[Illustration: Abraham Lincoln]

American Statesmen

STANDARD LIBRARY EDITION

[Illustration: _The Early House of Abraham Lincoln_. ]

ABRAHAM LINCOLN

BY

JOHN T. MORSE, JR. 

IN TWO VOLUMES VOL. I. 

1899

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

The fifth and final group of biographies in the American Statesmenseries deals with the Period of the Civil War. The statesmen whose livesare included in this group are Abraham Lincoln, William H. Seward, Salmon P. Chase, Charles Francis Adams, Charles Sumner, and ThaddeusStevens. 

The years of the civil war constitute an episode rather than anindependent period in our national history. They were interposed betweentwo eras; and if they are to be integrally connected with either ofthese, it is with the era which preceded them rather than with thatwhich followed them. They were the result, the closing act, of thequarter-century of the anti-slavery crusade. When the war came to an endthe country made a new start under new conditions. Yet it is proper totreat the years of the war by themselves, not only because they werefilled by the clearly defined and abnormal condition of warfare, butbecause a distinct group of statesmen is peculiarly associated withthem. The men whose lives are found in this group had been strugglingfor recognition during the years which preceded the war, but they onlyarrived at the control of affairs after that event became assured. Soonafter its close their work was substantially done. 

For a long while before hostilities actually broke out, it was evidentthat a civil war would be a natural result of the antagonism between theSouth and the North; it is now obvious enough that it was more than anatural, that it was an absolutely inevitable result. Looking backward, we can only be surprised that wise men ever fancied that a conflictcould be avoided; but, as usual, the strenuous hope became father to ananxious belief. Abraham Lincoln, in the first year when he gaveindication of his political clear-sightedness, said truly that thecountry could not continue half slave and half free. That truth involvedwar. There was no other possible way to settle the question between thetwo halves; talk of freeing the slaves by purchase, or by gradualemancipation and colonization, was simple nonsense, the forlorn schemesof men who would fain have escaped out of the track of inexorabledestiny. Yet the vast majority of the nation, appalled at the vision ofthe great fact which lay right athwart their road, was obstinate in thedelusive expectation of flanking it, as though there were side pathswhereby mankind can circumvent fate and walk around that which _mustbe_, just as if it were not. Thus it came to pass that when the Southseceded, as every intelligent man ought to have been perfectly surewould be the case, a confusion fell for a time upon the North. In thatsection of the country there was for a few months a spectacle which hasno parallel in history. There was paralysis, there was disintegration;worse than either, there was an utter lack of straight sense and clearthought. There were politicians, editors, writers, agitators, reformersin multitudes whose reiteration of their moral convictions, whoseintense addresses and uncompromising articles, had for years beenbringing about precisely this event; yet when it came, it appeared thatno one of them had contemplated it with any realizing appreciation, noone of them was ready for it, no one of them had any sensible, practicalcourse of action to recommend. There was no union among them, nocohesion of opinion or of purpose, no agreement of forecast; each hadhis own individual notion as to what could be done, what should be done, what would be the train of events. Politically speaking, society was amere parcel of units, with topical proximity, but with no other elementof aggregation. The immensity of the crisis seemed to shake men's minds;the enigma of duty involved such possibilities, in case of a wrongsolution, that the wisest leaders, becoming dazed and overawed, utteredthe grossest follies. Men who had been energetic and vigorous before, when they were pursuing a purpose, who became so again afterward, whenthe distinct issue had taken shape, now lost for a time theirintellectual self-possession. The picture of the country during three orfour months, or rather an observant study of the prominent men of thecountry, is sufficiently interesting historically, but is vastly more sopsychologically. I know of no other period in history in which thispeculiar element of interest exists to anywhere near an equal degree. Itis the study of human nature which for a brief time absorbs us, muchmore than the study of events. 

But this condition was, by its nature, transitory. Events moved, andsoon created defined and clean-cut issues, in relation to whichindividuals were compelled to find their positions, --positions wherethey could establish a belief, whether that belief should prove at lastto be right or wrong; positions wherein they were willing to abide tothe end, be that end victory or ruin. Primarily everything depended uponAbraham Lincoln. If he should prove to be a weak man, like hispredecessor, or if he should prove to be a man of merely ordinarycapacity and character like the presidents who had followed Van Buren, then all was over for the North. With what anxiety, with how muchdoubt, the people of the Northern States scanned their singular anduntried choice can never be fully appreciated by persons who cannotremember those wearisome, overladen days. He was an unknown quantity inthe awful problem. In his debates with Douglas he had given someindication of what was in him, but outside of Illinois not one man in ahundred was familiar with those debates. Nor did even they furnishconclusive proof of his administrative capacity, especially in thesedays of novel and mortal stress. For a time he seemed to wait, to drift;until the day of his inauguration he gave no sign; then in his speechthe people, whose hearts were standing still in their eagerness to hear, found reassuring sentences. Yet nothing seemed to follow during manyanxious weeks; the suns rose and the suns set, and still the leaderraised no standard around which the people could rally, uttered noinspiring word of command which could unite the dissevered politicalcliques. What was in his mind all this while can never be known, thoughno knowledge could be more interesting. Was he in a simple attitude ofexpectancy, awaiting the march of events, watchful for some one of themto give him the cue as well as the opportunity for action? Many believethat this was the case; and if it was, no other course could have beenmore intelligent. In due time events came which brought decision withthem, the crisis shaped itself, and he was ready with clear and promptaction. When it was known what he would do, matters were settled. Thepeople, once assured that the fight would be made, entered upon it withsuch a temper and in possession of such resources that, in spite ofthose trying fluctuations which any wise man could have foreseen, theywere sure in the end to win. 

It would be out of place in these prefatory paragraphs, to attempt anyskeleton picture of the momentous struggle. I believe that the story istold very completely in the lives which compose this group. Thestatesmen who controlled events during the war were a new group; theywere not young men, neither were they unknown or untried in publicaffairs; but they were for the first time in control. In their youngerdays they had been under the shadow and predominance of the old schoolof statesmen, whose object had been to prevent, or at least to deferindefinitely, precisely that crisis which was now present. Theythemselves, on the other hand, had been strenuously advocating thepolicies which had at last brought that crisis into existence. But theelection of Abraham Lincoln was their first, and as yet their onlytriumph. In all previous trials of strength they had been defeated. Their present success was like the bursting of a torrent through a dam. At the instant when they attained it they found themselves involved in apolitical swirl and clash of momentous difficulties. It was a tremendoustest to which they were being subjected. The part which Lincoln played, at their head, I have endeavored to depict in his life. The manner inwhich he controlled without commanding, his rare combination ofconfidence in his own judgment with entire absence of self-assertion, his instinctive appreciation of the meaning and bearing of facts, hiscapacity to recognize the precise time until which action should bepostponed and then to know that action must be taken, suggesting theidea of prescience, his long-suffering and tolerance towards impolitic, obstructive, or over-rash individuals, his marvelous gift of keeping intouch with the people, form a group of qualities which, united in thePresident of the United States at that mortal juncture, are as strongevidence as anything which this generation has seen to corroborate afaith in an overruling Providence. Conceive what might have happened ifit had been some other of our presidents who had happened to have histerm begin in 1861! Yet, after all the study that can be made of him, there are unexplainable elements in Lincoln's character which will leavehim forever an enigma. If the world ever settles down to the acceptanceof any definite, accurate picture of him, it will surely be a falsepicture. There must always be vague, indefinable uncertainties in anypresentation of him which shall be truly made. 

Of the men who labored with him, I have left myself room to say little, nor need much be said here. Their lives tell their stories. Takentogether, these biographies contain the history, upon the civil side, ofthe war period. Seward represents the policy of the administration as awhole, for all civil business centred in the office of the secretary ofstate. He was a man of extraordinary ability. It is true that he made astrange blunder or two, at the outset, odd episodes in his intelligent, clear-sighted, cool-headed career, --psychologically interesting, as hasbeen suggested; but he immediately recovered himself and settled down tothat course of wise statesmanship which was justly to be expected ofhim. 

Chase handled the finances of the country with brilliant success. Peoplehave criticised him, especially have said that his legal-tender schemewas a needless and mischievous measure. But his task was immeasurablydifficult, and he had to act with great promptitude, having little timefor consideration, obliged to provide instantly for immediateexigencies, forced to respect the present state of feeling among themoneyed classes, though it might be transitory, and to be controlled bythe possibilities of the passing moment. He met the gigantic dailyoutlay without even a temporary interruption, and the country grew rich, not only nominally in an inflated currency, but actually in a greatdevelopment of material resources, beneath his management of thetreasury. To find fault with him, and to talk of the "_might have been_"seems unworthy; also unsatisfactory, since the consequences of adifferent policy are wholly matter of supposition. 

Charles Sumner, the preacher of the crusade, stands for the moralelement. Possibly his most important work came before the war. But theprestige which he had gained made him a man to be reckoned with, and hehad a following of fervent and resolute men in the country so numerousthat his support was essential and his opinions had to be treated withrespect. 

The career of Charles Francis Adams in England will be read for thefirst time in the life which forms a part of this series. It has beenwritten by his son, of course with every possible advantage, and it isone of the most interesting chapters in the history of the civil war. Ofhim, too, it may be said that he seems to have been specially raised upfor precisely the duty which he had to fulfill. A blunder on the partof our envoy to Great Britain would have possibly led to consequenceswhich one trembles to contemplate even in imagination. The services ofFranklin in France and the positive good of the French alliance in theRevolution, may be compared with the services of Mr. Adams in Englandand the negative advantage of non-interference by England on behalf ofthe South in the civil war. Mr. Adams's coolness, his unerring judgment, and the prestige of his name, in combination, made him the one man inthe United States who ought by fitness to have held his post. That hedid hold it was, perhaps, one of the two or three essential facts whichtogether made Northern success possible, by the elimination of unfairand extrinsic causes of defeat. 

One part only of the picture remains to be drawn, the House ofRepresentatives. It is by no means conducive to a cheerful patrioticpride to contemplate the general throng of the politicians of thecountry during the war. In plain truth, they did themselves littlecredit. Amid the excitement of the times they utterly failed toappreciate their true position, their personal and official limitations. They could not let military matters alone; they did not often recognizethe boundaries of their own knowledge, and the proper scope of theirusefulness. They intermeddled ceaselessly, embroiled everything, and asa consequence they obstructed success in the field almost as much as ifthey had been another Confederate army. It has been with some difficultythat any one from among them has been found whose life it was desirableto write. But Thaddeus Stevens was really a man of great power and note. Intense and earnest, he exerted a magnificent influence in the way ofencouragement and inspiration. He adhered, if not altogether so closelyas he ought, yet at least more closely than did many others, to theproper sphere of his duties as a civilian. Influential in oratory, skillful in political management, masterful in temperament, and ofunflinching loyalty, he was long the genuine leader of the House. Inrecalling the several members of that body he stands forth as the onestriking and dominant figure. Nor did his activity cease with the war;he continued preëminent in the questions which immediately succeeded it, so that the reconstruction of the country, without which our story wouldbe incomplete, finds its proper place in his biography. Therewith, Ithink, the series reaches completion. 

JOHN T. MORSE, JR. 

September, 1898. 

CONTENTS

 I. THE RAW MATERIAL II. THE START IN LIFE III. LOVE; A DUEL; LAW, AND CONGRESS IV. NORTH AND SOUTH V. THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS JOINT DEBATE VI. ELECTION VII. INTERREGNUM VIII. THE BEGINNING OF WAR IX. A REAL PRESIDENT, AND NOT A REAL BATTLE X. THE FIRST ACT OF THE MCCLELLAN DRAMA XI. MILITARY MATTERS OUTSIDE OF VIRGINIA XII. FOREIGN AFFAIRS

ILLUSTRATIONS

ABRAHAM LINCOLN

From an original, unretouched negative, made in 1864, at the time hecommissioned Ulysses S. Grant Lieutenant-General and Commander of allthe armies of the Republic. It is said that this negative, with one ofGeneral Grant, was made in commemoration of that event. 

Autograph from the copy of the Gettysburg Address made by Lincoln forthe Soldiers' and Sailors' Fair at Baltimore, in 1864, and now in thepossession of Wm. J. A. Bliss, Esq. , of that city. 

The vignette of Lincoln's early home on Goose-Nest Prairie, nearFarmington, Ill. , is from a drawing after a photograph. This log cabinwas built by Lincoln and his father in 1831. 

LYMAN TRUMBULL

From a photograph by Brady in the Library of the State Department atWashington. 

Autograph from the Brady Register, owned by his nephew, Mr. Levin C. Handy, Washington, D. C. 

ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS

From a photograph by Brady in the Library of the State Department atWashington. 

Autograph from the Chamberlain collection, Boston Public Library. 

EDWIN M. STANTON

From a photograph by Brady in the Library of the State Department atWashington. 

Autograph from the Chamberlain collection, Boston Public Library. 

THE FIGHT BETWEEN THE MONITOR AND THE MERRIMAC

From the painting by W. F. Halsall in the Capitol at Washington. 

ABRAHAM LINCOLN

CHAPTER I

THE RAW MATERIAL

Abraham Lincoln knew little concerning his progenitors, and rested wellcontent with the scantiness of his knowledge. The character andcondition of his father, of whom alone upon that side of the house hehad personal cognizance, did not encourage him to pry into the obscuritybehind that luckless rover. He was sensitive on the subject; and when hewas applied to for information, a brief paragraph conveyed all that heknew or desired to know. Without doubt he would have been best pleasedto have the world take him solely for himself, with no inquiry as towhence he came, --as if he had dropped upon the planet like a meteorite;as, indeed, many did piously hold that he came a direct gift fromheaven. The fullest statement which he ever made was given in December, 1859, to Mr. Fell, who had interrogated him with an eye "to thepossibilities of his being an available candidate for the presidency in1860:" "My parents were both born in Virginia, of undistinguishedfamilies, --second families, perhaps I should say. My mother . . . Was of afamily of the name of Hanks, some of whom now remain in Adams, someothers in Macon, counties, Illinois. My paternal grandfather, AbrahamLincoln, emigrated from Rockingham County, Virginia, to Kentucky, about1781 or 1782. . . . His ancestors, who were Quakers, went to Virginia fromBerks County, Pennsylvania. An effort to identify them with the NewEngland family of the same name ended in nothing more definite than asimilarity of Christian names in both families, such as Enoch, Levi, Mordecai, Solomon, Abraham, and the like. " This effort to connect thePresident with the Lincolns of Massachusetts was afterward carriedforward by others, who felt an interest greater than his own inestablishing the fact. Yet if he had expected the quest to resultsatisfactorily, he would probably have been less indifferent about it;for it is obvious that, in common with all Americans of the old nativestock, he had a strenuous desire to come of "respectable people;" andhis very reluctance to have his apparently low extraction investigatedis evidence that he would have been glad to learn that he belonged to anancient and historical family of the old Puritan Commonwealth, settlersnot far from Plymouth Rock, and immigrants not long after the arrival ofthe Mayflower. This descent has at last been traced by the patientgenealogist. 

So early as 1848 the first useful step was taken by Hon. SolomonLincoln of Hingham, Massachusetts, who was struck by a speech deliveredby Abraham Lincoln in the national House of Representatives, and wroteto ask facts as to his parentage. The response[1] stated substantiallywhat was afterward sent to Mr. Fell, above quoted. Mr. Solomon Lincoln, however, pursued the search farther, and printed the results[2]. Later, Mr. Samuel Shackford of Chicago, Illinois, himself a descendant from thesame original stock, pushed the investigation more persistently[3]. Thechain, as put together by these two gentlemen, is as follows: Hingham, Massachusetts, was settled in 1635. In 1636 house lots were set off toThomas Lincoln, the miller, Thomas Lincoln, the weaver, and ThomasLincoln, the cooper. In 1638 other lots were set off to Thomas Lincoln, the husbandman, and to Stephen, his brother. In 1637 Samuel Lincoln, aged eighteen, came from England to Salem, Massachusetts, and threeyears later went to Hingham; he also was a weaver, and a brother ofThomas, the weaver. In 1644 there was a Daniel Lincoln in the place. Allthese Lincolns are believed to have come from the County of Norfolk inEngland[4], though what kinship existed between them is not known. Itis from Samuel that the President appears to have been descended. Samuel's fourth son, Mordecai, a blacksmith, married a daughter ofAbraham Jones of Hull;[5] about 1704 he moved to the neighboring town ofScituate, and there set up a furnace for smelting iron ore. This couplehad six children, of whom two were named respectively Mordecai andAbraham; and these two are believed to have gone to Monmouth County, NewJersey. There Mordecai seems to have continued in the iron business, andlater to have made another move to Chester County, Pennsylvania, stillcontinuing in the same business, until, in 1725, he sold out all his"Mynes & Minerals, Forges, etc. "[6] Then, migrating again, he settled inAmity, Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania, where, at last, death caughtup with him. By his will, February 22, 1735-36, he bequeathed his landin New Jersey to John, his eldest son; and gave other property to hissons Mordecai and Thomas. He belied the old motto, for in spite of morethan three removes he left a fair estate, and in the probate proceedingshe is described as "gentleman. "[7] In 1748 John sold all he had in NewJersey, and in 1758 moved into Virginia, settling in that part ofAugusta County which was afterward set off as Rockingham County. Thoughhis will has not been found, there is "ample proof, " says Mr. Shackford, that he had five sons, named Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Thomas, and John. Ofthese, Abraham went to North Carolina, there married Mary Shipley, andby her had sons Mordecai, Josiah, and Thomas, who was born in 1778. In1780 or 1782, as it is variously stated, this family moved to Kentucky. There, one day in 1784, the father, at his labor in the field, was shotby lurking Indians. His oldest son, working hard by, ran to the housefor a gun; returning toward the spot where lay his father's body, he sawan Indian in the act of seizing his brother, the little boy namedThomas. He fired, with happy aim; the Indian fell dead, and Thomasescaped to the house. This Thomas it was who afterward became the fatherof Abraham Lincoln. [8] Of the other sons of Mordecai (great-uncles ofthe President), Thomas also went to Kentucky, Isaac went to Tennessee, while Jacob and John stayed in Virginia, and begat progeny who became inlater times ferocious rebels, and of whom one wrote a very comicalblustering letter to his relative the President;[9] and probablyanother, bearing oddly enough the name of Abraham, was a notedfighter. [10] It is curious to observe of what migratory stock we havehere the sketch. Mr. Shackford calls attention to the fact that throughsix successive generations all save one were "pioneers in the settlementof new countries, " thus: 1. Samuel came from England to Hingham, Massachusetts. 2. Mordecai lived and died at Scituate, close by theplace of his birth. 3. Mordecai moved, and settled in Pennsylvania, inthe neighborhood which afterward became Berks County, while it was stillwilderness. 4. John moved into the wilds of Virginia. 5. Abraham went tothe backwoods of Kentucky shortly after Boone's settlement. 6. Thomasmoved first into the sparsely settled parts of Indiana, and thence wentonward to a similar region in Illinois. 

Thus in time was corroborated what Abraham Lincoln wrote in 1848 in oneof the above-mentioned letters to Hon. Solomon Lincoln: "We have a vaguetradition that my great-grandfather went from Pennsylvania to Virginia, and that he was a Quaker. " It is of little consequence that this "vaguetradition" was stoutly contradicted by the President's father, theignorant Thomas, who indignantly denied that either a Puritan or aQuaker could be found in the line of his forbears, and who certainlyseemed to set heredity at defiance if such were the case. But while thusrepudiating others, Thomas himself was in some danger of beingrepudiated; for so pained have some persons been by the necessity ofrecognizing Thomas Lincoln as the father of the President, that theyhave welcomed, as a happy escape from this so miserable paternity, a bitof gratuitous and unsupported gossip, published, though perhaps withmore of malice than of faith, by Mr. Herndon, to the effect that AbrahamLincoln was the illegitimate son of some person unknown, presumably sometolerably well-to-do Kentuckian, who induced Thomas to assume the rôleof parent. 

Upon the mother's side the ancestral showing is meagre, and fortunatelyso, since the case seems to be a bad one beyond reasonable hope. Hername was Nancy Hanks. She was born in Virginia, and was the illegitimatechild of one Lucy Hanks. [11] Nor was she the only instance ofillegitimacy[12] in a family which, by all accounts, seems to have beenvery low in the social scale. Mr. Herndon calls them by the dread nameof "poor whites, " and gives an unappetizing sketch of them. [13]Throughout his pages and those of Lamon there is abundant anddisagreeable evidence to show the correctness of his estimate. NancyHanks herself, who certainly was not to blame for her parentage, andperhaps may have improved matters by an infusion of better blood fromher unknown father, is described by some as a very rare flower to havebloomed amid the bed of ugly weeds which surrounded her. These friendlywriters make her a gentle, lovely, Christian creature, too delicate longto survive the roughness of frontier life and the fellowship of theshiftless rover to whom she was unfittingly wedded. [14] Whatever she mayhave been, her picture is exceeding dim, and has been made upon scantand not unquestionable evidence. Mr. Lincoln seems not often to havereferred to her; but when he did so it was with expressions of affectionfor her character and respect for her mental qualities, provided atleast that it was really of her, and not of his stepmother, that he wasspeaking, --a matter not clear from doubt. [15]

On June 10, 1806, Thomas Lincoln gave bond in the "just and full sum offifty pounds" to marry Nancy Hanks, and two days later, June 12, he didso, in Washington County, Kentucky. [16] She was then twenty-three yearsold. February 12, 1807, their daughter Sarah was born, who was marriedand died leaving no issue. February 12, 1809, Abraham Lincoln was born;no other children came save a boy who lived only a few days. 

The domestic surroundings amid which the babe came into life werewretched in the extreme. All the trustworthy evidence depicts acondition of what civilized people call misery. It is just as well toacknowledge a fact which cannot now be obscured by any amount ofeuphemism. Yet very many of Lincoln's biographers have been greatlyconcerned to color this truth, which he himself, with his honest nature, was never willing to misrepresent, however much he resisted efforts togive it a general publicity. He met curious inquiry with reticence, butwith no attempt to mislead. Some of his biographers, however, whileshunning direct false statements, have used alleviating adjectives withliterary skill, and have drawn fanciful pictures of a pious frugalhousehold, of a gallant frontiersman endowed with a long catalogue ofnoble qualities, and of a mother like a Madonna in the wilderness. [17]Yet all the evidence that there is goes to show that this romanticcoloring is purely illusive. Rough, coarse, low, ignorant, andpoverty-stricken surroundings were about the child; and though we maygladly avail ourselves of the possibility of believing his mother tohave been superior to all the rest of it, yet she could by no meansleaven the mass. The father[18] was by calling a carpenter, but not goodat his trade, a shiftless migratory squatter by invincible tendency, and a very ignorant man, for a long while able only to form the letterswhich made his signature, though later he extended his accomplishments alittle. He rested not much above the very bottom of existence in thepioneer settlements, apparently without capacity or desire to do better. The family was imbued with the peculiar, intense, but unenlightened formof Christianity, mingled with curious superstition, prevalent in thebackwoods, and begotten by the influence of the vast wilderness uponilliterate men of a rude native force. It interests scholars to tracethe evolutions of religious faiths, but it might be not less suggestiveto study the retrogression of religion into superstition. Thomas was asrestless in matters of creed as of residence, and made various changesin both during his life. These were, however, changes withoutimprovement, and, so far as he was concerned, his son Abraham might havegrown up to be what he himself was contented to remain. 

It was in the second year after his marriage that Thomas Lincoln madehis first removal. Four years later he made another. Two or three yearsafterwards, in the autumn of 1816, he abandoned Kentucky and went intoIndiana. Some writers have given to this migration the interestingcharacter of a flight from a slave-cursed society to a land of freedom, but whatever poetic fitness there might be in such a motive, thesuggestion is entirely gratuitous and without the slightestfoundation. [19] In making this move, Thomas's outfit consisted of atrifling parcel of tools and cooking utensils, with ever so littlebedding, and four hundred gallons of whiskey. At his new quarters hebuilt a "half-faced camp" fourteen feet square, that is to say, acovered shed of three sides, the fourth side being left open to theweather. In this, less snug than the winter's cave of a bear, the familydwelt for a year, and then were translated to the luxury of a "cabin, "four-walled indeed, but which for a long while had neither floor, door, nor window. Amid this hardship and wretchedness Nancy Lincoln passedaway, October 5, 1818, of that dread and mysterious disease, the scourgeof those pioneer communities, known as the "milk-sickness. "[20] In arough coffin, fashioned by her husband "out of green lumber cut with awhip-saw, " she was laid away in the forest clearing, and a few monthsafterward an itinerant preacher performed some funeral rites over thepoor woman's humble grave. 

For a year Thomas Lincoln was a widower. Then he went back to Kentucky, and found there Mrs. Sally Johnston, a widow, whom, when she was themaiden Sarah Bush, he had loved and courted, and by whom he had beenrefused. He now asked again, and with better success. The marriage was alittle inroad of good luck into his career; for the new wife was thriftyand industrious, with the ambition and the capacity to improve thesqualid condition of her husband's household. She had, too, worldlypossessions of bedding and furniture, enough to fill a four-horse wagon. She made her husband put a floor, a door, and windows to his cabin. Fromthe day of her advent a new spirit made itself felt amid the belongingsof the inefficient Thomas. Her immediate effort was to make her newhusband's children "look a little more human, " and the youthful Abrahambegan to get crude notions of the simpler comforts and decencies oflife. All agree that she was a stepmother to whose credit it is to besaid that she manifested an intelligent kindness towards Abraham. 

The opportunities for education were scant enough in that day and place. In his childhood in Kentucky Abraham got a few weeks with one teacher, and then a few weeks with another. Later, in Indiana, he studied a fewmonths, in a scattered way. Probably he had instruction at home, for thesum of all the schooling which he had in his whole life was hardly oneyear;[21] a singular start upon the road to the presidency of the UnitedStates! The books which he saw were few, but a little later he laidhands upon them all and read and re-read them till he must have absorbedall their strong juice into his own nature. Nicolay and Hay give thelist: The Bible; "Aesop's Fables;" "Robinson Crusoe;" "The Pilgrim'sProgress;" a history of the United States; Weems's "Washington. " He wasdoubtless much older when he devoured the Revised Statutes of Indiana inthe office of the town constable. Dr. Holland adds Lives of Henry Clayand of Franklin (probably the famous autobiography), and Ramsay's"Washington;" and Arnold names Shakespeare and Burns. It was a smalllibrary, but nourishing. He used to write and to do sums in arithmeticon the wooden shovel by the fireside, and to shave off the surface inorder to renew the labor. 

As he passed from boyhood to youth his mental development took itscharacteristics from the popular demand of the neighborhood. Hescribbled verses and satirical prose, wherein the coarse wit was adaptedto the taste of the comrades whom it was designed to please; and it mustbe admitted that, after giving due weight to all amelioratingconsiderations, it is impossible to avoid disappointment at thegrossness of the jesting. No thought, no word raised it above the lowlevel of the audience made up of the laborers on the farms and theloungers in the groceries. The biographer who has made public "The FirstChronicles of Reuben" deserves to be held in detestation. [22]

A more satisfactory form of intellectual effervescence consisted inwriting articles on the American Government, Temperance, etc. , and inspeech-making to any who were near at the moment of inspiration. Thereis abundant evidence, also, that already Lincoln was regarded as a wittyfellow, a rare mimic, and teller of jokes and stories; and therefore wasthe champion of the fields and the favorite of all the primitive socialgatherings. This sort of life and popularity had its perils, for in thatday and region men seldom met without drinking together; but allauthorities are agreed that Lincoln, while the greatest talker, was thesmallest drinker. 

The stories told of his physical strength rival those which decorate thememory of Hercules. Others, which show his kindly and humane nature, aremore valuable. Any or all of these may or may not be true, and, thoughthey are not so poetical or marvelous as the myths which lend an antiquecharm to the heroes of classic and romantic lore, yet they comparefairly well with those which Weems has twined about the figure of theyouthful Washington. There is a tale of the rescue of a pig from aquagmire, and another of the saving of a drunken man from freezing. There are many stories of fights; others of the lifting of enormousweights; and even some of the doing of great feats of labor in a day, though for such tasks Lincoln had no love. These are not worthrecounting; there is store of such in every village about the popularlocal hero; and though historians by such folk-lore may throw a glamourabout Lincoln's daily life, he himself, at the time, could hardly haveseen much that was romantic or poetical in the routine of ill-paid laborand hard living. Until he came of age his "time" belonged to his father, who let him out to the neighbors for any job that offered, making him aman-of-all-work, without-doors and within. In 1825 he was thus earningsix dollars a month, presumably besides board and lodging. Sometimes heslaughtered hogs, at thirty-one cents a day; and in this "rough work" hewas esteemed especially efficient. Such was the making of a President inthe United States in this nineteenth century!

Thomas Lincoln, like most men of his stamp, had the cheerful habit oflaying the results of his own worthlessness to the charge of theconditions about him, which, naturally, he constantly sought to change, since it seemed that no change could bring him to a lower level than hehad already found. As Abraham approached his "freedom-day, " his lucklessparent conceived the notion that he might do better in Illinois than hehad done in Indiana. So he shuffled off the farm, for which he had neverpaid, and about the middle of February the family caravan, with theirscanty household wares packed in an ox team, began a march which lastedfourteen days and entailed no small measure of hardship. They finallystopped at a bluff on the north bank of the north fork of the Sangamon, a stream which empties into the Ohio. Here Thomas Lincoln renewed thefamiliar process of "starting in life, " and with an axe, a saw, and aknife built a rough cabin of hewed logs, with a smoke-house and"stable. " Abraham, aided by John Hanks, cleared ten or fifteen acres ofland, split the rails and fenced it, planted it with corn, and made itover to Thomas as a sort of bequest at the close of his term of legalinfancy. His subsequent relationship with his parents, especially withhis father, seems to have been slight, involving an occasional gift ofmoney, a very rare visit, and finally a commonplace letter of Christiancomfort when the old man was on his deathbed. [23]

At first Abraham's coming of age made no especial change in hiscondition; he continued to find such jobs as he could, as an example ofwhich Is mentioned his bargain with Mrs. Nancy Miller "to split fourhundred rails for every yard of brown jeans dyed with white walnut barkthat would be necessary to make him a pair of trousers. " After manymonths there arrived in the neighborhood one Denton Offut, one of thosescheming, talkative, evanescent busybodies who skim vaguely over newterritories. This adventurer had a cargo of hogs, pork, and corn, whichhe wanted to send to New Orleans, and the engagement fell to Lincoln andtwo comrades at the wage of fifty cents per day and a bonus of $60 forthe three. It has been said that this and a preceding trip down theMississippi first gave Lincoln a glimpse of slavery in concrete form, and that the spectacle of negroes "in chains, whipped and scourged, "and of a slave auction, implanted in his mind an "unconquerable hate"towards the institution, so that he exclaimed: "If ever I get a chanceto hit that thing, I'll hit it hard. " So the loquacious myth-maker JohnHanks asserts;[24] but Lincoln himself refers his first vivid impressionto a later trip, made in 1841, when there were "on board ten or a dozenslaves shackled together with irons. " Of this subsequent incident hewrote, fourteen years later, to his friend, Joshua Speed: "That sightwas a continual torment to me; and I see something like it every time Itouch the Ohio or any other slave border. It is not fair for you toassume that I have no interest in a thing which has, and continuallyexercises, the power of making me miserable. "[25]

Of more immediate consequence was the notion which the rattle-brainedOffut conceived of Lincoln's general ability. This lively patron nowproposed to build a river steamboat, with "runners for ice and rollersfor shoals and dams, " of which his redoubtable young employee was to becaptain. But this strange scheme gave way to another for opening in NewSalem a "general store" of all goods. This small town had been born onlya few months before this summer of 1831, and was destined to a brief butriotous life of some seven years' duration. Now it had a dozen orfifteen "houses, " of which some had cost only ten dollars for thebuilding; yet to the sanguine Offut it presented a fair field for retailcommerce. He accordingly equipped his "store, " and being himself engagedin other enterprises, he installed Lincoln as manager. Soon he also gaveLincoln a mill to run. 

Besides all this patronage, Offut went about the region bragging in hisextravagant way that his clerk "knew more than any man in the UnitedStates, " would some day be President, and could now throw or thrash anyman in those parts. Now it so happened that some three miles out fromNew Salem lay Clary's Grove, the haunt of a gang of frontier ruffians ofthe familiar type, among whom one Jack Armstrong was champion bully. Offut's boasting soon rendered an encounter between Lincoln andArmstrong inevitable, though Lincoln did his best to avoid it, anddeclared his aversion to "this woolling and pulling. " The wrestlingmatch was arranged, and the settlers flocked to it like Spaniards to abull-fight. Battle was joined and Lincoln was getting the better ofArmstrong, whereupon the "Clary's Grove boys, " with fine chivalry, wereabout to rush in upon Lincoln and maim him, or worse, when the timelyintervention of a prominent citizen possibly saved even the life of thefuture President. [26] Some of the biographers, borrowing the license ofpoets, have chosen to tell about the "boys" and the wrestling matchwith such picturesque epithets that the combat bids fair to appear toposterity as romantic as that of Friar Tuck and Robin Hood. Itsconsequence was that Armstrong and Lincoln were fast friends ever after. Wherever Lincoln was at work, Armstrong used to "do his loafing, " andLincoln made visits to Clary's Grove, and long afterward did a friendlyservice to "old Hannah, " Armstrong's wife, by saving one of her viciousrace from the gallows, which upon that especial occasion he did nothappen to deserve. Also Armstrong and his gang gave Lincoln heartypolitical support, and an assistance at the polls which was veryeffective, for success generally smiled on that candidate who had as hisconstituency[27] the "butcher-knife boys, " the "barefooted boys, " the"half-horse, half-alligator men, " and the "huge-pawed boys. "

An item less susceptible of a poetic coloring is that about this timeLincoln ransacked the neighborhood in search of an English grammar, andgetting trace of one six miles out from the settlement, he walked overto borrow or to buy it. He brought it back in triumph, and studied itexhaustively. 

There are also some tales of his honesty which may stand withoutdisgrace beside that of Washington and the cherry-tree, and may bebetter entitled to credit. It is said that, while he was "keeping shop"for Offut, a woman one day accidentally overpaid him by the sum offourpence, and that he walked several miles that night to restore thesum to her before he slept. On another occasion, discovering that inselling half a pound of tea he had used too small a weight, he startedinstantly forth to make good the deficiency. Perhaps this integrity doesnot so much differentiate Lincoln from his fellows as it may seem to do, for it is said that honesty was the one distinguishing virtue of thatqueer society. None the less these legends are exponents, which thenumerous fighting stories are not, of the genuine nature of the man. Hischief trait all his life long was honesty of all kinds and in allthings; not only commonplace, material honesty in dealings, but honestyin language, in purpose, in thought; _honesty of mind_, so that he couldnever even practice the most tempting of all deceits, a deceit againsthimself. This pervasive honesty was the trait of his identity, whichstayed with him from beginning to end, when other traits seemed to bechanging, appearing or disappearing, and bewildering the observer of hiscareer. All the while the universal honesty was there. 

It took less than a year for Offut's shop to come to ruin, for theproprietor to wander off into the unknown void from which he had come, and for Lincoln to find himself again without occupation. He won somelocal reputation by navigating the steamboat Talisman up the SangamonRiver to Springfield; but nothing came of it. 

The foregoing narrative ought to have given some idea of the moral andphysical surroundings of Lincoln's early days. Americans need to carrytheir memories hardly fifty years back, in order to have a livelyconception of that peculiar body of men which for many years was pushedout in front of civilization in the West. Waifs and strays from highlycivilized communities, these wanderers had not civilization to learn, but rather they had shuffled off much that belonged to civilization, andafterwards they had to acquire it afresh. Among them crudity in thoughtand uncouthness in habits were intertwined in odd, incongruous crossingswith the remnants of the more respectable customs with which they hadonce been familiar. Much they forgot and much they put away as being nolonger useful; many of them--not all--became very ignorant without beingstupid, very brutal without being barbarous. Finding life hard, theyhelped each other with a general kindliness which is impracticable amongthe complexities of elaborate social organizations. Those who were bornon the land, among whom Lincoln belonged, were peculiar in having noreminiscences, no antecedent ideas derived from their own past, wherebyto modify the influences of the immediate present. What they shouldthink about men and things they gathered from what they saw and heardaround them. Even the modification to be got from reading was of theslightest, for very little reading was possible, even if desired. Animportant trait of these Western communities was the closeness ofpersonal intercourse in them, and the utter lack of any kind of barriersestablishing strata of society. Individuals might differ ever so widely;but the wisest and the dullest, the most worthless and the mostenterprising, had to rub shoulder to shoulder in daily life. Yet thevariety was considerable: hardy and danger-loving pioneers fulfillingthe requirements of romance; shiftless vagrants curiously combiningutter inefficiency with a sort of bastard contempt for hardship;ruffians who could only offset against every brutal vice an ignoblephysical courage; intelligent men whose observant eyes ranged over thewhole region in a shrewd search after enterprise and profit; a feweducated men, decent in apparel and bearing, useful in legislation andin preventing the ideal from becoming altogether vulgarized and debased;and others whose energy was chiefly of the tongue, the class imbued witha taste for small politics and the public business. All these and manyother varieties were like ingredients cast together into a caldron; theycould not keep apart, each with his own kind, to the degree which iscustomary in old established communities; but they all ceaselesslycrossed and mingled and met, and talked, and dealt, and helped andhustled each other, and exerted upon each other that subtle inevitableinfluence resulting from such constant intercourse; and so theyinoculated each other with certain characteristics which became commonto all and formed the type of the early settler. Thus was made "the newWest, " "the great West, " which was pushed ever onward, and endured alongeach successive frontier for about a generation. An eternal movement, atireless coming and going, pervaded these men; they passed hither andthither without pause, phantasmagorically; they seemed to be forever"moving on, " some because they were real pioneers and natural rovers, others because they were mere vagrants generally drifting away fromcreditors, others because the better chance seemed ever in the newerplace, and all because they had struck no roots, gathered noassociations, no home ties, no local belongings. The shopkeeper "movedon" when his notes became too pressing; the schoolmaster, after a shortstay, left his school to some successor whose accomplishments couldhardly be less than his own; clergymen ranged vaguely through thecountry, to preach, to pray, to bury, to marry, as the case might be;farmers heard of a more fruitful soil, and went to seek it. Mencertainly had at times to work hard in order to live at all, yet it wasperfectly possible for the natural idler to rove, to loaf, and to beshiftless at intervals, and to become as demoralized as the tramp forwhom a shirt and trousers are the sum of worldly possessions. Books werescarce; many teachers hardly had as much book-learning as lads ofthirteen years now have among ourselves. Men who could neither read norwrite abounded, and a deficiency so common could hardly imply muchdisgrace or a marked inferiority; many learned these difficult arts onlyin mature years. Fighting was a common pastime, and when these roughfellows fought, they fought like savages; Lincoln's father bit off hisadversary's nose in a fight, and a cousin lost the same feature in thesame way; the "gouging" of eyes was a legitimate resource. The necessityof fighting might at any moment come to any one; even the combination ofa peaceable disposition with formidable strength did not save Lincolnfrom numerous personal affrays, of which many are remembered, and notimprobably many more have been forgotten. In spite of the picturesqueadjectives which have been so decoratively used in describing theruffian of the frontier, he seems to have been about what his classalways is; and when these fellows had forced a fight, or "set up" amatch, their chivalry never prevented any unfairness or brutality. Atale illustrative of the times is told of a closely contested electionin the legislature for the office of state treasurer. The worstedcandidate strode into the hall of the Assembly, and gallantly selectingfour of the largest and strongest of those who had voted against him, thrashed them soundly. The other legislators ran away. But before theclose of the session this pugilist, who so well understood practicalpolitics, was appointed clerk of the Circuit Court and countyrecorder. [28]

Corn bread was the chief article of diet; potatoes were a luxury, andwere often eaten raw like apples. To the people at large whiskey"straight" seemed the natural drink of man, and whiskey toddy was notdistasteful to woman. To refuse to drink was to subject one's self toabuse and suspicion;[29] Lincoln's notorious lack of liking for itpassed for an eccentricity, or a physical peculiarity. The customarysocial gatherings were at horse-racings, at corn-shuckings, at politicalspeech-makings, at weddings, whereat the coarse proceedings would notnowadays bear recital; at log-rollings, where the neighbors gathered tocollect the logs of a newly cleared lot for burning; and athouse-raisings, where they kindly aided to set up the frame of a cabinfor a new-comer; at camp-meetings, where the hysterical excitement of acommunity whose religion was more than half superstition found clamorousand painful vent;[30] or perchance at a hanging, which, if it met publicapprobation, would be sanctioned by the gathering of the neighborswithin a day's journey of the scene. At dancing-parties men and womendanced barefoot; indeed, they could hardly do better, since theirfoot-wear was apt to be either moccasins, or such boots as theythemselves could make from the hides which they themselves had cured. InLincoln's boyhood the hunting-shirt and leggings made of skins were asufficiently respectable garb; and buckskin breeches dyed green wereenough to captivate the heart of any girl who wished a fashionablelover; but by the time that he had become a young man, mostself-respecting men had suits of jeans. The ugly butcher's knife andtomahawk, which had been essential as was the rapier to the costume ofgentlemen two centuries earlier, began now to be more rarely seen at thebelt about the waist. The women wore linsey-woolsey gowns, of homemanufacture, and dyed according to the taste or skill of the wearer instripes and bars with the brown juice of the butternut. In the towns itwas not long before calico was seen, and calfskin shoes; and in suchpopulous centres bonnets decorated the heads of the fair sex. Amid theseadvances in the art of dress Lincoln was a laggard, being usually one ofthe worst attired men of the neighborhood; not from affectation, butfrom a natural indifference to such matters. The sketch is likely tobecome classical in American history of the appearance which hepresented with his scant pair of trousers, "hitched" by a singlesuspender over his shirt, and so short as to expose, at the lower end, half a dozen inches of "shinbone, sharp, blue, and narrow. "

In the clearings the dwellings of these men were the "half-faced camp"open upon one side to the weather, or the doorless, floorless, andwindowless cabin which, with prosperity, might be made luxurious bygreased paper in the windows, and "puncheon" floors. The furniture wasin keeping with this exterior. At a corner the bed was constructed bydriving into the ground crotched sticks, whence poles extended to thecrevices of the walls; upon these poles were laid boards, and upon theseboards were tossed leaves and skins and such other alleviating materialas could be found. Three-legged stools and a table were hewed from thefelled trees with an axe, which was often the settler's only andinvaluable tool, and which he would travel long miles to sharpen. If awoman wanted a looking-glass, she scoured a tin pan, but the temptationto inspect one's self must have been feeble. A very few kitchen utensilscompleted the outfit. Troughs served for washtubs, when wash tubs wereused; and wooden ploughs broke up the virgin soil. The whole was little, if at all, more comfortable than the red man's wigwam. In "towns, " socalled, there was of course somewhat more of civilization than in theclearings. But one must not be misled by a name; a "town" might signifyonly a score of houses, and the length of its life was whollyproblematical; a few days sufficed to build the wooden huts, which in afew years might be abandoned. In the early days there was almost nomoney among the people; sometimes barter was resorted to; one lover paidfor his marriage license with maple sugar, another with wolf-scalps. More often a promise sufficed; credit was a system well understood, andpromissory notes constituted an unquestioned and popular method ofpayment that would have made a millennium for Mr. Micawber. But howeverscant might be cash and houses, each town had its grocery, and thesefamous "stores" were by far the chief influence in shaping the ideas ofthe Westerner. There all congregated, the idlers all day long, the busymen in the evening; and there, stimulated by the whiskey of theproprietor, they gossiped about everybody's affairs, talked aboutbusiness and the prospects of the neighborhood, and argued about thepolitics of the county, the State, and even of the nation. Jokes andstories, often most uncouth and gross, whiled away the time. It was inthese groceries, and in the rough crucible of such talk, whereingrotesque imagery and extravagant phrases were used to ridiculepretension and to bring every man to his place, sometimes also to escapetaking a hard fact too hardly, that what we now call "American humor, "with its peculiar native flavor, was born. To this it is matter oftradition that Lincoln contributed liberally. He liked neighborly chatand discussion; and his fondness for political debate, and his gifts intale and jest, made him the most popular man in every "store" that heentered. It is commonly believed that the effect of this familiaritywith coarse talk did not afterward disappear, so that he never becamefastidious in language or in story. But apologists of this habit aredoubtless correct in saying that vulgarity in itself had no attractionfor him; it simply did not repel him, when with it there was a flavor ofhumor or a useful point. Apparently it simply meant nothing to him; amental attitude which is not difficult of comprehension in view of itsorigin. [31]

Some of the most picturesque and amusing pages of Ford's "History ofIllinois" describe the condition of the bench and bar of thesetimes. [32] "Boys, come in, our John is going to hold court, " proclaimedthe sheriff; and the "boys" loitered into the barroom of the tavern, orinto a log cabin where the judge sat on the bed and thus, really fromthe woolsack, administered "law" mixed with equity as best he knew it. Usually these magistrates were prudent in guiding the course ofpractical justice, and rarely summed up the facts lest they should makedangerous enemies, especially in criminal cases; they often refused tostate the law, and generally for a very good reason. They liked best toturn the whole matter over to the jurors, who doubtless "understood thecase, and would do justice between the parties. " The books of thescience were scarce, and lawyers who studied them were perhaps scarcer. But probably substantial fairness in decision did not suffer by reasonof lack of sheepskin learning. 

Politics for a long while were strictly personal; the elections did notturn upon principles or measures, but upon the popular estimate of thecandidates individually. Political discussion meant unstinted praiseand unbounded vilification. A man might, if he chose, resent a voteagainst himself as a personal insult, and hence arose much secrecy andthe "keep dark" system. Stump-speaking, whiskey, and fighting were thechief elements of a campaign, and the worst class in society furnishedthe most efficient backing. [33]

Such was the condition of men and things in the neighborhood whereAbraham Lincoln was shaping in the days of his youth. Yet it was acondition which did not last long; Illinois herself changed and grew asrapidly as any youngster within her borders. The rate of advance in allthat goes to make up what we now regard as a civilized society wasastonishing. Between the time when Lincoln was fifteen and when he wastwenty-five, the alteration was so great as to be confusing. One hardlybecame familiar with a condition before it had vanished. Some townsbegan to acquire an aspect of permanence; clothes and manners becamelike those prevalent in older communities; many men were settling downin established residence, identifying themselves with the fortunes oftheir neighborhood. Young persons were growing up and staying where theyhad been "raised, " as the phrase of a farming community had it. Comfortable and presentable two-story houses lent an air of prosperityand stimulated ambition; law-books began to be collected in smallnumbers; and debts were occasionally paid in money, and could often becollected by legal process. These improvements were largely due to theswelling tide of immigration which brought men of a better type to pushtheir enterprises in a country presumably emerging from its disagreeablestage. But the chief educational influence was to be found in theAnglo-American passion for an argument and a speech. Hand in hand, ashas so long been the custom in our country, law and politics moved amongthe people, who had an inborn, inherited taste for both; thesestimulated and educated the settlers in a way that only Americans canappreciate. When Lincoln, as is soon to be seen, turned to them, heturned to what then and there appeared the highest callings which couldtempt intellect and ambition. 

The preëminently striking feature in Lincoln's nature--not a trait ofcharacter, but a characteristic of the man--which is noteworthy in theseearly days, and grew more so to the very latest, was the extraordinarydegree to which he always appeared to be in close and sympathetic touchwith the people, that is to say, the people in the mass wherein he wasimbedded, the social body amid which he dwelt, which pressed upon him onall sides, which for him formed "the public. " First this group or bodywas only the population of the frontier settlement; then it widened toinclude the State of Illinois; then it expanded to the population of theentire North; and such had come to be the popular appreciation of thisremarkably developed quality that, at the time of his death, hisadmirers even dared to believe that it would be able to make itself onewith all the heterogeneous, discordant, antagonistic elements which thencomposed the very disunited United States. It is by reason of thisquality that it has seemed necessary to depict so far as possible thatpeculiar, transitory phase of society which surrounded his early days. This quality in him caused him to be exceptionally susceptible to thepeculiar influences of the people among whom his lot was cast. Thisquality for a while prevented his differentiating himself from them, prevented his accepting standards and purposes unlike theirs either inspeech or action, prevented his rising rapidly to a higher moral planethan theirs. This quality kept him essentially one of them, until his"people" and his "public" expanded beyond them. It has been the fashionof his admirers to manifest an extreme distaste for a truthfulpresentation of his earlier days. Some writers have passed very lightlyover them; others, stating plain facts with a formal accuracy, have usedtheir skill to give to the picture an untruthful miscoloring; two orthree, instinct with the spirit of Zola, have made their sketch withplain unsparing realism in color as well as in lines, and so havebrought upon themselves abuse, and perhaps have deserved much of it, byreason of a lack of skill in doing an unwelcome thing, or rather byreason of overdoing it. The feeling which has led to suppression or toa falsely romantic description seems to me unreasonable and wrong. Thevery quality which made Lincoln, as a young man, not much superior tohis coarse surroundings was precisely the same quality which, ripeningand expanding rapidly and grandly with maturing years and a greatercircle of humanity, made him what he was in later life. It is throughthis quality that we get continuity in him; without it, we cannot evadethe insoluble problem of two men, --two lives, --one following the otherwith no visible link of connection between them; without it we havephysically one creature, morally and mentally two beings. If we rejectthis trait, we throw away the only key which unlocks the problem of themost singular life, taken from end to end, which has ever been witnessedamong men, a life which many have been content to regard as an unsolvedenigma. But if we admit and really perceive and feel the full force ofthis trait, developed in him in a degree probably unequaled in theannals of men, then, besides the enlightenment which it brings, we havethe great satisfaction of eliminating much of the disagreeablenessattendant upon his youthful days. Even the commonness and painfulcoarseness of his foolish written expressions become actually anexponent of his chief and crowning quality, his receptiveness and hisexpression of humanity, --that is to say, of all the humanity he thenknew. At first he expressed what he could discern with the limited, inexperienced vision of the ignorant son of a wretched vagrant pioneer;later he gave expression to the humanity of a people engaged in apurpose physically and morally as vast and as grand as any enterprisewhich the world has seen. Thus, with perfect fairness, without wrenchingor misrepresentation or sophistry, the ugliness of his youth ceases tobe his own and becomes only the presentation of a curious socialcondition. In his youth he expressed a low condition, in later life anoble one; at each period he expressed correctly what he found. His dayand generation uttered itself through him. With such thoughts, and fromthis point of view, it is possible to contemplate Lincoln's early days, amid all their degraded surroundings and influences and unmarked byapparent antagonism or obvious superiority on his part, without seriousdismay. 

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Two letters, now in the possession of Mr. Francis H. Lincoln ofBoston, Mass. 

[2] _New England Hist. And Gen. Register_, October, 1865. 

[3] _Ibid. _ April, 1887, vol. Xli. P. 153. 

[4] See articles in _N. E. H. And G. Reg. _ above cited. Mr. Lincoln'sarticle states that in Norwich, Norfolk County, Eng. , there is a"curious chased copper box with the inscription 'Abraham Lincoln, Norwich, 1731;'" also in St. Andrew's Church in the same place a muraltablet: "In memory of Abraham Lincoln, of this parish, who died July 13, 1798, aged 79 years. " Similarities of name are also noted. 

[5] A town adjoining Hingham, Mass. 

[6] His brother Abraham also resided in Chester County, and died there, April, 1745. 

[7] N. And H. I. 3. 

[8] A different pedigree, published in the _Lancaster Intelligencer_, September 24, 1879, by David J. Lincoln of Birdsboro, Berks County, Penn. , is refuted by George Lincoln of Hingham, Mass. , in the _HinghamJournal_, October 10, 1879. 

[9] N. And H. I. 4 note. 

[10] N. And H. I. 4 note. 

[11] Herndon, 3. 

[12] The unpleasant Dennis Hanks was an illegitimate son of an "aunt ofthe President's mother. " Herndon, 13; and see Lamon, 12. 

[13] Herndon, 14. 

[14] Holland, 23; Lamon, 11; N. And H. I. 24; Herndon, 13, 28; Raymond, 20; but Raymond is no authority as to Lincoln's youth, and Holland islittle more valuable for the same period. 

[15] Lamon, 32. But see Herndon, 13. 

[16] N. And H. 23; Herndon, 5; but see Lamon, 10. 

[17] For instance, see the pages of the first chapter of the Life byArnold, a book which becomes excellent after the author has got freefrom the fancied necessities of creating an appropriate background forthe origin and childhood of the hero. So, more briefly, Raymond, whogives no authority to support the faith which is in him. 

[18] For description of him, see Lamon, 8, 9; Herndon, 11. 

[19] Herndon, 19; Lamon, 16; Holland, 25. 

[20] Herndon, 25-28; Lamon, 26-28. 

[21] Herndon, 34-37, 41; Lamon, 34-36; Holland, 28. 

[22] Mr. Herndon did this ill deed; 50-54. Lamon prefers to say thatmost of this literature is "too indecent for publication, " 63. 

[23] Thomas Lincoln died January 17, 1851. 

[24] Herndon, 75, 76; Lamon, 82; Arnold, 30; N. And H. I. 72. 

[25] N. And H. I. 74. 

[26] Lamon, 92, 93, has the best account of this famous encounter. 

[27] Ford, _Hist. Of Illinois_, 88. 

[28] Ford, _Hist. Of Illinois_, 81. 

[29] See anecdote in _The Good Old Times in McLean County_, 48. 

[30] "The jerks" was the graphic name of an attack not uncommon at thesereligious meetings. 

[31] See Herndon, 104, 118; Holland has some singular remarks on thissubject, p. 83; N. And H. , i. 121, say that Lincoln was "clean ofspeech, "--an agreeable statement, for which one would like to have someauthority. 

[32] Ford, _Hist. Of Illinois_, 82-86. 

[33] Ford, _Hist. Of Illinois_, 55, 86, 88, 104; Herndon, 103; N. And H. I. 107; Lamon, 124, 230. 

CHAPTER II

THE START IN LIFE

In Illinois during the years of Lincoln's boyhood the red man wasretiring sullenly before the fatal advance of the white man's frontier. Shooting, scalping, and plundering forays still occurred, and in theself-complaisant reminiscences of the old settlers of that day themerciless and mysterious savage is apt to lend to the narrative thelively coloring of mortal danger. [34] In the spring of 1832 a notedchief of the Sacs led a campaign of such importance that it lives inhistory under the dignified title of "the Black Hawk war. " The Indiansgathered in numbers so formidable that Governor Reynolds issued a callfor volunteers to aid the national forces. Lincoln, left unemployed bythe failure of Offut, at once enlisted. The custom then was, so soon asthere were enough recruits for a company, to elect a captain by vote. The method was simple: each candidate stood at some point in the fieldand the men went over to one or another according to their severalpreferences. Three fourths of the company to which Lincoln belongedranged themselves with him, and long afterward he used to say that noother success in life had given him such pleasure as did this one. 

The company was attached to the Fourth Illinois Regiment, commanded byColonel Samuel Thompson, in the brigade of General Samuel Whiteside. OnApril 27 they started for the scene of conflict, and for many daysendured much hardship of hunger and rough marching. But thereby theyescaped serious danger, for they were too fatigued to go forward on May12, when the cavalry battalions rode out gallantly, recklessly, perhapsa little stupidly, into ambush and death. It so happened that Lincolnnever came nearer to any engagement than he did to this one of"Stillman's Run;" so that in place of military glory he had to becontent with the reputation of being the best comrade and story-tellerat the camp fire. He had, however, an opportunity to do one honorableact: the brief term of service of the volunteers expired on May 27, andmost of them eagerly hastened away from an irksome task, without regardto the fact that their services were still much needed, whereas Lincolnand some other officers reënlisted as privates. They were made the"Independent Spy Battalion" of mounted volunteers, were given manyspecial privileges, but were concerned in no engagement, and erelongwere mustered out of service. Lincoln's certificate of discharge wassigned by Robert Anderson, who afterward was in command at Fort Sumterat the outbreak of the rebellion. Thus, late in June, Lincoln was againa civilian in New Salem, and was passing from war to politics. 

Nomination by caucus had not yet been introduced into Illinois, [35] andany person who wished to be a candidate for an elective office simplymade public announcement of the fact and then conducted his campaign asbest he could. [36] On March 9, 1832, shortly before his enlistment, Lincoln issued a manifesto "To the People of Sangamon County, " in whichhe informed them that he should run as a candidate for the statelegislature at the autumn elections, and told them his politicalprinciples. [37] He was in favor of internal improvements, such asopening roads, clearing streams, building a railroad across SangamonCounty, and making the Sangamon River straight and navigable. Headvocated a usury law, and hazarded the extraordinary argument that "incases of extreme necessity there could always be means found to cheatthe law; while in all other cases it would have its intended effect. " Alaw ameliorated by infractions is no uncommon thing, but this is perhapsthe only instance in which a law has been befriended on the ground thatit can be circumvented. He believed that every man should "receive atleast a moderate education. " He deprecated changes in existing laws;for, he said, "considering the great probability that the framers ofthose laws were wiser than myself, I should prefer not meddling withthem. " The clumsy phraseology of his closing paragraph coupled not badlya frank avowal of ambition with an ingenuous expression of personalmodesty. The principles thus set forth were those of Clay and the Whigs, and at this time the "best people" in Sangamon County belonged to thisparty. The Democrats, on the other hand, did not much concern themselveswith principles, but accepted General Jackson in place thereof, asconstituting in himself a party platform. In the rough-and-tumblepioneer community they could not do better, and for many years they hadcontrolled the State; indeed, Lincoln himself had felt no small loyaltytowards a President who admirably expressed Western civilization. Now, however, he considered himself "an avowed Clay man, "[38] and besides theinternal improvement system he spoke also for a national bank and a highprotective tariff; probably he knew very little about either, but hispartisanship was perfect, for if there was any distinguishing badge ofan anti-Jackson Whig, it certainly was advocacy of a national bank. 

After his return from the "war, " Lincoln set about electioneering witha good show of energy. He hardly anticipated success, but at least uponthis trial trip he expected to make himself known to the people and togain useful experience. He "stumped" his own county thoroughly, and issaid to have made speeches which were blunt, crude, and inartificial, but not displeasing to his audiences. A story goes that once "a generalfight" broke out among his hearers, and one of his friends was gettingroughly handled, whereupon Lincoln, descending from the rostrum, took ahand in the affray, tossed one of the assailants "ten or twelve feeteasily, " and then continued his harangue. Yet not even thus could hewin, and another was chosen over his head. He had, however, more reasonto be gratified than disappointed with the result; for, though in plainfact he was a raw and unknown youngster, he stood third upon a list ofeight candidates, receiving 657 votes; and out of 208 votes cast in hisown county he scored 205. [39] In this there was ample encouragement forthe future. 

