ABRAHAM LINCOLN BY LORD CHARNWOOD GARDEN CITY, NEW YORK GARDEN CITY PUBLISHING CO. , INC. COPYRIGHT, 1917 BY HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY GENERAL EDITOR'S PREFACE Statesmen--even the greatest--have rarely won the same unquestioningrecognition that falls to the great warriors or those supreme inscience, art or literature. Not in their own lifetime and hardly tothis day have the claims to supremacy of our own Oliver Cromwell, William III. And Lord Chatham rested on so sure a foundation as thoseof a Marlborough or a Nelson, a Newton, a Milton or a Hogarth. This isonly natural. A warrior, a man of science, an artist or a poet arejudged in the main by definite achievements, by the victories they havewon over foreign enemies or over ignorance and prejudice, by the joyand enlightenment they have brought to the consciousness of their ownand succeeding generations. For the statesman there is no such exactmeasure of greatness. The greater he is, the less likely is his workto be marked by decisive achievement which can be recalled byanniversaries or signalised by some outstanding event: the chief workof a great statesman rests in a gradual change of direction given tothe policy of his people, still more in a change of the spirit withinthem. Again, the statesman must work with a rough and readyinstrument. The soldier finds or makes his army ready to yieldunhesitating obedience to his commands, the sailor animates his fleetwith his own personal touch, and the great man in art, literature orscience is master of his material, if he can master himself. Thestatesman cannot mould a heterogeneous people, as the men of awell-disciplined army or navy can be moulded, to respond to his calland his alone. He has to do all his work in a society of which a largepart cannot see his object and another large part, as far as they dosee it, oppose it. Hence his work at the best is often incomplete andhe has to be satisfied with a rough average rather than with his ideal. Lincoln, one of the few supreme statesmen of the last three centuries, was no exception to this rule. He was misunderstood and underrated inhis lifetime, and even yet has hardly come to his own. For his placeis among the great men of the earth. To them he belongs by right ofhis immense power of hard work, his unfaltering pursuit of what seemedto him right, and above all by that childlike directness and simplicityof vision which none but the greatest carry beyond their earliestyears. It is fit that the first considered attempt by an Englishman togive a picture of Lincoln, the great hero of America's struggle for thenoblest cause, should come at a time when we in England are passingthrough as fiery a trial for a cause we feel to be as noble. It is atime when we may learn much from Lincoln's failures and success, fromhis patience, his modesty, his serene optimism and his eloquence, sosimple and so magnificent. BASIL WILLIAMS. BISCOT CAMP, LUTON, March, 1916. CONTENTS GENERAL EDITOR'S PREFACE CHAP. I. BOYHOOD OF LINCOLN II. THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN NATION 1. The Formation of a National Government 2. Territorial Expansion 3. The Growth of the Practice and Traditions of the Union Government 4. The Missouri Compromise 5. Leaders, Parties, and Tendencies in Lincoln's Youth 6. Slavery and Southern Society 7. Intellectual Development III. LINCOLN'S EARLY CAREER 1. Life at New Salem 2. In the Illinois Legislature 3. Marriage IV. LINCOLN IN CONGRESS AND IN RETIREMENT 1. The Mexican War and Lincoln's Work in Congress 2. California and the Compromise of 1850 3. Lincoln in Retirement 4. The Repeal of the Missouri Compromise V. THE RISE OF LINCOLN 1. Lincoln's Return to Public Life 2. The Principles and the Oratory of Lincoln 3. Lincoln against Douglas 4. John Brown 5. The Election of Lincoln as President VI. SECESSION 1. The Case of the South against the Union 2. The Progress of Secession 3. The Inauguration of Lincoln 4. The Outbreak of War VII. THE CONDITIONS OF THE WAR VIII. THE OPENING OF THE WAR AND LINCOLN'S ADMINISTRATION 1. Preliminary Stages of the War 2. Bull Run 3. Lincoln's Administration Generally 4. Foreign Policy and England 5. The Great Questions of Domestic Policy IX. THE DISASTERS OF THE NORTH 1. Military Policy of the North 2. The War in the West up to May, 1862 3. The War in the East up to May, 1863 X. EMANCIPATION XI. THE APPROACH OF VICTORY 1. The War to the End of 1863 2. Conscription and the Politics of 1863 3. The War in 1864 4. The Second Election of Lincoln: 1864 XII. THE END BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE INDEX ABRAHAM LINCOLN CHAPTER I BOYHOOD OF LINCOLN The subject of this memoir is revered by multitudes of his countrymenas the preserver of their commonwealth. This reverence has grown withthe lapse of time and the accumulation of evidence. It is blended witha peculiar affection, seldom bestowed upon the memory of statesmen. Itis shared to-day by many who remember with no less affection how theirown fathers fought against him. He died with every circumstance oftragedy, yet it is not the accident of his death but the purpose of hislife that is remembered. Readers of history in another country cannot doubt that the praise sogiven is rightly given; yet any bare record of the American Civil Warmay leave them wondering why it has been so unquestioningly accorded. The position and task of the American President in that crisis cannotbe understood from those of other historic rulers or historic leadersof a people; and it may seem as if, after that tremendous conflict inwhich there was no lack of heroes, some perverse whim had made mensingle out for glory the puzzled civil magistrate who sat by. Thuswhen an English writer tells again this tale, which has been well toldalready and in which there can remain no important new facts todisclose, he must endeavour to make clear to Englishmen circumstancesand conditions which are familiar to Americans. He will incur thecertainty that here and there his own perspective of American affairsand persons will be false, or his own touch unsympathetic. He hadbetter do this than chronicle sayings and doings which to him and tothose for whom he writes have no significance. Nor should the writershrink too timidly from the display of a partisanship which, on oneside or the other, it would be insensate not to feel. The trueobligation of impartiality is that he should conceal no fact which, inhis own mind, tells against his views. Abraham Lincoln, sixteenth President of the United States of America, was born on February 12, 1809, in a log cabin on a barren farm in thebackwoods of Kentucky, about three miles west of a place calledHodgensville in what is now La Rue County. Fifty years later when he had been nominated for the Presidency he wasasked for material for an account of his early life. "Why, " he said, "it is a great folly to attempt to make anything out of me or my earlylife. It can all be condensed into a single sentence; and thatsentence you will find in Gray's 'Elegy':-- "'The short and simple annals of the poor. ' That's my life, and that's all you or anyone else can make out of it. "His other references to early days were rare. He would repeat queerreminiscences of the backwoods to illustrate questions of state; but ofhis own part in that old life he spoke reluctantly and sadly. Nevertheless there was once extracted from him an awkwardautobiographical fragment, and his friends have collected and recordedconcerning his earlier years quite as much as is common in great men'sbiographies or can as a rule be reproduced with its true associations. Thus there are tales enough of the untaught student's perseverance, andof the boy giant's gentleness and prowess; tales, too, more than enoughin proportion, of the fun which varied but did not pervade hisexistence, and of the young rustic's occasional and somewhat oafishpranks. But, in any conception we may form as to the growth of hismind and character, this fact must have its place, that to the manhimself the thought of his early life was unattractive, void ofself-content over the difficulties which he had conquered, and void ofromantic fondness for vanished joys of youth. Much the same may be said of his ancestry and family connections. Contempt for lowly beginnings, abhorrent as it is to any honest mind, would to Lincoln's mind have probably been inconceivable, but he lackedthat interest in ancestry which is generally marked in his countrymen, and from talk of his nearer progenitors he seems to have shrunk with apositive sadness of which some causes will soon be apparent. Since hisdeath it has been ascertained that in 1638 one Samuel Lincoln ofNorwich emigrated to Massachusetts. Descent from him could be claimedby a prosperous family in Virginia, several of whom fought on theSouthern side in the Civil War. One Abraham Lincoln, grandfather ofthe President and apparently a grandson of Samuel, crossed themountains from Virginia in 1780 and settled his family in Kentucky, ofwhich the nearer portions had recently been explored. One morning fouryears later he was at work near his cabin with Mordecai, Josiah, andThomas, his sons, when a shot from the bushes near by brought him down. Mordecai ran to the house, Josiah to a fort, which was close to them. Thomas, aged six, stayed by his father's body. Mordecai seized a gunand, looking through the window, saw an Indian in war paint stooping topick up Thomas. He fired and killed the savage, and, when Thomas hadrun into the cabin, continued firing at others who appeared among thebushes. Shortly Josiah returned with soldiers from the fort, and theIndians ran off, leaving Abraham the elder dead. Mordecai, hisheir-at-law, prospered. We hear of him long after as an old man ofsubstance and repute in Western Illinois. He had decided views aboutIndians. The sight of a redskin would move him to strange excitement;he would disappear into the bushes with his gun, and his conscience asa son and a sportsman would not be satisfied till he had stalked andshot him. We are further informed that he was a "good old man. "Josiah also moved to Illinois, and it is pleasant to learn that he alsowas a good old man, and, as became a good old man, prospered prettywell. But President Lincoln and his sister knew neither theseexcellent elders nor any other of their father's kin. And those with whom the story of his own first twenty-one years isbound up invite almost as summary treatment. Thomas Lincoln neverprospered like Mordecai and Josiah, and never seems to have left theimpress of his goodness or of anything else on any man. But, whilelearning to carpenter under one Joseph Hanks, he married his employer'sniece Nancy, and by her became the father first of a daughter Sarah, and four years later, at the farm near Hodgensville aforesaid, ofAbraham, the future President. In 1816, after several migrations, hetransported his household down the Ohio to a spot on the Indiana shore, near which the village of Gentryville soon sprang up. There he abodetill Abraham was nearly twenty-one. When the boy was eight his motherdied, leaving him in his sister's care; but after a year or so Thomaswent back alone to Kentucky and, after brief wooing, brought back awife, Sarah, the widow of one Mr. Johnston, whom he had courted vainlybefore her first marriage. He brought with her some useful additionsto his household gear, and her rather useless son John Johnston. Relatives of Abraham's mother and other old neighbours--in particularJohn and Dennis Hanks--accompanied all the family's migrations. Ultimately, in 1830, they all moved further west into Illinois. Meanwhile Abraham from an early age did such various tasks for hisfather or for neighbouring farmers as from time to time suited thefather. When an older lad he was put for a while in charge of a ferryboat, and this led to the two great adventures of his early days, voyages with a cargo boat; and two mates down by river to New Orleans. The second and more memorable of these voyages was just after themigration to Illinois. He returned from it to a place called NewSalem, in Illinois, some distance from his father's new farm, inexpectation of work in a store which was about to be opened. Abraham, by this time, was of age, and in accordance with custom had been setfree to shift for himself. Each of these migrations was effected with great labour intransportation of baggage (sometimes in home-made boats), clearing oftimber, and building; and Thomas Lincoln cannot have been wanting inthe capacity for great exertions. But historians have been inclined tobe hard on him. He seems to have been without sustained industry; inany case he had not much money sense and could not turn his industry tomuch account. Some hint that he drank, but it is admitted that mostKentucky men drank more. There are indications that he was a dutifulbut ineffective father, chastising not too often or too much, butgenerally on the wrong occasion. He was no scholar and did notencourage his son that way; but he had a great liking for stories. Hewas of a peaceable and inoffensive temper, but on great provocationwould turn on a bully with surprising and dire consequences. OldThomas, after Abraham was turned loose, continued a migrant, alwaystowards a supposed better farm further west, always with a mortgage onhim. Abraham, when he was a struggling professional man, helped himwith money as well as he could. We have his letter to the old man onhis death-bed, a letter of genuine but mild affection with due words ofpiety. He explains that illness in his own household makes itimpossible for him to pay a last visit to his father, and then, withthat curious directness which is common in the families of the poor andhas as a rule no sting, he remarks that an interview, if it had beenpossible, might have given more pain than pleasure to both. Everybodyhas insisted from the first how little Abraham took after his father, but more than one of the traits attributed to Thomas will certainlyreappear. Abraham, as a man, when for once he spoke of his mother, whom he veryseldom mentioned, spoke with intense feeling for her motherly care. "Iowe, " he said, "everything that I am to her. " It pleased him in thistalk to explain by inheritance from her the mental qualities whichdistinguished him from the house of Lincoln, and from others of thehouse of Hanks. She was, he said, the illegitimate daughter of aVirginian gentleman, whose name he did not know, but from whom as heguessed the peculiar gifts, of which he could not fail to be conscious, were derived. Sarah his sister was married at Gentryville to one Mr. Grigsby. TheGrigsbys were rather great people, as people went in Gentryville. Itis said to have become fixed in the boy's mind that the Grigsbys hadnot treated Sarah well; and this was the beginning of certain woes. Sarah Bush Lincoln, his stepmother, was good to him and he to her. Above all she encouraged him in his early studies, to which a fretfulhousewife could have opposed such terrible obstacles. She lived tohope that he might not be elected President for fear that enemiesshould kill him, and she lived to have her fear fulfilled. Hisaffectionate care over her continued to the end. She lived latterlywith her son John Johnston. Abraham's later letters to this companionof his youth deserve to be looked up in the eight large volumes calledhis Works, for it is hard to see how a man could speak or act better toan impecunious friend who would not face his own troubles squarely. Itis sad that the "ever your affectionate brother" of the earlier lettersdeclines to "yours sincerely" in the last; but it is an honest declineof affection, for the man had proved to be cheating his mother, andAbraham had had to stop it. Two of the cousinhood, Dennis Hanks, a character of comedy, and JohnHanks, the serious and steady character of the connection, deservemention. They and John Johnston make momentary reappearances again. Otherwise the whole of Abraham Lincoln's kindred are now out of thestory. They have been disposed of thus hastily at the outset, notbecause they were discreditable or slight people, but because Lincolnhimself when he began to find his footing in the world seems to havefelt sadly that his family was just so much to him and no more. Thedearest of his recollections attached to premature death; the next tochronic failure. Rightly or wrongly (and we know enough about hereditynow to expect any guess as to its working in a particular case to bewrong) he attributed the best that he had inherited to a licentiousconnection and a nameless progenitor. Quite early he must have beenintensely ambitious, and discovered in himself intellectual power; butfrom his twelfth year to his twenty-first there was hardly a soul tocomprehend that side of him. This chill upon his memory unmistakablyinfluenced the particular complexion of his melancholy. Unmistakablytoo he early learnt to think that he was odd, that his oddity wasconnected with his strength, that he might be destined to stand aloneand capable of so standing. The life of the farming pioneer in what was then the Far West affordeda fair prospect of laborious independence. But at least till Lincolnwas grown up, when a time of rapid growth and change set in, it offeredno hope of quickly gotten wealth, and it imposed severe hardship onall. The country was thickly wooded; the settler had before him at theoutset heavy toil in clearing the ground and in building some rudeshelter, --a house or just a "half-faced camp, " that is, a shed with oneside open to the weather such as that in which the Lincoln familypassed their first winter near Gentryville. The site once chosen andthe clearing once made, there was no such ease of cultivation or suchcertain fertility as later settlers found yet further west when thedevelopment of railways, of agricultural machinery, and of Eastern orEuropean markets had opened out to cultivation the enormous stretchesof level grass plain beyond the Mississippi. Till population had grown a good deal, pioneer families were largelyoccupied in producing for themselves with their own hands what, intheir hardy if not always frugal view, were the necessities andcomforts of life. They had no Eastern market for their produce, forrailways did not begin to be made till 1840, and it was many yearsbefore they crossed the Eastern mountains. An occasional cargo wastaken on a flat-bottomed boat down the nearest creek, as a stream iscalled in America, into the Ohio and so by the innumerable windings ofthe Mississippi to New Orleans; but no return cargo could be brought upstream. Knives and axes were the most precious objects to be gained bytrade; woollen fabrics were rare in the West, when Lincoln was born, and the white man and woman, like the red whom they had displaced, werechiefly dressed in deer skins. The woods abounded in game, and in theearly stages of the development of the West a man could largely supporthimself by his gun. The cold of every winter is there great, and anoccasional winter made itself long remembered, like the "winter of thedeep snow" in Illinois, by the havoc of its sudden onset and thesuffering of its long duration. The settling of a forest country wasaccompanied here as elsewhere by the occasional ravages of strange anddestructive pestilences and the constant presence of malaria. Population was soon thick enough for occasional gatherings, convivialor religious, and in either case apt to be wild, but for long it wasnot thick enough for the life of most settlers to be other than lonelyas well as hard. Abraham Lincoln in his teens grew very fast, and by nineteen he wasnearly six foot four. His weight was never quite proportionate tothis. His ungainly figure, with long arms and large hands andrelatively small development of chest, and the strange deep-cutlineaments of his face were perhaps the evidence of unfit (sometimesinsufficient) food in these years of growth. But his muscular strengthwas great, and startling statistical tales are told of the weight hecould lift and the force of his blows with a mallet or an axe. To agentle and thoughtful boy with secret ambition in him such strength isa great gift, and in such surroundings most obviously so. Lincoln as alad was a valuable workman at the varied tasks that came his way, without needing that intense application to manual pursuits which thebent of his mind made irksome to him. And he was a person of highconsideration among the lads of his age and company. The manners ofthe people then settling in Indiana and Illinois had not the extremeferocity for which Kentucky had earlier been famous, and which crops uphere and there in frontier life elsewhere. All the same, as mightnaturally be supposed, they shared Plato's opinion that youths and menin the prime of life should settle their differences with their fists. Young Lincoln's few serious combats were satisfactorily decisive, andneither they nor his friendly wrestling bouts ended in the quarrelswhich were too common among his neighbours. Thus, for all hisoriginality and oddity, he early grew accustomed to mix in the sort ofcompany he was likely to meet, without either inward shrinking or theneed of conscious self-assertion. In one thing he stood aloof from the sports of his fellows. Mostbackwoodsmen were bred to the gun; he has told us that he shot a turkeywhen he was eight and never afterwards shot at all. There is an earlytale of his protests against an aimless slaughter of mud turtles; andit may be guessed that the dislike of all killing, which gave him soretrouble later, began when he was young. Tales survive of his kindnessto helpless men and animals. It marks the real hardness of hissurroundings, and their hardening effect on many, that his exertions insaving a drunken man from death in the snow are related with apparentsurprise. Some tales of his helping a pig stuck in a bog or a dog onan ice floe and the like seem to indicate a curious and lasting trait. These things seem not to have been done spontaneously, but on maturereflection after he had passed unheeding by. He grew to be a man ofprompt action in circumstances of certain kinds; but generally hisimpulse was slow and not very sure. Taste and the minor sensibilitieswere a little deficient in him. As a lady once candidly explained tohim, he was not ready with little gracious acts. But rare occasions, such as can arouse a passionate sense of justice, would kindle hisslow, kind nature with a sudden fire. The total amount of his schooling, at the several brief periods forwhich there happened to have been a school accessible and facility toget to it, was afterwards computed by himself at something under twelvemonths. With this slight help distributed over the years from hiseighth to his fifteenth birthday he taught himself to read, write, anddo sums. The stories of the effort and painful shifts, by which greatmen accomplish this initial labour almost unhelped, have in all casesthe same pathos, and have a certain sameness in detail. Having learntto read he had the following books within his reach: the Bible, "Aesop's Fables, " "Robinson Crusoe, " the "Pilgrim's Progress, " a"History of the United States, " and Weems' "Life of Washington. " Lateron the fancy took him to learn the laws of his State, and he obtainedthe "Laws of Indiana. " These books he did read, and read again, andpondered, not with any dreamy or purely intellectual interest, but likeone who desires the weapon of learning for practical ends, and desiresalso to have patterns of what life should be. As already said, hisservice as a labourer could be considerable, and when something stirredhis ambition to do a task quickly his energy could be prodigious. But"bone idle is what I called him, " was the verdict long after of one, perhaps too critical, employer. "I found him, " he said, "cocked up ona haystack with a book. 'What are you reading?' I said. 'I'm notreading, I'm studying, ' says he. 'What are you studying?' says I. 'Law, ' says he, as proud as Cicero. 'Great God Almighty!' said I. "The boy's correction, "studying" for "reading, " was impertinent, butprobably sound. To be equally sound, we must reckon among hiseducational facilities the abundant stories which came his way in acommunity which, however unlettered, was certainly not dull-spirited;the occasional newspaper; the rare lectures or political meetings; themuch more frequent religious meetings, with preachers who taught a grimdoctrine, but who preached with vigour and sometimes with the deepestsincerity; the hymns often of great emotional power over a simplecongregation--Cowper's "There is a fountain filled with blood, " is onerecorded favourite among them; the songs, far other than hymns, whichDennis Hanks and his other mates would pick up or compose; and thepractice in rhetoric and the art of exposition, which he unblushinglyafforded himself before audiences of fellow labourers who welcomed thejest and the excuse for stopping work. The achievement of theself-taught man remains wonderful, but, if he surmounts hisdifficulties at all, some of his limitations may turn to sheeradvantage. There is some advantage merely in being driven to make themost of few books; great advantage in having one's choice restricted bycircumstances to good books; great advantage too in the consciousnessof untrained faculty which leaves a man capable in mature life ofdeliberately undertaking mental discipline. Along with the legends and authentic records of his self-training, signs of an ambition which showed itself early and which was from thefirst a clean and a high ambition, there are also other legends showingLincoln as a naughty boy among naughty boys. The selection here madefrom these lacks refinement, and the reader must note that this wasliterally a big, naughty boy, not a man who had grown stiff incoarseness and ill-nature. First it must be recalled that Abraham borea grudge against the Grigsbys, an honourable grudge in its origin andperhaps the only grudge he ever bore. There had arisen from this acombat, of which the details might displease the fastidious, but whichwas noble in so far that Abraham rescued a weaker combatant who wasover-matched. But there ensued something more displeasing, a series oflampoons by Abraham, in prose and a kind of verse. These were grossand silly enough, though probably to the taste of the public which hethen addressed, but it is the sequel that matters. In a work called"The First Chronicles of Reuben, " it is related how Reuben and Josiah, the sons of Reuben Grigsby the elder, took to themselves wives on thesame day. By local custom the bridal feast took place and the twoyoung couples began their married careers under the roof of thebridegrooms' father. Moreover, it was the custom that, at a certainstage in the celebrations, the brides should be escorted to theirchambers by hired attendants who shortly after conducted thebridegrooms thither. On this occasion some sense of mischief afootdisturbed the heart of Mrs. Reuben Grigsby the elder, and, hasteningupstairs, just after the attendants had returned, she cried out in aloud voice and to the great consternation of all concerned, "Why, Reuben, you're in bed with the wrong wife!" The historian who, to themanifest annoyance of Lincoln's other biographers, has preserved thisand much other priceless information, infers that Abraham, who was notinvited to the feast, had plotted this domestic catastrophe and wonover the attendants to his evil purpose. This is not a certaininference, nor is it absolutely beyond doubt that the event recorded in"The First Chronicles of Reuben" ever happened at all. What is certainis that these Chronicles themselves, composed in what purports to bethe style of Scripture, were circulated for the joint edification ofthe proud race of Grigsby and of their envious neighbours in thehandwriting of Abraham Lincoln, then between seventeen and eighteen. Not without reason does an earlier manuscript of the same authorconclude, after several correct exercises in compound subtraction, withthe distich:-- "Abraham Lincoln, his hand and pen, He will be good, but God knows when. " Not to be too solemn about a tale which has here been told for thewhimsical fancy of its unseemliness and because it is probably theworst that there is to tell, we may here look forward and face thewell-known fact that the unseemliness in talk of rough, rustic boysflavoured the great President's conversation through life. It is wellto be plain about this. Lincoln was quite without any elegant andsentimental dissoluteness, such as can be attractively portrayed. Hislife was austere and seems to have been so from the start. He had thatshy reverence for womanhood which is sometimes acquired as easily inrough as in polished surroundings and often quite as steadilymaintained. The testimony of his early companions, along with somefragments of the boy's feeble but sincere attempts at verse, shows thathe acquired it young. But a large part of the stories and pithysayings for which he was famous wherever he went, but of which whentheir setting is lost it is impossible to recover the enjoyment, wereundeniably coarse, and naturally enough this fact was jarring to someof those in America who most revered him. It should not really behard, in any comprehensive view of his character and the circumstancesin which it unfolded itself, to trace in this bent of his humoursomething not discordant with the widening sympathy and deepeningtenderness of his nature. The words of his political associate inIllinois, Mr. Leonard Swett, afterwards Attorney-General of the UnitedStates, may suffice. He writes: "Almost any man, who will tell a veryvulgar story, has, in a degree, a vulgar mind. But it was not so withhim; with all his purity of character and exalted morality andsensibility, which no man can doubt, when hunting for wit he had noability to discriminate between the vulgar and refined substances fromwhich he extracted it. It was the wit he was after, the pure jewel, and he would pick it up out of the mud or dirt just as readily as froma parlour table. " In any case his best remembered utterances of thisorder, when least fit for print, were both wise and incomparably witty, and in any case they did not prevent grave gentlemen, who marvelled atthem rather uncomfortably, from receiving the deep impression of whatthey called his pure-mindedness. One last recollection of Lincoln's boyhood has appealed, beyond anyother, to some of his friends as prophetic of things to come. Mentionhas already been made of his two long trips down the Mississippi. Withthe novel responsibilities which they threw on him, and the novelsights and company which he met all the way to the strange, distantcity of New Orleans, they must have been great experiences. Only twoincidents of them are recorded. In the first voyage he and his mateshad been disturbed at night by a band of negro marauders and had had asharp fight in repelling them, but in the second voyage he met with thenegro in a way that to him was more memorable. He and the youngfellows with him saw, among the sights of New Orleans, negroes chained, maltreated, whipped and scourged; they came in their rambles upon aslave auction where a fine mulatto girl was being pinched and proddedand trotted up and down the room like a horse to show how she moved, that "bidders might satisfy themselves, " as the auctioneer said, of thesoundness of the article to be sold. John Johnston and John Hanks andAbraham Lincoln saw these sights with the unsophisticated eyes ofhonest country lads from a free State. In their home circle it seemsthat slavery was always spoken of with horror. One of them had atenacious memory and a tenacious will. "Lincoln saw it, " John Hankssaid long after, and other men's recollections of Lincoln's talkconfirmed him--"Lincoln saw it; his heart bled; said nothing much, wassilent. I can say, knowing it, that it was on this trip that he formedhis opinion of slavery. It ran its iron into him then and there, May, 1831. I have heard him say so often. " Perhaps in other talks old JohnHanks dramatised his early remembrances a little; he related how at theslave auction Lincoln said, "By God, boys, let's get away from this. If ever I get a chance to hit that thing, I'll hit it hard. " The youth, who probably did not express his indignation in theseprophetic words, was in fact chosen to deal "that thing" a blow fromwhich it seems unlikely to recover as a permitted institution amongcivilised men, and it is certain that from this early time the thoughtof slavery never ceased to be hateful to him. Yet it is not in thelight of a crusader against this special evil that we are to regardhim. When he came back from this voyage to his new home in Illinois hewas simply a youth ambitious of an honourable part in the life of theyoung country of which he was proud. We may regard, and he himselfregarded, the liberation of the slaves, which will always be associatedwith his name, as a part of a larger work, the restoration of hiscountry to its earliest and noblest tradition, which alone gavepermanence or worth to its existence as a nation. CHAPTER II THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN NATION 1. _The Formation of a National Government_. It is of course impossible to understand the life of a politician inanother country without study of its conditions and its past. In thecase of America this study is especially necessary, not only because themany points of comparison between that country and our own are apt toconceal profound differences of customs and institutions, but because thebroader difference between a new country and an old is in many respectsmore important than we conceive. But in the case of Lincoln there ispeculiar reason for carrying such a study far back. He himself appealedunceasingly to a tradition of the past. In tracing the causes which upto his time had tended to conjoin the United States more closely and thecause which more recently had begun to threaten them with disruption, weshall be examining the elements of the problem with which it was his workin life to deal. The "Thirteen United States of America" which in 1776 declared theirindependence of Great Britain were so many distinct Colonies distributedunevenly along 1, 300 miles of the Atlantic coast. These thirteenColonies can easily be identified on the map when it is explained thatMaine in the extreme north was then an unsettled forest tract claimed bythe Colony of Massachusetts, that Florida in the extreme south belongedto Spain, and that Vermont, which soon after asserted its separateexistence, was a part of the State of New York. Almost every one ofthese Colonies had its marked peculiarities and its points of antagonismas against its nearest neighbours; but they fell into three groups. Wemay broadly contrast the five southernmost, which included those whichwere the richest and of which in many ways the leading State wasVirginia, with the four (or later six) northernmost States knowncollectively as New England. Both groups had at first been colonised bythe same class, the smaller landed gentry of England with a sprinkling ofwell-to-do traders, though the South received later a larger number ofpoor and shiftless immigrants than the North, and the North attracted alarger number of artisans. The physical conditions of the South led tothe growth of large farms, or "plantations" as they were called, and of aclass of large proprietors; negro slaves thrived there and were useful inthe cultivation of tobacco, indigo, rice, and later of cotton. The Northcontinued to be a country of small farms, but its people turned also tofishery and to commerce, and the sea carrying trade became early itspredominant interest, yielding place later on to manufacturingindustries. The South was attached in the main, though by no meansaltogether, to the Church of England; New England owed its origin tosuccessive immigrations of Puritans often belonging to the Congregationalor Independent body; with the honourable exception of Rhode Island thesecommunities showed none of the liberal and tolerant Spirit which theIndependents of the old country often developed; they manifested, however, the frequent virtues as well as the occasional defects of thePuritan character. The middle group of Colonies were of more mixedorigin; New York and New Jersey had been Dutch possessions, Delaware waspartly Swedish, Pennsylvania had begun as a Quaker settlement butincluded many different elements; in physical and economic conditionsthey resembled on the whole New England, but they lacked, some of themconspicuously, the Puritan discipline, and had a certain cosmopolitancharacter. Though there were sharp antagonisms among the northernsettlements, and the southern settlements were kept distinct by the greatdistances between them, the tendency of events was to soften these minordifferences. But it greatly intensified one broad distinction whichmarked off the southern group from the middle and the northern groupsequally. Nevertheless, before independence was thought of there were commoncharacteristics distinguishing Americans from English people. They arethe better worth an attempt to note them because, as a historian ofAmerica wrote some years ago, "the typical American of 1900 is on thewhole more like his ancestor of 1775 than is the typical Englishman. " Inall the Colonies alike the conditions of life encouraged personalindependence. In all alike they also encouraged a special kind ofability which may be called practical rather than thorough--that of aworkman who must be competent at many tasks and has neither opportunitynor inducement to become perfect at one; that of the scientific manirresistibly drawn to inventions which shall make life less hard; that ofthe scholar or philosopher who must supply the new community's need oflawyers and politicians. On the other hand, many of the colonists' forefathers had come to theirnew home with distinct aspirations for a better ordering of human lifethan the old world allowed, and it has frequently been noticed thatAmericans from the first have been more prone than their kinsmen inEngland to pay homage to large ideal conceptions. This is a dispositionnot entirely favourable to painstaking and sure-footed reform. Theidealist American is perhaps too ready to pay himself with fine words, which the subtler and shyer Englishman avoids and rather too readily setsdown as insincere in others. Moreover, this tendency is quite consistentwith the peculiar conservatism characteristic of America. New conditionsin which tradition gave no guidance called forth great inventive powersand bred a certain pride in novelty. An American economist has writtenin a sanguine humour, "The process of transplanting removes many of theshackles of custom and tradition which retard the progress of oldercountries. In a new country things cannot be done in the old way, andtherefore they are probably done in the best way. " But a new country isalways apt to cling with tenacity to those old things for which it stillhas use; and a remote and undeveloped country does not fully share thecontinual commerce in ideas which brings about change (and, in the main, advance) in the old world. The conservatism which these causes tend toproduce has in any case been marked in America. Thus, as readers ofLowell are aware, in spite of the ceaseless efflorescence of the modernslang of America, the language of America is in many respects that of anolder England than ours, and the like has all along been true ofimportant literature, and still more of oratory, in America. Moreover, as the sentences which have just been quoted may suggest, the maxim thathas once hit the occasion, or the new practice or expedient oncenecessitated by the conditions of the moment, has been readily hallowedas expressing the wisdom of the ages. An Englishman will quote Burke ashe would quote Demosthenes or Plato, but Americans have been apt to quotetheir elder statesmen as they would quote the Bible. In like mannerpolitical practices of accidental origin--for instance, that arepresentative should be an inhabitant of the place herepresents--acquire in America something like the force of constitutionallaw. In this connection we must recall the period at which the earliestsettlers came from England, and the political heritage which theyconsequently brought with them. This heritage included a certainaptitude for local government, which was fostered in the south by therise of a class of large landowners and in the north by theCongregational Church system. It included also a great tenacity of thesubject's rights as against the State--the spirit of Hampden refusingpayment of ship-money--and a disposition to look on the law and theCourts as the bulwarks of such rights against Government. But it did notinclude--and this explains the real meaning of the War ofIndependence--any sort of feeling of allegiance to a Parliament whichrepresented Great Britain only, and which had gained its position even inGreat Britain since the fathers of Virginia and Massachusetts left home. Nor did it include--and this was of great importance in its influence onthe form of the Constitution--any real understanding of or any aptitudefor the English Parliamentary Government, under which the leaders of thelegislative body and the advisers of the Crown in its executive functionsare the same men, and under which the elected persons, presumed for themoment to represent the people, are allowed for that moment an almostunfettered supremacy. Thus there was much that made it easy for the Colonies to combine in thesingle act of repudiating British sovereignty, yet the characteristicswhich may be ascribed to them in common were not such as inclined them orfitted them to build up a great new unity. The Colonies, however, backed up by the British Government with thevigour which Chatham imparted to it, had acted together against a commondanger from the French. When the States, as we must now call them, actedtogether against the British Government they did so in name as "UnitedStates, " and they shortly proceeded to draw up "Articles of Confederationand Perpetual Union. " But it was union of a feeble kind. The separategovernment of each State, in its internal affairs, was easy to providefor; representative institutions always existed, and no more change wasneeded than to substitute elected officers for the Governors andCouncillors formerly appointed by the Crown. For the Union a Congresswas provided which was to represent all the States in dealings with theoutside world, but it was a Government with no effective powers exceptsuch as each separate State might independently choose to lend it. Itmight wage war with England, but it could not effectually control orregularly pay the military service of its own citizens; it might make atreaty of peace with England, but it could not enforce on its citizensdistasteful obligations of that treaty. Such an ill-devised machinewould have worked well enough for a time, if the Union Government couldhave attached to itself popular sentiments of honour and loyalty. Butthe sentiments were not there; and it worked badly. When once we were reconciled to a defeat which proved good for us, itbecame a tradition among English writers to venerate the AmericanRevolution. Later English historians have revolted from thisindiscriminate veneration. They insist on another side of the facts: onthe hopelessness of the American cause but for the commanding genius ofWashington and his moral authority, and for the command which France andSpain obtained of the seas; on the petty quarrelsomeness with which therights of the Colonists were urged, and the meanly skilful agitationwhich forced on the final rupture; on the lack of sustained patrioticeffort during the war; on the base cruelty and dishonesty with which theloyal minority were persecuted and the private rights guaranteed by thepeace ignored. It does not concern us to ascertain the precise justicein this displeasing picture; no man now regrets the main result of theRevolution, and we know that a new country is a new country, and thatthere was much in the circumstances of the war to encourage indisciplineand ferocity. But the fact that there is cause for such an indictmentbears in two ways upon our present subject. In the first place, there has been a tendency both in England and inAmerica to look at this history upside down. The epoch of the Revolutionand the Constitution has been regarded as a heroic age--wherein lived theelder Brutus, Mucius Scaevola, Claelia and the rest--to be followed byalmost continuous disappointment, disillusionment and decline. A morepleasing and more bracing view is nearer to the historic truth. Thefaults of a later time were largely survivals, and the later history islargely that of growth though in the face of terrific obstacles and manyinfluences that favoured decay. The nobility of the Revolution in theeighteenth century may be rated higher or lower, but in the Civil War, inwhich the elder brothers of so many men now living bore their part, thepeople of the North and of the South alike displayed far more heroicqualities. In the second place, the War of Independence and of the Revolution lackedsome of the characteristics of other national uprisings. It was not arevolt against grievous oppression or against a wholly foreigndomination, but against a political system which the people mildlyresented and which only statesmen felt to be pernicious and found to bepast cure. The cause appealed to far-seeing political aspiration andappealed also to turbulent and ambitious spirits and to whatever waspresent of a merely revolutionary temper, but the ordinary law-abidingman who minded his own business was not greatly moved one way or theother in his heart. The subsequent movement which, in a few years after independence wassecured, gave the United States a national and a working Constitution wasaltogether the work of a few, to which popular movement contributednothing. Of popular aspiration for unity there was none. Statesmen knewthat the new nation or group of nations lay helpless between pressingdangers from abroad and its own financial difficulties. They saw clearlythat they must create a Government of the Union which could exercisedirectly upon the individual American citizen an authority like that ofthe Government of his own State. They did this, but with a reluctant andhalf-convinced public opinion behind them. The makers of the Constitution earned in a manner the full praise thathas ever since been bestowed on them. But they did not, as it has oftenbeen suggested they did, create a sort of archetype and pattern for allGovernments that may hereafter partake of a federal character. Nor hasthe curious machine which they devised--with its balanced oppositionbetween two legislative chambers, between the whole Legislature and theindependent executive power of the President, between the governing powerof the moment and the permanent expression of the people's will embodiedin certain almost unalterable laws--worked conspicuously better thanother political constitutions. The American Constitution owes itspeculiarities partly to the form which the State Governments hadnaturally taken, and partly to sheer misunderstanding of the BritishConstitution, but much more to the want at the time of any strong senseof national unity and to the existence of a good deal of dislike to allgovernment whatsoever. The sufficient merit of its founders was that ofpatient and skilful diplomatists, who, undeterred by difficulties, foundout the most satisfactory settlement that had a chance of being acceptedby the States. So the Colonies, which in 1776 had declared their independence of GreatBritain under the name of the United States of America, entered in 1789into the possession of machinery of government under which their unityand independence could be maintained. It will be well at once to describe those features of the Constitutionwhich it will be necessary for us later to bear in mind. It is generallyknown that the President of the United States is an electedofficer--elected by what operates, though intended to act otherwise, as apopular vote. During the four years of his office he might roughly besaid to combine the functions of the King in this country and those of aPrime Minister whose cabinet is in due subjection to him. But thatdescription needs one very important qualification. He wields, withcertain slight restrictions, the whole executive power of government, butneither he nor any of his ministers can, like the ministers of our King, sit or speak in the Legislature, nor can he, like our King, dissolve thatLegislature. He has indeed a veto on Acts of Congress, which can only beoverridden by a large majority in both Houses. But the executive and thelegislative powers in America were purposely so constituted as to beindependent of each other to a degree which is unknown in this country. It is perhaps not very commonly understood that President and Congressalike are as strictly fettered in their action by the Constitution as alimited liability company is by its Memorandum of Association. ThisConstitution, which defines both the form of government and certainliberties of the subject, is not unalterable, but it can be altered onlyby a process which requires both the consent of a great majority inCongress or alternatively of a great majority of the legislatures of thedistinct States composing the Union, and also ratification of amendmentsby three-fourths of the several States. Thus we shall have to noticelater that a "Constitutional Amendment" abolishing slavery became aterror of the future to many people in the slave States, but remained allthe time an impossibility in the view of most people in the free States. We have, above all things, to dismiss from our minds any idea that theLegislature of a State is subordinate to the Congress of the UnitedStates, or that a State Governor is an officer under the President. TheConstitution of the Union was the product of a half-developed sense ofnationality. Under it the State authority (in the American sense of"State") and the Union or Federal authority go on side by side working inseparate spheres, each subject to Constitutional restrictions, but eachin its own sphere supreme. Thus the State authority is powerless to makepeace or war or to impose customs duties, for those are Federal matters. But the Union authority is equally powerless, wherever a State authorityhas been constituted, to punish ordinary crime, to promote education, orto regulate factories. In particular, by the Constitution as it stoodtill after the Civil War, the Union authority was able to prohibit theimportation of slaves from abroad after the end of 1807, but had no powerto abolish slavery itself in any of the States. Further, Congress had to be constituted in such a manner as to beagreeable to the smaller States which did not wish to enter into a Unionin which their influence would be swamped by their more populousneighbours. Their interest was secured by providing that in the Senateeach State should have two members and no more, while in the House ofRepresentatives the people of the whole Union are represented accordingto population. Thus legislation through Congress requires theconcurrence of two forces which may easily be opposed, that of themajority of American citizens and that of the majority of the severalStates. Of the two chambers, the Senate, whose members are elected forsix years, and to secure continuity do not all retire at the same time, became as time went on, though not at first, attractive to statesmen ofposition, and acquired therefore additional influence. Lastly, the Union was and is still the possessor of Territories notincluded in any State, and in the Territories, whatever subordinateself-government they might be allowed, the Federal authority has alwaysbeen supreme and uncontrolled in all matters. But as these Territorieshave become more settled and more populated, portions of them havesteadily from the first been organised as States and admitted to theUnion. It is for Congress to settle the time of their admission and tomake any conditions in regard to their Constitutions as States. But whenonce admitted as States they have thenceforward the full rights of theoriginal States. Within all the Territories, while they remained underits jurisdiction it lay with Congress to determine whether slavery shouldbe lawful or not, and, when any portion of them was ripe for admission tothe Union as a State, Congress could insist that the new State'sConstitution should or should not prohibit slavery. When theConstitution of the Union was being settled, slavery was the subject ofmost careful compromise; but in any union formed between slave States andfree, a bitter root of controversy must have remained, and the openingthrough which controversy actually returned was provided by theTerritories. On all other matters the makers of the Constitution had in the highesttemper of statesmanship found a way round seemingly insuperabledifficulties. The whole attitude of "the fathers" towards slavery is aquestion of some consequence to a biographer of Lincoln, and we shallreturn to it in a little while. 2. _Territorial Expansion_. A machine of government had been created, and we are shortly to considerhow it was got to work. But the large dominion to be governed had to besettled, and its area was about to undergo an enormous expansion. Itwill be convenient at this point to mark the stages of this development. The thirteen Colonies had, when they first revolted, definite westernboundaries, the westernmost of them reaching back from the sea-board to afrontier in the Alleghany Mountains. But at the close of the war GreatBritain ceded to the United States the whole of the inland country up tothe Mississippi River. Virginia had in the meantime effectivelycolonised Kentucky to the west of her, and for a time this was treated aswithin her borders. In a similar way Tennessee had been settled fromNorth and South Carolina and was treated as part of the former. Virginiahad also established claims by conquest north of the Ohio River in whatwas called the North-West Territory, but these claims and all similarclaims of particular States in unsettled or half-settled territory wereshortly before or shortly after the adoption of the Constitution ceded tothe Union Government. But the dominions of that Government soon receiveda vast accession. In 1803, by a brave exercise of the Constitutionalpowers which he was otherwise disposed to restrict jealously, PresidentJefferson bought from Napoleon I. The great expanse of country west ofthe Mississippi called Louisiana. This region in the extreme south wasno wider than the present State of Louisiana, but further north itwidened out so as to take in the whole watershed of the Missouri and itstributaries, including in the extreme north nearly all the present Stateof Montana. In 1819 Florida was purchased from Spain, and that countryat the same time abandoned its claims to a strip of coastland which nowforms the sea-board of Alabama and Mississippi. Such was the extent of the United States when Lincoln began his politicallife. In the movement of population by which this domain was beingsettled up, different streams may be roughly distinguished. First, therewas from 1780 onwards a constant movement of the poorer class and ofyounger sons of rich men from the great State of Virginia and to someextent from the Carolinas into Kentucky and Tennessee, whence they oftenshifted further north into Indiana and Illinois, or sometimes furtherwest into Missouri. It was mainly a movement of single families orgroups of families of adventurous pioneers, very sturdy, and veryturbulent. Then there came the expansion of the great plantationinterest in the further South, carrying with it as it spread, notoccasional slaves as in Kentucky and Tennessee, but the whole plantationsystem. This movement went not only directly westward, but still more bythe Gulf of Mexico and up the Mississippi, into the State of Louisiana, where a considerable French population had settled, the State ofMississippi, and later into Missouri. Later still came the westwardmovement from the Northern States. The energies of the people in theseStates had at first been to great extent absorbed by sea-going pursuitsand the subjugation of their own rugged soil, so that they reachedwestern regions like Illinois rather later than did the settlers fromStates further south. Ultimately, as their manufactures grew, immigration from Europe began its steady flow to these States, and thegreat westward stream, which continuing in our days has filled up therich lands of the far North-West, grew in volume. But want of naturaltimber and other causes hindered the development of the fertile prairiesoil in the regions beyond the upper Mississippi, till the period ofrailway development, which began about 1840, was far advanced. Illinoiswas Far West in 1830, Iowa and Minnesota continued to be so in 1860. TheNortherners, when they began to move westward, came in comparativelylarge numbers, bringing comparatively ordered habits and the fullmachinery of outward civilisation with them. Thus a great social changefollowed upon their arrival in the regions to which only scatteredpioneers such as the Lincolns had previously penetrated. In Illinois, with which so much of our story is bound up, the rapidity of that changemay be estimated from the fact that the population of that Statemultiplied sevenfold between the time when Lincoln settled there and theday when he left it as President. The concluding stages by which the dominions of the United States came tobe as we know them were: the annexation by agreement in 1846 of theRepublic of Texas, which had separated itself from Mexico and whichclaimed besides the great State of Texas a considerable territoryreaching north-west to the upper portions of the Arkansas River; theapportionment to the Union by a delimitation treaty with Great Britain in1846 of the Oregon Territory, including roughly the State of that nameand the rest of the basin of the Columbia River up to the presentfrontier--British Columbia being at the same time apportioned to GreatBritain; the conquest from Mexico in 1848 of California and a vastmountainous tract at the back of it; the purchase from Mexico of a smallfrontier strip in 1853; and the acquisition at several later times ofvarious outlying dependencies which will in no way concern us. 3. _The Growth of the Practice and Traditions of the Union Government_. We must turn back to the internal growth of the new united nation. Whenthe Constitution had been formed and the question of its acceptance bythe States had been at last settled, and when Washington had beeninaugurated as the first President under it, a wholly new conflict arosebetween two parties, led by two Ministers in the President's Cabinet, Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson. Both were potent and remarkablemen, Hamilton in all senses a great man. These two men, for all theirantagonism, did services to their country, without which the vigorousgrowth of the new nation would not have been possible. The figure of Alexander Hamilton, then Secretary of the Treasury (rankedby Talleyrand with Fox and Napoleon as one of the three great men he hadknown), must fascinate any English student of the period. If his name isnot celebrated in the same way in the country which he so eminentlyserved, it is perhaps because in his ideas, as in his origin, he was notstrictly American. As a boy, half Scotch, half French Huguenot, from theEnglish West Indian island of Nevis, he had been at school in New Yorkwhen his speeches had some real effect in attaching that city to thecause of Independence. He had served brilliantly in the war, onWashington's staff and with his regiment. He had chivalrously defended, as an advocate and in other ways, the Englishmen and loyalists againstwhose cause he fought. He had induced the great central State of NewYork to accept the Constitution, when the strongest local party wouldhave rejected it and made the Union impossible. As Washington'sSecretary of the Treasury he organised the machinery of government, helped his chief to preserve a strong, upright and cautious foreignpolicy at the critical point of the young Republic's infancy, andperformed perhaps the greatest and most difficult service of all insetting the disordered finances of the country upon a sound footing. Inearly middle age he ended a life, not flawless but admirable and lovable, in a duel, murderously forced upon him by one Aaron Burr. This man, whowas an elegant profligate, with many graces but no public principle, wasa claimant to the Presidency in opposition to Hamilton's greatestopponent, Jefferson; Hamilton knowingly incurred a feud which must at thebest have been dangerous to him, by unhesitatingly throwing his weightupon the side of Jefferson, his own ungenerous rival. The details of hispolicy do not concern us, but the United States could hardly have enduredfor many years without the passionate sense of the need of government andthe genius for actual administration with which Hamilton set the newnation on its way. Nevertheless--so do gifts differ--the general spiritwhich has on the whole informed the American nation and held it togetherwas neither respected nor understood by him. His party, called theFederalists, because they claimed to stand for a strong and an efficientFederal Government, did not survive him long. It is of interest to ushere only because, with its early disappearance, there ceased for ever tobe in America any party whatsoever which in any sense representedaristocratic principles or leanings. The fate of Jefferson's party (at first called Republican but by no meansto be confused with the Republican party which will concern us later) wasfar different, for the Democratic party, represented by the President ofthe United States at this moment, claims to descend from it in unbrokenapostolic succession. But we need not pause to trace the connectingthread between them, real as it is, for parties are not to be regarded asindividuals. Indeed the personality of Thomas Jefferson, Secretary ofState in Washington's Cabinet, impressed itself, during his life and longafter, upon all America more than that of any other man. Democratsto-day have described Lincoln, who by no means belonged to their party, as Jefferson's spiritual heir; and Lincoln would have welcomed thedescription. No biographer has achieved an understanding presentment of Jefferson'scurious character, which as presented by unfriendly critics is anunpleasing combination of contrasting elements. A tall and activefellow, a good horseman and a good shot, living through seven years ofcivil war, which he had himself heralded in, without the inclination tostrike a blow; a scholar, musician, and mathematician, without delicacy, elevation, or precision of thought or language; a man of intenseambition, without either administrative capacity or the courage to asserthimself in counsel or in debate; a dealer in philanthropic sentiment, privately malignant and vindictive. This is not as a whole a credibleportrait; it cannot stand for the man as his friends knew him; but thereis evidence for each feature of it, and it remains impossible for aforeigner to think of Jefferson and not compare him to his disadvantagewith the antagonist whom he eclipsed. By pertinacious industry, however, working chiefly through private correspondence, he constructed a greatparty, dominated a nation, and dominated it mainly for good. For therapid and complete triumph of Jefferson's party over its opponentssignifies a very definite and lasting conversion of the main stream ofAmerican public opinion to what may be called the sane element in theprinciples of the French Revolution. At the time when he set himself tocounterwork Hamilton, American statesmanship was likely to be directedonly to making Government strong and to ensuring the stability of thebusiness world; for reaction against the bloody absurdities that hadhappened in France was strong in America, and in English thought, whichstill had influence in America, it was all-powerful. Against this heasserted an intense belief in the value of freedom, in the equal claim ofmen of all conditions to the consideration of government, and in thesupreme importance to government of the consenting mind of the governed. And he made this sense so definitely a part of the national stock ofideas that, while the older-established principles of strong and soundgovernment were not lost to sight, they were consciously rated assubordinate to the principles of liberty. It must not be supposed that the ascendency thus early acquired by whatmay be called liberal opinions in America was a matter merely of settingsome fine phrases in circulation, or of adopting, as was early done inmost States, a wide franchise and other external marks of democracy. Wemay dwell a little longer on the unusual but curiously popular figure ofJefferson, for it illustrates the spirit with which the commonwealthbecame imbued under his leadership. He has sometimes been presented as aman of flabby character whose historical part was that of intermediarybetween impracticable French "philosophes" and the ruffians and swindlersthat Martin Chuzzlewit encountered, who were all "children of liberty, "and whose "boastful answer to the Despot and the Tyrant was that theirbright home was in the Settin' Sun. " He was nothing of the kind. Hisjudgment was probably unsound on the questions of foreign policy on whichas Secretary of State he differed from Washington, and he leaned, nodoubt, to a jealous and too narrow insistence upon the limits set by theConstitution to the Government's power. But he and his party wereemphatically right in the resistance which they offered to certainneedless measures of coercion. As President, though he was not a greatPresident, he suffered the sensible course of administration originatedby his opponent to continue undisturbed, and America owed to one bold andfar-seeing act of his the greatest of the steps by which her territorywas enlarged. It is, however, in the field of domestic policy, whichrested with the States and with which a President has often little to do, that the results of his principles must be sought. Jefferson was a manwho had worked unwearyingly in Virginia at sound, and what we should nowcall conservative, reforms, establishing religious toleration, reforminga preposterous land law, seeking to provide education for the poor, striving unsuccessfully for a sensible scheme of gradual emancipation ofthe slaves. In like manner his disciples after him, in their severalStates, devoted themselves to the kind of work in removing manifestabuses and providing for manifest new social needs in which Englishreformers like Romilly and Bentham, and the leaders of the first reformedParliament, were to be successful somewhat later. The Americans who soexasperated Dickens vainly supposed themselves to be far ahead of Englandin much that we now consider essential to a well-ordered nation. Butthere could have been no answer to Americans of Jefferson's generation ifthey had made the same claim. It is with this fact in mind that we should approach the famous words ofJefferson which echoed so long with triumphant or reproachful sound inthe ears of Americans and to which long after Lincoln was to make amemorable appeal. The propaganda which he carried on when theConstitution had been adopted was on behalf of a principle which he hadenunciated as a younger man when he drafted the Declaration ofIndependence. That document is mainly a rehearsal of the colonists'grievances, and is as strictly lawyerlike and about as fair or unfair asthe arguments of a Parliamentarian under Charles I. But theargumentation is prefaced with these sounding words: "We hold thesetruths to be self-evident:--that all men are created equal; that they areendowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that amongthese are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. That to securethese rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their justpowers from the consent of the governed. " Few propositions outside theBible have offered so easy a mark to the shafts of unintelligently clevercriticism. Jefferson, when he said that "all men are created equal, " and the ToryDr. Johnson, when he spoke of "the natural equality of man, " used acurious eighteenth century phrase, of which a Greek scholar can see theorigin; but it did not mean anything absurd, nor, on the other hand, didit convey a mere platitude. It should not be necessary to explain, asLincoln did long after, that Jefferson did not suppose all men to be ofequal height or weight or equally wise or equally good. He did, however, contend for a principle of which one elementary application is the lawwhich makes murder the same crime whatever be the relative positions ofthe murderer and the murdered man. Such a law was indeed firmly rootedin England before Jefferson talked of equality, but it amazed the rest ofEurope when the House of Lords hanged a peer for the murder of hisservant. There are indefinitely many further ways in which men who areutterly unequal had best be treated as creatures equally entitled to theconsideration of government and of their neighbours. It is safer tocarry this principle too far than not to carry it far enough. IfJefferson had expressed this and his cognate principle of liberty withscientific precision, or with the full personal sincerity with which agreater man like Lincoln expressed it, he would have said little fromwhich any Englishman to-day would dissent. None the less he would haveenunciated a doctrine which most Governments then existing set at naughtor proscribed, and for which Hamilton and the prosperous champions ofindependence who supported him had no use. The Declaration of Independence was not a very candid State paper, andthe popularity Jefferson afterwards created for its sentiments was notwholly free from humbug. Many men were more ready to think themselvesthe equals of Washington or Hamilton in the respects in which they werenot so, than to think a negro their own equal in the respects in which hewas. The boundless space and untrammelled conditions of the new worldmade liberty and equality in some directions highly attainable ideals, somuch so that they seemed to demand little effort or discipline. Thepatriotic orators under whom Lincoln sat in his youth would ascribe tothe political wisdom of their great democracy what was really the resultof geography. They would regard the extent of forest and prairie ascreditable to themselves, just as some few Englishmen have regarded ourlocation upon an island. This does not, however, do away with the value of that tradition of thenew world which in its purest and sincerest form became part and parcelof Lincoln's mind. Jefferson was a great American patriot. In his caseinsistence on the rights of the several States sprang from nohalf-hearted desire for a great American nation; he regarded theseprovincial organisations as machinery by which government and the peoplecould be brought nearer together; and he contributed that which was mostneeded for the evolution of a vigorous national life. He imparted to thevery recent historical origin of his country, and his followers impartedto its material conditions, a certain element of poetry and the feltpresence of a wholesome national ideal. The patriotism of an oldercountry derives its glory and its pride from influences deep rooted inthe past, creating a tradition of public and private action which needsno definite formula. The man who did more than any other to supply thislack in a new country, by imbuing its national consciousness--even itsnational cant--with high aspiration, did--it may well be--more than anystrong administrator or constructive statesman to create a Union whichshould thereafter seem worth preserving. 4. _The Missouri Compromise_. No sober critic, applying to the American statesmen of the firstgeneration the standards which he would apply to their Englishcontemporaries, can blame them in the least because they framed theirConstitution as best they could and were not deterred by the scrupleswhich they felt about slavery from effecting a Union between Stateswhich, on all other grounds except their latent difference upon slavery, seemed meant to be one. But many of these men had set their hands in theDeclaration of Independence to the most unqualified claim of liberty andequality for all men and proceeded, in the Constitution, to give nineteenyears' grace to "that most detestable sum of all villainies, " as Wesleycalled it, the African slave trade, and to impose on the States whichthought slavery wrong the dirty work of restoring escaped slaves tocaptivity. "Why, " Dr. Johnson had asked, "do the loudest yelps forliberty come from the drivers of slaves?" We are forced to recognise, upon any study of the facts, that they could not really have made theUnion otherwise than as they did; yet a doubt presents itself as to thegeneral soundness and sincerity of their boasted notions of liberty. Now, later on we shall have to understand the policy as to slavery onbehalf of which Lincoln stepped forward as a leader. In his ownconstantly reiterated words it was a return to the position of "thefathers, " and, though he was not a professional historian, it concerns usto know that there was sincerity at least in his intensely historicalview of politics. We have, then, to see first how "the fathers"--thatis, the most considerable men among those who won Independence and madethe Constitution--set out with a very honest view on the subject ofslavery, but with a too comfortable hope of its approaching end, whichone or two lived to see frustrated; secondly, how the men who succeededthem were led to abandon such hopes and content themselves with acompromise as to slavery which they trusted would at least keep theAmerican nation in being. Among those who signed the Declaration of Independence there werepresumably some of Dr. Johnson's "yelpers. " It mattered more that therewere sturdy people who had no idea of giving up slavery and probably didnot relish having to join in protestations about equality. Men likeJefferson ought to have known well that their associates in SouthCarolina and Georgia in particular did not share their aspirations--thepeople of Georgia indeed were recent and ardent converts to the slavesystem. But these sincere and insincere believers in slavery were theexceptions; their views did not then seem to prevail even in the greatestof the slave States, Virginia. Broadly speaking, the American opinion onthis matter in 1775 or in 1789 had gone as far ahead of English opinion, as English opinion had in turn gone ahead of American, when, in 1833, theyear after the first Reform Bill, the English people put its hand intoits pocket and bought out its own slave owners in the West Indies. TheBritish Government had forced several of the American Colonies to permitslavery against their will, and only in 1769 it had vetoed, in theinterest of British trade, a Colonial enactment for suppressing the slavetrade. This was sincerely felt as a part, though a minor part, of thegrievance against the mother country. So far did such views prevail onthe surface that a Convention of all the Colonies in 1774 unanimouslyvoted that "the abolition of domestic slavery is the greatest object ofdesire in those Colonies where it was unhappily introduced in theirinfant state. But previous to the enfranchisement of the slaves in law, it is necessary to exclude all further importation from Africa. " It wastherefore very commonly assumed when, after an interval of war whichsuspended such reforms, Independence was achieved, that slavery was adoomed institution. Those among the "fathers" whose names are best known in England, Washington, John Adams, Jefferson, Madison, Franklin, and Hamilton, wereall opponents of slavery. These include the first four Presidents, andthe leaders of very different schools of thought. Some of them, Washington and Jefferson at least, had a few slaves of their own. Washington's attitude to his slaves is illustrated by a letter which hewrote to secure the return of a black attendant of Mrs. Washington's whohad run away (a thing which he had boasted could never occur in hishousehold); the runaway was to be brought back if she could be persuadedto return; her master's legal power to compel her was not to be used. She was in fact free, but had foolishly left a good place; and there isno reason to suppose that it was otherwise with Jefferson's slaves. Jefferson's theory was vehemently against slavery. In old age he gave uphope in the matter and was more solicitous for union than for liberty, but this was after the disappointment of many efforts. In these effortshe had no illusory notion of equality; he wrote in 1791, when he had beendefeated in the attempt to carry a measure of gradual emancipation inVirginia: "Nobody wishes more than I do to see such proofs as youexhibit, that Nature has given to our black brothers talents equal tothose of the other colours of men, and that the appearance of a want ofthem is owing mainly to the degraded condition of their existence, bothin Africa and America. I can add with truth, that nobody wishes moreardently to see a good system commenced for raising the condition both oftheir body and mind to what it ought to be, as fast as the imbecility oftheir present existence and other circumstances, which cannot beneglected, will permit. " When he felt at last that freedom was not making way, his letters, bywhich his influence was chiefly exercised, abounded in passionateregrets. "I tremble for my country, " he wrote, "when I think of thenegro and remember that God is just. " But if he is judged not by hissentiments, or even by his efforts, but by what he accomplished, thisrhetorical champion of freedom did accomplish one great act, the firstlink as it proved in the chain of events by which slavery was ultimatelyabolished. In 1784 the North-West Territory, as it was called, was cededby Virginia to the old Congress of the days before the Union. Jeffersonthen endeavoured to pass an Ordinance by which slavery should be excludedfrom all territory that might ever belong to Congress. In this indeed hefailed, for in part of the territory likely to be acquired slavery wasalready established, but the result was a famous Ordinance of 1787, bywhich slavery was for ever excluded from the soil of the North-WestTerritory itself, and thus, when they came into being, the States ofOhio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin found themselvescongenitally incapable of becoming slave States. The further achievements of that generation in this matter wereconsiderable. It must of course be understood that the holding of slavesand the slave trade from Africa were regarded as two distinct questions. The new Congress abolished the slave trade on the first day on which theConstitution allowed it to do so, that is, on January 1, 1808. Themother country abolished it just about the same time. But already allbut three of the States had for themselves abolished the slave trade intheir own borders. As to slavery itself, seven of the original thirteenStates and Vermont, the first of the added States, had abolished thatbefore 1805. These indeed were Northern States, where slavery was not ofimportance, but in Virginia there was, or had been till lately, a growingopinion that slavery was not economical, and, with the ignorance commonin one part of a country of the true conditions in another part, it wasnatural to look upon emancipation as a policy which would spread ofitself. At any rate it is certain fact that the chief among the men whohad made the Constitution had at that time so regarded it, and continuedto do so. Under this belief and in the presence of many pressingsubjects of interest the early movement for emancipation in America dieddown with its work half finished. But before this happy belief expired an economic event had happened whichriveted slavery upon the South. In 1793 Eli Whitney, a Yale student upona holiday in the South, invented the first machine for cleaning cotton ofits seeds. The export of cotton jumped from 192, 000 lbs. In 1791 to6, 000, 000 lbs. In 1795. Slave labour had been found, or was believed, tobe especially economical in cotton growing. Slavery therefore rapidlybecame the mainstay of wealth and of the social system in South Carolinaand throughout the far South; and in a little while the baser sort ofplanters in Virginia discovered that breeding slaves to sell down Southwas a very profitable form of stock-raising. We may pass to the year 1820, when an enactment was passed by Congresswhich for thirty-four years thereafter might be regarded as hardly lessfundamental than the Constitution itself. Up till then nine new Stateshad been added to the original thirteen. It was repugnant to principlesstill strong in the North that these States should be admitted to theUnion with State Constitutions which permitted slavery. On the otherhand, it was for two reasons important to the chief slave States, thatthey should be. They would otherwise be closed to Southern planters whowished to migrate to unexhausted soil carrying with them the methods ofindustry and the ways of life which they understood. Furthermore, theNorth was bound to have before long a great preponderance of population, and if this were not neutralised by keeping the number of States on oneside and the other equal there would be a future political danger toslavery. Up to a certain point the North could with good conscienceyield to the South in this matter, for the soil of four of the new slaveStates had been ceded to the Union by old slave States and slave-holdershad settled freely upon it; and in a fifth, Louisiana, slavery had beensafeguarded by the express stipulations of the treaty with France, whichapplied to that portion, though no other, of the territory then ceded. Naturally, then, it had happened, though without any definite agreement, that for years past slave States and free States had been admitted to theUnion in pairs. Now arose the question of a further portion of the oldFrench territory, the present State of Missouri. A few slave-holderswith their slaves had in fact settled there, but no distinct claims onbehalf of slavery could be alleged. The Northern Senators and members ofCongress demanded therefore that the Constitution of Missouri shouldprovide for the gradual extinction of slavery there. Naturally therearose a controversy which sounded to the aged Jefferson like "a fire-bellin the night" and revealed for the first time to all America a deep riftin the Union. The Representatives of the South eventually carried theirmain point with the votes of several Northern men, known to history asthe "Dough-faces, " who all lost their seats at the next election. Missouri was admitted as a slave State, Maine about the same time as afree State; and it was enacted that thereafter in the remainder of theterritory that had been bought from France slavery should be unlawfulnorth of latitude 36 degrees 30 minutes, while by tacit agreementpermitted south of it. This was the Missouri Compromise. The North regarded it at first as ahumiliation, but learnt to point to it later as a sort of Magna Carta forthe Northern territories. The adoption of it marks a point from which itbecame for thirty-four years the express ambition of the principalAmerican statesmen and the tacit object, of every party manager to keepthe slavery question from ever becoming again a burning issue inpolitics. The collapse of it in 1854 was to prove the decisive event inthe career of Abraham Lincoln, aged 11 when it was passed. 5. _Leaders, Parties, and Tendencies in Lincoln's Youth_. Just about the year 1830, when Lincoln started life in Illinois, severaldistinct movements in national life began or culminated. They linkthemselves with several famous names. The two leaders to whom, as a young politician, Lincoln owed some sort ofallegiance were Webster and Clay, and they continued throughout his longpolitical apprenticeship to be recognised in most of America as the greatmen of their time. Daniel Webster must have been nearly a great man. Hewas always passed over for the Presidency. That was not so much becauseof the private failings which marked his robust and generous character, as because in days of artificial party issues, when vital questions aredealt with by mere compromise, high office seems to belong of right tomen of less originality. If he was never quite so great as all Americatook him to be, it was not for want of brains or of honesty, but becausehis consuming passion for the Union at all costs led him into the path ofleast apparent risk to it. Twice as Secretary of State (that is, chiefly, Foreign Minister) he showed himself a statesman, but above allhe was an orator and one of those rare orators who accomplish a definitetask by their oratory. In his style he carried on the tradition ofEnglish Parliamentary speaking, and developed its vices yet further; butthe massive force of argument behind gave him his real power. That powerhe devoted to the education of the people in a feeling for the nation andfor its greatness. As an advocate he had appeared in great cases in theSupreme Court. John Marshall, the Chief Justice from 1801 to 1835, brought a great legal mind of the higher type to the settlement ofdoubtful points in the Constitution, and his statesmanlike judgments didmuch both to strengthen the United States Government and to gain publicconfidence for it. It was a memorable work, for the power of the UnionGovernment, under its new Constitution, lay in the grip of the Courts. The pleading of the young Webster contributed much to this. Later onWebster, and a school of followers, of whom perhaps we may take "ourElijah Pogram" to have been one, used ceremonial occasions, on whichEnglishmen only suffer the speakers, for the purpose of inculcating theirpatriotic doctrine, and Webster at least was doing good. His greatestspeech, upon an occasion to which we shall shortly come, was itself anevent. Lincoln found in it as inspiring a political treatise as manyEnglishmen have discovered in the speeches and writings of Burke. Henry Clay was a slighter but more attractive person. He was apparentlythe first American public man whom his countrymen styled "magnetic, " buta sort of scheming instability caused him after one or two trials to beset down as an "impossible" candidate for the Presidency. As a dashingyoung man from the West he had the chief hand in forcing on the secondwar with Great Britain, from 1812 to 1814, which arose out of perhapsinsufficient causes and ended in no clear result, but which, it isprobable, marked a stage in the growth of loyalty to America. As anolder man he was famed as an "architect of compromises, " for though hestrove for emancipation in his own State, Kentucky, and dreamed of agreat scheme for colonising the slaves in Africa, he was supremelyanxious to avert collision between North and South, and in this respectwas typical of his generation. But about 1830 he was chiefly known asthe apostle of what was called the "American policy. " This was a policywhich aimed at using the powers of the national Government for thedevelopment of the boundless resources of the country. Its methodscomprised a national banking system, the use of the money of the Union ongreat public works, and a protective tariff, which it was hoped mightchiefly operate to encourage promising but "infant" industries and to taxthe luxuries of the rich. Whatever may have been the merits of thispolicy, which made some commotion for a few years, we can easilyunderstand that it appealed to the imagination of young Lincoln at a timeof keen political energy on his part of which we have but meagre details. A third celebrity of this period, in his own locality a still morepowerful man, was John Caldwell Calhoun, of South Carolina. He enjoyedbeyond all his contemporaries the fame of an intellectual person. Lincoln conceded high admiration to his concise and penetrating phrases. An Englishwoman, Harriet Martineau, who knew him, has described him as"embodied intellect. " He had undoubtedly in full measure those negativetides to respect which have gone far in America to ensure praise from thepublic and the historians; for he was correct and austere, and, which ismore, kindly among his family and his slaves. He is credited, too, withan observance of high principle in public life, which it might bedifficult to illustrate from his recorded actions. But thewarmer-blooded Andrew Jackson set him down as "heartless, selfish, and aphysical coward, " and Jackson could speak generously of an opponent whomhe really knew. His intellect must have been powerful enough, but it wasthat of a man who delights in arguing, and delights in elaboratedeductions from principles which he is too proud to revise; a man, too, who is fearless in accepting conclusions which startle or repel thevulgar mind; who is undisturbed in his logical processes by good sense, healthy sentiment, or any vigorous appetite for truth. Such men havedisciples who reap the disgrace which their masters are apt somehow toavoid; they give the prestige of wisdom and high thought to causes whichcould not otherwise earn them. A Northern soldier came back wounded in1865 and described to the next soldier in the hospital Calhoun's monumentat Charleston. The other said: "What you saw is not the real monument, but I have seen it. It is the desolated, ruined South. . . . That isCalhoun's real monument. " This man was a Radical, and known as the successor of Jefferson, but hisRadicalism showed itself in drawing inspiration solely from the popularcatchwords of his own locality. He adored the Union, but it was to be aUnion directed by distinguished politicians from the South in a sectionalSouthern interest. He did not originate, but he secured the strength oforthodoxy and fashion to a tone of sentiment and opinion which for ageneration held undisputed supremacy in the heart of the South. Americans might have seemed at this time to be united in a curiouslyexultant national self-consciousness, but though there was no sharpdivision of sections, the boasted glory of the one America meant to manyplanters in the South the glory of their own settled and free life withtheir dignified equals round them and their often contented dependentsunder them. Plain men among them doubtless took things as they were, and, without any particular wish to change them, did not pretend theywere perfect. But it is evident that in a widening circle of cleveryoung men in the South the claim of some peculiar virtue for Southerninstitutions became habitual in the first half of the nineteenth century. Their way of life was beautiful in their eyes. It rested upon slavery. Therefore slavery was a good thing. It was wicked even to criticise it, and it was weak to apologise for it or to pretend that it neededreformation. It was easy and it became apparently universal for thedifferent Churches of the South to prostitute the Word of God in thiscause. Later on crude notions of evolution began to get about in a fewcircles of advanced thought, and these lent themselves as easily to thesame purpose. Loose, floating thoughts of this kind might have matteredlittle. Calhoun, as the recognised wise man of the old South, concentrated them and fastened them upon its people as a creed. Glorification of "our institution at the South" became the main principleof Southern politicians, and any conception that there may ever have beenof a task for constructive statesmanship, in solving the negro problem, passed into oblivion under the influence of his revered reasoning faculty. But, of his dark and dangerous sort, Calhoun was an able man. He foresawearly that the best weapon of the common interest of the slave States layin the rights which might be claimed for each individual State againstthe Union. The idea that a discontented State might secede from theUnion was not novel--it had been mooted in New England, during the lastwar against Great Britain, and, curiously enough, among the rump of theold Federalist party, but it was generally discounted. Calhoun firstbrought it into prominence, veiled in an elaborate form which someprevious South Carolinian had devised. The occasion had nothing to dowith slavery. It concerned Free Trade, a very respectable issue, but soclearly a minor issue that to break up a great country upon it would havegone beyond the limit of solemn frivolity, and Calhoun must be taken tohave been forging an implement with which his own section of the Statescould claim and extort concessions from the Union. A protective tariffhad been passed in 1828. The Southern States, which would have to paythe protective duties but did not profit by them, disliked it. Calhounand others took the intelligible but too refined point, that the powersof Congress under the Constitution authorised a tariff for revenue butnot a tariff for a protective purpose. Every State, Calhoun declared, must have the Constitutional right to protect itself against an Act ofCongress which it deemed unconstitutional. Let such a State, in specialConvention, "nullify" the Act of Congress. Let Congress then, unless itcompromised the matter, submit its Act to the people in the form of anAmendment to the Constitution. It would then require a three-fourthsmajority of all the States to pass the obnoxious Act. Last but notleast, if the Act was passed, the protesting State had, Calhoun claimed, the right to secede from the Union. Controversy over this tariff raged for fully four years, and had amemorable issue. In the course of 1830 the doctrine of "nullification"and "secession" was discussed in the Senate, and the view of Calhoun wasexpounded by one Senator Hayne. Webster answered him in a speech whichhe meant should become a popular classic, and which did become so. Heset forth his own doctrine of the Union and appealed to national againstState loyalty in the most influential oration that was perhaps ever made. "His utterance, " writes President Wilson, "sent a thrill through all theEast and North which was unmistakably a thrill of triumph. Men were gladbecause of what he had said. He had touched the nationalself-consciousness, awakened it, and pleased it with a morning vision ofits great tasks and certain destiny. " Later there came in the President, the redoubtable Andrew Jackson, the most memorable President betweenJefferson and Lincoln. He said very little--only, on Jefferson'sbirthday he gave the toast, "Our Federal Union; it must be preserved. "But when in 1832, in spite of concessions by Congress, a Convention wassummoned in South Carolina to "nullify" the tariff, he issued theappropriate orders to the United States Army, in case such action wascarried out, and it is understood that he sent Calhoun private word thathe would be the first man to be hanged for treason. Nullificationquietly collapsed. The North was thrilled still more than by Webster'soratory, and as not a single other State showed signs of backing SouthCarolina, it became thenceforth the fixed belief of the North that theUnion was recognised as in law indissoluble, as Webster contended it was. None the less the idea of secession had been planted, and planted in afertile soil. General Andrew Jackson, whose other great achievements must now be told, was not an intellectual person, but his ferocious and, in the literalsense, shocking character is refreshing to the student of this period. He had been in his day the typical product of the West--a far wilder Westthan that from which Lincoln later came. Originally a lawyer, he had wonmartial fame in fights with Indians and in the celebrated victory overthe British forces at New Orleans. He was a sincere Puritan; and he hada courtly dignity of manner; but he was of arbitrary and passionatetemper, and he was a sanguinary duellist. His most savage duels, itshould be added, concerned the honour of a lady whom he marriedchivalrously, and loved devotedly to the end. The case that can be madefor his many arbitrary acts shows them in some instances to have beenjustifiable, and shows him in general to have been honest. When in 1824 Jackson had expected to become President, and, owing toproceedings which do not now matter, John Quincy Adams, son of a formerPresident, and himself a remarkable man, was made President instead ofhim, Jackson resolved to overthrow the ruling class of Virginian countrygentlemen and Boston city magnates which seemed to him to controlGovernment, and to call into life a real democracy. To this end hecreated a new party, against which of course an opposition party arose. Neither of the new parties was in any sense either aristocratic ordemocratic. "The Democracy, " or Democratic party, has continued inexistence ever since, and through most of Lincoln's life ruled America. In trying to fix the character of a party in a foreign country we cannothope to be exact in our portraiture. At the first start, however, thisparty was engaged in combating certain tendencies to Governmentinterference in business. It was more especially hostile to a NationalBank, which Jackson himself regarded as a most dangerous form of alliancebetween the administration and the richest class. Of the growth of whatmay be called the money power in American politics he had an intense, indeed prophetic, dread. Martin Van Buren, his friend and successor, whatever else he may have been, was a sound economist of what is nowcalled the old school, and on a financial issue he did what few men inhis office have done, he deliberately sacrificed his popularity to hisprinciples. Beyond this the party was and has continued prone, in amanner which we had better not too clearly define, to insist upon therestrictions of the Constitution, whether in the interest of individualliberty or of State rights. This tendency was disguised at the first bythe arbitrary action of Jackson's own proceedings, for Jackson aloneamong Presidents displayed the sentiments of what may be called a populardespot. Its insistence upon State rights, aided perhaps by its dislikeof Protection, attracted to it the leading politicians of the South, whoin the main dominated its counsels, though later on they liked to do itthrough Northern instruments. But it must not in the least be imaginedthat either party was Northern or Southern; for there were many Whigs inthe South, and very many Democrats in the North. Moreover, it should beclearly grasped, though it is hard, that among Northern Democratsinsistence on State rights did not involve the faintest leaning towardsthe doctrine of secession; on the contrary a typical Democrat wouldbelieve that these limitations to the power of the Union were the verythings that gave it endurance and strength. Slavery, moreover, hadfriends and foes in both parties. If we boldly attempted to define theprevailing tone of the Democrats we might say that, while they and theiropponents expressed loyalty to the Union and the Constitution, theDemocrats would be prone to lay the emphasis upon the Constitution. Whatever might be the case with an average Whig, a man like Lincoln wouldbe stirred in his heart by the general spirit of the country'sinstitutions, while the typical Democrat of that time would dwellaffectionately on the legal instruments and formal maxims in which thatspirit was embodied. Of the Whigs it is a little harder to speak definitely, nor is it verynecessary, for in two only out of seven Presidential elections did theyelect their candidate, and in each case that candidate then died, and in1854 they perished as a party utterly and for ever. Just for a time theywere identified with the "American policy" of Clay. When that passed outof favour they never really attempted to formulate any platform, or totake permanently any very definite stand. They nevertheless had theadherence of the ablest men of the country, and, as an opposition partyto a party in power which furnished much ground for criticism, theypossessed an attraction for generous youth. The Democrats at once, and the Whigs not long after them, createdelaborate party machines, on the need of which Jackson insisted as theonly means of really giving influence to the common people. Theprevailing system and habit of local self-government made suchorganisation easy. Men of one party in a township or in a countyassembled, formulated their opinions, and sent delegates withinstructions, more or less precise, to party conventions for largerareas, these would send delegates to the State Convention and these inturn to the National Convention of the Party. The party candidates forthe Presidency, as well as for all other elective positions, were and arethus chosen, and the party "platform" or declaration of policy was and isthus formulated. Such machinery, which in England is likely always toplay a less important part, has acquired an evil name. At the best therehas always been a risk that a "platform" designed to detach voters fromthe opposite party will be an insincere and eviscerated document, bywhich active public opinion is rather muzzled than expressed. There hasbeen a risk too that the "available" candidate should be some blamelessnonentity, to whom no one objects, and whom therefore no one reallywants. But it must be observed that the rapidity with which suchorganisation was taken up betokened the prevalence of a widespread andkeen interest in political affairs. The days of really great moneyed interests and of corruption of thegravest sort were as yet far distant, but one demoralising influence wasimposed upon the new party system by its author at its birth. Jackson, in his perpetual fury, believed that office holders under the more orless imaginary ruling clique that had held sway were a corrupt gang, andhe began to turn them out. He was encouraged to extend to the wholecountry a system which had prevailed in New York and with which Van Burenwas too familiar. "To the victors belong the spoils, " exclaimed acertain respectable Mr. Marcy. A wholesale dismissal of office holderslarge and small, and replacement of them by sound Democrats, soon tookplace. Once started, the "spoils system" could hardly be stopped. Thenceforward there was a standing danger that the party machine would bein the hands of a crew of jobbers and dingy hunters after petty offices. England, of course, has had and now has practices theoretically asindefensible, but none possessing any such sinister importance. It ishard, therefore, for us to conceive how little of really vicious intentwas necessary to set this disastrous influence going. There was notrained Civil Service with its unpartisan traditions. In the case ofoffices corresponding to those of our permanent heads of departments itseemed reasonable that the official should, like his chief the Ministerconcerned, be a person in harmony with the President. As to the smalleroffices--the thousands of village postmasterships and so forth--one manwas likely to do the work as well as another; the dispossessed officialcould, in the then condition of the country, easily find another equallylucrative employment; "turn and turn about" seemed to be the rule of fairplay. There were now few genuine issues in politics. Compromise on vitalquestions was understood to be the highest statesmanship. TheConstitution itself, with its curious system of checks and balances, rendered it difficult to bring anything to pass. Added to this was aparty system with obvious natural weaknesses, infected from the firstwith a dangerous malady. The political life, which lay on the surface ofthe national life of America, thus began to assume an air of futility, and, it must be added, of squalor. Only, Englishmen, recollecting thefeebleness and corruption which marked their aristocratic governmentthrough a great part of the eighteenth century, must not enlarge theirphylacteries at the expense of American democracy. And it is yet moreimportant to remember that the fittest machinery for popular government, the machinery through which the real judgment of the people will prevail, can only by degrees and after many failures be devised. Populargovernment was then young, and it is young still. So much for the great world of politics in those days. But in or about1830 a Quaker named Lundy had, as Quakers used to say, "a concern" towalk 125 miles through the snow of a New England winter and speak hismind to William Lloyd Garrison. Garrison was a poor man who, likeFranklin, had raised himself as a working printer, and was now occupiedin philanthropy. Stirred up by Lundy, he succeeded after many painfulexperiences, in gaol and among mobs, in publishing in Boston on January1, 1831, the first number of the Liberator. In it he said: "I shallstrenuously contend for the immediate enfranchisement of our slavepopulation. I will be as hard as truth and as uncompromising as justice. I will not equivocate; I will not excuse; I will not retreat a singleinch; and I will be heard. " This was the beginning of the newAbolitionist movement. The Abolitionists, in the main, wereimpracticable people; Garrison in the end proved otherwise. Under theexisting Constitution, they had nothing to propose but that the freeStates should withdraw from "their covenant with death and agreement withhell"--in other words, from the Union, --whereby they would not haveliberated one slave. They included possibly too many of that sort whowould seek salvation by repenting of other men's sins. But even thesedid not indulge this propensity at their ease, for by this time thepoliticians, the polite world, the mass of the people, the churches (evenin Boston), not merely avoided the dangerous topic; they angrilyproscribed it. The Abolitionists took their lives in their hands, andsometimes lost them. Only two men of standing helped them: Channing, thegreat preacher, who sacrificed thereby a fashionable congregation; andAdams, the sour, upright, able ex-President, the only ex-President whoever made for himself an after-career in Congress. In 1852 a still morepotent ally came to their help, a poor lady, Mrs. Beecher Stowe, who inthat year published "Uncle Tom's Cabin, " often said to have influencedopinion more than any other book of modern times. Broadly speaking, theyaccomplished two things. If they did not gain love in quarters wherethey might have looked for it, they gained the very valuable hatred oftheir enemies; for they goaded Southern politicians to fury and madness, of which the first symptom was their effort to suppress Abolitionistpetitions to Congress. But above all they educated in their labour ofthirty years a school of opinion, not entirely in agreement with them butready one day to revolt with decision from continued complicity in wrong. 