. Mr. Wade, Henry Winter Davis, Thaddeus Stevens, and a host more, could not do otherwise than acceptthe party nominee; yet with what zeal could they work for the candidatewhen they felt that they, the leaders of the party, had been somethingworse than ignored in the selection of him? And what was their influenceworth, when all who could be reached by it knew well their extremehostility and distrust towards Mr. Lincoln? Stevens grudgingly admittedthat Lincoln would not be quite so bad a choice as McClellan, yet let nochance go by to assail the opinions, measures, and policy of theRepublican President. In this he was imitated by others, and theirreluctant adhesion in the mere matter of voting the party ticket wasmuch more than offset by this vehemence in condemning the man in whosebehalf they felt it necessary to go to the polls. In a word thesituation was, that the common soldiers of the party were to go into thefight under officers who did not expect, and scarcely desired, to win. Victory is rare under such circumstances. 

The opposition of the Democratic party was open and legitimate; theunfriendliness of the Republican politicians was more unfortunate thanunfair, because it was the mistake of sincere and earnest men. But inthe way of Mr. Lincoln's success there stood still other opponents whoseantagonism was mischievous, insidious, and unfair both in principle andin detail. Chief in this band appeared Horace Greeley, with a followingand an influence fluctuating and difficult to estimate, butconsiderable. His present political creed was a strange jumble ofDemocratic and Republican doctrines. No Democrat abused theadministration or cried for "peace on almost any terms" louder than hedid; yet he still declaimed against slavery, and proposed to buy fromthe South all its slaves for four hundred millions of dollars. Unfortunately those of his notions which were of importance in thepending campaign were the Democratic ones. If he had come out openly asa free lance, which was his true character, he would have less seriouslyinjured the President's cause. This, however, he would not do, butpreferred to fight against the Republicans in their own camp andwearing their own uniform, and in this guise to devote all his capacityto embarrassing the man who was the chosen president and the candidateof that party. Multitudes in the country had been wont to accept theeditorials of the "Tribune" as sound political gospels, and the presentdisaffected attitude of the variable man who inspired those vehementwritings was a national disaster. He created and led the party of peaceRepublicans. Peace Democracy was a legitimate political doctrine; butpeace Republicanism was an illogical monstrosity. It lay, with themortal threat of a cancer, in the political body of the party. It wasespecially unfortunate just at this juncture that clear thinking was notamong Mr. Greeley's gifts. In single-minded pursuit of his purpose todestroy Mr. Lincoln by any possible means, he had at first encouragedthe movement for Fremont, though it was based on views directly contraryto his own. But soon losing interest in that, he thereafter gave himselfwholly to the business of crying aloud for immediate peace, which hecontinued to do throughout the presidential campaign, alwaysunreasonably, sometimes disingenuously, but without rest, and withinjurious effect. The vivid picture which he loved to draw of "ourbleeding, bankrupt, and almost dying country, " longing for peace andshuddering at the "prospect of new rivers of human blood, " scared manyan honest and anxious patriot. 

In July and August Mr. Greeley was misled into lending himself to theschemes of some Southerners at Niagara Falls, who threw out intimationsthat they were emissaries from the Confederacy and authorized to treatfor peace. He believed these men, and urged that negotiations should beprosecuted with them. By the publicity which he gave to the matter hecaused much embarrassment to Mr. Lincoln, who saw at once that the wholebusiness was certainly absurd and probably treacherous. The real purposeof these envoys, he afterwards said, was undoubtedly "to assist inselecting and arranging a candidate and a platform for the ChicagoConvention. " Yet clearly as he understood this false and hollow scheme, he could not altogether ignore Greeley's demands for attention to itwithout giving too much color to those statements which the editor wasassiduously scattering abroad, to the effect that the administration didnot desire peace, and would not take it when proffered. So there werereasons why this sham offer must be treated as if it were an honest one, vexatious as the necessity appeared to the President. Perhaps he wascheered by the faith which he had in the wisdom of proverbs, for now, very fortunately, he permitted himself to be guided by a familiar one;and he decided to give to his annoyer liberal rope. Accordingly heauthorized Mr. Greeley himself to visit in person these emissaries, toconfer with them, and even to bring them to Washington in case theyshould prove really to have from Jefferson Davis any writtenproposition "for peace, embracing the restoration of the Union andabandonment of slavery. " It was an exceedingly shrewd move, and itseriously discomposed Mr. Greeley, who had not counted upon being sofrankly met, and whose disquietude was amusingly evident as hereluctantly fluttered forth to Niagara upon his mission of peace, lesswise than a serpent and unfortunately much less harmless than a dove. 

There is no room here to follow all the intricacies of the ensuing"negotiations. " The result was an utter fiasco, fully justifying thePresident's opinion of the fatuity of the whole business. The so-calledSouthern envoys had no credentials at all; they appeared to be mereadventurers, and members of that Southern colony in Canada which becameeven more infamous by what it desired to do than mischievous by what itactually did during the war. If they had any distinct purpose on thisoccasion, it was to injure the Republican party by discrediting itscandidate in precisely the way in which Mr. Greeley was aiding them todo these things. But he never got his head sufficiently clear toappreciate this, and he faithfully continued to play the part for whichhe had been cast by them, but without understanding it. He persistentlycharged the responsibility for his bootless return and ignominioussituation upon Mr. Lincoln; and though his errand proved conclusivelythat the South was making no advances, [72] and though no man in thecountry was more strictly affected with personal knowledge of this factthan he was, yet he continued to tell the people, with all the weight ofhis personal authority, that the President was obstinately set againstany and all proffers of peace. Mr. Lincoln, betwixt mercy and policy, refrained from crushing his antagonist by an ungarbled publication ofall the facts and documents; and in return for his forbearance he longcontinued to receive from Mr. Greeley vehement assurances that everydireful disaster awaited the Republican party. The cause suffered muchfrom these relentless diatribes of the "Tribune's" influential manager, for nothing else could make the administration so unpopular as thebelief that it was backward in any possible exertion to secure anhonorable peace. 

If by sound logic the Greeley faction should have voted with theDemocrats, --since in the chief point in issue, the prosecution of thewar, they agreed with the Democracy, --so the war Democrats, being inaccord with the Republicans, upon this same overshadowing issue should, at the coming election at least, have voted with that party. Many ofthem undoubtedly did finally prefer Lincoln, coupled with AndrewJohnson, to McClellan. But they also had anxieties, newly stirred, andentirely reasonable in men of their political faith. It was plain tothem that Mr. Lincoln had been finding his way to the distinct positionthat the abolition of slavery was an essential condition of peace. Nowthis was undeniably a very serious and alterative graft upon theoriginal doctrine that the war was solely for the restoration of theUnion. The editor of a war-Democratic newspaper in Wisconsin soughtinformation upon this point. In the course of Mr. Greeley's negotiatorybusiness Mr. Lincoln had offered to welcome "any proposition whichembraces the restoration of peace, the integrity of the whole Union, andthe abandonment of slavery. " Now this, said the interrogating editor, implies "that no steps can be taken towards peace . . . Unless accompaniedwith an abandonment of slavery. This puts the whole war question on anew basis and takes us war Democrats clear off our feet, leaving us noground to stand upon. If we sustain the war and war policy, does it notdemand the changing of our party politics?" Nicolay and Hay print thedraft of a reply by Mr. Lincoln which, they say, was "apparentlyunfinished and probably never sent. " In this he referred to his pastutterances as being still valid. But he said that no Southerner had"intimated a willingness for a restoration of the Union in any event oron any condition whatever. . . . If Jefferson Davis wishes for himself, orfor the benefit of his friends at the North, to know what I would do ifhe were to offer peace and reunion, saying nothing about slavery, lethim try me. " It must be admitted that this was not an answer, but was aclear waiver of an answer. The President could not or would not replycategorically to the queries of the editor. Perhaps the impossibility ofdoing so both satisfactorily and honestly may explain why the paper wasleft unfinished and unsent. It was not an easy letter to write; itscomposition must have puzzled one who was always clear both in thoughtand in expression. Probably Mr. Lincoln no longer expected that the endof the war would leave slavery in existence, nor intended that it shoulddo so; and doubtless he anticipated that the course of events wouldinvolve the destruction of that now rotten and undermined institution, without serious difficulty at the opportune moment. The speeches made atthe Republican nominating convention had been very outspoken, to theeffect that slavery must be made to "cease forever, " as a result of thewar. Yet a blunt statement that abolition would be a _sine qua non_ inany arrangements for peace, emanating directly from the President, as adeclaration of his policy, would be very costly in the pending campaign, and would imperil rather than advance the fortunes of him who had thisconsummation at heart, and would thereby also diminish the chance forthe consummation itself. So at last he seems to have left the warDemocrats to puzzle over the conundrum, and decide as best they could. Of course the doubt affected unfavorably the votes of some of them. 

A measure of the mischief which was done by these suspicions and byGreeley's assertions that the administration did not desire peace, maybe taken from a letter, written to Mr. Lincoln on August 22 by Mr. HenryJ. Raymond, chairman of the National Executive Committee of theRepublican party. From all sides, Mr. Raymond says, "I hear but onereport. The tide is setting strongly against us. " Mr. Washburne, hewrites, despairs of Illinois, and Mr. Cameron of Pennsylvania, and hehimself is not hopeful of New York, and Governor Morton is doubtful ofIndiana; "and so of the rest. " For this melancholy condition he assignstwo causes: the want of military successes, and the belief "that we arenot to have peace in any event under this administration until slaveryis abandoned. In some way or other the suspicion is widely diffused thatwe can have peace with union, if we would. " Then even this stanchRepublican leader suggests that it might be good policy to soundJefferson Davis on the feasibility of peace "on the sole condition ofacknowledging the supremacy of the Constitution, --all other questions tobe settled in a convention of the people of all the States. " ThePresident might well have been thrown into inextricable confusion ofmind, betwixt the assaults of avowed enemies, the denunciations andpredictions of inimical friends, the foolish advice of genuinesupporters. It is now plain that all the counsel which was given to himwas bad, from whatsoever quarter it came. It shows the powerfulness ofhis nature that he retained his cool and accurate judgment, althoughthe crisis was such that even he also had to admit that the danger ofdefeat was imminent. To Mr. Raymond's panic-stricken suggestions he madea very shrewd response by drafting some instructions for the purpose ofsending that gentleman himself on the mission to Mr. Davis. It was thesame tactics which he had pursued in dispatching Mr. Greeley to meet theSoutherners in Canada. The result was that the fruitlessness of thesuggestion was admitted by its author. 

As if all hurtful influences were to be concentrated against thePresident, it became necessary just at this inopportune time to makegood the terrible waste in the armies caused by expiration of terms ofservice and by the bloody campaigns of Grant and Sherman. Volunteeringwas substantially at an end, and a call for troops would have to beenforced by a draft. Inevitably this would stir afresh the hostility ofthose who dreaded that the conscription might sweep into militaryservice themselves or those dear to them. It was Mr. Lincoln's duty, however, to make the demand, and to make it at once. He did so;regardless of personal consequences, he called for 500, 000 more men. 

Thus in July and August the surface was covered with straws, and everyone of them indicated a current setting strongly against Mr. Lincoln. Unexpectedly the Democratic Convention made a small counter-eddy; forthe peace Democrats, led by Vallandigham, were ill advised enough toforce a peace plank into the platform. This was at once repudiated byMcClellan in his letter of acceptance, and then again was reiterated byVallandigham as the true policy of the party. Thus war Democrats werealarmed, and a split was opened. Yet it was by no means such a chasm asthat which, upon the opposite side, divided the radicals and politiciansfrom the mass of their Republican comrades. It might affect ratios, butdid not seem likely to change results. In a word, all politicalobservers now believed that military success was the only medicine whichcould help the Republican prostration, and whether this medicine couldbe procured was very doubtful. 

FOOTNOTES:

[64] Arnold, _Lincoln_, 384, 385. Nicolay and Hay seem to me to go toofar in belittling the opposition to Mr. Lincoln within the Republicanparty. 

[65] See Arnold, _Lincoln_, 385. But the fact is notorious among all whoremember those times. 

[66] _Polit. Recoll. 243 et seq. _ Mr. Julian here gives a vivid sketchof the opposition to Mr. Lincoln. 

[67] In the _National Intelligencer_, February 22, 1864. 

[68] Lovejoy had generally stood faithfully by the President. 

[69] N. And H. Ix. 40. 

[70] I Samuel xxii. 2. 

[71] See, more especially, McClure, _Lincoln and Men of War-Times_, chapter on "Lincoln and Hamlin, " 104-118. This writer says (p. 196) thatLincoln's first selection was General Butler. 

[72] Further illustration of this unquestionable fact was furnished bythe volunteer mission of Colonel Jaquess and Mr. Gilmore to Richmond inJuly. N. And H. Vol. Ix. Ch. Ix. 

CHAPTER X

MILITARY SUCCESSES, AND THE REËLECTION OF THE PRESIDENT

It is necessary now to return to military matters, and briefly to setforth the situation. No especial fault was found with General Meade'soperations in Virginia; yet it was obvious that a system quite differentfrom that which had hitherto prevailed must be introduced there. Tofight a great battle, then await entire recuperation of losses, thenfight again and wait again, was a process of lingering exhaustion whichmight be prolonged indefinitely. In February, 1864, Congress passed, though with some reluctance, and the President much more readily signed, a bill for the appointment of a lieutenant-general, "authorized, underthe direction and during the pleasure of the President, to command thearmies of the United States. "[73] All understood that the place was madefor General Grant, and it was at once given to him by Mr. Lincoln. OnMarch 3 the appointment was confirmed by the Senate. By this Halleck wassubstantially laid aside; his uselessness had long since become soapparent, that though still holding his dignified position, he seemedalmost forgotten by every one. 

Grant came to Washington, [74] arriving on March 8, and there was inducedby what he heard and saw to lay aside his own previous purpose and thestrenuous advice of Sherman, and to fall in with Mr. Lincoln's wishes;that is to say, to take personal control of the campaign in Virginia. Hedid this with his usual promptness, and set Sherman in command in themiddle of the country, the only other important theatre of operations. It is said that Grant, before accepting the new rank and taking Virginiaas his special province, stipulated that he was to be absolutely freefrom all interference, especially on the part of Stanton. Whether thisagreement was formulated or not, it was put into practical effect. Noman hereafter interfered with General Grant. Mr. Lincoln occasionallymade suggestions, but strictly and merely as suggestions. He distinctlyand pointedly said that he did not know, and did not wish to know, thegeneral's plans of campaign. [75] When the new commander had dulyconsidered the situation, he adopted precisely the same broad schemewhich had been previously devised by Mr. Lincoln and General McClellan;that is to say, he arranged a simultaneous vigorous advance all alongthe line. It was the way to make weight and numbers tell; and Grant hadgreat faith in weight and numbers; like Napoleon, he believed thatProvidence has a shrewd way of siding with the heaviest battalions. 

On April 30, all being ready for the advance, the President sent a noteof God-speed to the general. "I wish to express, " he said, "my entiresatisfaction with what you have done up to this time, so far as Iunderstand it. The particulars of your plan I neither know, nor seek toknow. . . . If there is anything wanting which is within my power to give, do not fail to let me know it. " The general replied in a pleasant tone:"I have been astonished at the readiness with which everything asked forhas been yielded, without even an explanation being asked. Should mysuccess be less than I desire and expect, the least I can say is, thefault is not with you. " When the President read these strange words hisastonishment must have far exceeded that expressed by the general. Neverbefore had he been thus addressed by any commander in Virginia!Generally he had been told that a magnificent success was about to beachieved, which he had done nothing to promote and perhaps much toretard, but which would nevertheless be secured by the ability of ageneral in spite of unfriendly neglect by a president. 

On May 4 General Grant's army started upon its way, with 122, 146 menpresent for duty. Against them General Lee had 61, 953. The odds seemedexcessive; but Lee had inside lines, the defensive, and intrenchments, to equalize the disparity of numbers. At once began those bloody andincessant campaigns by which General Grant intended to end, and finallydid end, the war. The North could afford to lose three men where theSouth lost two, and would still have a balance left after the South hadspent all. The expenditure in this proportion would be disagreeable; butif this was the inevitable and only price, Grant was willing to pay it, justly regarding it as cheaper than a continuation of the process ofpurchase by piecemeal. In a few hours the frightful struggle in theWilderness was in progress. All day on the 5th, all day on the 6th, theterrible slaughter continued in those darksome woods and swamps. "Moredesperate fighting has not been witnessed on this continent, " saidGrant. The Union troops could not force their way through those tangledforests. Thereupon, accepting the situation in his imperturbable way, hearranged to move, on May 7, by the left flank southerly towardsSpottsylvania. Lee, disappointed and surprised that Grant was advancinginstead of falling back, could not do otherwise than move in the samecourse; for, in fact, the combatants were locked together in a grapplingcampaign. Then took place more bloody and determined fighting. The Unionlosses were appalling, since the troops were attacking an army inposition. Yet Grant was sanguine; it was in a dispatch of May 11 thathe said that he had been getting the better in the struggle, and that heproposed to fight it out on that line if it took all summer. The resultof the further slaughter at Spottsylvania was not a victory for eitherleader, but was more hurtful to Lee because he could less well afford tohave his men killed and wounded. Grant, again finding that he could notforce Lee out of his position, also again moved by the left flank, steadily approaching Richmond and dragging Lee with him. The Northernloss had already reached the frightful total of 37, 335 men; theConfederate loss was less, but enormous. Amid the bloodshed, however, Grant scented success. On May 26 he wrote: "Lee's army is reallywhipped. . . . Our men feel that they have gained the morale over theenemy. . . . I may be mistaken, but I feel that our success over Lee's armyis already assured. " He even gratified the President by againdisregarding all precedent in Virginian campaigns, and saying that thepromptness with which reinforcements had been forwarded had contributedlargely to the promising situation! But almost immediately after thisthe North shuddered at the enormous and profitless carnage at ColdHarbor. Concurrently with all this bloodshed, there also took place thefamous and ill-starred movement of General Butler upon Richmond, whichended in securely shutting up him and his forces at Bermuda Hundred, "asin a bottle strongly corked. "

Such was the Virginian situation early in June. By a series of mostbloody battles, no one of which had been a real victory, Grant had comebefore the defenses of Richmond, nearly where McClellan had alreadybeen. And now, like McClellan, he proposed to move around to thesouthward and invest the city. It must be confessed that in all thisthere was nothing visible to the inexperienced vision of the citizens athome which made much brighter in their eyes the prestige of Mr. Lincoln's war policy. Nor could they see, as that summer of thepresidential campaign came and went, that any really great change orimprovement was effected. 

On the other hand, there took place in July what is sometimes lightlycalled General Early's raid against Washington. In fact, it was agenuine and very serious campaign, wherein that general was within a fewhours of capturing the city. Issuing out of that Shenandoah Valleywhence, as from a cave of horrors rather than one of the loveliestvalleys in the world, so much of terror and mischief had so often burstout against the North, Early, with 17, 000 veteran troops, moved straightand fast upon the national capital. On the evening of July 10 Mr. Lincoln rode out to his summer quarters at the Soldiers' Home. But theConfederate troops were within a few miles, and Mr. Stanton insistedthat he should come back. The next day the Confederates advanced alongthe Seventh Street road, in full expectation of marching into the citywith little opposition. There was brisk artillery firing, and Mr. Lincoln, who had driven out to the scene of action, actually came underfire; an officer was struck down within a few feet of him. 

The anticipation of General Early was sanguine, yet by no means illfounded. The veterans in Washington were a mere handful, and though thegreen troops might have held the strong defenses for a little while, yetthe Southern veterans would have been pretty sure to make their way. Itwas, in fact, a very close question of time. Grant had been at firstincredulous of the reports of Early's movements; but when he could nolonger doubt, he sent reinforcements with the utmost dispatch. Theyarrived none too soon. It was while General Early was making his finalarrangements for an attack, which he meant should be irresistible, thatGeneral Wright, with two divisions from the army of the Potomac, landedat the river wharves and marched through the city to the threatenedpoints. With this the critical hours passed away. It had really been acrisis of hours, and might have been one of minutes. Now Early saw thatthe prize had slipped through his fingers actually as they closed uponit, and so bitter was his disappointment that--since he wasdisappointed--even a Northerner can almost afford him sympathy. So, hischance being gone, he must go too, and that speedily; for it was he whowas in danger now. Moving rapidly, he saved himself, and returned upthe Shenandoah Valley. He had accomplished no real harm; but that thewar had been going on for three years, and that Washington was stillhardly a safe place for the President to live in, was another pointagainst the war policy. 

 * * * * *

Sherman had moved out against Johnston, at Dalton, at the same time thatGrant had moved out against Lee, and during the summer he made a recordvery similar to that of his chief. He pressed the enemy without rest, fought constantly, suffered and inflicted terrible losses, won no signalvictory, yet constantly got farther to the southward. Fortunately, however, he was nearer to a specific success than Grant was, and at lasthe was able to administer the sorely needed tonic to the politicalsituation. Jefferson Davis, who hated Johnston, made the steady retreatof that general before Sherman an excuse for removing him and puttingGeneral Hood in his place. The army was then at Atlanta. Hood was afighting man, and immediately he brought on a great battle, whichhappily proved to be also a great mistake; for the result was abrilliant and decisive victory for Sherman and involved the fall ofAtlanta. This was one of the important achievements of the war; andwhen, on September 3, Sherman telegraphed, "Atlanta is ours, and fairlywon, " the news came to the President like wine to the weary. He hastenedto tender the "national thanks" to the general and his gallant soldiers, with words of gratitude which must have come straight and warm from hisheart. There was a chance now for the Union cause in November. 

About ten days before this event Farragut, in spite of forts andbatteries, iron-clads and torpedoes, had possessed himself of Mobile Bayand closed that Gulf port which had been so useful a mouth to the hungrystomach of the Confederacy. No efficient blockade of it had ever beenpossible. Through it military, industrial, and domestic supplies hadbeen brought in, and invaluable cotton had gone out to pay for them. Now, however, the sealing of the South was all but hermetical. As anaval success the feat was entitled to high admiration, and as apractical injury to the Confederacy it could not be overestimated. 

Achievements equally brilliant, if not quite so important, were quicklycontributed by Sheridan. In spite of objections on the part of Stanton, Grant had put this enterprising fighter in command of a strong force ofcavalry in the Shenandoah Valley, where Lee was keeping Early as aconstant menace upon Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Washington. Threehard-fought battles followed, during September and October. In each theFederals were thoroughly victorious. The last of the three was thatwhich was made famous by "Sheridan's ride. " He had been to Washingtonand was returning on horseback, when to his surprise he encounteredsquads of his own troops hurrying back in disorderly flight from abattle which, during his brief absence, had unexpectedly been deliveredby Early. Halting them and carrying them back with him, he was relieved, as he came upon the field, to find a part of his army still standingfirm and even pressing the Confederates hard. He communicated his ownspirit to his troops, and turned partial defeat into brilliant victory. By this gallant deed was shattered forever the Confederate Army of theValley; and from that time forth there issued out of that fairconcealment no more gray-uniformed troopers to foray Northern fields orto threaten Northern towns. For these achievements Lincoln made Sheridana major-general, dictating the appointment in words of unusualcompliment. 

Late as the Democrats were in holding their nominating convention, theywould have done well to hold it a little later. They might then havederived wisdom from these military and naval events, and not improbablythey would have been less audacious in staking their success upon theissue that the war was a failure, and would have so modified that cravenproposition as to make it accord with the more patriotic sentiment oftheir soldier candidate. But the fortunes alike of the real war and ofthe political war were decidedly and happily against them. Even whilethey were in session the details of Farragut's daring and victoriousbattle in Mobile Bay were coming to hand. Scarcely had they adjournedwhen the roar of thunderous salvos in every navy yard, fort, andarsenal of the North hailed the triumph of Sherman at Atlanta. Beforethese echoes had died away the people were electrified by the threebattles in Virginia which Sheridan fought and won in style so brilliantas to seem almost theatrical. Thus from the South, from the West, andfrom the East came simultaneously the fierce contradiction of thisinsulting Copperhead notion, that the North had failed in the war. Thepolitical blunder of the party was now much more patent than was anyalleged military failure on the part of its opponents. In fact theNortherners were beholding the sudden turning over of a great page inthe book of the national history, and upon the newly exposed side of it, amid the telegrams announcing triumphs of arms, they read in great plainletters the reëlection of Mr. Lincoln. Before long most persons concededthis. He himself had said, a few months earlier, that the probabilitiesindicated that the presidential campaign would be a struggle between aUnion candidate and a Disunion candidate. McClellan had sought to giveto it a complexion safer for his party and more honorable for himself, but the platform and events combined to defeat his wise purpose. Inaddition to these difficulties the South also burdened him with anuntimely and compromising friendship. The Charleston "Courier, " withreckless frankness, declared that the armies of the Confederacy and thepeace-men at the North were working together for the procurement ofpeace; and said: "Our success in battle insures the success ofMcClellan. Our failure will inevitably lead to his defeat. " No wordscould have been more imprudent; the loud proclamation of such analliance was the madness of self-destruction. In the face of such talkthe Northerners could not but believe that the issue was truly made upbetween war and Union on the one side, peace and disunion on the other. If between the two, when distinctly formulated, there could under anycircumstances have been doubt, the successes by sea and land turned thescale for the Republicans. 