The political campaign being over, and legislative functions postponed, Lincoln was brought face to face with the pecuniary problem. Hecontemplated, not without approbation, the calling of the blacksmith;but the chance to obtain a part interest in a grocery "store" temptedhim into an occupation for which he was little fitted. He became juniorpartner in the firm of Berry & Lincoln, which, by executing anddelivering sundry notes of hand, absorbed the whole grocery business ofthe town. But Lincoln was hopelessly inefficient behind the counter, andBerry was a tippler. So in a year's time the store "winked out, " leavingas its only important trace those ill-starred scraps of paper by whichit had been founded. Berry "moved on" from the inconvenientneighborhood, and soon afterward died, contributing nothing to reducethe indebtedness. Lincoln patiently continued to make payments duringseveral years to come, until he had discharged the whole amount. It wasonly a few hundred dollars, but to him it seemed so enormous thatbetwixt jest and earnest he called it "the national debt. " So late as in1848, when he was a member of the House of Representatives atWashington, he applied part of his salary to this old indebtedness. 

During this "store"-keeping episode he had begun to study law, and while"keeping shop" he was with greater diligence reading Blackstone and suchother elementary classics of the profession as he could borrow. Hestudied with zeal and became absorbed in his books. Perched upon awoodpile, or lying under a tree with his feet thrust upwards against thetrunk and "grinding around with the shade, " he caused some neighbors tolaugh uproariously, and others to say that he was daft. In fact, he wasin grim earnest, and held on his way with much persistence. 

May 7, 1833, Lincoln was commissioned as postmaster at New Salem. Hismethod of distributing the scanty mail was to put all the letters in hishat, and to hand them out as he happened to meet the persons to whomthey were addressed. The emoluments could hardly have gone far towardsthe discharge of "the national debt. " His incumbency in this office ledto a story worth telling. When New Salem, and by necessity also thepost-office, like the grocery shop, "winked out, " in 1836, there was atrifling balance of sixteen or eighteen dollars due from Lincoln to thegovernment. Several years afterward, when he was practicing law inSpringfield, the government agent at last appeared to demand asettlement. Lincoln went to his trunk and drew forth "an old blue sockwith a quantity of silver and copper coin tied up in it, " the identicalbits of money which he had gathered from the people at New Salem, andwhich, through many days of need in the long intervening period, he hadnot once touched. 

Fortunately an occupation now offered itself which was more lucrative, and possessed also the valuable quality of leaving niches of leisure forthe study of the law. The mania for speculation in land had begun inIllinois; great tracts were being cut up into "town lots, " and there wasas lively a market for real estate as the world has ever seen. Theofficial surveyor of the county, John Calhoun, had more work than hecould do, and offered to appoint Lincoln as a deputy. A little studymade him competent for the work, which he performed for some time withadmirable accuracy, if the stories are to be believed. But he had notlong enjoyed the mild prosperity of this new career ere an untowardinterruption came from a creditor of the extinct grocery firm. This manheld one of the notes representing "the national debt, " and now leviedexecution upon Lincoln's horse and surveying instruments. Two friends, however, were at hand in this hour of need, and Bolin Greene and JamesShort are gratefully remembered as the men who generously furnished, inthat actual cash which was so scarce in Illinois, the sums of onehundred and twenty-five dollars and one hundred and twenty dollarsrespectively, to redeem these essential implements of Lincoln'sbusiness. 

The summer of 1834 found Lincoln again a candidate for the legislature. He ran as a Whig, but he received and accepted offers of aid from theDemocrats, and their votes swelled the flattering measure of hissuccess. It has usually been stated that he led the four successfulcandidates, the poll standing: Lincoln, 1, 376; Dawson, 1, 370; Carpenter, 1, 170; Stuart, 1, 164. But Mr. Herndon adduces evidence that Dawson'snumber was 1, 390, whereby Lincoln is relegated to the second place. Holland tells us that he "shouldered his pack and on foot trudged toVandalia, then the capital of the State, about a hundred miles, to makehis entrance into public life. " But the correcting pen of the laterbiographer interferes with this dramatic incident also. For it seemsthat, after the result of the election was known, Lincoln visited afriend, Coleman Smoot, and said: "Did you vote for me?" "I did, " repliedSmoot. "Then, " said Lincoln, "you must lend me two hundred dollars!"This seemed a peculiar _sequitur_, for ordinary political logic wouldhave made any money that was to pass between voter and candidate movethe other way. Yet Smoot accepted the consequence entailed in part byhis own act, and furnished the money, whereby Lincoln was able topurchase a new suit of clothes and to ride in the stage to Vandalia. 

The records of this legislature show nothing noteworthy. Lincoln wasvery inappropriately placed on the Committee on Public Accounts andExpenditures; also it is recorded that he introduced a resolution toobtain for the State a part of the proceeds of the public lands soldwithin it. What has chiefly interested the chroniclers is, that at thissession he first saw Stephen A. Douglas, then a lobbyist, and said ofhim: "He is the least man I ever saw. " Lincoln's part seems to have beenrather that of an observer than of an actor. The account given is thathe was watching, learning, making acquaintances, prudently preparing forfuture success, rather than endeavoring to seize it too greedily. Infact, there is reason to believe that his thoughts were intent on farother matter than the shaping of laws and statutes. For to this periodbelongs the episode of Ann Rutledge. The two biographers whose personalknowledge is the best regard this as the one real romance of Lincoln'slife. Heretofore he had held himself shyly aloof from women's society, but this maiden won his heart. She comes before posterity amid a glamourof rhetorical description, which attributes to her every grace of formand feature, every charm of character and intellect. She was but aschoolgirl of seventeen years when two men became her lovers; a year ormore afterward she became engaged to one of them, but before they couldbe married he made a somewhat singular excuse for going to New York onfamily affairs. His absence was prolonged and his letters became few. People said that the girl had been deceived, and Lincoln began to hopethat the way was clearing for him. But under the prolonged strain MissRutledge's health broke down, and on August 25, 1835, she died of brainfever. Lincoln was allowed to see her as she lay near her end. Theeffect upon him was grievous. Many declared him crazy, and his friendsfeared that he might go so far as to take his own life; they watched himclosely, and one of them at last kindly took him away from the scene ofhis sufferings for a while, and bore him constant and cheering company. In time the cloud passed, but it seems certain that on only one or twoother occasions in his life did that deep melancholy, which formed apermanent background to his temperament, take such overmastering, suchalarming and merciless possession of him. He was afflicted sorely witha constitutional tendency to gloom, and the evil haunted him all hislife long. Like a dark fog-bank it hung, always dull and threatening, onthe verge of his horizon, sometimes rolling heavily down upon him, sometimes drawing off into a more or less remote distance, but neverwholly disappearing. Every one saw it in his face and often felt it inhis manner, and few pictures of him have been made so bad as not in somedegree to present it. The access of it which was brought on by thisunhappy love affair was somewhat odd and uncouth in its manifestations, but was so genuine and sincere that one feels that he was trulyundergoing the baptism of a great sorrow. 

At no other point is there more occasion to note this trait ofcharacter, which presents a curious and interesting subject for study. Probably no exhaustive solution is possible. One wanders off into themystery of human nature, loses his way in the dimness of that which canbe felt but cannot be expressed, and becomes aware of even dimmerregions beyond in which it is vain to grope. It is well known that thecoarse and rough side of life among the pioneers had its reaction in areserved and at times morose habit, nearly akin to sadness, at least inthose who frequented the wilderness; it was the expression of theinfluence of the vast, desolate, and lonely nature amid which theypassed their lives. It is true that Lincoln was never a backwoodsman, and never roved alone for long periods among the shadowy forests and thelimit-less prairies, so that their powerful and weird influences, though not altogether remote, never bore upon him in full force; yettheir effect was everywhere around him, and through others he imbibedit, for his disposition was sensitive and sympathetic for such purposes. That there was also a simple prosaic physical inducement cannot bedenied. Hardship and daily discomfort in all the arrangements of lifecounted for something, and especially so the bad food, greasy, unwholesome, horribly cooked, enough to afflict an ostrich with the bluedevils of dyspepsia. The denizen of the town devoured messes vastlyworse than the simple meal of the hunter and trapper, and did notcounteract the ill effect by hard exercise in the free, inspiring air. Such facts must be considered, though they diminish the poetry whichrhetoricians and sentimentalists have cast over the melancholy ofLincoln's temperament. Yet they fall far short of wholly accounting fora gloom which many have loved to attribute to the mysticism of a greatdestiny, as though the awful weight of his immense task was makingitself felt in his strange, brooding nature long years before any humanprophet could have forecast any part of that which was to come. In thisapparent vague consciousness of the oppression of a great burden oftoil, duty, and responsibility, casting its shadow so far before, thereis something so fascinating to the imagination of man that we cannotquite forego it, or accept any explanation which would compel usaltogether to part with it. The shuddering awe and terrible sense offate, which the grandeur of the Greek tragedies so powerfully expresses, come to us when we contemplate this strange cloud which never leftLincoln in any year after his earliest youth, although some traits inhis character seemed often incomprehensibly to violate it, and likerebellious spirits to do outrage to it, while, in fact, they only madeit the more striking, picturesque, and mysterious. But, after allexplanations have been made, the conclusion must be that there is no oneand only thread to guide us through the labyrinth to the heart of thissingular trait, and each of us must follow that which his own naturerenders intelligible or congenial for him. To us, who know the awfulclosing acts of his life-drama, it seems so appropriate that thereshould be an impressive unity, and so an inevitable backward influenceworking from the end towards the beginning, that we cannot avoid, norwould avoid, an instinctive belief that an occult moral and mentalcondition already existed in the years of Lincoln's life which we arenow observing, although the profound cause of that condition lay whollyin the future, in the years which were still far away. There is a charmin the very unreason and mysticism of such a faith, and mankind willnever quite fail to fancy, if not actually to believe, that the lifewhich Lincoln had to live in the future wrought in some inexplicable wayupon the life which he was living in the present. The explanation is notmore strange than the enigma. 

Returning now to the narrative, an unpleasant necessity is encountered. It must be confessed that the atmosphere of romance which lingers aroundthis love-tale of the fair and sweet Ann Rutledge, so untimely takenaway, is somewhat attenuated by the fact that only some fifteen monthsrolled by after she was laid in the ground before Lincoln was againintent upon matrimony. In the autumn of 1836 Miss Mary Owens, ofKentucky, appeared in New Salem, --a comely lass, with "large blue eyes, ""fine trimmings, " and a long and varied list of attractions. Lincolnimmediately began to pay court to her, but in an ungainly and morbidfashion. It is impossible to avoid feeling that his mind was not yet ina natural and healthy condition. While offering to marry her, he advisedher not to have him. Upon her part she found him "deficient in thoselittle links which make up the chain of woman's happiness. " So she wouldnone of him, but wedded another and became the mother of someConfederate soldiers. Lincoln did not suffer on this second occasion ashe had done on the first; and in the spring of 1838 he wrote upon thesubject one of the most unfortunate epistles ever penned, in which heturned the whole affair into coarse and almost ribald ridicule. In facthe seems as much out of place in dealing with women and with love as hewas in place in dealing with politicians and with politics, and it ispleasant to return from the former to the latter topics. [40]

The spring of 1836 found Lincoln again nominating himself before thecitizens of Sangamon County, but for the last time. His party denouncedthe caucus system as a "Yankee contrivance, intended to abridge theliberties of the people;" but they soon found that it would be assensible to do battle with pikes and bows, after the invention ofmuskets and cannon, as to continue to oppose free self-nomination to theJacksonian method of nomination by convention. In enjoying this lastopportunity, not only of presenting himself, but also of constructinghis own "platform, " Lincoln published the following card:--

NEW SALEM, June 13, 1836. 

TO THE EDITOR OF THE JOURNAL:--

In your paper of last Saturday I see a communication over the signatureof "Many Voters" in which the candidates who are announced in the"Journal" are called upon to "show their hands. " Agreed. Here's mine. 

I go for all sharing the privileges of the government who assist inbearing its burdens. Consequently, I go for admitting all whites to theright of suffrage who pay taxes or bear arms (by no means excludingfemales). 

If elected, I shall consider the whole people of Sangamon myconstituents, as well those that oppose as those that support me. 

While acting as their representative, I shall be governed by their willon all subjects upon which I have the means of knowing what their willis; and upon all others I shall do what my own judgment teaches me willbest advance their interests. Whether elected or not, I go fordistributing the proceeds of the sales of public lands to the severalStates to enable our State, in common with others, to dig canals andconstruct railroads without borrowing money and paying the interest onit. 

If alive on the first Monday in November, I shall vote for Hugh L. Whitefor President. 

Very respectfully, A. LINCOLN. 

The canvass was conducted after the usual fashion, with stump-speaking, fighting, and drinking. Western voters especially fancied the jointdebate between rivals, and on such exciting occasions were apt to cometo the arbitrament of fists and knives. But it is pleasant to hear thatLincoln calmed rather than excited such affrays, and that once, whenNinian W. Edwards climbed upon a table and screamed at his opponent thelie direct, Lincoln replied by "so fair a speech" that it quelled thediscord. Henceforward he practiced a calm, carefully-weighed, dispassionate style in presenting facts and arguments. Even if hecultivated it from appreciation of its efficiency, at least his skill init was due to the fact that it was congenial to his nature, and that hismind worked instinctively along these lines. His mental constitution, his way of thinking, were so honest that he always seemed to be a mansincerely engaged in seeking the truth, and who, when he believed thathe had found it, would tell it precisely as he saw it, and tell it all. This was the distinguishing trait or habit which differentiates Lincolnfrom too many other political speakers and writers in the country. Yetwith it he combined the character of a practical politician and a stanchparty man. No party has a monopoly of truth and is always in the right;but Lincoln, with the advantage of being naturally fair-minded to a raredegree, understood that the best ingenuity is fairness, and that thesecond best ingenuity is the appearance of fairness. 

A pleasant touch of his humor illumined this campaign. George Forquer, once a Whig but now a Democrat and an office-holder, had lately builtfor himself the finest house in Springfield, and had decorated it withthe first lightning-rod ever seen in the neighborhood. One day, afterForquer had been berating Lincoln as a young man who must "be takendown, " Lincoln turned to the audience with a few words: "It is for you, not for me, to say whether I am up or down. The gentleman has alluded tomy being a young man;[41] I am older in years than I am in the tricksand trades of politicians. I desire to live, and I desire place anddistinction as a politician; but I would rather die now than, like thegentleman, live to see the day when I should have to erect alightning-rod to protect a guilty conscience from an offended God. "

There are other stories of this campaign, amusing and characteristic ofthe region and the times, but which there is not room to repeat. Theresult of it was that Sangamon County, hitherto Democratic, was now wonby the Whigs, and that Lincoln had the personal satisfaction of leadingthe poll. The county had in the legislature nine representatives, tallfellows all, not one of them standing less than six feet, so that theywere nicknamed "the Long Nine. " Such was their authority that one ofthem afterward said: "All the bad or objectionable laws passed at thatsession of the legislature, and for many years afterward, werechargeable to the management and influence of 'the Long Nine. '" Thiswas a damning confession, for the "bad and objectionable" laws of thatsession were numerous. A mania possessed the people. The whole State wasbeing cut up into towns and cities and house-lots, so that town-lotswere said to be the only article of export. [42] A system of internalimprovements at the public expense was pushed forward with incrediblerecklessness. The State was to be "gridironed" with thirteen hundredmiles of railroad; the courses of the rivers were to be straightened;and where nature had neglected to supply rivers, canals were to be dug. A loan of twelve millions of dollars was authorized, and the countiesnot benefited thereby received gifts of cash. The bonds were issued andsent to the bankers of New York and of Europe, and work was vigorouslybegun. The terrible financial panic of 1837 ought to have administeredan early check to this madness. But it did not. Resolutions of popularconventions instructed legislators to institute "a general system ofinternal improvements, " which should be "commensurate with the wants ofthe people;" and the lawgivers obeyed as implicitly as if each delegatewas lighting his steps by an Aladdin's lamp. 

With this mad current Lincoln swam as wildly and as ignorantly as didany of his comrades. He was absurdly misplaced as a member of theCommittee on Finance. Never in his life did he show the slightestmeasure of "money sense. " He had, however, declared his purpose to begoverned by the will of his constituents in all matters in which he knewthat will, and at this time he apparently held the American theory thatthe multitude probably possesses the highest wisdom, and that at anyrate the majority is entitled to have its way. Therefore, in thisambitious enterprise of putting Illinois at the very forefront of thecivilized world by an outburst of fine American energy, his ardor was aswarm as that of the warmest, and his intelligence was as utterly misledas that of the most ignorant. He declared his ambition to be "the DeWittClinton of Illinois. " After the inevitable crash had come, amid theperplexity of general ruin and distress, he honestly acknowledged thathe had blundered very badly. Nevertheless, no vengeance was exacted ofhim by the people; which led Governor Ford to say that it is safer for apolitician to be wrong with his constituents than to be right againstthem, and to illustrate this profound truth by naming Lincoln among the"spared monuments of popular wrath. "

"The Long Nine" had in this legislature a task peculiarly their own: todivide Sangamon County, and to make Springfield instead of Vandalia thestate capital. Amid all the whirl of the legislation concerningimprovements Lincoln kept this especial purpose always in view. It issaid that his skill was infinite, and that he never lost heart. Hegained the reputation of being the best "log-roller" in thelegislature, and no measure got the support of the "Long Nine" without acontract for votes to be given in return for the removal of the statecapital. It is unfortunate that such methods should enjoy the prestigeof having been conspicuously practiced by Abraham Lincoln, but theevidence seems to establish the fact. That there was anythingobjectionable in the skillful performance of such common transactions asthe trading of votes probably never occurred to him, being aprofessional politician, any more than it did to his constituents, whotriumphed noisily in this success, and welcomed their candidates homewith great popular demonstrations of approval. [43]

A more agreeable occurrence at this session is the position taken byLincoln concerning slavery, a position which was looked upon withextreme disfavor in those days in that State, and which he voluntarilyassumed when he was not called upon to act or commit himself in any wayconcerning the matter. During the session sundry resolutions werepassed, disapproving abolition societies and doctrines, asserting thesacredness of the right of property in slaves in the slave States, andalleging that it would be against good faith to abolish slavery in theDistrict of Columbia without the consent of the citizens of theDistrict. Two days before the end of the session, March 3, 1837, Lincoln introduced a strenuous protest. It bore only one signaturebesides his own, and doubtless this fact was fortunate for Lincoln, since it probably prevented the document from attracting the attentionand resentment of a community which, at the time, by no means held theopinion that there was either "injustice" or "bad policy" in the great"institution" of the South. It was within a few months after this verytime that the atrocious persecution and murder of Lovejoy took place inthe neighboring town of Alton. 

In such hours as he could snatch from politics and bread-winning Lincolnhad continued to study law, and in March, 1837, he was admitted to thebar. He decided to establish himself in Springfield, where certainly hedeserved a kindly welcome in return for what he had done towards makingit the capital. It was a little town of only between one and twothousand inhabitants; but to Lincoln it seemed a metropolis. "There is agreat deal of flourishing about in carriages here, " he wrote; there werealso social distinctions, and real aristocrats, who wore ruffled shirts, and even adventured "fair top-boots" in the "unfathomable" mud ofstreets which knew neither sidewalks nor pavements. 

Lincoln came into the place bringing all his worldly belongings in apair of saddle-bags. He found there John T. Stuart, his comrade in theBlack Hawk campaign, engaged in the practice of the law. The twopromptly arranged a partnership. But Stuart was immersed in that toocommon mixture of law and politics in which the former jealous mistressis apt to take the traditional revenge upon her half-hearted suitor. Such happened in this case; and these two partners, both making the sameblunder of yielding imperfect allegiance to their profession, paid theinevitable penalty; they got perhaps work enough in mere point ofquantity, but it was neither interesting nor lucrative. Such business, during the four years which he passed with Stuart, did not wean Lincolnfrom his natural fondness for matters political. At the same time he wasa member of sundry literary gatherings and debating societies. Such ofhis work as has been preserved does not transcend the ordinaryproductions of a young man trying his wings in clumsy flights oforatory; but he had the excuse that the thunderous declamatory style wasthen regarded in the West as the only true eloquence. He learned better, in course of time, and so did the West; and it was really good fortunethat he passed through the hobbledehoy period in the presence ofaudiences whose taste was no better than his own. 

Occasionally amid the tedium of these high-flown commonplaces thereopens a fissure through which the inner spirit of the man looks out foran instant. It is well known that Lincoln was politically ambitious; hisfriends knew it, his biographers have said it, he himself avowed it. Now and again, in these early days, when his horizon could hardly haveranged beyond the state legislature and the lower house of Congress, heuttered some sentences which betrayed longings of a high moral grade, and indicated that office and power were already regarded by him as theopportunities for great actions. Strenuous as ought to be the objectionto that tone in speaking of Lincoln which seems to proceed from beneaththe sounding-board of the pulpit, and which uses him as a Sunday-schoolfigure to edify a piously admiring world, yet it certainly seems a plainfact that his day-dreams at this period foreshadowed the acts of hislater years, and that what he pleased himself with imagining was not theacquirement of official position but the achievement of some greatbenefit for mankind. He did not, of course, expect to do this as aphilanthropist; for he understood himself sufficiently to know that hisroad lay in the public service. Accordingly he talks not as Clarkson orWilberforce, but as a public man, of "emancipating slaves, " ofeliminating slavery and drunkenness from the land; at the same time hespeaks thus not as a politician shrewdly anticipating the coming popularimpulse, but as one desiring to stir that impulse. When he said, in hismanifesto in 1832, that he had "no other ambition so great as that ofbeing truly esteemed by his fellow-men, " he uttered words which in themouths of most politicians have the irritating effect of the dreariestand cheapest of platitudes; but he obviously uttered them with thesincerity of a deep inward ambition, that kind of an ambition which isoften kept sacred from one's nearest intimates. Many side glimpses showhim in this light, and it seems to be the genuine and uncolored one. 

In 1838 Lincoln was again elected a member of the lower house of thelegislature, and many are the amusing stories told of the canvass. Itwas in this year that he made sudden onslaught on the demagogue DickTaylor, and opening with a sudden jerk the artful colonel's waistcoat, displayed a glittering wealth of jewelry hidden temporarily beneath it. There is also the tale of his friend Baker haranguing a crowd in thestore beneath Lincoln's office. The audience differed with Baker, andwas about to punish him severely for the difference, when Lincolndangled down through a trap-door in the ceiling, intimated his intentionto share in the fight if there was to be one, and brought the audienceto a more pacific frame of mind. Such amenities of political debate atleast tested some of the qualities of the individual. The Whig partymade him their candidate for the speakership and he came within one voteof being elected. [44] He was again a member of the Finance Committee;but financiering by those wise lawgivers was no longer so lightsome andexuberant a task as it had been. The hour of reckoning had come; and thebusiness proved to be chiefly a series of humiliating and futileefforts to undo the follies of the preceding two and a half years. Lincoln shared in this disagreeable labor, as he had shared in the maniawhich had made it necessary. He admitted that he was "no financier, " andgave evidence of the fact by submitting a bill which did not deserve tobe passed, and was not. It can, however, be said for him that he neverfavored repudiation, as some of his comrades did. 

In 1840[45] Lincoln was again elected, again was the nominee of the Whigparty for the speakership, and again was beaten by Ewing, the Democraticcandidate, who mustered 46 votes against 36 for Lincoln. Thislegislature held only one session, and apparently Holland's statement, that "no important business of general interest was transacted, " is afair summary. Lincoln did only one memorable thing, and thatunfortunately was discreditable. In a close and exciting contest, he, with two other Whigs, jumped out of the window in order to break aquorum. It is gratifying to hear from the chronicler of the event, whowas one of the parties concerned, that "Mr. Lincoln always regrettedthat he entered into that arrangement, as he deprecated everything thatsavored of the revolutionary. "[46]

The year 1840 was made lively throughout the country by the spiritedand rollicking campaign which the Whigs made on behalf of GeneralHarrison. In that famous struggle for "Tippecanoe and Tyler too, " thelog cabin, hard cider, and the 'coon skin were the popular emblems whichseemed to lend picturesqueness and enthusiasm and a kind of Westernspirit to the electioneering everywhere in the land. In Illinois Lincolnwas a candidate on the Whig electoral ticket, and threw himself withgreat zeal into the congenial task of "stumping" the State. Douglas wasdoing the same duty on the other side, and the two had many encounters. Of Lincoln's speeches only one has been preserved, [47] and it leads tothe conclusion that nothing of value was lost when the others perished. The effusion was in the worst style of the effervescent and exuberantschool of that region and generation. Nevertheless, it may have had thegreatest merit which oratory can possess, in being perfectly adapted tothe audience to which it was addressed. But rhetoric could not carryIllinois for the Whigs; the Democrats cast the vote of the State. 

FOOTNOTES:

[34] _The Good Old Times in McLean County_, passim. 

[35] It was first advocated in 1835-36, and was adopted by slow degreesthereafter. Ford, _Hist. Of Illinois_, 204. 

[36] _Ibid. _ 201. 

[37] Lamon, 129, where is given the text of the manifesto; Herndon, 101;N. And H. I. 101, 105; Holland, 53, says that _after_ his return fromthe Black Hawk campaign, Lincoln "was applied to" to become a candidate, and that the "application was a great surprise to him. " This seems anobvious error, in view of the manifesto; yet see Lamon, 122. 

[38] N. And H. I. 102. Lamon regards him as "a nominal Jackson man" incontradistinction to a "whole-hog Jackson man;" as "Whiggish" ratherthan actually a Whig. Lamon, 123, 126. 

[39] Herndon, 105. But see N. And H. I. 109. 

[40] The whole story of these two love affairs is given at great lengthby Herndon and by Lamon. Other biographers deal lightly with theseepisodes. Nicolay and Hay scantly refer to them, and, in theiradmiration for Mr. Lincoln, even permit themselves to speak of that mostabominable letter to Mrs. Browning as "grotesquely comic. " (Vol. I. P. 192. ) It is certainly true that the revelations of Messrs. Herndon andLamon are painful, and in part even humiliating; and it would be mostsatisfactory to give these things the go-by. But this seems impossible;if one wishes to study and comprehend the character of Mr. Lincoln, thestrange and morbid condition in which he was for some years at this timecannot possibly be passed over. It may even be said that it would beunfair to him to do so; and a truthful idea of him, on the whole, redounds more to his credit than a maimed and mutilated one, even thoughthe mutilation seems to consist in lopping off and casting out of sighta deformity. Psychologically, perhaps physiologically, these episodesare interesting, and as aiding a comprehension of Mr. Lincoln's naturethey are indispensable; but historically they are of no consequence, andI am glad that the historical character of this work gives me the rightto dwell upon them lightly. 

[41] It is amusing-to compare this Western oratory with the famousoutburst of the younger Pitt which he opened with those familiar words:"The atrocious crime of being a young man which the honorable gentlemanhas with such spirit and decency charged upon me, " etc. , etc. 

[42] For the whole history of the rise, progress, and downfall of thismania, see Ford, _Hist. Of Illinois_, ch. Vi. 

[43] Ford, _Hist. Of Illinois_, 186; Lamon, 198-201; Herndon, 176, 180. N. And H. , i. 137-139, endeavor to give a different color to thistransaction, but they make out no case as against the statements ofwriters who had such opportunities to know the truth as had GovernorFord, Lamon, and Herndon. 

[44] N. And H. I. 160; Holland, 74; Lamon, 212; but see Herndon, 193. 

[45] For the story of _The Skinning of Thomas_, belonging to thiscampaign, see Herndon, 197; Lamon, 231; and for the Radford story, seeN. And H. I. 172; Lamon, 230. 

[46] Lamon, 216, 217. Nicolay and Hay, i. 162, speak of "a number" ofthe members, among whom Lincoln was "prominent, " making this exit; butthere seem to have been only two besides him. 

[47] N. And H. I. 173-177. 

CHAPTER III

LOVE; A DUEL; LAW, AND CONGRESS

Collaterally with law and politics, Lincoln was at this time engagedwith that almost grotesque courtship which led to his marriage. Thestory is a long and strange one; in its best gloss it is not agreeable, and in its worst version it is exceedingly disagreeable. In any form itis inexplicable, save so far as the apparent fact that his mind wassomewhat disordered can be taken as an explanation. In 1839 Miss MaryTodd, who had been born in Lexington, Kentucky, December 13, 1818, cameto Springfield to stay with her sister, Mrs. Ninian W. Edwards. TheWestern biographers describe her as "gifted with rare talents, " as"high-bred, proud, brilliant, witty, " as "aristocratic" and"accomplished, " and as coming from a "long and distinguished ancestralline. " Later in her career critics with more exacting standards gaveother descriptions. There is, however, no doubt that in point of socialposition and acquirements she stood at this time much above Lincoln. 

Upon Lincoln's part it was a peculiar wooing, a series of morbidmisgivings as to the force of his affection, of alternate ardor andcoldness, advances and withdrawals, and every variety of strangelanguage and freakish behavior. In the course of it, oddly enough, hisomnipresent competitor, Douglas, crossed his path, his rival in love aswell as in politics, and ultimately outstripped by him in each alike. After many months of this queer, uncertain zigzag progress, it wasarranged that the marriage should take place on January 1, 1841. At theappointed hour the company gathered, the supper was set out, and thebride, "bedecked in veil and silken gown, and nervously toying with theflowers in her hair, " according to the graphic description of Mr. Herndon, sat in her sister's house awaiting the coming of her lover. Shewaited, but he came not, and soon his friends were searching the townfor him. Towards morning they found him. Some said that he was insane;if he was not, he was at least suffering from such a terrible access ofhis constitutional gloom that for some time to come it was considerednecessary to watch him closely. His friend Speed took him away upon along visit to Kentucky, from which he returned in a much improved mentalcondition, but soon again came under the influence of Miss Todd'sattractions. 

The memory of the absurd result of the recent effort at marriagenaturally led to the avoidance of publicity concerning the secondundertaking. So nothing was said till the last moment; then the licensewas procured, a few friends were hastily notified, and the ceremony wasperformed, all within a few hours, on November 4, 1842. A courtshipmarked by so many singularities was inevitably prolific of gossip; andby all this tittle-tattle, in which it is absolutely impossible toseparate probably a little truth from much fiction, the bride sufferedmore than the groom. Among other things it was asserted that Lincoln atlast came to the altar most reluctantly. One says that he was "pale andtrembling, as if being driven to slaughter;" another relates that thelittle son of a friend, noticing that his toilet had been more carefullymade than usual, asked him where he was going, and that he gloomilyresponded: "To hell, I suppose. " Probably enough, however, theseanecdotes are apocryphal; for why the proud and high-tempered Miss Toddshould have held so fast to an unwilling lover, who had behaved sostrangely and seemed to offer her so little, is a conundrum which hasbeen answered by no better explanation than the very lame one, that sheforesaw his future distinction. It was her misfortune that she failed tomake herself popular, so that no one has cared in how disagreeable orfoolish a position any story places her. She was charged with having asharp tongue, a sarcastic wit, and a shrewish temper, over whichperilous traits she had no control. It is related that her sister, Mrs. Edwards, opposed the match, from a belief that the two were utterlyuncongenial, and later on this came to be the accepted belief of thepeople at large. That Mrs. Lincoln often severely harassed her husbandalways has been and always will be believed. One would gladly leave thewhole topic veiled in that privacy which ought always to be accorded todomestic relations which are supposed to be only imperfectly happy; buthis countrymen have not shown any such respect to Mr. Lincoln, and it nolonger is possible wholly to omit mention of a matter about which somuch has been said and written. Moreover, it has usually been supposedthat the influence of Mrs. Lincoln upon her husband was unceasing andpowerful, and that her moods and her words constituted a very importantelement in his life. [48]

Another disagreeable incident of this period was the quarrel with JamesA. Shields. In the summer of 1842 sundry coarse assaults upon Shields, attributed in great part, or wholly, to the so-called trenchant andwitty pen of Miss Todd, appeared in the Springfield "Journal. " Lincolnaccepted the responsibility for them, received and reluctantly accepteda challenge, and selected broadswords as the weapons! "Friends, "however, brought about an "explanation, " and the conflict was avoided. But ink flowed in place of blood, and the newspapers were filled with amass of silly, grandiloquent, blustering, insolent, and altogetherpitiable stuff. All the parties concerned were placed in a mosthumiliating light, and it is gratifying to hear that Lincoln had atleast the good feeling to be heartily ashamed of the affair, so that he"always seemed willing to forget" it. But every veil which he eversought to throw over anything concerning himself has had the effect ofan irresistible provocation to drag the subject into the strongest glareof publicity. [49]

All the while, amid so many distractions, Lincoln was seeking alivelihood at the bar. On April 14, 1841, a good step was taken bydissolving the partnership with Stuart and the establishment of a newpartnership with Stephen T. Logan, lately judge of the Circuit Court ofthe United States, and whom Arnold calls "the head of the bar at thecapital. " This gentleman, though not averse to politics, was a closestudent, assiduous in his attention to business, and very accurate andmethodical in his ways. Thus he furnished a shining example of preciselythe qualities which Lincoln had most need to cultivate, and hisinfluence upon Lincoln was marked and beneficial. They continuedtogether until September 20, 1843, when they separated, and on the sameday Lincoln, heretofore a junior, became the senior in a new partnershipwith William H. Herndon. This firm was never formally dissolved up tothe day of Lincoln's death. 

When Lincoln was admitted to the bar the practice of the law was in avery crude condition in Illinois. General principles gathered from a fewtext-books formed the simple basis upon which lawyers tried cases andframed arguments in improvised court-rooms. But the advance was rapidand carried Lincoln forward with it. The raw material, if the phrase maybe pardoned, was excellent; there were many men in the State who uniteda natural aptitude for the profession with high ability, ambition, and aprogressive spirit. Lincoln was brought in contact with them all, whether they rode his circuit or not, because the federal courts wereheld only in Springfield. Among them were Stephen A. Douglas, LymanTrumbull, afterward for a long while chairman of the Judiciary Committeeof the national Senate, David Davis, afterward a senator, and anassociate justice of the Supreme Court of the United States; O. H. Browning, Ninian W. Edwards, Edward D. Baker, Justin Butterfield, JudgeLogan, and more. Precisely what position Lincoln occupied among thesemen it is difficult to say with accuracy, because it is impossible toknow just how much of the praise which has been bestowed upon him is thelanguage of eulogy or of the brotherly courtesy of the bar, and how muchis a discriminating valuation of his qualities. That in the foregoinglist there were better and greater lawyers than he is unquestionable;that he was primarily a politician and only secondarily a lawyer isequally beyond denial. He has been described also as "a case lawyer, "that is to say, a lawyer who studies each case as it comes to him simplyby and for itself, a method which makes the practitioner rather than thejurist. That Lincoln was ever learned in the science is hardlypretended. In fact it was not possible that the divided allegiance whichhe gave to his profession for a score of years could have achieved sucha result. [50] But it is said, and the well-known manner of his mentaloperations makes it easy to believe, that his arguments had a marveloussimplicity and clearness, alike in thought and in expression. To thesetraits they owed their great force; and a legal argument can have nohigher traits; fine-drawn subtlety is undeniably an inferior quality. Noteworthy above all else was his extraordinary capacity for statement;all agree that his statement of his case and his presentation of thefacts and the evidence were so plain and fair as to be far moreconvincing than the argument which was built upon them. Again it may besaid that the power to state in this manner is as high in the order ofintellectual achievement as anything within forensic possibilities. 

As an advocate Lincoln seems to have ranked better than he did in thediscussion of pure points of law. When he warmed to his work his powerover the emotions of a jury was very great. A less dignified but notless valuable capacity lay in his humor and his store of illustrativeanecdotes. But the one trait, which all agree in attributing to him andwhich above all others will redound to his honor, at least in the mindof the layman, is that he was only efficient when his client was in theright, and that he made but indifferent work in a wrong cause. He waspreëminently the honest lawyer, the counsel fitted to serve the litigantwho was justly entitled to win. His power of lucid statement was oflittle service when the real facts were against him; and his eloquenceseemed paralyzed when he did not believe thoroughly that his client hada just cause. He generally refused to take cases unless he could seethat as matter of genuine right he ought to win them. People whoconsulted him were at times bluntly advised to withdraw from an unjustor a hard-hearted contention, or were bidden to seek other counsel. Hecould even go the length of leaving a case, while actually conductingit, if he became satisfied of unfairness on the part of his client; andwhen a coadjutor won a case from which he had withdrawn _in transitu_, so to speak, he refused to accept any portion of the fee. Such habitsmay not meet with the same measure of commendation from professionalmen[51] which they will command on the part of others; but those who arenot members of this ingenious profession, contemning the fine logicwhich they fail to overcome, stubbornly insist upon admiring the lawyerwho refuses to subordinate right to law. In this respect Lincolnaccepted the ideals of laymen rather than the doctrines of hisprofession. [52]

In the presidential campaign of 1844, in which Henry Clay was thecandidate of the Whig party, Lincoln was nominated upon the Whigelectoral ticket. He was an ardent admirer of Clay and he threw himselfinto this contest with great zeal. Oblivious of courts and clients, hedevoted himself to "stumping" Illinois and a part of Indiana. WhenIllinois sent nine Democratic electors to vote for James K. Polk, hisdisappointment was bitter. All the members of the defeated party had apeculiar sense of personal chagrin upon this occasion, and Lincoln feltit even more than others. It is said that two years later a visit toAshland resulted in a disillusionment, and that his idol then came downfrom its pedestal, or at least the pedestal was made much lower. [53]

In March, 1843, Lincoln had hopes that the Whigs would nominate him astheir candidate for the national House of Representatives. In thecanvass he developed some strength, but not quite enough, and the resultwas somewhat ludicrous, for Sangamon County made him a delegate to thenominating convention with instructions to vote for one of his owncompetitors, Colonel Edward D. Baker, the gallant gentleman andbrilliant orator who fell at Ball's Bluff. The prize was finally carriedoff by Colonel John J. Hardin, who afterward died at Buena Vista. By achange of election periods the next convention was held in 1844, andthis time Lincoln publicly declined to make a contest for thenomination against Colonel Baker, who accordingly received it and waselected. It has been said that an agreement was made between Hardin, Baker, Lincoln, and Judge Logan, whereby each should be allowed one termin Congress, without competition on the part of any of the others; butthe story does not seem altogether trustworthy, nor wholly corroboratedby the facts. Possibly there may have been a courteous understandingbetween them. It has, however, been spoken of as a very reprehensiblebargain, and Lincoln has been zealously defended against the reproach ofhaving entered into it. Why, if indeed it ever was made, it had thisobjectionable complexion is a point in the inscrutable moralities ofpolitics which is not plain to those uninitiated in these ethicalmysteries. 

In the year 1846 Lincoln again renewed his pursuit of the coveted honor, as Holland very properly puts it. Nothing is more absurd than statementsto the purport that he was "induced to accept" the nomination, statements which he himself would have heard with honest laughter. Onlythree years ago[54] he had frankly written to a friend: "Now, if youshould hear any one say that Lincoln don't want to go to Congress, Iwish you, as a personal friend of mine, would tell him you have reasonto believe he is mistaken. The truth is I would [should] like to go verymuch. " Now, the opportunity being at hand, he spared no pains tocompass it. In spite of the alleged agreement Hardin madereconnoissances in the district, which Lincoln met withcounter-manifestations so vigorous that on February 26 Hardin withdrew, and on May 1 Lincoln was nominated. Against him the Democrats set PeterCartwright, the famous itinerant preacher of the Methodists, whosestrenuous and popular eloquence had rung in the ears of every Westernsettler. Stalwart, aggressive, possessing all the qualities adapted towin the good-will of such a constituency, the Apostle of the West was adangerous antagonist. But Lincoln had political capacity in a raredegree. Foresight and insight, activity and the power to organize and todirect, were his. In this campaign his eye was upon every one;individuals, newspaper editors, political clubs, got their inspirationand their guidance from him. [55] Such thoroughness deserved and achievedan extraordinary success; and at the polls, in August, the district gavehim a majority of 1, 511. In the latest presidential campaign it hadgiven Clay a majority of 914; and two years later it gave Taylor amajority of 1, 501. Sangamon County gave Lincoln a majority of 690, thelargest given to any candidate from 1836 to 1850, inclusive. Moreover, Lincoln was the only Whig who secured a place in the Illinoisdelegation. 

Though elected in the summer of 1846, it was not until December 6, 1847, that the Thirtieth Congress began its first session. Robert C. Winthropwas chosen speaker of the House, by 110 votes out of 218. The change inthe political condition was marked; in the previous House the Democratshad numbered 142 and the Whigs only 75; in this House the Whigs were116, the Democrats 108. Among the members were John Quincy Adams, AndrewJohnson, Alexander H. Stephens, Howell Cobb, David Wilmot, JacobCollamer, Robert Toombs, with many more scarcely less familiar names. The Mexican war was drawing towards its close, [56] and most of thetalking in Congress had relation to it. The whole Whig party denouncedit at the time, and the nation has been more than half ashamed of itever since. By adroit manoeuvres Polk had forced the fight upon a weakand reluctant nation, and had made to his own people false statements asto both the facts and the merits of the quarrel. The rebuke which theyhad now administered, by changing the large Democratic majority into aminority, "deserves, " says von Holst, "to be counted among the mostmeritorious proofs of the sound and honorable feeling of the Americannation. "[57] But while the administration had thus smirched theinception and the whole character of the war with meanness and dishonor, the generals and the army were winning abundant glory for the nationalarms. Good strategy achieved a series of brilliant victories, andfortunately for the Whigs General Taylor and General Scott, togetherwith a large proportion of the most distinguished regimental officers, were of their party. This aided them essentially in their policy, whichwas, to denounce the entering into the war but to vote all necessarysupplies for its vigorous prosecution. 

Into this scheme of his party Lincoln entered with hearty concurrence. Aweek after the House met he closed a letter to his partner with theremark: "As you are all so anxious for me to distinguish myself, I haveconcluded to do so before long, " and what he said humorously he probablymeant seriously. Accordingly he soon afterward[58] introduced a seriesof resolutions, which, under the nickname of "The Spot Resolutions, "attracted some attention. Quoting in his preamble sundry paragraphs ofthe President's message of May 11, 1846, to the purport that Mexico had"invaded _our territory_" and had "shed the blood of our citizens on_our own soil_" he then requested the President to state "_the spot_"where these and other alleged occurrences had taken place. His first"little speech" was on "a post-office question of no general interest;"and he found himself "about as badly scared and no worse" than when hespoke in court. So a little later, January 12, 1848, he ventured to callup his resolutions and to make an elaborate speech upon them. [59] It wasnot a very great or remarkable speech, but it was a good one, and notconceived in the fervid and florid style which defaced his youthfulefforts; he spoke sensibly, clearly, and with precision of thought; hesought his strength in the facts, and went in straight pursuit of thetruth; his best intellectual qualities were plainly visible. Theresolutions were not acted upon, and doubtless their actual passage hadnever been expected; but they were a good shot well placed; and theywere sufficiently noteworthy to save Lincoln from being left among theherd of the nobodies of the House. 

In view of his future career, but for no other reason, a brief paragraphis worth quoting. He says:--

"Any people anywhere, being inclined and having the power, have the_right_ to rise up and shake off the existing government, and form a newone that suits them better. This is a most valuable, a most sacredright, --a right which, we hope and believe, is to liberate the world. Nor is this right confined to cases in which the whole people of anexisting government may choose to exercise it. Any portion of suchpeople, that _can_, may revolutionize, and make their _own_ of so muchof the territory as they inhabit. " This doctrine, so comfortablyapplied to Texas in 1848, seemed unsuitable for the Confederate Statesin 1861. But possibly the point lay in the words, "having the power, "and "can, " for the Texans "had the power" and "could, " and the South hadit not and could not; and so Lincoln's practical proviso saved histheoretical consistency; though he must still have explained how eitherTexas or the South could know whether they "had the power, " and "could, "except by trial. 

Lincoln's course concerning the war and the administration did notplease his constituents. With most of the Whigs he voted for Ashmun'samendment, which declared that the war had been "unnecessarily andunconstitutionally commenced by the President. " But soon he heard thatthe people in Springfield were offended at a step which might weaken theadministration in time of stress; and even if the President hadtranscended the Constitution, they preferred to deny rather than toadmit the fact. When Douglas afterward charged Lincoln with lack ofpatriotism, Lincoln replied that he had not chosen to "skulk, " and, feeling obliged to vote, he had voted for "the truth" rather than for "alie. "[60] He remarked also that he, with the Whigs generally, alwaysvoted for the supply bills. He took and maintained his position withentire manliness and honesty, and stated his principles with perfectclearness, neither shading nor abating nor coloring by any conciliatoryor politic phrase. It was a question of conscience, and he met itpoint-blank. Many of his critics remained dissatisfied, and it isbelieved that his course cost the next Whig candidate in the districtvotes which he could not afford to lose. It is true that another paidthis penalty, yet Lincoln himself would have liked well to take hischance as the candidate. To those "who desire that I should bereflected, " he wrote to Herndon, "I can say, as Mr. Clay said of theannexation of Texas, that '_personally_ I would not object. ' . . . If itshould so happen _that nobody else wishes to be elected_, I could notrefuse the people the right of sending me again. But to enter myself asa competitor of others, or to authorize any one so to enter me, is whatmy word and honor forbid. " It did so happen that Judge Logan, whose turnit seemed to be, wished the nomination and received it. He was, however, defeated, and probably paid the price of Lincoln's scrupulous honesty. 

In the canvassing of the spring of 1848 Lincoln was an ardent advocatefor the nomination of General Taylor as the Whig candidate for thepresidency; for he appreciated how much greater was the strength of themilitary hero, with all that could be said against him, than was that ofMr. Clay, whose destiny was so disappointingly non-presidential. Whenthe nomination went according to his wishes, he entered into thecampaign with as much zeal as his congressional duties wouldpermit, --indeed, with somewhat an excess of zeal, for he delivered onthe floor of the House an harangue in favor of the general which waslittle else than a stump speech, admirably adapted for a backwoodsaudience, but grossly out of place where it was spoken. He closed itwith an assault on General Cass, as a military man, which was designedto be humorous, and has, therefore, been quoted with unfortunatefrequency. So soon as Congress adjourned he was able to seek a morelegitimate arena in New England, whither he went at once and deliveredmany speeches, none of which have been preserved. 

Lincoln's position upon the slavery question in this Congress was thatof moderate hostility. In the preceding Congress, the Twenty-ninth, thefamous Wilmot Proviso, designed to exclude slavery from any territorywhich the United States should acquire from Mexico, had passed the Houseand had been killed in the Senate. In the Thirtieth Congress efforts tothe same end were renewed in various forms, always with Lincoln's favor. He once said that he had voted for the principle of the Wilmot Proviso"about forty-two times, " which, if not an accurate mathematicalcomputation, was a vivid expression of his stanch adherence to thedoctrine. At the second session Mr. Lincoln voted against a bill toprohibit the slave trade in the District of Columbia, because he did notapprove its form; and then introduced another bill, which he himselfhad drawn. This prohibited the bringing slaves into the District, exceptas household servants by government officials who were citizens of slaveStates; it also prohibited selling them to be taken away from theDistrict; children born of slave mothers after January 1, 1850, were tobe subject to temporary apprenticeship and finally to be made free;owners of slaves might collect from the government their full cash valueas the price of their freedom; fugitive slaves escaping into Washingtonand Georgetown were to be returned; finally the measure was to besubmitted to popular vote in the District. This was by no means ameasure of abolitionist coloring, although Lincoln obtained for it thesupport of Joshua R. Giddings, who believed it "as good a bill as wecould get at this time, " and was "willing to pay for slaves in order tosave them from the Southern market. " It recognized the right of propertyin slaves, which the Abolitionists denied; also it might conceivably bepracticable, a characteristic which rarely marked the measures of theAbolitionists, who professed to be pure moralists rather than practicalpoliticians. From this first move to the latest which he made in thisgreat business, Lincoln never once broke connection with practicability. On this occasion he had actually succeeded in obtaining from Mr. Seaton, editor of the "National Intelligencer" and mayor of Washington, apromise of support, which gave him a little prospect of success. Later, however, the Southern Congressmen drew this influential gentleman totheir side, and thereby rendered the passage of the bill impossible; atthe close of the session it lay with the other corpses in that gravecalled "the table. "

When his term of service in Congress was over Lincoln sought, but failedto obtain, the position of Commissioner of the General Lands Office. Hewas offered the governorship of the newly organized Territory of Oregon;but this, controlled by the sensible advice of his wife, he fortunatelydeclined. 

FOOTNOTES:

[48] Lamon, pp. 238-252, tells the story of Lincoln's marriage at greatlength, sparing nothing; he liberally sets forth the gossip and thestories; he quotes the statements of witnesses who knew both parties atthe time, and he gives in full much correspondence. The spirit and theletter of his account find substantial corroboration in the narrative ofHerndon, pp. 206-231. So much original material and evidence ofacquaintances have been gathered by these two writers, and their ownopportunities of knowing the truth were so good, that one seems not atliberty to reject the _substantial_ correctness of their version. Messrs. Nicolay and Hay, vol. I. Ch. 11, give a narrative for the mostpart in their own language. Their attempt throughout to mitigate allthat is disagreeable is so obvious, not only in substance but in theturn of every phrase, that it is impossible to accept their chapter as apicture either free from obscurity or true in color, glad as one mightbe to do so. Arnold, pp. 68, 72, and Holland, p. 90, simply mention themarriage, and other biographers would have done well to imitate thisforbearance; but too much has been said to leave this course now open. 

[49] It is fair to say that my view of this "duel" is not that of otherwriters. Lamon, p. 260, says that "the scene is one of transcendentinterest. " Herndon, p. 260, calls it a "serio-comic affair. " Holland, pp. 87-89, gives a brief, deprecatory account of what he calls"certainly a boyish affair. " Arnold, pp. 69-72, treats it simply enough, but puts the whole load of the ridicule upon Shields. Nicolay and Hay, vol. I. Ch. 12, deal with it gravely, and in the same way in which, inthe preceding chapter, they deal with the marriage; that is to say, theyeschew the production of original documents, and, by their own gloss, make a good story for Lincoln and a very bad one for Shields; they speaklightly of the "ludicrousness" of the affair. To my mind the opinionwhich Lincoln himself held is far more correct than that expressed byany of his biographers. 

[50] Serious practice only began with him when he formed his partnershipwith Judge Logan in 1841; in 1860 his practice came to an end; in theinterval he was for two years a member of Congress. 

[51] A story is told by Lamon, p. 321, which puts Lincoln in a positionabsolutely indefensible by any sound reasoning. 

[52] For accounts of Lincoln at the bar, as also for many illustrativeand entertaining anecdotes to which the plan of this volume does notpermit space to be given, see Arnold, 55-59, 66, 73, 84-91; Holland, 72, 73, 76-83, 89; Lamon, 223-225, ch. Xiii. 311-332; N. And H. I. 167-171, 213-216, ch. Xvii. 298-309; Herndon, 182-184, 186, 264-266, 306 n. , 307-309, 312-319, 323-331, ch. Xi. 332-360. 

[53] Holland, 95; but _per contra_ see Herndon, 271. 

[54] March, 1843. 

[55] By way of example of his methods, see letter to Herndon, June 22, 1848, Lamon, 299. 

[56] The treaty of peace, subject to some amendments, was ratified bythe Senate March 10, 1848, and officially promulgated on July 4. 

[57] Von Holst, _Const. Hist. Of U. S. _ iii. 336. All historians arepretty well agreed upon the relation of the Polk administration to theMexican war. But the story has never been so clearly and admirablytraced by any other as by von Holst in the third volume of his history. 

[58] December 22, 1847. 

[59] Printed by Lamon, 282. See, also, Herndon, 277. 

[60] Herndon, 281; see letters given in full by Lamon, 291, 293, 295 (at296); N. And H. I. 274

CHAPTER IV

NORTH AND SOUTH

The Ordinance of 1787 established that slavery should never exist in anypart of that vast northwestern territory which had then lately beenceded by sundry States to the Confederation. This Ordinance could not beconstrued otherwise than as an integral part of the transaction ofcession, and was forever unalterable, because it represented in acertain way a part of the consideration in a contract, and was also inthe nature of a declaration of trust undertaken by the Congress of theConfederation with the granting States. The article "was agreed towithout opposition;" but almost contemporaneously, in the sessions ofthat convention which framed the Constitution, debate waxed hot upon thetopic which was then seen to present grave obstacles to union. It wastrue that many of the wisest Southerners of that generation regarded theinstitution as a menacing misfortune; they however could not ignore thefact that it was a "misfortune" of that peculiar kind which was enduredwith much complacency by those afflicted by it; and it was equallycertain that the great body of slave-owners would resent any effort torelieve them of their burden. Hence there were placed in theConstitution provisions in behalf of slavery which involved an admissionthat the institution needed protection, and should receive it. The ideaof protection implied the existence of hostility either of men or ofcircumstances, or of both. Thus by the Ordinance and the Constitution, taken together, there was already indirectly recognized an antagonismbetween the institutions, interests, and opinions of the South and thoseof the North. 

Slowly this feeling of opposition grew. The first definite mark of thegrowth was the struggle over the admission of Missouri, in 1820. Thiswas settled by the famous "Compromise, " embodied in the Act of March 6, 1820, whereby the people of the Territory of Missouri were allowed toframe a state government with no restriction against slavery; but aclause also enacted that slavery should never be permitted in any partof the remainder of the public territory lying north of the parallel of36° 30'. By its efficiency during thirty-four years of constantlyincreasing strain this legislation was proved to be a remarkablepolitical achievement; and as the people saw it perform so long and sowell a service so vital they came to regard it as only less sacred thanthe Constitution itself. Even Douglas, who afterward led in repealingit, declared that it had an "origin akin to the Constitution, " and thatit was "canonized in the hearts of the American people as a sacredthing. " Yet during the long quietude which it brought, each sectionkept a jealous eye upon the other; and especially was the scrutiny ofthe South uneasy, for she saw ever more and more plainly the disturbingtruth that her institution needed protection. Being in derogation ofnatural right, it was peculiarly dependent upon artificial sustention;the South would not express the condition in this language, but actedupon the idea none the less. It was true that the North was notaggressive towards slavery, but was observing it with much laxity andindifference; that the crusading spirit was sleeping soundly, and eventhe proselyting temper was feeble. But this state of Northern feelingcould not relieve the South from the harassing consciousness thatslavery needed not only toleration, but positive _protection_ at thehands of a population whose institutions were naturally antagonistic tothe slave idea. This being the case, she must be alarmed at seeing thatpopulation steadily outstripping her own in numbers and wealth. [61]Since she could not possibly even hold this disproportion stationary, her best resource seemed to be to endeavor to keep it practicallyharmless by maintaining a balance of power in the government. Thus itbecame unwritten law that slave States and free States must be equal innumber, so that the South could not be outvoted in the Senate. Thissystem was practicable for a while, yet not a very long while; for theNorth was filling up that great northwestern region, which was eternallydedicated to freedom, and full-grown communities could not forever bekept outside the pale of statehood. On the other hand, apart from anyquestion of numbers, the South could make no counter-expansion, becauseshe lay against a foreign country. After a time, however, Texasopportunely rebelled against Mexico, and then the opportunity forremoving this obstruction was too obvious and too tempting to be lost. Abrief period of so-called independence on the part of Texas was followedby the annexation of her territory to the United States, [62] with theproviso that from her great area might in the future be cut off stillfour other States. Slavery had been abolished in all Mexican territory, and Texas had been properly a "free" country; but in becoming a part ofthe United States she became also a slave State. 

Mexico had declared that annexation of Texas would constitute a _casusbelli_, yet she was wisely laggard in beginning vindictive hostilitiesagainst a power which could so easily whip her, and she probably neverwould have done so had the United States rested content with an honestboundary line. But this President Polk would not do, and by theft andfalsehood he at last fairly drove the Mexicans into a war, in which theywere so excessively beaten that the administration found itself able togather more plunder than it had expected. By the treaty of peace theUnited States not only extended unjustly the southwestern boundary ofTexas, but also got New Mexico and California. To forward this result, Polk had asked the House to place $2, 000, 000 at his disposal. Thereupon, as an amendment to the bill granting this sum, Wilmot introduced hisfamous proviso, prohibiting slavery in any part of the territory to beacquired. Repeatedly and in various shapes was the substance of thisproviso voted upon, but always it was voted down. Though New Mexico hadcome out from under the rule of despised Mexico as "free" country, acontrary destiny was marked out for it in its American character. Aplausible suggestion was made to extend the sacred line of the MissouriCompromise westward to the Pacific Ocean; and very little of the newcountry lay north of that line. By all these transactions the Southseemed to be scoring many telling points in its game. They were definitepoints, which all could see and estimate; yet a price, which wasconsiderable, though less definite, less easy to see and to estimate, had in fact been paid for them; for the antagonism of the rich andteeming North to the Southern institution and to the Southern policy forprotecting it had been spread and intensified to a degree which involveda menace fully offsetting the Southern territorial gain. One of theindications of this state of feeling was the organization of the "FreeSoil" party. 

Almost simultaneously with this important advancement of the Southernpolicy there occurred an event, operative upon the other side, whichcertainly no statesman could have foreseen. Gold was discovered inCalifornia, and in a few months a torrent of immigrants poured over theland. The establishment of an efficient government became a pressingneed. In Congress they debated the matter hotly; the friends of theWilmot proviso met in bitter conflict the advocates of the westwardextension of the line of 36° 30'. Neither side could prevail, and amidintense excitement the Thirtieth Congress expired. For the politiciansthis was well enough, but for the Californians organization was such aninstant necessity that they now had to help themselves to it. So theypromptly elected a Constitutional Convention, which assembled onSeptember 1, 1849, and adjourned on October 13. Though this body heldfifteen delegates who were immigrants from slave States, yet it wasunanimous in presenting a Constitution which prohibited slavery, andwhich was at once accepted by a popular vote of 12, 066 yeas against 811nays. 