6. _Slavery and Southern Society_. In the midst of this growing America, a portion, by no means sharplymarked off, and accustomed to the end to think itself intensely American, was distinguished by a peculiar institution. What was the character ofthat institution as it presented itself in 1830 and onwards? Granting, as many slave holders did, though their leaders always deniedit, that slavery originated in foul wrongs and rested legally upon a vileprinciple, what did it look like in its practical working? Most of ushave received from two different sources two broad but vivid generalimpressions on this subject, which seem hard to reconcile but which areboth in the main true. On the one hand, a visitor from England or theNorth, coming on a visit to the South, or in earlier days to the BritishWest Indies, expecting perhaps to see all the horror of slavery at aglance, would be, as a young British officer once wrote home, "mostagreeably undeceived as to the situation of these poor people. " He woulddiscern at once that a Southern gentleman had no more notion of using hislegal privilege to be cruel to his slave than he himself had ofoverdriving his old horse. He might easily on the contrary find quiteordinary slave owners who had a very decided sense of responsibility inregard to their human chattels. Around his host's house, where theowner's children, petted by a black nurse, played with the little blackchildren or with some beloved old negro, he might see that pretty aspectof "our institution at the South, " which undoubtedly created in manyyoung Southerners as they grew up a certain amount of genuine sentimentin favour of slavery. Riding wider afield he might be struck, as GeneralSherman was, with the contentment of the negroes whom he met on theplantations. On enquiry he would learn that the slave in old age wassure of food and shelter and free from work, and that as he approachedold age his task was systematically diminished. As to excessive toil atany time of life, he would perhaps conclude that it was no easy thing todrive a gang of Africans really hard. He would be assured, quiteincorrectly, that the slave's food and comfort generally were greaterthan those of factory workers in the North, and, perhaps only too truly, that his privations were less than those of the English agriculturallabourer at that time. A wide and careful survey of the subject was madeby Frederick Law Olmsted, a New York farmer, who wrote what but for theirgloomy subject would be among the best books of travel. He presents tous the picture of a prevailingly sullen, sapless, brutish life, butcertainly not of acute misery or habitual oppression. A Southerner oldenough to remember slavery would probably not question the accuracy ofhis details, but would insist, very likely with truth, that there wasmore human happiness there than an investigator on such a quest wouldreadily discover. Even on large plantations in the extreme South, wherethe owner only lived part of the year, and most things had to be left toan almost always unsatisfactory overseer, the verdict of the observer wasapt to be "not so bad as I expected. " On the other hand, many of us know Longfellow's grim poem of the HuntedNegro. It is a true picture of the life led in the Dismal Swamps ofVirginia by numbers of skulking fugitives, till the industry ofnegro-hunting, conducted with hounds of considerable value, ultimatelymade their lairs untenable. The scenes in the auction room where, perhaps on the death or failure of their owner, husbands and wives, parents and children, were constantly being severed, and negresses werehabitually puffed as brood mares; the gentleman who had lately sold hishalf-brother, to be sent far south, because he was impudent; the devilishcruelty with which almost the only recorded slave insurrection wasstamped out; the chase and capture and return in fetters of slaves whohad escaped north, or, it might be, of free negroes in their place; theadvertisements for such runaways, which Dickens collected, and whichdescribed each by his scars or mutilations; the systematic slavebreeding, for the supply of the cotton States, which had become a stapleindustry of the once glorious Virginia; the demand arising for therestoration of the African slave trade--all these were realities. TheSouthern people, in the phrase of President Wilson, "knew that theirlives were honourable, their relations with their slaves humane, theirresponsibility for the existence of slavery amongst them remote"; theyburned with indignation when the whole South was held responsible for theoccasional abuses of slavery. But the harsh philanthropist, whodenounced them indiscriminately, merely dwelt on those aspects of slaverywhich came to his knowledge or which he actually saw on the border line. And the occasional abuses, however occasional, were made by thedeliberate choice of Southern statesmanship an essential part of theinstitution. Honourable and humane men in the South scorned exceedinglythe slave hunter and the slave dealer. A candid slave owner, discussing"Uncle Tom's Cabin, " found one detail flagrantly unfair; the ruinedmaster would have had to sell his slaves to the brute, Legree, but forthe world he would not have shaken hands with him. "Your children, "exclaimed Lincoln, "may play with the little black children, but theymust not play with his"--the slave dealer's, or the slave driver's, orthe slave hunter's. By that fact alone, as he bitingly but unanswerablyinsisted, the whole decent society of the South condemned the foundationon which it rested. It is needless to discuss just how dark or how fair American slavery inits working should be painted. The moderate conclusions which are quitesufficient for our purpose are uncontested. First, this much mustcertainly be conceded to those who would defend the slave system, that inthe case of the average slave it was very doubtful whether his happiness(apart from that of future generations) could be increased by suddenlyturning him into a free man working for a wage; justice would certainlyhave demanded that the change should be accompanied by other provisionsfor his benefit. But, secondly, on the refractory negro, more vicious, or sometimes, one may suspect, more manly than his fellows, the systemwas likely to act barbarously. Thirdly, every slave family was exposedto the risk, on such occasions as the death or great impoverishment ofits owner, of being ruthlessly torn asunder, and the fact that negroesoften rebounded or seemed to rebound from sorrows of this sort withsurprising levity does not much lessen the horror of it. Fourthly, it isinherent in slavery that its burden should be most felt precisely by thebest minds and strongest characters among the slaves. And, though thecapacity of the negroes for advancement could not then and cannot yet betruly measured, yet it existed, and the policy of the South shut the doorupon it. Lastly, the system abounded in brutalising influences upon alarge number of white people who were accessory to it, and notoriously itdegraded the poor or "mean whites, " for whom it left no industrialopening, and among whom it caused work to be despised. There is thus no escape from Lincoln's judgment: "If slavery is notwrong, nothing is wrong. " It does not follow that the way to right thewrong was simple, or that instant and unmitigated emancipation was thebest way. But it does follow that, failing this, it was for thestatesmen of the South to devise a policy by which the most flagrantevils should be stopped, and, however cautiously and experimentally, theraising of the status of the slave should be proceeded with. It does notfollow that the people who, on one pretext or another, shut their eyes tothe evil of the system, while they tried to keep their personal dealinghumane, can be sweepingly condemned by any man. But it does follow thata deliberate and sustained policy which, neglecting all reform, strove atall costs to perpetuate the system and extend it to wider regions, was ascriminal a policy as ever lay at the door of any statesmen. And this, infact, became the policy of the South. "The South" meant, for political purposes, the owners of land and slavesin the greater part of the States in which slavery was lawful. The poorwhites never acquired the political importance of the working classes inthe North, and count for little in the story. Some of the more northerlyslave States partook in a greater degree of the conditions and ideas ofthe North and were doubtfully to be reckoned with the South. Moreover, there is a tract of mountainous country, lying between the Atlanticsea-board and the basin of the Mississippi and extending southwards tothe borders of Georgia and Alabama, of which the very vigorous andindependent inhabitants were and are in many ways a people apart, oftencherishing to this day family feuds which are prosecuted in the truespirit of the Icelandic Sagas. The South, excluding these districts, was predominantly Democratic inpolitics, and its leaders owed some allegiance to the tradition ofRadicals like Jefferson. But it was none the less proud of itsaristocracy and of the permeating influence of aristocratic manners andtraditions. A very large number of Southerners felt themselves to beladies and gentlemen, and felt further that there were few or none likethem among the "Yankee" traders of the North. A claim of that sort islikely to be aggressively made by those who have least title to make it, and, as strife between North and South grew hotter, the gentility of thelatter infected with additional vulgarity the political controversy ofprivate life and even of Congress. But, as observant Northerners werequite aware, these pretensions had a foundation of fact. An Englishman, then or now, in chance meetings with Americans of either section, wouldat once be aware of something indefinable in their bearing to which hewas a stranger; but in the case of the Southerner the strangeness wouldoften have a positive charm, such as may be found also among people ofthe Old World under southern latitudes and relatively primitiveconditions. Newly-gotten and ill-carried wealth was in those days (Mr. Olmsted, of New York State, assures us) as offensive in the more recentlydeveloped and more prosperous parts of the South as in New York Cityitself; and throughout the South sound instruction and intellectualactivity were markedly lacking--indeed, there is no serious Southernliterature by which we can check these impressions of his. Comparing themasses of moderately well-to-do and educated people with whom heassociated in the North and in the South, he finds them both free fromthe peculiar vulgarity which, we may be pained to know, he had discoveredamong us in England; he finds honesty and dishonesty in serious mattersof conduct as prevalent in one section as in the other; he finds theNortherner better taught and more alert in mind; but he ascribes to himan objectionable quality of "smartness, " a determination to show you thathe is a stirring and pushing fellow, from which the Southerner is whollyfree; and he finds that the Southerner has derived from home influencesand from boarding schools in which the influence of many similar homes isconcentrated, not indeed any great refinement, but a manner which is"more true, more quiet, more modestly self-assured, more dignified. " Thisadvantage, we are to understand, is diffused over a comparatively largerclass than in England. Beyond this he discerns in a few parts of theSouth and notably in South Carolina a somewhat inaccessible, selectsociety, of which the nucleus is formed by a few (incredibly few) oldColonial families which have not gone under, and which altogether is sosmall that some old gentlewomen can enumerate all the members of it. Fewas they are, these form "unquestionably a wealthy and remarkablygenerous, refined, and accomplished first class, clinging with somepertinacity, although with too evident an effort, to the traditionalmanners and customs of an established gentry. " No doubt the sense of high breeding, which was common in the South, wentbeyond mere manners; it played its part in making the struggle of theSouthern population, including the "mean whites, " in the Civil War one ofthe most heroic, if one of the most mistaken, in which a whole populationhas ever been engaged; it went along with integrity and a high average ofgoverning capacity among public men; and it fitted the gentry of theSouth to contribute, when they should choose, an element of great valueto the common life of America. As it was, the South suffered to the fullthe political degeneration which threatens every powerful class which, with a distinct class interest of its own, is secluded from real contactwith competing classes with other interests and other ideas. It is notto be assumed that all individual Southerners liked the policy which theylearnt to support in docile masses. But their very qualities of loyaltymade them the more ready, under accepted and respected leaders, to adoptpolitical aims and methods which no man now recalls without regret. The connection between slavery and politics was this; as populationslowly grew in the South, and as the land in the older States became tosome extent exhausted, the desire for fresh territory in whichcultivation by slaves could flourish became stronger and stronger. Thiswas the reason for which the South became increasingly aware of asectional interest in politics. In all other respects the community ofpublic interests, of business dealings, and of general intercourse was asgreat between North and South as between East and West. It is certainthat throughout the South, with the doubtful exception of South Carolina, political instinct and patriotic pride would have made the idea ofseparation intolerable upon any ground except that of slavery. In regardto this matter of dispute a peculiar phenomenon is to be observed. Thequarrel grew not out of any steady opposition between North and South, but out of the habitual domination of the country by the South and thelong-continued submission of the North to that domination. For the North had its full share of blame for the long course ofproceedings which prepared the coming tragedy, and the most impassionedwriters on the side of the Union during the Civil War have put that blamehighest. The South became arrogant and wrong-headed, and no defence ispossible for the chief acts of Southern policy which will be recordedlater; but the North was abject. To its own best sons it seemed to havelost both its conscience and its manhood, and to be stifled in the coilsof its own miserable political apparatus. Certainly the prevailingattitude of the Northern to the Southern politicians was that oftruckling. And Southerners who went to Washington had a further reasonfor acquiring a fatal sense of superiority to the North. The traditionof popular government which maintained itself in the South caused men whowere respected, in private life, and were up to a point capable leaders, who were, in short, representative, to be sent to Congress and to be keptthere. The childish perversion of popular government which took hold ofthe newer and more unsettled population in the North led them to send toCongress an ever-changing succession of unmeritable and sometimes shadypeople. The eventual stirring of the mind of the North which so closelyconcerns this biography was a thing hard to bring about, and to the Southit brought a great shock of surprise. 7. _Intellectual Development_. No survey of the political movements of this period should concludewithout directing attention to something more important, which cannot beexamined here. In the years from 1830 till some time after the death ofLincoln, America made those contributions to the literature of our commonlanguage which, though neither her first nor her last, seemed likely tobe most permanently valued. The learning and literature of America atthat time centred round Boston and Harvard University in the adjacentcity of Cambridge, and no invidious comparison is intended or will befelt if they, with their poets and historians and men of letters at thattime, with their peculiar atmosphere, instinct then and now with a lifeathletic, learned, business-like and religious, are taken to show thedawning capacities of the new nation. No places in the United Statesexhibit more visibly the kinship of America with England, yet in nonecertainly can a stranger see more readily that America is independent ofthe Old World in something more than politics. Many of their streets andbuildings would in England seem redolent of the past, yet no cities ofthe Eastern States played so large a part in the development, materialand mental, of the raw and vigorous West. The limitations of theirgreatest writers are in a manner the sign of their achievement. It wouldhave been contrary to all human analogy if a country, in such an earlystage of creation out of such a chaos, had put forth books markedstrongly as its own and yet as the products of a mature national mind. It would also have been surprising if since the Civil War the rush ofstill more appalling and more complex practical problems had notobstructed for a while the flow of imaginative or scientific production. But the growth of those relatively early years was great. Boston hadbeen the home of a loveless Christianity; its insurrection in the War ofIndependence had been soiled by shifty dealing and mere acidity; butBoston from the days of Emerson to those of Phillips Brooks radiated atemper and a mental force that was manly, tender, and clean. The manamong these writers about whose exact rank, neither low nor very highamong poets, there can be least dispute was Longfellow. He might seemfrom his favourite subjects to be hardly American; it was hisdeliberately chosen task to bring to the new country some savour ofthings gentle and mellow caught from the literature of Europe. But, inthe first place, no writer could in the detail of his work have been moreracy of that New England countryside which lay round his home; and, inthe second place, no writer could have spoken more unerringly to the earof the whole wide America of which his home was a little part. It seemsstrange to couple the name of this mild and scholarly man with thethought of that crude Western world to which we must in a moment pass. But the connection is real and vital. It is well shown in theappreciation written of him and his fellows by the American writer whomost violently contrasts with him, Walt Whitman. A student of American history may feel something like the experiencewhich is common among travellers in America. When they come home theycannot tell their friends what really interested them. Ugly things andvery dull things are prominent in their story, as in the tales ofAmerican humorists. The general impression they convey is of somethingtiresomely extensive, distractingly miscellaneous, and yet insufferablymonotonous. But that is not what they mean. They had better not seek toexpress themselves by too definite instances. They will be understoodand believed when they say that to them America, with its vast spacesfrom ocean to ocean, does present itself as one country, not less worthythan any other of the love which it has actually inspired; a countrywhich is the home of distinctive types of manhood and womanhood, bringingtheir own addition to the varying forms in which kindness and courage andtruth make themselves admirable to mankind. The soul of a single peopleseems to be somewhere present in that great mass, no less than in sometiny city State of antiquity. Only it has to struggle, submergedevermore by a flood of newcomers, and defeated evermore by difficultiesquite unlike those of other lands; and it struggles seemingly withundaunted and with rational hope. Americans are fond of discussing Americanism. Very often they select asa pattern of it Abraham Lincoln, the man who kept the North together buthas been pronounced to have been a Southerner in his inherited character. Whether he was so typical or not, it is the central fact of thisbiography that no man ever pondered more deeply in his own way, oranswered more firmly the question whether there was indeed an Americannationality worth preserving. CHAPTER III LINCOLN'S EARLY CAREER 1. _Life at New Salem_. From this talk of large political movements we have to recall ourselvesto a young labouring man with hardly any schooling, naturally andincurably uncouth, but with a curious, quite modest, impulse to asserta kindly ascendency over the companions whom chance threw in his way, and with something of the gift, which odd, shy people often possess, for using their very oddity as a weapon in their struggles. In theconditions of real equality which still prevailed in a newly settledcountry it is not wonderful that he made his way into political lifewhen he was twenty-five, but it was not till twenty years later that heplayed an important part in events of enduring significance. Thus the many years of public activity with which we are concerned inthis and the following chapter belong rather to his apprenticeship thanto his life's work; and this apprenticeship at first sight contrastsmore strongly with his fame afterwards than does his boyhood of povertyand comparatively romantic hardship. For many poor boys have lived tomake a great mark on history, but as a rule they have entered early ona life either of learning or of adventure or of large business. Butthe affairs in which Lincoln early became immersed have an air ofpettiness, and from the point of view of most educated men and women inthe Eastern States or in Europe, many of the associates and competitorsof his early manhood, to whom he had to look up as his superiors inknowledge, would certainly have seemed crude people with a narrowhorizon. Indeed, till he was called upon to take supreme control ofvery great matters, Lincoln must have had singularly little intercourseeither with men versed in great affairs or with men of approvedintellectual distinction. But a mind too original to be subdued to itssurroundings found much that was stimulating in this time when Illinoiswas beginning rapidly to fill up. There were plenty of men with shrewdwits and robust character to be met with, and the mental atmospherewhich surrounded him was one of keen interest in life. Lincolneventually stands out as a surprising figure from among the otherlawyers and little politicians of Illinois, as any great man does fromany crowd, but some tribute is due to the undistinguished andhistorically uninteresting men whose generous appreciation gave rapidway to the poor, queer youth, and ultimately pushed him into a greaterarena as their selected champion. In 1831, at the age of twenty-two, Lincoln, returning from his NewOrleans voyage, settled in New Salem to await the arrival of hispatron, Denton Offutt, with the goods for a new store in which Lincolnwas to be his assistant. The village itself was three years old. Itnever got much beyond a population of one hundred, and like manysimilar little towns of the West it has long since perished off theearth. But it was a busy place for a while, and, contrary to what itsname might suggest, it aspired to be rather fast. It was acock-fighting and whisky-drinking society into which Lincoln waslaunched. He managed to combine strict abstinence from liquor withkeen participation in all its other diversions. One departure fromtotal abstinence stands alleged among the feats of strength for whichhe became noted. He hoisted a whisky barrel, of unspecified butevidently considerable content, on to his knees in a squatting postureand drank from the bunghole. But this very arduous potation stoodalone. Offutt was some time before he arrived with his goods, andLincoln lived by odd jobs. At the very beginning one Mentor Graham, aschoolmaster officiating in some election, employed him as a clerk, andthe clerk seized the occasion to make himself well known to New Salemas a story-teller. Then there was a heavy job at rail-splitting, andanother job in navigating the Sangamon River. Offutt's store was atlast set up, and for about a year the assistant in this importantestablishment had valuable opportunities of conversation with all NewSalem. He had also leisure for study. He had mentioned to theaforesaid Mentor Graham his "notion to study English grammar, " and hadbeen introduced to a work called "Kirkham's Grammar, " which by a walkof some miles he could borrow from a neighbour. This he would read, lying full length on the counter with his head on a parcel of calico. At other odd times he would work away at arithmetic. Offutt's kindlyinterest procured him distinction in another field. At Clary's Grove, near New Salem, lived a formidable set of young ruffians, over whosesomewhat disguised chivalry of temper the staid historian of Lincoln'syouth becomes rapturous. They were given to wrecking the store of anyNew Salem tradesman who offended them; so it shows some spirit in Mr. Denton Offutt that he backed his Abraham Lincoln to beat their JackArmstrong in a wrestling match. He did beat him; moreover, some charmin the way he bore himself made him thenceforth not hated but belovedof Clary's Grove in general, and the Armstrongs in particular. HannahArmstrong, Jack's wife, thereafter mended and patched his clothes forhim, and, years later, he had the satisfaction, as their unfeedadvocate, of securing the acquittal of their son from a charge ofmurder, of which there is some reason to hope he may not have beenguilty. It is, by the way, a relief to tell that there once was anoted wrestling match in which Lincoln was beaten; it is characteristicof the country that his friends were sure there was foul play, andcharacteristic of him that he indignantly denied it. Within a year Offutt's store, in the phrase of the time, "petered out, "leaving Lincoln shiftless. But the victor of Clary's Grove, with hisadded mastery of "Kirkham's Grammar, " was now ripe for public life. Moreover, his experience as a waterman gave him ideas on the question, which then agitated his neighbours, whether the Sangamon River could bemade navigable. He had a scheme of his own for doing this; and in thespring of 1832 he wrote to the local paper a boyish but modest andsensible statement of his views and ambitions, announcing that he wouldbe a candidate in the autumn elections for the State Legislature. Meanwhile he had his one experience of soldiering. The Indian chief, Black Hawk, who had agreed to abide west of the Mississippi, broke thetreaty and led his warriors back into their former haunts in NorthernIllinois. The Governor of the State called for volunteers, and Lincolnbecame one. He obtained the elective rank of captain of his company, and contrived to maintain some sort of order in that, doubtless brave, but undisciplined body. He saw no fighting, but he could earn hisliving for some months, and stored up material for effective chaff inCongress long afterwards about the military glory which General Cass'ssupporters for the Presidency wished to attach to their candidate. Hismost glorious exploit consisted in saving from his own men a poor oldfriendly Indian who had fallen among them. A letter of credentials, which the helpless creature produced, was pronounced a forgery and hewas about to be hanged as a spy, when Lincoln appeared on the scene, "swarthy with resolution and rage, " and somehow terrified hisdisorderly company into dropping their prey. The war ended in time for a brief candidature, and a supporter of hisat the time preserved a record of one of his speeches. His lastimportant speech will hereafter be given in full for other reasons;this may be so given too, for it is not a hundred words long: "FellowCitizens, I presume you all know who I am. I am humble AbrahamLincoln. I have been solicited by many friends to become a candidatefor the Legislature. My politics are short and sweet like the oldwoman's dance. I am in favour of a national bank. I am in favour ofthe internal improvement system and a high protective tariff. Theseare my sentiments and political principles. If elected, I shall bethankful; if not, it will be all the same. " To this succinct declaration of policy may be added from his earlierletter that he advocated a law against usury, and laws for theimprovement of education. The principles of the speech are those whichthe new Whig party was upholding against the Democrats under Jackson(the President) and Van Buren. Lincoln's neighbours, like the peopleof Illinois generally, were almost entirely on the side of theDemocrats. It is interesting that however he came by his views, theywere early and permanently fixed on the side then unpopular inIllinois; and it is interesting that though, naturally, not elected, hesecured very nearly the whole of the votes of his immediateneighbourhood. The penniless Lincoln was now hankering to become a lawyer, though withsome thoughts of the more practicable career of a blacksmith. Unexpectedly, however, he was tempted into his one venture, singularlyunsuccessful, in business. Two gentlemen named Herndon, cousins of abiographer of Lincoln's, started a store in New Salem and got tired ofit. One sold his share to a Mr. Berry, the other sold his to Lincoln. The latter sale was entirely on credit--no money passed at the time, because there was no money. The vendor explained afterwards that herelied solely on Lincoln's honesty. He had to wait a long while forfull payment, but what is known of storekeeping in New Salem shows thathe did very well for himself in getting out of his venture as he did. Messrs. Berry and Lincoln next acquired, likewise for credit, the stockand goodwill of two other storekeepers, one of them the victim of araid from Clary's Grove. The senior partner then applied himselfdiligently to personal consumption of the firm's liquid goods; thejunior member of the firm was devoted in part to intellectual andhumorous converse with the male customers, but a fatal shynessprevented him from talking to the ladles. For the rest, he walked longdistances to borrow books, got through Gibbon and through Rollin's"History of the World, " began his study of Blackstone, and acquired asettled habit of reading novels. So business languished. Early in1833 Berry and Lincoln sold out to another adventurer. This also was acredit transaction. The purchaser without avoidable delay failed anddisappeared. Berry then died of drink, leaving to Lincoln the soleresponsibility for the debts of the partnership. Lincoln could with nodifficulty and not much reproach have freed himself by bankruptcy. Asa matter of fact, he ultimately paid everything, but it took him aboutfifteen years of striving and pinching himself. Lincoln is one of the many public characters to whom the standingepithet "honest" became attached; in his case the claim to this restedoriginally on the only conclusive authority, that of his creditors. But there is equally good authority, that of his biographer, WilliamHerndon, for many years his partner as a lawyer, that "he had no moneysense. " This must be understood with the large qualification that hemeant to pay his way and, unlike the great statesmen of the eighteenthcentury in England, did pay it. But, though with much experience ofpoverty in his early career, he never developed even a reasonabledesire to be rich. Wealth remained in his view "a superfluity of thethings one does not want. " He was always interested in mathematics, but mainly as a discipline in thinking, and partly, perhaps, inassociation with mechanical problems of which he was fond enough tohave once in his life patented an invention. The interest never ledhim to take to accounts or to long-sighted financial provisions. Inlater days, when he received a payment for his fees, his partner'sshare would be paid then and there; and perhaps the rent would be paid, and the balance would be spent at once in groceries and other goodslikely to be soon wanted, including at long intervals, when the needwas very urgent, a new hat. These are amiable personal traits, but they mark the limitations of hiscapacity as a statesman. The chief questions which agitated theIllinois Legislature were economic, and so at first were the issuesbetween Whigs and Democrats in Federal policy. Lincoln, though hethrew himself into these affairs with youthful fervour, would appearnever to have had much grasp of such matters. "In this respect alone, "writes an admirer, "I have always considered Mr. Lincoln a weak man. "It is only when (rarely, at first) constitutional or moral issuesemerge that his politics become interesting. We can guess the causeswhich attached him to the Whigs. As the party out of power, and inIllinois quite out of favour, they had doubtless some advantage incharacter. As we have seen, the greatest minds among Americanstatesmen of that day, Webster and Clay, were Whigs. Lincoln's simpleand quite reasonable, if inconclusive, argument for Protection, can befound among his speeches of some years later. And schemes of internaldevelopment certainly fired his imagination. After his failure in business Lincoln subsisted for a while on odd jobsfor farmers, but was soon employed as assistant surveyor by JohnCalhoun, then surveyor of the county. This gentleman, who had beeneducated as a lawyer but "taught school in preference, " was a keenDemocrat, and had to assure Lincoln that office as his assistant wouldnot necessitate his desertion of his principles. He was a clever man, and Lincoln remembered him long after as the most formidable antagonisthe ever met in debate. With the help, again, of Mentor Graham, Lincolnsoon learned the surveyor's business. He continued at this work tillhe was able to start as a lawyer, and there is evidence that hissurveys of property were done with extreme accuracy. Soon he furtherobtained the local Postmastership. This, the only position except thePresidency itself which he ever held in the Federal Government, was notonerous, for the mails were infrequent; he "carried the office aroundin his hat"; we are glad to be told that "his administration gavesatisfaction. " Once calamity threatened him; a creditor distrained onthe horse and the instruments necessary to his surveyorship; butLincoln was reputed to be a helpful fellow, and friends were ready tohelp him; they bought the horse and instruments back for him. To thistime belongs his first acquaintance with some writers of unsettlingtendency, Tom Paine, Voltaire, and Volney, who was then recognised asone of the dangerous authors. Cock-fights, strange feats of strength, or of usefulness with axe or hammer or scythe, and a passion formimicry continue. In 1834 he became a candidate again. "Can't theparty raise any better material than that?" asked a bystander before aspeech of his; after it, he exclaimed that the speaker knew more thanall the other candidates put together. This time he was elected, beingthen twenty-five, and thereafter he was returned for three furtherterms of two years. Shortly before his second election in 1836 theState capital was removed to Springfield, in his own county. There in1837 Lincoln fixed his home. He had long been reading law in hiscurious, spasmodically concentrated way, and he had practised a littleas a "pettifogger, " that is, an unlicensed practitioner in the inferiorcourts. He had now obtained his license and was very shortly takeninto partnership by an old friend in Springfield. 2. _In the Illinois Legislature_. Here his youth may be said to end. Springfield was a different placefrom New Salem. There were carriages in it, and ladles who studiedpoetry and the fashions. There were families from Virginia andKentucky who were conscious of ancestry, while graver, possibly morepushing, people from the North-eastern States, soon to outnumber them, were a little inclined to ridicule what they called their "illusoryascendency. " There was a brisk competition of churches, and mutualimprovement societies such as the "Young Men's Lyceum" had a rivalclaim to attention with races and cock-fights. And it was an altered Abraham Lincoln that came to inhabit Springfield. Arriving a day or two before his first law partnership was settled hecame into the shop of a thriving young tradesman, Mr. Joshua Speed, toask about the price of the cheapest bedding and other necessaryarticles. The sum for which Lincoln, who had not one cent, would havehad to ask, and would have been readily allowed, credit, was onlyseventeen dollars. But this huge prospect of debt so visibly depressedhim that Speed instantly proposed an arrangement which involved nomoney debt. He took him upstairs and installed him--Western domesticarrangements were and are still simple--as the joint occupant of hisown large bed. "Well, Speed, I'm moved, " was the terse acknowledgment. Speed was to move him later by more precious charity. We are concernedfor the moment with what moved Speed. "I looked up at him, " said he, long after, "and I thought then, as I think now, that I never saw sogloomy and melancholy a face in my life. " The struggle of ambition andpoverty may well have been telling on Lincoln; but besides that atragical love story (shortly to be told) had left a deep and permanentmark; but these influences worked, we may suppose, upon a dispositionquite as prone to sadness as to mirth. His exceedingly gregarioushabit, drawing him to almost any assembly of his own sex, continued allhis life; but it alternated from the first with a habit of solitude orabstraction, the abstraction of a man who, when he does wish to read, will read intently in the midst of crowd or noise, or walking along thestreet. He was what might unkindly be called almost a professionalhumorist, the master of a thousand startling stories, delightful to thehearer, but possibly tiresome in written reminiscences, but we know toowell that gifts of this kind are as compatible with sadness as theycertainly are with deadly seriousness. The Legislature of Illinois in the eight years from 1834 to 1842, inwhich Lincoln belonged to it, was, though not a wise, a vigorous body. In the conditions which then existed it was not likely to have beencaptured as the Legislatures of wilder and more thinly-peopled Stateshave sometimes been by a disreputable element in the community, nor tohave subsided into the hands of the dull mechanical class ofprofessional politicians with which, rightly or wrongly, we have nowbeen led to associate American State Government. The fact of Lincoln'sown election suggests that dishonest adventurers might easily have gotthere, but equally suggests that a very different type of menprevailed. "The Legislature, " we are told, "contained the youth andblood and fire of the frontier. " Among the Democrats in theLegislature was Stephen Douglas, who was to become one of the mostpowerful men in the United States while Lincoln was still unknown; andseveral of Lincoln's Whig colleagues were afterwards to playdistinguished or honourable parts in politics or war. We need notlinger over them, but what we know of those with whom he had anyspecial intimacy makes it entirely pleasant to associate him with them. After a short time in which, like any sensible young member of anassembly, he watched and hardly ever spoke, Lincoln soon made his wayamong these men, and in 1838 and 1840 the Whig members--though, beingin a minority, they could not elect him--gave him their unanimous votesfor the Speakership of the Assembly. The business which engrossed theLegislature, at least up to 1838, was the development of the naturalresources of the State. These were great. It was natural thatrailways, canals and other public works to develop them should bepushed forward at the public cost. Other new countries since, withless excuse because with greater warning from experience, have plungedin this matter, and, though the Governor protested, the IllinoisLegislature, Whigs and Democrats, Lincoln and every one else, plungedgaily, so that, during the collapse which followed, Illinois, though, like Lincoln himself, it paid its debts in the end, was driven in 1840to suspend interest payments for several years. Very little is recorded of Lincoln's legislative doings. What isrelated chiefly exhibits his delight in the game of negotiation andcombination by which he and the other members for his county, togetherknown as "the Long Nine, " advanced the particular projects whichpleased their constituents or struck their own fancy. Thus he earlyhad a hand in the removal of the capital from Vandalia to Springfieldin his own county. The map of Illinois suggests that Springfield was abetter site for the purpose than Vandalia and at least as good asJacksonville or Peoria or any of its other competitors. Of his fewrecorded speeches one concerns a proposed inquiry into some allegedimpropriety in the allotment of shares in the State Bank. It iscertainly the speech of a bold man; it argues with remarkabledirectness that whereas a committee of prominent citizens which hadalready inquired into this matter consisted of men of known honesty, the proposed committee of the Legislators, whom he was addressing, would consist of men who, for all he knew, might be honest, and, forall he knew, might not. The Federal politics of this time, though Lincoln played an activelocal part in the campaigns of the Whig party, concern us little. TheWhigs, to whom he did subordinate service, were, as has been said, anunlucky party. In 1840, in the reaction which extreme commercialdepression created against the previously omnipotent Democrats, theWhig candidate for the Presidency was successful. This was GeneralHarrison, a respected soldier of the last war, who was glorified as asort of Cincinnatus and elected after an outburst of enthusiastictomfoolery such as never before or since rejoiced the American people. But President Harrison had hardly been in office a month when he died. Some say he was worried to death by office seekers, but a more prosaiccause, pneumonia, can also be alleged. It is satisfactory that thisgood man's grandson worthily filled his office forty-eight years after, but his immediate successor was of course the Vice-President, Tyler, chosen as an influential opponent of the last Democrat Presidents, butnot because he agreed with the Whigs. Cultivated but narrow-minded, highly independent and wholly perverse, he satisfied no aspiration ofthe Whigs and paved the way effectually for the Democrat who succeededhim. Throughout these years Lincoln was of course working at law, whichbecame, with the development of the country, a more arduous and a morelearned profession. Sessions of the Legislature did not last long, andpolitical canvasses were only occasional. If Lincoln was active inthese matters he was in many other directions, too, a keen participatorin the keen life of the society round him. Nevertheless politics assuch, and apart from any large purpose to be achieved through them, hadfor many years a special fascination for him. For one thing he wasargumentative in the best sense, with a passion for what the Greekssometimes called "dialectic"; his rare capacity for solitary thought, the most marked and the greatest of his powers, went absolutely hand inhand with the desire to reduce his thoughts to a form which would carrylogical conviction to others. Further, there can be no doubt--and sucha combination of tastes, though it seems to be uncommon, is quiteintelligible--that the somewhat unholy business of party management wasat first attractive to him. To the end he showed no intuitivecomprehension of individual men. His sincere friendly intention, theunanswerable force of an argument, the convincing analogy veiled in anunseemly story, must take their chance of suiting the particular tasteof Senator Sherman or General McClellan; but any question of managingmen in the mass--will a given candidate's influence with this sectionof people count for more than his unpopularity with that section? andso on--involved an element of subtle and long-sighted calculation whichwas vastly congenial to him. We are to see him hereafter applying thissort of science on a grand scale and for a great end. His earlydiscipline in it is a dull subject, interesting only where it displays, as it sometimes does, the perfect fairness with which this ambitiousman could treat his own claims as against those of a colleague andcompetitor. In forming any judgment of Lincoln's career it must, further, berealised that, while he was growing up as a statesman, the prevailingconception of popular government was all the time becoming moreunfavourable to leadership and to robust individuality. The new partymachinery adopted by the Democrats under Jackson, as the proper mode ofsecuring government by the people, induced a deadly uniformity ofutterance; breach of that uniformity was not only rash, but improper. Once in early days it was demanded in a newspaper that "all candidatesshould show their hands. " "Agreed, " writes Lincoln, "here's mine"; andthen follows a young man's avowal of advanced opinions; he would givethe suffrage to "all whites who pay taxes or bear arms, by no meansexcluding females. " Disraeli, who was Lincoln's contemporary, throveby exuberances quite as startling as this, nor has any Englishpolitician found it damaging to be bold. On this occasion indeed (in1836) Lincoln was far from damaging himself; the Whigs had not till afew years later been induced, for self-preservation, to copy theDemocratic machine. But it is striking that the admiring friend whoreports this declaration, "too audacious and emphatic for the statesmenof a later day, " must carefully explain how it could possibly suit thetemper of a time which in a few years passed away. Very soon thequestion whether a proposal or even a sentiment was timely or prematurecame to bulk too large in the deliberations of Lincoln's friends. Thereader will perhaps wonder later whether such considerations did notbulk too largely in Lincoln's own mind. Was there in hisstatesmanship, even in later days when he had great work to do, anelement of that opportunism which, if not actually base, is at leastcheap? Or did he come as near as a man with many human weaknessescould come to the wise and nobly calculated opportunism which is notmerely the most beneficent statesmanship, but demands a heroicself-mastery? The main interest of his doings in Illinois politics and in Congress isthe help they may give in penetrating his later mind. On the one hand, it is certain that Lincoln trained himself to be a great student of thefitting opportunity. He evidently paid very serious attention to thecounsels of friends who would check his rasher impulses. One of hisclosest associates insists that his impulsive judgment was bad, and heprobably thought so himself. It will be seen later that the mostmomentous utterance he ever made was kept back through the whole spaceof two years of crisis at the instance of timid friends. It requirednot less courage and was certainly more effective when at last it didcome out. The same great capacity for waiting marks any steps that hetook for his own advancement. Indeed it was a happy thing for him andfor his country that his character and the whole cast of his ideas andsympathies were of a kind to which the restraint imposed on an Americanpolitician was most congenial and to which therefore it could do leastharm. He was to prove himself a patient man in other ways as well asthis. On many things, perhaps on most, the thoughts he worked out inhis own mind diverged very widely from those of his neighbours, but hewas not in the least anxious either to conceal or to obtrude them. Hissocial philosophy as he expressed it to his friends in these days wasone which contemplated great future reforms--abolition of slavery and astrict temperance policy were among them. But he looked for them witha sort of fatalistic confidence in the ultimate victory of reason, andsaw no use and a good deal of harm in premature political agitation forthem. "All such questions, " he is reported to have said, "must findlodgment with the most enlightened souls who stamp them with theirapproval. In God's own time they will be organised into law and thuswoven into the fabric of our institutions. " This seems a littlecold-blooded, but perhaps we can already begin to recognise the manwho, when the time had fully come, would be on the right side, and inwhom the evil which he had deeply but restrainedly hated would find anappallingly wary foe. But there were crucial instances which test sufficiently whether thiswary politician was a true man or not. The soil of Illinois was freesoil by the Ordinance of 1787, and Congress would only admit it to theUnion as a free State. But it had been largely peopled from the South. There had been much agitation against this restriction; prevailingsentiment to a late date strongly approved of slavery; it was at Altonin Illinois that, in 1836, Elijah Lovejoy, an Abolitionist publisher, had been martyred by the mob which had failed to intimidate him. In1837, when the bold agitation of the Abolitionists was exciting muchdisapproval, the Illinois Legislature passed resolutions condemningthat agitation and declaring in soothing tones the constitutionalpowerlessness of Congress to interfere with slavery in the SouthernStates. Now Lincoln himself--whether for good reasons or bad must beconsidered later--thoroughly disapproved of the actual agitation of theAbolitionists; and the resolutions in question, but for one merelytheoretical point of law and for an unctuous misuse of the adjective"sacred, " contained nothing which he could not literally have accepted. The objection to them lay in the motive which made it worth while topass them. Lincoln drew up and placed on the records of the House aprotest against these resolutions. He defines in it his own quiteconservative opinions; he deprecates the promulgation of Abolitiondoctrines; but he does so because it "tends rather to increase thanabate the evils" of slavery; and he lays down "that the institution ofslavery is founded on both injustice and bad policy. " One man alonecould he induce to sign this protest with him, and that man was notseeking re-election. By 1842 Lincoln had grown sensibly older, and a little less ready, wemay take it, to provoke unnecessary antagonism. Probably very oldmembers of Free Churches are the people best able to appreciate thedaring of the following utterance. Speaking on Washington's birthdayin a Presbyterian church to a temperance society formed among therougher people of the town and including former drunkards who desiredto reform themselves, he broke out in protest against the doctrine thatrespectable persons should shun the company of people tempted tointemperance. "If, " he said, "they believe as they profess thatOmnipotence condescended to take upon Himself the form of sinful man, and as such die an ignominious death, surely they will not refusesubmission to the infinitely lesser condescension, for the temporal andperhaps eternal salvation of a large, erring, and unfortunate class oftheir fellow creatures! Nor is the condescension very great. In myjudgment such of us as have never fallen victims have been spared morefrom the absence of appetite than from any mental or moral superiorityover those who have. Indeed, I believe, if we take habitual drunkardsas a class, that their heads and their hearts will bear an advantageouscomparison with those of any other class. " It proved, at a later day, very lucky for America that the virtuous Lincoln, who did not drinkstrong drink--nor, it is sad to say, smoke, nor, which is all to thegood, chew--did feel like that about drunkenness; But there was greatand loud wrath. "It's a shame, " said one, "that he should be permittedto abuse us so in the house of the Lord. " It is certain that in thissort of way he did himself a good deal of injury as an aspiringpolitician. It is also the fact that he continued none the lesspersistently in a missionary work conceived in a spirit none the lessChristian because it shocked many pious people. 3. _Marriage_. The private life of Lincoln continued, and for many years increasingly, to be equally marked by indiscriminate sociability and broodingloneliness. Comfort and the various influences which may be associatedwith the old-fashioned American word "elegance" seem never to enterinto it. What is more, little can be discerned of positive happinessin the background of his life, as the freakish elasticity of his youthdisappeared and, after a certain measure of marked success, the furtherobjects of his ambition though not dropped became unlikely ofattainment and seemed, we may guess, of doubtful value. All along hewas being moulded for endurance rather than for enjoyment. Nor, though his children evidently brought him happiness, does what weknow of his domesticities and dearest affections weaken this generalimpression. When he married he had gone through a saddeningexperience. He started on manhood with a sound and chivalrous outlookon women in general, and a nervous terror of actual women when he metthem. In New Salem days he absented himself from meals for the wholetime that some ladies were staying at his boarding house. His clothesand his lack of upbringing must have weighed with him, besides hisnatural disposition. None the less, of course he fell in love. MissAnn Rutledge, the daughter of a store and tavern keeper from Kentuckywith whom Lincoln was boarding in 1833, has been described as ofexquisite beauty; some say this is over-stated, but speak strongly ofher grace and charm. A lady who knew her gives these curiouslycollocated particulars: "Miss Rutledge had auburn hair, blue eyes, faircomplexion. She was pretty, slightly slender, but in everything agood-hearted young woman. She was about five feet two inches high, andweighed in the neighbourhood of a hundred and twenty pounds. She wasbeloved by all who knew her. She died as it were of grief. Inspeaking of her death and her grave Lincoln once said to me, 'My heartlies buried there. '" The poor girl, when Lincoln first came courtingto her, had passed through a grievous agitation. She had been engagedto a young man, who suddenly returned to his home in the EasternStates, after revealing to her, with some explanation which was moreconvincing to her than to her friends, that he had been passing underan assumed name. It seems that his absence was strangely prolonged, that for a long time she did not hear from him, that his letters whenthey did come puzzled her, that she clung to him long, but yielded atlast to her friends, who urged their very natural suspicions upon her. It is further suggested that there was some good explanation of hisconduct all the while, and that she learnt this too late when actuallyengaged to Lincoln. However that may be, shortly after her engagementto Lincoln she fell seriously ill, insisted, as she lay ill, on a longinterview with Lincoln alone, and a day or two later died. This was in1835, when he was twenty-six. It is perhaps right to say that onebiographer throws doubt on the significance of this story in Lincoln'slife. The details as to Ann Rutledge's earlier lover are vague anduncertain. The main facts of Lincoln's first engagement and almostimmediate loss of his betrothed are quite certain; the blow would havebeen staggering enough to any ordinary young lover and we know nothingof Lincoln which would discredit Mr. Herndon's judgment that its effecton him was both acute and permanent. There can be no real doubt thathis spells of melancholy were ever afterwards more intense, and politerbiographers should not have suppressed the testimony that for a timethat melancholy seemed to his friends to verge upon insanity. Healways found good friends, and, as was to happen again later, one ofthem, Mr. Bowline Greene, carried him off to his own secluded home andwatched him carefully. He said "the thought that the snows and rainsfell upon her grave filled him with indescribable grief. " Two yearslater he told a fellow-legislator that "although he seemed to others toenjoy life rapturously, yet when alone he was so overcome by mentaldepression, he never dared to carry a pocket-knife. " Later stillGreene, who had helped him, died, and Lincoln was to speak over hisgrave. For once in his life he broke down entirely; "the tears randown his yellow and shrivelled cheeks. . . . After repeated efforts hefound it impossible to speak and strode away sobbing. " The man whom a grief of this kind has affected not only intensely, butmorbidly, is almost sure, before its influence has faded, to make loveagain, and is very likely to do so foolishly. Miss Mary Owens wasslightly older than Lincoln. She was a handsome woman; commanding, butcomfortable. In the tales of Lincoln's love stories, much else isdoubtfully related, but the lady's weight is in each case stated withassurance, and when she visited her sister in New Salem in 1836 MaryOwens weighed one hundred and fifty pounds. There is nothing sad inher story; she was before long happily married--not to Lincoln--and shelong outlived him. But Lincoln, who had seen her on a previous visitand partly remembered her, had been asked, perhaps in jest, by hersister to marry her if she returned, and had rashly announced half injest that he would. Her sister promptly fetched her, and he lingeredfor some time in a half-engaged condition, writing her reasonable, conscientious, feeble letters, in which he put before herdispassionately the question whether she could patiently bear "to seewithout sharing . . . A lot of flourishing about in carriages, . . . Tobe poor without the means of hiding your poverty, " and assuring herthat "I should be much happier with you than the way I am, provided Isaw no signs of discontent in you. " Whether he rather wished to marryher but felt bound to hold her free, or distinctly wished not to marryher but felt bound not to hold himself free, he probably was neversure. The lady very wisely decided that he could not make her happy, and returned to Kentucky. She said he was deficient in the littlecourteous attentions which a woman's happiness requires of her husband. She gave instances long after to prove her point; but she always spokeof him with friendship and respect as "a man with a heart full of humankindness and a head full of common sense. " Rather unluckily, Lincoln, upon his rejection or release, relieved hisfeelings in a letter about Miss Owens to one of the somewhat oldermarried ladies who were kind to him, the wife of one of his colleagues. She ought to have burnt his letter, but she preserved it to kindle mildgossip after his death. It is a burlesque account of his wholeadventure, describing, with touches of very bad taste, hisdisillusionment with the now maturer charms of Miss Owens when hersister brought her back to New Salem, and making comedy of his ownhonest bewilderment and his mingled relief and mortification when sheat last refused him. We may take it as evidence of the natural want ofperception and right instinctive judgment in minor matters which somewho knew and loved him attribute to him. But, besides that, the manwho found relief in this ill-conceived exercise of humour was one inwhom the prospect of marriage caused some strange and pitifulperturbation of mind. This was in 1838, and a year later Mary Todd came from Kentucky to stayat Springfield with her brother-in-law Ninian Edwards, a legislator ofIllinois and a close ally of Lincoln's. She was aged twenty-one, andher weight was one hundred and thirty pounds. She was well educated, and had family connections which were highly esteemed. She waspleasant in company, but somewhat imperious, and she was a vivacioustalker. When among the young men who now became attentive in callingon the Edwards's Lincoln came and sat awkwardly gazing on Miss Todd, Mrs. Edwards appears to have remarked that the two were not suited toeach other. But an engagement took place all the same. As to thedetails of what followed, whether he or she was the first to havedoubts, and whether, as some say, the great Stephen Douglas appeared onthe scene as a rival and withdrew rather generously but too late, isuncertain. But Lincoln composed a letter to break off his engagement. He showed it to Joshua Speed, who told him that if he had the courageof a man he would not write to her, but see her and speak. He did so. She cried. He kissed and tried to comfort her. After this Speed hadto point out to him that he had really renewed his engagement. Againthere may be some uncertainty whether on January 1, 1841, the bridalparty had actually assembled and the bridegroom after long search wasfound by his friends wandering about in a state which made them watchday and night and keep knives from him. But it is quite certain fromhis letters that in some such way on "the fatal 1st of January, 1841, "he broke down terribly. Some weeks later he wrote to his partner:"Whether I shall ever be better I cannot tell; I awfully forebode Ishall not. To remain as I am is impossible. I must die or be better, as it appears to me. " After a while Speed was able to remove him tohis own parents' home in Kentucky, where he and his mother nursed himback to mental life. Then in the course of 1841 Speed himself began to contemplate marriage, and Speed himself had painful searchings of heart, and Lincoln's turncame to show a sureness of perception in his friend's case that hewholly lacked in his own. "I know, " he writes, "what the painful pointwith you is . . . It is an apprehension that you do not love her as youshould. What nonsense! How came you to court her? But you say youreasoned yourself into it. What do you mean by that? Was it not thatyou found yourself unable to reason yourself out of it? Did you notthink, and partly form the purpose, of courting her the first time youever saw or heard of her? What had reason to do with it at that earlystage?" A little later the lady of Speed's love falls ill. Lincolnwrites: "I hope and believe that your present anxiety about her healthand her life must and will for ever banish those horrid doubts which Iknow you sometimes felt as to the truth of your affection forher. . . . Perhaps this point is no longer a question with you, and mypertinacious dwelling upon it is a rude intrusion upon your feelings. If so, you must pardon me. You know the hell I have suffered upon thatpoint, and how tender I am upon it. " When he writes thus it is nosurprise to hear from him that he has lost his hypochondria, but it maybe that the keen recollection of it gives him excessive anxieties forSpeed. On the eve of the wedding he writes: "You will always hereafterbe on ground that I have never occupied, and consequently, if advicewere needed, I might advise wrong. I do fondly hope, however, that youwill never need comfort from abroad. I incline to think it probablethat your nerves will occasionally fail you for a while; but once youget them firmly graded now, that trouble is over for ever. If you wentthrough the ceremony calmly or even with sufficient composure not toexcite alarm in any present, you are safe beyond question, and in twoor three months, to say the most, will be the happiest of men. " Soonhe is reassured and can "feel somewhat jealous of both of you now. Youwill be so exclusively concerned with one another that I shall beforgotten entirely. I shall feel very lonesome without you. " And alittle later: "It cannot be told how it thrills me with joy to hear yousay you are far happier than you ever expected to be. I know you toowell to suppose your expectations were not at least sometimesextravagant, and if the reality exceeds them all, I say, 'Enough, dearLord. '" And here follows what might perhaps have been foreseen: "Yourlast letter gave me more pleasure than the total sum of all that I havereceived since the fatal 1st of January, 1841. Since then it seems tome I should have been entirely happy but for the never absent idea thatthere is still one unhappy whom I have contributed to make so. Thatkills my soul. I cannot but reproach myself for even wishing to behappy while she is otherwise. " Very significantly he has inquired offriends how that one enjoyed a trip on the new railway cars toJacksonville, and--not being like Falkland in "The Rivals"--praises Godthat she has enjoyed it exceedingly. This was in the spring of 1842. Some three months later he writesagain to Speed: "I must gain confidence in my own ability to keep myresolves when they are made. In that ability I once prided myself asthe only chief gem of my character. That gem I lost how and where youknow too well. I have not regained it, and until I do I cannot trustmyself in any matter of much importance. I believe now that, had youunderstood my case at the time as well as I understood yoursafterwards, by the aid you would have given me I should have sailedthrough clear. . . . I always was superstitious. I believe God mademe one of the instruments of bringing Fanny and you together, whichunion I have no doubt He had fore-ordained. Whatever He designs for meHe will do. 'Stand still and see the salvation of the Lord, ' is mytext just now. If, as you say, you have told Fanny all, I should haveno objection to her seeing this letter. I do not think I can come toKentucky this season. I am so poor and make so little headway in theworld that I drop back in a month of idleness as much as I gain in ayear's sowing. " At last in the autumn of that year Lincoln addressesto Speed a question at once so shrewd and so daringly intimate asperhaps no other man ever asked of his friend. "The immense sufferingsyou endured from the first days of September till the middle ofFebruary" (the date of Speed's wedding) "you never tried to concealfrom me, and I well understood. You have now been the husband of alovely woman nearly eight months. That you are happier now than theday you married her I well know. . . . But I want to ask a closequestion! 'Are you in _feeling_ as well as in _judgment_ glad you aremarried as you are?' From anybody but me this would be an impudentquestion, not to be tolerated, but I know you will pardon it in me. Please answer it quickly, as I am impatient to know. " Speed remained in Kentucky; Lincoln was too poor for visits ofpleasure; and Speed was not a man who cared for political life; but thememorials, from which the above quotations have been taken, ofLincoln's lasting friendship with Speed and his kind mother, who gaveLincoln a treasured Bible, and his kind young wife, who made herhusband's friend her own, and whose violet, dropped into her husband'sletter to him just as he was sealing it, was among the few flowers thatLincoln ever appreciated, throw the clearest light that we can anywhereobtain on the inner mind of Lincoln. As may have been foreseen, Mary Todd and he had met again on a friendlyfooting. A managing lady is credited with having brought about ameeting between them, but evidently she did not do it till Lincoln wasat least getting desirous to be managed. He was much absorbed at thistime in law business, to which since his breakdown he had appliedhimself more seriously. It was at this period too that his notableaddress on temperance was given. Soon after his meetings with MissTodd began again he involved himself in a complication of a differentkind. He had written, partly, it seems, for the young lady'samusement, some innocent if uninteresting political skits relating tosome question about taxes. This brought on him an unexpected challengefrom a fiery but diminutive revenue official, one Colonel Shields, aprominent Democratic politician. Lincoln availed himself of the rightof the challenged to impose ridiculous conditions of combat, partly nodoubt in fun, but with the sensible object also of making sure that hecould disarm his antagonist with no risk of harm to the little man. The tangled controversy which ensued as to how and by whose fault theduel eventually fell through has nothing in it now, but the wholeundignified business seems to have given Lincoln lasting chagrin, andworried him greatly at a time when it would have been well that heshould be cheerful. At last on November 4, 1842, when Lincoln wasnearly thirty-three, he was safely married. The wedding, held, according to the prevailing custom, in a private house, was animportant function, for it was the first Episcopalian wedding that goodsociety in Springfield had witnessed. Malicious fortune brought in aludicrous incident at the last moment, for when in the lawyerlikeverbiage of the then American Prayer-Book the bridegroom said, "Withthis ring I thee endow with all my goods, chattels, lands andtenements, " old Judge Brown of the Illinois Supreme Court, who hadnever heard the like, impatiently broke in, "God Almighty, Lincoln!The statute fixes all that. " There is more than the conventional reason for apology for pressing thesubject a little further. Nothing very illuminating can be said as tothe course of Lincoln's married life, but much has already been madepublic about it which, though it cannot be taken as reaching to theheart of the matter, is not properly to be dismissed as mere gossip. Mrs. Lincoln, it is clear, had a high temper--the fact that, poorwoman! after her husband had been murdered by her side, she developedclear symptoms of insanity, may or may not, for all we are entitled toknow, be relevant in this regard. She was much younger than herhusband, and had gone through a cruel experience for him. Moreover, she had proper ambitions and was accustomed to proper conventionalrefinements; so her husband's exterior roughness tried her sorely, notthe less we may be sure because of her real pride in him. Wife andtailor combined could not, with any amount of money, have dressed himwell. Once, though they kept a servant then, Lincoln thought itfriendly to open the door himself in his shirt sleeves when two mostelegant ladies came to call. On such occasions, and doubtless on otheroccasions of less provocation, Mrs. Lincoln's high temper was letloose. It seems pretty certain, too, that he met her with mereforbearance, sad patience, and avoidance of conflict. His fellowlawyers came to notice that he stayed away from home on circuit whenall the rest of them could go home for a day or two. Fifteen yearsafter his wedding he himself confessed to his trouble, not disloyally, but in a rather moving remonstrance with some one who had feltintolerably provoked by Mrs. Lincoln. There are slight indicationsthat occasions of difficulty and pain to Lincoln happened up to the endof his life. On the other hand, there are slight indications thatcommon love for their children helped to make the two happier, andthere are no indications at all of any approach to a serious quarrel. All that is told us may be perfectly true and not by any means havejustified the pity that some of Lincoln's friends were ready to feelfor him. It is difficult to avoid suspecting that Lincoln's wife didnot duly like his partner and biographer, Mr. Herndon, who felt it hisduty to record so many painful facts and his own possibly too painfulimpression from them. On the other side, Mr. Herndon makes it clearthat in some respects Mrs. Lincoln was an admirable wife for herhusband. She faced the difficulties of their poverty with spirit andresolution. Testimony from other sources to her graceful hospitalityabounds. More than this, from the very first she believed in hispowers. It seems she had the discernment to know, when few others canhave done so, how far greater he was than his rival Douglas. It wasHerndon's belief, in days when he and Mrs. Lincoln were the two personswho saw most of him, that she sustained his just ambition, and that atthe most critical moment of his personal career she had the courage tomake him refuse an attractive appointment which must have ruined it. The worst that we are told with any certainty amounts to this, thatlike the very happily married writer of "Virginibus Puerisque, " Lincolndiscovered that marriage is "a field of battle and not a bed ofroses"--a battle in which we are forced to suspect that he did not playhis full part. We should perhaps be right in associating his curious record, of rightand high regard for women and inefficiency where a particular woman'shappiness depended on him, with the belief in Woman Suffrage, which heearly adopted and probably retained. Be that as it may, this part ofhis story points to something which runs through his whole character, something which perhaps may be expressed by saying that the naturalbias of his qualities was towards the negative side. We hear, nodoubt, of occasions when his vigour was instant and terrible--like thatof Hamlet on the ship for England; but these were occasions when theright or the necessity of the case was obvious. We have seen him alsofirm and absolutely independent where his conviction had already beenthought out. Where there was room for further reflection, forpatiently waiting on events, or for taking counsel of wise friends, manly decision had not come easily to him. He had let a third personalmost engage him to Miss Owens. Once in this relation to her, he hadlet it be the woman's part and not the man's to have decision enoughfor the two. Speed had to tell him that he must face Miss Todd andspeak to her, and Speed again had to make clear to him what the effectof his speaking had been. In time he decided what he thought his ownfeelings were, but it was by inference from the feelings of Speed. Lastly, it seems, the troubles of his married life were met by merepatience and avoidance. All this, of course, concerned a side oflife's affairs in regard to which his mind had suffered painful shocks;but it shows the direction of his possible weakness and his possiblestrength in other things. It falls in with a trait which he himselfnoted in one of the letters to Speed: "I have no doubt, " he writes, "itis the peculiar misfortune of both you and me to dream dreams ofElysium far exceeding all that anything earthly can realise. " All suchmen have to go through deep waters; but they do not necessarily misseither success or happiness in the end. Lincoln's life may be said tohave tested him by the test which Mr. Kipling states in his lines aboutWashington:-- "If you can dream--and not make dreams your master; If you can think--and not make thoughts your aim. " He was to prove that he could do this; it is for the following pages toshow in how high a degree. Meanwhile one thing should already be clearabout him. No shrewd judge of men could read his letters to Speed withcare and not feel that, whatever mistakes this man might commit, fundamentally he was worthy of entire trust. That, as a matter offact, is what, to the end of his life, Speed and all the men who knewhim and an ever widening circle of men who had to judge by more casualimpressions did feel about Lincoln. Whatever was questionable in hisprivate or public acts, his own explanation, if he happened to giveone, would be taken by them as the full and naked truth, and, if therewas no known explanation, it remained to them an irrebuttablepresumption that his main intention was right. CHAPTER IV LINCOLN IN CONGRESS AND IN RETIREMENT 1. _The Mexican War and Lincoln's Work in Congress_. Lincoln had ceased before his marriage to sit in the IllinoisLegislature. He had won sufficient standing for his ambition to aimhigher; a former law partner of his was now in Congress, and he wishedto follow. But he had to submit to a few years' delay of which thestory is curious and honourable. His rivals for the representation ofhis own constituency were two fellow Whigs, Baker and Hardin, both ofwhom afterwards bore distinguished parts in the Mexican war and withboth of whom he was friendly. Somewhat to his disgust at a partygathering in his own county in 1843, Baker was preferred to him. Aletter of his gives a shrewd account of the manoeuvres among members ofvarious Churches which brought this about; it is curiously careful notto overstate the effect of these influences and characteristicallydenies that Baker had part in them. To make the thing harder, he wassent from this meeting to a convention, for the whole constituency, with which the nomination lay, and his duty, of course, was to work forBaker. Here it became obvious that Hardin would be chosen; nothingcould be done for Baker at that time, but Lincoln, being against hiswill there in Baker's interests, took an opportunity in the bargainingthat took place to advance Baker's claim, to the detriment of his own, to be Hardin's successor two years later. By some perverse accident notes about details of party management filla disproportionate space among those letters of Lincoln's which havebeen preserved, but these reveal that, with all his business-likeattention to the affairs of his very proper ambition, he was ablethroughout to illuminate dull matters of this order with action ofsingular disinterestedness. After being a second time postponed, nodoubt to the advantage of his law business, he took his seat in theHouse of Representatives at Washington for two years in the spring of1847. Two short sessions can hardly suffice for mastering the verycomplicated business of that body. He made hardly any mark. Heprobably learned much and was able to study at leisure the charactersof his brother politicians. He earned the valuable esteem of some, andseems to have passed as a very pleasant, honest, plain specimen of therough West. Like others of the younger Congressmen, he had theprivilege of breakfasting with Webster. His brief career in the Houseseems to have disappointed him, and it certainly dissatisfied hisconstituents. The part that he played may impress us more favourablythan it did them, but, slight as it was, it requires a historicalexplanation. Mexico had detached itself from Spain in 1826, and in 1833 the provinceof Texas detached itself from Mexico. Texas was largely peopled byimmigrants from the States, and these had grievances. One of them wasthat Mexico abolished slavery, but there was real misgovernment aswell, and, among other cruel incidents of the rebellion which followed, the massacre of rebels at the Alamo stamped itself on American memory. The Republic of Texas began to seek annexation to the United States in1839, but there was opposition in the States and there weredifficulties with Mexico and other Governments. At last in 1845, atthe very close of his term of office, President Tyler got theannexation pushed through in defiance of the Whigs who made himPresident. Mexico broke off diplomatic relations, but peace could nodoubt have been preserved if peace had been any object with the newPresident Polk or with the Southern leaders whose views he represented. They had set their eyes upon a further acquisition, larger even thanTexas--California, and the whole of the territories, still belonging toMexico, to the east of it. It is not contested, and would not havebeen contested then, that the motive of their policy was the Southerndesire to win further soil for cultivation by slaves. But there was nogreat difficulty in gaining some popularity for their designs in theNorth. Talk about "our manifest destiny" to reach the Pacific may havebeen justly described by Parson Wilbur as "half on it ign'ance andt'other half rum, " but it is easy to see how readily it might be takenup, and indeed many Northerners at that moment had a fancy of their ownfor expansion in the North-West and were not over-well pleased withPolk when, in 1846, he set the final seal upon the settlement withGreat Britain of the Oregon frontier. When he did this Polk had already brought about his own war. Thejudgment on that war expressed at the time in the first "Biglow Papers"has seldom been questioned since, and there seldom can have been a warso sternly condemned by soldiers--Grant amongst others--who fought init gallantly. The facts seem to have been just as Lincoln afterwardsrecited them in Congress. The Rio Grande, which looks a reasonablefrontier on a map, was claimed by the United States as the frontier ofTexas. The territory occupied by the American settlers of Texasreached admittedly up to and beyond the River Nueces, east of the RioGrande. But in a sparsely settled country, where water is notabundant, the actual border line, if there be any clear line, betweensettlement from one side and settlement from the other will not for theconvenience of treaty-makers run along a river, but rather for theconvenience of the settlers along the water-parting between two rivers. So Mexico claimed both banks of the Rio Grande and Spanish settlersinhabited both sides. Polk ordered General Zachary Taylor, who wasallowed no discretion in the matter, to march troops right up to theRio Grande and occupy a position commanding the encampment of theMexican soldiers there. The Mexican commander, thus threatened, attacked. The Mexicans had thus begun the war. Polk could thus allegehis duty to prosecute it. When the whole transaction was afterwardsassailed his critics might be tempted to go, or represented as going, upon the false ground that only Congress can constitutionally declarewar--that is, of course, sanction purely offensive operations. Long, however, before the dispute could come to a head, the brilliantsuccesses of General Taylor and still more of General Scott, with a fewtrained troops against large undisciplined numbers, put all criticismat a disadvantage. The City of Mexico was occupied by Scott inSeptember, 1847, and peace, with the cession of the vast domain thathad been coveted, was concluded in May, 1848. War having begun, the line of the Whig opposition was to vote suppliesand protest as best they might against the language endorsing Polk'spolicy which, in the pettiest spirit of political manoeuvre, wassometimes incorporated in the votes. In this Lincoln steadilysupported them. One of his only two speeches of any length in Congresswas made on the occasion of a vote of this kind in 1848. The subjectwas by that time so stale that his speech could hardly make muchimpression, but it appears to-day an extraordinarily clear, strong, upright presentment of the complex and unpopular case against the war. His other long speech is elevated above buffoonery by a brief, cogent, and earnest passage on the same theme, but it was a frank piece ofclowning on a licensed occasion. It was the fashion for the House whenits own dissolution and a Presidential election were both imminent tohave a sort of rhetorical scrimmage in which members on both sidesspoke for the edification of their own constituencies and that ofBuncombe. The Whigs were now happy in having "diverted the war-thunderagainst the Democrats" by running for the Presidency General Taylor, agood soldier who did not know whether he was a Whig or a Democrat, butwho, besides being a hero of the war, was inoffensive to the South, forhe lived in Louisiana and had slaves of his own. It is characteristicof the time that the Democrats, in whose counsels the Southern menprevailed, now began a practice of choosing Northern candidates, andnominated General Cass of Michigan, whose distinction had not been wonin war. The Democratic Congressmen in this debate made game of theWhigs, with their war-hero, and seem to have carried a crude manner ofpleasantry pretty far when Lincoln determined to show them that theycould be beaten at that game. He seems to have succeeded admirably, with a burlesque comparison, too long to quote, of General Cass'smartial exploits with his own, and other such-like matter enhanced bythe most extravagant Western manner and delivery. Anyone who reads much of the always grave and sometimes most movingorations of Lincoln's later years may do well to turn back to thisagreeable piece of debating-society horse-play. But he should thenturn a few pages further back to Lincoln's little Bill for the gradualand compensated extinction of slavery in the District of Columbia, where Washington stands. He introduced this of his own motion, withoutencouragement from Abolitionist or Non-Abolitionist, accompanying itwith a brief statement that he had carefully ascertained that therepresentative people of the district privately approved of it, but hadno right to commit them to public support of it. It perished, ofcourse. With the views which he had long formed and continued to holdabout slavery, very few opportunities could in these years come to himof proper and useful action against it. He seized upon theseopportunities not less because in doing so he had to stand alone. His career as a Congressman was soon over. There was no movement tore-elect him, and the Whigs now lost his constituency. His speechesand his votes against the Mexican war offended his friends. Even hispartner, the Abolitionist, Mr. Herndon, whose further acquaintance wehave to make, was too much infected with the popularity of a successfulwar to understand Lincoln's plain position or to approve of his givingvotes which might seem unpatriotic. Lincoln wrote back to him firmlybut sadly. Persuaded as he was that political action in advance ofpublic sentiment was idle, resigned and hardened as we might easilythink him to many of the necessities of party discipline, it evidentlycaused him naïve surprise that, when he was called upon for a definiteopinion, anybody should expect him, as he candidly puts it, to "tell alie. " As a retiring Congressman he was invited to speak in several places inthe East on behalf of Taylor's candidature; and after Taylor's electionclaimed his right as the proper person to be consulted, with certainothers, about Government appointments in Illinois. Taylor carried outthe "spoils system" with conscientious thoroughness; as he touchinglysaid, he had thought over the question from a soldier's point of view, and could not bear the thought that, while he as their chief enjoyedthe Presidency, the private soldiers in the Whig ranks should not getwhatever was going. Lincoln's attitude in the matter may be ofinterest. To take an example, he writes to the President, about thepostmastership in some place, that he does not know whether thePresident desires to change the tenure of such offices on partygrounds, and offers no advice; that A is a Whig whose appointment ismuch desired by the local Whigs, and a most respectable man; that B, also a Whig, would in Lincoln's judgment be a somewhat better but notso popular subject for appointment; that C, the present postmaster, isa Democrat, but is on every ground, save his political party, a properperson for the office. There was an office which he himself desired, it was that of "Commissioner of the General Land Office, " a new officein Washington dealing with settlement on Government lands in the West. He was probably well suited to it; but his application was delayed bythe fact that friends in Illinois wanted the post too; a certain Mr. Butterfield (a lawyer renowned for his jokes, which showed, it is said, "at least a well-marked humorous intention") got it; and then it fellto the lot of the disappointed Lincoln to have to defend Butterfieldagainst some unfair attack. But a tempting offer was made him, that ofthe Governorship of Oregon Territory, and he wavered before refusing totake work which would, as it happened, have kept him far away when theopportunity of his life came. It was Mrs. Lincoln who would not lethim cut himself off so completely from politics. As for himself, it ishard to resist the impression that he was at this time a tired man, disappointed as to the progress of his career and probably alsodisappointed and somewhat despondent about politics and thepossibilities of good service that lay open to politicians. It may bethat this was partly the reason why he was not at all aroused by thecrisis in American politics which must now be related. 2. _California and the Compromise of 1850_. It has been said that the motive for the conquests from Mexico was thedesire for slave territory. The attractive part of the new dominionwas of course California. Arizona and New Mexico are arid regions, andthe mineral wealth of Nevada was unknown. The peacefully acquiredregion of Oregon, far north, need not concern us, but Oregon became afree State in 1859. Early in the war a struggle began betweenNortherners and Southerners (to a large extent independent of party) inthe Senate and the House as to whether slavery should be allowed in theconquered land or not. David Wilmot, a Northern DemocraticCongressman, proposed a proviso to the very first money grant connectedwith the war, that slavery should be forbidden in any territory to beannexed. The "Wilmot Proviso" was proposed again on every possibleoccasion; Lincoln, by the way, sturdily supported it while in Congress;it was always voted down. Cass proposed as a solution of alldifficulties that the question of slavery should be left to the peopleof the new Territories or States themselves. The American public, aptas condensing an argument into a phrase, dismissed Cass's principle forthe time being with the epithet "squatter sovereignty. " Calhoun andhis friends said it was contrary to the Constitution that an Americancitizen should not be free to move with his property, including hisslaves, into territory won by the Union. The annexation was carriedout, and the question of slavery was unsettled. Then events took asurprising turn. In the winter of 1848 gold was discovered in California. Throughout1849 gold-seekers came pouring in from every part of the world. Thismiscellaneous new people, whose rough ways have been more celebrated inliterature than those of any similar crowd, lived at first inconsiderable anarchy, but they determined without delay to set up someregular system of government. In the course of 1849 they elected aConvention to draw up a State Constitution, and to the astonishment ofall the States the Convention unanimously made the prohibition ofslavery part of that Constitution. There was no likelihood that, witha further influx of settlers of the same sort, this decision ofCalifornia would alter. Was California to be admitted as a State withthis Constitution of its own choice, which the bulk of the people ofAmerica approved? To politicians of the school now fully developed in the South thereseemed nothing outrageous in saying that it should be refusedadmission. To them Calhoun's argument, which regarded a citizen'sslave as his chattel in the same sense as his hat or walking-stick, seemed the ripe fruit of logic. It did not shock them in the leastthat they were forcing the slave system on an unwilling community, forwere not the Northerners prepared to force the free system? Aprominent Southern Senator, talking with a Northern colleague a littlelater, said triumphantly: "I see how it is. You may force freedom asmuch as you like, but we are to beware how we force slavery, " and wassurprised that the Northerner cheerfully accepted this position. It isnecessary to remember throughout the following years that, whateverordinary Southerners thought in private, their whole political actionwas now based on the assumption that slavery, as it was, was aninstitution which no reasonable man could think wrong. Zachary Taylor, unlike Harrison, the previous hero of the Whigs, survived his inauguration by sixteen months. He was no politician atall, but placed in the position of President, for which fairness andfirmness were really the greatest qualifications, he was man enough torely on his own good sense. He had come to Washington under theimpression that the disputes which raged there were due to theaggressiveness of the North; a very little time there convinced him ofthe contrary. Slave-owner as he was, the claim of the South to forceslavery on California struck him as an arrogant pretension, and so faras matters rested with him, he was simply not to be moved by it. Hesent a message to Congress advising the admission of California withthe constitution of its own choice. When, as we shall shortly see, thegreat men of the Senate thought the case demanded conciliation and agreat scheme of compromise, he resolutely disagreed; he used the wholeof his influence against their compromise, and it is believed with goodreason that he would have put his veto as President on the chiefmeasure in which the compromise issued. If he had lived to carry outhis policy, it seems possible that there would have been an attempt toexecute the threats of secession which were muttered--this time inVirginia. But it is almost certain that at that time, and with theposition which he occupied, he would have been able to quell themovement at once. There is nothing to suggest that Taylor was a man ofany unusual gifts of intellect, but he had what we may call character, and it was the one thing wanting in political life at the time. Thegreatest minds in American politics, as we shall see, viewed theoccasion otherwise, but, in the light of what followed, it seems asignal and irreparable error that, when the spirit of aggression risingin the South had taken definite shape in a demand which was manifestlywrongful, it was bought off and not met with a straightforward refusal. Taylor died in the course of 1850 and Vice-President Millard Fillmore, of New York, succeeded him. Fillmore had an appearance of grave andbenign wisdom which led a Frenchman to describe him as the ideal rulerof a Republic, but he was a pattern of that outwardly dignified, yetnerveless and heartless respectability, which was more dangerous toAmerica at that period than political recklessness or want of scruple. The actual issue of the crisis was that the admission of California wasbought from the South by large concessions in other directions. Thiswas the proposal of Henry Clay, who was now an old man anxious for theUnion, but had been a lover of such compromises ever since he promotedthe Missouri Compromise thirty years ago; but, to the savageindignation of some of his Boston admirers, Webster used the wholeforce of his influence and debating power in support of Clay. Thechief concessions made to the South were two. In the first placeTerritorial Governments were set up in New Mexico and Utah (since thenthe home of the Mormons) without any restriction on slavery. Thisconcession was defended in the North on the ground that it was a sham, because the physical character of those regions made successful slaveplantations impossible there. But it was, of course, a surrender ofthe principle which had been struggled for in the Wilmot Proviso duringthe last four years; and the Southern leaders showed the clearness oftheir limited vision by valuing it just upon that ground. There hadbeen reason for the territorial concessions to slavery in the pastgeneration because it was established in the territories concerned; butthere was no such reason now. The second concession was that of a newFederal law to ensure the return of fugitive slaves from the freeStates. The demand for this was partly factitious, for the States inthe far South, which were not exposed to loss of slaves, were the mostinsistent on it, and it would appear that the Southern leaders felt itpolitic to force the acceptance of the measure in a form which wouldhumiliate their opponents. There is no escape from the contention, which Lincoln especially admitted without reserve, that the enactmentof an effective Act of this sort was, if demanded, due under theprovisions of the Constitution; but the measure actually passed wasmanifestly defiant of all principles of justice. It was so framed asalmost to destroy the chance which a lawfully free negro might have ofproving his freedom, if arrested by the professional slave-hunters as arunaway. It was the sort of Act which a President should have vetoedas a fraud upon the Constitution. Thus over and above the objection, now plain, to any compromise, the actual compromise proposed was markedby flagrant wrong. But it was put through by the weight of Webster andClay. This event marks the close of a period. It was the last achievement ofWebster and Clay, both of whom passed away in 1852 in the hope thatthey had permanently pacified the Union. Calhoun, their greatcontemporary, had already died in 1850, gloomily presaging andlamenting the coming danger to the Union which was so largely his owncreation. For a while the cheerful view of Webster and Clay seemedbetter justified. There had been angry protest in the North againstthe Fugitive Slave Law; there was some forcible resistance to arrestsof negroes; and some States passed Protection of Liberty Acts of theirown to impede the Federal law in its working. But the excitement, which had flared up suddenly, died down as suddenly. In thePresidential election of 1852 Northerners generally reflected that theywanted quiet and had an instinct, curiously falsified, that theDemocratic party was the more likely to give it them. The Whigs againproposed a hero, General Scott, a greater soldier than Taylor, but avainer man, who mistakenly broke with all precedent and went upon thestump for himself. The President who was elected, Franklin Pierce ofNew Hampshire, a friend of Hawthorne, might perhaps claim the palmamong the Presidents of those days, for sheer, deleteriousinsignificance. The favourite observation of his contemporaries uponhim was that he was a gentleman, but his convivial nature made thesocial attractiveness of Southern circles in Washington overpowering toany brain or character that he may have possessed. A new generation ofpolitical personages now came to the front. Jefferson Davis ofMississippi, a man of force and considerable dignity, began to take theleading part in the powerful group of Southern Senators; StephenDouglas, of Illinois, rapidly became the foremost man of the Democraticparty generally; William Seward, late Governor of New York, and SalmonChase, a Democrat, late Governor of Ohio, had played a manful part inthe Senate in opposition to Webster and Clay and their compromise. From this time on we must look on these two, joined a little later byCharles Sumner, of Massachusetts, as the obvious leaders in thestruggle against slavery which was shortly to be renewed, and in whichLincoln's part seemed likely to remain a humble one. 3. _Lincoln in Retirement_. Whether Seward and Chase and the other opponents of the Compromise wereright, as it now seems they were, or not, Lincoln was not the man whoin the unlooked-for crisis of 1850 would have been likely to make aninsurrectionary stand against his old party-leader Clay, and therevered constitutional authority of Webster. He had indeed littleopportunity to do so in Illinois, but his one recorded speech of thisperiod, an oration to a meeting of both parties on the death of Clay in1852, expresses approval of the Compromise. This speech, which issignificant of the trend of his thoughts at this time, does not lenditself to brief extracts because it is wanting in the frankness of hisspeeches before and after. A harsh reference to Abolitionists servesto disguise the fact that the whole speech is animated by antagonism toslavery. The occasion and the subject are used with ratherdisagreeable subtlety to insinuate opposition to slavery into the mindsof a cautious audience. The speaker himself seems satisfied with themood of mere compromise which had governed Clay in this matter, orrather perhaps he is twisting Clay's attitude into one of moreconsistent opposition to slavery than he really showed. In any case wecan be quite sure that the moderate and subtle but intensely firmopinion with which a little later Lincoln returned to political strifewas the product of long and deep and anxious thought during the yearsfrom 1849 to 1854. On the surface it did not go far beyond thecondemnation of slavery and acceptance of the Constitution which hadguided him earlier, nor did it seem to differ from the wide-spreadpublic opinion which in 1854 created a new party; but there was thisdifference that Lincoln had by then looked at the matter in all itsbearings, and prepared his mind for all eventualities. We shall find, and need not be surprised to find, that he who now hung back a little, and who later moved when public opinion moved, later still continued tomove when public opinion had receded. What we know of these years of private life is mainly due to Mr. William Herndon, the young lawyer already quoted, whom he took intopartnership in 1845, and who kept on the business of the firm inSpringfield till Lincoln's death. This gentleman was, like Boswell, ofopinion that a great man is not best portrayed as a figure in astained-glass window. He had lived with Lincoln, groaned under his oddways, and loved them, for sixteen years before his Presidency, andafter his death he devoted much research, in his own memory and thoseof many others, to the task of substituting for Lincoln's aureole thebattered tall hat, with valuable papers stuck in its lining, which hehad long contemplated with reverent irritation. Mr. Herndon was notendowed with Boswell's artistic gift for putting his materialstogether, perhaps because he lacked that delicacy and sureness of moralperception which more than redeemed Boswell's absurdities. Hesucceeded on the whole in his aim, for the figure that more or lessdistinctly emerges from the litter of his workshop is lovable; but inspite of all Lincoln's melancholy, the dreariness of his life, sittingwith his feet on the table in his unswept and untidy office atIllinois, or riding on circuit or staying at ramshackle western innswith the Illinois bar, cannot have been so unrelieved as it is in Mr. Herndon's presentation. And Herndon overdid his part. He ferreted outpetty incidents which he thought might display the acute Lincoln asslightly too acute, when for all that can be seen Lincoln acted just asany sensible man would have acted. But the result is that, in thispart of his life especially, Lincoln's way of living was subjected toso close a scrutiny as few men have undergone. Herndon's scrutiny does not reveal the current of his thoughts eitheron life generally or on the political problem which hereafter was toabsorb him. It shows on the contrary, and the recollections of hisPresidency confirm it, that his thought on any important topic thoughit might flash out without disguise in rare moments of intimacy, usually remained long unexpressed. His great sociability had perhapseven then a rather formidable side to it. He was not merely amusinghimself and other people, when he chatted and exchanged anecdotes farinto the night; there was an element, not ungenial, of purposeful studyin it all. He was building up his knowledge of ordinary human nature, his insight into popular feeling, his rather slow but surecomprehension of the individual men whom he did know. It astonishedthe self-improving young Herndon that the serious books he read werefew and that he seldom seemed to read the whole of them--though withthe Bible, Shakespeare, and to a less extent Burns, he saturated hismind. The few books and the great many men were part of one study. Inso far as his thought and study turned upon politics it seems to haveled him soon to the conclusion that he had for the present no part toplay that was worth playing. By 1854, as he said himself, "hisprofession as a lawyer had almost superseded the thought of politics inhis mind. " But it does not seem that the melancholy sense of somegreat purpose unachieved or some great destiny awaiting him ever quiteleft him. He must have felt that his chance of political fame was inall appearance gone, and would have liked to win himself a considerableposition and a little (very little) money as a lawyer; but the study, in the broadest sense, of which these years were full, evidentlycontemplated a larger education of himself as a man than professionalkeenness, or any such interest as he had in law, will explain. Middle-aged and from his own point of view a failure, he was set uponmaking himself a bigger man. In some respects he let himself be. His exterior oddities never seemto have toned down much; he could not be taught to introduce tidinessor method into his office; nor did he make himself an exact lawyer; arough and ready familiarity with practice and a firm grasp of largerprinciples of law contented him without any great apparatus oflearning. His method of study was as odd as anything else about him;he could read hard and commit things to memory in the midst of bustleand noise; on the other hand, since reading aloud was his chosen way ofimpressing what he read on his own mind, he would do it at all sorts oftimes to the sore distraction of his partner. When his studies arespoken of, observation and thought on some plan concealed in his ownmind must be taken to have formed the largest element in these studies. There was, however, one methodic discipline, highly commended of oldbut seldom perhaps seriously pursued with the like object by men offorty, even self-taught men, which he did pursue. Some time duringthese years he mastered the first six Books of Euclid. It wouldprobably be no mere fancy if we were to trace certain definite effectsof this discipline upon his mind and character. The faculty which hehad before shown of reducing his thought on any subject to the simplestand plainest terms possible, now grew so strong that few men can becompared with him in this. He was gaining, too, from some source, whatthe ancient geometers would themselves have claimed as partly theproduct of their study: the plain fact and its plain consequences werenot only clear in calm hours of thought, but remained present to him, felt and instinctive, through seasons of confusion, passion, anddismay. His life in one sense was very full of companionship, but itis probable that in his real intellectual interests he was lonely. ToHerndon, intelligently interested in many things, his master's mind, much as he held it in awe, seemed chillingly unpoetic--which is acurious view of a mind steeped in Shakespeare and Burns. The twopartners had been separately to Niagara. Herndon was anxious to knowwhat had been Lincoln's chief impression, and was pained by the reply, "I wondered where all that water came from, " which he felt showedmaterialism and insensibility. Lincoln's thought had, very obviously, a sort of poetry of its own, but of a vast and rather awful kind. Hehad occasionally written verses of his own a little before this time;sad verses about a friend who had become a lunatic, wondering that heshould be allowed to outlive his mind while happy young lives passedaway, and sad verses about a visit to old familiar fields in Indiana, where he wandered brooding, as he says, "Till every sound appears a knell, And every spot a grave. " They are not great poetry; but they show a correct ear for verse, andthey are not the verses of a man to whom any of the familiar forms ofpoetic association were unusual. They are those of a man in whom thehabitual undercurrent of thought was melancholy. Apart from these signs and the deep, humorous delight which heevidently took in his children, there may be something slightlyforbidding in this figure of a gaunt man, disappointed in ambition andnot even happy at home, rubbing along through a rather rough crowd, with uniform rough geniality and perpetual jest; all the while insecret forging his own mind into an instrument for some vaguelyforeshadowed end. But there are two or three facts which stand outcertain and have to be taken account of in any image we may be temptedto form of him. In the first place, his was no forbidding figure atthe time to those who knew him; a queer and a comic figure evidently, but liked, trusted, and by some loved; reputed for honest dealing andfor kindly and gentle dealing; remarked too by some at that time, asbefore and ever after, for the melancholy of his face in repose; knownby us beyond doubt to have gone through great pain; known lastly amonghis fellows in his profession for a fire of anger that flashed out onlyin the presence of cruelty and wrong. His law practice, which he pursued with energy, and on which he wasnow, it seems, prepared to look as his sole business in life, fitted innone the less well with his deliberately adopted schemes ofself-education. A great American lawyer, Mr. Choate, assures us thatat the Illinois bar in those days Lincoln had to measure himselfagainst very considerable men in suits of a class that required someintellect and training. And in his own way he held his own among thesemen. A layman may humbly conjecture that the combination in one personof the advocate and the solicitor must give opportunities of far truerintellectual training than the mere advocate can easily enjoy. TheIllinois advocate was not all the time pleading the cause which he wasemployed to plead, and which if it was once offered to him it was hisduty to accept; he was the personal adviser of the client whose causehe pleaded, and within certain limits he could determine whether thecause was brought at all, and if so whether he should take it uphimself or leave it to another man. The rule in such matters waselastic and practice varied. Lincoln's practice went to the very limitof what is permissible in refusing legal aid to a cause he disapproved. Coming into court he discovered suddenly some fact about his case whichwas new to him but which would probably not have justified an Englishbarrister in throwing up his brief. The case was called; he wasabsent; the judge sent to his hotel and got back a message: "Tell thejudge I'm washing my hands. " One client received advice much to thiseffect: "I can win your case; I can get you $600. I can also make anhonest family miserable. But I shall not take your case, and I shallnot take your fee. One piece of advice I will give you gratis: Go homeand think seriously whether you cannot make $600 in some honest way. "And this habit of mind was beyond his control. Colleagues whom he wasengaged to assist in cases agreed that if a case lost his sympathy hebecame helpless and useless in it. This, of course, was not the way tomake money; but he got along and won a considerable local position atthe bar, for his perfect honesty in argument and in statement of factwas known to have won the confidence of the judges, and a difficultcase which he thought was right elicited the full and curious powers ofhis mind. His invective upon occasion was by all accounts terrific. An advocate glanced at Lincoln's notes for his speech, when he wasappearing against a very heartless swindler and saw that they concludedwith the ominous words, "Skin Defendant. " The vitriolic outburst whichoccurred at the point thus indicated seems to have been long rememberedby the Illinois bar. To a young man who wished to be a lawyer yetshrunk from the profession lest it should necessarily involve somedishonesty Lincoln wrote earnestly and wisely, showing him how falsehis impression of the law was, but concluding with earnest entreatythat he would not enter the profession if he still had any fear ofbeing led by it to become a knave. One of his cases is interesting for its own sake, not for his part init. He defended without fee the son of his old foe and friend JackArmstrong, and of Hannah, who mended his breeches, on a charge ofmurder. Six witnesses swore that they had seen him do the deed about11 P. M. On such and such a night. Cross-examined: They saw it allquite clearly; they saw it so clearly because of the moonlight. Theonly evidence for the defence was an almanac. There had been no moonthat night. Another case is interesting for his sake. Two young menset up in a farm together, bought a waggon and team from a poor oldfarmer, Lincoln's client, did not pay him, and were sued. They hadboth been just under twenty-one when they contracted the debt, and theywere advised to plead infancy. A stranger who was present in Courtdescribed afterwards his own indignation as the rascally tale wasunfolded, and his greater indignation as he watched the locally famousMr. Lincoln, lying back in his seat, nodding complacently and saying, "I reckon that's so, " as each of the relevant facts was produced, andthe relevant Statute read and expounded. At last, as the onlookerproceeded to relate, the time came for Lincoln to address the jury, with whom, by Illinois law, the issue still rested. Slowly hedisengaged his long, lean form from his seat, and before he had got itdrawn out to its height he had fixed a gaze of extraordinarybenevolence on the two disgraceful young defendants and begun in thisstrain: "Gentlemen of the Jury, are you prepared that these two youngmen shall enter upon life and go through life with the stain of adishonourable transaction for ever affixed to them, " and so forth atjust sufficient length and with just enough of Shakespearean paddingabout honour. The result with that emotional and probably irregularWestern court is obvious, and the story concludes with the quitecredible assertion that the defendants themselves were relieved. Anygood jury would, of course, have been steeled against the appeal, whichmight have been expected, to their compassion for a poor and honest oldman. A kind of innocent and benign cunning has been the most engagingquality in not a few great characters. It is tempting, though at therisk of undue solemnity, to look for the secret of Lincoln's cunning inthis instance. We know from copybooks and other sources that these twoyoung men, starting on the down grade with the help of theirblackguardly legal adviser, were objects for pity, more so than the manwho was about to lose a certain number of dollars. Lincoln, as fewother men would have done, felt a certain actual regret for them thenand there; he felt it so naturally that he knew the same sympathy couldbe aroused, at least in twelve honest men who already wished they couldfind for the plaintiff. It has often been remarked that the cause ofhis later power was a knowledge of the people's mind which wascuriously but vitally bound up with his own rectitude. Any attempt that we may make to analyse a subtle character and in somerespects to trace its growth is certain to miss the exact mark. But itis in any case plain that Abraham Lincoln left political life in 1849, a praiseworthy self-made man with good sound views but with nothingmuch to distinguish him above many other such, and at a sudden callreturned to political life in 1854 with a touch of something quiteuncommon added to those good sound views. 