 * * * * *

During the spring and summer many prominent Republicans strenuouslyurged Mr. Lincoln to remove the postmaster-general, Montgomery Blair, from the cabinet. The political purpose was to placate the Radicals, whose unnatural hostility within the party greatly disturbed thePresident's friends. Many followers of Fremont might be conciliated bythe elimination of the bitter and triumphant opponent of their belovedchieftain; and besides this leader, the portentous list of those withwhom the postmaster was on ill terms included many magnates, --Chase, Seward, Stanton, Halleck, and abundance of politicians. Henry Wilsonwrote to the President: "Blair every one hates. Tens of thousands of menwill be lost to you, or will give a reluctant vote, on account of theBlairs. " Even the Republican National Convention had covertly assailedhim; for a plank in the platform, declaring it "essential to thegeneral welfare that harmony should prevail in the national councils, "was known to mean that he should no longer remain in the cabinet. Yet toforce him out was most distasteful to the President, who was always slowto turn against any man. Replying to a denunciatory letter from Halleckhe said: "I propose continuing to be myself the judge as to when amember of the cabinet shall be dismissed. " He made a like statement, curtly and decisively, in a cabinet meeting. Messrs. Nicolay and Hay saythat he did not yield to the pressure until he was assured of hisreëlection, and that then he yielded only because he felt that he oughtnot obstinately to retain an adviser in whom the party had lostconfidence. On September 23 he wrote to Mr. Blair a kindly note: "Youhave generously said to me more than once that whenever your resignationcould be a relief to me, it was at my disposal. The time has come. Youvery well know that this proceeds from no dissatisfaction of mine withyou, personally or officially. Your uniform kindness has beenunsurpassed by that of any friend. " Mr. Blair immediately relieved thePresident from the embarrassing situation, and he and his family behavedafterward with honorable spirit, giving loyal support to Mr. Lincolnduring the rest of the campaign. Ex-Governor Dennison of Ohio wasappointed to the vacant office. 

[Illustration: M. Blair]

Many and various were the other opportunities which the President wasurged to seize for helping both himself and other Republicancandidates. But he steadfastly declined to get into the mud of thestruggle. It was a jest of the campaign that Senator King was sent bysome New York men to ask whether Lincoln meant to support the Republicanticket. He did: he openly admitted that he believed his reëlection to befor the best interest of the country. As an honest man he could notthink otherwise. "I am for the regular nominee in all cases, " he bluntlysaid, in reply to a request for his interference concerning a member ofCongress; and the general principle covered, of course, his own case. Tothe postmaster of Philadelphia, however, whose employees displayedsuspicious Republican unanimity, he administered a sharp and imperiouswarning. He even would not extend to his close and valued friend, Mr. Arnold, assistance which that gentleman too sorely needed. Morecommendable still was his behavior as to the draft. On July 18, as hasbeen said, he issued a call for 500, 000 men, though at that time hemight well have believed that by so doing he was burying beyondresurrection all chance of reëlection. Later the Republican leadersentreated him, with earnest eloquence and every melancholy presage, tosuspend the drafting under this call for a few weeks only. It seemed tohim, however, that the army could not wait a few weeks. "What is thepresidency worth to me, if I have no country?" he said; and the storm ofpersuasion could not induce him to issue the postponing order. 

Campaign slanders were rife as usual. One of them Mr. Lincoln cared tocontradict. Some remarks made by Mr. Seward in a speech at Auburn hadbeen absurdly construed by Democratic orators and editors to indicatethat Mr. Lincoln, if defeated at the polls, would use the remainder ofhis term for doing what he could to ruin the government. This vilecharge, silly as it was, yet touched a very sensitive spot. On October19, in a speech to some serenaders, and evidently having this in mind, he said:--

"I am struggling to maintain the government, not to overthrow it. I amstruggling especially to prevent others from overthrowing it. . . . Whoevershall be constitutionally elected in November shall be duly installed asPresident on the fourth of March. . . . In the interval I shall do myutmost that whoever is to hold the helm for the next voyage shall startwith the best possible chance to save the ship. This is due to thepeople both on principle and under the Constitution. . . . If they shoulddeliberately resolve to have immediate peace, even at the loss of theircountry and their liberty, I know [have?] not the power or the right toresist them. It is their business, and they must do as they please withtheir own. "

In this connection it is worth while to recall an incident whichoccurred on August 26, amid the dark days. Anticipating at that timethat he might soon be compelled to encounter the sore trial ofadministering the government during four months in face of its neartransmission to a successor all whose views and purposes would bediametrically opposite to his own, and desiring beforehand clearly tomark out his duty in this stress, Mr. Lincoln one day wrote thesewords:--

"This morning, as for some days past, it seems exceedingly probable thatthis administration will not be reëlected. Then it will be my duty to socooperate with the President-elect as to save the Union between theelection and the inauguration, as he will have secured his election onsuch ground that he cannot possibly save it afterwards. "

He then closed the paper so that it could not be read, and requestedeach member of the cabinet to sign his name on the reverse side. 

In the end, honesty was vindicated as the best policy, and courage asthe soundest judgment. The preliminary elections in Vermont and Maine inSeptember, the important elections in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Indiana inOctober, showed that a Republican wave was sweeping across the North. Itswept on and gathered overwhelming volume in the brief succeedinginterval before November 8. On that momentous day, the voting in theStates showed 2, 213, 665 Republican votes, to which were added 116, 887votes of soldiers in the field, electing 212 presidential electors;1, 802, 237 Democratic votes, to which were added 33, 748 votes of soldiersin the field, electing 21 presidential electors. Mr. Lincoln's pluralitywas therefore 494, 567; and it would have been swelled to over half amillion had not the votes of the soldiers of Vermont, Kansas, andMinnesota arrived too late to be counted, and had not those of Wisconsinbeen rejected for an informality. Thus were the dreary predictions ofthe midsummer so handsomely confuted that men refused to believe thatthey had ever been deceived by them. 

On the evening of election day Mr. Lincoln went to the War Department, and there stayed until two o'clock at night, noting the returns as theycame assuring his triumph and steadily swelling its magnitude. Amid thegood news his feelings took on no personal complexion. A crowd ofserenaders, meeting him on his return to the White House, demanded aspeech. He told them that he believed that the day's work would be thelasting advantage, if not the very salvation, of the country, and thathe was grateful for the people's confidence; but, he said, "if I know myheart, my gratitude is free from any taint of personal triumph. I do notimpugn the motives of any one opposed to me. It is no pleasure to me totriumph over any one; but I give thanks to the Almighty for thisevidence of the people's resolution to stand by free government and therights of humanity. " A hypocrite would, probably enough, have said muchthe same thing; but when Mr. Lincoln spoke in this way, men who werethemselves honest never charged him with hypocrisy. On November 10 aserenade by the Republican clubs of the District called forth this:--

"It has long been a grave question whether any government, not toostrong for the liberties of its people, can be strong enough to maintainits own existence in great emergencies. On this point the presentrebellion brought our republic to a severe test, and a presidentialelection occurring in regular course during the rebellion added not alittle to the strain. If the loyal people united were put to the utmostof their strength by the rebellion, must they not fail when divided andpartially paralyzed by a political war among themselves? But theelection was a necessity. We cannot have free government withoutelections; and if the rebellion could force us to forego or postpone anational election, it might fairly claim to have already conquered andruined us. The strife of the election is but human nature practicallyapplied to the facts of the case. What has occurred in this case mustever recur in similar cases. Human nature will not change. In any futuregreat national trial, compared with the men of this, we shall have asweak and as strong, as silly and as wise, as bad and as good. Let us, therefore, study the incidents of this, as philosophy to learn wisdomfrom, and none of them as wrongs to be revenged. But the election, alongwith its incidental and undesirable strife, has done good, too. It hasdemonstrated that a people's government can sustain a national electionin the midst of a great civil war. Until now, it has not been known tothe world that this was a possibility. It shows, also, how sound andhow strong we still are. It shows that, even among candidates of thesame party, he who is most devoted to the Union and most opposed totreason can receive most of the people's votes. It shows, also, to theextent yet known, that we have more men now than we had when the warbegan. Gold is good in its place; but living, brave, patriotic men arebetter than gold. 

"But the rebellion continues; and, now that the election is over, maynot all having a common interest reunite in a common effort to save ourcommon country? For my own part, I have striven and shall strive toavoid placing any obstacle in the way. So long as I have been here, Ihave not willingly planted a thorn in any man's bosom. While I am deeplysensible to the high compliment of a reëlection, and duly grateful, as Itrust, to Almighty God for having directed my countrymen to a rightconclusion, as I think, for their own good, it adds nothing to mysatisfaction that any other man may be disappointed or pained by theresult. 

"May I ask those who have not differed with me to join with me in thissame spirit towards those who have? And now let me close by asking threehearty cheers for our brave soldiers and seamen, and their gallant andskillful commanders. "

 * * * * *

The unfortunate disputes about reconstruction threatened to causetrouble at the counting of the votes in Congress. Of the States whichhad seceded, two, Arkansas and Tennessee, had endeavored to reconstructthemselves as members of the Union; and their renewed statehood hadreceived some recognition from the President. He, however, firmlyrefused to listen to demands, which were urgently pushed, to obtain hisinterference in the arrangements made for choosing presidentialelectors. To certain Tennesseeans, who sent him a protest against theaction of Governor Johnson, he replied that, "by the Constitution andthe laws, the President is charged with no duty in the conduct of apresidential election in any State; nor do I in this case perceive anymilitary reason for his interference in the matter. . . . It is scarcelynecessary to add that if any election shall be held, and any votes shallbe cast, in the State of Tennessee, . . . It will belong not to themilitary agents, nor yet to the executive department, but exclusively toanother department of the government, to determine whether they areentitled to be counted, in conformity with the Constitution and laws ofthe United States. " His prudent abstention from stretching his officialauthority afterward saved him from much embarrassment in the turn whichthis troublesome business soon took. In both Arkansas and TennesseeRepublican presidential electors were chosen, who voted, and sent on toWashington the certificates of their votes to be counted in due coursewith the rest. But Congress jealously guarded its position onreconstruction against this possible flank movement, and in January, 1865, passed a joint resolution declaring that Virginia, North and SouthCarolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, and Tennessee were in such a condition on November 8 that novalid election of presidential electors was held in any of them, andthat therefore no electoral votes should be received or counted from anyof them. When this resolution came before Mr. Lincoln for his signatureit placed him in an embarrassing position, because his approval mightseem to be an implied contradiction of the position which he had takenconcerning the present status of Tennessee and Arkansas. It was notuntil February 8, the very day of the count, that he conquered hisreluctance, and when at last he did so and decided to sign theresolution, he at the same time carefully made his position plain by abrief message. He said that he conceived that Congress had lawful powerto exclude from the count any votes which it deemed illegal, and thattherefore he could not properly veto a joint resolution upon thesubject; he disclaimed "all right of the executive to interfere in anyway in the matter of canvassing or counting electoral votes;" and healso disclaimed that, by signing the resolution, he had "expressed anyopinion on the recitals of the preamble, or any judgment of his own uponthe subject of the resolution. " That is to say, the especial matterdealt with in this proceeding was _ultra vires_ of the executive, andthe formal signature of the President was affixed by him withoutprejudice to his official authority in any other business which mightarise concerning the restored condition of statehood. 

When the counting of the votes began, the members of the Senate andHouse did not know whether Mr. Lincoln had signed the resolution or not;and therefore, in the doubt as to what his action would be, the famoustwenty-second joint rule, regulating the counting of electoral votes, was drawn in haste and passed with precipitation. [76] It was an instanceof angry partisan legislation, which threatened trouble afterward andwas useless at the time. No attempt was made to present or count thevotes of Arkansas and Tennessee, and the president of the Senate actedunder the joint resolution and not under the joint rule. Yet the vote ofWest Virginia was counted, and it was not easy to show that her titlewas not under a legal cloud fully as dark as that which shadowedArkansas and Tennessee. 

 * * * * *

When Mr. Lincoln said concerning his reëlection, that the element ofpersonal triumph gave him no gratification, he spoke far within thetruth. He was not boasting of, but only in an unintentional waydisplaying, his dispassionate and impersonal habit in all politicalrelationships, --a distinguishing trait, of which history is so chary ofparallels that perhaps no reader will recall even one. A strikinginstance of it occurred in this same autumn. On October 12, 1864, thevenerable Chief Justice Taney died, and at once the friends of Mr. Chasenamed him for the succession. There were few men whom Mr. Lincoln hadless reason to favor than this gentleman, who had only condescended tomitigate severe condemnation of his capacity by mild praise of hischaracter, who had hoped to displace him from the presidency, and who, in the effort to do so, had engaged in what might have been stigmatizedeven as a cabal. Plenty of people were ready to tell him storiesinnumerable of Chase's hostility to him, and contemptuous remarks abouthim; but to all such communications he quietly refused to give ear. WhatMr. Chase thought or felt concerning him was not pertinent to thequestion whether or no Chase would make a good chief justice. Yet it wastrue that Montgomery Blair would have liked the place, and the Presidenthad many personal reasons for wishing to do a favor to Blair. It wasalso true that the opposition to Mr. Chase was so bitter and came fromso many quarters, and was based on so many alleged reasons, that had thePresident chosen to prefer another to him, it would have been impossibleto attribute the preference to personal prejudice. In his own mind, however, Mr. Lincoln really believed that, in spite of all theobjections which could be made, Mr. Chase was the best man for theposition; and his only anxiety was that one so restless and ambitiousmight still scheme for the presidency to the inevitable prejudice of hisjudicial duties. He had some thought of speaking frankly with Chase onthis subject, perhaps seeking something like a pledge from him; but hewas deterred from this by fear of misconstruction. Finally having, afterhis usual fashion, reached his own conclusion, and communicated it to noone, he sent the nomination to the Senate, and it received the honor ofimmediate confirmation without reference to a committee. 

FOOTNOTES:

[73] The rank had been held by Washington; also, but by brevet only, byScott. 

[74] For curious account of his interview with Mr. Lincoln, see N. AndH. Viii. 340-342. 

[75] In this connection, see story of General Richard Taylor, andcontradiction thereof, concerning choice of route to Richmond, N. And H. Viii. 343. 

[76] This was the rule which provided that if, at the count, anyquestion should arise as to counting any vote offered, the Senate andHouse should separate, and each should vote on the question of receivingor not receiving the vote; and it should not be received and countedexcept by concurrent assent. 

CHAPTER XI

THE END COMES INTO SIGHT: THE SECOND INAUGURATION

When Congress came together in December, 1864, the doom of theConfederacy was in plain view of all men, at the North and at the South. If General Grant had sustained frightful losses without having won anysignal victory, yet the losses could be afforded; and the nature of theman and his methods in warfare were now understood. It was seen that, with or without victory, and at whatever cost, he had moved relentlesslyforward. His grim, irresistible persistence oppressed, as with a senseof destiny, those who tried to confront it; every one felt that he wasgoing to "end the job. " He was now beleaguering Petersburg, and fewSoutherners doubted that he was sure of taking it and Richmond. In themiddle country Sherman, after taking Atlanta, had soon thereaftermarched cheerily forth on his imposing, theatrical, holiday excursion tothe sea, leaving General Thomas behind him to do the hard fighting withGeneral Hood. The grave doubt as to whether too severe a task had notbeen placed upon Thomas was dispelled by the middle of the month, whenhis brilliant victory at Nashville so shattered the Southern army thatit never again attained important proportions. In June preceding, thenotorious destroyer, the Alabama, had been sunk by the Kearsarge. InNovember the Shenandoah, the last of the rebel privateers, came intoLiverpool, and was immediately handed over by the British authorities toFederal officials; for the Englishmen had at last found out who wasgoing to win in the struggle. In October, the rebel ram Albemarle wasdestroyed by the superb gallantry of Lieutenant Cushing. Thus the rebelflag ceased to fly above any deck. Along the coast very few penetrablecrevices could still be found even by the most enterprisingblockade-runners; and already the arrangements were making which broughtabout, a month later, the capture of Fort Fisher and Wilmington. 

Under these circumstances the desire to precipitate the pace and toreach the end with a rush possessed many persons of the nervous andeager type. They could not spur General Grant, so they gave theirvexatious attention to the President, and endeavored to compel him toopen with the Confederate government negotiations for a settlement, which they believed, or pretended to believe, might thus be attained. But Mr. Lincoln was neither to be urged nor wheedled out of his simpleposition. In his message to Congress he referred to the number of votescast at the recent election as indicating that, in spite of the drain ofwar, the population of the North had actually increased during thepreceding four years. This fact shows, he said, "that we are notexhausted nor in process of exhaustion; that we are _gaining_ strength, and may, if need be, maintain the contest indefinitely. This as to men. Material resources are now more complete and abundant than ever. Thenatural resources, then, are unexhausted, and, as we believe, inexhaustible. The public purpose to reëstablish and maintain thenational authority is unchanged, and, as we believe, unchangeable. Themanner of continuing the effort remains to choose. On carefulconsideration of all the evidence accessible, it seems to me that noattempt at negotiation with the insurgent leader could result in anygood. He would accept nothing short of severance of theUnion, --precisely what we will not and cannot give. His declarations tothis effect are explicit and oft-repeated. He does not attempt todeceive us. He affords us no excuse to deceive ourselves. He cannotvoluntarily re-accept the Union; we cannot voluntarily yield it. Betweenhim and us the issue is distinct, simple, and inflexible. It is an issuewhich can only be tried by war, and decided by victory. If we yield, weare beaten; if the Southern people fail him, he is beaten. Either way, it would be the victory and defeat following war. 

"What is true, however, of him who heads the insurgent cause is notnecessarily true of those who follow. Although he cannot re-accept theUnion, they can; some of them, we know, already desire peace andreunion. The number of such may increase. They can at any moment havepeace simply by laying down their arms and submitting to the nationalauthority under the Constitution. 

"After so much, the government could not, if it would, maintain waragainst them. The loyal people would not sustain or allow it. Ifquestions should remain, we would adjust them by the peaceful means oflegislation, conference, courts, and votes, operating only inconstitutional and lawful channels. Some certain, and other possible, questions are, and would be, beyond the executive power to adjust, --as, for instance, the admission of members into Congress, and whatever mightrequire the appropriation of money. 

"The executive power itself would be greatly diminished by the cessationof actual war. Pardons and remissions of forfeitures, however, wouldstill be within executive control. In what spirit and temper thiscontrol would be exercised can be fairly judged of by the past. "

If rebels wished to receive, or any Northerners wished to extend, akindlier invitation homeward than this, then such rebels and suchNortherners were unreasonable. Very soon the correctness of Mr. Lincoln's opinion was made so distinct, and his view of the situationwas so thoroughly corroborated, that all men saw clearly that noreluctance or unreasonable demands upon his part contributed to delaypeace. Mr. Francis P. Blair, senior, though in pursuit of a quitedifferent object, did the service of setting the President in the trueand satisfactory light before the people. This restless politician wasanxious for leave to seek a conference with Jefferson Davis, but couldnot induce Mr. Lincoln to hear a word as to his project. On December 8, however, by personal insistence, he extorted a simple permit "to passour lines, go South, and return. " He immediately set out on his journey, and on January 12 he had an interview with Mr. Davis at Richmond andmade to him a most extraordinary proposition, temptingly decorated withabundant flowers of rhetoric. Without the rhetoric, the proposition was:that the pending war should be dropped by both parties for the purposeof an expedition to expel Maximilian from Mexico, of which tropicalcrusade Mr. Davis should be in charge and reap the glory! So ardent andso sanguine was Mr. Blair in his absurd project, that he fancied that hehad impressed Mr. Davis favorably. But in this undoubtedly he deceivedhimself, for in point of fact he succeeded in bringing back nothing morethan a short letter, addressed to himself, in which Mr. Davis expressedwillingness to appoint and send, or to receive, agents "with a view tosecure peace to the two countries. " The last two words lay in this rebelcommunication like the twin venom fangs in the mouth of a serpent, andmade of it a proposition which could not safely be touched. It servedonly as distinct proof that the President had correctly stated thefixedness of Mr. Davis. 

Of more consequence, however, than this useless letter was the newswhich Mr. Blair brought: that other high officials in Richmond--"thosewho follow, " as Mr. Lincoln had hopefully said--were in a temper farmore despondent and yielding than was that of their chief. These menmight be reached. So on January 18, 1865, Mr. Lincoln wrote a few lines, also addressed to Mr. Blair, saying that he was ready to receive anySouthern agent who should be informally sent to him, "with the view ofsecuring peace to the people of our one common country. " The twoletters, by their closing words, locked horns. Yet Mr. Davis nominatedAlexander H. Stephens, R. M. T. Hunter, and John A. Campbell, as informalcommissioners, and directed them, "in conformity with the letter of Mr. Lincoln, " to go to Washington and informally confer "for the purpose ofsecuring peace to the two countries. " This was disingenuous, and soobviously so that it was also foolish; for no conference about "twocountries" was "in conformity" with the letter of Mr. Lincoln. By reasonof the difficulty created by this silly trick the commissioners weredelayed at General Grant's headquarters until they succeeded inconcocting a note, which eliminated the obstacle by the simple processof omitting the objectionable words. Then, on January 31, the Presidentsent Mr. Seward to meet them, stating to him in writing "that threethings are indispensable, to wit: 1. The restoration of the nationalauthority throughout all the States. 2. No receding by the executive ofthe United States on the slavery question from the position assumedthereon in the late annual message to Congress, and in precedingdocuments. 3. No cessation of hostilities short of an end of the war andthe disbanding of all forces hostile to the government. You will informthem that all propositions of theirs, not inconsistent with the above, will be considered and passed upon in a spirit of sincere liberality. You will hear all they may choose to say, and report it to me. You willnot assume to definitely consummate anything. "

The following day Mr. Lincoln seemed to become uneasy at beingrepresented by any other person whomsoever in so important a business;for he decided to go himself and confer personally with the Southerners. Then ensued, and continued during four hours, on board a steamer inHampton Roads, the famous conference between the President and hissecretary of state on the one side and the three Confederatecommissioners on the other. It came to absolutely nothing; nor was thereat any time pending its continuance any chance that it would come toanything. Mr. Lincoln could neither be led forward nor cajoled sideways, directly or indirectly, one step from the primal condition of therestoration of the Union. On the other hand, this was the oneimpossible thing for the Confederates. The occasion was historic, andyet, in fact, it amounted to nothing more than cumulative evidence of afamiliar fact, and really its most interesting feature is that it gaverise to one of the best of the "Lincoln stories. " The President waspersisting that he could not enter into any agreement with "parties inarms against the government;" Mr. Hunter tried to persuade him to thecontrary, and by way of doing so, cited precedents "of this characterbetween Charles I. Of England and the people in arms against him. " Mr. Lincoln could not lose such an opportunity! "I do not profess, " he said, "to be posted in history. On all such matters I will turn you over toSeward. All I distinctly recollect about the case of Charles I. Is, _that he lost his head_!" Then silence fell for a time upon Mr. Hunter. 

Across the wide chasm of the main question the gentlemen discussed thesmaller topics: reconstruction, concerning which Mr. Lincoln expressedhis well-known, most generous sentiments; confiscation acts, as to whichalso he desired to be, and believed that Congress would be, liberal; theEmancipation Proclamation, and the Thirteenth Amendment, concerningwhich he said, that the courts of law must construe the proclamation, and that he personally should be in favor of appropriating even so muchas four hundred millions of dollars to extinguish slavery, and that hebelieved such a measure might be carried through. West Virginia, in hisopinion, must continue to be a separate State. Yet there was littlepractical use in discussing, and either agreeing or disagreeing, aboutall these dependent parts; they were but limbs which it was useless toset in shape while the body was lacking. Accordingly the party broke up, not having found, nor having ever had any prospect of finding, anycommon standing-ground. The case was simple; the North was fighting forUnion, the South for disunion, and neither side was yet ready to give upthe struggle. Nevertheless, it is not improbable that Mr. Lincoln, sofar as he personally was concerned, brought back from Hampton Roads allthat he had expected and precisely what he had hoped to bring. For inthe talk of those four hours he had recognized the note of despair, andhad seen that Mr. Davis, though posing still in an imperious andmonumental attitude, was, in fact, standing upon a disintegrated andcrumbling pedestal. It seemed not improbable that the disappointedsupporters of the rebel chief would gladly come back to the old Union ifthey could be fairly received, although at this conference they had feltcompelled by the exigencies of an official situation and theirrepresentative character to say that they would not. Accordingly Mr. Lincoln, having no idea that a road to hearty national re-integrationeither should or could be overshadowed by Caudine forks, endeavored tomake as easy as possible the return of discouraged rebels, whetherpenitent or impenitent. If they were truly penitent, all was as itshould be. If they were impenitent, he was willing to trust to time toeffect a change of heart. Accordingly he worked out a scheme wherebyCongress should empower him to distribute between the slave States$400, 000, 000, in proportion to their respective slave populations, oncondition that "all resistance to the national authority [should] beabandoned and cease on or before the first day of April next;" one halfthe sum to be paid when such resistance should so cease; the other halfwhenever, on or before July 1 next, the Thirteenth Amendment shouldbecome valid law. So soon as he should be clothed with authority, heproposed to issue "a proclamation looking to peace and reunion, " inwhich he would declare that, upon the conditions stated, he wouldexercise this power; that thereupon war should cease and armies bereduced to a peace basis; that all political offenses should bepardoned; that all property, except slaves, liable to confiscation orforfeiture, should be released therefrom (except in cases of interveninginterests of third parties); and that liberality should be recommendedto Congress upon all points not lying within executive control. On theevening of February 5 he submitted to his cabinet a draft covering thesepoints. His disappointment may be imagined when he found that not one ofhis advisers agreed with him; that his proposition was "unanimouslydisapproved. " "There may be such a thing, " remarked Secretary Welles, "as so overdoing as to cause a distrust or adverse feeling. " It was alsosaid that the measure probably could not pass Congress; that to attemptto carry it, without success, would do harm; while if the offer shouldreally be made, it would be misconstrued by the rebels. In fact scarcelyany Republican was ready to meet the rebels with the free and ampleforgiveness which Lincoln desired to offer; and later opinion seems tobe that his schemes were impracticable. 