Great then was the consternation of the Southern leaders whenCalifornian delegates appeared immediately upon the assembling of theThirty-first Congress, and asked for admission beneath this unlooked-for"free" charter of statehood. The shock was aggravated by the fact thatNew Mexico, actually instigated thereto by the slaveholding PresidentTaylor himself, was likely to follow close in the Californianfoot-tracks. The admission of Texas had for a moment disturbed thesenatorial equilibrium between North and South, which, however, hadquickly been restored by the admission of Wisconsin. But the South hadnothing to offer to counterbalance California and New Mexico, which werebeing suddenly filched from her confident expectation. In this emergencythose extremists in the South who offset the Abolitionists at the Northfell back upon the appalling threat of disunion, which could hardly beregarded as an idle extravagance of the "hotspurs, " since it wassubstantially certain that the Senate would never admit California withher anti-slavery Constitution; and thus a real crisis seemed at hand. Other questions also were cast into the seething caldron. Texas, whoseboundaries were as uncertain as the ethics of politicians, set up aclaim which included nearly all New Mexico, and so would have settledthe question of slavery for that region at least. Further, the Southcalled for a Fugitive Slave Law sufficiently stringent to beserviceable. Also, in encountering the Wilmot proviso, Southernstatesmen had asserted the doctrine, far-reaching and subversive ofestablished ideas and of enacted laws, that Congress could notconstitutionally interfere with the property-rights of citizens of theUnited States in the Territories, and that slaves were property. Amidsuch a confused and violent hurly-burly the perplexed body oforder-loving citizens were, with reason, seriously alarmed. 

To the great relief of these people and to the equal disgust of theextremist politicians, Henry Clay, the "great compromiser, " was nowannounced to appear once more in the rôle which all felt that he alonecould play. He came with much dramatic effect; an aged and broken man, he emerged from the retirement in which he seemed to have sought a briefrest before death should lay him low, and it was with an impressive airof sadness and of earnestness that he devoted the last remnants of hisfailing strength to save a country which he had served so long. Hisfriends feared that he might not survive even a few months to reach theend of his patriotic task. On January 29, 1850, he laid before theSenate his "comprehensive scheme of adjustment. " But it came not as oilupon the angry waters; every one was offended by one or another part ofit, and at once there opened a war of debate which is among the mostnoteworthy and momentous in American history. Great men who belonged tothe past and great men who were to belong to the future shared in theexciting controversies, which were prolonged over a period of more thanhalf a year. Clay was constantly on his feet, doing battle with a voicewhich gained rather than lost force from its pathetic feebleness. "I amhere, " he solemnly said, "expecting soon to go hence, and owing noresponsibility but to my own conscience and to God. " Jefferson Davisspoke for the extension westward of the Missouri Compromise line to thePacific Ocean, with a proviso positively establishing slavery south ofthat line. Calhoun, from the edge of the grave, into which only a fewweeks later he was to fall, once more faced his old adversaries. OnMarch 4 he sat beside Mason of Virginia, while that gentleman read forhim to a hushed audience the speech which he himself was too weak todeliver. Three days later Webster uttered that speech which made theseventh day of March almost as famous in the history of the UnitedStates as the Ides of the same month had been in that of Rome. In theeyes of the anti-slavery men of New England the fall of Webster washardly less momentous than the fall of Caesar had appeared in theEternal City. Seward also spoke a noteworthy speech, bringing uponhimself infinite abuse by his bold phrase, _a higher law than theConstitution_. Salmon P. Chase followed upon the same side, in anexalted and prophetic strain. In that momentous session every man gaveout what he felt to be his best, while anxious and excited millionsdevoured every word which the newspapers reported to them. 

Clay had imprudently gathered the several matters of his Compromise intoone bill, which was soon sneeringly nicknamed "the Omnibus Bill. " It wassorely harassed by amendments, and when at last, on July 31, the Omnibusreached the end of its journey, it contained only one passenger, viz. , aterritorial government for Utah. Its trip had apparently ended in utterfailure. But a careful study of individual proclivities showed that notimprobably those measures might be passed one by one which could not bepassed in combination. In this hope, five several bills, being all theejected contents of the Omnibus, were brought forward, and each in turnhad the success which had been denied to them together. First: Texasreceived $10, 000, 000, and for this price magnanimously relinquished herunfounded claim upon New Mexico. Second: California was admitted as afree State. Third: New Mexico was organized as a Territory, with theproviso that when she should form a state constitution the slaveryquestion should be determined by the people, and that during herterritorial existence the question of property in a slave should be leftundisturbed by congressional action, to be determined by the SupremeCourt of the United States. Fourth: A more efficient Fugitive Slave Lawwas passed. Fifth: Slave trading in the District of Columbia wasabolished. Such were the terms of an arrangement in which every man sawso much which he himself disliked that he felt sure that others must besatisfied. Each plumed himself on his liberality in his concessionsnobly made in behalf of public harmony. "The broad basis, " says vonHolst, "on which the compromise of 1850 rested, was the conviction ofthe great majority of the people, both North and South, that it wasfair, reasonable, and patriotic to come to a friendly understanding. "

Thus in the midsummer of 1850 did the nation, with intense relief, seethe imminent disaster of civil discord averted, --or was it onlypostponed? It was ominous that no men who were deeply in earnest inpublic affairs were sincerely satisfied. The South saw no gain whichoffset the destruction of the balance of power by the admission ofCalifornia. Thinking men at the North were alarmed at the recognition ofthe principle of non-intervention by Congress concerning slavery in theTerritories, a principle which soon, under the seductive title of"popular sovereignty" in the Territories, threatened even that partialrestriction heretofore given by the Missouri Compromise. Neither partyfelt sufficiently secure of the strength of its legal position to bealtogether pleased at seeing the doctrine of treating the slave in theTerritories as "property" cast into the lottery of the Supreme Court. Lincoln recognized the futility of this whole arrangement, and saidtruly that the slavery question could "never be successfullycompromised. " Yet he accepted the situation, with the purpose of makingof it the best that was possible. The mass of the people, lessfar-sighted, were highly gratified at the passing of the great danger;refused to recognize that a more temporary compromise was never patchedup to serve a turn; and applauded it so zealously that in preparing forthe presidential campaign of 1852 each party felt compelled to declareemphatically--what all wise politicians knew to be false--the "finality"of the great Compromise of 1850. Never, never more was there to be arevival of the slavery agitation! Yet, at the same time, it wasinstinctively felt that the concord would cease at once if the nationshould not give to the South a Democratic President! In this campaignLincoln made a few speeches in Illinois in favor of Scott; but Herndonsays that they were not very satisfactory efforts. Franklin Pierce waschosen, and slavery could have had no better man. 

This doctrine of non-intervention by Congress with slavery in theTerritories lay as the seed of mortal disease imbedded in the vitals ofthe great Compromise even at the hour of its birth. All the howlings ofthe political medicine-men in the halls of Congress, and in the wigwamswhere the party platforms were manufactured, could not defer theinevitable dissolution. The rapid peopling of the Pacific coast alreadymade it imperative to provide some sort of governmental organization forthe sparsely inhabited regions lying between these new lands and thefringe of population near the Mississippi. Accordingly bills wereintroduced to establish as a Territory the region which was afterwarddivided between Kansas and Nebraska; but at two successive sessions theyfailed to pass, more, as it seemed, from lack of interest than from anyopen hostility. In the course of debate it was explained, and notcontradicted, that slavery was not mentioned in the bills because theMissouri Compromise controlled that matter. Yet it was well known thatthe Missouri Compromise was no longer a sure barrier; for one wing ofthe pro-slavery party asserted that it was unconstitutional on theground that slaves, being property, could not be touched in theTerritories by congressional enactments; while another wing of the partypreferred the plausible cry of "popular sovereignty, " than which nowords could ring truer in American ears; and no one doubted that, inorder to give that sovereignty full sway, they would at any convenientmoment vote to repeal even the "sacred" Compromise. It could not bedenied that this was the better course, if it were practicable; andaccordingly, January 16, 1854, Senator Dixon of Kentucky offered anamendment to the pending Nebraska bill, which substantially embodied therepeal. In the Senate Douglas was chairman of the Committee onTerritories, and was induced to coöperate. [63] January 23, 1854, heintroduced his famous "Kansas-Nebraska bill, " establishing the twoTerritories and declaring the Missouri Compromise "inoperative" therein. A later amendment declared the Compromise to be "inconsistent with theprinciple of non-intervention by Congress with slavery in the States andTerritories, as recognized by the legislation of 1850, " and therefore"inoperative and void; it being the true intent and meaning of this Actnot to legislate slavery into any Territory or State, nor to exclude ittherefrom, but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form andregulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only tothe Constitution. " After a long and hard fight the bill was passed withthis clause in it, which Benton well stigmatized as a "stump speechinjected into the belly of the bill. " The insertion of the word Statewas of momentous significance. 

This repeal set the anti-slavery party all ablaze. Among the restLincoln was fired with strenuous indignation, and roused from thecondition of apparent indifference to public affairs in which he hadrested since the close of his term in Congress. Douglas, coming home inthe autumn, was so disagreeably received by an angry audience in Chicagothat he felt it imperative to rehabilitate his stricken popularity. Thisdifficult task he essayed at the great gathering of the State Fair inOctober. But Lincoln was put forward to answer him, and was brilliantlysuccessful in doing so, if the highly colored account of Mr. Herndon maybe trusted. Immediately after Lincoln's close, Owen Lovejoy, theAbolitionist leader, announced "a meeting in the same place that eveningof all the friends of freedom. " The scheme was to induce Lincoln toaddress them, and thus publicly to commit him as of their faith. But theastute Herndon, though himself an Abolitionist, felt that for Lincolnpersonally this was by no means desirable. So he hastened to Lincoln andstrenuously said: "Go home at once! Take Bob with you, and drivesomewhere into the country, and stay till this thing is over;" andLincoln did take Bob and drove away to Tazewell Court House "onbusiness. " Herndon congratulates himself upon having "saved Lincoln, "since either joining, or refusing to join, the Abolitionists at thattime would have been attended with "great danger. " Lincoln had upon hisown part a wise instinct and a strong purpose to keep hard by Douglasand to close with him as often as opportunity offered. Soon afterwardthe two encountered again, and on this occasion it is narrated thatLincoln gave Douglas so much trouble that Douglas cried for a truce, proposing that neither of them should make any more speeches thatautumn, to which Lincoln good-naturedly assented. 

During this winter Lincoln was elected to the state legislature, butcontrary to his own wish. For he designed to be a candidate for theUnited States Senate, and there might be a question as to hiseligibility if he remained a member of the electing body. Accordingly heresigned his seat, which, to his surprise and chagrin, was immediatelyfilled by a Democrat; for there was a reaction in Sangamon County. OnFebruary 8, 1855, the legislature began voting to elect a senator. The"Douglas Democrats" wished to reelect Shields, the present incumbent. The first ballot stood, Lincoln, 45, Shields, 41, Lyman Trumbull, 5, scattering, 5 (or, according to other authority, 8). After severalballots Shields was thrown over in favor of a more "practicable"candidate, Governor Matteson, a "quasi-independent, " who, upon the ninthballot, showed a strength of 47, while Trumbull had 35, Lincoln had rundown to 15, and "scattering" caught 1. Lincoln's weakness lay in thefact that the Abolitionists had too loudly praised him and publiclycounted him as one of themselves. For this reason five Democrats, disgusted with Douglas for his attack on the Missouri Compromise, butequally bitter against Abolitionism, stubbornly refused ever to vote fora Whig, above all a Whig smirched by Abolitionist applause. So it seemedthat Owen Lovejoy and his friends had incumbered Lincoln with a fatalhandicap. The situation was this: Lincoln could count upon his fifteenadherents to the extremity; but the five anti-Douglas Democrats wereequally stanch against him, so that his chance was evidently gone. Trumbull was a Democrat, but he was opposed to the policy of Douglas'sKansas-Nebraska bill; his following was not altogether trustworthy, anda trifling defection from it seemed likely to occur and to make outMatteson's majority. Lincoln pondered briefly; then, subjecting all elseto the great principle of "anti-Nebraska, " he urged his friends totransfer their votes to Trumbull. With grumbling and reluctance they didso, and by this aid, on the tenth ballot, Trumbull was elected. In aletter to Washburne, Lincoln wrote: "I think you would have done thesame under the circumstances, though Judge Davis, who came down thismorning, declares he never would have consented to the 47 men beingcontrolled by the 5. I regret my defeat moderately, but am not nervousabout it. " If that was true which was afterwards so frequentlyreiterated by Douglas during the campaign of 1858, that a bargain hadbeen struck between Lincoln and Trumbull, whereby the former was tosucceed Shields and the latter was to succeed Douglas at the electiontwo years later, then Lincoln certainly displayed on this occasion a"generosity" which deserves more than the very moderate praise which hasbeen given it, of being "above the range of the mere politician'svision. "[64]

An immediate effect of this repealing legislation of 1854 was to castKansas into the arena as booty to be won in fight between anti-slaveryand pro-slavery. For this competition the North had the advantage thatits population outnumbered that of the South in the ratio of three totwo, and emigration was in accord with the habits of the people. Againstthis the South offset proximity, of which the peculiar usefulness soonbecame apparent. Then was quickly under way a fair fight, in a certainsense, but most unfairly fought. Each side contended after its fashion;Northern anti-slavery merchants subscribed money to pay the expenses offree-state immigrants. "Border ruffians" and members of "Blue Lodges"and of kindred fraternities came across the border from Missouri totake a hand in every politico-belligerent crisis. The parties werenot unequally matched; by temperament the free-state men were inclinedto orderly and legitimate ways, yet they were willing and able to fightfire with fire. On the other hand, the slave-state men had a nativepreference for the bowie-knife and the shot-gun, yet showed a kind ofrespect for the ballot-box by insisting that it should be stuffed withvotes on their side. Thus for a long while was waged a dubious, savage, and peculiar warfare. Imprisonments and rescues, beatings, shootings, plunderings, burnings, sieges, and lootings of towns were interspersedwith elections of civil officers, with legislative enactments inordinary form, with trials, suits at law, legal arguments, and decisionsof judges. It is impossible here to sketch in detail this strangephantasmagory of arson, bloodshed, politics, and law. 

[Illustration: Lyman Trumbull]

Meantime other occurrences demand mention. In May, 1854, the seizure inBoston of Anthony Burns, as an escaped slave, caused a riot in which thecourt-house was attacked by a mob, one of the assailants was killed, andthe militia were called out. Other like seizures elsewhere aroused theindignation of people who, whatever were their abstract theories as tothe law, revolted at the actual spectacle of a man dragged back fromfreedom into slavery. May 22, 1856, Preston S. Brooks strode suddenlyupon Charles Sumner, seated and unarmed at his desk in thesenate-chamber, and beat him savagely over the head with a cane, inflicting very serious injuries. Had it been a fair fight, or had theSouth repudiated the act, the North might have made little of it, forSumner was too advanced in his views to be politically popular. But, although the onslaught was even more offensive for its cowardice thanfor its brutality, nevertheless the South overwhelmed Brooks withlaudation, and by so doing made thousands upon thousands of Republicanvotes at the North. The deed, the enthusiastic greeting, and the angryresentment marked the alarming height to which the excitement had risen. 

The presidential campaign of the following summer, 1856, showed astriking disintegration and re-formation of political groups. Nominallythere were four parties in the field: Democrats, Whigs, Native Americansor Know-Nothings, and Republicans. The Know-Nothings had lately won somestate elections, but were of little account as a national organization, for they stood upon an issue hopelessly insignificant in comparison withslavery. Already many had gone over to the Republican camp; those whoremained nominated as their candidates Millard Fillmore and Andrew J. Donelson. The Whigs were the feeble remnant of a really dead party, heldtogether by affection for the old name; too few to do anything bythemselves, they took by adoption the Know-Nothing candidates. TheRepublican party had been born only in 1854. Its members, differing onother matters, united upon the one doctrine, which they accepted as atest: opposition to the extension of slavery. They nominated John C. Fremont and William L. Dayton, and made a platform whereby they declaredit to be "both the right and the duty of Congress to prohibit in theTerritories those twin relics of barbarism, polygamy and slavery;" bywhich vehement and abusive language they excited the bitter resentmentof the Southern Democracy. In this convention 110 votes were cast forLincoln for the second place on the ticket. Lamon tells the little storythat when this was told to Lincoln he replied that he could not havebeen the person designated, who was, doubtless, "the great Lincoln fromMassachusetts. "[65] In the Democratic party there were two factions. Thefavorite candidate of the South was Franklin Pierce, for reëlection, with Stephen A. Douglas as a substitute or second choice; the North moregenerally preferred James Buchanan, who was understood to be displeasedwith the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. The struggle was sharp, butwas won by the friends of Buchanan, with whom John C. Breckenridge wascoupled. The campaign was eager, for the Republicans soon developed astrength beyond what had been expected and which put the Democrats totheir best exertions. The result was

 | Popular vote | Electoral vote -------------------------+--------------+--------------- Democrats. | 1, 838, 169 | 174 Republicans. | 1, 341, 264 | 114 Know-Nothings and Whigs. | 874, 534 | 8

Thus James Buchanan became President of the United States, March 4, 1857, --stigmatized somewhat too severely as "a Northern man withSouthern principles;" in fact an honest man and of good abilities, who, in ordinary times, would have left a fair reputation as a statesman ofthe second rank; but a man hopelessly unfit alike in character and inmind either to comprehend the present emergency or to rise to itsdemands. [66] Yet, while the Democrats triumphed, the Republicans enjoyedthe presage of the future; they had polled a total number of votes whichsurprised every one; on the other hand, the Democrats had lost tenStates[67] which they had carried in 1852 and had gained only twoothers, [68] showing a net loss of eight States; and their electoralvotes had dwindled from 254 to 174. 

On the day following Buchanan's inauguration that occurred which hadbeen foreshadowed with ill-advised plainness in his inaugural address. In the famous case of Dred Scott, [69] the Supreme Court of the UnitedStates established as law the doctrine lately advanced by the SouthernDemocrats, that a slave was "property, " and that his owner was entitledto be protected in the possession of him, as such, in the Territories. This necessarily demolished the rival theory of "popular sovereignty, "which the Douglas Democrats had adopted, not without shrewdness, asbeing far better suited to the Northern mind. For clearly the peopleenjoyed no sovereignty where they had no option. Consequently in theTerritories there was no longer a slavery question. The indignation ofanti-slavery men of all shades of opinion was intense, and wasunfortunately justifiable. For wholly apart from the controversy as towhether the law was better expounded by the chief justice or by JudgeCurtis in his dissenting opinion, there remained a main fact, undeniableand inexcusable, to wit: that the court, having decided that the lowercourt had no jurisdiction, and being therefore itself unable to remandthe cause for a new trial, had then outstepped its own proper functionand outraged legal propriety by determining the questions raised by therest of the record, --questions which no longer had any real standingbefore this tribunal. This course was well known to have been pursuedwith the purpose on the part of the majority of the judges to settle byjudicial authority, and by a _dictum_ conspicuously _obiter_, that greatslavery question with which Congress had grappled in vain. It was aterrible blunder, for the people were only incensed by a volunteered andunauthorized interference. Moreover, the reasoning of Chief JusticeTaney was such that the Republicans began anxiously to inquire why itwas not as applicable to States as to Territories, and why it must notbe extended to States when occasion should arrive; and in thisconnection it seemed now apparent why "States" had been named in thebill which repealed the Missouri Compromise. [70] In spite of this menacethe struggle in Kansas was not slackened. Time had been counting heavilyin favor of the North. Her multitudinous population ceaselessly fed thestream of immigrants, and they were stubborn fellows who came to stay, and therefore were sure to wear out the persistence of theboot-and-saddle men from over the Missouri border. Accordingly, in 1857, the free-state men so vastly outnumbered the slavery contingent, thateven pro-slavery men had to acknowledge it. Then the slavery party madeits last desperate effort. Toward the close of that year the LecomptonConstitution was framed by a convention chosen at an election in whichthe free-state men, perhaps unwisely, had refused to take part. Whenthis pro-slavery instrument was offered to the people, they were notallowed to vote simply Yea or Nay, but only "for the Constitution withslavery, " or "for the Constitution with no slavery. " Again thefree-state men refrained from voting, and on December 21, 6, 143 ballotswere declared to have been cast "for the Constitution with slavery, " and589 "for the Constitution with no slavery. " Much more than one third ofthe 6, 143 were proved to be fraudulent, but the residue far exceeded therequisite majority. January 4, 1858, state officers were to be chosen, and now the free-state men decided to make an irregular opportunity tovote, in their turn, simply for or against the Lecompton Constitution. This time the pro-slavery men, considering the matter already lawfullysettled, refused to vote, and the result was that this polling showed10, 226 against the Constitution, 138 for the Constitution with slavery, 24 for the Constitution without slavery. It is an instance of Lincoln'spolitical foresight that nearly two years and a half before thiscondition of affairs came about he had written: "If Kansas fairly votesherself a slave State, she must be admitted, or the Union must bedissolved. But how if she votes herself a slave State unfairly?. . . Mustshe still be admitted, or the Union be dissolved? That will be the phaseof the question when it first becomes a practical one. "[71]

The struggle was now transferred to Washington. President Buchanan hadsolemnly pledged himself to accept the result of the popular vote. Nowhe was confronted by two popular votes, of which the one made somewhatthe better technical and formal showing, and the other undeniablyexpressed the true will of a large majority of lawful voters. Heselected the former, and advised Congress to admit Kansas under theLecompton Constitution with slavery. But Douglas took the other side. The position of Douglas in the nation and in the Democratic partydeserves brief consideration, for in a way it was the cause of Lincoln'snomination as the Republican candidate for the presidency in 1860. From1852 to 1860 Douglas was the most noteworthy man in public life in thecountry. Webster, Clay, and Calhoun had passed away. Seward, Chase, andSumner, still in the earlier stages of their brilliant careers, wereorganizing the great party of the future. This interval of eight yearsbelonged to Douglas more than to any other one man. He had been acandidate for the Democratic nomination for the presidency in 1852 andagain in 1856; and had failed to secure it in part by reason of thatunwritten rule whereby the leading statesmen are so often passed over, in order to confer the great prize upon insignificant and thereforepresumably submissive men. Douglas was not of this type; he had highspirit, was ambitious, masterful, and self-confident; he was also anaggressive, brilliant, and tireless fighter in a political campaign, anorator combining something of the impressiveness of Webster with thereadiness and roughness of the stump speaker. He had a thoroughfamiliarity with all the politics, both the greater and the smaller, ofthe time; he was shrewd and adroit as a politician, and he had as good aright as any man then prominent in public life to the more dignifiedtitle of statesman. He had the art of popularity, and upon sufficientoccasion could be supple and accommodating even in the gravest mattersof principle. He had always been a Democrat. He now regarded himself asproperly the leader of the Democratic party; and of course he stillaimed at the high office which he had twice missed. [72] With this objectin view, he had gone very far to retain his hold upon the South. He toldSoutherners that by his happy theory of "popular sovereignty" he hadeducated the public mind, and accomplished the repeal of the MissouriCompromise. When the Dred Scott decision took the life out of his"popular sovereignty, " he showed his wonted readiness in adaptinghimself to the situation. To the triumphant South he graciously admittedthe finality of a decision which sustained the most extreme Southerndoctrine. To the perturbed and indignant North he said cheeringly thatthe decision was of no practical consequence whatsoever! For every oneknew that slavery could not exist in any community without the aid offriendly legislation; and if any anti-slavery community should by itsanti-slavery legislature withhold this essential friendly legislation, then slavery in that State might be lawful but would be impossible. So, he said, there is still in fact "popular sovereignty. "[73] When thepro-slavery Lecompton Constitution came up for consideration Douglasdecided not to rest content with the form of popular approval, but tostand out for the substance. He quarreled with Buchanan, and in an angryinterview they exchanged threats and defiance. Douglas felt himself thegreater man of the two in the party, and audaciously indicated somethinglike contempt for the rival who was not leader but only President. Conscience, if one may be allowed gravely to speak of the conscience ofa professional politician, and policy were in comfortable unison incommending this choice to Douglas. For his term as senator was to expirein 1858, and reëlection was not only in itself desirable, but seemedessential to securing the presidency in 1860. Heretofore Illinois hadbeen a Democratic State; the southern part, peopled by immigrants fromneighboring slave States, was largely pro-slavery; but the northernpart, containing the rapidly growing city of Chicago, had been filledfrom the East, and was inclined to sympathize with the rest of theNorth. Such being the situation, an avowal of Democratic principles, coupled with the repudiation of the Lecompton fraud, seemed the shrewdand safe course in view of Douglas's political surroundings, also theconsistent, or may we say honest, course in view of his antecedentposition. If, in thus retaining his hold on Illinois, he gave to theSouthern Democracy an offense which could never be forgotten orforgiven, this misfortune was due to the impracticable situation and notto any lack of skillful strategy on his part. In spite of him the billpassed the Senate, but in the House twenty-two Northern Democrats wentover to the opposition, and carried a substitute measure, whichestablished that the Lecompton Constitution must again be submitted topopular vote. Though this was done by the body of which Douglas was nota member, yet every one felt that it was in fact his triumph over theadministration. A Committee of Conference then brought in the "Englishbill. " Under this the Kansans were to vote, August 3, 1858, either toaccept the pro-slavery Lecompton Constitution, with the _douceur_ of aland grant, or to reject it. If they accepted it, the State was to beadmitted at once; if they rejected it, they were not to be admitteduntil the population should reach the number which was required forelecting a member to the House of Representatives. At present thepopulation was far short of this number, and therefore rejectioninvolved a long delay in acquiring statehood. Douglas very justlyassailed the unfairness of a proposal by which an anti-slavery vote wasthus doubly and very severely handicapped; but the bill was passed byboth Houses of Congress and was signed by the President. The Kansans, however, by an enormous majority, [74] rejected the bribes of land andstatehood in connection with slavery. For his action concerning theLecompton Constitution and the "English bill" Douglas afterward tookmuch credit to himself. 

Such was the stage of advancement of the slavery conflict in thecountry, and such the position of Douglas in national and in statepolitics, when there took place that great campaign in Illinois whichmade him again senator in 1858, and made Lincoln President in 1860. 

FOOTNOTES:

[61] For a striking comparison of the condition of the South with thatof the North in 1850, see von Holst's _Const. Hist. Of U. S. _ v. 567-586. 

[62] December, 1845. 

[63] For a description of Douglas's state of mind, see N. And H. I. 345-351, quoting original authorities. 

[64] N. And H. I. 388. 

[65] Thus when John Adams first landed in Europe, and was asked whetherhe was "the great Mr. Adams, " he said: No, the great Mr. Adams was hiscousin, Samuel Adams of Boston. 

[66] For a fair and discriminating estimate of Buchanan, see Blaine, _Twenty Years in Congress_, vol. I. Ch. X. , especially pp. 239-241. 

[67] Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, Iowa, all for Fremont; Maryland for Fillmore. 

[68] Tennessee and Kentucky. 

[69] Dred Scott, plff. In error, _vs. _ Sandford, Sup. Ct. Of U. S. Dec. Term, 1856, 19 Howard, 393. After the conclusion of this case Scott wasgiven his freedom by his master. 

[70] _Ante_, pp. 94, 95. 

[71] August 24, 1855; Holland, 145. 

[72] For a good sketch of Douglas, see Elaine, _Twenty Years ofCongress_, i. 144. 

[73] This doctrine was set forth by Douglas in a speech at Springfield, Ill. , June 12, 1857. A fortnight later, June 26, at the same place, Lincoln answered this speech. N. And H. Ii. 85-89. 

[74] By 11, 300 against 1, 788, August 2, 1858. Kansas was admitted as aState at the close of January, 1861, after many of the Southern Stateshad already seceded. 

CHAPTER V

THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS JOINT DEBATE

About this time Lincoln again became active in the politics of hisState, aiding in the formation of the Republican party there. On May 29, 1856, a state convention of "all opponents of anti-Nebraska legislation"was held at Bloomington. After "a platform ringing with stronganti-Nebraska sentiments" had been adopted, Lincoln, "in response torepeated calls, came forward and delivered a speech of such earnestnessand power that no one who heard it will ever forget the effect itproduced. " It was "never written out or printed, " which is to beregretted; but it lives in one of those vivid descriptions by Herndonwhich leave nothing to the imagination. For the moment this triumph wasgratifying; but when Lincoln, leaving the hot enthusiasts ofBloomington, came home to his fellow townsmen at Springfield, he passedinto a chill atmosphere of indifference and disapproval. An effort wasmade to gather a mass meeting in order to ratify the action of the stateconvention. But the "mass" consisted of three persons, viz. , AbrahamLincoln, Herndon, and one John Pain. It was trying, but Lincoln wasfinely equal to the occasion; in a few words, passing from jest toearnest, he said that the meeting was larger than he _knew_ it would be;for while he knew that he and his partner would attend, he was not sureof any one else; and yet another man had been found brave enough to comeout. But, "while all seems dead, the age itself is not. It liveth assure as our Maker liveth. Under all this seeming want of life and motionthe world does move, nevertheless. Be hopeful, and now let us adjournand appeal to the people!"

In the presidential campaign of 1856 the Republicans of Illinois putLincoln on their electoral ticket, and he entered into the campaignpromptly and very zealously. Traveling untiringly to and fro, he madeabout fifty speeches. By the quality of these, even more than by theirnumber, he became the champion of the party, so that pressing demandsfor him came from the neighboring States. He was even heard of in theEast. But there he encountered a lack of appreciation and in somequarters an hostility which he felt to be hurtful to his prospects aswell as unjust towards a leading Republican of the Northwest. HoraceGreeley, enthusiastic, well meaning, ever blundering, the editor of theNew York "Tribune, " cast the powerful influence of that sheet againsthim; and as the senatorial contest of 1858 was approaching, in whichLincoln hoped to be a principal, this ill feeling was veryunfortunate. [75] "I fear, " he said, "that Greeley's attitude willdamage me with Sumner, Seward, Wilson, Phillips, and other friends inthe East, "--and by the way, it is interesting to note this significantlist of political "friends. " Thereupon Herndon, as guardian of Lincoln'spolitical prospects, went to pass the opening months of the importantyear upon a crusade among the great men of the East, designing toextinguish the false lights erroneously hung out by persons ignorant ofthe truth. Erelong he cheered Lincoln by encouraging accounts ofsuccess, and of kind words spoken by many Eastern magnates. 

In 1858, ability, courage, activity, ambition, the prestige of success, and a plausible moderation in party politics combined to make Douglasthe most conspicuous individual in the public view. There was no otherway whereby any other man could so surely attract the close andinterested attention of the whole people as by meeting Douglas in directpersonal competition. If Douglas had not held the position which he did, or if, holding it, he had lived in another State than Illinois, Lincolnmight never have been President of the United States. But the essentialfacts lay favorably for effecting that presentation before the peoplewhich was indispensable for his fortunes. In April, 1858, theDemocratic State Convention of Illinois indorsed the position whichDouglas had taken in the Kansas business. This involved that the partyshould present him as its candidate for reëlection to the nationalSenate by the legislature whose members were to be chosen in thefollowing autumn. "In the very nature of things, " says the enthusiasticHerndon, Lincoln was at once selected by the Republicans, and on June 16their convention resolved that "Hon. Abraham Lincoln is our first andonly choice for United States senator to fill the vacancy about to becreated by the expiration of Mr. Douglas's term of office. " Immediatelythe popular excitement gave measure of the estimate placed upon the twomen by those who most accurately knew their qualities. All Illinoisianslooked forward eagerly to the fine spectacle of a battle royal betweenreal leaders. 

The general political condition was extremely confused. The great numberof worthy citizens, who had been wont to save themselves from the worryof critical thought in political matters by the simple process ofuniform allegiance to a party, now found the old familiar organizationsrapidly disintegrating. They were dismayed and bewildered at the scene;everywhere there were new cries, new standards, new leaders, while smallbodies of recruits, displaying in strange union old comrades beside oldfoes, were crossing to and fro and changing relationships, to theinextricable confusion of the situation. In such a chaos each man wasdriven to do his own thinking, to discover his genuine beliefs, and todetermine in what company he could stand enduringly in the troubloustimes ahead. It was one of those periods in which small men are laidaside and great leaders are recognized by popular instinct; when thelittle band that is in deepest earnest becomes endowed with a forcewhich compels the mass of careless, temporizing human-kind to gravitatetowards it. Such bands were now the Abolitionists at the North and theSecessionists at the South. Between them lay the nation, disquieted, contentious, and more than a little angry at the prevalent discomfortand alarm. At the North nine men out of ten cared far less for anyprinciple, moral or political, than they did for the discovery of somecourse whereby this unwelcome conflict between slavery and freedom couldbe prevented from disorganizing the course of daily life and business;and since the Abolitionists were generally charged with being in greatmeasure responsible for the present menacing condition, they wereregarded with bitter animosity by a large number of their fellowcitizens. The Secessionists were not in equal disfavor at the South, yetthey were still very much in the minority, even in the Gulf States. 

Illinois had been pretty stanchly Democratic in times past, but no onecould forecast the complexion which she would put on in the comingcampaign. The Whigs were gone. The Republican party, though so latelyborn, yet had already traversed the period of infancy and perhaps alsothat of youth; men guessed wildly how many voters would now cast itsballot. On the other hand, the Democrats were suffering from internalquarrels. The friends of Douglas, and all moderate Democrats, declaredhim to be the leader of the Democracy; but Southern conventions andnewspapers were angrily "reading him out" of the party, and the singularspectacle was witnessed of the Democratic administration sending out itsorders to all Federal office-holders in Illinois to oppose theDemocratic nominee, even to the point of giving the election to theRepublicans; for if discipline was to exist, a defection like that ofwhich Douglas had been guilty must be punished with utter andeverlasting destruction at any cost. This schism of course made thenumerical uncertainties even more uncertain than they rightfully shouldhave been. Yet, in an odd way, the same fact worked also againstLincoln; for Douglas's recent votes against the pro-slavery measures ofthe administration for the admission of Kansas, together with his owndirect statements on recent occasions, had put him in a light whichmisled many Northern anti-slavery men, whose perception did notpenetrate to the core-truth. For example, not only Greeley, but HenryWilson, Burlingame, Washburne, Colfax, and more, really believed thatDouglas was turning his back upon his whole past career, and that thisbrilliant political strategist was actually bringing into theanti-slavery camp[76] all his accumulations of prestige, popularity, andexperience, all his seductive eloquence, his skill, and his grandmastery over men. Blinded by the dazzling prospect, they gave all theirinfluence in favor of this priceless recruit, forgetting that, if hewere in fact such an apostate as they believed him to be, he would cometo them terribly shrunken in value and trustworthiness. Some even wereso infatuated as to insist that the Republicans of Illinois ought topresent no candidate against him. Fortunately the Illinoisians knewtheir fellow citizen better; yet in so strange a jumble no one coulddeny that it was a doubtful conflict in which these two rivals werejoining. 

Lincoln had expected to be nominated, and during several weeks he hadbeen thinking over his speech of acceptance. However otherwise he mightseem at any time to be engaged, he was ceaselessly turning over thismatter in his mind; and frequently he stopped short to jot down an ideaor expression upon some scrap of paper, which then he thrust into hishat. Thus, piece by piece, the accumulation grew alike inside andoutside of his head, and at last he took all his fragments and withinfinite consideration moulded them into unity. So studiously had hewrought that by the time of delivery he had unconsciously committed thewhole speech accurately to memory. If so much painstaking seemed toindicate an exaggerated notion of the importance of his words, he wassoon vindicated by events; for what he said was subjected to adissection and a criticism such as have not often pursued the wingedwords of the orator. When at last the composition was completed, hegathered a small coterie of his friends and admirers, and read it tothem. The opening paragraph was as follows:--

"If we could first know where we are, and whither we are tending, wecould better judge what to do and how to do it. We are now far into thefifth year since a policy was initiated with the avowed object andconfident promise of putting an end to slavery agitation. Under theoperation of that policy, that agitation has not only not ceased, buthas constantly augmented. In my opinion, it will not cease until acrisis shall have been reached and passed. 'A house divided againstitself cannot stand. ' I believe this government cannot endurepermanently half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to bedissolved, --I do not expect the house to fall, --but I do expect it willcease to be divided. It will become all one thing or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it isin the course of ultimate extinction; or its advocates will push itforward, till it shall become alike lawful in all the States, old aswell as new, --North as well as South. "

As the reader watched for the effect of this exordium he only sawdisapproval and consternation. His assembled advisers and critics, eachand all save only the fiery Herndon, protested that language so daringand advanced would work a ruin that might not be mended in years. Lincoln heard their condemnation with gravity rather than surprise. Buthe had worked his way to a conviction, and he was immovable; all he saidwas, that the statement was true, right, and just, that it was time itshould be made, and that he would make it, even though he might have "togo down with it;" that he would "rather be defeated with this expressionin the speech . . . Than to be victorious without it. " Accordingly, on thenext day he spoke the paragraph without the change of a word. 

It is not without effort that we can now appreciate fully why thisutterance was so momentous in the spring of 1858. [77] By it Lincoln camebefore the people with a plain statement of precisely that which morethan nine hundred and ninety-nine persons in every thousand, especiallyat the North, were striving with all their might to stamp down as anuntruth; he said to them what they all were denying with desperation, and with rage against the asserters. Their bitterness was the greaterbecause very many, in the bottom of their hearts, distrusted their ownpainful and strenuous denial. No words could be more unpopular than thatthe divided house could not permanently stand, when the whole nation wasinsisting, with the intensity of despair, that it could stand, wouldstand, must stand. Consequently occurrences soon showed his friends tobe right so far as concerned the near, practical point: that theparagraph would cost more voters in Illinois than Lincoln could losewithout losing his election. But beyond that point, a little fartheraway in time, much deeper down amid enduring results, Lincoln's judgmentwas ultimately seen to rest upon fundamental wisdom, politically as wellas morally. For Lincoln was no idealist, sacrificing realities toabstractions; on the contrary, the right which he saw was always apractical right, a right which could be compassed. In this instance, thestory goes that he retorted upon some of those who grumbled about his"mistake, " that in time they "would consider it the wisest thing he eversaid. " In this he foretold truly; that daring and strong utterance wasthe first link in the chain of which a more distant link lay across thethreshold of the White House. 

A battle opened by so resounding a shot was sure to be furious. Writersand speakers fell upon the fateful paragraph and tore it savagely. Theyfound in it a stimulus which, in fact, was not needed; for already werepresent all the elements of the fiercest struggle, --the best man and thebest fighter in each party at the front, and not unevenly matched; acanvass most close and doubtful; and a question which stirred the soulsof men with the passions of crusading days. Douglas added experience anddistinction to gallantry in attack, adroitness in defense, readiness inpersonalities, and natural aptitude for popular oratory. Lincoln franklyadmitted his formidable qualifications. But the Republican managers hada shrewd appreciation of both opponents; they saw that Lincoln's fortelay in hitting out straight, direct, and hard; and they felt that blowsof the kind he delivered should not go out into the air, but shouldalight upon a concrete object, --upon Douglas. They conceived a wiseplan. On July 24, 1858, Lincoln challenged Douglas to a series of jointdebates. Douglas accepted, and named seven meetings, which he soarranged that he opened and closed four times and Lincoln opened andclosed three times; but Lincoln made no point of the inequality; thearrangement was completed, and this famous duel constituted another linkin that White House chain. 

The setting of the spectacle had the picturesqueness of the times andthe region. The people gathered in vast multitudes, to the number often thousand, even of twenty thousand, at the places named for thespeech-making; they came in their wagons from all the country round, bringing provisions, and making camps in the groves and fields. Therewere bonfires and music, parading and drinking. He was a singular man inIllinois who was not present at some one of these encounters. 

Into a competition so momentous Lincoln entered with a full appreciationof the burden and responsibility which it put upon him. He had at onceto meet a false gloss of his famous sentence; and though he had beenvery precise and accurate in his phraseology for the express purpose ofescaping misinterpretation, yet it would have been a marvel in appliedpolitical morals if the paraphrases devised by Douglas had been strictlyingenuous. The favorite distortion was to alter what was strictly aforecast into a declaration of a policy, to make a prediction pass foran avowal of a purpose to wage war against slavery until either the"institution" or "Abolitionism" should be utterly defeated and foreverexterminated. It was said to be a "doctrine" which was "revolutionaryand destructive of this government, " and which "invited a warfarebetween the North and the South, to be carried on with ruthlessvengeance, until the one section or the other shall be driven to thewall and become the victim of the rapacity of the other. " Suchmisrepresentation annoyed Lincoln all the more because it wasundeserved. The history of the utterance thus maltreated illustrates thedeliberate, cautious, thorough way in which his mind worked. So long agoas August 15, 1855, he had closed a letter with the paragraph: "Ourpolitical problem now is: Can we, as a nation, continue together_permanently_--_forever_, half slave and half free? The problem is toomighty for me. May God in his mercy superintend the solution. "[78] Thisis one among many instances which show how studiously Lincoln pondereduntil he had got his conclusion into that simple shape in which it wasimmutable. When he had found a form which satisfied him for theexpression of a conviction, he was apt to use it repeatedly rather thanto seek new and varied shapes, so that substantially identical sentencesoften recur at distant intervals of time and place. 

When one has been long studying with much earnest intensity of thought aperplexing and moving question, and at last frames a conclusion withpainstaking precision in perfectly clear language, it is not pleasant tohave that accurate utterance misstated with tireless reiteration, andwith infinite art and plausibility. But for this vexation Lincoln couldfind no remedy, and it was in vain that he again and again calledattention to the fact that he had expressed neither a "doctrine, " nor an"invitation, " nor any "purpose" or policy whatsoever. But as it seemednot altogether courageous to leave his position in doubt, he said: "Now, it is singular enough, if you will carefully read that passage over, that I did not say in it that I was in favor of anything. I only saidwhat I expected would take place. . . . I did not even say that I desiredthat slavery should be put in course of ultimate extinction. I do say sonow, however, so there need be no longer any difficulty about that. " Hefelt that nothing short of such extinction would surely prevent therevival of a dispute which had so often been settled "_forever_. " "Wecan no more foretell, " he said, "where the end of this slavery agitationwill be than we can see the end of the world itself. . . . There is no wayof putting an end to the slavery agitation amongst us but to put it backupon the basis where our fathers placed it. . . . Then the public mind willrest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction. "

There was much of this eloquence about "the fathers, " much evocation ofthe shades of the great departed, who, having reached the eternalsilence, could be claimed by both sides. The contention was none theless strenuous because it was entirely irrelevant; since the opinion of"the fathers" could not make slavery right or wrong. Many timestherefore did Douglas charge Lincoln with having said "that the Unioncould not endure divided as our fathers made it, with free and slaveStates;" as though this were a sort of blasphemy against the nationaldemigods. Lincoln aptly retorted that, as matter of fact, these samedistinguished "fathers"--"Washington, Jefferson, Franklin, Madison, Hamilton, Jay, and the great men of that day"--did not _make_, but_found_, the nation half slave and half free; that they set "many clearmarks of disapprobation" upon slavery, and left it so situated that thepopular mind rested in the belief that it was in the course of ultimateextinction. Unfortunately it had not been allowed to remain as they hadleft it; but on the contrary, "all the trouble and convulsion hasproceeded from the efforts to spread it over more territory. "

Pursuing this line, Lincoln alleged the purpose of the pro-slavery mento make slavery "perpetual and universal" and "national. " In his greatspeech of acceptance at Springfield he put this point so well that henever improved upon this first presentation of it. The repeal of theMissouri Compromise in 1854 "opened all the national territory toslavery, and was the first point gained. But so far Congress only hadacted, and an indorsement by the people, real or imaginary, " wasobtained by "the notable argument of 'squatter sovereignty, ' otherwisecalled 'sacred right of self-government, ' which latter phrase, thoughexpressive of the only rightful basis of any government, was soperverted in this attempted use of it as to amount to just this: that ifany _one_ man choose to enslave _another_, no _third_ man shall bepermitted to object. That argument was incorporated into the Nebraskabill. " In May, 1854, this bill was passed. Then the presidentialelection came. "Mr. Buchanan was elected, and the indorsement wassecured. That was the second point gained. " Meantime the celebrated caseof the negro, Dred Scott, was pending in the Supreme Court, and the"President in his inaugural address fervently exhorted the people toabide by the forthcoming decision, whatever it might be. Then in a fewdays came the decision, " which was at once emphatically indorsed byDouglas, "the reputed author of the Nebraska bill, " and by the newPresident. 

"At length a squabble springs up between the President and the author ofthe Nebraska bill on the mere question of _fact_, whether the LecomptonConstitution was or was not, in any just sense, made by the people ofKansas; and in that quarrel the latter declares that all he wants is afair vote for the people, and that he cares not whether slavery be voted_down_ or voted _up_. 

. . . "The several points of the Dred Scott decision in connection withSenator Douglas's 'care not' policy constitute the piece of machinery inits present state of advancement. This was the third point gained. 

. . . "We cannot absolutely know that all these exact adaptations are theresult of preconcert. But when we see a lot of framed timbers, differentportions of which we know have been gotten out at different times andplaces and by different workmen, --Stephen, Franklin, Roger, and James, for instance, --and when we see these timbers joined together, and seethey exactly make the frame of a house or a mill, all the tenons andmortices exactly fitting, and all the lengths and proportions of thedifferent pieces exactly adapted to their respective places, and not apiece too many or too few, --not omitting even scaffolding; or, if asingle piece be lacking, we see the place in the frame exactly fittedand prepared yet to bring such piece in, --in such a case, we find itimpossible not to believe that Stephen and Franklin and Roger and Jamesall understood one another from the beginning, and all worked upon acommon plan or draft drawn up before the first blow was struck. 

"It should not be overlooked that by the Nebraska bill the people of a_State_ as well as a Territory were to be left 'perfectly free, ''subject only to the Constitution. ' Why mention a _State_?. . . Why ismention of this lugged into this merely territorial law?

. . . "Put this and that together, and we have another nice little niche, which we may erelong see filled with another Supreme Court decision, declaring that the Constitution of the United States does not permit a_State_ to exclude slavery from its limits. And this may especially beexpected if the doctrine of 'care not whether slavery be voted down orvoted up' shall gain upon the public mind sufficiently to give promisethat such a decision can be maintained when made. Such a decision is allthat slavery now lacks of being alike lawful in all the States. "Following out this idea, Lincoln repeatedly put to Douglas a question towhich he could never get a direct answer from his nimble antagonist: "Ifa decision is made, holding that the people of the _States_ cannotexclude slavery, will he support it, or not?"

Even so skillful a dialectician as Douglas found this compact structureof history and argument a serious matter. Its simple solidity was not sosusceptible to treatment by the perverting process as had been thefigurative and prophetic utterance about the "house divided againstitself. " Neither could he find a chink between the facts and theinferences. One aspect of the speech, however, could not be passed over. Lincoln said that he had not charged "Stephen and Franklin and Roger andJames" with collusion and conspiracy; but he admitted that he had"arrayed the evidence tending to prove, " and which he "thought didprove, " these things. [79] It was impossible for the four distinguishedgentlemen[80] who owned the rest of these names to refuse to plead. Accordingly Douglas sneered vehemently at the idea that two presidents, the chief justice, and he himself had been concerned in that grave crimeagainst the State which was imputed to them; and when, by his loftyindignation, he had brought his auditors into sympathy, he made the onlypossible reply: that the real meaning, the ultimate logical outcome, ofwhat Lincoln had said was, that a decision of the Supreme Court was tobe set aside by the political action of the people at the polls. TheSupreme Court had interpreted the Constitution, and Lincoln was incitingthe people to annul that interpretation by some political process notknown to the law. For himself, he proclaimed with effective emphasis hisallegiance to that great tribunal in the performance of itsconstitutional duties. Lincoln replied that he also bowed to the DredScott decision in the specific case; but he repudiated it as a bindingrule in political action. [81] His point seemed more obscure than wasusual with him, and not satisfactory as an answer to Douglas. But asmatter of fact no one was deceived by the amusing adage of theprofession: that the courts do not _make_ the law, but only _declarewhat it is_. Every one knew that the law was just what the judges chosefrom time to time to say that it was, and that if judicial_declarations_ of the law were not reversed quite so often aslegislative _makings_ of the law were repealed, it was only because theidentity of a bench is usually of longer duration than the identity of alegislative body. If the people, politically, willed the reversal of theDred Scott decision, it was sure in time to be judicially reversed. [82]

Douglas boasted that the Democrats were a national party, whereas the"Black Republicans" were a sectional body whose creed could not beuttered south of Mason and Dixon's line. He was assiduous in fasteningupon Lincoln the name of "Abolitionist, " and "Black Republican, "epithets so unpopular that those who held the faith often denied thetitle, and he only modified them by the offensive admission thatLincoln's doctrines were sometimes disingenuously weakened to suitcertain audiences: "His principles in the north [of Illinois] are jetblack; in the centre they are in color a decent mulatto; and in lowerEgypt[83] they are almost white. "

Concerning sectionalism, Lincoln countered fairly enough on hisopponent by asking: Was it, then, the case that it was slavery which wasnational, and freedom which was sectional? Or, "Is it the true test ofthe soundness of a doctrine that in some places people won't let youproclaim it?" But the remainder of Douglas's assault was by no means tobe disposed of by quick retort. When Lincoln was pushed to formulateaccurately his views concerning the proper status of the negro in thecommunity, he had need of all his extraordinary care in statement. Herein lay problems that were vexing many honest citizens and clever menbesides himself, and were breeding much disagreement among persons whoall were anti-slavery in a general way, but could by no means reach acomfortable unison concerning troublesome particulars. The "all men freeand equal" of the Constitution, and the talk about human brotherhood, gave the Democrats wide scope for harassing anti-slavery men withvexatious taunts and embarrassing cross-interrogatories on practicalpoints. "I do not question, " said Douglas, "Mr. Lincoln's conscientiousbelief that the negro was made his equal, and hence is his brother. Butfor my own part, I do not regard the negro as my equal, and positivelydeny that he is my brother, or any kin to me whatever. " He said that"the signers of the Declaration had no reference to the negro, . . . Or anyother inferior and degraded race, when they spoke of the equality ofmen, " but meant only "white men, of European birth and descent. " Thistopic opens the whole subject of Lincoln's political affiliations and ofhis opinions concerning slavery and the negro, opinions which seem tohave undergone no substantial change during the interval betwixt thiscampaign and his election to the presidency. Some selections from whathe said may sufficiently explain his position. 

At Freeport, August 27, replying to a series of questions from Douglas, he declared that he had supposed himself, "since the organization of theRepublican party at Bloomington, in May, 1856, bound as a party man bythe platforms of the party, then and since. " He said: "I do not now, norever did, stand in favor of the unconditional repeal of the FugitiveSlave Law. " He believed that under the Constitution the Southerners wereentitled to such a law; but thought that the existing law "should havebeen framed so as to be free from some of the objections that pertain toit, without lessening its efficiency. " He would not "introduce it as anew subject of agitation upon the general question of slavery. "

He should be "exceedingly sorry" ever to have to pass upon the questionof admitting more slave States into the Union, and exceedingly glad toknow that another never would be admitted. But "if slavery shall be keptout of the Territories during the territorial existence of any one givenTerritory, and then the people shall, having a fair chance and a clearfield, when they come to adopt their constitution, do such anextraordinary thing as to adopt a slave constitution, uninfluenced bythe actual presence of the institution among them, I see no alternative, if we own the country, but to admit them into the Union. " He shouldalso, he said, be "exceedingly glad to see slavery abolished in theDistrict of Columbia, " and he believed that Congress had "constitutionalpower to abolish it" there; but he would favor the measure only uponcondition: "First, that the abolition should be gradual; second, that itshould be on a vote of the majority of qualified voters in the District;and, third, that compensation should be made to unwilling owners. " As tothe abolition of the slave trade between the different States, heacknowledged that he had not considered the matter sufficiently to havereached a conclusion concerning it. But if he should think that Congresshad power to effect such abolition, he should "not be in favor of theexercise of that power unless upon some conservative principle, akin towhat I have said in relation to the abolition of slavery in the Districtof Columbia. " As to the territorial controversy, he said: "I amimpliedly, if not expressly, pledged to a belief in the _right_ and_duty_ of Congress to prohibit slavery in all the United StatesTerritories. " Concerning the acquisition of new territory he said: "I amnot generally opposed to honest acquisition of territory; and in anygiven case I would or would not oppose such acquisition, according as Imight think such acquisition would or would not aggravate the slaveryquestion among ourselves. " The statement derived its immediateimportance from the well-known purpose of the administration and aconsiderable party in the South very soon to acquire Cuba. All theseutterances were certainly clear enough, and were far from constitutingAbolitionist doctrine, though they were addressed to an audience "asstrongly tending to Abolitionism as any audience in the State ofIllinois, " and Mr. Lincoln believed that he was saying "that which, ifit would be offensive to any person and render them enemies to himself, would be offensive to persons in this audience. "

At Quincy Lincoln gave his views concerning Republicanism with his usualunmistakable accuracy, and certainly he again differentiated it widelyfrom Abolitionism. The Republican party, he said, think slavery "amoral, a social, and a political wrong. " Any man who does not hold thisopinion "is misplaced and ought to leave us. While, on the other hand, if there be any man in the Republican party who is impatient over thenecessity springing from its actual presence, and is impatient of theconstitutional guarantees thrown around it, and would act in disregardof these, he, too, is misplaced, standing with us. He will find hisplace somewhere else; for we have a due regard . . . For all thesethings. " . . . "I have always hated slavery as much as anyAbolitionist, . . . But I have always been quiet about it until this newera of the introduction of the Nebraska bill again. " He repeated oftenthat he had "no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with theinstitution of slavery in the States where it exists;" that he had "nolawful right to do so, " and "no inclination to do so. " He said that hisdeclarations as to the right of the negro to "life, liberty, and thepursuit of happiness" were designed only to refer to legislation "aboutany new country which is not already cursed with the actual presence ofthe evil, --slavery. " He denied having ever "manifested any impatiencewith the necessities that spring from the . . . Actual existence ofslavery among us, where it does already exist. "

He dwelt much upon the equality clause of the Declaration. If we begin"making exceptions to it, where will it stop? If one man says it doesnot mean a negro, why not another say it does not mean some other man?"Only within three years past had any one doubted that negroes wereincluded by this language. But he said that, while the authors "intendedto include _all_ men, they did not mean to declare all men equal _in allrespects_, . . . In color, size, intellect, moral development, or socialcapacity, " but only "equal in certain inalienable rights. " "Anythingthat argues me into his [Douglas's] idea of perfect social and politicalequality with the negro is but a specious and fantastic arrangement ofwords, by which a man can prove a horse chestnut to be a chestnuthorse. . . . I have no purpose to produce political and social equalitybetween the white and the black races. There is a physical differencebetween the two, which, in my judgment, will probably forever forbidtheir living together upon the footing of perfect equality; and inasmuchas it becomes a necessity that there must be a difference, I, as well asJudge Douglas, am in favor of the race to which I belong having thesuperior position. . . . But I hold that . . . There is no reason in theworld why the negro is not entitled to all the natural rights enumeratedin the Declaration of Independence, the right to life, liberty, and thepursuit of happiness. I hold that he is as much entitled to these as thewhite man. I agree with Judge Douglas that he is not my equal in manyrespects, --certainly not in color, perhaps not in moral or intellectualendowment. But in the right to eat the bread, without the leave ofanybody else, which his own hand earns, _he is my equal, and the equalof Judge Douglas, and the equal of every living man_. " Later atCharleston he reiterated much of this in almost identical language, andthen in his turn took his fling at Douglas: "I am not in favor of makingvoters or jurors of negroes, nor of qualifying them to hold office, norto intermarry with white people. . . . I do not understand that because Ido not want a negro woman for a slave I must necessarily want her for awife. My understanding is that I can just let her alone. . . . I have neverhad the least apprehension that I or my friends would marry negroes, ifthere was no law to keep them from it; but as Judge Douglas and hisfriends seem to be in great apprehension that _they_ might, if therewere no law to keep them from it, I give him the most solemn pledge thatI will to the very last stand by the law of this State, which forbidsthe marrying of white people with negroes. "

By all this it is made entirely evident that Lincoln held a faith widelydifferent from that of the great crusading leaders of Abolitionism atthe East. [84] Equally marked was the difference between him and them inthe matters of temper and of the attitude taken towards opponents. Theabsence of any sense of personal hostility towards those who assailedhim with unsparing vindictiveness was a trait often illustrated in hisafter life, and which was now noted with surprise, for it was rare inthe excited politics of those days. In this especial campaign bothcontestants honestly intended to refrain from personalities, but thedifference between their ways of doing so was marked. Douglas, under thetemptation of high ability in that line, held himself in check by aneffort which was often obvious and not always entirely successful. ButLincoln never seemed moved by the desire. "All I have to ask, " he said, "is that we talk reasonably and rationally;" and again: "I hope to dealin all things fairly with Judge Douglas. " No innuendo, no artifice, inany speech, gave the lie to these protestations. Besides this, hisdenunciations were always against _slavery_, and never against_slaveholders_. The emphasis of condemnation, the intensity of feeling, were never expended against persons. By this course, unusual among theAbolitionists, he not only lost nothing in force and impressiveness, but, on the contrary, his attack seemed to gain in effectiveness bybeing directed against no personal object, but exclusively against apractice. His war was against slavery, not against the men and women ofthe South who owned slaves. At Ottawa he read from the Peoria speech of1854: "I have no prejudice against the Southern people. They are justwhat we would [should] be in their situation. If slavery did not nowexist among them, they would not introduce it. If it did now exist amongus, we should not instantly give it up. . . . It does seem to me thatsystems of gradual emancipation might be adopted; but for theirtardiness in this, I will not undertake to judge our brethren of theSouth. " Repeatedly he admitted the difficulty of the problem, andfastened no blame upon those Southerners who excused themselves for notexpelling the evil on the ground that they did not know how to do so. AtPeoria he said: "If all earthly power were given me, I should not knowwhat to do as to the existing institution. " He contributed somesuggestions which certainly were nothing better than chimerical. Deportation to Africa was his favorite scheme; he also proposed that itwould be "best for all concerned to have the colored population in aState by themselves. " But he did not abuse men who declined to adopt hismethods. Though he was dealing with a question which was arousingpersonal antagonisms as bitter as any that history records, yet he nevercondemned any one, nor ever passed judgment against his fellow men. 