4. _The Repeal of the Missouri Compromise_. The South had become captive to politicians, personally reputable andof some executive capacity, who had converted its natural prejudiceinto a definite doctrine which was paradoxical and almost inconceivablynarrow, and who, as is common in such instances of perversion andfanaticism, knew hardly any scruple in the practical enforcement oftheir doctrine. In the North, on the other hand, though there weresome few politicians who were clever and well-intentioned, publicopinion had no very definite character, and public men generallyspeaking were flabby. At such a time the sheer adventurer has anexcellent field before him and perhaps has his appointed use. Stephen Douglas, who was four years younger than Lincoln, had come toIllinois from the Eastern States just about the time when Lincolnentered the Legislature. He had neither money nor friends to startwith, but almost immediately secured, by his extraordinary address inpushing himself, a clerkship in the Assembly. He soon became, likeLincoln, a lawyer and a legislator, but was on the Democratic side. Herapidly soared into regions beyond the reach of Lincoln, and in 1847became a Senator for Illinois, where he later became Chairman of theCommittee on Territories, and as such had to consider the question ofproviding for the government of the districts called Kansas andNebraska, which lay west and north-west of Missouri, and from whichslavery was excluded by the Missouri Compromise. He was what inEngland is called a "Jingo, " and was at one time eager to fight thiscountry for the possession of what is now British Columbia. His shortfigure gave an impression of abounding strength and energy whichobtained him the nickname of "the little Giant. " With no assignablehigher quality, and with the blustering, declamatory, shamelesslyfallacious and evasive oratory of a common demagogue, he wasnevertheless an accomplished Parliamentarian, and imposed himself aseffectively upon the Senate as he did upon the people of Illinois andthe North generally. He was, no doubt, a remarkable man, with the giftof attracting many people. A political opponent has described vividlyhow at first sight he was instantly repelled by the sinister anddangerous air of Douglas' scowl; a still stronger opponent, but awoman, Mrs. Beecher Stowe, seems on the contrary to have found itimpossible to hate him. What he now did displayed at any rate asporting quality. In the course of 1854 Stephen Douglas while in charge of an inoffensiveBill dealing with the government of Kansas and Nebraska converted itinto a form in which it empowered the people of Kansas at any time todecide for themselves whether they would permit slavery or not, and inexpress terms repealed the Missouri Compromise. With the easyconnivance of President Pierce and the enthusiastic support of theSoutherners, and by some extraordinary exercise of his art as demagogueand Parliamentarian, he triumphantly ran this measure through. Just how it came about seems to be rather obscure, but it is easy toconjecture his motives. Trained in a school in which scruple orprinciple were unknown and the man who arrives is the great man, Douglas, like other such adventurers, was accessible to visions of asort. He cared nothing whether negroes were slaves or not, anddoubtless despised Northern and Southern sentiment on that subjectequally; as he frankly said once, on any question between white men andnegroes he was on the side of the white men, and on any questionbetween negroes and crocodiles he would be on the side of the negroes. But he did care for the development of the great national heritage inthe West, that subject of an easy but perfectly wholesome patrioticpride with which we are familiar. It must have been a satisfaction tohim to feel that North and South would now have an equal chance in thatheritage, and also that the white settlers in the West would berelieved of any restriction on their freedom. None the less his actionwas to the last degree reckless. The North had shown itself ready in1850 to put up with a great deal of quiet invasion of its formerprinciple, but to lay hands upon the sacred letter of the Act in whichthat principle was enshrined was to invite exciting consequences. The immediate consequences were two-fold. In the first place Southernsettlers came pouring into Kansas and Northern settlers in still largernumbers (rendered larger still by the help of an emigration societyformed in the North-East for that purpose) came pouring in too. It wasat first a race to win Kansas for slavery or for freedom. When itbecame apparent that freedom was winning easily, the race turned into acivil war between these two classes of immigrants for the possession ofthe Territorial government, and this kept on its scandalous and bloodycourse for three or four years. In the second place there was a revolution in the party system. Theold Whig party, which, whatever its tendencies, had avoided having anyprinciple in regard to slavery, now abruptly and opportunely expired. There had been an attempt once before, and that time mainly among theDemocrats, to create a new "Free-soil Party, " but it had come to verylittle. This time a permanent fusion was accomplished between themajority of the former Whigs in the North and a numerous secession fromamong the Northern Democrats. They created the great Republican party, of which the name and organisation have continued to this day, but ofwhich the original principle was simply and solely that there should beno further extension of slavery upon territory present or future of theUnited States. It naturally consisted of Northerners only. This wasof course an ominous fact, and caused people, who were too timid eitherto join the Republicans or turn Democrat, to take refuge in anotherstrange party, formed about this time, which had no views aboutslavery. This was the "American" party, commonly called the"Know-Nothing" party from its ridiculous and objectionable secretorganisation. Its principle was dislike of foreign immigrants, especially such as were Roman Catholics. To them ex-PresidentFillmore, protesting against "the madness of the times" when menventured to say yes or no on a question relating to slavery, fled forcomfort, and became their candidate for the Presidency at the nextelection. It was in 1854 that Lincoln returned to political life as one of thefounders of the Republican party. But it will be better at once todeal with one or two later events with which he was not speciallyconcerned. The Republicans chose as their Presidential candidate in1856 an attractive figure, John Frémont, a Southerner of French origin, who had conducted daring and successful explorations in Oregon, hadsome hand (perhaps a very important hand) in conquering California fromMexico, and played a prominent part in securing California for freedom. The Southern Democrats again secured a Northern instrument in JamesBuchanan of Pennsylvania, an elderly and very respectable man, who wasunderstood to be well versed in diplomatic and official life. He was amore memorable personage than Pierce. A great chorus of friendlywitnesses to his character has united in ascribing all his actions toweakness. Buchanan was elected; but for a brand-new party the Republicans had putup a very good fight, and they were in the highest of spirits when, shortly after Buchanan's Inauguration in 1857, a staggering blow fellupon them from an unexpected quarter. This was nothing less than apronouncement by the Chief Justice and a majority of Justices in theSupreme Court of the United States, that the exclusion of slavery fromany portion of the Territories, and therefore, of course, the whole aimand object of the Republicans, was, as Calhoun had contended eight orten years before, unconstitutional. Dred Scott was a Missouri slave whose misfortunes it is needless tocompassionate, since, after giving his name to one of the most famouslaw cases in history, he was emancipated with his family by a newmaster into whose hands he had passed. Some time before the MissouriCompromise was repealed he had been taken by his master into Minnesota, as a result of which he claimed that he became, by virtue of theMissouri Compromise, a free man. His right to sue his master in aFederal Court rested on the allegation that he was now a citizen ofMissouri, while his master was a citizen of another State. There wasthus a preliminary question to be decided, Was he really a citizen, before the question, Was he a freeman, could arise at all. If theSupreme Court followed its established practice, and if it decidedagainst his citizenship, it would not consider the question whichinterested the public, that of his freedom. Chief Justice Roger Taney may be seen from the refined features of hisportrait and the clear-cut literary style of his famous judgment tohave been a remarkable man. He was now eighty-three, but in unimpairedintellectual vigour. In a judgment, with which five of his colleaguesentirely concurred and from which only two dissented, he decided thatDred Scott was not a citizen, and went on, contrary to practice, topronounce, in what was probably to be considered as a mere _obiterdictum_, that Dred Scott was not free, because the Missouri Compromisehad all along been unconstitutional and void. Justices McLean andCurtis, especially the latter, answered Taney's arguments in cogentjudgments, which it seems generally to be thought were right. Manylawyers thought so then, and so did the prudent Fillmore. This is oneof the rare cases where a layman may have an opinion on a point of law, for the argument of Taney was entirely historical and rested upon theopinion as to negroes and slavery which he ascribed to the makers ofthe Constitution and the authors of the Declaration of Independence. On the question of Scott's citizenship he laid down that these men hadhardly counted Africans as human at all, and used words such as "men, ""persons, " "citizens" in a sense which necessarily excluded the negro. We have seen already that he was wrong--the Southern politician whocalled the words of the Declaration of Independence "a self-evidentlie" was a sounder historian than Taney; but an amazing fact is to beadded: the Constitution, whose authors, according to Taney, could notconceive of a negro as a citizen, was actually the act of a number ofStates in several of which negroes were exercising the full rights ofcitizens at the time. It would be easy to bring almost equally plainconsiderations to bear against the more elaborate argument of Taneythat the Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional, but it is enough tosay this much: the first four Presidents--that is, all the Presidentswho were in public life when the Constitution was made--had all actedunhesitatingly upon the belief that Congress had the power to allow orforbid slavery in the Territories. The fifth, John Quincy Adams, whenhe set his hand to Acts involving this principle, had consulted beforedoing so the whole of his Cabinet on this constitutional point and hadsigned such legislation with the full concurrence of them all. EvenPolk had acted later upon the same view. The Dred Scott judgment wouldthus appear to show the penetrating power at that time of an altogetherfantastic opinion. The hope, which Taney is known to have entertained, that his judgmentwould compose excited public opinion, was by no means fulfilled. Itraised fierce excitement. What practical effect would hereafter begiven to the opinion of six out of the nine judges in that Court mightdepend on many things. But to the Republicans, who appealed much toantiquity, it was maddening to be thus assured that their whole"platform" was unconstitutional. In the long run, there seems to be nodoubt that Taney helped the cause of freedom. He had tried to makeevident the personal sense of compassion for "these unfortunate people"with which he contemplated the opinion that he ascribed to a pastgeneration; but he failed to do this, and instead he succeeded inimparting to the supposed Constitutional view of the slave, as nothingbut a chattel, a horror which went home to many thousands of thewarm-hearted men and women of his country. For the time, however, the Republicans were deeply depressed, and afurther perplexity shortly befell them. An attempt, to which we mustshortly return, was made to impose the slave system on Kansas againstthe now unmistakable will of the majority there. Against this attemptDouglas, in opposition to whom the Republican party had been formed, revolted to his lasting honour, and he now stood out for the occasionas the champion of freedom. It was at this late period of bewildermentand confusion that the life-story of Abraham Lincoln became one withthe life-story of the American people. CHAPTER V THE RISE OF LINCOLN 1. _Lincoln's Return to Public Life_. We possess a single familiar letter in which Lincoln opened his heartabout politics. It was written while old political ties were not yetquite broken and new ties not quite knit, and it was written to an oldand a dear friend who was not his political associate. We mayfittingly place it here, as a record of the strong and conflictingfeelings out of which his consistent purpose in this crisis was formed. "_24 August, 1855_. "To JOSHUA SPEED. "You know what a poor correspondent I am. Ever since I received yourvery agreeable letter of the 22nd I have been intending to write you ananswer to it. You suggest that in political action, now, you and Iwould differ. I suppose we would; not quite so much, however, as youmay think. You know I dislike slavery, and you fully admit theabstract wrong of it. So far there is no cause of difference. But yousay that sooner than yield your legal right to the slave, especially atthe bidding of those who are not themselves interested, you would seethe Union dissolved. I am not aware that any one is bidding you yieldthat right; very certainly I am not. I leave that matter entirely toyourself. I also acknowledge your rights and my obligations under theConstitution in regard to your slaves. I confess I hate to see thepoor creatures hunted down and caught and carried back to their stripesand unrequited toil; but I bite my lips and keep quiet. In 1841 youand I had together a tedious low-water trip on a steamboat fromLouisville to St. Louis. You may remember, as I well do, that fromLouisville to the mouth of the Ohio there were on board ten or a dozenslaves shackled together with irons. That sight was a continualtorment to me, and I see something like it every time I touch the Ohioor any other slave border. It is not fair for you to assume that Ihave no interest in a thing which has, and continually exercises, thepower to make me miserable. You ought rather to appreciate how muchthe great body of the Northern people do crucify their feelings, inorder to maintain their loyalty to the Constitution and the Union. Ido oppose the extension of slavery because my judgment and feelings soprompt me, and I am under no obligations to the contrary. If for thisyou and I must differ, differ we must. . . . "You say that if Kansas fairly votes herself a free State, as aChristian you will rejoice at it. All decent slave holders talk thatway and I do not doubt their candour. But they never vote that way. Although in a private letter or conversation you will express yourpreference that Kansas shall be free, you will vote for no man forCongress who would say the same thing publicly. No such man could beelected from any district in a slave State. . . . The slave breedersand slave traders are a small, odious and detested class among you; andyet in politics they dictate the course of all of you, and are ascompletely your masters as you are the masters of your own negroes. "You inquire where I now stand. That is a disputed point. I think Iam a Whig; but others say there are no Whigs, and that I am anAbolitionist. When I was at Washington I voted for the Wilmot Provisoas good as forty times; and I never heard of any one attempting toun-Whig me for that. I now do no more than oppose the extension ofslavery. I am not a Know-Nothing, that is certain. How could I be?How can any one who abhors the oppression of negroes be in favour ofdegrading classes of white people? Our progress in degeneracy appearsto me pretty rapid. As a nation we began by declaring that 'all menare created equal. ' We now practically read it, 'all men are createdequal, except negroes. ' When the Know-Nothings get control, it willread, 'all men are created equal, except negroes and foreigners andCatholics. ' When it comes to this, I shall prefer emigrating to somecountry where they make no pretence of loving liberty--to Russia, forinstance, where despotism can be taken pure, and without the base alloyof hypocrisy. "Mary will probably pass a day or two in Louisville in October. Mykindest regards to Mrs. Speed. On the leading subject of this letter Ihave more of her sympathy than I have of yours; and yet let me say I am "Your friend forever, "A. LINCOLN. " The shade of doubt which this letter suggests related really to thecomposition of political parties and the grouping of political forces, not in the least to the principles by which Lincoln's own actions wouldbe guided. He has himself recorded that the repeal of the MissouriCompromise meant for him the sudden revival in a far stronger form ofhis interest in politics, and, we may add, of his political ambition. The opinions which he cherished most deeply demanded no longer patiencebut vehement action. The faculties of political organisation and ofpopular debate, of which he enjoyed the exercise, could now be used fora purpose which satisfied his understanding and his heart. From 1854 onwards we find Lincoln almost incessantly occupied, atconventions, at public meetings, in correspondence, in secretconsultation with those who looked to him for counsel, for the oneobject of strengthening the new Republican movement in his own State ofIllinois, and, so far as opportunity offered, in the neighbouringStates. Some of the best of his reported and the most effective of hisunreported speeches were delivered between 1854 and 1858. Yet as largea part of his work in these years was done quietly in the background, and it continued to be his fate to be called upon to efface himself. It is unnecessary to follow in any detail the labours by which hebecame a great leader in Illinois. It may suffice to pick out twoinstances that illustrate the ways of this astute, unselfish man. Thefirst is very trifling and shows him merely astute. A Springfieldnewspaper called the _Conservative_ was acquiring too much influence asthe organ of moderate and decent opinion that acquiesced in theextension of negro slavery. The Abolitionist, Mr. Herndon, was afriend of the editor. One day he showed Lincoln an article in aSouthern paper which most boldly justified slavery whether the slaveswere black or white. Lincoln observed what a good thing it would be ifthe pro-slavery papers of Illinois could be led to go this length. Herndon ingeniously used his acquaintance with the editor to procurethat he should reprint this article with approval. Of course thatpromising journalistic venture, the _Conservative_, was at once ruinedby so gross an indiscretion. This was hard on its confiding editor, and it is not to Lincoln's credit that he suggested or connived at thistrick. But this trumpery tale happens to be a fair illustration of twothings. In the first place a large part of Lincoln's activity went inthe industrious and watchful performance of services to his cause, veryseldom as questionable but constantly as minute as this, and in makinghimself as in this case confidant and adviser to a number of lessnotable workers. In the second place a biographer must set forth if hecan the materials for the severest judgment on his subject, and in thecase of a man whose fame was built on his honesty, but who certainlyhad an aptitude for ingenious tricks and took a humorous delight inthem, this duty might involve a tedious examination of many unimportantincidents. It may save such discussion hereafter to say, as can safelybe said upon a study of all the transactions in his life of which thecircumstances are known, that this trick on the editor of the_Conservative_ marks the limit of Lincoln's deviation from the straightpath. Most of us might be very glad if we had really never doneanything much more dishonest. Our second tale of this period is much more memorable. In 1856 theterm of office of one of the Senators for Illinois came to an end; andthere was a chance of electing an opponent of Douglas. Those of theRepublicans of Illinois who were former Whigs desired the election ofLincoln, but could only secure it by the adhesion of a sufficientnumber of former Democrats and waverers. United States Senators wereelected by the Legislatures of their own States through a proceduresimilar to that of the Conclave of Cardinals which elects a Pope; ifthere were several candidates and no one of them had an absolutemajority of the votes first cast, the candidate with most votes was notelected; the voting was repeated, perhaps many times, till some one hadan absolute majority; the final result was brought about by a transferof votes from one candidate to another in which the prompt and cunningwire-puller had sometimes a magnificent opportunity for his skill. Inthis particular contest there were many ballots, and Lincoln at firstled. His supporters were full of eager hope. Lincoln, looking on, discerned before any of them the setting in of an under-current likelyto result in the election of a supporter of Douglas. He discerned, too, that the surest way to prevent this was for the whole of hisfriends immediately to go over to the Democrat, Lyman Trumbull, who wasa sound opponent of slavery. He sacrificed his own chance instantly bypersuading his supporters to do this. They were very reluctant, but heoverbore them; one, a very old friend, records that he never saw himmore earnest and decided. The same friend records, what is necessaryto the appreciation of Lincoln's conduct, that his personaldisappointment and mortification at his failure were great. Lincoln, it will be remembered, had acted just in this way when he soughtelection to the House of Representatives; he was to repeat this line ofconduct in a manner at least as striking in the following year. Minutecriticism of his action in many matters becomes pointless when weobserve that his managing shrewdness was never more signally displayedthan it was three times over in the sacrifice of his own personalchances. For four years, it is to be remembered, the activity and influence ofwhich we are speaking were of little importance beyond the boundariesof Illinois. It is true that at the Republican Convention in 1856which chose Frémont as its candidate for the Presidency, Lincoln wasexposed for a moment to the risk (for so it was to be regarded) ofbeing nominated for the Vice-Presidency; but even his greatest speechwas not noticed outside Illinois, and in the greater part of theNorthern States his name was known to comparatively few and to themonly as a local notability of the West. But in the course of 1858 hechallenged the attention of the whole country. There was again avacancy for a Senator for Illinois. Douglas was the sole and obviouscandidate of the Democrats. Lincoln came forward as his opponent. Theelections then pending of the State Legislature, which in its turnwould elect a Senator, became a contest between Lincoln and Douglas. In the autumn of that year these rival champions held seven jointdebates before mass meetings in the open air at important towns ofIllinois, taking turns in the right of opening the debate and replyingat its close; in addition each was speaking at meetings of his own atleast once a day for three months. At the end of it all Douglas hadwon his seat in the Senate, and Lincoln had not yet gained recognitionamong the Republican leaders as one of themselves. Nevertheless thecontest between Lincoln and Douglas was one of the decisive events inAmerican history, partly from the mere fact that at that particularmoment any one opposed Douglas at all; partly from the manner in which, in the hearing of all America, Lincoln formulated the issue betweenthem; partly from the singular stroke by which he deliberately ensuredhis own defeat and certain further consequences. 2. _The Principles and the Oratory of Lincoln_. We can best understand the causes which suddenly made him a man ofnational consequence by a somewhat close examination of the principlesand the spirit which governed all his public activity from the momentof the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. The new Republican partywhich then began to form itself stood for what might seem a simplecreed; slavery must be tolerated where it existed because theConstitution and the maintenance of the Union required it, but it mustnot be allowed to extend beyond its present limits because it wasfundamentally wrong. This was what most Whigs and many Democrats inthe North had always held, but the formulation of it as the platform ofa party, and a party which must draw its members almost entirely fromthe North, was bound to raise in an acute form questions on which veryfew men had searched their hearts. Men who hated slavery were likelyto falter and find excuses for yielding when confronted with the dangerto the Union which would arise. Men who loved the Union might in thelast resort be ready to sacrifice it if they could thereby be rid ofcomplicity with slavery, or might be unwilling to maintain it at thecost of fratricidal war. The stress of conflicting emotions and thecomplications of the political situation were certain to try to theuttermost the faith of any Republican who was not very sure just howmuch he cared for the Union and how much for freedom, and what loyaltyto either principle involved. It was the distinction of Lincoln--a manlacking in much of the knowledge which statesmen are supposed topossess, and capable of blundering and hesitation about details--first, that upon questions like these he was free from ambiguity of thought orfaltering of will, and further, that upon his difficult path, amidbewildering and terrifying circumstances, he was able to take with himthe minds of very many very ordinary men. In a slightly conventional memorial oration upon Clay, Lincoln had saidof him that "he loved his country, partly because it was his owncountry, and mostly because it was a free country. " He might trulyhave said the like of himself. To him the national unity of America, with the Constitution which symbolised it, was the subject of pride andof devotion just in so far as it had embodied and could hereafter morefully embody certain principles of permanent value to mankind. On thishe fully knew his own inner mind. For the preservation of an Americawhich he could value more, say, than men value the Argentine Republic, he was to show himself better prepared than any other man to pay anypossible price. But he definitely refused to preserve the Union bywhat in his estimation would have been the real surrender of theprinciples which had made Americans a distinct and self-respectingnation. Those principles he found in the Declaration of Independence. Itsrhetorical inexactitude gave him no trouble, and must not, now that itslanguage is out of fashion, blind us to the fact that the founders ofthe United States did deliberately aspire to found a commonwealth inwhich common men and women should count for more than elsewhere, and inwhich, as we might now phrase it, all authority must defer somewhat tothe interests and to the sentiments of the under dog. "Public opinionon any subject, " he said, "always has a 'central idea' from which allits minor thoughts radiate. The 'central idea' in our public opinionat the beginning was, and till recently has continued to be, 'theequality of man'; and, although it has always submitted patiently towhatever inequality seemed to be a matter of actual necessity, itsconstant working has been a steady and progressive effort towards thepractical equality of all men. " The fathers, he said again, had neverintended any such obvious untruth as that equality actually existed, orthat any action of theirs could immediately create it; but they had setup a standard to which continual approximation could be made. So far as white men were concerned such approximation had actuallytaken place; the audiences Lincoln addressed were fully conscious thatvery many thousands had found in the United States a scope to leadtheir own lives which the traditions and institutions no less than thephysical conditions of their former countries had denied them. Therewas no need for him to enlarge on this fact; but there are repeatedindications of the distaste and alarm with which he witnessed a demandthat newcomers from Europe, or some classes of them, should be accordedlesser privileges than they had enjoyed. But notions of freedom and equality as applied to the negroes presenteda real difficulty. "There is, " said Lincoln, "a natural disgust in theminds of nearly all white people at the idea of an indiscriminateamalgamation of the white and black men. " (We might perhaps add thatas the inferior race becomes educated and rises in status it is likelyitself to share the same disgust. ) Lincoln himself disliked thethought of intermarriage between the races. He by no means took it forgranted that equality in political power must necessarily and properlyfollow upon emancipation. Schemes for colonial settlement of thenegroes in Africa, or for gradual emancipation accompanied byeducational measures, appealed to his sympathy. It was not given himto take a part in the settlement after the war, and it is impossible toguess what he would have achieved as a constructive statesman; but itis certain that he would have proceeded with caution and with thepatience of sure faith; and he had that human sympathy with the whitepeople of the South, and no less with the slaves themselves, whichtaught him the difficulty of the problem. But difficult as the problemwas, one solution was certainly wrong, and that was the permanentacquiescence in slavery. If we may judge from reiteration in hisspeeches, no sophism angered him quite so much as the very popularsophism which defended slavery by presenting a literal equality as thereal alternative to it. "I protest against the counterfeit logic whichsays that since I do not want a negro woman for my slave I mustnecessarily want her for my wife. I may want her for neither. I maysimply let her alone. In some respects she is certainly not my equal. But in her natural right to eat the bread which she has earned by thesweat of her brow, she is my equal and the equal of any man. " The men who had made the Union had, as Lincoln contended, and in regardto most of them contended justly, been true to principle in theirdealing with slavery. "They yielded to slavery, " he insists, "what thenecessity of the case required, and they yielded nothing more. " Itwas, as we know, impossible for them in federating America, howevermuch they might hope to inspire the new nation with just ideas, to takethe power of legislating as to slavery within each existing State outof the hands of that State. Such power as they actually possessed ofstriking at slavery they used, as we have seen and as Lincoln recountedin detail, with all promptitude and almost to its fullest extent. Theyreasonably believed, though wrongly, that the natural tendency ofopinion throughout the now freed Colonies with principles of freedom inthe air would work steadily towards emancipation. "The fathers, "Lincoln could fairly say, "place slavery, where the public mind couldrest in the belief that it was in the course of ultimate extinction. "The task for statesmen now was "to put slavery back where the fathersplaced it. " Now this by no means implied that slavery in the States which nowadhered to it should be exposed to attack from outside, or the slaveowner be denied any right which he could claim under the Constitution, however odious and painful it might be, as in the case of the renditionof fugitive slaves, to yield him his rights. "We allow, " says Lincoln, "slavery to exist in the slave States, not because it is right, butfrom the necessities of the Union. We grant a fugitive slave lawbecause it is so 'nominated in the bond'; because our fathers sostipulated--had to--and we are bound to carry out this agreement. " Andthe obligations to the slave owners and the slave States, which thisoriginal agreement and the fundamental necessities of the Unioninvolved, must be fulfilled unswervingly, in spirit as well as in theletter. Lincoln was ready to give the slave States any possibleguarantee that the Constitution should not be altered so as to takeaway their existing right of self-government in the matter of slavery. He had remained in the past coldly aloof from the Abolitionistpropaganda when Herndon and other friends tried to interest him in it, feeling, it seems, that agitation in the free States against laws whichexisted constitutionally in the slave States was not only futile butimproper. With all his power he dissuaded his more impulsive friendsfrom lending any aid to forcible and unlawful proceedings in defence offreedom in Kansas. "The battle of freedom, " he exclaims in a vehementplea for what may be called moderate as against radical policy, "is tobe fought out on principle. Slavery is violation of eternal right. Wehave temporised with it from the necessities of our condition; but assure as God reigns and school children read, that black foul lie cannever be consecrated into God's hallowed truth. " In other words, thesure way and the only way to combat slavery lay in the firm and thescrupulous assertion of principles which would carry the reason and theconscience of the people with them; the repeal of the prohibition ofslavery in the Territories was a defiance of such principles, but sotoo in its way was the disregard by Abolitionists of the rightscovenanted to the slave States. This side of Lincoln's doctrine is aptto jar upon us. We feel with a great American historian that the Northwould have been depraved indeed if it had not bred Abolitionists, andit requires an effort to sympathise with Lincoln's rigidly correctfeeling--sometimes harshly expressed and sometimes apparently cold. Itis not possible to us, as it was to him a little later, to look on JohnBrown's adventure merely as a crime. Nor can we wonder that, when hewas President and Civil War was raging, many good men in the Northmistook him and thought him half-hearted, because he persisted in hisrespect for the rights of the Slave States so long as there seemed tobe a chance of saving the Union in that way. It was his primarybusiness, he then said, to save the Union if he could; "if I could savethe Union by emancipating all the slaves I would do so; if I could saveit by emancipating none of them, I would do it; if I could save it byemancipating some and not others, I would do that too. " But, as in theletter at the beginning of this chapter he called Speed to witness, hisforbearance with slavery cost him real pain, and we shall misread bothhis policy as President and his character as a man if we fail to seethat in the bottom of his mind he felt this forbearance to be requiredby the very same principles which roused him against the extension ofthe evil. Years before, he had written to an Abolitionistcorrespondent that respect for the rights of the slave States was duenot only to the Constitution but, "as it seems to me, in a sense tofreedom itself. " Negro slavery was not the only important issue, norwas it an isolated issue. What really was in issue was the continuanceof the nation "dedicated, " as he said on a great occasion, "to theproposition that all men are equal, " a nation founded by the Union ofself-governing communities, some of which lagged far behind the othersin applying in their own midst the elementary principles of freedom, but yet a nation actuated from its very foundation in some importantrespects by the acknowledgment of human rights. The practical policy, then, on which his whole efforts wereconcentrated consisted in this single point--the express recognition ofthe essential evil of slavery by the enactment that it should notspread further in the Territories subject to the Union. If slaverywere thus shut up within a ring fence and marked as a wrong thing whichthe Union as a whole might tolerate but would not be a party to, emancipation in the slave States would follow in course of time. Itwould come about, Lincoln certainly thought, in a way far better forthe slaves as well as for their masters, than any forced liberation. He was content to wait for it. "I do not mean that when it takes aturn towards ultimate extinction, it will be in a day, nor in a year, nor in two years. I do not suppose that in the most peaceful wayultimate extinction would occur in less than a hundred years at least, but that it will occur in the best way for both races in God's own goodtime I have no doubt. " If we wonder whether this policy, if soonenough adopted by the Union as a whole, would really have brought onemancipation in the South, the best answer is that, when the policy didreceive national sanction by the election of Lincoln, the principalslave States themselves instinctively recognised it as fatal to slavery. For the extinction of slavery he would wait; for a decision on theprinciple of slavery he would not. It was idle to protest againstagitation of the question. If politicians would be silent that wouldnot get rid of "this same mighty deep-seated power that somehowoperates on the minds of men, exciting them and stirring them up inevery avenue of society--in politics, in religion, in literature, inmorals, in all the manifold relations of life. " The stand, temperateas it was, that he advocated against slavery should be taken at onceand finally. The difference, of which people grown accustomed toslavery among their neighbours thought little, between letting it be inMissouri, which they could not help, and letting it cross the borderinto Kansas, which they could help, appeared to Lincoln the wholetremendous gulf between right and wrong, between a wise people'spatience with ills they could not cure and a profligate people'sacceptance of evil as their good. And here there was a distinctionbetween Lincoln and many Republicans, which again may seem subtle, butwhich was really far wider than that which separated him from theAbolitionists. Slavery must be stopped from spreading into Kansas notbecause, as it turned out, the immigrants into Kansas mostly did notwant it, but because it was wrong, and the United States, where theywere free to act, would not have it. The greatest evil in the repealof the Missouri Compromise was the laxity of public tone which had madeit possible. "Little by little, but steadily as man's march to thegrave, we have been giving up the old faith for the new faith. "Formerly some deference to the "central idea" of equality was generaland in some sort of abstract sense slavery was admitted to be wrong. Now it was boldly claimed by the South that "slavery in the abstractwas right. " All the most powerful influences in the country, "Mammon"(for "the slave property is worth a billion dollars"), "fashion, philosophy, " and even "the theology of the day, " were enlisted infavour of this opinion. And it met with no resistance. "You yourselfmay detest slavery; but your neighbour has five or six slaves, and heis an excellent neighbour, or your son has married his daughter, andthey beg you to help save their property, and you vote against yourinterests and principle to oblige a neighbour, hoping your vote will beon the losing side. " And again "the party lash and the fear ofridicule will overawe justice and liberty; for it is a singular fact, but none the less a fact and well known by the most common experience, that men will do things under the terror of the party lash that theywould not on any account or for any consideration do otherwise; whilemen, who will march up to the mouth of a loaded cannon withoutshrinking, will run from the terrible name of 'Abolitionist, ' even whenpronounced by a worthless creature whom they with good reason despise. "And so people in the North, who could hardly stomach the doctrine thatslavery was good, yet lapsed into the feeling that it was a thingindifferent, a thing for which they might rightly shuffle off theirresponsibility on to the immigrants into Kansas. This feeling that itwas indifferent Lincoln pursued and chastised with special scorn. Butthe principle of freedom that they were surrendering was the principleof freedom for themselves as well as for the negro. The sense of thenegro's rights had been allowed to go back till the prospect ofemancipation for him looked immeasurably worse than it had a generationbefore. They must recognise that when, by their connivance, they hadbarred and bolted the door upon the negro, the spirit of tyranny whichthey had evoked would then "turn and rend them. " The "central idea"which had now established itself in the intellect of the Southern wasone which favoured the enslavement of man by man "apart from colour. "A definite choice had to be made between the principle of the fathers, which asserted certain rights for all men, and that other principleagainst which the fathers had rebelled and of which the "divine rightof kings" furnished Lincoln with his example. In what particularmanner the white people would be made to feel the principle of tyrannywhen they had definitely "denied freedom to others" and ceased to"deserve it for themselves" Lincoln did not attempt to say, and perhapsonly dimly imagined. But he was as convinced as any prophet thatAmerica stood at the parting of the ways and must choose now the rightprinciple or the wrong with all its consequences. The principle of tyranny presented itself for their choice in aspecious form in Douglas' "great patent, everlasting principle of'popular sovereignty. '" This alleged principle was likely, so to say, to take upon their blind side men who were sympathetic to theimpatience of control of any crowd resembling themselves but notsympathetic to humanity of another race and colour. The claim to somedivine and indefeasible right of sovereignty overriding all otherconsiderations of the general good, on the part of a majority greateror smaller at any given time in any given area, is one which cangenerally be made to bear a liberal semblance, though it certainly hasno necessary validity. Americans had never before thought of grantingit in the case of their outlying and unsettled dominions; they wouldnever, for instance, as Lincoln remarked, have admitted the claim ofsettlers like the Mormons to make polygamy lawful in the territory theyoccupied. In the manner in which it was now employed the proposedprinciple could, as Lincoln contended, be reduced to this simple form"that, if one man chooses to enslave another, no third man shall havethe right to object. " It is impossible to estimate how far Lincoln foresaw the strain towhich a firm stand against slavery would subject the Union. It islikely enough that those worst forebodings for the Union, which eventsproved to be very true, were confined to timid men who made a practiceof yielding to threats. Lincoln appreciated better than many of hisfellows the sentiment of the South, but it is often hard for men, notin immediate contact with a school of thought which seems to themthoroughly perverse, to appreciate its pervasive power, and Lincoln wasinclined to stake much upon the hope that reason will prevail. Moreover, he had a confidence in the strength of the Union which mighthave been justified if his predecessor in office had been a man ofordinary firmness. But it is not to be supposed that any unduehopefulness, if he felt it, influenced his judgment. He was of atemper which does not seek to forecast what the future has to show, andhis melancholy prepared him well for any evil that might come. Twothings we can say with certainty of his aim and purpose. On the onehand, as has already been said, whatever view he had taken of the perilto the Union he would never have sought to avoid the peril by whatappeared to him a surrender of the principle which gave the Union itsworth. On the other hand, he must always have been prepared to upholdthe Union at whatever the cost might prove to be. To a man of deep andgentle nature war will always be hateful, but it can never, any morethan an individual death, appear the worst of evils. And the claim ofthe Southern States to separate from a community which to him wasvenerable and to form a new nation, based on slavery and bound to livein discord with its neighbors, did not appeal to him at all, though ina certain literal sense it was a claim to liberty. His attitude to anypossible movement for secession was defined four years at least beforesecession came, in words such as it was not his habit to use withoutfull sense of their possible effect or without much previous thought. They were quite simple: "We won't break up the Union, and you shan't. " Such were the main thoughts which would be found to animate the wholeof Lincoln's notable campaign, beginning with his first encounter withDouglas in 1855 and culminating in his prolonged duel with him in theautumn of 1858. It is unnecessary here to follow the complexities, especially in regard to the Dred Scott judgments, through which thediscussion wandered. It is now worth few men's while to do more thanglance at two or three of his speeches at that period; his speeches inthe formal Lincoln-Douglas debates, except the first, are not the bestof them. A scientific student of rhetoric, as the art by which man doactually persuade crowds, might indeed do well to watch closely the useby Douglas and Lincoln of their respective weapons, but for most of usit is an unprofitable business to read reiterated argument, even thoughin beautiful language, upon points of doubt that no longer trouble us. Lincoln does not always show to advantage; later readers have found himinferior in urbanity to Douglas, of whom he disapproved, while Douglasprobably disapproved of no man; his speeches are, of course, not freeeither from unsound arguments or from the rough and tumble of populardebate; occasionally he uses hackneyed phrases; but it is remarkablethat a hackneyed or a falsely sentimental phrase in Lincoln comesalways as a lapse and a surprise. Passages abound in these speecheswhich to almost any literate taste are arresting for the simple beautyof their English, a beauty characteristic of one who had learned toreason with Euclid and learned to feel and to speak with the authors ofthe Bible. And in their own kind they were a classic and probablyunsurpassed achievement. Though Lincoln had to deal with a singleissue demanding no great width of knowledge, it must be evident thatthe passions aroused by it and the confused and shifting state ofpublic sentiment made his problem very subtle, and it was a rareprofundity and sincerity of thought which solved it in his own mind. In expressing the result of thought so far deeper than that of mostmen, he achieved a clearness of expression which very few writers, andthose among the greatest, have excelled. He once during thePresidential election of 1856 wrote to a supporter of Fillmore topersuade him of a proposition which must seem paradoxical to anyone notdeeply versed in American institutions, namely, that it was actuallyagainst Fillmore's interest to gain votes from Frémont in Illinois. Hedemonstrated his point, but he was not always judicious in his way ofaddressing solemn strangers, and in his rural manner he concludes hisletter, "the whole thing is as simple as figuring out the weight ofthree small hogs, " and this inelegant sentence conveys with littleexaggeration one especial merit of his often austerely gracefullanguage. Grave difficulties are handled in a style which could arouseall the interest of a boy and penetrate the understanding of acase-hardened party man. But if in comparison with the acknowledged masterpieces of our prose werank many passages in these speeches very high--and in fact the men whohave appreciated them most highly have been fastidious scholars--weshall not yet have measured Lincoln's effort and performance. Forthese are not the compositions of a cloistered man of letters, they arethe outpourings of an agitator upon the stump. The men who think hardare few; few of them can clothe their thought in apt and simple words;very, very few are those who in doing this could hold the attention ofa miscellaneous and large crowd. Popular government owes thatcomparative failure, of which in recent times we have taken perhapsexaggerated notice, partly to the blindness of the polite world to thetrue difficulty and true value of work of this kind; and the importancewhich Roman education under the Empire gave to rhetoric was the marknot of deadness, but of the survival of a manly public spirit. Lincoln's wisdom had to utter itself in a voice which would reach theoutskirts of a large and sometimes excited crowd in the open air. Itwas uttered in strenuous conflict with a man whose reputation quiteovershadowed his; a person whose extraordinary and good-humouredvitality armed him with an external charm even for people who, likeMrs. Beecher Stowe, detested his principles; an orator whose mastery ofpopular appeal and of resourceful and evasive debate was quiteunhampered by any weakness for the truth. The utterance had to be keptup day after day and night after night for a quarter of a year, by aman too poor to afford little comforts, travelling from one crowded innto another, by slow trains on a railway whose officials paid littleattention to him, while his more prosperous and distinguished rivalcould travel in comfort and comparative magnificence. The physicalstrain of electioneering, which is always considerable, its alternationof feverish excitement with a lassitude that, after a while, becomesprevailing and intense, were in this case far greater and moreprolonged than in any other instance recorded of English or probably ofAmerican statesmen. If, upon his sudden elevation shortly afterwards, Lincoln was in a sense an obscure man raised up by chance, he wasnevertheless a man who had accomplished a heroic labour. On the whole the earthen vessel in which he carried his treasure ofclear thought and clean feelings appears to have enhanced its flavour. There was at any rate nothing outward about him that aroused thepassion of envy. A few peculiarly observant men were immediatelyimpressed with his distinction, but there is no doubt that to theordinary stranger he appeared as a very odd fish. "No portraits that Ihave ever seen, " writes one, "do justice to the awkwardness andungainliness of his figure. " Its movements when he began to speakrather added to its ungainliness, and, though to a trained actor hiselocution seemed perfect, his voice when he first opened his mouthsurprised and jarred upon the hearers with a harsh note of curiouslyhigh pitch. But it was the sort of oddity that arrests attention, andpeople's attention once caught was apt to be held by the man'stransparent earnestness. Soon, as he lost thought of himself in hissubject, his voice and manner changed; deeper notes, of which friendsrecord the beauty, rang out, the sad eyes kindled, and the tall, gauntfigure, with the strange gesture of the long, uplifted arms, acquiredeven a certain majesty. Hearers recalled afterwards with evidentsincerity the deep and instantaneous impression of some appeal tosimple conscience, as when, "reaching his hands towards the stars ofthat still night, " he proclaimed, "in some things she is certainly notmy equal, but in her natural right to eat the bread that she has earnedwith the sweat of her brow, she is my equal, and the equal of JudgeDouglas, and the equal of any man. " Indeed, upon a sympatheticaudience, already excited by the occasion, he could produce an effectwhich the reader of his recorded speeches would hardly believe. Of hisspeech at an early state convention of the Republican party there is noreport except that after a few sentences every reporter laid down hispen for the opposite of the usual reason, and, as he proceeded, "theaudience arose from their chairs and with pale faces and quivering lipspressed unconsciously towards him. " And of his speech on anothersimilar occasion several witnesses seem to have left descriptionshardly less incongruous with English experience of public meetings. Ifwe credit him with these occasional manifestations of electricoratory--as to which it is certain that his quiet temperament did attimes blaze out in a surprising fashion--it is not to be thought thathe was ordinarily what could be called eloquent; some of his speechesare commonplace enough, and much of his debating with Douglas is of adrily argumentative kind that does honour to the mass meetings whichheard it gladly. But the greatest gift of the orator he did possess;the personality behind the words was felt. "Beyond and above allskill, " says the editor of a great paper who heard him at Peoria, "wasthe overwhelming conviction imposed upon the audience that the speakerhimself was charged with an irresistible and inspiring duty to hisfellow men. " One fact about the method of his speaking is easily detected. Indebate, at least, he had no use for perorations, and the reader wholooks for them will often find that Lincoln just used up the last fewminutes in clearing up some unimportant point which he wanted toexplain only if there was time for it. We associate our olderParliamentary oratory with an art which keeps the hearer pleasedlyexpectant rather than dangerously attentive, through an argument whichif dwelt upon might prove unsubstantial, secure that it all leads inthe end to some great cadence of noble sound. But in Lincoln'sargumentative speeches the employment of beautiful words is leastsparing at the beginning or when he passes to a new subject. It seemsas if he deliberately used up his rhetorical effects at the outset toput his audience in the temper in which they would earnestly follow himand to challenge their full attention to reasoning which was to satisfytheir calmer judgment. He put himself in a position in which if hisargument were not sound nothing could save his speech from failure as aspeech. Perhaps no standing epithet of praise hangs with such a weighton a man's reputation as the epithet "honest. " When the man is provednot to be a fraud, it suggests a very mediocre virtue. But the methodby which Lincoln actually confirmed his early won and dangerousreputation of honesty was a positive and potent performance of raredistinction. It is no mean intellectual and spiritual achievement tobe as honest in speech with a crowd as in the dearest intercourse oflife. It is not, of course, pretended that he never used a fallaciousargument or made an unfair score--he was entirely human. But this isthe testimony of an Illinois political wire-puller to Lincoln: "He wasone of the shrewdest politicians in the State. Nobody had moreexperience in that way. Nobody knew better what was passing in theminds of the people. Nobody knew better how to turn things toadvantage politically. " And then he goes on--and this is really thesum of what is to be said of his oratory: "He could not cheat peopleout of their votes any more than he could out of their money. " 3. _Lincoln against Douglas_. It has now to be told how the contest with Douglas which concludedLincoln's labours in Illinois affected the broad stream of politicalevents in America as a whole. Lincoln, as we know, was still only alocal personage; Illinois is a State bigger than Ireland, but it isonly a little part and was still a rather raw and provincial part ofthe United States; but Douglas had for years been a national personage, for a time the greatest man among the Democrats, and now, for a reasonwhich did him honour, he was in disgrace with many of his party and onthe point of becoming the hero of all moderate Republicans. We need not follow in much detail the events of the great politicalworld. The repeal of the Missouri Compromise threw it into a ferment, which the continuing disorders in Kansas were in themselves sufficientto keep up. New great names were being made in debate in the Senate;Seward, the most powerful opponent of the repeal of the MissouriCompromise, kept his place as the foremost man in the Republican partynot by consistency in the stand that he made, but by his mastery of NewYork political machinery; Sumner of Massachusetts, the friend of JohnBright, kept up a continual protest for freedom in turgid, scholarlyharangues, which caught the spirit of Cicero's Philippics mostsuccessfully in their personal offensiveness. Powerful voices inliterature and the Press were heard upon the same side--the _New YorkTribune_, edited by Horace Greeley, acquired, as far as a paper in solarge a country can, a national importance. Broadly it may be saidthat the stirring intellect of America old and young was with theRepublicans--it is a pleasant trifle to note that Longfellow gave up avisit to Europe to vote for Frémont as President, and we know the viewsof Motley and of Lowell and of Darwin's fellow labourer Asa Gray. Butfashion and that better and quite different influence, the tone ofopinion prevailing in the pleasantest society, inclined always to theSouthern view of every question, and these influences were nowhere morefelt than among Washington politicians. A strong and respectable groupof Southern Senators, of whom Jefferson Davis was the strongest, werethe real driving power of the administration. Convivial PresidentPierce and doting President Buchanan after him were complaisant totheir least scrupulous suggestions in a degree hardly credible ofhonourable men who were not themselves Southerners. One famous incident of life in Congress must be told to explain thetemper of the times. In 1856, during one of the many debates thatarose out of Kansas, Sumner recited in the Senate a speechconscientiously calculated to sting the slave-owning Senators tomadness. Sumner was a man with brains and with courage and rectitudebeyond praise, set off by a powerful and noble frame, but he lackedevery minor quality of greatness. He would not call his opponent indebate a skunk, but he would expend great verbal ingenuity in couplinghis name with repeated references to that animal's attributes. On thisoccasion he used to the full both the finer and the most exquisitelytasteless qualities of his eloquence. This sort of thing passed thecensorship of many excellent Northern men who would lament Lincoln'slack of refinement; and though from first to last the seriousprovocation in their disputes lay in the set policy of the Southernleaders, it ought to be realised that they, men who for the most partwere quite kind to their slaves and had long ago argued themselves outof any compunction about slavery, were often exposed to intense verbalprovocation. Nevertheless, what followed on Sumner's speech isterribly significant of the depravation of Southern honour. Congressman Preston Brooks, of South Carolina, had an uncle in theSenate; South Carolina, and this Senator in particular, had beenspecially favoured with self-righteous insolence in Sumner's speech. Aday or so later the Senate had just risen and Sumner sat writing at hisdesk in the Senate chamber in a position in which he could not quicklyrise. Brooks walked in, burning with piety towards his State and hisuncle, and in the presence, it seems, of Southern Senators who couldhave stopped him, beat Sumner on the head with a stick with all hismight. Sumner was incapacitated by injuries to his spine for nearlyfive years. Brooks, with a virtuous air, explained in Congress that hehad caught Sumner in a helpless attitude because if Sumner had beenfree to use his superior strength he, Brooks, would have had to shoothim with his revolver. It seems to be hardly an exaggeration to saythat the whole South applauded Brooks and exulted. ExuberantSoutherners took to challenging Northern men, knowing well that theirprinciples compelled them to refuse duels, but that the refusal wouldstill be humiliating to the North. Brooks himself challengedBurlingame, a distinguished Congressman afterwards sent by Lincoln asMinister to China, who had denounced him. Burlingame accepted, and hissecond arranged for a rifle duel at a wild spot across the frontier atNiagara. Brooks then drew back; he alleged, perhaps sincerely, that hewould have been murdered on his way through the Northern States, butNorthern people were a little solaced. The whole disgusting storycontains only one pleasant incident. Preston Brooks, who, afternumbers of congratulations, testimonials, and presentations, diedwithin a year of his famous exploit, had first confessed himself tiredof being a hero to every vulgar bully in the South! Now, though this dangerous temper burned steadily in the South, andthere were always sturdy Republicans ready to provoke it, and questionsarising out of slavery would constantly recur to disturb high politicalcircles, it is not to be imagined that opinion in the North, thegrowing and bustling portion of the States, would remain for yearsexcited about the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. In 1857 men'sminds were agitated by a great commercial depression and collapse ofcredit, and in 1858 there took place one of the most curious (for itwould seem to have deserved this cold description) of evanescentreligious revivals. Meanwhile, by 1857 the actual bloodshed in Kansashad come to an end under the administration of an able Governor; theenormous majority of settlers in Kansas were now known to be againstslavery and it was probably assumed that the legalisation of slaverycould not be forced upon them. Prohibition of slavery there byCongress thus began to seem needless, and the Dred Scott judgmentsraised at least a grave doubt as to whether it was possible. Thusenthusiasm for the original platform of the Republicans was coolingdown, and to the further embarrassment of that party, when towards theend of 1857 the Southern leaders attempted a legislative outrage, thegreat champion of the Northern protest was not a Republican, butDouglas himself. A Convention had been elected in Kansas to frame a State Constitution. It represented only a fraction of the people, since, for some reasongood or bad, the opponents of slavery did not vote in the election. But it was understood that whatever Constitution was framed would besubmitted to the popular vote. The Convention framed a Constitutionlegalising slavery, and its proposals came before Congress backed bythe influence of Buchanan. Under them the people of Kansas were tovote whether they would have this Constitution as it stood, or have itwith the legalisation of slavery restricted to the slaves who had thenbeen brought into the territory. No opportunity was to be given themof rejecting the Constitution altogether, though Governor Walker, himself in favor of slavery, assured the President that they wished todo so. Ultimately, by way of concession to vehement resistance, themajority in Congress passed an Act under which the people in Kansaswere to vote simply for or against the slavery Constitution as itstood, only--if they voted for it, they as a State were to be rewardedwith a large grant of public lands belonging to the Union in theirterritory. Eventually the Kansas people, unmoved by this bribe, rejected the Constitution by a majority of more than 11, 000 to 1, 800. Now, the Southern leaders, three years before, had eagerly joined withDouglas to claim a right of free choice for the Kansas people. Theshamelessness of this attempt to trick them out of it is moresignificant even than the tale of Preston Brooks. There was no hotblood there; the affair was quietly plotted by respected leaders of theSouth. They were men in many ways of character and honour, understoodby weak men like Buchanan to represent the best traditions of Americanpublic life. But, as they showed also in other instances that cannotbe related here, slavery had become for them a sacred cause whichhallowed almost any means. It is essential to remember this in tryingto understand the then political situation. Douglas here behaved very honourably. He, with his cause of popularsovereignty, could not have afforded to identify himself with the fraudon Kansas, but he was a good enough trickster to have made his protestsafely if he had cared to do so. As it was he braved the hatred ofBuchanan and the fury of his Southern friends by instant, manly, courageous, and continued opposition. It may therefore seem anungracious thing that, immediately after this, Lincoln should haveaccepted the invitation of his friends to oppose Douglas' re-election. To most of the leading Republicans out of Illinois it seemed altogetherunwise and undesirable that their party, which had seemed to be losingground, should do anything but welcome Douglas as an ally. Of theseSeward indeed went too far for his friends, and in his sanguine hopethat it would work for freedom was ready to submit to the doctrine of"popular sovereignty"; but, except the austere Chase, now Governor ofOhio, who this once, but unfortunately not again, was whole-heartedlywith Lincoln, the Republican leaders in the East, and great Republicanjournals, like the Tribune, declared their wish that Douglas should bere-elected. Why, then, did Lincoln stand against him? It has often been suggested that his personal feelings towards Douglasplayed some part in the matter, though no one thinks they played thechief part. Probably they did play a part, and it is a relief to thinkthat Lincoln thoroughly gratified some minor feelings in this contest. Lincoln no doubt enjoyed measuring himself against other men; and itwas galling to his ambition to have been so completely outstripped by aman inferior to him in every power except that of rapid success. Hehad also the deepest distrust for Douglas as a politician, thinkingthat he had neither principle nor scruple, though Herndon, who knew, declares he neither distrusted nor had cause to distrust Douglas in hisprofessional dealings as a lawyer. He had, by the way, one definite, if trifling, score to wipe off. After their joint debate at Peoria in1855 Douglas, finding him hard to tackle, suggested to Lincoln thatthey should both undertake to make no more speeches for the present. Lincoln oddly assented at once, perhaps for no better reason than aridiculous difficulty, to which he once confessed, in refusing anyrequest whatever. Lincoln of course had kept this agreement strictly, while Douglas had availed himself of the first temptation to break it. Thus on all grounds we may be sure that Lincoln took pleasure in nowopposing Douglas. But to go further and say that the two men cordiallyhated each other is probably to misread both. There is no necessaryconnection between a keen desire to beat a man and any sort ofmalignity towards him. That much at least may be learned in Englishschools, and the whole history of his dealing with men shows that insome school or other Lincoln had learned it very thoroughly. Douglas, too, though an unscrupulous, was not, we may guess, an ungenerous man. But the main fact of the matter is that Lincoln would have turnedtraitor to his rooted convictions if he had not stood up and foughtDouglas even at this moment when Douglas was deserving of somesympathy. Douglas, it must be observed, had simply acted on hisprinciple that the question between slavery and freedom was to besettled by local, popular choice; he claimed for the white men ofKansas the fair opportunity of voting; given that, he persistentlydeclared, "I do not care whether slavery be voted up or voted down. "In Lincoln's settled opinion this moral attitude of indifference to thewrongfulness of slavery, so long as respect was had to the liberties ofthe privileged race, was, so to say, treason to the basic principle ofthe American Commonwealth, a treason which had steadily been becomingrife and upon which it was time to stamp. There can be no doubt of his earnestness about this. But theRepublican leaders, honourably enough, regarded this as an unpracticalline to take, and indeed to the political historian this is the mostcrucial question in American history. Nobody can say that civil warwould or would not have occurred if this or that had been done a littledifferently, but Abraham Lincoln, at this crisis of his life, did, inpursuance of his peculiarly cherished principle, forge at least a linkin the chain of events which actually precipitated the war. And he didit knowing better than any other man that he was doing something ofgreat national importance, involving at least great national risk. Washe pursuing his principles, moderate as they were in the originalconception, with fanaticism, or at the best preferring a solemnconsistency of theory to the conscientious handling of facts notreducible to theory? As a question of practical statesmanship in thelargest sense, how did matters really stand in regard to slavery and tothe relations between South and North, and what was Lincoln's idea of"putting slavery back where the fathers placed it" really worth? Herndon in these days went East to try to enlist the support of thegreat men for Lincoln. He found them friendly but immovable. EditorHorace Greeley said to him: "The Republican standard is too high; wewant something practical. " This, we may be pretty sure, stiffenedLincoln's back, as a man with a cause that he cared for, and, for thatmatter, as a really shrewd manager in a party which he thought stoodfor something. It reveals the flabbiness which the Northerners were indanger of making a governing tradition of policy. The wrongfulness ofany extension of slavery might be loudly asserted in 1854, but in 1858, when it no longer looked as if so great an extension of it was reallyimminent, there was no harm in shifting towards some less provocativeprinciple on which more people at the moment might agree. Confrontedwith Northern politicians who would reason in this fashion stood aunited South whose leaders were by now accustomed to make the UnionGovernment go which way they chose and had no sort of disposition tocompromise their principle in the least. "What, " as Lincoln put it inan address given, not long after his contest with Douglas, at theCooper Institute in New York, "what do you think will content theSouth?" "Nothing, " he answered, "but an acknowledgment that slavery isright. " "Holding as they do that slavery is morally right and sociallyelevating, they cannot cease to demand a full national recognition ofit, as a legal right and a social blessing. Nor can we justifiablywithhold this on any ground save our conviction that slavery is wrong. "That being so, there was no use, he said, in "groping about for somemiddle ground between right and wrong, " or in "a policy of 'don't care'on a question about which all true men do care. " And there is ampleevidence that he understood rightly the policy of the South. It isvery doubtful whether any large extension of cultivation by slavelabour was economically possible in Kansas or in regions yet furtherNorth, but we have seen to what lengths the Southern leaders would goin the attempt to secure even a limited recognition of slavery aslawful in a new State. They were not succeeding in the business of theKansas Constitution. But they had a very good prospect of a far moreimportant success. The celebrated dicta of Chief Justice Taney andother judges in the Dred Scott case had not amounted to an actualdecision, nor if they had would a single decision have beenirreversible. Whether the principle of them should become fixed inAmerican Constitutional law depended (though this could not be openlysaid) on whether future appointments to the Supreme Court were to bemade by a President who shared Taney's views; whether the executiveaction of the President was governed by the same views; and on thesubtle pressure which outside opinion does exercise, and in this casehad surely exercised, upon judicial minds. If the simple principlethat the right to a slave is just one form of the ordinary right toproperty once became firmly fixed in American jurisprudence it is hardto see how any laws prohibiting slavery could have continued to be heldconstitutional except in States which were free States when theConstitution was adopted. Of course, a State like New York whereslaves were industrially useless would not therefore have been filledwith slave plantations, but, among a loyally minded people, thetradition which reprobated slavery would have been greatly weakened. The South would have been freed from the sense that slavery was adoomed institution. If attempts to plant slavery further in the Westwith profit failed, there was Cuba and there was Central America, onwhich filibustering raids already found favour in the South, and inwhich the national Government might be led to adopt schemes of conquestor annexation. Moreover, it was avowed by leaders like Jefferson Davisthat though it might be impracticable to hope for the repeal of theprohibition of the slave trade, at least some relaxation of itsseverity ought to be striven for, in the interest of Texas and NewMexico and of possible future Territories where there might be room formore slaves. Such were the views of the leaders whose influencepreponderated with the present President and in the main with thepresent Congress. When Lincoln judged that a determined stand againsttheir policy was required, and further that no such stand could bepossible to a party which had embraced Douglas with his principle, "Icare not whether slavery be voted up or voted down, " there is no doubtnow that he was right and the great body of Republican authorityopposed to him wrong. When Lincoln and his friends in Illinois determined to fight Douglas, it became impossible for the Republican party as a whole to fall farbehind them. This was in itself at that crisis an important thing. Lincoln added greatly to its importance by the opening words in thefirst speech of his campaign. They were the most carefully preparedwords that he had yet spoken, and the most momentous that he had spokentill now or perhaps ever spoke. There is nothing in them for whichwhat has been said of the situation and of his views will not haveprepared us, and nothing which thousands of men might not have said toone another in private for a year or two before. But the first publicavowal by a responsible man in trenchant phrase, that a grave issue hasbeen joined upon which one party or the other must accept entiredefeat, may be an event of great and perilous consequence. He said: "If we could first know where we are and whither we aretending, we could better judge what to do and how to do it. We are nowfar into the fifth year since a policy was initiated with the avowedobject, and confident promise, of putting an end to slavery agitation. Under the operation of that policy, that agitation has not only notceased, but has constantly augmented. In my opinion it will not ceaseuntil a crisis shall have been reached and passed. 'A house dividedagainst itself cannot stand. ' I believe this Government cannot endurepermanently half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to bedissolved--I do not expect the house to fall--but I do expect that itwill cease to be divided. It will become all one thing or all theother. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spreadof it and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief thatit is in course of ultimate extinction, or its advocates will push itforward till it shall become lawful alike in all the States, old aswell as new--North as well as South. " It may perhaps be said that American public opinion has in the pastbeen very timid in facing clear-cut issues. But, as has already beenobserved, an apt phrase crystallising the unspoken thought of many iseven more readily caught up in America than anywhere else; so, thoughbut few people in States at a distance paid much attention to the restof the debates, or for a while again to Lincoln, the comparison of thehouse divided against itself produced an effect in the country whichdid not wear out. In this whole passage, moreover, Lincoln hadcertainly formulated the question before the nation more boldly, moreclearly, more truly than any one before. It is impossible to estimatesuch influences precisely, but this was among the speeches that rank asimportant actions, and the story, most characteristic of the speaker, which lay behind it, is worth relating in detail. Lincoln had actuallyin a speech in 1856 declared that the United States could not longendure half slave and half free. "What in God's name, " said somefriend after the meeting, "could induce you to promulgate such anopinion?" "Upon my soul, " he said, "I think it is true, " and he couldnot be argued out of this opinion. Finally the friend protested that, true or not, no good could come of spreading this opinion abroad, andafter grave reflection Lincoln promised not to utter it again for thepresent. Now, in 1858, having prepared his speech he read it toHerndon. Herndon questioned whether the passage on the divided housewas politic. Lincoln said: "I would rather be defeated with thisexpression in my speech, and uphold and discuss it before the people, than be victorious without it. " Once more, just before he deliveredit, he read it over to a dozen or so of his closest supporters, for itwas his way to discuss his intentions fully with friends, sometimesaccepting their advice most submissively and sometimes disregarding itwholly. One said it was "ahead of its time, " another that it was a"damned fool utterance. " All more or less strongly condemned it, except this time Herndon, who, according to his recollection, said, "Itwill make you President. " He listened to all and then addressed them, we are told, substantially as follows: "Friends, this thing has beenretarded long enough. The time has come when these sentiments shouldbe uttered; and if it is decreed that I should go down because of thisspeech, then let me go down linked to the truth--let me die in theadvocacy of what is just and right. " Rather a memorable pronouncementof a candidate to his committee; and the man who records it isinsistent upon every little illustration he can find both of Lincoln'scunning and of his ambition. Lincoln did go down in this particular contest. Many friends wrote andreproved him after this "damned fool utterance, " but his defeat wasnot, after all, attributed to that. All the same he did himself assurehis defeat, and he did it with extraordinary skill, for the purpose ofensuring that the next President should be a Republican President, though it is impossible he should at that time have counted upon beinghimself that Republican. Each candidate had undertaken to answer setquestions which his opponent might propound to him. And great publicattention was paid to the answers to these interrogatories. The DredScott judgments created a great difficulty for Douglas; he was bound totreat them as right; but if they were right and Congress had no powerto prohibit slavery in a Territory, neither could a TerritorialLegislature with authority delegated by Congress have that power; and, if this were made clear, it would seem there was an end of that freechoice of the people in the Territories of which Douglas had been thegreat advocate. Douglas would use all his evasive skill in keepingaway from this difficult point. If, however, he could be forced toface it Lincoln knew what he would say. He would say that slaverywould not be actually unlawful in a Territory, but would never actuallyexist in it if the Territorial Legislature chose to abstain, as itcould, from passing any of the laws which would in practice benecessary to protect slave property. By advocating this view Douglaswould fully reassure those of his former supporters in Illinois whopuzzled themselves on the Dred Scott case, but he would infuriate theSouth. Lincoln determined to force Douglas into this position by thequestions which he challenged him to answer. When he told his friendsof his ambition, they all told him he would lose his election. "Gentlemen, " said Lincoln, "I am killing larger game; if Douglasanswers, he can never be President, and the battle of 1860 is worth ahundred of this. " The South was already angry with Douglas for hisaction over the Kansas Constitution, but he would have been aninvincible candidate for the South to support in 1860, and it must havetold in his favour that his offence then had been one of plain honesty. But in this fresh offence the Southern leaders had some cause to accusehim of double dealing, and they swore he should not be President. A majority of the new Illinois Legislature returned Douglas to theSenate. Lincoln, however, had an actual majority of the votes of thewhole State. Probably also he had gained a hold on Illinois for thefuture out of all proportion to the actual number of votes then givenagainst the popular Douglas, and above all he had gathered to him aband of supporters who had unbounded belief in him. But his fall forthe moment was little noticed or regretted outside Illinois, or at anyrate in the great Eastern States, to which Illinois was, so to speak, the provinces and he a provincial attorney. His first words in thecampaign had made a stir, but the rest of his speeches in these longdebates could not be much noticed at a distance. Douglas had won, andthe presumption was that he had proved himself the better man. Lincolnhad performed what, apart from results, was a work of intellectualmerit beyond the compass of any American statesman since Hamilton;moreover, as can now be seen, there had been great results; for, first, the young Republican party had not capitulated and collapsed, and, then, the great Democratic party, established in power, inindifference, and in complicity with wrong, was split clean in two. But these were not results that could be read yet awhile in electionfigures. Meanwhile the exhausted Lincoln reconciled himself for themoment to failure. As a private man he was thoroughly content that hecould soon work off his debt for his election expenses, could earnabout 500 pounds a year, and be secure in the possession of the littlehouse and the 2, 000 pounds capital which was "as much as any man oughtto have. " As a public man he was sadly proud that he had at least"said some words which may bear fruit after I am forgotten. "Persistent melancholy and incurable elasticity can go together, andthey make a very strong combination. The tone of resignation had notpassed away from his comparatively intimate letters when he was writinglittle notes to one political acquaintance and another inciting them tolook forward to the fun of the next fight. 4. _John Brown_. For the next few months the excitements of the great political worldconcern this biography little. There was strife between Davis andDouglas in the Senate. At a meeting strong against slavery, Sewardregained courage from the occasion and roused the North with grave andearnest words about the "irrepressible conflict. " The "undergroundrailway, " or chain of friendly houses by which fugitive slaves werestealthily passed on to Canada, became famous. Methodist professorsriotously attempted to rescue an arrested fugitive at Oberlin. ASouthern grand jury threw out the bill of indictment against aslave-trading crew caught red-handed. In California Democratsbelonging to what was nicknamed "the chivalry" forced upon SenatorBroderick, a literally democratic Irishman and the bravest of theDemocrats who stood out for fair treatment to Kansas, a duel in whichhe might fairly be said to have been murdered. The one event whichdemands more than allusion was the raid and the death of John Brown. John Brown, in whom Puritan religion, as strict as that of hisancestors on the _Mayflower_, put forth gentler beauties of characterthan his sanguinary mission may suggest, had been somewhat of a failureas a scientific farmer, but as a leader of fighting men in desperateadventure only such men as Drake or Garibaldi seem to have excelledhim. More particularly in the commotions in Kansas he had led forays, slain ruthlessly, witnesses dry-eyed the deaths of several of his tall, strong sons, and as a rule earned success by cool judgment--all, as hewas absolutely sure, at the clear call of God. In October, 1859--howand with whose help the stroke was prepared seems to be a question ofsome mystery--John Brown, gathering a little band of Abolitionists andnegroes, invaded the slave States and seized the United States arsenalat Harper's Ferry in Virginia. In the details, which do not matter, ofthis tiny campaign, John Brown seems, for the first time in his life, to have blundered badly. This was the only thing that lay upon hisconscience towards the last. What manner of success he can haveexpected does not appear; most likely he had neither care nor definiteexpectation as to the result. The United States troops under RobertLee, soon to be famous, of course overcame him quickly. One of hisprisoners describes how he held out to the last; a dead son beside him;one hand on the pulse of a dying son, his rifle in the other. He wascaptured, desperately wounded. Southerners could not believe the factthat Brown had not contemplated some hideous uprising of slaves againsttheir wives and children, but he only wished to conquer them with thesword of the Lord and of Gideon, quietly freeing slaves as he went. Sonaturally there was talk of lynching, but the Virginian gentlemenconcerned would not have that. Governor Wise, of Virginia, had sometalk with him and justified his own high character rather than Brown'sby the estimate he gave of him in a speech at Richmond. Brown washanged. "Stonewall" Jackson, a brother fanatic, if that is the word, felt the spectacle "awful, " as he never felt slaughter in battle, and"put up a prayer that if possible Brown might be saved. " "So perishall foes of the human race, " said the officer commanding on theoccasion, and the South generally felt the like. A little before his death Brown was asked: "How do you justify youracts?" He said: "I think, my friend, you are guilty of a great wrongagainst God and humanity--I say it without wishing to be offensive--andit would be perfectly right for any one to interfere with you so far asto free those you wilfully and wickedly hold in bondage. I think I didright, and that others will do right who interfere with you at any timeand at all times. " In a conversation still later, he is reported tohave concluded: "I wish to say furthermore that you had better--all youpeople at the South--prepare yourselves for a settlement of thisquestion, that must come up for settlement sooner than you are preparedfor it. You may dispose of me very easily. I am nearly disposed ofnow. But this question is still to be settled--this negro question Imean. The end of that is not yet. " To a friend he wrote that herejoiced like Paul because he knew like Paul that "if they killed him, it would greatly advance the cause of Christ. " Lincoln, who regarded lawlessness and slavery as twin evils, could onlysay of John Brown's raid: "That affair, in its philosophy, correspondswith the many attempts related in history at the assassination of kingsand emperors. An enthusiast broods over the oppression of a peopletill he fancies himself commissioned by Heaven to liberate them. Heventures the attempt, which ends in little else than his own execution. Orsini's attempt on Louis Napoleon and John Brown's attempt at Harper'sFerry were, in their philosophy, precisely the same. " Seward, it mustbe recorded, spoke far more sympathetically of him than Lincoln; andfar more justly, for there is a flaw somewhere in this example, as hischief biographer regards it, of "Mr. Lincoln's common-sense judgment. "John Brown had at least left to every healthy-minded Northern boy amemory worth much in the coming years of war and, one hopes, everafter. He had well deserved to be the subject of a song which, whatever may be its technical merits as literature, does stir. Emersontook the same view of him as the song writer, and Victor Hugo suggestedas an epitaph for him: "Pro Christo sicut Christus. " A calmer poet, Longfellow, wrote in his diary on Friday, December 2, 1859, the daywhen Brown was hanged: "This will be a great day in our history, thedate of a new revolution, quite as much needed as the old one. Evennow, as I write, they are leading old John Brown to execution inVirginia for attempting to rescue slaves. This is sowing the wind toreap the whirlwind, which will soon come. " Any one who is interested in Lincoln is almost forced to linger overthe contrasting though slighter character who crossed the stage justbefore he suddenly took the principal part upon it. Men like JohnBrown may be fitly ranked with the equally rare men who, steering avery different course, have consistently acted out the principles ofthe Quakers, constraining no man whether by violence or by law, yetgoing into the thick of life prepared at all times to risk all. Allsuch men are abnormal in the sense that most men literally could notput life through on any similar plan and would be wrong and foolish totry. The reason is that most men have a wider range of sympathy and ofintellect than they. But the common sense of most of us revolts fromany attitude of condemnation or condescension towards them; for theyare more disinterested than most of us, more single-minded, and intheir own field often more successful. With a very clear conscience werefuse to take example from these men whose very defects have operatedin them as a special call; but undoubtedly most of us regard them witha warmth of sympathy which we are slow to accord to safer guides. Weturn now from John Brown, who saw in slavery a great oppression, andwas very angry, and went ahead slaying the nearest oppressor andliberating--for some days at least--the nearest slave, to a patientbeing, who, long ago in his youth, had boiled with anger againstslavery, but whose whole soul now expressed itself in a policy ofdeadly moderation towards it: "Let us put back slavery where thefathers placed it, and there let it rest in peace. " We are to studyhow he acted when in power. In almost every department of policy weshall see him watching and waiting while blood flows, suspendingjudgment, temporising, making trial of this expedient and of that, adopting in the end, quite unthanked, the measure of which most menwill say, when it succeeds, "That is what we always said should bedone. " Above all, in that point of policy which most interests us, weshall witness the long postponement of the blow that killed negroslavery, the steady subordination of this particular issue to what willnot at once appeal to us as a larger and a higher issue. All thisprovoked at the time in many excellent and clever men dissatisfactionand deep suspicion; they longed for a leader whose heart visibly glowedwith a sacred passion; they attributed his patience, the one quality ofgreatness which after a while everybody might have discerned in him, not to a self-mastery which almost passed belief, but to a tepiddisposition and a mediocre if not a low level of desire. We who readof him to-day shall not escape our moments of lively sympathy withthese grumblers of the time; we shall wish that this man could everplunge, that he could ever see red, ever commit some passionateinjustice; we shall suspect him of being, in the phrase of a greatphilosopher, "a disgustingly well-regulated person, " lacking thatindefinable quality akin to the honest passions of us ordinary men, butdeeper and stronger, which alone could compel and could reward any truereverence for his memory. These moments will recur but they cannotlast. A thousand little things, apparent on the surface but deeplysignificant; almost every trivial anecdote of his boyhood, his prime, or his closing years; his few recorded confidences; his equally fewspeeches made under strong emotion; the lineaments of his facedescribed by observers whom photography corroborated; all theseabsolutely forbid any conception of Abraham Lincoln as a worthycommonplace person fortunately fitted to the requirements of his officeat the moment, or as merely a "good man" in the negative anddisparaging sense to which that term is often wrested. It is reallyevident that there were no frigid perfections about him at all; indeedthe weakness of some parts of his conduct is so unlike what seems to berequired of a successful ruler that it is certain some almostunexampled quality of heart and mind went to the doing of what he did. There is no need to define that quality. The general wisdom of hisstatesmanship will perhaps appear greater and its not infrequent errorsless the more fully the circumstances are appreciated. As to the man, perhaps the sense will grow upon us that this balanced and calculatingperson, with his finger on the pulse of the electorate while he crackedhis uncensored jests with all comers, did of set purpose drink andrefill and drink again as full and fiery a cup of sacrifice as ever waspressed to the lips of hero or of saint. 5. _The Election of Lincoln_. Unlooked-for events were now raising Lincoln to the highest place whichhis ambition could contemplate. His own action in the months thatfollowed his defeat by Douglas cannot have contributed much to hissurprising elevation, yet it illustrates well his strength and hisweakness, his real fitness, now and then startlingly revealed, for thehighest position, and the superficial unfitness which long hid hiscapacity from many acute contemporaries. In December, 1859, he made a number of speeches in Kansas and elsewherein the West, and in February, 1860, he gave a memorable address in theCooper Institute in New York before as consciously intellectual anaudience as could be collected in that city, proceeding afterwards tospeak in several cities of New England. His appearance at the CooperInstitute, in particular, was a critical venture, and he knew it. There was natural curiosity about this untutored man from the West. Anexaggerated report of his wit prepared the way for probabledisappointment. The surprise which awaited his hearers was of adifferent kind; they were prepared for a florid Western eloquenceoffensive to ears which were used to a less spontaneous turgidity; theyheard instead a speech with no ornament at all, whose only beauty wasthat it was true and that the speaker felt it. The single flaw in theCooper Institute speech has already been cited, the narrow view ofWestern respectability as to John Brown. For the rest, this speech, dry enough in a sense, is an incomparably masterly statement of thethen political situation, reaching from its far back origin to theprecise and definite question requiring decision at that moment. Mr. Choate, who as a young man was present, set down of late years hisvivid recollection of that evening. "He appeared in every sense of theword like one of the plain people among whom he loved to be counted. At first sight there was nothing impressive or imposing about him; hisclothes hung awkwardly on his giant frame; his face was of a darkpallor without the slightest tinge of colour; his seamed and ruggedfeatures bore the furrows of hardship and struggle; his deep-set eyeslooked sad and anxious; his countenance in repose gave little evidenceof the brilliant power which raised him from the lowest to the higheststation among his countrymen; as he talked to me before the meeting heseemed ill at ease. " We know, as a fact, that among his causes ofapprehension, he was for the first time painfully conscious of thoseclothes. "When he spoke, " proceeds Mr. Choate, "he was transformed;his eye kindled, his voice rang, his face shone and seemed to light upthe whole assembly. For an hour and a half he held his audience in thehollow of his hand. His style of speech and manner of delivery wereseverely simple. What Lowell called 'the grand simplicities of theBible, ' with which he was so familiar, were reflected in his discourse. . . . It was marvellous to see how this untutored man, by mereself-discipline and the chastening of his own spirit, had outgrown allmeretricious arts, and found his way to the grandeur and strength ofabsolute simplicity. " The newspapers of the day after this speech confirm these reverentreminiscences. On this, his first introduction to the cultivated worldof the East, Lincoln's audience were at the moment and for the momentconscious of the power which he revealed. The Cooper Institute speechtakes the plain principle that slavery is wrong, and draws the plaininference that it is idle to seek for common ground with men who say itis right. Strange but tragically frequent examples show how rare it isfor statesmen in times of crisis to grasp the essential truth sosimply. It is creditable to the leading men of New York that theyrecognised a speech which just at that time urged this plain thing insufficiently plain language as a very great speech, and had an inklingof great and simple qualities in the man who made it. It is notspecially discreditable that very soon and for a long while part ofthem, or of those who were influenced by their report, reverted totheir former prejudices in regard to Lincoln. When they saw him thrustby election managers into the Presidency, very few indeed of what mightbe called the better sort believed, or could easily learn, that hisgreat qualities were great enough to compensate easily for the manythings he lacked. This specially grotesque specimen of the wild Westwas soon seen not to be of the charlatan type; as a natural alternativehe was assumed to be something of a simpleton. Many intelligent menretained this view of him throughout the years of his trial, and, onlywhen his triumph and tragic death set going a sort of Lincoln myth, began to recollect that "I came to love and trust him even before Iknew him, " or the like. A single speech like this at the CooperInstitute might be enough to show a later time that Lincoln was a manof great intellect, but it could really do little to prepare men in theEast for what they next heard of him. Already a movement was afoot among his friends in Illinois to securehis nomination for the Presidency at the Convention of the Republicanparty which was to be held in Chicago in May. Before that Conventioncould assemble it had become fairly certain that whoever might bechosen as the Republican candidate would be President of the UnitedStates, and signs were not wanting that he would be faced with graveperil to the Union. For the Democratic party, which had met inConvention at Charleston in April, had proceeded to split into twosections, Northern and Southern. This memorable Convention was adignified assembly gathered in a serious mood in a city of someantiquity and social charm. From the first, however, a latentantipathy between the Northern and the Southern delegates made itselffelt. The Northerners, predisposed to a certain deference towards theSouth and prepared to appreciate its graceful hospitality, experiencedan uneasy sense that they were regarded as social inferiors. Worsetrouble than this appeared when the Convention met for its firstbusiness, the framing of the party platform. Whether the positionwhich Lincoln had forced Douglas to take up had precipitated thisresult or not, dissension between Northern and Southern Democrats onthe subject of slavery had already manifested itself in Congress, andin the party Convention the division became irreparable. Douglas, itwill be remembered, had started with the principle that slavery in theTerritories formed a question for the people of each territory todecide; he had felt bound to accept the doctrine underlying the DredScott judgments, according to which slavery was by the Constitutionlawful in all territories; pressed by Lincoln, he had tried toreconcile his original position with this doctrine by maintaining thatwhile slavery was by the Constitution lawful in every Territory it wasnevertheless lawful for a Territorial Legislature to make slave-owningpractically impossible. In framing a declaration of the partyprinciples as to slavery the Southern delegates in the DemocraticConvention aimed at meeting this evasion. With considerable show oflogic they asserted, in the party platform which they proposed, notmerely the abstract rightfulness and lawfulness of slavery, but theduty of Congress itself to make any provision that might be necessaryto protect it in the Territories. To this the Northern majority of thedelegates could not consent; they carried an amendment declaring merelythat they would abide by any decision of the Supreme Court as toslavery. Thereupon the delegates, not indeed of the whole South but ofall the cotton-growing States except Georgia, withdrew from theConvention. The remaining delegates were, under the rules of theConvention, too few to select a candidate for the Presidency, and theConvention adjourned, to re-assemble at Baltimore in June. Eventually, after attempts at reunion and further dissensions, two separateDemocratic Conventions at Baltimore, a Northern and a Southern, nominated, as their respective candidates, Stephen Douglas, the obviouschoice with whom, if the Southerners had cared to temporise further, aunited Democratic party could have swept the polls, and John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky, a gentleman not otherwise known than as thestandard bearer on this great occasion of the undisguised andunmitigated claims of the slave owners. Thus it was that the American Democratic party forfeited power fortwenty-four years, divided between the consistent maintenance of aparadox and the adroit maintenance of inconsistency. Another party inthis election demands a moment's notice. A Convention of delegates, claiming to represent the old Whigs, met also at Baltimore and declaredmerely that it stood for "the Constitution of the country, the union ofthe States, and the enforcement of the laws. " They nominated for thePresidency John Bell of Tennessee, and for the Vice-Presidency EdwardEverett. This latter gentleman was afterwards chosen as the orator ofthe day at the ceremony on the battlefield of Gettysburg when Lincoln'smost famous speech was spoken. He was a travelled man and a scholar;he was Secretary of State for a little while under Fillmore, and dealthonestly and firmly with the then troublous question of Cuba. Hisorations deserve to be looked at, for they are favourable examples ofthe eloquence which American taste applauded, and as such they help toshow how original Lincoln was in the simpler beauty of his own simplerdiction. In justice to the Whigs, let it be noted that they declaredfor the maintenance of the Union, committing themselves with decisionon the question of the morrow; but it was a singular platform thatresolutely and totally ignored the only issue of the day. Fewpoliticians can really afford to despise either this conspicuouslyfoolish attempt to overcome a difficulty by shutting one's eyes to it, or the more plausible proposal of the Northern Democrats to continuetemporising with a movement for slavery in which they were neither boldenough nor corrupted enough to join. The consequences, now known tous, of a determined stand against the advance of slavery wereinstinctively foreseen by these men, and they cannot be blamed forshrinking from them. Yet the historian now, knowing that thoseconsequences exceeded in terror all that could have been foreseen, canonly agree with the judgment expressed by Lincoln in one of his Kansasspeeches: "We want and must have a national policy as to slavery whichdeals with it as being a wrong. Whoever would prevent slavery becomingnational and perpetual yields all when he yields to a policy whichtreats it either as being right, or as being a matter of indifference. "The Republican party had been founded upon just this opinion. Electoral victory was now being prepared for it, not because a majoritywas likely yet to take so resolute a view, but because its effectiveopponents were divided between those who had gone the length of callingslavery right and those who strove to treat it as indifferent. Thefate of America may be said to have depended in the early months of1860 on whether the nominee of the Republican party was a man who wouldmaintain its principles with irresolution, or with obstinacy, or withfirm moderation. When it had first been suggested to Lincoln in the course of 1859 thathe might be that nominee he said, "I do not think myself fit for thePresidency. " This was probably his sincere opinion at the moment, though perhaps the moment was one of dejection. In any case hisopinion soon changed, and though it is not clear whether he encouragedhis friends to bring his name forward, we know in a general way thatwhen they decided to do so he used every effort of his own to helpthem. We must accept without reserve Herndon's reiterated assertionthat Lincoln was intensely ambitious; and, if ambition means the eagerdesire for great opportunities, the depreciation of it, which has longbeen a commonplace of literature, and which may be traced back to theEpicureans, is a piece of cant which ought to be withdrawn fromcurrency, and ambition, commensurate with the powers which each man candiscover in himself, should be frankly recognised as a part ofChristian duty. In judging him to be the best man for the Presidency, Lincoln's Illinois friends and he himself formed a very sensiblejudgment, but they did so in flagrant contradiction to many superficialappearances. This candidate for the chief magistracy at a criticaltime of one of the great nations of the world had never administeredany concern much larger than that post office that he once "carriedaround in his hat. " Of the several other gentlemen whose names werebefore the party there was none who might not seem greatly to surpasshim in experience of affairs. To one of them, Seward, the nominationseemed to belong almost of right. Chase and Seward both were known anddignified figures in that great assembly the Senate. Chase was ofproved rectitude and courage, Seward of proved and very considerableability. Chase had been Governor of Ohio, Seward of New York State;and the position of Governor in a State--a State it must be rememberedis independent in almost the whole of what we call domesticpolitics--is strictly analogous to the position of President in theUnion, and, especially in a great State, is the best training groundfor the Presidency. But beyond this, Seward, between whom and Lincolnthe real contest lay, had for some time filled a recognised thoughunofficial position as the leader of his party. He had failed, as hasbeen seen in his dealings with Douglas, in stern insistence uponprinciple, but the failure was due rather to his sanguine and hopefultemper than to lack of courage. On the whole from the time when hefirst stood up against Webster in the discussions of 1850, when Lincolnwas both silent and obscure, he had earned his position well. Hereafter, as Lincoln's subordinate, he was to do his countryfirst-rate service, and to earn a pure fame as the most generouslyloyal subordinate to a chief whom he had thought himself fit tocommand. We happen to have ample means of estimating now all Lincoln'sRepublican competitors; we know that none of the rest were equal toSeward; and we know that Seward himself, if he had had his way, wouldhave brought the common cause to ruin. Looking back now at thecomparison which Lincoln, when he entered into the contest, must havedrawn between himself and Seward--for of the rest we need not takeaccount--we can see that to himself at least and some few in Illinoishe had now proved his capacities, and that in Seward's public record, more especially in his attitude towards Douglas, he had the means ofmeasuring Seward. In spite of the far greater experience of the latterhe may have thought himself to be his superior in that indefinablething--the sheer strength of a man. Not only may he have thought this;he must have known it. He had shown his grasp of the essential factswhen he forced the Republican party to do battle with Douglas and theparty of indifference; he showed the same now when, after long years ofpatience and self-discipline, he pushed himself into Seward's place asthe Republican leader. All the same, what little we know of the methods by which he now helpedhis own promotion suggests that the people who then and long after sethim down as a second-rate person may have had a good deal to go upon. A kind friend has produced a letter which he wrote in March, 1860, to aKansas gentleman who desired to be a delegate to the RepublicanConvention, and who offered, upon condition, to persuade his fellowdelegates from Kansas to support Lincoln. Here is the letter: "As toyour kind wishes for myself, allow me to say I cannot enter the ring onthe money basis--first because in the main it is wrong; and secondly Ihave not and cannot get the money. I say in the main the use of moneyis wrong; but for certain objects in a political contest the use ofsome is both right and indispensable. With me, as with yourself, thislong struggle has been one of great pecuniary loss. I now distinctlysay this: If you shall be appointed a delegate to Chicago I willfurnish one hundred dollars to bear the expenses of the trip. " TheKansas gentleman failed to obtain the support of the Kansas delegatesas a body for Lincoln. Lincoln none the less held to his promise of ahundred dollars if the man came to Chicago; and, having, we areassured, much confidence in him, took the earliest opportunity ofappointing him to a lucrative office, besides consulting him as toother appointments in Kansas. This is all that we know of the affair, but our informant presents it as one of a number of instances in whichLincoln good-naturedly trusted a man too soon, and obstinately clung tohis mistake. As to the appointment, the man had evidently begun bysoliciting money in a way which would have marked him to most of us asa somewhat unsuitable candidate for any important post; and the paymentof the hundred dollars plainly transgresses a code both of honour andof prudence which most politicians will recognise and which should notneed definition. To say, as Lincoln probably said to himself, thatthere is nothing intrinsically wrong in a moderate payment for expensesto a fellow worker in a public cause, whom you believe to havesacrificed much, is to ignore the point, indeed several points. Lincoln, hungry now for some success in his own unrewarded career, wastempted to a small manoeuvre by which he might pick up a littlesupport; he was at the same time tempted, no less, to act generously(according to his means) towards a man who, he readily believed, hadmade sacrifices like his own. He was not the man to stand against thisdouble temptation. Petty lapses of this order, especially when the delinquent may be seento hesitate and excuse himself, are more irritating than many largerand more brazen offences, for they give us the sense of not knowingwhere we are. When they are committed by a man of seemingly strong andhigh character, it is well to ask just what they signify. Some of theshrewdest observers of Lincoln, friendly and unfriendly, concur intheir description of the weaknesses of which this incident may serve asthe example, weaknesses partly belonging to his temperament, but partlysuch as a man risen from poverty, with little variety of experience andwith no background of home training, stands small chance of escaping. For one thing his judgment of men and how to treat them was as bad insome ways as it was good in others. His own sure grasp of the largestand commonest things in life, and his sober and measured trust in humannature as a whole, gave him a rare knowledge of the mind of the peoplein the mass. So, too, when he had known a man long, or been with himor against him in important transactions, he sometimes developed greatinsight and sureness of touch; and, when the man was at bottomtrustworthy, his robust confidence in him was sometimes of great publicservice. But he had no gift of rapid perception and no instinctivetact or prudence in regard to the very numerous and very various menwith whom he had slight dealings on which he could bestow no thought. This is common with men who have risen from poverty; if they have notbecome hard and suspicious, they are generally obtuse to the minorindications by which shrewd men of education know the impostor, andthey are perversely indulgent to little meannesses in their fellowswhich they are incapable of committing themselves. In Lincoln this wasaggravated by an immense good-nature--as he confessed, he could hardlysay "no";--it was an obstinate good-nature, which found a naughtypleasure in refusing to be corrected; and if it should happen that theobject of his weak benevolence had given him personal cause of offence, the good-nature became more incorrigible than ever. Moreover, Lincoln's strength was a slow strength, shown most in matters in whichelementary principles of right or the concentration of intense thoughtguided him. Where minor and more subtle principles of conduct shouldhave come in, on questions which had not come within the range of hisreflection so far and to which, amidst his heavy duties, he could notspare much cogitation, he would not always show acute perception, and, which is far worse, he would often show weakness of will. The presentinstance may be ever so trifling, yet it does relate to the indistinctand dangerous borderland of political corruption. It need arouse novery serious suspicions. Mr. Herndon, whose pertinacious researchesunearthed that Kansas gentleman's correspondence, and who is keenlycensorious of Lincoln's fault, in the upshot trusts and reveresLincoln. And the massive testimony of his keenest critics to hishonesty quite decides the matter. But Lincoln had lived in a simpleWestern town, not in one of the already polluted great cities; he was apoor man himself and took the fact that wealth was used against him asa part of the inevitable drawbacks of his lot; and it is certain thathe did not clearly take account of the whole business of corruption andjobbery as a hideous and growing peril to America. It is certain toothat he lacked the delicate perception of propriety in such matters, orthe strict resolution in adhering to it on small occasions, which mighthave been possessed by a far less honest man. The severest criticismswhich Lincoln afterwards incurred were directed to the appointmentswhich he made; we shall