The fourth of March was close at hand, when Mr. Lincoln was a secondtime to address the people who had chosen him to be their ruler. Thatblack and appalling cloud, which four years ago hung oppressively overthe country, had poured forth its fury and was now passing away. Hisanxiety then had been lest the South, making itself deaf to reason andto right, should force upon the North a civil war; his anxiety now waslest the North, hardening itself in a severe if not vindictive temper, should deal so harshly with a conquered South as to perpetuate asectional antagonism. To those who had lately come, bearing to him theformal notification of his election, he had remarked: "Having servedfour years in the depths of a great and yet unended national peril, Ican view this call to a second term in no wise more flattering to myselfthan as an expression of the public judgment that I may better finish adifficult work, in which I have labored from the first, than could anyone less severely schooled to the task. " Now, mere conquest was not, inhis opinion, a finishing of the difficult work of restoring a Union. 

The second inaugural was delivered from the eastern portico of theCapitol, as follows:--

"FELLOW COUNTRYMEN, --At this second appearing to take the oath of thepresidential office, there is less occasion for an extended address thanthere was at the first. Then, a statement, somewhat in detail, of acourse to be pursued, seemed fitting and proper. Now, at the expirationof four years, during which public declarations have been constantlycalled forth on every point and phase of the great contest which stillabsorbs the attention and engrosses the energies of the nation, littlethat is new could be presented. The progress of our arms, upon which allelse chiefly depends, is as well known to the public as to myself; andit is, I trust, reasonably satisfactory and encouraging to all. Withhigh hope for the future, no prediction in regard to it is ventured. 

"On the occasion corresponding to this four years ago, all thoughts wereanxiously directed to an impending civil war. All dreaded it, --allsought to avert it. While the inaugural address was being delivered fromthis place, devoted altogether to saving the Union without war, insurgent agents were in the city seeking to destroy it withoutwar--seeking to dissolve the Union, and divide effects, by negotiation. Both parties deprecated war; but one of them would make war rather thanlet the nation survive; and the other would accept war rather than letit perish. And the war came. 

"One eighth of the whole population were colored slaves, not distributedgenerally over the Union, but localized in the southern part of it. These slaves constituted a peculiar and powerful interest. All knew thatthis interest was, somehow, the cause of the war. To strengthen, perpetuate, and extend this interest was the object for which theinsurgents would rend the Union, even by war; while the governmentclaimed no right to do more than to restrict the territorial enlargementof it. Neither party expected for the war the magnitude or the durationwhich it has already attained. Neither anticipated that the cause of theconflict might cease with, or even before, the conflict itself shouldcease. Each looked for an easier triumph, and a result less fundamentaland astounding. Both read the same Bible, and pray to the same God; andeach invokes his aid against the other. It may seem strange that any menshould dare to ask a just God's assistance in wringing their bread fromthe sweat of other men's faces; but let us judge not, that we be notjudged. The prayers of both could not be answered, --that of neither hasbeen answered fully. The Almighty has his own purposes. 'Woe unto theworld because of offenses! for it must needs be that offenses come; butwoe to that man by whom the offense cometh. ' If we shall suppose thatAmerican slavery is one of those offenses which, in the providence ofGod, must needs come, but which, having continued through his appointedtime, He now wills to remove, and that He gives to both North and Souththis terrible war, as the woe due to those by whom the offense came, shall we discern therein any departure from those divine attributeswhich the believers in a living God always ascribe to Him? Fondly do wehope, fervently do we pray, that this mighty scourge of war may speedilypass away. Yet, if God wills that it continue until all the wealth piledby the bondman's two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall besunk, and until every drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be paid byanother drawn with the sword, as was said three thousand years ago, sostill it must be said, 'The judgments of the Lord are true and righteousaltogether. '

"With malice toward none, with charity for all, with firmness in theright, as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish thework we are in; to bind up the nation's wounds; to care for him whoshall have borne the battle, and for his widow, and his orphan, --to doall which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace amongourselves, and with all nations. "

This speech has taken its place among the most famous of all the writtenor spoken compositions in the English language. In parts it has oftenbeen compared with the lofty portions of the Old Testament. Mr. Lincoln's own contemporaneous criticism is interesting. "I expect it, "he said, "to wear as well as, perhaps better than, anything I haveproduced; but I believe it is not immediately popular. Men are notflattered by being shown that there has been a difference of purposebetween the Almighty and them. To deny it, however, in this case is todeny that there is a God governing the world. It is a truth which Ithought needed to be told; and as whatever of humiliation there is in itfalls most directly on myself, I thought others might afford for me totell it. "

CHAPTER XII

EMANCIPATION COMPLETED

On January 1, 1863, when the President issued the Proclamation ofEmancipation, he stepped to the uttermost boundary of his authority inthe direction of the abolition of slavery. Indeed a large proportion ofthe people believed that he had trespassed beyond that boundary; andamong the defenders of the measure there were many who felt bound tomaintain it as a legitimate exercise of the war power, while in theirinmost souls they thought that its real basis of justification lay inits intrinsic righteousness. Perhaps the President himself was somewhatof this way of thinking. He once said: "I felt that measure, otherwiseunconstitutional, might become lawful by becoming indispensable to thepreservation of the Constitution through the preservation of theUnion. . . . I was, in my best judgment, driven to the alternative ofeither surrendering the Union, and with it the Constitution, or oflaying strong hand upon the colored element. " Time, however, proved thatthe act had in fact the character which Mr. Lincoln attributed to it asproperly a war measure. It attracted the enlistment of negroes, chieflySouthern negroes, in the army; and though to the end of the war thefighting value of negro troops was regarded as questionable, yet theywere certainly available for garrisons and for many duties which wouldotherwise have absorbed great numbers of white soldiers. Thus, as thePresident said, the question became calculable mathematically, likehorse-power in a mechanical problem. The force of able-bodied Southernnegroes soon reached 200, 000, of whom most were in the regular militaryservice, and the rest were laborers with the armies. "We have the men, "said Mr. Lincoln, "and we could not have had them without the measure. "Take these men from us, "and put them in the battlefield or cornfieldagainst us, and we should be compelled to abandon the war in threeweeks. "

But the proclamation was operative only upon certain individuals. ThePresident's emancipatory power covered only those persons (with, perhaps, their families) whose freedom would be a military loss to theSouth and a military gain to the North in the pending war. He had nopower to touch the _institution of slavery_. That survived, for thefuture, and must survive in spite of anything that he alone, asPresident, could do. Nevertheless, in designing movements for itspermanent destruction he was not less earnest than were the radicals andextremists, though he was unable to share their contempt for legalitiesand for public opinion. It has been shown how strong was his desirethat legislative action for abolition should be voluntarily initiatedamong the border slave States themselves. This would save their pride, and also would put a decisive end to all chance of their ever allyingthemselves with the Confederacy. He was alert to promote this purposewhenever and wherever he conceived that any opportunity offered forgiving the first impulse. In time rehabilitated governments of someStates managed with more or less show of regularity to accomplish thereform. But it was rather a forced transaction, having behind it anuncomfortably small proportion of the adult male population of theseveral States; and by and by the work, thus done, might be undone; forsuch action was lawfully revocable by subsequent legislatures orconventions, which bodies would be just as potent at any future time toreëstablish slavery as the present bodies were now potent todisestablish it. It was entirely possible that reconstruction wouldleave the right of suffrage in such shape that in some Statespro-slavery men might in time regain control. 

In short, the only absolute eradicating cure was a constitutionalamendment;[77] and, therefore, it was towards securing this that thePresident bent all his energies. He could use, of course, only personalinfluence, not official authority; for the business, as such, lay withCongress. In December, 1863, motions for such an amendment wereintroduced in the House; and in January, 1864, like resolutions wereoffered in the Senate. The debate in the Senate was short; it opened onMarch 28, and the vote was taken April 8; it stood 38 ayes, 6 noes. Thiswas gratifying; but unfortunately the party of amendment had to face avery different condition of feeling in the House. The President, saysMr. Arnold, "very often, with the friends of the measure, canvassed theHouse to see if the requisite number could be obtained, but we couldnever count a two-thirds vote. " The debate began on March 19; not untilJune 15 was the vote taken, and then it showed 93 ayes, 65 noes, being adiscouraging deficiency of 27 beneath the requisite two thirds. Thereupon Ashley of Ohio changed his vote to the negative, and thenmoved a reconsideration, which left the question to come up again in thenext session. Practically, therefore, at the adjournment of Congress, the amendment was left as an issue before the people in the politicalcampaign of the summer of 1864; and in that campaign it was second onlyto the controlling question of peace or war. 

Mr. Lincoln, taking care to omit no effort in this business, sent forSenator Morgan, the chairman of the Republican National Committee, whichwas to make the Republican nomination for the presidency and to framethe Republican platform, and said to him: "I want you to mention in yourspeech, when you call the convention to order, as its keynote, and toput into the platform, as the keystone, the amendment of theConstitution abolishing and prohibiting slavery forever. " Accordinglythe third plank in that platform declared that slavery was the cause andthe strength of the rebellion, that it was "hostile to the principle ofrepublican government, " and that the "national safety demanded its utterand complete extirpation from the soil of the Republic, " and that tothis end the Constitution ought to be so amended as to "terminate andforever prohibit the existence of slavery within the limits or thejurisdiction of the United States. " Thus at the special request of thePresident the issue was distinctly presented to the voters of thecountry. The Copperheads, the conservatives, and reactionaries, and manyof the war Democrats, promptly opened their batteries against both theman and the measure. 

The Copperhead Democracy, as usual, went so far as to lose force; theyinsisted that the Emancipation Proclamation should be rescinded, and allex-slaves restored to their former masters. This, in their opinion, would touch, a conciliatory chord in Southern breasts, and might lead topacification. That even pro-slavery Northerners should urgently advocatea proposition at once so cruel and so disgraceful is hardly credible. Yet it was reiterated strenuously, and again and again Mr. Lincoln hadto repeat his decisive and indignant repudiation of it. In the messageto Congress, December, 1863, he said that to abandon the freedmen nowwould be "a cruel and astounding breach of faith. . . . I shall not attemptto retract or modify the Emancipation Proclamation, nor shall I returnto slavery any person who is free by the terms of that proclamation, orby any of the acts of Congress. " In May, 1864, he spurned the absurdityof depending "upon coaxing, flattery, and concession to get them [theSecessionists] back into the Union. " He said: "There have been men baseenough to propose to me to return to slavery our black warriors of PortHudson and Olustee, and thus win the respect of the masters they fought. Should I do so, I should deserve to be damned in time and eternity. Comewhat will, I will keep my faith with friend and foe. " He meant never tobe misunderstood on this point. Recurring to it after the election, inhis message to Congress in December, 1864, he quoted his language of theyear before and added: "If the people should, by whatever mode or means, make it an executive duty to reinslave such persons, another, and not I, must be their instrument to perform it. " All this was plain andspirited. But it is impossible to praise Mr. Lincoln for contemning acourse which it is surprising to find any person sufficiently ignoble torecommend. It was, nevertheless, recommended by many, and thus we maypartly see what extremities of feeling were produced by this mostdebasing question which has ever entered into the politics of acivilized nation. 

The anxieties of the war Democrats, who feared that Mr. Lincoln wasmaking abolition an essential purpose of the war, have already been setforth. In truth he was not making it so, but by the drifting of eventsand the ensnarlment of facts it had practically become so without hisresponsibility. His many utterances which survive seem to indicate that, having from the beginning hoped that the war would put an end toslavery, he now knew that it must do so. He saw that this conclusion layat the end of the natural course of events, also that it was not a goalwhich was set there by those to whom it was welcome, or which could betaken away by those to whom it was unwelcome. It was there by theabsolute and uncontrollable logic of facts. His function was only totake care that this natural course should not be obstructed, and thisestablished goal should not be maliciously removed away out of reach. When he was asked why his expressions of willingness to negotiate withthe Confederate leaders stipulated not only for the restoration of theUnion but also for the enfranchisement of all slaves, he could onlyreply by intimating that the yoking of the two requirements wasunobjectionable from any point of view, because he was entirely assuredthat Mr. Davis would never agree to reunion, either with or withoutslavery. Since, therefore, Union could not be had until after the Southhad been whipped, it would be just as well to demand abolition also; forthe rebels would not then be in a position to refuse it, and we shouldpractically buy both in one transaction. To him it seemed an appallingblunder to pay the price of this great war simply in order to cure thisespecial outbreak of the great national malady, and still to leaveexisting in the body politic that which had induced this dissension andwould inevitably afterward induce others like unto it. The excision ofthe cause was the only intelligent action. Yet when pushed to the pointof declaring what he would do in the supposed case of an opportunity torestore the Union, with slavery, he said: "My enemies pretend I am nowcarrying on the war for the sole purpose of abolition. So long as I amPresident, it shall be carried on for the sole purpose of restoring theUnion. " The duty of his official oath compelled him to say this, but heoften and plainly acknowledged that he had no fear of ever being broughtface to face with the painful necessity of saving both the Union andslavery. 

It is worth noticing that the persons who charged upon the Presidentthat he would never assent to a peace which was not founded upon theabolition of slavery as one of its conditions or stipulations, neverdistinctly stated by what right he could insist upon such a condition orstipulation, or by what process he could establish it or introduce itinto a settlement. Mr. Lincoln certainly never had any thought ofnegotiating with the seceded States as an independent country, andmaking with them a treaty which could embody an article establishingemancipation and permanent abolition. He had not power to enter withthem into an agreement of an international character, nor, if theyshould offer to return to the Union, retaining their slave institutions, could he lawfully reject them. The endeavor would be an act ofusurpation, if it was true that no State could go out. The plain truthwas that, from any save a revolutionary point of view, theconstitutional amendment was the only method of effecting theconsummation permanently. When, in June, 1864, Mr. Lincoln said thatabolition of slavery was "a fitting and necessary condition to the finalsuccess of the Union cause, " he was obviously speaking of what waslogically "fitting and necessary, " and in the same sentence he clearlyspecified a constitutional amendment as the practical process. There isno indication that he ever had any other scheme. 

In effect, in electing members of Congress in the autumn of 1864, thepeople passed upon the amendment. Votes for Republicans were votes forthe amendment, and the great Republican gain was fairly construed as anexpression of the popular favor towards the measure. But though theelections thus made the permanent abolition of slavery a reasonably sureevent in the future, yet delay always has dangers. The new Congresswould not meet for over a year. In the interval the Confederacy mightcollapse, and abolition become ensnarled with considerations ofreconciliation, of reconstruction, of politics generally. All friendsof the measure, therefore, agreed on the desirability of disposing ofthe matter while the present Congress was in the way with it, if thiscould possibly be compassed. That it could be carried only by the aid ofa contingent of Democratic votes did not so much discourage them asstimulate their zeal; for such votes would prevent the mischief of apartisan or sectional aspect. In his message to Congress, December 6, 1864, the President referred to the measure which, after its failure inthe preceding session, was now to come up again, by virtue of thatshrewd motion for reconsideration. Intelligibly, though not in terms, heappealed for Democratic help. He said:--

"Although the present is the same Congress and nearly the same members, and without questioning the wisdom or patriotism of those who stood inopposition, I venture to recommend the reconsideration and passage ofthe measure at the present session. Of course the abstract question isnot changed; but an intervening election shows, almost certainly, thatthe next Congress will pass the measure if this does not. Hence there isonly a question of _time_ as to when the proposed amendment will go tothe States for their action; and as it is so to go, at all events, maywe not agree that the sooner the better. It is not claimed that theelection has imposed a duty on members to change their views or theirvotes, any further than, as an additional element to be considered, their judgment may be affected by it. It is the voice of the people nowfor the first time heard upon the question. In a great national crisislike ours unanimity of action among those seeking a common end is verydesirable, --almost indispensable. And yet no approach to such unanimityis attainable unless some deference shall be paid to the will of themajority. In this case the common end is the maintenance of the Union, and among the means to secure that end, such will, through the election, is more clearly declared in favor of such a constitutional amendment. "

In the closing sentence the word "maintenance" is significant. So far asthe _restoration_ of Union went, the proclamation had done nearly allthat could be done. This amendment was to insure the future_maintenance_ of the Union by cutting out the cause of disunion. 

The President did not rest content with merely reiterating sentimentswhich every man had long known that he held. Of such influence as hecould properly exert among members of the House he was not chary. Thedebate began on January 6, 1865, and he followed it closely and eagerly. On the 27th it was agreed that the voting should take place on thefollowing day. No one yet felt sure of the comparative strength of thefriends and opponents of the measure, and up to the actual taking of thevote the result was uncertain. We knew, says Arnold, "we should get someDemocratic votes; but whether enough, none could tell. " Ex-GovernorEnglish of Connecticut, a Democrat, gave the first Aye from his party;whereupon loud cheers burst forth; then ten others followed his example. Eight more Democrats gave their indirect aid by being absent when theirnames were called. Thus both the great parties united to establish thefreedom of all men in the United States. As the roll-call drew to theend, those who had been anxiously keeping tally saw that the measure hadbeen carried. The speaker, Mr. Colfax, announced the result; ayes 119, noes 56, and declared that "the joint resolution is passed. " At oncethere arose from the distinguished crowd an irrepressible outburst oftriumphant applause; there was no use in rapping to order, or trying toturn to other business, and a motion to adjourn, "in honor of thisimmortal and sublime event, " was promptly made and carried. At the samemoment, on Capitol Hill, artillery roared loud salutation to the edictof freedom. 

The crowds poured to the White House, and Mr. Lincoln, in a few words, of which the simplicity fitted well with the grandness of the occasion, congratulated them, in homely phrase, that "the great job is ended. "Yet, though this was substantially true, he did not live to see thestrictly legal completion. Ratification by the States was stillnecessary, and though this began at once, and proceeded in due course astheir legislatures came into session, yet the full three quarters of thewhole number had not passed the requisite resolutions at the time ofhis death. This, however, was mere matter of form. The question wasreally settled when Mr. Colfax announced the vote of therepresentatives. [78]

FOOTNOTES:

[77] A constitutional amendment requires for its passage a two thirdsvote in the Senate and the House of Representatives, and ratification bythree fourths of the States. 

[78] Thirteenth Amendment. _First_: Neither slavery nor involuntaryservitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall havebeen duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any placesubject to their jurisdiction. _Second_: Congress shall have power toenforce this article by appropriate legislation. 

CHAPTER XIII

THE FALL OF RICHMOND, AND THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN

From the Capitol, where he had spoken his inaugural on March 4, 1865, Mr. Lincoln came back to the White House with less than five weeks oflife before him; yet for those scant weeks most men would have gladlyexchanged their full lifetimes. To the nation they came fraught with allthe intoxicating triumph of victory; but upon the President they laidthe vast responsibility of rightly shaping and using success; and it wasfar less easy to end the war wisely than it had been to conduct itvigorously. Two populations, with numbers and resources amply enough fortwo powerful nations, after four years of sanguinary, relentlessconflict, in which each side had been inspired and upheld by a faithlike that of the first crusaders, were now to be reunited as fellowcitizens, and to be fused into a homogeneous body politic based uponuniversal suffrage. As if this did not verge closely enough on theimpossible, millions of people of a hitherto servile race were suddenlyestablished in the new status of freedom. It was very plain that theproblems which were advancing with approaching peace were moreperplexing than those which were disappearing with departing war. Muchwould depend upon the spirit and terms of the closing of hostilities. 

If the limits of the President's authority were vague, they might forthat very reason be all the more extensive; and, wherever they might beset, he soon made it certain that he designed to part with no powerwhich he possessed. On the evening of March 3 he went up, as usual, tothe Capitol, to sign bills during the closing hours of the last sessionof the Thirty-eighth Congress. To him thus engaged was handed a telegramfrom General Grant, saying that General Lee had suggested an interviewbetween himself and Grant in the hope that, upon an interchange ofviews, they might reach a satisfactory adjustment of the present unhappydifficulties through a military convention. Immediately, exchanging noword with any one, he wrote:--

"The President directs me to say that he wishes you to have noconference with General Lee, unless it be for the capitulation ofGeneral Lee's army, or on some minor or purely military matter. Heinstructs me to say that you are not to decide, discuss, or confer uponany political questions. Such questions the President holds in his ownhands, and will submit them to no military conferences or conventions. Meanwhile, you are to press to the utmost your military advantages. "

This reply he showed to Seward, then handed it to Stanton and orderedhim to sign and dispatch it at once. 

About this same time General Lee notified Mr. Davis that Petersburg andRichmond could not be held many more days. Indeed, they would probablyhave been evacuated at once, had not the capital carried so costly afreight of prestige as well as of pride. It was no surprising secretwhich was thus communicated to the chief rebel; all the common soldiersin the Confederate army had for a long while known it just as well asthe general-in-chief did; and they had been showing their appreciationof the situation by deserting and coming within the Union lines in suchincreasing numbers that soon General Grant estimated that theConfederate forces were being depleted by the equivalent of nearly aregiment every day. The civilian leaders had already suggested the lastexpedients of despair, --the enrolling of boys of fourteen years and oldmen of sixty-five, nay, even the enlistment of slaves. But there was nocure for the mortal dwindling. The Confederacy was dying of anaemia. 

Grant understood the situation precisely as his opponents did. ThatPetersburg and Richmond were about to be his was settled. But he wasreaching out for more than only these strongholds, and that he could getLee's army also was by no means settled. As March opened he lay downevery night in the fear that, while he was sleeping, the evacuationmight be furtively, rapidly, in progress, and the garrison escaping. Hedreaded that, any morning, he might awake to find delusive picket lines, guarding nothing, while Lee and his soldiers were already well in thelead, marching for the South. For him, especially, it was a period ofextreme tension. Since the capture of Savannah and the evacuation ofCharleston several weeks ago, Sherman with his fine army had been movingsteadily northward. In front of Sherman was Johnston, with aconsiderable force which had been got together from the remnants ofHood's army and other sources. At Bentonsville a battle took place, which resulted in Johnston's falling back, but left him stillformidable. General Grant had not yet been able to break the Richmondand Danville Railroad, which ran out from Richmond in a southwesterlydirection; and the danger was that by this and the "South Side"railroad, Lee might slip out, join Johnston, and overwhelm Shermanbefore Grant could reach him. In time, this peril was removed by thejunction of Schofield's army, coming from Wilmington, with that ofSherman at Goldsboro. Yet, even after this relief, there remained apossibility that Lee, uniting with Johnston, and thus leading a stillpowerful army of the more determined and constant veterans, mightprolong the war indefinitely. 

Not without good reason was Grant harassed by this thought, for in factit was precisely this thing that the good soldier in Petersburg wasscheming to do. The closing days of the month brought the endeavor andthe crisis. To improve his chances Lee made a desperate effort todemoralize, at least temporarily, the left or western wing of the Unionarmy, around which he must pass in order to get away, when he shouldactually make his start. March 25, therefore, he made so fierce anassault, that he succeeded in piercing the Union lines and capturing afort. But it was a transitory gleam of success; the Federals promptlyclosed in upon the Confederates, and drove them back, capturing andkilling 4000 of them. In a few hours the affair was all over; theNorthern army showed the dint no more than a rubber ball; but theConfederates had lost brave men whom they could not spare. 

On March 22 Mr. Lincoln went to City Point; no one could say just howsoon important propositions might require prompt answering, and it washis purpose to be ready to have any such business transacted as closelyas possible in accordance with his own ideas. On March 27 or 28, thefamous conference[79] was held on board the River Queen, on James River, hard by Grant's headquarters, between the President, General Grant, General Sherman, who had come up hastily from Goldsboro, and AdmiralPorter. Not far away Sheridan's fine body of 13, 000 seasoned cavalrymen, fresh from their triumphs in the Shenandoah Valley, was even nowcrossing the James River, on their way into the neighborhood ofDinwiddie Court House, which lies southwest of Richmond, and where theycould threaten that remaining railroad which was Lee's best chance ofescape. General Sherman reported that on April 10 he should be ready tomove to a junction with Grant. But Grant, though he did not thenproclaim it, did not mean to wait so long; in fact he had the secretwish and purpose that the Eastern army, which had fought so long and sobloodily in Virginia, should have all to itself the well-deserved gloryof capturing Richmond and conquering Lee, a purpose which Mr. Lincoln, upon suggestion of it, accepted. [80] The President then returned to CityPoint, there to stay for the present, awaiting developments. 

On April 1 General Sheridan fought and won the important battle at FiveForks. Throughout that night, to prevent a too vigorous return-assaultupon Sheridan, the Federal batteries thundered all along the line; andat daybreak on the morning of April 2 the rebel intrenchments werefiercely assaulted. After hard fighting the Confederates were forcedback upon their inner lines. Then General Grant sent a note to CityPoint, saying: "I think the President might come out and pay us a visitto morrow;" and then also General Lee, upon his part, sent word toJefferson Davis that the end had come, that Petersburg and Richmond mustbe abandoned immediately. 