Diagnosis would perhaps show that the trait thus illustrated was mentalrather than moral. This absence of animosity and reproach as towardsindividuals found its root not so much in human charity as in fairnessof thinking. Lincoln's ways of mental working are not difficult todiscover. He thought slowly, cautiously, profoundly, and with a mostclose accuracy; but above all else he _thought fairly_. This capacityfar transcended, or, more correctly, differed from, what is ordinarilycalled the judicial habit of mind. Many men can weigh arguments withoutletting prejudice get into either scale; but Lincoln carried on thewhole process of thinking, not only with an equal clearness ofperception, but also with an entire impartiality of liking or dislikingfor both sides. His aim, while he was engaged in thinking, was todiscover what was really true; and later when he spoke to others hispurpose was to show them the truth which he had discovered, and tostate to them on what grounds he believed it to be the truth; it did notinvolve a judgment against the individuals who failed to recognize thattruth. His singular trait of impersonality was not made more apparent inany other way. His effort never was to defeat the person who happened tobe his adversary, but always was to overcome the arguments of thatadversary. Primarily he was discussing a topic and establishing a truth;it was only incidental that in doing these things he had to oppose aman. It is noteworthy that his opponents never charged him withmisstating their case in order to make an apparently effective answer toit. On the contrary, his hope of success seemed always to lie in havingboth sides presented with the highest degree of clearness and honesty. He had perfect confidence in the ultimate triumph of the truth; he wasalways willing to tie fast to it, according as he could see it, and thento bide time with it. This being a genuine faith and not merelip-service, he used the same arguments to others which he used tohimself, and staked his final success upon the probability that what hadpersuaded his mind would in time persuade also the minds of otherintelligent men. It has been well said of him by an excellent judge: "Heloved the truth for the truth's sake. He would not argue from a falsepremise, or be deceived himself, or deceive others, by a falseconclusion. . . . He did not seek to say merely the thing which was bestfor that day's debate, but the thing which would stand the test oftime, and square itself with eternal justice. . . . His logic was severeand faultless. He did not resort to fallacy. "[85]

To return to the points made in the debate: Douglas laid down the "greatprinciple of non-interference and non-intervention by Congress withslavery in the States and Territories alike;" which he assured hisaudience would enable us to "continue at peace with one another. " In thesame connection he endeavored to silver-coat for Northern palates thebitter pill of the Dred Scott decision, by declaring that the people ofany State or Territory might withhold that protecting legislation, those"friendly police regulations, " without which slavery could not exist. But this was, indeed, a "lame, illogical, evasive answer, " which enabledLincoln to "secure an advantage in the national relations of the contestwhich he held to the end. "

Lincoln, in replying, agreed that "all the States have the right to doexactly as they please about all their domestic relations, includingthat of slavery. " But he said that the proposition that slavery couldnot enter a new country without police regulations was historicallyfalse; and that the facts of the Dred Scott case itself showed thatthere was "vigor enough in slavery to plant itself in a new country evenagainst unfriendly legislation. " Beyond this issue of historical fact, Douglas had already taken and still dared to maintain a position whichproved to be singularly ill chosen. The right to hold slaves as propertyin the Territories had lately, to the infinite joy of the South, beendeclared by the Supreme Court to be guaranteed by the Constitution; andnow Douglas had the audacity to repeat that notion of his, so abhorrentto all friends of slavery, --that this invaluable right could be madepractically worthless by unfriendly local legislation, or even by thenegative hostility of withholding friendly legislation! From the momentwhen this deadly suggestion fell from his ingenious lips, the SouthernDemocracy turned upon him with vindictive hate and marked him fordestruction. He had also given himself into the hands of his avowed andnatural enemies. The doctrine, said Mr. Lincoln, is "no less than that athing may lawfully be driven away from a place where it has a lawfulright to be. " "If you were elected members of the legislature, whatwould be the first thing you would have to do, before entering upon yourduties? _Swear to support the Constitution of the United States_. Suppose you believe, as Judge Douglas does, that the Constitution of theUnited States guarantees to your neighbor the right to hold slaves inthat Territory, --that they are his property, --how can you clear youroaths, unless you give him such legislation as is necessary to enablehim to enjoy that property? What do you understand by supporting theConstitution of a State, or of the United States? Is it not to give suchconstitutional helps to the rights established by that Constitution asmay be practically needed?. . . And what I say here will hold with stillmore force against the judge's doctrine of 'unfriendly legislation. ' Howcould you, having sworn to support the Constitution, and believing itguaranteed the right to hold slaves in the Territories, assist inlegislation _intended to defeat that right_?" "Is not Congress itselfunder obligation to give legislative support to any right that isestablished under the United States Constitution?" Upon what otherprinciple do "many of us, who are opposed to slavery upon principle, give our acquiescence to a Fugitive Slave Law?" Does Douglas mean to saythat a territorial legislature, "by passing unfriendly laws, " can"_nullify a constitutional right_?" He put to Douglas the direct andembarrassing query: "If the slaveholding citizens of a United StatesTerritory should need and demand congressional legislation for theprotection of their slave property in such Territory, would you, as amember of Congress, vote for or against such legislation?" "Repeatthat, " cried Douglas, ostentatiously; "I want to answer that question. "But he never composed his reply. 

Another kindred question had already been put by Lincoln: "Can thepeople of a United States Territory, in any lawful way, against the wishof any citizen of the United States, exclude slavery from its limits, prior to the formation of a State Constitution?" Friends advised him notto force this, as it seemed against the immediate policy of the presentcampaign. But it was never his way to subordinate his own deliberateopinion to the opinions of advisers; and on this occasion he wasmerciless in pressing this question. A story has been very generallyrepeated that he told the protesters that, whatever might be the bearingon the senatorship, Douglas could not answer that question and beelected President of the United States in 1860. "I am killing largergame, " he said; "the battle of 1860 is worth a hundred of this. "[86] Afew legends of this kind are extant, which tend to indicate that Lincolnalready had in mind the presidential nomination, and was fighting thepresent fight with an eye to that greater one in the near future. It isnot easy to say how much credit should be given to such tales; they maynot be wholly inventions, but a remark which is uttered with littlethought may later easily take on a strong color in the light ofsubsequent developments. 

In presenting the Republican side of the question Lincoln seemed to feela duty beyond that of merely outarguing his opponent. He bore theweighty burden of a responsibility graver than personal success. Hemight prevail in the opinions of his fellow citizens; without thisinstant triumph he might so present his cause that the jury of posteritywould declare that the truth lay with him; he might even convince boththe present and the coming generations; and though achieving all thesetriumphs, he might still fall far short of the peculiar and exactingrequirement of the occasion. For the winning of the senatorship was theinsignificant part of what he had undertaken; his momentous charge wasto maintain a grand moral crusade, to stimulate and to vindicate a greatuprising in the cause of humanity and of justice. His full appreciationof this is entirely manifest in the tone of his speeches. They have anearnestness, a gravity, at times even a solemnity, unusual in suchencounters in any era or before any audiences, but unprecedented "on thestump" before the uproarious gatherings of the West at that day. Repeatedly he stigmatized slavery as "a moral, a social, a politicalevil. " Very impressively he denounced the positions of an opponent who"cared not whether slavery was voted down or voted up, " who said thatslavery was not to be differentiated from the many domestic institutionsand daily affairs which civilized societies control by policeregulations. He said that slavery could not be treated as "only equal tothe cranberry laws of Indiana;" that slaves could not be put "upon a parwith onions and potatoes;" that to Douglas he supposed that theinstitution really "looked small, " but that a great proportion of theAmerican people regarded slavery as "a vast moral evil. " "The real issuein this controversy--the one pressing upon every mind--is the sentimenton the part of one class that looks upon the institution of slavery _asa wrong_, and of another class that does _not_ look upon it as awrong. . . . No man can logically say he does not care whether a wrong isvoted up or voted down. He [Douglas] contends that whatever communitywants slaves has a right to have them. So they have, if it is not awrong. But if it is a wrong, he cannot say people have a right to dowrong. He says that, upon the score of equality, slaves should beallowed to go into a new Territory, like other property. This isstrictly logical if there is no difference between it and otherproperty. . . . But if you insist that one is wrong and the other right, there is no use to institute a comparison between right and wrong. . . . That is the real issue. That is the issue that will continue in thiscountry when these poor tongues of Judge Douglas and myself shall besilent. It is the eternal struggle between these two principles, rightand wrong, throughout the world. They are the two principles that havestood face to face from the beginning of time, and will ever continue tostruggle. The one is the common right of humanity, and the other thedivine right of kings. It is the same principle in whatever shape itdevelops itself. It is the same spirit that says: 'You work and toil andearn bread, and I'll eat it. '" "I ask you if it is not a falsephilosophy? Is it not a false statesmanship that undertakes to build upa system of policy upon the basis of caring nothing about _the verything that everybody does care the most about_?"

We cannot leave these speeches without a word concerning their literaryquality. In them we might have looked for vigor that would be a littleuncouth, wit that would be often coarse, a logic generally sound butalways clumsy, --in a word, tolerably good substance and very poor form. We are surprised, then, to find many and high excellences in art. As itis with Bacon's essays, so it is with these speeches: the moreattentively they are read the more striking appears the closeness oftheir texture both in logic and in language. Clear thought is accuratelyexpressed. Each sentence has its special errand, and each word itsindividual importance. There is never either too much or too little. Thework is done with clean precision and no waste. Nowhere does one pauseto seek a meaning or to recover a connection; and an effort to make outa syllabus shows that the most condensed statement has already beenused. There are scintillations of wit and humor, but they are not verynumerous. When Lincoln was urged to adopt a more popular style, hereplied: "The occasion is too serious; the issues are too grave. I donot seek applause, or to amuse the people, but to convince them. " Thisspirit was upon him from the beginning to the end. Had he beenaddressing a bench of judges, subject to a close limitation of minutes, he would have won credit by the combined economy and force which weredisplayed in these harangues to general assemblages. To speak of thelofty tone of these speeches comes dangerously near to the distastefulphraseology of extravagant laudation, than which nothing else canproduce upon honest men a worse impression. Yet it is a truth visible toevery reader that at the outset Lincoln raised the discussion to a veryhigh plane, and held it there throughout. The truth which he had tosustain was so great that it was perfectly simple, and he had the goodsense to utter it with appropriate simplicity. In no speech was therefervor or enthusiasm or rhetoric; he talked to the reason and theconscience of his auditors, not to their passions. Yet the depth of hisfeeling may be measured by the story that once in the canvass he said toa friend: "Sometimes, in the excitement of speaking, I seem to see theend of slavery. I feel that the time is soon coming when the sun shallshine, the rain fall, on no man who shall go forth to unrequited toil. How this will come, when it will come, by whom it will come, I cannottell, --but that time will surely come. "[87] It is just appreciation, andnot extravagance, to say that the cheap and miserable little volume, nowout of print, containing in bad newspaper type, "The Lincoln and DouglasDebates, "[88] holds some of the masterpieces of oratory of all ages andnations. 

The immediate result of the campaign was the triumph of Douglas, who hadcertainly made not only a very able and brilliant but a splendidlygallant fight, with Republicans assailing him in front andAdministrationists in rear. [89] Lincoln was disappointed. His feelingshad been so deeply engaged, he had worked so strenuously, and the resulthad been so much in doubt, that defeat was trying. But he bore it withhis wonted resolute equanimity. He said that he felt "like the boy thatstumped his toe, --'it hurt too bad to laugh, and he was too big tocry. '" In fact, there were encouraging elements. [90] The popular votestood, [91] Republicans, 126, 084; Douglas Democrats, 121, 940; LecomptonDemocrats, 5, 091. But the apportionment of districts was such that thelegislature contained a majority for Douglas. [92] So the prestige ofvictory seemed separated from its fruits; for the nation, attentivelywatching this duel, saw that the new man had convinced upwards of fourthousand voters more than had the great leader of the Democracy. Douglas is reported to have said that, during his sixteen years inCongress, he had found no man in the Senate whom he would not ratherencounter in debate than Lincoln. If it was true that Lincoln wasalready dreaming of the presidency, he was a sufficiently shrewdpolitician to see that his prospects were greatly improved by thiscampaign. He had worked hard for what he had gained; he had beentraveling incessantly to and fro and delivering speeches in unbrokensuccession during about one hundred of the hot days of the Westernsummer, and speeches not of a commonplace kind, but which severely taxedthe speaker. After all was over, he was asked by the state committee tocontribute to the campaign purse! He replied: "I am willing to payaccording to my ability, but I am the poorest hand living to get othersto pay. _I have been on expense_ so long, without earning anything, thatI am absolutely without money now for even household expenses. Still, ifyou can put in $250 for me, . . . I will allow it when you and I settle theprivate matter between us. This, with what I have already paid, . . . Willexceed my subscription of $500. This, too, is exclusive of my ordinaryexpenses during the campaign, all of which being added to my loss oftime and business bears pretty heavily upon one no better off than Iam. . . . You are feeling badly; 'and this, too, shall pass away;' neverfear. "

The platform which, with such precision and painstaking, Lincoln hadconstructed for himself was made by him even more ample and more strongby a few speeches delivered in the interval between the close of thisgreat campaign and his nomination by the Republicans for the presidency. In Ohio an important canvass for the governorship took place, andDouglas went there, and made speeches filled with allusions to Lincolnand the recent Illinois campaign. Even without this provocation Lincolnknew, by keen instinct, that where Douglas was, there he should be also. In no other way had he yet appeared to such advantage as in encountering"the Little Giant. " To Ohio, accordingly, he hastened, and spoke atColumbus and at Cincinnati. [93] To the citizens of the latter place hesaid: "This is the first time in my life that I have appeared before anaudience in so great a city as this. I therefore make this appearanceunder some degree of embarrassment. " There was little novelty insubstance, but much in treatment. Thus, at Cincinnati, he imaginedhimself addressing Kentuckians, and showed them that their next nomineefor the presidency ought to be his "distinguished friend, JudgeDouglas;" for "in all that there is a difference between you and him, Iunderstand he is sincerely for you, and more wisely for you than you arefor yourselves. " Through him alone pro-slavery men retained any holdupon the free States of the North; and in those States, "in everypossible way he can, he constantly moulds the public opinion to yourends. " Ingeniously but fairly he sketched Douglas as the most efficientamong the pro-slavery leaders. Perhaps the clever and truthful picturemay have led Mr. Greeley and some other gentlemen at the East to suspectthat they had been inconsiderate in their choice between the Westernrivals; and perhaps, also, Lincoln, while addressing imaginaryKentuckians, had before his inner eye some Eastern auditors. For at thetime he did not know that his voice would ever be heard at any pointnearer to their ears than the hall in which he then stood. Within a fewweeks, however, this unlooked-for good fortune befell. In October, 1859, he was invited to speak in the following winter in New York. That theanti-slavery men of that city wished to test him by personal observationsignified that his reputation was national, and that the highestaspirations were, therefore, not altogether presumptuous. He acceptedgladly, and immediately began to prepare an address which probably costhim more labor than any other speech which he ever made. He found time, however, in December to make a journey through Kansas, where hedelivered several speeches, which have not been preserved but aredescribed as "repetitions of those previously made in Illinois. " Lamontells us that the journey was an "ovation, " and that "wherever Lincolnwent, he was met by vast assemblages of people. " The population of thisagricultural State was hardly in a condition to furnish "vastassemblages" at numerous points, but doubtless the visitor receivedgratifying assurance that upon this battle-ground of slavery andanti-slavery the winning party warmly appreciated his advocacy of theircause. 

On Saturday, February 25, 1860, Lincoln arrived in New York. On Mondayhis hosts "found him dressed in a sleek and shining suit of new black, covered with very apparent creases and wrinkles, acquired by beingpacked too closely and too long in his little valise. He felt uneasy inhis new clothes and a strange place. " Certainly nothing in his previousexperience had prepared him to meet with entire indifference an audienceof metropolitan critics; indeed, had the surroundings been morefamiliar, he had enough at stake to tax his equanimity when WilliamCullen Bryant introduced him simply as "an eminent citizen of the West, hitherto known to you only by reputation. " Probably the first impressionmade upon those auditors by the ungainly Westerner in his outlandishgarb were not the same which they carried home with them a little later. The speech was so condensed that a sketch of it is not possible. Fortunately it had the excellent quality of steadily expanding ininterest and improving to the end. 

Of the Dred Scott case he cleverly said that the courts had decided it"_in a sort of way_;" but, after all, the decision was "mainly basedupon a mistaken statement of fact, --the statement in the opinion that'the right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmedin the Constitution. '"

In closing, he begged the Republicans, in behalf of peace and harmony, to "do nothing through passion and ill-temper;" but he immediately wenton to show the antagonism between Republican opinion and Democraticopinion with a distinctness which left no hope of harmony, and verylittle hope of peace. To satisfy the Southerners, he said, we must"cease to call slavery _wrong_, and join them in calling it _right_. Andthis must be done thoroughly, --done in _acts_ as well as in _words_. . . . We must arrest and return their fugitive slaves with greedy pleasure. Wemust pull down our free-state Constitutions. . . . If slavery is right, allwords, acts, laws, and constitutions against it are themselves wrong, and should be silenced and swept away. If it is right, we cannot objectto its nationality, its universality; if it is wrong, they cannot justlyinsist upon its extension, its enlargement. All they ask we couldreadily grant, if we thought slavery right; all we ask they could asreadily grant, if they thought it wrong. Their thinking it right and ourthinking it wrong is the precise fact upon which depends the wholecontroversy. Thinking it right, as they do, they are not to blame fordesiring its full recognition, as being right; but thinking it wrong, aswe do, can we yield to them?. . . Wrong as we think slavery is, we can yetafford to let it alone where it is, because that much is due to thenecessity arising from its actual presence in the nation; but can we, while our votes will prevent it, allow it to spread into the nationalTerritories, and to overrun us here in these free States? If our senseof duty forbids this . . . Let us be diverted by no sophisticalcontrivances, such as groping for some middle ground between the rightand the wrong, vain as the search for a man who should be neither aliving man nor a dead man; such as a policy of 'don't care' on aquestion about which all true men do care; such as Union appealsbeseeching true Union men to yield to Disunionists, reversing the divinerule and calling not the sinners but the righteous to repentance. "

The next morning the best newspapers gave full reports of the speech, with compliments. The columns of the "Evening Post" were generouslydeclared to be "indefinitely elastic" for such utterances; and the"Tribune" expressed commendation wholly out of accord with the recentnotions of its editor. The rough fellow from the crude West had made apowerful impression upon the cultivated gentlemen of the East. 

From New York Lincoln went to Massachusetts, Rhode Island, NewHampshire, and Connecticut. In this last-named State he deliveredspeeches which are said to have contributed largely to the Republicansuccess in the closely contested election then at hand. In Manchester itwas noticed that "he did not abuse the South, the administration, orthe Democrats, or indulge in any personalities, with the exception of afew hits at Douglas's notions. "[94]

These speeches of 1858, 1859, and 1860 have a very great value ascontributions to history. During that period every dweller in the UnitedStates was hotly concerned about this absorbing question of slavery, advancing his own views, weighing or encountering the arguments ofothers, quarreling, perhaps, with his oldest friends and his nearestkindred, --for about this matter men easily quarreled and rarelycompromised. Every man who fancied that he could speak in public gotupon some platform in city, town, or village, and secured an audience byhis topic if not by his ability; every one who thought that he couldwrite found some way to print what he had to say upon a subject of whichreaders never tired; and for whatever purpose two or three men weregathered together, they were not likely to separate without a few wordsabout North and South, pro-slavery and anti-slavery. Never was anymatter more harried and ransacked by disputation. Now to all thespeaking and writing of the Republicans Lincoln's condensed speecheswere what a syllabus is to an elaborate discourse, what a lawyer's briefis to his verbal argument. Perhaps they may better be likened to ananti-slavery gospel; as the New Testament is supposed to cover the wholeground of Christian doctrines and Christian ethics, so that theologiansand preachers innumerable have only been able to make elaborations orglosses upon the original text, so Lincoln's speeches contain the wholebasis of the anti-slavery cause as maintained by the Republican party. They also set forth a considerable part of the Southern position, doubtless as fairly as the machinations of the Devil are set forth inHoly Writ. They only rather gingerly refrain from speaking of the smallbody of ultra-Abolitionists, --for while Lincoln was far from agreeingwith these zealots, he felt that it was undesirable to widen by anyexcavation upon his side the chasm between them and the Republicans. Sothe fact is that the whole doctrine of Republicanism, as it existedduring the political campaign which resulted in the election of Lincoln, also all the historical facts supporting that doctrine, were clearly andaccurately stated in these speeches. Specific points were moreelaborated by other persons; but every seed was to be found in thisgranary. 

This being the case, it is worth noticing that both Lincoln and Douglasconfined their disputation closely to the slavery question. Disunion andsecession were words familiar in every ear, yet Lincoln referred tothese things only twice or thrice, and incidentally, while Douglasignored them. This fact is fraught with meaning. American writers andAmerican readers have always met upon the tacit understanding that theUnion was the chief cause of, and the best justification for, the war. An age may come when historians, treating our history as we treat thatof Greece, stirred by no emotion at the sight of the "Stars andStripes, " moved by no patriotism at the name of the United States ofAmerica, will seek a deeper philosophy to explain this obstinate, bloody, costly struggle. Such writers may say that a rich, civilizedmultitude of human beings, possessors of the quarter of a continent, believing it best for their interests to set up an independentgovernment for themselves, fell back upon the right of revolution, though they chose not to call it by that name. Now, even if it bepossible to go so far as to say that every nation has always a right topreserve by force, if it can, its own integrity, certainly it cannot bestated as a further truth that no portion of a nation can ever bejustified in endeavoring to obtain an independent national existence; nocitizen of this country can admit this, but must say that such anendeavor is justifiable or not justifiable according as its cause andbasis are right or wrong. Far down, then, at the very bottom lay thequestion whether the Southerners had a sufficient cause upon which tobase a revolution. Now this question was hardly conclusively answered bythe perfectly true statement that the North had not interfered withSouthern rights. Southerners might admit this, and still believe thattheir welfare could be best subserved by a government wholly their own. So the very bottom question of all still remained: Was the Southendeavoring to establish a government of its own for a justifiablereason and a right purpose? Now the avowed purpose was to establish onan enduring foundation a permanent slave empire; and the declared reasonwas, that slavery was not safe within the Union. Underneath the questionof the Union therefore lay, logically, the question of slavery. 

Lincoln and the other Republican leaders said that, if slavery extensionwas prevented, then slavery was in the way of extinction. If theassertion was true, it pretty clearly followed that the South couldretain slavery only by independence and a complete imperial controlwithin the limits of its own homogeneous nationality; for undeniably thepreponderant Northern mass was becoming firmly resolved that slaveryshould not be extended, however it might be tolerated within its presentlimits. So still, by anti-slavery statement itself, the ultimatequestion was: whether or not the preservation of slavery was a right andsufficient cause or purpose for establishing an independent nationality. Lincoln, therefore, went direct to the logical heart of the contention, when he said that the real dispute was whether slavery was a right thingor a wrong thing. If slavery was a right thing, a Union conducted upon apolicy which was believed to doom it to "ultimate extinction" was not aright thing. But if slavery was a wrong thing, a revolution undertakenwith the purpose of making it perpetual was also a wrong thing. Therefore, from beginning to end, Lincoln talked about slavery. By sodoing he did what he could to give to the war a character far highereven than a war of patriotism, for he extended its meaning far beyondthe age and the country of its occurrence, and made of it, not a war forthe United States alone, but a war for humanity, a war for ages andpeoples yet to come. In like manner, he himself also gained the right tobe regarded as much more than a great party leader, even more than agreat patriot; for he became a champion of mankind and the defender ofthe chief right of man. I do not mean to say that he saw these things inthis light at the moment, or that he accurately formulated the preciserelationship and fundamental significance of all that was then inprocess of saying and doing. Time must elapse, and distance must enableone to get a comprehensive view, before the philosophy of an era likethat of the civil war becomes intelligible. But the philosophy is notthe less correct because those who were framing it piece by piece didnot at any one moment project before their mental vision the whole inits finished proportions and relationship. 

FOOTNOTES:

[75] As an example of Greeley's position, see letter quoted by N. And H. Ii. 140, note. The fact that he was strenuously pro-Douglas andanti-Lincoln is well known. Yet afterward he said that it "was hardly inhuman nature" for Republicans to treat Douglas as a friend. Greeley's_American Conflict_, i. 301. 

[76] Wilson, _Rise and Fall of the Slave Power_, ii. 567; for sketchesof Douglas's position, see Blaine, _Twenty Years of Congress_, i. 141-144; von Holst, _Const. Hist. Of U. S. _ vi. 280-286; Herndon, 391-395; N. And H. Ii. 138-143; Lamon, 390-395; Holland, 158. Crittendenwas one of the old Whigs, who now sorely disappointed Lincoln bypreferring Douglas. N. And H. Ii. 142. 

[77] Several months afterward, October 25, 1858, Mr. Seward made thespeech at Rochester which contained the famous sentence: "It is anirrepressible conflict between opposing and enduring forces, and itmeans that the United States must and will, sooner or later, becomeeither entirely a slaveholding nation or entirely a free-labor nation. "Seward's _Works_, new edition, 1884, iv. 292. But Seward ranked amongthe extremists and the agitators. See _Lincoln and Douglas Deb. _ 244. After all, the idea had already found expression in the Richmond_Enquirer_, May 6, 1856, quoted by von Hoist, vi. 299, also referred toby Lincoln; see _Lincoln and Douglas Deb. _ 262. 

[78] Letter to Hon. Geo. Robertson, N. And H. I. 392; and see Lamon, 398; also see remarks of von Holst, vi. 277. 

[79] _Lincoln and Douglas Deb. _ 93. W. P. Fessenden, "who, " says Mr. Blaine, "always spoke with precision and never with passion, " expressedhis opinion that if Fremont had been elected instead of Buchanan, thatdecision would never have been given. _Twenty Years of Congress_, i. 133. 

[80] Stephen A. Douglas, Franklin Pierce, Roger B. Taney, JamesBuchanan. 

[81] _Lincoln and Douglas Deb. _ 198. At Chicago he said that he wouldvote for the prohibition of slavery in a new Territory "in spite of theDred Scott decision. " _Lincoln and Douglas Deb. _ 20; and see the rest ofhis speech on the same page. The Illinois Republican Convention, June16. 1858, expressed "condemnation of the principles and tendencies ofthe extra-judicial opinions of a majority of the judges, " as puttingforth a "political heresy. " Holland, 159. 

Years ago Salmon P. Chase had dared to say that, if the courts would notoverthrow the pro-slavery construction of the Constitution, the peoplewould do so, even if it should be "necessary to overthrow the courtsalso. " Warden's _Life of Chase_, 313. 

[82] For Lincoln's explanation of his position concerning the Dred Scottdecision, see _Lincoln and Douglas Deb. _ 20. 

[83] A nickname for the southern part of Illinois. 

[84] Henry Wilson has made his criticism in the words that "some of his[Lincoln's] assertions and admissions were both unsatisfactory andoffensive to anti-slavery men; betrayed too much of the spirit of casteand prejudice against color, and sound harshly dissonant by the side ofthe Proclamation of Emancipation and the grand utterances of his laterstate papers. " _Rise and Fall of the Slave Power_, ii. 576. 

[85] Blaine, _Twenty Years of Congress_, i. 145

[86] N. And H. Ii. 159, 160, 163; Arnold, 151; Lamon, 415, 416, and see406; Holland, 189; Wilson, _Rise and Fall of the Slave Power_, ii. 576;Blaine, _Twenty Years of Congress_, i. 148. 

[87] Arnold, 144. This writer speaks with discriminating praiseconcerning Lincoln's oratory, p. 139. It is an illustration of Lincoln'shabit of adopting for permanent use any expression that pleased him, that this same phrase had been used by him in a speech made two yearsbefore this time. Holland, 151. 

[88] Published in Columbus, in 1860, for campaign purposes, from copiesfurnished by Lincoln; see his letter to Central Exec. Comm. , December19, 1859, on fly-leaf. 

[89] Many tributes have been paid to Douglas by writers who oppose hisopinions; _e. G. _, Arnold says: "There is, on the whole, hardly anygreater personal triumph in the history of American politics than hisreëlection, " pp. 149, 150; Blaine, _Twenty Years of Congress_, i. 149. 

[90] See Lincoln's letter to Judd, quoted N. And H. Ii. 167; also_Ibid. _ 169. 

[91] Raymond, 76. 

[92] The Senate showed 14 Democrats, 11 Republicans; the House, 40Democrats, 35 Republicans. 

[93] In September, 1859. These are included in the volume of _TheLincoln and Douglas Debates_, printed at Columbus, 1860. 

[94] _The Mirror_, quoted by Lamon, 442. 

CHAPTER VI

ELECTION

Mr. J. W. Fell, a leading citizen of Illinois, says that after thedebates of 1858 he urged Lincoln to seek the Republican nomination forthe presidency in 1860. Lincoln, however, replied curtly that men likeSeward and Chase were entitled to take precedence, and that no such"good luck" was in store for him. In March, 1859, he wrote to anotherperson: "In regard to the other matter that you speak of, I beg that youwill not give it further mention. I do not think I am fit for thepresidency. " He said the same to the editor of the "Central IllinoisGazette;" but this gentleman "brought him out in the issue of May 4, "and "thence the movement spread rapidly and strongly. "[95] In the winterof 1859-60 sundry "intimate friends, " active politicians of Illinois, pressed him to consent to be mentioned as a candidate. He considered thematter over night and then gave them the desired permission, at the sametime saying that he would not accept the vice-presidency. 

Being now fairly started in the race, he used all his well-known skillas a politician to forward his campaign, though nothing derogatory isto be inferred from these words as to his conduct or methods. February9, 1860, he wrote to Mr. Judd: "I am not in a position where it wouldhurt much for me not to be nominated on the national ticket; but I amwhere it would hurt some for me not to get the Illinois delegates. . . . Can you help me a little in this matter at your end of the vineyard?"This point of the allegiance of his own State was soon made right. TheRepublican State Convention met in the "Wigwam" at Decatur, May 9 and10, 1860. Governor Oglesby, who presided, suggested that a distinguishedcitizen, whom Illinois delighted to honor, was present, and that heshould be invited to a place on the stand; and at once, amid a tumult ofapplause, Lincoln was lifted over the heads of the crowd to theplatform. John Hanks then theatrically entered, bearing a couple offence rails, and a flag with the legend that they were from a "lot madeby Abraham Lincoln and John Hanks in the Sangamon Bottom, in the year1830. " The sympathetic roar rose again. Then Lincoln made a "speech, "appropriate to the occasion. At last, attention was given to business, and the convention resolved that Abraham Lincoln was the first choice ofthe Republican party of Illinois for the presidency, and instructedtheir delegates to the nominating convention "to use all honorable meansto secure his nomination, and to cast the vote of the State as a unitfor him. "

With the opening of the spring of 1860 the several parties began thecampaign in earnest. The Democratic Convention met first, at Charleston, April 23; and immediately the line of disruption opened. Upon the oneside stood Douglas, with the moderate men and nearly all the Northerndelegates, while against him were the advocates of extreme Southerndoctrines, supported by the administration and by most of the delegatesfrom the "Cotton States. " The majority of the committee appointed todraft the platform were anti-Douglas men; but their report was rejected, and that offered by the pro-Douglas minority was substituted, 165 yeasto 138 nays. [96] Thereupon the delegations of Alabama, Mississippi, Florida, and Texas, and sundry delegates from other States, withdrewfrom the convention, [97] taking away 45 votes out of a total of 303. Those who remained declared the vote of two thirds of a full convention, _i. E. _, 202 votes, to be necessary for a choice. Then during three daysfifty-seven ballots were cast, Douglas being always far in the lead, butnever polling more than 152-1/2 votes. At last, on May 3, an adjournmentwas had until June 18, at Baltimore. At this second meeting contestingdelegations appeared, and the decisions were uniformly in favor of theDouglas men, which provoked another secession of the extremist Southernmen. A ballot showed 173-1/2 votes for Douglas out of a total of191-1/2; the total was less than two thirds of the full number of theoriginal convention, and therefore it was decided that any personreceiving two thirds of the votes cast by the delegates present shouldbe deemed the nominee. The next ballot gave Douglass 181-1/2. HerschelV. Johnson of Georgia was nominated for vice-president. 

On June 28, also at Baltimore, there came together a collection composedof original seceders at Charleston, and of some who had been rejectedand others who had seceded at Baltimore. Very few Northern men werepresent, and the body in fact represented the Southern wing of theDemocracy. Having, like its competitor, the merit of knowing its ownmind, it promptly nominated John C. Breckenridge of Kentucky and JosephLane of Oregon, and adopted the radical platform which had been reportedat Charleston. 

These doings opened, so that it could never be closed, that seam ofwhich the thread had long been visible athwart the surface of the oldDemocratic party. The great record of discipline and of triumph, whichthe party had made when united beneath the dominion of imperiousleaders, was over, and forever. Those questions which Lincolnobstinately and against advice had insisted upon pushing in 1858 hadforced this disastrous development of irreconcilable differences. Theanswers, which Douglas could not shirk, had alienated the mostimplacable of men, the dictators of the Southern Democracy. His"looking-both-ways" theory would not fit with their policy, and theirpolicy was and must be immutable; modification was in itself defeat. Onthe other hand, what he said constituted the doctrine to which the massof the Northern Democracy firmly held. So now, although Republicansadmitted that it was "morally certain" that the Democratic party, holding together, could carry the election, [98] yet these men from theCotton States could not take victory and Douglas together. [99] It hadactually come to this, that, in spite of all that Douglas had done forthe slaveholders, they now marked him for destruction at any cost. Manyalso believe that they had another motive; that they had matured theirplans for secession; and that they did not mean to have the schemedisturbed or postponed by an ostensibly Democratic triumph in the shapeof the election of Douglas. 

In May the convention of the Constitutional Union party met, also atBaltimore. This organization was a sudden outgrowth designed only tomeet the present emergency. Its whole political doctrine lay in theopening words of the one resolution which constituted its platform:"That it is both the part of patriotism and of duty to recognize nopolitical principle other than the Constitution of the country, theunion of the States, and the enforcement of the laws. " This partygathered nearly all the peaceable elements of the community; it assumeda deprecatory attitude between angry contestants, and of course receivedthe abuse and contempt of both; it was devoid of combative force, yethad some numerical strength. The Republicans especially mocked at these"trimmers, " as if their only platform was moral cowardice, which, however, was an unfair statement of their position. The party died, ofnecessity, upon the day when Lincoln was elected, and its members werethen distributed between the Republicans, the Secessionists, and theCopperheads. John Bell of Tennessee, the candidate for the presidency, joined the Confederacy; Edward Everett of Massachusetts, the candidatefor the vice-presidency, became a Republican. The party never had a hopeof electing its men; but its existence increased the chance of throwingthe election into Congress; and this hope inspired exertions far beyondwhat its own prospects warranted. 

On May 16 the Republican Convention came together at Chicago, where thegreat "Wigwam" had been built to hold 10, 000 persons. The intenseinterest with which its action was watched indicated the popular beliefthat probably it would name the next President of the United States. Many candidates were named, chiefly Seward, Lincoln, Chase, Cameron, Edward Bates of Missouri, and William L. Dayton of New Jersey. ThurlowWeed was Seward's lieutenant. Horace Greeley, chiefly bent upon thedefeat of Seward, would have liked to achieve it by the success ofBates. David Davis, aided by Judge Logan and a band of personal friendsfrom Illinois, was manager for Lincoln. Primarily the contest laybetween Seward and Lincoln, and only a dead-lock between these two couldgive a chance to some one of the others. But Seward's friends hoped, andLincoln's friends dreaded, that the New Yorker might win by a rush onthe first ballot. George Ashmun of Massachusetts presided. With littlediscussion a platform was adopted, long and ill-written, overloaded withadjectives and rhetoric, sacrificing dignity to the supreme pleasure ofabusing the Democracy, but honest in stating Republican doctrines, andclearly displaying the temper of an earnest, aggressive party, hot forthe fight and confident of victory. The vote of acceptance was greetedwith such a cheering that "a herd of buffaloes or lions could not havemade a more tremendous roaring. "

The details of the brief but sharp contest for the nomination are notaltogether gratifying. The partisans of Seward set about winning votesby much parading in the streets with banners and music, and byout-yelling all competitors within the walls of the convention. For thisintelligent purpose they had engaged Tom Hyer, the prize fighter, witha gang of roughs, to hold possession of the Wigwam, and to howlillimitably at appropriate moments. But they had undertaken a difficulttask in trying to outdo the great West, in one of its own cities, at agame of this kind. The Lincoln leaders in their turn secured a couple ofstentorian yellers (one of them a Democrat), instructed them carefully, and then filled the Wigwam full actually at daybreak, while the Sewardmen were marching; so in the next yelling match the West wonmagnificently. How great was the real efficiency of these tactics inaffecting the choice of the ruler of a great nation commonly accountedintelligent, it is difficult to say with accuracy; but it is certainthat the expert managers spared no pains about this scenic business of"enthusiasm. "

Meanwhile other work, entirely quiet, was being done elsewhere. Theobjection to Seward was that he was too radical, too far in advance ofthe party. The Bates following were pushing their candidate as amoderate man, who would be acceptable to "Union men. " But Bates's chancewas small, and any tendency towards a moderate candidate was likely tocarry his friends to Lincoln rather than to Seward; for Lincoln wasgenerally supposed, however erroneously, [100] to be more remote fromAbolitionism than Seward was. To counteract this, a Seward delegatetelegraphed to the Bates men at St. Louis that Lincoln was as radicalas Seward. Lincoln, at Springfield, saw this dispatch, and at once wrotea message to David Davis: "Lincoln agrees with Seward in hisirrepressible-conflict idea, and in Negro Equality; but he is opposed toSeward's Higher Law. _Make no contracts that will bind me_. " Heunderscored the last sentence; but when his managers saw it, theyrecognized that such independence did not accord with the situation, andso they set it aside. 

The first vote was:--

 Whole number 465 Necessary for choice 233

 William H. Seward of New York 173-1/2 Abraham Lincoln of Illinois 102 Simon Cameron of Pennsylvania 50-1/2 Salmon P. Chase of Ohio 49 Edward Bates of Missouri 48 William L. Dayton of New Jersey 14 John McLean of Ohio 12 Jacob Collamer of Vermont 10

 Scattering 6

The fact was, and Lincoln's friends perfectly understood it, thatCameron held that peculiar kind of power which gave him no real prospectof success, yet had a considerable salable value. Could they refrainfrom trying the market? They asked the owners of the 50-1/2 Cameronvotes what was their price. The owners said: The Treasury Department. Lincoln's friends declared this extravagant. Then they all chaffered. Finally Cameron's men took a place in the cabinet, without furtherspecification. Lamon says that another smaller contract was made withthe friends of Caleb B. Smith. Then the Lincoln managers rested in apleasing sense of security. 

The second ballot showed slight changes:--

 Seward 184-1/2 Lincoln 181 Cameron 2 Chase 42-1/2 Bates 5 Dayton 10 McLean 8

 Scattering 2

Upon the third ballot delivery was made of what Mr. Davis had bought. That epidemic foreknowledge, which sometimes so unaccountably forerunsan event, told the convention that the decision was at hand. A deadsilence reigned save for the click of the telegraphic instruments andthe low scratching of hundreds of pencils checking off the votes as theroll was called. Those who were keeping the tally saw that it stood:--

 Seward 180 Lincoln 231-1/2 Chase 24-1/2 Bates 22 Dayton 1 McLean 5

 Scattering 1

Cameron was out of the race; Lincoln was within 1-1/2 votes of the goal. Before the count could be announced, a delegate from Ohio transferredfour votes to Lincoln. This settled the matter; and then otherdelegations followed, till Lincoln's score rose to 354. At once the"enthusiasm" of 10, 000 men again reduced to insignificance a "herd ofbuffaloes or lions. " When at last quiet was restored, William M. Evarts, who had led for Seward, offered the usual motion to make the nominationof Abraham Lincoln unanimous. It was done. Again the "tremendousroaring" arose. Later in the day the convention nominated HannibalHamlin[101] of Maine, on the second ballot, by 367 votes, for thevice-presidency. Then for many hours, till exhaustion brought rest, Chicago was given over to the wonted follies; cannon boomed, musicresounded, and streets and barrooms were filled with the howling anddrinking crowds of the intelligent promoters of one of the great moralcrusades of the human race. 

Lamon says that the committee deputed to wait upon Lincoln atSpringfield found him "sad and dejected. The reaction from excessive joyto deep despondency--a process peculiar to his constitution--had alreadyset in. "[102] His remarks to these gentlemen were brief and colorless. His letter afterward was little more than a simple acceptance of theplatform. 

 * * * * *

Since white men first landed on this continent, the selection ofWashington to lead the army of the Revolution is the only event to becompared in good fortune with this nomination of Abraham Lincoln. Yetthe convention deserved no credit for its action. It did not know thetrue ratio between Seward and Lincoln, which only the future was to makeplain. By all that it did know, it ought to have given the honor toSeward, who merited it by the high offices which he had held withdistinction and without blemish, by the leadership which he had acquiredin the party through long-continued constancy and courage, by the forceand clearness with which he had maintained its principles, by hisexperience and supposed natural aptitude in the higher walks ofstatesmanship. Yet actually by reason of these very qualifications[103]it was now admitted that the all-important "October States" of Indianaand Pennsylvania could not be carried by the Republicans if Seward werenominated; while Greeley, sitting in the convention as a substitute fora delegate from Oregon, cast as much of the weight of New York as hecould lift into the anti-Seward scale. In plain fact, the convention, byits choice, paid no compliment either to Lincoln or to the voters of theparty. They took him because he was "available, " and the reason that hewas "available" lay not in any popular appreciation of his merits, butin the contrary truth, --that the mass of people could place nointelligent estimate upon him at all, either for good or for ill. Outside of Illinois a few men, who had studied his speeches, esteemedhim an able man in debate; more had a vague notion of him as aneffective stump speaker of the West; far the greatest number had to findout about him. [104] In a word, Mr. Lincoln gained the nomination becauseMr. Seward had been "too conspicuous, " whereas he himself was so littleknown that it was possible for Wendell Phillips to inquire indignantly:"Who is this huckster in politics? Who is this county courtadvocate?"[105] For these singular reasons he was the most "available"candidate who could be offered before the citizens of the United States!

It cannot be said that the nomination was received with muchsatisfaction. "Honest old Abe the rail-splitter!" might sound well inthe ear of the masses; but the Republican party was laden with theburden of an immense responsibility, and the men who did its thinkingcould not reasonably feel certain that rail-splitting was an altogethersatisfactory training for the leader in such an era as was now at hand. Nevertheless, nearly[106] all came to the work of the campaign with asmuch zeal as if they had surely known the full value of their candidate. Shutting their minds against doubts, they made the most spirited andenergetic canvass which has ever taken place in the country. Theorganization of the "Wide-Awake" clubs was an effective success. [107]None who saw will ever forget the spectacle presented by theseprocessions wherein many thousands of men, singing the campaign songs, clad in uniform capes of red or white oil-cloth, each with a flamingtorch or a colored lantern, marched nightly in every city and town ofthe North, in apparently endless numbers and with military precision, making the streets a brilliant river of variously tinted flame. Torchlight parades have become mere conventional affairs since thosedays, when there was a spirit in them which nothing has ever stirredmore lately. They were a good preparation for the more serious marchingand severer drill which were soon to come, though the Republicansscoffed at all anticipations of such a future, and sneered at the timidones who croaked of war and bloodshed. 

Almost from the beginning it was highly probable that the Republicanswould win, and it was substantially certain that none of theircompetitors could do so. The only contrary chance was that no electionmight be made by the people, and that it might be thrown into Congress. Douglas with his wonted spirit made a vigorous fight, traveling to andfro, speaking constantly in the North and a few times in the South, butdefiant rather than conciliatory in tone. He did not show one whit theless energy because it was obvious that he waged a contest without hope. If there were any road to Democratic success, which it now seems thatthere was not, it lay in uniting the sundered party. An attempt was madeto arrange that whichever Democratic candidate should ultimately displaythe greater strength should receive the full support of the party. Projects for a fusion ticket met with some success in New York. InPennsylvania like schemes were imperfectly successful. In other NorthernStates they were received with scant favor. Except some followers ofBell and Everett, men were in no temper for compromise. At the Southfusion was not even attempted; the Breckenridge men would not hear ofit; the voters in that section were controlled by leaders, and theseleaders probably had a very distinct policy, which would be seriouslyinterfered with by the triumph of the Douglas ticket. 

The chief anxiety of Lincoln and the Republican leaders was lest somevoters, who disagreed with them only on less important issues, mightstay away from the polls. All the platforms, except that of theConstitutional Union party, touched upon other topics besides thequestion of slavery in the Territories; the tariff, native Americanism, acquisition of Cuba, a transcontinental railway, public lands, internalimprovements, all found mention. The Know-Nothing party still byoccasional twitchings showed that life had not quite taken flight, andendeavors were made to induce Lincoln to express his views. But heevaded it. [108] For above all else he wished to avoid the stirring ofany dissension upon side issues or minor points; his hope was to see allopponents of the extension of slavery put aside for a while all othermatters, refrain from discussing troublesome details, and unite for theone broad end of putting slavery where "the fathers" had left it, sothat the "public mind should rest in the belief that it was in the wayof ultimate extinction. " He felt it to be fair and right that he shouldreceive the votes of all anti-slavery men; and ultimately he did, withthe exception only of the thorough-going Abolitionists. 

It was not so very long since he had spoken of the Abolitionist leadersas "friends;" but they did not reciprocate the feeling, nor indeed couldreasonably be expected to do so, or to vote the Republican ticket. Theywere even less willing to vote it with Lincoln at the head of it than ifSeward had been there. [109] But Republicanism itself under any leaderwas distinctly at odds with their views; for when they said"_abolition_" they meant accurately what they said, and abolitioncertainly was impossible under the Constitution. The Republicans, andLincoln personally, with equal directness acknowledged the supremacy ofthe Constitution. Lincoln, therefore, plainly asserted a policy whichthe Abolitionists equally plainly condemned. In their eyes, to be aparty to a contract maintaining slavery throughout a third of acontinent was only a trifle less criminal than aiding to extend it overanother third. Yet it should be said that the Abolitionists were not allof one mind, and some voted the Republican ticket as being at least astep in the right direction. Joshua R. Giddings was a member of theRepublican Convention which nominated Lincoln. But Wendell Phillips, always an extremist among extremists, published an article entitled"Abraham Lincoln, the Slave-hound of Illinois, " whereof the keynote wasstruck in this introductory sentence: "We gibbet a Northern houndto-day, side by side with the infamous Mason of Virginia. " Mr. Garrison, a man of far larger and sounder intellectual powers than belonged toPhillips, did not fancy this sort of diatribe, though five monthsearlier he had accused the Republican party of "slavish subserviency tothe Union, " and declared it to be "still insanely engaged in glorifyingthe Union and pledging itself to frown upon all attempts to dissolveit. " Undeniably men who held these views could not honestly vote for Mr. Lincoln. 

The popular vote and the electoral vote were as follows:[110]--

 Li: Abraham Lincoln, Illinois. Do: Stephen A. Douglas, Illinois. Br: John C. Breckenridge, Kentucky. Be: John Bell, Tennessee. 

 Popular Vote | Electoral Vote State Li Do Br Be | Li Do Br Be -------------------------------------------------------+-------------- Maine 62, 811 26, 693 6, 368 2, 046 | 8 -- -- -- New Hampshire 37, 519 25, 881 2, 112 441 | 5 -- -- -- Vermont 33, 808 6, 849 218 1, 969 | 5 -- -- -- Massachusetts 106, 533 34, 372 5, 939 22, 231 | 13 -- -- -- Rhode Island 12, 244 7, 707[B] -- -- | 4 -- -- -- Connecticut 43, 792 15, 522 14, 641 3, 291 | 6 -- -- -- New York 362, 646 312, 510[B] -- -- | 35 -- -- -- New Jersey 58, 324 62, 801[B] -- -- | 4 3 -- -- Pennsylvania 268, 030 16, 765 178, 871[B] 12, 776 | 27 -- -- -- Delaware 3, 815 1, 023 7, 337 3, 864 | -- -- 3 -- Maryland 2, 294 5, 966 42, 482 41, 760 | -- -- 8 -- Virginia 1, 929 16, 290 74, 323 74, 681 | -- -- -- 15 North Carolina -- 2, 701 48, 539 44, 990 | -- -- 10 -- South Carolina[A] -- -- -- -- | -- -- 8 -- Georgia -- 11, 590 51, 889 42, 886 | -- -- 10 -- Florida -- 367 8, 543 5, 437 | -- -- 3 -- Alabama -- 13, 651 48, 831 27, 875 | -- -- 9 -- Mississippi -- 3, 283 40, 797 25, 040 | -- -- 7 -- Louisiana -- 7, 625 22, 861 20, 204 | -- -- 6 -- Texas -- -- 47, 548 15, 438[B]| -- -- 4 -- Arkansas -- 5, 227 28, 732 20, 094 | -- -- 4 -- Missouri 17, 028 58, 801 31, 317 58, 372 | -- 9 -- -- Tennessee -- 11, 350 64, 709 69, 274 | -- -- -- 12 Kentucky 1, 364 25, 651 53, 143 66, 058 | -- -- -- 12 Ohio 231, 610 187, 232 11, 405 12, 194 | 23 -- -- -- Michigan 88, 480 65, 057 805 405 | 6 -- -- -- Indiana 139, 033 115, 509 12, 295 5, 306 | 13 -- -- -- Illinois 172, 161 160, 215 2, 404 4, 913 | 11 -- -- -- Wisconsin 86, 110 65, 021 888 161 | 5 -- -- -- Minnesota 22, 069 11, 920 748 62 | 4 -- -- -- Iowa 70, 409 55, 111 1, 048 1, 763 | 4 -- -- -- California 39, 173 38, 516 34, 334 6, 817 | 4 -- -- -- Oregon 5, 270 3, 951 5, 006 183 | 3 -- -- -- -------------------------------------------------------+-------------- Totals 1, 866, 452 1, 375, 157 847, 953 590, 631 | 180 12 72 39

 [A] By legislature. [B] Fusion electoral tickets. 

Messrs. Nicolay and Hay say that Lincoln was the "indisputable choice ofthe American people, " and by way of sustaining the statement say that, if the "whole voting strength of the three opposing parties had beenunited upon a single candidate, Lincoln would nevertheless have beenchosen with only a trifling diminution of his electoral majority. "[111]It might be better to say that Lincoln was the "indisputable choice" ofthe electoral college. The "American people" fell enormously short ofshowing a majority in his favor. His career as president was madeinfinitely more difficult as well as greatly more creditable to him byreason of the very fact that he was _not_ the choice of the Americanpeople, but of less than half of them, --and this, too, even if theConfederate States be excluded from the computation. [112]

The election of Lincoln was "hailed with delight" by the extremists inSouth Carolina; for it signified secession, and the underlying and realdesire of these people was secession, and not either compromise orpostponement. [113]

FOOTNOTES:

[95] Lamon, 422. 

[96] The majority report was supported by 15 slave States and 2 freeStates, casting 127 electoral votes; the minority report was supportedby 15 free States, casting 176 electoral votes. N. And H. Ii. 234. 

[97] This action was soon afterward approved in a manifesto signed byJefferson Davis, Toombs, Iverson, Slidell, Benjamin, Mason, and others. _Ibid. _ 245. 

[98] Greeley's _Amer. Conflict_, i. 326. 

[99] _Ibid. _ i. 306, 307. 

[100] Mr. Blaine says that Lincoln "was chosen in spite of expressionsfar more radical than those of Mr. Seward. " _Twenty Years of Congress_, i. 169. 

[101] "In strong common sense, in sagacity and sound judgment, in ruggedintegrity of character, Mr. Hamlin has had no superior among publicmen. " Blaine, _Twenty Years of Congress_, i. 170. 

[102] Lamon, 453. 

[103] McClure adds, or rather mentions as the chief cause, Seward'sposition on the public-school question in New York. _Lincoln and Men ofWar-Times_, 28, 29. 

[104] "To the country at large he was an obscure, not to say an unknownman. " _Life of W. L. Garrison_, by his children, iii. 503. 

[105] _Life of W. L. Garrison_, by his children, iii. 503. 

[106] See remarks of McClure, _Lincoln and Men of War-Times_, 28, 29. 

[107] See N. And H. Ii. 284 n. 

[108] See letter of May 17, 1859, to Dr. Canisius, Holland, 196; N. AndH. Ii. 181. 

[109] _Life of W. L. Garrison_, by his children, iii. 502. 

[110] This table is taken from Stanwood's _History of PresidentialElections_. 

[111] N. And H. Iii. 146. 

[112] The total popular vote was 4, 680, 193. Lincoln had 1, 866, 452. InNorth Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, and Tennessee, no vote was cast for the Lincoln ticket;in Virginia only 1929 voted it. Adding the total popular vote of allthese States (except the 1929), we get 854, 775; deducting this from thetotal popular vote leaves a balance of 3, 825, 418, of which one half is1, 912, 709; so that even outside of the States of the Confederacy Lincolndid not get one half of the popular vote. South Carolina is not includedin any calculation concerning the popular vote, because she choseelectors by her legislature. 

[113] Letter of Henry A. Wise of Virginia, May 28, 1858, quoted N. AndH. Ii. 302 n. 

CHAPTER VII

INTERREGNUM

For a while now the people of the Northern States were compelledpassively to behold a spectacle which they could not easily reconcilewith the theory of the supreme excellence and wisdom of their system ofgovernment. Abraham Lincoln was chosen President of the United StatesNovember 6, 1860; he was to be inaugurated March 4, 1861. During theintervening four months the government must be conducted by a chiefwhose political creed was condemned by an overwhelming majority of thenation. [114] The situation was as unfair for Mr. Buchanan as it washurtful for the people. As head of a republic, or, in the more popularphrase, as the chief "servant of the people, " he must respect thepopular will, yet he could not now administer the public businessaccording to that will without being untrue to all his own convictions, and repudiating all his trusted counselors. In a situation sointrinsically false efficient government was impossible, no matter whatwas the strength or weakness of the hand at the helm. Therefore therewas every reason for displacing Buchanan from control of the nationalaffairs in the autumn, and every reason against continuing him in thatcontrol through the winter; yet the law of the land ordained the lattercourse. It seemed neither sensible nor even safe. During this dolefulperiod all descriptions of him agree: he seemed, says Chittenden, "shaken in body and uncertain in mind, . . . An old man worn out by worry;"while the Southerners also declared him as "incapable of purpose as achild. " To the like purport spoke nearly all who saw him. 

During the same time Lincoln's position was equally absurd and moretrying. After the lapse of four months he was, by the brief ceremony ofan hour, to become the leader of a great nation under an exceptionallyawful responsibility; but during those four months he could play noother part than simply to watch, in utter powerlessness, the swiftsuccession of crowding events, which all were tending to make hisadministration of the government difficult, or even impossible. Throughout all this long time, the third part of a year, which statutesscarcely less venerable than the Constitution itself freely presented tothe disunion leaders, they safely completed their civil and militaryorganization, while the Northerners, under a ruler whom they haddiscredited, but of whom they could not get rid, were paralyzed for allpurposes of counter preparation. 

As a trifling compensation for its existence this costly interregnumpresents to later generations a curious spectacle. A volume might bemade of the public utterances put forth in that time by men of familiarnames and more or less high repute, and it would show many of them inmost strange and unexpected characters, so entirely out of keeping withthe years which they had lived before, and the years which they were tolive afterward, that the reader would gaze in hopeless bewilderment. Inthe "solid" South, so soon to be a great rebelling unit, he would findperhaps half of the people opposed to disunion; in the North he wouldhear everywhere words of compromise and concession, while coercion wouldbe mentioned only to be denounced. If these four months were useful inbringing the men of the North to the fighting point, on the other handthey gave an indispensable opportunity for proselyting, by whirl andexcitement, great numbers at the South. Even in the autumn of 1860 andin the Gulf States secession was still so much the scheme of leadersthat there was no popular preponderance in favor of disunion doctrines. In evidence of this are the responses of governors to a circular letterof Governor Gist of South Carolina, addressed to them October 5, 1860, and seeking information as to the feeling among the people. From NorthCarolina, Louisiana, Georgia, and Alabama came replies that secessionwas not likely to be favorably received. Mississippi was non-committal. Louisiana, Georgia, and Alabama desired a convention of thediscontented States, and might be influenced by its action. NorthCarolina, Louisiana, and Alabama would oppose forcible coercion of aseceding State. Florida alone was rhetorically belligerent. Thesereports were discouraging in the ears of the extremist governor; butagainst them he could set the fact that the disunionists had theadvantage of being the aggressive, propagandist body, homogeneous, andpursuing an accurate policy in entire concert. They were willing to takeany amount of pains to manipulate and control the election of delegatesand the formal action of conventions, and in all cases except that ofTexas the question was conclusively passed upon by conventions. By everymeans they "fired the Southern heart, " which was notoriouslycombustible; they stirred up a great tumult of sentiment; they madethunderous speeches; they kept distinguished emissaries moving to andfro; they celebrated each success with an uproar of cannonading, withbonfires, illuminations, and processions; they appealed to thosechivalrous virtues supposed to be peculiar to Southerners; they preacheddevotion to the State, love of the state flag, generous loyalty tosister slave-communities; sometimes they used insult, abuse, andintimidation; occasionally they argued seductively. Thus Mr. Cobb'sassertion, that "we can make better terms out of the Union than in it, "was, in the opinion of Alexander H. Stephens, the chief influence whichcarried Georgia out of the Union. In the main, however, it was theprinciple of state sovereignty and state patriotism which proved the oneentirely trustworthy influence to bring over the reluctant. "I abhordisunion, but I go with my State, " was the common saying; and the Stateswere under skillful and resolute leadership. So, though the populardiscontent was far short of the revolutionary point, yet individuals, one after another, yielded to that sympathetic, emotional instinct whichtempts each man to fall in with the big procession. In this way it wasthat during the Buchanan interregnum the people of the Gulf Statesbecame genuinely fused in rebellion. 

It is not correct to say that the election of Lincoln was the cause ofthe Rebellion; it was rather the signal. To the Southern leaders, it wasthe striking of the appointed hour. His defeat would have meant onlypostponement. South Carolina led the way. On December 17, 1860, herconvention came together, the Palmetto flag waving over its chamber ofconference, and on December 20 it issued its "Ordinance. "[115] Thisdeclared that the Ordinance of May 23, 1788, ratifying the Constitution, is "hereby repealed, " and the "Union now subsisting between SouthCarolina and other States, under the name of the United States ofAmerica, is hereby dissolved. " A Declaration of Causes said that SouthCarolina had "resumed her position among the nations of the world as aseparate and independent State. " The language used was appropriate forthe revocation of a power of attorney. The people hailed this actionwith noisy joy, unaccompanied by any regret or solemnity at theseverance of the old relationship. The newspapers at once began topublish "Foreign News" from the other States. The new governor, Pickens, a fiery Secessionist, and described as one "born insensible tofear, "--presumably the condition of most persons at that early period ofexistence, --had already suggested to Mr. Buchanan the impropriety ofreinforcing the national garrisons in the forts in Charleston harbor. Henow accredited to the President three commissioners to treat with himfor the delivery of the "forts, magazines, lighthouses, and other realestate, with their appurtenances, in the limits of South Carolina; andalso for an apportionment of the public debt, and for a division of allother property held by the government of the United States as agent ofthe Confederate States of which South Carolina was recently a member. "This position, as of the dissolution of a copartnership, or therevocation of an agency, and an accounting of debts and assets, was atleast simple; and by way of expediting it an appraisal of the "realestate" and "appurtenances" within the state limits had been made by thestate government. Meanwhile there was in the harbor of Charleston a sortof armed truce, which might at any moment break into war. Major Andersonin Fort Moultrie, and the state commander in the city, watched eachother like two suspicious animals, neither sure when the other willspring. In short, in all the overt acts, the demeanor and the languageof this excitable State, there was such insolence, besides hostility, that her emissaries must have been surprised at the urbane courtesy withwhich they were received, even by a President of Mr. Buchanan's views. 