see hereafter that he had very solid reasonsfor his general conduct in such matters; but it cannot be said withconviction that he had that horror of appointment on other grounds thanmerit which enlightens, though it does not always govern, more educatedstatesmen. His administration would have been more successful, and thelegacy he left to American public life more bountiful, if histraditions, or the length of his day's work, had allowed him to be morecareful in these things. As it is he was not commended to the peopleof America and must not be commended to us by the absence of defects asa ruler or as a man, but by the qualities to which his defectsbelonged. An acute literary man wrote of Lincoln, when he had beenthree years in office, these remarkable words: "You can't help feelingan interest in him, a sympathy and a kind of pity; feeling, too, thathe has some qualities of great value, yet fearing that his weak pointsmay wreck him or may wreck something. His life seems a series of wise, sound conclusions, slowly reached, oddly worked out, on great questionswith constant failures in administration of detail and dealings withindividuals. " It was evidently a clever man who wrote this; he wouldhave been a wise man if he had known that the praise he was bestowingon Lincoln was immeasurably greater than the blame. So the natural prejudice of those who welcomed Lincoln as a prophet inthe Cooper Institute but found his candidature for the Presidencyridiculous, was not wholly without justification. His partisans, however--also not unjustly--used his humble origin for all it wasworth. The Republicans of Illinois were assembled at Decatur inpreparation for the Chicago Convention, when, amid tumultuous cheers, there marched in old John Hanks and another pioneer bearing on theirshoulders two long fence rails labelled: "Two rails from a lot made byAbraham Lincoln and John Hanks in the Sangamon Bottom in the year1830. " "Gentlemen, " said Lincoln, in response to loud calls, "Isuppose you want to know something about those things. Well, the truthis, John Hanks and I did make rails in the Sangamon Bottom. I don'tknow whether we made those rails or not; fact is, I don't think theyare a credit to the makers. But I do know this: I made rails then, andI think I could make better ones than these now. " It is unnecessary totell of the part those rails were to play in the coming campaign. Itis a contemptible trait in books like that able novel "Democracy, " thatthey treat the sentiment which attached to the "Rail-splitter" asanything but honourable. The Republican Convention met at Chicago in circumstances of far lessdignity than the Democratic Convention at Charleston. Processions andbrass bands, rough fellows collected by Lincoln's managers, rowdiesimported from New York by Seward's, filled the streets with noise; andthe saloon keepers did good business. Yet the actual Conventionconsisted of grave men in an earnest mood. Besides Seward and Chaseand Lincoln, Messrs. Cameron of Pennsylvania and Bates of Missouri, ofwhom we shall hear later, were proposed for the Presidency. So alsowere Messrs. Dayton and Collamer, politicians of some repute; andMcLean, of the Supreme Court, had some supporters. The prevalentexpectation in the States was that Seward would easily secure thenomination, but it very soon appeared in the Convention that hisopponents were too strong for that. Several ballots took place; therewere the usual conferences and bargainings, which probably affected theresult but little; Lincoln's managers, especially Judge David Davis, afterwards of the Supreme Court, were shrewd people; Lincoln hadwritten to them expressly that they could make no bargain binding onhim, but when Cameron was clearly out of the running they did promiseCameron's supporters a place in Lincoln's Cabinet, and a similarpromise was made for one Caleb Smith. The delegates from Pennsylvaniawent on to Lincoln; then those of Ohio; and before long his victory wasassured. A Committee of the Convention, some of them sick at heart, was sent to bear the invitation to Lincoln. He received them in hislittle house with a simple dignity which one of them has recorded; andas they came away one said, "Well, we might have chosen a handsomerarticle, but I doubt whether a better. " On the whole, if we can put aside the illusion which besets us, whoread the preceding history if at all in the light of Lincoln'sspeeches, and to whom his competitors are mere names, this was the mostsurprising nomination ever made in America. Other Presidentialcandidates have been born in poverty, but none ever wore the scars ofpoverty so plainly; others have been intrinsically more obscure, butthese have usually been chosen as bearing the hall-mark of eminentprosperity or gentility. Lincoln had indeed at this time displayedbrilliant ability in the debates with Douglas, and he had really showna statesman's grasp of the situation more than any other Republicanleader. The friends in Illinois who put him forward--men like DavidDavis, who was a man of distinction himself--did so from a trueappreciation of his powers. But this does not seem to have been thecase with the bulk of the delegates from other States. The explanationgiven us of their action is curious. The choice was not the result ofmerit; on the other hand, it was not the work of the ordinary wickedwire-puller, for what may be called the machine was working for Seward. The choice was made by plain representative Americans who set tothemselves this question: "With what candidate can we beat Douglas?"and who found the answer in the prevalence of a popular impression, concerning Lincoln and Seward, which was in fact wholly mistaken. There was, it happens, earnest opposition to Seward among some EasternRepublicans on the good ground that he was a clean man but withdoubtful associates. This opposition could not by itself have defeatedhim. What did defeat him was his reputation at the moment as a veryadvanced Republican who would scare away the support of the weakerbrethren. He was, for instance, the author of the alarming phraseabout "irrepressible conflict, " and he had spoken once, in a phrasethat was misinterpreted, about "a higher law than the Constitution. "Lincoln had in action taken a far stronger line than Seward; he wasalso the author of the phrase about the house divided against itself;but then, besides the fact that Lincoln was well regarded just whereDouglas was most popular, Lincoln was a less noted man than Seward andhis stronger words occasioned less wide alarm. So, to please those wholiked compromise, the Convention rejected a man who would certainlyhave compromised, and chose one who would give all that moderationdemanded and die before he yielded one further inch. Many Americanshave been disposed to trace in the raising up of Lincoln the hand of aProvidence protecting their country in its worst need. It would beaffectation to set their idea altogether aside; it is, at any rate, amemorable incident in the history of a democracy, permeated withexcellent intentions but often hopelessly subject to inferiorinfluences, that at this critical moment the fit man was chosen on thevery ground of his supposed unfitness. The result of the contest between the four Presidential candidates wasrendered almost a foregone conclusion by the decision of the Democrats. Lincoln in deference to the usual and seemly procedure took no part inthe campaign, nor do his doings in the next months concern us. Seward, to his great honour, after privately expressing his bitter chagrin atthe bestowal of what was his due upon "a little Illinois attorney, "threw himself whole-heartedly into the contest, and went about makingadmirable speeches. On the night of November 6, Lincoln sat alone withthe operator in the telegraph box at Springfield, receiving as theycame in the results of the elections of Presidential electors in thevarious States. Long before the returns were complete his knowledge ofsuch matters made him sure of his return, and before he left that boxhe had solved in principle, as he afterwards declared, the first and byno means least important problem of his Presidency, the choice of aCabinet. The victory was in one aspect far from complete. If we look not at thevotes in the Electoral College with which the formal choice ofPresident lay, but at the popular votes by which the electors werereturned, we shall see that the new President was elected by a minorityof the American people. He had a large majority over Douglas, but ifDouglas had received the votes which were given for the SouthernDemocrat, Breckinridge, he would have had a considerable majority overLincoln, though the odd machinery of the Electoral College would stillhave kept him out of the Presidency. In another aspect it was afatally significant victory. Lincoln's votes were drawn only from theNorthern States; he carried almost all the free States and he carriedno others. For the first time in American history, the united Northhad used its superior numbers to outvote the South. This would in anycase have caused great vexation, and the personality of the man chosenby the North aggravated it. The election of Lincoln was greetedthroughout the South with a howl of derision. CHAPTER VI SECESSION 1. _The Case of the South against the Union_. The Republicans of the North had given their votes upon a very clearissue, but probably few of them had fully realised how grave a resultwould follow. Within a few days of the election of Lincoln the firststep in the movement of Secession had been taken, and before the newPresident entered upon his duties it was plain that either thedissatisfied States must be allowed to leave the Union or the Union mustbe maintained by war. Englishmen at that time and since have found a difficulty in grasping theprecise cause of the war that followed. Of those who were inclined tosympathise with the North, some regarded the war as being simply aboutslavery, and, while unhesitatingly opposed to slavery, wondered whetherit was right to make war upon it; others, regarding it as a war for theUnion and not against slavery at all, wondered whether it was right tomake war for a Union that could not be peaceably maintained. Now it isseldom possible to state the cause of a war quite candidly in a singlesentence, because as a rule there are on each side people who concur inthe final rupture for somewhat different reasons. But, in this case, forecasting a conclusion which must be examined in some detail, we canstate the cause of war in a very few sentences. If we ask first what theSouth fought for, the answer is: the leaders of the South and the greatmass of the Southern people had a single supreme and all-embracing objectin view, namely, to ensure the permanence and, if need be, the extensionof the slave system; they carried with them, however, a certain number ofSoutherners who were opposed or at least averse to slavery, but whothought that the right of their States to leave the Union or remain in itas they chose must be maintained. If we ask what the North fought for, the answer is: A majority, by no means overwhelming, of the Northernpeople refused to purchase the adhesion of the South by conniving at anyfurther extension of slavery, and an overwhelming majority refused to letthe South dissolve the Union for slavery or for any other cause. The issue about slavery, then, became merged in another issue, concerningthe Union, which had so far remained in the background. The first thing that must be grasped about it is the total difference ofview which now existed between North and South in regard to the verynature of their connection. The divergence had taken place so completelyand in the main so quietly that each side now realised with surprise andindignation that the other held an opposite opinion. In the North theUnion was regarded as constituting a permanent and unquestionablenational unity from which it was flat rebellion for a State or any othercombination of persons to secede. In the South the Union appeared merelyas a peculiarly venerable treaty of alliance, of which the dissolutionwould be very painful, but which left each State a sovereign body with anindefeasible right to secede if in the last resort it judged that thepainful necessity had come. In a few border States there was divisionand doubt on this subject, a fact which must have helped to hide fromeach side the true strength of opinion on the other. But, setting asidethese border States, there were in the North some who doubted whether itwas expedient to fight for the Union, but none of any consequence whodoubted that it was constitutionally correct; and there were in the Southmen who insisted that no occasion to secede had arisen, but these verymen, when outvoted in their States, maintained most passionately theabsolute right of secession. The two sides contended for two contrary doctrines of constitutional law. It is natural when parties are disputing over a question of politicalwisdom and of moral right that each should claim for its contention ifpossible the sanction of acknowledged legal principle. So it was withthe parties to the English Civil War, and the tendency to regard mattersfrom a legal point of view is to this day deeply engrained in the mentalhabits of America. But North and South were really divided by somethingother than legal opinion, a difference in the objects to which theirfeelings of loyalty and patriotism were directed. This difference foundapt expression in the Cabinet of President Buchanan, who of courseremained in office between the election of Lincoln in November and hisinauguration in March. General Cass of Michigan had formerly stood forthe Presidency with the support of the South, and he held Cabinet officenow as a sympathiser with the South upon slavery, but he was aNortherner. "I see how it is, " he said to two of his colleagues; "youare a Virginian, and you are a South Carolinian; I am not a Michigander, I am an American. " In a former chapter the creation of the Union and the beginnings of acommon national life have been traced in outline. Obstacles to the Unionhad existed both in the North and in the South, and, after it had beencarried, the tendency to threaten disruption upon some slight conflict ofinterest had shown itself in each. But a proud sense of singlenationality had soon become prevalent in both, and in the North nothingwhatever had happened to set back this growth, for the idea which Lowellhad once attributed to his Hosea Biglow of abjuring Union with slaveowners was a negligible force. Undivided allegiance to the Union was thenatural sentiment of citizens of Ohio or Wisconsin, States created by theauthority of the Union out of the common dominion of the Union. It hadbecome, if anything, more deeply engrained in the original States of theNorth, for their predominant occupation in commerce would tend in thisparticular to give them larger views. The pride of a Boston man in theCommonwealth of Massachusetts was of the same order as his pride in thecity of Boston; both were largely pride in the part which Boston andMassachusetts had taken in making the United States of America. Such aman knew well that South Carolina had once threatened secession, but, forthat matter, the so-called Federalists of New England had once threatenedit. The argument of Webster in the case of South Carolina was a classic, and was taken as conclusive on the question of legal right. The terserand more resonant declaration of President Jackson, a Southerner, and theresponse to it which thrilled all States, South or North, outside SouthCarolina, had set the seal to Webster's doctrines. There had been loudand ominous talk of secession lately; it was certainly not mere bluster;Northerners in the main were cautious politicians and had been tempted togo far to conciliate it. But if the claim of Southern States were put inpractice, the whole North would now regard it not as a respectable claim, but as an outrage. It is important to notice that the disposition to take this view did notdepend upon advanced opinions against slavery. Some of the most violentopponents of slavery would care relatively little about the Constitutionor the Union; they would at first hesitate as to whether a peacefulseparation between States which felt so differently on a moral questionlike slavery was not a more Christian solution of their difference than afratricidal war. On the other hand, men who cared little about slavery, and would gladly have sacrificed any convictions they had upon thatmatter for the sake of the Union, were at first none the less vehement intheir anger at an attack upon the Union. There is, moreover, a moresubtle but still important point to be observed in this connection. Democrats in the North inclined as a party to stringent and perhapspedantically legal views of State rights as against the rights of theUnion; but this by no means necessarily meant that they sympathised morethan Republicans with the claim to dissolve the Union. They laidemphasis on State rights merely because they believed that these would bea bulwark against any sort of government tyranny, and that the largepower which was reserved to the local or provincial authorities of theStates made the government of the nation as a whole more truly expressiveof the will of the whole people. They now found themselves entangled (aswe shall see) in curious doubts as to what the Federal Government mightdo to maintain the Union, but they had not the faintest doubt that theUnion was meant to be maintained. The point which is now beingemphasised must not be misapprehended; differences of sentiment in regardto slavery, in regard to State rights, in regard to the authority ofGovernment, did, as the war went on and the price was paid, gravelyembarrass the North; but it was a solid and unhesitating North which saidthat the South had no right to secede. Up to a certain point the sense of patriotic pride in the Union had grownalso in the South. It was fostered at first by the predominant partwhich the South played in the political life of the country. But for ageneration past the sense of a separate interest of the South had beengrowing still more vigorously. The political predominance of the Southhad continued, but under a standing menace of downfall as the North grewmore populous and the patriotism which it at first encouraged had becomeperverted into an arrogantly unconscious feeling that the Union was anexcellent thing on condition that it was subservient to the South. Thecommon interest of the Southern States was slavery; and, when theNortherners had become a majority which might one day dominate theFederal Government, this common interest of the slave States found aweapon at hand in the doctrine of the inherent sovereignty of eachindividual State. This doctrine of State sovereignty had come to be heldas universally in the South as the strict Unionist doctrine in the North, and held with as quiet and unshakable a confidence that it could not bequestioned. It does not seem at all strange that the State, as againstthe Union, should have remained the supreme object of loyalty in oldcommunities like those of South Carolina and Virginia, abounding as theydid in conservative influences which were lacking in the North. But thisprovincial loyalty was not in the same sense a natural growth in Stateslike Alabama or Mississippi. These, no less than Indiana and Illinois, were the creatures of the Federal Congress, set up within the memory ofliving men, with arbitrary boundaries that cut across any old lines ofdivision. There was, in fact, no spontaneous feeling of allegianceattaching to these political units, and the doctrine of their sovereigntyhad no use except as a screen for the interest in slavery which theSouthern States had in common. But Calhoun, in a manner characteristicof his peculiar and dangerous type of intellect, had early seen in a viewof State sovereignty, which would otherwise have been obsolete, the mostserviceable weapon for the joint interests of the Southern States. In asociety where intellectual life was restricted, his ascendency had beengreat, though his disciples had, reasonably enough, thrown aside thequalifications which his subtle mind had attached to the right ofsecession. Thus in the Southern States generally, even among men moststrongly opposed to the actual proposal to secede, the real or allegedconstitutional right of a State to secede if it chose now passedunquestioned and was even regarded as a precious liberty. It is impossible to avoid asking whether on this question ofconstitutional law the Northern opinion or the Southern opinion wascorrect. (The question was indeed an important question in determiningthe proper course of procedure for a President when confronted withsecession, but it must be protested that the moral right and politicalwisdom of neither party in the war depended mainly, if at all, upon thislegal point. It was a question of the construction which a court of lawshould put upon a document which was not drawn up with any view todetermining this point. ) If we go behind the Constitution, which wasthen and is now in force, to the original document of which it took theplace, we shall find it entitled "Articles of Confederation and PerpetualUnion, " but we shall not find any such provisions as men desirous ofcreating a stable and permanent federal government might have beenexpected to frame. If we read the actual Constitution we shall find noword distinctly implying that a State could or could not secede. As tothe real intention of its chief authors, there can be no doubt that theyhoped and trusted the Union would prove indissoluble, and equally littledoubt that they did not wish to obtrude upon those whom they asked toenter into it the thought that this step would be irrevocable. For theview taken in the South there is one really powerful argument, on whichJefferson Davis insisted passionately in the argumentative memoirs withwhich he solaced himself in old age. It is that in several of theStates, when the Constitution was accepted, public declarations were madeto the citizens of those States by their own representatives that a Statemight withdraw from the Union. But this is far from conclusive. No mangets rid of the obligation of a bond by telling a witness that he doesnot mean to be bound; the question is not what he means, but what theparty with whom he deals must naturally take him to mean. Now theConstitution of the United States upon the face of it purports to createa government able to take its place among the other governments of theworld, able if it declares war to wield the whole force of its country inthat war, and able if it makes peace to impose that peace upon all itssubjects. This seems to imply that the authority of that government overpart of the country should be legally indefeasible. It would have beenridiculous if, during a war with Great Britain, States on the Canadianborder should have had the legal right to secede, and set up a neutralgovernment with a view to subsequent reunion with Great Britain. Thesound legal view of this matter would seem to be: that the doctrine ofsecession is so repugnant to the primary intention with which thenational instrument of government was framed that it could only have beensupported by an express reservation of the right to secede in theConstitution itself. The Duke of Argyll, one of the few British statesmen of the time whofollowed this struggle with intelligent interest, briefly summed up thequestion thus: "I know of no government in the world that could possiblyhave admitted the right of secession from its own allegiance. " Oddlyenough, President Buchanan, in his Message to Congress on December 4, putthe same point not less forcibly. But to say--as in a legal sense we may--that the Southern States rebelledis not necessarily to say that they were wrong. The deliberate endeavourof a people to separate themselves from the political sovereignty underwhich they live and set up a new political community, in which theirnational life shall develop itself more fully or more securely, mustalways command a certain respect. Whether it is entitled further to thefull sympathy and to the support or at least acquiescence of others is aquestion which in particular cases involves considerations such as cannotbe foreseen in any abstract discussion of political theory. But, speaking very generally, it is a question in the main of the worth whichwe attribute on the one hand to the common life to which it is sought togive freer scope, and on the other hand to the common life which maythereby be weakened or broken up. It sometimes seems to be held thatwhen a decided majority of the people whose voices can be heard, in amore or less defined area, elect to live for the future under aparticular government, all enlightened men elsewhere would wish them tohave their way. If any such principle could be accepted withoutqualification, few movements for independence would ever have been morecompletely justified than the secession of the Southern States. If weset aside the highland region of which mention has already been made, inthe six cotton-growing States which first seceded, and in several ofthose which followed as soon as it was clear that secession would beresisted, the preponderance of opinion in favour of the movement wasoverwhelming. This was not only so among the educated and governingportions of society, which were interested in slavery. While the negroesthemselves were unorganised and dumb and made no stir for freedom, thepoorer class of white people, to whom the institution of slavery was inreality oppressive, were quite unconscious of this; the enslavement ofthe negro appeared to them a tribute to their own dignity, and theirindiscriminating spirit of independence responded enthusiastically to theappeal that they should assert themselves against the real or fanciedpretensions of the North. So large a statement would require somequalification if we were here concerned with the life of a Southernleader; and there was of course a brief space, to be dealt with in thischapter, in which the question of secession hung in the balance, and itis true in this, as in every case, that the men who gave the initial pushwere few. But, broadly speaking, it is certain that the movement forsecession was begun with at least as general an enthusiasm and maintainedwith at least as loyal a devotion as any national movement with which itcan be compared. And yet to-day, just fifty-one years after theconsummation of its failure, it may be doubted whether one soul among thepeople concerned regrets that it failed. English people from that time to this have found the statementincredible; but the fact is that this imposing movement, in which richand poor, gentle and simple, astute men of state and pious clergymen, went hand in hand to the verge of ruin and beyond, was undertaken simplyand solely in behalf of slavery. Northern writers of the time found itso surprising that they took refuge in the theory of conspiracy, allegingthat a handful of schemers succeeded, by the help of fictitious popularclamour and intimidation of their opponents, in launching the South upona course to which the real mind of the people was averse. Later andcalmer historical survey of the facts has completely dispelled this view;and the English suspicion, that there must have been some cause beyondand above slavery for desiring independence, never had any facts tosupport it. Since 1830 no exponent of Southern views had ever hinted atsecession on any other ground than slavery; every Southern leaderdeclared with undoubted truth that on every other ground he prized theUnion; outside South Carolina every Southern leader made an earnestattempt before he surrendered the Union cause to secure the guarantees hethought sufficient for slavery within the Union. The Southern statesman(for the soldiers were not statesmen) whose character most attractssympathy now was Alexander Stephens, the Vice-President of the SouthernConfederacy, and though he was the man who persisted longest in the viewthat slavery could be adequately secured without secession, he was nonethe less entitled to speak for the South in his remarkable words on theConstitution adopted by the Southern Confederacy: "The new Constitutionhas put at rest for ever all the agitating questions relating to ourpeculiar institution, African slavery. This was the immediate cause ofthe late rupture and present revolution. The prevailing ideasentertained by Jefferson and most of the leading statesmen at the time ofthe old Constitution were that the enslavement of the African was wrongin principle socially, morally, and politically. Our new government isfounded upon exactly the opposite idea; its foundations are laid, itscorner stone rests, upon the great truth that the negro is not the equalof the white man; that slavery--subordination to the white man--is hisnatural and normal condition. This, our new government, is the first inthe history of the world based upon this great physical, philosophical, and moral truth. The great objects of humanity are best attained whenthere is conformity to the Creator's laws and decrees. " Equally explicitand void of shame was the Convention of the State of Mississippi. "Ourposition, " they declared, "is thoroughly identified with slavery. " It is common to reproach the Southern leaders with reckless folly. Theytried to destroy the Union, which they really valued, for the sake ofslavery, which they valued more; they in fact destroyed slavery; and theydid this, it is said, in alarm at an imaginary danger. This is not atrue ground of reproach to them. It is true that the danger to slaveryfrom the election of Lincoln was not immediately pressing. He neitherwould have done nor could have done more than to prevent during his fouryears of office any new acquisition of territory in the slave-holdinginterest, and to impose his veto on any Bill extending slavery within theexisting territory of the Union. His successor after four years might ormight not have been like-minded. He did not seem to stand for anyoverwhelming force in American politics; there was a majority opposed tohim in both Houses of Congress; a great majority of the Supreme Court, which might have an important part to play, held views of theConstitution opposed to his; he had been elected by a minority only ofthe whole American people. Why could not the Southern States have satstill, secure that no great harm would happen to their institution forthe present, and hoping that their former ascendency would come back tothem with the changing fortunes of party strife? This is an argumentwhich might be expected to have weighed with Southern statesmen if eachof them had been anxious merely to keep up the value of his own slaveproperty for his own lifetime, but this was far from being their case. It is hard for us to put ourselves at the point of view of men who couldsincerely speak of their property in negroes as theirs by the "decree ofthe Creator"; but it is certain that within the last two generationstrouble of mind as to the rightfulness of slavery had died out in a largepart of the South; the typical Southern leader valued the peculiar formof society under which he lived and wished to hand it on intact to hischildren's children. If their preposterous principle be granted, themost extreme among them deserve the credit of statesmanlike insight forhaving seen, the moment that Lincoln was elected, that they must strikefor their institution now if they wished it to endure. The Convention ofSouth Carolina justly observed that the majority in the North had votedthat slavery was sinful; they had done little more than express thisabstract opinion, but they had done all that. Lincoln's administrationmight have done apparently little, and after it the pendulum wouldprobably have swung back. But the much-talked-of swing of the pendulumis the most delusive of political phenomena; America was never going toreturn to where it was before this first explicit national assertion ofthe wrongfulness of slavery had been made. It would have been hard toforecast how the end would come, or how soon; but the end was certain ifthe Southern States had elected to remain the countrymen of a people whowere coming to regard their fundamental institution with growingreprobation. Lincoln had said, "This government cannot endurepermanently, half slave and half free. " Lincoln was right, and so fromtheir own point of view, that of men not brave or wise enough to take inhand a difficult social reform, were the leaders who declared immediatelyfor secession. In no other contest of history are those elements in human affairs onwhich tragic dramatists are prone to dwell so clearly marked as in theAmerican Civil War. No unsophisticated person now, except in ignoranceas to the cause of the war, can hesitate as to which side enlists hissympathy, or can regard the victory of the North otherwise than as thecostly and imperfect triumph of the right. But the wrongside--emphatically wrong--is not lacking in dignity or human worth; thelong-drawn agony of the struggle is not purely horrible to contemplate;there is nothing that in this case makes us reluctant to acknowledge themerits of the men who took arms in the evil cause. The experience as tothe relations between superior and inferior races, which is now at thecommand of every intelligent Englishman, forbids us to think that theinferiority of the negro justified slavery, but it also forbids us tofancy that men to whom the relation of owner to slave had become naturalmust themselves have been altogether degraded. The men upon the Southernside who can claim any special admiration were simple soldiers who had noshare in causing the war; among the political leaders whom they served, there was none who stands out now as a very interesting personality, andtheir chosen chief is an unattractive figure; but we are not to think ofthese authors of the war as a gang of hardened, unscrupulous, corruptedmen. As a class they were reputable, public-spirited, and religious men;they served their cause with devotion and were not wholly to blame thatthey chose it so ill. The responsibility for the actual secession doesnot rest in an especial degree on any individual leader. Secession beganrather with the spontaneous movement of the whole community of SouthCarolina, and in the States which followed leading politicians expressedrather than inspired the general will. The guilt which any of us canventure to attribute for this action of a whole deluded society must reston men like Calhoun, who in a previous generation, while opinion in theSouth was still to some extent unformed, stifled all thought of reformand gave the semblance of moral and intellectual justification to asystem only susceptible of a historical excuse. The South was neither base nor senseless, but it was wrong. To someminds it may not seem to follow that it was well to resist it by war, andindeed at the time, as often happens, people took up arms with greatersearchings of heart upon the right side than upon the wrong. If theslave States had been suffered to depart in peace they would have set upa new and peculiar political society, more truly held together than theoriginal Union by a single avowed principle; a nation dedicated to theinequality of men. It is not really possible to think of the freenational life which they could thus have initiated as a thing to berespected and preserved. Nor is it true that their choice for themselvesof this dingy freedom was no concern of their neighbours. We have seenhow the slave interest hankered for enlarged dominion; and it is certainthat the Southern Confederacy, once firmly established, would have beenan aggressive and disturbing power upon the continent of America. Thequestions of territorial and other rights between it and the old Unionmight have been capable of satisfactory settlement for the moment, orthey might have proved as insoluble as Lincoln thought they were. But, at the best, if the States which adhered to the old Union had admittedthe claim of the first seceding States to go, they could only haveretained for themselves an insecure existence as a nation, threatened ateach fresh conflict of interest or sentiment with a further disruptionwhich could not upon any principle have been resisted. The precedingchapters have dwelt with iteration upon the sentiments which had operatedto make Americans a people, and on the form and the degree in which thosesentiments animated the mind of Lincoln. Only so perhaps can we fullyappreciate for what the people of the North fought. It is inaccurate, though not gravely misleading, to say that they fought against slavery. It would be wholly false to say that they fought for mere dominion. Theyfought to preserve and complete a political unity nobly conceived bythose who had done most to create it, and capable, as the sequel showed, of a permanent and a healthy continuance. And it must never be forgotten, if we wish to enter into the spirit whichsustained the North in its struggle, that loyalty for Union had a largeraspect than that of mere allegiance to a particular authority. Vividlypresent to the mind of some few, vaguely but honestly present to the mindof a great multitude, was the sense that even had slavery not enteredinto the question a larger cause than that of their recent Union wasbound up with the issues of the war. The Government of the United Stateshad been the first and most famous attempt in a great modern country tosecure government by the will of the mass of the people. If in thiscrucial instance such a Government were seen to be intolerably weak, ifit was found to be at the mercy of the first powerful minority whichseized a worked-up occasion to rebel, what they had learnt to think themost hopeful agency for the uplifting of man everywhere would for ages tocome have proved a failure. This feeling could not be stronger in anyAmerican than it was in Lincoln himself. "It has long been a question, "he said, "whether any Government which is not too strong for theliberties of the people can be strong enough to maintain itself. " Thereis one marked feature of his patriotism, which could be illustrated byabundance of phrases from his speeches and letters, and which the peopleof several countries of Europe can appreciate to-day. His affection forhis own country and its institutions is curiously dependent upon a widercause of human good, and is not a whit the less intense for that. Thereis perhaps no better expression of this widespread feeling in the Norththan the unprepared speech which he delivered on his way to becomePresident, in the Hall of Independence at Philadelphia, in which theDeclaration of Independence had been signed. "I have never, " he said, "had a feeling politically that did not spring from the sentimentsembodied in the Declaration of Independence. I have often pondered overthe dangers which were incurred by the men who assembled here and framedand adopted that Declaration of Independence. I have pondered over thetoils that were endured by the officers and soldiers of the army whoachieved that independence. I have often inquired of myself what greatprinciple or idea it was that kept the Confederacy so long together. Itwas not the mere matter of separation of the colonies from themotherland, it was the sentiment in the Declaration of Independence whichgave liberty, not alone to the people of this country, but I hope to theworld, for all future time. It was that which gave promise that in duetime the weight would be lifted from the shoulders of all men. " 2. _The Progress of Secession_. So much for the broad causes without which there could have been no CivilWar in America. We have now to sketch the process by which the fuel waskindled. It will be remembered that the President elected in Novemberdoes not enter upon his office for nearly four months. For that time, therefore, the conduct of government lay in the hands of PresidentBuchanan, who, for all his past subserviency to Southern interests, believed and said that secession was absolutely unlawful. Severalmembers of his Cabinet were Southerners who favoured secession; but theonly considerable man among them, Cobb of Georgia, soon declared that hisloyalty to his own State was not compatible with his office and resigned;and, though others, including the Secretary for War, hung on to theirposition, it does not appear that they influenced Buchanan much, or thattheir somewhat dubious conduct while they remained was of greatimportance. Black, the Attorney-General, and Cass, the Secretary ofState, who, however, resigned when his advice was disregarded, were notonly loyal to the Union, but anxious that the Government should doeverything that seemed necessary in its defence. Thus thisadministration, hitherto Southern in its sympathies, must be regarded forits remaining months as standing for the Union, so far as it stood foranything. Lincoln meanwhile had little that he could do but to watchevents and prepare. There was, nevertheless, a point in the negotiationswhich took place between parties at which he took on himself a tremendousresponsibility and at which his action was probably decisive of all thatfollowed. The Presidential election took place on November 6, 1860. On November 10the Legislature of South Carolina, which had remained in session for thispurpose, convened a specially elected Convention of the State to decideupon the question of secession. Slave owners and poor whites, young andold, street rabble, persons of fashion, politicians and clergy, the wholepeople of this peculiar State, distinguished in some marked respects evenfrom its nearest neighbours, received the action of the Legislature withenthusiastic but grave approval. It was not till December 20 that theConvention could pass its formal "Ordinance of Secession, " but there wasnever for a moment any doubt as to what it would do. The question waswhat other States would follow the example of South Carolina. Thereensued in all the Southern States earnest discussion as to whether tosecede or not, and in the North, on which the action of South Carolina, however easily it might have been foretold, came as a shock, greatbewilderment as to what was to be done. As has been said, there was inthe South generally no disposition to give up Southern claims, no doubtas to the right of secession, and no fundamental and overriding loyaltyto the Union, but there was a considerable reluctance to give up theUnion and much doubt as to whether secession was really wise; there wasin the North among those who then made themselves heard no doubt whateveras to the loyalty due to the Union, but there was, apart from previousdifferences about slavery, every possible variety and fluctuation ofopinion as to the right way of dealing with States which should secede orrebel. In certain border States, few in number but likely to play animportant part in civil war, Northern and Southern elements were mingled. Amid loud and distracted discussion, public and private, leaders of theseveral parties and of the two sections of the country conducted earnestnegotiations in the hope of finding a peaceable settlement, and whenCongress met, early in December, their debates took a formal shape incommittees appointed by the Senate and by the House. Meanwhile the President was called upon to deal with the problempresented for the Executive Government of the Union by the action ofSouth Carolina. It may be observed that if he had given his mind to themilitary measures required to meet the possible future, the North, whichin the end had his entire sympathy, would have begun the war with thatadvantage in preparation which, as it was, was gained by the South. Inthis respect he did nothing. But, apart from this, if he had taken up aclear and comprehensible attitude towards South Carolina and had given alead to Unionist sympathy, he would have consolidated public opinion inthe North, and he would have greatly strengthened those in the South whoremained averse to secession. There would have been a considerablefurther secession, but in all likelihood it would not have become soformidable as it did. As it was, the movement for secession proceededwith all the proud confidence that can be felt in a right which is notchallenged, and the people of the South were not aware, though shrewdleaders like Jefferson Davis knew it well, of the risk they wouldencounter till they had committed themselves to defying it. The problem before Buchanan was the same which, aggravated by his failureto deal with it, confronted Lincoln when he came into office, and it mustbe clearly understood. The secession of South Carolina was not amovement which could at once be quelled by prompt measures of repression. Even if sufficient military force and apt forms of law had existed fortaking such measures they would have united the South in support of SouthCarolina, and alienated the North, which was anxious for conciliation. Yet it was possible for the Government of the Union, while patientlyabstaining from violent or provocative action, to make plain that in thelast resort it would maintain its rights in South Carolina with its fullstrength. The main dealings of the Union authorities with the people ofa State came under a very few heads. There were local Federal Courts totry certain limited classes of issues; jurors, of course, could not becompelled to serve in these nor parties to appear. There was the postalservice; the people of South Carolina did not at present interfere withthis source of convenience to themselves and of revenue to the Union. There were customs duties to be collected at the ports, and there wereforts at the entrance of the harbour in Charleston, South Carolina, aswell as forts, dockyards and arsenals of the United States at a number ofpoints in the Southern States; the Government should quietly but openlyhave taken steps to ensure that the collection should go on unmolested, and that the forts and the like should be made safe from attack, in SouthCarolina and everywhere else where they were likely to be threatened. Measures of this sort were early urged upon Buchanan by Scott, theLieutenant-General (that is, Second in Command under the President) ofthe Army, who had been the officer that carried out Jackson's militarydispositions when secession was threatened in South Carolina thirty yearsbefore, and by other officers concerned, particularly by Major Anderson, a keen Southerner, but a keen soldier, commanding the forts atCharleston, and by Cass and Black in his Cabinet. Public opinion in theNorth demanded such measures. If further action than the proper manning and supply of certain forts hadbeen in contemplation, an embarrassing legal question would have arisen. In the opinion of the Attorney-General, of leading Democrats like Cassand Douglas, and apparently of most legal authorities of every party, there was an important distinction, puzzling to an English lawyer even ifhe is versed in the American Constitution, between the steps which theGovernment might justly take in self-protection, and measures which couldbe regarded as coercion of the State of South Carolina as such. Theselatter would be unlawful. Buchanan, instead of acting on or declaringhis intentions, entertained Congress, which met early in December, with aMessage, laying down very clearly the illegality of secession, butdiscussing at large this abstract question of the precise powers of theExecutive in resisting secession. The legal question will not furtherconcern us because the distinction which it was really intended to drawbetween lawful and unlawful measures against secession quite coincided, in its practical application, with what common sense and just feelingwould in these peculiar circumstances have dictated. But, as a naturalconsequence of such discussion, an impression was spread abroad of theillegality of something vaguely called coercion, and of the shadowynature of any power which the Government claimed. Up to Lincoln's inauguration the story of the Charleston forts, of whichone, lying on an island in the mouth of the harbour, was the famous FortSumter, is briefly this. Buchanan was early informed that if the UnionGovernment desired to hold them, troops and ships of war should instantlybe sent. Congressmen from South Carolina remaining in Washington came tohim and represented that their State regarded these forts upon its soilas their own; they gave assurances that there would be no attack on theforts if the existing military situation was not altered, and they triedto get a promise that the forts should not be reinforced. Buchanan wouldgive them no promise, but he equally refused the entreaties of Scott andhis own principal ministers that he should reinforce the forts, becausehe declared that this would precipitate a conflict. Towards the end ofthe year Major Anderson, not having men enough to hold all the forts if, as he expected, they were attacked, withdrew his whole force to FortSumter, which he thought the most defensible, dismantling the principalother fort. The Governor of South Carolina protested against this as aviolation of a supposed understanding with the President, and seized uponthe United States arsenal and the custom house, taking the revenueofficers into State service. Commissioners had previously gone fromSouth Carolina to Washington to request the surrender of the forts, uponterms of payment for property; they now declared that Anderson'swithdrawal, as putting him in a better position for defence, was an actof war, and demanded that he should be ordered to retire to the mainland. Buchanan wavered; decided to yield to them on this last point;ultimately, on the last day of 1860, yielded instead to severe pressurefrom Black, and decided to reinforce Anderson on Fort Sumter. The actualattempt to reinforce him was bungled; a transport sent for this purposewas fired upon by the South Carolina forces, and returned idle. Thisfirst act of war, for some curious reason, caused no excitement. Thepeople of the North were intensely relieved that Buchanan had not yieldedto whatever South Carolina might demand, and, being prone to forgive andto applaud, seem for a time to have experienced a thrill of glory in thethought that the national administration had a mind. Dix, the Secretaryof the Treasury, elated them yet further by telegraphing to a Treasuryofficial at New Orleans, "If any one attempts to haul down the Americanflag, shoot him on the spot. " But Anderson remained withoutreinforcements or further provisions when Lincoln entered office; andtroops in the service first of South Carolina and afterwards of theSouthern Confederacy, which was formed in February, erected batteries andprepared to bombard Fort Sumter. No possible plea for President Buchanan can make him rank among those whohave held high office with any credit at all, but he must at once beacquitted of any intentional treachery to the Union. It is agreed thathe was a truthful and sincere man, and there is something pleasant in thesimple avowal he made to a Southern negotiator who was pressing him forsome instant concession, that he always said his prayers before decidingany important matter of State. His previous dealings with Kansas wouldsuggest to us robust unscrupulousness, but it seems that he had quitegiven his judgment over into the keeping of a little group of SouthernSenators. Now that he was deprived of this help, he had only enough willleft to be obstinate against other advice. It is suggested that he hadnow but one motive, the desire that the struggle should break out in hissuccessor's time rather than his own. Even this is perhaps to judgeBuchanan's notorious and calamitous laches unfairly. Any action that hetook must to a certain extent have been provocative, and he knew it, andhe may have clung to the hope that by sheer inaction he would give timefor some possible forces of reason and conciliation to work. If so, hewas wrong, but similar and about as foolish hopes paralysed Lincoln'sCabinet (and to a less but still very dangerous degree Lincoln himself)when they took up the problem which Buchanan's neglect had made moreurgent. Buchanan had in this instance the advantage of far betteradvice, but this silly old man must not be gibbeted and Lincoln left freefrom criticism for his part in the same transaction. Both Presidentshesitated where to us who look back the case seems clear. Thecircumstances had altered in some respects when Lincoln came in, but itis only upon a somewhat broad survey of the governing tendencies ofLincoln's administration and of its mighty result in the mass that wediscover what really distinguishes his slowness of action in such casesas this from the hesitation of a man like Buchanan. Buchanan waited inthe hope of avoiding action, Lincoln with the firm intention to see hispath in the fullest light he could get. From an early date in November, 1860, every effort was made, by men toonumerous to mention, to devise if possible such a settlement of what werenow called the grievances of the South as would prevent any other Statefrom following the example of South Carolina. Apart from the intangibledifference presented by much disapprobation of slavery in the North andgrowing resentment in the South as this disapprobation grew louder, thesolid ground of dispute concerned the position of slavery in the existingTerritories and future acquisitions of the United States Government; thequarrel arose from the election of a President pledged to use whateverpower he had, though indeed that might prove little, to prevent thefurther extension of slavery; and we may almost confine our attention tothis point. Other points came into discussion. Several of the NorthernStates had "Personal Liberty Laws" expressly devised to impede theexecution of the Federal law of 1850 as to fugitive slaves. Someattention was devoted to these, especially by Alexander Stephens, who, asthe Southern leader most opposed to immediate secession, wished to directmen's minds to a grievance that could be remedied. Lincoln, who hadalways said that, though the Fugitive Slave Law should be made just andseemly, it ought in substance to be enforced, made clear again that hethought such "Personal Liberty Laws" should be amended, though heprotested that it was not for him as President-elect to advise the StateLegislatures on their own business. The Republicans generally agreed. Some of the States concerned actually began amending their laws. Thus, if the disquiet of the South had depended on this grievance, the cause ofdisquiet would no doubt have been removed. Again the Republican leaders, including Lincoln in particular, let there be no ground for thinking thatan attack was intended upon slavery in the States where it wasestablished; they offered eventually to give the most solemn pledgepossible in this matter by passing an Amendment of the Constitutiondeclaring that it should never be altered so as to take away theindependence of the existing slave States as to this portion of theirdemocratic institutions. Lincoln indeed refused on several occasions tomake any fresh public disclaimer of an intention to attack existinginstitutions. His views were "open to all who will read. " "For the goodmen in the South, " he writes privately, "--I regard the majority of themas such--I have no objection to repeat them seventy times seven. But Ihave bad men to deal with both North and South; men who are eager forsomething new upon which to base new misrepresentations; men who wouldlike to frighten me, or at least fix upon me the character of timidityand cowardice. " Nevertheless he endeavoured constantly in privatecorrespondence to narrow and define the issue, which, as he insisted, concerned only the territorial extension of slavery. The most serious of the negotiations that took place, and to which mosthope was attached, consisted in the deliberations of a committee ofthirteen appointed by the Senate in December, 1860, which took for itsguidance a detailed scheme of compromise put forward by SenatorCrittenden, of Kentucky. The efforts of this committee to come to anagreement broke down at the outset upon the question of the Territories, and the responsibility, for good or for evil, of bringing them to an endmust probably be attributed to the advice of Lincoln. Crittenden's firstproposal was that there should be a Constitutional Amendment declaringthat slavery should be prohibited "in all the territory of the UnitedStates, now held or hereafter acquired, north of latitude 36 degrees 30minutes"--(the limit fixed in the Missouri Compromise, but restrictedthen to the Louisiana purchase)--while in all territory, now held orthereafter acquired south of that line, it should be permitted. Crittenden also proposed that when a Territory on either side of the linebecame a State, it should become free to decide the question for itself;but the discussion never reached this point. On the proposal as to theTerritories there seemed at first to be a prospect that the Republicanswould agree, in which case the South might very likely have agreed too. The desire for peace was intensely strong among the commercial men of NewYork and other cities, and it affected the great political managers andthe statesmen who, like Seward himself, were in close touch with thiscommercial influence. Tenacious adherence to declared principle may havebeen as strong in country districts as the desire for accommodation wasin these cities, but it was at any rate far less vocal, and on the wholeit seems that compromise was then in the air. It seemed clear from theexpressed opinions of his closest allies that Seward would support thiscompromise. Now Seward just at this time received Lincoln's offer of theoffice of Secretary of State, a great office and one in which Sewardexpected to rule Lincoln and the country, but in accepting which, as hedid, he made it incumbent on himself not to part company at once with theman who would be nominally his chief. Then there occurred a visit paidon Seward's behalf by his friend Thurlow Weed, an astute politicalmanager but also an able statesman, to Lincoln at Springfield. Weedbrought back a written statement of Lincoln's views. Seward's supportwas not given to the compromise; nor naturally was that of the moreradical Republicans, to use a term which now became common; and theCommittee of Thirteen found itself unable to agree. It is unnecessary to repeat what Lincoln's conviction on this, to him theone essential point of policy, was, or to quote from the numerous lettersin which from the time of his nomination he tried to keep the minds ofhis friends firm on this single principle, and to show them that if therewere the slightest further yielding as to this, save indeed as to thepeculiar case of New Mexico, which did not matter, and which perhaps heregarded as conceded already, the Southern policy of extending slaveryand of "filibustering" against neighbouring counties for that purposewould revive in full force, and the whole labour of the Republicanmovement would have to begin over again. Since his election he had beenwriting also to Southern politicians who were personally friendly, toGilmer of North Carolina, to whom he offered Cabinet office, and toStephens, making absolutely plain that his difference with them lay inthis one point, but making it no less plain that on this point he was, with entire respect to them, immovable. Now, on December 22, the _NewYork Tribune_ was "enabled to state that Mr. Lincoln stands now as hestood in May last, square upon the Republican platform. " The writingthat Weed brought to Seward must have said, perhaps more elaborately, thesame. If Lincoln had not stood square upon that platform there wereothers like Senator Wade of Ohio and Senator Grimes of Iowa who mighthave done so and might have been able to wreck the compromise. Lincoln, however, did wreck it, at a time when it seemed likely to succeed, and itis most probable that thereby he caused the Civil War. It cannot be saidthat he definitely expected the Civil War. Probably he avoided makingany definite forecast; but he expressed no alarm, and he privately told afriend about this time that "he could not in his heart believe that theSouth designed the overthrow of the Government. " But, if he had in hisheart believed it, nothing in his life gives reason to think that hewould have been more anxious to conciliate the South; on the contrary, itis in line with all we know of his feelings to suppose that he would havethought firmness all the more imperative. We cannot recall the solemnityof his long-considered speech about "a house divided against itself, "with which all his words and acts accorded, without seeing that, ifperhaps he speculated little about the risks, he was prepared to facethem whatever they were. Doubtless he took a heavy responsibility, butit is painful to find honourable historians, who heartily dislike thecause of slavery, capable to-day of wondering whether he was right to doso. "If he had not stood square" in December upon the same "platform" onwhich he had stood in May, if he had preferred to enroll himself amongthose statesmen of all countries whose strongest words are uttered fortheir own subsequent enjoyment in eating them, he might conceivably havesaved much bloodshed, but he would not have left the United States acountry of which any good man was proud to be a citizen. Thus, by the end of 1860, the bottom was really out of the policy ofcompromise, and it is not worth while to examine the praiseworthy effortsthat were still made for it while State after State in the South wasdeciding to secede. One interesting proposal, which was aired inJanuary, 1861, deserves notice, namely, that the terms of compromiseproposed by Crittenden should have been submitted to a vote of the wholepeople. It was not passed. Seward, whom many people now thought likelyto catch at any and every proposal for a settlement, said afterwards withjustice that it was "unconstitutional and ineffectual. " Ineffectual itwould have been in this sense: the compromise would in all probabilityhave been carried by a majority consisting of men in the border Statesand of all those elsewhere who, though they feared war and desired goodfeeling, had no further definite opinion upon the chief questions atissue; but it would have left a local majority in many of the SouthernStates and a local majority in many of the Northern States asirreconcilable with each other as ever. It was opposed also to thespirit of the Constitution. In a great country where the people withinfinitely varied interests and opinions can slowly make theirpredominant wishes appear, but cannot really take counsel together andgive a firm decision upon any emergency, there may be exceptional caseswhen a popular vote on a defined issue would be valuable, significant, desired by the people themselves; but the machinery of representativegovernment, however faulty, is the only machinery by which the people canin some sense govern itself, instead of making itself ungovernable. Above all, in a serious crisis it is supremely repugnant to the spirit ofpopular government that the men chosen by a people to govern it shouldthrow their responsibility back at the heads of the electors. It is wellto be clear as to the kind of proceeding which the authors of thisproposal were really advocating: a statesman has come before the ordinarycitizen with a definite statement of the principle on which he would act, and an ordinary citizen has thereupon taken his part in entrusting himwith power; then comes the moment for the statesman to carry out hisprinciple, and the latent opposition becomes of necessity more alarming;the statesman is therefore to say to the ordinary citizen, "This is amore difficult matter than I thought; and if I am to act as I said Iwould, take on yourself the responsibility which I recently put myselfforward to bear. " The ordinary citizen will naturally as a rule declinea responsibility thus offered him, but he will not be grateful for theoffer or glad to be a forced accomplice in this process of indecision. If we could determine the prevailing sentiment in the North at someparticular moment during the crisis, it would probably represent whatvery few individual men continued to think for six months together. Early in the crisis some strong opponents of slavery were for letting theSouth go, declaring, as did Horace Greeley of the _New York Tribune_, that "they would not be citizens of a Republic of which one part waspinned to the other part with bayonets"; but this sentiment seems soon tohave given way when the same men began to consider, as Lincoln hadconsidered, whether an agreement to sever the Union between the States, with the difficult adjustment of mutual interests which it would haveinvolved, could be so effected as to secure a lasting peace. A blindrage on behalf of conciliation broke out later in prosperous business menin great towns--even in Boston it is related that "Beacon Streetaristocrats" broke up a meeting to commemorate John Brown on theanniversary of his death, and grave persons thought the meeting anoutrage. Waves of eager desire for compromise passed over the Northerncommunity. Observers at the time and historians after are easilymistaken as to popular feeling; the acute fluctuations of opinioninevitable among journalists, and in any sort of circle where men areconstantly meeting and talking politics, may leave the great mass ofquiet folk almost unaffected. We may be sure that there was aconsiderable body of steady opinion very much in accord with Lincoln;this should not be forgotten, but it must not be supposed that itprevailed constantly. On the contrary, it was inherent in the nature ofthe crisis that opinion wavered and swayed. We should miss the wholesignificance of Lincoln's story if we did not think of the North now andto the end of the war as exposed to disunion, hesitation, and quickreaction. If at this time a sufficiently authoritative leader withsufficiently determined timidity had inaugurated a policy of stampede, hemight have had a vast and tumultuous following. Only his following wouldquickly, if too late, have repented. What was wanted, if the people ofthe North were to have what most justly might be called their way, was aleader who would not seem to hurry them along, nor yet be ever lookinground to see if they followed, but just go groping forward among theinnumerable obstacles, guided by such principles of good sense and ofright as would perhaps on the whole and in the long run be approved bythe maturer thought of most men; and Lincoln was such a leader. When we turn to the South, where, as has been said, the movement forsecession was making steady though not unopposed progress, we have indeedto make exceptions to any sweeping statement, but we must recognise a farmore clearly defined and far more prevailing general opinion. We may setaside for the moment the border slave States of Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri, each of which has a distinct and an importanthistory. Delaware belonged in effect to the North. In Texas there werepeculiar conditions, and Texas had an interesting history of its own inthis matter, but may be treated as remote. There was also, as has beensaid, a highland region covering the west of Virginia and the east ofKentucky but reaching far south into the northern part of Alabama. Looking at the pathetic spectacle of enduring heroism in a mistaken causewhich the South presented, many people have been ready to suppose that itwas manoeuvred and tricked into its folly by its politicians and mighthave recovered itself from it if the North and the Government hadexercised greater patience and given it time. In support of this viewinstances are cited of strong Unionist feeling in the South. Suchinstances probably belong to the peculiar people of this highlandcountry, or else to the mixed and more or less neutral population thatmight be found at New Orleans or trading along the Mississippi. Thereremains a solid and far larger South in which indeed (except for SouthCarolina) dominant Southern policy was briskly debated, but as a questionof time, degree, and expediency. Three mental forces worked for the sameend: the alarmed vested interest of the people of substance, aristocraticand otherwise; the racial sentiment of the poor whites, a sentiment oftenstrongest in those who have no subject of worldly pride but their colour;and the philosophy of the clergy and other professional men whoconstituted what in some countries is called the intellectual class. These influences resulted in a rare uniformity of opinion that slaverywas right and all attacks on it were monstrous, that the Southern Stateswere free to secede and form, if they chose, a new Confederacy, and thatthey ought to do this if the moment should arrive when they could nototherwise safeguard their interests. Doubtless there were leading menwho had thought over the matter in advance of the rest and taken counseltogether long before, but the fact seems to be that such leaders nowfound their followers in advance of them. Jefferson Davis, by far themost commanding man among them, now found himself--certainly it servedhim right--anxiously counselling delay, and spending nights in prayerbefore he made his farewell speech to the Senate in words of greaterdignity and good feeling than seem to comport with the fanaticalnarrowness of his view and the progressive warping of his determinedcharacter to which it condemned him. Whatever fundamental loyalty to theUnion existed in any man's heart there were months of debate in which itfound no organised and hardly any audible expression. The most notablestand against actual secession was that which was made in Georgia byStephens; he was determined and outspoken, but he proceeded wholly uponthe ground that secession was premature. And this instance issignificant of something further. It has been said that discussion andvoting were not free, and it would be altogether unlikely that theirfreedom should in no cases be infringed, but there is no evidence thatthis charge was widely true. It is surely significant of the generaltemper of the South, and most honourable to it, that Stephens, who thusstruggled against secession at that moment, was chosen Vice-President ofthe Southern Confederacy. By February 4, 1861, the States of Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, and Louisiana had followed South Carolina by passing Ordinancesof Secession, and on that date representatives of these States met atMontgomery in Alabama to found a new Confederacy. Texas, whereconsiderable resistance was offered by Governor Houston, the adventurousleader under whom that State had separated from Mexico, was in process ofpassing the like Ordinance. Virginia and North Carolina, which lie northof the region where cotton prevails, and with them their westernneighbour Tennessee, and Arkansas, yet further west and separated fromTennessee by the Mississippi River, did not secede till after Lincoln'sinauguration and the outbreak of war. But the position of Virginia(except for its western districts) admitted of very little doubt, andthat of Tennessee and North Carolina was known to be much the same. Virginia took a historic pride in the Union, and its interest in slaverywas not quite the same as that of the cotton States, yet its strongestsocial ties were to the South. This State was now engaged in a last idleattempt to keep itself and other border States in the Union, with somehope also that the departed States might return; and on this sameFebruary 6, a "Peace Convention, " invited by Virginia and attended bydelegates from twenty-one States, met at Washington with ex-PresidentTyler in the chair; but for Virginia it was all along a condition of anyterms of agreement that the right of any State to secede should be fullyacknowledged. The Congress of the seceding States, which met at Montgomery, wasdescribed by Stephens as, "taken all in all, the noblest, soberest, mostintelligent, and most conservative body I was ever in. " It has beenremarked that Southern politicians of the agitator type were not sent toit. It adopted a provisional Constitution modelled largely upon that ofthe United States. Jefferson Davis, who had retired to his farm, wassent for to become President; Stephens, as already said, becameVice-President. The delegates there were to continue in session for thepresent as the regular Congress. Whether sobered by the thought thatthey were acting in the eyes of the world, or in accordance with theirown prevailing sentiment, these men, some of whom had before urged therevival of the slave trade, now placed in their Constitution a perpetualprohibition of it, and when, as a regular legislature, they afterwardspassed a penal statute which carried out this intention inadequately, President Davis conscientiously vetoed it and demanded a moresatisfactory measure. At his inauguration the Southern Presidentdelivered an address, typical of that curious blending of propriety andinsincerity, of which the politics of that period in America had offeredmany examples. It may seem incredible, but it contained no word ofslavery, but recited in dignified terms how the South had been driven toseparation by "wanton aggression on the part of others, " and after it had"vainly endeavoured to secure tranquillity. " The new Southern Congressnow resolved to take over the forts and other property in the secededStates that had belonged to the Union, and the first Confederate general, Beauregard, was sent to Charleston to hover over Fort Sumter. 3. _The Inauguration of Lincoln_. The first necessary business of the President-elect, while he watched thegathering of what Emerson named "the hurricane in which he was called tothe helm, " was to construct a strong Cabinet, to which may be added theseemingly unnecessary business forced upon him of dealing with a horde ofpilgrims who at once began visiting him to solicit some office or, inrarer cases, to press their disinterested opinions. His Cabinet, designed in principle, as has been said, while he was waiting in thetelegraph office for election returns, was actually constructed with somedelay and hesitation. Lincoln could not know personally all the men heinvited to join him, but he proceeded with the view of conjoining in hisadministration representatives of the chief shades of opinion which inthis critical time it would be his supreme duty to hold together. Notonly different shades of opinion, but the local sentiment of differentdistricts had to be considered; he once complained that if the twelveApostles had to be chosen nowadays the principle of locality would haveto be regarded; but at this time there was very solid reason whydifferent States should be contented and why he should be advised as totheir feelings. His own chief rivals for the Presidency offered a goodchoice from both these points of view. They were Seward of New York, Chase of Ohio, Bates of Missouri, Cameron of Pennsylvania. Seward andChase were both able and outstanding men: the former was in a sense theold Republican leader, but was more and more coming to be regarded as thetypical "Conservative, " or cautious Republican; Chase on the other handwas a leader of the "Radicals, " who were "stern and unbending" in theirattitude towards slavery and towards the South. These two must be gotand kept together if possible. Bates was a good and capable man whomoreover came from Missouri, a border slave State, where his influencewas much to be desired. He became Attorney-General. Cameron, anunfortunate choice as it turned out, was a very wealthy business man ofPennsylvania, representative of the weighty Protectionist influencethere. After he had been offered office, which had been withoutLincoln's authority promised him in the Republican Convention, Lincolnwas dismayed by representations that he was "a bad, corrupted man"; hewrote a curious letter asking Cameron to refuse his offer; Cameroninstead produced evidence of the desire of Pennsylvania for him; Lincolnstuck to his offer; the old Whig element among Republicans, theProtectionist element, and above all, the friends of the indispensableSeward, would otherwise have been outweighted in the Cabinet. Cameroneventually became for a time Secretary of War. To these Lincoln, uponsomebody's strong representations, tried, without much hope, to add somedistinctly Southern politician. The effort, of course, failed. Ultimately the Cabinet was completed by the addition of Caleb Smith ofIndiana as Secretary of the Interior, Gideon Welles of Connecticut asSecretary of the Navy, and Montgomery Blair of Maryland asPostmaster-General. Welles, with the guidance of a brilliantsubordinate, Fox, served usefully, was very loyal to Lincoln, had anantipathy to England which was dangerous, and kept very diligently adiary for which we may be grateful now. Blair was a vehement, irresponsible person with an influential connection, and, which wasimportant, his influence and that of his family lay in Maryland and otherborder slave States. Of all these men, Seward, Secretary of State--thatis, Foreign Minister and something more--and Chase, Secretary of theTreasury, most concern us. Lincoln's offer to Seward was made andaccepted in terms that did credit to both men, and Seward, still smartingat his own defeat, was admirably loyal. But his friends, though they hadsecured the appointment of Cameron to support them, thought increasinglyill of the prospects of a Cabinet which included the Radical Chase. Onthe very night before his inauguration Lincoln received from Seward, whohad just been helping to revise his Inaugural Address, a letterwithdrawing his acceptance of office. By some not clearly recordedexercise of that great power over men, which, if with some failures, wasgenerally at his command, he forced Seward to see that the unconditionalwithdrawal of this letter was his public duty. It must throughout whatfollows be remembered that Lincoln's first and most constant duty was tohold together the jarring elements in the North which these jarringelements in his own Cabinet represented; and it was one of his greatachievements that he kept together, for as long as was needful, able butdiscordant public servants who could never have combined together withouthim. On February 11, 1861, Lincoln, standing on the gallery at the end of arailway car, upon the instant of departure from the home to which henever returned, said to his old neighbours (according to the version ofhis speech which his private secretary got him to dictate immediatelyafter): "My friends, no one, not in my situation, can appreciate myfeeling of sadness at this parting. To this place, and the kindness ofthese people, I owe everything. Here I have lived for a quarter of acentury, and have passed from a young to an old man. Here my childrenhave been born and one is buried. I now leave, not knowing when orwhether ever I may return, with a task before me greater than that whichrested upon Washington. Without the assistance of that Divine Being whoever attended him, I cannot succeed. With that assistance, I cannotfail. Trusting in Him who can go with me, and remain with you, and beeverywhere for good, let us confidently hope that all will yet be well. To His care commending you, as I hope in your prayers you will commendme, I bid you an affectionate farewell. " He was, indeed, going to a task not less great than Washington's, but hewas going to it with a preparation in many respects far inferior to his. For the last eight years he had laboured as a public speaker, and in ameasure as a party leader, and had displayed and developed comprehension, perhaps unequalled, of some of the larger causes which mould publicaffairs. But, except in sheer moral discipline, those years had donenothing to supply the special training which he had previously lacked, for high executive office. In such office at such a time ready decisionin an obscure and passing situation may often be a not less requisitethan philosophic grasp either of the popular mind or of eternal laws. The powers which he had hitherto shown would still be needful to him, butso too would other powers which he had never practised in any comparableposition, and which nature does not in a moment supply. Any attempt tojudge of Lincoln's Presidency--and it can only be judged at all when ithas gone on some way--must take account, not perhaps so much of hisinexperience, as of his own reasonable consciousness of it and his greatanxiety to use the advice of men who were in any way presumably morecompetent. He deliberately delayed his arrival in Washington and availed himself ofofficial invitations to stay at four great towns and five State capitalswhich he could conveniently pass on his way. The journey abounded insmall incidents and speeches, some of which exposed him to a littleridicule in the press, though they probably created an undercurrent ofsympathy for him. Near one station where the train stopped lived alittle girl he knew, who had recently urged upon him to wear a beard orwhiskers. To this dreadful young person, and to that persistent goodnature of his which was now and then fatuous, was due the ill-designedhairy ornamentation which during his Presidency hid the really beautifulmodelling of his jaw and chin. He enquired for her at the station, hadher fetched from the crowd, claimed her praise for this supposedimprovement, and kissed her in presence of the press. In New York he wasguilty of a more sinister and tragic misfeasance. In that city, where, if it may be said with respect, there has existed from of old afashionable circle not convinced of its own gentility and insisting themore rigorously on minor decorum, Lincoln went to the opera, and historystill deplores that this misguided man went there and sat there with hislarge hands in black kid gloves. Here perhaps it is well to say that theeducated world of the Eastern States, including those who privatelydeplored Lincoln's supposed unfitness, treated its untried chiefmagistrate with that engrained good breeding to which it was utterlyindifferent how plain a man he might be. His lesser speeches as he wentwere unstudied appeals to loyalty, with very simple avowals of inadequacyto his task, and expressions of reliance on the people's support when hetried to do his duty. To a man who can sometimes speak from the heartand to the heart as Lincoln did it is perhaps not given to be uniformlyfelicitous. Among these speeches was that delivered at Philadelphia, which has already been quoted, but most of them were not consideredfelicitous at the time. They were too unpretentious. Moreover, theycontained sentences which seemed to understate the gravity of the crisisin a way which threw doubt on his own serious statesmanship. Whetherthey were felicitous or not, the intention of these much-criticisedutterances was the best proof of his statesmanship. He would appeal tothe steady loyalty of the North, but he was not going to arouse itspassion. He assumed to the last that calm reflection might prevail inthe South, which was menaced by nothing but "an artificial crisis. " Hereferred to war as a possibility, but left no doubt of his own wish byall means to avoid it. "There will, " he said, "be no bloodshed unless itbe forced on the Government. The Government will not use force unlessforce is used against it. " Before he passed through Baltimore he received earnest communicationsfrom Seward and from General Scott. Each had received trustworthyinformation of a plot, which existed, to murder him in that city. Owingto their warnings he went through Baltimore secretly at night, so thathis arrival in Washington, on February 23, was unexpected. This was hisobvious duty, and nobody who knew him was ever in doubt of his personalintrepidity; but of course it helped to damp the effect of what manypeople would have been glad to regard as a triumphal progress. On March 4, 1861, old Buchanan came in his carriage to escort hissuccessor to the inaugural ceremony, where it was the ironical fate ofChief Justice Taney to administer the oath to a President who had alreadygone far to undo his great work. Yet a third notable Democrat was thereto do a pleasant little act. Douglas, Lincoln's defeated rival, placedhimself with a fine ostentation by his side, and, observing that he wasembarrassed as to where to put his new tall hat and preposterousgold-knobbed cane, took charge of these encumbrances before the momentarrived for the most eagerly awaited of all his speeches. Lincoln hadsubmitted his draft of his "First Inaugural" to Seward, and this draftwith Seward's abundant suggestions of amendment has been preserved. Ithas considerable literary interest, and, by the readiness with which mostof Seward's suggestions were adopted, and the decision with which some, and those not the least important, were set aside by Lincoln, itillustrates well the working relation which, after one short struggle, was to be established between these two men. By Seward's advice Lincolnadded to an otherwise dry speech some concluding paragraphs of emotionalappeal. The last sentence of the speech, which alone is much remembered, is Seward's in the first conception of it, Seward's in the slightlyhackneyed phrase with which it ends, Lincoln's alone in the touch ofhaunting beauty which is on it. His "First Inaugural" was by general confession an able state paper, setting forth simply and well a situation with which we are now familiar. It sets out dispassionately the state of the controversy on slavery, laysdown with brief argument the position that the Union is indissoluble, andproceeds to define the duty of the Government in face of an attempt todissolve it. "The power, " he said, "confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the Government, and to collect the duties on imports; but beyond what may be necessaryfor these objects there will be no invasion, no using of force against oramong the people anywhere. The mails, unless repelled, will continue tobe furnished in all parts of the Union. " He proceeded to set out what heconceived to be the impossibility of real separation; the intimaterelations between the peoples of the several States must still continue;they would still remain for adjustment after any length of warfare; theycould be far better adjusted in Union than in enmity. He concluded: "Inyour hands, my dissatisfied fellow-countrymen, and not in mine, is themomentous issue of civil war. The Government will not assail you. Youcan have no conflict without being yourselves the aggressors. I am loathto close. We are not enemies but friends. We must not be enemies. Though passion may have strained, it must not break our bonds ofaffection. The mystic chords of memory, stretching from everybattlefield and patriot grave to every living heart and hearthstone allover this broad land, will yet swell the chorus of the Union, when againtouched, as surely they will be, by the better angels of our nature. " 4. _The Outbreak of War_. Upon the newly-inaugurated President there now descended a swarm ofoffice-seekers. The Republican party had never been in power before, andthese patriotic people exceeded in number and voracity those that hadassailed any American President before. To be accessible to all such wasthe normal duty of a President; it was perhaps additionally incumbent onhim at this time. When in the course of nature the number ofoffice-seekers abated, they were succeeded, as will be seen, bysupplicants of another kind, whose petitions were often really harrowing. The horror of this enduring visitation has been described by Artemus Wardin terms which Lincoln himself could not have improved upon. Hisclassical treatment of the subject is worth serious reference; for itshould be realised that Lincoln, who had both to learn his new trade ofstatecraft and to exercise it in a terrible emergency, did so with alarge part of each day necessarily consumed by worrying and distastefultasks of a much paltrier kind. On the day after the Inauguration came word from Major Anderson at FortSumter that he could only hold out a few weeks longer unless reinforcedand provisioned. With it came to Lincoln the opinion of General Scott, that to relieve Fort Sumter now would require a force of 20, 000 men, which did not exist. The Cabinet was summoned with military and navaladvisers. The sailors thought they could throw men and provisions intoFort Sumter; the soldiers said the ships would be destroyed by theConfederate batteries. Lincoln asked his Cabinet whether, assuming it tobe feasible, it was politically advisable now to provision Fort Sumter. Blair said yes emphatically; Chase said yes in a qualified way. Theother five members of the Cabinet said no; General Scott had given hisopinion, as on a military question, that the fort should now beevacuated; they argued that the evacuation of this one fort would berecognised by the country as merely a military necessity arising from theneglect of the last administration. Lincoln reserved his decision. Let us conceive the effect of a decision to evacuate Fort Sumter. SouthCarolina had for long claimed it as a due acknowledgment of its sovereignand independent rights, and for no other end; the Confederacy now claimedit and its first act had been to send Beauregard to threaten the fort. Even Buchanan had ended by withstanding these claims. The assertion thathe would hold these forts had been the gist of Lincoln's Inaugural. Thiswas the one fort that was in the eyes of the Northern public or theSouthern public either; they probably never realised that there wereother forts, Fort Pickens, for example, on the Gulf of Mexico, which theadministration was prepared to defend. And now it was proposed thatLincoln, who had put down his foot with a bang yesterday, should take itup with a shuffle to-day. And Lincoln reserved his judgment; and, whichis much more, went on reserving it till the question nearly settleditself to his disgrace. Lincoln lacked here, it would seem, not by any means the qualities of thetrained administrator, but just that rough perception and vigour whichuntaught genius might be supposed to possess. The passionate Jackson(who, by the way, was a far more educated man in the respects whichcount) would not have acted so. Lincoln, it is true, had declared thathe would take no provocative step--"In your hands, my dissatisfiedfellow-countrymen, and not in mine, is the momentous issue of civil war, "and the risk which he would have taken by over-ruling that day theopinion of the bulk of his Cabinet based on that of his chief militaryadviser is obvious, but it seems to have been a lesser risk than he didtake in delaying so long to overrule his Cabinet. It is preciselycharacteristic of his strength and of his weakness that he did not atonce yield to his advisers; that he long continued weighing the matterundisturbed by the danger of delay; that he decided as soon as and nosooner than he felt sure as to the political results, which alone heremattered, for the military consequences amounted to nothing. This story was entangled from the first with another difficult story. Commissioners from the Southern Confederacy came to Washington and soughtinterviews with Seward; they came to treat for the recognition of theConfederacy and the peaceful surrender of forts and the like within itsborders. Meanwhile the action of Virginia was in the balance, and the"Peace Convention, " summoned by Virginia, still "threshing again, " asLowell said, "the already twice-threshed straw of debate. " The action ofVirginia and of other border States, about which Lincoln was intenselysolicitous, would certainly depend upon the action of the Governmenttowards the States that had already seceded. Might it not be well thatthe Government should avoid immediate conflict with South Carolina aboutFort Sumter, though conflict with the Confederacy about Fort Pickens andthe rest would still impend? Was it not possible that conflict could bestaved off till an agreement could be reached with Virginia and theborder States, which would induce the seceded States to return? Thesequestions were clearly absurd, but they were as clearly natural, and theygreatly exercised Seward. Disappointed at not being President andequally disturbed at the prospect of civil war, but still inclined tolarge and sanguine hopes, he was rather anxious to take things out ofLincoln's hands and very anxious to serve his country as the greatpeacemaker. Indirect negotiations now took place between him and theSouthern Commissioners, who of course could not be officially recognised, through the medium of two Supreme Court Judges, especially one Campbell, who was then in Washington. Seward was quite loyal to Lincoln and toldhim in a general way what he was doing; he was also candid with Campbelland his friends, and explained to them his lack of authority, but hetalked freely and rashly of what he hoped to bring about. Lincoln gaveSeward some proper cautions and left him all proper freedom; but it ispossible that he once told Douglas that he intended, at that moment, toevacuate Fort Sumter. The upshot of the matter is that the decision ofthe Government was delayed by negotiations which, as it ought to haveknown, could come to nothing, and that the Southern Government and theCommissioners, after they had got home, thought they had been deceived inthese negotiations. Discussions were still proceeding as to Fort Sumter when a freshdifficulty arose for Lincoln, but one which enabled him to becomehenceforth master in his Cabinet. The strain of Seward's position upon aman inclined to be vain and weak can easily be imagined, but the suddenvagary in which it now resulted was surprising. Upon April 1 he sent toLincoln "Some Thoughts for the President's Consideration. " In thispaper, after deploring what he described as the lack of any policy sofar, and defining, in a way that does not matter, his attitude as to theforts in the South, he proceeded thus: "I would demand explanations fromGreat Britain and Russia, and send agents into Canada, Mexico, andCentral America, to raise a vigorous spirit of independence on thiscontinent against European intervention, and if satisfactory explanationsare not received from Spain and France, would convene Congress anddeclare war against them. " In other words, Seward would seek to end alldomestic dissensions by suddenly creating out of nothing a dazzlingforeign policy. But this was not the only point, even if it was the mainpoint; he proceeded: "Either the President must do it" (that is the soleconduct of this policy) "himself, or devolve it on some member of hisCabinet. It is not my especial province. But I neither seek to evadenor assume responsibility. " In other words, Seward put himself forwardas the sole director of the Government. In his brief reply Lincoln madeno reference whatever to Seward's amazing programme. He pointed out thatthe policy so far, as to which Seward had complained, was one in whichSeward had entirely concurred. As to the concluding demand that some oneman, and that man Seward, should control all policy, he wrote, "If thismust be done, I must do it. When a general line of policy is adopted, Iapprehend there is no danger of its being changed without good reason, orcontinuing to be a subject of unnecessary debate; still, upon pointsarising in its progress I wish, and suppose I am entitled to have, theadvice of all the Cabinet. " Seward was not a fool, far from it; he wasone of the ablest men in America, only at that moment strained andexcited beyond the limits of his good sense. Lincoln's quiet answersobered him then and for ever after. He showed a generous mind; he wroteto his wife soon after: "Executive force and vigour are rare qualities;the President is the best of us. " And Lincoln's generosity was no less;his private secretary, Nicolay, saw these papers; but no other man knewanything of Seward's abortive rebellion against Lincoln till after theyboth were dead. The story needs no explanation, but the more attentivelyall the circumstances are considered, the more Lincoln's handling of thisemergency, which threatened the ruin of his Government, throws into shadethe weakness he had hitherto shown. Lincoln was thus in a stronger position when he finally decided as toFort Sumter. It is unnecessary to follow the repeated consultations thattook place. There were preparations for possible expeditions both toFort Sumter and to Fort Pickens, and various blunders about them, andSeward made some trouble by officious interference about them. Anannouncement was sent to the Governor of South Carolina that provisionswould be sent to Fort Sumter and he was assured that if this wasunopposed no further steps would be taken. What chiefly concerns us isthat the eventual decision to send provisions but not troops to FortSumter was Lincoln's decision; but that it was not taken till afterSenators and Congressmen had made clear to him that Northern opinionwould support him. It was the right decision, for it conspicuouslyavoided the appearance of provocation, while it upheld the right of theUnion; but it was taken perilously late, and the delay exposed theGovernment to the risk of a great humiliation. An Alabama gentleman had urged Jefferson Davis that the impendingstruggle must not be delayed. "Unless, " he said, "you sprinkle blood inthe face of the people of Alabama, they will be back in the old Union inten days. " There is every reason to suppose that the gentleman'sstatement as to the probable collapse of the South was mere rhetoric, butit seems that his advice led to orders being sent to Beauregard to reduceFort Sumter. Beauregard sent a summons to Anderson; Anderson, now allbut starved out, replied that unless he received supplies or instructionshe would surrender on April 15. Whether by Beauregard's orders orthrough some misunderstanding, the Confederate batteries opened fire onFort Sumter on April 12. Fort Sumter became untenable on the next day, when the relief ships, which Anderson had been led to expect sooner, butwhich could in no case really have helped him, were just appearing in theoffing. Anderson very properly capitulated. On Sunday, April 14, 1861, he marched out with the honours of war. The Union flag had been firedupon in earnest by the Confederates, and, leaving Virginia and the Statesthat went with it to join the Confederacy if they chose, the North sprangto arms. In the events which had led up to the outbreak of war Abraham Lincoln hadplayed a part more admirable and more decisive in its effect than hiscountrymen could have noted at the time or perhaps have appreciatedsince. He was confronted now with duties requiring mental gifts of adifferent kind from those which he had hitherto displayed, and withtemptations to which he had not yet been exposed. In a general sense thegreatness of mind and heart which he unfolded under fierce trial does notneed to be demonstrated to-day. Yet in detail hardly an action of hisPresidency is exempt from controversy; nor is his many-sided characterone of those which men readily flatter themselves that they understand. There are always, moreover, those to whom it is a marvel how any greatman came by his name. The particular tribute, which in the pages thatfollow it is desired to pay to him, consists in the careful examinationof just those actions and just those qualities of his upon which candiddetraction has in fact fastened, or on which candid admiration haspronounced with hesitancy. CHAPTER VII THE CONDITIONS OF THE WAR In recounting the history of Lincoln's Presidency, it will be necessaryto mark the course of the Civil War stage by stage as we proceed. There are, however, one or two general features of the contest withwhich it may be well to deal by way of preface. It has seldom happened that a people entering upon a great war haveunderstood at the outset what the character of that war would be. Whenthe American Civil War broke out the North expected an easy victory, but, as disappointment came soon and was long maintained, many cleverpeople adopted the opinion, which early prevailed in Europe, that therewas no possibility of their success at all. At the first thedifficulty of the task was unrecognised; under early and long-sustaineddisappointment the strength by which those difficulties could beovercome began to be despaired of without reason. The North, after several slave States, which were at first doubtful, had adhered to it, had more than double the population of the South; ofthe Southern population a very large part were slaves, who, thoughindustrially useful, could not be enlisted. In material resources thesuperiority of the North was no less marked, and its material wealthgrew during the war to a greater extent than had perhaps ever happenedto any other belligerent power. These advantages were likely to bedecisive in the end, if the North could and would endure to the end. But at the very beginning these advantages simply did not tell at all, for the immediately available military force of the North wasinsignificant, and that of the South clearly superior to it; and evenwhen they began to tell, it was bound to be very long before their fullweight could be brought to bear. And the object which was to beobtained was supremely difficult of attainment. It was not a defeat ofthe South which might result in the alteration of a frontier, thecession of some Colonies, the payment of an indemnity, and such likematters; it was a conquest of the South so complete that the Unioncould be restored on a firmer basis than before. Any less result thanthis would be failure in the war. And the country, to be thuscompletely conquered by an unmilitary people of nineteen millions, wasof enormous extent: leaving out of account the huge outlying State ofTexas, which is larger than Germany, the remaining Southern Stateswhich joined in the Confederacy have an area somewhat larger than thatof Germany, Austria-Hungary, Holland, and Belgium put together; andthis great region had no industrial centres or other points of suchgreat strategic importance that by the occupation of them the remainingarea could be dominated. The feat which the Northern people eventuallyachieved has been said by the English historians of the war (perhapswith some exaggeration) to have been "a greater one than that whichNapoleon attempted to his own undoing when he invaded Russia in 1812. " On the other hand, the South was in some respects very favourablyplaced for resisting invasion from the North. The Southern forcesduring most of the war were, in the language of military writers, operating on interior lines; that is, the different portions of themlay nearer to one another than did the different portions of theNorthern forces, and could be more quickly brought to converge on thesame point; the country abounded in strong positions for defence whichcould be held by a relatively small force, while in every invadingmovement the invaders had to advance long distances from the base, thusexposing their lines of communication to attack. The advantage of thissituation, if competent use were made of it, was bound to go very fartowards compensating for inferiority of numbers; the North could notmake its superior numbers on land tell in any rapidly decisive fashionwithout exposing itself to dangerous counter-strokes. In navalstrength its superiority was asserted almost from the first, and bycutting off foreign supplies caused the Southern armies to suffersevere privations before the war was half through; but its full effectcould only be produced very slowly. Thus, if its people were brave andits leaders capable, the South was by no means in so hopeless a case asmight at first have appeared; with good fortune it might hope to strikeits powerful antagonist some deadly blow before that antagonist couldbring its strength to bear; and even if this hope failed, asufficiently tenacious defence might well wear down the patience of theNorth. As soldiers the Southerners started with a superiority which theNortherners could only overtake slowly. If each people were taken inthe mass, the proportion of Southerners bred to an outdoor life washigher. Generally speaking, if not exactly more frugal, they were farless used to living comfortably. Above all, all classes of peopleamong them were still accustomed to think of fighting as a normal andsuitable occupation for a man; while the prevailing temper of the Norththought of man as meant for business, and its higher temper was apt tothink of fighting as odious and war out of date. This, like the otheradvantages of the South, was transitory; before very long Northernerswho became soldiers at a sacrifice of inclination, from the highestspirit of patriotism or in the methodic temper in which business has tobe done, would become man for man as good soldiers as the Southerners;but the original superiority of the Southerners would continue to havea moral effect in their own ranks and on the mind of the enemy, moreespecially of the enemy's generals, even after its cause had ceased toexist; and herein the military advantage of the South was undoubtedly, through the first half of the war, considerable. In the matter of leadership the South had certain very real and certainother apparent but probably delusive advantages. The United States hadno large number of trained military officers, still capable of activeservice. The armies of the North and South alike had to be commandedand staffed to a great extent by men who first studied their professionin that war; and the lack of ripe military judgment was likely to befelt most in the higher commands where the forces to be employed andco-ordinated were largest. The South secured what may be called itsfair proportion of the comparatively few officers, but it was oftremendous moment that, among the officers who, when the war began, were recognised as competent, two, who sadly but in simple loyalty tothe State of Virginia took the Southern side, were men of genius. Theadvantages of the South would have been no advantages without skill andresolution to make use of them. The main conditions of the war--thevast space, the difficulty in all parts of it of moving troops, thegenerally low level of military knowledge--were all such as greatlyenhance the opportunities of the most gifted commander. Lee and"Stonewall" Jackson thus became, the former throughout the war, thelatter till he was killed in the summer of 1863, factors of primaryimportance in the struggle. Wolseley, who had, besides studying theirrecord, conversed both with Lee and with Moltke, thought Lee evengreater than Moltke, and the military writers of our day speak of himas one of the great commanders of history. As to Jackson, Lee's beliefin him is sufficient testimony to his value. And the good fortune ofthe South was not confined to these two signal instances. Most of theSouthern generals who appeared early in the war could be retained inimportant commands to the end. The South might have seemed at first equally fortunate in the characterof the Administration at the back of the generals. An ascendency wasat once conceded to Jefferson Davis, a tried political leader, to whichLincoln had to win his way, and the past experiences of the two men hadbeen very different. The operations of war in which Lincoln had takenpart were confined, according to his own romantic account in a speechin Congress, to stealing ducks and onions from the civil population;his Ministers were as ignorant in the matter as he; their militaryadviser, Scott, was so infirm that he had soon to retire, and it provedmost difficult to replace him. Jefferson Davis, on the other hand, started with knowledge of affairs, including military affairs; he hadbeen Secretary of War in Pierce's Cabinet and Chairman of the SenateCommittee on War since then; above all, he had been a soldier and hadcommanded a regiment with some distinction in the Mexican War. It isthought that he would have preferred a military command to thePresidency of the Confederacy, and as his own experience of actual warwas as great as that of his generals, he can hardly be blamed for adisposition to interfere with them at the beginning. But militaryhistorians, while criticising (perhaps a little hastily) all Lincoln'sinterventions in the affairs of war up to the time when he foundgenerals whom he trusted, insist that Davis' systematic interferencewas far more harmful to his cause; and Wolseley, who watched eventsclosely from Canada and who visited the Southern Army in 1863, is mostemphatic in this opinion. He interfered with Lee to an extent whichnothing but Lee's devoted friendship and loyalty could have madetolerable. He put himself into relations of dire hostility with JosephJohnston, and in 1864 suspended him in the most injudicious manner. Above all, when the military position of the South had begun to beacutely perilous, Jefferson Davis neither devised for himself, norallowed his generals to devise, any bold policy by which the chancethat still remained could be utilised. His energy of will showeditself in the end in nothing but a resolution to protract bloodshedafter it had certainly become idle. If we turn to the political conditions, on which, in any but a shortwar, so much depends, the South will appear to have had greatadvantages. Its people were more richly endowed than the mixed andcrudely democratic multitude of the North, in the traditional aptitudefor commanding or obeying which enables people to pull together in acrisis. And they were united in a cause such as would secure thesustained loyalty of any ordinary people under any ordinary leader. For, though it was nothing but slavery that led to their assertion ofindependence, from the moment that they found themselves involved inwar, they were fighting for a freedom to which they felt themselvesentitled, and for nothing else whatever. A few successful encountersat the start tempted the ordinary Southerner to think himself a betterman than the ordinary Northerner, even as the Southern Congressmen feltthemselves superior to the persons whom the mistaken democracy of theNorth too frequently elected. This claim of independence soon acquiredsomething of the fierce pride that might have been felt by an ancientnation. But it would have been impossible that the Northern people asa whole should be similarly possessed by the cause in which theyfought. They did not seem to be fighting for their own liberty, andthey would have hated to think that they were fighting for conquest. They were fighting for the maintenance of a national unity which theyheld dear. The question how far it was worth fighting a formidableenemy for the sake of eventual unity with him, was bound to presentitself. Thus, far from wondering that the cause of the Union arousedno fuller devotion than it did in the whole lump of the Northernpeople, we may wonder that it inspired with so lofty a patriotism menand women in every rank of life who were able to leaven that lump. Butthe political element in this war was of such importance as to lead toa startling result; the North came nearest to yielding at a time whenin a military sense its success had become sure. To preserve a unitedNorth was the greatest and one of the hardest of the duties ofPresident Lincoln. To a civilian reader the history of the war, in spite of thepicturesque incidents of many battles, may easily be made dreary. Tillfar on in the lengthy process of subjecting the South, we might easilybecome immersed in some futile story of how General X. Was supersededby General Y. In a command, for which neither discovered any purposebut that of not co-operating with General Z. And this impression isnot merely due to our failure to understand the difficulties whichconfronted these gallant officers. The dearth of trained militaryfaculty, which was felt at the outset, could only be made good by thetraining which the war itself supplied. Such commanders as Grant andSherman