The news had been expected at any moment by the Confederate leaders, but none the less it produced intense excitement. Away went Mr. Davis, in hot haste, also the members of his cabinet and of his congress, andthe officials of the rebel State of Virginia, and, in short, every onewho felt himself of consequence enough to make it worth his while to runaway. The night was theirs, and beneath its friendly shade they escaped, with archives and documents which had suddenly become valuable chieflyfor historical purposes. Grant had ordered that on the morning of April3 a bombardment should begin at five o'clock, which was to be followedby an assault at six o'clock. But there was no occasion for either; evenat the earlier hour Petersburg was empty, and General Grant and GeneralMeade soon entered it undisturbed. A little later Mr. Lincoln joinedthem, and they walked through streets in which neither man nor animal, save only this little knot, was to be seen. [81]

At quarter after eight o'clock, that same morning, General Weitzel, witha few attendants, rode into the streets of Richmond. That place, however, was by no means deserted, but, on the contrary, it seemedPandemonium. The rebels had been blowing up and burning warships andstores; they had also gathered great quantities of cotton and tobaccointo the public storehouses and had then set them on fire. More than 700buildings were feeding a conflagration at once terrible and magnificentto behold, and no one was endeavoring to stay its advance. The negroeswere intoxicated with joy, and the whites with whiskey; the convictsfrom the penitentiary had broken loose; a mob was breaking into housesand stores and was pillaging madly. Erelong the Fifth MassachusettsCavalry, a negro regiment under Colonel C. F. Adams, Jr. , paradedthrough the streets, and then the Southern whites hid themselves withindoors to shun the repulsive spectacle. It may be that armed and hostilenegroes brought to them the dread terror of retaliation and massacre inthe wild hour of triumph. But if so, their fear was groundless; theerrand of the Northern troops was, in fact, one of safety and charity;they began at once to extinguish the fires, to suppress the riot, and tofeed the starving people. 

On the following day President Lincoln started on his way up the riverfrom City Point, upon an excursion to the rebel capital. Obstructionswhich had been placed in the stream stopped the progress of his steamer;whereupon he got into a barge and was rowed to one of the city wharves. He had not been expected, and with a guard of ten sailors, and with fourgentlemen as comrades, he walked through the streets, under the guidanceof a "contraband, " to the quarters of General Weitzel. This has beenspoken of as an evidence of bravery; but, regarded in this light, itwas only superfluous evidence of a fact which no one ever doubted; itreally deserves better to be called foolhardiness, as Captain Penrose, who was one of the party, frankly described it in his Diary. The walkwas a mile and a half long, and this gentleman says: "I never passed amore anxious time than in this walk. In going up [the river] . . . We ranthe risk of torpedoes and the obstructions; but I think the risk thePresident ran in going through the streets of Richmond was even greater, and shows him to have great courage. The streets of the city were filledwith drunken rebels, both officers and men, and all was confusion. . . . Alarge portion of the city was still on fire. " Probably enough theimpunity with which this great risk was run was due to the dazing andbewildering effect of an occasion so confused and exciting. Meantime, Lee, abandoning Petersburg, but by no means abandoning "the Cause, "pushed his troops with the utmost expedition to gain that southwesternroute which was the slender thread whence all Confederate hope nowdepended. His men traveled light and fast; for, poor fellows, they hadlittle enough to carry! But Grant was an eager pursuer. Until the sixthday that desperate flight and chase continued. Lee soon saw that hecould not get to Danville, as he had hoped to do, and thereupon changedhis plan and struck nearly westward, for open country, via AppomattoxCourt House. All the way, as he marched, Federal horsemen worried theleft flank of his columns, while the infantry came ever closer upon therear, and kept up a ceaseless skirmishing. It had become "a life anddeath struggle with Lee to get south to his provisions;" and Grant wasstruggling with not less stern zeal, along a southerly line, to getahead of him in this racing journey. The Federal troops, sanguine andexcited, did their part finely, even marching a whole day and nightwithout rations. On April 6 there was an engagement, in which about 7000Southerners, with six general officers, surrendered; and perhaps thecaptives were not deeply sorry for their fate. Sheridan telegraphed: "Ifthe thing is pressed, I think that Lee will surrender. " Grant repeatedthis to the President, who replied: "Let the thing be pressed, "--notthat there was any doubt about it! Yet, April 7, General Lee was cheeredby an evanescent success in an engagement. It was trifling, however, anddid not suffice to prevent many of his generals from uniting to advisehim to capitulate. Grant also sent to him a note saying that resistancewas useless, and that he desired to shift from himself theresponsibility of further bloodshed by asking for a surrender. Leedenied the hopelessness, but asked what terms would be offered. At thesame time he continued his rapid retreat. On April 8, about sunset, nearAppomattox Station, his advance encountered Sheridan's cavalry directlyacross the road. The corral was complete. Nevertheless, there ensued afew critical hours; for Sheridan could by no means stand against Lee'sarmy. Fortunately, however, these hours of crisis were also the hours ofdarkness, in which troops could march but could not fight, and at dawn, on April 9, the Southerners saw before them a great force of Federalsoldiery abundantly able to hold them in check until Grant's whole armycould come up. "A sharp engagement ensued, " says General Grant, "but Leequickly set up a white flag. " He then notified Sheridan, in his front, and Meade, in his rear, that he had sent a note to General Grant with aview to surrender, and he asked a suspension of hostilities. Thesecommanders doubted a ruse, and reluctantly consented to hold theirtroops back for two hours. That was just enough; pending the recessGrant was reached by the bearer of the dispatch, and at once rode insearch of Lee. 

The two met at the house of a villager and easily came to terms, forGrant's offer transcended in liberality anything which Lee could fairlyhave expected. General Grant hastily wrote it out in the form of aletter to Lee: The Confederates, officers and men, were to be paroled, "not to take up arms against the government of the United States untilproperly exchanged;" arms, artillery, and public property were to beturned over to the Federals except the side-arms of the officers, theirprivate horses, and baggage. "This done, each officer and man will beallowed to return to their homes, not to be disturbed by United Statesauthority so long as they observe their parole and the laws in forcewhere they may reside. " This closing sentence practically grantedamnesty to all persons then surrendering, not excluding even the rebelgeneral-in-chief. It was afterward severely criticised as trenching uponthe domain of the President, and perhaps, also, on that of Congress. Forit was practically an exercise of the pardoning power; and it was, ormight be, an element in reconstruction. Not improbably the full force ofthe language was not appreciated when it was written; but whether thiswas so or not, and whether authority had been unduly assumed or not, anengagement of General Grant was sure to be respected, especially when itwas entirely in harmony with the spirit of the President's policy, though it happened to be contrary to the letter of his order. 

General Lee had no sooner surrendered than he asked for food for hisstarving troops; and stated, by way of estimate, that about twenty-fivethousand rations would be needed. The paroles, as signed, showed a totalof 28, 231. To so trifling a force had his once fine army been reduced bythe steady drain of battles and desertions. [82] The veterans had longsince understood that their lives were a price which could buy nothing, and which therefore might as well be saved. 

The fall of Richmond and the surrender of Lee were practically the endof the war. Remnants of secession indeed remained, of which Mr. Lincolndid not live to see the disposition. Johnston's army was still in thefield; but on learning that there really was no longer either aConfederacy or a cause to fight for, it surrendered on April 26. Jefferson Davis also arranged for himself[83] the most effectual of allamnesties by making himself ridiculous; for though some persons haddesigned a serious punishment for this dethroned ruler, they recognizedthat this became impossible after he had put himself into petticoats. Itwas hardly fair that Mr. Lincoln was robbed of the amusement which hewould have gathered from this exploit. 

On April 11, in the evening, a multitude gathered before the WhiteHouse, bringing loud congratulations, and not to be satisfied without aspeech from the President. Accordingly he came out and spoke to thecheering crowd, and by a few simple, generous words, turned over theenthusiastic acclamation, which seemed to honor him, to those "whoseharder part" had given the cause of rejoicing. "Their honors, " he said, "must not be parceled out with others. I myself was near the front, andhad the high pleasure of transmitting much of the good news to you; butno part of the honor, for plan or execution, is mine. To General Grant, his skillful officers and brave men, all belongs. The gallant navy stoodready, but was not in reach to take an active part. " He then at onceturned to the subject of reconstruction, and the last words which headdressed to the people were mingled of argument and appeal in behalf ofthe humane and liberal policy which he had inaugurated in Louisiana, which was still in the experimental stage, yet which had already excitedthe bitter denunciations of the politicians. 

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So soon as it was known in the autumn of 1860 that Abraham Lincoln wasto be the next president of the United States, he was at once beset bytwo pests: the office-seekers, and the men who either warned him to fearassassination or anonymously threatened him with it. Of the two, theoffice-seekers annoyed him by far the more; they came like the plague oflocusts, and devoured his time and his patience. His contempt anddisgust towards them were unutterable; he said that the one purpose inlife with at least one half of the nation seemed to be that they shouldlive comfortably at the expense of the other half. But it was thefashion of the people, and he was obliged to endure the affliction, however it might stir his indignation and contempt. The matter ofassassination he was more free to treat as he chose. A curious incident, strangely illustrating the superstitious element in his nature, wasnarrated by him as follows:--

"It was just after my election in 1860, when the news had been coming inthick and fast all day, and there had been a great 'hurrah boys!' sothat I was well tired out and went home to rest, throwing myself upon alounge in my chamber. Opposite to where I lay was a bureau with aswinging glass upon it; and, in looking in that glass, I saw myselfreflected nearly at full length; but my face, I noticed, had twoseparate and distinct images, the tip of the nose of one being aboutthree inches from the tip of the other. I was a little bothered, perhapsstartled, and got up and looked in the glass; but the illusion vanished. On lying down again I saw it a second time, plainer, if possible, thanbefore; and then I noticed that one of the faces was a little paler--sayfive shades--than the other. I got up and the thing melted away; and Iwent off, and in the excitement of the hour forgot all aboutit, --nearly, but not quite, for the thing would once in a while come up, and give me a little pang, as though something uncomfortable hadhappened. When I went home, I told my wife about it; and a few daysafter I tried the experiment again, when, sure enough, the thing cameback again; but I never succeeded in bringing the ghost back after that, though I once tried very industriously to show it to my wife, who wasworried about it somewhat. She thought it was 'a sign' that I was to beelected to a second term of office, and that the paleness of one of thefaces was an omen that I should not see life through the last term. "

From this time forth anonymous threats and friendly warnings came thickand fast up to the fatal day when the real event befell. Some of thesehe kept, and after his death they were found in his desk, labeled"Assassination Letters. " Before he left Springfield for his journey toWashington, many ingenious fears were suggested to him; but, except forhis change of route toward the close of his journey, none of thesepresagings visibly influenced him, and his change of purpose concerningthe passage through Baltimore was never afterward recalled by himwithout vexation. From that time forth he resolutely ignored all dangerof this kind. During most of the time that he was in office any onecould easily call upon him, unguarded, at the White House; he movedthrough the streets of Washington like any private citizen; and he droveabout the environs, and habitually in the warm season took the longdrive to and from the Soldiers' Home, with substantially no protection. When, at last, a guard at the White House and an escort upon his driveswere fairly forced upon him by Mr. Stanton (who was declared by thegossip of the unfriendly to be somewhat troubled with physicaltimidity), he rebelled against these incumbrances upon his freedom, andsubmitted, when he had to do so, with an ill grace. To those whoremonstrated with him upon his carelessness he made various replies. Sometimes, half jocosely, he said that it was hardly likely that anyintelligent Southerner would care to get rid of him in order to seteither Vice-President Hamlin or, later, Vice-President Johnson, in hisplace. At other times he said: "What is the use of setting up the _gap_, when the fence is down all round?" or, "I do not see that I can makemyself secure except by shutting myself up in an iron box, and in thatcondition I think I could hardly satisfactorily transact the business ofthe presidency. " Again he said: "If I am killed, I can die but once; butto live in constant dread of it, is to die over and over again. " Thiswas an obvious reflection, easy enough of suggestion for any one who wasnot within the danger line; but to live every day in accordance with it, when the danger was never absent, called for a singular tranquillity oftemperament, and a kind of courage in which brave men are notoriouslyapt to be deficient. 

On April 9 the President was coming up the Potomac in a steamer fromCity Point; the Comte de Chambrun was of the party and relates that, asthey were nearing Washington, Mrs. Lincoln, who had been silently gazingtoward the town, said: "That city is filled with our enemies;" whereuponMr. Lincoln "somewhat impatiently retorted: 'Enemies! we must neverspeak of that!'" For he was resolutely cherishing the impossible ideathat Northerners and Southerners were to be enemies no longer, but thata pacification of the spirit was coming throughout the warring landcontemporaneously with the cessation of hostilities, --a dream romanticand hopelessly incapable of realization, but humane and beautiful. Since he did not live to endeavor to transform it into a fact, andthereby perhaps to have his efforts cause even seriously injuriousresults, it is open to us to forget the impracticability of the fancyand to revere the nature which in such an hour could give birth to sucha purpose. 

The fourteenth day of April was Friday, --Good Friday. Many religiouspersons afterward ventured to say that if the President had not been atthe theatre upon that sacred day, the awful tragedy might never haveoccurred at all. Others, however, not less religiously disposed, wereimpressed by the coincidence that the fatal shot was fired upon that daywhich the Christian world had agreed to adopt as the anniversary of thecrucifixion of the Saviour of mankind. General Grant and his wife werein Washington on that day and the President invited them to go with himto see the play at Ford's theatre in the evening, but personalengagements called them northward. In the afternoon the President droveout with his wife, and again the superstitious element comes in; for heappeared in such good spirits, as he chatted cheerfully of the past andthe future, that she uneasily remarked to him: "I have seen you thusonly once before; it was just before our dear Willie died. " Such a frameof mind, however, under the circumstances at that time must be regardedas entirely natural rather than as ominous. 

About nine o'clock in the evening the President entered his box at thetheatre; with him were his wife, Major Rathbone, and a lady; the boxhad been decorated with an American flag, of which the folds swept downto the stage. Unfortunately it had also been tampered with, inpreparation for the plans of the conspirators. Between it and thecorridor was a small vestibule; and a stout stick of wood had been soarranged that it could in an instant be made to fasten securely, on theinside, the door which opened from the corridor into this vestibule. Also in the door which led from the vestibule into the box itself a holehad been cut, through which the situation of the different persons inthe box could be clearly seen. Soon after the party had entered, whenthe cheering had subsided and the play was going forward, just after teno'clock, a man approached through the corridor, pushed his visiting cardinto the hands of the attendant who sat there, hastily entered thevestibule, and closed and fastened the door behind him. A moment laterthe noise of a pistol shot astounded every one, and instantly a man wasseen at the front of the President's box; Major Rathbone sprang tograpple with him, but was severely slashed in the arm and failed toretard his progress; he vaulted over the rail to the stage, but caughthis spur in the folds of the flag, so that he did not alight fairly uponhis feet; but he instantly recovered himself, and with a visible limp inhis gait hastened across the stage; as he went, he turned towards theaudience, brandished the bloody dagger with which he had just struckRathbone, and cried "_Sic semper tyrannis!_" Some one recognized JohnWilkes Booth, an actor of melodramatic characters. The door at the backof the theatre was held open for him by Edward Spangler, an employee, and in the alley hard by a boy, also employed about the theatre, washolding the assassin's horse, saddled and bridled. Booth kicked the boyaside, with a curse, climbed into the saddle with difficulty, --for thesmall bone of his leg between the knee and ankle had been broken in hisfall upon the stage, --and rode rapidly away into the night. Amid theconfusion, no efficient pursuit was made. 

The President had been shot at the back of the head, on the left side;the bullet passed through the brain, and stopped just short of the lefteye. Unconsciousness of course came instantaneously. He was carried to aroom in a house opposite the theatre, and there he continued to breatheuntil twenty-two minutes after seven o'clock in the morning, at whichmoment he died. 

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The man Booth, who had done this deed of blood and madness, was anunworthy member of the family of distinguished actors of that name. Hewas young, handsome, given to hard drinking, of inordinate vanity, andof small capacity in his profession; altogether, he was a disreputablefellow, though fitted to seem a hero in the eyes of the ignorant anddissipated classes. Betwixt the fumes of the brandy which he so freelydrank and the folly of the melodramatic parts which he was wont to act, his brain became saturated with a passion for notoriety, which grew intothe very mania of egotism. His crime was as stupid as it was barbarous;and even from his own point of view his achievement was actually worsethan a failure. As an act of revenge against a man whom he hated, heaccomplished nothing, for he did not inflict upon Mr. Lincoln so much asone minute of mental distress or physical suffering. To the South hebrought no good, and at least ran the risk of inflicting upon it muchevil, since he aroused a vindictive temper among persons who had thepower to carry vindictiveness into effect; and he slew the only sincereand powerful friend whom the Southerners had among their conquerors. Hepassed a miserable existence for eleven days after the assassination, moving from one hiding-place to another, crippled and suffering, findingconcealment difficult and escape impossible. Moreover, he had theintense mortification to find himself regarded with execration ratherthan admiration, loathed as a murderer instead of admired as a hero, andcharged with having wrought irreparable hurt to those whom he hadfoolishly fancied that he was going to serve conspicuously. It was acurious and significant fact that there was among the people of theNorth a considerable body of persons who, though undoubtedly as shockedas was every one else at the method by which the President had beeneliminated from the political situation, were yet well pleased to seeAndrew Johnson come into power;[84] and these persons were the very oneswho had been heretofore most extreme in their hostility to slavery, mostimplacable towards the people of the Confederacy. There were no personsliving to whom Booth would have been less willing to ministergratification than to these men. Their new President, it is true, soondisappointed them bitterly, but for the moment his accession wasgenerally regarded as a gain for their party. 

Late on April 25 a squad of cavalry traced Booth to a barn in Virginia;they surrounded it, but he refused to come out; thereupon they set fireto it, and then one of them, Boston Corbett, contrary to orders, thrusthis musket through a crevice and fired at Booth. Probably he hit hismark, though some think that the hunted wretch at this last desperatemoment shot himself with his own revolver. Be this as it may, theassassin was brought forth having a bullet in the base of his brain, andwith his body below the wound paralyzed. He died on the morning of April26. 

While the result of Booth's shot secured for him that notoriety which heloved, the enterprise was in fact by no means wholly his own. Aconspiracy involving many active members, and known also to others, hadbeen long in existence. For months plans had been laid and changed, andopportunities had been awaited and lost. Had the plot not been thusdelayed, its success might have done more practical mischief. Now, inaddition to what the plotters lost by reason of this delay, only a partof their whole great scheme was carried out. At the same time that thetragedy was enacting at Ford's Theatre an assault was perpetrated uponMr. Seward, who was then confined to his bed by hurts lately received inan accident. The assassin gained admission into the house under pretenseof bringing medicine; thus he reached the bedroom, and at once threwhimself upon the secretary, whom he stabbed about the face and neck;then encountering in turn two sons of Mr. Seward and two men nurses, hewounded them all more or less seriously, and escaped. But much as hadbeen done, as much or more was left undone; for there can be littledoubt that the plot also included the murder of the Vice-President, General Grant, and Secretary Stanton; the idea being, so far as therewas any idea or any sense at all in the villainy, that the suddendestruction of all these men would leave the government with no lawfulhead, and that anarchy would ensue. 

Not many days elapsed before the government had in custody seven men, Herold, Spangler, Payne, O'Laughlin, Arnold, Atzerodt, and Mudd, andone woman, Mary E. Surratt, all charged with being concerned in theconspiracy. But though they had been so happily caught, there was muchdifficulty in determining just how to deal with them. Such was the forceof secession feeling in the District of Columbia that no jury therecould be expected to find them guilty, unless the panel should be packedin a manner which would be equally against honesty and good policy. After some deliberation, therefore, the government decided to haverecourse to a military commission, provided this were possible under thelaw, and the attorney-general, under guise of advising theadministration, understood distinctly that he must find that it waspossible. Accordingly he wrote a long, sophistical, absurd opinion, inwhich he mixed up the law of nations and the "laws of war, " and emergedout of the fog very accurately at the precise point at which he wasexpected to arrive. Not that fault should be found with him forperforming this feat; it was simply one of many instances, furnished bythe war, of the homage which necessity pays to law and which law repaysto necessity. That which must be done must also be stoutly andingeniously declared to be legal. It was intolerable that the men shouldescape, yet their condemnation must be accomplished in a respectableway. So the Military Commission was promptly convened, heard theevidence which could be got together at such short notice, and foundall the accused guilty, as undoubtedly they were. The men were amiserable parcel of fellows, belonging in that class of the communitycalled "roughs, " except only Mudd, who was a country doctor. Mrs. Surratt was a fit companion for such company. Herold, Atzerodt and Paynewere hanged on July 7; O'Laughlin, Spangler, Arnold, and Mudd were sentto the Dry Tortugas, there to be kept at hard labor in the militaryprison for life, save Spangler, whose term was six years. Mrs. Surrattwas also found guilty and condemned to be hanged. Five members of thecommission signed a petition to President Johnson to commute thissentence, but he refused, and on July 7 she also met the fate which noone could deny that she deserved. John H. Surratt escaped for the time, but was apprehended and tried in the District of Columbia, in 1867; hehad then the advantage of process under the regular criminal law, andthe result was that on September 22, 1868, a _nolle prosequi_ wasentered, and he was set free, to swell the multitude of villains whoseimpunity reflects no great credit upon our system of dealing with crime. 

Besides those who have been named, the government also charged severalother persons with complicity in the plot. Among these were JeffersonDavis and some members of that notorious colony of Confederates who, inthe wholesome and congenial safety of Canada, had been plotting meancrimes during the war. Of course, since these men could not be capturedand actually placed upon trial, there was little object in seekingevidence against them, and only so much was produced as came to thepossession of the government incidentally in the way of its endeavor toconvict those prisoners who were in its possession. Under thesecircumstances there was not sufficient evidence to prove that any one ofthem aided or abetted, or had a guilty knowledge of, the conspiracy; yetcertainly there was evidence enough to place them under such suspicion, that, if they were really innocent, they deserve commiseration for theirunfortunate situation. 

 * * * * *

It is startling to contemplate the responsibility so lightly taken bythe mad wretch who shortly and sharply severed the most important lifewhich any man was living on the fourteenth day of April, 1865. Veryrarely, in the course of the ages, have circumstances so converged upona single person and a special crisis as to invest them with theimportance which rested upon this great leader at this difficult time. Yet, in the briefest instant that can be measured, an ignoble tipplerhad dared to cut the life-thread from which depended no small portion ofthe destinies of millions of people. How the history of this nationmight have been changed, had Mr. Lincoln survived to bear hisinfluential part in reconstructing and reuniting the shattered country, no man can tell. Many have indulged in the idle speculation, though todo so is but to waste time. The life which he had already lived givesfood enough for reflection and for study without trying to evolve out ofarbitrary fancy the further things which might have been attempted byhim, which might have been of wise or of visionary conception, mighthave brilliantly succeeded or sadly failed. 

It is only forty years since Abraham Lincoln became of much note in theworld, yet in that brief time he has been the subject of more varieddiscussion than has been expended upon any other historical character, save, perhaps, Napoleon; and the kind of discussion which has beencalled forth by Lincoln is not really to be likened to that which hastaken place concerning Napoleon or concerning any other personwhomsoever. The great men of the various eras and nations arecomprehensible, at least upon broad lines. The traits to which each oweshis peculiar power can be pretty well agreed upon; the capacity of eachcan be tolerably well expressed in a formula; each can be intelligiblydescribed in fairly distinct phrases; and whether this be in the spiritof admiration or of condemnation will, in all cases which admit ofdoubt, be largely a question of the personal sympathies of the observer. But Lincoln stands apart in striking solitude, --an enigma to all men. The world eagerly asks of each person who endeavors to write or speak ofhim: What illumination have you for us? Have you solved the mystery? Canyou explain this man? The task has been essayed many times; it will beessayed many times more; it never has been, and probably it never willbe entirely achieved. Each biographer, each writer or speaker, makes hislittle contribution to the study, and must be content to regard itmerely as a contribution. For myself, having drawn the picture of theman as I see him, though knowing well that I am far from seeing him all, and still farther from seeing inwardly through him, yet I know that Icannot help it by additional comments. Very much more than is the casewith other men, Lincoln means different things to different persons, andthe aspect which he presents depends to an unusual degree upon the moraland mental individuality of the observer. Perhaps this is due to thebreadth and variety of his own nature. As a friend once said to me:Lincoln was like Shakespeare, in that he seemed to run through the wholegamut of human nature. It was true. From the superstition of theignorant backwoodsman to that profoundest faith which is the surestmeasure of man's greatness, Lincoln passed along the whole distance. Inhis early days he struck his roots deep down into the common soil of theearth, and in his latest years his head towered and shone among thestars. Yet his greatest, his most distinctive, and most abiding traitwas his humanness of nature; he was the expression of his people; atsome periods of his life and in some ways it may be that he expressedthem in their uglier forms, but generally he displayed them in theirnoblest and most beautiful developments; yet, for worse or for better, one is always conscious of being in close touch with him as a fellowman. People often call him the greatest man who ever lived; but, infact, he was not properly to be compared with any other. One may set upa pole and mark notches upon it, and label them with the names of JuliusCaesar, William of Orange, Cromwell, Napoleon, even Washington, and maymeasure these men against each other, and dispute and discuss theirrespective places. But Lincoln cannot be brought to this pole, he cannotbe entered in any such competition. This is not necessarily because hewas greater than any of these men; for, before this could be asserted, the question would have to be settled: How is greatness to be estimated?One can hardly conceive that in any age of the world or any combinationof circumstances a capacity and temperament like that of Caesar orNapoleon would not force itself into prominence and control. On theother hand, it is easy to suppose that, if precisely such a great moralquestion and peculiar crisis as gave to Lincoln his opportunity had notarisen contemporaneously with his years of vigor, he might never havegot farther away from obscurity than does the ordinary member ofCongress. Does this statement limit his greatness, by requiring a rarecondition to give it play? The question is of no serious consequence, since the condition existed; and the discussion which calls it forth isalso of no great consequence. For what is gained by trying to award hima number in a rank-list of heroes? It is enough to believe that probablyLincoln alone among historical characters could have done that especialtask which he had to do. It was a task of supreme difficulty, and likenone which any other man ever had to undertake; and he who was chargedwith it was even more distantly unlike any other man in both moral andmental equipment. We cannot force lines to be parallel, for our ownconvenience or curiosity, when in fact they are not parallel. Let us notthen try to compare and to measure him with others, and let us notquarrel as to whether he was greater or less than Washington, as towhether either of them, set to perform the other's task, would havesucceeded with it, or, perchance, would have failed. Not only is thecompetition itself an ungracious one, but to make Lincoln a competitoris foolish and useless. He was the most individual man who ever lived;let us be content with this fact. Let us take him simply as AbrahamLincoln, singular and solitary, as we all see that he was; let us bethankful if we can make a niche big enough for him among the world'sheroes, without worrying ourselves about the proportion which it maybear to other niches; and there let him remain forever, lonely, as inhis strange lifetime, impressive, mysterious, unmeasured, and unsolved. 