After the secession of South Carolina the other Gulf States hesitatedbriefly. Mississippi followed first; her convention assembled January 7, 1861, and on January 9 passed the ordinance, 84 yeas to 15 nays, subsequently making the vote unanimous. The Florida convention metJanuary 3, and on January 10 decreed the State to be "a sovereign andindependent nation, " 62 yeas to 7 nays. The Alabama convention passedits ordinance on January 11 by 61 yeas to 39 nays; the Presidentannounced that the idea of reconstruction must be forever "dismissed. "Yet the northern part of the State appeared to be substantiallyanti-secession. In Georgia the Secessionists doubted whether they couldcontrol a convention, yet felt obliged to call one. Toombs, Cobb, andIverson labored with tireless zeal throughout the State; but in spite ofall their proselyting, Unionist feeling ran high and debate was hot. Themembers from the southern part of the State ventured to menace anddragoon those from the northern part, who were largely Unionists. Thelatter retorted angrily; a schism and personal collisions were narrowlyavoided. Alexander H. Stephens spoke for the Union with a warmth andlogic not surpassed by anything that was said at the North. He andHerschel V. Johnson both voted against secession; yet, on January 18, when the vote was taken, it showed 208 yeas against 89 nays. On January26 Louisiana followed, the vote of the convention being 113 yeas to 17nays; but it refused to submit the ordinance to the people forratification. The action of Texas, the only other State which secededprior to the inauguration of Lincoln, was delayed until February 1. There Governor Houston was opposing secession with such vigor asremained to a broken old man, whereby he provoked Senator Iverson toutter the threat of assassination: "Some Texan Brutus may arise to ridhis country of this old hoary-headed traitor. " But in the convention, when it came to voting, the yeas were 166, the nays only 7. 

By the light that was in him Mr. Buchanan was a Unionist, but it was asadly false and flickering light, and beneath its feeble illuminationhis steps staggered woefully. For two months he diverged little from thepath which the Secessionist leaders would have marked out for him, hadthey controlled his movements. At the time of the election his cabinetwas:--

 Lewis Cass of Michigan, secretary of state. Howell Cobb of Georgia, secretary of the treasury. John B. Floyd of Virginia, secretary of war. Isaac Toucey of Connecticut, secretary of the navy. Jacob Thompson of Mississippi, secretary of the interior. Aaron V. Brown of Tennessee, postmaster-general. Jeremiah S. Black of Pennsylvania, attorney-general. 

Of these men Cobb, Floyd, and Thompson were extreme Secessionists. Manyfelt that Cobb should have been made President of the SouthernConfederacy instead of Davis. In December Thompson went as commissionerfrom Mississippi to North Carolina to persuade that State to secede, anddid not resign his place in the cabinet because, as he said, Mr. Buchanan approved his mission. 

Betwixt his own predilections and the influence of these advisers Mr. Buchanan composed for the Thirty-sixth Congress a message which carriedconsternation among all Unionists. It was of little consequence that hedeclared the present situation to be the "natural effect" of the"long-continued and intemperate interference" of the Northern peoplewith slavery. But it was of the most serious consequence that, while hecondemned secession as unconstitutional, he also declared himselfpowerless to prevent it. His duty "to take care that the laws befaithfully executed" he knew no other way to perform except by aidingfederal officers in the performance of their duties. But where, as inSouth Carolina, the federal officers had all resigned, so that noneremained to be aided, what was he to do? This was practically to takethe position that half a dozen men, by resigning their offices, couldmake the preservation of the Union by its chief executiveimpossible![116] Besides this, Mr. Buchanan said that he had "noauthority to decide what should be the relations between the Federalgovernment and South Carolina. " He afterward said that he desired toavoid a collision of arms "between this and any other government. " Hedid not seem to reflect that he had no right to recognize a State of theUnion as being an "other government, " in the sense in which he used thephrase, and that, by his very abstention from the measures necessary formaintaining unchanged that relationship which had hitherto existed, hebecame a party to the establishment of a new relationship, and that, too, of a character which he himself alleged-to be unconstitutional. Intruth, his chief purpose was to rid himself of any responsibility and tolay it all upon Congress. Yet he was willing to advise Congress as toits powers and duties in the business which he shirked in favor of thatbody, saying that the power to coerce a seceding State had not beendelegated to it, and adding the warning that "the Union can never becemented by the blood of its citizens shed in civil war. " So the nationlearned that its ruler was of opinion that to resist the destruction ofits nationality was both unlawful and inexpedient. 

If the conclusions of the message aroused alarm and indignation, itslogic excited ridicule. Senator Hale gave a not unfair synopsis: ThePresident, he said, declares: 1. That South Carolina has just cause forseceding. 2. That she has no right to secede. 3. That we have no rightto prevent her from seceding; and that the power of the government is "apower to do nothing at all. " Another wit said that Buchanan was willingto give up a _part_ of the Constitution, and, if necessary, the _whole_, in order to preserve the _remainder_! But while this message of Mr. Buchanan has been bitterly denounced, and with entire justice, from thehour of its transmission to the present day, yet a palliatingconsideration ought to be noted: he had little reason to believe that, if he asserted the right and duty of forcible coercion, he would find athis back the indispensable force, moral and physical, of the people. Demoralization at the North was widespread. After the lapse of a fewmonths this condition passed, and then those who had been beneath itsinfluence desired to forget the humiliating fact, and hoped that othersmight either forget or never know the measure of their weakness. Inorder that they might save their good names, it was natural that theyshould seek to suppress all evidence which had not already found its wayupon the public record; but enough remains to show how grievously for awhile the knees were weakened under many who enjoy--and rightfully, byreason of the rest of their lives--the reputation of stalwart patriots. For example, late in October, General Scott suggested to the Presidenta division of the country into four separate confederacies, roughlyoutlining their boundaries. Scott was a dull man, but he was the head ofthe army and enjoyed a certain prestige, so that it was impossible tosay that his notions, however foolish in themselves, were of noconsequence. But if the blunders of General Scott could not fatallywound the Union cause, the blunders of Horace Greeley might conceivablydo so. If there had been in the Northern States any newspaper--apartfrom Mr. Garrison's "Liberator"--which was thoroughly committed to theanti-slavery cause, it was the New York "Tribune, " under the guidance ofthat distinguished editor. Republicans everywhere throughout the landhad been educated by his teachings, and had become accustomed to take alarge part of their knowledge and their opinions in matters politicalfrom his writings. It was a misfortune for Abraham Lincoln, which cannotbe overrated, that from the moment of his nomination to the day of hisdeath the "Tribune" was largely engaged in criticising his measures andin condemning his policy. 

No sooner did all that, which Mr. Greeley had been striving during manyyears to bring about, seem to be on the point of consummation, than thedemoralized and panic-stricken reformer became desirous to undo his ownachievements, and to use for the purpose of effecting a suddenretrogression all the influence which he had gained by bold leadership. November 9, 1860, it was appalling to read in the editorial columns ofhis sheet, that "if the Cotton States shall decide that they can dobetter out of the Union than in it, we insist on letting them go inpeace;" that, while the "Tribune" denied the right of nullification, yetit would admit that "to withdraw from the Union is quite anothermatter;" that "whenever a considerable section of our Union shalldeliberately resolve to go out, we shall resist all coercive measuresdesigned to keep it in. "[117] At the end of another month the"Tribune's" famous editor was still in the same frame of mind, declaringhimself "averse to the employment of military force to fasten onesection of our confederacy to the other, " and saying that, "if eightStates, having five millions of people, choose to separate from us, theycannot be permanently withheld from so doing by federal cannon. " OnDecember 17 he even said that the South had as good a right to secedefrom the Union as the colonies had to secede from Great Britain, andthat he "would not stand up for coercion, for subjugation, " because hedid not "think it would be just. " On February 23, 1861, he said that ifthe Cotton States, or the Gulf States, "choose to form an independentnation, they have a clear moral right to do so, " and if the "great bodyof the Southern people" become alienated from the Union and wish to"escape from it, we will do our best to forward their views. " A volumecould be filled with the like writing of his prolific pen at this time, and every sentence of such purport was the casting of a new stone tocreate an almost impassable obstruction in the path along which the newPresident must soon endeavor to move. Thurlow Weed, editor of the Albany"Evening Journal, " and the confidential adviser of Seward, wrote infavor of concessions; he declared that "a victorious party can afford tobe tolerant;" and he advocated a convention to revise the Constitution, on the ground that, "after more than seventy years of wear and tear, ofcollision and abrasion, it should be no cause of wonder that themachinery of government is found weakened, or out of repair, or evendefective. " Frequently he uttered the wish, vague and of fine sound, butenervating, that the Republicans might "meet secession as patriots andnot as partisans. " On November 9 the Democratic New York "Herald, "discussing the election of Lincoln, said: "For far less than this ourfathers seceded from Great Britain;" it also declared coercion to be"out of the question, " and laid down the principle that each Statepossesses "the right to break the tie of the confederacy, as a nationmight break a treaty, and to repel coercion as a nation might repelinvasion. "

Local elections in New York and Massachusetts "showed a striking andgeneral reduction of Republican strength. " In December the mayor ofPhiladelphia, though that city had polled a heavy Republican majority, told a mass meeting in Independence Square that denunciations of slaverywere inconsistent with national brotherhood, and "must be frowned downby a just and law-abiding people. " The Bell and Everett men, generally, desired peace at any price. The business men of the North, alarmed atthe prospect of disorder, became loudly solicitous for concession, compromise, even surrender. [118] In Democratic meetings a threateningtone was adopted. One proposal was to reconstruct the Union, leaving outthe New England States. So late even as January 21, 1861, before animmense and noteworthy gathering in New York, an orator ventured to say:"If a revolution of force is to begin, it shall be inaugurated at home;"and the words were cheered. The distinguished Chancellor Walworth saidthat it would be "as brutal to send men to butcher our own brothers ofthe Southern States as it would be to massacre them in the NorthernStates. " When DeWitt Clinton's son, George, spoke of secession as"rebellion, " the multitude hailed the word with cries of dissent. Evenat Faneuil Hall, in Boston, "a very large and respectable meeting" wasemphatically in favor of compromise. It was impossible to measureaccurately the extent and force of all this demoralization; but thesymptoms were that vast numbers were infected with such sentiments, andthat they would have been worse than useless as backers of a vigorouspolicy on the part of the government. 

With the North wavering and ready to retreat, and the South aggressiveand confident, it was exacting to expect Mr. Buchanan to stand up for afight. Why should he, with his old-time Democratic principles, now by afirm, defiant attitude precipitate a crisis, possibly a civil war, whenHorace Greeley and Wendell Phillips were conspicuously running away fromthe consequences of their own teachings, and were loudly crying "Peace!peace!" after they themselves had long been doing all in their power tobring the North up to the fighting point? When these leaders faced tothe rear, it was hard to say who could be counted upon to fill the frontrank. In truth, it was a situation which might have discouraged a morecombative patriot than Buchanan. Meanwhile, while the Northerners talkedchiefly of yielding, the hot and florid rhetoric of the Southernorators, often laden with contemptuous insult, smote with disturbingmenace upon the ears even of the most courageous Unionists. It was saidat the South and feared at the North that secession had a "Spartan bandin every Northern State, " and that blood would flow in Northern citiesat least as soon and as freely as on the Southern plantations, ifforcible coercion should be attempted. Was it possible to be sure thatthis was all rodomontade? To many good citizens there seemed some reasonto think that the best hope for avoiding the fulfillment at the North ofthese sanguinary threats might lie in the probability that theanti-slavery agitators would not stand up to encounter a genuinelymortal peril. 

When the Star of the West retired, a little ignominiously, from her taskof reinforcing Fort Sumter, Senator Wigfall jeered insolently. "Yourflag has been insulted, " he said; "redress it if you dare! You havesubmitted to it for two months, and you will submit forever. . . . We havedissolved the Union; mend it if you can; cement it with blood; try theexperiment!" Mr. Chestnut of South Carolina wished to "unfurl thePalmetto flag, fling it to the breeze . . . And ring the clarion notes ofdefiance in the ears of an insolent foe. " Such bombastic but confidentlanguage, of which a great quantity was uttered in this winter of1860-61, may exasperate or intimidate according to the present temper ofthe opponent whose ear it assaults; for a while the North was more incondition to be awestruck than to be angered. Her spokesmen failed toanswer back, and left her to listen not without anxiety to fiercepredictions that Southern flags would soon be floating over the dome ofthe Capitol and even over Faneuil Hall, if she should be so imprudent asto test Southern valor and Southern resources. 

Matters looked even worse for the Union cause in Congress than in thecountry. Occasionally some irritated Northern Republican shot out wordsof spirit; but the prevalent desire was for conciliation, compromise, and concession, while some actually adopted secession doctrines. Forexample, Daniel E. Sickles, in the House, threatened that the secessionof the Southern States should be followed by that of New York city; andin fact the scheme had been recommended by the Democratic mayor, Fernando Wood, in a message to the Common Council of the city on January6; and General Dix conceived it to be a possibility. In the Senate SimonCameron declared himself desirous to preserve the Union "by anysacrifice of feeling, and I may say of principle. " A sacrifice ofpolitical principle by Cameron was not, perhaps, a serious matter; buthe intended the phrase to be emphatic, and he was a leading Republicanpolitician, had been a candidate for the presidential nomination, andwas dictator in Pennsylvania. Even Seward, in the better days of themiddle of January, felt that he could "afford to meet prejudice withconciliation, exaction with concession which surrenders no principle, and violence with the right hand of peace;" and he was "willing, afterthe excitement of rebellion and secession should have passed away, tocall a convention for amending the Constitution. "

This message of Buchanan marked the lowest point to which thetemperature of his patriotism fell. Soon afterward, stimulated by heatapplied from outside, it began to rise. The first intimation whichimpressed upon his anxious mind that he was being too acquiescenttowards the South came from General Cass. That steadfast Democrat, ofthe old Jacksonian school, like many of his party at the North, wasfully as good a patriot and Union man as most of the Republicans wereapproving themselves to be during these winter months of vacillation, alarm, and compromise. In November he was strenuously in favor offorcibly coercing a seceding State, but later assented to the tenor ofMr. Buchanan's message. The frame of mind which induced this assent, however, was transitory; for immediately he began to insist upon thereinforcement of the garrisons of the Southern forts, and on December 13he resigned because the President refused to accede to his views. A fewdays earlier Howell Cobb had had the grace to resign from the Treasury, which he left entirely empty. In the reorganization Philip F. Thomas ofMaryland, a Secessionist also, succeeded Cobb; Judge Black was movedinto the State Department; and Edwin M. Stanton of Pennsylvania followedBlack as attorney-general. Mr. Floyd, than whom no Secessionist has lefta name in worse odor at the North, had at first advised against any"rash movement" in the way of secession, on the ground that Mr. Lincoln's administration would "fail, and be regarded as impotent forgood or evil, within four months after his inauguration. " None the lesshe had long been using his official position in the War Department tosend arms into the Southern States, and to make all possiblearrangements for putting them in an advantageous position forhostilities. Fortunately about this time the famous defalcation in theIndian Department, in which he was guiltily involved, destroyed hiscredit with the President, and at the same time he quarreled with hisassociates concerning Anderson's removal to Fort Sumter. On December 29he resigned, and the duties of his place were laid for a while uponJudge Holt, the postmaster-general. 

On Sunday morning, December 30, there was what has been properly calleda cabinet crisis. The South Carolina commissioners, just arrived inWashington, were demanding recognition, and to treat with the governmentas if they were representatives of a foreign power. The Presidentdeclined to receive them in a diplomatic character, but offered to actas go-between betwixt them and Congress. The President's advisers, however, were in a far less amiable frame of mind, for their blood hadbeen stirred wholesomely by the secession of South Carolina and thepresence of these emissaries with their insolent demands. Mr. Black, nowat the head of the State Department, had gone through much the samephases of feeling as General Cass. In November he had been "emphatic inhis advocacy of coercion, " but afterward had approved the President'smessage and even declared forcible coercion to be "_ipso facto_ anexpulsion" of the State from the Union; since then he had drifted backand made fast at his earlier moorings. On this important Sunday morningMr. Buchanan learned with dismay that either his reply to the SouthCarolinians must be substantially modified, or Mr. Black and Mr. Stantonwould retire from the cabinet. Under this pressure he yielded. Mr. Blackdrafted a new reply to the commissioners, Mr. Stanton copied it, Holtconcurred in it, and, in substance, Mr. Buchanan accepted it. Thisaffair constituted, as Messrs. Nicolay and Hay well say, "thePresident's virtual abdication, " and thereafterward began the "cabinetrégime. " Upon the commissioners this chill gust from the North struck sodisagreeably that, on January 2, they hastened home to their"independent nation. " From this time forth the South covered Mr. Buchanan with contumely and abuse; Mr. Benjamin called him "a senileexecutive, under the sinister influence of insane counsels;" and thepoor old man, really wishing to do right, but stripped of friends and ofhis familiar advisers, and confounded by the views of new counselors, presented a spectacle for pity. 

On January 8 Mr. Thompson, secretary of the interior, resigned, and thevacancy was left unfilled. A more important change took place on thefollowing day, when Mr. Thomas left the Treasury Department, and the NewYork bankers, whose aid was essential, forced the President, sorelyagainst his will, to give the place to General John A. Dix. This provedan excellent appointment. General Dix was an old Democrat, but of thehigh-spirited type; he could have tolerated secession by peaceableagreement, but rose in anger at menaces against the flag and the Union. He conducted his department with entire success, and also rendered tothe country perhaps the greatest service that was done by any man duringthat winter. On January 29 he sent the telegram which closed with thefamous words: "If any one attempts to haul down the American flag, shoothim on the spot. "[119] This rung out as the first cheering, stimulatingindication of a fighting temper at the North. It was a tonic which cameat a time of sore need, and for too long a while it remained thesolitary dose!

So much of the President's message as concerned the condition of thecountry was referred in the House to a Committee of Thirty-three, composed by appointing one member from each State. Other resolutions andmotions upon the same subject, to the number of twenty-five, were alsosent to this committee. It had many sessions from December 11 to January14, but never made an approach to evolving anything distantlyapproaching agreement. When, on January 14, the report came, it was anabsurd fiasco: it contained six propositions, of which each had theassent of a majority of a quorum; but seven minority reports, bearingtogether the signatures of fourteen members, were also submitted; andthe members of the seceding States refused to act. The only actual fruitwas a proposed amendment to the Constitution: "That no amendment shallbe made to the Constitution which will authorize or give to Congress thepower to abolish or interfere, within any State, with the domesticinstitutions thereof, including that of persons held to labor or serviceby the laws of said State. " In the expiring hours of the Thirty-sixthCongress this was passed by the House, and then by the Senate, and wassigned by the President. Lincoln, in his inaugural address, said of it:"Holding such a provision to be now constitutional law, I have noobjection to its being made express and irrevocable. " This view of itwas correct; it had no real significance, and the ill-written sentencenever disfigured the Constitution; it simply sank out of sight, forgotten by every one. 

Collaterally with the sitting of this House committee, a Committee ofThirteen was appointed in the Senate. To these gentlemen also "a stringof Union-saving devices" was presented, but on the last day of the yearthey reported that they had "not been able to agree upon any generalplan of adjustment. "

The earnest effort of the venerable Crittenden to Affect a compromisearoused a faint hope. But he offered little else than an extensionwestward of the Missouri Compromise line; and he never really had theslightest chance of effecting that consummation, which in fact _couldnot be_ effected. His plan was finally defeated on the last evening ofthe session. 

Collaterally with these congressional debates there were also proceedingin Washington the sessions of the Peace Congress, another futile effortto concoct a cure for an incurable condition. It met on February 4, 1861, but only twenty-one States out of thirty-four were represented. The seven States which had seceded said that they could not come, being"Foreign Nations. " Six other States[120] held aloof. Those NorthernStates which sent delegates selected "their most conservative andcompromising men, " and so great a tendency towards concession was shownthat Unionists soon condemned the scheme as merely a deceitful coverdevised by the Southerners behind which they could the more securelycarry on their processes of secession. These gentlemen talked a greatdeal and finally presented a report or plan to Congress five days beforethe end of the session; the House refused to receive it, the Senaterejected it by 7 ayes to 28 nays. The only usefulness of the gatheringwas as evidence of the unwillingness of the South to compromise. In factthe Southern leaders were entirely frank and outspoken in acknowledgingtheir position; they had said, from the beginning, that they did notwish the Committee of Thirty-three to accomplish anything; and they hadendeavored to dissuade Southerners from accepting positions upon it. Hawkins of Florida said that "the time of compromise had passedforever. " South Carolina refused to share in the Peace Congress, becauseshe did "not deem it advisable to initiate negotiations when she had nodesire or intention to promote the object in view. " Governor Peters ofMississippi, in poetic language, suggested another difficulty: "Whensparks cease to fly upwards, " he said, "Comanches respect treaties, andwolves kill sheep no more, the oath of a Black Republican might be ofsome value as a protection to slave property. " Jefferson Daviscontemptuously stigmatized all the schemes of compromise as "quacknostrums, " and he sneered justly enough at those who spun fine argumentsof legal texture, and consumed time "discussing abstract questions, reading patchwork from the opinions of men now mingled with the dust. "

It is not known by what logic gentlemen who held these views defendedtheir conduct in retaining their positions in the government of thenation for the purpose of destroying it. Senator Yulee of Floridashamelessly gave his motive for staying in the Senate: "It is thought wecan keep the hands of Mr. Buchanan tied and disable the Republicans fromeffecting any legislation which will strengthen the hands of theincoming administration. " Mr. Toombs of Georgia, speaking and voting athis desk in the Senate, declared himself "as good a rebel and as good atraitor as ever descended from Revolutionary loins, " and said that theUnion was already dissolved, --by which assertion he made his position inthe Senate absolutely indefensible. The South Carolina senators resignedbefore their State ordained itself a "foreign nation, " and incurredcensure for being so "precipitate. " In a word, the general desire was toremain in office, hampering and obstructing the government, until March4, 1861, and at a caucus of disunionists it was agreed to do so. But thepace became too rapid, and resignations followed pretty close upon theformal acts of secession. 

On the same day on which the Peace Congress opened its sessions inWashington, there came together at Montgomery, in Alabama, delegatesfrom six States for the purpose of forming a Southern Confederacy. Onthe third day thereafter a plan for a provisional government, substantially identical with the Constitution of the United States, wasadopted. On February 9 the oath of allegiance was taken, and JeffersonDavis and Alexander H. Stephens were elected respectively President andVice-President. On February 13 the military and naval committees weredirected to report plans for organizing an army and navy. Mr. Davispromptly journeyed to Montgomery, making on the way many speeches, inwhich he told his hearers that no plan for a reconstruction of the oldUnion would be entertained; and promised that those who should interferewith the new nation would have to "smell Southern powder and to feelSouthern steel. " On February 18 he was inaugurated, and in his addressagain referred to the "arbitrament of the sword. " Immediately afterwardhe announced his cabinet as follows:--

 Robert Toombs of Georgia, secretary of state. C. G. Memminger of South Carolina, secretary of the treasury. L. P. Walker of Alabama, secretary of war. S. R. Mallory of Florida, secretary of the navy. J. H. Reagan of Texas, postmaster-general. Judah P. Benjamin of Louisiana, attorney-general. 

On March 11 the permanent Constitution was adopted. [121] Thus themachine of the new government was set in working order. Mr. Greeleygives some interesting figures showing the comparative numericalstrength of the sections of the country at this time:[122]--

 The free population of the seven States which had seceded, was 2, 656, 948 The free population of the eight slave States[123] which had not seceded, was 5, 633, 005 Total 8, 289, 953 The slaves in the States of the first list were 2, 312, 046 The slaves in the States of the second list were 1, 638, 297 Total of slaves 3, 950, 343 The population of the whole Union by the census of 1860, was 31, 443, 321

[Illustration: Alexander H. Stephens]

The disproportion would have discouraged the fathers of the newnation, if they had anticipated that the North would be resolute inusing its overwhelming resources. But how could they believe that thiswould be the case when they read the New York "Tribune" and the reportsof Mr. Phillips's harangues?

 * * * * *

On February 13 the electoral vote was to be counted in Congress. Rumorswere abroad that the Secessionists intended to interfere with this bytumults and violence; but the evidence is insufficient to prove that anysuch scheme was definitely matured; it was talked of, but ultimately itseems to have been laid aside with a view to action at a later date. Naturally enough, however, the country was disquieted. In the emergencythe action of General Scott was watched with deep anxiety. A Southernerby birth and by social sympathies, he had been expected by theSecessionists to join their movement. But the old soldier--though brokenby age and infirmities, and though he had proposed the folly ofvoluntarily quartering the country, like the corpse of a traitor--hadhis patriotism and his temper at once aroused when violence wasthreatened. On and after October 29 he had repeatedly advisedreinforcement of the Southern garrisons; though it must be admitted, inBuchanan's behalf, that the general made no suggestion as to how orwhere the troops could be obtained for this purpose. In the same spirithe now said, with stern resolution, that there should be ample militarypreparations to insure both the count and the inauguration; and he toldsome of the Southerners that he would blow traitors to pieces at thecannon's mouth without hesitation. Disturbed at his vehemence, theydenounced him bitterly, and sent him frequent notices of assassination. Floyd distributed orders concerning troops and munitions directly fromthe War Department, and carefully concealed them from the general whowas the head of the army. But secrecy and intimidation were in vain. Theaged warrior was fiercely in earnest; if there was going to be anyoutbreak in Washington he was going to put it down with bullets andbayonets, and he gathered his soldiers and instructed his officersaccordingly. But happily the preparation of these things was sufficientto render the use of them unnecessary. When the day came Vice-PresidentBreckenridge performed his duty, however unwelcome, without flinching. He presided over the joint session and conducted the count with the airof a man determined to enforce law and order, and at the close declaredthe election of Abraham Lincoln and Hannibal Hamlin. 

Still only the smaller crisis had been passed. Much more alarmingstories now flew from mouth to mouth, --of plots to seize the capital andto prevent the inauguration, even to assassinate Lincoln on his journeyto Washington. How much foundation there was for these is not accuratelyknown. That the idea of capturing Washington had fascinated theSouthern fancy is certain. "I see no reason, " said Senator Iverson, "whyWashington city should not be continued the capital of the SouthernConfederacy. " The Richmond "Examiner" railed grossly: "That filthy cageof unclean birds must and will assuredly be purified by fire. . . . Ourpeople can take it, --they will take it. . . . Scott, the arch-traitor, andLincoln, the beast, combined, cannot prevent it. The 'Illinois Ape' mustretrace his journey more rapidly than he came. " The abundant talk ofthis sort created uneasiness; and Judge Holt said that there was causefor alarm. But a committee of Congress reported that, though it wasdifficult to speak positively, yet they found no evidence sufficient toprove "the existence of a secret organization. " Alexander H. Stephenshas denied that there was any intention to attack the city, and probablythe notion of seizure did not pass beyond the stage of talk. 

But the alleged plot to assassinate Mr. Lincoln was more definite. Hehad been spending the winter quietly in Springfield, where he had beenoverrun by visitors, who wished to look at him, to advise him, and tosecure promises of office; fortunately the tedious procession had lostpart of its offensiveness by touching his sense of humor. Anxious peoplemade well-meaning but useless efforts to induce him to say something foreffect upon the popular mind; but he resolutely and wisely maintainedsilence. His position and opinions, he said, had already been declaredin his speeches with all the clearness he could give to them, and thepeople had appeared to understand and approve them. He could not improveand did not desire to change these utterances. Occasionally he privatelyexpressed his dislike to the conceding and compromising temper whichthreatened to undo, for an indefinite future, all which the long andweary struggle of anti-slavery men had accomplished. In this line hewrote a letter of protest to Greeley, which inspired that gentleman to asingular expression of sympathy; let the Union go to pieces, exclaimedthe emotional editor, let presidents be assassinated, let the Republicanparty suffer crushing defeat, but let there not be "another nastycompromise. " To Mr. Kellogg, the Illinoisian on the House Committee ofThirty-three, Lincoln wrote: "Entertain no proposition for a compromisein regard to the extension of slavery. The instant you do, they have usunder again; all our labor is lost, and sooner or later must be doneover again. " He repeated almost the same words to E. B. Washburne, amember of the House. Duff Green tried hard to get something out of himfor the comfort of Mr. Buchanan, but failed to extort more thancommonplace generalities. To Seward he wrote that he did not wish tointerfere with the present status, or to meddle with slavery as it nowlawfully existed. To like purport he wrote to Alexander H. Stephens, induced thereto by the famous Union speech of that gentleman. Heeschewed hostile feeling, saying: "I never have been, am not now, andprobably never shall be, in a mood of harassing the people, either Northor South. " Nevertheless, while he said that all were "brothers of acommon country, " he was perfectly resolved that the country shouldremain "common, " even if the bond of brotherhood had to be riveted byforce. He admitted that this necessity would be "an ugly point;" but hewas perfectly clear that "the right of a State to secede is not an openor debatable question. " He desired that General Scott should be preparedeither to "hold or retake" the Southern forts, if need should be, at orafter the inauguration; but on his journey to Washington he said to manyaudiences that he wished no war and no bloodshed, and that these evilscould be avoided if people would only "keep cool" and "keep theirtemper, on both sides of the line. "

On Monday, February 11, 1861, Mr. Lincoln spoke to his fellow citizensof Springfield a very brief farewell, so solemn as to sound ominous inthe ears of those who know what afterward occurred. It was arranged thathe should stop at various points upon the somewhat circuitous routewhich had been laid out, and that he should arrive in Washington onSaturday, February 23. The programme, was pursued accurately till nearthe close; he made, of course, many speeches, but none added anything towhat was already known as to his views. 

Meantime the thick rumors of violence were bringing much uneasiness topersons who were under responsibilities. Baltimore was the place where, and its villainous "Plug Uglies" were the persons by whom, the plot, ifthere was one, was to be executed. Mr. Felton, president of thePhiladelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad Company, engaged AllanPinkerton to explore the matter, and the report of this skillfuldetective indicated a probability of an attack with the purpose ofassassination. At that time the cars were drawn by horses across townfrom the northern to the southern station, and during the passage anassault could be made with ease and with great chance of success. As yetthere was no indication that the authorities intended to make, even ifthey could make, [124] any adequate arrangements for the protection ofthe traveler. At Philadelphia Mr. Lincoln was told of the fears of hisfriends, and talked with Mr. Pinkerton, but he refused to change hisplan. On February 22 he was to assist at a flag-raising in Philadelphia, and was then to go on to Harrisburg, and on the following day he was togo from there to Baltimore. He declined to alter either route or hours. 

But other persons besides Mr. Felton had been busy with independentdetective investigations, the result of which was in full accord withthe report of Mr. Pinkerton. On February 22 Mr. Frederick W. Seward, sent by his father and General Scott, both then at Washington, deliveredto Mr. Lincoln, at Philadelphia, the message that there was "seriousdanger" to his life if the time of his passage through Baltimore shouldbe known. Yet Lincoln still remained obdurate. He declared that if anescorting delegation from Baltimore should meet him at Harrisburg, hewould go on with it. But at Harrisburg no such escort presented itself. Then the few who knew the situation discussed further as to what shouldbe done, Norman B. Judd being chief spokesman for evading the danger bya change of programme. Naturally the objection of seeming timid and ofexciting ridicule was present in the minds of all, and it was putsomewhat emphatically by Colonel Sumner. Mr. Lincoln at last settled thedispute; he said: "I have thought over this matter considerably since Iwent over the ground with Pinkerton last night. The appearance of Mr. Frederick Seward, with warning from another source, confirms Mr. Pinkerton's belief. Unless there are some other reasons besides fear ofridicule, I am disposed to carry out Judd's plan. "

This plan was accordingly carried out with the success which itssimplicity insured. Mr. Lincoln and his stalwart friend, Colonel Lamon, slipped out of a side door to a hackney carriage, were driven to therailway station, and returned by the train to Philadelphia. Theirdeparture was not noticed, but had it been, news of it could not havebeen sent away, for Mr. Felton had had the telegraph wires secretly cutoutside the town. He also ordered, upon a plausible pretext, that thesouthward-bound night train on his road should be held back until thearrival of this train from Harrisburg. Mr. Lincoln and Colonel Lamonpassed from the one train to the other without recognition, and rolledinto Washington early on the following morning. Mr. Seward and Mr. Washburne met Lincoln at the station and went with him to Willard'sHotel. Soon afterward the country was astonished, and perhaps somepersons were discomfited, as the telegraph carried abroad the news ofhis arrival. 

Those who were disappointed at this safe conclusion of his journey, ifin fact there were any such, together with many who would have contemnedassassination, at once showered upon him sneers and ridicule. They saidthat Lincoln had put on a disguise and had shown the white feather, whenthere had been no real danger. But this was not just. Whether or notthere was the completed machinery of a definite, organized plot forassault and assassination is uncertain; that is to say, this is not_proved_; yet the evidence is so strong that the majority ofinvestigators seem to agree in the opinion that _probably_ there was aplan thoroughly concerted and ready for execution. Even if there wasnot, it was very likely that a riot might be suddenly started, whichwould be as fatal in its consequences as a premeditated scheme. But, after all, the question of the plot is one of mere curiosity and quiteaside from the true issue. That issue, so far as it presented itself fordetermination by Mr. Lincoln, was simply whether a case of suchprobability of danger was made out that as a prudent man he shouldoverrule the only real objection, --that of exciting ridicule, --and avoida peril which the best judges believed to exist, and which, if it didexist, involved consequences of immeasurable seriousness not only tohimself but to the nation. For a wise man only one conclusion waspossible. The story of the disguise was a silly slander, based upon thetrifling fact that for this night journey Lincoln wore a traveling capinstead of his hat. 

Lincoln's own opinion as to the danger is not quite clear. [125] He saidto Mr. Lossing that, after hearing Mr. Seward, he believed "such a plotto be in existence. " But he also said: "I did not then, nor do I now, believe I should have been assassinated, had I gone through Baltimore asfirst contemplated; but I thought it wise to run no risk, where no riskwas necessary. "

The reflection can hardly fail to occur, how grossly unfair it was thatMr. Lincoln should be put into the position in which he was put at thistime, and then that fault should be found with him even if his prudencewas overstrained. Many millions of people in the country hated him witha hatred unutterable; among them might well be many fanatics, to whomassassination would seem a noble act, many desperadoes who would regardit as a pleasing excitement; and he was to go through a city which menof this stamp could at any time dominate. The custom of the countrycompelled this man, whom it had long since selected as its ruler, tomake a journey of extreme danger without any species of protectionwhatsoever. So far as peril went, no other individual in the UnitedStates had ever, presumably, been in a peril like that which beset him;so far as safeguards went, he had no more than any other traveler. A fewfriends volunteered to make the journey with him, but they were uselessas guardians; and he and they were so hustled and jammed in the railwaystations that one of them actually had his arm broken. Thisextraordinary spectacle may have indicated folly on the part of thenation which permitted it, but certainly it did not involve the disgraceof the individual who had no choice about it. The people put Mr. Lincolnin a position in which he was subjected to the most appalling, as it isthe most vague, of all dangers, and then left him to take care ofhimself as best he could. It was ungenerous afterward to criticise himfor exercising prudence in the performance of that duty which he oughtnever to have been called upon to perform at all. [126]

Immediately after his arrival in Washington Mr. Lincoln received avisit from the members of the Peace Congress. Grotesque and ridiculousdescriptions of him, as if he had been a Caliban in education, manners, and aspect, had been rife among Southerners, and the story goes that theSouthern delegates expected to be at once amused and shocked by thesight of a clodhopper whose conversation would be redolent of thebarnyard, not to say of the pigsty. Those of them who had any skill inreading character were surprised, --as the tradition is, --discomfited, even a little alarmed, at what in fact they beheld; for Mr. Lincolnappeared before them a self-possessed man, expressing to them such clearconvictions and such a distinct and firm purpose as compelled them intonew notions of his capacity and told them of much trouble ahead. Hisremark to Mr. Rives, coming from one who spoke accurately, had anominous sound in rebellious ears: "My course is as plain as a turnpikeroad. It is marked out by the Constitution. I am in no doubt which wayto go. " The wiser Southerners withdrew from this reception quite soberand thoughtful, with some new ideas about the man with whom theirrelationship seemed on the verge of becoming hostile. After abundantallowance is made for the enthusiasm of Northern admirers, it remainscertain that Lincoln bore well this severe ordeal of criticism on thepart of those who would have been glad to despise him. Ungainly they sawhim, but not undignified, and the strange impressive sadness seldomdwelt so strikingly upon his face as at this time, as though all theweight of misery, which the millions of his fellow citizens were toendure throughout the coming years, already burdened the soul of theruler who had been chosen to play the most responsible part in thecrisis and the anguish. 

March 4, 1861, inauguration day, was fine and sunny. If there had everbeen any real danger of trouble, the fear of it had almost entirelysubsided. Northerners and Southerners had found out in good season thatGeneral Scott was not in a temporizing mood; he had in the city twobatteries, a few companies of regulars, --653 men, exclusive of somemarines, --and the corps of picked Washington Volunteers. He said thatthis force was all he wanted. President Buchanan left the White Housein an open carriage, escorted by a company of sappers and miners underCaptain Duane. At Willard's Hotel Mr. Lincoln entered the carriage, andthe two gentlemen passed along the avenue, through crowds which cheeredbut made no disturbance, to the Capitol. General Scott with his regularsmarched, "flanking the movement, in parallel streets. " His twobatteries, while not made unpleasantly conspicuous, yet controlled theplateau which extends before the east front of the Capitol. Mr. Lincolnwas simply introduced by Senator Baker of Oregon, and delivered hisinaugural address. His voice had great carrying capacity, and the vastcrowd heard with ease a speech of which every sentence was fraught withan importance and scrutinized with an anxiety far beyond that of anyother speech ever delivered in the United States. At its close thevenerable Chief Justice Taney administered the oath of office, therebyinformally but effectually reversing the most famous opinion deliveredby him during his long incumbency in his high office. 

The inaugural address was simple, earnest, and direct, unincumbered bythat rhetorical ornamentation which the American people have alwaysadmired as the highest form of eloquence. Those Northerners who hadexpected magniloquent periods and exaggerated outbursts of patriotismwere disappointed; and as they listened in vain for the scream of theeagle, many grumbled at the absence of what they conceived to be_force_. Yet the general feeling was of satisfaction, which grew as theaddress was more thoroughly studied. The Southerners, upon their part, looking anxiously to see whether or not they must fight for theirpurpose, construed the words of the new President correctly. They heardhim say: "The union of these States is perpetual. " "No State upon itsown mere motion can lawfully get out of the Union. " "I shall take care, as the Constitution itself expressly enjoins upon me, that the laws ofthe Union be faithfully executed in all the States. " He also declaredhis purpose "to hold, occupy, and possess the property and placesbelonging to the government, and to collect the duties and imposts. "These sentences made up the issue directly with secession, and theSouth, reading them, knew that, if the North was ready to back thePresident, war was inevitable; none the less so because Mr. Lincolnclosed with patriotic and generous words: "We are not enemies, butfriends. We must not be enemies. Though passion may have strained, itmust not break our bonds of affection. "

Until after the election of Mr. Lincoln in November, 1860, the soleissue between the North and the South, between Republicans on the onehand and Democrats and Compromisers on the other, had related toslavery. Logically, the position of the Republicans was impregnable. Their platforms and their leaders agreed that the party intendedstrictly to respect the Constitution, and not to interfere at all withslavery in the States within which it now lawfully existed. They saidwith truth that they had in no case deprived the slaveholdingcommunities of their rights, and they denied the truth of the chargethat they cherished an inchoate design to interfere with those rights;adding very truly that, at worst, a mere design, which did not findexpression in an overt act, could give no right of action to the South. Mr. Lincoln had been most explicit in declaring that the opposition toslavery was not to go beyond efforts to prevent its _extension_, whichefforts would be wholly within the Constitution and the law. He repeatedthese things in his inaugural. 

But while these incontrovertible allegations gave the Republicans alogical advantage of which they properly made the most, the Southclaimed a right to make other collateral and equally undeniable factsthe ground of action. The only public matter in connection with whichMr. Lincoln had won any reputation was that of slavery. No one coulddeny that he had been elected because the Republican party had beenpleased with his expression of opinion on this subject. Now his mostpointed and frequently reiterated expression of that opinion was thatslavery was a "moral, social, and political evil;" and this language wasa fair equivalent of the statement of the Republican platform of 1856, classing Slavery and Mormonism together, as "twin relics of barbarism. "That the North was willing, or would long be willing, to remain inamicable social and political bonds with a moral, social, and politicalevil, and a relic of barbarism, was intrinsically improbable, and wasmade more improbable by the symptoms of the times. [127] Indeed, Mr. Seward had said, in famous words, that his section would not play thisunworthy part; he had proclaimed already the existence of an"irrepressible conflict;" and therefore the South had the word of theRepublican leader that, in spite of the Republican respect for the law, an anti-slavery crusade was already in existence. The Southern chiefsdistinctly recognized and accepted this situation. [128] There was anavowed Northern condemnation of their institution; there was anacknowledged "conflict. " Such being the case, it was the opinion of thechief men at the South that the position taken by the North, of strictperformance of clear constitutional duties concerning an odiousinstitution, would not suffice for the safe perpetuation of thatinstitution. [129] This, their judgment, appeared to be in a certain wayalso the judgment of Mr. Lincoln; for he also conceived that to putslavery where the "fathers" had left it was to put it "in the way ofultimate extinction;" and he had, in the most famous utterance of hislife, given his forecast of the future to the effect that the countrywould in time be "all free. " The only logical deduction was that he, andthe Republican party which had agreed with him sufficiently to make himpresident, believed that the South had no lawful recourse by which thisresult, however unwelcome or ruinous, could in the long run and thefullness of time be escaped. Under such circumstances Southern politicalleaders now decided that the time for separation had come. In speakingof their scheme they called it "secession, " and said that secession wasa lawful act because the Constitution was a compact revocable by any ofthe parties. They might have called it "revolution, "[130] and havedefended it upon the general right of any large body of people, dissatisfied with the government under which they find themselves, tocast it off. But, if the step was _revolution_, then the burden of proofwas upon them; whereas they said that _secession_ was their lawfulright, without any regard whatsoever to the motive which induced them toexercise it. [131] Such was the character of the issue between the Northand the South prior to the first ordinance of secession. The action ofSouth Carolina, followed by the other Gulf States, at once changed thatissue, shifting it from pro-slavery versus anti-slavery to union versusdisunion. This alteration quickly compelled great numbers of men, bothat the North and at the South, to reconsider and, upon a new issue, toplace themselves also anew. 

It has been said by all writers that in the seven seceding States therewas, in the four months following the election, a very large proportionof "Union men. " The name only signified that these men did not thinkthat the present inducements to disunion were sufficient to render it awise measure. It did not signify that they thought disunion unlawful, unconstitutional, and treasonable. When, however, state conventionsdecided the question of advisability against their opinions, and theyhad to choose between allegiance to the State and allegiance to theUnion, they immediately adhered to the State, and this none the lessbecause they feared that she had taken an ill-advised step. That is tosay, at the South a "Union man" _wished_ to preserve the Union, whereasat the North a "Union man" recognized a supreme _obligation_ to do so. 

While the South, by political alchemy, was becoming solidified andhomogeneous, a corresponding change was going on at the North. In thatsection the great numbers--of whom some would have re-made theConstitution, others would have agreed to peaceable separation, andstill others would have made any concession to retain the integrity ofthe Union--now saw that these were indeed, as Jefferson Davis had said, "quack nostrums, " and that the choice lay between permitting a secessionaccompanied with insulting menaces and some degree of actual violence, and maintaining the Union by coercion. In this dilemma great multitudesof Northern Democrats, whose consciences had never been in the leastdisturbed by the existence of slavery in the country or even by effortsto extend it, became "Union men" in the Northern sense of the word, which made it about equivalent to coercionists. Their simple creed wasthe integrity and perpetuity of the nation. 

Mr. Lincoln showed in his inaugural his accurate appreciation of the newsituation. Owing all that he had become in the world to a fewanti-slavery speeches, elevated to the presidency by votes which reallymeant little else than hostility to slavery, what was more natural thanthat he should at this moment revert to this great topic and make theold dispute the main part and real substance of his address? But thisfatal error he avoided. With unerring judgment he dwelt little on thatmomentous issue which had only just been displaced, and took his standfairly upon that still more momentous one which had so newly come up. Hespoke for the Union; upon that basis a united North _ought_ to supporthim; upon that basis the more northern of the slave States might remainloyal. As matter of fact, Union had suddenly become the real issue, butit needed at the hands of the President to be publicly and explicitlyannounced as such; this recognition was essential; he gave it on thisearliest opportunity, and the announcement was the first great serviceof the new Republican ruler. It seems now as though he could hardly havedone otherwise, or have fallen into the error of allying himself withbygone or false issues. It may be admitted that he could not have passedthis new one by; but the important matter was that of proportion andrelation, and in this it was easy to blunder. In truth it was a crisiswhen blundering was so easy that nearly all the really able men of theNorth had been doing it badly for three or four months past, and not afew of them were going to continue it for two or three months to come. Therefore the sound conception of the inaugural deserves to beconsidered as an indication, one among many, of Lincoln's capacity forseeing with entire distinctness the great main fact, and for recognizingit as such. Other matters, which lay over and around such a fact, sideissues, questions of detail, affairs of disguise or deception, neverconfused or misled him. He knew with unerring accuracy where the biggestfact lay, and he always anchored fast to it and stayed with it. For manyyears he had been anchored to anti-slavery; now, in the face of thenation, he shifted his anchorage to the Union; and each time he heldsecurely. 

FOOTNOTES:

[114] Breckenridge was the legitimate representative of theadministrationists, and his ticket received only 847, 953 votes out of4, 680, 193. Douglas and Buchanan were at open war. 

[115] See remarks of Mr. Elaine upon use of this word. _Twenty Years ofCongress_, i. 219. 

[116] But it should be said that Attorney-General Black supported theseviews in a very elaborate opinion, which he had furnished to thePresident, and which was transmitted to Congress at the same time withthe message. 

[117] Greeley afterwards truly said that his journal had plenty ofcompany in these sentiments, even among the Republican sheets. _Amer. Conflict_, i. 359. Reference is made in the text to the utterances ofthe _Tribune_ more because it was so prominent and influential thanbecause it was very peculiar in its position. 

[118] Wilson, _Rise and Fall of Slave Power_, iii. 63-69; N. And H. In. 255. See account of "the Pine Street meeting, " New York, in Dix's_Memoirs of Dix_, i. 347. 

[119] For an account of this by General Dix himself, see _Memoirs ofJohn A. Dix_, by Morgan Dix, i. 370-373. 

[120] Arkansas, California, Michigan, Minnesota, Oregon, and Wisconsin

[121] It differed from that of the United States very little, save incontaining a distinct recognition of slavery, and in being made by theStates instead of by the people. 

[122] _American Conflict_, i. 351. 

[123] This includes Delaware, 110, 420, and Maryland, 599, 846. 

[124] Marshal Kane and most of the police were reported to beSecessionists. Pinkerton, _Spy of the Rebellion_, 50, 61. 

[125] Lamon says that Mr. Lincoln afterwards regretted this journey, andbecame convinced "that he had committed a grave mistake. " Lamon, 527. Soalso McClure, 45, 48. 

[126] For accounts of this journey and statements of the evidence of aplot, see Schouler, _Hist. Of Mass. In Civil War_, i. 59-65 (account bySamuel M. Felton, Prest. P. W. & B. R. R. Co. ); N. And H. Iii. Ch. 19 and20; Chittenden, _Recoll. Of Lincoln_, x. ; Holland, 275; Arnold, 183-187;Lamon, ch. Xx. (this account ought to be, and doubtless is, the mosttrustworthy); Herndon, 492 (a bit of gossip which sounds improbable);Pinkerton, _Spy of the Rebellion_, 45-103. On the anti-plot side of thequestion the most important evidence is the little volume, _Baltimoreand the Nineteenth of April_, 1861, by George William Brown. Thiswitness, whose strict veracity is beyond question, was mayor of thecity. One of his statements, especially, is of the greatest importance. It is obvious that, if the plot existed, one of two things ought tooccur on the morning of February 23, viz. : either the plotters and themobsmen should know that Mr. Lincoln had escaped them, or else theyshould be at the station at the hour set for his arrival. In fact theywere not at the station; there was no sudden assault on the cars, norother indication of assassins and a mob. Had they, then, receivedknowledge of what had occurred? Those who sustain the plot-theory saythat the news had spread through the city, so that all the assassins andthe gangs of the "Plug Uglies" knew that their game was up. This was_possible_, for Mr. Lincoln had arrived in the Washington station a fewminutes after six o'clock in the morning, and the train which wasexpected to bring him to Baltimore did not arrive in Baltimore untilhalf after eleven o'clock. But, on the other hand, the news was notdispatched from Washington immediately upon his arrival; somewhat later, though still early in the morning, the detectives telegraphed to thefriends of Mr. Lincoln, but in cipher. Just at what time intelligibletelegrams, which would inform the public, were sent out cannot belearned; but upon any arrangement of hours it is obvious that the timewas exceedingly short for distributing the news throughout the lowerquarters of Baltimore by word of mouth, and there is no pretense of anypublication. But while the believers in the plot say, nevertheless, thatthis had been done and that the story of the journey had spread throughthe city so that all the assassins and "Plug Uglies" knew it in time toavoid assembling at the railway station about eleven o'clock, yet itappears that Mr. Brown, the mayor, knew nothing about it. On thecontrary, he tells us that in anticipation of Mr. Lincoln's arrival he, "as mayor of the city, accompanied by the police commissioners andsupported by a strong force of police, was at the Calvert Street stationon Saturday morning, February 23, at 11. 30 o'clock . . . Ready to receivewith due respect the incoming President. An open carriage was inwaiting, in which I was to have the honor of escorting Mr. Lincolnthrough the city to the Washington station, and of sharing in any dangerwhich he might encounter. It is hardly necessary to say that Iapprehended none. " To the "great astonishment" of Mr. Brown, however, the train brought only "Mrs. Lincoln and her three sons, " and "it wasthen announced that he had passed through the city _incognito_ in thenight train. " This is a small bit of evidence to set against theelaborate stories of the believers in the plot, yet to some it will seemlike the little obstruction which suffices to throw a whole railwaytrain from the track. I would rather let any reader, who is sufficientlyinterested to examine the matter, reach his own conclusion, thanendeavor to furnish one for him; for I think that a dispute moredifficult of really conclusive settlement will not easily be found. 

[127] Some of the Southern members of Congress collected and recitedsundry noteworthy utterances of Republicans concerning slavery, andcertainly there was little in them to induce a sense of security on thepart of slaveholders. Wilson, _Rise and Fall of Slave Power_, iii. 97, 154. 

[128] Toombs declared, as Lincoln had said, that what was wanted wasthat the North should _call slavery right_. Wilson, _Rise and Fall ofSlave Power_, iii. 76. Stephens declared the "corner-stone" of the newgovernment to be "the great truth that the negro is not equal to thewhite man; that slavery . . . Is his natural and normal condition;" andsaid that it was the first government "in the history of the world basedupon this great physical, philosophical, and moral truth. " N. And H. Iii. 203; and see his letter to Lincoln, _ibid. _ 272, 273. Mississippi, in declaring the causes of her secession, said: "Our position isthoroughly identical with the institution of slavery, --the greatestmaterial interest in the world. " N. And H. Iii. 201. Senator Mason ofVirginia said: "It is a war of sentiment, of opinion; a war of one formof society against another form of society. " Wilson, _Rise and Fall ofSlave Power_, iii. 26. Green of Missouri ascribed the trouble to the"vitiated and corrupted state of public sentiment. " _Ibid. _ 23. Iversonof Georgia said it was the "public sentiment" at the North, not the"overt acts" of the Republican administration, that was feared; and saidthat there was ineradicable enmity between the two sections, which hadnot lived together in peace, were not so living now, and could not beexpected to do so in the future. _Ibid. _ 17. 

[129] Historians generally seem to admit that the South had to choosebetween making the fight now, and seeing its favorite institutiongradually become extinct. 

[130] Sometimes, though very rarely, the word was used. 

[131] See Lincoln's message to Congress, July 4, 1861. 

CHAPTER VIII

THE BEGINNING OF WAR

From the inaugural ceremonies Lincoln drove quietly back throughPennsylvania Avenue and entered the White House, the President of theUnited States, --alas, united no longer. Many an anxious citizen breathedmore freely when the dreaded hours had passed without disturbance. Butburdens a thousand fold heavier than any which were lifted from othersdescended upon the new ruler. Save, however, that the thoughtful, far-away expression of sadness had of late seemed deeper and moreimpressive than ever before, Lincoln gave no sign of inward trouble. Hissingular temperament armed him with a rare and peculiar strength beneathresponsibility and in the face of duty. He has been seen, with entiretranquillity, not only seeking, but seeming to assume as his natural dueor destiny, positions which appeared preposterously out of accord alikewith his early career and with his later opportunities for development. In trying to explain this, it is easier to say what was _not_ theunderlying quality than what it was. Certainly there was no taintwhatsoever of that vulgar self-confidence which is so apt to lead the"free and equal" citizens of the great republic into grotesquepositions. Perhaps it was a grand simplicity of faith; a profoundinstinctive confidence that by patient, honest thinking it would bepossible to know the right road, and by earnest enduring courage tofollow it. Perhaps it was that so-called divine inspiration which seemsalways a part of the highest human fitness. The fact which is distinctlyvisible is, that a fair, plain and honest method of thinking saved himfrom the perplexities which beset subtle dialecticians in politics andin constitutional law. He had lately said that his course was "as plainas a turnpike road;" it was, to execute the public laws. 

His duty was simple; his understanding of it was unclouded by doubt orsophistry; his resolution to do it was firm; but whether his hands wouldbe strengthened sufficiently to enable him to do it was a question ofgrave anxiety. The president of a republic can do everything if thepeople are at his back, and almost nothing if the people are not at hisback. Where, then, were now the people of the United States? In sevenStates they were openly and unitedly against him; in at least seven morethey were under a very strong temptation to range themselves against himin case of a conflict; and as for the Republican States of the North, onthat fourth day of March, 1861, no man could say to what point theywould sustain the administration. There had as yet come slightindications of any change in the conceding, compromising temper of thatsection. Greeley and Seward and Wendell Phillips, representative men, were little better than Secessionists. The statement sounds ridiculous, yet the proof against each comes from his own mouth. The "Tribune" hadretracted none of those disunion sentiments, of which examples have beengiven. Even so late as April 10, 1861, Mr. Seward wrote officially toMr. C. F. Adams, minister to England: "Only an imperial and despoticgovernment could subjugate thoroughly disaffected and insurrectionarymembers of the state. This federal, republican country of ours is, ofall forms of government, the very one which is the most unfitted forsuch a labor. " He had been and still was favoring delay andconciliation, in the visionary hope that the seceders would follow thescriptural precedent of the prodigal son. On April 9 the rumor of afight at Sumter being spread abroad, Mr. Phillips said:[132] "Here are aseries of States, girding the Gulf, who think that their peculiarinstitutions require that they should have a separate government. Theyhave a right to decide that question without appealing to you or me. . . . Standing with the principles of '76 behind us, who can deny them theright?. . . Abraham Lincoln has no right to a soldier in Fort Sumter. . . . There is no longer a Union. . . . Mr. Jefferson Davis is angry, and Mr. Abraham Lincoln is mad, and they agree to fight. . . . You cannot gothrough Massachusetts and recruit men to bombard Charleston or NewOrleans. . . . We are in no condition to fight. . . . Nothing but madness canprovoke war with the Gulf States;"--with much more to the same effect. 

If the veterans of the old anti-slavery contest were in this frame ofmind in April, Lincoln could hardly place much dependence upon thepeople at large in March. If he could not "recruit men" inMassachusetts, in what State could he reasonably expect to do so?Against such discouragement it can only be said that he had a singularinstinct for the underlying popular feeling, that he could scent it inthe distance and in hiding; moreover, that he was always willing to runthe chance of any consequences which might follow the performance of aclear duty. Still, as he looked over the dreary Northern field in thosechill days of early March, he must have had a marvelous sensitiveness inorder to perceive the generative heat and force in the depths beneaththe cheerless surface and awaiting only the fullness of the near springseason to burst forth in sudden universal vigor. Yet such was hisknowledge and such his faith concerning the people that we may fancy, ifwe will, that he foresaw the great transformation. But there were stillother matters which disturbed him. Before his inauguration, he had heardmuch of his coming official isolation. One of the arguments reiteratedalike by Southern Unionists and by Northerners had been that theRepublican President would be powerless, because the Senate, the House, and the Supreme Court were all opposed to him. But the supposed lack ofpolitical sympathy on the part of these bodies, however it might begetanxiety for the future, was for the present of much less moment thananother fact, viz. , that none of the distinguished men, leaders in hisown party, whom Lincoln found about him at Washington, were in a frameof mind to assist him efficiently. If all did not actually distrust hiscapacity and character, --which, doubtless, many honestly did, --at leastthey were profoundly ignorant concerning both. Therefore they could notyet, and did not, place genuine, implicit confidence in him; they couldnot yet, and did not, advise and aid him at all in the same spirit andwith the same usefulness as later they were able to do. They were not toblame for this; on the contrary, the condition had been brought aboutdistinctly against their will, since certainly few of them had lookedwith favor upon the selection of an unknown, inexperienced, ill-educatedman as the Republican candidate for the presidency. How much Lincolnfelt his loneliness will never be known; for, reticent andself-contained at all times, he gave no outward sign. That he felt itless than other men would have done may be regarded as certain; for, ashas already appeared to some extent, and as will appear much more inthis narrative, he was singularly self-reliant, and, at least inappearance, was strangely indifferent to any counsel or support whichcould be brought to him by others. Yet, marked as was this trait in him, he could hardly have been human had he not felt oppressed by thepersonal solitude and political isolation of his position when theresponsibility of his great office rested newly upon him. Under allthese circumstances, if this lonely man moved slowly and cautiouslyduring the early weeks of his administration, it was not at his doorthat the people had the right to lay the reproach of weakness orhesitation. 