and Sheridan not only could not have been recognised at thebeginning of the war; they were not then the soldiers that theyafterwards became. And the want was necessarily very serious in thecase of the higher commands which required the movement of largeforces, the control of subordinates each of whom must have a widediscretion, and the energy of intellect and will necessary forresolving the more complex problems of strategy. We are called upon toadmire upon both sides the devotion of forgotten thousands, and toadmire upon the side of the South the brilliant and daring operationsby which in so many battles Lee and Jackson defeated superior forces. On the Northern side, later on, great generals came to view, but it isin the main a different sort of achievement which we are called upon toappreciate. An Administration appointed to direct a stupendousoperation of conquest was itself of necessity ill prepared for such atask; behind it were a Legislature and a public opinion equally illprepared to support and to assist it. There were in its militaryservice many intelligent and many enterprising men, but none, at first, so combining intelligence and enterprise that he could grapple with anygreat responsibility or that the civil power would have been warrantedin reposing complete confidence in him. The history of the war has tobe recounted in this volume chiefly with a view to these difficultiesof the Administration. One of the most interesting features of the war would, in any militarystudy of it, be seen to be the character of the troops on both sides. On both sides their individual quality was high; on both, circumstancesand the disposition of the people combined to make discipline weak. This character, common to the two armies, was conspicuous in manybattles of the war, but a larger interest attaches to the policy of thetwo administrations in raising and organising their civilian armies. The Southern Government, if its proceedings were studied in detail, would probably seem to have been better advised at the start on mattersof military organisation; for instance, it had early and long retaineda superiority in cavalry which was not a mere result of good fortune. But here, too, there was an inherent advantage in the very fact thatthe South had started upon a desperate venture. There can hardly be amore difficult problem of detail for statesmen than the co-ordinationof military and civil requirements in the raising of an army. But inthe South all civil considerations merged themselves in the paramountnecessity of a military success for which all knew the utmost effortwas needed. The several States of the South, claiming as they did afar larger independence than the Northern States, knew that they couldonly make that claim good by being efficient members of theConfederacy. Thus it was comparatively easy for the ConfederateGovernment to adopt and maintain a consecutive policy in this matter, and though, from the conditions of a widely spread agriculturalpopulation, voluntary enlistment produced poor results at the beginningof the war, it appears to have been easy to introduce quite early anentirely compulsory system of a stringent kind. The introduction of compulsory service in the North has its place inour subsequent story. The system that preceded it need not be dweltupon here, because, full of instruction as a technical study of it(such as has been made by Colonel Henderson) must be, no brief surveyby an amateur could be useful. It is necessary, however, to understandthe position in which Lincoln's Administration was placed, without muchexperience In America, or perhaps elsewhere in the world, to guide it. It must not be contended, for it cannot be known that the problem wasfully and duly envisaged by Lincoln on his Cabinet, but it wouldprobably in any case have been impossible for them to pursue from thefirst a consecutive and well-thought-out policy for raising an army andkeeping up its strength. The position of the North differedfundamentally from that of the South; the North experienced neither theardour nor the throes of a revolution; it was never in any fear ofbeing conquered, only of not conquering. There was nothing, therefore, which at once bestowed on the Government a moral power over the countryvastly in excess of that which it exercised in normal times. This, however, was really necessary to it if the problem of the Army was tobe handled in the way which was desirable from a military point ofview. Compulsory service could not at first be thought of. It wasnever supposed that the tiny regular Army of the United StatesGovernment could be raised to any very great size by voluntaryenlistment, and the limited increase of it which was attempted was notaltogether successful. The existing militia system of the severalStates was almost immediately found faulty and was discarded. A greatVolunteer Force had to be raised which should be under the command ofthe President, who by the Constitution is Commander-in-Chief of theforces of the Union, but which must be raised in each State by theState Governor (or, if he was utterly wanting, by leading localcitizens). Now State Governors are not--it must be recalled--officersunder the President, but independent potentates acting usually in asmuch detachment from him as the Vice-Chancellor of Oxford or Cambridgefrom the Board of Education or a Presbyterian minister from a bishop. This group of men, for the most part able, patriotic, and determined, were there to be used and had to be consulted. It follows that thepolicy of the North in raising and organising its armies had at firstto be a policy evolved between numerous independent authorities whichnever met and were held together by a somewhat ignorant public opinion, sometimes much depressed and sometimes, which was worse, oversanguine. It is impossible to judge exactly how ill or how well Lincoln, undersuch circumstances, grappled with this particular problem, but manyanomalies which seem to us preposterous--the raising of raw newregiments when fine seasoned regiments were short of half theirstrength, and so forth--were in these circumstances inevitable. Thenational system of recruiting, backed by compulsion, which was laterset up, still required for its success the co-operation of State andlocal authorities of this wholly independent character. Northern and Southern armies alike had necessarily to be commanded to agreat extent by amateur officers; the number of officers, in theservice or retired, who had been trained at West Point, wasimmeasurably too small for the needs of the armies. Amateurs had to becalled in, and not only so, but they had in some cases to be given veryimportant commands. The not altogether unwholesome tradition that aself-reliant man can turn his hand to anything was of course verystrong in America, and the short military annals of the country hadbeen thought to have added some illustrious instances to the roll ofmen of peace who have distinguished themselves in arms. So a politicalleader, no matter whether he was Democrat or Republican, who was a manof known general capacity, would sometimes at first seem suitable foran important command rather than the trained but unknown professionalsoldier who was the alternative. Moreover, it seemed foolish not toappoint him, when, as sometimes happened, he could bring thousands ofrecruits from his State. The Civil War turned out, however, to showthe superiority of the duly trained military mind in a marked degree. Some West-Pointers of repute of course proved incapable, and a greatmany amateur colonels and generals, both North and South, attained avery fair level of competence in the service (the few conspicuousfailures seem to have been quite exceptional); but, all the same, ofthe many clever and stirring men who then took up soldiering as novicesand served for four years, not one achieved brilliant success; of thegenerals in the war whose names are remembered, some had indeed passedyears in civil life, but every one had received a thorough militarytraining in the years of his early manhood. It certainly does notappear that the Administration was really neglectful of professionalmerit; it hungered to find it; but many appointments must at first havebeen made in a haphazard fashion, for there was no machinery forsifting claims. A zealous but unknown West-Pointer put under anoutsider would be apt to write as Sherman did in early days: "Mr. Lincoln meant to insult me and the Army"; and a considerable jealousyevidently arose between West-Pointers and amateurs. It was aggravatedby the rivalry between officers of the Eastern army and those of the, more largely amateur, Western army. The amateurs, too, had somethingto say on their side; they were apt to accuse West-Pointers as a classof a cringing belief that the South was invincible. There was nothingunnatural or very serious in all this, but political influences whicharose later caused complaints of this nature to be made the most of, and a general charge to be made against Lincoln's Administration ofappointing generals and removing them under improper politicalinfluences. This general charge, however, rests upon a limited numberof alleged instances, and all of these which are of any importance willnecessarily be examined in later chapters. It may be useful to a reader who wishes to follow the main course ofthe war carefully, if the chief ways in which geographical factsaffected it are here summarised--necessarily somewhat dryly. Minoroperations at outlying points on the coast or in the Far West will beleft out of account, so also will a serious political consideration, which we shall later see caused doubt for a time as to the properstrategy of the North. It must be noted first, startling as it may be to Englishmen whoremember the war partly by the exploits of the _Alabama_, that thenaval superiority of the North was overwhelming. In spite of manygallant efforts by the Southern sailors, the North could blockade theircoasts and could capture most of the Southern ports long before itssuperiority on land was established. Turning then to land, we maytreat the political frontier between the two powers, after a shortpreliminary stage of war, as being marked by the southern boundaries ofMaryland, West Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri, just as they are seenon the map to-day. In doing so, we must note that at the commencementof large operations parts of Kentucky and Missouri were occupied bySouthern invading forces. This frontier is cut, not far from theAtlantic, by the parallel mountain chains which make up the Alleghaniesor Appalachians. These in effect separated the field of operationsinto a narrow Eastern theatre of war, and an almost boundless Westerntheatre; and the operations in these two theatres were almost to theend independent of each other. In the Eastern theatre of war lies Washington, the capital of theUnion, a place of great importance to the North for obvious reasons, and especially because if it fell European powers would be likely torecognise the Confederacy. It lies, on the Potomac, right upon thefrontier; and could be menaced also in the rear, for the broad andfertile trough between the mountain chains formed by the valley of theShenandoah River, which flows northward to join the Potomac at a pointnorth-west of Washington, was in Confederate hands and formed a sort ofsally-port by which a force from Richmond could get almost behindWashington. A hundred miles south of Washington lay Richmond, whichshortly became the capital of the Confederates, instead of Montgomeryin Alabama. As a brand-new capital it mattered little to theConfederates, though at the very end of the war it became their lastremaining stronghold. The intervening country, which was in Southernhands, was extraordinarily difficult. The reader may notice on the mapthe rivers with broad estuaries which are its most marked features, andwith the names of which we shall become familiar. The riversthemselves were obstacles to an invading Northern army; theirestuaries, on the other hand, soon afforded it safe communication bysea. In the Western theatre of war we must remember first the enormouslength of frontier in proportion to the population on either side. This necessarily made the progress of Northern invasion slow, and itsproper direction hard to determine, for diversions could be created bya counter-invasion elsewhere along the frontier or a stroke at theinvaders' communications. The principal feature of the whole region isthe great waterways, on which the same advantages which gave the sea tothe North gave it also an immense superiority in the river warfare offlotillas of gunboats. When the North with its gunboats could getcontrol of the Mississippi the South would be deprived of aconsiderable part of its territory and resources, and cut off from itslast means of trading with Europe (save for the relief afforded byblockade-runners) by being cut off from Mexico and its ports. Further, when the North could control the tributaries of the Mississippi, especially the Cumberland and the Tennessee which flow into the greatriver through the Ohio, it would cut deep into the internalcommunications of the South. Against this menace the South could onlycontend by erecting powerful fortresses on the rivers, and the captureof some of them was the great object of the earlier Northern operations. The railway system of the South must also be taken into account inconnection with their waterways. This, of course, cannot be seen on amodern map. Perhaps the following may make the main points clear. TheSouthern railway system touched the Mississippi and the world beyond itat three points only: Memphis, Vicksburg, and New Orleans. A travellerwishing to go, say, from Richmond by rail towards the West could have, if distance were indifferent to him, a choice of three routes for partof the way. He could go through Knoxville in Tennessee to Chattanoogain that State, where he had a choice of routes further West, or hecould take one of two alternative lines south into Georgia and thencego either to Atlanta or to Columbus in the west of that State. Arrivedat Atlanta or Columbus, he could proceed further West either by makinga detour northwards through Chattanooga or by making a detoursouthwards through the seaport town of Mobile, crossing the harbour byboat. Thus the capture of Chattanooga from the South would go fartowards cutting the whole Southern railway system in two, and thecapture of Mobile would complete it. Lastly, we may notice two linesrunning north and south through the State of Mississippi, one throughCorinth and Meridian, and the other nearer the great river. From thisand the course of the rivers the strategic importance of some of thetowns mentioned may be partly appreciated. The subjugation of the South in fact began by a process, necessarilyslow and much interrupted, whereby having been blockaded by sea it wassurrounded by land, cut off from its Western territory, and deprived ofits main internal lines of communication. Richmond, against which theNorth began to move within the first three months of the war, did notfall till nearly four years later, when the process just described hadbeen completed, and when a Northern army had triumphantly progressed, wasting the resources of the country as it went, from Chattanooga toAtlanta, thence to the Atlantic coast of Georgia, and thence northwardthrough the two Carolinas till it was about to join hands with the armyassailing Richmond. Throughout this time the attention of a large partof the Northern public and of all those who watched the war from Europewas naturally fastened to a great extent upon the desperate fightingwhich occurred in the region of Washington and of Richmond and upon theill success of the North in endeavours of unforeseen difficulty againstthe latter city. We shall see, however, that the long and humiliatingfailure of the North in this quarter was neither so unaccountable nornearly so important as it appeared. CHAPTER VIII THE OPENING OF THE WAR AND LINCOLN'S ADMINISTRATION 1. _Preliminary Stages_. On the morning after the bombardment of Fort Sumter there appeared aProclamation by the President calling upon the Militia of the severalStates to furnish 75, 000 men for the service of the United States inthe suppression of an "unlawful combination. " Their service, however, would expire by law thirty days after the next meeting of Congress, and, in compliance with a further requirement of law upon this subject, the President also summoned Congress to meet in extraordinary sessionupon July 4. The Army already in the service of the United Statesconsisted of but 16, 000 officers and men, and, though the men of thisforce, being less affected by State ties than their officers, remained, as did the men of the Navy, true almost without exception to theirallegiance, all but 3, 000 of them were unavailable and scattered insmall frontier forts in the West. A few days later, when it becameplain that the struggle might long outlast the three months of theMilitia, the President called for Volunteers to enlist for three years'service, and perhaps (for the statements are conflicting) some 300, 000troops of one kind and another had been raised by June. The affair of Fort Sumter and the President's Proclamation at oncearoused and concentrated the whole public opinion of the free States inthe North and, in an opposite sense, of the States which had alreadyseceded. The border slave States had now to declare for the one sideor for the other. Virginia as a whole joined the Southern Confederacyforthwith, but several Counties in the mountainous region of the westof that State were strongly for the Union. These eventually succeededwith the support of Northern troops in separating from Virginia andforming the new State of West Virginia. Tennessee also joined theSouth, though in Eastern Tennessee the bulk of the people held out forthe Union without such good fortune as their neighbours in WestVirginia. Arkansas beyond the Mississippi followed the same example, though there were some doubt and division in all parts of that State. In Delaware, where the slaves were very few, the Governor did notformally comply with the President's Proclamation, but the people as awhole responded to it. The attitude of Maryland, which almostsurrounds Washington, kept the Government at the capital in suspenseand alarm for a while, for both the city of Baltimore and the existingState legislature were inclined to the South. In Kentucky and Missourithe State authorities were also for the South, and it was only after astruggle, and in Missouri much actual fighting, that the Unionistmajority of the people in each State had its way. The secession ofVirginia had consequences even more important than the loss to theUnion of a powerful State. General Robert E. Lee, a Virginian, then inWashington, was esteemed by General Scott to be the ablest officer inthe service. Lincoln and his Secretary of War desired to confer on himthe command of the Army. Lee's decision was made with much reluctanceand, it seems, hesitation. He was not only opposed to the policy ofsecession, but denied the right of a State to secede; yet he believedthat his absolute allegiance was due to Virginia. He resigned hiscommission in the United States Army, went to Richmond, and, inaccordance with what Wolseley describes as the prevailing principlethat had influenced most of the soldiers he met in the South, placedhis sword at the disposal of his own State. The same loyalty toVirginia governed another great soldier, Thomas J. Jackson, whosehistoric nickname, "Stonewall, " fails to convey the dashing celerity ofhis movements. While they both lived these two men were to be linkedtogether in the closest comradeship and mutual trust. They sprang fromdifferent social conditions and were of contrasting types. The epithetCavalier has been fitly enough applied to Lee, and Jackson, afterconversion from the wild courses of his youth, was an austere Puritan. To quote again from a soldier's memoirs, Wolseley calls Lee "one of thefew men who ever seriously impressed and awed me with their natural, their inherent, greatness"; he speaks of his "majesty, " and of the"beauty, " of his character, and of the "sweetness of his smile and theimpressive dignity of the old-fashioned style of his address"; "hisgreatness, " he says, "made me humble. " "There was nothing, " he tellsus, "of these refined characteristics in Stonewall Jackson, " a man with"huge hands and feet. " But he possessed "an assured self-confidence, the outcome of his sure trust in God. How simple, how humble-minded aman. As his impressive eyes met yours unflinchingly, you knew that hiswas an honest heart. " To this he adds touches less to be expectedconcerning a Puritan warrior, whose Puritanism was in fact inclined toferocity--how Jackson's "remarkable eyes lit up for the moment with alook of real enthusiasm as he recalled the architectural beauty of theseven lancet windows in York Minster, " how "intense" was the"benignity" of his expression, and how in him it seemed that "greatstrength of character and obstinate determination were united withextreme gentleness of disposition and with absolute tenderness towardsall about him. " Men such as these brought to the Southern causesomething besides their military capacity; but as to the greatness ofthat capacity, applied in a war in which the scope was so great forindividual leaders of genius, there is no question. A civilian reader, looking in the history of war chiefly for the evidences of personalquality, can at least discern in these two famous soldiers the moraldaring which in doubtful circumstances never flinches from theresponsibility of a well-considered risk, and, in both their cases asin those of some other great commanders, can recognise in this rare andprecious attribute the outcome of their personal piety. We shallhenceforth have to do with the Southern Confederacy and its armies, notin their inner history but with sole regard to the task which theyimposed upon Lincoln and the North. But at this parting of the ways atribute is due to the two men, pre-eminent among many devoted people, who, in their soldier-like and unreflecting loyalty to their cause, gave to it a lustre in which, so far as they can be judged, neither itsstatesmen nor its spiritual guides had a share. There were Virginian officers who did not thus go with their State. Ofthese were Scott himself, and G. H. Thomas; and Farragut, the greatsailor, was from Tennessee. Throughout the free States of the North there took place a nationaluprising of which none who remember it have spoken without feeling anewits spontaneous ardour. Men flung off with delight the hesitancy ofthe preceding months, and recruiting went on with speed and enthusiasm. Party divisions for the moment disappeared. Old Buchanan made publichis adhesion to the Government. Douglas called upon Lincoln to ask howbest he could serve the public cause, and, at his request, went down toIllinois to guide opinion and advance recruiting there; so employed, the President's great rival, shortly after, fell ill and died, leavingthe leadership of the Democrats to be filled thereafter by morescrupulous but less patriotic men. There was exultant confidence inthe power of the nation to put down rebellion, and those who realisedthe peril in which for many days the capital and the administrationwere placed were only the more indignantly determined. Perhaps themost trustworthy record of popular emotions is to be found in popularhumorists. Shortly after these days Artemus Ward, the author whoalmost vied with Shakespeare in Lincoln's affections, relates how theconfiscation of his show in the South led him to have an interview withJefferson Davis. "Even now, " said Davis, in this pleasant fiction, "wehave many frens in the North. " "J. Davis, " is the reply, "there's yourgrate mistaik. Many of us was your sincere frends, and thought certinparties amung us was fussin' about you and meddlin' with your consarnsintirely too much. But, J. Davis, the minit you fire a gun at thepiece of dry goods called the Star-Spangled Banner, the North gits upand rises en massy, in defence of that banner. Not agin you asindividooals--not agin the South even--but to save the flag. We shouldindeed be weak in the knees, unsound in the heart, milk-white in theliver, and soft in the hed, if we stood quietly by and saw this glorusGovyment smashed to pieces, either by a furrin or a intestine foe. Thegentle-harted mother hates to take her naughty child across her knee, but she knows it is her dooty to do it. So we shall hate to whip thenaughty South, but we must do it if you don't make back tracks at onct, and we shall wallup you out of your boots!" In the days whichfollowed, when this prompt chastisement could not be effected and itseemed indeed as if the South would do most of the whipping, thediscordant elements which mingled in this unanimity soon showedthemselves. The minority that opposed the war was for a time silentand insignificant, but among the supporters of the war there were thosewho loved the Union and the Constitution and who, partly for this veryreason, had hitherto cultivated the sympathies of the South. These--adherents mainly of the Democratic party--would desire thatcivil war should be waged with the least possible breach of theConstitution, and be concluded with the least possible social change;many of them would wish to fight not to a finish but to a compromise. On the other hand, there were those who loved liberty and hated alikethe slave system of the South and the arrogance which it hadengendered. These--the people distinguished within the Republicanparty as Radicals--would pay little heed to constitutional restraintsin repelling an attack on the Constitution, and they would wish fromthe first to make avowed war upon that which caused the war--slavery. In the border States there was of course more active sympathy with theSouth, and in conflict with this the Radicalism of some of these Statesbecame more stalwart and intractable. To such causes of dissension wasadded as time went on sheer fatigue of the war, and strangely enoughthis influence was as powerful with a few Radicals as it was with theingrained Democratic partisans. They despaired of the result whensuccess at last was imminent, and became sick of bloodshed when itpassed what they presumably regarded as a reasonable amount. It was the task of the Administration not only to conduct the war, butto preserve the unity of the North in spite of differences and itsresolution in spite of disappointments. Lincoln was in more than oneway well fitted for this task. Old experience in Illinois and Kentuckyenabled him to understand very different points of view in regard tothe cause of the South. The new question that was now to arise aboutslavery was but a particular form of the larger question of principleto which he had long thought out an answer as firm and as definite asit was moderate and in a sense subtle. He had, moreover, a quality ofheart which, as it seemed to those near him, the protraction of theconflict, with its necessary strain upon him, only strengthened. Inhim a tenacity, which scarcely could falter in the cause which hejudged to be right, was not merely pure from bitterness towards hisantagonists, it was actually bound up with a deep-seated kindlinesstowards them. Whatever rank may be assigned to his services and to hisdeserts, it is first and foremost in these directions, though not inthese directions alone, that the reader of his story must look forthem. Upon attentive study he will probably appear as the embodiment, in a degree and manner which are alike rare, of the more constant andthe higher judgment of his people. It is plainer still that heembodied the resolute purpose which underlay the fluctuations upon thesurface of their political life. The English military historians, Woodand Edmonds, in their retrospect over the course of the war, well sumup its dramatic aspect when they say: "Against the great militarygenius of certain of the Southern leaders fate opposed the unbrokenresolution and passionate devotion to the Union, which he worshipped, of the great Northern President. As long as he lived, and ruled thepeople of the North, there could be no turning back. " There are plenty of indications in the literature of the time thatLincoln's determination soon began to be widely felt and to beappreciated by common people. Literally, crowds of people from allparts of the North saw him, exchanged a sentence or two, and carriedhome their impressions; and those who were near him record the constantfortitude of his bearing, noting as marked exceptions the unrestrainedwords of impatience and half-humorous despondency which did on rareoccasions escape him. In a negative way, too, even the political worldbore its testimony to this; his administration was charged with almostevery other form of weakness, but there was never a suspicion that hewould give in. Nor again, in the severest criticisms upon him byknowledgeable men that have been unearthed and collected, does thesuggestion of petty personal aims or of anything but unselfish devotionever find a place. The belief that he could be trusted spread itselfamong plain people, and, given this belief, plain people liked him thebetter because he was plain. But if at the distance at which wecontemplate him, and at which from the moment of his death all Americacontemplated him, certain grand traits emerge, it is not for a momentto be supposed that in his life he stood out in front of the people asa great leader, or indeed as a leader at all, in the manner, say, ofChatham or even of Palmerston. Lincoln came to Washington doubtlesswith some deep thoughts which other men had not thought, doubtless alsowith some important knowledge, for instance of the border States, whichmany statesmen lacked, but he came there a man inexperienced inaffairs. It was a part of his strength that he knew this very well, that he meant to learn, thought he could learn, did not mean to behurried where he had not the knowledge to decide, entirely appreciatedsuperior knowledge in others, and was entirely unawed by it. ButSenators and Representatives in Congress and journalists of highstanding, as a rule, perceived the inexperience and not the strength. The deliberation with which he acted, patiently watching events, sayinglittle, listening to all sides, conversing with a naïveté which wasgenuine but not quite artless, seemingly obdurate to the pressure ofwise counsels on one side and on the other--all this struck manyanxious observers as sheer incompetence, and when there was just andnatural cause for their anxiety, there was no established presumptionof his wisdom to set against it. And this effect was enhanced by whatmay be called his plainness, his awkwardness, and actual eccentricityin many minor matters. To many intelligent people who met him theywere a grievous stumbling-block, and though some most cultivated menwere not at all struck by them, and were pleased instead by his"seeming sincere, and honest, and steady, " or the like, it is clearthat no one in Washington was greatly impressed by him at firstmeeting. His oddities were real and incorrigible. Young John Hay, whom Nicolay, his private secretary, introduced as his assistant, ahumorist like Lincoln himself, but with leanings to literary eleganceand a keen eye for social distinctions, loved him all along and came toworship him, but irreverent amusement is to be traced in his recentlypublished letters, and the glimpses which he gives us of "the Ancient"or "the Tycoon" when quite at home and quite at his ease fully justifyhim. Lincoln had great dignity and tact for use when he wanted them, but he did not always see the use of them. Senator Sherman waspresented to the new President. "So you're John Sherman?" saidLincoln. "Let's see if you're as tall as I am. We'll measure. " Thegrave politician, who was made to stand back to back with him beforethe company till this interesting question was settled, dimly perceivedthat the intention was friendly, but felt that there was a lack ofceremony. Lincoln's height was one of his subjects of harmless vanity;many tall men had to measure themselves against him in this manner, andprobably felt like John Sherman. On all sorts of occasions and to allsorts of people he would "tell a little story, " which was often enough, in Lord Lyons' phrase, an "extreme" story. This was the way in whichhe had grown accustomed to be friendly in company; it served a purposewhen intrusive questions had to be evaded, or reproofs or refusals tobe given without offence. As his laborious and sorrowful task came toweigh heavier upon him, his capacity for play of this sort became agreat resource to him. As his fame became established peoplerecognised him as a humorist; the inevitable "little story" became tomany an endearing form of eccentricity; but we may be sure it was notso always or to everybody. "Those, " says Carl Schurz, a political exile from Prussia, who did goodservice, military and political, to the Northern cause--"those whovisited the White House--and the White House appeared to be open towhosoever wished to enter--saw there a man of unconventional manners, who, without the slightest effort to put on dignity, treated all menalike, much like old neighbours; whose speech had not seldom a rusticflavour about it; who always seemed to have time for a homely talk andnever to be in a hurry to press business; and who occasionally spokeabout important affairs of State with the same nonchalance--I mightalmost say irreverence--with which he might have discussed an every-daylaw case in his office at Springfield, Illinois. " Thus Lincoln was very far from inspiring general confidence in anythingbeyond his good intentions. He is remembered as a personality with a"something" about him--the vague phrase is John Bright's--which widelyendeared him, but his was by no means that "magnetic" personality whichwe might be led to believe was indispensable in America. Indeed, it isremarkable that to some really good judges he remained alwaysunimpressive. Charles Francis Adams, who during the Civil War servedhis country as well as Minister in London as his grandfather had doneafter the War of Independence, lamented to the end that Seward, hisimmediate chief, had to serve under an inferior man; and a moresympathetic man, Lord Lyons, our representative at Washington, refersto Lincoln with nothing more than an amused kindliness. No detail ofhis policy has escaped fierce criticism, and the man himself while helived was the subject of so much depreciation and condescendingapproval, that we are forced to ask who discovered his greatness tillhis death inclined them to idealise him. The answer is that preciselythose Americans of trained intellect whose title to this description isclearest outside America were the first who began to see beneath hisstrange exterior. Lowell, watching the course of public events withceaseless scrutiny; Walt Whitman, sauntering in Washington in theintervals of the labour among the wounded by which he broke down hisrobust strength, and seeing things as they passed with the sureobservation of a poet; Motley, the historian of the Dutch Republic, studying affairs in the thick of them at the outset of the war, and notless closely by correspondence when he went as Minister to Vienna--suchmen when they praised Lincoln after his death expressed a judgmentwhich they began to form from the first; a judgment which started withthe recognition of his honesty, traced the evidence of his wisdom as itappeared, gradually and not by repentant impulse learned his greatness. And it is a judgment large enough to explain the lower estimate ofLincoln which certainly had wide currency. Not to multiply witnesses, Motley in June, 1861, having seen him for the second time, writes: "Iwent and had an hour's talk with Mr. Lincoln. I am very glad of it, for, had I not done so, I should have left Washington with a veryinaccurate impression of the President. I am now satisfied that he isa man of very considerable native sagacity; and that he has aningenuous, unsophisticated, frank, and noble character. I believe himto be as true as steel, and as courageous as true. At the same timethere is doubtless an ignorance about State matters, and particularlyabout foreign affairs, which he does not attempt to conceal, but whichwe must of necessity regret in a man placed in such a position at sucha crisis. Nevertheless his very modesty in this respect disarmscriticism. We parted very affectionately, and perhaps I shall neverset eyes on him again, but I feel that, so far as perfect integrity anddirectness of purpose go, the country will be safe in his hands. "Three years had passed, and the political world of America was in thatstorm of general dissatisfaction in which not a member of Congresswould be known as "a Lincoln man, " when Motley writes again from Viennato his mother, "I venerate Abraham Lincoln exactly because he is thetrue, honest type of American democracy. There is nothing of theshabby-genteel, the would-be-but-couldn't-be fine gentleman; he is thegreat American Demos, honest, shrewd, homely, wise, humorous, cheerful, brave, blundering occasionally, but through blunders struggling onwardstowards what he believes the right. " In a later letter he observes, "His mental abilities were large, and they became the more robust asthe more weight was imposed upon them. " This last sentence, especially if in Lincoln's mental abilities thequalities of his character be included, probably indicates the chiefpoint for remark in any estimate of his presidency. It is true that hewas judged at first as a stranger among strangers. Walt Whitman hasdescribed vividly a scene, with "a dash of comedy, almost farce, suchas Shakespeare puts in his blackest tragedies, " outside the hotel inNew York where Lincoln stayed on his journey to Washington; "his lookand gait, his perfect composure and coolness, " to cut it short, theusually noted marks of his eccentricity, "as he stood looking withcuriosity on that immense sea of faces, and the sea of faces returnedthe look with similar curiosity, not a single one" among the crowd "hispersonal friend. " He was not much otherwise situated when he came toWashington. It is true also that in the early days he was learning hisbusiness. "Why, Mr. President, " said some one towards the end of hislife, "you have changed your mind. " "Yes, I have, " said he, "and Idon't think much of a man who isn't wiser to-day than he wasyesterday. " But it seems to be above all true that the exercise ofpower and the endurance of responsibility gave him new strength. This, of course, cannot be demonstrated, but Americans then living, whorecall Abraham Lincoln, remark most frequently how the man grew to histask. And this perhaps is the main impression which the slight recordhere presented will convey, the impression of a man quite unlike themany statesmen whom power and the vexations attendant upon it have insome piteous way spoiled and marred, a man who started by being toughand shrewd and canny and became very strong and very wise, started withan inclination to honesty, courage, and kindness, and became, under atremendous strain, honest, brave, and kind to an almost tremendousdegree. The North then started upon the struggle with an eagerness andunanimity from which the revulsion was to try all hearts, and thePresident's most of all; and not a man in the North guessed what thestrain of that struggle was to be. At first indeed there was alarm inWashington for the immediate safety of the city. Confederate flagscould be seen floating from the hotels in Alexandria across the river;Washington itself was full of rumours of plots and intendedassassinations, and full of actual Southern spies; everything wasdisorganised; and Lincoln himself, walking round one night, found thearsenal with open doors, absolutely unguarded. By April 20, first the Navy Yard at Gosport, in Virginia, had to beabandoned, then the Arsenal at Harper's Ferry, and on the day of thislatter event Lee went over to the South. One regiment fromMassachusetts, where the State authorities had prepared for war beforethe fall of Sumter, was already in Washington; but it had had to fightits way through a furious mob in Baltimore, with some loss of life onboth sides. A deputation from many churches in that city came to thePresident, begging him to desist from his bloodthirsty preparations, but found him "constitutionally genial and jovial, " and "whollyinaccessible to Christian appeals. " It mattered more that a majorityof the Maryland Legislature was for the South, and that the Governortemporised and requested that no more troops should pass throughBaltimore. The Mayor of Baltimore and the railway authorities burnedrailway bridges and tore up railway lines, and the telegraph wires werecut. Thus for about five days the direct route to Washington from theNorth was barred. It seemed as if the boast of some Southern oratorthat the Confederate flag would float over the capital by May 1 mightbe fulfilled. Beauregard could have transported his now drilled troopsby rail from South Carolina and would have found Washington isolatedand hardly garrisoned. As a matter of fact, no such daring move wascontemplated in the South, and the citizens of Richmond, Virginia, werethemselves under a similar alarm; but the South had a real opportunity. The fall of Washington at that moment would have had politicalconsequences which no one realised better than Lincoln. It might wellhave led the Unionists in the border States to despair, and there isevidence that even then he so fully realised the task which lay beforethe North as to feel that the loss of Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouriwould have made it impossible. He was at heart intensely anxious, andquaintly and injudiciously relieved his feelings by the remark to the"6th Massachusetts" that he felt as if all other help were a dream, andthey were "the only real thing. " Yet those who were with him testifyto his composure and to the vigour with which he concerted with hisCabinet the various measures of naval, military, financial, postal, andpolice preparation which the occasion required, but which need not herebe detailed. Many of the measures of course lay outside the powerswhich Congress had conferred on the public departments, but thePresident had no hesitation in "availing himself, " as he put it, "ofthe broader powers conferred by the Constitution in cases ofinsurrection, " and looking for the sanction of Congress afterwards, rather than "let the Government at once fall into ruin. " Thedifficulties of government were greatly aggravated by the uncertaintyas to which of its servants, civil, naval, or military, were loyal, andthe need of rapidly filling the many posts left vacant by unexpecteddesertion. Meanwhile troops from New England, and also from New York, which had utterly disappointed some natural expectations in the Southby the enthusiasm of its rally to the Union, quickly arrived nearBaltimore. They repaired for themselves the interrupted railway tracksround the city, and by April 25 enough soldiers were in Washington toput an end to any present alarm. In case of need, the law of "habeascorpus" was suspended in Maryland. The President had no wish thatunnecessary recourse should be had to martial law. Naturally, however, one of his generals summarily arrested a Southern recruiting agent inBaltimore. The ordinary law would probably have sufficed, and Lincolnis believed to have regretted this action, but it was obvious that hemust support it when done. Hence arose an occasion for the old ChiefJustice Taney to make a protest on behalf of legality, to which thePresident, who had armed force on his side, could not give way, andthus early began a controversy to which we must recur. It was gravelyurged upon Lincoln that he should forcibly prevent the Legislature ofMaryland from holding a formal sitting; he refused on the sensibleground that the legislators could assemble in some way and had betternot assemble with a real grievance in constitutional law. Then astrange alteration came over Baltimore. Within three weeks all activedemonstration in favour of the South had subsided; the disaffectedLegislature resolved upon neutrality; the Governor, loyal at heart--ifthe brief epithet loyal may pass, as not begging any profound legalquestion--carried on affairs in the interest of the Union; postalcommunication and the passage of troops were free from interruption bythe middle of May; and the pressing alarm about Maryland was over. These incidents of the first days of war have been recounted in somedetail, because they may illustrate the gravity of the issue in theborder States, in others of which the struggle, though further removedfrom observation, lasted longer; and because, too, it is well torealise the stress of agitation under which the Government had to makefar-reaching preparation for a larger struggle, while Lincoln, whosewill was decisive in all these measures, carried on all the while thatseemingly unimportant routine of a President's life which is in thequietest times exacting. The alarm in Washington was only transitory, and it was generallysupposed in the North that insurrection would be easily put down. Someeven specified the number of days necessary, agreeably fixing upon asmaller number than the ninety days for which the militia were calledout. Secretary Seward has been credited with language of this kind, and even General Scott, whose political judgment was feeble, though hismilitary judgment was sound, seems at first to have rejected proposals, for example, for drilling irregular cavalry, made in the expectation ofa war of some length. There is evidence that neither Lincoln norCameron, the Secretary of War, indulged in these pleasant fancies. Irresistible public opinion, in the East especially, demanded to seeprompt activity. The North had arisen in its might; it was for theAdministration to put forth that might, capture Richmond, to which theConfederate Government had moved, and therewith make an end ofrebellion. The truth was that the North had to make its army before itcould wisely advance into the assured territory of the South; thesituation of the Southern Government in this respect was precisely thesame. The North had enough to do meantime in making sure of the Stateswhich were still debatable ground. Such forces as were available mustof necessity be used for this purpose, but for any larger operations ofwar military considerations, especially on the side which had thelarger resources at its back, were in favour of waiting and perfectingthe instrument which was to be used. But in the course of July thepressure of public opinion and of Congress, which had then assembled, overcame, not without some reason, the more cautious military view, andon the 21st of that month the North received its first great lesson inadversity at the battle of Bull Run. Before recounting this disaster we may proceed with the story of thestruggle in the border States. At an early date the rising armies ofthe North had been organised into three commands, called the Departmentof the Potomac, on the front between Washington and Richmond, theDepartment of the Ohio, on the upper watershed of the river of thatname, and the Department of the West. Of necessity the generalscommanding in these two more Western Departments exercised a largerdiscretion than the general at Washington. The Department of the Ohiowas under General McClellan, before the war a captain of Engineers, whohad retired from active service and had been engaged as a railwaymanager, in which capacity he has already been noticed, but who hadearned a good name in the Mexican War, had been keen enough in hisprofession to visit the Crimea, and was esteemed by General Scott. Thepeople of West Virginia, who, as has been said, were trying to organisethemselves as a new State, adhering to the Union, were invaded byforces despatched by the Governor of their old State. They lay mainlywest of the mountains, and help could reach them up tributary valleysof the Ohio. They appealed to McClellan, and the successes quickly wonby forces despatched by him, and afterwards under his direct command, secured West Virginia, and incidentally the reputation of McClellan. In Kentucky, further west, the Governor endeavoured to hold the fieldfor the South with a body known as the State Guard, while Unionistleaders among the people were raising volunteer regiments for theNorth. Nothing, however, was determined by fighting between theseforces. The State Legislature at first took up an attitude ofneutrality, but a new Legislature, elected in June, was overwhelminglyfor the Union. Ultimately the Confederate armies invaded Kentucky, andthe Legislature thereupon invited the Union armies into the State toexpel them, and placed 40, 000 Kentucky volunteers at the disposal ofthe President. Thenceforward, though Kentucky, stretching as it doesfor four hundred miles between the Mississippi and the Alleghanies, remained for long a battle-ground, the allegiance of its people to theUnion was unshaken. But the uncertainty about their attitude continuedtill the autumn of 1861, and while it lasted was an important elementin Lincoln's calculations. (It must be remembered that slavery existedin Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri. ) In Missouri the strife offactions was fierce. Already in January there had been reports of aconspiracy to seize the arsenal at St. Louis for the South when thetime came, and General Scott had placed in command Captain NathanielLyon, on whose loyalty he relied the more because he was an opponent ofslavery. The Governor was in favour of the South--as was also theLegislature, and the Governor could count on some part of the StateMilitia; so Lincoln, when he called for volunteers, commissioned Lyonto raise them in Missouri. In this task a Union State Committee in St. Louis greatly helped him, and the large German population in that citywas especially ready to enlist for the Union. Many of the Germanimmigrants of those days had come to America partly for the sake of itsfree institutions. A State Convention was summoned by the Governor topass an Ordinance of Secession, but its electors were minded otherwise, and the Convention voted against secession. In several encountersLyon, who was an intrepid soldier, defeated the forces of the Governor;in June he took possession of the State capital, driving the Governorand Legislature away; the State Convention then again assembled and setup a Unionist Government for the State. This new State Government wasnot everywhere acknowledged; conspiracies in the Southern interestcontinued to exist in Missouri; and the State was repeatedly molestedby invasions, of no great military consequence, from Arkansas. Indeed, in the autumn there was a serious recrudescence of trouble, in whichLyon lost his life. But substantially Missouri was secured for theUnion. Naturally enough, a great many of the citizens of Missouri whohad combined to save their State to the Union became among thestrongest of the "Radicals" who will later engage our attention. Many, however, of the leading men who had done most in this cause, includingthe friends of Blair, Lincoln's Postmaster-General, adhered no lessemphatically to the "Conservative" section of the Republicans. 2. _Bull Run_. Thus, in the autumn of 1861, North and South had become solidified intosomething like two countries. In the month of July, which now concernsus, this process was well on its way, but it is to be marked that thewhole long tract of Kentucky still formed a neutral zone, which theNorthern Government did not wish to harass, and which perhaps the Southwould have done well to let alone, while further west in Missouri theforces of the North were not even as fully organised as in the East. So the only possible direction in which any great blow could be struckwas the direction of Richmond, now the capital, and it might seem, therefore, the heart, of the Confederacy. The Confederate Congress wasto meet there on July 20. The _New York Tribune_, which was edited byMr. Horace Greeley, a vigorous writer whose omniscience was unabated bythe variation of his own opinion, was the one journal of far-reachinginfluence in the North; and it only gave exaggerated point to a generalfeeling when it declared that the Confederate Congress must not meet. The Senators and Congressmen now in Washington were not quite soexacting, but they had come there unanimous in their readiness to votetaxes and support the war in every way, and they wanted to seesomething done; and they wanted it all the more because the threemonths' service of the militia was running out. General Scott, stillthe chief military adviser of Government, was quite distinct in hispreference for waiting and for perfecting the discipline andorganisation of the volunteers, who had not yet even been formed intobrigades. On the militia he set no value at all. For long he refusedto countenance any but minor movements preparatory to a later advance. It is not quite certain, however, that Congress and public opinion werewrong in clamouring for action. The Southern troops were not much, ifat all, more ready for use than the Northerners; and Jefferson Davisand his military adviser, Lee, desired time for their defensivepreparations. It was perhaps too much to expect that the country afterits great uprising should be content to give supplies and men withoutend while nothing apparently happened; and the spirit of the troopsthemselves might suffer more from inaction than from defeat. A furtherthought, while it made defeat seem more dangerous, made battle moretempting. There was fear that European Powers might recognise theSouthern Confederacy and enter into relations with it. Whether theydid so depended on whether they were confirmed in their growingsuspicion that the North could not conquer the South. Balancing themilitary advice which was given them as to the risk against thispolitical importunity, Lincoln and his Cabinet chose the risk, andScott at length withdrew his opposition. Lincoln was possibly moresensitive to pressure than he afterwards became, more prone to treathimself as a person under the orders of the people, but there is noreason to doubt that he acted on his own sober judgment as well as thatof his Cabinet. Whatever degree of confidence he reposed in Scott, Scott was not very insistent; the risk was not overwhelming; the battlewas very nearly won, would have been won if the orders of Scott hadbeen carried out. No very great harm in fact followed the defeat ofBull Run; and the danger of inaction was real. He was probably then, as he certainly was afterwards, profoundly afraid that the excessivemilitary caution which he often encountered would destroy the cause ofthe North by disheartening the people who supported the war. That isno doubt a kind of fear to which many statesmen are too prone, butLincoln's sense of real popular feeling throughout the wide extent ofthe North is agreed to have been uncommonly sure. Definite judgment onsuch a question is impossible, but probably Lincoln and his Cabinetwere wise. However, they did not win their battle. The Southern army underBeauregard lay near the Bull Run river, some twenty miles fromWashington, covering the railway junction of Manassas on the line toRichmond. The main Northern army, under General McDowell, a capableofficer, lay south of the Potomac, where fortifications to guardWashington had already been erected on Virginian soil. In theShenandoah Valley was another Southern force, under Joseph Johnston, watched by the Northern general Patterson at Harper's Ferry, which hadbeen recovered by Scott's operations. Each of these Northern generalswas in superior force to his opponent. McDowell was to attack theConfederate position at Manassas, while Patterson, whose numbers werenearly double Johnston's, was to keep him so seriously occupied that hecould not join Beauregard. With whatever excuse of misunderstanding orthe like, Patterson made hardly an attempt to carry out his part ofScott's orders, and Johnston, with the bulk of his force, succeeded injoining Beauregard the day before McDowell's attack, and without hisgaining knowledge of this movement. The battle of Bull Run or Manassas(or rather the earlier and more famous of two battles so named) was anengagement of untrained troops in which up to a certain point the highindividual quality of those troops supplied the place of discipline. McDowell handled with good judgment a very unhandy instrument. It wasonly since his advance had been contemplated that his army had beenorganised in brigades. The enemy, occupying high wooded banks on thesouth side of the Bull Run, a stream about as broad as the Thames atOxford but fordable, was successfully pushed back to a high ridgebeyond; but the stubborn attacks over difficult ground upon thisfurther position failed from lack of co-ordination, and, when italready seemed doubtful whether the tired soldiers of the North couldrenew them with any hope, they were themselves attacked on their rightflank. It seems that from that moment their success upon that day wasreally hopeless, but some declare that the Northern soldiers with oneaccord became possessed of a belief that this flank attack by acomparatively small body was that of the whole force of Johnston, freshly arrived upon the scene. In any case they spontaneously retiredin disorder; they were not effectively pursued, but McDowell was unableto rally them at Centreville, a mile or so behind the Bull Run. Amongthe camp followers the panic became extreme, and they pressed intoWashington in wild alarm, accompanied by citizens and Congressmen whohad come out to see a victory, and who left one or two of their numberbehind as prisoners of war. The result was a surprise to the Southernarmy. Johnston, who now took over the command, declared that it was asmuch disorganised by victory as the Northern army by defeat. With thefull approval of his superiors in Richmond, he devoted himself toentrenching his position at Manassas. But in Washington, where rumoursof victory had been arriving all through the day of battle, thereprevailed for some time an impression that the city was exposed toimmediate capture, and this impression was shared by McClellan, to whomuniversal opinion now turned as the appointed saviour, and who wasforthwith summoned to Washington to take command of the army of thePotomac. Within the circle of the Administration there was, of course, deepmortification. Old General Scott passionately declared himself to havebeen the greatest coward in America in having ever given way to thePresident's desire for action. Lincoln, who was often to prove hisreadiness to take blame on his own shoulders, evidently thought thatthe responsibility in this case was shared by Scott, and demanded toknow whether Scott accused him of having overborne his judgment. Theold general warmly, if a little ambiguously, replied that he had servedunder many Presidents, but never known a kinder master. Plainly hefelt that his better judgment had somehow been overpowered, and yetthat there was nothing in their relations for which in his heart hecould blame the President; and this trivial dialogue is worthremembering during the dreary and controversial tale of Lincoln'srelations with Scott's successor. Lincoln, however bitterlydisappointed, showed no signs of discomposure or hesitancy. Thebusiness of making the army of the Potomac quietly began over again. To the four days after Bull Run belongs one of the few records of thevisits to the troops which Lincoln constantly paid when they were nottoo far from Washington, cheering them with little talks which served agood purpose without being notable. He was reviewing the brigadecommanded at Bull Run by William Sherman, later, but not yet, one ofthe great figures in the war. He was open to all complaints, and acolonel of militia came to him with a grievance; he claimed that histerm of service had already expired, that he had intended to go home, but that Sherman unlawfully threatened to shoot him if he did so. Lincoln had a good look at Sherman, and then advised the colonel tokeep out of Sherman's way, as he looked like a man of his word. Thiswas said in the hearing of many men, and Sherman records his livelygratitude for a simple jest which helped him greatly in keeping hisbrigade in existence. Not one of the much more serious defeats suffered later in the warproduced by itself so lively a sense of discomfiture in the North asthis; thus none will equally claim our attention. But, except for thefirst false alarms in Washington, there was no disposition to mistakeits military significance. The "second uprising of the North, " whichfollowed upon this bracing shock, left as vivid a memory as the littledisaster of Bull Run. But there was of necessity a long pause whileMcClellan remodelled the army in the East, and the situation in theWest was becoming ripe for important movements. The eagerness of theNorthern people to make some progress, again asserted itself beforelong, but to their surprise, and perhaps to that of a reader to-day, the last five months of 1861 passed without notable military events. Here then we may turn to the progress of other affairs, departmentalaffairs, foreign affairs, and domestic policy, which, it must not beforgotten, had pressed heavily upon the Administration from the momentthat war began. 3. _Lincoln's Administration Generally_. Long before the Eastern public was very keenly aware of Lincoln themembers of his Cabinet had come to think of the Administration as hisAdministration, some, like Seward, of whom it could have been littleexpected, with a loyal, and for America most fortunate, acceptance ofreal subordination, and one at least, Chase, with indignant surprisethat his own really great abilities were not dominant. One Ministerearly told his friends that there was but one vote in the Cabinet, thePresident's. This must not be taken in the sense that Lincoln'spersonal guidance was present in every department. He had his owndepartment, concerned with the maintenance of Northern unity and withthat great underlying problem of internal policy which will before longappear again, and the business of the War Department was so immediatelyvital as to require his ceaseless attention; but in other matters thedegree and manner of his control of course varied. Again, it is farfrom being the case that the Cabinet had little influence on hisaction. He not only consulted it much, but deferred to it much. Hiswisdom seems to have shown itself in nothing more strongly than inrecognising when he wanted advice and when he did not, when he neededsupport and when he could stand alone. Sometimes he yielded to hisMinisters because he valued their judgment, sometimes also because hegauged by them the public support without which his action must fail. Sometimes, when he was sure of the necessity, he took grave stepswithout advice from them or any one. More often he tried to arrivewith them at a real community of decision. It is often impossible toguess what acts of an Administration are rightly credited to its chief. The hidden merit or demerit of many statesmen has constantly lain inthe power, or the lack of it, of guiding their colleagues and beingguided in turn. If we tried to be exact in saying Lincoln, orLincoln's Cabinet, or the North did this or that, it would be necessaryto thresh out many bushels of tittle-tattle. The broad impression, however, remains that in the many things in which Lincoln did notdirectly rule he ruled through a group of capable men of whom he madethe best use, and whom no other chief could have induced to serve solong in concord. As we proceed some authentic examples of his preciserelations with them will appear, in which, unimportant as they seem, one test of his quality as a statesman and of his character should besought. The naval operations of the war afford many tales of daring on bothsides which cannot here be noticed. They afford incidents of strangeinterest now, such as the exploit of the first submarine. (It belongedto the South; its submersion invariably resulted in the death of thewhole crew; and, with full knowledge of this, a devoted crew went downand destroyed a valuable Northern iron-clad. ) The ravages on commerceof the _Alabama_ and some other Southern cruisers became only toofamous in England, from whose ship-building yards they had escaped. The North failed too in some out of the fairly numerous combined navaland military expeditions, which were undertaken with a view to makingthe blockade more complete and less arduous by the occupation ofSouthern ports, and perhaps to more serious incursions into the South. Among those of them which will require no special notice, mostsucceeded. Thus by the spring of 1863 Florida was substantially inNorthern hands, and by 1865 the South had but two ports left, Charleston and Wilmington; but the venture most attractive to Northernsentiment, an attack upon Charleston itself, proved a mere waste ofmilitary force. Moreover, till a strong military adviser was at lastfound in Grant there was some dissipation of military force in suchexpeditions. Nevertheless, the naval success of the North was socontinuous and overwhelming that its history in detail need not berecounted in these pages. Almost from the first the ever-tighteninggrip of the blockade upon the Southern coasts made its power felt, andearly in 1862 the inland waterways of the South were beginning to fallunder the command of the Northern flotillas. Such a success needed, ofcourse, the adoption of a decided policy from the outset; it neededgreat administrative ability to improvise a navy where hardly anyexisted, and where the conditions of its employment were in manyrespects novel; and it needed resourceful watching to meet thesurprises of fresh naval invention by which the South, poor as were itspossibilities for ship-building, might have rendered impotent, as onceor twice it seemed likely to do, the Northern blockade. Gideon Welles, the responsible Cabinet Minister, was constant and would appear to havebeen capable at his task, but the inspiring mind of the NavalDepartment was found in Gustavus V. Fox, a retired naval officer, whoat the beginning of Lincoln's administration was appointed AssistantSecretary of the Navy. The policy of blockade was begun by Lincoln'sProclamation on April 19, 1861. It was a hardy measure, certain to bea cause of friction with foreign Powers. The United States Governmenthad contended in 1812 that a blockade which is to confer any rightsagainst neutral commerce must be an effective blockade, and has notlately been inclined to take lax views upon such questions; but when itdeclared its blockade of the South it possessed only three steamshipsof war with which to make it effective. But the policy was stoutlymaintained. The Naval Department at the very first set about buyingmerchant ships in Northern ports and adapting them to warlike use, andbuilding ships of its own, in the design of which it shortly obtainedthe help of a Commission of Congress on the subject of ironclads. TheNaval Department had at least the fullest support and encouragementfrom Lincoln in the whole of its policy. Everything goes to show thathe followed naval affairs carefully, but that, as he found themconducted on sound lines by men that he trusted, his intervention inthem was of a modest kind. Welles continued throughout the member ofhis Cabinet with whom he had the least friction, and was probably oneof those Ministers, common in England, who earn the confidence of theirown departments without in any way impressing the imagination of thepublic; and a letter by Lincoln to Fox immediately after the affair ofFort Sumter shows the hearty esteem and confidence with which from thefirst he regarded Fox. Of the few slight records of his judgment inthese matters one is significant. The unfortunate expedition againstCharleston in the spring of 1863 was undertaken with high hopes by theNaval Department; but Lincoln, we happen to know, never believed itcould succeed. He has, rightly or wrongly, been blamed for dealingswith his military officers in which he may be said to have spurred themhard; he cannot reasonably be blamed for giving the rein to his expertsubordinates, because his own judgment, which differed from theirs, turned out right. This is one of very many instances which suggestthat at the time when his confidence in himself was full grown hisdisposition, if any, to interfere was well under control. It is alsoone of the indications that his attention was alert in many matters inwhich his hand was not seen. He was no financier, and that important part of the history of the war, Northern finance, concerns us little. The real economic strength ofthe North was immense, for immigration and development were going on sofast, that, for all the strain of the war, production and exportsincreased. But the superficial disturbance caused by borrowing and theissue of paper money was great, and, though the North never bore thepinching that was endured in the South, it is an honourable thing that, for all the rise in the cost of living and for all the trouble thatoccurred in business when the premium on gold often fluctuated between40 and 60 and on one occasion rose to 185, neither the solid workingclass of the country generally nor the solid business class of New Yorkwere deeply affected by the grumbling at the duration of the war. TheAmerican verdict upon the financial policy of Chase, a man of intellectbut new to such affairs, is one of high praise. Lincoln left him freein that policy. He had watched the acts and utterances of his chiefcontemporaries closely and early acquired a firm belief in Chase'sability. How much praise is due to the President, who for this reasonkept Chase in his Cabinet, a later part of this story may show. One function of Government was that of the President alone. An Englishstatesman is alleged to have said upon becoming Prime Minister, "I hadimportant and interesting business in my old office, but now my chiefduty will be to create undeserving Peers. " Lincoln, in the anxiousdays that followed his first inauguration, once looked especiallyharassed; a Senator said to him: "What is the matter, Mr. President?Is there bad news from Fort Sumter?" "Oh, no, " he answered, "it's thePost Office at Baldinsville. " The patronage of the President wasenormous, including the most trifling offices under Government, such asvillage postmasterships. In the appointment to local offices, he wasexpected to consult the local Senators and Representatives of his ownparty, and of course to choose men who had worked for the party. Inthe vast majority of cases decent competence for the office in thepeople so recommended might be presumed. The established practicefurther required that a Republican President on coming in shouldreplace with good Republicans most of the nominees of the lateDemocratic administration, which had done the like in its day. Lincoln's experience after a while led him to prophesy that theprevalence of office-seeking would be the ruin of American politics, but it certainly never occurred to him to try and break down then theaccepted rule, of which no party yet complained. It would have beenunmeasured folly, even if he had thought of it, to have taken duringsuch a crisis a new departure which would have vexed the Republicansfar more than it would have pleased the Democrats. And at that time itwas really of great consequence that public officials should be men ofknown loyalty to the Union, for obviously a postmaster of doubtfulloyalty might do mischief. Lincoln, then, except in dealing with postsof special consequence, for which men with really specialqualifications were to be found, frankly and without a question took asthe great principle of his patronage the fairest possible distributionof favours among different classes and individuals among the supportersof the Government, whom it was his primary duty to keep together. Hisattitude in the whole business was perfectly understood and respectedby scrupulous men who watched politics critically. It was the cause inone way of great worry to him, for, except when his indignation waskindled, he was abnormally reluctant to say "no, "--he once shuddered tothink what would have happened to him if he had been a woman, but wasconsoled by the thought that his ugliness would have been a shield; andhis private secretaries accuse him of carrying out his principle withneedless and even ridiculous care. In appointments to which the partyprinciple did not apply, but in which an ordinary man would have feltparty prejudice, Lincoln's old opponents were often startled by hisfreedom from it. If jobbery be the right name for his persistentendeavour to keep the partisans of the Union pleased and united, hisjobbery proved to have one shining attribute of virtue; later on, when, apart from the Democratic opposition which revived, there arose in theRepublican party sections hostile to himself, the claims of personaladherence to him and the wavering prospects of his own reelection seem, from recorded instances, to have affected his choice remarkably little. 4. _Foreign Policy and England_. The question, what was his influence upon foreign policy, is moredifficult than the general praise bestowed upon it might lead us toexpect; because, though he is known to have exercised a constantsupervision over Seward, that influence was concealed from thediplomatic world. For at least the first eighteen months of the war, apart from lesserpoints of quarrel, a real danger of foreign intervention hung over theNorth. The danger was increased by the ambitions of Napoleon III. Inregard to Mexico, and by the loss and suffering caused to England, above all, not merely from the interruption of trade but from thesuspension of cotton supplies by the blockade. From the first therewas the fear that foreign powers would recognise the SouthernConfederacy as an independent country; that they were then likely tooffer mediation which it would at the best have been embarrassing forthe President to reject; that they might ultimately, when theirmediation had been rejected, be tempted to active intervention. It iscurious that the one European Government which was recognised all alongas friendly to the Republic was that of the Czar, Alexander II. OfRussia, who in this same year, 1861, was accomplishing the project, bequeathed to him by his father, of emancipating the serfs. Mercier, the French Minister in Washington, advised his Government to recognisethe South Confederacy as early as March, 1861. The Emperor of theFrench, though not the French people, inclined throughout to thispolicy; but he would not act apart from England, and the EnglishGovernment, though Americans did not know it, had determined, and forthe present was quite resolute, against any hasty action. Neverthelessan almost accidental cause very soon brought England and the Northwithin sight of a war from which neither people was in appearanceaverse. Neither the foreign policy of Lincoln's Government nor, indeed, therelations of England and America from his day to our own can beunderstood without some study of the attitude of the two countries toeach other during the war. If we could put aside any previous judgmenton the cause as between North and South, there are still some markedfeatures in the attitude of England during the war which everyEnglishman must now regret. It should emphatically be added that therewere some upon which every Englishman should look back withsatisfaction. Many of the expressions of English opinion at that timebetray a powerlessness to comprehend another country and aself-sufficiency in judging it, which, it may humbly be claimed, werenot always and are not now so characteristic of Englishmen as they werein that period of our history, in many ways so noble, which weassociate with the rival influences of Palmerston and of Cobden. It isnot at all surprising that ordinary English gentlemen started with aleaning towards the South; they liked Southerners and there was much inthe manners of the North, and in the experiences of Englishmen tradingwith or investing in the North, which did not impress them favourably. Many Northerners discovered something snobbish and unsound in thispreference, but they were not quite right. With this leaning, Englishmen readily accepted the plea of the South that it wasthreatened with intolerable interference; indeed to this day it ishardly credible to Englishmen that the grievance against which theSouth arose in such passionate revolt was so unsubstantial as it reallywas. On the other hand, the case of the North was not apprehended. How it came to pass, in the intricate and usually uninteresting play ofAmerican politics, that a business community, which had seemed prettytolerant of slavery, was now at war on some point which was said to beand said not to be slavery, was a little hard to understand. Those ofus who remember our parents' talk of the American Civil War did nothear from them the true and fairly simple explanation of the war, thatthe North fought because it refused to connive further in the extensionof slavery, and would not--could not decently--accept the disruption ofa great country as the alternative. It is strictly true that thechivalrous South rose in blind passion for a cause at the bottom ofwhich lay the narrowest of pecuniary interests, while the over-sharpYankees, guided by a sort of comic backwoodsman, fought, whether wiselyor not, for a cause as untainted as ever animated a nation in arms. But it seems a paradox even now, and there is no reproach in the fact, that our fathers, who had not followed the vacillating course ofNorthern politics hitherto, did not generally take it in. We shall seein a later chapter how Northern statesmanship added to theirperplexity. But it is impossible not to be ashamed of some of theforms in which English feeling showed itself and was well known in theNorth to show itself. Not only the articles of some Englishnewspapers, but the private letters of Americans who then foundthemselves in the politest circles in London, are unpleasant to readnow. It is painful, too, that a leader of political thought likeCobden should even for a little while--and it was only a littlewhile--have been swayed in such a matter by a sympathy relatively sopetty as agreement with the Southern doctrine of Free Trade. We mightnow call it worthier of Prussia than of England that a great Englishmanlike Lord Salisbury (then Lord Robert Cecil) should have expressedfriendship for the South as a good customer of ours, and antagonism forthe North as a rival in our business. When such men as these said suchthings they were, of course, not brutally indifferent to right, theywere merely blind to the fact that a very great and plain issue ofright and wrong was really involved in the war. Gladstone, to takeanother instance, was not blind to that, but with irritatingmisapprehension he protested against the madness of plunging into warto propagate the cause of emancipation. Then came in his love of smallstates, and from his mouth, while he was a Cabinet Minister, came theimpulsive pronouncement, bitterly regretted by him and bitterlyresented in the North: "Jefferson Davis and other leaders of the Southhave made an army; they are making, it appears, a navy; and they havemade--what is more than either--they have made a nation. " Many otherEnglishmen simply sympathised with the weaker side; many too, it shouldbe confessed, with the apparently weaker side which they were reallypersuaded would win. ("Win the battles, " said Lord Robert Cecil to aNorthern lady, "and we Tories shall come round at once. ") These thingsare recalled because their natural effect in America has to beunderstood. What is really lamentable is not that in this distant anddebatable affair the sympathy of so many inclined to the South, butthat, when at least there was a Northern side, there seemed at first tobe hardly any capable of understanding or being stirred by it. Apartfrom politicians there were only two Englishmen of the first rank, Tennyson and Darwin, who, whether or not they understood the matter indetail, are known to have cared from their hearts for the Northerncause. It is pleasant to associate with these greater names that ofthe author of "Tom Brown. " The names of those hostile to the North orapparently quite uninterested are numerous and surprising. EvenDickens, who had hated slavery, and who in "Martin Chuzzlewit" hadappealed however bitterly to the higher national spirit which hethought latent in America, now, when that spirit had at last and indeed asserted itself, gave way in his letters to nothing but hatred ofthe whole country. And a disposition like this--explicable butodious--did no doubt exist in the England of those days. There is, however, quite another aspect of this question besides thatwhich has so painfully impressed many American memories. When thelargest manufacturing industry of England was brought near to famine bythe blockade, the voice of the stricken working population was loudlyand persistently uttered on the side of the North. There has been noother demonstration so splendid of the spirit which remains widelydiffused among individual English working men and which at one timeanimated labour as a concentrated political force. John Bright, whocompletely grasped the situation in America, took a stand, in which J. S. Mill, W. E. Forster, and the Duke of Argyll share his credit, butwhich did peculiar and great honour to him as a Quaker who hated war. But there is something more that must be said. The conduct of theEnglish Government, supported by the responsible leaders of theOpposition, was at that time, no less than now, the surest indicationof the more deep-seated feelings of the real bulk of Englishmen on anygreat question affecting our international relations; and the attitudeof the Government, in which Lord Palmerston was Prime Minister and LordJohn Russell Foreign Secretary, and with which in this matterConservative leaders like Disraeli and Sir Stafford Northcote entirelyconcurred, was at the very least free from grave reproach. Lord JohnRussell, and, there can be little doubt, his colleagues generally, regarded slavery as an "accursed institution, " but they felt no angerwith the people of the South for it, because, as he said, "we gave themthat curse and ours were the hands from which they received that fatalgift"; in Lord John at least the one overmastering sentiment upon theoutbreak of the war was that of sheer pain that "a great Republic, which has enjoyed institutions under which the people have been freeand happy, is placed in jeopardy. " Their insight into American affairsdid not go deep; but the more seriously we rate "the strong antipathyto the North, the strong sympathy with the South, and the passionatewish to have cotton, " of which a Minister, Lord Granville, wrote at thetime, the greater is the credit due both to the Government as a wholeand to Disraeli for having been conspicuously unmoved by theseconsiderations; and "the general approval from Parliament, the press, and the public, " which, as Lord Granville added, their policy received, is creditable too. It is perfectly true, as will be seen later, thatat one dark moment in the fortunes of the North, the Government verycautiously considered the possibility of intervention, but Disraeli, towhom a less patriotic course would have offered a party advantage, recalled to them their own better judgment; and it is impossible toread their correspondence on this question without perceiving that inthis they were actuated by no hostility to the North, but by a sincerebelief that the cause of the North was hopeless and that intervention, with a view to stopping bloodshed, might prove the course of honestfriendship to all America. Englishmen of a later time have becomedeeply interested in America, and may wish that their fathers hadbetter understood the great issue of the Civil War, but it is matterfor pride, which in honesty should be here asserted, that with manyselfish interests in this contest, of which they were most keenlyaware, Englishmen, in their capacity as a nation, acted with completeintegrity. But for our immediate purpose the object of thus reviewing a subject onwhich American historians have lavished much research is to explain theeffect produced in America by demonstrations of strong antipathy andsympathy in England. The effect in some ways has been long lasting. The South caught at every mark of sympathy with avidity, was led by itspoliticians to expect help, received none, and became resentful. It issurprising to be told, but may be true, that the embers of thisresentment became dangerous to England in the autumn of 1914. In theNorth the memory of an antipathy which was almost instantly perceivedhas burnt deep--as many memoirs, for instance those recently publishedby Senator Lodge, show--into the minds of precisely those Americans towhom Englishmen have ever since been the readiest to accord theiresteem. There were many men in the North with a ready-made dislike ofEngland, but there were many also whose sensitiveness to Englishopinion, if in some ways difficult for us to appreciate, was intense. Republicans such as James Russell Lowell had writhed under thereproaches cast by Englishmen upon the acquiescence of all America inslavery; they felt that the North had suddenly cut off this reproachand staked everything on the refusal to give way to slavery anyfurther; they looked now for expressions of sympathy from many quartersin England; but in the English newspapers which they read and thereports of Americans in England they found evidence of nothing butdislike. There soon came evidence, as it seemed to the whole North, ofactually hostile action on the part of the British Government. Itissued a Proclamation enjoining neutrality upon British subjects. Thiswas a matter of course on the outbreak of what was nothing less thanwar; but Northerners thought that at least some courteous explanationshould first have been made to their Government, and there were othermatters which they misinterpreted as signs of an agreement of Englandwith France to go further and open diplomatic relations with theConfederate Government. Thus alike in the most prejudiced and in themost enlightened quarters in the North there arose an irritation whichan Englishman must see to have been natural but can hardly think tohave been warranted by the real facts. Here came in the one clearly known and most certainly happyintervention of Lincoln's in foreign affairs. Early in May Sewardbrought to him the draft of a vehement despatch, telling the BritishGovernment peremptorily what the United States would not stand, andframed in a manner which must have frustrated any attempt by Adams inLondon to establish good relations with Lord John Russell. That draftnow exists with the alterations made in Lincoln's own hand. With a fewtouches, some of them very minute, made with the skill of a master oflanguage and of a life-long peacemaker, he changed the draft into afirm but entirely courteous despatch. In particular, instead ofrequiring Adams, as Seward would have done, to read the whole despatchto Russell and leave him with a copy of it, he left it to the man onthe spot to convey its sense in what manner he judged best. Probably, as has been claimed for him, his few penstrokes made peaceful relationseasy when Seward's despatch would have made them almost impossible;certainly a study of this document will prove both his strange, untutored diplomatic skill and the general soundness of his view offoreign affairs. Now, however, followed a graver crisis in which his action requiressome discussion. Messrs. Mason and Slidell were sent by theConfederate Government as their emissaries to England and France. Theygot to Havana and there took ship again on the British steamer _Trent_. A watchful Northern sea captain overhauled the _Trent_, took Mason andSlidell off her, and let her go. If he had taken the course, far moreinconvenient to the _Trent_, of bringing her into a Northern harbour, where a Northern Prize Court might have adjudged these gentlemen to bebearers of enemy despatches, he would have been within the law. As itwas he violated well-established usage, and no one has questioned theright and even the duty of the British Government to demand the releaseof the prisoners. This they did in a note of which the expression wasmade milder by the wish of the Queen (conveyed in almost the lastletter of the Prince Consort), but which required compliance within afortnight. Meanwhile Secretary Welles had approved the sea captain'saction. The North was jubilant at the capture, the more so becauseMason and Slidell were Southern statesmen of the lower type and held tobe specially obnoxious; and the House of Representatives, to makematters worse, voted its approval of what had been done. Lincoln, onthe very day when the news of the capture came, had seen and saidprivately that on the principles which America had itself upheld in thepast the prisoners would have to be given up with an apology. Butthere is evidence that he now wavered, and that, bent as he was onmaintaining a united North, he was still too distrustful of his ownbetter judgment as against that of the public. At this very time hewas already on other points in painful conflict with many friends. Inany case he submitted to Seward a draft despatch making the ill-judgedproposal of arbitration. He gave way to Seward, but at the Cabinetmeeting on Christmas Eve, at which Seward submitted a despatch yieldingto the British demand, it is reported that Lincoln, as well as Chaseand others, was at first reluctant to agree, and that it was Bates andSeward that persuaded the Cabinet to a just and necessary surrender. This was the last time that there was serious friction in the actualintercourse of the two Governments. The lapse of Great Britain inallowing the famous _Alabama_ to sail was due to delay and misadventure("week-ends" or the like) in the proceedings of subordinate officials, and was never defended, and the numerous minor controversies thatarose, as well as the standing disagreement as to the law of blockadenever reached the point of danger. For all this great credit was dueto Lord Lyons and to C. F. Adams, and to Seward also, when he had alittle sobered down, but it might seem as if the credit commonly givento Lincoln by Americans rested on little but the single happyperformance with the earlier despatch which has been mentioned. Adamsand Lyons were not aware of his beneficent influence--the papers of thelatter contain little reference to him beyond a kindly record of atrivial conversation, at the end of which, as the Ambassador was goingfor a holiday to England, the President said, "Tell the English peopleI mean them no harm. " Yet it is evident that Lincoln's supporters inAmerica, the writer of the Biglow Papers, for instance, ascribed to hima wise, restraining power in the _Trent_ dispute. What is more, Lincoln later claimed this for himself. Two or three years later, inone of the confidences with which he often startled men who were butslight acquaintances, but who generally turned out worthy ofconfidence, he exclaimed with emphatic self-satisfaction, "Seward knowsthat I am his master, " and recalled with satisfaction how he had forcedSeward to yield to England in the _Trent_ affair. It would have beenentirely unlike him to claim praise when it was wholly undue to him; wefind him, for example, writing to Fox, of the Navy Department, about "ablunder which was probably in part mine, and certainly was not yours";so that a puzzling question arises here. It is quite possible thatLincoln, who did not press his proposal of arbitration, reallymanoeuvred Seward and the Cabinet into full acceptance of the Britishdemands by making them see the consequences of any other action. It isalso, however, likely enough that, being, as he was, interested inarbitration generally, he was too inexperienced to see theinappropriateness of the proposal in this case. If so, we may none theless credit him with having forced Seward to work for peace andfriendly relations with Great Britain, and made that minister theagent, more skilful than himself, of a peaceful resolution which in itsorigin was his own. 5. _The Great Questions of Domestic Policy_. The larger questions of civil policy which arose out of the fact of thewar, and which weighed heavily on Lincoln before the end of 1861, canbe related with less intricate detail if the fundamental point ofdifficulty is made clear. Upon July 4 Congress met. In an able Message which was a skilful butsimple appeal not only to Congress, but to the "plain people, " thePresident set forth the nature of the struggle as he conceived it, putting perhaps in its most powerful form the contention that the Unionwas indissoluble, and declaring that the "experiment" of "our populargovernment" would have failed once for all if it did not prove that"when ballots have fairly and constitutionally decided, there can be nosuccessful appeal back to bullets. " He recounted the steps which hehad taken since the bombardment of Fort Sumter, some of which might beheld to exceed his constitutional authority as indeed they did, sayinghe would have been false to his trust if for fear of such illegality hehad let the whole Constitution perish, and asking that, if necessary, Congress should ratify them. He appealed to Congress now to do itspart, and especially he appealed for such prompt and adequate provisionof money and men as would enable the war to be speedily brought to aclose. Congress, with but a few dissentient voices, chiefly from theborder States, approved all that he had done, and voted the suppliesthat he had asked. Then, by a resolution of both Houses, it definedthe object of the war; the war was not for any purpose of conquest orsubjugation, or of "overthrowing or interfering with the rights orestablished institutions" of the Southern States; it was solely "topreserve the Union with all the dignity, equality, and rights of theseveral States unimpaired. " In this resolution may be found the clue to the supreme politicalproblem with which, side by side with the conduct of the war, Lincolnwas called upon to grapple unceasingly for the rest of his life. Thatproblem lay in the inevitable change, as the war dragged on, of thepolitical object involved in it. The North as yet was not making warupon the institutions of Southern States, in other words upon slavery, and it would have been wrong to do so. It was simply asserting thesupremacy of law by putting down what every man in the North regardedas rebellion. That rebellion, it seemed likely, would completelysubside after a decisive defeat or two of the Southern forces. The lawand the Union would then have been restored as before. A great victorywould in fact have been won over slavery, for the policy of restrictingits further spread would have prevailed, but the constitutional rightof each Southern State to retain slavery within its borders was not tobe denied by those who were fighting, as they claimed, for theConstitution. Such at first was the position taken up by an unanimous Congress. Itwas obviously in accord with those political principles of Lincolnwhich have been examined in a former chapter. More than that, it wasthe position which, as he thought, his official duty as Presidentimposed on him. It is exceedingly difficult for any Englishman tofollow his course as the political situation developed. He was neithera dictator, nor an English Prime Minister. He was first and foremostan elected officer with powers and duties prescribed by a fixedConstitution which he had sworn to obey. His oath was continuallypresent to his mind. He was there to uphold the Union and the laws, with just so muchinfraction of the letter of the law, and no more, as might be obviouslynecessary if the Union and the whole fabric of law were not to perish. The mere duration of the war altered of necessity the policy of theNorth and of the President. Their task had presented itself as intheory the "suppression of an unlawful combination" within theircountry; it became in manifest fact the reabsorption of a country nowhostile, with which reunion was possible only if slavery, thefundamental cause of difference, was uprooted. As the hope of a speedy victory and an easy settlement vanished, widedifferences of opinion appeared again in the North, and the lines onwhich this cleavage proceeded very soon showed themselves. There werethose who gladly welcomed the idea of a crusade against slavery, andamong them was an unreasonable section of so-called Radicals. Theseresented that delay in a policy of wholesale liberation which wasenforced by legal and constitutional scruples, and by such practicalconsiderations as the situation in the slave States which adhered tothe North. There was, on the other hand, a Democratic party Oppositionwhich before long began to revive. It combined many shades of opinion. There were supporters or actual agents of the South, few at first andvery quiet, but ultimately developing a treasonable activity. Therewere those who constituted themselves the guardians of legality andjealously criticised all the measures of emergency which became more orless necessary. Of the bulk of the Democrats it would probably be fairto say that their conscious intention throughout was to be true to theUnion, but that throughout they were beset by a respect for Southernrights which would have gone far to paralyse the arm of the Government. Lastly, there were Republicans, by no means in sympathy with theDemocratic view, who became suspect to their Radical fellows and werevaguely classed together as Conservatives. This term may be taken tocover men simply of moderate and cautious, or in some cases, ofvariable disposition, but it included, too, some men who, whilerigorous against the South, were half-hearted in their detestation ofslavery. So far as Lincoln's private opinions were concerned, it would have beenimpossible to rank him in any of these sections. He had as strong asympathy with the Southern people as any Democrat, but he was for therestoration of the Union absolutely and without compromise. He was themost cautious of men, but his caution veiled a detestation of slaveryof which he once said that he could not remember the time when he hadnot felt it. It was his business, so far as might be, to retain thesupport of all sections in the North to the Union. In the course, fullof painful deliberation, which we shall see him pursuing, he tried tobe guided by a two-fold principle which he constantly avowed. TheUnion was to be restored with as few departures from the ways of theConstitution as was possible; but such departures became his dutywhenever he was thoroughly convinced that they were needful for therestoration of the Union. Before the war was four months old, the inevitable subject of disputebetween Northern parties had begun to trouble Lincoln. As soon as aNorthern force set foot on Southern soil slaves were apt to escape toit, and the question arose, what should the Northern general do withthem, for he was not there to make war on the private property ofSouthern citizens. General Butler--a newspaper character of some fameor notoriety throughout the war--commanded at Fort Monroe, a point onthe coast of Virginia which was always held by the North. He learntthat the slaves who fled to him had been employed on makingentrenchments for the Southern troops, so he adopted a view, which tookthe fancy of the North, that they were "contraband of war, " and shouldbe kept from their owners. The circumstances in which slaves couldthus escape varied so much that great discretion must be left to thegeneral on the spot, and the practice of generals varied. Lincoln waswell content to leave the matter so. Congress, however, passed an Actby which private property could be confiscated, if used in aid of the"insurrection" but not otherwise, and slaves were similarly dealt with. This moderate provision as to slaves met with a certain amount ofopposition; it raised an alarming question in slave States likeMissouri that had not seceded. Lincoln himself seems to have beenaverse to any legislation on the subject. He had deliberatelyconcentrated his mind, or, as his critics would have said, narrowed itdown to the sole question of maintaining the Union, and was resolved totreat all other questions as subordinate to this. Shortly after, there reappeared upon the political scene a leader withwhat might seem a more sympathetic outlook. This was Frémont, Lincoln's predecessor as the Republican candidate for the Presidency. Frémont was one of those men who make brilliant and romantic figures intheir earlier career, and later appear to have lost all solidqualities. It must be recalled that, though scarcely a professionalsoldier (for he had held a commission, but served only in the OrdnanceSurvey) he had conducted a great exploring expedition, had seenfighting as a free-lance in California, and, it is claimed, had withhis handful of men done much to win that great State from Mexico. Addto this that he, a Southerner by birth, was known among the leaders whohad made California a free State, and it is plain how appropriate itmust have seemed when he was set to command the Western Department, which for the moment meant Missouri. Here by want of competence, and, which was more surprising, lethargy he had made a present of somesuccesses to a Southern invading force, and had sacrificed thepromising life of General Lyon. Lincoln, loath to remove him, had madea good effort at helping him out by tactfully persuading a moreexperienced general to serve as a subordinate on his staff. At the endof August Frémont suddenly issued a proclamation establishing martiallaw throughout Missouri. This contained other dangerous provisions, but above all it liberated the slaves and confiscated the wholeproperty of all persons proved (before Court Martial) to have takenactive part with the enemy in the field. It is obvious that such ameasure was liable to shocking abuse, that it was certain to infuriatemany friends of the Union, and that it was in conflict with the lawwhich Congress had just passed on the subject. To Lincoln's mind itpresented the alarming prospect that it might turn the scale againstthe Union cause in the still pending deliberations in Kentucky. Lincoln's overpowering solicitude on such a point is among the proofsthat his understanding of the military situation, however elementary, was sound. He wished, characteristically, that Frémont himself shouldwithdraw his Proclamation. He invited him to withdraw it in privateletters from which one sentence may be taken: "You speak of it as beingthe only means of saving the Government. On the contrary, it is itselfthe surrender of the Government. Can it be pretended that it is anylonger the Government of the United States--any government ofconstitution and laws--wherein a general or a president may makepermanent rules of property by proclamation?" Frémont preferred tomake Lincoln publicly overrule him, which he did; and the inevitableconsequence followed. When some months later, the utter militarydisorganisation, which Frémont let arise while he busied himself withpolitics, and the scandalous waste, out of which his flatterersenriched themselves, compelled the President to remove him from hiscommand, Frémont became, for a time at least, to patriotic crowds andto many intelligent, upright and earnest men from St. Louis to Boston, the chivalrous and pure-hearted soldier of freedom, and Lincoln, thesoulless politician, dead to the cause of liberty, who, to gratify afew wire-pulling friends, had struck this hero down on the eve ofvictory to his army--an army which, by the way, he had reduced almostto nonentity. This salient instance explains well enough the nature of one half ofthe trial which Lincoln throughout the war had to undergo. Pursuingthe restoration of the Union with a thoroughness which must estrangefrom him the Democrats of the North, he was fated from the first toestrange also Radicals who were generally as devoted to the Union ashimself and with whose over-mastering hatred of slavery he reallysympathised. In the following chapter we are more concerned with theother half of his trial, the war itself. Of his minor politicaldifficulties few instances need be given--only it must be rememberedthat they were many and involved, besides delicate questions ofprinciple, the careful sifting of much confident hearsay; and, thoughthe critics of public men are wont to forget it, that there are onlytwenty-four hours in the day. But the year 1861 was to close with a further vexation that must berelated. Secretary Cameron proved incapable on the business side ofwar administration. Waste and alleged corruption called down upon hima searching investigation by a committee of the House ofRepresentatives. He had not added to his own considerable riches, buthis political henchmen had grown fat. The displeasure with the wholeAdministration was the greater because the war was not progressingfavourably, or at all. There were complaints of the Naval Departmentalso, but politicians testified their belief in the honesty of Welleswithout saying a word for Cameron. There is every reason to think hewas not personally dishonourable. Lincoln believed in his completeintegrity, and so also did sterner critics, Chase, an apostle ofeconomy and uprightness, and Senator Sumner. But he had to go. Heopened the door for his removal by a circular to generals on thesubject of slaves, which was comparable to Frémont's Proclamation andof which Lincoln had to forbid the issue. He accepted the appointmentof Minister to Russia, and when, before long, he returned, he justifiedhimself and Lincoln's judgment by his disinterested friendship andsupport. He was removed from the War Office at the end of December anda remarkable incident followed. While Lincoln's heart was still set onhis law practice, the prospect of appearing as something more than abackwoods attorney smiled for a single moment on him. He was briefedto appear in an important case outside Illinois with an eminent lawyerfrom the East, Edwin M. Stanton; but he was not allowed to open hismouth, for Stanton snuffed him out with supreme contempt, and hereturned home crestfallen. Stanton before the war was a strongDemocrat, but hated slavery. In the last days of Buchanan's Presidencyhe was made Attorney-General and helped much to restore the lost creditof that Administration. He was now in Washington, criticising the slowconduct of the war with that explosive fury and scorn which led him tocommit frequent injustice (at the very end of the war he publicly andmonstrously accused Sherman of being bribed into terms of peace bySouthern gold), which concealed from most eyes his real kindness and alurking tenderness of heart, but which made him a vigorousadministrator intolerant of dishonesty and inefficiency. He was morecontemptuous of Lincoln than ever, he would constantly be denouncinghis imbecility, and it is incredible that kind friends were wanting toconvey his opinion to Lincoln. Lincoln made him Secretary of War. Since the summer, to the impatient bewilderment of the Northern people, of Congress, now again in session, and of the President himself, theirarmies in the field were accomplishing just nothing at all, and, asthis agitating year, 1861, closed, a deep gloom settled on the North, to be broken after a while by the glare of recurrent disaster. CHAPTER IX THE DISASTERS OF THE NORTH 1. _Military Policy of the North_. The story of the war has here to be told from the point of view of thecivilian administrator, the President; stirring incidents of combat andmuch else of interest must be neglected; episodes in the war whichpeculiarly concerned him, or have given rise to controversy about him, must be related lengthily. The President was an inexperienced man. Itshould be said, too--for respect requires perfect frankness--that hewas one of an inexperienced people. The Americans had conquered theirindependence from Great Britain at the time when the ruling factions ofour country had reached their utmost degree of inefficiency. They hadfought an indecisive war with us in 1812-14, while our main businesswas to win at Salamanca and Vittoria. These experiences in some wayswarped American ideas of war and politics, and their influence perhapssurvives to this day. The extent of the President's authority and hisposition in regard to the advice he could obtain have been explained. An examination of the tangle in which military policy was firstinvolved may make the chief incidents of the war throughout easier tofollow. Immediately after Bull Run McClellan had been summoned to Washington tocommand the army of the Potomac. In November, Scott, worn out byinfirmity, and finding his authority slighted by "my ambitious junior, "retired, and thereupon McClellan, while retaining his immediate commandupon the Potomac, was made for the time General-in-Chief over all thearmies of the North. There were, it should be repeated, two otherprincipal armies besides that of the Potomac: the army of the Ohio, ofwhich General Buell was given command in July; and that of the West, towhich General Halleck was appointed, though Frémont seems to haveretained independent command in Missouri. All these armies were in anearly stage of formation and training, and from a purely military pointof view there could be no haste to undertake a movement of invasionwith any of them. Three distinct views of military policy were presented to Lincoln inthe early days. Scott, as soon as it was clear that the South meantreal fighting, saw how serious its resistance would be. His militaryjudgment was in favour of a strictly defensive attitude beforeWashington; of training the volunteers for at least four months inhealthy camps; and of then pushing a large army right down theMississippi valley to New Orleans, making the whole line of that riversecure, and establishing a pressure on the South between this Westernarmy and the naval blockade which must slowly have strangled theConfederacy. He was aware that public impatience might not allow arigid adherence to his policy, and in fact, when his view was madepublic before Bull Run, "Scott's Anaconda, " coiling itself round theConfederacy, was the subject of general derision. The view of theNorthern public and of the influential men in Congress was in favour ofspeedy and, as it was hoped, decisive action, and this was understoodas involving, whatever else was done, an attempt soon to captureRichmond. In McClellan's view, as in Scott's, the first object was thefull preparation of the Army, but he would have wished to wait till hehad a fully trained force of 273, 000 men on the Potomac, and a powerfulfleet with many transports to support his movements; and, when he hadall this, to move southwards in irresistible force, both advancingdirect into Virginia and landing at points on the coast, subduing eachof the Atlantic States of the Confederacy in turn. If the indefinitedelay and the overwhelming force which his fancy pictured could havebeen granted him, it is plain, the military critics have said, that "hecould not have destroyed the Southern armies--they would have withdrawninland, and the heart of the Confederacy would have remaineduntouched. " But neither the time nor the force for which he wishedcould be allowed him. So he had to put aside his plan, but in someways perhaps it still influenced him. It would have been impossible to disregard the wishes of those, who inthe last resort were masters, for a vigorous attempt on Richmond, andthe continually unsuccessful attempts that were made did serve amilitary purpose, for they kept up a constant drain upon the resourcesof the South. In any well-thought-out policy the objects both ofScott's plan and of the popular plan would have been borne in mind. That no such policy was consistently followed from the first was partlya result of the long-continued difficulty in finding any younger manwho could adequately take the place of Scott; it was not for a want ofclear ideas, right or wrong, on Lincoln's part. Only two days after the battle of Bull Run, he put on paper his ownview as to the future employment of the three armies. He thought thatone should "threaten" Richmond; that one should move from Cincinnati, in Ohio, by a pass called Cumberland Gap in Kentucky, upon Knoxville inEastern Tennessee; and that the third, using Cairo on the Mississippias its base, should advance upon Memphis, some 120 miles further southon that river. Apparently he did not at first wish to commit the armyof the Potomac very deeply in its advance on Richmond, and he certainlywished throughout that it should cover Washington against any possibleattack. Memphis was one of the three points at which the Southernrailway system touched the great river and communicated with the Statesbeyond--Vicksburg and New Orleans, much further south, were the others. Knoxville again is a point, by occupying which, the Northern forceswould have cut the direct railway communication between Virginia andthe West, but for this move into Eastern Tennessee Lincoln had otherreasons nearer his heart. The people of that region were strongly forthe Union; they were invaded by the Confederates and held down bysevere coercion, and distressing appeals from them for help keptarriving through the autumn; could they have been succoured and theirmountainous country occupied by the North, a great stronghold of theUnion would, it seemed to Lincoln, have been planted securely far intothe midst of the Confederacy. Therefore he persistently urged thispart of his scheme on the attention of his generals. The chiefmilitary objection raised by Buell was that his army would have toadvance 150 miles from the nearest base of supply upon a railway; (for200 miles to the west of the Alleghanies there were no railways runningfrom north to south). To meet this Lincoln, in September, urged upon ameeting of important Senators and Representatives the construction of arailway line from Lexington in Kentucky southwards, but his hearers, with their minds narrowed down to an advance on Richmond, seem to havethought the relatively small cost in time and money of this work toogreat. Lincoln still thought an expedition to Eastern Tennesseepracticable at once, and it has been argued from the circumstances inwhich one was made nearly two years later that he was right. It would, one may suppose, have been unwise to separate the armies of the Ohioand of the West so widely; for the main army of the Confederates in theWest, under their most trusted general, Albert Sidney Johnston, wasfrom September onwards in South-western Kentucky, and could have struckat either of these two Northern armies; and this was in Buell's mind. On the other hand, Lincoln's object was a wise one in itself and wouldhave been worth some postponement of the advance along the Mississippiif thereby the army in the West could have been used in support of it. However this may be, the fact is that Lincoln's plan, as it stood, wasbacked up by McClellan; McClellan was perhaps unduly anxious for Buellto move on Eastern Tennessee, because this would have supported theinvasion of Virginia which he himself was now contemplating, and he wasprobably forgetful of the West; but he was Lincoln's highest militaryadviser and his capacity was still trusted. Buell's own view was that, when he moved, it should be towards Western Tennessee. He would havehad a railway connection behind him all his way, and Albert Johnston'sarmy would have lain before him. He wished that Halleck meanwhileshould advance up the courses of the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers;Eastern Tennessee (he may have thought) would be in the end moreeffectively succoured; their two armies would thus have converged onJohnston's. Halleck agreed with Buell to the extent of disagreeingwith Lincoln and McClellan, but no further. He declined to move inconcert with Buell. Frémont had disorganised the army of the West, andHalleck, till he had repaired the mischief, permitted only certainminor enterprises under his command. Each of the three generals, including the General-in-Chief, who was theGovernment's chief adviser, was set upon his own immediate purpose, andindisposed to understanding the situation of the others--Buell perhapsthe least so. Each of them had at first a very sound reason, theunreadiness of his army, for being in no hurry to move, but then eachof them soon appeared to be a slow or unenterprising commander. Buellwas perhaps unlucky in this, for his whole conduct is the subject ofsome controversy; but he did appear slow, and the two others, it isuniversally agreed, really were so. As 1861 drew to a close, it becameurgent that something should be done somewhere, even if it were notdone in the best possible direction. The political pressure upon theAdministration became as great as before Bull Run. The army of thePotomac had rapidly become a fine army, and its enemy, in no waysuperior, lay entrenching at Manassas, twenty miles in front of it. When Lincoln grew despondent and declared that "if something was notdone soon, the bottom would drop out of the whole concern, " soldiersremark that the military situation was really sound; but he was right, for a people can hardly be kept up to the pitch of a high enterprise ifit is forced to think that nothing will happen. Before the end of theyear 1861 military reasons for waiting were no longer being urged;McClellan had long been promising immediate action, Buell and Halleckseemed merely unable to agree. In later days when Lincoln had learnt much by experience it is hard totrace the signs of his influence in military matters, because, thoughhe followed them closely, he was commonly in full agreement with hischief general and he invariably and rightly left him free. At thisstage, when his position was more difficult, and his guidance came fromcommon sense and the military books, of which, ever since Bull Run, hehad been trying, amidst all his work, to tear out the heart, there isevidence on which to judge the intelligence which he applied to thewar. Certainly he now and ever after looked at the matter as a wholeand formed a clear view of it, which, for a civilian at any rate, was areasonable view. Certainly also at this time and for long after nomilitary adviser attempted, in correcting any error of his, to supplyhim with a better opinion equally clear and comprehensive. This isprobably why some Northern military critics, when they came to read hiscorrespondence with his generals, called him, as his chief biographerswere tempted to think him, "the ablest strategist of the war. " Grantand Sherman did not say this; they said, what is another thing, thathis was the greatest intellectual force that they had met with. Strictly speaking, he could not be a strategist. If he were so judged, he would certainly be found guilty of having, till Grant came toWashington, unduly scattered his forces. He could pick out the mainobjects; but as to how to economise effort, what force and how composedand equipped was necessary for a particular enterprise, whether ingiven conditions of roads, weather, supplies, and previous fatigue, amovement was practicable, and how long it would take any cleversubaltern with actual experience of campaigning ought to have been abetter judge than he. The test, which the reader must be asked toapply to his conduct of the war, is whether he followed, duly or undulyhis own imperfect judgment, whether, on the whole, he gave in wheneverit was wise to the generals under him, and whether he did so withoutlosing his broad view or surrendering his ultimate purpose. It isreally no small proof of strength that, with the definite judgmentswhich he constantly formed, he very rarely indeed gave imperativeorders as Commander-in-Chief, which he was, to any general. Thecircumstances, all of which will soon appear, in which he was temptedor obliged to do so, are only the few marked exceptions to his habitualconduct. There are significant contrary instances in which heabstained even from seeking to know his general's precise intentions. At the time which has just been reviewed, when the scheme of the warwas in the making, his correspondence with Buell and Halleck shows hisfundamental intention. He emphatically abstains from forcing them; helucidly, though not so tactfully as later, urges his own view upon theconsideration of his general, begging him, not necessarily to act uponit, but at least to see the point, and if he will not do what iswished, to form and explain as clearly a plan for doing somethingbetter. 