FOOTNOTES:

[79] See _ante_, pp. 237-241 (chapter on Reconstruction). 

[80] Grant, _Memoirs_, ii. 460. 

[81] Grant, _Memoirs_, ii. 459. This differs from the statement of N. And H. X. 216, that "amid the wildest enthusiasm, the President againreviewed the victorious regiments of Grant, marching through Petersburgin pursuit of Lee. " Either picture is good; perhaps that of the silent, deserted city is not the less effective. 

[82] Between March 29 and the date of surrender, 19, 132 Confederates hadbeen captured, a fate to which it was shrewdly suspected that many werenot averse. 

[83] May 11, 1865. 

[84] Hon. George W. Julian says: "I spent most of the afternoon in apolitical caucus, held for the purpose of considering the necessity fora new cabinet and a line of policy less conciliatory than that of Mr. Lincoln; and while everybody was shocked at his murder, the feeling wasnearly universal that the accession of Johnson to the presidency wouldprove a godsend to the country. " _Polit. Recoll. _ 255. 

INDEX

[**Transcriber's Note: The index covers volume I and volume II of thework. For every term, the individual entries are arranged in order ofappearance in the two volumes. Index entries are therefore marked with"see vol. I. ", and "see vol. Ii. " accordingly. References that have nomark refer to the same volume as the last entry with a mark. ]

Abolitionists, denounced by Illinois legislature, see vol. I. ; disapprove emancipation with compensation; wish to induce Lincoln to join them; unpopular at North; difference of Lincoln from; refuse to support Lincoln in 1860; urge peaceful secession in 1861; denounce Lincoln for not making war an anti-slavery crusade, see vol. Ii. ; demand a proclamation of emancipation; unwisdom of their course; unappeased, even after emancipation proclamation; their small numbers; their attitude toward Lincoln. 

Adams, Charles Francis, letter of Seward to, on impossibility of war, see vol. I. ; appointed minister to England; instructions; complains to England of privateers, see vol. Ii. ; complains of the Alabama. 

Adams, Charles F. , Jr. , enters Richmond with negro cavalry regiment, see vol. Ii. 

Adams, John Quincy, in Congress with Lincoln, see vol. I. 

Alabama, not ready to secede, but opposed to coercion, see vol. I. ; wishes Southern convention; secedes. 

Alabama, Confederate privateer, see vol. Ii. ; sunk by Kearsarge. 

Albert, Prince, revises Palmerston's dispatch on Trent affair, see vol. I. 

Anderson, Robert, signs Lincoln's certificate of discharge in Black Hawk war, see vol. I. ; commands at Fort Moultrie in 1860; moves forces to Sumter; asks instructions in vain; appeals to Lincoln; refuses to surrender Sumter. 

Andrew, Governor John A. , prepares Massachusetts militia, see vol. I. ; asks United States for muskets; sends on troops. 

Anthony, Henry B. , in Senate in 1861, see vol. I. 

Antietam, battle of, see vol. Ii. 

Arkansas, refuses to furnish Lincoln troops, see vol. I. ; at first Unionist, finally secedes; campaign of Curtis in; reconstructed, see vol. Ii. ; chooses electors. 

Armstrong, Jack, his wrestling match with Lincoln, see vol. I. ; his later friendship with Lincoln; aids him in politics. 

Arnold, Isaac N. , in House in 1861, see vol. I. ; describes drilling of Army of Potomac; on importance of Lincoln's action in Trent case; introduces bill abolishing slavery under federal jurisdiction, see vol. Ii. ; on composition of Gettysburg address; dreads danger in election of 1864; Lincoln's only supporter in Congress; refusal of Lincoln to help in campaign; on Lincoln's attempt to push thirteenth amendment through Congress; on second vote on thirteenth amendment. 

Arnold, Samuel, accomplice of Booth, tried and condemned, see vol. Ii. 

Ashley, James M. , in House in 1861, see vol. I. ; moves to reconsider thirteenth amendment, see vol. Ii. 

Ashmun, George, presides over Republican Convention of 1860, see vol. I. 

Assassination of Lincoln, plot of 1861, see vol. I. ; threats during term of office, see vol. Ii. ; successful plot of 1865; death of Booth; trial and punishment of other persons concerned. 

Atlanta, battle of, see vol. Ii. 

Atzerodt, Geo. A. , accomplice of Booth, tried and condemned, see vol. Ii. 

Baker, Edward D. , in Illinois campaign of 1838; at Illinois bar; candidate for Congress; elected; his agreement with Lincoln and others; introduces Lincoln at inauguration; killed at Ball's Bluff; responsible for disaster. 

Ball's Bluff, battle of, see vol. I. 

Banks, Nathaniel P. , in Federal army, see vol. I. ; his corps in 1862, see vol. Ii. ; defeated by Jackson; takes Port Hudson. 

Barnard, General John G. , opposes McClellan's plan of campaign, see vol. I. ; on impossibility of taking Yorktown, see vol. Ii. 

Bates, Edward, candidate for Republican nomination, see vol. I. ; favored by Greeley; his chances as a moderate candidate; vote for; attorney-general; opposes reinforcing Sumter. 

Bayard, James A. , in Senate in 1861, see vol. I. 

Beauregard, General P. G. T. , commands at Charleston, see vol. I. ; notified by Lincoln of purpose to reinforce Sumter; requests surrender of Sumter; commands bombardment; commands Confederate army at Manassas; at battle of Bull Run; at battle of Shiloh; evacuates Corinth. 

Bell, John, candidate of Constitutional Union party, see vol. I. ; vote for. 

Benjamin, Judah P. , denounces Buchanan, see vol. I. ; in Confederate cabinet. 

Bentonsville, battle of, see vol. Ii. 

Berry, Wm. F. , his partnership with Lincoln, and failure, see vol. I. 

Big Bethel, battle of, see vol. I. 

Black, Jeremiah S. , in Buchanan's cabinet, see vol. I. ; succeeds Cass in State Department; after vacillation turns toward coercion; forces Buchanan to alter reply to South Carolina commissioners. 

Black Hawk war, see vol. I. 

Blaine, James G. , on purpose of war, see vol. Ii. ; on Lincoln's order to McDowell to pursue Jackson; on crisis in congressional elections of 1862; on admission of West Virginia; on Vallandigham case. 

Blair, F. P. , Jr. , tries to keep Lee in Union army, see vol. I. ; leads Unionist party in Missouri; in House in 1861; confers with Davis, see vol. Ii. 

Blair, Montgomery, in Lincoln's cabinet, see vol. I. ; wishes to relieve Sumter; at council of war; favors McClellan's plan of war; visits Missouri to investigate Fremont; arrested by Fremont; warns Lincoln that emancipation proclamation will lose fall elections, see vol. Ii. ; hated by radicals; his dismissal urged; upheld by Lincoln; resigns at Lincoln's request; wishes chief-justiceship. 

Blenker, General Louis, favors McClellan's plan of campaign, see vol. I. ; sent to strengthen Fremont, see vol. Ii. 

Booth, John Wilkes, murders Lincoln, see vol. Ii. ; his character; his end. 

Border States, necessity of retaining in Union, see vol. I. ; dealings of Lincoln with, in 1861; their neutrality policy explained in annual message; both pro-slavery and Unionist, see vol. Ii. ; desire to conciliate controls Lincoln's policy; with their slave property guaranteed by North; oppose bill freeing slaves used in war; oppose other anti-slavery bills; irritated by congressional policy; urged by Lincoln to agree to emancipation; refuse to approve; Lincoln's policy toward, denounced by Abolitionists; their support in 1862 saves Lincoln. 

Boutwell, George S. , urges emancipation upon Lincoln, see vol. Ii. 

Bragg, General Braxton, invades Kentucky, see vol. Ii. ; outmarched by Buell; at battle of Stone's River; retreats; reinforced; at battle of Chickamauga; besieges Chattanooga; defeated by Grant. 

Breckenridge, John C. , elected Vice-President, see vol. I. ; nominated by South for President; carries Southern States; announces election of Lincoln; expelled from Senate. 

Bright, Jesse D. , expelled from Senate, see vol. I. 

Brooks, Preston S. , assaults Sumner, see vol. I. ; praised at the South. 

Brough, John, nominated for governor in Ohio and elected, see vol. Ii. 

Brown, Aaron V. , in Buchanan's cabinet, see vol. I. 

Brown, B. Gratz, supports Fremont against Lincoln in 1864, see vol. Ii. 

Brown, Mayor Geo. W. , thinks Maryland will secede, see vol. I. ; burns bridges and cuts wires north of Baltimore. 

Browning, O. H. , at Illinois bar, see vol. I. 

Bryant, William Cullen, introduces Lincoln in New York, see vol. I. ; favors postponement of Republican convention in 1864, see vol. Ii. 

Buchanan, James, nominated by Democrats, see vol. I. ; elected President, his character; refers to Dred Scott decision in inaugural address; his recognition of Lecompton Constitution in Kansas; despised by Douglas; accused by Lincoln of plotting to make slavery national; his hard situation in 1860; distracted in body and mind; receives secession commissioners of South Carolina; a Unionist in feeling; his message on secession; wishes to shirk responsibility; declares coercion unconstitutional; ridiculed by Republicans; excuse for his position; declines to receive Southern commissioners; virtually abdicates power to cabinet; denounced by South; forced to appoint Dix to Treasury Department; calls extra session of Senate to aid Lincoln; his futile policy towards Fort Sumter. 

Buckner, General Simon B. , surrenders Fort Donelson, see vol. I. 

Buell, General D. C. , his resemblance in character to McClellan, see vol. I. ; refuses to seize East Tennessee; snubbed by McClellan; recommended by Halleck for promotion; takes Nashville; saves battle of Shiloh; allows slave-owners to reclaim fugitives, see vol. Ii. ; seizes Louisville before Bragg; opposes Halleck's plan to invade Tennessee; resigns. 

Bull Run, first battle of, see vol. I. ; second battle of, see vol. Ii. 

Burlingame, Anson D. , hopes that Douglas will join Republicans, see vol. I. 

Burns, Anthony, seized as a slave in Boston, see vol. I. 

Burnside, General Ambrose E. , commands in North Carolina, see vol. I. ; given command of Army of Potomac, see vol. Ii. ; at Fredericksburg; loses confidence of army; ordered by Lincoln to do nothing without informing him; offers to resign; wishes to dismiss several generals; resigns; his campaign in East Tennessee; relieved by Sherman; alarmed at Copperheads; commands in Ohio; issues order threatening traitors; tries and condemns Vallandigham; comment of Lincoln on; offers resignation. 

Butler, Benjamin F. , takes possession of hill commanding Baltimore, see vol. I. ; commands at Fortress Monroe; commands at New Orleans; keeps slaves as "contraband of war", see vol. Ii. ; "bottled" at Bermuda Hundred. 

Butterfield, Justin, at Illinois bar, see vol. I. 

Cadwalader, General George, refuses to liberate Merryman on Taney's writ, see vol. I. 

Calhoun, John, appoints Lincoln deputy surveyor, see vol. I. 

Calhoun, John C. , his speech on Compromise of 1850, see vol. I. 

California, annexed, see vol. I. ; gold fever in; asks admission as State; prohibits slavery; refusal of South to admit; admitted. 

Cameron, Simon, candidate for Republican presidential nomination in 1860, see vol. I. ; sells his vote for promise of a place in cabinet; willing to sacrifice anything to save Union; secretary of war; difficulty over his appointment; opposes relieving Fort Sumter; refuses muskets to Massachusetts militia; wishes to leave War Department; appointed minister to Russia; instructs Butler not to return slaves, see vol. Ii. ; authorizes Sherman to use negroes; suggests arming slaves in annual report; his report suppressed by Lincoln; supports Lincoln for reëlection. 

Campbell, Judge John A. , acts as intermediary between Seward and Confederate commissioners, see vol. I. ; on Confederate Peace Commission, see vol. Ii. 

Cartwright, Peter, defeated by Lincoln for Congress, see vol. I. ; his character as itinerant preacher. 

Cass, Lewis, attacked by Lincoln in Congress, see vol. I. ; in Buchanan's cabinet; wishes to coerce South; resigns when Buchanan refuses to garrison Southern forts. 

Caucus, denounced by Whigs in Illinois, see vol. I. 

Cedar Mountain, battle of, see vol. Ii. 

Chambrun, Comte de, on Lincoln's magnanimity, see vol. Ii. 

Chancellorsville, battle of, see vol. Ii. 

Chandler, Zachariah, in Senate in 1861, see vol. I. ; denounces conservatives, see vol. Ii. ; threatens Lincoln. 

Chase, Salmon P. , in debate on Compromise, see vol. I. ; candidate for Republican nomination in 1860; secretary of treasury; objected to by Pennsylvania protectionists; wishes to reinforce Sumter; dislikes subordination to Lincoln; wishes McClellan to advance; asks him his plans and is snubbed; favors Lincoln's plan of campaign; on ease of a victory; considers Lincoln inefficient, see vol. Ii. ; leader of discontented Republicans; on Lincoln's responsibility for emancipation proclamation; suggests an addition to it; wishes to present bankers to Lincoln; left undisturbed in control of Treasury; his resignation taken by Lincoln; letter of Lincoln to; hesitates to withdraw resignation; finally does so; irritated by Lincoln's independence; becomes candidate for Republican nomination; not feared by Lincoln; his offer to resign declined; fails to obtain support; withdraws name; continues to dislike Lincoln; frequently offers resignation; finally leaves office; on bad terms with Blair; appointed chief justice. 

Chestnut, James, defies North in 1860, see vol. I. 

Chickamauga, battle of, see vol. Ii. 

Chittenden, L. E. , on danger of a recognition of Confederacy by England, see vol. I. 

Cisco, John J. , quarrel over appointment of his successor, see vol. Ii. 

Clay, Henry, admired by Lincoln, see vol. I. ; less admired after his visit at Ashland; offers Compromise of 1850. 

Clinton, George, denounced in New York for calling secession "rebellion", see vol. I. 

Cobb, Howell, in Congress with Lincoln, see vol. I. ; on "making better terms out of the Union than in it"; in Buchanan's cabinet; candidate for presidency of South; resigns from cabinet. 

Cochrane, General John, nominated for Vice-President, see vol. Ii. 

Cold Harbor, battle of, see vol. Ii. 

Colfax, Schuyler, expects Douglas to join Republicans, see vol. I. ; in House in 1861; on Lincoln's tenacity, see vol. Ii. ; announces passage of thirteenth amendment. 

Collamer, Jacob, in Congress with Lincoln, see vol. I. ; vote for, in Republican Convention of 1860; in Senate in 1861. 

Colonization, favored by Lincoln, see vol. I. , see vol. Ii. 

Compromise of 1850, history of, see vol. I. 

Confederate States, formed by convention, see vol. I. ; organization of; sends commissioners to United States; its envoys rejected by Lincoln; prepares to seize Fort Sumter; amused at Lincoln's call for volunteers; receives Virginia; belligerency of, recognized by England and France; refusal of Lincoln to receive Stephens embassy from, see vol. Ii. ; sells bonds in England; dealings of supposed emissaries from, with Greeley; refusal of Lincoln to negotiate with; dealings of Blair with; sends commissioners; conference of Lincoln and Seward with commissioners of; government of, collapses. 

Congress, proposes amendment to Constitution to protect slavery, see vol. I. ; counts electoral votes; extra session called; votes to support Lincoln; creates Committee on Conduct of War; discusses battle of Shiloh; passes Crittenden resolution disavowing slavery as cause of war, see vol. Ii. ; passes bill freeing slaves used in war; refuses to reaffirm Crittenden resolution; passes bill for emancipation in District; prohibits officers to return fugitive slaves; abolishes slavery in Territories, etc. ; passes act freeing slaves of rebels; passes act to arm negroes; fails to provide equal pay; ignores Lincoln's wishes to conciliate Border States; passes resolution to cooperate with States adopting emancipation; unpopularity of Lincoln with; continues in 1862 to oppose Lincoln; fails to pass bill offering compensated emancipation to Missouri; character of, in 1863; accepts Representatives from reconstructed Louisiana; jealous of Lincoln's plan of reconstruction; desires to control matter itself; passes reconstruction bill; wishes to supplant Lincoln by Chase; creates lieutenant-general; refuses to recognize electors from Southern reconstructed States; fails to adopt thirteenth amendment; after election of 1864, passes amendment. 

Conkling, James C. , letter of Lincoln to, see vol. Ii. 

Conkling, Roscoe, in House in 1861, see vol. I. 

Constitution, slavery compromises in, see vol. I. ; in relation to doctrine of non-intervention; in relation to slavery in States; in relation to emancipation; in relation to popular sovereignty and Dred Scott decision; attitude of Abolitionists and Republicans toward; its relation to secession, Buchanan's view; proposal to amend, in 1861; its relation to secession, Lincoln's view; in relation to blockade; strained by civil war; war powers of, used by Lincoln; in connection with suspension of habeas corpus; makes President commander-in-chief; in relation to act abolishing slavery in Territories, see vol. Ii. ; desire of Abolitionists to ignore; Lincoln's view of, as forcing issue of war to be the Union; in relation to emancipation proclamation; strained by admission of West Virginia; really in abeyance; in relation to reconstruction; justifies "military governors"; in regard to relative powers of executive and Congress in reconstruction; as to power of Congress over electoral count; proposal to amend so as to abolish slavery; passage of thirteenth amendment by Congress. 

Constitutional Union party, its origin and aims, see vol. I. ; its subsequent fate; its vote in 1860. 

"Copperheads, " developed in second year of war, see vol. Ii. ; their principles and policy; active after Chancellorsville; organization of, to oppose war; feared in Indiana; fail to accomplish anything; despised by Lincoln; led by Vallandigham; attempt to put down; Lincoln's opinion of; demand revocation of emancipation proclamation. 

Corbett, Boston, kills Booth, see vol. Ii. 

Covode, John, in House in 1861, see vol. I. 

Cox, Samuel S. , in House in 1861, see vol. I. 

Crittenden, John J. , offers compromise in 1861, see vol. I. ; in House in 1861; offers resolution that war is not against slavery, see vol. Ii. ; opposes Lincoln's plan of emancipation in Kentucky. 

Curtin, Governor Andrew G. , invites governors to meet at Altoona, see vol. Ii. ; on connection of conference with emancipation proclamation; reflected. 

Curtis, Benjamin R. , his opinion in Dred Scott case, see vol. I. 

Curtis, General Samuel R. , his campaign in Missouri and Arkansas, see vol. I. 

Cushing, Lieutenant William B. , destroys the Albemarle, see vol. Ii. 

Davis, David, at Illinois bar, see vol. I. ; disgusted at election of Trumbull in 1855; Lincoln's manager in convention of 1860. 

Davis, Garrett, succeeds Breckenridge in Senate, see vol. I. ; his plea against arming negroes, see vol. Ii. 

Davis, Henry Winter, introduces reconstruction bill, see vol. Ii. ; issues address denouncing Lincoln for vetoing bill; obliged to support Lincoln rather than McClellan. 

Davis, Jefferson, advocates extension of Missouri Compromise in 1850, see vol. I. ; sneers at attempted compromise in 1861; elected President of Confederate States; defies North; hopes to entrap Seward into debate with commissioners; urged by South to do something; prefers to make North aggressor; tries to win over Kentucky; offers to issue "letters of marque and reprisal"; when secretary of war, sent McClellan to Europe; sends troops to seize East Tennessee; wishes to free Kentucky, see vol. Ii. ; his escape wished by Lincoln; replaces Johnston by Hood; proposition of Blair to; expresses willingness to treat for peace; nominates commissioners to treat for peace with independence; notified by Lee of approaching fall of Richmond; escapes from city; makes himself ridiculous and escapes punishment; suspected of complicity in Booth's plot. 

Dawson, ----, leads Lincoln in vote for legislature in 1834. 

Dayton, William L. , nominated by Republicans in 1856, see vol. I. ; candidate for nomination in 1860. 

Democratic party, controls Illinois, see vol. I. ; wins in 1852; factions in; elects Buchanan in 1856; in. Illinois, nominates Douglas for Senate; torn with factions; breaks up in 1860 into Northern and Southern wings; nominates two sets of candidates; campaign of, in 1860; attempts to reunite; in North, members of, become Union men; effort of Lincoln to placate, by giving recognition in cabinet; Copperhead and other factions of, see vol. Ii. ; "War Democrats"; makes campaign in 1862 on opposition to anti-slavery legislation; gains in Congressional elections; wishes Lincoln to compromise; denounces seizure of Vallandigham; agitates against military tyranny; commits error in opposing war; loses ground in 1863; applauds Fremont's candidacy; hopes for success in 1864; denounces war as failure and nominates McClellan; war faction of, hesitates to vote for Lincoln, on slavery grounds; divided over peace plank; damaged by Federal military successes; hurt by Southern approval; defeated in election; members of, in Congress, aid in passage of thirteenth amendment. 

Dennison, William, succeeds Blair as postmaster-general, see vol. Ii. 

Dickinson, Daniel S. , candidate for vice-presidential nomination, see vol. Ii. 

Diplomatic history, Seward's proposed foreign wars to prevent disunion, see vol. I. ; recognition of Southern belligerency by England and France; instructions of Seward to Adams; difficulties over English privateers; message of Lincoln on foreign relations; the Trent affair; the Oreto affair, see vol. Ii. ; the Alabama affair. 

District of Columbia, bill to emancipate slaves in, advocated by Lincoln, see vol. I. ; slave trade in, abolished; abolition in, favored by Lincoln; emancipation in, carried, see vol. Ii. 

Dix, John A. , on possible secession of New York, see vol. I. ; appointed to Treasury Department; his order to protect American flag. 

Dixon, Archibald, offers amendment repealing Missouri Compromise, see vol. I. 

Donelson, Andrew J. , nominated for presidency by Whigs and Know-Nothings, see vol. I. 

Donelson, Fort, battle of, see vol. I. 

Doolittle, James R. , in Senate in 1861, see vol. I. 

Doubleday, General Abner, on Hooker's plan in Chancellorsville campaign, see vol. Ii. 

Douglas, Stephen A. , meets Lincoln in 1835, see vol. I. ; encounters him in campaign of 1840; Lincoln's rival in love affair; his position at Illinois bar; charges Lincoln with lacking patriotism in opposing Mexican war; introduces Kansas-Nebraska Bill; mobbed in Chicago; debates with Lincoln in campaign of 1854; proposes a truce; candidate for Democratic nomination in 1856; opposes Lecompton Constitution; leading figure in public life; his character and ability; his doctrine of "popular sovereignty"; avoids consequences of Dred Scott decision; defies Buchanan; his conduct in Lecompton case dictated by desire to secure reëlection to Senate; attacks "English Bill" as unfair; his candidacy for reëlection gives Lincoln opportunity; renominated by Democrats; denounced by South; opposed by administration; accepts Lincoln's challenge to joint debates; his attacks upon Lincoln; accused by Lincoln of a plot to make slavery national; denies any plot; on status of negro under Declaration of Independence; sneered at by Lincoln; keeps temper with difficulty; attempts to reconcile Dred Scott decision with popular sovereignty; fails to satisfy South; cornered by Lincoln; gains reëlection; on difficulty of debating with Lincoln; speaks in Ohio; in debate ignores secession; nominated by Democrats in 1860; reasons why repudiated by South; his vigorous canvass in 1860; vote for; offers to aid Lincoln after fall of Sumter; value of his assistance. 

Dred Scott case, decision in, see vol. I. ; equivocal attitude of Douglas toward; discussed by Lincoln. 

Duane, Captain, escorts Lincoln at inauguration, see vol. I. 

Early, General Jubal A. , tries to capture Washington, see vol. Ii. ; repulsed; retreats; defeated by Sheridan. 

East, ignorant of Lincoln, see vol. I. ; led to respect Lincoln by his speeches. 

Edwards, Ninian W. , in frontier political debates, see vol. I. ; member of Illinois bar. 

Emancipation, Lincoln's plan for, in 1849, see vol. I. ; compensation for, wished by Lincoln; again proposed by Lincoln with compensation and colonization, see vol. Ii. ; discussion of Lincoln's proposal; demanded instantly by Abolitionists; question of its constitutionality; opposition to, in North; demanded by clergymen; gradual decision of Lincoln to proclaim; reasons for caution in issuing proclamation; delay urged by Seward; preliminary declaration of, after battle of Antietam; not influenced by Altoona conference; its effect upon North; urged again, with compensation, by Lincoln; repudiated by Missouri; final proclamation of, issued; condemned by rulers of England, though approved by people; renewed scheme of Lincoln to gain, by compensation. 

England, ignorance of, in West, see vol. I. ; its aid hoped by South; its sympathy expected by North; its upper classes dislike America; rejoices in anticipated destruction of United States; recognizes belligerency of South; attitude of Seward toward; later dealings with; acquiesces in blockade; enraged at Trent affair; demands reparation; admitted by Lincoln to be in the right; reply of Seward; Northern hatred of; wisdom of Lincoln's attitude toward; people of, gratified by emancipation proclamation, see vol. Ii. ; fails to detain Oreto and Alabama; subscribes to Confederate loan. 