Mr. Buchanan, for the convenience of his successor, had called an extrasession of the Senate, and on March 5 President Lincoln sent in thenominations for his cabinet. All were immediately confirmed, asfollows:--

 William H. Seward, New York, secretary of state. Salmon P. Chase, Ohio, secretary of the treasury. Simon Cameron, Pennsylvania, secretary of war. Gideon Welles, Connecticut, secretary of the navy. Caleb B. Smith, Indiana, secretary of the interior. Edward Bates, Missouri, attorney-general. Montgomery Blair, Maryland, postmaster-general. 

It is matter of course that a cabinet slate should fail to give generalsatisfaction; and this one encountered fully the average measure ofcriticism. The body certainly was somewhat heterogeneous in itscomposition, yet the same was true of the Republican party which itrepresented. Nor was it by any means so heterogeneous as Mr. Lincolnhad designed to have it, for he had made efforts to place in it aSouthern spokesman for Southern views; and he had not desisted from thepurpose until its futility was made apparent by the direct refusal ofMr. Gilmer of North Carolina, and by indications of a like unwillingnesson the part of one or two other Southerners who were distantly soundedon the subject. Seward, Chase, Bates, and Cameron were the four men whohad manifested the greatest popularity, after Lincoln, in the nationalconvention, and the selection of them, therefore, showed that Mr. Lincoln was seeking strength rather than amity in his cabinet; for itwas certainly true that each one of them had a following which was farfrom being wholly in sympathy with the following of any one of theothers. The President evidently believed that it was of more importancethat each great body of Northern men should feel that its opinions werefairly presented, than that his cabinet officers should alwayscomfortably unite in looking at questions from one and the same point ofview. Judge Davis says that Lincoln's original design was to appointDemocrats and Republicans alike to office. He carried this theory so farthat the radical Republicans regarded the make-up of the cabinet as a"disgraceful surrender to the South;" while men of less extreme viewssaw with some alarm that he had called to his advisory council fourex-Democrats and only three ex-Whigs, a criticism which he met by sayingthat he himself was an "old-line Whig" and should be there to make theparties even. On the other hand, the Republicans of the middle line ofStates grumbled much at the selection of Bates and Blair asrepresentatives of their section. 

The cabinet had not been brought together without some jarring andfriction, especially in the case of Cameron. On December 31 Mr. Lincolnintimated to him that he should have either the Treasury or the WarDepartment, but on January 3 requested him to "decline the appointment. "Cameron, however, had already mentioned the matter to many friends, without any suggestion that he should not be glad to accept eitherposition, and therefore, even if he were willing to accede to thesudden, strange, and unexplained request of Mr. Lincoln, he would havefound it difficult to do so without giving rise to much embarrassinggossip. Accordingly he did not decline, and thereupon ensued muchwire-pulling. Pennsylvania protectionists wanted Cameron in theTreasury, and strenuously objected to Chase as an ex-Democrat offree-trade proclivities. On the other hand, Lincoln gradually hardenedinto the resolution that Chase should have the Treasury. He made thetender, and it was accepted. He then offered consolation to Pennsylvaniaby giving the War portfolio to Cameron, which was accepted withsomething of chagrin. How far this Cameron episode was affected by thebargain declared by Lamon to have been made at Chicago cannot be told. Other biographers ignore this story, but I do not see how the directtestimony furnished by Lamon and corroborated by Colonel McClure canjustly be treated in this way; neither is the temptation so to treat itapparent, since the evidence entirely absolves Lincoln from anycomplicity at the time of making the alleged "trade, " while he couldhardly be blamed if he felt somewhat hampered by it afterward. 

Seward also gave trouble which he ought not to have given. On December 8Lincoln wrote to him that he would nominate him as secretary of state. Mr. Seward assented and the matter remained thus comfortably settleduntil so late as March 2, 1861, when Seward wrote a brief note asking"leave to withdraw his consent. " Apparently the Democratic complexion ofthe cabinet, and the suggestions of suspicious friends, made him fearthat his influence in the ministry would be inferior to that of Chase. Coming at this eleventh hour, which already had its weighty burden ofmany anxieties, this brief destructive note was both embarrassing andexasperating. It meant the entire reconstruction of the cabinet. Neverdid Lincoln's tranquil indifference to personal provocation stand him inbetter stead than in this crisis, --for a crisis it was when Seward, indiscontent and distrust, desired to draw aloof from the administration. He held the note of the recalcitrant politician for two days unanswered, then he wrote a few lines: "Your note, " he said, "is the subject of themost painful solicitude with me; and I feel constrained to beg that youwill countermand the withdrawal. The public interest, I think, demandsthat you should; and my personal feelings are deeply enlisted in thesame direction. " These words set Mr. Seward right again; on March 5 hewithdrew his letter of March 2, and in a few hours was appointed. 

Immediately after the installation of the new government threecommissioners from the Confederacy came to Washington, and requested anofficial audience. They said that seven States of the American Union hadwithdrawn therefrom, had reassumed sovereign power, and were now anindependent nation in fact and in right; that, in order to adjust uponterms of amity and good-will all questions growing out of this politicalseparation, they were instructed to make overtures for openingnegotiations, with the assurance that the Confederate governmentearnestly desired a peaceful solution and would make no demand notfounded in strictest justice, neither do any act to injure their lateconfederates. From the Confederate point of view these approaches weredignified and conciliatory; from the Northern point of view they weretreasonable and insolent. Probably the best fruit which Mr. Davis hopedfrom them was that Mr. Seward, who was well known to be desirous offinding some peace-assuring middle course, might be led into adiscussion of the situation, inevitably provoking divisions in thecabinet, in the Republican party, and in the country. But thoughSeward's frame of mind about this time was such as to put him in greatjeopardy of committing hurtful blunders, he was fortunate enough toescape quite doing so. To the agent of the commissioners he replied thathe must "consult the President, " and the next day he wrote, in terms ofpersonal civility, that he could not receive them. Nevertheless theyremained in Washington a few weeks longer, gathering and forwarding tothe Confederate government such information as they could. In this theywere aided by Judge Campbell of Alabama, a Secessionist, who stillretained his seat upon the bench of the Supreme Court. This gentlemannow became a messenger between the commissioners and Mr. Seward, withthe purpose of eliciting news and even pledges from the latter for theuse of the former. His errands especially related to Fort Sumter, and hegradually drew from Mr. Seward strong expressions of opinion that Sumterwould in time be evacuated, even declarations substantially to theeffect that this was the arranged policy of the government. Words whichfell in so agreeably with the wishes of the judge and the commissionerswere received with that warm welcome which often outruns correctconstruction, and later were construed by them as actual assurances, atleast in substance, whereby they conceived themselves to have been"abused and overreached, " and they charged the government with"equivocating conduct. " In the second week in April, contemporaneouslywith the Sumter crisis, they addressed to Mr. Seward a high-flownmissive of reproach, in which they ostentatiously washed the hands ofthe South, as it were, and shook from their own departing feet the dustof the obdurate North, where they had not been met "in the conciliatoryand peaceful spirit" in which they had come. They invoked "impartialhistory" to place the responsibility of blood and mourning upon thosewho had denied the great fundamental doctrine of American liberty; andthey declared it "clear that Mr. Lincoln had determined to appeal to thesword to reduce the people of the Confederate States to the will of thesection or party whose President he is. " In this dust-cloud of glowingrhetoric vanished the last deceit of peaceful settlement. 

About the same time, April 13, sundry commissioners from the Virginiaconvention waited upon Lincoln with the request that he wouldcommunicate the policy which he intended to pursue towards theConfederate States. Lincoln replied with a patient civility that cloakedsatire: "Having at the beginning of my official term expressed myintended policy as plainly as I was able, it is with deep regret andsome mortification I now learn that there is great and injuriousuncertainty in the public mind as to what that policy is, and whatcourse I intend to pursue. " To this ratification of the plain positiontaken in his inaugural, he added that he might see fit to repossesshimself of the public property, and that possibly he might withdraw themail service from the seceding States. 

The inauguration of Mr. Lincoln was followed by a lull which endured forseveral weeks. A like repose reigned contemporaneously in theConfederate States. For a while the people in both sections receivedwith content this reaction of quiescence. But as the same laws of humannature were operative equally at the North and at the South, it sooncame about that both at the North and at the South there broke forthalmost simultaneously strong manifestations of impatience. The genuinePresident at Washington and the sham President at Montgomery wereassailed by the like pressing demand: Why did they not do something tosettle this matter? Southern irascibility found the situationexceedingly trying. The imposing and dramatic attitude of theConfederate States had not achieved an appropriate result. They hadorganized a government and posed as an independent nation, but no powerin the civilized world had yet recognized them in this character; on thecontrary, Abraham Lincoln, living hard by in the White House, wasexplicitly denying it, contumaciously alleging himself to be theirlawful ruler, and waiting with an exasperating patience to see what theywere really going to do in the business which they had undertaken. Theymust make some move or they would become ridiculous, and theirrevolution would die and their confederacy would dissolve from sheerinanition. The newspapers told their leaders this plainly; and aprominent gentleman of Alabama said to Mr. Davis: "Sir, unless yousprinkle blood in the face of the people of Alabama, they will be backin the Union in ten days. " On the other hand, the people of the Northwere as energetic as the sons of the South were excitable, and withequal urgency they also demanded a conclusion. If the Union was to beenforced, why did not Mr. Lincoln enforce it? How long did he meanplacidly to suffer treason and a rival government to rest undisturbedwithin the country?

With this state of feeling growing rapidly more intense in bothsections, action was inevitable. Yet neither leader wished to act first, even for the important purpose of gratifying the popular will. As wheretwo men are resolved to fight, yet have an uneasy vision of a judge andjury in waiting for them, each seeks to make the other the assailant andhimself to be upon his defense, so these two rulers took prudent thoughtof the tribunal of public sentiment not in America alone but in Europealso, with perhaps a slight forward glance towards posterity. If Mr. Lincoln did not like to "invade" the Southern territory, Mr. Davis wasequally reluctant to make the Southern "withdrawal" actively belligerentthrough operations of military offense. Both men were capable ofstatesmanlike waiting to score a point that was worth waiting for; Davishad been for years biding the ripeness of time, but Lincoln had thecapacity of patience beyond any precedent on record. 

The spot where the strain came, where this question of the first blowmust be settled, was at Fort Sumter, in the mid-throat of Charlestonharbor. On December 27, 1860, by a skillful movement at night, MajorAnderson, the commander at Fort Moultrie, had transferred his scantyforce from that dilapidated and untenable post on the shore to the moredefensible and more important position of Fort Sumter. Thereafter aprecarious relationship betwixt peace and war had subsisted between himand the South Carolinians. It was distinctly understood that, sooner orlater, by negotiation or by force, South Carolina intended to possessherself of this fortress. From her point of view it certainly waspreposterous and unendurable that the key to her chief harbor and cityshould be permanently held by a "foreign" power. Gradually she erectedbatteries on the neighboring mainland, and kept a close surveillanceupon the troops now more than half besieged in the fort. 

Under the Buchanan régime the purpose of the United States governmenthad been less plain than it became after Mr. Lincoln's accession; forBuchanan had not the courage either to order a surrender, or to provokereal warfare by reinforcing the place. In vain did the unfortunate MajorAnderson seek distinct instructions; the replies which he received werecontradictory and more obscure than Delphic oracles. This unfair, vacillating, and contemptible conduct indicated the desire to lay uponhim alone the whole responsibility of the situation, with a politic andselfish reservation to the government of the advantage of disavowing anddiscrediting him, whatever he might do. On January 9 a futile effort atcommunication was made by the steamer Star of the West; it failed, andleft matters worse rather than better. On March 3, 1861, the Confederategovernment put General Beauregard in command at Charleston, therebyemphasizing the resolution to have Sumter ere long. Such was thesituation on March 4, when Mr. Lincoln came into control and declared apolicy which bound him to "hold, occupy, and possess" Sumter. On thesame day there came a letter from Major Anderson, describing hisposition. There were shut up in the fort together a certain number ofmen and a certain quantity of biscuit and of pork; when the men shouldhave eaten the biscuit and the pork, which they would probably do inabout four weeks, they would have to go away. The problem thus becamedirect, simple, and urgent. 

Lincoln sought an opinion from Scott, and was told that "evacuationseems almost inevitable. " He requested a more thorough investigation, and a reply to specific questions: "To what point of time can Andersonmaintain his position in Sumter? Can you, with present means, relievehim in that time? What additional means would enable you to do so?" Thegeneral answered that four months would be necessary to prepare thenaval force, and an even longer time to get together the 5000 regulartroops and 20, 000 volunteers that would be needed, to say nothing ofobtaining proper legislation from Congress. Equally discouraging werethe opinions of the cabinet officers. On March 15 Lincoln put to themthe question: "Assuming it to be possible to now provision Fort Sumter, under all the circumstances is it wise to attempt it?" Only Chase andBlair replied that it would be wise; Seward, Cameron, Wells, Smith, andBates were against it. 

The form of this question indicated that Lincoln contemplated apossibility of being compelled to recede from the policy expressed inhis inaugural. Yet it was not his temperament to abandon a purposedeliberately matured and definitely announced, except under absolutenecessity. To determine now this question of necessity he sent anemissary to Sumter and another to Charleston, and meantime stayedoffensive action on the part of the Confederates by authorizing Sewardto give assurance through Judge Campbell that no provisioning orreinforcement should be attempted without warning. Thus he secured, orcontinued, a sort of truce, irregular and informal, but practical. Meantime he was encouraged by the earnest propositions of Mr. G. V. Fox, until lately an officer of the navy, who was ready to undertake therelief of the fort. Eager discussions ensued, wherein naval men backedthe project of Mr. Fox, and army men condemned it. Such difference ofexpert opinion was trying, for the problem was of a kind which Mr. Lincoln's previous experience in life did not make it easy for him tosolve with any confidence in the correctness of his own judgment. 

Amid this puzzlement day after day glided by, and the question remainedunsettled. Yet during this lapse of time sentiment was ripening, andperhaps this was the real purpose of Lincoln's patient waiting. On March29 his ministers again put their opinions in writing, and now Chase, Welles, and Blair favored an effort at reinforcement; Bates modified hisprevious opposition so far as to say that the time had come either toevacuate or relieve the fort; Smith favored evacuation, but only on theground of military necessity; and Seward alone advocated evacuation inpart on the ground of policy; he deemed it unwise to "provoke a civilwar, " especially "in rescue of an untenable position. "

Was it courtesy or curiosity that induced the President to sit andlisten to this warm debate between his chosen advisers? They would havebeen angry had they known that they were bringing their counsel to achief who had already made his decision. They did not yet know that uponevery occasion of great importance Lincoln would make up his mind forand by himself, yet would not announce his decision, or save hiscounselors the trouble of counseling, until such time as he should seefit to act. So in this instance he had already, the day before themeeting of the cabinet, directed Fox to draw up an order for such ships, men, and supplies as he would require, and when the meeting broke up heat once issued formal orders to the secretaries of the navy and of warto enter upon the necessary preparation. 

Contemporaneously with this there was also undertaken another enterprisefor the relief of Fort Pickens at Pensacola. It was, however, kept sostrictly secret that the President did not even communicate it to Mr. Welles. Apparently his only reason for such extreme reticence lay in theproverb: "If you wish your secret kept, keep it. " But proverbial wisdomhad an unfortunate result upon this occasion. Both the President and Mr. Welles set the eye of desire upon the warship Powhatan, lying in NewYork harbor. The secretary designed her for the Sumter fleet; thePresident meant to send her to Pensacola. Of the Sumter expedition shewas an absolutely essential part; for the Pensacola plan she was notaltogether indispensable. 

On April 6 Captain Mercer, on board the Powhatan as his flagship, and onthe very point of weighing anchor to sail in command of the Sumterreinforcement, under orders from Secretary Welles, was astounded to findhimself dispossessed and superseded by Lieutenant Porter, who suddenlycame upon the deck bringing an order signed by the President himself. Afew hours later, at Washington, a telegram startled Mr. Welles with thenews. Utterly confounded, he hastened, in the early night-time, to theWhite House, and obtained an audience of the President. Then Mr. Lincolnlearned what a disastrous blunder he had made; greatly mortified, herequested Mr. Seward to telegraph with all haste to New York that thePowhatan must be immediately restored to Mercer for Sumter. LieutenantPorter was already far down the bay, when he was overtaken by a swifttug bringing this message. But unfortunately Mr. Seward had so phrasedthe dispatch that it did not purport to convey an order either from thePresident or the secretary of the navy, and he had signed his own name:"Give up the Powhatan to Mercer. SEWARD. " To Porter, hurriedlyconsidering this unintelligible occurrence, it seemed better to goforward under the President's order than to obey the order of anofficial who had no apparent authority to command him. So he steamed onfor Pensacola. 

On April 8, discharging the obligation of warning, Mr. Lincoln notifiedGeneral Beauregard that an attempt would be made to put provisions intoSumter, but not at present to put in men, arms, or ammunition, unlessthe fort should be attacked. Thereupon Beauregard, at two o'clock P. M. On April 11, sent to Anderson a request for a surrender. Andersonrefused, remarking incidentally that he should be starved out in a fewdays. At 3. 20 A. M. , on April 12, Beauregard notified Anderson that heshould open fire in one hour. That morning the occupants of Sumter, 9commissioned officers, 68 non-commissioned officers and privates, 8musicians, and 43 laborers, breakfasted on pork and water, the lastrations in the fort. Before daybreak the Confederate batteries werepouring shot and shell against the walls. Response was made from as manyguns as the small body of defenders could handle. But the fort was moreeasily damaged than were the works on the mainland, and on the morningof the 13th, the officers' quarters having caught fire, and the magazinebeing so imperiled that it had to be closed and covered with earth, thefort became untenable. Early in the evening terms of capitulation wereagreed upon. 

Meantime three transports of the relief expedition were lying outsidethe bar. The first arrived shortly before the bombardment began, theother two came only a trifle later. All day long these vessels lay to, wondering why the Powhatan did not appear. Had she been there upon thecritical night of the 12th, the needed supplies could have been throwninto the fort, for the weather was so dark that the rebel patrol wasuseless, and it was actually believed in Charleston that the relief hadbeen accomplished. But the Powhatan was far away steaming at full speedfor Pensacola. For this sad blunder Lincoln generously, but fairlyenough, took the blame to himself. The only excuse which has ever beenadvanced in behalf of Mr. Lincoln is that he allowed himself to be ledblindfold through this important business by Mr. Seward, and that hesigned such papers as the secretary of state presented to him withoutlearning their purport and bearing. But such an excuse, even if it canbe believed, seems fully as bad as the blunder which it is designed topalliate. 

Other blame also has been laid upon Lincoln on the ground that he wasdilatory in reaching the determination to relieve the fort. That thedecision should have been reached and the expedition dispatched morepromptly is entirely evident; but whether or not Lincoln was in fault isquite another question. Three facts are to be considered: 1. The highestmilitary authority in the country advised him, a civilian, thatevacuation was a necessity. 2. Most of his ministers were at firstagainst reinforcement, and they never unanimously recommended it;especially his secretary of state condemned it as bad policy. 3. Thealmost universal feeling of the people of the North, so far as it couldthen be divined, was compromising, conciliatory, and thoroughly opposedto any act of war. Under such circumstances it was rather an exhibitionof independence and courage that Lincoln reached the conclusion ofrelieving the fort at all, than it was a cause of fault-finding that hedid not come to the conclusion sooner. He could not know in March howthe people were going to feel after the 13th of April; in fact, if theyhad fancied that he was provoking hostilities, their feeling might noteven then have developed as it did. Finally, he gained his point inforcing the Confederacy into the position of assailant, and there isevery reason to believe that he bought that point cheaply at the priceof the fortress. 

The news of the capture of Sumter had an instant and tremendous effect. The States which had seceded were thrown into a pleasurable ferment oftriumph; the Northern States arose in fierce wrath; the Middle States, still balancing dubiously between the two parties, were rent withpassionate discussion. For the moment the North seemed a unit; there hadbeen Southern sympathizers before, and Southern sympathizers appeared inconsiderable numbers later, but for a little while just now they werevery scarce. Douglas at once called upon the President, and thetelegraph carried to his numerous followers throughout the land the newsthat he had pledged himself "to sustain the President in the exercise ofall his constitutional functions to preserve the Union, and maintain thegovernment, and defend the Federal capital. " By this prompt and generousaction he warded off the peril of a divided North. Douglas is not inquite such good repute with posterity as he deserves to be; his attitudetowards slavery was bad, but his attitude towards the country was thatof a zealous patriot. His veins were full of fighting blood, and he wasreally much more ready to go to war for the Union than were greatnumbers of Republicans whose names survive in the strong odor ofpatriotism. During the presidential campaign he had been speaking outwith defiant courage regardless of personal considerations, and in thispresent juncture he did not hesitate an instant to bring to hissuccessful rival an aid which at the time and under the circumstanceswas invaluable. 

In every town and village there were now mass meetings, ardent speeches, patriotic resolutions, a confusing stir and tumult of words that wouldbecome deeds as fast as definite plans could furnish opportunity. Thedifficulty lay in utilizing this abundant, this exuberant zeal. Historians say rhetorically that the North sprang to arms; and it reallywould have done so if there had been any arms to spring to; but musketswere scarce, and that there were any at all was chiefly due to the factthat antiquated and unserviceable weapons had been allowed to accumulateundestroyed. Moreover, no one knew even the manual of arms; and therewere no uniforms, or accoutrements, or camp equipment of any sort. Therewas, however, the will which makes the way. Simultaneously with thestory of Sumter came also the President's proclamation of April 15. Hecalled for seventy-five thousand volunteers to serve for threemonths, --an insignificant body of men, as it now seems, and a period oftime not sufficient to change them from civilians into soldiers. Yet forthe work immediately visible the demand seemed adequate. Moreover, asthe law stood, a much longer term could not have been named, [133] andan apparently disproportionate requisition in point of numbers mighthave been of injurious effect; for nearly every one was cheerfullysaying that the war would be no such very great affair after all. In hisown mind the President may or may not have forecast the future moreaccurately than most others were doing; but his idea plainly was to askno more than was necessary for the visible occasion. He stated that thetroops would be used to "repossess the forts, places, and property whichhad been seized from the Union, " and that great care would be taken notto disturb peaceful citizens. Amid all the prophesying and theorizing, and the fanciful comparisons of the respective fighting qualities of theNorthern and Southern populations, a sensible remark is attributed toLincoln: "We must not forget that the people of the seceded States, likethose of the loyal States, are American citizens with essentially thesame characteristics and powers. Exceptional advantages on one side arecounterbalanced by exceptional advantages on the other. We must make upour minds that man for man the soldier from the South will be a matchfor the soldier from the North, and _vice versa_. " This was good commonsense, seasonably offsetting the prevalent but foolish notion that theSoutherners were naturally a better fighting race than the Northerners. Facts ultimately sustained Lincoln's just estimate of equality; forthough the North employed far greater numbers than did the South, it wasbecause the North had the burdens of attack and conquest upon exteriorlines of great extent, because it had to detail large bodies of troopsfor mere garrison and quasi-police duty, and because during the latterpart of the war it took miserable throngs of bounty-bought foreignersinto its ranks. Man for man, as Lincoln said at the outset, the warproved that Northern Americans and Southern Americans were closelymatched. [134]

By the same instrument the President summoned Congress to assemble inextra session on July 4. It seemed a distant date; and many thought thatthe Executive Department ought not to endeavor to handle alone all thepossible novel developments of so long a period. But Mr. Lincoln had hispurposes. By July 4 he and circumstances, together, would have wroughtout definite conditions, which certainly did not exist at present;perhaps also, like most men who find themselves face to face withdifficult practical affairs, he dreaded the conclaves of thelaw-makers; but especially he wished to give Kentucky a chance to hold aspecial election for choosing members of this Congress, because themoral and political value of Kentucky could hardly be overestimated, andthe most tactful manoeuvring was necessary to control her. 

The Confederate cabinet was said to have greeted Mr. Lincoln'sproclamation with "bursts of laughter. " The governors of Kentucky, NorthCarolina, Arkansas, Tennessee, and Missouri telegraphed that no troopswould be furnished by their respective States, using language clearlydesigned to be offensive and menacing. The Northern States, however, responded promptly and enthusiastically. Men thronged to enlist. Hundreds of thousands offered themselves where only 75, 000 could beaccepted. Of the human raw material there was excess; but discipline andequipment could not be created by any measure of mere willingness. Yetthere was great need of dispatch. Both geographically and politicallyWashington lay as an advanced outpost in immediate peril. General Scotthad been collecting the few companies within reach; but all, he said onApril 8, "may be too late for this place. " By April 15, however, hebelieved himself able to hold the city till reinforcements shouldarrive. The total nominal strength of the United States army, officersand men, was only 17, 113, of whom not two thirds could be counted uponthe Union side, and even these were scattered over a vast expanse ofcountry, playing police for Indians, and garrisoning distant posts. Rumors of Southern schemes to attack Washington caused widespread alarm;the government had no more definite information than the people, and allalike feared that there was to be a race for the capital, and that theSouth, being near and prepared, would get there first. As matter offact, the Southern leaders had laid no military plan for thisenterprise, and the danger was exaggerated. The Northerners, however, did not know this, and made desperate haste. 

The first men to arrive came from Philadelphia, 460 troops, as they werecalled, though they came "almost entirely without arms. " InMassachusetts, Governor Andrew, an anti-slavery leader, enthusiastic, energetic, and of great executive ability, had been for many monthspreparing the militia for precisely this crisis, weeding out the holidaysoldiers and thoroughly equipping his regiments for service in thefield. For this he had been merrily ridiculed by the aristocracy ofBoston during the winter; but inexorable facts now declared for him andagainst the local aristocrats. On April 15 he received the call fromWashington, and immediately sent forth his own summons through theState. All day on the 16th, amid a fierce northeasterly storm, thetroops poured into Boston, and by six o'clock on that day three fullregiments were ready to start. [135] Three days before this the governorhad asked Secretary Cameron for 2000 rifled muskets from the nationalarmory at Springfield, in the State. The secretary refused, and thegovernor managed to supply his regiment with the most improved arms[136]without aid from the national government. On the forenoon of the 17th, the Sixth Regiment started for Washington. Steamers were ready to takeit to Annapolis; but the secretary of war, with astonishing ignorance offacts easily to be known, ordered it to come through Baltimore. Accordingly the regiment reached Baltimore on the 19th, the anniversaryof the battle of Lexington. Seven companies were transported inhorse-cars from the northern to the southern station without serioushindrance; but then the tracks of the street railway were torn up, andthe remaining four companies had to leave the cars and march. A furiousmob of "Plug Uglies" and Secessionists assailed them with paving-stones, brickbats, and pistol-shots. The mayor and the marshal of the policeforce performed fairly their official duty, but were far from quellingthe riot. The troops, therefore, thrown on their own resources, justifiably fired upon their assailants. The result of the conflict wasthat 4 soldiers were killed and 36 were wounded, and of the rioters 12were killed, and the number of wounded could not be ascertained. Thetroops reached Washington at five o'clock in the afternoon, the firstarmed rescuers of the capital; their presence brought a comfortingsense of relief, and they were quartered in the senate chamber itself. 

 * * * * *

What would be the effect of the proclamation, of the mustering of troopsin the capital, and of the bloodshed at Baltimore upon the slave Stateswhich still remained in the Union, was a problem of immeasurableimportance. The President, who had been obliged to take theresponsibility of precipitating the crisis in these States, appreciatedmore accurately than any one else the magnitude of the stake involved intheir allegiance. He watched them with the deepest anxiety, and broughtthe utmost care and tact of his nature to the task of influencing them. The geographical position of Maryland, separating the District ofColumbia from the loyal North, made it of the first consequence. Thesituation there, precarious at best, seemed to be rendered actuallyhopeless by what had occurred. A tempest of uncontrollable rage whirledaway the people and prostrated all Union feeling. Mayor Brown admitsthat "for some days it looked very much as if Baltimore had taken herstand decisively with the South;" and this was putting it mildly, whenthe Secessionist Marshal Kane was telegraphing: "Streets red withMaryland blood. Send express over the mountains of Maryland and Virginiafor the riflemen to come without delay. " Governor Hicks was opposed tosecession, but he was shaken like a reed by this violent blast. Lateron this same April 19, Mayor Brown sent three gentlemen to PresidentLincoln, bearing a letter from himself, in which he said that it was"not possible for more soldiers to pass through Baltimore unless theyfight their way at every step. " That night he caused the northwardrailroad bridges to be burned and disabled; and soon afterward thetelegraph wires were cut. 

The President met the emergency with coolness and straightforwardsimplicity, abiding firmly by his main purpose, but conciliatory as tomeans. He wrote to the governor and the mayor: "For the future troops_must_ be brought here, but I make no point of bringing them _through_Baltimore;" he would "march them _around_ Baltimore, " if, as he hoped, General Scott should find it feasible to do so. In fulfillment of thispromise he ordered a detachment, which had arrived at a station nearBaltimore, to go all the way back to Philadelphia and come around bywater. He only demurred when the protests were extended to include thewhole "sacred" soil of Maryland, --for it appeared that the presence ofslavery accomplished the consecration of soil! His troops, he said, could neither fly over the State, nor burrow under it; therefore theymust cross it, and the Marylanders must learn that "there was no pieceof American soil too good to be pressed by the foot of a loyal soldieron his march to the defense of the capital of his country. " For a while, however, until conditions in Baltimore changed, Eastern regiments cameby way of Annapolis, though with difficulty and delay. Yet, even uponthis route, conflict was narrowly avoided. 

Soon, however, these embarrassments came to an end, and the President'spolicy was vindicated by its fruits. It had been strictly his own; healone ruled the occasion, and he did so in the face of severe pressureto do otherwise, some of which came even from members of his cabinet. Firmness, reasonableness, and patience brought things right; Lincolnspoke sensibly to the Marylanders, and gave them time to consider thesituation. Such treatment started a reaction; Unionism revived andUnionists regained courage. Moreover, the sure pressure of materialconsiderations was doing its work. Baltimore, as an isolated secessionoutpost, found, even in the short space of a week, that business wasdestroyed and that she was suffering every day financial loss. In aword, by the end of the month, "the tide had turned. " Baltimore, if notquite a Union city, at least ceased to be secessionist. On May 9Northern troops passed unmolested through it. On May 13 General Butlerwith a body of troops took possession of Federal Hill, which commandsthe harbor and city, and fortified it. If the Baltimore question wasstill open at that time, this settled it. Early in the same month thestate legislature came together, Mr. Lincoln refusing to accept thesuggestion of interfering with it. This body was by no means Unionist, for it "protested against the war as unjust and unconstitutional, announced a determination to take no part in its prosecution, andexpressed a desire for the immediate recognition of the ConfederateStates. " Yet practically it put a veto on secession by voting that itwas inexpedient to summon a convention; it called on all good citizens"to abstain from violent and unlawful interference with the troops. "Thus early in May this brand, though badly scorched, was saved from theconflagration; and its saving was a piece of good fortune of which theimportance cannot be exaggerated; for without Maryland Washington couldhardly have been held, and with the national capital in the hands of therebels European recognition probably could not have been prevented. These momentous perils were in the mind of the administration duringthose anxious days, and great indeed was the relief when the ultimateturn of affairs became assured. For a week officials in Washington werepainfully taught what it would mean to have Baltimore a rebel city andMaryland a debatable territory and battle-ground. For a week Mr. Lincolnand his advisers lived almost in a state of siege; they were utterly cutoff from communication with the North; they could get no news; theycould not learn what was doing for their rescue, nor how serious werethe obstructions in the way of such efforts; in place of correctinformation they heard only the most alarming rumors. In a word, theywere governing a country to which they really had no access. Thetension of those days was awful; and it was with infinite comfort thatthey became certain that, whatever other strain might come, this one atleast could not be repeated. Henceforth the loyalty of Maryland, socarefully nurtured, gradually grew in strength to the end. Manyindividuals long remained in their hearts disloyal, and thousands[137]joined the Confederate ranks; but they had to leave their State in orderto get beneath a secessionist standard, for Maryland was distinctly andconclusively in the Union. 

The situation, resources, and prestige of Virginia made her next toMaryland in importance among the doubtful States. Her Unionists werenumerically preponderant; and accordingly the convention, whichassembled early in January, was opposed to secession by the overwhelmingmajority of 89 to 45. But the Secessionists here as elsewhere in theSouth were propagandists, fiery with enthusiasm and energy, and theycontrolled the community although they were outnumbered by those whoheld, in a more quiet way, contrary opinions. When the decisive conflictcame it was short and sharp and carried with a rush. By intrigue, bymenace, by passionate appeals seasonably applied with sudden intensityof effort at the time of the assault upon Sumter, the convention wasinduced to pass an ordinance of secession. Those who could not bringthemselves to vote in the affirmative were told that they might "absentthemselves or be hanged. " On the other hand, there were almost no linesalong which the President could project any influence into the State toencourage the Union sentiment. He sought an interview with a politicalleader, but the gentleman only sent a substitute, and the colloquyamounted to nothing. He fell in with the scheme of General Scottconcerning Robert E. Lee, which might have saved Virginia; but this alsomiscarried. General Lee has always been kindly spoken of at the North, whether deservedly or not is a matter not to be discussed here. Only afew bare facts and dates can be given: April 17, by a vote of 88 to 55, the dragooned convention passed an "ordinance to repeal the ratificationof the Constitution of the United States, " but provided that this actionshould for the present be kept secret, and that it might be annulled bythe people at a popular voting, which should be had upon it on thefourth Thursday in May. The injunction of secrecy was immediatelybroken, and before the polls were to be opened for the ballotingVirginia was held by the military forces of the Confederacy, so that thevote was a farce. April 18 Mr. F. P. Blair, Jr. , had an interview inWashington with Lee, in which he intimated to Lee that the President andGeneral Scott designed to place him in command of the army which hadjust been summoned. [138] Accounts of this conversation, otherwiseinconsistent, all agree that Lee expressed himself as opposed tosecession, [139] but as unwilling to occupy the position designed forhim, because he "could take no part in an invasion of the SouthernStates. " April 20 he tendered his resignation of his commission in thearmy, closing with the words, "Save in defense of my native State, Inever desire again to draw my sword. "[140] On April 22-23 he wasappointed to, and accepted, the command of the state forces. In soaccepting he said: "I devote myself to the service of my native State, in whose behalf alone will I ever again draw my sword. "[141] April 24 amilitary league was formed between Virginia and the Confederate States, and her forces were placed under the command of Jefferson Davis; also aninvitation was given, and promptly accepted, to make Richmond theConfederate capital. May 16 Virginia formally entered the Confederacy, and Lee became a general--the third in rank--in the service of theConfederate States, though the secession of his State was still onlyinchoate and might never become complete, since the day set for thepopular vote had not arrived, and it was still a possibility that theUnionists might find courage to go to the polls. Thus a rapid successionof events settled it that the President could save neither Virginia norRobert E. Lee for the Union. Yet the failure was not entire. Thenorthwestern counties were strongly Union in their proclivities, andsoon followed to a good end an evil example; for they in turn secededfrom Virginia, established a state government, sought admission into theUnion, and became the State of West Virginia. 

Next in order of importance came Kentucky. The Secessionists, using herethe tactics so successful in other States, endeavored to drive throughby rush and whirl a formal act of secession. But the Unionists ofKentucky were of more resolute and belligerent temper than those ofGeorgia and Virginia, and would not submit to be swept away by a torrentreally of less volume than their own. [142] Yet in spite of the spiritedhead thus made by the loyalists the condition in the State long remainedsuch as to require the most skillful treatment by the President; duringseveral critical weeks one error of judgment, a single imprudence, uponhis part might have proved fatal. For the condition was anomalous andperplexing, and the conflict of opinion in the State had finally led tothe evolution of a theory or scheme of so-called "neutrality. " Asimilar notion had been imperfectly developed in Maryland, when herlegislature declared that she would take no part in a war. The idea wasillogical to the point of absurdity, for by it the "neutral" State wouldat once stay in the Union and stand aloof from it. Neutrality reallysignified a refusal to perform those obligations which nevertheless wereadmitted to be binding, and it made of the State a defensive barrier forthe South, not to be traversed by Northern troops on an errand ofhostility against Confederate Secessionists. It was practical"non-coercion" under a name of fairer sound, and it involved theinconsequence of declaring that the dissolution of an indissoluble Unionshould not be prevented; it was the proverbial folly of being "for thelaw but ag'in the enforcement of it. " In the words of a resolutionpassed by a public meeting in Louisville: it was the "duty" of Kentuckyto maintain her "independent position, " taking sides neither with theadministration nor with the seceding States, "_but with the Unionagainst them both_. "

Nevertheless, though both logic and geography made neutralityimpracticable, yet at least the desire to be neutral indicated awavering condition, and therefore it was Mr. Lincoln's task so toarrange matters that, when the State should at last see that it could byno possibility avoid casting its lot with one side or the other, itshould cast it with the North. For many weeks the two Presidents playedthe game for this invaluable stake with all the tact and skill of whicheach was master. It proved to be a repetition of the fable of the sunand the wind striving to see which could the better make the travelertake off his cloak, and fortunately the patience of Mr. Lincolnrepresented the warmth of the sun. He gave the Kentuckians time to learnby observation and the march of events that neutrality was animpossibility, also to determine with which side lay the probableadvantages for themselves; also he respected the borders of the Stateduring its sensitive days, though in doing so he had to forego somemilitary advantages of time and position. Deliberation brought a soundconclusion. Kentucky never passed an ordinance of secession, butmaintained her representation in Congress and contributed her quota tothe armies; and these invaluable results were largely due to this wisepolicy of the President. Many of her citizens, of course, fought uponthe Southern side, as was the case in all these debatable Border States, where friends and even families divided against each other, and each manplaced himself according to his own convictions. It may seem, therefore, in view of this individual independence of action, that the ordinance ofsecession was a formality which would not have greatly affectedpractical conditions; and many critics of Mr. Lincoln at the time couldnot appreciate the value of his "border-state policy, " and thought thathe was making sacrifices and paying prices wholly against wisdom, andout of proportion to anything that could be gained thereby. But heunderstood the situation and comparative values correctly. Loyalty tothe State governed multitudes; preference of the State over the UnitedStates cost the nation vast numbers of would-be Unionists in theseceding States, and in fact made secession possible; and the samefeeling, erroneous though it was from the Unionist point of view, yetsaved for the Unionist party very great numbers in these doubtful Stateswhich never in fact seceded. Mr. Davis appreciated this just as much asMr. Lincoln did; both were shrewd men, and were wasting no foolishefforts when they strove so hard to carry or to prevent formal stateaction. They appreciated very well that success in passing an ordinancewould gain for the South throngs of adherents whose allegiance was, bytheir peculiar political creed, due to the winner in this local contest. 

In Tennessee the Unionist majority, as indicated early in February, wasoverwhelming. Out of a total vote of less than 92, 000, more than 67, 000opposed a state convention. The mountaineers of the eastern regionespecially were stalwart loyalists, and later held to their faiththrough the severe ordeal of a peculiarly cruel invasion. But thepolitical value of these scattered settlements was small; and in themore populous parts the Secessionists pursued their usual aggressive andenterprising tactics with success. Ultimately the governor and thelegislature despotically compelled secession. It was not decreed by apopular vote, not even by a convention, but by votes of the legislaturecast in secret session, a proceeding clearly _ultra vires_ of that body. Finally, on June 8, when a popular vote was taken, the State was in themilitary control of the Confederacy. 

Very similar was the case of North Carolina. The people of the uplands, like their neighbors of Tennessee, were Unionists, and in the rest ofthe State there was a prevalent Union sentiment; but the influence ofthe political leaders, their direct usurpations of power, and thecustomary energetic propagandism, ultimately won. After a convention hadbeen once voted down by popular vote, a second effort to bring onetogether was successfully made, and an ordinance of secession was passedon May 20. Arkansas was swept along with the stream, seceding on May 6, although prior to that time the votes both for holding a stateconvention and afterward in the convention itself had shown a decidedUnionist preponderance. These three States, Tennessee, North Carolina, and Arkansas, were entirely beyond the reach of the President. He hadabsolutely no lines of influence along which he could work to restrainor to guide them. 

Missouri had a career peculiar to herself. In St. Louis there was astrong Unionist majority, and especially the numerous German populationwas thoroughly anti-slavery, and was vigorously led by F. P. Blair, Jr. But away from her riverfront the State had a sparse populationpreserving the rough propensities of frontiersmen; these men were notunevenly divided between loyalty and secession and they were anindependent, fighting set of fellows, each one of whom intended tofollow his own fancy. The result was that Missouri for a long whilecarried on a little war of her own within her own borders, on too largea scale to be called "bushwhacking, " and yet with a strong flavor ofthat irregular style of conflict. The President interested himself agood deal in the early efforts of the loyalists, and amid a puzzlingsnarl of angry "personal politics" he tried to extend to them aid andcountenance, though with imperfect success. It was fortunate thatMissouri was away on the outskirts, for she was the most vexatious andperplexing part of the country. Her population had little feeling ofstate allegiance, or, indeed, of any allegiance at all, but what smallamount there was fell upon the side of the Union; for though thegovernor and a majority of the legislature declared for secession, yetthe state convention voted for the Union by a large majority. It is truethat a sham convention passed a sham ordinance, but this had no weightwith any except those who were already Secessionists. 

Thus by the close of May, 1861, President Lincoln looked forth upon aspectacle tolerably definite at last, and certainly as depressing asever met the eyes of a great ruler. Eleven States, with area, population, and resources abundant for constituting a powerful nationand sustaining an awful war, were organized in rebellion; their peoplewere welded into entire unity of feeling, were enthusiasticallyresolute, and were believed to be exceptionally good fighters. Thepopulation of three Border States was divided between loyalty anddisloyalty. The Northern States, teeming with men and money, hadabsolutely no experience whatsoever to enable them to utilize their vastresources with the promptitude needful in the instant emergency. Therewas a notion, prevalent even among themselves, that they were bytemperament not very well fitted for war; but this fancy Mr. Lincolnquietly set aside, knowing better. He also had confidence in theefficiency of Northern men in practical affairs of any kind whatsoever, and he had not to tax his patience to see this confidence vindicated. His appeal for military support seemed the marvelous word of a magician, and wrought instant transformation throughout the vast loyal territory. One half of the male population began to practice the manual, to drill, and to study the text-books of military science; the remainder put atleast equal energy into the preparations for equipment; everymanufacturer in the land set the proverbial Yankee enterprise andingenuity at work in the adaptation of his machinery to the productionof munitions of war and all the various outfit for troops. Everyfoundry, every mill, and every shipyard was at once diverted from itsaccustomed industries in order to supply military demands; patriotismand profit combined to stimulate sleepless toil and invention. In ahard-working community no one had ever before worked nearly so hard asnow. The whole North was in a ferment, and every human being strainedhis abilities of mind and of body to the utmost in one serviceabledirection or another; the wise and the foolish, the men of words and themen of deeds, the projectors of valuable schemes and the venders ofridiculous inventions, the applicants for military commissions and theseekers after the government's contracts, all hustled and crowded eachother in feverish eagerness to get at work in the new condition ofthings. It was going to take time for all this energy to produceresults, --yet not a very long time; the President had more patience thanwould be needed, and the spirit of his people reassured him. If thelukewarm, compromising temper of the past winter had caused him to feelany lurking anxious doubts as to how the crisis would be met, suchillusive mists were now cleared away in a moment before the sweepinggale of patriotism. 

FOOTNOTES:

[132] At New Bedford, in a lecture "which was interrupted by frequenthisses. " Schouler, _Hist. Of Mass. In the Civil War_, i. 44-47. 

[133] The Act of 1795 only permitted the use of the militia until thirtydays after the next session of Congress; this session being now summonedfor July 4, the period of service extended only until August 3. 

[134] When General Grant took command of the Eastern armies he said thatthe country should be cautioned against expecting too great success, because the loyal and rebel armies were made up of men of the same race, having about the same experience in war, and neither able justly toclaim any great superiority over the other in endurance, courage, ordiscipline. Chittenden, _Recoll. _ 320. 

[135] The third, fourth, and sixth. Schouler, _Mass. In the Civil War_, i. 52. 

[136] Schouler, _Mass. In the Civil War_, i. 72. 

[137] Mayor Brown thinks that the estimate of these at 20, 000 is toogreat. Brown, _Baltimore and Nineteenth April_, 1861, p. 85. 

[138] N. And H. Iv. 98; Chittenden, 102; Lee's biographer, Childe, saysthat "President Lincoln offered him the effective command of the UnionArmy, " and that Scott "conjured him . . . Not to quit the army. " Childe, _Lee_, 30. 

[139] Shortly before this time he had written to his son that it was"idle to talk of secession, " that it was "nothing but revolution" and"anarchy. " N. And H. Iv. 99. 

[140] Childe, _Lee_, 32; Mr. Childe, p. 33, says that Lee's resignationwas accepted on the 20th (the very day on which his letter was dated!), so that he "ceased to be a member of the United States Army" before hetook command of the state forces. _Per contra_, N. And H. Iv. 101. 

[141] Childe, _Lee_, 34. 

[142] Greeley in his _Amer. Conflict_, i. 349, says that the "openSecessionists were but a handful. " This, however, is clearly anexaggerated statement. 

CHAPTER IX

A REAL PRESIDENT, AND NOT A REAL BATTLE

The capture of Fort Sumter and the call for troops established one fact. There was to be a war. The period of speculation was over and the periodof action had begun. The transition meant much. The talking men of thecountry had not appeared to advantage during the few months in whichthey had been busy chiefly in giving weak advice and in concoctingprophecies. They now retired before the men of affairs, who were to dobetter. To the Anglo-Saxon temperament it was a relief to have done withwaiting and to begin to do something. Activity cleared the minds of men, and gave to each his appropriate duty. 

The gravity of the crisis being undeniable, the people of the Northqueried, with more anxiety than ever before, as to what kind of a chiefthey had taken to carry them through it. But the question which allasked none could answer. Mr. Lincoln had achieved a good reputation as apolitician and a stump speaker. Whatever a few might _think_, this wasall that any one _knew_. The narrow limitations of his actual experiencecertainly did not encourage a belief in his probable fitness toencounter duties more varied, pressing, numerous, novel, and difficultthan had ever come so suddenly to confound any ruler within recordedtime. Later on, when it was seen with what rare capacity he met demandsso exacting, many astonished and excitable observers began to cry outthat he was inspired. This, however, was sheer nonsense. That the verypeculiar requirements of these four years found a president so wellresponding to them may be fairly regarded, by those who so please, as aspecific Providential interference, --a striking one among many lessstriking. But, in fact, nothing in Mr. Lincoln's life requires, for itsexplanation, the notion of divine inspiration. His doings, one and all, were perfectly intelligible as the outcome of honesty of purpose, strongcommon sense, clear reasoning powers, and a singular sagacity in readingthe popular mind. Intellectually speaking, a clear and vigorous thinkingcapacity was his chief trait. This sounds commonplace and uninteresting, but a more serviceable qualification could not have been given him. Thetruth is, that it was part of the good fortune of the country that thePresident was not a brilliant man. Moreover, he was cool, shrewd, dispassionate, and self-possessed, and was endowed really in anextraordinary degree with an intermingling of patience and courage, whereby he was enabled both to await and to endure results. Above all hewas a masterful man; not all the time and in small matters, and notoften in an opinionated way; but, from beginning to end, whenever hesaw fit to be master, master he was. [143]

This last fact, when it became known, answered another question whichpeople were asking: In whose hands were the destinies of the North tobe? In those of Mr. Lincoln? or in those of the cabinet? or in those ofinfluential advisers, something like what have been called "favorites"in Europe, and "kitchen cabinet" in the more homely phrase of the UnitedStates? The early impression was that Mr. Lincoln did not know a greatdeal. How could he? Where and how could he have learned much? It must beadmitted that it was entirely natural that his advisers, and otherinfluential men concerned in public affairs, should adopt and act uponthe theory that Mr. Lincoln, emerging so sharply from such a past as hishad been, into such a crisis as was now present, must need a vast amountof instruction, guidance, suggestion. Accordingly there were manygentlemen who stood ready, not to say eager, to supply these fanciedwants, and who could have supplied them very well had they existed. Therefore one of the first things which Mr. Lincoln had to do was, without antagonizing Mr. Seward and Mr. Chase, to indicate to them thatthey were to be not only in name but also in rigid fact his secretaries, and that he was in fact as well as by title President. This delicatebusiness was done so soon as opportunity offered, not in any disguisedway but with plain simplicity. Mr. Chase never took the dispositionquite pleasantly. He managed his department with splendid ability, butin the personal relation of a cabinet adviser upon the various mattersof governmental policy he was always somewhat uncomfortable to get alongwith, inclined to fault-finding, ever ready with discordant suggestions, and in time also disturbed by ambition. 

Mr. Seward behaved far better. After the question of supremacy had beensettled, though in a way quite contrary to his anticipation, he franklyaccepted the subordinate position, and discharged his duties with heartygood-will. Indeed, this settlement had already come, before the timewhich this narrative has reached; but the people did not know it; it wasa private matter betwixt the two men who had been parties to it. OnlyMr. Lincoln and Mr. Seward knew that the secretary had suggested hiswillingness to run the government for the President, and that thePresident had replied that he intended to run it himself. It came aboutin this way: on April 1 Mr. Seward presented, in writing, "Some thoughtsfor the President's consideration. " He opened with the statement, notconciliatory, that "We are at the end of a month's administration, andyet without a policy, either domestic or foreign. " He then proceeded tooffer suggestions for each. For the "policy at home" he proposed, as the"ruling idea:" "Change the question before the public from one uponslavery, or about slavery, for a question upon Union or Disunion. " Itwas odd and not complimentary that he should seem to forget or ignorethat precisely this thing had already been attempted by Mr. Lincoln inhis inaugural address. Also within a few days, as we all know now, events were to show that the attempt had been successful. Furthercomment upon the domestic policy of Mr. Seward is, therefore, needless. But his scheme "For Foreign Nations" is more startling:--

"I would demand explanations from Spain and France categorically atonce. 

"I would seek explanations from Great Britain and Russia, and sendagents into Canada, Mexico, and Central America, to rouse a vigorousspirit of independence on this continent against European intervention. 

"And, if satisfactory explanations are not received from Spain andFrance, "Would convene Congress and declare war against them. 

"But whatever policy we adopt, there must be an energetic prosecution ofit. 

"For this purpose it must be somebody's business to pursue and direct itincessantly. 

"Either the President must do it himself, and be all the while active init, or

"Devolve it on some member of his cabinet. 

"Once adopted, debates on it must end, and all agree and abide. 

"It is not in my especial province. 

"But I neither seek to evade nor assume responsibility. "

Suggestions so wild could not properly constitute material for"consideration" by the President; but much consideration on the part ofstudents of those times and men is provoked by the fact that suchcounsel emanated from such a source. The secretary of state, heretoforethe most distinguished leader in the great Republican movement, whoshould by merit of actual achievement have been the Republican candidatefor the presidency, and who was expected by a large part of the countryto save an ignorant president from bad blunders, was advancing aproposition to create pretexts whereby to force into existence a foreignwar upon a basis which was likely to set one half of the civilized worldagainst the other half. The purpose for which he was willing to do thisawful thing was: to paralyze for a while domestic discussions, and toundo and leave to be done anew by the next generation all that vast workwhich he himself, and the President whom he advised, and the leaders ofthe great multitude whom they both represented, had for years beenengaged in prosecuting with all the might that was in them. But theexplanation is simple: like many another at that trying moment, thesecretary was smitten with sudden panic at the condition which had beenbrought about so largely by his own efforts. It was strictly a panic, for it passed away rapidly as panics do. 

The biographer of Mr. Seward may fairly enough glide lightly over thisepisode, since it was nothing more than an episode; but one who writesof Mr. Lincoln must, in justice, call attention to this spectacle of thesage statesman from whom, if from any one, this "green hand, " thisinexperienced President, must seek guidance, thus in deliberate writingpointing out a course which was ridiculous and impossible, and which, ifit had been possible, would have been an intolerably humiliatingretreat. The anxious people, who thought that their untried Presidentmight, upon the worst estimate of his own abilities, get on fairly wellby the aid of wise and skilled advisers, would have been aghast had theyknown that, inside of the government, the pending question was: notwhether Mr. Lincoln would accept sound instruction, but whether he wouldhave sense to recognize bad advice, and independence to reject it. Before Mr. Seward went to bed on that night of April 1, he was perhapsthe only man in the country who knew the solution of this problem. Buthe knew it, for Mr. Lincoln had already answered his letter. It had nottaken the President long! The secretary's extraordinary offer to assumethe responsibility of pursuing and directing the policy of thegovernment was rejected within a few hours after it was made; rejectednot offensively, but briefly, clearly, decisively, and without thanks. Concerning the proposed policies, domestic and foreign, the Presidentsaid as little as was called for; he actually did not even refer to thescheme for inaugurating gratuitously a war with a large part of Europe, in order for a while to distract attention from slavery. 

To us, to-day, it seems that the President could not have missed acourse so obvious; yet Mr. Seward, who suggested the absurdity, was agreat statesman. In truth, the President had shown not only sense butnerve. For the difference between Seward's past opportunities andexperience and his own was appreciated by him as fully as by any one. Heknew perfectly well that what seemed the less was controlling whatseemed the greater when he overruled his secretary. It took courage onthe part of a thoughtful man to put himself in such a position. Othersolemn reflections also could not be avoided. Not less interested thanany other citizen in the fate of the nation, he had also a personalrelation to the ultimate event which was exclusively his own. For hehimself might be called, in a certain sense, the very cause ofrebellion; of course the people who had elected him carried the realresponsibility; but he stood as the token of the difference, theconcrete provocation to the fight. The South had said: _Abraham Lincoln_brings secession. It was frightful to think that, as he was in fact thesignal, so posterity might mistake him for the very cause of the rendingof a great nation, the failure of a grand experiment. It might be thatthis destiny was before him, for the outcome of this struggle no onecould foretell; it might be his sad lot to mark the end of the line ofPresidents of the United States. Lincoln was not a man who could escapethe full weight of these reflections, and it is to be remembered thatall actions were taken beneath that weight. It was a strong man, then, who stood up and said, This is my load and I will carry it; and who didcarry it, when others offered to shift much of it upon their ownshoulders; also who would not give an hour's thought to a scheme whichpromised to lift it away entirely, and to leave it for some other who byand by should come after him. 

It is worth while to remember that Mr. Lincoln was the most advised man, often the worst advised man, in the annals of mankind. The torrent musthave been terribly confusing! Another instance deserves mention: shortlybefore Mr. Seward's strange proposal, Governor Hicks, distracted at thetumult in Maryland, had suggested that the quarrel between North andSouth should be referred to Lord Lyons as arbitrator! It was difficultto know whether to be amused or resentful before a proposition at onceso silly and so ignominious. Yet it came from an important official, andit was only one instance among thousands. With war as an actuality, suchvagaries as those of Hicks and Seward came sharply to an end. Peoplewondered and talked somewhat as to how long hostilities would last, howmuch they would cost, how they would end; and were not more correct inthese speculations than they had been in others. But though the day ofgross absurdities was over, the era of advice endured permanently. Thatpeculiar national trait whereby every American knows at least as much onevery subject whatsoever as is known by any other living man, producedits full results during the war. Every clergyman and humanitarian, everyvillage politician and every city wire-puller, every one who conned themaps of Virginia and imbibed the military wisdom of the newspapers, every merchant who put his name to a subscription paper, considered ithis privilege and his duty to set the President right upon everyquestion of moral principle, of politics, of strategy, and of finance. In one point of view it was not flattering that he should seem to standin need of so much instruction; and this was equally true whether itcame bitterly, as criticism from enemies, or sugar-coated, as advicefrom friends. That friends felt obliged to advise so much was in itselfa criticism. Probably, however, Mr. Lincoln was not troubled by thisview, for he keenly appreciated the idiosyncrasies as well as the betterqualities of the people. They, however, were a long while inunderstanding him sufficiently to recognize that there was never a manwhom it was less worth while to advise. 

 * * * * *

Business crowded upon Mr. Lincoln, and the variety and novelty of it waswithout limit. On April 17 Jefferson Davis issued a proclamationoffering "letters of marque and reprisal" to owners of private armedvessels. Two days later the President retorted by proclaiming a blockadeof Confederate ports. [144] Of course this could not be made effectiveupon the moment. On March 4 the nominal total of vessels in the navy was90. Of these, 69 were classed as "available;" but only 42 were actuallyin commission; and even of these many were in Southern harbors, and fellinto the hands of the Confederates; many more were upon foreign anddistant stations. Indeed, the dispersion was so great that it wascommonly charged as having been intentionally arranged by secessionistofficials under Mr. Buchanan. Also, at the very moment when thisproclamation was being read throughout the country, the great navy yardof Gosport, at Norfolk, Virginia, "always the favored depot" of thegovernment, with all its workshops and a great store of cannon and othermunitions, was passing into the hands of the enemy. Most of the vesselsand some other property were destroyed by Federals before the seizurewas consummated; nevertheless, the loss was severe. Moreover, even hadall the vessels of the regular navy been present, they would have hadother duties besides lying off Southern ports. Blockading squadrons, therefore, had to be improvised, and orders at once issued for thepurchase and equipment of steam vessels from the merchant marine andthe coasting service. Fortunately the summer season was at hand, so thatthese makeshifts were serviceable for many months, during which bettercraft were rapidly got together by alteration and building. Threethousand miles of coast and many harbors were included within theblockade limits, and were distributed into departments under differentcommanders. Each commander was instructed to declare his blockade inforce as soon as he felt able to make it tolerably effective, with theexpectation of rapidly improving its efficiency. The beginning was, therefore, ragged, and was naturally criticised in a very jealous andhostile spirit by those foreign nations who suffered by it. Dangerousdisputes threatened to arise, but were fortunately escaped, and in asurprisingly short time "Yankee" enterprise made the blockade toothorough for question. 

Amid the first haste and pressure it was ingeniously suggested that, since the government claimed jurisdiction over the whole country andrecognized only a rebellion strictly so called, therefore the Presidentcould by proclamation simply _close_ ports at will. Secretary Wellesfavored this course, and in the extra session of the summer of 1861Congress passed a bill giving authority to Mr. Lincoln to pursue it, inhis discretion. Mr. Seward, with better judgment, said that it might belegal, but would certainly be unwise. The position probably could havebeen successfully maintained by lawyers before a bench of judges; butto have relied upon it in the teeth of the commercial interests andunfriendly sentiment of England and France would have been a fatalblunder. Happily it was avoided; and the President had the shrewdness tokeep within a line which shut out technical discussion. Already he sawthat, so far as relations with foreigners were concerned, the domestictheory of a rebellion, pure and simple, must be very greatly modified. In a word, that which began as rebellion soon developed into civil war;the two were closely akin, but with some important differences. 