2. _The War in the West Up to May, 1862_. The pressure upon McClellan to move grew stronger and indeed morejustifiable month after month, and when at last, in March, 1862, McClellan did move, the story of the severest adversity to the North, of Lincoln's sorest trials, and, some still say, his gravest failures, began. Its details will concern us more than those of any other partof the war. But events in the West began earlier, proceeded faster, and should be told first. Buell could not obtain from McClellanpermission to carry out his own scheme. He did, however, obtainpermission for Halleck, if he consented, to send flotillas up theTennessee and Cumberland Rivers to make a diversion while Buell, asLincoln had proposed and as McClellan had now ordered, marched uponEastern Tennessee. Halleck would not move. Buell prepared to movealone, and in January, 1862, sent forward a small force under Thomas tomeet an equally small Confederate force that had advanced throughCumberland Gap into Eastern Kentucky. Thomas won a complete victory, most welcome as the first success since the defeat of Bull Run, at aplace called Mill Springs, far up the Cumberland River towards themountains. But at the end of January, while Buell was following upwith his forces rather widely dispersed because he expected no supportfrom Halleck, he was brought to a stop, for Halleck, without warning, did make an important movement of his own, in which he would needBuell's support. The Cumberland and the Tennessee are navigable rivers which in theirlower course flow parallel in a northerly or north-westerly directionto join the Ohio not far above its junction with the Mississippi atCairo. Fort Henry was a Confederate fort guarding the navigation ofthe Tennessee near the northern boundary of the State of that name, Fort Donelson was another on the Cumberland not far off. UlyssesSimpson Grant, who had served with real distinction in the Mexican War, had retired from the Army and had been more or less employed about hisfather's leather store in Illinois and in the gloomy pursuit ofintoxication and of raising small sums from reluctant friends when hemet them. On the outbreak of the Civil War he suddenly pulled himselftogether, and with some difficulty got employment from the Governor ofIllinois as a Major-General in the State Militia (obtaining Army ranklater). Since then, while serving under Halleck, he had shown senseand promptitude in seizing an important point on the Ohio, upon whichthe Confederates had designs. He had a quick eye for seeing importantpoints. Grant was now ordered or obtained permission from Halleck tocapture Fort Henry and Fort Donelson. By the sudden movements of Grantand of the flotilla acting with him, the Confederates were forced toabandon Fort Henry on February 6, 1862. Ten days later Fort Donelsonsurrendered with nearly 10, 000 prisoners, after a brilliant and nearlysuccessful sortie by the garrison, in which Grant showed, further, tenacity and a collected mind under the pressure of imminent calamity. Halleck had given Grant little help. Buell was reluctant to detach anyof his volunteer troops from their comrades to act with a strange army, and Halleck had not warned him of his intentions. Halleck soon appliedto Lincoln for the supreme command over the two Western armies withBuell under him. This was given to him. Experience showed that one orthe other must command now that concerted action was necessary. Nothing was known at Washington to set against Halleck's own claim ofthe credit for the late successes. So Lincoln gave him the command, though present knowledge shows clearly that Buell was the better man. Grant had been left before Fort Donelson in a position of some dangerfrom the army under Albert Johnston; and, from needless fear ofBeauregard with a Confederate force under him yet further West, Hallecklet slip the chance of sending Grant in pursuit of Johnston, who wasfalling back up the Cumberland valley. As it was, Johnston for a timeevacuated Nashville, further up the Cumberland, the chief town ofTennessee and a great railway centre, which Buell promptly occupied;Beauregard withdrew the Confederate troops from Columbus, a fortress ofgreat reputed strength on the Mississippi not far below Cairo, topositions forty or fifty miles (as the crow flies) further down thestream. Thus, as it was, some important steps had been gained insecuring that control of the navigation of the river which was one ofthe great military objects of the North. Furthermore, successful workwas being done still further West by General Curtis in Missouri, whodrove an invading force back into Arkansas and inflicted a crushingdefeat upon them there in March. But a great stroke should now havebeen struck. Buell, it is said, saw plainly that his forces andHalleck's should have been concentrated as far up the Tennessee aspossible in an endeavour to seize upon the main railway system of theConfederacy in the West. Halleck preferred, it would seem, toconcentrate upon nothing and to scatter his forces upon minorenterprises, provided he did not risk any important engagement. Animportant engagement with the hope of destroying an army of the enemywas the very thing which, as Johnston's forces now stood, he shouldhave sought, but he appears to have been contented by the temporaryretirement of an unscathed enemy who would return again reinforced. Buell was an unlucky man, and Halleck got quite all he deserved, so itis possible that events have been described to us without enough regardto Halleck's case as against Buell. But at any rate, while much shouldhave been happening, nothing very definite did happen till April 6, when Albert Johnston, now strongly reinforced from the extreme South, came upon Grant, who (it is not clear why) had lain encamped, withoutentrenching, and not expecting immediate attack, near Shiloh, far upthe Tennessee River in the extreme south of Tennessee State. Buell atthe time, though without clear information as to Grant's danger, was onhis way to join him. There seems to have been negligence both onHalleck's part and on Grant's. The battle of Shiloh is said to havebeen highly characteristic of the combats of partly disciplined armies, in which the individual qualities, good or bad, of the troops play aconspicuous part. Direction on the part of Johnston or Grant was notconspicuously seen, but the latter, whose troops were surprised anddriven back some distance, was intensely determined. In the course ofthat afternoon Albert Johnston was killed. Rightly or wronglyJefferson Davis and his other friends regarded his death as thegreatest of calamities to the South. After the manner of many battles, more especially in this war, the battle of Shiloh was the subject oflong subsequent dispute between friends of Grant and of Buell, and farmore bitter dispute between friends of Albert Johnston and Beauregard. But it seems that the South was on the point of winning, till late onthe 6th the approach of the first reinforcements from Buell made ituseless to attempt more. By the following morning further largereinforcements had come up; Grant in his turn attacked, and Beauregardhad difficulty in turning a precipitate retirement into an orderlyretreat upon Corinth, forty miles away, a junction upon the principalrailway line to be defended. The next day General Pope, who had sometime before been detached by Halleck for this purpose, after arduouswork in canal cutting, captured, with 7, 000 prisoners, the northernmostforts held by the Confederacy on the Mississippi. But Halleck's plansrequired that his further advance should be stopped. Halleck himself, in his own time, arrived at the front. In his own time, after beingjoined by Pope, he advanced, carefully entrenching himself every night. He covered in something over a month the forty miles route to Corinth, which, to his surprise, was bloodlessly evacuated before him. He wasan engineer, and like some other engineers in the Civil War, wasovermuch set upon a methodical and cautious procedure. But his mereadvance to Corinth caused the Confederates to abandon yet another forton the Mississippi, and on June 6 the Northern troops were able tooccupy Memphis, for which Lincoln had long wished, while the flotillaaccompanying them destroyed a Confederate flotilla. Meanwhile, on May1, Admiral Farragut, daringly running up the Mississippi, had capturedNew Orleans, and a Northern force under Butler was able to establishitself in Louisiana. The North had now gained the command of most ofthe Mississippi, for only the hundred miles or so between Vicksburg farsouth and Port Hudson, between that and New Orleans, was still held bythe South; and command by Northern gunboats of the chief tributaries ofthe great river was also established. The Confederate armies in theWest were left intact, though with some severe losses, and would beable before long to strike northward in a well-chosen direction; forall that these were great and permanent gains. Yet the North was notcheered. The great loss of life at Shiloh, the greatest battle in thewar so far, created a horrible impression. Halleck, under whom allthis progress had been made, properly enough received a credit, whichcritics later have found to be excessive, though it is plain that hehad reorganised his army well; but Grant was felt to have been caughtnapping at Shiloh; there were other rumours about him, too, and he felldeep into general disfavour. The events of the Western war did notpause for long, but, till the end of this year 1862, the North made nofurther definite progress, and the South, though it was able to invadethe North, achieved no Important result. It will be well then here totake up the story of events in the East and to follow them continuouslytill May, 1863, when the dazzling fortune of the South in that theatreif the war reached its highest point. 3. _The War in the East Up to May, 1863_. The interest of this part of the Civil War lies chiefly in theachievements of Lee and "Stonewall" Jackson. From the point of view ofthe North, it was not only disastrous but forms a dreary andcontroversial chapter. George McClellan came to Washington amidoverwhelming demonstrations of public confidence. His comparativeyouth added to the interest taken in him; and he was spoken of as "theyoung Napoleon. " This ridiculous name for a man already thirty-fourwas a sign that the people expected impossible things from him. Letters to his wife, which have been injudiciously published, show himto us delighting at first in the consideration paid to him by Lincolnand Scott, proudly confident in his own powers, rather elated thanotherwise by a sense that the safety of the country rested on himalone. "I shall carry the thing _en grande_, and crush the rebels inone campaign. " He soon had a magnificent army; he may be said to havemade it himself. Before, as he thought, the time had come to use it, he had fallen from favour, and a dead set was being made against him inWashington. A little later, at the crisis of his great venture, when, as he claimed, the Confederate capital could have been taken, hisexpedition was recalled. Then at a moment of deadly peril to thecountry his services were again called in. He warded off the danger. Yet a little while and his services were discarded for ever. Thissummary, which is the truth, but not the whole truth, must enlist acertain sympathy for him. The chief fact of his later life should atonce be added. In 1864, when a Presidential election was approachingand despondency prevailed widely in the North, he was selected as thechampion of a great party. The Democrats adopted a "platform" whichexpressed neither more nor less than a desire to end the war on anyterms. In accordance with the invariable tradition of party oppositionin war time, they chose a war hero as their candidate for thePresidency. McClellan publicly repudiated their principles, and nodoubt he meant it, but he became their candidate--their master or theirservant as it might prove. That he was Lincoln's opponent in theelection of that year ensured that his merits and his misfortunes wouldbe long remembered, but his action then may suggest to any one thedoubtful point in his career all along. Some estimate of his curious yet by no means uncommon type of characteris necessary, if Lincoln's relations with him are to be understood atall. The devotion to him shown by his troops proves that he had greattitles to confidence, besides, what he also had, a certain faculty ofparade, with his handsome charger, his imposing staff and the rest. Hewas a great trainer of soldiers, and with some strange lapses, a goodorganiser. He was careful for the welfare of his men; and his almosttender carefulness of their lives contrasted afterwards with whatappeared the ruthless carelessness of Grant. Unlike some of hissuccessors, he could never be called an incapable commander. His greatopponent, Lee, who had known him of old, was wont to calculate on hisextraordinary want of enterprise, but he spoke of him on the whole interms of ample respect--also, by the way, he sympathised with him likea soldier when, as he naturally assumed, he became a victim to schemingpoliticians; and Lee confided this feeling to the ready ears of anothergreat soldier, Wolseley. As he showed himself in civil life, McClellanwas an attractive gentleman of genial address; it was voted that he was"magnetic, " and his private life was so entirely irreproachable as toafford lively satisfaction. More than this, it may be conjectured thatto a certain standard of honour, loyalty, and patriotism, which he setconsciously before himself, he would always have been devotedly true. But if it be asked further whether McClellan was the desired instrumentfor Lincoln's and the country's needs, and whether, as the saying is, he was a man to go tiger-hunting with, something very much against him, though hard to define, appears in every part of his record (exceptindeed, one performance in his Peninsular Campaign). Did he ever dohis best to beat the enemy? Did he ever, except for a moment, concentrate himself singly upon any great object? Were even hispreparations thorough? Was his information ever accurate? Was hispurpose in the war ever definite, and, if so, made plain to hisGovernment? Was he often betrayed into marked frankness, or intomarked generosity? No one would be ready to answer yes to any of thesequestions. McClellan fills so memorable a place in American historythat he demands such a label as can be given to him. In the mostmoving and the most authentic of all Visions of Judgment, men were notset on the right hand or the left according as they were ofirreproachable or reproachable character; they were divided into thosewho did and those who did not. In the provisional judgment which men, if they make it modestly, should at times make with decision, McClellan's place is clear. The quality, "spiacente a Dio ed ai nemicisuoi, " of the men who did not, ran through and through him. Lincoln required first a general who would make no fatal blunder, buthe required too, when he could find him, a general of undauntedenterprise; he did not wish to expose the North to disaster, but he didmean to conquer the South. There was some security in employingMcClellan, though employing him did at one time throw on Lincoln'sunfit shoulders the task of defending Washington. It proved very hardto find another general equally trustworthy. But, in the light offacts which Lincoln came to perceive, it proved impossible to considerMcClellan as the man to finish the war. We need only notice the doings of the main armies in this theatre ofthe war and take no account of various minor affairs at outlying posts. From the battle of Bull Run, which was on July 21, 1861, to March 5, 1862, the Southern army under Joseph Johnston lay quietly drilling atManassas. It, of course, entrenched its position, but to add to theappearance of its strength, it constructed embrasures for more than itsnumber of guns and had dummy guns to show in them. At one moment therewas a prospect that it might move. Johnston and the general with himhad no idea of attacking the army of the Potomac where it lay, but theydid think that with a further 50, 000 or 60, 000 they might successfullyinvade Maryland, crossing higher up the Potomac, and by drawingMcClellan away from his present position, get a chance of defeatinghim. The Southern President came to Manassas, at their invitation, onOctober 1, but he did not think well to withdraw the trained men whomhe could have sent to Johnston from the various points in the South atwhich they were stationed; he may have had good reasons but it islikely that he sacrificed one of the best chances of the South. McClellan's army was soon in as good a state of preparation asJohnston's. Early in October McClellan had, on his own statement, over147, 000 men at his disposal; Joseph Johnston, on his own statement, under 47, 000. Johnston was well informed as to McClellan'snumbers--very likely he could get information from Maryland more easilythan McClellan from Virginia. The two armies lay not twenty-five milesapart. The weather and the roads were good to the end of December; theroads were practicable by March and they seem to have been so all thetime. As spring approached, it appeared to the Southern generals thatMcClellan must soon advance. Johnston thought that his right flank wasliable to be turned and the railway communications south of Manassasliable to be cut. In the course of February it was realised that hisposition was too dangerous; the large stores accumulated there wereremoved; and when, early in March, there were reports of unusualactivity in the Northern camp, Johnston, still expecting attack fromthe same direction, began his retreat. On March 9 it was learned inWashington that Manassas had been completely evacuated. McClellanmarched his whole army there, and marched it back. Johnston withdrewquietly behind the Rapidan River, some 30 miles further south, and tohis surprise was left free from any pursuit. For months past the incessant report in the papers, "all quiet upon thePotomac, " had been getting upon the nerves of the North. The gradualconversion of their pride in an imposing army into puzzled rage at itsinactivity has left a deeper impression on Northern memories than theshock of disappointment at Bull Run. Public men of weight had beenpressing for an advance in November, and when the Joint Committee ofCongress, an arbitrary and meddlesome, but able and perhaps on thewhole useful body, was set up in December, it brought its fullinfluence to bear on the President. Lincoln was already anxiousenough; he wished to rouse McClellan himself to activity, while hescreened him against excessive impatience or interference with hisplans. It is impossible to say what was McClellan's real mind. Quiteearly he seems to have held out hopes to Lincoln that he would soonattack, but he was writing to his wife that he expected to be attackedby superior numbers. It is certain, however, that he was possessed nowand always by a delusion as to the enemy's strength. For instanceLincoln at last felt bound to work out for himself definite prospectsfor a forward movement; it is sufficient to say of this layman's effortthat he proposed substantially the line of advance which Johnston alittle later began to dread most; Lincoln's plan was submitted forMcClellan's consideration; McClellan rejected it, and his reasons werebased on his assertion that he would have to meet nearly equal numbers. He, in fact, out-numbered the enemy by more than three to one. If wefind the President later setting aside the general's judgment ongrounds that are not fully explained, we must recall McClellan's vastand persistent miscalculations of an enemy resident in hisneighbourhood. And the distrust which he thus created was aggravatedby another propensity of his vague mind. His illusory fear was thecompanion of an extravagant hope; the Confederate army was invinciblewhen all the world expected him to attack it then and there, but theblow which he would deal it in his own place and his own time was tohave decisive results, which were indeed impossible; the enemy was to"pass beneath the Caudine Forks. " The demands which he made on theAdministration for men and supplies seemed to have no finality aboutthem; his tone in regard to them seemed to degenerate into a chronicgrumble. The War Department certainly did not intend to stint him inany way; but he was an unsatisfactory man to deal with in thesematters. There was a great mystery as to what became of the men sentto him. In the idyllic phrase, which Lincoln once used of him or ofsome other general, sending troops to him was "like shifting fleasacross a barn floor with a shovel--not half of them ever get there. "But his fault was graver than this; utterly ignoring the needs of theWest, he tried, as General-in-Chief, to divert to his own army therecruits and the stores required for the other armies. The difficulty with him went yet further; McClellan himselfdeliberately set to work to destroy personal harmony between himselfand his Government. It counts for little that in private he soon setdown all the civil authorities as the "greatest set of incapables, " andso forth, but it counts for more that he was personally insolent to thePresident. Lincoln had been in the habit, mistaken in this case butnatural in a chief who desires to be friendly, of calling atMcClellan's house rather than summoning him to his own. McClellanacquired a habit of avoiding him, he treated his enquiries as idlecuriosity, and he probably thought, not without a grain of reason, thatLincoln's way of discussing matters with many people led him intoindiscretion. So one evening when Lincoln and Seward were waiting atthe general's house for his return, McClellan came in and wentupstairs; a message was sent that the President would be glad to seehim; he said he was tired and would rather be excused that night. Lincoln damped down his friends' indignation at this; he would, he oncesaid, "hold General McClellan's stirrup for him if he will only win usvictories. " But he called no more at McClellan's, and a curiousabruptness in some of his orders later marks his unsuccessful effort todeal with McClellan in another way. The slightly ridiculous light inwhich the story shows Lincoln would not obscure to any soldier the fullgravity of such an incident. It was not merely foolish to treat a kindsuperior rudely; a general who thus drew down a curtain between his ownmind and that of the Government evidently went a very long way toensure failure in war. Lincoln had failed to move McClellan early in December. For part ofthat month and January McClellan was very ill. Consultations were heldwith other generals, including McDowell, who could not be given thechief command because the troops did not trust him. McDowell and therest were in agreement with Lincoln. Then McClellan suddenly recoveredand was present at a renewed consultation. He snubbed McDowell; theinadequacy of his force to meet, in fact, less than a third of itsnumber was "so plain that a blind man could see it"; he was severelyand abruptly tackled as to his own plans by Secretary Chase; Lincolnintervened to shield him, got from him a distinct statement that he hadin his mind a definite time for moving, and adjourned the meeting. Stanton, one of the friends to whom McClellan had confided hisgrievances, was now at the War Department and was at one with the JointCommittee of Congress in his impatience that McClellan should move. Atlast, on January 27, Lincoln published a "General War Order" that aforward movement was to be made by the army of the Potomac and theWestern armies on February 22. It seems a blundering step, but itroused McClellan. For a time he even thought of acting as Lincolnwished; he would move straight against Johnston, and "in ten days, " hetold Chase on February 13, "I shall be in Richmond. " But he quicklyreturned to the plan which he seems to have been forming before butwhich he only now revealed to the Government, and it was a plan whichinvolved further delay. When February 22 passed and nothing was done, the Joint Committee were indignant that Lincoln still stood byMcClellan. But McClellan now was proposing definite action; apart fromthe difficulty of finding a better man, there was the fact thatMcClellan had made his army and was beloved by it; above all, Lincolnhad not lost all the belief he had formed at first in McClellan'scapacity; he believed that "if he could once get McClellan started" hewould do well. Professional criticism, alive to McClellan's militaryfaults, has justified Lincoln in this, and it was for something otherthan professional failure that Lincoln at last removed him. McClellan had determined to move his army by sea to some point furtherdown the coast of the Chesapeake Bay. The questions which Lincolnwrote to him requesting a written answer have never been adequatelyanswered. Did McClellan's plan, he asked, require less time or moneythan Lincoln's? Did it make victory more certain? Did it make it morevaluable? In case of disaster, did it make retreat more easy? The onepoint for consideration in McClellan's reply to him is that the enemydid not expect such a movement. This was quite true; but the enemy wasable to meet it, and McClellan was far too deliberate to reap anyadvantage from a surprise. His original plan was to land near a placecalled Urbana on the estuary of the Rappahannock, not fifty miles eastof Richmond. When he heard that Johnston had retreated further south, he assumed, and ever after declared, that this was to anticipate hisdesign upon Urbana, which, he said, must have reached the enemy's earsthrough the loose chattering of the Administration. As has been seen, this was quite untrue. His project of going to Urbana was now changed, by himself or the Government, upon the unanimous advice of his chiefsubordinate generals, into a movement to Fort Monroe, which he had evenbefore regarded as preferable to a direct advance southwards. A fewdays after Johnston's retreat, the War Department began the embarkationof his troops for this point. Fort Monroe is at the end of thepeninsula which lies between the estuaries of the York River on thenorth and the James on the south. Near the base of this projection ofland, seventy-five miles from Fort Monroe, stands Richmond. On April2, 1862, McClellan himself landed to begin the celebrated PeninsulaCampaign which was to close in disappointment at the end of July. Before the troops were sent to the Peninsula several things were to bedone. An expedition to restore communication westward by the Baltimoreand Ohio Rail way involved bridging the Potomac with boats which wereto be brought by canal. It collapsed because McClellan's boats weresix inches too wide for the canal locks. Then Lincoln had insistedthat the navigation of the lower Potomac should be made free from themenace of Confederate batteries which, if McClellan would haveco-operated with the Navy Department, would have been cleared away longbefore. This was now done, and though a new peril to thetransportation of McClellan's army suddenly and dramatically discloseditself, it was as suddenly and dramatically removed. In the hastyabandonment of Norfolk harbour on the south of the James estuary by theNorth, a screw steamer called the _Merrimac_ had been partly burnt andscuttled by the North. On March 1 she steamed out of the harbour insight of the North. The Confederates had raised her and converted herinto an ironclad. Three wooden ships of the North gave gallant butuseless fight to her and were destroyed that day; and the news spreadconsternation in every Northern port. On the very next morning therecame into the mouth of the James the rival product of the Northern NavyDepartment and of the Swedish engineer Ericsson's invention. She wascompared to a "cheesebox on a raft"; she was named the _Monitor_, andwas the parent of a type of vessel so called which has been heard ofmuch more recently. The _Merrimac_ and the _Monitor_ forthwith foughta three hours' duel; then each retired into harbour without fataldamage. But the _Merrimac_ never came out again; she was destroyed bythe Confederates when McClellan had advanced some way up the Peninsula;and it will be unnecessary to speak of the several similar efforts ofthe South, which nearly but not quite achieved very important successeslater. Before and after his arrival at the Peninsula, McClellan receivedseveral mortifications. Immediately after the humiliation of theenemy's escape from Manassas, he was without warning relieved of hiscommand as General-in-Chief. This would in any case have followednaturally upon his expedition away from Washington; it was in publicput on that ground alone; and he took it well. He had been urged toappoint corps commanders, for so large a force as his could not remainorganised only in divisions; he preferred to wait till he had madetrial of the generals under him; Lincoln would not have this delay, andappointed corps commanders chosen by himself because he believed themto be fighting men. The manner in which these and some otherpreparatory steps were taken were, without a doubt, intended to makeMcClellan feel the whip. They mark a departure, not quite happy atfirst, from Lincoln's formerly too gentle manner. A worse shock toMcClellan followed. The President had been emphatic in his orders thata sufficient force should be left to make Washington safe, and supposedthat he had come to a precise understanding on this point. He suddenlydiscovered that McClellan, who had now left for Fort Monroe, hadordered McDowell to follow him with a force so large that it would notleave the required number behind. Lincoln immediately ordered McDowelland his whole corps to remain, though he subsequently sent a part of itto McClellan. McClellan's story later gives reason for thinking thathe had intended no deception; but if so, he had expressed himself withunpardonable vagueness, and he had not in fact left Washington secure. Now and throughout this campaign Lincoln took the line that Washingtonmust be kept safe--safe in the judgment of all the best militaryauthorities available. McClellan's progress up the Peninsula was slow. He had not informedhimself correctly as to the geography; he found the enemy not sounprepared as he had supposed; he wasted, it is agreed, a month inregular approaches to their thinly-manned fortifications at Yorktown, when he might have carried them by assault. He was soon confronted byJoseph Johnston, and he seems both to have exaggerated Johnston'snumbers again and to have been unprepared for his movements. TheAdministration does not seem to have spared any effort to support him. In addition to the 100, 000 troops he took with him, 40, 000 altogetherwere before long despatched to him. He was operating in a verydifficult country, but he was opposed at first by not half his ownnumber. Lincoln, in friendly letters, urged upon him that delayenabled the enemy to strengthen himself both in numbers and infortifications. The War Department did its best for him. The whole ofhis incessant complaints on this score are rendered unconvincing by thelanguage of his private letters about that "sink of iniquity, Washington, " "those treacherous hounds, " the civil authorities, whowere at least honest and intelligent men, and the "Abolitionists andother scoundrels, " who, he supposed, wished the destruction of hisarmy. The criticism in Congress of himself and his generals was nodoubt free, but so, as Lincoln reminded him, was the criticism ofLincoln himself. Justly or not, there were complaints of his relationswith corps commanders. Lincoln gave no weight to them, but wrote him amanly and a kindly warning. The points of controversy which McClellanbequeathed to writers on the Civil War are innumerable, but no one canread his correspondence at this stage without concluding that he wasalmost impossible to deal with, and that the whole of his evidence inhis own case was vitiated by a sheer hallucination that people wishedhim to fail. He had been nearly two months in the Peninsula when hewas attacked at a disadvantage by Johnston, but defeated him on May 31and June 1 in a battle which gave confidence and prestige to theNorthern side, but which he did not follow up. A part of his armypursued the enemy to within four miles of Richmond, and it has beencontended that if he had acted with energy he could at this time havetaken that city. His delay, to whatever it was due, gave the enemytime to strengthen himself greatly both in men and in fortifications. The capable Johnston was severely wounded in the battle, and wasreplaced by the inspired Lee. According to McClellan's own account, which English writers have followed, his movements had been greatlyembarrassed by the false hope given him that McDowell was now to marchoverland and join him. His statement that he was influenced by this isrefuted by his own letters at the time. McClellan, however, suffered agreat disappointment. The front of Washington was now clear of theenemy and Lincoln had determined to send McDowell when he was inducedto keep him back by a diversion in the war which he had not expected, and which indeed McClellan had advised him not to expect. "Stonewall" Jackson's most famous campaign happened at this juncture, and to save Washington, Lincoln and Stanton placed themselves, or wereplaced, in the trying position of actually directing movements oftroops. There were to the south and south-west of Washington, besidesthe troops under McDowell's command, two Northern forces respectivelycommanded by Generals Banks and Frémont. These two men were among thechief examples of those "political generals, " the use of whom in thisearly and necessarily blundering stage of the war has been the subjectof much comment. Banks was certainly a politician, a self-made man, who had worked in a factory and who had risen to be at one time Speakerof the House. He was now a general because as a powerful man in thepatriotic State of Massachusetts he brought with him many men, andthese were ready to obey him. On the other hand, he on severaloccasions showed good judgment both in military matters and in thequestions of civil administration which came under him; his heart wasin his duty; and, though he held high commands almost to the end of thewar, want of competence was never imputed to him till the failure of avery difficult enterprise on which he was despatched in 1864. He wasnow in the lower valley of the Shenandoah, keeping a watch over a muchsmaller force under Jackson higher up the valley. Frémont was in somesense a soldier, but after his record in Missouri he should never havebeen employed. His new appointment was one of Lincoln's greatestmistakes, and it was a mistake of a characteristic kind. It willeasily be understood that there were real political reasons for notleaving this popular champion of freedom unused and unrecognized. These reasons should not have, and probably would not have, prevailed. But Lincoln's personal reluctance to resist all entreaties on behalf ofhis own forerunner and his own rival was great; and then Frémont cameto Lincoln and proposed to him a knight-errant's adventure to succourthe oppressed Unionists of Tennessee by an expedition through WestVirginia. So he was now to proceed there, but was kept for the presentin the mountains near the Shenandoah valley. The way in which theforces under McDowell, Banks and Frémont were scattered on variouserrands was unscientific; what could be done by Jackson, incorrespondence with Lee, was certainly unforeseen. At the beginning ofMay, Jackson, who earlier in the spring had achieved some minorsuccesses in the Shenandoah valley and had raided West Virginia, begana series of movements of which the brilliant skill and daring arerecorded in Colonel Henderson's famous book. With a small force, surrounded by other forces, each of which, if concentrated, should haveoutnumbered him, he caught each in turn at a disadvantage, inflicted onthem several damaging blows, and put the startled President andSecretary of War in fear for the safety of Washington. There seemed tobe no one available who could immediately be charged with the supremecommand of these three Northern forces, unless McDowell could have beenspared from where he was; so Lincoln with Stanton's help took uponhimself to ensure the co-operation of their three commanders by ordersfrom Washington. His self-reliance had now begun to reach its fullstature, his military good sense in comparison with McClellan's wasproving greater than he had supposed, and he had probably notdiscovered its limitations. Presumably his plans now were, like anamateur's, too complicated, and it is not worth while to discuss them. But he was trying to cope with newly revealed military genius, and, sofar as can be told, he was only prevented from crushing the adventurousJackson by a piece of flat disobedience on the part of Frémont. Frémont, having thus appropriately punished Lincoln, was removed, thistime finally, from command. Jackson, having successfully kept McDowellfrom McClellan, had before the end of June escaped safe southward. McClellan was nearing Richmond. Lee, by this time, had been set freefrom Jefferson Davis' office and had taken over the command of JosephJohnston's army. Lincoln must have learnt a great deal, and he fullyrealised that the forces not under McClellan in the East should beunder some single commander. Pope, an experienced soldier, hadsucceeded well in the West; he was no longer necessary there, and therewas no adverse criticism upon him. He was in all respects a properchoice, and he was now summoned to take command of what was to becalled the army of Virginia. A few days later, upon the advice, as itseems, of Scott, Halleck himself was called from the West. His oldcommand was left to Grant and he himself was made General-in-Chief andcontinued at Washington to the end of the war as an adviser of theGovernment. All the progress in the West had been made under Halleck'ssupervision, and his despatches had given an exaggerated impression ofhis own achievement at Corinth. He had not seen active service beforethe war, but he had a great name as an accomplished military writer; inafter years he was well known as a writer on international law. He isnot thought to have justified his appointment by showing sound judgmentabout war, and Lincoln upon some later emergency told him in his directway that his military knowledge was useless if he could not give adefinite decision in doubtful circumstances. But whether Halleck'sabilities were great or small, Lincoln continued to use them, becausehe found him "wholly for the service, " without personal favour orprejudice. McClellan was slowly but steadily nearing Richmond. From June 26 toJuly 2 there took place a series of engagements between Lee andMcClellan, or rather the commanders under him, known as the Seven Days'Battles. The fortunes of the fighting varied greatly, but the upshotis that, though the corps on McClellan's left won a strong position notfar from Richmond, the sudden approach of Jackson's forces uponMcClellan's right flank, which began on the 26th, placed him in whatappears to have been, as he himself thought it, a situation of greatdanger. Lee is said to have "read McClellan like an open book, "playing upon his caution, which made him, while his subordinatesfought, more anxious to secure their retreat than to seize upon anyadvantage they gained. But Lee's reading deceived him in one respect. He had counted upon McClellan's retreating, but thought he wouldretreat under difficulties right down the Peninsula to his originalbase and be thoroughly cut up on the way. But on July 2 McClellan withgreat skill withdrew his whole army to Harrison's Landing far up theJames estuary, having effected with the Navy a complete transference ofhis base. Here his army lay in a position of security; they might yetthreaten Richmond, and McClellan's soldiers still believed in him. Butthe South was led by a great commander and had now learned to give himunbounded confidence; there was some excuse for a panic in Wall Street, and every reason for dejection in the North. On the third of the Seven Days, McClellan, much moved by the sight ofdead and wounded comrades, sent a gloomy telegram to the Secretary ofWar, appealing with excessive eloquence for more men. "I only wish tosay to the President, " he remarked in it, "that I think he is wrong inregarding me as ungenerous when I said that my force was too weak. " Heconcluded: "If I save the army now, I tell you plainly that I owe nothanks to you nor to any other persons in Washington. You have doneyour best to sacrifice this army. " Stanton still expressed theextraordinary hope that Richmond would fall in a day or two. He hadlately committed the folly of suspending enlistment, an act which, though of course there is an explanation of it, must rank as the onefirst-rate blunder of Lincoln's Administration. He was now negotiatingthrough the astute Seward for offers from the State Governors of a levyof 300, 000 men to follow up McClellan's success. Lincoln, as was hisway, feared the worst. He seems at one moment to have had fears forMcClellan's sanity. But he telegraphed, himself, an answer to him, which affords as fair an example as can be given of his characteristicmanner. "Save your army at all events. Will send reinforcements asfast as we can. Of course they cannot reach you to-day or to-morrow, or next day. I have not said you were ungenerous for saying you neededreinforcements. I thought you were ungenerous in assuming that I didnot send them as fast as I could. I feel any misfortune to you andyour army quite as keenly as you feel it yourself. If you have had adrawn battle or repulse, it is the price we pay for the enemy not beingin Washington. We protected Washington and the enemy concentrated onyou. Had we stripped Washington, he would have been upon us before thetroops could have gotten to you. Less than a week ago you notified usreinforcements were leaving Richmond to come in front of us. It isthe nature of the case, and neither you nor the Government are toblame. Please tell me at once the present condition and aspect ofthings. " Demands for an impossible number of reinforcements continued. Lincolnexplained to McClellan a few days later that they were impossible, andadded: "If in your frequent mention of responsibility you have theimpression that I blame you for not doing more than you can, please berelieved of such an impression. I only beg that, in like manner, youwill not ask impossibilities of me. " Much argument upon Lincoln's nextimportant act may be saved by the simple observations that the problemin regard to the defence of Washington was real, that McClellan'spropensity to ask for the impossible was also real, and that Lincoln'spatient and loyal attitude to him was real too. Five days after his arrival at Harrison's Landing, McClellan wroteLincoln a long letter. It was a treatise upon Lincoln's politicalduties. It was written as "on the brink of eternity. " He was not thenin fact in any danger, and possibly he had composed it seven daysbefore as his political testament; and apprehensions, free frompersonal fear, excuse, without quite redeeming, its inappropriateness. The President is before all things not to abandon the cause. But thecause should be fought for upon Christian principles. Christianprinciples exclude warfare on private property. More especially dothey exclude measures for emancipating slaves. And if the Presidentgives way to radical views on slavery, he will get no soldiers. Thenfollows a mandate to the President to appoint a Commander-in-Chief, notnecessarily the writer. Such a summary does injustice to a certainelevation of tone in the letter, but that elevation is itself slightlystrained. McClellan, whatever his private opinions, had not meddledwith politics before he left Washington. The question why in thismilitary crisis he should have written what a Democratic politicianmight have composed as a party manifesto must later have caused Lincolnsome thought, but it apparently did not enter into the decision he nexttook. He arrived himself at Harrison's Landing next day. McClellanhanded him the letter. Lincoln read it, and said that he was obligedto him. McClellan sent a copy to his wife as "a very important record. " Lincoln had come in order to learn the views of McClellan and all hiscorps commanders. They differed a good deal on important points, but amajority of them were naturally anxious to stay and fight there. Lincoln was left in some anxiety as to how the health of the troopswould stand the climate of the coming months if they had to wait longwhere they were. He was also disturbed by McClellan's vagueness aboutthe number of his men, for he now returned as present for duty a numberwhich far exceeded that which some of his recent telegrams had givenand yet fell short of the number sent him by an amount which noreasonable estimate of killed, wounded, and sick could explain. Thisadded to Lincoln's doubt on the main question presented to him. McClellan believed that he could take Richmond, but he demanded forthis very large reinforcements. Some part of them were already beingcollected, but the rest could by no means be given him without leavingWashington with far fewer troops to defend it than McClellan or anybodyelse had hitherto thought necessary. On July 24, the day after his arrival at Washington, Halleck was sentto consult with McClellan and his generals. The record of theirconsultations sufficiently shows the intricacy of the problem to bedecided. The question of the health of the climate in August weighedmuch with Halleck, but the most striking feature of their conversationwas the fluctuation of McClellan's own opinion upon each importantpoint--at one moment he even gave Halleck the impression that he wishedunder all the circumstances to withdraw and to join Pope. When Halleckreturned to Washington McClellan telegraphed in passionate anxiety tobe left in the Peninsula and reinforced. On the other hand, some ofthe officers of highest rank with him wrote strongly urging withdrawal. This latter was the course on which Lincoln and Halleck decided. Inthe circumstances it was certainly the simplest course to concentrateall available forces in an attack upon the enemy from the direction ofWashington which would keep that capital covered all the while. It wasin any case no hasty and no indefensible decision, nor is there anyjustification for the frequent assertion that some malignant influencebrought it about. It is one of the steps taken by Lincoln which havebeen the most often lamented. But if McClellan had had all he demandedto take Richmond and had made good his promise, what would Lee havedone? Lee's own answer to a similar question later was, "We would swapqueens"; that is, he would have taken Washington. If so theConfederacy would not have fallen, but in all probability the Northwould have collapsed, and European Powers would at the least haverecognised the Confederacy. Lincoln indeed had acted as any prudent civilian Minister would thenhave acted. But disaster followed, or rather there followed, withbrief interruption, a succession of disasters which, after this longtale of hesitation, can be quickly told. It would be easy to representthem as a judgment upon the Administration which had rejected theguidance of McClellan. But in the true perspective of the war, thepoint which has now been reached marks the final election by the Northof the policy by which it won the war. McClellan, even if he had takenRichmond while Washington remained safe, would have concentrated theefforts of the North upon a line of advance which gave little promiseof finally reducing the Confederacy. It is evident to-day that theright course for the North was to keep the threatening of Richmond andthe recurrent hammering at the Southern forces on that front dulyrelated to that continual process by which the vitals of the Southerncountry were being eaten into from the west. This policy, it has beenseen, was present to Lincoln's mind from an early day; the temptationto depart from it was now once for all rejected. On the other hand, the three great Southern victories, the second battle of Bull Run, Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville, which followed within the nextnine months, had no lasting influence. Jefferson Davis might perhapshave done well if he had neglected all else and massed every man hecould gather to pursue the advantage which these battles gave him. Hedid not--perhaps could not--do this. But he concentrated his greatestresource of all, the genius of Lee, upon a point at which the realdanger did not lie. Pope had now set vigorously to work collecting and pulling together hisforces, which had previously been scattered under different commandersin the north of Virginia. He was guilty of a General Order whichshocked people by its boastfulness, insulted the Eastern soldiers by acomparison with their Western comrades, and threatened harsh and mostunjust treatment of the civil population of Virginia. But upon thewhole he created confidence, for he was an officer well trained in hisprofession as well as an energetic man. The problem was now to effectas quickly as possible the union of Pope's troops and McClellan's in anoverwhelming force. Pope was anxious to keep McClellan unmolestedwhile he embarked his men. So, to occupy the enemy, he pushed boldlyinto Virginia; he pushed too far, placed himself in great danger fromthe lightning movements which Lee now habitually employed Jackson toexecute, but extricated himself with much promptitude, though with someconsiderable losses. McClellan had not been deprived of command; hewas in the curious and annoying position of having to transfer troopsto Pope till, for a moment, not a man remained under him, but theprocess of embarking and transferring them gave full scope for energyand skill. McClellan, as it appeared to Lincoln, performed his taskvery slowly. This was not the judgment of impatience, for McClellancaused the delay by repeated and perverse disobedience to Halleck'sorders. But the day drew near when 150, 000 men might be concentratedunder Pope against Lee's 55, 000. The stroke which Lee now struck afterearnest consultation with Jackson has been said to have been "perhapsthe most daring in the history of warfare. " He divided his army almostunder the enemy's eyes and sent Jackson by a circuitous route to cutPope's communications with Washington. Then followed an intricatetactical game, in which each side was bewildered as to the movements ofthe other. Pope became exasperated and abandoned his prudence. Heturned on his enemy when he should and could have withdrawn to a safeposition and waited. On August 29 and 30, in the ominous neighbourhoodof the Bull Run and of Manassas, he sustained a heavy defeat. Then heabandoned hope before he need have done so, and, alleging that his menwere demoralised, begged to be withdrawn within the defences ofWashington, where he arrived on September 3, and, as was inevitable inthe condition of his army, was relieved of his command. McClellan, inLincoln's opinion, had now been guilty of the offence which thatgenerous mind would find it hardest to forgive. He had not bestirredhimself to get his men to Pope. In Lincoln's belief at the time he hadwished Pope to fail. McClellan, who reached Washington at the crisisof Pope's difficulties, was consulted, and said to Lincoln that Popemust be left to get out of his scrape as best he could. It was perhapsonly an awkward phrase, but it did not soften Lincoln. Washington was now too strongly held to be attacked, but Lee determinedto invade Maryland. At least this would keep Virginia safe duringharvest time. It might win him many recruits in Maryland. It wouldfrighten the North, all the more because a Confederate force furtherwest was at that same time invading Kentucky; it might accomplish therewas no saying how much. This much, one may gather from the "Life ofLord John Russell, " any great victory of the South on Northern soilwould probably have accomplished: the Confederacy would have beenrecognised, as Jefferson Davis longed for it to be, by European Powers. Lincoln now acted in total disregard of his Cabinet and of allWashington, and in equal disregard of any false notions of dignity. Byword of mouth he directed McClellan to take command of all the troopsat Washington. His opinion of McClellan had not altered, but, as hesaid to his private secretaries, if McClellan could not fight himself, he excelled in making others ready to fight. No other step could havesucceeded so quickly in restoring order and confidence to the Army. Few or no instructions were given to McClellan. He was simply allowedthe freest possible hand, and was watched with keen solicitude as tohow he would rise to his opportunity. Lee, in his advance, expected his opponent to be slow. He actuallyagain divided his small army, leaving Jackson with a part of it behindfor a while to capture, as he did, the Northern fort at Harper's Ferry. A Northern private picked up a packet of cigars dropped by someSouthern officer with a piece of paper round it. The paper was a copyof an order of Lee's which revealed to McClellan the opportunity nowgiven him of crushing Lee in detail. But he did not rouse himself. Hewas somewhat hampered by lack of cavalry, and his greatest quality inthe field was his care not to give chances to the enemy. His want ofenergy allowed Lee time to discover what, had happened and fall back alittle towards Harper's Ferry. Yet Lee dared, without having yetreunited his forces, to stop at a point where McClellan must be temptedto give him battle, and where, if he could only stand againstMcClellan, Jackson would be in a position to deliver a deadlycounter-stroke. Lee knew that for the South the chance of rapidsuccess was worth any risk. McClellan, however, moved so slowly thatJackson was able to join Lee before the battle. The Northern army cameup with them near the north bank of the Potomac on the Antietam Creek, a small tributary of that river, about sixty miles north-east ofWashington. There, on September 17, 1862, McClellan ordered an attack, to which he did not attempt to give his personal direction. His corpscommanders led assaults on Lee's position at different times and in sodisconnected a manner that each was repulsed singly. But on thefollowing morning Lee found himself in a situation which determined himto retreat. As a military success the battle of Antietam demanded to be followedup. Reinforcements had now come to McClellan, and Lincoln telegraphed, "Please do not let him get off without being hurt. " Lee was betweenthe broad Potomac and a Northern army fully twice as large as his own, with other large forces near. McClellan's subordinates urged him torenew the attack and drive Lee into the river. But Lee was allowed tocross the river, and McClellan lay camped on the Antietam battlefieldfor a fortnight. He may have been dissatisfied with the condition ofhis army and its supplies. Some of his men wanted new boots; many ofLee's were limping barefoot. He certainly, as often before, exaggerated the strength of his enemy. Lee recrossed the Potomaclittle damaged. Lincoln, occupied in those days over the mostmomentous act of his political life, watched McClellan eagerly, andcame to the Antietam to see things for himself. He came back in thefull belief that McClellan would move at once. Once more undeceived, he pressed him with letters and telegrams from himself and Halleck. Hewas convinced that McClellan, if he tried, could cut off Lee fromRichmond. Hearing of the fatigue of McClellan's horses, he telegraphedabout the middle of October, "Will you pardon me for asking what yourhorses have done since the battle of Antietam that tires anything. "This was unkind; McClellan indeed should have seen about cavalry in thedays when he was organising in Washington, but at this moment theSouthern horse had just raided right round his lines and got safe back, and his own much inferior cavalry was probably worn out with vainpursuit of them. On the same day Lincoln wrote more kindly, "My dearSir, you remember my speaking to you of what I called yourover-cautiousness. Are you not over-cautious when you assume that youcannot do what the enemy is constantly doing? Change positions withthe enemy, and think you not, he would break your communications withRichmond within the next twenty-four hours. " And after a briefanalysis of the situation, which seems conclusive, he ends: "I say'try'; if we never try we shall never succeed. . . . If we cannot beathim now when he bears the wastage of coming to us, we never can when webear the wastage of going to him. " His patience was nearing a limitwhich he had already fixed in his own mind. On October 28, more thanfive weeks after the battle, McClellan began to cross the Potomac, andtook a week in the process. On November 5, McClellan was removed fromhis command, and General Burnside appointed in his place. Lincoln had longed for the clear victory that he thought McClellanwould win; he gloomily foreboded that he might not find a better man toput in his place; he felt sadly how he would be accused, as he has beenever since, of displacing McClellan because he was a Democrat. "Inconsidering military merit, " he wrote privately, "the world hasabundant evidence that I disregard politics. " A friend, a Republicangeneral, wrote to him a week or so after McClellan had been removed tourge that all the generals ought to be men in thorough sympathy withthe Administration. He received a crushing reply (to be followed in aday or two by a friendly invitation) indignantly proving that Democratsserved as well in the field as Republicans. But in regard to McClellanhimself we now know that a grave suspicion had entered Lincoln's mind. He might, perhaps, in the fear of finding no one better, have toleratedhis "over-cautiousness"; he did not care what line an officer who didhis duty might in civil life take politically; but he would not takethe risk of entrusting the war further to a general who let hispolitics govern his strategy, and who, as he put it simply, "did notwant to hurt the enemy. " This, he had begun to believe, was the causeof McClellan's lack of energy. He resolved to treat McClellan'sconduct now, in fighting Lee or in letting him escape South, as thetest of whether his own suspicion about him was justified or not. Leedid get clear away, and Lincoln dismissed McClellan in the full belief, right or wrong, that he was not sorry for Lee's escape. It is not known exactly what further evidence Lincoln then had for hisbelief, but information which seems to have come later made him thinkafterwards that he had been right. The following story was told him bythe Governor of Vermont, whose brother, a certain General Smith, servedunder McClellan and was long his intimate friend. Lincoln believed thestory; so may we. The Mayor of New York, a shifty demagogue namedFernando Wood, had visited McClellan in the Peninsula with a proposalthat he should become the Democratic candidate for the Presidency, andwith a view to this should pledge himself to certain Democraticpoliticians to conduct the war in a way that should conciliate theSouth, which to Lincoln's mind meant an "inefficient" way. McClellan, after some days of unusual reserve, told Smith of this and showed him aletter which he had drafted giving the desired pledge. On Smith'searnest remonstrance that this "looked like treason, " he did not sendthe letter then. But Wood came again after the battle of Antietam, andthis time McClellan sent a letter in the same sense. This heafterwards confessed to Smith, showing him a copy of the letter. Smithand other generals asked, after this, to be relieved from service underhim. If, as can hardly be doubted, McClellan did this, there can be noserious excuse for him, and no serious question that Lincoln was rightwhen he concluded it was unsafe to employ him. McClellan, according toall evidence except his own letters, was a nice man, and was not likelyto harbour a thought of what to him seemed treason; it is honourable tohim that he wished later to serve under Grant but was refused by him. But, to one of his views, the political situation before and afterAntietam was alarming, and it is certain that to his inconclusive mindand character an attitude of half loyalty would be easy. He may nothave wished that Lee should escape, but he had no ardent desire that heshould not. Right or wrong, such was the ground of Lincoln'sindependent and conscientiously deliberate decision. The result again did not reward him. His choice of Burnside was amistake. There were corps commanders under McClellan who had earnedspecial confidence, but they were all rather old. General Burnside, who was the senior among the rest, had lately succeeded in operationsin connection with the Navy on the North Carolina coast, wherebycertain harbours were permanently closed to the South. He had sinceserved under McClellan at the Antietam, but had not earned much credit. He was a loyal friend to McClellan and very modest about his owncapacity. Perhaps both these things prejudiced Lincoln in his favour. He continued in active service till nearly the end of the war, when afailure led to his retirement; and he was always popular and respected. At this juncture he failed disastrously. On December 11 and 12, 1862, Lee's army lay strongly posted on the south of the Rappahannock. Burnside, in spite, as it appears, of express warnings from Lincoln, attacked Lee at precisely the point, near the town of Fredericksburg, where his position was really impregnable. The defeat of the Northernarmy was bloody and overwhelming. Burnside's army became all butmutinous; his corps commanders, especially General Hooker, were loud incomplaint. He was tempted to persist, in spite of all protests, insome further effort of rashness. Lincoln endeavoured to restrain him. Halleck, whom Lincoln begged to give a definite military opinion, upholding or overriding Burnside's, had nothing more useful to offerthan his own resignation. After discussions and recriminations amongall officers concerned, Burnside offered his resignation. Lincoln wasby no means disposed to remove a general upon a first failure or toside with his subordinates against him, and refused to accept it. Burnside then offered the impossible alternative of the dismissal ofall his corps commanders for disaffection to him, and on January 25, 1863, his resignation was accepted. There was much discussion in the Cabinet as to the choice of hissuccessor. It was thought unwise to give the Eastern army a commanderfrom the West again. At Chase's instance [Transcriber's note:insistance?] the senior corps commander who was not too old, GeneralHooker, sometimes called "Fighting Joe Hooker, " was appointed. Hereceived a letter, often quoted as the letter of a man much alteredfrom the Lincoln who had been groping a year earlier after the rightway of treating McClellan: "I have placed you, " wrote Lincoln, "at thehead of the Army of the Potomac. Of course I have done this upon whatappear to me to be sufficient reasons, and yet I think it best for youto know that there are some things in regard to which I am not quitesatisfied with you. I believe you to be a brave and skilful soldier, which of course I like. I also believe that you do not mix politicswith your profession, in which you are right. You have confidence inyourself, which is a valuable, if not indispensable, quality. You areambitious, which, within reasonable bounds, does good rather than harm;but I think that during General Burnside's command of the army you havetaken counsel of your ambition and thwarted him as much as you could, in which you did a great wrong to the country, and to a mostmeritorious and honourable brother officer. I have heard, in such away as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the Army andthe Government needed a dictator. Of course it was not for this, butin spite of it, that I gave you the command. Only those generals whogain successes can set up dictators. What I now ask of you is militarysuccess, and I will risk the dictatorship. The Government will supportyou to the utmost of its ability, which is neither more nor less thanit has done and will do for all commanders. I much fear that thespirit which you have aided to infuse into the army, of criticisingtheir commander and withholding confidence from him, will now turn uponyou. Neither you nor Napoleon, if he were alive again, could get anygood out of an army while such a spirit prevails in it; and now bewareof rashness. Beware of rashness, but with energy and sleeplessvigilance go forward and give us victories. " "He talks to me like a father, " exclaimed Hooker, enchanted with arebuke such as this. He was a fine, frank, soldierly fellow, with anoble figure, with "a grand fighting head, " fresh complexion and brightblue eyes. He was a good organiser; he put a stop to the constantdesertions; he felt the need of improving the Northern cavalry; and hegroaned at the spirit with which McClellan had infected his army, acurious collective inertness among men who individually were daring. He seems to have been highly strung; the very little wine that he drankperceptibly affected him; he gave it up altogether in his campaigns. And he cannot have been very clever, for the handsomest beating thatLee could give him left him unaware that Lee was a general. In the endof April he crossed the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, which stilldivided the two armies, and in the first week of May, 1863, a briefcampaign, full of stirring incident, came to a close with the threedays' battle of Chancellorsville, in which Hooker, hurt and dazed withpain, lost control and presence of mind, and, with heavy loss, drewback across the Rappahannock. The South had won another amazingvictory; but "Stonewall" Jackson, at the age of thirty-nine, had fallenin the battle. Abroad, this crowning disaster to the North seemed to presage the fulltriumph of the Confederacy; and it was a gloomy time enough for Lincolnand his Ministers. A second and more serious invasion by Lee wasimpending, and the lingering progress of events in the West, of whichthe story must soon be resumed, caused protracted and deepeninganxiety. But the tide turned soon. Moreover, Lincoln's militaryperplexities, which have demanded our detailed attention during theseparticular campaigns, were very nearly at an end. We have here to turnback to the political problem of his Presidency, for the bloody andinconclusive battle upon the Antietam, more than seven months before, had led strangely to political consequences which were great andmemorable. CHAPTER X EMANCIPATION When the news of a second battle of Bull Run reached England it seemedat first to Lord John Russell that the failure of the North wascertain, and he asked Palmerston and his colleagues to consider whetherthey must not soon recognise the Confederacy, and whether mediation inthe interest of peace and humanity might not perhaps follow. Butwithin two months all thoughts of recognising the Confederacy had beenso completely put aside that even Fredericksburg and Chancellorsvillecaused no renewal of the suggestion, and an invitation from LouisNapoleon to joint action of this kind between England and France hadonce for all been rejected. The battle of Antietam had been fought inthe meantime. This made men think that the South could no more win aspeedy and decisive success than the North, and that victory must restin the end with the side that could last. But that was not all; thebattle of Antietam was followed within five days by an event which madeit impossible for any Government of this country to take actionunfriendly to the North. On September 22, 1862, Abraham Lincoln set his hand to a Proclamationof which the principal words were these: "That, on the first day ofJanuary in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred andsixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State, or designatedpart of a State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion againstthe United States, shall be then, thenceforward and forever free. " The policy and the true effect of this act cannot be understood withoutsome examination. Still less so can the course of the man who willalways be remembered as its author. First, in regard to the legaleffect of the Proclamation; in normal times the President would ofcourse not have had the power, which even the Legislature did notpossess, to set free a single slave; the Proclamation was an act of waron his part, as Commander-in-Chief of the forces, by which slaves wereto be taken from people at war with the United States, just as horsesor carts might be taken, to subtract from their resources and add tothose of the United States. In a curiously prophetic manner, ex-President John Quincy Adams had argued in Congress many years beforethat, if rebellion ever arose, this very thing might be done. Adamswould probably have claimed that the command of the President becamelaw in the States which took part in the rebellion. Lincoln onlyclaimed legal force for his Proclamation in so far as it was an act ofwar based on sufficient necessity and plainly tending to help theNorthern arms. If the legal question had ever been tried out, theCourts would no doubt have had to hold that at least those slaves whoobtained actual freedom under the Proclamation became free in law; forit was certainly in good faith an act of war, and the military resultjustified it. A large amount of labour was withdrawn from the industrynecessary to the South, and by the end of the war 180, 000 colouredtroops were in arms for the North, rendering services, especially inoccupying conquered territory that was unhealthy for white troops, without which, in Lincoln's opinion, the war could never have beenfinished. The Proclamation had indeed an indirect effect morefar-reaching than this; it committed the North to a course from whichthere could be no turning back, except by surrender; it made it apolitical certainty that by one means or another slavery would be endedif the North won. But in Lincoln's view of his duty as President, thisulterior consequence was not to determine his action. The fateful stepby which the end of slavery was precipitated would not have taken theform it did take if it had not come to commend itself to him as amilitary measure conducing to the suppression of rebellion. On the broader grounds on which we naturally look at this measure, manypeople in the North had, as we have seen, been anxious from thebeginning that he should adopt an active policy of freeing Southernslaves. It was intolerable to think that the war might end and leaveslavery where it was. To convert the war into a crusade againstslavery seemed to many the best way of arousing and uniting the North. This argument was reinforced by some of the American Ministers abroad. They were aware that people in Europe misunderstood and disliked theConstitutional propriety with which the Union government insisted thatit was not attacking the domestic institutions of Southern States. English people did not know the American Constitution, and when toldthat the North did not threaten to abolish slavery would answer "Whynot?" Many Englishmen, who might dislike the North and might havetheir doubts as to whether slavery was as bad as it was said to be, would none the less have respected men who would fight against it. They had no interest in the attempt of some of their own secededColonists to coerce, upon some metaphysical ground of law, others whoin their turn wished to secede from them. Seward, with wonderfulmisjudgment, had instructed Ministers abroad to explain that no attackwas threatened on slavery, for he was afraid that the purchasers ofcotton in Europe would feel threatened in their selfish interests; theagents of the South were astute enough to take the same line and insistlike him that the North was no more hostile to slavery than the South. If this misunderstanding were removed English hostility to the Northwould never again take a dangerous form. Lincoln, who knew less ofaffairs but more of men than Seward, was easily made to see this. Yet, with full knowledge of the reasons for adopting a decided policyagainst slavery, Lincoln waited through seventeen months of the wartill the moment had come for him to strike his blow. Some of his reasons for waiting were very plain. He was not going totake action on the alleged ground of military necessity till he wassure that the necessity existed. Nor was he going to take it till itwould actually lead to the emancipation of a great number of slaves. Above all, he would not act till he felt that the North generally wouldsustain his action, for he knew, better than Congressmen who judgedfrom their own friends in their own constituencies, how doubtful alarge part of Northern opinion really was. We have seen how in thesummer of 1861 he felt bound to disappoint the advanced opinion whichsupported Frémont. He continued for more than a year after in a coursewhich alienated from himself the confidence of the men with whom he hadmost sympathy. He did this deliberately rather than imperil theunanimity with which the North supported the war. There was indeedgrave danger of splitting the North in two if he appeared unnecessarilyto change the issue from Union to Liberation. We have to remember thatin all the Northern States the right of the Southern States to choosefor themselves about slavery had been fully admitted, and that four ofthe Northern States were themselves slave States all this while. But this is not the whole explanation of his delay. It is certain thatapart from this danger he would at first rather not have played thehistoric part which he did play as the liberator of the slaves, if hecould have succeeded in the more modest part of encouraging a processof gradual emancipation. In his Annual Message to Congress inDecember, 1861, he laid down the general principles of his policy inthis matter. He gave warning in advance to the Democrats of the North, who were against all interference with Southern institutions, that"radical and extreme measures" might become indispensable to militarysuccess, and if indispensable would be taken; but he declared hisanxiety that if possible the conflict with the South should not"degenerate into a violent and remorseless revolutionary struggle, " forhe looked forward with fear to a complete overturning of the socialsystem of the South. He feared it not only for the white people butalso for the black. "Gradual and not sudden emancipation, " he said, ina later Message, "is better for all. " It is now probable that he wasright, and yet it is difficult not to sympathise with the earnestRepublicans who were impatient at his delay, who were puzzled andpained by the free and easy way in which in grave conversation he wouldallude to "the nigger question, " and who concluded that "the Presidentis not with us; has no sound Anti-slavery sentiment. " Indeed, hissentiment did differ from theirs. Certainly, he hated slavery, for hehad contended more stubbornly than any other man against any concessionwhich seemed to him to perpetuate slavery by stamping it with approval;but his hatred of it left him quite without the passion of moralindignation against the slave owners, in whose guilt the whole country, North and South, seemed to him an accomplice. He would have classedthat very natural indignation under the head of "malice"--"I shall donothing in malice, " he wrote to a citizen of Louisiana; "what I dealwith is too vast for malicious dealing. " But it was not, as we shallsee before long, too vast for an interest, as sympathetic as it wasmatter of fact, in the welfare of the negroes. They were actual humanbeings to him, and he knew that the mere abrogation of the law ofslavery was not the only thing necessary to their advancement. Lookingback, with knowledge of what happened later, we cannot fail to be gladthat they were emancipated somehow, but we are forced to regret thatthey could not have been emancipated by some more considerate process. Lincoln, perhaps alone among the Americans who were in earnest in thismatter, looked at it very much in the light in which all men look at itto-day. In the early part of 1862 the United States Government concluded atreaty with Great Britain for the more effectual suppression of theAfrican slave trade, and it happened about the same time that the firstwhite man ever executed as a pirate under the American law against theslave trade was hanged in New York. In those months Lincoln wasprivately trying to bring about the passing by the Legislature ofDelaware of an Act for emancipating, with fit provisions for theirwelfare, the few slaves in that State, conditionally upon compensationto be paid to the owners by the United States. He hoped that if thisexample were set by Delaware, it would be followed in Maryland, andwould spread later. The Delaware House were favourable to the scheme, but the Senate of the State rejected it. Lincoln now made a morepublic appeal in favour of his policy. In March, 1862, he sent aMessage to Congress, which has already been quoted, and in which heurged the two Houses to pass Resolutions pledging the United States togive pecuniary help to any State which adopted gradual emancipation. It must be obvious that if the slave States of the North could havebeen led to adopt this policy it would have been a fitting preliminaryto any action which might be taken against slavery in the South; andthe policy might have been extended to those Southern States which werefirst recovered for the Union. The point, however, upon which Lincolndwelt in his Message was that, if slavery were once given up by theborder States, the South would abandon all hope that they would everjoin the Confederacy. In private letters to an editor of a newspaperand others he pressed the consideration that the cost of compensatedabolition was small in proportion to what might be gained by a quickerending of the war. During the discussion of his proposal in Congressand again after the end of the Session he invited the Senators andRepresentatives of the border States to private conference with him inwhich he besought of them "a calm and enlarged consideration, ranging, if it may be, far above, personal and partisan politics, " of theopportunity of good now open to them. The hope of the Confederacy was, as he then conceived, fixed upon the sympathy which it might arouse inthe border States, two of which, Kentucky and Maryland, were in factinvaded that year with some hope of a rising among the inhabitants. The "lever" which the Confederates hoped to use in these States was theinterest of the slave owners there; "Break that lever before theireyes, " he urged. But the hundred and one reasons which can always befound against action presented themselves at once to theRepresentatives of the border States. Congress itself so far acceptedthe President's view that both Houses passed the Resolution which hehad suggested. Indeed it gladly did something more; a Bill, such asLincoln himself had prepared as a Congressman fourteen years before, was passed for abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia;compensation was paid to the owners; a sum was set apart to help thesettlement in Liberia of any of the slaves who were willing to go; andat Lincoln's suggestion provision was added for the education of thenegro children. Nothing more was done at this time. Throughout this matter Lincoln took counsel chiefly with himself. Hecould not speak his full thought to the public, and apparently he didnot do so to any of his Cabinet. Supposing that the border States hadyielded to his persuasion, it may still strike us as a very sanguinecalculation that their action would have had much effect upon theresolution of the Confederates. But it must be noted that when Lincolnfirst approached the Representatives of the border States, the highestexpectations were entertained of the victory that McClellan would winin Virginia, and when he made his last, rather despairing, appeal tothem, the decision to withdraw the army from the Peninsula had not yetbeen taken. If a really heavy blow had been struck at the Confederatesin Virginia, their chief hope of retrieving their military fortuneswould certainly have lain in that invasion of Kentucky, which didshortly afterwards occur and which was greatly encouraged by the hopeof a rising of Kentucky men who wished to join the Confederacy. Thispart of Lincoln's calculations was therefore quite reasonable. And itwas further reasonable to suppose that, if the South had then given inand Congress had acted in the spirit of the Resolution which it hadpassed, the policy, of gradual emancipation, starting in the borderStates, would have spread steadily. The States which were disposed tohold out against the inducement that the cost of compensatedemancipation, if they adopted it, would be borne by the whole Union, would have done so at a great risk; for each new free State would havebeen disposed before long to support a Constitutional Amendment toimpose enfranchisement, possibly with no compensation, upon the Statesthat still delayed. The force of example and the presence of this fearcould not have been resisted long. Lincoln was not a man who could beaccused of taking any course without a reason well thought out; we cansafely conclude that in the summer of 1862 he nursed a hope, by nomeans visionary, of initiating a process of liberation free fromcertain evils in that upon which he was driven back. Before, however, he had quite abandoned this hope he had already begunto see his way in case it failed. His last appeal to the border Stateswas made on July 12, 1862, while McClellan's army still lay atHarrison's Landing. On the following day he privately told Seward andBates that he had "about come to the conclusion that it was a militarynecessity, absolutely essential to the salvation of the nation, that wemust free the slaves or be ourselves subdued. " On July 22 he read tohis Cabinet the first draft of his Proclamation of Emancipation;telling them before he consulted them that substantially his mind wasmade up. Various members of the Cabinet raised points on which he hadalready thought and had come to a conclusion, but, as he afterwardstold a friend, Seward raised a point which had never struck him before. He said that, if issued at that time of depression, just after thefailure in the Peninsula, the Proclamation would seem like "a cry ofdistress"; and that it would have a much better effect if it wereissued after some military success. Seward was certainly right. The danger of division in the North wouldhave been increased and the prospect of a good effect abroad would havebeen diminished if the Proclamation had been issued at a time ofdepression and manifest failure. Lincoln, who had been set on issuingit, instantly felt the force of this objection. He put aside hisdraft, and resolved not to issue the Proclamation till the rightmoment, and apparently resolved to keep the whole question open in hisown mind till the time for action came. Accordingly the two months which followed were not only full of anxietyabout the war; they were full for him of a suspense painfullymaintained. It troubled him perhaps comparatively little that he wasdriven into a position of greater aloofness from the support andsympathy of any party or school. He must now expect an opposition fromthe Democrats of the North, for they had declared themselves stronglyagainst the Resolution which he had induced Congress to pass. And thestrong Republicans for their part had acquiesced in it coldly, some ofthem contemptuously. In May of this year he had been forced for asecond time publicly to repress a keen Republican general who tried totake this question of great policy into his own hands. General Hunter, commanding a small expedition which had seized Port Royal in SouthCarolina and some adjacent islands rich in cotton, had in a grandmanner assumed to declare free all the slaves in South Carolina, Georgia and Florida. This, of course, could not be let pass. Congress, too, had been occupied in the summer with a new measure forconfiscating rebel property; some Republicans in the West set greatstore on such confiscation; other Republicans saw in it the incidentaladvantage that more slaves might be liberated under it. It was learntthat the President might put his veto upon it. It seemed to purport, contrary to the Constitution, to attaint the property of rebels aftertheir death, and Lincoln was unwilling that the Constitution should bestretched in the direction of revengeful harshness. The objectionablefeature in the Bill was removed, and Lincoln accepted it. But thesuspicion with which many Republicans were beginning to regard him wasnow reinforced by a certain jealousy of Congressmen against theExecutive power; they grumbled and sneered about having to "ascertainthe Royal pleasure" before they could legislate. This was an able, energetic, and truly patriotic Congress, and must not be despised forits reluctance to be guided by Lincoln. But it was reluctant. Throughout August and September he had to deal in the country withdread on the one side of any revolutionary action, and belief on theother side that he was timid and half-hearted. The precise state ofhis intentions could not with advantage be made public. To up-holdersof slavery he wrote plainly, "It may as well be understood once for allthat I shall not surrender this game leaving any available cardunplayed"; to its most zealous opponents he had to speak in an entirelydifferent strain. While the second battle of Bull Run was impending, Horace Greeley published in the _New York Tribune_ an "open letter" ofangry complaint about Lincoln's supposed bias for slavery. Lincoln atonce published a reply to his letter. "If there be in it, " he said, "any statements or assumptions of fact which I may know to beerroneous, I do not now and here controvert them. If there beperceptible in it an impatient and dictatorial tone, I waive it indeference to an old friend whose heart I have always supposed to beright. My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union. IfI could save the Union without freeing any slaves I would do it; and ifI could save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it; and if I couldsave it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. I shall do less whenever I shall believe what I am doing hurts thecause, and I shall do more whenever I shall believe doing more willhelp the cause. I shall adopt new views so fast as they shall appearto be true views. " It was probably easy to him now to write these masterful generalities, but a week or two later, after Pope's defeat, he had to engage in acontroversy which tried his feelings much more sorely. It had reallygrieved him that clergymen in Illinois had opposed him as unorthodox, when he was fighting against the extension of slavery. Now, a week ortwo after his correspondence with Greeley, a deputation from a numberof Churches in Chicago waited upon him, and some of their members spoketo him with assumed authority from on high, commanding him in God'sname to emancipate the slaves. He said, "I am approached with the mostopposite opinions and advice, and that by religious men who are equallycertain that they represent the divine will. I am sure that either theone or the other class is mistaken in that belief, and perhaps in somerespects both. I hope it will not be irreverent for me to say that, ifit is probable that God would reveal His will to others, on a point soconnected with my duty, it might be supposed He would reveal itdirectly to me. What good would a proclamation of emancipation from medo especially as we are now situated? I do not want to issue adocument that the whole world will see must necessarily be inoperativelike the Pope's Bull against the comet. Do not misunderstand me, because I have mentioned these objections. They indicate thedifficulties that have thus far prevented my acting in some such way asyou desire. I have not decided against a proclamation of liberty tothe slaves, but hold the matter under advisement. And I can assure youthat the subject is on my mind, by day and night, more than any other. Whatever shall appear to be God's will, I will do. " The language ofthis speech, especially when the touch is humorous, seems that of astrained and slightly irritated man, but the solemnity blended in itshowed Lincoln's true mind. In this month, September, 1862, he composed for his own reading alone asad and inconclusive fragment of meditation which was found after hisdeath. "The will of God prevails, " he wrote. "In great contests eachparty claims to act in accordance with the will of God. Both may beand one must be wrong. God cannot be for and against the same thing atthe same time. In the present civil war it is quite possible thatGod's purpose is something different from the purpose of either party, and yet the human instrumentalities, working just as they do, are ofthe best adaptation to effect His purpose. I am almost ready to saythat this is probably true, that God wills this contest, and wills thatit shall not end yet. By His mere great power on the minds of thecontestants, He could have either saved or destroyed the Union withouta human contest. Yet the contest began, and, having begun, He couldgive the final victory to either side any day. Yet the contestproceeds. " For Lincoln's own part it seemed his plain duty to do whatin the circumstances he thought safest for the Union, and yet he wasalmost of a mind with the deputation which had preached to him, that hemust be doing God's will in taking a great step towards emancipation. The solution, that the great step must be taken at the first opportunemoment, was doubtless clear enough in principle, but it must alwaysremain arguable whether any particular moment was opportune. He toldsoon afterwards how his mind was finally made up. On the day that he received the news of the battle of Antietam, thedraft Proclamation was taken from its drawer and studied afresh; hisvisit to McClellan on the battlefield intervened; but on the fifth dayafter the battle the Cabinet was suddenly called together. When theMinisters had assembled Lincoln first entertained them by reading theshort chapter of Artemus Ward entitled "High-handed Outrage at Utica. "It is less amusing than most of Artemus Ward; but it had just appeared;it pleased all the Ministers except Stanton, to whom the frivolousreading he sometimes had to hear from Lincoln was a standing vexation;and it was precisely that sort of relief to which Lincoln's mind whenoverwrought could always turn. Having thus composed himself forbusiness, he reminded his Cabinet that he had, as they were aware, thought a great deal about the relation of the war to slavery, and hada few weeks before read them a draft Proclamation on this subject. Ever since then, he said, his mind had been occupied on the matter, and, though he wished it were a better time, he thought the time hadcome now. "When the rebel army was at Frederick, " he is related tohave continued, "I determined, as soon as it should be driven out ofMaryland, to issue a Proclamation of Emancipation such as I thoughtlikely to be most useful. I said nothing to any one, but I made thepromise to myself and"--here he hesitated a little--"to my Maker. Therebel army is now driven out, and I am going to fulfil that promise. Ihave got you together to hear what I have written down. I do not wishyour advice about the main matter, for that I have determined formyself. This I say without intending anything but respect for any oneof you. " He then invited their suggestions upon the expressions usedin his draft and other minor matters, and concluded: "One otherobservation I will make. I know very well that many others might inthis matter, as in others, do better than I can; and if I was satisfiedthat the public confidence was more fully possessed by any one of themthan by me, and knew of any constitutional way in which he could be putin my place, he should have it. I would gladly yield it to him. Butthough I believe I have not so much of the confidence of the people asI had some time since, I do not know that, all things considered, anyother person has more; and, however this may be, there is no way inwhich I can have any other man put where I am. I am here; I must dothe best I can, and bear the responsibility of taking the course whichI feel I ought to take. " Then he read his draft, and in the longdiscussion which followed, and owing to which a few slight changes weremade in it, he told them further, without any false reserve, just howhe came to his decision. In his great perplexity he had gone on hisknees, before the battle of Antietam, and, like a child, he hadpromised that if a victory was given which drove the enemy out ofMaryland he would consider it as an indication that it was his duty tomove forward. "It might be thought strange, " he said, "that he had inthis way submitted the disposal of matters, when the way was not clearto his mind what he should do. God had decided this question in favourof the slaves. " Such is the story of what we may now remember as one of the signalevents in the chequered progress of Christianity. We have to followits consequences a little further. These were not at first all thatits author would have hoped. "Commendation in newspapers and bydistinguished individuals is, " he said in a private letter, "all that avain man could wish, " but recruits for the Army did not seem to come infaster. In October and November there were elections for Congress, andin a number of States the Democrats gained considerably, though it wasnoteworthy that the Republicans held their ground not only in NewEngland and in the furthest Western States, but also in the borderslave States. The Democrats, who from this time on became veryformidable to Lincoln, had other matters of complaint, as will be seenlater, but they chiefly denounced the President for trying to turn thewar into one against slavery. "The Constitution as it is and the Unionas it was" had been their election cry. The good hearing that theygot, now as at a later time, was due to the fact that people weredepressed about the war; and it is plain enough that Lincoln had beenwell advised in delaying his action till after a military success. Asit was, there was much that seemed to show that public confidence inhim was not strong, but public confidence in any man is hard toestimate, and the forces that in the end move opinion most are notquickly apparent. There are little indications that his power andcharacter were slowly establishing their hold; it seems, for instance, to have been about this time that "old Abe" or "Uncle Abe" began to bewidely known among common people by the significant name of "FatherAbraham, " and his secretaries say that he was becoming conscious thathis official utterances had a deeper effect on public opinion than anyimmediate response to them in Congress showed. In his Annual Message of December, 1862, Lincoln put before Congress, probably with little hope of result, a comprehensive policy for dealingwith slavery justly and finally. He proposed that a ConstitutionalAmendment should be submitted to the people providing: first, thatcompensation should be given in United States bonds to any State, whether now in rebellion or not, which should abolish slavery beforethe year 1900; secondly, that the slaves who had once enjoyed actualfreedom through the chances of the war should be permanently free andthat their owners should be compensated; thirdly, that Congress shouldhave authority to spend money on colonisation for negroes. Even if thegreater part of these objects could have been accomplished without aConstitutional Amendment, it is evident that such a procedure wouldhave been more satisfactory in the eventual resettlement of the Union. He urged in his Message how desirable it was, as a part of the effortto restore the Union, that the whole North should be agreed in aconcerted policy as to slavery, and that parties should for thispurpose reconsider their positions. "The dogmas of the quiet past, " hesaid, "are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piledhigh with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our caseis new, so we must think anew and act anew. We must disenthrallourselves, and then we shall save our country. Fellow citizens, wecannot escape history. We of this Congress and this Administrationwill be remembered in spite of ourselves. No personal significance orinsignificance can spare one or another of us. We say we are for theUnion. The world will not forget that we say this. We know how tosave the Union. The world knows we do know how to save it. In givingfreedom to the slave we assure freedom to the free. We shall noblysave or meanly lose the last, best hope of earth. Other means maysucceed, this could not fail. " The last four words expressed tooconfident a hope as to what Northern policy apart from Northern armscould do towards ending the war, but it was impossible to exaggeratethe value which a policy, concerted between parties in a spirit ofmoderation, would have had in the settlement after victory. Everyhonest Democrat who then refused any action against slavery must haveregretted it before three years were out, and many sensible Republicanswho saw no use in such moderation may have lived to regret their parttoo. Nothing was done. It is thought that Lincoln expected this; butthe Proclamation of Emancipation would begin to operate within a month;it would produce by the end of the war a situation in which the countrywould be compelled to decide on the principle of slavery, and Lincolnhad at least done his part in preparing men to face the issue. Before this, the nervous and irritable feeling of many Northernpoliticians, who found in emancipation a good subject for quarrel amongthemselves and in the slow progress of the war a good subject ofquarrel with the Administration, led to a crisis in Lincoln's Cabinet. Radicals were inclined to think Seward's influence in theAdministration the cause of all public evils; some of them had now gothold of a foolish private letter, which he had written to Adams inEngland a few months before, denouncing the advocates of emancipation. Desiring his downfall, they induced a small "caucus" of RepublicanSenators to speak in the name of the party and the nation and send thePresident a resolution demanding such changes in his Cabinet as wouldproduce better results in the war. Discontented men of oppositeopinions could unite in demanding success in the war; and ConservativeSenators joined in this resolution hoping that it would get rid notonly of Seward, but also of Chase and Stanton, the objects of theirparticular antipathy. Seward, on hearing of this, gave Lincoln hisresignation, which was kept private. Though egotistic, he was a cleverman, and evidently a pleasant man to work with; he was a usefulMinister under a wise chief, though he later proved a harmful one undera foolish chief. Stanton was most loyal, and invaluable as head of theWar Department. Chase, as Lincoln said in private afterwards, was "apretty good fellow and a very able man"; Lincoln had completeconfidence in him as a Finance Minister, and could not easily havereplaced him. But this handsome, dignified, and righteous person wasunhappily a sneak. Lincoln found as time went on that, if he ever hadto do what was disagreeable to some important man, Chase would paycourt to that important man and hint how differently he himself wouldhave done as President. On this occasion he was evidently aware thatChase had encouraged the Senators who attacked Seward. Much as hewished to retain each of the two for his own worth, he was above alldetermined that one should not gain a victory over the other. Accordingly, when a deputation of nine important Senators came toLincoln to present their grievances against Seward, they foundthemselves, to their great annoyance, confronted with all the Cabinetexcept Seward, who had resigned, and they were invited by Lincoln todiscuss the matter in his presence with these Ministers. Chase, to hisstill greater annoyance, found himself, as the principal Ministerthere, compelled for decency's sake to defend Seward from the veryattack which he had helped to instigate. The deputation withdrew, notsure that, after all, it wanted Seward removed. Chase next daytendered, as was natural, his resignation. Lincoln was able, now thathe had the resignations of both men, to persuade both of their jointduty to continue in the public service. By this remarkable piece ofriding he saved the Union from a great danger. The Democraticopposition, not actually to the prosecution of the war, but to any andevery measure essential for it, was now developing, and a seriousdivision, such as at this stage any important resignation would haveproduced in the ranks of the Republicans, or, as they now calledthemselves, the "Union men, " would have been perilous. On the first day of January, 1863, the President signed the furtherProclamation needed to give effect to emancipation. The small portionsof the South which were not in rebellion were duly excepted; the navaland military authorities were ordered to maintain the freedom of theslaves seeking their protection; the slaves were enjoined to abstainfrom violence and to "labour faithfully for reasonable wages" ifopportunity were given them; all suitable slaves were to be taken intoarmed service, especially for garrison duties. Before the end of 1863, a hundred thousand coloured men were already serving, as combatants oras labourers, on military work in about equal number. They wereneeded, for volunteering was getting slack, and the work of guardingand repairing railway lines was specially repellent to Northernvolunteers. The coloured regiments fought well; they behaved well inevery way. Atrocious threats of vengeance on them and their whiteofficers were officially uttered by Jefferson Davis, but, except forone hideous massacre wrought in the hottest of hot blood, only a fewcrimes by individuals were committed in execution of these threats. ToLincoln himself it was a stirring thought that when democraticgovernment was finally vindicated and restored by the victory of theUnion, "then there will be some black men who can remember that withsilent tongue and clenched teeth and steady eye and well-poised bayonetthey have helped mankind on to this great consummation. " There was, however, prejudice at first among many Northern officers against negroenlistment. The greatest of the few great American artists, St. Gaudens, commemorated in sculpture (as the donor of the new playingfields at Harvard