English, James E. , in House in 1861, see vol. I. ; votes for thirteenth amendment, see vol. Ii. 

Ericsson, John, designs the Monitor, see vol. I. 

Evarts, William M. , moves to make Lincoln's nomination unanimous, see vol. I. 

Everett, Edward, nominated for Vice-President by Constitutional Union party, see vol. I. ; delivers oration at Gettysburg, see vol. Ii. 

Ewell, General R. S. , enters Shenandoah Valley, see vol. Ii. ; enters Pennsylvania. 

Ewing, ----, defeats Lincoln for speakership in Illinois legislature, see vol. I. 

Farragut, Captain D. G. , takes New Orleans, see vol. I. ; his campaign on Mississippi; takes Mobile, see vol. Ii. 

Fell, J. W. , asks Lincoln concerning his ancestry, see vol. I. ; urges Lincoln to seek presidential nomination. 

Felton, Samuel M. , fears plot to assassinate Lincoln, see vol. I. ; has wires cut to avoid sending news. 

Fenton, Reuben E. , in House in 1861, see vol. I. 

Fessenden, William P. , in Senate in 1861, see vol. I. ; reluctantly accepts Treasury Department, see vol. Ii. ; his success. 

Fillmore, Millard, nominated for presidency by Know-Nothings and Whigs in 1856, see vol. I. 

Financial history, Chase's conduct of Treasury, see vol. Ii. 

Five Forks, battle of, see vol. Ii. 

Florida, ready to secede in 1860, see vol. I. ; secedes. 

Florida, Confederate privateer, see vol. Ii. 

Floyd, John B. , in Buchanan's cabinet, see vol. I. ; wishes secession delayed; sends arms into South; involved in defalcation; quarrels on question of reinforcing Sumter and resigns; runs away from Fort Donelson. 

Foote, Admiral Andrew H. , his operations in 1862, see vol. I. ; captures Fort Henry. 

Ford, Governor, remark on Lincoln's political luck, see vol. I. 

Forney, John W. , on Republican Convention of 1864, see vol. Ii. 

Forquer, George, taunts Lincoln with youth, see vol. I. ; retort of Lincoln to. 

Fox, G. V. , his plan to relieve Fort Sumter, see vol. I. 

Franklin, General William B. , summoned by Lincoln to consultation, see vol. I. ; does not tell McClellan; favors McClellan's plan of attack; his division sent to McClellan, but not used, see vol. Ii. ; his force occupies West Point. 

Fremont, Mrs. Jessie Benton, her interview with Lincoln, see vol. I. 

Fremont, John C. , nominated for presidency by Republicans, see vol. I. ; appointed to command in Missouri; his quarrelsomeness and inefficiency; arrests Blair; the idol of Abolitionists; removed; declares slaves of rebels free in Missouri, see vol. Ii. ; asked by Lincoln to modify order; refuses, and becomes enemy of Lincoln; reinforced by Lincoln under political pressure; commands force in West Virginia; ordered to catch Jackson; fails; resigns; upheld by Lincoln's enemies in Missouri, as rival for presidency; nominated for presidency; failure of his candidacy; withdraws; his followers hate Blair. 

France, recognizes belligerency of South, see vol. I. ; would have joined England in case of war; proposes mediation, see vol. Ii. 

Fredericksburg, battle of, see vol. Ii. 

Free Soil party, origin of, see vol. I. 

Fugitive Slave Law, passed, see vol. I. ; Lincoln's opinion of. 

Garrison, William Lloyd, disapproves of Republican party, see vol. I. ; supports Lincoln in 1864, see vol. Ii. 

Georgia, not ready for secession, see vol. I. ; wishes a Southern convention; how led to secede; Union minority in. 

Gettysburg, battle of, see vol. Ii. ; Lincoln's address at. 

Giddings, Joshua R. , favors Lincoln's emancipation bill in 1849, see vol. I. ; member of Republican Convention of 1860. 

Gilmer, John A. , refuses to enter Lincoln's cabinet, see vol. I. 

Gist, governor of South Carolina, sends circular letter asking about secession feeling in South, see vol. I. 

Grant, Ulysses S. , his operations in 1862, see vol. I. ; captures Forts Henry and Donelson; recommended by Halleck for promotion; condemned by Halleck and relieved from command; reinstated; advances to Pittsburg Landing; attacked by Johnston; does not admit defeat at Shiloh; on severity of battle; his conduct of battle criticised; harassed by Halleck, asks to be relieved; on Halleck's mistakes; on Copperheads, see vol. Ii. ; forms plan to take Vicksburg; tries to approach city from south; besieges and takes Vicksburg; his credit for campaign; his relations with Lincoln; accused of drunkenness; congratulated by Lincoln; given command of the West; orders Thomas to hold Chattanooga; relieves siege; wins battle of Chattanooga; sends Sherman to relieve Burnside; on reconstruction; his conference with Lincoln; movement to nominate for President in 1864; appointed lieutenant-general; given free control; prepares plan of campaign; correspondence with Lincoln; his campaigns in Virginia; sends force to hold Washington against Early; sends Sheridan against Early; character of his military methods; reports proposal of Lee for a conference; ordered by Lincoln to refuse; on desertions from Lee's army; his plan to entrap Lee's army; wishes to capture Lee without Sherman's aid; enters Petersburg; pursues Lee; urges Lee to surrender; his liberal terms to Lee; praised by Lincoln; unable to accept Lincoln's invitation to theatre the evening of his assassination. 

Greeley, Horace, prefers Douglas to Lincoln in 1858, see vol. I. ; in convention of 1860, works against Seward; his influence used against Lincoln; willing to admit peaceable secession; on comparative strength of North and South; suddenly denounces compromise; a secessionist in 1861; publishes address to President, see vol. Ii. ; his influence; answered by Lincoln; his abusive retort; suggests French mediation; condemns Lincoln in 1864; on movement to delay nomination; his political creed; claims to be a Republican while denouncing Lincoln; favors Fremont; wishes peace at any price; wishes to treat with Confederates; authorized to do so by Lincoln; conditions named by Lincoln; abuses Lincoln for causing failure of negotiations. 

Green, Duff, tries to induce Lincoln to support Buchanan, see vol. I. 

Greene, Bolin, lends Lincoln money, see vol. I. 

Grimes, James W. , in Senate in 1861, see vol. I. 

Grow, Galusha A. , speaker of House in 1861, see vol. I. 

Habeas Corpus, suspension of, by Lincoln, see vol. I. 

Hale, John P. , sums up Buchanan's secession doctrine, see vol. I. ; in Senate in 1861; denounces administration in Trent affair. 

Halleck, General Henry W. , letter of Lincoln to, on plan of war, see vol. I. ; commands in Missouri; sends news of capture of Fort Donelson and asks for command in West; assumes command; complains of Grant; drives Grant to request to be relieved; his slow advance upon Corinth; refuses to fight; enters Corinth unopposed; fails to use powerful army; appointed general-in-chief, see vol. I. , see vol. Ii. ; compared with McClellan, see vol. I. ; gains advancement because unopposed and unnoticed by politicians; expels slaves from camp, see vol. Ii. ; favors recall of McClellan from Peninsula; allowed free hand by Lincoln; inferior to McClellan; his telegraphic dispute with McClellan; begs McClellan's assistance after Pope's defeat; instructs McClellan to command defences of Washington; alarmed over safety of capital; has friction with Hooker; refuses to give Hooker garrison of Harper's Ferry; urges Meade to attack after Gettysburg; wishes Buell and Rosecrans to invade Tennessee; superseded by Grant; on bad terms with Blair. 

Hamlin, Hannibal, nominated for Vice-President, see vol. I. ; reasons why not renominated, see vol. Ii. 

Hanks, John, aids Lincoln to split rails, see vol. I. ; on Lincoln's first sight of slavery; brings rails split by Lincoln into Republican Convention. 

Hanks, Nancy, mother of Lincoln, see vol. I. ; descends from a "poor white" family; her character; marries Thomas Lincoln; her death. 

Hardin, Colonel John J. , defeats Lincoln and Baker for Congress, see vol. I. ; defeated by Lincoln. 

Harlan, James, in Senate in 1861, see vol. I. 

Harrison, W. H. , campaign for, in 1840, see vol. I. 

Hawkins, George S. , opposes compromise in 1861 as futile, see vol. I. 

Hayti, recognized, see vol. Ii. 

Heintzelman, General Samuel P. , opposes McClellan's plan of campaign, see vol. I. ; appointed corps commander; on force necessary to protect Washington, see vol. Ii. 

Henderson, John B. , approves Lincoln's emancipation scheme, see vol. Ii. 

Henry, Fort, captured, see vol. I. 

Herndon, William H. , law partner of Lincoln, see vol. I. ; prevents Lincoln from association with Abolitionists; aids Lincoln in organizing Republican party; visits East to counteract Greeley's influence against Lincoln. 

Herold, David E. , tried for assassination of Lincoln, see vol. Ii. ; hanged. 

Hickman, John, calls Lincoln's emancipation scheme unmanly, see vol. Ii. 

Hicks, Governor Thomas H. , opposed to secession, see vol. I. ; suggests referring troubles to Lord Lyons as arbitrator. 

"Higher Law, " Seward's doctrine of, see vol. I. 

Hitchcock, General Ethan A. , considers Washington insufficiently protected, see vol. Ii. 

Holt, Joseph, succeeds Floyd in Buchanan's cabinet, see vol. I. ; joins Black and Stanton in coercing Buchanan; fears attempt of South to seize Washington. 

Hood, General John Bell, succeeds Johnston, see vol. Ii. ; defeated by Sherman. 

Hooker, General Joseph, allows slave owners to reclaim fugitives, see vol. Ii. ; replaces Burnside in command; letter of Lincoln to; his abilities; in Chancellorsville campaign; throws away chance of success; fails to use all of troops; orders retreat; wishes to resume attack; first prevented, then urged by Lincoln; wishes to capture Richmond; follows Lee to North; instructed by Lincoln to obey Halleck; irritated by Halleck, resigns; sent to aid Rosecrans; storms Lookout Mountain. 

House of Representatives, election of Lincoln to, and career in, see vol. I. ; members of; debates Mexican war; struggles in, over Wilmot proviso; refuses to pass Lincoln's emancipation bill of 1849; settles question of admission of Kansas; proposes Constitutional amendment in 1861; rejects plan of Peace Congress; leaders of, in 1861; thanks Captain Wilkes; approves emancipation proclamation, see vol. Ii. ; fails to pass thirteenth amendment; later passes amendment. 

Houston, Samuel, opposes secession in Texas, see vol. I. 

Hunter, General David, asked by Lincoln to aid Fremont, see vol. I. ; succeeds Fremont; proclaims martial law and abolishes slavery in Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina, see vol. Ii. ; his order revoked; organizes a negro regiment. 

Hunter, R. M. T. , on Confederate peace commission, see vol. Ii. ; retort of Lincoln to. 

Hyer, Tom, hired by Seward's supporters in Republican Convention, see vol. I. 

Illinois, early settlers and society of, see vol. I. ; in Black Hawk war; early politics in, ; land speculation in; career of Lincoln in legislature of; the career of "Long Nine" in; internal improvement craze in; adopts resolutions condemning Abolitionists and emancipation in the District; suffers from financial collapse; carried by Van Buren against Harrison; legal profession in; carried by Democrats in 1844; upholds Mexican war; denounces Kansas-Nebraska Act; senatorial election of 1855 in; popular feeling in, concerning Kansas; in campaign of 1856; political situation in, during 1858; prestige of Douglas in; senatorial campaign in; carried by Douglas; movement in, to nominate Lincoln for President; carried by Democrats in 1862, see vol. Ii. 

Indiana, carried by Democrats in 1862, see vol. Ii. ; Copperheads in. 

Internal improvements, craze over, in Western States, see vol. I. 

Iverson, Alfred, works in Georgia for secession, see vol. I. ; threatens Houston with assassination; wishes to keep Washington as capital of Confederacy. 

Jackson, Andrew, popularity of, in Illinois, see vol. I. ; attitude of Lincoln toward. 

Jackson, Thomas Jonathan, "Stonewall", commands at Harper's Ferry, see vol. I. ; in Shenandoah valley, see vol. Ii. ; his raid down valley in 1862; escapes pursuing forces; joins Johnston and attacks McClellan; compels McClellan to retreat to James River; defeats Banks; reinforced; marches around Pope; on too good condition of Federal armies; breaks Federal right at Chancellorsville; accidentally shot by his own soldiers. 

Johnson, Andrew, in Congress with Lincoln, see vol. I. ; in Senate in 1861; instructed by Lincoln to reorganize government in Tennessee, see vol. Ii. ; stern opinion of treason; repudiates Sherman's terms with Johnston; his nomination for vice-presidency aided by Lincoln; protested against, by Tennesseeans; his accession to presidency welcomed by radicals; refuses to commute Mrs. Surratt's sentence. 

Johnson, Bushrod R. , captured at Fort Donelson, see vol. I. 

Johnson, Herschel V. , nominated for Vice-President in 1860, see vol. I. ; votes against secession in 1860. 

Johnson, Oliver, supports Lincoln in 1864, see vol. Ii. 

Johnston, General A. S. , plans to crush Grant and Buell in detail, see vol. I. ; commands at battle of Shiloh; killed. 

Johnston, Joseph succeeds Jackson at Harper's Ferry, see vol. I. ; aids Beauregard at Bull Run; on condition of Confederate army; evacuates Manassas; fears that McClellan will storm Yorktown, see vol. Ii. ; begins attack on McClellan; retreats from Sherman after Vicksburg; terms of Sherman with, in 1865; campaign against Sherman in 1864; removed by Davis; campaign against Sherman in Carolinas; plan of Lee to join; surrenders. 

Johnston, Sally, marries Thomas Lincoln, see vol. I. ; her character. 

Jones, Abraham, ancestor of Lincoln, see vol. I. 

Judd, N. B. , asked by Lincoln to help his canvass in 1860, see vol. I. ; urges Lincoln to avoid danger of assassination. 

Julian, George W. , in House in 1861, see vol. I. ; on Republican dissatisfaction with Lincoln, see vol. Ii. 

Kane, Marshal Geo. P. , telegraphs for Southern aid to oppose passage of troops through Baltimore, see vol. I. 

Kansas, struggle in, between free and slave-state men, see vol. I. ; rival constitutions of; admission of, under Lecompton Constitution, urged by Buchanan; opposed by Douglas; attempt of Congress to bribe into acceptance of Lecompton Constitution; rejects offer; speeches of Lincoln in. 

Kansas-Nebraska bill, introduced, see vol. I. ; repeals Missouri Compromise. 

Keitt, Lawrence M. , his fight with Grow, see vol. I. 

Kellogg, Win. Pitt, letter of Lincoln to, on extension of slavery, see vol. I. 

Kentucky, desire of Lincoln to retain in Union, see vol. I. ; refuses to furnish troops; attempt of Secessionists to carry; wishes to be neutral; thereby intends to aid South; skillful dealings of Lincoln with; remains in Union; saved by State loyalty; its neutrality violated by South, joins North; campaign of Grant in; invaded by Bragg, see vol. Ii. 

Keyes, General Erasmus D. , favors McClellan's plan of campaign, see vol. I. ; appointed corps commander; on force necessary to protect Washington, see vol. Ii. ; on impossibility of taking Yorktown. 

Know-Nothings, their career in 1854-1856, see vol. I. ; attempt to draw out Lincoln in 1860. 

Lamon, Colonel Ward H. , connection with assassination story, see vol. I. 

Lane, James H. , senator from Kansas, see vol. I. 

Lane, Joseph, nominated for Vice-President on Breckinridge ticket in 1860, see vol. I. 

Lee, Robert E. , offered command of Union army, see vol. I. ; opposes secession; resigns from army and accepts command of State troops; becomes Confederate general; commands against Pope, see vol. Ii. ; prepares to invade Maryland; his contempt for McClellan; at Antietam; at Fredericksburg; outmanoeuvred by Hooker; at Chancellorsville; hopes to conquer a peace; enters Pennsylvania; retreats after Gettysburg; sends reinforcements to Bragg; campaign in Virginia against Meade; his campaign against Grant; suggests a conference with Grant; notifies Davis that Richmond must fall; his chance of escape; attacks Federal lines; tries to escape; surrenders at Appomattox; asks for food. 

Liberia, recognized, see vol. Ii. 

Lincoln, Abraham, his ignorance concerning his ancestry, see vol. I. ; sensitive regarding it; his own statements; anxious to appear of respectable stock; his genealogy as established later; his reputed illegitimacy; his birth; his references to his mother; his childhood; befriended by his step-mother; his education; early reading; early attempts at humorous writing; storytelling; youthful exploits; let out by his father; helps his father settle in Sangamon County, Ill. ; works for himself; his trip to New Orleans for Offut; impressed with slavery; in Offut's store; fights Armstrong; later friendship with Armstrong; borrows a grammar; his honesty; loses situation; involved in border quarrels; his temperance considered eccentric; careless habits of dress; in the country groceries; coarseness of speech; his sympathetic understanding of the people; his standards dependent on surroundings; enlists in Black Hawk war; chosen captain; his services. 

 _Frontier Politician_. Announces himself a candidate for the legislature; a "Clay man"; his campaign and defeat; enters grocery store, fails; pays off debt; studies law; postmaster at New Salem; settles account with government; surveyor; elected to legislature; borrows money to ride to capital; his career in legislature; love affair with Ann Rutledge; his gloom; its inexplicable character; affair with Mary Owens; again a candidate, his platform; calms excitement in campaign; his fairness; his retort to Forquer; elected as one of "Long Nine"; favors unlimited internal improvements; acknowledges his blunder; his skill as log-roller; gains popularity in county; protests against anti-abolition resolutions; admitted to bar, settles in Springfield; partnership with Stuart; studies debating; political ambitions; shows evidences of high ideals; incidents of his canvass in 1838; opposes repudiation, in legislature; reflected in 1840, unsuccessful candidate for speaker; jumps out of window to break a quorum; in campaign of 1840; his courtship of Mary Todd; fails to appear on wedding day; married; character of his married life; quarrels with Shields; later ashamed of it; improves prospects by a partnership with Logan; later joins with Herndon; his competitors at the bar; considers law secondary to politics; his legal ability; a "case lawyer"; his ability as jury lawyer; refuses to conduct a bad case; on Whig electoral ticket in 1844; later disillusioned with Clay; fails to get nomination to Congress; alleged understanding with Baker and others; renews candidacy in 1846; nominated; elected, his vote. 

 _In Congress_. Agrees with Whig programme on Mexican war; introduces "Spot Resolutions" against Polk; his speech; his doctrine of right of revolution; votes for Ashmun's amendment condemning war; defends himself from charge of lack of patriotism; his honesty; damages Whigs in Illinois; favors candidacy of Taylor; his speech in House for Taylor against Cass; votes for Wilmot Proviso; his bill to prohibit slave trade in District of Columbia; obtains support of Giddings; fails to obtain commissionership in Land Office; declines governorship of Oregon. 

 _Candidate for Senate_. Accepts compromise although recognizing its futility; favors Scott in 1852; answers Douglas's defense of Nebraska bill; escapes connection with Abolitionists; renews attack upon Douglas; candidate for Senate; leads in first ballots; injured by Abolitionist praise; urges friends to secure election of Trumbull; his alleged bargain with Trumbull; receives vote for Vice-President in Republican National Convention; his surprise; his opinion of Kansas question; delivers speech at organization of Republican party; meets disapproval at Springfield; in campaign of 1856; encounters hostility of Greeley in the East; journey of Herndon in his behalf; nominated by State Convention for senatorship; damaged by Whig support of Douglas; prepares letter of acceptance; reads paragraph on situation to friends; alarms advisers by his plainness of utterance; insists on asserting the irrepressible conflict; statesmanship of his course; challenges Douglas to joint debate; misrepresentations of his position on slavery; his appeal to "the fathers"; his accusation against the South; his crucial question to Douglas; Douglas's reply; his position on Dred Scott decision; accused of duplicity; his views as to slavery under the Constitution considered; on Abolitionists; on negro race; his freedom from animosity toward opponents or slaveholders; does not denounce slaveholders; his fairness a mental trait; on popular sovereignty; convicts Douglas of ambiguity; alleged purpose to discredit Douglas as presidential candidate; feels himself upholder of a great cause; his moral denunciation of slavery; his literary form; elevation of tone; disappointed at defeat by Douglas; exhausted by his efforts; asked to contribute to campaign fund. 

 _Candidate for Presidency_. Makes speeches in Ohio; calls Douglas pro-slavery; invited to speak in New York, prepares address; journey through Kansas; his New York address; states the situation; praised by newspapers; tour in New England; comprehensive nature of his speeches; ignores disunion; by dwelling on wrong of slavery, makes disunion wrong; slow to admit publicly a desire for presidency; enters field in 1859; nominated as candidate by Illinois Republican Convention; his managers at National Convention; yelled for by hired shouters; supposed to be more moderate than Seward; his own statement of principles; votes secured for, by bargains; nominated on third ballot; accepts nomination in dejection; his nomination a result of "availability"; little known in country at large; anxious to avoid discussion of side issues; opposed by Abolitionists; supported by Giddings; elected; the choice of a minority. 

 _President-elect_. His trying position during interregnum; his election the signal for secession; damaged by persistent opposition of New York "Tribune"; his opinion of the proposed constitutional amendment to guarantee slavery; declared elected by electoral count; alleged plot to assassinate; maintains silence during winter; privately expresses dislike of compromise; declares against interfering with slavery; pronounces for coercing seceded States; his journey to Washington; warned of plot against; speeches in Pennsylvania; induced to avoid danger; accused of cowardice; his own opinion as to plot; question of his real danger; visited by Peace Congress; impresses visitors by his appearance; inauguration of; his address; states intention to enforce laws; repeats opposition to extension only of slavery; his previous denunciations remembered by South; shows statesmanship in emphasizing Union. 