Nice points of domestic constitutional law also arose with the firstnecessity for action, opening the broad question as to what courseshould be pursued in doubtful cases, and worse still in those caseswhere the government could not fairly claim the benefit of a real doubt. The plain truth was that, in a condition faintly contemplated in theConstitution, many things not permitted by the Constitution must be doneto preserve the Constitution. The present crisis had been very scantilyand vaguely provided for by "the fathers. " The instant that actionbecame necessary to save the Union under the Constitution, it wasperfectly obvious that the Constitution must be stretched, transcended, and most liberally interlined, in a fashion which would furnish annoyingarguments to the disaffected. The President looked over the situation, and decided, in the proverbial phrase, to take the bull by the horns;that which clearly ought to be done he would do, law or no law, doubtor no doubt. He would have faith that the people would sustain him; andthat the courts and the lawyers, among whose functions it is to see toit that laws and statutes do not interfere too seriously with theconvenience of the community, would arrive, in what subtle androundabout way they might choose, at the conclusion that whatever mustbe done might be done. These learned gentlemen did their duty, anddeveloped the "war powers" under the Constitution in a manner equallyingenious, comical, and sensible. But the fundamental basis was, thatnecessity knows no law; every man in the country knew this, but thewell-intentioned denied it, as matter of policy, while theill-intentioned made such use of the opportunities thus afforded to themas might have been expected. Among the "war Democrats, " however, therewas at least ostensible liberality. 

An early question related to the writ of habeas corpus. The Marylandlegislature was to meet on April 26, 1861, and was expected to guide theState in the direction of secession. Many influential men urged thePresident to arrest the members before they could do this. He, however, conceived such an interference with a state government, in the presentcondition of popular feeling, to be impolitic. "We cannot know inadvance, " he said, "that the action will not be lawful and peaceful;"and he instructed General Scott to watch them, and, in case they shouldmake a movement towards arraying the people against the United States, to counteract it by "the bombardment of their cities, and, in theextremest necessity, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. " Thisintimation that the suspension of the venerated writ was a measuregraver than even bombarding a city, surely indicated sufficient respectfor laws and statutes. The legislators restrained their rebellious ardorand proved the wisdom of Mr. Lincoln's moderation. In the autumn, however, the crisis recurred, and then the arrests seemed the only meansof preventing the passage of an ordinance of secession. Accordingly theorder was issued and executed. Public opinion upheld it, and GovernorHicks afterward declared his belief that only by this action hadMaryland been saved from destruction. 

The privilege of habeas corpus could obviously, however, be madedangerously serviceable to disaffected citizens. Therefore, April 27, the President instructed General Scott: "If at any point on or in thevicinity of any military line which is now, or which shall be, usedbetween the city of Philadelphia and the city of Washington, you find itnecessary to suspend the writ of habeas corpus for the public safety, you . . . Are authorized to suspend that writ. " Several weeks elapsedbefore action was taken under this authority. Then, on May 25, JohnMerryman, recruiting in Maryland for the Confederate service, was seizedand imprisoned in Fort McHenry. Chief Justice Taney granted a writ ofhabeas corpus. General Cadwalader replied that he held Merryman upon acharge of treason, and that he had authority under the President'sletter to suspend the writ. The chief justice thereupon issued againstthe general an attachment for contempt, but the marshal was refusedadmittance to the fort. The chief justice then filed with the clerk, andalso sent to the President, his written opinion, in which he said: "Iunderstand that the President not only claims the right to suspend thewrit of habeas corpus at his discretion, but to delegate thatdiscretionary power to a military officer;" whereas, according to theview of his honor, the power did not lie even with the Presidenthimself, but only with Congress. Warming to the discussion, he usedpretty strong language, to the effect that, if authority intrusted toother departments could thus "be usurped by the military power at itsdiscretion, the people . . . Are no longer living under a government oflaws; but every citizen holds life, liberty, and property at the willand pleasure of the army officer in whose military district he mayhappen to be found. " It was unfortunate that the country should hearsuch phrases launched by the chief justice against the President, or atleast against acts done under orders of the President. Direct retort wasof course impossible, and the dispute was in abeyance for a shorttime. [145] But the predilections of the judicial hero of the Dred Scottdecision were such as to give rise to grave doubts as to whether or notthe Union could be saved by any process which would not often runcounter to his ideas of the law; therefore in this matter the Presidentcontinued to exercise the useful and probably essential power, thoughtaking care, for the future, to have somewhat more regard for form. Thus, on May 10, instead of simply writing a letter, he issued throughthe State Department a proclamation authorizing the Federal commander onthe Florida coast, "if he shall find it necessary, to suspend there thewrit of habeas corpus. "

In due time the assembling of Congress gave Mr. Lincoln the opportunityto present his side of the case. In his message he said that arrests, and suspension of the writ, had been made "very sparingly;" and that, ifauthority had been stretched, at least the question was pertinent: "Areall the laws but one to go unexecuted, and the government itself to goto pieces, lest that one be violated?" He, however, believed that infact this question was not presented, and that the law had not beenviolated. "The provision of the Constitution, that the privilege of thewrit of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless when, in cases ofrebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it, is equivalentto a provision that such privilege may be suspended when, in cases ofrebellion or invasion, the public safety does require it. " As betweenCongress and the executive, "the Constitution itself is silent as towhich or who is to exercise the power; and as the provision was plainlymade for a dangerous emergency it cannot be believed that the framers ofthe instrument intended that in every case the danger should run itscourse until Congress could be called together, the very assembling ofwhich might be prevented, as was intended in this case by therebellion. "

If it was difficult, it was also undesirable to confute the President'slogic. The necessity for military arrests and for indefinite detentionof the arrested persons was undeniable. Congress therefore recognizedthe legality of what had been done, and the power was frequentlyexercised thereafter, and to great advantage. Of course mistakesoccurred, and subordinates made some arrests which had better have beenleft unmade; but these bore only upon discretion in individual cases, not upon inherent right. The topic, however, was in itself a temptingone, not only for the seriously disaffected, but for the far larger bodyof the quarrelsome, who really wanted the government to do its work, yetmaliciously liked to make the process of doing it just as difficult andas disagreeable as possible. Later on, when the malcontent classacquired the organization of a distinct political body, no other chargeagainst the administration proved so plausible and so continuouslyserviceable as this. It invited to florid declamation profuselyillustrated with impressive historical allusions, and to the free use ofvague but grand and sonorous phrases concerning "usurpation, " "thesubjection of the life, liberty, and property of every citizen to themere will of a military commander, " and other like terrors. Unfortunately men much more deserving of respect than the Copperheads, men of sound loyalty and high ability, but of anxious and conservativetemperament, were led by their fears to criticise severely arrests ofmen who were as dangerous to the government as if they had been soldiersof the Confederacy. 

May 3, 1861, by which time military exigencies had become betterunderstood, Mr. Lincoln called "into the service of the United States42, 034 volunteers, " and directed that the regular army should beincreased by an aggregate of 22, 714 officers and enlisted men. Moresuggestive than the mere increase was the fact that the volunteers werenow required "to serve for a period of three years, unless soonerdischarged. " The opinion of the government as to the magnitude of thetask in hand was thus for the first time conveyed to the people. Theyreceived it seriously and without faltering. 

July 4, 1861, the Thirty-seventh Congress met in extra session, and thesoundness of the President's judgment in setting a day which had atfirst been condemned as too distant was proved. In the interval, nothinghad been lost which could have been saved by the sitting of Congress;while, on the other hand, the members had had the great advantage ofhaving time to think soberly concerning the business before them, and tolearn the temper and wishes of their constituents. 

Mr. Lincoln took great pains with his message, which he felt to be avery important document. It was his purpose to say simply what eventshad occurred, what questions had been opened, and what necessities hadarisen; to display the situation and to state facts fairly and fully, but not apparently to argue the case of the North. Yet it was essentialfor him so to do this that no doubt could be left as to where the rightlay. This peculiar process of argument by statement had constituted hisspecial strength at the bar, and he now gave an excellent instance ofit. He briefly sketched the condition of public affairs at the time whenhe assumed the government; he told the story of Sumter, and of thepeculiar process whereby Virginia had been linked to the Confederacy. With a tinge of irony he remarked that, whether the sudden change offeeling among the members of the Virginian Convention was "wrought bytheir great approval of the assault upon Sumter, or their greatresentment at the government's resistance to that assault, is notdefinitely known. "

He explained the effect of the neutrality theory of the Border States. "This, " he said, "would be disunion completed. Figuratively speaking, itwould be the building of an impassable wall along the line ofseparation, --and yet not quite an impassable one, for under the guise ofneutrality it would tie the hands of the Union men, and freely passsupplies to the insurrectionists. . . . At a stroke it would take all thetrouble off the hands of secession, except what proceeds from theexternal blockade. " It would give to the disunionists "disunion, withouta struggle of their own. "

Of the blockade and the calls for troops, he said: "These measures, whether strictly legal or not, were ventured upon under what appeared tobe a popular demand and a public necessity, trusting then, as now, thatCongress would ratify them. " At the same time he stated the matter ofthe suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, which has been alreadyreferred to. 

Speaking of the doctrine that secession was lawful under theConstitution, and that it was not rebellion, he made plain the genuinesignificance of the issue thus raised: "It presents . . . The questionwhether a Constitutional Republic or Democracy, a government of thepeople by the same people, can or cannot maintain its territorialintegrity against its own domestic foes. It presents the questionwhether discontented individuals, too few in numbers to control theadministration according to the organic law in any case, can always, upon the pretenses made in this case, or any other pretenses, orarbitrarily without any pretense, break up their government, and thuspractically put an end to free government upon the earth. It forces usto ask: Is there in all Republics this inherent fatal weakness? Must agovernment of necessity be too strong for the liberties of its ownpeople, or too weak to maintain its own existence?" The Constitution ofthe Confederacy was a paraphrase with convenient adaptations of theConstitution of the United States. A significant one of theseadaptations was the striking out of the first three words, "We, thepeople, " and the substitution of the words, "We, the deputies of thesovereign and independent States. " "Why, " said Mr. Lincoln, "why thisdeliberate pressing out of view the rights of men and the authority ofthe people? This is essentially a people's contest. On the side of theUnion it is a struggle for maintaining in the world that form andsubstance of government whose leading object is to elevate the conditionof men . . . To afford to all an unfettered start and a fair chance in therace of life. . . . This is the leading object of the government for whoseexistence we contend. I am most happy to believe that the plain peopleunderstand and appreciate this. "

Many persons, not gifted with the power of thinking clearly, weredisturbed at what seemed to them a purpose to "invade" and to"subjugate" sovereign States, --as though a government could invade itsown country or subjugate its own subjects! These phrases, he said, wereproducing "uneasiness in the minds of candid men" as to what would bethe course of the government toward the Southern States after thesuppression of the rebellion. The President assured them that he had noexpectation of changing the views set forth in his inaugural address;that he desired "to preserve the government, that it may be administeredfor all as it was administered by the men who made it. Loyal citizenseverywhere have a right to expect this, . . . And the government has noright to withhold or neglect it. It is not perceived that in giving itthere is any coercion, any conquest, or any subjugation. "

In closing he said that it was with the deepest regret that he had usedthe war power; but "in defense of the government, forced upon him, hecould but perform this duty or surrender the existence of thegovernment. " Compromise would have been useless, for "no populargovernment can long survive a marked precedent that those who carry anelection can only save the government from immediate destruction bygiving up the main point upon which the people gave the election. " Tothose who would have had him compromise he explained that only thepeople themselves, not their servants, can safely reverse their owndeliberate decisions. He had no power to agree to divide the countrywhich he had the duty to govern. "As a private citizen the executivecould not have consented that these institutions shall perish; much lesscould he, in betrayal of so vast and so sacred a trust as these freepeople have confided to him. He felt that he had no moral right toshrink, nor even to count the chances of his own life in what mightfollow. "

The only direct request made in the message was that, to make "thiscontest a short and decisive one, " Congress would "place at the controlof the government for the work at least 400, 000 men, and $400, 000, 000. That number of men is about one tenth of those of proper ages within theregions where apparently all are willing to engage, and the sum is lessthan a twenty-third part of the money value owned by the men who seemready to devote the whole. "

The message was well received by the people, as it deserved to be. 

The proceedings of Congress can only be referred to with brevity. Yet amere recital of the names of the more noteworthy members of the Senateand the House must be intruded, if merely for the flavor of reminiscencewhich it will bring to readers who recall those times. In the Senate, upon the Republican side, there were: Lyman Trumbull from Illinois, James Harlan and James W. Grimes from Iowa, William P. Fessenden fromMaine, Charles Sumner and Henry Wilson from Massachusetts, ZachariahChandler from Michigan, John P. Hale from New Hampshire, Benjamin F. Wade from Ohio, and John Sherman, who was elected to fill the vacancycreated by the appointment of Salmon P. Chase to the TreasuryDepartment, David Wilmot from Pennsylvania, filling the place of SimonCameron, Henry B. Anthony from Rhode Island, Andrew Johnson fromTennessee, Jacob Collamer from Vermont, and James R. Doolittle fromWisconsin. On the Democratic side, there were: James A. McDougall ofCalifornia, James A. Bayard and William Saulsbury of Delaware, Jesse D. Bright of Indiana, who was expelled February 5, 1862, John C. Breckenridge of Kentucky, who a little later openly joined theSecessionists, and was formally expelled December 4, 1861; he wassucceeded by Garrett Davis, an "American or Old Line Whig, " by whichname he and two senators from Maryland preferred to be described; JamesW. Nesmith of Oregon. Lane and Pomeroy, the first senators from the freeState of Kansas, were seated. In the House Galusha A. Grow ofPennsylvania, who had lately knocked down Mr. Keitt of South Carolina ina fisticuff encounter on the floor of the chamber, was chosen speaker, over Francis P. Blair, Jr. , of Missouri. Thaddeus Stevens ofPennsylvania was the most prominent man in the body. Among many familiarnames in running down the list the eye lights upon James E. English ofConnecticut; E. B. Washburne, Isaac N. Arnold, and Owen Lovejoy ofIllinois; Julian, Voorhees, and Schuyler Colfax of Indiana; Crittendenof Kentucky; Roscoe Conkling, Reuben E. Fenton, and Erastus Corning ofNew York; George H. Pendleton, Vallandigham, Ashley, Shellabarger, andS. S. Cox of Ohio; Covode of Pennsylvania; Maynard of Tennessee. Themembers came together in very good temper; and the great preponderanceof Republicans secured dispatch in the conduct of business; for thecliques which soon produced intestine discomfort in that dominant partywere not yet developed. No ordinary legislation was entered upon; but intwenty-nine working days seventy-six public Acts were passed, of whichall but four bore directly upon the extraordinary emergency. The demandsof the President were met, with additions: 500, 000 men and $500, 000, 000were voted; $207, 000, 000 were appropriated to the army, and $56, 000, 000to the navy. August 6 Congress adjourned. 

 * * * * *

The law-makers were treated, during their session, to what was regarded, in the inexperience of those days, as a spectacle of real war. During acouple of months past large bodies of men had been gathering together, living in tents, shouldering guns, and taking the name of armies. General Butler was in command at Fortress Monroe, and was faced byColonel Magruder, who held the peninsula between the York and the Jamesrivers. Early in June the lieutenants of these two commanders performedthe comical fiasco of the "battle" of Big Bethel. In this skirmish theFederal regiments fired into each other, and then retreated, while theConfederates withdrew; but in language of absurd extravagance theConfederate colonel reported that he had won a great victory, andNorthern men flushed beneath the ridicule incurred by the blunder oftheir troops. 

A smaller affair at Vienna was more ridiculous; several hundredsoldiers, aboard a train of cars, started upon a reconnoissance, as ifit had been a picnic. The Confederates fired upon them with a couple ofsmall cannon, and they hastily took to the woods. When they got homethey talked wisely about "masked batteries. " But the shrewdness andhumor of the people were not thus turned aside, and the "masked battery"long made the point of many a bitter jest. 

Up the river, Harper's Ferry was held by "Stonewall" Jackson, who wassoon succeeded by J. E. Johnston. Confronting and watching this force wasGeneral Patterson, at Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, with a body of menrapidly growing to considerable numbers by the daily coming of recruits. Not very far away, southeastward, the main body of the Confederate army, under Beauregard, lay at Manassas, and the main body of the Federalarmy, under McDowell, was encamped along the Potomac. On May 23 theNorthern advance crossed that river, took possession of ArlingtonHeights and of Alexandria, and began work upon permanent defensiveintrenchments in front of the capital. 

The people of the North knew nothing about war or armies. Wild withenthusiasm and excitement, they cheered the departing regiments, which, as they vaguely and eagerly fancied, were to begin fighting at once. Yet it was true that no one would stake his money on a "football team"which should go into a game trained in a time so short as that which hadbeen allowed for bringing into condition for the manoeuvres andbattlefields of a campaign an army of thirty or forty thousand men, withstaff and commissariat, and arms of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, altogether constituting an organization vast, difficult, and complex inthe highest degree of human coöperation. Nevertheless "On to Richmond!"rolled up the imperious cry from every part of the North. Thegovernment, either sharing in this madness, or feeling that it must beyielded to, passed the word to the commander, and McDowell veryreluctantly obeyed orders and started with his army in thatdirection, --not, however, with any real hope of reaching this nominalobjective; for he was an intelligent man and a good soldier, and wasperfectly aware of the unfitness of his army. But when, protesting, hesuggested that his troops were "green, " he was told to remember that theSouthern troops were of the same tint; for, in a word, the North wasbound to have a fight, and would by no means endure that the threemonths' men should come home without doing something more positive thanmerely preventing the capture of Washington. 

On July 16, therefore, McDowell began his advance, having with him about35, 000 men, and by the 19th he was at the stream of Bull Run, behindwhich the Confederates lay. He planned his battle skillfully, and beganhis attack on the morning of the 21st. On the other hand, Beauregard wasat the double disadvantage of misapprehending his opponent's purpose, and of failing to get his orders conveyed to his lieutenants until thefight was far advanced. The result was, that at the beginning of theafternoon the Federals had almost won a victory which they fullydeserved. That they did not finally secure it was due to theinefficiency of General Patterson. This general had crossed the Potomaca few days before and had been instructed to watch Johnston, who haddrawn back near Winchester, and either to prevent him from moving hisforce from the Shenandoah Valley to Manassas, or, failing this, to keepclose to him and unite with McDowell. But Patterson neither detained norfollowed his opponent. On July 18 Beauregard telegraphed to Johnston:"If you wish to help me, now is the time. " If Patterson wished to helpMcDowell, then, also, was the time. The Southern general seized hisopportunity, and the Northern general let his opportunity go. Johnston, uninterrupted and unfollowed by Patterson, brought his troops in fromManassas Junction upon the right wing of the Federals at the very momentand crisis when the battle was actually in the process of going in theirfavor. Directly all was changed. Older troops would not have stood, andthese untried ones were defeated as soon as they were attacked. Speedilyretreat became rout, and rout became panic. At a great speed thefrightened soldiers, resolved into a mere disorganized mob ofindividuals, made their way back to the camps on the Potomac; manythought Washington safer, and some did not stop short of their distantNorthern homes. 

The Southerners, who had been on the point of running away when theNortherners anticipated them in so doing, now triumphed immoderately, and uttered boastings magniloquent enough for Homeric heroes. Yet theywere, as General Johnston said, "almost as much disorganized by victoryas were the Federals by defeat. " Many of them also hastened to theirhomes, spreading everywhere the cheering tidings that the war was overand the South had won. 

In point of fact, it was a stage of the war when defeat was morewholesome than victory. Fortunately, too, the North was not evenmomentarily discouraged. The people had sense enough to see that whathad happened was precisely what should have been expected. A littlehumiliated at their own folly, about as much vexed with themselves asangry with their enemies, they turned to their work in a new spirit. Persistence displaced excitement, as three years' men replaced threemonths' men. The people settled down to a long, hard task. Besides this, they had now some idea of what was necessary to be done in order tosucceed in that task. Invaluable lessons had been learned, and no liveswhich were lost in the war bore fruit of greater usefulness than didthose which seemed to have been foolishly thrown away at Bull Run. 

FOOTNOTES:

[143] So said Hon. George W. Julian, somewhat ruefully acknowledgingthat Lincoln "was always himself the President. " _Polit. Recoll. _ 190. 

[144] South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas were covered by this proclamation; on April 27, North Carolinaand Virginia were added. 

[145] For the documents in this case, and also for some of the morefamous professional opinions thereon, see McPherson, _Hist. OfRebellion, 154 et seq. _; also (of course from the side of the chiefjustice), Tyler's _Taney_, 420-431; and see original draft of thePresident's message on this subject; N. And H. Iv. 176. 

CHAPTER X

THE FIRST ACT OF THE MCCLELLAN DRAMA

On the day after the battle of Bull Run General George B. McClellan wassummoned to Washington, where he arrived on July 26. On the 25th he hadbeen assigned to the command of the army of the Potomac. By all thelight which President Lincoln had at the time of making thisappointment, it seemed the best that was possible; and in fact it wasso, in view of the immediate sphere of usefulness of a commandinggeneral in Virginia. McClellan was thirty-four years old, of vigorousphysique and fine address. After his graduation at West Point, in 1846, he was attached to the Engineer Corps; he served through the Mexicanwar, and for merit received a captaincy. In 1855 he was sent byJefferson Davis, then secretary of war, to Europe to study theorganizing and handling of armies in active service; and he was for awhile at the British headquarters during the siege of Sebastopol, observing their system in operation. In January, 1857, he resigned fromthe army; but with the first threatenings of the civil war he made readyto play an active part. April 23, 1861, he was appointed by the governorof Ohio a major-general, with command of all the state forces. May 13, by an order from the national government, he took command of theDepartment of the Ohio, in which shortly afterward Western Virginia wasincluded. He found the sturdy mountaineers of this inaccessible regionfor the most part loyalists, but overawed by rebel troops, and towardthe close of May, upon his own sole responsibility, he inaugurated acampaign for their relief. In this he had the good fortune to beentirely successful. By some small engagements he cleared the country ofarmed Secessionists and returned it to the Union; and in so doing heshowed energy and good tactical ability. These achievements, which laterin the war would have seemed inconsiderable, now led to confidence andpromotion. 

In his new and exalted position McClellan became commander of a greatnumber of men, but not of a great army. The agglomeration of civilians, who had run away from Manassas under the impression that they had foughtand lost a real battle, was utterly disorganized and demoralized. Somehad already reached the sweet safety of the villages of the North;others were lounging in the streets of Washington and swelling thereceipts of its numerous barrooms. The majority, it is true, were incamp across the Potomac, but in no condition to render service. All, having been enlisted for three months, now had only a trifling remnantof so-called military life before them, in which it seemed to manyhardly worth while to run risks. The new call for volunteers for threeyears had just gone forth, and though troops began to arrive under itwith surprising promptitude and many three months' men reënlisted, yet along time had to elapse before the new levies were all on hand. Thusbetwixt departing and coming hosts McClellan's duty was not to use anarmy, but to create one. 

The task looked immeasurable, but there was a fortunate fitness for itupon both sides. The men who in this awful crisis were answering thesummons of President Lincoln constituted a raw material of a kind suchas never poured into any camp save possibly into that of Cromwell. Forthe most part they were courageous, intelligent, self-respectingcitizens, who were under the noble compulsion of conscience andpatriotism in leaving reputable and prosperous callings for a militarycareer. The moral, mental, and physical average of such a body of menwas a long way above that of professional armies, and insured readinessin acquiring their new calling. But admirable as were the latentpossibilities, and apt as each individual might be, these multitudesarrived wholly uninstructed; few had even so much as seen a realsoldier; none had any notion at all of what military discipline was, orhow to handle arms, or to manoeuvre, or to take care of their health. Nor could they easily get instruction in these things, for officers knewno more than privates; indeed, for that matter, one of the greatdifficulties at first encountered lay in the large proportion of utterlyunfit men who had succeeded in getting commissions, and who had to betoilfully eliminated. 

That which was to be done, McClellan was well able to do. He had apassion for organization, and fine capacity for work; he showed tact andskill in dealing with subordinates; he had a thorough knowledge and ahigh ideal of what an army should be. He seemed the Genius of Order ashe educated and arranged the chaotic gathering of human beings, who camebefore him to be transmuted from farmers, merchants, clerks, shopkeepers, and what not into soldiers of all arms and into leaders ofsoldiers. To that host in chrysalis he was what each skillfuldrill-master is to his awkward squad. Under his influence privateslearned how to obey and officers how to command; each individual mergedthe sense of individuality in that of homogeneousness and cohesion, until the original loose association of units became one grand unitendowed with the solidarity and machine-like quality of an efficientarmy. Patient labor produced a result so excellent that General Meadesaid long afterward: "Had there been no McClellan there could have beenno Grant, for the army made no essential improvement under any of hissuccessors. "

That the formation of this great complex machine was indispensable, andthat it would take much time, were facts which the disaster at Bull Runhad compelled both the administration and the people to appreciatemoderately well. Accordingly they resolutely set themselves to bepatient. The cry of "On to Richmond!" no longer sounded through theland, and the restraint imposed by the excited masses upon their ownardor was the strongest evidence of their profound earnestness. In asteady stream they poured men and material into the camps in Virginia, and they heard with satisfaction of the advance of the levies indiscipline and soldierly efficiency. For a while the scene was pleasantand without danger. "It was, " says Arnold, describing that of which hehad been an eye-witness, "the era of brilliant reviews and magnificentmilitary displays, of parades, festive parties, and junketings. " Membersof Congress found excursions to the camps attractive for themselves andtheir visitors. Glancing arms, new uniforms, drill, and musicconstituted a fine show. Thus the rest of the summer passed away, andautumn came and was passing, too. Then here and there signs ofimpatience began again to be manifested. It was observed with discontentthat the glorious days of the Indian Summer, the perfect season formilitary operations, were gliding by as tranquilly as if there were nota great war on hand, and still the citizen at home read each morning inhis newspaper the stereotyped bulletin, "All quiet on the Potomac;" thephrase passed into a byword and a sneer. By this time, too, to a nationwhich had not European standards of excellence, the army seemed to havereached a high state of efficiency, and to be abundantly able to takethe field. Why did not its commander move? Amid all the drilling andband-playing the troops had been doing hard work: a chain of strongfortifications scientifically constructed had been completed around thecapital, and rendered it easy of defense. It could be left in safety. Why, then, was it not left? Why did the troops still linger?

For a moment this monotony was interrupted by the ill-conductedengagement at Ball's Bluff. On October 21 nearly 2000 troops were sentacross the Potomac by the local commander, with the foolish expectationof achieving something brilliant. [146] The actual result was that theywere corralled in an open field; in their rear the precipitous bankdropped sharply to the river, upon which floated only the two or threelittle boats which had ferried them across in small parties; in frontand flank from the shelter of thick woods an outnumbering force ofrebels poured a steady fire upon them. They were in a cruel snare, andsuffered terribly in killed and drowned, wounded and captured. Theaffair was, and the country at once saw that it was, a gross blunder. The responsibility lay upon General Stone and Colonel Baker. Stone, amilitary man by education, deserved censure, but he was treated in amanner so cruel, so unjust, and so disproportionate to his deserts, thathis error has been condoned in sympathy for his wrongs. The injusticewas chargeable chiefly to Stanton, in part to the Committee on theConduct of the War. Apparently Mr. Lincoln desired to know as little aspossible about a wrong which he could not set right without injury tothe public interests. He said to Stanton concerning the arrest: "Isuppose you have good reasons for it, and having good reasons I am gladI knew nothing of it until it was done. " To General Stone himself hesaid that, if he should tell all he knew about it, he should not tellmuch. Colonel Baker, senator from Oregon, a personal friend of thePresident, a brilliant orator, and a man beloved and admired by all whoknew him, was a favorable specimen of the great body of new civilianofficers. While brimming over with gallantry and enthusiasm, he wasentirely ignorant of the military art. In the conduct of this enterprisea considerable discretion had been reposed in him, and he had, as wasaltogether natural, failed in everything except courage. But as he paidwith his life on the battlefield the penalty of his daring and hisinexperience, he was thought of only with tenderness and regret. 

This skirmish illustrated the scant trust which could yet be reposed inthe skill and judgment of subordinate officers. The men behaved withencouraging spirit and constancy under severe trial. But could acommander venture upon a campaign with brigadier-generals and colonelsso unfit to assume responsibility?

Nevertheless impatience hardly received a momentary check from thislesson. With some inconsistency, people placed unlimited confidence inMcClellan's capacity to beat the enemy, but no confidence at all in hisjudgment as to the feasibility of a forward movement. The grumbling didnot, however, indicate that faith in him was shaken, for just now he wasgiven promotion by Mr. Lincoln, and it met with general approval. Forsome time past it had been a cause of discomfort that he did not get onaltogether smoothly with General Scott; the elder was irascible andjealous, the younger certainly not submissive. At last, on October 31, the old veteran regretfully but quite wisely availed himself of hisright to be placed upon the retired list, and immediately, November 1, General McClellan succeeded him in the distinguished position ofcommander-in-chief (under the President) of all the armies of the UnitedStates. On the same day Mr. Lincoln courteously hastened out toheadquarters to make in person congratulations which were unquestionablyas sincere as they were generous. Every one felt that a magnificentopportunity was given to a favorite general. But unfortunately among allhis admirers there was not one who believed in him quite so fully as hebelieved in himself; he lost all sense of perspective and proportion, and felt upon a pinnacle from which he could look down even on apresident. [147] Being in this masterful temper, he haughtily disregardedthe growing demand for an advance. On the other hand the politicians, always eager to minister to the gratification of the people, began to beimportunate; they harried the President, and went out to camp to pricktheir civilian spurs into the general himself. But McClellan had asoldierly contempt for such intermeddling in matters military, and waswholly unimpressible. When Senator Wade said that an unsuccessful battlewas preferable to delay, for that a defeat would easily be repaired byswarming recruits, the general tartly replied that he preferred a fewrecruits before a victory to a great many after a defeat. But, howevercleverly and fairly the military man might counter upon the politician, there was no doubt that discontent was developing dangerously. Thepeople had conscientiously intended to do their part fully, and a largeproportion of them now sincerely believed that they had done it. Theyknew that they had been lavish of men, money, and supplies; and theythought that they had been not less liberal of time; wherefore theyrebelled against the contrary opinion of the general, whose ideal of atrustworthy army had by no means been reached, and who, being of astubborn temperament, would not stir till it had been. 

It is difficult to satisfy one's self of the real fitness of the armyto move at or about this time, --that is to say, in or near the month ofNovember, 1861, --for the evidence is mixed and conflicting. TheCommittee on the Conduct of the War asserted that "the army of thePotomac was well armed and equipped and had reached a high state ofdiscipline by the last of September or first of October;" but thecommittee was not composed of experts. Less florid commendation is givenby the Comte de Paris, of date October 15. McClellan himself said: "Itcertainly was not till late in November that the army was in anycondition to move, nor even then were they capable of assaultingintrenched positions. " At that time winter was at hand, and advance wassaid to be impracticable. That these statements were as favorable aspossible seems probable; for it is familiar knowledge that the call forthese troops did not issue until July, that at the close of November therecruits were still continuing "to pour in, to be assigned and equippedand instructed;"[148] that many came unarmed or with useless weapons;and that these "civilians, suddenly called to arms as soldiers andofficers, did not take kindly to the subordination and restraints of thecamp. "[149] Now McClellan's temperament did not lead him to run risks inthe effort to force achievements with means of dubious adequacy. Hispurpose was to create a machine perfect in every part, sure andirresistible in operation, and then to set it in motion with acertainty of success. He wrote to Lincoln: "I have ever regarded ourtrue policy as being that of fully preparing ourselves, and then seekingfor the most decisive results. "[150] Under favoring circumstances thisplan might have been the best. But circumstances were not favoring. Neither he nor the government itself, nor indeed both together, couldafford long or far to disregard popular feeling. Before the close ofNovember that popular feeling was such that the people would haveendured without flinching the discouragement of a defeat, but would notendure the severe tax of inaction, and from this time forth theirimpatience gathered volume until it became a controlling element in thesituation. Themselves intending to be reasonable, they grew more andmore convinced that McClellan was unreasonable. General and peopleconfronted each other: the North would fight, at the risk of defeat;McClellan would not fight, because he was not sure to win. Any one whocomprehended the conditions, the institutions of the country, thecharacter of the nation, especially its temper concerning the presentconflict, also the necessities beneath which that conflict must bewaged, if it was to be waged at all, would have seen that the peoplemust be deferred to. The question was not whether they were right orwrong. Assuming them to be wrong, it would still be a mistake towithstand them beyond a certain point. If yielding to them shouldresult in disastrous consequences, they must be called upon to rally, and could be trusted to do so, instructed but undismayed by theirexperience. All this McClellan utterly failed to appreciate, therebyleading Mr. Swinton very justly to remark that he was lacking in "thestatesmanlike qualities that enter into the composition of a greatgeneral. "[151]

On the other hand, no man ever lived more capable than Mr. Lincoln ofprecisely appreciating the present facts, or more sure to avoid thosepeculiar blunders which entrapped the military commander. He was veryloyal in living up to his pledge to give the general full support, andby his conduct during many months to come he proved his readiness toabide to the last possible point. He knew, however, with unerringaccuracy just where that last point lay, and he saw with disquietudethat it was being approached too rapidly. He was getting sufficientknowledge of McClellan's character to see that the day was not distantwhen he must interfere. Meantime he kept his sensitive finger upon thepopular pulse, as an expert physician watches a patient in a fever. Withthe growth of the impatience his anxiety grew, for the people's warwould not be successfully fought by a dissatisfied people. Repeatedly hetested the situation in the hope that a movement could be forcedwithout undue imprudence; but he was always met by objections fromMcClellan. In weighing the Northern and the Southern armies against eachother, the general perhaps undervalued his own resources and certainlyovervalued those of his opponent. He believed that the Confederate"discipline and drill were far better than our own;" wherein he wasprobably in error, for General Lee admitted that, while the Southernerswould always fight well, they were refractory under discipline. Moreover, they were at this time very ill provided with equipment andtransportation. Also McClellan said that the Southern army had thrown upintrenchments at Manassas and Centreville, and therefore the "problemwas to attack victorious and finely drilled troops in intrenchment. " Butthe most discouraging and inexplicable assertion, which he emphaticallyreiterated, concerned the relative numerical strength. He not onlydeclared that he himself could not put into the field the numbers shownby the official returns to be with him, but also he exaggerated theSouthern numbers till he became extravagant to the point of absurdity. So it had been from the outset, and so it continued to be to the timewhen he was at last relieved of his command. Thus, on August 15, heconceived himself to be "in a terrible place; the enemy have three orfour times my force. " September 9 he imagined Johnston to have 130, 000men, against his own 85, 000; and he argued that Johnston could moveupon Baltimore a column 100, 000 strong, which he could meet with only60, 000 or 70, 000. Later in October he marked the Confederates up to150, 000. He estimated his own requirement at a "total effective force"of 208, 000 men, which implied "an aggregate, present and absent, ofabout 240, 000 men. " Of these he designed 150, 000 as a "column of activeoperations;" the rest were for garrisons and guards. He said that infact he had a gross aggregate of 168, 318, and the "force present forduty was 147, 695. " Since the garrisons and the guards were a fixednumber, the reduction fell wholly upon the movable column, and reduced"the number disposable for an advance to 76, 285. " Thus he made himselfout to be fatally overmatched. But he was excessively in error. In theautumn Johnston's effective force was only 41, 000 men, and on December1, 1861, it was 47, 000. [152]

Such comparisons, advanced with positiveness by the highest authority, puzzled Mr. Lincoln. They seemed very strange, yet he could not disprovethem, and was therefore obliged to face the perplexing choice which wasmercilessly set before him: "either to go into winter quarters, or toassume the offensive with forces greatly inferior in number" to whatwas "desirable and necessary. " "If political considerations render thefirst course unadvisable, the second alone remains. " The general's mostcheering admission was that, by stripping all other armies down to thelowest numbers absolutely necessary for a strict defensive, and byconcentrating all the forces of the nation and all the attention of thegovernment upon "the vital point" in Virginia, it might yet be possiblefor this "main army, whose destiny it [was] to decide thecontroversy, . . . To move with a reasonable prospect of success before thewinter is fairly upon us. " A direct assertion of impossibility, provocative of denial or discussion, would have been less disheartening. 

In passing, it may be remarked that McClellan's prevision that theultimate arbitrament of the struggle must occur in Virginia was correct. But in another point he was wrong, and unfortunately this was of moreimmediate consequence, because it corroborated him in his purpose todelay till he could make success a certainty. He hoped that when hemoved, he should be able to win one or two overwhelming victories, tocapture Richmond, and to crush the rebellion in a few weeks. It was abrilliant and captivating programme, [153] but impracticable andundesirable. Even had the Southerners been quelled by so great adisaster, --which was not likely, --they would not have been thoroughlyconquered, nor would slavery have been disposed of, and both theseevents were indispensable to a definitive peace between the twosections. Whether the President shared this notion of his general is notevident. Apparently he was not putting his mind upon theories reachinginto the future so much as he was devoting his whole thought to dealingwith the urgent problems of the present. If this was the case, he waspursuing the wise and sound course. In the situation, it was moredesirable to fight a great battle at the earliest possible moment thanto await a great victory many months hence. 

It is commonplace wisdom that it is foolish for a civilian to undertakethe direction of a war. Yet our Constitution ordains that "the Presidentshall be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States, when called into the actualservice of the United States. " It is not supposable that the delegateswho suggested this function, or the people who ordained it, anticipatedthat presidents generally would be men skilled in military science. Therefore Mr. Lincoln could not escape the obligation on the ground ofunfitness for the duty which was imperatively placed upon him. It mightbe true that to set him in charge of military operations was likeordering a merchant to paint a picture or a jockey to sail a ship, butit was also true that he was so set in charge. He could not shirk it, nor did he try to shirk it. In consequence hostile critics have dealtmercilessly with his actions, and the history of this winter and springof 1861-62 is a painful and confusing story of bitter controversy andcrimination. Further it is to be remembered that, apart from theobligation imposed on the President by the Constitution, it was truethat if civilians could not make rapid progress in the military art, thewar might as well be abandoned. They were already supposed to be doingso; General Banks, a politician, and General Butler, a lawyer, werealready conducting important movements. Still it remains undeniable thatfinally it was only the professional soldiers who, undergoingsuccessfully the severe test of time, composed the illustrious frontrank of strategists when the close of the war left every man in hisestablished place. In discussing this perplexing period, extremists uponone side attribute the miscarriages and failure of McClellan's campaignto ceaseless, thwarting interference by the President, the secretary ofwar, and other civil officials. Extremists upon the other side allegethe marvel that a sudden development of unerring judgment upon everyquestion involving the practical application of military science tookplace on Mr. Lincoln's part. [154] Perhaps the truth lies between thedisputants, but it is not likely ever to be definitely agreed upon solong as the controversy excites interest; for the discussion bristleswith _ifs_, and where this is the case no advocate can be irremediablyvanquished. 

It seems right, at this place, to note one fact concerning Mr. Lincolnwhich ought not to be overlooked and which cannot be denied. This is hisentire _political unselfishness_, the rarest moral quality among men inpublic life. In those days of trouble and distrust slanders were rife ina degree which can hardly be appreciated by men whose experience hasbeen only with quieter times. Sometimes purposes and sometimes methodswere assailed; and those prominent in civil life, and a few also inmilitary life, were believed to be artfully and darkly seeking tointerlace their personal political fortunes in the web of publicaffairs, naturally subordinating the latter fabric. Alliances, enmities, intrigues, schemes, and every form of putting the interest of selfbefore that of the nation, were insinuated with a bitter malevolenceunknown except amid such abnormal conditions. The few who escapedcharges of this kind were believed to cherish their own peculiarfanaticisms, desires, and purposes concerning the object and results ofthe struggle, which they were resolved to satisfy at almost any cost andby almost any means. While posterity is endeavoring very wisely todiscredit and to forget a great part of these painful criminations, itis cheering to find that no effort has to be made to forget anythingabout the President. In his case injurious gossip has long since diedaway and been buried. Whatever may be said of him in other respects, atleast the purity and the singleness of his patriotism shine brilliantand luminous through all this cloud-dust of derogation. By his positionhe had more at stake, both in his lifetime and before the tribunal ofthe future, than any other person in the country. But there was only oneidea in his mind, and that was, --not that _he should save the country_, but _that the country should be saved_. Not the faintest shadow of selfever fell for an instant across this simple purpose. He was intent toplay his part out faithfully, with all the ability he could bring to it;but any one else, who could, might win and wear the title of savior. Hechiefly cared that the saving should be done. Never once did hemanipulate any covert magnet to draw toward himself the credit or theglory of a measure or a move. To his own future he seemed to give nothought. It would be unjust to allow the dread of appearing to uttereulogy rather than historic truth to betray a biographer intooverlooking this genuine magnanimity. 

 * * * * *

It was in December, 1861, that Congress created the famous Committee onthe Conduct of the War, to some of whose doings it has already beennecessary to allude. The gentlemen who were placed upon it were selectedpartly of course for political reasons, and were all men who had madethemselves conspicuous for their enthusiasm and vehemence; not one ofthem had any military knowledge. The committee magnified its officealmost beyond limit, --investigated everything; haled whom it chose totestify before it; made reports, expressed opinions, insisted uponpolicies and measures in matters military; and all with a dictatorialassumption and self-confidence which could not be devoid of effect, although every one knew that each individual member was absolutelywithout fitness for this business. So the committee made itself a greatpower, and therefore also a great complication, in the war machinery;and though it was sometimes useful, yet, upon a final balancing of itslong account, it failed to justify its existence, as, indeed, was tohave been expected from the outset. [155] In the present discussionsconcerning an advance of the army, its members strenuously insisted uponimmediate action, and their official influence brought much strength tothat side. 

The first act indicating an intention on the part of the President tointerfere occurred almost simultaneously with the beginning of thegeneral's illness. About December 21, 1861, he handed to McClellan abrief memorandum: "If it were determined to make a forward movement ofthe army of the Potomac, without awaiting further increase of numbersor better drill and discipline, how long would it require to actuallyget in motion? After leaving all that would be necessary, how manytroops could join the movement from southwest of the river? How manyfrom northeast of it?" Then he proceeded briefly to hint rather thandistinctly to suggest that plan of a direct advance by way ofCentreville and Manassas, which later on he persistently advocated. Tendays elapsed before McClellan returned answers, which then came in ashape too curt to be respectful. Almost immediately afterward thegeneral fell ill, an occurrence which seemed to his detractors a mostaggravating and unjustifiable intervention of Nature herself in behalfof his policy of delay. 

On January 10 a dispatch from General Halleck represented in hisdepartment also a condition of check and helplessness. Lincoln notedupon it: "Exceedingly discouraging. As everywhere else, nothing can bedone. " Yet something must be done, for the game was not to be abandoned. Under this pressure, on this same day, he visited McClellan, but couldnot see him; nor could he get any definite idea how long might be theduration of the typhoid fever, the lingering and uncertain disease whichhad laid the general low. Accordingly he summoned General McDowell andGeneral Franklin to discuss with him that evening the militarysituation. The secretaries of state and of the treasury, and theassistant secretary of war, also came. The President, says McDowell, "was greatly disturbed at the state of affairs, " "was in greatdistress, " and said that, "if something was not soon done, the bottomwould be out of the whole affair; and if General McClellan did not wantto use the army, he would like to '_borrow it_, ' provided he could seehow it could be made to do something. " The two generals were directed toinform themselves concerning the "actual condition of the army, " and tocome again the next day. Conferences followed on January 11 and 12, Postmaster-General Blair and General Meigs being added to the council. The postmaster-general condemned a direct advance as "strategicallydefective, " while Chase descanted on the "moral power" of a victory. Thepicture of the two civilians injecting their military suggestions is notreassuring. Meigs is somewhat vaguely reported to have favored a "battlein front. "

McDowell and Franklin had not felt justified in communicating theseoccurrences to McClellan, because the President had marked his order tothem "private and confidential. " But the commander heard rumors of whatwas going forward, [156] and on January 12 he came from his sick-room tosee the President; he was "looking quite well, " and apparently was "ableto assume the charge of the army. " The apparition put a differentcomplexion upon the pending discussions. On the 13th the same gentlemenmet, but now with the addition of General McClellan. The situation wasembarrassing. McClellan took scant pains to conceal his resentment. McDowell, at the request of the President, explained what he thoughtcould be done, closing "by saying something apologetic;" to whichMcClellan replied, "somewhat coldly if not curtly: 'You are entitled tohave any opinion you please. '" Secretary Chase, a leader among theanti-McClellanites, bluntly asked the general to explain his militaryplans in detail; but McClellan declined to be interrogated except by thePresident, or by the secretary of war, who was not present. Finally, according to McClellan's account, which differs a little but notessentially from that of McDowell, Mr. Lincoln suggested[157] that heshould tell what his plans were. McClellan replied, in substance, thatthis would be imprudent and seemed unnecessary, and that he would onlygive information if the President would order him in writing to do so, and would assume the responsibility for the results. [158] McDowell adds(but McClellan does not), that the President then asked McClellan "if hehad counted upon any particular time; he did not ask what that time was, but had he in his own mind any particular time fixed, when a movementcould be commenced. He replied, he had. 'Then, ' rejoined the President, 'I will adjourn this meeting. '" This unfortunate episode aggravated thediscord, and removed confidence and coöperation farther away than everbefore. 

The absence of the secretary of war from these meetings was due to thefact that a change in the War Department was in processcontemporaneously with them. The President had been allowed tounderstand that Mr. Cameron did not find his duties agreeable, and mightprefer a diplomatic post. Accordingly, with no show of reluctance, Mr. Lincoln, on January 11, 1862, offered to Mr. Cameron the post ofminister to Russia. It was promptly accepted, and on January 13 Edwin M. Stanton was nominated and confirmed to fill the vacancy. [159] Theselection was a striking instance of the utter absence of vindictivenesswhich so distinguished Mr. Lincoln, who, in fact, was simply insensibleto personal feeling as an influence. In choosing incumbents for publictrusts, he knew no foe, perhaps no friend; but as dispassionately as ifhe were manoeuvring pieces on a chessboard, he considered only whichavailable piece would serve best in the square which he had to fill. In1859 he and Stanton had met as associate counsel in perhaps the mostimportant lawsuit in which Mr. Lincoln had ever been concerned, andStanton had treated Lincoln with his habitual insolence. [160] Later, in the trying months which closed the year 1861, Stanton had abused theadministration with violence, and had carried his revilings of thePresident even to the point of coarse personal insults. [161] No man, notbeing a rebel, had less right to expect an invitation to become anadviser of the President; and most men, who had felt or expressed theopinions held by Mr. Stanton, would have had scruples or delicacy aboutcoming into the close relationship of confidential adviser with theobject of their contempt; but neither scruples nor delicacy delayed him;his acceptance was prompt. [162]

[Illustration: Edwin M. Stanton]

So Mr. Lincoln had chosen his secretary solely upon the belief of thepeculiar fitness of the individual for the special duties of the waroffice. Upon the whole the choice was wisely made, and was evidence ofMr. Lincoln's insight into the aptitudes and the uses of men. Stanton'sabilities commanded some respect, though his character never excitedeither respect or liking; just now, however, all his good qualities andmany of his faults seemed precisely adapted to the present requirementsof his department. He had been a Democrat, but was now zealous toextremity in patriotism; in his dealings with men he was capable of muchduplicity, yet in matters of business he was rigidly honest, and it washis pleasure to protect the treasury against the contractors; he lovedwork, and never wearied amid the driest and most exacting toil; he wasprompt and decisive rather than judicial or correct in his judgmentsconcerning men and things; he was arbitrary, harsh, bad-tempered, andimpulsive; he often committed acts of injustice or cruelty, for which herarely made amends, and still more rarely seemed disturbed by remorse orregret. These traits bore hard upon individuals; but ready andunscrupulous severity was supposed to have its usefulness in a civilwar. Many a time he taxed the forbearance of the President to a degreethat would have seemed to transcend the uttermost limit of humanpatience, if Mr. Lincoln had not taken these occasions to show to theworld how forbearing and patient it is possible for man to be. But thosewho knew the relations of the two men are agreed that Stanton, howeverbrowbeating he was to others, recognized a master in the President, and, though often grumbling and insolent, always submitted if a crisis came. Undoubtedly Mr. Lincoln was the only ruler known to history who couldhave coöperated for years with such a minister. He succeeded in doing sobecause he believed it to be for the good of the cause, to which hecould easily subordinate all personal considerations; and posterity, agreeing with him, concedes to Stanton credit for efficiency in theconduct of his department. 

It is worth while here to pause long enough to read part of a letterwhich, on this same crowded thirteenth day of January, 1862, thePresident sent to General Halleck, in the West: "For my own views: Ihave not offered, and do not now offer, them as orders; and while I amglad to have them respectfully considered, I would blame you to followthem contrary to your own clear judgment, unless I should put them inthe form of orders. . . . With this preliminary, I state my general idea ofthis war to be that we have the greater numbers and the enemy has thegreater facility of concentrating forces upon points of collision; thatwe must fail unless we can find some way of making our advantage anovermatch for his; and that this can only be done by menacing him withsuperior forces at different points at the same time, so that we cansafely attack one or both if he makes no change; and if he weakens oneto strengthen the other, forbear to attack the strengthened one, butseize and hold the weakened one, gaining so much. "

In a personal point of view this short letter is pregnant with interestand suggestion. The writer's sad face, eloquent of the charge and burdenof one of the most awful destinies of human-kind, rises before us as weread the expression of his modest self-distrust amid the strange dutiesof military affairs. But closely following this comes the intimationthat in due time "_orders_" will come. Such was the quiet, unflinchingway in which Lincoln always faced every test, apparently with a tranquiland assured faith that, whatever might seem his lack of fittingpreparation, his best would be adequate to the occasion. The habit hasled many to fancy that he believed himself divinely chosen, andtherefore sure of infallible guidance; but it is observable far back, almost from the beginning of his life; it was a trait of mind andcharacter, nothing else. The letter closes with a broad general theoryconcerning the war, wrought out by that careful process of thinkingwhereby he was wont to make his way to the big, simple, and fundamentaltruth. The whole is worth holding in memory through the narrative of thecoming weeks. 

The conference of January 13 developed a serious difference of opinionas to the plan of campaign, whenever a campaign should be entered upon. The President's notion, already shadowed forth in his memorandum ofDecember, was to move directly upon the rebel army at Centreville andManassas and to press it back upon Richmond, with the purpose ofcapturing that city. But McClellan presented as his project a movementby Urbana and West Point, using the York River as a base of supplies. General McDowell and Secretary Chase favored the President's plan;General Franklin and Postmaster Blair thought better of McClellan's. ThePresident had a strong fancy for his own scheme, because by it the Unionarmy was kept between the enemy and Washington; and therefore thesupreme point of importance, the safety of the national capital, wasinsured. The discussion, which was thus opened and which remained longunsettled, had, among other ill effects, that of sustaining thevexatious delay. While the anti-McClellan faction--for the matter wasbecoming one of factions[163]--grew louder in denunciation of hisinaction, and fastened upon him the contemptuous nickname of "theVirginia creeper, " the friends of the general retorted that thePresident, meddling in what he did not understand, would not let themilitary commander manage the war. 

Nevertheless Mr. Lincoln, dispassionate and fair-minded as usual, allowed neither their personal difference of opinion nor this abusiveoutcry to inveigle into his mind any prejudice against McClellan. TheSoutherner who, in February, 1861, predicted that Lincoln "would do hisown thinking, " read character well. Lincoln was now doing precisely thisthing, in his silent, thorough, independent way, neither provoked byMcClellan's cavalier assumption of superior knowledge, nor alarmed bythe danger of offending the politicians. In fact, he decided to gocounter to both the disputants; for he resolved, on the one hand, tocompel McClellan to act; on the other, to maintain him in his command. He did not, however, abandon his own plan of campaign. On January 27, ascommander-in-chief of the army, he issued his "General War Order No. 1. "In this he directed "that the 22d day of February, 1862, be the day fora general movement of the land and naval forces of the United Statesagainst the insurgent forces;" and said that heads of departments andmilitary and naval commanders would "be held to their strict and fullresponsibilities for prompt execution of this order. " By this hepractically repudiated McClellan's scheme, because transportation andother preparations for pursuing the route by Urbana could not be madeready by the date named. 

Critics of the President have pointed to this document as a fineinstance of the follies to be expected from a civil ruler who conducts awar. To order an advance all along a line from the Mississippi to theAtlantic, upon a day certain, without regard to differing localconditions and exigencies, and to notify the enemy of the purpose nearlya month beforehand, were acts preposterous according to militaryscience. But the criticism was not so fair as it was obvious. The orderreally bore in part the character of a manifesto; to the people of theNorth, whose confidence must be kept and their spirit sustained, itsaid that the administration meant action at once; to commandingofficers it was a fillip, warning them to bestir themselves, obstaclesto the contrary notwithstanding. It was a reveille. Further, in ageneral way it undoubtedly laid out a sound plan of campaign, substantially in accordance with that which McClellan also was evolving, viz. : to press the enemy all along the western and middle line, and thusto prevent his making too formidable a concentration in Virginia. In theend, however, practicable or impracticable, wise or foolish, the orderwas never fulfilled. The armies in Virginia did nothing till many weeksafter the anniversary of Washington's birthday; whereas, in the West, Admiral Foote and General Grant did not conceive that they were enforcedto rest in idleness until that historic date. Before it arrived they hadperformed the brilliant exploits of capturing Fort Henry and FortDonelson. 

On January 31 the President issued "Special War Order No. 1, " directingthe army of the Potomac to seize and occupy "a point upon the railroadsouthwestward of what is known as Manassas Junction;. . . The expeditionto move before or on the 22d day of February next. " This was thedistinct, as the general order had been the indirect, adoption of hisown plan of campaign, and the overruling of that of the general. McClellan at once remonstrated, and the two rival plans thus came faceto face for immediate and definitive settlement. It must be assumedthat the President's order had been really designed only to forceexactly this issue; for on February 3, so soon as he received theremonstrance, he invited argument from the general by writing to him aletter which foreshadowed an open-minded reception for views opposed tohis own:--

"If you will give satisfactory answers to the following questions, Ishall gladly yield my plan to yours:--

"1st. Does not your plan involve a greatly larger expenditure of _time_and _money_ than mine?

"2d. Wherein is a victory _more certain_ by your plan than mine?

"3d. Wherein is a victory _more valuable_ by your plan than mine?

"4th. In fact, would it not be _less_ valuable in this: that it wouldbreak no great line of the enemy's communications, while mine would?

"5th. In case of disaster would not a retreat be more difficult by yourplan than mine?"

To these queries McClellan replied by a long and elaborate exposition ofhis views. He said that, if the President's plan should be pursuedsuccessfully, the "results would be confined to the possession of thefield of battle, the evacuation of the line of the upper Potomac by theenemy, and the moral effect of the victory. " On the other hand, amovement in force by the route which he advocated "obliges the enemy toabandon his intrenched position at Manassas, in order to hasten tocover Richmond and Norfolk. " That is to say, he expected to achieve by amanoeuvre what the President designed to effect by a battle, to befought by inexperienced troops against an intrenched enemy. Hecontinued: "This movement, if successful, gives us the capital, thecommunications, the supplies, of the rebels; Norfolk would fall; all thewaters of the Chesapeake would be ours; all Virginia would be in ourpower, and the enemy forced to abandon Tennessee and North Carolina. Thealternative presented to the enemy would be, to beat us in a positionselected by ourselves, disperse, or pass beneath the Caudine forks. " Incase of defeat the Union army would have a "perfectly secure retreatdown the Peninsula upon Fort Monroe. " "This letter, " he afterward wrote, "must have produced some effect upon the mind of the President!" Theslur was unjust. The President now and always considered the views ofthe general with a liberality of mind rarely to be met with in any man, and certainly never in McClellan himself. In this instance the letterdid in fact produce so much "effect upon the mind of the President" thathe prepared to yield views which he held very strongly to views which hewas charged with not being able to understand, and which he certainlycould not bring himself actually to believe in. 

Yet before quite taking this step he demanded that a council of thegenerals of division should be summoned to express their opinions. Thiswas done, with the result that McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, andBarnard voted against McClellan's plan; Keyes voted for it, with theproviso "that no change should be made until the rebels were driven fromtheir batteries on the Potomac. " Fitz-John Porter, Franklin, W. F. Smith, McCall, Blenker, Andrew Porter, and Naglee (of Hooker's division) votedfor it. Stanton afterward said of this: "We saw ten generals afraid tofight. " The insult, delivered in the snug personal safety which wassuspected to be very dear to Stanton, was ridiculous as aimed at men whosoon handled some of the most desperate battles of the war; but it isinteresting as an expression of the unreasoning bitterness of thecontroversy then waging over the situation in Virginia, a controversycausing animosities vastly more fierce than any between Union soldiersand Confederates, animosities which have unfortunately lasted longer, and which can never be brought to the like final and conclusivearbitrament. The purely military question quickly became snarled up withpolitics and was reduced to very inferior proportions in the noxiouscompetition. "Politics entered and strategy retired, " says General Webb, too truly. McClellan himself conceived that the politicians were leaguedto destroy him, and would rather see him discredited than the rebelswhipped. In later days the strong partisan loves and hatreds of ourhistorical writers have perpetuated and increased all this bad blood, confusion, and obscurity. 