commemorated by his gift) the action of a brilliantand popular Massachusetts officer, Robert Gould Shaw, who set theexample of leaving his own beloved regiment to take command of acoloured regiment, at the head of which he died, gallantly leading themand gallantly followed by them in a desperate fight. It was easier to raise and train these negro soldiers than to arrangefor the control, shelter, and employment of the other refugees whocrowded especially to the protection of Grant's army in the West. Theefforts made for their benefit cannot be related here, but therecollections of Army Chaplain John Eaton, whom Grant selected to takecharge of them in the West, throw a little more light on Lincoln and onthe spirit of his dealing with "the nigger question. " When Eaton aftersome time had to come to Washington, upon the business of his chargeand to visit the President, he received that impression, of versatilepower and of easy mastery over many details as well as over broadissues, which many who worked under Lincoln have described, but he wasabove all struck with the fact that from a very slight experience inearly life Lincoln had gained a knowledge of negro character such asvery few indeed in the North possessed. He was subjected to manyseemingly trivial questions, of which he was quick enough to see thegrave purpose, about all sorts of persons and things in the West, buthe was also examined closely, in a way which commanded his fullestrespect as an expert, about the ideas, understanding, and expectationsof the ordinary negroes under his care, and more particularly as to thepast history and the attainments of the few negroes who had becomeprominent men, and who therefore best illustrated the real capacitiesof their race. Later visits to the capital and to Lincoln deepenedthis impression, and convinced Eaton, though by trifling signs, of therare quality of Lincoln's sympathy. Once, after Eaton's difficultbusiness had been disposed of, the President turned to relating his ownrecent worries about a colony of negroes which he was trying toestablish on a small island off Hayti. There flourishes in Southernlatitudes a minute creature called _Dermatophilus penetrans_, or thejigger, which can inflict great pain on barefooted people by housingitself under their toe-nails. This Colony had a plague of jiggers, andevery expedient for defeating them had failed. Lincoln was not merelygiving the practical attention to this difficulty that might perhaps beexpected; the Chaplain was amazed to find that at that moment, at theturning point of the war, a few days only after Vicksburg andGettysburg, with his enormous pre-occupations, the President's mind hadroom for real and keen distress about the toes of the blacks in the CowIsland. At the end of yet another interview Eaton was startled by thequestion, put by the President with an air of shyness, whetherFrederick Douglass, a well-known negro preacher, could be induced tovisit him. Of course he could. Frederick Douglass was then reputed tobe the ablest man ever born as a negro slave; he must have met many ofthe best and kindest Northern friends of the negro; and he went toLincoln distressed at some points in his policy, particularly at hisfailure to make reprisals for murders of negro prisoners by Southerntroops. When he came away he was in a state little short of ecstasy. It was not because he now understood, as he did, Lincoln's policy. Lincoln had indeed won his warm approval when he told him "with aquiver in his voice" of his horror of killing men in cold blood forwhat had been done by others, and his dread of what might follow such apolicy; but he had a deeper gratification, the strangeness of which itis sad to realise. "He treated me as a man, " exclaimed Douglass. "Hedid not let me feel for a moment that there was any difference in thecolour of our skins. " Perhaps the hardest effort of speech that Lincoln ever essayed was anaddress to negroes which had to do with this very subject of colour. His audience were men who had been free from birth or for some time andwere believed to be leaders among their community. It was Lincoln'sobject to induce some of them to be pioneers in an attempt atcolonisation in some suitable climate, an attempt which he felt mustfail if it started with negroes whose "intellects were clouded byslavery. " He clung to these projects of colonisation, as probably thebest among the various means by which the improvement of the negro mustbe attempted, because their race, "suffering the greatest wrong everinflicted on any people, " would "yet be far removed from being on anequality with the white race" when they ceased to be slaves; a"physical difference broader than exists between almost any other tworaces" and constituting "a greater disadvantage to us both, " wouldalways set a "ban" upon the negroes even where they were best treatedin America. This unpalatable fact he put before them with that totalabsence of pretence which was probably the only possible form of tactin such a discussion, with no affectation of a hope that progress wouldremove it or of a desire that the ordinary white man should lose theinstinct that kept him apart from the black. But this only makes moreapparent his simple recognition of an equality and fellowship which didexist between him and his hearers in a larger matter than that ofsocial intercourse or political combination. His appeal to theircapacity for taking large and unselfish views was as direct and asconfident as in his addresses to his own people; it was made in thelanguage of a man to whom the public spirit which might exist amongblack people was of the same quality as that which existed among white, in whose belief he and his hearers could equally find happiness in"being worthy of themselves" and in realising the "claim of kindred tothe great God who made them. " It may be well here, without waiting to trace further the course of thewar, in which at the point where we left it the slow but irresistibleprogress of conquest was about to set in, to recount briefly the laterstages of the abolition of slavery in America. In 1863 it becameapparent that popular feeling in Missouri and in Maryland was gettingripe for abolition. Bills were introduced into Congress to compensatetheir States if they did away with slavery; the compensation was to belarger if the abolition was immediate and not gradual. There was amajority in each House for these Bills, but the Democratic minority wasable to kill them in the House of Representatives by the methods of"filibustering, " or, as we call it, obstruction, to which the procedureof that body seems well adapted. The Republican majority had not beenvery zealous for the Bills; its members asked "why compensate for awrong" which they had begun to feel would soon be abolished withoutcompensation; but their leaders at least did their best for the Bills. It would have been idle after the failure of these proposals tointroduce the Bills that had been contemplated for buying out the loyalslave owners in West Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee, which was nowfast being regained for the Union. Lincoln after his Message ofDecember, 1862, recognised it as useless for him to press again theprinciples of gradual emancipation or of compensation, as to which itis worth remembrance that the compensation which he proposed was forloyal and disloyal owners alike. His Administration, however, boughtevery suitable slave in Delaware for service (service as a free man) inthe Army. In the course of 1864 a remarkable development of publicopinion began to be manifest in the States chiefly concerned. In theautumn of that year Maryland, whose representatives had paid so littleattention to Lincoln two years before, passed an Amendment to the StateConstitution abolishing slavery without compensation. A movement inthe same direction was felt to be making progress in Kentucky andTennessee; and Missouri followed Maryland's example in January, 1865. Meanwhile, Louisiana had been reconquered, and the Unionists in theseStates, constantly encouraged and protected by Lincoln when Congresslooked upon them somewhat coldly or his generals showed jealousy oftheir action, had banded themselves together to form State Governmentswith Constitutions that forbade slavery. Lincoln, it may be noted, hadsuggested to Louisiana that it would be well to frame some plan bywhich the best educated of the negroes should be admitted to thefranchise. Four years after his death a Constitutional Amendment waspassed by which any distinction as to franchise on the ground of raceor colour is forbidden in America. The policy of giving the vote tonegroes indiscriminately had commended itself to the cold pedantry ofsome persons, including Chase, on the ground of some natural right ofall men to the suffrage; but it was adopted as the most effectiveprotection for the negroes against laws, as to vagrancy and the like, by which it was feared they might practically be enslaved again. Whatever the excuse for it, it would seem to have proved in fact agreat obstacle to healthy relations between the two races. The truepolicy in such a matter is doubtless that which Rhodes and otherstatesmen adopted in the Cape Colony and which Lincoln had advocated inthe case of Louisiana. It would be absurd to imagine that the spiritwhich could champion the rights of the negro and yet face fairly theabiding difficulty of his case died in America with Lincoln, but itlost for many a year to come its only great exponent. But the question of overwhelming importance, between the principles ofslavery and of freedom, was ready for final decision when local opinionin six slave States was already moving as we have seen. The RepublicanConvention of 1864, which again chose Lincoln as its candidate for thePresidency, declared itself in favour of a Constitutional Amendment toabolish slavery once for all throughout America. Whether the firstsuggestion came from him or not, it is known that Lincoln's privateinfluence was energetically used to procure this resolution of theConvention. In his Message to Congress in 1864 he urged the initiationof this Amendment. Observation of elections made it all but certainthat the next Congress would be ready to take this action, but Lincolnpleaded with the present doubtful Congress for the advantage whichwould be gained by ready, and if possible, unanimous concurrence in theNorth in the course which would soon prevail. The necessary Resolutionwas passed in the Senate, but in the House of Representatives tillwithin a few hours of the vote it was said to be "the toss of a copper"whether the majority of two-thirds, required for such a purpose, wouldbe obtained. In the efforts made on either side to win over the fewdoubtful voters Lincoln had taken his part. Right or wrong, he was notthe man to see a great and beneficent Act in danger of postponementwithout being tempted to secure it if he could do so by terrifying someunprincipled and white-livered opponents. With the knowledge that hewas always acquiring of the persons in politics, he had been able topick out two Democratic Congressmen who were fit for hispurpose--presumably they lay under suspicion of one of thosetreasonable practices which martial law under Lincoln treated veryunceremoniously. He sent for them. He told them that the gaining of acertain number of doubtful votes would secure the Resolution. He toldthem that he was President of the United States. He told them that thePresident of the United States in war time exercised great and dreadfulpowers. And he told them that he looked to them personally to get himthose votes. Whether this wrong manoeuvre affected the result or not, on January 31, 1865, the Resolution was passed in the House by atwo-thirds majority with a few votes to spare, and the great crowd inthe galleries, defying all precedent, broke out in a demonstration ofenthusiasm which some still recall as the most memorable scene in theirlives. On December 18 of that year, when Lincoln had been eight monthsdead, William Seward, as Secretary of State, was able to certify thatthe requisite majority of States had passed the Thirteenth Amendment tothe Constitution, and the cause of that "irrepressible conflict" whichhe had foretold, and in which he had played a weak but valuable part, was for ever extinguished. At the present day, alike in the British Empire and in America, theunending difficulty of wholesome human relations between races ofdifferent and unequal development exercises many minds; but thisdifficulty cannot obscure the great service done by those who, first inEngland and later and more hardly in America, stamped out that cardinalprinciple of error that any race is without its human claim. Amongthese men William Lloyd Garrison lived to see the fruit of his labours, and to know and have friendly intercourse with Lincoln. There havebeen some comparable instances in which men with such differentcharacters and methods have unconsciously conspired for a common end, as these two did when Garrison was projecting the "Liberator" andLincoln began shaping himself for honourable public work in the vague. The part that Lincoln played in these events did not seem to him apersonal achievement of his own. He appeared to himself rather as aninstrument. "I claim not, " he once said in this connection, "to havecontrolled events, but confess plainly that events have controlled me. "In 1864, when a petition was sent to him from some children that thereshould be no more child slaves, he wrote, "Please tell these littlepeople that I am very glad their young hearts are so full of just andgenerous sympathy, and that, while I have not the power to grant allthey ask, I trust they will remember that God has, and that, as itseems, He wills to do it. " Yet, at least, he redeemed the boyishpledge that has been, fancifully perhaps, ascribed to him; eachopportunity that to his judgment ever presented itself of striking someblow for human freedom was taken; the blows were timed and directed bythe full force of his sagacity, and they were never restrained byprivate ambition or fear. It is probable that upon that cool review, which in the case of this singular figure is difficult, the sense ofhis potent accomplishment would not diminish, but increase. CHAPTER XI THE APPROACH OF VICTORY 1. _The War to the End of 1863_. The events of the Eastern theatre of war have been followed into theearly summer of 1863, when Lee was for the second time about to invadethe North. The Western theatre of war has been left unnoticed since theend of May, 1862. From that time to the end of the year no definiteprogress was made here by either side, but here also the perplexities ofthe military administration were considerable; and in Lincoln's life itmust be noted that in these months the strain of anxiety about theEastern army and about the policy of emancipation was accompanied byacute doubt in regard to the conduct of war in the West. When Halleck had been summoned from the West, Lincoln had again a generalby his side in Washington to exercise command under him of all thearmies. Halleck was a man of some intellectual distinction who might beexpected to take a broad view of the war as a whole; this and his freedomfrom petty feelings, as to which Lincoln's known opinion of him can becorroborated, doubtless made him useful as an adviser; nor for aconsiderable time was there any man with apparently better qualificationsfor his position. But Lincoln soon found, as has been seen, that Hallecklacked energy of will, and cannot have been long in discovering that hisjudgment was not very good. The President had thus to make the best usehe could of expert advice upon which he would not have been justified inrelying very fully. When Halleck arrived at Corinth at the end of May, 1862, the whole ofWestern and Middle Tennessee was for the time clear of the enemy, and heturned his attention at once to the long delayed project of rescuing theUnionists in Eastern Tennessee, which was occupied by a Confederate armyunder General Kirby Smith. His object was to seize Chattanooga, whichlay about 150 miles to the east of him, and invade Eastern Tennessee byway of the valley of the Tennessee River, which cuts through themountains behind Chattanooga. With this in view he would doubtless havebeen wise if he had first continued his advance with his whole forceagainst the Confederate army under Beauregard, which after evacuatingCorinth had fallen back to rest and recruit in a far healthier situation50 miles further south. Beauregard would have been obliged either tofight him with inferior numbers or to shut himself up in the fortress ofVicksburg. As it was, Halleck spent the month of June merely inrepairing the railway line which runs from Corinth in the direction ofChattanooga. When he was called to Washington he left Grant, who forseveral months past had been kept idle as his second in command, inindependent command of a force which was to remain near the Mississippiconfronting Beauregard, but he restricted him to a merely defensive partby ordering him to keep a part of his army ready to send to Buellwhenever that general needed it, as he soon did. Buell, who again tookover his former independent command, was ordered by Halleck to advance onChattanooga, using Corinth as his base of supply. Buell had wished thatthe base for the advance upon Chattanooga should be transferred toNashville, in the centre of Tennessee, in which case the line of railwaycommunication would have been shorter and also less exposed to raids bythe Southern cavalry. After Halleck had gone, Buell obtained permissionto effect this change of base. The whole month of June had been wastedin repairing the railway with a view to Halleck's faulty plan. WhenBuell himself was allowed to proceed on his own lines and was approachingChattanooga, his communications with Nashville were twice, in the middleof July and in the middle of August, cut by Confederate cavalry raids, which did such serious damage as to impose great delay upon him. In theend of August and beginning of September Kirby Smith, whose army had beenstrengthened by troops transferred from Beauregard, crossed the mountainsfrom East Tennessee by passes some distance northeast of Chattanooga, andinvaded Kentucky, sending detachments to threaten Louisville on theIndiana border of Kentucky and Cincinnati in Ohio. It was necessary forBuell to retreat, when, after a week or more of uncertainty, it becameclear that Kirby Smith's main force was committed to this invasion. Meanwhile General Bragg, who, owing to the illness of Beauregard, hadsucceeded to his command, left part of his force to hold Grant in check, marched with the remainder to support Kirby Smith, and succeeded inplacing himself between Buell's army and Louisville, to protect whichfrom Kirby Smith had become Buell's first object. It seems that Bragg, who could easily have been reinforced by Kirby Smith, had now anopportunity of fighting Buell with great advantage. But the Confederategenerals, who mistakenly believed that Kentucky was at heart with them, saw an imaginary political gain in occupying Frankfort, the Statecapital, and formally setting up a new State Government there. Braggtherefore marched on to join Kirby Smith at Frankfort, which was well tothe east of Buell's line of retreat, and Buell was able to reachLouisville unopposed by September 25. These events were watched in the North with all the more anxiety becausethe Confederate invasion of Kentucky began just about the time of thesecond battle of Bull Run, and Buell arrived at Louisville within a weekafter the battle of Antietam while people were wondering how that victorywould be followed up. Men of intelligence and influence, especially inthe Western States, were loud in their complaints of Buell's want ofvigour. It is remarkable that the Unionists of Kentucky, who sufferedthe most through his supposed faults, expressed their confidence in him;but his own soldiers did not like him, for he was a strict disciplinarianwithout either tact or any quality which much impressed them. Theirreports to their homes in Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, from which theymostly came, increased the feeling against him which was arising in thoseStates, and his relations with the Governors of Ohio and Indiana, whowere busy in sending him recruits and whose States were threatened withinvasion, seem, wherever the fault may have lain, to have beenunfortunate. Buell's most powerful friend had been McClellan, and by anirrational but unavoidable process of thought the real dilatoriness ofMcClellan became an argument for blaming Buell as well. Halleck defendedhim loyally, but this by now probably seemed to Lincoln the apology ofone irresolute man for another. Stanton, whose efficiency in thebusiness of the War Department gave him great weight, had become eagerfor the removal of Buell. Lincoln expected that as soon as Buell couldcover Louisville he would take the offensive promptly. His army appearsto have exceeded in numbers, though not very much, the combined forces ofBragg and Kirby Smith, and except as to cavalry it was probably as goodin quality. If energetically used by Halleck some months before, theWestern armies should have been strong enough to accomplish greatresults; and if the attempt had been made at first to raise much largerarmies, it seems likely that the difficulties of training andorganisation and command would have increased out of proportion to anygain. Buell remained some days at Louisville itself, receivingreinforcements which were considerable, but consisted mainly of rawrecruits. While he was there orders arrived from Lincoln removing himand appointing his second in command, the Virginian Thomas, in his place. This was a wise choice; Thomas was one of the four Northern generals whowon abiding distinction in the Civil War. But Thomas felt the injusticewhich was done to Buell, and he refused the command in a lettermagnanimously defending him. The fact was that Lincoln had rescinded hisorders before they were received, for he had issued them under the beliefthat Buell was remaining on the defensive, but learnt immediately that anoffensive movement was in progress, and had no intention of changingcommanders under those circumstances. On October 8 a battle, which began in an accidental minor conflict, tookplace between Buell with 58, 000 men and Bragg with considerably less thanhalf that number of tried veterans. Buell made little use of hissuperior numbers, for which the fault may have lain with the corpscommander who first became engaged and who did not report at once to him;the part of Buell's army which bore the brunt of the fighting sufferedheavy losses, which made a painful impression in the North, and thepublic outcry against him, which had begun as soon as Kentucky wasinvaded by the Confederates, now increased. After the battle Bragg fellback and effected a junction with Kirby Smith. Their joint forces werenot very far inferior to Buell's in numbers, but after a few more daysBragg determined to evacuate Kentucky, in which his hope of raising manyrecruits had been disappointed. Buell, on perceiving his intention, pursued him some distance, but, finding the roads bad for the movement oflarge bodies of troops, finally took up a position at Bowling Green, onthe railway to the north of Nashville, intending later in the autumn tomove a little south of Nashville and there to wait for the spring beforeagain moving on Chattanooga. He was urged from Washington to pressforward towards Chattanooga at once, but replied decidedly that he wasunable to do so, and added that if a change of command was desired thepresent was a suitable time for it. At the end of October he was removedfrom command. In the meantime the Confederate forces that had been leftto oppose Grant had attacked him and been signally defeated in twoengagements, in each of which General Rosecrans, who was serving underGrant, was in immediate command on the Northern side. Rosecrans, whotherefore began to be looked upon as a promising general, and indeed wasone of those who, in the chatter of the time, were occasionally spoken ofas suitable for a "military dictatorship, " was now put in Buell's place, which Thomas had once refused. He advanced to Nashville, but was as firmas Buell in refusing to go further till he had accumulated rations enoughto make him for a time independent of the railway. Ultimately he movedon Murfreesborough, some thirty miles further in the direction ofChattanooga. Here on December 31, 1862, Bragg, with somewhat inferiornumbers, attacked him and gained an initial success, which Rosecrans andhis subordinates, Thomas and Sheridan, were able to prevent him frommaking good. Bragg's losses were heavy, and, after waiting a few days inthe hope that Rosecrans might retreat first, he fell back to a point nearthe Cumberland mountains a little in advance of Chattanooga. Thus thebattle of Murfreesborough counted as a victory to the North, a slightset-off to the disaster at Fredericksburg a little while before. But ithad no very striking consequences. For over six months Rosecransproceeded no further. The Northern armies remained in more securepossession of all Tennessee west of the mountains than they had obtainedin the first half of 1862; but the length of their communications and thegreat superiority of the South in cavalry, which could threaten thosecommunications, suspended their further advance. Lincoln urged thattheir army could subsist on the country which it invaded, but Buell andRosecrans treated the idea as impracticable; in fact, till a little laterall Northern generals so regarded it. Thus Chattanooga, which it was hoped would be occupied soon after Halleckhad occupied Corinth, remained in Southern hands for more than a yearafter that, notwithstanding the removal of Buell, to whom thisdisappointment and the mortifying invasion of Kentucky were at firstattributed. This was rightly felt to be unsatisfactory, but the chiefblame that can now be imputed falls upon the mistakes of Halleck while hewas still commanding in the West. There is no reason to suppose thatBuell had any exceptional amount of intuition or of energy and it wasright to demand that a general with both these qualities should beappointed if he could be found. But he was at least a prudent officer, of fair capacity, doing his best. The criticisms upon him, of which thewell informed were lavish, were uttered without appreciation of practicaldifficulties or of the standard by which he was really to be judged. So, with far more justice than McClellan, he has been numbered among themisused generals. Lincoln, there is no doubt, had watched hisproceedings, as he watched those of Rosecrans after him, with a feelingof impatience, and set him down as unenterprising and obstinate. In onepoint his Administration was much to blame in its treatment of theWestern commanders. It became common political talk that the way to getvictories was to treat unsuccessful generals almost as harshly as theFrench in the Revolution were understood to have treated them. Lincolndid not go thus far, but it was probably with his authority that beforeBuell was removed Halleck, with reluctance on his own part, wrote aletter referring to this prevalent idea and calculated to put about amongthe Western commanders an expectation that whichever of them first didsomething notable would be put over his less successful colleagues. Later on, and, as we can hardly doubt, with Lincoln's consent, Grant andRosecrans were each informed that the first of them to win a victorywould get the vacant major-generalship in the United States Army in placeof his present volunteer rank. This was not the way to handle men withproper professional pride, and it is one of those cases, which arestrangely few, where Lincoln made the sort of mistake that might havebeen expected from his want of training and not from his nativegenerosity. But in the main his treatment of this difficult question wassound. Sharing as he did the prevailing impatience with Buell, he had nointention of yielding to it till there was a real prospect that a changeof generals would be a change for the better. When the appointment ofThomas was proposed there really was such a prospect. When Rosecrans waseventually put in Buell's place the result was disappointing to Lincoln, but it was evidently not a bad appointment, and a situation had thenarisen in which it would have been folly to retain Buell if any capablesuccessor to him could be found; for the Governors of Indiana, Ohio andIllinois, of whom the first named was reputed the ablest of the "warGovernors" in the West, and on whom his army depended for recruits, nowcombined in representations against him which could not be ignored. Lincoln, who could not have personal acquaintance with the generals ofthe Western armies as he had with those in the East, was, it should beobserved, throughout unceasing in his efforts to get the fullest andclearest impression of them that he could; he was always, as it has beenput, "taking measurements" of men, and a good deal of what seemed idleand gossipy talk with chance visitors, who could tell him littleincidents or give him new impressions, seems to have had this seriouspurpose. For the first half of the war the choice of men for highcommands was the most harassing of all the difficulties of hisadministration. There is no doubt of his constant watchfulness todiscern and promote merit. He was certainly beset by the feeling thatgenerals were apt to be wanting in the vigour and boldness which theconduct of the war demanded, but, though this in some cases probablymisled him, upon the whole there was good reason for it. On the otherhand, it must be considered that all this while he knew himself to belosing influence through his supposed want of energy in the war, and thathe was under strong and unceasing pressure from every influential quarterto dismiss every general who caused disappointment. Newspapers andprivate letters of the time demonstrate that there was intense impatienceagainst him for not producing victorious generals. This being so, hisown patience in this matter and his resolution to give those under him afair chance appear very remarkable and were certainly very wise. We have come, however, to the end, not of all the clamour againstLincoln, but of his own worst perplexities. In passing to the operationsfurther west we are passing to an instance in which Lincoln felt it rightto stand to the end by a decried commander, and that decried commanderproved to possess the very qualities for which he had vainly looked inothers. The reverse side of General Grant's fame is well enough known tothe world. Before the war he had been living under a cloud. In theautumn of 1862, while his army lay between Corinth and Memphis, the cloudstill rested on his reputation. In spite of the glory he had won for amoment at Fort Donelson, large circles were ready to speak of him simplyas an "incompetent and disagreeable man. " The crowning work of his lifewas accomplished with terrible bloodshed which was often attributed tocallousness and incapacity on his part. The eight years of hisPresidency afterwards, which cannot properly be discussed here, added atthe best no lustre to his memory. Later still, when he visited Europe asa celebrity the general impression which he created seems to be containedin the words "a rude man. " Thus the Grant that we discover in therecollections of a few loyal and loving friends, and in the memoirs whichhe himself began when late in life he lost his money and which hefinished with the pains of death upon him, is a surprising, in some wayspathetic, figure. He had been a shy country boy, ready enough at all thework of a farm and good with horses, but with none of the businessaptitude that make a successful farmer, when his father made him go toWest Point. Here he showed no great promise and made few friends; hishealth became delicate, and he wanted to leave the army and become ateacher of mathematics. But the Mexican War, one of the most unjust inall history, as he afterwards said, broke out, and--so he laterthought--saved his life from consumption by keeping him in the open air. After that he did retire, failed at farming and other ventures, and atthirty-nine, when the Civil War began, was as has been seen, ashabby-looking, shiftless fellow, pretty far gone in the habit of drink, and more or less occupied about a leather business of his father's. Rough in appearance and in manner he remained--the very opposite ofsmart, the very opposite of versatile, the very opposite of expansive inspeech or social intercourse. Unlike many rough people, he had a reallysimple character--truthful, modest, and kind; without varied interests, or complicated emotions, or much sense of fun, but thinking intensely onthe problems that he did see before him, and in his silent way keenlysensitive on most of the points on which it is well to be sensitive. Hisfriends reckoned up the very few occasions on which he was ever seen tobe angry; only one could be recalled on which he was angry on his ownaccount; the cruelty of a driver to animals in his supply train, heartless neglect in carrying out the arrangements he had made for thecomfort of the sick and wounded, these were the sort of occasions whichbroke down Grant's habitual self-possession and good temper. "He wasnever too anxious, " wrote Chaplain Eaton, who, having been set by him incharge of the negro refugees with his army, had excellent means ofjudging, "never too preoccupied with the great problems that beset him, to take a sincere and humane interest in the welfare of the mostsubordinate labourer dependent upon him. " And he had delicacy of feelingin other ways. Once in the crowd at some hotel, in which he mingled anundistinguished figure, an old officer under him tried on a lecherousstory for the entertainment of the General, who did not look the sort ofman to resent it; Grant, who did not wish to set down an older manroughly, and had no ready phrases, but had, as it happens, a sensitiveskin, was observed to blush to the roots of his hair in exquisitediscomfort. It would be easy to multiply little recorded traits of thissomewhat unexpected kind, which give grace to the memory of hisdetermination in a duty which became very grim. The simplicity of character as well as manner which endeared him to a fewclose associates was probably a very poor equipment for the Presidency, which, from that very simplicity, he afterwards treated as his due; andGrant presented in some ways as great a contrast as can be imagined tothe large and complex mind of Lincoln. But he was the man that Lincolnhad yearned for. Whatever degree of military skill may be ascribed tohim, he had in the fullest measure the moral attributes of a commander. The sense that the war could be put through and must be put throughpossessed his soul. He was insusceptible to personal danger--at least, so observers said, though he himself told a different story--and hetaught himself to keep a quiet mind in the presence of losses, rout inbattle, or failure in a campaign. It was said that he never troubledhimself with fancies as to what the enemy might be doing, and heconfessed to having constantly told himself that the enemy was as muchafraid of him as he of the enemy. His military talent was doubled inefficacy by his indomitable constancy. In one sense, moreover, and thata wholly good sense, he was a political general; for he had constantlybefore his mind the aims of the Government which employed him, perceivingearly that there were only two possible ends to the war, the completesubjugation of the South or the complete failure of the Union; perceivingalso that there was no danger of exhausting the resources of the Northand great danger of discouraging its spirit, while the position of theSouth was in this respect the precise contrary. He was therefore thebetter able to serve the State as a soldier, because throughout hemeasured by a just standard the ulterior good or harm of success orfailure in his enterprises. The affectionate confidence which existed between Lee and "Stonewall"Jackson till the latter was killed at Chancellorsville had a parallel inthe endearing friendship which sprung up between Grant and his principalsubordinate, William T. Sherman, who was to bear a hardly less momentouspart than his own in the conclusion of the war. Sherman was a man ofquick wits and fancy, bright and mercurial disposition, capable of beinga delightful companion to children, and capable of being sharp andinconsiderate to duller subordinates. It is a high tribute both to thisbrilliant soldier and to Grant himself that he always regarded Grant ashaving made him, not only by his confidence but by his example. As has been said, Grant was required to remain on the defensive betweenMemphis and Corinth, which mark the line of the Northern frontier at thisperiod, while Buell was advancing on Chattanooga. Later, while theConfederates were invading Kentucky further east, attacks were alsodirected against Grant to keep him quiet. These were defeated, thoughGrant was unable to follow up his success at the time. When the invasionof Kentucky had collapsed and the Confederates under Bragg wereretreating before Buell and his successor out of Middle Tennessee, itbecame possible for Grant and for Halleck and the Government atWashington to look to completing the conquest of the Mississippi River. The importance to the Confederates of a hold upon the Mississippi hasbeen pointed out; if it were lost the whole of far South-West wouldmanifestly be lost with it; in the North, on the other hand, publicsentiment was strongly set upon freeing the navigation of the greatriver. The Confederacy now held the river from the fortress ofVicksburg, which after taking New Orleans Admiral Farragut had attackedin vain, down to Port Hudson, 120 miles further south, where theConfederate forces had since then seized and fortified another point ofvantage. Vicksburg, it will be observed, lies 175 to 180 miles south ofMemphis, or from Grand Junction, between Memphis and Corinth, the pointsin the occupation of the North which must serve Grant as a base. AtVicksburg itself, and for some distance south of it, a line of bluffs orsteep-sided hills lying east of the Mississippi comes right up to theedge of the river. The river as it approaches these bluffs makes asudden bend to the north-east and then again to the south-west, so thattwo successive reaches of the stream, each from three to four miles long, were commanded by the Vicksburg guns, 200 feet above the valley; theeastward or landward side of the fortress was also well situated fordefence. To the north of Vicksburg the country on the east side of theMississippi is cut up by innumerable streams and "bayous" or marshycreeks, winding and intersecting amid a dense growth of cedars. TheNorth, with a flotilla under Admiral Porter, commanded the Mississippiitself, and the Northern forces could freely move along its western shoreto the impregnable river face of Vicksburg beyond. But the question ofhow to get safely to the assailable side of Vicksburg presentedformidable difficulty to Grant and to the Government. Grant's operations began in November, 1862. Advancing directly southwardalong the railway from Memphis with the bulk of his forces, he after awhile detached Sherman with a force which proceeded down the Mississippito the mouth of the Yazoo, a little north-west of Vicksburg. HereSherman was to land, and, it was hoped, surprise the enemy at Vicksburgitself while the bulk of the enemy's forces were fully occupied byGrant's advance from the north. But Grant's lengthening communicationswere cut up by a cavalry raid, and he had to retreat, while Sherman cameupon an enemy fully prepared and sustained a defeat a fortnight afterBurnside's defeat at Fredericksburg. This was the first of a long seriesof failures during which Grant, who for his part was conspicuously frankand loyal in his relations with the Government, received upon the wholethe fullest confidence and support from them. There occurred, however, about this time an incident which was trying to Grant, and of which thevery simple facts must be stated, since it was the last of the occasionsupon which severe criticism of Lincoln's military administration has beenfounded. General McClernand was an ambitious Illinois lawyer-politicianof energy and courage; he was an old acquaintance of Lincoln's, and anold opponent; since the death of Douglas he and anotherlawyer-politician, Logan, had been the most powerful of the Democrats inIllinois; both were zealous in the war and had joined the Army upon itsoutbreak. Logan served as a general under Grant with confessed ability. It must be repeated that, North and South, former civilians had to beplaced in command for lack of enough soldiers of known capacity to goround, and that many of them, like Logan and like the Southern general, Polk, who was a bishop in the American Episcopal Church, did very goodservice. McClernand had early obtained high rank and had shown no signas yet of having less aptitude for his new career than other men ofsimilar antecedents. Grant, however, distrusted him, and proved to beright. In October, 1862, McClernand came to Lincoln with an offer of hispersonal services in raising troops from Illinois, Indiana, and Iowa, with a special view to clearing the Mississippi. He of course expectedto be himself employed in this operation. Recruiting was at a low ebb, and it would have been folly to slight this offer. McClernand did infact raise volunteers to the number of a whole army corps. He was placedunder Grant in command of the expedition down the Mississippi which hadalready started under Sherman. Sherman's great promise had not yet beenproved to any one but Grant; he appears at this time to have come underthe disapproval of the Joint Committee of Congress on the War, and thenewspaper Press had not long before announced, with affected regret, thenews that he had become insane. McClernand, arriving just afterSherman's defeat near Vicksburg, fell in at once with a suggestion of histo attack the Post of Arkansas, a Confederate stronghold in the State ofArkansas and upon the river of that name, from the shelter of whichConfederate gunboats had some chance of raiding the Mississippi aboveVicksburg. The expedition succeeded in this early in January, 1863, andwas then recalled to join Grant. This was a mortification to McClernand, who had hoped for a command independent of Grant. In his subsequentconduct he seems to have shown incapacity; he was certainly insubordinateto Grant, and he busied himself in intrigues against him, with suchresult as will soon be seen. As soon as Grant told the Administrationthat he was dissatisfied with McClernand, he was assured that he was atliberty to remove him from command. This he eventually did after somemonths of trial. In the first three months of 1863, while the army of the Potomac, shattered at Fredericksburg, was being prepared for the fresh attack uponLee which ended at Chancellorsville, and while Bragg and Rosecrans layconfronting each other in Middle Tennessee, each content that the otherwas afraid to weaken himself by sending troops to the Mississippi, Grantwas occupied in a series of enterprises apparently more cautious thanthat in which he eventually succeeded, but each in its turn futile. Anattempt was made to render Vicksburg useless by a canal cutting acrossthe bend of the Mississippi to the west of that fortress. Then Grantendeavoured with the able co-operation of Admiral Porter and his flotillato secure a safe landing on the Yazoo, which enters the Mississippi alittle above Vicksburg, so that he could move his army to the rear ofVicksburg by this route. Next Grant and Porter tried to establish a sureline of water communication from a point far up the Mississippi throughan old canal, then somehow obstructed, into the upper waters of the Yazooand so to a point on that river 30 or 40 miles to the north-east ofVicksburg, by which they would have turned the right of the mainConfederate force; but this was frustrated by the Confederates, whosucceeded in establishing a strong fort further up the Yazoo. Yet afurther effort was made to establish a waterway by a canal quitting theMississippi about 40 miles north of Vicksburg and communicating, throughlakes, bayous, and smaller rivers, with its great tributary the Red Riverfar to the south. This, like the first canal attempted, would haverendered Vicksburg useless. Each of these projects failed in turn. The tedious engineering workwhich two of them involved was rendered more depressing by adverseconditions of weather and by ill-health among Grant's men. Naturalgrumbling among the troops was repeated and exaggerated in the North. McClernand employed the gift for intrigue, which perhaps had helped himto secure his command, in an effort to get Grant removed. It ismelancholy to add that a good many newspapers at this time began to printstatements that Grant had again taken to drink. It is certain that hewas at this time a total abstainer. It is said that he had offended theauthors of this villainy by the restrictions which he had long beforefound necessary to put upon information to the Press. Some of the menfreely confessed afterwards that they had been convinced of his sobriety, and added the marvellous apology that their business was to give thepublic "the news. " Able and more honest journalists urged that Grant hadproved his incompetence. Secretary Chase took up their complaints andpressed that Grant should be removed. Lincoln, before the outcry againstGrant had risen to its height, had felt the need of closer informationthan he possessed about the situation on the Mississippi; and had hitupon the happy expedient of sending an able official of the WarDepartment, who deserved and obtained the confidence of Grant and hisofficers, to accompany the Western army and report to him. Apart, however, from the reports he thus received, he had always treated theattacks on Grant with contempt. "I cannot spare this general; hefights, " he said. In reply to complaints that Grant drank, he enquired(adapting, as he knew, George II. 's famous saying about Wolfe) whatwhisky he drank, explaining that he wished to send barrels of it to someof his other generals. His attitude is remarkable, because in his ownmind he had not thought well of any of Grant's plans after his firstfailure in December; he had himself wished from an early day that Grantwould take the very course by which he ultimately succeeded. He let himgo his own way, as he afterwards told him, from "a general hope that youknow better than I. " At the end of March Grant took a memorable determination to transfer hiswhole force to the south of Vicksburg and approach it from thatdirection. He was urged by Sherman to give up any further attempt to usethe river, and, instead, to bring his whole army back to Memphis andbegin a necessarily slow approach on Vicksburg by the railway. Hedeclared himself that on ordinary grounds of military prudence this wouldhave been the proper course, but he decided for himself that thedepressing effect of the retreat to Memphis would be politicallydisastrous. At Grand Gulf, 30 miles south of Vicksburg, the Southpossessed another fortified post on the river; to reach this Grantrequired the help of the Navy, not only in crossing from the western bankof the river, but in transporting the supplies for which the roads westof the river were inadequate. Admiral Porter, with his gunboats andladen barges, successfully ran the gauntlet of the Vicksburg batteries bynight without serious damage. Grand Gulf was taken on May 3, and Grant'sarmy established at this new base. A further doubt now arose. GeneralBanks in Louisiana was at this time preparing to besiege Port Hudson. Itmight be well for Grant to go south and join him, and, after reducingPort Hudson, return with Banks' forces against Vicksburg. This was whatnow commended itself to Lincoln. In the letter of congratulation whichsome time later he was able to send to Grant, after referring to hisformer opinion which had been right, he confessed that he had now beenwrong. Banks was not yet ready to move, and Vicksburg, now seriouslythreatened, might soon be reinforced. Orders to join Banks, though theywere probably meant to be discretionary, were actually sent to Grant, buttoo late. He had cut himself loose from his base at Grand Gulf andmarched his troops north, to live with great hardship to themselves onthe country and the supplies they could take with them. He had with him35, 000 men. General Pemberton, to whom he had so far been opposed, laycovering Vicksburg with 20, 000 and a further force in the city; JosephJohnston, whom he afterwards described as the Southern general who in allthe war gave him most trouble, had been sent by Jefferson Davis to takesupreme command in the West, and had collected 11, 000 men at Jackson, thecapital of Mississippi, 45 miles east of Vicksburg. Grant was able totake his enemy in detail. Having broken up Johnston's force he defeatedPemberton in a series of battles. His victory at Champion's Hill on May16, not a fortnight after Chancellorsville, conveyed to his mind theassurance that the North would win the war. An assault on Vicksburgfailed with heavy loss. Pemberton was at last closely invested inVicksburg and Grant could establish safe communications with the North byway of the lower Yazoo and up the Mississippi above its mouth. There hadbeen dissension between Pemberton and Johnston, who, seeing that gunboatsproved able to pass Vicksburg in any case, thought that Pemberton, whomhe could not at the moment hope to relieve, should abandon Vicksburg andtry to save his army. Long before Johnston could be sufficientlyreinforced to attack Grant, Grant's force had been raised to 71, 000. OnJuly 4, 1863, the day of the annual commemoration of nationalIndependence, Vicksburg was surrendered. Its garrison, who had sufferedseverely, were well victualled by Grant and allowed to go free on parole. Pemberton in his vexation treated Grant with peculiar insolence, whichprovoked a singular exhibition of the conqueror's good temper to him; andin his despatches to the President, Grant mentioned nothing with greaterpride than the absence of a word or a sign on the part of his men whichcould hurt the feelings of the fallen. Johnston was forced to abandonthe town of Jackson with its large stores to Sherman, but could not bepursued in his retreat. On July 9, five days later, the defender of PortHudson, invested shortly before by Banks, who had not force enough for anassault, heard the news of Vicksburg and surrendered. Lincoln could nowboast to the North that "the Father of Waters again goes unvexed to thesea. " At the very hour when Vicksburg was surrendered Lincoln had been issuingthe news of another victory won in the preceding three days, which, alongwith the capture of Vicksburg, marked the turning point of the war. Formore than a month after the battle of Chancellorsville the two opposingarmies in the East had lain inactive. The Conscription Law, with whichwe must deal later, had recently been passed, and various elements ofdiscontent and disloyalty in the North showed a great deal of activity. It seems that Jefferson Davis at first saw no political advantage in themilitary risk of invading the North. Lee thought otherwise, and waseager to follow up his success. At last, early in June, 1863, he startednorthward. This time he aimed at the great industrial regions ofPennsylvania, hoping also while assailing them to draw Hooker furtherfrom Washington. Hooker, on first learning that Lee had crossed theRappahannock, entertained the thought of himself going south of it andattacking Richmond. Lincoln dissuaded him, since he might be "entangledupon the river, like an ox jumped half over a fence"; he could not takeRichmond for weeks, and his communications might be cut; besides, Lincolnadded, his true objective point throughout was Lee's army and notRichmond. Hooker's later movements, in conformity with what he couldgather of Lee's movements, were prudent and skilful. He rejected a latersuggestion of Lincoln's that he should strike quickly at the mostassailable point in Lee's lengthening line of communications, and he waswise, for Lee could live on the country he was traversing, and Hooker nowaimed at covering Philadelphia or Baltimore and Washington, according tothe direction which Lee might take, watching all the while for the momentto strike. He found himself hampered in some details by probablyinjudicious orders of his superior, Halleck, and became irritable andquerulous; Lincoln had to exercise his simple arts to keep him to hisduty and to soothe him, and was for the moment successful. Suddenly onJune 27, with a battle in near prospect, Hooker sent in his resignation;probably he meant it, but there was no time to debate the matter. Probably he had lost confidence in himself, as he did before atChancellorsville. Lincoln evidently judged that his state of mind madeit wise to accept this resignation. He promptly appointed in Hooker'splace one of his subordinates, General George Meade, a lean, tall, studious, somewhat sharp-tongued man, not brilliant or popular or thechoice that the army would have expected, but with a record in previouscampaigns which made him seem to Lincoln trustworthy, as he was. Asubordinate command in which he could really distinguish himself waslater found for Hooker, who now took leave of his army in words of markedgenerosity towards Meade. All this while there was great excitement inthe North. Urgent demands had been raised for the recall of McClellan, acourse of which, Lincoln justly observed, no one could measure theinconvenience so well as he. Lee was now feeling his way, somewhat in the dark as to his enemy'smovements, because he had despatched most of his cavalry upon raidingexpeditions towards the important industrial centre of Harrisburg. Meadecontinued on a parallel course to him, with his army spread out to guardagainst any movements of Lee's to the eastward. Each commander wouldhave preferred to fight the other upon the defensive. Suddenly on July1, three days after Meade had taken command, a chance collision tookplace north of the town of Gettysburg between the advance guards of thetwo armies. It developed into a general engagement, of which the resultmust partly depend on the speed with which each commander could bring upthe remainder of his army. On the first day Lee achieved a decidedsuccess. The Northern troops were driven back upon steep heights justsouth of Gettysburg, of which the contour made it difficult for the enemyto co-ordinate his movements in any attack on them. Here Meade, who whenthe battle began was ten miles away and did not expect it, was able bythe morning of the 2nd or during that day to bring up his full force; andhere, contrary to his original choice of a position for bringing on abattle, he made his stand. The attack planned by Lee on the followingday must, in his opinion, afterwards have been successful if "Stonewall"Jackson had been alive and with him. As it was, his most brilliantremaining subordinate, Longstreet, disapproved of any assault, and onthis and the following day obeyed his orders reluctantly and too slowly. On July 3, 1863, Lee renewed his attack. In previous battles theNorthern troops had been contending with invisible enemies in woods; now, after a heavy cannonade, the whole Southern line could be seen advancingin the open to a desperate assault. This attack was crushed by theNorthern fire. First and last in the fighting round Gettysburg the Northlost 23, 000 out of about 93, 000 men, and the South about an equal numberout of 78, 000. The net result was that, after a day's delay, Lee feltcompelled to retreat. Nothing but an actual victory would have made itwise for him to persist in his adventurous invasion. The importance of this, which has been remembered as the chief battle ofthe war, must be estimated rather by the peril from which the North wasdelivered than by the results it immediately reaped. Neither on July 3nor during Lee's subsequent retreat did Meade follow up his advantagewith the boldness to which Lincoln, in the midst of his congratulations, exhorted him. On July 12 Lee recrossed the Potomac. Meade on the daybefore had thought of attacking him, but desisted on the advice of themajority in a council of war. That council of war, as Lincoln said, should never have been held. Its decision was demonstrably wrong, sinceit rested on the hope that Lee would himself attack. Lincoln writhed ata phrase in Meade's general orders about "driving the invader from oursoil. " "Will our generals, " he exclaimed in private, "never get thatidea out of their heads? The whole country is our soil. " Meade, however, unlike McClellan, was only cautious, not lukewarm, nor without amind of his own. The army opposed to him was much larger than that whichMcClellan failed to overwhelm after Antietam. He had offered to resignwhen he inferred Lincoln's dissatisfaction from a telegram. Lincolnrefused this, and made it clear through another officer that his strongopinion as to what might have been done did not imply ingratitude or wantof confidence towards "a brave and skilful officer, and a true man. "Characteristically he relieved his sense of Meade's omissions in a letterof most lucid criticism, and characteristically he never sent it. Stepby step Meade moved on Lee's track into the enemy's country. Indecisivemanoeuvres on both sides continued over four months. Lee was forced overthe Rappahannock, then over the Rapidan; Meade followed him, found hisarmy in peril, and prudently and promptly withdrew. In December the twoarmies went into winter quarters on the two sides of the Rappahannock toawait the opening of a very different campaign when the next spring wasfar advanced. The autumn months of 1863 witnessed in the Middle West a varying conflictending in a Northern victory hardly less memorable than those ofGettysburg and Vicksburg. At last, after the fall of Vicksburg, Rosecrans in Middle Tennessee found himself ready to advance. By skilfulmanoeuvres, in the difficult country where the Tennessee River cuts theCumberland mountains and the parallel ranges which run from north-east tosouth-west behind, he turned the flank of Bragg's position at Chattanoogaand compelled him to evacuate that town in the beginning of September. Bragg, as he retreated, succeeded in getting false reports as to hismovements and the condition of his army conveyed to Rosecrans, whoaccordingly followed him up in an incautious manner. By this time thebulk of the forces that had been used against Vicksburg should have beenbrought to support Rosecrans. Halleck, however, at first scattered themfor purposes which he thought important in the West. After a while, however, one part of the army at Vicksburg was brought back to GeneralBurnside in Ohio, from whom it had been borrowed. Burnside accomplishedthe very advance by Lexington, in Kentucky, over the mountains intoEastern Tennessee, which Lincoln had so long desired for the relief ofthe Unionists there, and he was able to hold his ground, defeating atKnoxville a little later an expedition under Longstreet which was sent todislodge him. Other portions of the Western army were at last ordered tojoin Rosecrans, but did not reach him before he had met with disaster. For the Confederate authorities, eager to retrieve their losses, sentevery available reinforcement to Bragg, and he was shortly able to turnback towards Chattanooga with over 71, 000 men against the 57, 000 withwhich Rosecrans, scattering his troops in false security, was pursuinghim. The two armies came upon one another, without clear expectation, upon the Chicamauga Creek beyond the ridge which lies south-east ofChattanooga. The battle fought among the woods and hills by Chicamaugaon September 19 and 20 surpassed any other in the war in the heaviness ofthe loss on each side. On the second day Bragg's manoeuvres brokeRosecrans' line, and only an extraordinarily gallant stand by Thomas witha part of the line, in successive positions of retreat, prevented Braggfrom turning the hasty retirement of the remainder into a disastrousrout. As it was, Rosecrans made good his retreat to Chattanooga, butthere he was in danger of being completely cut off. A corps was promptlydetached from Meade in Virginia, placed under Hooker, and sent to relievehim. Rosecrans, who in a situation of real difficulty seems to have hadno resourcefulness, was replaced in his command by Thomas. Grant wasappointed to supreme command of all the forces in the West and ordered toChattanooga. There, after many intricate operations on either side, agreat battle was eventually fought on November 24 and 25, 1863. Granthad about 60, 000 men; Bragg, who had detached Longstreet for his vainattack on Burnside, had only 33, 000, but he had one steep and entrenchedridge behind another on which to stand. The fight was marked by notableincidents--Hooker's "battle above the clouds"; and the impulse by whichapparently with no word of command, Thomas' corps, tired of waiting whileSherman advanced upon the one flank and Hooker upon the other, arose andcarried a ridge which the enemy and Grant himself had regarded asimpregnable. It ended in a rout of the Confederates, which wasenergetically followed up. Bragg's army was broken and driven right backinto Georgia. To sum up the events of the year, the one serious invasionof the North by the South had failed, and the dominion on which theConfederacy had any real hold was now restricted to the Atlantic States, Alabama, and a part of the State of Mississippi. At this point, at which the issue of the war, if it were only pursued, could not be doubted, and at which, as it happens, the need of Lincoln'spersonal intervention in military matters became greatly diminished, wemay try to obtain a general impression of his wisdom, or want of it, insuch affairs. The closeness and keen intelligence with which he followedthe war is undoubted, but could only be demonstrated by a lengthyaccumulation of evidence. The larger strategy of the North, sound in themain, was of course the product of more than one co-operating mind, butas his was undoubtedly the dominant will of his Administration, so too itseems likely that, with his early and sustained grasp of the generalproblem, he contributed not a little to the clearness and consistency ofthe strategical plans. The amount of the forces raised was for long, aswe shall see later, beyond his control, and, in the distribution of whathe had to the best effect, his own want of knowledge and the poorjudgment of his earlier advisers seem to have caused some errors. Hestarted with the evident desire to put himself almost unreservedly in thehands of the competent military counsellors, and he was able in the endto do so; but for a long intermediate period, as we have seen, he wascompelled as a responsible statesman to forego this wish. It was allthat time his function first to pick out, with very little to go by, thebest officers he could find, replacing them with better when he could;and secondly to give them just so much direction, and no more, as hiswisdom at a distance and their more expert skill upon the spot madeproper. In each of these respects his occasional mistakes are plainenough, but the evidence, upon which he has often been thought capable ofsetting aside sound military considerations causelessly or in obedienceto interested pressure, breaks down when the facts of any imputedinstance are known. It is manifest that he gained rapidly both inknowledge of the men he dealt with and in the firm kindness with which hetreated them. It is remarkable that, with his ever-burning desire to seevigour and ability displayed, he could watch so constantly as he did forthe precise opportunity or the urgent necessity before he made changes incommand. It is equally remarkable that, with his decided and often rightviews as to what should be done, his advice was always offered with equaldeference and plainness. "Quite possibly I was wrong both then and now, "he once wrote to Hooker, "but in the great responsibility resting uponme, I cannot be entirely silent. Now, all I ask is that you will be insuch mood that we can get into action the best cordial judgment ofyourself and General Halleck, with my poor mite added, if indeed he andyou shall think it entitled to any consideration at all. " The man whosehabitual attitude was this, and who yet could upon the instant take hisown decision, may be presumed to have been wise in many cases where we donot know his reasons. Few statesmen, perhaps, have so often stoodwaiting and refrained themselves from a firm will and not from the wantof it, and for the sake of the rare moment of action. The passing of the crisis in the war was fittingly commemorated by anumber of State Governors who combined to institute a National Cemeteryupon the field of Gettysburg. It was dedicated on November 19, 1863. The speech of the occasion was delivered by Edward Everett, theaccomplished man once already mentioned as the orator of highest reputein his day. The President was bidden then to say a few words at theclose. The oration with which for two hours Everett delighted his vastaudience charms no longer, though it is full of graceful sentiment andcontains a very reasonable survey of the rights and wrongs involved inthe war, and of its progress till then. The few words of Abraham Lincolnwere such as perhaps sank deep, but left his audience unaware that aclassic had been spoken which would endure with the English language. The most literary man present was also Lincoln's greatest admirer, youngJohn Hay. To him it seemed that Mr. Everett spoke perfectly, and "theold man" gracefully for him. These were the few words: "Four score andseven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men arecreated equal. Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whetherthat nation, or any nation so conceived and so dedicated, can longendure. We are met on a great battlefield of that war. We have come todedicate a portion of that field as a final resting place for those whohere gave their lives that that nation might live. It is altogetherfitting and proper that we should do this. But, in a larger sense, wecannot dedicate--we cannot consecrate--we cannot hallow--this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here have consecrated itfar above our poor power to add or to detract. The world will littlenote nor long remember what we say here, but it can never forget whatthey did here. It is for us, the living, rather to be dedicated here tothe unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so noblyadvanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great taskremaining before us--that from these honoured dead we take increaseddevotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure ofdevotion; that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have diedin vain; that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom;and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shallnot perish from the earth. " 2. _Conscription and the Politics of 1863_. The events of our day may tempt us to underestimate the magnitude of theAmerican Civil War, not only in respect of its issues, but in respect ofthe efforts that were put forth. Impartial historians declare that "noprevious war had ever in the same time entailed upon the combatants suchenormous sacrifices of life and wealth. " Even such battles as Malplaquethad not rivalled in carnage the battles of this war, and in the space ofthese four years there took place a number of engagements--far more thancan be recounted here--in many of which, as at Gettysburg, the casualtiesamounted to a quarter of the whole forces engaged. The Southern armies, especially towards the end of the war, were continually being pittedagainst vastly superior numbers; the Northern armies, whether we look atthe whole war as one vast enterprise of conquest or at almost anyimportant battle save that of Gettysburg, were as continually confrontedwith great obstacles in the matter of locality and position. In thiscase, of a new and not much organised country unprepared for war, exactor intelligible figures as to losses or as to the forces raised must notbe expected, but, according to what seems to be a fair estimate, thetotal deaths on the Northern and the Southern side directly due to thewar stood to the population of the whole country at its beginning as atleast 1 to 32. Of these deaths about half occurred on the Northern andhalf on the Southern side; this, however, implies that in proportion toits population the South lost twice as heavily as the North. Neither side obtained the levies of men that it needed without resort tocompulsion. The South, in which this necessity either arose more quicklyor was seen more readily, had called up before the end of the war itswhole available manhood. In the North the proportion of effort andsacrifice required was obviously less, and, at least at one criticalmoment, it was disastrously under-estimated. A system of compulsion, tobe used in default of volunteering, was brought into effect half-waythrough the war. Under this system there were in arms at the end of thewar 980, 000 white Northern soldiers, who probably stood to the populationat that time in as high a proportion as 1 to 25, and everything was inreadiness for calling up a vastly greater number if necessary. Aftertwenty months of war, when the purely voluntary system still existed butwas proving itself inadequate to make good the wastage of the armies, thenumber in arms for the North was 860, 717, perhaps as much as 1 in 27 ofthe population then. It would be useless to evade the question which atonce suggests itself, whether the results of voluntary enlistment in thiscountry during the present war have surpassed to the extent to which theyundoubtedly ought to have surpassed the standard set by the North in theCivil War. For these two cases furnish the only instances in which theinstitution of voluntary enlistment has been submitted to a severe testby Governments reluctant to abandon it. The two cases are of course notstrictly comparable. Our own country in this matter had the advantagesof riper organisation, political and social, and of the preparatoryeducation given it by the Territorials and by Lord Roberts. Theextremity of the need was in our case immediately apparent; and the causeat issue appealed with the utmost simplicity and intensity to every braveand to every gentle nature. In the Northern States, on the other hand, apart from all other considerations, there were certain to be sections, local, racial, and political, upon which the national cause could take novery firm hold. That this was so proves no unusual prevalence ofselfishness or of stupidity; and the apathy of such sections of thepeople, like that of smaller sections in our own case, sets in a brighterlight the devotion which made so many eager to give their all. Moreover, the general patriotism of the Northern people is not to be judged by thefailure of the purely voluntary system, but rather, as will be seenlater, by the success of the system which succeeded it. There is in ourcase no official statement of the exact number serving on any particularday, but the facts which are published make it safe to conclude that, atthe end of fifteen months of war, when no compulsion was in force, thesoldiers then in service and drawn from the United Kingdom alone amountedto 1 in 17 of the population. The population in this case is one ofwhich a smaller proportion are of military age than was the case in theNorthern States, with their great number of immigrants. The apparenteffect of these figures would be a good deal heightened if it werepossible to make a correct addition in the case of each country for thenumbers killed or disabled in war up to the dates in question and for thenumbers serving afloat. Moreover, the North, when it was driven toabandon the purely voluntary system, had not reached the point at whichthe withdrawal of men from civil occupations could have been regardedamong the people as itself a national danger, or at which the Governmentwas compelled to deter some classes from enlisting; new industriesunconnected with the war were all the while springing up, and theproduction and export of foodstuffs were increasing rapidly. For thereasons which have been stated, there is nothing invidious in thusanswering an unavoidable question. Judged by any previous standard ofvoluntary national effort, the North answered the test well. Each of ourrelated peoples must look upon the rally of its fathers and grandfathersin the one case, its brothers and sons in the other, with mingledfeelings in which pride predominates, the most legitimate source of pridein our case being the unity of the Empire. To each the question mustpresent itself whether the nations, democratic and otherwise, which havefollowed from the first, or, like the South, have rapidly adopted adifferent principle, have not, in this respect, a juster cause of pride. In some of these countries, by common and almost unquestioning consent, generation after generation of youths and men in their prime have heldthemselves at the instant disposal of their country if need should arise;and, in the absence of need and the absence of excitement, havecontentedly borne the appreciable sacrifice of training. With this it issurely necessary to join a further question, whether the compulsionwhich, under conscription, the public imposes on individuals iscomparable in its harshness to the sacrifice and the conflict of dutiesimposed by the voluntary system upon the best people in all classes assuch. From the manner in which the war arose it will easily be understood thatthe South was quicker than the North in shaping its policy for raisingarmies. Before a shot had been fired at Fort Sumter, and when only sevenof the ten Southern States had yet seceded, President Jefferson Davis hadat his command more than double the number of the United States Army asit then was. He had already lawful authority to raise that number tonearly three times as many. And, though there was protest in someStates, and some friction between the Confederate War Department and theState militias, on the whole the seceding States, in theory jealous oftheir rights, submitted very readily in questions of defence to theConfederacy. It is not clear how far the Southern people displayed their warliketemper by a sustained flow of voluntary enlistment; but their Congressshowed the utmost promptitude in granting every necessary power to theirPresident, and on April 16, 1862, a sweeping measure of compulsoryservice was passed. The President of the Confederacy could call into theservice any white resident in the South between the ages of eighteen andthirty-five, with certain statutory exemptions. There was, of course, trouble about the difficult question of exemptions, and under conflictingpressure the Confederate Congress made and unmade various laws aboutthem. After a time all statutory exemptions were done away, and it wasleft entirely in the discretion of the Southern President to say what menwere required in various departments of civil life. The liability toserve was extended in September, 1862, to all between eighteen andforty-five, and finally in February, 1864, to all between seventeen andfifty. The rigorous conscription which necessity required could not beworked without much complaint. There was a party disposed to regard thelaw as unconstitutional. The existence of sovereign States within theConfederacy was very likely an obstacle to the local and largelyvoluntary organisation for deciding claims which can exist in a unifiedcountry. A Government so hard driven must, even if liberally minded, have enforced the law with much actual hardship. A belief in theruthlessness of the Southern conscription penetrated to the North. Ifwas probably exaggerated from the temptation to suppose that secessionwas the work of a tyranny and not of the Southern people. Desertion andfailure of the Conscription Law became common in the course of 1864, butthis would seem to have been due not so much to resentment at the systemas to the actual loss of a large part of the South, and the spread of aperception that the war was now hopelessly lost. In the last extremitiesof the Confederate Government the power of compulsion of coursecompletely broke down. But, upon the surface at least, it seems plainthat what has been called the military despotism of Jefferson Davisrested upon the determination rather than upon the submissiveness of thepeople. In the North, where there was double the population to draw upon, theneed for compulsion was not likely to be felt as soon. The variousinfluences which would later depress enlistment had hardly begun toassert themselves, when the Government, as if to aggravate them inadvance, committed a blunder which has never been surpassed in its ownline. On April 3, 1862, recruiting was stopped dead; the centralrecruiting office at Washington was closed and its staff dispersed. Manywriters agree in charging this error against Stanton. He must have beenthe prime author of it, but this does not exonerate Lincoln. It was nodepartmental matter, but a matter of supreme policy. Lincoln's knowledgeof human nature and his appreciation of the larger bearings of everyquestion might have been expected to set Stanton right, unless, indeed, the thing was done suddenly behind his back. In any case, this must beadded to the indications seen in an earlier chapter, that Lincoln's calmstrength and sure judgment had at that time not yet reached their fulldevelopment. As for Stanton, a man of much narrower mind, but acute, devoted, and morally fearless, kept in the War Department as a sort oftame tiger to prey on abuses, negligences, pretensions, and politicalinfluences, this was one among a hundred smaller erratic doings, whichhis critics have never thought of as outweighing his peculiar usefulness. His departmental point of view can easily be understood. Recruits, embarrassingly, presented themselves much faster than they could beorganised or equipped, and an overdriven office did not pause to thinkout some scheme of enlistment for deferred service. Waste had beenterrific, and Stanton did not dislike a petty economy which might shockpeople in Washington. McClellan clamoured for more men--let him dosomething with what he had got; Stanton, indeed, very readily becamesanguine that McClellan, once in motion, would crush the Confederacy. Events conspired to make the mistake disastrous. In these very days theConfederacy was about to pass its own Conscription Act. McClellan, instead of pressing on to Richmond, sat down before Yorktown and let theConfederate conscripts come up. Halleck was crawling southward, when arapid advance might have robbed the South of a large recruiting area. The reopening of enlistment came on the top of the huge disappointment atMcClellan's failure in the peninsula. There was a creditable response tothe call which was then made for volunteers. But the disappointment ofthe war continued throughout 1862; the second Bull Run; the inconclusivesequel to Antietam; Fredericksburg; and, side by side with these events, the long-drawn failure of Buell's and Rosecrans' operations. The spiritof voluntary service seems to have revived vigorously enough wherever andwhenever the danger of Southern invasion became pressing, but under thisprotracted depressing influence it no longer rose to the task of subduingthe South. It must be added that wages in civil employment were veryhigh. Lincoln, it is evident, felt this apparent failure of patriotismsadly, but in calm retrospect it cannot seem surprising. In the latter part of 1862 attempts were made to use the powers ofcompulsion which the several States possessed, under the antiquated lawsas to militia which existed in all of them, in order to supplementrecruiting. The number of men raised for short periods in this way is sosmall that the description of the Northern armies at this time as purelyvolunteer armies hardly needs qualification. It would probably be worthno one's while to investigate the makeshift system with which theGovernment, very properly, then tried to help itself out; for it speedilyand completely failed. The Conscription Act, which became law on March3, 1863, set up for the first time an organisation for recruiting whichcovered the whole country but was under the complete control of theFederal Government. It was placed under an officer of great ability, General J. B. Fry, formerly chief of staff to Buell, and now entitledProvost-Marshal-General. It was his business, through provost-marshalsin a number of districts, each divisible into sub-districts asconvenience might require, to enroll all male citizens between twenty andforty-five. He was to assign a quota, in other words a stated proportionof the number of troops for which the Government might at any time call, to each district, having regard to the number of previous enlistmentsfrom each district. The management of voluntary enlistment was placed inhis hands, in order that the two methods of recruiting might be worked inharmony. The system as a whole was quite distinct from any such systemof universal service as might have been set up beforehand in time ofpeace. Compulsion only came into force in default of sufficientvolunteers from any district to provide its required number of the troopswanted. When it came into force the "drafts" of conscripts were chosenby lot from among those enrolled as liable for service. But there was away of escape from actual service. It seems, from what Lincoln wrote, tohave been looked upon as a time-honoured principle, established byprecedent in all countries, that the man on whom the lot fell mightprovide a substitute if he could. The market price of a substitute (acommodity for the provision of which a class of "substitute brokers" cameinto being) proved to be about 1, 000 dollars. Business or professionalmen, who felt they could not be spared from home but wished to actpatriotically, did buy substitutes; but they need not have done so, forthe law contained a provision intended, as Lincoln recorded, to safeguardpoorer men against such a rise in prices. They could escape by paying300 dollars, or 60 pounds, not, in the then state of wages, anextravagant penalty upon an able-bodied man. The sums paid under thisprovision covered the cost of the recruiting business. Most emphatically the Conscription Law operated mainly as a stimulus tovoluntary enlistment. The volunteer received, as the conscript did not, a bounty from the Government; States, counties, and smaller localities, when once a quota was assigned to them, vied with one another in fillingtheir quota with volunteers, and for that purpose added to the Governmentbounty. It goes without saying that in a new country, with its scatteredcountry population and its disorganised great new towns, there wereplenty of abuses. Substitute brokers provided the wrong article;ingenious rascals invented the trade of "bounty-jumping, " and wouldenlist for a bounty, desert, enlist for another bounty, and so onindefinitely; and the number of men enrolled who were afterwardsunaccounted for was large. There was of course also grumbling oflocalities at the quotas assigned to them, though no pains were spared toassign them fairly. There was some opposition to the working of the lawafter it was passed, but it was, not general, but partly the oppositionof rowdies in degraded neighbourhoods, partly factitious politicalopposition, and partly seditious and openly friendly to the South. Ingeneral the country accepted the law as a manifest military necessity. The spirit and manner of its acceptance may be judged from the results ofany of the calls for troops under this law. For example, in December, 1864, towards the end of the war, 211, 752 men were brought up to thecolours; of these it seems that 194, 715 were ordinary volunteers, 10, 192were substitutes provided by conscripts, and only 6, 845 were actuallycompelled men. It is perhaps more significant still that among those whodid not serve there were only 460 who paid the 300-dollar penalty, asagainst the 10, 192 who must have paid at least three times that sum forsubstitutes. Behind the men who had been called up by the end of the warthe North had, enrolled and ready to be called, over two million men. The North had not to suffer as the South suffered, but unquestionably inthis matter it rose to the occasion. The constitutional validity of the law was much questioned bypoliticians, but never finally tried out on appeal to the Supreme Court. There seems to be no room for doubt that Lincoln's own reasoning on thismatter was sound. The Constitution simply gave to Congress "power toraise and support armies, " without a word as to the particular means tobe used for the purpose; the new and extremely well-consideredConstitution of the Confederacy was in this respect the same. TheConstitution, argued Lincoln, would not have given the power of raisingarmies without one word as to the mode in which it was to be exercised, if it had not meant Congress to be the sole judge as to the mode. "Theprinciple, " he wrote, "of the draft, which simply is involuntary orenforced service, is not new. It has been practised in all ages of theworld. It was well known to the framers of our Constitution as one ofthe modes of raising armies. . . . It had been used just before, inestablishing our independence, and it was also used under theConstitution in 1812. " In fact, as we have seen, a certain power ofcompelling military service existed in each of the States and had existedin them from the first. Their ancestors had brought the principle withthem from the old country, in which the system of the "militia ballot"had not fallen into desuetude when they became independent. Thetraditional English jealousy, which the American Colonies had imbibed, against the military power of the Crown had never manifested itself inany objection to the means which might be taken to raise soldiers, but inestablishing a strict control of the number which the Crown could at anymoment maintain; and this control had long been in England and had alwaysbeen in America completely effective. We may therefore treat the protestwhich was raised against the law as unconstitutional, and the companionargument that it tended towards military despotism, as having belonged tothe realm of political verbiage, and as neither founded in reason noraddressed to living popular emotions. This is the way in which the Northern people, of whom a large part were, it must be remembered, Democrats, seem to have regarded thesecontentions, and a real sense, apart from these contentions, thatconscription was unnecessary or produced avoidable hardship seemsscarcely to have existed. It was probably for this reason that Lincolnnever published the address to the people, or perhaps more particularlyto the Democratic opposition, to which several references have alreadybeen made. In the course of it he said: "At the beginning of the war, and ever since, a variety of motives, pressing, some in one direction andsome in the other, would be presented to the mind of each man physicallyfit to be a soldier, upon the combined effect of which motives he would, or would not, voluntarily enter the service. Among these motives wouldbe patriotism, political bias, ambition, personal courage, love ofadventure, want of employment, and convenience, or the opposite of someof these. We already have and have had in the service, as it appears, substantially all that can be obtained upon this voluntary weighing ofmotives. And yet we must somehow obtain more or relinquish the originalobject of the contest, together with all the blood and treasure alreadyexpended in the effort to secure it. To meet this necessity the law forthe draft has been enacted. You who do not wish to be soldiers do notlike this law. This is natural; nor does it imply want of patriotism. Nothing can be so just and necessary as to make us like it if it isdisagreeable to us. We are prone, too, to find false arguments withwhich to excuse ourselves for opposing such disagreeable things. " Heproceeded to meet some of these arguments upon the lines which havealready been indicated. After speaking of the precedents forconscription in America, he continued: "Wherein is the peculiar hardshipnow? Shall we shrink from the necessary means to maintain our freegovernment, which our grandfathers employed to establish it and ourfathers have already once employed to maintain it? Are we degenerate?Has the manhood of our race run out?" Unfair administration wasapprehended. "This law, " he said, "belongs to a class, which class iscomposed of those laws whose object is to distribute burthens or benefitson the principle of equality. No one of these laws can ever bepractically administered with that exactness which can be conceived of inthe mind. A tax law . . . Will be a dead letter if no one will becompelled to pay until it can be shown that every other one will becompelled to pay in precisely the same proportion according to value;nay, even it will be a dead letter if no one can be compelled to payuntil it is certain that every other one will pay at all. . . . Thissort of difficulty applies in full force to the practical administrationof the draft law. In fact, the difficulty is greater in the case of thedraft law"; and he proceeded to state the difficulties. "In all thesepoints, " he continued, "errors will occur in spite of the utmostfidelity. The Government is bound to administer the law with such anapproach to exactness as is usual in analogous cases, and as entire goodfaith and fidelity will reach. " Errors, capable of correction, should, he promised, be corrected when pointed out; but he concluded: "With theseviews and on these principles, I feel bound to tell you it is my purposeto see the draft law faithfully executed. " It was his way, as has beenseen, sometimes to set his thoughts very plainly on paper and to considerafterwards the wisdom of publishing them. This paper never saw the lighttill after his death. It is said that some scruple as to the custom inhis office restrained him from sending it out, but this scruple probablyweighed with him the more because he saw that the sincere people whom hehad thought of addressing needed no such appeal. It was surely a wiseman who, writing so wisely, could see the greater wisdom of silence. The opposition to the Conscription Law may be treated simply as oneelement in the propaganda of the official Opposition to theAdministration. The opposition to such a measure which we might possiblyhave expected to arise from churches, or from schools of thoughtindependent of the ordinary parties, does not seem, as a matter of fact, to have arisen. The Democratic party had, as we have seen, revived inforce in the latter part of 1862. Persons, ambitious, from whatevermixture of motives, of figuring as leaders of opposition during a warwhich they did not condemn, found a public to which to appeal, mainlybecause the war was not going well. They found a principle of oppositionsatisfactory to themselves in condemning the Proclamation ofEmancipation. (It was significant that McClellan shortly after theProclamation issued a General Order enjoining obedience to the Governmentand adding the hint that "the remedy for political errors, if any arecommitted, is to be found only in the action of the people at thepolls. ") In the curious creed which respectable men, with whomallegiance to an ancient party could be a powerful motive at such a time, were driven to construct for themselves, enforcement of the duty todefend the country and liberation of the enemy's slaves appeared as twinoffences against the sacred principles of constitutional freedom. Itwould have been monstrous to say that most of the Democrats were opposedto the war. Though a considerable number had always disliked it and nowfound courage to speak loudly, the bulk were as loyal to the Union asthose very strong Republicans like Greeley, who later on despaired ofmaintaining it. But there were naturally Democrats for whom a chance nowappeared in politics, and who possessed that common type of politicalmind that meditates deeply on minor issues and is inflamed by zealagainst minor evils. Such men began to debate with their conscienceswhether the wicked Government might not become more odious than theenemy. There arose, too, as there often arises in war time, a fraternalfeeling between men who hated the war and men who reflected how muchbetter they could have if waged it themselves. There was, of course, much in the conduct of the Government which calledfor criticism, and on that account it was a grievous pity thatindependence should have stultified itself by reviving in any form theroot principle of party government, and recognising as the best criticsof the Administration men who desired to take its place. More usefulcensure of the Government at that time might have come from men who, ifthey had axes to grind, would have publicly thrown them away. There weretwo points which especially called for criticism, apart from militaryadministration, upon which, as it happened, Lincoln knew more than hiscritics knew and more than he could say. One of these points wasextravagance and corruption in the matter of army contracts and the like;these evils were dangerously prevalent, but members of the Cabinet wereas anxious to prevent them as any outside critic could be, and it wasfriendly help, not censure, that was required. The other point was theexercise of martial law, a difficult question, upon which a word musthere be said, but upon which only those could usefully have spoken outwhose general support of the Government was pronounced and sincere. In almost every rebellion or civil war statesmen and the militaryofficers under them are confronted with the need, for the sake of thepublic safety or even of ordinary justice, of rules and procedure whichthe law in peace time would abhor. In great conflicts, such as our ownwars after the French Revolution and the American Civil War, statesmensuch as Pitt and Lincoln, capable of handling such a problem well, havehad their hands full of yet more urgent matters. The puzzling part ofthe problem does not lie in the neighbourhood of the actual fighting, where for the moment there can be no law but the will of the commander, but in the districts more distantly affected, or in the period when thewar is smouldering out. Lincoln's Government had at first to guarditself against dangerous plots which could be scented but not proved inWashington; later on it had to answer such questions as this: What shouldbe done when a suspected agent of the enemy is vaguely seen to be workingagainst enlistment, when an attack by the civil mob upon the recruits islikely to result, and when the local magistrate and police are not muchto be trusted? There is no doubt that Seward at the beginning, andStanton persistently, and zealous local commanders now and then solvedsuch problems in a very hasty fashion, or that Lincoln throughout was farmore anxious to stand by vigorous agents of the Government than tocorrect them. Lincoln claimed that as Commander-in-Chief he had during the continuanceof civil war a lawful authority over the lives and liberties of allcitizens, whether loyal or otherwise, such as any military commanderexercises in hostile country occupied by his troops. He held that therewas no proper legal remedy for persons injured under this authorityexcept by impeachment of himself. He held, further, that this authorityextended to every place to which the action of the enemy in any formextended--that is, to the whole country. This he took to be the doctrineof English Common Law, and he contended that the Constitution left thisdoctrine in full force. Whatever may be said as to his view of theCommon Law doctrine, his construction of the Constitution would now beheld by every one to have been wrong. Plainly read, the Constitutionswept away the whole of that somewhat undefined doctrine of martial lawwhich may be found in some decisions of our Courts, and it did much more. Every Legislature in the British Empire can, subject to the veto of theCrown, enact whatever exceptional measures of public safety it thinksnecessary in an emergency. The Constitution restricted this legislativepower within the very narrowest limits. There is, moreover, a recognisedBritish practice, initiated by Wellington and Castlereagh, by which allquestion as to the authority of martial law is avoided; a governor orcommander during great public peril is encouraged to consider what isright and necessary, not what is lawful, knowing that if necessary therewill be enquiry into his conduct afterwards, but knowing also that, unless he acts quite unconscionably, he and his agents will be protectedby an Act of Indemnity from the legal consequences of whatever they havedone in good faith. The American Constitution would seem to render anysuch Act of Indemnity impossible. In a strictly legal sense, therefore, the power which Lincoln exercised must be said to have been usurped. Thearguments by which he defended his own legality read now as goodarguments on what the law should have been, but bad arguments on what thelaw was. He did not, perhaps, attach extreme importance to this legalcontention, for he declared plainly that he was ready to break the law inminor matters rather than let the whole fabric of law go to ruin. This, however, does not prove that he was insincere when he pleaded legal aswell as moral justification; he probably regarded the Constitution in amanner which modern lawyers find it difficult to realise; he probablyapplied in construing it a principle such as Hamilton laid down for theconstruction of statutes, that it was "qualified and controlled" by theCommon Law and by considerations of "convenience" and of "reason" and ofthe policy which its framers, as wise and honest men, would have followedin present circumstances; he probably would have adapted to the occasionHamilton's position that "construction may be made against the letter ofthe statute to render it agreeable to natural justice. " In the exercise of his supposed prerogative Lincoln sanctioned frombeginning to end of the war the arrest of many suspected dangerouspersons under what may be called "letters de cachet" from Seward andafterwards from Stanton. He publicly professed in 1863 his regret thathe had not caused this to be done in cases, such as those of Lee andJoseph Johnston, where it had not been done. When agitation arose on thematter in the end of 1862 many political prisoners were, no doubt wisely, released. Congress then proceeded, in 1863, to exercise such powers inthe matter as the Constitution gave it by an Act suspending, where thePresident thought fit, the privilege of the writ of _habeas corpus_. Adecision of the Supreme Court, delivered curiously enough by Lincoln'sold friend David Davis, showed that the real effect of this Act, so faras valid under the Constitution, was ridiculously small (see _Ex parteMilligan_, 4 Russell, 2). In any case the Act was hedged about with manyprecautions. These were entirely disregarded by the Government, whichproceeded avowedly upon Lincoln's theory of martial law. The wholecountry was eventually proclaimed to be under martial law, and manypersons were at the orders of the local military commander tried andpunished by court-martial for offences, such as the discouragement ofenlistment or the encouragement of desertion, which might not have beenpunishable by the ordinary law, or of which the ordinary Courts might nothave convicted them. This fresh outbreak of martial law must in largepart be ascribed to Lincoln's determination that the Conscription Actshould not be frustrated; but apart from offences relating to enlistmentthere was from 1863 onwards no lack of seditious plots fomented by theagents of the Confederacy in Canada, and there were several secretsocieties, "knights" of this, that, or the other. Lincoln, it is true, scoffed at these, but very often the general on the spot thoughtseriously of them, and the extreme Democratic leader, Vallandigham, boasted that there were half a million men in the North enrolled in suchseditious organisations. Drastic as the Government proceedings were, theopposition to them died down before the popular conviction that strongmeasures were necessary, and the popular appreciation that theblood-thirsty despot "King Abraham I. , " as some Democrats were pleased tocall him, was not of the stuff of which despots were made and was amongthe least blood-thirsty men living. The civil Courts made no attempt tointerfere; they said that, whatever the law, they could not in factresist generals commanding armies. British Courts would in many caseshave declined to interfere, not on the ground that the general had themight, but on the ground that he had the right; yet, it seems, they wouldnot quite have relinquished their hold on the matter, but would have heldthemselves free to consider whether the district in which martial law wasexercised was materially affected by the state of war or not. The legalcontroversy ended in a manner hardly edifying to the layman; in thecourse of 1865 the Supreme Court solemnly tried out the question of theright of one Milligan to a writ of _habeas corpus_. At that time thewar, the only ground on which the right could have been refused him, hadfor some months been ended; and nobody in court knew or cared whetherMilligan was then living to enjoy his right or had been shot long before. Save in a few cases of special public interest, Lincoln took no personalpart in the actual administration of these coercive measures. So great atax was put upon his time, and indeed his strength, by the personalconsideration of cases of discipline in the army, that he could notpossibly have undertaken a further labour of the sort. Moreover, hethought it more necessary for the public good to give steady support tohis ministers and generals than to check their action in detail. Hecontended that no great injustice was likely to arise. Very likely hewas wrong; not only Democrats, but men like Senator John Sherman, astrong and sensible Republican, thought him wrong. There are evilstories about the secret police under Stanton, and some records of theproceedings of the courts-martial, composed sometimes of the officersleast useful at the front, are not creditable. Very likely, as JohnSherman thought, the ordinary law would have met the needs of the case inmany districts. The mere number of the political prisoners, who countedby thousands, proves nothing, for the least consideration of thecircumstances will show that the active supporters of the Confederacy inthe North must have been very numerous. Nor does it matter much that, tothe horror of some people, there were persons of station, culture, andrespectability among the sufferers; persons of this kind were not likelyto be exposed to charges of disloyal conduct if they were actively loyal. Obscure and ignorant men are much more likely to have become the innocentvictims of spiteful accusers or vile agents of police. Doubtless thismight happen; but that does not of itself condemn Lincoln for havingmaintained an extreme form of martial law. The particular kind ofoppression that is likely to have occurred is one against which thenormal procedure of justice and police in America is said to-day toprovide no sufficient safeguard. It is almost certain that the regularcourse of law would have exposed the public weal to formidable dangers;but it by no means follows that it would have saved individuals fromwrong. The risk that many individuals would be grievously wronged was atleast not very great. The Government was not pursuing men for erroneousopinions, but for certain very definite kinds of action dangerous to theState. These were indeed kinds of action with which Lincoln thoughtordinary Courts of justice "utterly incompetent" to deal, and he avowedthat he aimed rather at preventing intended actions than at punishingthem when done. To some minds this will seem to be an attitude dangerousto liberty, but he was surely justified when he said, "In such cases thepurposes of men are much more easily understood than in cases of ordinarycrime. The man who stands by and says nothing when the peril of hisGovernment is discussed cannot be misunderstood. If not hindered, he issure to help the enemy, much more if he talks ambiguously--talks for hiscountry with 'buts' and 'ifs' and 'ands. '" In any case, Lincoln stoodclearly and boldly for repressing speech or act, that could help theenemy, with extreme vigour and total disregard for the legalities ofpeace time. A little later on we shall see fully whether this importedon his part any touch whatever of the ferocity which it may seem tosuggest. The Democratic opposition which made some headway in the first half of1863 comprised a more extreme opposition prevailing in the West and ledby Clement Vallandigham, a Congressman from Ohio, and a milder oppositionled by Horatio Seymour, who from the end of 1862 to the end of 1864, whenhe failed of re-election, was Governor of New York State. The extremesection were often called "Copperheads, " after a venomous snake of thatname. Strictly, perhaps, this political term should be limited to thefew who went so far as to desire the victory of the South; more looselyit was applied to a far larger number who went no further than to saythat the war should be stopped. This demand, it must be observed, wasbased upon the change of policy shown in the Proclamation ofEmancipation. "The war for the Union, " said Vallandigham in Congress inJanuary, 1863, "is in your hands a most bloody and costly failure. Warfor the Union was abandoned; war for the negro openly begun. With whatsuccess? Let the dead at Fredericksburg answer. --Ought this war tocontinue? I answer no--not a day, not an hour. What then? Shall weseparate? Again I answer, no, no, no. --Stop fighting. Make anarmistice. Accept at once friendly foreign mediation. " And further:"The secret but real purpose of the war was to abolish slavery in theStates, and with it the change of our present democratical form ofgovernment into an imperial despotism. " This was in no sense treason; itwas merely humbug. The alleged design to establish despotism, chieflyrevealed at that moment by the liberation of slaves, had of course noexistence. Equally false, as will be seen later, was the wholesuggestion that any peace could have been had with the South except onthe terms of separation. Vallandigham, a demagogue of real vigour, hadperhaps so much honesty as is compatible with self-deception; at anyrate, upon his subsequent visit to the South his intercourse withSouthern leaders was conducted on the footing that the Union should berestored. But his character inspired no respect. Burnside, nowcommanding the troops in Ohio, held that violent denunciation of theGovernment in a tone that tended to demoralise the troops was treason, since it certainly was not patriotism, and when in May, 1863, Vallandigham made a very violent and offensive speech in Ohio he had himarrested in his house at night, and sent him before a court-martial whichimprisoned him. Loud protest was raised by every Democrat. This worrycame upon Lincoln just after Chancellorsville. He regretted Burnside'saction--later on he had to reverse the rash suppression of a newspaper bywhich Burnside provoked violent indignation--but on this occasion hewould only say in public that he "regretted the necessity" of suchaction. Evidently he thought it his duty to support a well-intentionedgeneral against a dangerous agitator. The course which after someconsideration he took was of the nature of a practical joke, perhapsjustified by its success. Vallandigham was indeed released; he was takento the front and handed over to the Confederates as if he had been anexchanged prisoner of war. In reply to demands from the Democraticorganisation in Ohio that Vallandigham might be allowed to return home, Lincoln offered to consent if their leaders would sign a pledge tosupport the war and promote the efficiency of the army. This they calledan evasion. Vallandigham made his way to Canada and conducted intriguesfrom thence. In his absence he was put up for the governorship of Ohioin November, but defeated by a huge majority, doubtless the largerbecause of Gettysburg and Vicksburg. The next year he suddenly returnedhome, braving the chance of arrest, and, probably to his disappointment, Lincoln let him be. In reply to protests against Vallandigham's arrestwhich had been sent by meetings in Ohio and New York, Lincoln had writtenclear defences of his action, from which the foregoing account of hisviews on martial law has been taken. In one of them was a sentence whichprobably went further with the people of the North than any other: "MustI shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who deserts, while I must not touch ahair of a wily agitator who induces him to desert?" There may or may notbe some fallacy lurking here, but it must not be supposed that thissentence came from a pleader's ingenuity. It was the expression of a manreally agonised by his weekly task of confirming sentences on desertersfrom the army. Governor Seymour was a more presentable antagonist than Vallandigham. Hedid not propose to stop the war. On the contrary, his case was that thewar could only be effectively carried on by a law-abiding Government, which would unite the people by maintaining the Constitution, not, as theRadicals argued, by the flagitious policy of freeing the slaves. Itshould be added that he was really concerned at the corruption which wasbecoming rife, for which war contracts gave some scope, and which, with acritic's obliviousness to the limitations of a human force, he thoughtthe most heavily-burdened Administration of its time could easily haveput down. With a little imagination it is easy to understand thedifficult position of the orthodox Democrats, who two years before hadvoted against restricting the extension of slavery, and were now askedfor the sake of the Union to support a Government which was actuallyabolishing slavery by martial law. Also the attitude of the thoroughlyself-righteous partisan is perfectly usual. Many of Governor Seymour'sutterances were fair enough, and much of his conduct was patrioticenough. His main proceedings can be briefly summarised. His election asGovernor in the end of 1862 was regarded as an important event, theappearance of a new leader holding an office of the greatest influence. Lincoln, assuming, as he had a right to do, the full willingness ofSeymour to co-operate in prosecuting the war, did the simplest and bestthing. He wrote and invited Seymour after his inauguration in March, 1863, to a personal conference with himself as to the ways in which, withtheir divergent views, they could best co-operate. The Governor waitedthree weeks before he acknowledged this letter. He then wrote andpromised a full reply later. He never sent this reply. He protestedenergetically and firmly against the arrest of Vallandigham. In July, 1863, the Conscription Act began to be put in force in New York city;then occurred the only serious trouble that ever did occur under the Act;and it was very serious. A mob of foreign immigrants, mainly Irish, puta forcible stop to the proceeding of the draft. It set fire to thehouses of prominent Republicans, and prevented the fire brigade fromsaving them. It gave chase to all negroes that it met, beating some todeath, stringing up others to trees and lamp-posts and burning them asthey hung. It burned down an orphanage for coloured children after thepolice had with difficulty saved its helpless inmates. Four days ofrioting prevailed throughout the city before the arrival of fresh troopsrestored order. After an interval of prudent length the draft wassuccessfully carried out. Governor Seymour arrived in the city duringthe riots. He harangued this defiled mob in gentle terms, promisingthem, if they would be good, to help them in securing redress of thegrievance to which he attributed their conduct. Thenceforward to the endof his term of office he persecuted Lincoln with complaints as to theunfairness of the quota imposed on certain districts under theConscription Act. It is true that he also protested on presumablysincere constitutional grounds against the Act itself, begging Lincoln tosuspend its enforcement till its validity had been determined by theCourts. As to this Lincoln most properly agreed to facilitate, if hecould, an appeal to the Supreme Court, but declined, on the ground ofurgent military necessity, to delay the drafts in the meantime. Seymour's obstructive conduct, however, was not confined to theintelligible ground of objection to the Act itself; it showed itself inthe perpetual assertion that the quotas were unfair. No complaint as tothis had been raised before the riots. It seems that a quite unintendederror may in fact at first have been made. Lincoln, however, immediatelyreduced the quotas in question to the full extent which the alleged errorwould have required. Fresh complaints from Seymour followed, and so onto the end. Ultimately Seymour was invited to come to Washington andhave out the whole matter of his complaints in conference with Stanton. Like a prudent man, he again refused to face personal conference. Itseems that Governor Seymour, who was a great person in his day, was verydecidedly, in the common acceptance of the term, a gentleman. This hasbeen counted unto him for righteousness. It should rather be treated asan aggravation of his very unmeritable conduct. Thus, since the Proclamation of Emancipation the North had again becomepossessed of what is sometimes considered a necessity of good government, an organised Opposition ready and anxious to take the place of theexisting Administration. It can well be understood that honourable menentered into this combination, but it is difficult to conceive on whatcommon principle they could hold together which would not have beendisastrous in its working. The more extreme leaders, who were likely toprove the driving force among them, were not unfitly satirised in a novelof the time called the "Man Without a Country. " Their chance of successin fact depended upon the ill-fortune of their country in the war and onthe irritation against the Government, which could be aroused by thatcause alone and not by such abuses as they fairly criticised. In thelatter part of 1863 the war was going well. A great meeting of "Unionmen" was summoned in August in Illinois. Lincoln was tempted to go andspeak to them, but he contented himself with a letter. Phrases in itmight suggest the stump orator, more than in fact his actual stumpspeeches usually did. In it, however, he made plain in the simplestlanguage the total fallacy of such talk of peace as had lately becomecommon; the Confederacy meant the Confederate army and the men whocontrolled it; as a fact no suggestion of peace or compromise came fromthem; if it ever came, the people should know it. In equally simpleterms he sought to justify, even to supporters of the Union who did notshare his "wish that all men could be free, " his policy in regard toemancipation. In any case, freedom had for the sake of the Union beenpromised to negroes who were now fighting or working for the North, "andthe promise being made must be kept. " As that most critical year of thewar drew to a close there was a prevailing recognition that the rough butstraight path along which the President groped his way was the rightpath, and upon the whole he enjoyed a degree of general favour which wasnot often his portion. 