 _President_--_First Term_. Appears tranquil after entering office; not over-confident, but resolved on doing his duty; disheartened by lack of support at North; not trusted by leaders of Republican party; feels isolation; his cabinet; seeks representatives of all views; prefers individual strength to unity in cabinet; criticised by radical Republicans; has difficulties in satisfying Cameron; dissuades Seward from refusing to join cabinet; his statement of purpose to Virginia commissioners; annoys South by failing to notice it; irritates Northern extremists; asks opinion of Scott as to relieving Sumter; asks advice of cabinet; promises South to take no action without warning; again asks cabinet; forms plan to relieve Fort Pickens; spoils plan to relieve Sumter by sending Powhatan to Pensacola; announces intention to provision Sumter; admits blame for failure; question of his fault in delaying to relieve fort; issues proclamation calling for volunteers for three months; his purpose; expects Northerners to equal Southerners as fighters; calls Congress for special session; wishes to gain Kentucky; dreads effect of Baltimore riot on Border States; offers to send troops around Baltimore; soothes Maryland; cut off from North for a week; tries in vain to prevent Virginia from seceding; tries to secure Lee; successful in his policy for retaining Kentucky in Union; unable to reach North Carolina, Tennessee, or Arkansas; tries to aid Missouri loyalists; confident in efficiency of North; his capacities unknown to people; question of his "inspiration"; his masterfulness not realized; question as to his relations with advisers; obliged to restrain Chase and Seward; his relations with Chase; receives Seward's "Thoughts"; his reply to Seward; realizes his own responsibility and accepts it; receives absurd advice; proclaims blockade of Southern ports; advised to "close" ports; sees necessity of admitting war; decides to act efficiently without regard to Constitution; instructs Scott to watch Maryland legislature; issues order to arrest Maryland secessionists; orders Scott to suspend writ of habeas corpus; denounced by Taney; issues proclamation authorizing further suspension; states his argument to Congress; calls for more volunteers; takes pains with message which he sends to Congress; on neutrality of Kentucky; on blockade; on secession; appeals for ample means to end war; appoints McClellan to command Army of Potomac; avoids connection with Ball's Bluff affair; appoints McClellan to succeed Scott; sees that popular demand for action must be followed; puzzled by McClellan's refusal to move; forced to bear military responsibility; his freedom from self-seeking; urges McClellan to advance; discouraged by McClellan's illness, consults McDowell and Franklin; consults McClellan; exasperates McClellan by his action; appoints Stanton to succeed Cameron; his lack of personal feeling against Stanton; his patience toward Stanton; his letter to Halleck; wishes a direct attack; accused by McClellan's friends of meddling; decides to force action; issues General War Order No. ; its purpose political rather than military; orders McClellan to move South; asks McClellan to justify his plan; calls council of generals; accepts McClellan's plan; insists on preservation of capital; political reasons for his anxiety to hold Washington; reasons why his plan should have been adopted; never convinced of superiority of McClellan's scheme; issues General War Order to secure Washington; unmoved by abuse of McClellan's enemies; relieves McClellan of general command; forced by Congress to divide Army of Potomac into corps; appreciates importance of Western operations; urges on Western generals; unable to supply troops; appoints Fremont to command Department of West; tries to guide Fremont; appealed to by Mrs. Fremont; removes Fremont, his reasons; sees military importance of Cumberland Gap; urges construction of a railroad there; urges Buell on; annoyed by Buell's refusal to move; death of his son; discusses plan to capture New Orleans; suddenly obliged to consider foreign affairs; his corrections on Seward's instructions to Adams; his statement of foreign relations in message of December, 1861; avoids either timidity or defiance; objects from beginning to seizure of Mason and Slidell; proposes to arbitrate the matter; thinks England's claim just; wisdom of his course in surrendering the envoys; unable to prevent slavery from entering into war, see vol. Ii. ; disapproves of Fremont's order freeing slaves of rebels; by rescinding it, makes an enemy of Fremont; revokes order of Hunter freeing slaves; takes responsibility of matter upon himself; prevents Cameron from urging arming of negroes; advises recognition of Hayti and Liberia; in message suggests compensated emancipation and colonization; approves bill abolishing slavery, with compensation, in District; signs bill prohibiting return of fugitive slaves; signs bill abolishing slavery in United States Territories; signs bill to emancipate slaves of rebels; slow to execute bill to enlist slaves; finally recognizes value of black troops; his conciliatory policy not followed by Congress; his reasons for advocating compensated emancipation; hopes to induce Border States to emancipate voluntarily; sends special message urging gradual emancipation; practically warns Border State men; denounced by both sides; tries in vain to persuade Border State representatives; his plans repudiated; repeats appeal in proclamation; his scheme impracticable, but magnanimous; sees future better than others; refrains from filling vacancies on Supreme Bench with Northern men; agrees to McClellan's peninsular campaign; still worried over safety of capital; neglects to demand any specific force to protect it; forced to detach troops from McClellan to reinforce Fremont; nearly orders McClellan to attack; his plan better than McClellan's; orders McDowell to return to Washington; alarmed at condition of defenses of capital; question of his error in retaining McDowell; shows apparent vacillation; explains situation in letter to McClellan; urges him to strike; annoyed by politicians; tries to forward troops; orders McDowell to join McClellan without uncovering capital; criticised by McClellan; refuses to let McDowell move in time; sends McDowell to rescue Banks; loses his head; insists on McDowell's movement; his blunder a fatal one; not a quick thinker; ruins McClellan's campaign; begins to lose patience with McClellan's inaction; appoints Halleck commander-in-chief; his constancy in support of McClellan; does not sacrifice McClellan as scapegoat; visits Harrison's Landing; avoids any partisanship in whole affair; appears better than McClellan in campaign; yet makes bad blunders; stands alone in failure; remains silent; allows Halleck a free hand; his reasons for appointing Halleck and Pope; decides to reappoint McClellan; shows sound judgment; places everything in McClellan's hands; indignant at slight results from Antietam; urges McClellan to pursue; his order ignored by McClellan; writes McClellan a blunt letter insinuating sluggishness or cowardice; replaces McClellan by Burnside; his extreme reticence as to his motives; attacked by Copperheads; criticised by defenders of the Constitution; harassed by extreme Abolitionists; denounced for not issuing a proclamation of emancipation; his reasons for refusing; explains his attitude as President toward slavery; struggles to hold Border States; general dissatisfaction with, in 1862; held inefficient by Chase; and by Congressmen; but believed in by people; addressed by Greeley with "Prayer of 20, 000, 000"; his reply to Greeley; his reply to Abolitionist clergymen; points out folly of a mere proclamation; thinks silently for himself under floods of advice; writes draft of Emancipation Proclamation; questions expediency of issuing; reads proclamation to cabinet; adopts Seward's suggestion to postpone until a victory; issues preliminary proclamation after Antietam; takes entire responsibility; not influenced by meeting of governors; fails to appease extremists; supported by party; thinks an earlier proclamation would not have been sustained; warned that he will cause loss of fall elections; always willing to trust people on a moral question; supported by Border States in election; renews proposals for compensated emancipation; favors it as a peaceful measure; his argument; fails to persuade Missouri to accept plan; issues definite proclamation; his remark on signing; tries to stimulate enlistment of blacks; threatens retaliation for Southern excesses; shows signs of care and fatigue; never asks for sympathy; slow to displace McClellan until sure of a better man; doubtful as to Burnside's plan of attack; refuses to accept Burnside's resignation after Fredericksburg; declines to ratify Burnside's dismissals; his letter to Hooker; suggestions to Hooker after Chancellorsville; opposes plan to dash at Richmond; directs Hooker to obey Halleck; appoints Meade to succeed Hooker; urges Meade to attack Lee after Gettysburg; angry at Meade's failure; his letter to Meade; annoyed by Democratic proposals for peace; refuses to receive Stephens. ; annoyed by inaction of Rosecrans; urged to remove Grant; refuses to disturb him; his letter to Grant after Vicksburg; wishes Rosecrans to unite with Burnside; tries to encourage Rosecrans after Chickamauga; sends aid to Rosecrans; replaces him by Thomas and puts Grant in command in West; wishes Meade to attack in Virginia; refuses to interfere in finances; his attitude in Alabama affair; refuses foreign arbitration; asked by radicals to dismiss Seward; secures resignations of Chase and Seward, and then urges them to resume duties; his wisdom in avoiding a rupture; asks opinion of cabinet on admission of West Virginia; his reasons for signing bill; not alarmed by Copperhead societies; his relation to Vallandigham case; supports Burnside; sends Vallandigham within Confederate lines; replies to addresses condemning martial law; obliged to begin draft; insists upon its execution; his letter to Illinois Union Convention; shows necessity of war; impossibility of compromise; justifies emancipation; points to successes; really controls government autocratically; able to, because supported by people; gains military experience; has measure of generals; henceforward supervises rather than specifically orders; begged by Chandler to disregard conservatives; prepares address for Gettysburg; the address; his theory of "reconstruction"; recognizes a state government of Virginia; appoints military governors for conquered States; urges them to organize state governments; wishes only Union men to act; wishes bona fide elections; instructs new State organizers to recognize emancipation; fails to prevent quarrels; issues amnesty proclamation; proposes reconstruction by one tenth of voters; at first generally applauded; later opposed by Congress; on negro suffrage; doubts power of Congress over slavery in States; refuses to sign reconstruction bill; denounced by radicals; defends his course; his conference with Sherman, Grant, and Porter; wishes to let Davis escape; his authority appealed to by Sherman later; question of practicability of his plan; its generosity and humanity. 

 _Reëlection_. Opposition to his reëlection in Republican party; exasperates Congressmen by his independence; not disquieted by Chase's candidacy; desires reëlection; trusts in popular support; letter of Pomeroy against; refuses Chase's resignation; renominated by Ohio and Rhode Island Republicans; opposition to, collapses; relations with Chase strained; accepts Chase's resignation; nominates as successor, Tod, who declines; forces Fessenden to accept Treasury; angers Missourians by refusing to remove Schofield; denounced by them and by Phillips; gradually wins support of Abolitionists; witty remark on Fremont's nomination; remark on Grant's candidacy; generally supported by local party organizations; the "people's candidate"; refuses to interfere actively to secure renomination; desires admission of delegates from South; nominated; question of his having dictated nomination of Johnson; accepts nomination; feels need of some military success; assailed by Greeley; embarrassed by Greeley's dealings with Confederate emissaries; authorizes Greeley to confer; charged by Greeley with failure; asked if he intends to insist on abolition; for political reasons, does not reply; renews call for soldiers; waits for military success; appoints Grant lieutenant-general; agrees not to interfere with Grant; wishes Grant success; astonished by a civil reply; under fire during Early's attack on Washington; discredited by fact of Washington's being still in danger; thanks Sherman for victory of Atlanta; rewards Sheridan for defeating Early; his election secured by these successes; urged by radicals to remove Blair; refuses at first, later does so; refuses to interfere in campaign; refuses to postpone call for more troops; refutes campaign slanders; prepares for defeat; re-elected easily; his remarks on election; refuses to intervene to secure counting of electoral votes of Border States; signs bill rejecting elections in Southern States, his reasons; shows magnanimity in appointing Chase chief justice; refuses to try to hasten matters; refuses to negotiate with Davis; permits Blair to see Davis; sends Seward to confer with Southern peace commissioners; later himself confers with them; insists on complete submission; other positions; recognizes decline of Confederacy; wishes to hasten peace by offer of money compensation and an amnesty proclamation; his scheme disapproved by cabinet; his second inaugural address. 

 _Second Term_. Possibly thinks Emancipation Proclamation unconstitutional; on its practical results; unable to touch institution of slavery; wishes a constitutional amendment; wishes it mentioned in Republican platform; on impossibility of renewing slavery; led to make war on slavery by situation; sees necessity of its abolition to secure results of war; unable to treat with seceded States; renews appeal for Constitutional amendment in 1864; exerts influence with Congressmen; congratulates crowd on passage of amendment; his responsibility in last weeks of war; forbids Grant to treat with Lee on political matters; conference with Grant, Sherman, and Porter; enters Petersburg; visits Richmond; speech on returning to White House; his disgust with office-seekers; superstitious concerning assassination; receives threats, but ignores them; persuaded to accept a guard; his remarks; refuses to consider Americans as his enemies; visits theatre, is assassinated; effect of his death upon history; general view of his character. 

 _Personal Characteristics_. General view, see vol. Ii. ; unfriendly views, see vol. I. , see vol. Ii. ; abstemiousness, see vol. I. ; ambition, see vol. I. , see vol. Ii. ; business inefficiency, see vol. I. , see vol. Ii. ; coarseness, see vol. I. ; coolness, see vol. I. , see vol. Ii. ; courage, see vol. I. , see vol. Ii. ; development through life, see vol. I. ; education, see vol. I. ; eloquence, see vol. I. , see vol. Ii. ; far-sightedness, see vol. I. , see vol. Ii. ; honesty, see vol. I. , see vol. Ii. ; humor, see vol. I. , see vol. Ii. ; kindliness, see vol. I. , see vol. Ii. ; legal ability, see vol. I. ; loyalty, see vol. I. , see vol. Ii. ; magnanimity, see vol. I. , see vol. Ii. ; masterfulness, see vol. I. , see vol. Ii. ; melancholy, see vol. I. , see vol. Ii. ; military ability, see vol. I. , see vol. Ii. ; modesty, see vol. I. , see vol. Ii. ; morbidness, see vol. I. ; patience, see vol. I. , see vol. Ii. ; physical strength, see vol. I. ; popular insight, see vol. I. , see vol. Ii. ; reticence, see vol. I. , see vol. Ii. ; shrewdness, see vol. I. , see vol. Ii. ; superstition, see vol. Ii. ; tenacity, see vol. I. , see vol. Ii. ; unselfishness, see vol. I. , see vol. Ii. ; women, relations with, see vol. I. 

 _Political Opinions_. Blockade, see vol. I. ; Border State policy, see vol. I. , see vol. Ii. ; Compromise of 1850, see vol. I. ; Constitution, see vol. I. , see vol. Ii. ; Copperheads, see vol. Ii. ; disunion, see vol. I. , see vol. Ii. ; draft, see vol. Ii. ; Dred Scott case, see vol. I. ; emancipation, see vol. I. , see vol. Ii. ; England, see vol. I. , see vol. Ii. ; finance, see vol. I. , see vol. Ii. ; habeas corpus, suspension of, see vol. I. ; "house divided against itself", see vol. I. ; internal improvements, see vol. I. ; Kansas-Nebraska Bill, see vol. I. ; Mexican war, see vol. I. ; military events of war of Rebellion, see vol. Ii. ; negro soldiers, see vol. Ii. ; negro suffrage, see vol. Ii. ; office-seekers, see vol. Ii. ; party management, see vol. I. , see vol. Ii. ; peace, terms of, see vol. Ii. ; reconstruction, see vol. Ii. ; slavery, see vol. I. , see vol. Ii. ; Southern policy, see vol. I. ; States' rights, see vol. I. ; suffrage, see vol. I. ; Trent affair, see vol. I. ; war, purpose of, see vol. Ii. ; Wilmot Proviso, see vol. I. 

Lincoln, Abraham, grandfather of Lincoln, emigrates to Kentucky, see vol. I. ; his marriage; shot by Indians. 

Lincoln, John, son of Mordecai, inherits property in New Jersey, see vol. I. ; moves to Virginia; his descendants. 

Lincoln, Mordecai, son of Samuel, lives in Scituate, Mass. , see vol. I. ; his descendants. 

Lincoln, Mordecai, son of Mordecai, moves to Pennsylvania, see vol. I. ; his property. 

Lincoln, Mordecai, son of Abraham, saves life of Thomas Lincoln, see vol. I. 

Lincoln, Samuel, ancestor of Lincoln, emigrates to New England, see vol. I. 

Lincoln, Solomon, establishes Lincoln's pedigree, see vol. I. 

Lincoln, Thomas, father of Abraham, see vol. I. ; life saved from Indians; denies Puritan or Quaker ancestry; his parentage of Abraham denied; marries Nancy Hanks; his children; moves from Kentucky to Indiana; marries again; moves to Illinois; later relations with Abraham; his manner of fighting. 

Logan, Stephen T. , partnership with, and influence upon, Lincoln, see vol. I. ; leader of Illinois bar; agrees with Lincoln to receive election to House in turn; defeated for Congress; manages Lincoln's candidacy in Republican Convention of 1860. 

Longstreet, General James, sent to reinforce Jackson, see vol. Ii. ; enters Pennsylvania; sent to reinforce Bragg; at battle of Chickamauga; sent to crush Burnside; retreats from Sherman. 

Louisiana, not ready for secession, see vol. I. ; but prepared to resist coercion; plan of Lincoln to reconstruct, see vol. Ii. 

Lovejoy, Elijah P. , killed at Alton, see vol. I. 

Lovejoy, Owen, tries to commit Lincoln to joining Abolitionists, see vol. I. ; prevents Lincoln's election as senator; in House in 1861; his rage after Trent affair; supports Lincoln in 1864, see vol. Ii. 

Lyons, Lord, suggested by Hicks as arbitrator between North and South, see vol. I. ; instructed to insist on instant reply in Trent affair; confers with Seward. 

McCall, General George A. , favors McClellan's plan of campaign, see vol. I. ; his division sent to aid McClellan, see vol. Ii. 

McClellan, George B. , given command of Army of Potomac, see vol. I. ; his record prior to 1861; his organizing ability; promoted to succeed Scott; his arrogance and contempt for civilians; causes discontent by inactivity; considers army unfit to move; unwilling from temperament to take any risks; fails to appreciate political situation; overestimates preparations of Confederates; overestimates Confederate numbers; wishes to end war by a crushing campaign; ignores Lincoln's suggestion to move; falls ill; hearing of conferences, becomes well and makes appearance; snubs McDowell and Chase; objects to a direct attack on Confederates; his plan; his opponents become a recognized faction; his scheme repudiated by Lincoln; protests and explains views; liberality of Lincoln towards; thinks politicians plot to destroy him; his plan accepted by Lincoln; discussion of its merit; makes mistake in insisting on his plan against Lincoln's wish; hampered by Lincoln's detaching men to protect Washington; discredited by Johnston's evacuation of Manassas; denounced Committee on Conduct of War; begins advance; annoyed at being relieved from general command; exasperated at action of Lincoln in forming corps and appointing commanders; authorizes Halleck to arrest Grant; approves Buell's plan; his career compared with Halleck's; promises to put down any slave insurrection, see vol. Ii. ; in spite of evacuation of Manassas, insists on Peninsular campaign; approved by corps commanders; estimate of forces needed to defend Washington; fears no danger from Manassas; protests against removal of Blenker's brigade; begins campaign at Fortress Monroe; besieges Yorktown; sneers at Lincoln's suggestion of storming it; his excuses always good; exasperated at retention of McDowell before Washington; question of his responsibility; not really trusted by Lincoln; still outnumbers enemy; letter of Lincoln to, answering his complaints; takes Yorktown; advances slowly; predicts Confederate evacuation of Norfolk; continues advance; forbidden to use McDowell so as to uncover Washington; protests; follows Lincoln's plan and extends right wing to meet McDowell; informed by Lincoln of withdrawal of McDowell to pursue Jackson; attacked by Johnston and Jackson; refuses to move for two weeks; wears out Lincoln's patience by delay; retorts sharply to suggestions; retreats to James River; writes bitter letter to Stanton; proves his incapacity to attack; wishes to resume offensive by James River; his prestige ruined at Washington; his recall demanded by Pope and Halleck; supported by Lincoln in spite of attacks; finally ordered to retreat; discussion of his conduct; beloved by army; predicts defeat of Pope; accused of failing to support Pope; exchanges telegrams with Halleck; his aid asked by Halleck after Pope's defeat; kept inactive during Pope's campaign; appointed by Lincoln, in spite of protests, to command in Washington; his fitness to reorganize army; describes steps taken to put him in command; cautious attitude toward Lee; at Antietam; welcomed by troops; fails to use advantages; urged by Lincoln to pursue; disappoints country by inaction; ordered by Lincoln to advance; letter of Lincoln to; fails to move; relieved from command; conduct of Lincoln towards; praised by conservative Democrats; endangers of emancipation; nominated for President; repudiates peace plank; his election hoped for by South. 

McClernand, General John A. , letter of Lincoln to, on difficulties of equipping armies, see vol. I. 

McClure, A. K. , on influence of New York "Tribune", see vol. Ii. 

McDougall, James A. , in Congress in 1861, see vol. I. 

McDowell, General Irwin, commands Federal army, see vol. I. ; obliged to attack; at battle of Bull Run; summoned by Lincoln to consultation; does not tell McClellan; describes McClellan's appearance at conference; favors Lincoln's plan of campaign; appointed to command a corps; on force necessary to defend Washington, see vol. Ii. ; his corps retained at Washington; reasons of Lincoln for retaining; again ordered to support McClellan; ordered not to uncover Washington; prevented from advancing by Lincoln's superstition; ordered to turn and pursue Jackson; protests vigorously; obliged to abandon McClellan; foretells that Jackson will escape. 

McLean, John, candidate for Republican nomination in 1860, see vol. I. 

Magruder, General J. B. , confronts McClellan at Yorktown, see vol. Ii. ; evacuates Yorktown. 

Maine, Democratic gains in, during 1862, see vol. Ii. 

Mallory, S. R. , in Confederate cabinet, see vol. I. 

Malvern Hill, battle of, see vol. Ii. 

Maryland, passage of troops through, see vol. I. ; effect of Baltimore conflict upon; danger of its secession; determines to stand neutral; importance of its action; furnishes South with troops; military arrests in, to prevent secession; Lee's invasion of, see vol. Ii. 

Mason, James M. , captured by Wilkes, see vol. I. ; imprisoned in Port Warren; surrendered. 

Massachusetts, prepared for war by Governor Andrew, see vol. I. ; sends troops to front. 

Matteson, Governor Joel A. , Democratic candidate for Senator in Illinois, see vol. I. 

Maynard, Horace, in House in 1861, see vol. I. ; approves Lincoln's emancipation scheme, see vol. Ii. 

Meade, General George G. , on McClellan's organizing ability, see vol. I. ; replaces Burnside in command, see vol. Ii. ; question of his powers; at Gettysburg; fails to attack; irritation of Lincoln with; offers to resign; urged in vain by Lincoln to attack; "campaign in mud"; enters Petersburg; at Appomattox. 

Meigs, General Montgomery C. , at Lincoln's council of war in January, 1862, see vol. I. 

Memminger, C. G. , in Confederate cabinet, see vol. I. 

Mercer, Captain, Samuel, superseded by Porter under Lincoln's orders, see vol. I. 

Mercier, M. Henri, letter of Greeley to, see vol. Ii. 

Merryman, John, arrested in Maryland, see vol. I. ; attempt of Taney to liberate. 

Mexican war, denounced by Whigs, see vol. I. ; character of. 

Mexico, driven into war, see vol. I. ; abolishes slavery. 

Michigan, Republican losses in election of 1862, see vol. Ii. 

Miles, Colonel Dixon S. , at Harper's Ferry, see vol. Ii. 

Miller, Mrs. Nancy, bargains with Lincoln to make a pair of trousers, see vol. I. 

Mississippi, not ready to secede, see vol. I. ; secedes; sends commissioner to persuade North Carolina. 

Missouri, refuses to furnish Lincoln with troops, see vol. I. ; Unionist and Southern elements in; civil war in; refuses to secede; Fremont's career in; saved from South by General Curtis; refuses compensated emancipation, see vol. Ii. ; factional quarrels in; declares for Fremont against Lincoln; delegates from, in Republican Convention. 

Missouri Compromise, its sacred character, see vol. I. ; its extension demanded in 1850; questioned by South; repealed. 

Morgan, Edwin D. , urged by Lincoln to put emancipation plank in Republican platform, see vol. Ii. 

Morton, Governor Oliver P. , harassed by Copperheads, see vol. Ii. ; tries to alarm Lincoln. 

Mudd, Samuel, accomplice of Booth, tried and condemned, see vol. Ii. 

Naglee, General Henry M. , favors McClellan's plan of campaign, see vol. I. 

Napoleon I. , Lincoln contrasted with, see vol. Ii. 

Napoleon III. , agrees with Earl Russell to recognize belligerency of South, see vol. I. ; offers mediation, see vol. Ii. ; his course suggested by Greeley. 

Negroes, equality of, Lincoln's feeling toward, see vol. I. 

Nesmith, James W. , in Senate in 1861, see vol. I. 

New England, speeches of Lincoln in, see vol. I. 

New Jersey, carried by Democrats in 1862, see vol. Ii. 

New Mexico, plan of South to occupy as slave territory, see vol. I. ; urged by Taylor to ask for admission as a State; organized as a Territory. 

New York, Lincoln's speech in, see vol. I. ; secession threatened in; carried by Democrats in 1862, see vol. Ii. ; tries to evade draft; draft riots in. 

North, surpasses South in development, see vol. I. ; begins to oppose spread of slavery; denounces Kansas-Nebraska Act; anti-Southern feeling in; enraged at Dred Scott decision; annoyed at both Secessionists and Abolitionists; effect of Lincoln's "House divided" speech upon; effect of Lincoln's speeches in; its attitude toward slavery the real cause of secession; carried by Republicans in 1860; its condition between Lincoln's election and his inauguration; panic in, during 1860; urged to let South secede in peace; proposals in, to compromise with South; led by Lincoln to oppose South on grounds of union, not slavery; irritated at inaction of Lincoln; effect of capture of Fort Sumter upon; rushes to arms; compared with South infighting qualities; responds to Lincoln's call for troops; military enthusiasm; doubtful as to Lincoln's ability; wishes to crush South without delay; forces McDowell to advance; enlightened by Bull Run; impatient with slowness of McClellan to advance; expects sympathy of England; annoyed at recognition of Southern belligerency by England; rejoices at capture of Mason and Slidell; its hatred of England; unity of, in 1861, see vol. Ii. ; inevitably led to break on slavery question; depressed by Peninsular campaign; opponents of the war in; public men of, condemn Lincoln; popular opinion supports him; effect of Emancipation Proclamation upon; forced by Lincoln to choose between emancipation and failure of war; depressed after Chancellorsville; discouraged by European offers of mediation; adjusts itself to war; waning patriotism in; tries to evade draft; draft riots in; bounty-jumping in; Republican gains in; really under Lincoln's dictatorship; relieved from gloom by successes of 1864; rejoicings in 1865. 

North Carolina, not at first in favor of secession, see vol. I. ; ready to oppose coercion; urged by Mississippi to secede; refuses to furnish Lincoln troops; finally secedes;

Offut, Denton, sends Lincoln to New Orleans with a cargo, see vol. I. ; makes Lincoln manager of a store; brags of Lincoln's abilities; fails and moves away. 

Oglesby, Governor R. J. , presides over Illinois Republican Convention, see vol. I. 

Ohio, campaign of 1858 in, see vol. I. ; carried by Democrats in 1862, see vol. Ii. ; career of Vallandigham in; reply of Lincoln to Democrats of; election of 1863 in; renominates Lincoln in 1864. 

O'Laughlin, Michael, accomplice of Booth, tried and condemned, see vol. Ii. 

Ordinance of 1787, its adoption and effect, see vol. I. 

Owens, Mary, rejects Lincoln, see vol. I. 

Pain, John, Lincoln's only hearer at "mass meeting" to organize Republican party, see vol. I. 

Palmerston, Lord, drafts British ultimatum in Mason and Slidell case, see vol. I. ; shows it to Queen. 

Paris, Comte de, on condition of Union army in 1861, see vol. I. ; on McDowell's advance from Washington to aid McClellan, see vol. Ii. 

Patterson, General Robert, commands force in Pennsylvania, see vol. I. ; fails to watch Johnston. 

Payne, Lewis, accomplice of Booth, tried and hanged, see vol. Ii. 

Peace Congress, its composition and action, see vol. I. ; repudiated by South. 

Pea Ridge, battle of, see vol. I. 

Pemberton, General John C. , surrenders Vicksburg, see vol. Ii. 

Pendleton, George H. , in House in 1861, see vol. I. 

Pennsylvania, carried by Democrats in 1862, see vol. Ii. ; regained by Republicans; renominates Lincoln. 

Penrose, Captain----, on Lincoln's rashness in entering Richmond, see vol. Ii. 

Perryville, battle of, see vol. Ii. 

Peters, ----, refuses to trust a Republican, see vol. I. 

Phillips, Wendell, remark on nomination of Lincoln, see vol. I. ; denounces Lincoln; welcomes secession; upholds right of South to secede; opposes Lincoln's renomination, see vol. Ii. 

Pickens, Fort, relief of, in 1861, see vol. I. 

Pickens, Governor F. W. , sends commissioners to Buchanan regarding dissolution of Union by South Carolina, see vol. I. 

Pierce, Franklin, elected President, see vol. I. ; defeated for renomination. 

Pierpoint, Francis H. , recognized as governor of Virginia, see vol. Ii. 

Pillow, Fort, massacre at, see vol. Ii. 

Pillow, General Gideon J. , runs away from Fort Donelson, see vol. I. 

Pinkerton, Allan, discovers plot to assassinate Lincoln, see vol. I. 

Plug Uglies, feared in 1861, see vol. I. ; mob Massachusetts troops. 

Polk, James K. , carries Illinois in 1844, see vol. I. ; brings on Mexican war; his policy attacked by Lincoln's "Spot Resolutions"; asks for two millions to buy territory. 