The action of the council of generals was conclusive. The Presidentaccepted McClellan's plan. Therein he did right; for undeniably it washis duty to allow his own inexperience to be controlled by thedeliberate opinion of the best military experts in the country; and thisfact is wholly independent of any opinion concerning the intrinsic orthe comparative merits of the plans themselves. Indeed, Mr. Lincoln hadnever expressed positive disapproval of McClellan's plan _per se_, butonly had been alarmed at what seemed to him its indirect result inexposing the capital. To cover this point, he now made an imperativepreliminary condition that this safety should be placed beyond aquestion. He was emphatic and distinct in reiterating this proviso asfundamental. The preponderance of professional testimony, from that dayto this, has been to the effect that McClellan's strategy was sound andable, and that Mr. Lincoln's anxiety for the capital was groundless. Butin spite of all argument, and though military men may shed ink as if itwere mere blood, in spite even of the contempt and almost ridicule whichthe President incurred at the pen of McClellan, [164] the civilian willretain a lurking sympathy with the President's preference. It isimpossible not to reflect that precisely in proportion as the safety ofthe capital, for many weighty reasons, immeasurably outweighed any otherpossible consideration in the minds of the Northerners, so the desire tocapture it would be equally overmastering in the estimation of theSoutherners. Why might not the rebels permit McClellan to march intoRichmond, provided that at the same time they were marching intoWashington? Why might they not, in the language afterward used byGeneral Lee, "swap Queens?" They would have a thousand fold the betterof the exchange. The Northern Queen was an incalculably more valuablepiece on the board than was her Southern rival. With the Northerngovernment in flight, Maryland would go to the Confederacy, and Europeanrecognition would be sure and immediate; and these two facts might, almost surely would, be conclusive against the Northern cause. Moreover, memory will obstinately bring up the fact that long afterward, whenGeneral Grant was pursuing a route to Richmond strategically notdissimilar to that proposed by McClellan, and when all the circumstancesmade the danger of a successful attack upon Washington much less than itwas in the spring of 1862, the rebels actually all but captured thecity; and it was saved not alone by a rapidity of movement which wouldhave been impossible in the early stages of the war, but also by whatmust be called the aid of good luck. It is difficult to see why GeneralJackson in 1862 might not have played in fatal earnest a game which in1864 General Early played merely for the chances. Pondering upon thesethings, it is probable that no array of military scientists will everpersuade the non-military world that Mr. Lincoln was so timid, or sodull-witted, or so unreasonable, as General McClellan declared him tobe. 

Another consideration is suggested by some remarks of Mr. Swinton. It istolerably obvious that, whether McClellan's plan was or was not thebetter, the President's plan was entirely possible; all that could besaid against it was that it promised somewhat poorer results at somewhathigher cost. This being the case, and in view of the fact that thePresident's disquietude concerning Washington was so profound and hisdistrust of McClellan's plan so ineradicable, it would have been muchbetter to have had the yielding come from the general than from thePresident. A man of less stubborn temper and of broader intellect thanbelonged to McClellan would have appreciated this. In fact, it was in acertain sense even poor generalship to enter upon a campaign of suchmagnitude, when a thorough and hearty coöperation was really not to beexpected. For after all might be ostensibly settled and agreed upon, andhowever honest might be Mr. Lincoln's intentions to support thecommanding general, one thing still remained certain: that the safety ofthe capital was Mr. Lincoln's weightiest responsibility, that it was amatter concerning which he was sensitively anxious, and that he wasperfectly sure in any moment of alarm concerning that safety to insureit by any means in his power and at any sacrifice whatsoever. In a word, that which soon did happen was precisely that which ought to have beenforeseen as likely to happen. For it was entirely obvious that Mr. Lincoln did not abandon his own scheme because his own reason wasconvinced of the excellence of McClellan's; in fact, he never was andnever pretended to be thus convinced. To his mind, McClellan's reasoningnever overcame his own reasoning; he only gave way before professionalauthority; and, while he sincerely meant to give McClellan the mostefficient aid and backing in his power, the anxiety about Washingtonrested immovable in his thought. If the two interests should ever, inhis opinion, come into competition, no one could doubt which would besacrificed. To push forward the Peninsula campaign under theseconditions was a terrible mistake of judgment on McClellan's part. Farbetter would it have been to have taken the Manassas route; for even ifits inherent demerits were really so great as McClellan had depicted, they would have been more than offset by preserving the undiminishedcoöperation of the administration. The personal elements in the problemought to have been conclusive. 

An indication of the error of forcing the President into a course notcommended by his judgment, in a matter where his responsibility was sograve, was seen immediately. On March 8 he issued General War Order No. 3: That no change of base should be made "without leaving in and aboutWashington such a force as, in the opinion of the general-in-chief andthe commanders of army corps, shall leave said city entirely secure;"that not more than two corps (about 50, 000 men) should be moved en routefor a new base until the Potomac, below Washington, should be freed fromthe Confederate batteries; that any movement of the army via ChesapeakeBay should begin as early as March 18, and that the general-in-chiefshould be "responsible that it moves as early as that day. " This greatlyaggravated McClellan's dissatisfaction; for it expressed the survival ofthe President's anxiety, it hampered the general, and by its last clauseit placed upon him a responsibility not properly his own. 

Yet at this very moment weighty evidence came to impeach the soundnessof McClellan's opinion concerning the military situation. On February 27Secretary Chase wrote that the time had come for dealing decisively withthe "army in front of us, " which he conceived to be already so weakenedthat "a victory over it is deprived of half its honor. " Not many daysafter this writing, the civilian strategists, the President and hisfriends, seemed entitled to triumph. For on March 7, 8, and 9 the Northwas astonished by news of the evacuation of Manassas by Johnston. Atonce the cry of McClellan's assailants went up: If McClellan had onlymoved upon the place! What a cheap victory he would have won, andattended with what invaluable "moral effects"! Yet, forsooth, he hadbeen afraid to move upon these very intrenched positions which it nowappeared that the Confederates dared not hold even when unthreatened!But McClellan retorted that the rebels had taken this backward stepprecisely because they had got some hint of his designs for advancing byUrbana, and that it was the exact fulfillment, though inconvenientlypremature, of his predictions. This explanation, however, wholly failedto prevent the civilian mind from believing that a great point had beenscored on behalf of the President's plan. Further than this, there weremany persons, including even a majority of the members of the Committeeon the Conduct of the War, who did not content themselves with mereabuse of McClellan's military intelligence, but who actually charged himwith being disaffected and nearly, if not quite, a traitor. None theless Mr. Lincoln generously and patiently adhered to his agreement tolet McClellan have his own way. 

Precisely at the same time that this evacuation of Manassas gave toMcClellan's enemies an argument against him which they deemed fair andforcible and he deemed unfair and ignorant, two other occurrences addedto the strain of the situation. McClellan immediately put his entireforce in motion towards the lines abandoned by the Confederates, notwith the design of pressing the retreating foe, which the "almostimpassable roads" prevented, but to strip off redundancies and to trainthe troops in marching. On March 11, immediately after he had started, the President issued his Special War Order No. 3: "Major-GeneralMcClellan having personally taken the field at the head of the army ofthe Potomac, . . . He is relieved from the command of the other militarydepartments, he retaining command of the Department of the Potomac. "McClellan at once wrote that he should continue to "work just ascheerfully as before;" but he felt that the removal was veryunhandsomely made just as he was entering upon active operations. Lincoln, on the other hand, undoubtedly looked upon it in precisely theopposite light, and conceived that the opportunity of the momentdeprived of any apparent sting a change which he had determined to make. The duties which were thus taken from McClellan were assumed duringseveral months by Mr. Stanton. He was utterly incompetent for them, and, whether or not it was wise to displace the general, it was certainlyvery unwise to let the secretary practically succeed him. [165] The wayin which, both at the East and West, our forces were distributed intomany independent commands, with no competent chief who could compel allto coöperate and to become subsidiary to one comprehensive scheme, was aserious mistake in general policy, which cost very dear before it wasrecognized. [166] McClellan had made some efforts to effect thiscombination or unity in purpose, but Stanton gave no indication even ofunderstanding that it was desirable. 

The other matter was the division of the army of the Potomac into fourarmy corps, to be commanded respectively by the four senior generals ofdivision, viz. , McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes. The proprietyof this action had been for some time under consideration, and the stepwas now forced upon Mr. Lincoln by the strenuous insistence of theCommittee on the Conduct of the War. That so large an army requiredorganization by corps was admitted; but McClellan had desired to deferthe arrangement until his generals of division should have had someactual experience in the field, whereby their comparative fitness forhigher responsibilities could be measured. An incapable corps commanderwas a much more dangerous man than an incapable commander of a divisionor brigade. The commander naturally felt the action now taken by thePresident to be a slight, and he attributed it to pressure by the bandof civilian advisers whose untiring hostility he returned withunutterable contempt. Not only was the taking of the step at this timecontrary to his advice, but he was not even consulted in the selectionof his own subordinates, who were set in these important positions bythe blind rule of seniority, and not in accordance with his opinion ofcomparative merit. His irritation was perhaps not entirelyunjustifiable. 

FOOTNOTES:

[146] A reconnoissance or "slight demonstration" ordered for the daybefore by McClellan had been completed, and is not to be confounded withthis movement, for which he was not responsible. 

[147] For example, see his _Own Story_, 82; but, unfortunately, one mayrefer to that book _passim_ for evidence of the statement. 

[148] N. And H. Iv. 469. 

[149] _Ibid. _ v. 140. 

[150] Letter to Lincoln, February 3, 1862. 

[151] _Army of Potomac_, 97. Swinton says: "He should have made thelightest possible draft on the indulgence of the people. " _Ibid. _ 69. General Webb says: "He drew too heavily upon the faith of the public. "_The Peninsula_, 12. 

[152] The Southern generals had a similar propensity to overestimate theopposing force; _e. G. _, Johnston's _Narrative_, 108, where he puts theNorthern force at 140, 000, when in fact it was 58, 000; and on p. 112 hisstatement is even worse. 

[153] The Southerners also had the same notion, hoping by one greatvictory to discourage and convince the North and make peace on the basisof independence; _e. G. _, see Johnston's _Narrative_ 113, 115. Grantlikewise had the notion of a decisive battle. _Memoirs_, i. 368. 

[154] The position taken by Messrs. Nicolay and Hay, I think, fullywarrants this language. 

[155] General Palfrey says of this committee that "the worst spirit ofthe Inquisition characterized their doings. " _The Antietam andFredericksburg_ (Campaigns of Civil War Series), 182. 

[156] Through Stanton; McClellan, _Own Story_, 156. 

[157] Only a few days before this time Lincoln had said that he had no"right" to insist upon knowing the general's plans. Julian, _Polit. Recoll. _ 201. 

[158] It appears that he feared that what he said would leak out, andultimately reach the enemy. 

[159] For an interesting account of these incidents, from SecretaryChase's Diary, see Warden, 401. 

[160] Lamon, 332; Herndon, 353-356; N. And H. Try to mitigate thisstory, v. 133. 

[161] He did not always feel his tongue tied afterward by theobligations of office; _e. G. _, see Julian, _Polit. Recoll. _ 210. 

[162] For a singular tale, see McClellan, _Own Story_, 153. 

[163] In fact, the feeling against McClellan was getting so strong thatsome of his enemies were wild enough about this time to accuse him ofdisloyalty. He himself narrates a dramatic tale, which would seemincredible if his veracity were not beyond question, of an interview, occurring March 8, 1862, in which the President told him, apparentlywith the air of expecting an explanation, that he was charged withlaying his plans with the traitorous intent of leaving Washingtondefenseless. McClellan's _Own Story_, 195. On the other hand, McClellanretaliated by believing that his detractors wished, for political andpersonal motives, to prevent the war from being brought to an early andsuccessful close, and that they intentionally withheld from him themeans of success; also that Stanton especially sought by underhand meansto sow misunderstanding between him and the President. _Ibid. _ 195. 

[164] McClellan afterward wrote that the administration "had neithercourage nor military insight to understand the effect of the plan Idesired to carry out. " _Own Story_, 194. This is perhaps a mild exampleof many remarks to the same purport which fell from the general at onetime and another. 

[165] See remarks of Mr. Blaine, _Twenty Years of Congress_, i. 368. 

[166] _E. G. _, McClellan, _Rep. _ (per Keyes), 82; Grant, _Mem. _ i. 322;and indeed all writers agree upon this. 

CHAPTER XI

MILITARY MATTERS OUTSIDE OF VIRGINIA

The man who first raised the cry "On to Richmond!" uttered the formulaof the war. Richmond was the gage of victory. Thus it happened, as hasbeen seen, that every one at the North, from the President down, had hisattention fast bound to the melancholy procession of delays andmiscarriages in Virginia. At the West there were important things to bedone; the States of Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri, trembling in thebalance, were to be lost or won for the Union; the passage down theMississippi to the Gulf was at stake, and with it the prosperity anddevelopment of the boundless regions of the Northwest. Surely these wereinterests of some moment, and worthy of liberal expenditure of thoughtand energy, men and money; yet the swarm of politicians gave them onlyside glances, being unable for many minutes in any day to withdraw theireyes from the Old Dominion. The consequence was that at the East mattersmilitary and matters political, generals and "public men" of allvarieties were mixed in a snarl of backbiting and quarreling, whichpresented a spectacle most melancholy and discouraging. On the otherhand, the West throve surprisingly well in the absence of politicalnourishment, and certain local commanders achieved cheering successeswithout any aid from the military civilians of Washington. The contrastseems suggestive, yet perhaps it is incorrect to attach to these factsany sinister significance, or any connection of cause and effect. Otherreasons than civilian assistance may account for the Virginia failures, while Western successes may have been won in spite of neglect ratherthan by reason of it. Still, simply as naked facts, these things wereso. 

Upon occurrences outside of Virginia Mr. Lincoln bestowed more thoughtthan was fashionable in Washington, and maintained an oversight stronglyin contrast to the indifference of those who seemed to recognize noother duty than to discuss the demerits of General McClellan. ThePresident had at least the good sense to see the value of unity of planand coöperation along the whole line, from the Atlantic seaboard to theextreme West. Also at the West as at the East he was bent uponadvancing, pressing the enemy, and doing something positive. He had notoccasion to use the spur at the West either so often or so severely asat the East; yet Halleck and Buell needed it and got it more than once. The Western commanders, like those at the East, and with better reason, were importunate for more men and more equipment. The President couldnot, by any effort, meet their requirements. He wrote to McClernandafter the battle of Belmont: "Much, very much, goes undone; but it isbecause we have not the power to do it faster than we do. " Some troopswere without arms; but, he said, "the plain matter of fact is, our goodpeople have rushed to the rescue of the government faster than thegovernment can find arms to put in their hands. " Yet, withal, it is truethat Mr. Lincoln's actual interferences at the South and West were sooccasional and incidental, that, since this writing is a biography ofhim and not a history of the war, there is need only for a list of theevents which were befalling outside of that absorbing domain which layaround the rival capitals. 

Along the southern Atlantic coast some rather easy successes wererapidly won. August 29, 1861, Hatteras Inlet was taken, with littlefighting. November 7, Port Royal followed. Lying nearly midway betweenCharleston and Savannah, and being a very fine harbor, this was a prizeof value. January 7, 1862, General Burnside was directed to take commandof the Department of North Carolina. February 8, Roanoke Island wasseized by the Federal forces. March 14, Newbern fell. April 11, FortPulaski, at the mouth of the Savannah River, was taken. April 26, Beaufort was occupied. The blockade of the other Atlantic ports havinglong since been made effective, the Eastern seaboard thus early became aprison wall for the Confederacy. 

At the extreme West Missouri gave the President some trouble. Thebushwhacking citizens of that frontier State, divided not unequallybetween the Union and Disunion sides, entered upon an irregular butenergetic warfare with ready zeal if not actually with pleasure. Northerners in general hardly paused to read the newspaper accounts ofthese rough encounters, but the President was much concerned to save theState. As it lay over against Illinois along the banks of theMississippi River, and for the most part above the important strategicpoint where Cairo controls the junction of that river with the Ohio, possession of it appeared to him exceedingly desirable. In the hope ofhelping matters forward, on July 3, 1861, he created the Department ofthe West, and placed it under command of General Fremont. But the choiceproved unfortunate. Fremont soon showed himself inefficient andtroublesome. At first the President endeavored to allay the localbickerings; on September 9, 1861, he wrote to General Hunter: "GeneralFremont needs assistance which it is difficult to give him. He is losingthe confidence of men near him. . . . His cardinal mistake is that heisolates himself;. . . He does not know what is going on. . . . He needs tohave by his side a man of large experience. Will you not, for me, takethat place? Your rank is one grade too high;. . . But will you not servethe country, and oblige me, by taking it voluntarily?" Kindlyconsideration, however, was thrown away upon Fremont, whose self-esteemwas so great that he could not see that he ought to be grateful, or thathe must be subordinate. He owed his appointment largely to the friendlyurgency of the Blair family; and now Postmaster-General Blair, puzzledat the disagreeable stories about him, went to St. Louis on an errand ofinvestigation. Fremont promptly placed him under arrest. At the sametime Mrs. Fremont was journeying to Washington, where she had anextraordinary interview with the President. "She sought an audience withme at midnight, " wrote Lincoln, "and taxed me so violently with manythings that I had to exercise all the awkward tact I have to avoidquarreling with her. . . . She more than once intimated that if GeneralFremont should decide to try conclusions with me, he could set up forhimself. " Naturally the angry lady's threats of treason, instead ofseeming a palliation of her husband's shortcomings, tended to make hisdisplacement more inevitable. Yet the necessity of being rid of him wasunfortunate, because he was the pet hero of the Abolitionists, who stoodby him without the slightest regard to reason. Lincoln was loath tooffend them, but he felt that he had no choice, and therefore orderedthe removal. He preserved, however, that habitual strange freedom frompersonal resentment which made his feelings, like his action, seem to bestrictly official. After the matter was all over he uttered a fairjudgment: "I thought well of Fremont. Even now I think well of hisimpulses. I only think he is the prey of wicked and designing men; and Ithink he has absolutely no military capacity. " For a short while GeneralHunter filled Fremont's place, until, in November, General Henry W. Halleck was assigned to command the Department of Missouri. In February, 1862, General Curtis drove the only regular and considerable rebel forceacross the border into Arkansas; and soon afterward, March 7 and 8, within this latter State, he won the victory of Pea Ridge. 

In Tennessee the vote upon secession had indicated that more than twothirds of the dwellers in the mountainous eastern region were Unionists. Mr. Lincoln had it much at heart to sustain these men, and aside fromthe personal feeling of loyalty to them it was also a point of greatmilitary consequence to hold this district. Near the boundary separatingthe northeastern corner of the State from Kentucky, the famousCumberland Gap gave passage through the Cumberland Mountains for theEast Tennessee and Virginia Railroad, "the artery that supplied therebellion. " The President saw, as many others did, and appreciated muchmore than others seemed to do, the desirability of gaining this place. To hold it would be to cut in halves, between east and west, thenorthern line of the Confederacy. In the early days a movement towardsthe Gap seemed imprudent in face of Kentucky's theory of "neutrality. "But this foolish notion was in time effectually disposed of by theConfederates. Unable to resist the temptation offered by the importantposition of Columbus at the western end of the State on the MississippiRiver, they seized that place in September, 1861. The state legislature, incensed at the intrusion, immediately embraced the Union cause andwelcomed the Union forces within the state lines. 

This action opened the way for the President to make strenuous effortsfor the protection of the East Tennesseeans and the possession of theGap. In his annual message he urged upon Congress the construction of amilitary railroad to the Gap, and afterward appeared in person toadvocate this measure before a committee of the Senate. If the place hadbeen in Virginia, he might have gained for his project an attentionwhich, as matters stood, the politicians never accorded to it. He alsoendeavored to stir to action General Buell, who commanded in Kentucky. Buell, an appointee and personal friend of General McClellan, resembledhis chief somewhat too closely both in character and history. Just asMr. Lincoln had to prick McClellan in Virginia, he now had to prickBuell in Kentucky; and just as McClellan, failed to respond in Virginia, Buell also failed in Kentucky. Further, Buell, like McClellan, had withhim a force very much greater than that before him; but Buell, likeMcClellan, would not admit that his troops were in condition to move. The result was that Jefferson Davis, more active to protect a crucialpoint than the North was to assail it, in December, 1861, sent into EastTennessee a force which imprisoned, deported, and hanged the loyalresidents there, harried the country without mercy, and held it with theiron hand. The poor mountaineers, with good reason, concluded that thehostility of the South was a terribly serious evil, whereas thefriendship of the North was a sadly useless good. The President wasbitterly chagrined, although certainly the blame did not rest with him. Then the parallel between Buell and McClellan was continued even onestep farther; for Buell at last intimated that he did not approve of theplan of campaign suggested for him, but thought it would be bettertactics to move upon Nashville. It so happened, however, that when heexpressed these views McClellan was commander-in-chief of all thearmies, and that general, being little tolerant of criticism fromsubordinates when he himself was the superior, responded very tartly andimperiously. Lincoln, on the other hand, according to his wont, wrotemodestly: "Your dispatch . . . Disappoints and distresses me. . . . I am notcompetent to criticise your views. " Then, in the rest of the letter, hemaintained with convincing clearness both the military and the politicalsoundness of his own opinions. 

In offset of this disappointment caused by Buell's inaction, the westernend of Kentucky became the theatre of gratifying operations. So soon aspolicy ceased to compel recognition of the "neutrality" of the State, General Grant, on September 6, 1861, entered Paducah at the confluenceof the Ohio and Tennessee rivers. By this move he checked the watercommunication hitherto freely used by the rebels, and neutralized theadvantage which they had expected to gain by their possession ofColumbus. But this was only a first and easy step. Farther to thesouthward, just within the boundaries of Tennessee, lay Fort Henry onthe Tennessee River and Fort Donelson on the Cumberland, presenting akind of temptation which Grant was less able to resist than were most ofthe Union generals at this time. Accordingly he arranged with AdmiralFoote, who commanded the new gunboats on the Mississippi, for a jointexcursion against these places. On February 6, Fort Henry fell, chieflythrough the work of the river navy. Ten days later, February 16, FortDonelson was taken, the laurels on this occasion falling to the landforces. Floyd and Pillow were in the place when the Federals came to it, but when they saw that capture was inevitable they furtively slippedaway, and thus shifted upon General Buckner the humiliation of thesurrender. This mean behavior excited the bitter resentment of thatgeneral, which was not alleviated by what followed. For when he proposedto discuss terms of capitulation, General Grant made that famous replywhich gave rise to his popular nickname: "No terms except unconditionaland immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediatelyupon your works. "

Halleck telegraphed the pleasant news that the capture of Fort Donelsoncarried with it "12, 000 to 15, 000 prisoners, including Generals Bucknerand Bushrod R. Johnson, also about 20, 000 stands of arms, 48 pieces ofartillery, 17 heavy guns, from 2000 to 4000 horses, and large quantitiesof commissary stores. " He also advised: "Make Buell, Grant, and Popemajor-generals of volunteers, and give me command in the West. I askthis in return for Forts Henry and Donelson. " Halleck was one of thosewho expect to reap where others sow. The achievements of Grant and Footealso led him, by some strange process of reasoning, to conclude thatGeneral C. W. Smith was the most able general in his department. 

Congress, highly gratified at these cheering events, ordered a grandillumination at Washington for February 22; but the death of thePresident's little son, at the White House, a day or two before thatdate, checked a rejoicing which in other respects also would not havebeen altogether timely. 

The Federal possession of these two forts rendered Columbus untenablefor the Confederates, and on March 2 they evacuated it. This wasfollowed by the fall of New Madrid on March 13, and of Island No. 10 onApril 7. At the latter place between 6000 and 7000 Confederatessurrendered. Thus was the Federal wedge being driven steadily deeperdown the channel of the Mississippi. 

Soon after this good service of the gunboats on the Western rivers, thesalt-water navy came in for its share of glory. On March 8 the ramVirginia, late Merrimac, which had been taking on her mysterious ironraiment at the Norfolk navy yard, issued from her concealment, an uglyand clumsy, but also a novel and terrible monster. Straight she steamedagainst the frigate Cumberland, and with one fell rush cut the poorwooden vessel in halves and sent her, with all on board, to the bottomof the sea. Turning then, she mercilessly battered the frigate Congress, drove her ashore, and burned her. All this while the shot which hadrained upon her iron sides had rolled off harmless, and she returned toher anchorage, having her prow broken by impact with the Cumberland, butotherwise unhurt. Her armor had stood the test, and now the Federalgovernment contemplated with grave anxiety the further possibleachievements of this strange and potent destroyer. 

But the death of the Merrimac was to follow close upon her birth; shewas the portent of a few weeks only. For, during a short time past, there had been also rapidly building in a Connecticut yard the Northernmarvel, the famous Monitor. When the ingenious Swede, John Ericsson, proposed his scheme for an impregnable floating battery, his hearerswere divided between distrust and hope; but fortunately the President'sfavorable opinion secured the trial of the experiment. The work waszealously pushed, and the artisans actually went to sea with the craftin order to finish her as she made her voyage southward. It was wellthat such haste was made, for she came into Hampton Roads actually bythe light of the burning Congress. On the next day, being Sunday, March9, the Southern monster again steamed forth, intending this time to makethe Minnesota her prey; but a little boat, that looked like a"cheese-box" afloat, pushed forward to interfere with this plan. Thenoccurred a duel which, in the annals of naval science, ranks as the mostimportant engagement which ever took place. It did not actually resultin the destruction of the Merrimac then and there, for, though muchbattered, she was able to make her way back to the friendly shelter ofthe Norfolk yard. But she was more than neutralized; it was evident thatthe Monitor was the better craft of the two, and that in a combat _àoutrance_ she would win. The significance of this day's work on thewaters of Virginia cannot be exaggerated. By the armor-clad Merrimac andthe Monitor there was accomplished in the course of an hour a revolutionwhich differentiated the naval warfare of the past from that of thefuture by a chasm as great as that which separated the ancient Greektrireme from the flagship of Lord Nelson. 

As early as the middle of November, 1861, Mr. Lincoln was discussingthe feasibility of capturing New Orleans. Already Ship Island, off theMississippi coast, with its uncompleted equipment, had been seized as aGulf station, and could be used as a base. The naval force was preparedas rapidly as possible, but it was not until February 3 that CaptainFarragut, the commander of the expedition, steamed out of Hampton Roadsin his flagship, the screw steam sloop Hartford. On April 18 he began tobombard forts St. Philip and Jackson, which lie on the river banksseventy-five miles below New Orleans, guarding the approach. Soon, becoming impatient of this tardy process, he resolved upon the bold andoriginal enterprise of running by the forts. This he achieved in thenight of April 24; and on April 27 the stars and stripes floated overthe Mint in New Orleans. Still two days of shilly-shallying on the partof the mayor ensued, delaying a formal surrender, until Farragut, whohad no fancy for nonsense, sharply put a stop to it, and New Orleans, inform and substance, passed under Northern control. On April 28 the twoforts, isolated by what had taken place, surrendered. On May 1 GeneralButler began in the city that efficient régime which so exasperated themen of the South. On May 7 Baton Rouge, the state capital, was occupied, without resistance; and Natchez followed in the procession on May 12. 

[Illustration: The Fight Between The Monitor And The Merrimac]

With one Union fleet at the mouth of the Mississippi and another atIsland No. 10, and the Union army not far from the riverside inKentucky and Tennessee, the opening and repossession of the whole streamby the Federals became a thing which ought soon to be achieved. On June5 the gunboat fleet from up the river came down to within two miles ofMemphis, engaged in a hard fight and won a complete victory, and on thenext day Memphis was held by the Union troops. Farragut also, working inhis usual style, forced his way up to Vicksburg, and exchanged shotswith the Confederate batteries on the bluffs. He found, however, thatwithout the coöperation of a land force he could do nothing, and had todrop back again to New Orleans, arriving there on June 1. In a few weekshe returned in stronger force, and on June 27 he was bombarding therebel works. On June 28, repeating the operation which had been sosuccessful below New Orleans, he ran some of his vessels by thebatteries and got above the city. But there was still no army on theland, and so the vessels which had run by, up stream, had to make thedangerous gauntlet again, down stream, and a second time the fleetdescended to New Orleans. 

General Halleck had arrived at St. Louis on November 18, 1861, to takecommand of the Western Department. Perhaps a more energetic commanderwould have been found ready to coöperate with Farragut at Vicksburg bythe end of June, 1862; for matters had been going excellently with theUnionists northeast of that place, and it would seem that a powerfuland victorious army might have been moving thither during that month. Early in March, however, General Halleck reported that Grant's army wasas much demoralized by victory as the army at Bull Run had been bydefeat. He said that Grant "richly deserved" censure, and that hehimself was worn out by Grant's neglect and inefficiency. By suchcharges he obtained from McClellan orders relieving General Grant fromduty, ordering an investigation, and even authorizing his arrest. But afew days later, March 13, more correct information caused the reversalof these orders, and March 17 found Grant again in command. He at oncebegan to busy himself with arrangements for moving upon Corinth. GeneralBuell meanwhile, after sustaining McClellan's rebuke and being taughthis place, had afterward been successful in obtaining for his own planpreference over that of the administration, had easily possessed himselfof Nashville toward the end of February, and was now ready to marchwestward and coöperate with General Grant in this enterprise. Corinth, lying just across the Mississippi border, was "the great strategicposition" at this part of the West. The Mobile and Ohio Railroad ranthrough it north and south; the Memphis and Charleston Railroad passedthrough east and west. If it could be taken and held, it would leave, asthe only connection open through the Confederacy from the MississippiRiver to the Atlantic coast, the railroad line which started fromVicksburg. The Confederates also had shown their estimation of Corinthby fortifying it strongly, and manifesting plainly their determinationto fight a great battle to hold it. Grant, aiming towards it, had hisarmy at Pittsburg Landing, on the west bank of the Tennessee, and thereawaited Buell, who was moving thither from Nashville with 40, 000 men. Such being the status, Grant expected General A. S. Johnston to await inhis intrenchments the assault of the Union army. But Johnston, in anaggressive mood, laid well and boldly his plan to whip Grant beforeBuell could join him, then to whip Buell, and, having thus disposed ofthe Northern forces in detail, to carry the war up to, or even across, the Ohio. So he came suddenly out from Corinth and marched straight uponPittsburg Landing, and precipitated that famous battle which has beennamed after the church of Shiloh, because about that church the mostdesperate and bloody fighting was done. 

The conflict began on Sunday, April 6, and lasted all day. There was notmuch plan about it; the troops went at each other somewhatindiscriminately and did simple stubborn fighting. The Federals lostmuch ground all along their line, and were crowded back towards theriver. Some say that the Confederates closed that day on the way tovictory; but General Grant says that he felt assured of winning onMonday, and that he instructed all his division commanders to open withan assault in the morning. The doubt, if doubt there was, was settledby the arrival of General Buell, whose fresh forces, coming in as goodan hour as the Prussians came at Waterloo, were put in during theevening upon the Federal left. On Sunday the Confederates had greatlyoutnumbered the Federals, but this reinforcement reversed theproportions, so that on Monday the Federals were in the greater force. Again the conflict was fierce and obstinate, but again the greaternumbers whipped the smaller, and by afternoon the Confederates were infull retreat. Shiloh, says General Grant, "was the severest battlefought at the West during the war, and but few in the East equaled itfor hard, determined fighting. " It ended in a complete Union victory. General A. S. Johnston was killed and Beauregard retreated to Corinth, while the North first exulted because he was compelled to do so, andthen grumbled because he was allowed to do so. It was soon said thatGrant had been surprised, that he was entitled to no credit for winningclumsily a battle which he had not expected to fight, and that he wasblameworthy for not following up the retreating foe more sharply. Thediscussion survives among those quarrels of the war in which thedisputants have fought over again the contested field, with harmlessfierceness, and without any especial result. Congress took up thedispute, and did a vast deal of talking, in the course of which thereoccurred one sensible remark. This was made by Mr. Richardson ofIllinois, who said that the armies would get along much better if theRiot Act could be read, and the members of Congress dispersed and senthome. 

General Grant found that General Halleck was even more obstinately inthe way of his winning any success than were the Confederatesthemselves. As commander of the department, Halleck now conceived thatit was his fair privilege to do the visible taking of that conspicuousprize which his lieutenant had brought within sure reach. Accordingly, on April 11, he arrived and assumed command for the purpose of moving onCorinth. Still he was sedulous in his endeavors to neglect, suppress, and even insult General Grant, whom he put nominally second in command, but practically reduced to insignificance, until Grant, finding hisposition "unendurable, " asked to be relieved. This conduct on the partof Halleck has of course been attributed to jealousy; but more probablyit was due chiefly to the personal prejudice of a dull man, perhaps alittle stimulated by a natural desire for reputation. Having takencharge of the advance, he conducted it slowly and cautiously, intrenching as he went, and moving with pick and shovel, in the phraseof General Sherman, who commanded a division in the army. "Themovement, " says General Grant, "was a siege from the start to theclose. " Such tactics had not hitherto been tried at the West, andapparently did not meet approval. There were only about twenty-two milesto be traversed, yet four weeks elapsed in the process. The armystarted on April 30; twice Pope got near the enemy, first on May 4, andagain on May 8, and each time he was ordered back. It was actually May28, according to General Grant, when "the investment of Corinth wascomplete, or as complete as it was ever made. " But already, on May 26, Beauregard had issued orders for evacuating the place, which wasaccomplished with much skill. On May 30 Halleck drew up his army inbattle array and "announced in orders that there was every indicationthat our left was to be attacked that morning. " A few hours later histroops marched unopposed into empty works. 

Halleck now commanded in Corinth a powerful army, --the forces of Grant, Buell, and Pope, combined, --not far from 100, 000 strong, and he wasthreatened by no Southern force at all able to face him. According tothe views of General Grant, he had great opportunities; and among thesecertainly was the advance of a strong column upon Vicksburg. If he couldbe induced to do this, it seemed reasonable to expect that he andFarragut together would be able to open the whole Mississippi River, andto cut the last remaining east-and-west line of railroad communication. But he did nothing, and ultimately the disposition made of this splendidcollection of troops was to distribute and dissipate it in such a mannerthat the loss of the points already gained became much more probablethan the acquisition of others. 

Early in July, as has been elsewhere said, Halleck was called toWashington to take the place of general-in-chief of all the armies ofthe North; and at this point perhaps it is worth while to devote aparagraph to comparing the retirement of McClellan with the promotion ofHalleck. Some similarities and dissimilarities in their careers arestriking. The dissimilarities were: that McClellan had organized thefinest army which the country had yet seen, or was to see; also that hehad at least made a plan for a great campaign; and he had not suppressedany one abler than himself; that Halleck on the other hand had donelittle to organize an army or to plan a campaign, had failed to find outthe qualities of General W. T. Sherman, who was in his department, andhad done all in his power to drive General Grant into retirement. Thesimilarities are more worthy of observation. Each general had weariedthe administration with demands for reinforcements when each alreadyoutnumbered his opponent so much that it was almost disgraceful todesire to increase the odds. If McClellan had been reprehensibly slow inmoving upon Yorktown, and had blundered by besieging instead of tryingan assault, certainly the snail-like approach upon Corinth had beenequally deliberate and wasteful of time and opportunity; and ifMcClellan had marched into deserted intrenchments, so also had Halleck. If McClellan had captured "Quaker guns" at Manassas, Halleck had foundthe like peaceful weapons frowning from the ramparts of Corinth. IfMcClellan had held inactive a powerful force when it ought to have beenmarching to Manassas, Halleck had also held inactive another powerfulforce, a part of which might have helped to take Vicksburg. If therecords of these two men were stated in parallel columns, it would bedifficult to see why one should have been taken and the other left. Butthe explanation exists and is instructive, and it is wholly for the sakeof the explanation that the comparison has been made. McClellan was "inpolitics, " and Halleck was not; McClellan, therefore, had a host ofactive, unsparing enemies in Washington, which Halleck had not; theVirginia field of operations was ceaselessly and microscopicallyinspected; the Western field attracted occasional glances not conduciveto a full knowledge. Halleck, as commander in a department wherevictories were won, seemed to have won the victories, and no politicianscared to deny his right to the glory; whereas the politicians, whosehatred of McClellan had, by the admission of one of themselves, become amania, [167] were entirely happy to have any one set over his head, andwould not imperil their pleasure by too close an inspection of the newaspirant's merits. These remarks are not designed to have anysignificance upon the merits or demerits of McClellan, which have beenelsewhere discussed, nor upon the merits or demerits of Halleck, whichare not worth discussing; but they are made simply because they affordso forcible an illustration of certain important conditions atWashington at this time. The truth is that the ensnarlment of theEastern military affairs with politics made success in that fieldimpossible for the North. The condition made it practically inevitablethat a Union commander in Virginia should have his thoughts at least asmuch occupied with the members of Congress in the capital behind him aswith the Confederate soldiers in camp before him. Such division of hisattention was ruinous. At and before the outbreak of the rebellion theSouth had expected to be aided efficiently by a great body ofsympathizers at the North. As yet they had been disappointed in this;but almost simultaneously with this disappointment they were surprisedby a valuable and unexpected assistance, growing out of the open feuds, the covert malice, the bad blood, the partisanship, and the wire-pullingintroduced by the loyal political fraternity into campaigning business. The quarreling politicians were doing, very efficiently, the work whichSouthern sympathizers had been expected to do. 

FOOTNOTES:

[167] George W. Julian, _Polit. Recoll. _ 204. 

CHAPTER XII

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

To the people who had been engaged in changing Illinois from awilderness into a civilized State, Europe had been an abstraction, amere colored spot upon a map, which in their lives meant nothing. ThoughEngland had been the home of their ancestors, it was really lessinteresting than the west coast of Africa, which was the home of thenegroes; for the negroes were just now of vastly more consequence thanthe ancestors. So even Dahomey had some claim to be regarded as a moreimportant place than Great Britain, and the early settlers wasted littlethought on the affairs of Queen Victoria. Amid these conditions, absorbed even more than his neighbors in the exciting questions ofdomestic politics, and having no tastes or pursuits which guided histhoughts abroad, Mr. Lincoln had never had occasion to consider theforeign relations of the United States, up to the time when he wassuddenly obliged to take an active part in managing them. 

At an early stage of the civil dissensions each side hoped for thegood-will of England. For obvious reasons, that island counted to theUnited States for more than the whole continent of Europe; indeed, thecontinental nations were likely to await and to follow her lead. Southern orators, advocating secession, assured their hearers that "KingCotton" would be the supreme power, and would compel that realm ofspinners and weavers to friendship if not to alliance with theConfederacy. Northern men, on the other hand, expressed confidence thata people with the record of Englishmen against slavery would notcountenance a war conducted in behalf of that institution; nor did theyallow their hopes to be at all impaired by the consideration that, inorder to found them upon this support, they had to overlook the factthat they were at the same time distinctly declaring that slavery reallyhad nothing to do with the war, in which only and strictly the questionof the Union, the integrity of the nation, was at stake. When the issuewas pressing for actual decision, each side was disappointed; and eachfound that it had counted upon a motive which fell far short of exertingthe anticipated influence. It was, of course, the case that Englandsuffered much from the short supply of cotton; but she made shift toprocure it elsewhere, while the working people, sympathizing with theNorth, were surprisingly patient. Thus the political pressure arisingfrom commercial distress was much less than had been expected, and theSouth learned that cotton was only a spurious monarch. Not less did theNorth find itself deceived; for the upper and middle classes of GreatBritain appeared absolutely indifferent to the humanitarian elementwhich, as they were assured, underlay the struggle. Perhaps they werenot to be blamed for setting aside these assurances, and accepting inplace thereof the belief that the American leaders spoke the truth whenthey solemnly told the North that the question at issue was purely andsimply of "the Union. " The unfortunate fact was that it was necessary tosay one thing to Englishmen and a different thing to Americans. 

That which really did inspire the feelings and the wishes, and which didinfluence, though it could not be permitted fully to control, the actionof England, had not been counted upon by either section of the country;perhaps its existence had not been appreciated. This was the intensedislike felt for the American republic by nearly all Englishmen who wereabove the social grade of mechanics and mill operatives. The extent andforce of this antipathy and even contempt were for the first time givenfree expression under the irresistible provocation which arose out ofthe delightful likelihood of the destruction of the United States. Thesituation at least gave to the people of that imperiled country a chanceto find out in what estimation they were held across the water. Thebehavior of the English government and the attitude of the English pressduring the early part of the civil war have been ascribed by differenthistorians to one or another dignified political or commercial motive. But while these influences were certainly not absent, yet the Englishnewspapers poured an inundating flood of evidence to show that genuineand deep-seated dislike, not to say downright hatred, was by very muchthe principal motive. This truth is so painful and unfortunate that manyhave thought best to suppress or deny it; but no historian is entitledto use such discretion. From an early period, therefore, in theadministration of Mr. Lincoln, he and Mr. Seward had to endeavor topreserve friendly relations with a power which, if she could only makeentirely sure of the worldly wisdom of yielding to her wishes, wouldinstantly recognize the independence of the South. This being the case, it was matter for regret that the rules of international law concerningblockades, contraband of war, and rights of neutrals were perilouslyvague and unsettled. 

Earl[168] Russell was at this time in charge of her majesty's foreignaffairs. Because in matters domestic he was liberal-minded, Americanshad been inclined to expect his good-will; but he now disappointed themby appearing to share the prejudices of his class against the republic. A series of events soon revealed his temper. So soon as there purportedto be a Confederacy, an understanding had been reached betwixt him andthe French emperor that both powers should take the same course as torecognizing it. About May 1 he admitted three Southern commissioners toan audience with him, though not "officially. " May 13 there waspublished a proclamation, whereby Queen Victoria charged and commandedall her "loving subjects to observe a strict neutrality" in and duringthe hostilities which had "unhappily commenced between the government ofthe United States and certain States styling themselves 'the ConfederateStates of America. '" This action--this assumption of a position of"neutrality, " as between enemies--taken while the "hostilities" hadextended only to the single incident of Fort Sumter, gave surprise andsome offense to the North. It was a recognition of belligerency; that isto say, while not in any other respect recognizing the revolting Statesas an independent power, it accorded to them the rights of abelligerent. The magnitude very quickly reached by the struggle wouldhave made this step necessary and proper, so that, if England had onlygone a trifle more slowly, she would soon have reached the same pointwithout exciting any anger; but now the North felt that the queen'sgovernment had been altogether too forward in assuming this position ata time when the question of a real war was still in embryo. Moreover, the unfriendliness was aggravated by the fact that the proclamation wasissued almost at the very hour of the arrival in London of Mr. CharlesFrancis Adams, the new minister sent by Mr. Lincoln to the court of St. James. It seemed, therefore, not open to reasonable doubt that EarlRussell had purposely hastened to take his position before he could hearfrom the Lincoln administration. 

When Mr. Seward got news of this, his temper gave way; so that, beingstill new to diplomacy, he wrote a dispatch to Mr. Adams whereinoccurred words and phrases not so carefully selected as they should havebeen. He carried it to Mr. Lincoln, and soon received it back revisedand corrected, instructively. _A priori_, one would have anticipated theconverse of this. 

The essential points of the paper were:--

That Mr. Adams would "desist from all intercourse whatever, unofficialas well as official, with the British government, so long as it shallcontinue intercourse of either kind with the domestic enemies of thiscountry. "

That the United States had a "right to expect a more independent if nota more friendly course" than was indicated by the understanding betweenEngland and France; but that Mr. Adams would "take no notice of that orany other alliance. "

He was to pass by the question as to whether the blockade must berespected in case it should not be maintained by a competent force, andwas to state that the "blockade is now, and will continue to be, somaintained, and therefore we expect it to be respected. "

As to recognition of the Confederacy, either by publishing anacknowledgment of its sovereignty, or officially receiving itsrepresentatives, he was to inform the earl that "no one of theseproceedings will pass unquestioned. " Also, he might suggest that "aconcession of belligerent rights is liable to be construed as arecognition" of the Confederate States. Recognition, he was to say, could be based only on the assumption that these States were aself-sustaining power. But now, after long forbearance, the UnitedStates having set their forces in motion to suppress the insurrection, "the true character of the pretended new state is at once revealed. Itis seen to be a power existing in pronunciamento only. It has never wona field. It has obtained no forts that were not virtually betrayed intoits hands or seized in breach of trust. It commands not a single port onthe coast, nor any highway out from its pretended capital by land. Underthese circumstances, Great Britain is called upon to intervene, and giveit body and independence by resisting our measures of suppression. British recognition would be British intervention to create within ourown territory a hostile state by overthrowing this republic itself. " InMr. Seward's draft a menacing sentence followed these words, but Mr. Lincoln drew his pen through it. 

Mr. Adams was to say that the treatment of insurgent privateers was "aquestion exclusively our own, " and that we intended to treat them aspirates. [169] If Great Britain should recognize them as lawfulbelligerents and give them shelter, "the laws of nations afford anadequate and proper remedy;"--"_and we shall avail ourselves of it_, "added Mr. Seward; but again Mr. Lincoln's prudent pen went through thesewords of provocation. 

Finally Mr. Adams was instructed to offer the adhesion of the UnitedStates to the famous Declaration of the Congress of Paris, of 1856, which concerned sundry matters of neutrality. 

The letter ended with two paragraphs of that patriotic rodomontade whichseems eminently adapted to domestic consumption in the United States, but which, if it ever came beneath the eye of the British minister, probably produced an effect very different from that which was aimed at. Mr. Lincoln had the good taste to write on the margin: "Drop all fromthis line to the end;" but later he was induced to permit the nonsenseto stand, since it was really harmless. 

The amendments made by the President in point of quantity were trifling, but in respect of importance were very great. All that he did was hereand there to change or to omit a phrase, which established no position, but which in the strained state of feeling might have had seriousresults. The condition calls to mind the description of the summit ofthe Alleghany Ridge, where the impulses given by almost imperceptibleinequalities in the surface of the rock have for their ultimate resultthe dispatching of mighty rivers either through the Atlantic slope tothe ocean, or down the Mississippi valley to the Gulf of Mexico. A fewadjectives, two or three ever so little sentences, in this dispatch, might have led to peace or to war; and peace or war with England almostsurely meant, respectively, Union or Disunion in the United States. Infact, no more important state paper was issued by Mr. Seward. Itestablished our relations with Great Britain, and by consequence alsowith France and with the rest of Europe, during the whole period of thecivil war. Its positions, moderate in themselves, and resolutely laiddown, were never materially departed from. The English minister did notafterward give either official or unofficial audiences to accreditedrebel emissaries; the blockade was maintained by a force so competentthat the British government acquiesced in it; no recognition of theConfederacy was ever made, either in the ways prohibited or in any waywhatsoever; it is true that bitter controversies arose concerningConfederate privateers, and to some extent England failed to meet ourposition in this matter; but it was rather the application of our rulethan the rule itself which was in dispute; and she afterward, under theGeneva award, made full payment for her derelictions. The behavior andthe proposal of terms, which constituted a practical exclusion of theUnited States from the benefits of the Treaty of Paris, certainlyinvolved something of indignity; but in this the country had no actual_rights_; and to speak frankly, since she had refused to come in wheninvited, she could hardly complain of an inhospitable reception when, under the influence of immediate and stringent self-interest, herdiplomatists saw fit to change their course. So, on the whole, it is notto be denied that delicate and novel business in the untried departmentof foreign diplomacy was managed with great skill, under tryingcircumstances. A few months later, in his message to Congress, at thebeginning of December, 1861, the President referred to our foreignrelations in the following paragraphs:--

"The disloyal citizens of the United States, who have offered the ruinof our country in return for the aid and comfort which they have invokedabroad, have received less patronage and encouragement than theyprobably expected. If it were just to suppose, as the insurgents haveseemed to assume, that foreign nations, in this case, discarding allmoral, social, and treaty obligations, would act solely and selfishlyfor the speedy restoration of commerce, including especially theacquisition of cotton, those nations appear as yet not to have seentheir way to their object more directly or clearly through thedestruction than through the preservation of the Union. If we could dareto believe that foreign nations are actuated by no higher principle thanthis, I am quite sure a sound argument could be made to show them thatthey can reach their aim more readily and easily by aiding to crush thisrebellion than by giving encouragement to it. 

"The principal lever relied on by these insurgents for exciting foreignnations to hostility against us, as already intimated, is theembarrassment of commerce. Those nations, however, not improbably sawfrom the first that it was the Union which made as well our foreign asour domestic commerce. They can scarcely have failed to perceive thatthe effort for disunion produces the existing difficulty; and that onestrong nation promises more durable peace and a more extensive, valuable, and reliable commerce than can the same nation broken intohostile fragments. 

"It is not my purpose to review our discussions with foreign states;because, whatever might be their wishes or dispositions, the integrityof our country and the stability of our government mainly depend notupon them but on the loyalty, virtue, patriotism, and intelligence ofthe American people. The correspondence itself with the usualreservations is herewith submitted. I venture to hope it will appearthat we have practiced prudence and liberality toward foreign powers, averting causes of irritation, and with firmness maintaining our ownrights and honor. "

While this carefully measured language certainly fell far short ofexpressing indifference concerning European action, it was equally farfrom betraying any sense of awe or dependence as towards the greatnations across the Atlantic. Yet in fact beneath its self-containedmoderation there unquestionably was politic concealment of very profoundanxiety. Since the war did in fact maintain to the end an entirelydomestic character, it is now difficult fully to appreciate theapprehensions which were felt, especially in its earlier stages, lestEngland or France or both might interfere with conclusive effect infavor of the Confederacy. It was very well for Mr. Lincoln to state thematter in such a way that it would seem an unworthy act upon their partto encourage a rebellion, especially a pro-slavery rebellion; and verywell for him also to suggest that their commerce could be betterconducted with one nation than with two. In plain fact, they wereconsidering nothing more lofty than their own material interests, andupon this point their distinguished statesmen did not feel the need ofseeking information or advice from the Western lawyer who had just beenso freakishly picked out of a frontier town to take charge of thedestinies of the United States. The only matter which they contemplatedwith some interest, and upon which they could gather enlightenment fromhis words, related to the greater or less degree of firmness andconfidence with which he was likely to meet them; for even in their eyesthis must be admitted to constitute one of the elements in thesituation. It was, therefore, fortunate that Mr. Lincoln successfullyavoided an appearance either of alarm or of defiance. 

But, difficult as it may have been skillfully to compose the sentencesof the message so far as it concerned foreign relationships, someoccurrences were taking place, at this very time of the composition, which reduced verbal manoeuvring to insignificance. A sudden andunexpected menace was happily turned into a substantial aid andadvantage; and the administration, not long after it had firmly declaredits resolution to maintain its clear and lawful rights, was given theopportunity greatly to strengthen its position by an event which, atfirst, seemed untoward enough. In the face of very severe temptation todo otherwise, it had the good sense to seize this opportunity, and toshow that it had upon its own part the will not only to respect, but toconstrue liberally as against itself, the rights of neutrals; also thatit had the power to enforce its will, upon the instant, even at the costof bitterly disappointing the whole body of loyal citizens in the veryhour of their rejoicing. 

The story of Mason and Slidell is familiar: accredited as envoys of theConfederacy to England and France, in the autumn of 1861, they ran theblockade at Charleston and came to Havana. There they did not concealtheir purpose to sail for England, by the British royal mail steamshipTrent, on November 7. Captain Wilkes of the United States steam sloop ofwar San Jacinto, hearing all this, lay in wait in the Bahama Channel, sighted the Trent on November 8, fired a shot across her bows, andbrought her to. He then sent on board a force of marines to search herand fetch off the rebels. This was done against the angry protests ofthe Englishman, and with such slight force as constituted technicalcompulsion, but without violence. The Trent was then left to proceed onher voyage. The envoys, or "missionaries, " as they were called by way ofavoiding the recognition of an official character, were soon inconfinement in Fort Warren, in Boston Harbor. Everywhere at the Norththe news produced an outburst of joy and triumph. Captain Wilkes was thehero of the hour, and received every kind of honor and compliment. Thesecretary of the navy wrote to him a letter of congratulation, declaringthat his conduct was "marked by intelligence, ability, decision, andfirmness, and has the emphatic approval of this department. " SecretaryStanton was outspoken in his praise. When Congress convened, on December1, almost the first thing done by the House of Representatives was tohurry through a vote of thanks to the captain for his "brave, adroit, and patriotic conduct. " The newspaper press, public meetings, privateconversation throughout the country, all reechoed these joyoussentiments. The people were in a fever of pleasurable excitement. Itcalled for some nerve on the part of Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Seward suddenlyto plunge them into a chilling bath of disappointment. 

Statements differ as to what was Mr. Seward's earliest opinion in thematter. [170] But all writers agree that Mr. Lincoln did not move withthe current of triumph. He was scarcely even non-committal. On thecontrary, he is said at once to have remarked that it did not look rightto stop the vessel of a friendly power on the high seas and takepassengers out of her; that he did not understand whence Captain Wilkesderived authority to turn his quarter-deck into a court of admiralty;that he was afraid the captives might prove to be white elephants on ourhands; that we had fought Great Britain on the ground of like doingsupon her part, and that now we must stick to American principles; that, if England insisted upon our surrendering the prisoners, we must do so, and must apologize, and so bind her over to keep the peace in relationto neutrals, and to admit that she had been wrong for sixty years. 

The English demand came quickly, forcibly, and almost offensively. Thenews brought to England by the Trent set the whole nation in a blaze offury, --and naturally enough, it must be admitted. The government sentout to the navy yards orders to make immediate preparations for war; thenewspapers were filled with abuse and menace against the United States;the extravagance of their language will not be imagined without actualreference to their pages. Lord Palmerston hastily sketched a dispatch toLord Lyons, the British minister at Washington, demanding instantreparation, but couched in language so threatening and insolent as tomake compliance scarcely possible. Fortunately, in like manner as Mr. Seward had taken to Mr. Lincoln his letter of instructions to Mr. Adams, so Lord Palmerston also felt obliged to lay his missive before thequeen, and the results in both cases were alike; for once at leastroyalty did a good turn to the American republic. Prince Albert, illwith the disease which only a few days later carried him to his grave, labored hard over that important document, with the result that theroyal desire to eliminate passion sufficiently to make a peaceablesettlement possible was made unmistakably plain, and therefore theletter, as ultimately revised by Earl Russell, though still disagreeablyperemptory in tone, left room for the United States to set itself rightwithout loss of self-respect. The most annoying feature was that GreatBritain insisted upon instant action; if Lord Lyons did not receive afavorable reply within seven days after formally preferring his demandfor reparation, he was to call for his passports. In other words, delayby diplomatic correspondence and such ordinary shilly-shallying meantwar. As the London "Times" expressed it, America was not to be allowed"to retain what she had taken from us, at the cheap price of aninterminable correspondence. "

December 19 this dispatch reached Lord Lyons; he talked its contentsover with Mr. Seward informally, and deferred the formal communicationuntil the 23d. Mr. Lincoln drew up a proposal for submission toarbitration. But it could not be considered; the instructions to LordLyons gave no time and no discretion. It was aggravating to concede whatwas demanded under such pressure; but the President, as has been said, had already expressed his opinion upon the cardinal point, --that Englandhad the strength of the case. Moreover he remarked, with good commonsense, "One war at a time. " So it was settled that the emissaries mustbe surrendered. The "prime minister of the _Northern States ofAmerica_, " as the London "Times" insultingly called Mr. Seward, was wiseenough to agree; for, under the circumstances, to allow discourtesy toinduce war was unjustifiable. On December 25 a long cabinet council washeld, and the draft of Seward's reply was accepted, though with sorereluctance. The necessity was cruel, but fortunately it was nothumiliating; for the President had pointed to the road of honorable exitin those words which Mr. Lossing heard uttered by him on the very daythat the news arrived. In 1812 the United States had fought with Englandbecause she had insisted, and they had denied, that she had the right tostop their vessels on the high seas, to search them, and to take fromthem British subjects found on board them. Mr. Seward now said that thecountry still adhered to the ancient principle for which it had oncefought, and was glad to find England renouncing her old-time error. Captain Wilkes, not acting under instructions, had made a mistake. If hehad captured the Trent and brought her in for adjudication as prize inour admiralty courts, a case might have been maintained and theprisoners held. He had refrained from this course out of kindlyconsideration for the many innocent persons to whom it would have causedserious inconvenience; and, since England elected to stand upon thestrict rights which his humane conduct gave to her, the United Statesmust be bound by their own principles at any cost to themselves. Accordingly the "envoys" were handed over to the commander of theEnglish gunboat Rinaldo, at Provincetown, on January 1, 1862. 

The decision of the President and the secretary of state was thoroughlywise. Much hung upon it; "no one, " says Arnold, "can calculate theresults which would have followed upon a refusal to surrender thesemen. " An almost certain result would have been a war with England; and ahighly probable result would have been that erelong France also wouldfind pretext for hostilities, since she was committed to friendship withEngland in this matter, and moreover the emperor seemed to have arestless desire to interfere against the North. What then would havebeen the likelihood of ultimate success in that domestic struggle, which, by itself, though it did not exhaust, yet very severely taxedboth Northern endurance and Northern resources? It is fair also to thesetwo men to say that, in reaching their decision, instead of receivingaid or encouragement from outside, they had the reverse. Popular feelingmay be estimated from the utterances which, even after there had beentime for reflection, were made by men whose positions curbed them withthe grave responsibilities of leadership. In the House ofRepresentatives Owen Lovejoy pledged himself to "inextinguishablehatred" of Great Britain, and promised to bequeath it as a legacy to hischildren; and, while he was not engaging in the war for the integrity ofhis own country, he vowed that if a war with England should come, hewould "carry a musket" in it. Senator Hale, in thunderous oratory, notified the members of the administration that if they would "notlisten to the voice of the people, they would find themselves engulfedin a fire that would consume them like stubble; they would be helplessbefore a power that would hurl them from their places. " The greatmajority at the North, though perhaps incapable of such felicity ofexpression, was undoubtedly not very much misrepresented by thevindictive representative and the exuberant senator. Yet a brief period, in which to consider the logic of the position, sufficed to bring nearlyall to intelligent conclusions; and then it was seen that what had beendone had been rightly and wisely done. There was even a sense of pridein doing fairly and honestly, without the shuffling evasions ofdiplomacy, an act of strict right; and the harder the act the greaterwas the honor. The behavior of the people was generous and intelligent, and greatly strengthened the government in the eyes of foreigners. Bythe fullness and readiness of this reparation England was put under amoral obligation to treat the United States as honorably as the UnitedStates treated her. She did not do so, it is true; but in more ways thanone she ultimately paid for not doing so. At any rate, for the timebeing, after this action it would have been nothing less than indecentfor her to recognise the Confederacy at once; and a little laterprudence had the like restraining effect. Yet though recognition and warwere avoided they never entirely ceased to threaten, and Mr. Chittendenis perfectly correct in saying that "every act of our government wasperformed under the impending danger of a recognition of theConfederacy, a disregard of the blockade, and the actual intervention ofGreat Britain in our attempt to suppress an insurrection upon our ownterritory. "

FOOTNOTES:

[168] Lord John Russell was raised to the peerage, as Earl Russell, justafter this time, _i. E. _, in July, 1861. 

[169] An effort was made to carry out this theory in the case of thecrew of the privateer Savannah; but the jury failed to agree, and theattempt was not afterward renewed, privateersmen being exchanged likeother prisoners of war. 

[170] Mr. Welles declares that Seward at first opposed the surrender;but Mr. Chittenden asserts that he knows that Mr. Seward's first opinioncoincided with his later action; see Mr. Welles's _Lincoln and Seward_, and Chittenden's _Recollections_, 148.