Pomeroy, Samuel C. , senator from Kansas, see vol. I. ; an enemy of Lincoln, see vol. Ii. ; urges Chase's friends to organize to oppose Lincoln's renomination. 

Pope, General John, recommended by Halleck for promotion, see vol. I. ; prevented by Halleck from fighting; urges recall of McClellan from Peninsula, see vol. Ii. ; his military abilities; commands Army of Virginia; shows arrogance and lack of tact; fails to cut off Jackson from Lee; insists on fighting; beaten at Bull Run; discredited. 

Popular sovereignty, doctrine of, in Compromise of 1850, see vol. I. ; used by Douglas to justify repeal of Missouri Compromise; theory of, destroyed by Dred Scott decision; attempt of Douglas to reconcile, with Dred Scott case. 

Porter, General Andrew, favors McClellan's plan of campaign, see vol. I. 

Porter, David D. , takes Powhatan under Lincoln's orders, see vol. I. ; refuses to obey Seward's order; aids Grant at Vicksburg, see vol. Ii. ; confers with Lincoln; upholds Sherman in referring to Lincoln as authorizing Johnston's terms of surrender. 

Porter, General Fitz-John, favors McClellan's plan of campaign, see vol. I. ; sent to meet McDowell, see vol. Ii. 

Powell, L. W. , denounces Lincoln's emancipation scheme, see vol. Ii. 

Rathbone, Major Henry R. , at Lincoln's assassination, see vol. Ii. 

Raymond, Henry J. , warns Lincoln of danger done to Republican party by emancipation policy, see vol. Ii. ; reply of Lincoln to. 

Reagan, J. H. , in Confederate cabinet, see vol. I. 

Reconstruction, constitutional theory of, see vol. Ii. ; begun by appointment of military governors; Lincoln's plan for; blocked by refusal of Congress to receive representatives; usually associated with new constitutions; method laid down in amnesty proclamation; difficulties in way of; extremist proposals concerning; Reconstruction bill passed; bill for, vetoed by Lincoln; later statements of Lincoln concerning; involved in Sherman's terms of surrender given to Johnston; Lincoln's scheme discussed; problem of, in 1865; intention of Lincoln to keep, in his own control. 

Republican party, its origin, see vol. I. ; in campaign of 1856; organized in Illinois; defined by Lincoln; its programme put forth by Lincoln; in Illinois, nominates Lincoln for presidency; convention of, in 1860; candidates before; balloting, in convention; nominates Lincoln; chooses Lincoln because available; its campaign methods; denounced by Abolitionists; elects Lincoln; its moral attitude toward slavery the real cause of secession; its legal position on slavery; its leaders distrust Lincoln; dissatisfied with Lincoln's cabinet; dissatisfied with Lincoln's emancipation policy, see vol. Ii. ; torn by factions; Abolitionist members of, denounce Lincoln; leaders of, condemn Lincoln; majority of, continues to support him; influence of Greeley upon; upholds Emancipation Proclamation; loses in congressional elections of 1862; radical wing of, demands dismissal of Seward; regains ground in 1863; extreme faction of, still distrusts Lincoln and Seward; members of, denounce Lincoln for vetoing reconstruction bill; movement in, to nominate Chase; movement in, to nominate Fremont; masses of, adhere to Lincoln; fails to postpone nominating convention; nominates Lincoln; nominates Johnson for Vice-President; receives reluctant support of radicals; damaged by Greeley's denunciations of Lincoln; dreads defeat in summer of 1864; damaged by draft; radical element of, forces dismissal of Blair; conduct of campaign by; gains election in 1864; makes thirteenth amendment a plank in platform; radical members of, rejoice at accession of Johnson after murder of Lincoln. 

Reynolds, Governor, calls for volunteers in Black Hawk war, see vol. I. 

Rhode Island, renominates Lincoln, see vol. Ii. 

Richardson, W. A. , remark on congressional interference with armies, see vol. I. 

Rives, W. C. , remark of Lincoln to, on coercion, see vol. I. 

Rosecrans, General William S. , succeeds Buell, see vol. Ii. ; disapproves Halleck's plan to invade East Tennessee; fights battle of Stone's River; reluctant to advance; drives Bragg out of Tennessee; refuses to move; finally advances to Chattanooga; defeated at Chickamauga; unnerved after Chickamauga; cheered by Lincoln; besieged in Chattanooga; relieved by Grant. 

Russell, Earl, his prejudices in favor of South, see vol. I. ; recognizes belligerency of South, see vol. I. ; revises Palmerston's dispatch in Trent affair; condemns Emancipation Proclamation, see vol. Ii. ; calls Alabama affair a scandal. 

Rutledge, Ann, love affair of Lincoln with, see vol. I. 

Saulsbury, Willard, in Senate in 1861, see vol. I. 

Saxton, General Rufus, permitted to raise negro troops, see vol. Ii. 

Schofield, General John M. , treats with Johnston, see vol. Ii. ; his removal from Missouri refused by Lincoln. 

Schurz, General Carl, refused permission by Lincoln to leave army to support his canvass, see vol. Ii. 

Scott, Winfield, in Mexican war, see vol. I. ; supported by Lincoln for President; suggests division of country into four parts; his help expected by Secessionists; advises reinforcement of Southern garrisons; threatens Southerners with violence; warns Lincoln of plot to murder; his military preparations; thinks Sumter must be abandoned; assembles troops at Washington; wishes to induce Lee to command Northern army; instructed to watch Maryland legislature; authorized to suspend writ of habeas corpus; has difficulties with McClellan; retires. 

Seaton, William W. , promises to help Lincoln's emancipation bill, see vol. I. 

Secession, mention of, avoided by Douglas and Lincoln, see vol. I. ; question of its justification in 1860; process of, in 1860-61; discussed by Buchanan; admitted by Northern leaders; threatened by New York Democrats; Lincoln's view of; Southern theory of; its success makes union, not slavery, the issue at stake; renewed by Border States; recognized as not the ultimate cause of war, see vol. Ii. ; again asserted by Lincoln to be cause of war. 

Sedgwick, General John, beaten at Chancellorsville, see vol. Ii. 

Semmes, Captain Raphael, his career with the Alabama, see vol. Ii. 

Senate of United States, proposes "Union-saving devices", see vol. I. ; defeats Crittenden compromise; rejects plan of Peace Congress; leaders of, in 1861; passes thirteenth amendment, see vol. Ii. 

Seward, Frederick, warns Lincoln of plot in 1861, see vol. I. 

Seward, W. H. , appeals to higher law, see vol. I. ; candidate for Republican nomination to presidency; opposed by Greeley; methods of his supporters; considered too radical; defeated by a combination; deserves the nomination; adopts conciliatory attitude in 1860; sends son to warn Lincoln; meets Lincoln at Washington; his theory of irrepressible conflict; wishes to submit to South; secretary of state; tries to withdraw consent; attempt of Davis to involve, in discussion with Confederate commissioners; refuses to receive them; announces that Sumter will be evacuated; reproached by commissioners; opposes reinforcing Sumter; authorized to inform Confederates that Lincoln will not act without warning; makes mistake in order concerning Powhatan; said to have led Lincoln to sign papers without understanding contents; made to feel subordination by Lincoln; submits thoughts for President's consideration; wishes foreign war; offers to direct the government; reasons for his actions; repressed by Lincoln; advises against a paper blockade; wishes to maintain friendly relations with England; angered at Russell's conduct; writes menacing instructions to Adams; his attitude in Mason and Slidell affair; drafts reply to England's ultimatum; disavows Wilkes's act and surrenders envoys; advises Lincoln to withhold Emancipation Proclamation until after a victory, see vol. Ii. ; suggests promise to maintain freedom of slaves; dealings with England; rejects offer of French mediation; denounced by radicals; plan to force his resignation; offers resignation; withdraws it at Lincoln's request; on Copperhead societies; denounced by Chandler; on bad terms with Blair; his remarks used against Lincoln; sent by Lincoln to confer with Confederate peace commission, his instructions; shown Lincoln's dispatch to Grant; attempt to assassinate. 

Seymour, Horatio, elected governor of New York, see vol. Ii. ; denounces tyranny of Lincoln; tries to prevent draft; asks Lincoln to delay enforcement until Supreme Court gives judgment; inefficient at time of draft riots. 

Shackford, Samuel, investigates Lincoln's ancestry, see vol. I. 

Shellabarger, Samuel, in House in 1861, see vol. I. 

Shepley, Governor G. F. , remark of Lincoln to, see vol. Ii. 

Sheridan, General Philip H. , at battle of Chattanooga, see vol. Ii. ; his campaign against Early; plans to cut off Lee; wins Five Forks; at Appomattox. 

Sherman, John, in Senate in 1861, see vol. I. 

Sherman, General W. T. , unappreciated by Halleck, see vol. I. ; authorized by Cameron to use slaves, see vol. Ii. ; assaults Vicksburg; pursues Johnston; sent to reinforce Rosecrans; storms Missionary Ridge; relieves Burnside; confers with Lincoln; his terms to Johnston in 1865 involve political reconstruction; his terms annulled by Stanton; shows resentment toward Stanton; makes terms with Johnston; refers to Lincoln as authority; his terms disapproved by Grant; appointed to command in West; drives Johnston southward; defeats Hood at Atlanta; thanked by Lincoln; marches to the sea; marches north through Carolinas; ready to join Grant. 

Shields, General James A. , paper duel of Lincoln with, see vol. I. ; loses reëlection to Senate; his force joined to McDowell's, see vol. Ii. 

Shipley, Mary, ancestor of Lincoln, see vol. I. 

Short, James, lends Lincoln money, see vol. I. 

Sickles, Daniel E. , threatens secession of New York city, see vol. I. 

Sigel, General Franz, replaces Fremont, see vol. Ii. 

Slavery, its entrance into politics described, see vol. I. ; compromises concerning, in Constitution; settled by Missouri Compromise; attitude of South toward; necessity of extending area of, in order to preserve; Lincoln's description of struggle over; attitude of Lincoln toward; moral condemnation of, by North, the real cause of secession; wisdom of Lincoln in passing over, as cause of war; forced to front as real cause of war, see vol. Ii. ; comes into question through action of Federal generals; attempts of Fremont and Hunter to abolish, revoked by Lincoln; acts of Congress affecting; Emancipation Proclamation against; regard for, hinders War Democrats from supporting Lincoln; not touched as an institution by Emancipation Proclamation; necessity of a constitutional amendment to abolish; desire of Copperheads to reëstablish. 

Slaves, during Civil War, called "contraband" by Butler, see vol. Ii. ; escape to Northern armies; declared free by Fremont; this declaration revoked by Lincoln; declared free by Hunter; inconsistent attitude of generals toward; proposal of Cameron to arm, cancelled by Lincoln; protected from return to owners by Congress; armed; not paid equally with whites until 1864; armed in 1863; threatened with death by South. 

Slidell, John, seized by Wilkes, see vol. I. ; imprisoned in Fort Warren; released. 

Smith, Caleb B. , delivers votes to Lincoln in convention of 1860, see vol. I. ; secretary of interior; opposes relieving Sumter. 

Smith, General C. W. , praised by Halleck, see vol. I. 

Smith, General W. F. , favors McClellan's plan of campaign, see vol. I. 

Smoot, Coleman, lends Lincoln money, see vol. I. 

South, its early sectionalism, see vol. I. ; demands political equality with North; its inferior development; gains by annexation of Texas; enraged at organization of California as a free State; threatens disunion; demands Fugitive Slave Law; asserts doctrine of non-intervention in Territories; not satisfied with Compromise of 1850; fails to secure Kansas; applauds Brooks for his assault on Sunnier; enraged at Douglas's opposition to Lecompton Constitution. ; reads Douglas out of party; its policy described by Lincoln; fairness of Lincoln toward; demands that North cease to call slavery wrong; question of its justification in seceding; its delegates disrupt Democratic party; scatters vote in 1860; process of secession in; agitation of dis-unionists in; State loyalty in; justified by Greeley and others; threatens North; repudiates Peace Congress; its leaders in Congress remain to hamper government; forms Confederacy; expects Scott to aid; wishes to seize Washington; impressed by Lincoln's inaugural; its real grievance the refusal of North to admit validity of slavery; its doctrine of secession; "Union men" in; makes secession, not slavery, the ground of war; irritated at failure of secession to affect North; purpose of Lincoln to put in the wrong; rejoices over capture of Sumter; compared with North in fighting qualities; elated over Bull Bun; its strength overestimated by McClellan; expects aid from Northern sympathizers; hopes of aid from England disappointed; after Chancellorsville, wishes to invade North and conquer a peace, see vol. Ii. ; welcomes Vallandigham; economically exhausted in 1863; reconstruction in; applauds McClellan; evidently exhausted in 1864; hopes of Lincoln to make its surrender easy. 

South Carolina, desires secession, see vol. I. ; suggests it to other States; secedes; sends commissioners to treat for division of property with United States; refusal of Buchanan to receive; refuses to participate in Peace Congress; besieges Fort Sumter. 

Spangler, Edward, aids Booth to escape, see vol. Ii. ; tried by court martial; condemned. 

Speed, Joshua, letter of Lincoln to, on slavery, see vol. I. ; goes with Lincoln to Kentucky. 

Spottsylvania, battle of, see vol. Ii. 

Sprague, Governor William, of Rhode Island, see vol. Ii. 

Stanton, Edwin M. , attorney-general under Buchanan, see vol. I. ; joins Black in forcing Buchanan to alter reply to South Carolina Commissioners; share in Stone's punishment; appointed secretary of war; his previous insulting attitude toward Lincoln; discussion of his qualities, good and bad; an efficient secretary; sneers at generals who favor McClellan's plans; shows incompetence in organizing army; praises Wilkes for capturing Mason and Slidell; communicates Lincoln's approval to McClellan, see vol. Ii. ; loses head during Jackson's raid; bitter letter of McClellan to; becomes McClellan's merciless enemy; tries to prevent reappointment of McClellan; wishes to take troops from Meade for Rosecrans; repudiates Sherman's terms with Johnston; insults Sherman; his relations with Grant; at time of Early's attack on Washington; on bad terms with Blair; persuades Lincoln to use an escort; plan to assassinate. 

Stephens, Alexander H. , in Congress with Lincoln, see vol. I. ; on reasons for Georgia's secession; opposes secession; elected Vice-President of Confederate States; denies plot to seize Washington; letter of Lincoln to; wishes to treat for peace with Lincoln, see vol. Ii. ; his attempt foiled by Lincoln; admits desire to place Lincoln in false position; nominated by Davis on peace commission. 

Stevens, Thaddeus, leader of House in 1861, see vol. I. ; denounces Lincoln's emancipation scheme, see vol. Ii. ; considers Constitution destroyed; on admission of West Virginia; on unpopularity of Lincoln in Congress; admits Lincoln to be better than McClellan. 

Stone, General Charles P. , commands at Ball's Bluff, see vol. I. ; his punishment. 

Stuart, John T. , law partnership of Lincoln with, see vol. I. 

Stuart, General J. E. B. , rides around Federal army, see vol. Ii. ; repeats feat after Antietam. 

Sumner, Charles, assaulted by Brooks, see vol. I. ; in Senate in 1861. 

Sumner, General Edwin V. , objects to Lincoln's trying to avoid murder plot, on ground of cowardice, see vol. I. ; opposes plan of Peninsular campaign; appointed corps commander; on force necessary to protect Washington, see vol. Ii. 

Sumter, Fort, question of its retention in 1861, see vol. I. 

Supreme Court, left to determine status of slavery in Territories, see vol. I. ; in Dred Scott case; in Merryman case; reluctance of Lincoln to fill, exclusively with Northern men, see vol. Ii. ; Chase appointed chief justice of. 

Surratt, John H. , escapes punishment for complicity in assassination plot, see vol. Ii. 

Surratt, Mary E. , accomplice of Booth, tried and executed, see vol. Ii. 

Swinton, William, on McClellan's self-sufficiency, see vol. I. ; on campaign of 1862; on extraordinary powers given Meade, see vol. Ii. 

Tanet, Roger B. , his opinion in Dred Scott case discussed, see vol. I. ; administers inaugural oath to Lincoln; attempts to liberate Merryman by habeas corpus; denounces Lincoln's action as unconstitutional; succeeded by Chase, see vol. Ii. 

Tatnall, Captain Josiah, destroys Merrimac, see vol. Ii. 

Taylor, Dick, amusingly tricked by Lincoln, see vol. I. 

Taylor, General Zachary, his victories in Mexican war, see vol. I. ; supported by Lincoln for President; urges New Mexico to apply for admission as a State. 

Tennessee, refuses to furnish Lincoln with troops, see vol. I. ; at first opposed to secession; eastern counties of, Unionist; forced to secede; desire of Lincoln to save eastern counties of; prevented from Northern interference by Kentucky's "neutrality"; seized by South; plan of Halleck to invade, see vol. Ii. ; eastern counties freed from Confederates; plan of Lincoln to reconstruct; chooses presidential electors. 

Texas, its rebellion and annexation, see vol. I. ; claims New Mexico; compensated; secedes. 

Thomas, General George H. , considers Washington insufficiently protected, see vol. Ii. ; at Chickamauga; replaces Rosecrans; prepares to hold Chattanooga; defeats Hood at Nashville, see vol. Ii. 

Thomas, Philip F. , succeeds Cobb in Buchanan's cabinet, see vol. I. ; resigns from Treasury Department. 

Thompson, Jacob, in Buchanan's cabinet, see vol. I. ; acts as Mississippi commissioner to persuade Georgia to secede; claims Buchanan's approval; resigns. 

Thompson, Colonel Samuel, in Black Hawk war, see vol. I. 

Tod, David, declines offer of Treasury Department, see vol. Ii. 

Todd, Mary, her character, see vol. I. ; morbid courtship of, by Lincoln; marries Lincoln; her married life with Lincoln; involves Lincoln in quarrel with Shields. 

Toombs, Robert, in Congress with Lincoln, see vol. I. ; works for secession in 1860; declares himself a rebel in the Senate; secretary of state under Jefferson Davis. 

Toucey, Isaac, in Buchanan's cabinet, see vol. I. 

"Tribune, " New York; See Greeley, Horace. 

Trumbull, Lyman, leader of Illinois bar, see vol. I. ; elected senator from Illinois through Lincoln's influence; said to have bargained with Lincoln; in Senate in 1861; introduces bill to confiscate slaves of rebels, see vol. Ii. 

Tucker, John, prepares for transportation of Army of Potomac to Fortress Monroe, see vol. Ii. 

Utah, organized as a Territory, see vol. I. 

Vallandigham, Clement L. , in House in 1861, see vol. I. ; his speeches in 1863, see vol. Ii. ; tried and condemned for treason; imprisoned in Fort Warren; sent by Lincoln to Confederate lines; goes to Canada, nominated for governor in Ohio; opinion of Lincoln on; defeated; forces peace plank into National Democratic platform. 

Vicksburg, siege of, see vol. Ii. 

Virginia, at first opposed to secession, see vol. I. ; carried by Secessionists; makes military league with Confederate States; becomes member of Confederacy; northwestern counties of, secede from; comment of Lincoln on; nominal State government of, see vol. Ii. 

Voorhees, Daniel W. , in House in 1861, see vol. I. 

Wade, Benjamin F. , in Senate in 1861, see vol. I. ; thinks country ruined in 1862, see vol. Ii. ; issues address denouncing Lincoln for veto of reconstruction bill; obliged to support Lincoln rather than McClellan. 

Wadsworth, General James S. , commands forces to protect Washington, see vol. Ii. ; considers troops insufficient. 

Walker, L. P. , in Confederate cabinet, see vol. I. 

Walworth, Chancellor R. H. , denounces coercion, see vol. I. 

War of Rebellion, first call for volunteers, see vol. I. ; protection of Washington; passage of Massachusetts troops through Baltimore; proclamation of blockade; naval situation; second call for volunteers, army increased; military episodes of 1861; campaign of Bull Run; character and organization of Northern armies; McClellan commander-in-chief; civilian officers in; attempt to force McClellan to advance; administration of War Department by Stanton; Lincoln's plan for; debate as to plan of Virginia campaign; General War Order No. I; adoption of McClellan's plan; discussion of McClellan's and Lincoln's plans; evacuation of Manassas; removal of McClellan from chief command; creation of army corps; character of Western military operations; Northern successes along the coast; campaign in Missouri and Arkansas; operations in Kentucky; campaign of Forts Henry and Donelson; capture of New Madrid and Island No. ; career of the ram Merrimac; battle of Merrimac and Monitor; capture of New Orleans; battle of Memphis; cruise of Farragut on Mississippi; Halleck commander in West; advance of Grant and Buell on Corinth; battle of Shiloh; Halleck's advance on Corinth; part played in war by politics; question of protection of Washington, see vol. Ii. ; reinforcement of Fremont; Peninsular campaign; transportation to Fortress Monroe; Yorktown; retention of McDowell before Washington; advance of McClellan; Jackson's raid on Harper's Ferry; McDowell ordered to pursue Jackson; criticism of Lincoln's orders; Seven Pines and Fair Oaks; halt and retreat of McClellan; Malvern Hill; retreat continued; discussion of campaign; Halleck commander-in-chief; abandonment of campaign; Army of Virginia formed under Pope; Pope's campaign in Virginia; Cedar Mountain; second battle of Bull Run; quarrels between officers; reinstatement of McClellan; reorganization of army; Lee's campaign in Maryland; Antietam; McClellan fails to pursue Lee; Lincoln's proposals; McClellan superseded by Burnside; Fredericksburg campaign; quarrels in army; Burnside succeeded by Hooker; Chancellorsville campaign; failure of Hooker to fight Lee in detail; Lee's invasion of Pennsylvania; Hooker replaced by Meade; battle of Gettysburg; failure of Meade to pursue Lee; Bragg's invasion of Kentucky; battle of Perryville; Buell replaced by Rosecrans; battle of Stone's River; Rosecrans drives Bragg out of Tennessee; siege and capture of Vicksburg; fall of Port Hudson; Rosecrans' Chattanooga campaign; battle of Chickamauga; siege of Chattanooga; Rosecrans replaced by Thomas, Grant given command of West; battle of Chattanooga; liberation of East Tennessee; Meade's campaign in mud; steps leading to draft; diminishing influence of politicians in; Grant made lieutenant-general; new plan of campaign; Grant's Virginia campaign; battle of Wilderness; battle at Spottsylvania; battle of Cold Harbor; Butler "bottled up"; Early's raid against Washington; Sherman's Atlanta campaign; capture of Mobile; Sheridan's Valley campaign; Sherman's march to the sea; Thomas's destruction of Hood's army; sinking of the Alabama and of the Albemarle; decay of Confederate army in 1865; siege of Petersburg; march of Sherman through Carolinas; Bentonsville; attempts of Lee to escape; Five Forks; abandonment of Petersburg and Richmond; flight of Lee to Southwest; Appomattox; surrender of Lee; surrender of Johnston. 

Washburne, Elihu B. , letters of Lincoln to, on senatorial election of 1855, see vol. I. ; on compromise in 1861; meets Lincoln at Washington; in House in 1861. 

Washington, George, futility of attempt to compare Lincoln with, see vol. Ii. 

Webb, General A. S. , on effects of politics in Virginia campaigns, see vol. I. ; on the consequences of Lincoln's relation to McClellan, see vol. Ii. ; on McClellan's change of base. 

Webster, Daniel, his 7th of March speech, see vol. I. 

Weed, Thurlow, advocates revision of Constitution in 1860, see vol. I. 

Weitzel, General Godfrey, enters Richmond, see vol. Ii. 

Welles, Gideon, secretary of navy, see vol. I. ; opposes relieving Sumter; changes opinion; not told by Lincoln of plan to relieve Pensacola; learns that Lincoln has spoiled his plan to relieve Sumter; wishes Lincoln to close Southern ports by proclamation; disapproves of Lincoln's scheme of amnesty, see vol. Ii. 

West, social characteristics of frontier life in, see vol. I. ; democracy in; vagrants in; violence and barbarity of; manners and customs; grows in civilization; economic conditions of; frontier law and politics; popular eloquence in; its ignorance of foreign countries. 

West Virginia, origin of, see vol. I. ; campaign of McClellan in; forms a state Constitution, see vol. Ii. ; question of its admission; its vote counted in 1864. 

Whigs, character of, in Illinois, see vol. I. ; support Lincoln for speaker; fail to carry Illinois in 1840; and in 1844; elect Lincoln to Congress; oppose Mexican war; elect Taylor; defeated in 1852; join Know-Nothings in 1856. 

White, Hugh L. , supported by Lincoln in 1836, see vol. I. 

Whiteside, General Samuel, in Black Hawk war, see vol. I. 

Wigfall, Lewis T. , jeers at North in 1860, see vol. I. 

Wilderness, battle of, see vol. Ii. 

Wilkes, Captain Charles, seizes Mason and Slidell, see vol. I. ; applauded in North; condemned by Lincoln. 

Wilmot, David, in Congress with Lincoln, see vol. I. ; in Senate in 1861. 

Wilson, Henry, hopes that Douglas will become Republican in 1858, see vol. I. ; in Senate in 1861; introduces bill to emancipate slaves in District, see vol. Ii. ; on negro troops; admits small number of radical emancipationists; denounces Blair to Lincoln. 

Winthrop, Robert C. , chosen speaker of House, see vol. I. 

Wisconsin, admitted as free State to balance Texas, see vol. I. ; Democratic gains in, see vol. Ii. 

Wood, Fernando, advocates secession of New York City, see vol. I. ; wishes Lincoln to compromise, see vol. Ii. 

Wool, General John E. , commands at Fortress Monroe, see vol. Ii. 

Yorktown, siege of, see vol. Ii. 

Yulee, David L. , remains in Senate in 1861 to embarrass government, see vol. I.