3. _The War in 1864_. It is the general military opinion that before the war entered on itsfinal stage Jefferson Davis should have concentrated all his forces for alarger invasion of the North than was ever in fact undertaken. In theGettysburg campaign he might have strengthened Lee's army by 20, 000 menif he could have withdrawn them from the forts at Charleston. Charleston, however, was threatened during 1863 by the sea and landforces of the North, in an expedition which was probably itself unwise, as Lincoln himself seems to have suspected, but which helped to divert aConfederate army. In the beginning of 1864 Davis still kept this forceat Charleston; he persisted also in keeping a hold on his own State, Mississippi, with a further small army; while Longstreet still remainedin the south-east corner of Tennessee, where a useful employment of hisforce was contemplated but none was made. The chief Southern armies withwhich we have to deal are that of Lee, lying south of the Rapidan, andthat of Bragg, now superseded by Joseph Johnston, at Dalton, south ofChattanooga. The Confederacy, it is thought, was now in a position inwhich it might take long to reduce it, but the only military chance forit was concentration on one great counter-stroke. This seems to havebeen the opinion of Lee and Longstreet. Jefferson Davis clung, even latein the year 1864, to the belief that disaster must somehow overtake anyinvading Northern army which pushed far. Possibly he reckoned also thatthe North would weary of the repeated checks in the process of conquest. Indeed, as will be seen later, the North came near to doing so, while aserious invasion of the North, unless overwhelmingly successful, mightreally have revived its spirit. In any case Jefferson Davis, unlikeLincoln, had no desire to be guided by his best officers. He was forever quarrelling with Joseph Johnston and often with Beauregard; the lesscapable Bragg, though removed from the West, was now installed as hischief adviser in Richmond; and the genius of Lee was not encouraged toapply itself to the larger strategy of the war. At the beginning of 1864 an advance from Chattanooga southward into theheart of the Confederate country was in contemplation. Grant andFarragut wished that it should be supported by a joint military and navalattack upon Mobile, in Alabama, on the Gulf of Mexico. Otherconsiderations on the part of the Government prevented this. In 1863Marshal Bazaine had invaded Mexico to set up Louis Napoleon's ill-fatedclient the Archduke Maximilian as Emperor. As the so-called "MonroeDoctrine" (really attributable to the teaching of Hamilton and the actionof John Quincy Adams, who was Secretary of State under President Monroe)declared, such an extension of European influence, more especiallydynastic influence, on the American continent was highly unacceptable tothe United States. Many in the North were much excited, so much so thatduring 1864 a preposterous resolution, which meant, if anything, war withFrance, was passed on the motion of one Henry Winter Davis. It was ofcourse the business of Lincoln and of Seward, now moulded to his views, to avoid this disaster, and yet, with such dignity as the situationallowed, keep the French Government aware of the enmity which they mightone day incur. They did this. But they apprehended that the French, with a footing for the moment in Mexico, had designs on Texas; and thus, though the Southern forces in Texas were cut off from the rest of theConfederacy and there was no haste for subduing them, it was thoughtexpedient, with an eye on France, to assert the interest of the Union inTexas. General Banks, in Louisiana, was sent to Texas with the forceswhich would otherwise have been sent to Mobile. His various endeavoursended in May, 1864, with the serious defeat of an expedition up the RedRiver. This defeat gave great annoyance to the North and made an end ofBanks' reputation. It might conceivably have had a calamitous sequel inthe capture by the South of Admiral Porter's river flotilla, whichaccompanied Banks, and the consequent undoing of the conquest of theMississippi. As it was it wasted much force. Before Grant could safely launch his forces southward from Chattanoogaagainst Johnston, it was necessary to deal in some way with theConfederate force still at large in Mississippi. Grant determined to dothis by the destruction of the railway system by which alone it couldmove eastward. For this purpose he left Thomas to hold Chattanooga, while Sherman was sent to Meridian, the chief railway centre in theSouthern part of Mississippi. In February Sherman arrived there, and, though a subsidiary force, sent from Memphis on a similar but lessimportant errand somewhat further north, met with a severe repulse, hewas able unmolested to do such damage to the lines around Meridian as tosecure Grant's purpose. There was yet a further preliminary to the great final struggle. OnMarch 1, 1864, pursuant to an Act of Congress which was necessary forthis object, Lincoln conferred upon Grant the rank of Lieutenant-General, never held by any one else since Washington, for it was only brevet rankthat was conferred on Scott. Therewith Grant took the command, under thePresident, of all the Northern armies. Grant came to Washington toreceive his new honour. He had taken leave of Sherman in an interchangeof letters which it is good to read; but he had intended to return to theWest. Sherman, who might have desired the command in the West forhimself, had unselfishly pressed him to return. He feared that thedreaded politicians would in some way hurt Grant, and that he would bethwarted by them, become disgusted, and retire; they did hurt him, butnot then, nor in the way that Sherman had expected. Grant, however, could trust Sherman to carry out the work he wanted done in the West, andhe now saw that, as Lincoln might have told him and possibly did, thework he wanted done in the East must be done by him. He went West againfor a few days only, to settle his plans with Sherman. Sherman with hisarmy of 100, 000 was to follow Johnston's army of about 60, 000, whereverit went, till he destroyed it. Grant with his 120, 000 was to keep up anequally unfaltering fight with Lee's army, also of 60, 000. There was, ofcourse, nothing original about this conception except the idea, fullypresent to both men's minds, of the risk and sacrifice with which it wasworth while to carry it out. Lincoln and Grant had never met till thismonth. Grant at the first encounter was evidently somewhat on his guard. He was prepared to like Lincoln, but he was afraid of mistaken dictationfrom him, and determined to discourage it. Also Stanton had advised himthat Lincoln, out of mere good nature, would talk unwisely of any plansdiscussed with him. This was probably quite unjust. Stanton, in orderto keep politicians and officers in their places, was accustomed to biteoff the noses of all comers. Lincoln, on the contrary, would talk to allsorts of people with a readiness which was sometimes astonishing, butthere was a good deal of method in this--he learnt something from thesepeople all the time--and he certainly had a very great power of keepinghis own counsel when he chose. In any case, when Grant at the end ofApril left Washington for the front, he parted with Lincoln on terms ofmutual trust which never afterwards varied. Lincoln in fact, satisfiedas to his general purpose, had been happy to leave him to make his plansfor himself. He wrote to Grant: "Not expecting to see you again beforethe spring campaign begins, I wish to express in this way my entiresatisfaction with what you have done up to this time so far as Iunderstand it. The particulars of your plan I neither know nor seek toknow. You are vigilant and self-reliant, and, pleased with this, I wishnot to obtrude any constraints or restraints upon you. While I am veryanxious that any great disaster or capture of our men in great numbersshall be avoided, I know these points are less likely to escape yourattention than they would be mine. If there is anything wanting which iswithin my power to give, do not fail to let me know it. And now, with abrave army and a just cause, may God sustain you. " Grant replied: "Frommy first entrance into the volunteer service of the country to thepresent day I have never had cause of complaint--have never expressed orimplied a complaint against the Administration, or the Secretary of War, for throwing any embarrassment in the way of my vigorously prosecutingwhat appeared to me my duty. Indeed, since the promotion which placed mein command of all the armies, and in view of the great responsibility andimportance of success, I have been astonished at the readiness with whicheverything asked for has been yielded, without even an explanation beingasked. Should my success be less than I desire or expect, the least Ican say is, the fault is not with you. " At this point the realresponsibility of Lincoln in regard to military events becamecomparatively small, and to the end of the war those events may be tracedwith even less detail than has hitherto been necessary. Upon joining the Army of the Potomac Grant retained Meade, with whom hewas pleased, in a somewhat anomalous position under him as commander ofthat army. "Wherever Lee goes, " he told him, "there you will go too. "His object of attack was, in agreement with the opinion which Lincoln hadfrom an early date formed, Lee's army. If Lee could be compelled, orshould choose, to shut himself up in Richmond, as did happen, thenRichmond would become an object of attack, but not otherwise. Grant, however, hoped that he might force Lee to give him battle in the open. In the open or behind entrenchments, he meant to fight him, reckoningthat if he lost double the number that Lee did, his own loss could easilybe made up, but Lee's would be irreparable. His hope was to a largeextent disappointed. He had to do with a greater general than himself, who, with his men, knew every inch of a tangled country. In theengagements which now followed, Grant's men were constantly being hurledagainst chosen positions, entrenched and with the new device of wireentanglements in front of them. "I mean, " he wrote, "to fight it out onthis line if it takes all summer. " It took summer, autumn, winter, andthe early spring. Once across the Rapidan he was in the tract of scrubbyjungle called the Wilderness. He had hoped to escape out of thisunopposed and at the same time to turn Lee's right by a rapid march tohis own left. But he found Lee in his way. On May 5 and 6 there wasstubborn and indecisive fighting, with a loss to Grant of 17, 660 and toLee of perhaps over 10, 000--from Grant's point of view something gained. Then followed a further movement to the left to out-flank Lee. Again Leewas to be found in the way in a chosen position of his own nearSpottsylvania Court House. Here on the five days from May 8 to May 12the heavy fighting was continued, with a total loss to Grant of over18, 000 and probably a proportionate loss to Lee. Another move by Grantto the left now caused Lee to fall back to a position beyond the NorthAnna River, on which an attack was made but speedily given up. Furthermovements in the same general direction, but without any such seriousfighting--Grant still endeavouring to turn Lee's right, Lee still movingso as to cover Richmond--brought Grant by the end of the month to ColdHarbour, some ten miles east by north of Richmond, close upon the sceneof McClellan's misadventures. Meanwhile Grant had caused an expeditionunder General Butler to go by sea up the James, and to land a littlesouth of Richmond, which, with the connected fortress of Petersburg, twenty-two miles to the south of it, had only a weak garrison left. Butler was a man with remarkable powers of self-advertisement; he had nowa very good chance of taking Petersburg, but his expedition failedtotally. From June 1 to June 3 Grant was occupied on the most disastrousenterprise of his career, a hopeless attack upon a strong entrenchedposition, which, with the lesser encounters that took place within thenext few days, cost the North 14, 000 men, against a loss to the Southwhich has been put as low as 1, 700. It was the one battle which Grantregretted having fought. He gave up the hope of a fight with Lee onadvantageous conditions outside Richmond. On June 12 he suddenly movedhis army across the James to the neighbourhood of City Point, east ofPetersburg. Lee must now stand siege in Richmond and Petersburg. Had henow marched north against Washington, Grant would have been after him andwould have secured for his vastly larger force the battle in the openwhich he had so far vainly sought. Yet another disappointment followed. On July 30 an attempt was made to carry Petersburg by assault immediatelyafter the explosion of an enormous mine. It failed with heavy loss, through the fault of the amiable but injudicious Burnside, who now passedinto civil life, and of the officers under him. The siege was to be along affair. In reality, for all the disappointment, and in spite ofGrant's confessed mistake at Cold Harbour, his grim plan was progressing. The force which the South could ill spare was being worn down, and Grantwas in a position in which, though he might have got there at less cost, and though the end would not be yet, the end was sure. His army was forthe time a good deal shaken, and the estimation in which the West Pointofficers held him sank low. His own determination was quite unshaken, and, though Lincoln hinted somewhat mildly that these enormous lossesought not to recur, his confidence in Grant was unabated, too. People in Washington who had watched all this with alternations offeeling that ended in dejection had had another trial to their nervesearly in July. The Northern General Sigel, who commanded in the lowerpart of the Shenandoah Valley, protecting the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, had marched southward in June in pursuance of a subsidiary part ofGrant's scheme, but in a careless and rather purposeless manner. GeneralEarly, detached by Lee to deal with him, defeated him; outmanoeuvred anddefeated General Hunter, who was sent to supersede him; overwhelmed withsuperior force General Lew Wallace, who stood in his way further on; andupon July 11 appeared before Washington itself. The threat to Washingtonhad been meant as no more than a threat, but the garrison was largelymade up of recruits; reinforcements to it sent back by Grant arrived onlyon the same day as Early, and if that enterprising general had not wastedsome previous days there might have been a chance that he could get intoWashington, though not that he could hold it. As it was he attacked oneof the Washington forts. Lincoln was present, exhibiting, till theofficers there insisted on his retiring, the indifference to personaldanger which he showed on other occasions too. The attack was soon givenup, and in a few days Early had escaped back across the Potomac, leavingin Grant's mind a determination that the Shenandoah Valley should ceaseto be so useful to the South. Sherman set out from Chattanooga on the day when Grant crossed theRapidan. Joseph Johnston barred his way in one entrenched position afteranother. Sherman, with greater caution than Grant, or perhaps withgreater facilities of ground, manoeuvred him out of each position inturn, pushing him slowly back along the line of the railway towardsAtlanta, the great manufacturing centre of Georgia, one hundred andtwenty miles south by east from Chattanooga. Only once, towards the endof June at Kenesaw Mountain, some twenty miles north of Atlanta, did heattack Johnston's entrenchments, causing himself some unnecessary lossand failing in his direct attack on them, but probably thinking itnecessary to show that he would attack whenever needed. Johnston hasleft a name as a master of defensive warfare, and doubtless delayed andhampered Sherman as much as he could. Jefferson Davis angrily andunwisely sent General Hood to supersede him. This less prudent officergave battle several times, bringing up the Confederate loss beforeAtlanta fell to 34, 000 against 30, 000 on the other side, and being, bygreat skill on Sherman's part, compelled to evacuate Atlanta on September2. By this time there had occurred the last and most brilliant exploit ofold Admiral Farragut, who on August 5 in a naval engagement ofextraordinarily varied incident, had possessed himself of the harbour ofMobile, with its forts, though the town remained as a stronghold inConfederate hands and prevented a junction with Sherman which would havequite cut the Confederacy in two. Nearer Washington, too, a memorable campaign was in process. For threeweeks after Early's unwelcome visit, military mismanagement prevailednear Washington. Early was able to turn on his pursuers, and a furtherraid, this time into Pennsylvania, took place. Grant was too far off toexercise control except through a sufficiently able subordinate, whichHunter was not. Halleck, as in a former crisis, did not help matters. Lincoln, though at this time he issued a large new call for recruits, wasunwilling any longer to give military orders. Just now his politicalanxieties had reached their height. His judgment was never firmer, butfriends thought his strength was breaking under the strain. On this andon all grounds he was certainly wise to decline direct interference inmilitary affairs. On August 1 Grant ordered General Philip H. Sheridanto the Shenandoah on temporary duty, expressing a wish that he should beput "in command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to puthimself south of the enemy or follow him to the death. " Lincolntelegraphed to Grant, quoting this despatch and adding, "This I think isexactly right; but please look over the despatches you may have receivedfrom here even since you made that order and see if there is any idea inthe head of any one here of putting our army south of the enemy orfollowing him to the death in any direction. I repeat to you it willneither be done nor attempted unless you watch it every day and hour andforce it. " Grant now came to Hunter's army and gently placed Sheridan inthat general's place. The operations of that autumn, which establishedSheridan's fame and culminated in his final defeat of Early at CedarCreek on October 19, made him master of all the lower part of the valley. Before he retired into winter quarters he had so laid waste the resourcesof that unfortunate district that Richmond could no longer draw suppliesfrom it, nor could it again support a Southern army in a sally againstthe North. In the month of November Sherman began a new and extraordinary movement, of which the conception was all his own, sanctioned with reluctance byGrant, and viewed with anxiety by Lincoln, though he maintained hisabsolute resolve not to interfere. He had fortified himself in Atlanta, removing its civil inhabitants, in an entirely humane fashion, to placesof safety, and he had secured a little rest for his army. But he lay farsouth in the heart of what he called "Jeff Davis' Empire, " and Hood couldcontinually harass him by attacks on his communications. Hood, nowsupervised by Beauregard, was gathering reinforcements, and Shermanlearnt that he contemplated a diversion by invading Tennessee. Shermandetermined to divide his forces, to send Thomas far back into Tennesseewith sufficient men, as he calculated, to defend it, and himself with therest of his army to set out for the eastern sea-coast, wasting no men onthe maintenance of his communications, but living on the country and"making the people of Georgia feel the weight of the war. " He set outfor the East on November 15. Hood, at Beauregard's orders, shortlymarched off for the North, where the cautious Thomas awaited eventswithin the fortifications of Nashville. At Franklin, in the heart ofTennessee, about twenty miles south of Nashville, Hood's army sufferedbadly in an attack upon General Schofield, whom Thomas had left to checkhis advance while further reinforcements came to Nashville. Schofieldfell back slowly on Thomas, Hood rashly pressing after him with a smallbut veteran army now numbering 44, 000. Grant and the Washingtonauthorities viewed with much concern an invasion which Thomas hadsuffered to proceed so far. Grant had not shared Sherman's faith inThomas. He now repeatedly urged him to act, but Thomas had his own viewsand obstinately bided his time. Days followed when frozen sleet made anadvance impossible. Grant had already sent Logan to supersede Thomas, and, growing still more anxious, had started to come west himself, whenthe news reached him of a battle on December 15 and 16 in which Thomashad fallen on Hood, completely routing him, taking on these days and inthe pursuit that followed no less than 13, 000 prisoners. There was a song, "As we go marching through Georgia, " which wasafterwards famous, and which Sherman could not endure. What his men mostoften sang, while they actually were marching through Georgia, wasanother, and of its kind a great song:-- "John Brown's body lies amouldering in the grave, But his soul goes marching on. Glory, glory, Hallelujah. " Their progress was of the nature of a frolic, though in one way a verystern frolic. They had little trouble from the small and scatteredConfederate forces that lay near their route. They industriously andingeniously destroyed the railway track of the South, heating the railsand twisting them into knots; and the rich country of Georgia, which hadbecome the chief granary of the Confederates, was devastated as theypassed, for a space fifty or sixty miles broad, by the destruction of allthe produce they could not consume. This was done under control byorganised forage parties. Reasonable measures were taken to preventprivate pillage of houses. No doubt it happened. Sherman's able cavalrycommander earned a bad name, and "Uncle Billy, " as they called him to hisface, clearly had a soft corner in his heart for the light-hearted andlight-fingered gentlemen called "bummers" (a "bummer, " says the OxfordDictionary, "is one who quits the ranks and goes on an independentforaging expedition on his own account"). They were, incidentally, Sherman found, good scouts. But the serious crimes committed were veryfew, judged by the standard of the ordinary civil population. Theauthentic complaints recorded relate to such matters as the smashing of agrand piano or the disappearance of some fine old Madeira. Thus thesuffering caused to individuals was probably not extreme, and a longcontinuance of the war was rendered almost impossible. A little beforeChristmas Day, 1864, Sherman had captured, with slight opposition, thecity of Savannah, on the Atlantic, with many guns and other spoils, andwas soon ready to turn northwards on the last lap of his triumphantcourse. Lincoln's letter of thanks characteristically confessed hisearlier unexpressed and unfulfilled fears. Grant was proceeding all the time with his pressure on the single largefortress which Richmond and Petersburg together constituted. Its circuitwas far too great for complete investment. His efforts were for a timedirected to seizing the three railway lines which converged from thesouth on Petersburg and to that extent cutting off the supplies of theenemy. But he failed to get hold of the most important of theserailways. He settled down to the slow process of entrenching his ownlines securely and extending the entrenchment further and further roundthe south side of Petersburg. Lee was thus being forced to extend theposition held by his own small army further and further. In time thelines would crack and the end come. It need hardly be said that despair was invading the remnant of theConfederacy; supplies began to run short in Richmond, recruiting hadceased, desertion was increasing. Before the story of its longresistance closes it is better to face the gravest charge against theSouth. That charge relates to the misery inflicted upon many thousandsof Northern prisoners in certain prisons or detention camps of the South. The alleged horrors were real and were great. The details should not becommemorated, but it is right to observe that the pitiable condition inwhich the stricken survivors of this captivity returned, and the talethey had to tell, caused the bitterness which might be noted afterwardsin some Northerners. The guilt lay mainly with a few subordinate butuncontrolled officials. In some degree it must have been shared byJefferson Davis and his Administration, though a large allowance shouldbe made for men so sorely driven. But it affords no ground whatever, asmore fortunate prisoners taken by the Confederates have sometimestestified, for any general imputation of cruelty against the Southernofficers, soldiers, or people. There is nothing in the record of the warwhich dishonours the South, nothing to restrain the tribute to itsheroism which is due from a foreign writer, and which is irrepressible inthe case of a writer who rejoices that the Confederacy failed. 4. _The Second Election of Lincoln: 1864_. Having the general for whom he had long sought, Lincoln could now be inmilitary matters little more than the most intelligent onlooker; he couldmaintain the attitude, congenial to him where he dealt with skilled men, that when he differed from them they probably knew better than he. Thiswas well, for in 1864 his political anxieties became greater than theyhad been since war declared itself at Fort Sumter. Whole States whichhad belonged to the Confederacy were now securely held by the Unionarmies, and the difficult problem of their government was approaching itsfinal settlement. It seemed that the war should soon end; so thequestion of peace was pressed urgently. Moreover, the election of aPresident was due in the autumn, and, strange as it is, the issue was tobe whether, with victory in their grasp, the victors should themselvessurrender. It was not given to Lincoln after all to play a great part in thereconstruction of the South; that was reserved for much rougher and muchweaker hands. But the lines on which he had moved from the first are ofinterest. West Virginia, with its solid Unionist population, was simplyallowed to form itself into an ordinary new State. But matters were notso simple where the Northern occupation was insecure, or where a tinyfraction of a State was held, or where a large part of the people leanedto the Confederacy. Military governors were of course appointed; inTennessee this position was given to a strong Unionist, Andrew Johnson, who was already Senator for that State. In Louisiana and elsewhereLincoln encouraged the citizens who would unreservedly accept the Unionto organise State Governments for themselves. Where they did so therewas friction between them and the Northern military governor who wasstill indispensable. There was also to the end triangular troublebetween the factions in Missouri and the general commanding there. Tothese little difficulties, which were of course unceasing, Lincolnapplied the firmness and tact which were no longer surprising in him, with a pleasing mixture of good temper and healthy irritation. Butfurther difficulties lay in the attitude of Congress, which was concernedin the matter because each House could admit or reject the Senators orRepresentatives claiming to sit for a Southern State. There werequestions about slavery in such States. Lincoln, as we have seen, haddesired, if he could, to bring about the abolition of slavery throughgradual and through local action, and he had wished to see the franchisegiven only to the few educated negroes. Nothing came of this, but itkept up the suspicion of Radicals in Congress that he was not sound onslavery; and, apart from slavery, the whole question of the terms onwhich people lately in arms against the country could be admitted asparticipators in the government of the country was one on which statesmenin Congress had their own very important point of view. Lincoln's mainwish was that, with the greatest speed and the least heat spent onavoidable controversy, State government of spontaneous local growthshould spring up in the reconquered South. "In all available ways, " hehad written to one of his military governors, "give the people a chanceto express their wishes at these elections. Follow forms of law as faras convenient, but at all events get the expression of the largest numberof people possible. " Above all he was afraid lest in the Southernelections to Congress that very thing should happen which after his deathdid happen. "To send a parcel of Northern men here as representatives, elected, as would be understood (and perhaps really so), at the point ofthe bayonet, would be disgraceful and outrageous. " For a time he andCongress worked together well enough, but sharp disagreement arose in1864. He had propounded a particular plan for the reconstruction ofSouthern States. Senator Wade, the formidable Chairman of the JointCommittee on the War, and Henry Winter Davis, a keen, acrid, and fluentman who was powerful with the House, carried a Bill under which a Statecould only be reconstructed on their own plan, which differed fromLincoln's. The Bill came to Lincoln for signature in the last hours ofthe session, and, amidst frightened protests from friendly legislatorsthen in his room, he let it lie there unsigned, till it expired with thesession, and went on with his work. This was in July, 1864; hisre-election was at stake. The Democrats were gaining ground; he might begiving extreme offence to the strongest Republican. "If they choose, " hesaid, "to make a point of this I do not doubt that they can do harm"(indeed, those powerful men Wade and Davis now declared against hisre-election with ability and extraordinary bitterness); but he continued:"At all events I must keep some consciousness of being somewhere nearright. I must keep some standard or principle fixed within myself. " TheBill would have repressed loyal efforts already made to establish StateGovernments in the South. It contained also a provision imposing theabolition of slavery on every such reconstructed State. This was anattempt to remedy any flaw in the constitutional effect of theProclamation of Emancipation. But it was certainly in itself flagrantlyunconstitutional; and the only conclusive way of abolishing slavery wasthe Constitutional Amendment, for which Lincoln was now anxious. Thiswas not a pedantic point, for there might have been great trouble if thecourts had later found a constitutional flaw in some negro's title tofreedom. But the correctness of Lincoln's view hardly matters. In lotsof little things, like a tired man who was careless by nature, Lincolnmay perhaps have yielded to influence or acted for his politicalconvenience in ways which may justly be censured, but it would be merelyimmoral to care whether he did so or did not, since at the crisis of hisfate he could risk all for one scruple. In an earlier stage of hiscontroversies with the parties he had written: "From time to time I havedone and said what appeared to me proper to do and say. The public knowsit all. It obliges nobody to follow me, and I trust it obliges me tofollow nobody. The Radicals and Conservatives each agree with me in somethings and disagree in others. I could wish both to agree with me in allthings; for then they would agree with each other, and be too strong forany foe from any quarter. They, however, choose to do otherwise, and Ido not question their right. I, too, shall do what seems to be my duty. I hold whoever commands in Missouri or elsewhere responsible to me andnot to either Radicals or Conservatives. It is my duty to hear all; butat last I must, within my sphere, judge what to do and what to forbear. " In this same month of July, after the Confederate General Early'sappearance before Washington had given Lincoln a pause from politicalcares, another trouble reached a point at which it is known to have triedhis patience more than any other trouble of his Presidency. Peace afterwar is not always a matter of substituting the diplomatist for thesoldier. When two sides were fighting, one for Union and the other forIndependence, one or the other had to surrender the whole point at issue. In this case there might appear to have been a third possibility. TheSouthern States might have been invited to return to the Union on termswhich admitted their right to secede again if they felt aggrieved. Theinvitation would in fact have been refused. But, if it had been made andaccepted, this would have been a worse surrender for the North than anymere acknowledgment that the South could not be reconquered; for nationalunity from that day to this would have existed on the sufferance of afactious or a foreign majority in any single State. Lincoln had facedthis. He was there to restore the Union on a firm foundation. He meantto insist to the point of pedantry that, by not so much as a word or linefrom the President or any one seeming to act for him, should the lawfulright of secession even appear to be acknowledged. Some men would havebeen glad to hang Jefferson Davis as a traitor, yet would have been readyto negotiate with him as with a foreign king. Lincoln, who would nothave hurt one hair of his head, and would have talked things over withMr. Davis quite pleasantly, would have died rather than treat with him onthe footing that he was head of an independent Confederacy. The bloodshed might have been shed for nothing if he had done so. But to manymen, in the long agony of the war and its disappointments, the plainposition became much obscured. The idea in various forms that by somesort of negotiation the issue could be evaded began to assert itselfagain and again. The delusion was freely propagated that the South wasready to give in if only Lincoln would encourage its approaches. It wassheer delusion. Jefferson Davis said frankly to the last that theConfederacy would have "independence or extermination, " and thoughStephens and many others spoke of peace to the electors in their ownStates, Jefferson Davis had his army with him, and the only result whichagitation against him ever produced was that two months before theirreparable collapse the chief command under him was given to his mostfaithful servant Lee. But it was useless for Lincoln to expose thedelusion in the plainest terms; it survived exposure and became a dangerto Northern unity. Lincoln therefore took a strange course, which generally succeeded. Whenhonest men came to him and said that the South could be induced to yield, he proposed to them that they should go to Jefferson Davis and see forthemselves. The Chairman of the Republican organisation ultimatelyapproached Lincoln on this matter at the request of a strong committee;but he was a sensible man whom Lincoln at once converted by drafting theprecise message that would have to be sent to the Confederate President. On two earlier occasions such labourers for peace were allowed to goacross the lines and talk with Davis; it could be trusted to their honourto pretend to no authority; they had interesting talks with the greatenemy, and made religious appeals to him or entertained him with wildproposals for a joint war on France over Mexico. They returned, converted also. But in July Horace Greeley, the great editor, who wastoo opinionated to be quite honest, was somehow convinced that Southernagents at Niagara, who had really come to hold intercourse with thedisloyal group among the Democrats, were "two ambassadors" from theConfederacy seeking an audience of Lincoln. He wrote to Lincoln, begginghim to receive them. Lincoln caused Greeley to go to Niagara and see thesupposed ambassadors himself. He gave him written authority to bring tohim any person with proper credentials, provided, as he made plain interms that perhaps were blunt, that the basis of any negotiation shouldinclude the recognition of the Union and the abolition of slavery. Thepersons whom Greeley saw had no authority to treat about anything. Greeley in his irritation now urged Lincoln to convey to Jefferson Davisthrough these mysterious men his readiness to receive them if they wereaccredited. In other words, the North was to begin suing for peace--athing clearly unwise, which Lincoln refused. Greeley now involvedLincoln in a tangled controversy to which he gave such a turn that, unless Lincoln would publish the most passionately pacific of Greeley'sletters, to the great discouragement of the public with whom Greeleycounted, he must himself keep silent on what had passed. He elected tokeep silent while Greeley in his paper criticised him as the personresponsible for the continuance of senseless bloodshed. This waspublicly harmful; and, as for its private bearing, the reputation ofobstinate blood-thirstiness was certain to be painful to Lincoln. The history of Lincoln's Cabinet has a bearing upon what is to follow. He ruled his Ministers with undisputed authority, talked with themcollectively upon the easiest terms, spoke to them as a headmaster to hisschool when they caballed against one another, kept them in some sort ofunison in a manner which astonished all who knew them. Cameron had hadto retire early; so did the little-known Caleb Smith, who was succeededin his unimportant office as Secretary of the Interior by a Mr. Usher, who seems to have been well chosen. Bates, the Attorney-General, retired, weary of his work, towards the end of 1864, and Lincoln had thekeen pleasure of appointing James Speed, the brother of that unforgottenand greatly honoured friend whom he honoured the more for hiscontentedness with private station. James Speed himself was in Lincoln'sopinion "an honest man and a gentleman, and one of those well-poised men, not too common here, who are not spoiled by a big office. " Blair might be regarded as a delightful, or equally as an intolerableman. He attacked all manner of people causelessly and violently, andearned implacable dislike from the Radicals In his party. Then hefrankly asked Lincoln to dismiss him whenever it was convenient. Therecame a time when Lincoln's re-election was in great peril, and he might, it was urged, have made it sure by dismissing Blair. It is significantthat Lincoln then refused to promote his own cause by seeming tosacrifice Blair, but later on, when his own election was fairly certain, but a greater degree of unity in the Republican party was to be gained, did ask Blair to go; (Blair's quarrels, it should be added, had becomemore and more outrageous). So he went and immediately flung himself withenthusiasm into the advocacy of Lincoln's cause. All the men who leftLincoln remained his friends, except one who will shortly concern us. OfLincoln's more important ministers Welles did his work for the Navyindustriously but unnoted. Stanton, on the other hand, and Lincoln'srelations with Stanton are the subjects of many pages of literature. These two curious and seemingly incompatible men hit upon extraordinarymethods of working together. It can be seen that Lincoln's chief care indealing with his subordinates was to give support and to give free playto any man whose heart was in his work. In countless small matters hewould let Stanton disobey him and flout him openly. ("Did Stanton tellyou I was a damned fool? Then I expect I must be one, for he is almostalways right and generally says what he means. ") But every now and then, when he cared much about his own wish, he would step in and crush Stantonflat. Crowds of applicants to Lincoln with requests of a kind that mustbe granted sparingly were passed on to Stanton, pleased with thePresident, or mystified by his sadly observing that he had not muchinfluence with this Administration but hoped to have more with the next. Stanton always refused them. He enjoyed doing it. Yet it seems a lowtrick to have thus indulged his taste for unpopularity, till onediscovers that, when Stanton might have been blamed seriously andunfairly, Lincoln was very careful to shoulder the blame himself. Thegist of their mutual dealings was that the hated Stanton received athinly disguised, but quite unfailing support, and that hated orapplauded, ill or well, wrong in this detail and right in that, he abodein his department and drove, and drove, and drove, and worshippedLincoln. To Seward, who played first and last a notable part in history, and who all this time conducted foreign affairs under Lincoln without anymishap in the end, one tribute is due. When he had not a master it issaid that his abilities were made useless by his egotism; yet it can beseen that, with his especial cause to be jealous of Lincoln, he could noteven conceive how men let private jealousy divide them in the performanceof duty. It was otherwise with the ablest man in the Cabinet. Salmon P. Chasemust really have been a good man in the days before he fell in love withhis own goodness. Lincoln and the country had confidence in hismanagement of the Treasury, and Lincoln thought more highly of hisgeneral ability than of that of any other man about him. He, for hispart, distrusted and despised Lincoln. Those who read Lincoln'simportant letters and speeches see in him at once a great gentleman;there were but few among the really well-educated men of America who mademuch of his lacking some of the minor points of gentility to which mostof them were born; but of these few Chase betrayed himself as one. Atthe beginning of 1864 Chase was putting it about that he had himself nowish to be President, but--; that of course he was loyal to Mr. Lincoln, but--; and so forth. He had, as indeed he deserved, admirers who wishedhe should be President, and early in the year some of them expressed thiswish in a manifesto. Chase wrote to Lincoln that this was not his owndoing; Lincoln replied that he himself knew as little of these things "asmy friends will allow me to know. " To those who spoke to him of Chase'sintrigues he only said that Chase would in some ways make a very goodPresident, and he hoped they would never have a worse President than he. The movement in favour of Chase collapsed very soon, and it evidently hadno effect on Lincoln. Chase, however, was beginning to foster grievancesof his own against Lincoln. These related always to appointments in theservice of the Treasury. He professed a horror of party influences inappointments, and imputed corrupt motives to Lincoln in such matters. Heshared the sound ideas of the later civil service reformers, though hewas far too easily managed by a low class of flatterers to have been ofthe least use in carrying them out. Lincoln would certainly not at thatcrisis have permitted strife over civil service reform, but some of hisadmirers have probably gone too far in claiming him as a sturdy supporterof the old school who would despise the reforming idea. Letters of hismuch earlier betray his doubts as to the old system, and he was exactlythe man who in quieter times could have improved matters with the leastpossible fuss. However that may be, all the tiresome circumstances ofChase's differences with him are well known, and in these instancesLincoln was clearly in the right, and Chase quarrelled only because hecould not force upon him appointments that would have created fury. OnceChase was overruled and wrote his resignation. Lincoln went to him withthe resignation in his hand, treated him with simple affection for a manwhom he still liked, and made him take it back. Later on Chase got hisown way on the whole, but was angry and sent another resignation. Someone heard of it and came to Lincoln to say that the loss of Chase wouldcause a financial panic. Lincoln's answer was to this effect: "Chasethinks he has become indispensable to the country; that his intimatefriends know it, and he cannot comprehend why the country does notunderstand it. He also thinks he ought to be President; has no doubtwhatever about that. It is inconceivable to him why people do not riseas one man and say so. He is a great statesman, and at the bottom apatriot. Ordinarily he discharges the duties of a public office withgreater ability than any man I know. Mind, I say 'ordinarily, ' but hehas become irritable, uncomfortable, so that he is never perfectly happyunless he is thoroughly miserable and able to make everybody else just asuncomfortable as he is himself. He is either determined to annoy me, orthat I shall pat him on the shoulder and coax him to stay. I don't thinkI ought to do it. I will not do it. I will take him at his word. " Sohe did. This was at the end of June, 1864, when Lincoln's apprehensionsabout his own re-election were keen, and the resignation of Chase, alongwith the retention of Blair, seemed likely to provoke anger which wasvery dangerous to himself. An excellent successor to the indispensableman was soon found. Chase found more satisfaction than ever in insidiousopposition to Lincoln. Lincoln's opportunity of requiting him was notyet. The question of the Presidency loomed large from the beginning of theyear to the election in November. At first, while the affairs of warseemed to be in good train, the chief question was who should be theRepublican candidate. It was obviously not a time when a President ofeven moderate ability and character, with all the threads in his hands, could wisely have been replaced except for overwhelming reasons. Butsince 1832, when Jackson had been re-elected, the practice of giving aPresident a second term had lapsed. It has been seen that there wasfriction, not wholly unnatural, between Lincoln and many of his party. The inner circles of politicians were considering what candidate couldcarry the country. They were doing so with great anxiety, fordisaffection was growing serious in the North and the Democrats wouldmake a good fight. They honestly doubted whether Lincoln was the bestcandidate, and attributed their own excited mood of criticism to thepublic at large. They forgot the leaning of ordinary men towards one whois already serving them honestly. Of the other possible candidates, including Chase, Frémont had the most energetic backers. Enough has beensaid already of his delusive attractiveness. General Butler had alsosome support. He was an impostor of a coarser but more useful stamp. Asuccessful advocate in Massachusetts, he had commanded the militia of theState when they first appeared on the scene at Baltimore in 1861, and hehad been in evidence ever since without sufficient opportunity till May, 1864, of proving that real military incapacity of which some of Lincoln'sfriends suspected him. He had a kind of resourceful impudence, coupledwith executive vigour and a good deal of wit, which had made him usefulin the less martial duties of his command. Generals in a war of thischaracter were often so placed that they had little fighting to do andmuch civil government, and Butler, who had first treated slaves as"contraband" and had dealt with his difficulties about negroes with moreheart and more sense than many generals, had to some extent earned hisreputation among the Republicans. Thus of those volunteer generals whonever became good soldiers he is said to have been the only one thatescaped the constant process of weeding out. To the end he keptconfidently claiming higher rank in the Army, and when he had signallyfailed under Grant at Petersburg he succeeded somehow in imposing himselfupon that, at first indignant, general. Nothing actually came of thedanger that the public might find a hero in this man, who was neitherscrupulous nor able, but he had so captivated experienced politiciansthat some continued even after Lincoln's re-election to think Butler theman whom the people would have preferred. Last but not least many wereanxious to nominate Grant. It was an innocent thought, but Grant'smerits were themselves the conclusive reason why he should not be takenfrom the work he had already in hand. Through the early months of the year the active politicians earnestlycollogued among themselves about possible candidates, and it seems therewas little sign among them of that general confidence in Lincoln which alittle while before had been recognised as prevailing in the country. InMay the small and light-headed section of the so-called Radicals whofavoured Frémont organised for themselves a "national meeting" of somefew people at which they nominated him for the Presidency. They had nochance of success, but they might have helped the Democrats by carryingoff some Republican votes. Besides, there are of course men who, havingstarted as extremists in one direction and failed, will go over to theopposite extreme rather than moderate their aims. Months later, when aRepublican victory of some sort became certain, unanimity amongRepublicans was secured; for some passions were appeased by theresignation of Blair, and Frémont was prevailed upon to withdraw. But inthe meantime the Republican party had sent its delegates to a Conventionat Baltimore early in June. This Convention met in a comparativelyfortunate hour. In spite of the open disaffection of small sections, theNorthern people had been in good spirits about the war when Grant set outto overcome Lee. At first he was felt to be progressing pretty well, and, though the reverse at Cold Harbour had happened a few days before, the size of that mishap was not yet appreciated. Ordinary citizens, called upon now and then to decide a broad and grave issue, often judgewith greater calm than is possible to any but the best of the politiciansand the journalists. Indeed, some serious politicians had been anxiousto postpone the Convention, justly fearing that these ignorant delegateswere not yet imbued with that contempt for Lincoln which they had workedup among themselves. At the Baltimore Convention the delegates of oneState wanted Grant, but the nomination of Lincoln was immediate andalmost unanimous. This same Convention declared for a ConstitutionalAmendment to abolish slavery. Lincoln would say nothing as to the choiceof a candidate for the Vice-Presidency. He was right, but the result wasmost unhappy in the end. The Convention chose Andrew Johnson. Johnson, whom Lincoln could hardly endure, began life as a journeyman tailor. Hehad raised himself like Lincoln, and had performed a great part inrallying the Unionists of Tennessee. But--not to dwell upon the factthat he was drunk when he was sworn in as Vice-President--his politicalcreed was that of bitter class-hatred, and his character degenerated intoa weak and brutal obstinacy. This man was to succeed Lincoln. Lincoln, in his letter to accept the nomination, wrote modestly, refusing to takethe decision of the Convention as a tribute to his peculiar fitness forhis post, but was "reminded in this connection of a story of an old Dutchfarmer, who remarked to a companion that it was not best to swap horseswhen crossing a stream. " It remained possible that the dissatisfied Republicans would revolt laterand put another champion in the field. But now attention turned to theDemocrats. Their Convention was to meet at Chicago at the end of August, and in the interval the North entered upon the period of deepest mentaldepression that came to it during the war. It is startling to learn nowthat in the course of that year, when the Confederacy lay like a nut inthe nutcrackers, when the crushing of its resistance might indeed requirea little stronger pressure than was expected, and the first splitting inits hard substance might not come on the side on which it was looked for, but when no wise man could have a doubt as to the end, the victoriouspeople were inclined to think that the moment had come for giving in. "In this purpose to save the country and its liberties, " said Lincoln, "no class of people seem so nearly unanimous as the soldiers in the fieldand the sailors afloat. Do they not have the hardest of it? Who shouldquail while they do not?" Yet there is conclusive authority for sayingthat there was now more quailing in the North than there had ever beenbefore. When the war had gone on long, checks to the course of victoryshook the nerves of people at home more than crushing defeats had shakenthem in the first two years of the struggle, and men who would havewrapped the word "surrender" in periphrasis went about with surrender intheir hearts. Thus the two months that went before the great rally ofthe Democrats at Chicago were months of good omen for a party which, however little the many honourable men in its ranks were willing to facethe fact, must base its only hope upon the weakening of the nationalwill. For public attention was turned away from other fields of war andfixed upon the Army of the Potomac. Sherman drove back Johnston, androuted Hood; Farragut at Mobile enriched the annals of the sea; but whattold upon the imagination of the North was that Grant's earlier progresswas followed by the definite failure of his original enterprise againstLee's army, by Northern defeats on the Shenandoah and an actual dash bythe South against Washington, by the further failure of Grant's firstassault upon Petersburg, and by hideous losses and some demoralisation inhis army. The candidate that the Democrats would put forward and thegeneral principle of their political strategy were well known many weeksbefore their Convention met; and the Republicans already despaired ofdefeating them. In the Chicago Convention there were men, apparentlyless reputable in character than their frank attitude suggests, who wereoutspoken against the war; their leader was Vallandigham. There were menwho spoke boldly for the war, but more boldly against emancipation andthe faults of the Government; their leader was Seymour, talking with theaccent of dignity and of patriotism. Seymour, for the war, presided overthe Convention; Vallandigham, against the war, was the master spirit inits debates. It was hard for such men, with any saving of conscience, tocombine. The mode of combination which they discovered is memorable inthe history of faction. First they adopted a platform which meant peace;then they adopted a candidate intended to symbolise successful war. Theyresolved "that this Convention does explicitly declare, as the sense ofthe American people, that after four years of failure to restore theUnion by the experiment of war . . . Justice, humanity, liberty, and thepublic welfare demand that immediate efforts be made for a cessation ofhostilities, with a view to an ultimate convention of the States or otherpeaceable means, to the end that at the earliest practicable moment peacemay be restored on the basis of the Federal Union of the States. " Thefallacy which named the Union as the end while demanding as a means theimmediate cessation of hostilities needs no demonstration. Theresolution was thus translated: "Resolved that the war is a failure"; andthe translation had that trenchant accuracy which is often found inAmerican popular epigram. The candidate chosen was McClellan; McClellanin set terms repudiated the resolution that the war was a failure, andthen accepted the candidature. He meant no harm to the cause of theUnion, but he meant no definite and clearly conceived good. Electorsmight now vote Democratic because the party was peaceful or because thecandidate was a warrior. The turn of fortune was about to arrest thiscombination in the really formidable progress of its crawling approach topower. Perhaps it was not only, as contemporary observers thought, events in the field that began within a few days to make havoc with theschemes of McClellan and his managers. Perhaps if the patience of theNorth had been tried a little longer the sense of the people would stillhave recoiled from the policy of the Democrats, which had now beendefined in hard outline. As a matter of fact it was only in the monthswhile the Chicago Convention was still impending and for a few days orweeks after it had actually taken place that the panic of the Republicanslasted. But during that time the alarm among them was very great, whether it was wholly due to the discouragement of the people about thewar or originated among the leaders and was communicated to their flock. Sagacious party men reported from their own neighbourhoods that there wasno chance of winning the election. In one quarter or another there wastalk of setting aside Lincoln and compelling Grant to be a candidate. About August 12 Lincoln was told by Thurlow Weed, the greatest of partymanagers, that his election was hopeless. Ten days later he received thesame assurance from the central Republican Committee through theirchairman, Raymond, together with the advice that he should make overturesfor peace. Supposing that in the following November McClellan should have beenelected, and that in the following March he should have come into officewith the war unfinished, it seems now hardly credible that he would havereturned to slavery, or at least disbanded without protection the 150, 000negroes who were now serving the North. Lincoln, however, seriouslybelieved that this was the course to which McClellan's principles andthose of his party committed him, and that (policy and honour apart) thiswould have been for military reasons fatal. McClellan had repudiated thePeace Resolution, but his followers and his character were to be reckonedwith rather than his words, and indeed his honest principles committedhim deeply to some attempt to reverse Lincoln's policy as to slavery, andhe clearly must have been driven into negotiations with the South. Theconfusion which must inevitably be created by attempts to satisfy theSouth, when it was in no humour of moderation, and by the fury whichyielding would have provoked in half the people of the North, was welland tersely described by Grant in a letter to a friend, which that friendpublished in support of Lincoln. At a fair at Philadelphia for the helpof the wounded Lincoln said: "We accepted this war; we did not begin it. We accepted it for an object, and when that object is accomplished thewar will end, and I hope to God that it will never end until that objectis accomplished. " Whatever the real mind of McClellan and of the averageDemocrat may have been, it was not this; and the posterity of Mr. Facing-both-ways may succeed in an election, but never in war or themaking of lasting peace. Lincoln looked forward with happiness, after he was actually re-elected, to the quieter pursuits of private life which might await him in fouryears' time. He looked forward not less happily to a period of peaceadministration first, and there can be no doubt that he would have prizedas much as any man the highest honour that his countrymen could bestow, asecond election to the Presidency. But, even in a smaller man who hadpassed through such an experience as he had and was not warped by power, these personal wishes might well have been merged in concern for thecause in hand. There is everything to indicate that they were completelyso in his case. A President cannot wisely do much directly to promotehis own re-election, but he appears to have done singularly little. Atthe beginning of 1864, when the end of the war seemed near, and theelection of a Republican probable, he may well have thought that he wouldbe the Republican candidate, but he had faced the possible choice ofChase very placidly, and of Grant he said, "If he takes Richmond let himhave the Presidency. " It was another matter when the war again seemedlikely to drag on and a Democratic President might come in before the endof it. An editor who visited the over-burdened President in August toldhim that he needed some weeks of rest and seclusion. But he said, "Icannot fly from my thoughts. I do not think it is personal vanity orambition, though I am not free from those infirmities, but I cannot butfeel that the weal or woe of the nation will be decided in November. There is no proposal offered by any wing of the Democratic party but thatmust result in the permanent destruction of the Union. " He would havebeen well content to make place for Grant if Grant had finished his work. But that work was delayed, and then Lincoln became greatly troubled bythe movement to force Grant, the general whom he had at last found, intopolitics with his work undone; for all would have been lost if McClellanhad come in with the war still progressing badly. Lincoln had beeninvited in June to a gathering in honour of Grant, got up with the thinlydisguised object of putting the general forward as his rival. He wrote, with true diplomacy: "It is impossible for me to attend. I approvenevertheless of whatever may tend to strengthen and sustain General Grantand the noble armies now under his command. He and his brave soldiersare now in the midst of their great trial, and I trust that at yourmeeting you will so shape your good words that they may turn to men andguns, moving to his and their support. " In August he told his mindplainly to Grant's friend Eaton. He never dreamed for a moment thatGrant would willingly go off into politics with the military situationstill insecure, and he believed that no possible pressure could forceGrant to do so; but on this latter question he wished to make himselfsure; with a view to future military measures he really needed to be sureof it. Eaton saw Grant, and in the course of conversation very tactfullybrought to Grant's notice the designs of his would-be friends. "We had, "writes Eaton, "been talking very quietly, but Grant's reply came in aninstant and with a violence for which I was not prepared. He brought hisclenched fists down hard on the strap arms of his camp chair, 'They can'tdo it. They can't compel me to do it. ' Emphatic gesture was not astrong point with Grant. 'Have you said this to the President?' I asked. 'No, ' said Grant. 'I have not thought it worth while to assure thePresident of my opinion. I consider it as important for the cause thathe should be elected as that the army should be successful in thefield. '" "I told you, " said Lincoln afterwards, "they could not get himto run till he had closed out the rebellion. " Since the great danger wasnow only that McClellan would become President in March, there was butone thing to do--to try and finish the war before then. Raymond's advicein favour of negotiations with the South now came, and Lincoln's mode ofreplying to this has been noticed. Rumours were afloat that if McClellanwon in November there would be an attempt to bring him irregularly intopower at once. Lincoln let it be known that he should stay at his postat all costs till the last lawful day. On August 23, in that curious wayin which deep emotion showed itself with him, he wrote a resolution upona paper, which he folded and asked his ministers to endorse with theirsignatures without reading it. They all wrote their names on the back ofit, ready, if that were possible, to commit themselves blindly to supportof him in whatever he had resolved; a great tribute to him and tothemselves. He sealed it up and put it away. How far in this dark time the confidence of the people had departed fromLincoln no one can tell. It might be too sanguine a view of the world tosuppose that they would have been proof against what may be called aconspiracy to run him down. There were certainly quarters in which theperception of his worth came soon and remained. Not all those who arepoor or roughly brought up were among those plain men whose approvalLincoln desired and often expected; but at least the plain man does existand the plain people did read Lincoln's words. The soldiers of thearmies in the East by this time knew Lincoln well, and there were by now, as we shall see, in every part of the North, honest parents who had goneto Washington, and entered the White House very sad, and came out veryhappy, and taken their report of him home. No less could there be found, among those to whom America had given the greatest advantages that birthand upbringing can offer, families in which, when Lincoln died, adaughter could write to her father as Lady Harcourt (then Miss LilyMotley) wrote: "I echo your 'thank God' that we always appreciated himbefore he was taken from us. " But if we look at the political world, wefind indeed noble exceptions such as that of Charles Sumner among thosewho had been honestly perplexed by Lincoln's attitude on slavery; we haveto allow for the feelings of some good State Governor who had come to himwith a tiresome but serious proposition and been adroitly parried with anuntactful and coarse apologue; yet it remains to be said that a thickveil, woven of self-conceit and half-education, blinded most politiciansto any rare quality in Lincoln, and blinded them to what was due indecency to any man discharging his task. The evidence collected by Mr. Rhodes as to the tone prevailing in 1864 at Washington and among those intouch with Washington suggests that strictly political society was on theaverage as poor in brain and heart as the court of the most decadentEuropean monarchy. It presents a stern picture of the isolation, on oneside at least, in which Lincoln had to live and work. A little before this crowning period of Lincoln's career Walt Whitmandescribed him as a man in the streets of Washington could see him, if hechose. He has been speaking of the cavalry escort which the President'sadvisers insisted should go clanking about with him. "The party, " hecontinues, "makes no great show in uniform or horses. Mr. Lincoln on thesaddle generally rides a good-sized, easy-going grey horse, is dressed inplain black, somewhat rusty and dusty, and looks about as ordinary inattire, etc. , as the commonest man. The entirely unornamental _cortège_arouses no sensation; only some curious stranger stops and gazes. I seevery plainly Abraham Lincoln's dark brown face, with the deep-cut lines, the eyes always to me with a deep latent sadness in the expression. Wehave got so that we exchange bows, and very cordial ones. Sometimes thePresident goes and comes in an open barouche" (not, the poet intimates, avery smart turn-out). "Sometimes one of his sons, a boy of ten ortwelve, accompanies him, riding at his right on a pony. They passed meonce very close, and I saw the President in the face fully as they weremoving slowly, and his look, though abstracted, happened to be directedsteadily in my eye. He bowed and smiled, but far beneath his smile Inoticed well the expression I have alluded to. None of the artists orpictures has caught the deep though subtle and indirect expression ofthis man's face. There is something else there. One of the greatportrait painters of two or three centuries ago is needed. " The little boy on the pony was Thomas, called "Tad, " a constant companionof his father's little leisure, now dead. An elder boy, Robert, haslived to be welcomed as Ambassador in this country, and was at this timea student at Harvard. Willie, a clever and lovably mischievous child, "the chartered libertine of the White House" for a little while, had diedat the age of twelve in the early days of 1862, when his father wasgetting so impatient to stir McClellan into action. These and a son whohad long before died in infancy were the only children of Mr. And Mrs. Lincoln. Little has been made public concerning them, but enough toconvey the impression of a wise and tender father, trusted by hischildren and delighting in them. John Nicolay, his loyal and capablesecretary, and the delightful John Hay must be reckoned on the cheerfulside--for there was one--of Lincoln's daily life. The life of the homeat the White House, and sometimes in summer at the "Soldiers' Home" nearWashington, was simple, and in his own case (not in that of his guests)regardless of the time, sufficiency, or quality of meals. He cannot havegiven people much trouble, but he gave some to the guard who watched him, themselves keenly watched by Stanton; for he loved, if he could, to walkalone from his midnight conferences at the War Department to the WhiteHouse or the Soldiers' Home. The barest history of the events with whichhe dealt is proof enough of long and hard and anxious working days, whichcontinued with hardly a break through four years. In that history many acomplication has here been barely glanced at or clean left out; in thisyear, for example, the difficulty about France and Mexico and the failureof the very estimable Banks in Texas have been but briefly noted. Andthere must be remembered, in addition, the duty of a President to beaccessible to all people, a duty which Lincoln especially strove tofulfil. Apart from formal receptions, the stream of callers on him must havegiven Lincoln many compensations for its huge monotony. Very odd, andsometimes attractive, samples of human nature would come under his keeneye. Now and then a visitor came neither with a troublesome request, norfor form's sake or for curiosity, but in simple honesty to pay a tributeof loyalty or speak a word of good cheer which Lincoln received withunfeigned gratitude. Farmers and back-country folk, of the type he couldbest talk with, came and had more time than he ought to have sparedbestowed on them. At long intervals there came a friend of verydifferent days. Some ingenious men, for instance, fitted out DennisHanks in a new suit of clothes and sent him as their ambassador to pleadfor certain political offenders. It is much to be feared that they weremore successful than they deserved, though Stanton intervened and Dennis, when he had seen him, favoured his old companion, the President, withadvice to dismiss that minister. But the immense variety of puzzlingrequests to be dealt with in such interviews must have made heavy demandsupon a conscientious and a kind man, especially if his conscience and hiskindness were, in small matters, sometimes at variance. Lincoln sent amultitude away with that feeling, so grateful to poor people, that atleast they had received such hearing as it was possible to give them; andin dealing with the applications which imposed the greatest strain onhimself he made an ineffaceable impression upon the memory of hiscountrymen. The American soldier did not take naturally to discipline. Deathsentences, chiefly for desertion or for sleeping or other negligence onthe part of sentries, were continually being passed by courts-martial. In some cases or at some period these used to come before the Presidenton a stated day of the week, of which Lincoln would often speak withhorror. He was continually being appealed to in relation to suchsentences by the father or mother of the culprit, or some friend. At onetime, it may be, he was too ready with pardon; "You do not know, " hesaid, "how hard it is to let a human being die, when you feel that astroke of your pen will save him. " Butler used to write to him that hewas destroying the discipline of the army. A letter of his to Meadeshows clearly that, later at least, he did not wish to exercise a merelycheap and inconsiderate mercy. The import of the numberless pardonstories really is that he would spare himself no trouble to enquire, andto intervene wherever he could rightly give scope to his longing forclemency. A Congressman might force his way into his bedroom in themiddle of the night, rouse him from his sleep to bring to his noticeextenuating facts that had been overlooked, and receive the decision, "Well, I don't see that it will do him any good to be shot. " It isrelated that William Scott, a lad from a farm in Vermont, after atremendous march in the Peninsula campaign, volunteered to do doubleguard duty to spare a sick comrade, slept at his post, was caught, andwas under sentence of death, when the President came to the army andheard of him. The President visited him, chatted about his home, lookedat his mother's photograph, and so forth. Then he laid his hands on theboy's shoulders and said with a trembling voice, "My boy, you are notgoing to be shot. I believe you when you tell me that you could not keepawake. I am going to trust you and send you back to the regiment. But Ihave been put to a great deal of trouble on your account. . . . Now whatI want to know is, how are you going to pay my bill?" Scott toldafterwards how difficult it was to think, when his fixed expectation ofdeath was suddenly changed; but how he managed to master himself, thankMr. Lincoln and reckon up how, with his pay and what his parents couldraise by mortgage on their farm and some help from his comrades, he mightpay the bill if it were not more than five or six hundred dollars. "Butit is a great deal more than that, " said the President. "My bill is avery large one. Your friends cannot pay it, nor your bounty, nor thefarm, nor all your comrades. There is only one man in the world who canpay it, and his name is William Scott. If from this day William Scottdoes his duty, so that, when he comes to die, he can look me in the faceas he does now and say, 'I have kept my promise and I have done my dutyas a soldier, ' then my debt will be paid. Will you make the promise andtry to keep it?" And William Scott did promise; and, not very longafter, he was desperately wounded, and he died, but not before he couldsend a message to the President that he had tried to be a good soldier, and would have paid his debt in full if he had lived, and that he diedthinking of Lincoln's kind face and thanking him for the chance he gavehim to fall like a soldier in battle. If the story is not true--andthere is no reason whatever to doubt it--still it is a remarkable man ofwhom people spin yarns of that kind. When Lincoln's strength became visibly tried friends often sought topersuade him to spare himself the needless, and to him very oftenharrowing, labour of incessant interviews. They never succeeded. Lincoln told them he could not forget what he himself would feel in theplace of the many poor souls who came to him desiring so little and withso little to get. But he owned to the severity of the strain. He wasnot too sensitive to the ridicule and reproach that surrounded him. "Give yourself no uneasiness, " he had once said to some one who hadsympathised with him over some such annoyance, "I have endured a greatdeal of ridicule without much malice, and have received a great deal ofkindness not quite free from ridicule. I am used to it. " But the gentlenature that such words express, and that made itself deeply felt by thosethat were nearest him, cannot but have suffered from want ofappreciation. With all this added to the larger cares, which before theclosing phases of the war opened had become so intense, Lincoln must havebeen taxed near to the limit of what men have endured without loss ofjudgment, or loss of courage or loss of ordinary human feeling. There isno sign that any of these things happened to him; the study of his recordrather shows a steady ripening of mind and character to the end. It hasbeen seen how throughout his previous life the melancholy of histemperament impressed those who had the opportunity of observing it. Acolleague of his at the Illinois bar has told how on circuit he sometimescame down in the morning and found Lincoln sitting alone over the embersof the fire, where he had sat all night in sad meditation, after anevening of jest apparently none the less hilarious for his totalabstinence. There was no scope for this brooding now, and in a sense thetime of his severest trial cannot have been the saddest time of Lincoln'slife. It must have been a cause not of added depression but of addedstrength that he had long been accustomed to face the sternest aspect ofthe world. He had within his own mind two resources, often, perhapsnormally, associated together, but seldom so fully combined as with him. In his most intimate circle he would draw upon his stores of poetry, particularly of tragedy; often, for instance, he would recite suchspeeches as Richard II. 's: "For God's sake let us sit upon the ground And tell sad stories of the death of kings. . . . . . All murdered. " Slighter acquaintances saw, day by day, another element in his thoughts, the companion to this; for the hardly interrupted play of humour in whichhe found relief continued to help him to the end. Whatever there was init either of mannerism or of coarseness, no one can grudge it him; it isan oddity which endears. The humour of real life fades in reproduction, but Lincoln's, there is no doubt was a vein of genuine comedy, deep, rich, and unsoured, of a larger human quality than marks the brilliantworks of literary American humorists. It was, like the comedy ofShakespeare, plainly if unaccountably akin with the graver and granderstrain of thought and feeling that inspired the greatest of his speeches. Physically his splendid health does not seem to have been impaired beyondrecovery. But it was manifestly near to breaking; and the "deep-cutlines" were cut still deeper, and the long legs were always cold. The cloud over the North passed very suddenly. The North indeed paid thepenalty of a nation which is spared the full strain of a war at thefirst, and begins to discover its seriousness when the hope of easyvictory has been many times dashed down. It has been necessary to dwellupon the despondency which at one time prevailed; but it would be hard torate too highly the military difficulty of the conquest undertaken by theNorth, or the trial involved to human nature by perseverance in such atask. If the depression during the summer was excessive, as it clearlywas, at least the recovery which followed was fully adequate to theoccasion which produced it. On September 2 Sherman telegraphed, "Atlantais ours and fairly won. " The strategic importance of earlier successesmay have been greater, but the most ignorant man who looked at a mapcould see what it signified that the North could occupy an important cityin the heart of Georgia. Then they recalled Farragut's victory of amonth before. Then there followed, close to Washington, putting an endto a continual menace, stirring and picturesquely brilliant beyond otherincidents of the war, Sheridan's repeated victories in the ShenandoahValley. The war which had been "voted a failure" was evidently not afailure. At the same time men of high character conducted a vigorouscampaign of speeches for Lincoln. General Schurz, the Germanrevolutionary Liberal, who lived to tell Bismarck at his table that hestill preferred democracy to his amused host's method of government, sacrificed his command in the Army--for Lincoln told him it could not berestored--to speak for Lincoln. Even Chase was carried away, and aftermonths of insidious detraction, went for Lincoln on the stump. In theelections in November Lincoln was elected by an enormous popularmajority, giving him 212 out of the 233 votes in the electoral college, where in form the election is made. Three Northern States only, one ofthem his native State, had gone against him. He made some littlespeeches to parties which came to "serenade" him; some were not veryformal speeches, for, as he said, he was now too old to "care much aboutthe mode of doing things. " But one was this: "It has long been a gravequestion whether any Government not too strong for the liberties of itspeople can be strong enough to maintain its existence in greatemergencies. On this point the present rebellion brought our Governmentto a severe test, and a Presidential election occurring in regular courseduring the rebellion added not a little to the strain. But we cannothave a free Government without elections; and if the rebellion couldforce us to forego or postpone a national election it might fairly claimto have already conquered and ruined us. But the election along with itsincidental and undesirable strife has done good too. It has demonstratedthat a people's Government can sustain a national election in the midstof a great civil war. Until now it has not been known to the world thatthis was a possibility. But the rebellion continues, and now that theelection is over may not all have a common interest to reunite in acommon effort to save our common country? For my own part I have strivenand shall strive to avoid placing any obstacle in the way. So long as Ihave been here I have not willingly planted a thorn in any man's bosom. While I am duly sensible to the high compliment of a re-election, andduly grateful as I trust to Almighty God for having directed mycountrymen to a right conclusion, as I think, for their good, it addsnothing to my satisfaction that any man may be disappointed by theresult. May I ask those who have not differed from me to join with me inthis same spirit towards those who have? And now let me close by askingthree hearty cheers for our brave soldiers and seamen, and their gallantand skilful commanders. " In the Cabinet he brought out the paper that he had sealed up in the darkdays of August; he reminded his ministers of how they had endorsed itunread, and he read it them. Its contents ran thus: "This morning, asfor some days past, it seems exceedingly probable that thisAdministration will not be re-elected. Then it will be my duty to soco-operate with the President-elect as to save the Union between theelection and the inauguration, as he will have secured his election onsuch ground that he cannot possibly save it afterwards. " Lincolnexplained what he had intended to do if McClellan had won. He would havegone to him and said, "General, this election shows that you arestronger, have more influence with the people of this country than I";and he would have invited him to co-operate in saving the Union now, byusing that great influence to secure from the people the willingenlistment of enough recruits. "And the general, " said Seward, "wouldhave said, 'Yes, yes'; and again the next day, when you spoke to himabout it, 'Yes, yes'; and so on indefinitely, and he would have donenothing. " "Seldom in history, " wrote Emerson in a letter after the election, "wasso much staked upon a popular vote. I suppose never in history. " And to those Americans of all classes and in all districts of the North, who had set their hearts and were giving all they had to give to preservethe life of the nation, the political crisis of 1864 would seem to havebeen the most anxious moment of the war. It is impossible--it must berepeated--to guess how great the danger really was that their populargovernment might in the result betray the true and underlying will of thepeople; for in any country (and in America perhaps more than most) theaverage of politicians, whose voices are most loudly heard, can only in arough and approximate fashion be representative. But there is in anycase no cause for surprise that the North should at one time havetrembled. Historic imagination is easily, though not one whit toodeeply, moved by the heroic stand of the South. It is only after theeffort to understand the light in which the task of the North haspresented itself to capable soldiers, that a civilian can perceive whatsustained resolution was required if, though far the stronger, it was tomake its strength tell. Notwithstanding the somewhat painful impressionwhich the political chronicle of this time at some points gives, it isthe fact that the wisest Englishmen who were in those days in America andhad means of observing what passed have retained a lasting sense of theconstancy, under trial, of the North. CHAPTER XII THE END On December 6, 1864, Lincoln sent the last of his Annual Messages toCongress. He treated as matter for oblivion the "impugning of motivesand heated controversy as to the proper means of advancing the Unioncause, " which had played so large a part in the Presidential electionand the other elections of the autumn. For, as he said, "on thedistinct issue of Union or no Union the politicians have shown theirinstinctive knowledge that there is no diversity among the people. "This was accurate as well as generous, for though many Democrats hadopposed the war, none had avowed that for the sake of peace he wouldgive up the Union. Passing then to the means by which the Union couldbe made to prevail he wrote: "On careful consideration of all theevidence accessible it seems to me that no attempt at negotiation withthe insurgent leader could result in any good. He would accept nothingshort of severance of the Union--precisely what we will not and cannotgive. Between him and us the issue is distinct, simple, andinflexible. It is an issue which can only be tried by war and decidedby victory. The abandonment of armed resistance to the nationalauthority on the part of the insurgents is the only indispensablecondition to ending the war on the part of the Government. " To avoid apossible misunderstanding he added that not a single person who wasfree by the terms of the Emancipation Proclamation or of any Act ofCongress would be returned to slavery while he held the executiveauthority. "If the people should by whatever mode or means make it anexecutive duty to re-enslave such persons, another, and not I, must betheir instrument to perform it. " This last sentence was no meaninglessflourish; the Constitutional Amendment prohibiting slavery could not bepassed for some time, and might conceivably be defeated; in themeantime the Courts might possibly have declared any negro in theSouthern States a slave; Lincoln's words let it be seen that they wouldhave found themselves without an arm to enforce their decision. But infact there was no longer an issue with the South as to abolition. Jefferson Davis had himself declared that slavery was gone, for mostslaves had now freed themselves, and that he for his part troubled verylittle over that. There remained, then, no issue between North andSouth except that between Independence and Union. On the same day that he sent his annual message Lincoln gave himself acharacteristic pleasure by another communication which he sent to theSenate. Old Roger Taney of the Dred Scott case had died in October;the Senate was now requested to confirm the President's nomination of anew Chief Justice to succeed him; and the President had nominatedChase. Chase's reputation as a lawyer had seemed to fit him for theposition, but the well informed declared that, in spite of someappearances on the platform for Lincoln he still kept "going aroundpeddling his griefs in private ears and sowing dissatisfaction againstLincoln. " So in spite of Lincoln's pregnant remark on this subjectthat he "did not believe in keeping any man under, " nobody supposedthat Lincoln would appoint him. Sumner and Congressman Alley ofMassachusetts had indeed gone to Lincoln to urge the appointment. "Wefound, to our dismay, " Alley relates, "that the President had heard ofthe bitter criticisms of Mr. Chase upon himself and his Administration. Mr. Lincoln urged many of Chase's defects, to discover, as weafterwards learned, how his objection could be answered. We were bothdiscouraged and made up our minds that the President did not mean toappoint Mr. Chase. It really seemed too much to expect of poor humannature. " One morning Alley again saw the President. "I have somethingto tell you that will make you happy, " said Lincoln. "I have just sentMr. Chase word that he is to be appointed Chief Justice, and you arethe first man I have told of it. " Alley said something natural aboutLincoln's magnanimity, but was told in reply what the only realdifficulty had been. Lincoln from his "convictions of duty to theRepublican party and the country" had always meant to appoint Chase, subject to one doubt which he had revolved in his mind till he hadsettled it. This doubt was simply whether Chase, beset as he was by acraving for the Presidency which he could never obtain, would everreally turn his attention with a will to becoming the great ChiefJustice that Lincoln thought he could be. Lincoln's occasionalfailures of tact had sometimes a noble side to them; he even thoughtnow of writing to Chase and telling him with simple seriousness wherehe felt his temptation lay, and he with difficulty came to see thatthis attempt at brotherly frankness would be misconstrued by asuspicious and jealous man. Charles Sumner, Chase's advocate on thisoccasion, was all this time the most weighty and the most pronounced ofthose Radicals who were beginning to press for unrestricted negrosuffrage in the South and in general for a hard and inelastic scheme of"reconstruction, " which they would have imposed on the conquered Southwithout an attempt to conciliate the feeling of the vanquished or toinvite their co-operation in building up the new order. He was thusthe chief opponent of that more tentative, but as is now seen, moreliberal and more practical policy which lay very close to Lincoln'sheart; enough has been said of him to suggest too that this graveperson, bereft of any glimmering of fun, was in one sense no congenialcompanion for Lincoln. But he was stainlessly unselfish and sincere, and he was the politician above all others in Washington with whomLincoln most gladly and most successfully maintained easy socialintercourse. And, to please him in little ways, Lincoln woulddisentangle his long frame from the "grotesque position of comfort"into which he had twisted it in talk with some other friend, and wouldassume in an instant a courtly demeanour when Sumner was about to enterhis room. On January 31, 1865, the resolution earlier passed by the Senate for aConstitutional Amendment to prohibit slavery was passed by the House ofRepresentatives, as Lincoln had eagerly desired, so that the requisitevoting of three quarters of the States in its favour could now begin. Before that time the Confederate Congress had, on March 13, 1865, closed its last, most anxious and distracted session by passing an Actfor the enlistment of negro volunteers, who were to become free onenlistment. As a military measure it was belated and inoperative, butnothing could more eloquently have marked the practical extinction ofslavery which the war had wrought than the consent of Southernlegislators to convert the remaining slaves into soldiers. The military operations of 1865 had proceeded but a very little waywhen the sense of what they portended was felt among the Southernleaders in Richmond. The fall of that capital itself might be hastenedor be delayed; Lee's army if it escaped from Richmond might prolongresistance for a shorter or for a longer time, but Sherman's march tothe sea, and the far harder achievements of the same kind which he wasnow beginning, made the South feel, as he knew it would feel, that nota port, not an arsenal, not a railway, not a corn district of the Southlay any longer beyond the striking range of the North. Congressmen andpublic officials in Richmond knew that the people of the South nowlonged for peace and that the authority of the Confederacy was gone. They beset Jefferson Davis with demands that he should startnegotiations. But none of them had determined what price they wouldpay for peace; and there was not among them any will that could reallywithstand their President. In one point indeed Jefferson Davis didwisely yield. On February 9, 1865, he consented to make LeeGeneral-in-Chief of all the Southern armies. This belated delegationof larger authority to Lee had certain military results, but nopolitical result whatever. Lee could have been the dictator of theConfederacy if he had chosen, and no one then or since would haveblamed him; but it was not in his mind to do anything but his duty as asoldier. The best beloved and most memorable by far of all the men whoserved that lost cause, he had done nothing to bring about secession atthe beginning, nor now did he do anything but conform to the wishes ofhis political chief. As for that chief, Lincoln had interpreted Davis'simple position quite rightly. Having once embraced the cause ofSouthern independence and taken the oath as chief magistrate of anindependent Confederacy, he would not yield up that cause while therewas a man to obey his orders. Whether this attitude should be setdown, as it usually has been set down, to a diseased pride or to a veryreal heroism on his part, he never faced the truth that the situationwas desperate and the spirit of his people daunted at last. But it isprobable that just like Lincoln he was ready that those who were inhaste to make peace should see what peace involved; and it is probabletoo that, in his terrible position, he deluded himself with some vagueand vain hopes as to the attitude of the North. Lincoln on the otherhand would not enter into any proceedings in which the secession of theSouth was treated otherwise than as a rebellion which must cease; butthis did not absolutely compel him to refuse every sort of informalcommunication with influential men in the South, which might help themto see where they stood and from which he too might learn something. Old Mr. Francis Blair, the father of Lincoln's late Postmaster-General, was the last of the honest peace-makers whom Lincoln had allowed to seethings for themselves by meeting Jefferson Davis. His visit took placein January, 1865, and from his determination to be a go-between and thecurious and difficult position in which Lincoln and Davis both stood inthis respect an odd result arose. The Confederate Vice-PresidentStephens, who had preached peace in the autumn without a quarrel withDavis, and two other Southern leaders presented themselves at Grant'sheadquarters with the pathetic misrepresentation that they were sent byDavis on a mission which Lincoln had undertaken to receive. What theycould show was authority from Davis to negotiate with Lincoln on thefooting of the independence of the Confederacy, and a politely turnedintimation from Lincoln that he would at any time receive personsinformally sent to talk with a view to the surrender of the rebelarmies. Grant, however, was deeply impressed with the sincerity oftheir desire for peace, and he entreated Lincoln to receive them. Lincoln therefore decided to overlook the false pretence under whichthey came. He gave Grant strict orders not to delay his operations onthis account, but he came himself with Seward and met Davis' threecommissioners on a ship at Hampton Roads on February 3. He andStephens had in old days been Whig Congressmen together, and Lincolnhad once been moved to tears by a speech of Stephens. They met now asfriends. Lincoln lost no time in making his position clear. Theunhappy commissioners made every effort to lead him away from the plainground he had chosen. It is evident that they and possible thatJefferson Davis had hoped that when face to face with them he wouldchange his mind, and possibly Blair's talk had served to encourage thishope. They failed, but the conversation continued in a frank andfriendly manner. Lincoln told them very freely his personal opinionsas to how the North ought to treat the South when it did surrender, butwas careful to point out that he could make no promise or bargain, except indeed this promise that so far as penalties for rebellion wereconcerned the executive power, which lay in his sole hands, would beliberally used. Slavery was discussed, and Seward told them of theConstitutional Amendment which Congress had now submitted to thepeople. One of the commissioners returning again to Lincoln's refusalto negotiate with armed rebels, as he considered them, cited theprecedent of Charles I. 's conduct in this respect. "I do not profess, "said Lincoln, "to be posted in history. On all such matters I turn youover to Seward. All I distinctly recollect about Charles I. Is that helost his head in the end. " Then he broke out into simple advice toStephens as to the action he could now pursue. He had to report toCongress afterwards that the conference had had no result. He broughthome, however, a personal compliment which he valued. "I understand, then, " Stephens had said, "that you regard us as rebels, who are liableto be hanged for treason. " "That is so, " said Lincoln. "Well, " saidStephens, "we supposed that would have to be your view. But, to tellyou the truth, we have none of us been much afraid of being hanged withyou as President. " He brought home, besides the compliment, an idea ofa kind which, if he could have had his way with his friends, might havebeen rich in good. He had discovered how hopeless the people of theSouth were, and he considered whether a friendly pronouncement mightnot lead them more readily to surrender. He deplored the suffering inwhich the South might now lie plunged, and it was a fixed part of hiscreed that slavery was the sin not of the South but of the nation. Sohe spent the day after his return in drafting a joint resolution whichhe hoped the two Houses of Congress might pass, and a Proclamationwhich he would in that case issue. In these he proposed to offer tothe Southern States four hundred million dollars in United Statesbonds, being, as he calculated the cost to the North of two hundreddays of war, to be allotted among those States in proportion to theproperty in slaves which each had lost. One half of this sum was to bepaid at once if the war ended by April 1, and the other half upon thefinal adoption of the Constitutional Amendment. It would have been ahappy thing if the work of restoring peace could have lain with astatesman whose rare aberrations from the path of practical politicswere of this kind. Yet, considering the natural passions which even inthis least revengeful of civil wars could not quite be repressed, weshould be judging the Congress of that day by a higher standard than weshould apply in other countries if we regarded this proposal as onethat could have been hopefully submitted to them. Lincoln's illusionswere dispelled on the following day when he read what he had written tohis Cabinet, and found that even among his own ministers not one mansupported him. It would have been worse than useless to put forwardhis proposals and to fail. "You are all opposed to me, " he said sadly;and he put his papers away. But the war had now so far progressed thatit is necessary to turn back to the point at which we left it at theend of 1864. Winter weather brought a brief pause to the operations of the armies. Sherman at Savannah was preparing to begin his northward march, aharder matter, owing to the rivers and marshes that lay in his way, than his triumphal progress from Atlanta. Efforts were made toconcentrate all available forces against him at Augusta to hisnorth-west. Making feints against Augusta on the one side, and againstthe city and port of Charleston on the other, he displayed themarvellous engineering capacity of his army by an advance ofunlooked-for speed across the marshes to Columbia, due north of him, which is the State capital of South Carolina. He reached it onFebruary 17, 1865. The intended concentration of the South at Augustawas broken up. The retreating Confederates set fire to great stores ofcotton and the unfortunate city was burnt, a calamity for which theSouth, by a natural but most unjust mistake, blamed Sherman. Therailway communications of Charleston were now certain to be severed; sothe Confederates were forced to evacuate it, and on February 18, 1865, the North occupied the chief home of the misbegotten political idealsof the South and of its real culture and chivalry. Admiral Porter (for age and ill-health had come upon Farragut) wasready at sea to co-operate with Sherman. Thomas' army in Tennessee hadnot been allowed by Grant to go into winter quarters. A part of itunder Schofield was brought to Washington and there shipped for NorthCarolina, where, ever since Burnside's successful expedition in 1862, the Union Government had held the ports north of Wilmington. Wilmington itself was the only port left to the South, and Richmond hadnow come to depend largely on the precarious and costly supplies whichcould still, notwithstanding the blockade, be run into that harbour. At the end of December, Butler, acting in flagrant disobedience toGrant, had achieved his crowning failure in a joint expedition withPorter against Wilmington. But Porter was not discouraged, nor wasGrant, who from beginning to end of his career had worked well togetherwith the Navy. On February 8, Porter, this time supported by anenergetic general, Terry, effected a brilliant capture of Fort Fisherat the mouth of Wilmington harbour. The port was closed to the South. On the 22nd, the city itself fell to Schofield, and Sherman had nowthis sea base at hand if he needed it. Meanwhile Grant's entrenchments on the east of Richmond and Petersburgwere still extending southward, and Lee's defences had been stretchedtill they covered nearly forty miles. Grant's lines now cut theprincipal railway southward from the huge fortress, and he was ableeffectually to interrupt communication by road to the southwest. Therecould be little doubt that Richmond would fall soon, and the realquestion was coming to be whether Lee and his army could escape fromRichmond and still carry on the war. The appointment of Lee as General-in-Chief was not too late to bear oneconsequence which may have prolonged the war a little. JosephJohnston, whose ability in a campaign of constant retirement beforeoverwhelming force had been respected and redoubted by Sherman, hadbeen discarded by Davis in the previous July. He was now put incommand of the forces which it was hoped to concentrate againstSherman, with a view to holding up his northward advance and preventinghim from joining hands with Grant before Richmond. There werealtogether about 89, 000 Confederate troops scattered in the Carolinas, Georgia, and Florida, and there would be about the same number underSherman when Schofield in North Carolina could join him, but the numberwhich Johnston could now collect together seems never to have exceeded33, 000. It was Sherman's task by the rapidity of his movements toprevent a very formidable concentration against him. Johnston on theother hand must hinder if he could Sherman's junction with Schofield. Just before that junction took place he narrowly missed dealing aconsiderable blow to Sherman's army at the battle of Bentonville in theheart of North Carolina, but had in the end to withdraw within anentrenched position where Sherman would not attack him, but which uponthe arrival of Schofield he was forced to abandon. On March 23, 1865, Sherman took possession of the town and railway junction ofGoldsborough between Raleigh and New Berne. From Savannah toGoldsborough he had led his army 425 miles in fifty days, amiddisadvantages of ground and of weather which had called forth bothextraordinary endurance and mechanical skill on the part of his men. He lay now 140 miles south of Petersburg by the railway. The port ofNew Berne to the east of him on the estuary of the Neuse gave him asure base of supplies, and would enable him quickly to move his army bysea to Petersburg and Richmond if Grant should so decide. Thedirection in which Johnston would now fall back lay inland up the NeuseValley, also along a railway, towards Greensborough, some 150 milessouth-west of Petersburg; Greensborough was connected by anotherrailway with Petersburg and Richmond, and along this line Lee mightattempt to retire and join him. All this time whatever designs Lee had of leaving Richmond weresuspended because the roads in that weather were too bad for histransport; and, while of necessity he waited, his possible openingsnarrowed. Philip Sheridan had now received the coveted rank ofMajor-General, which McClellan had resigned on the day on which he wasdefeated for the Presidency. The North delighted to find in hisachievements the dashing quality which appeals to civilian imagination, and Grant now had in him, as well as in Sherman, a lieutenant who wouldfaithfully make his chief's purposes his own, and who would executethem with independent decision. The cold, in which his horsessuffered, had driven Sheridan into winter quarters, but on February 27he was able to start up the Shenandoah Valley again with 10, 000cavalry. Most of the Confederate cavalry under Early had now beendispersed, mainly for want of forage in the desolated valley; the restwere now dispersed by Sheridan, and the greater part of Early's smallforce of infantry with all his artillery were captured. There was agarrison in Lynchburg, 80 or 90 miles west of Richmond, which thoughstrong enough to prevent Sheridan's cavalry from capturing that placewas not otherwise of account; but there was no Confederate force in thefield except Johnston's men near enough to co-operate with Lee; onlysome small and distant armies, hundreds of miles away with the railwaycommunication between them and the East destroyed. Sheridan now brokeup the railway and canal communication on the north-west side ofRichmond. He was to have gone on south and eventually joined Shermanif he could; but, finding himself stopped for the time by floods in theupper valley of the James, he rode past the north of Richmond, and onMarch 19 joined Grant, to put his cavalry and brains at his servicewhen Grant judged that the moment for his final effort had come. On March 4, 1865, Abraham Lincoln took office for the second time asPresident of the United. States. There was one new and strikingfeature in the simple ceremonial, the presence of a battalion of negrotroops in his escort. This time, though he would say no sanguine word, it cannot have been a long continuance of war that filled his thoughts, but the scarcely less difficult though far happier task of restoringthe fabric of peaceful society in the conquered South. Hisdifficulties were now likely to come from the North no less than theSouth. Tentative proposals which he had once or twice made suggest thespirit in which he would have felt his way along this new path. In theInaugural address which he now delivered that spirit is none the lessperceptible because he spoke of the past. The little speech atGettysburg, with its singular perfection of form, and the "SecondInaugural" are the chief outstanding examples of his peculiaroratorical power. The comparative rank of his oratory need not bediscussed, for at any rate it was individual and unlike that of mostother great speakers in history, though perhaps more like that of somegreat speeches in drama. But there is a point of some moment in which the Second Inaugural doesinvite a comment, and a comment which should be quite explicit. Probably no other speech of a modern statesman uses so unreservedly thelanguage of intense religious feeling. The occasion made it natural;neither the thought nor the words are in any way conventional; nosensible reader now could entertain a suspicion that the orator spoketo the heart of the people but did not speak from his own heart. Butan old Illinois attorney, who thought he knew the real Lincoln behindthe President, might have wondered whether the real Lincoln spoke here. For Lincoln's religion, like everything else in his character, became, when he was famous, a stock subject of discussion among his oldassociates. Many said "he was a Christian but did not know it. " Somehinted, with an air of great sagacity, that "so far from his being aChristian or a religious man, the less said about it the better. " Inearly manhood he broke away for ever from the scheme of Christiantheology which was probably more or less common to the very variousChurches which surrounded him. He had avowed this sweeping denial witha freedom which pained some friends, perhaps rather by its rashnessthan by its impiety, and he was apt to regard the procedure oftheologians as a blasphemous twisting of the words of Christ. Herejected that belief in miracles and in the literally inspired accuracyof the Bible narrative which was no doubt held as fundamental by allthese Churches. He rejected no less any attempt to substitute for thisfoundation the belief in any priestly authority or in the authority ofany formal and earthly society called the Church. With this totalindependence of the expressed creeds of his neighbours he still wentand took his boys to Presbyterian public worship--their mother was anEpiscopalian and his own parents had been Baptists. He loved the Bibleand knew it intimately--he is said also by the way to have stored inhis memory a large number of hymns. In the year before his death hewrote to Speed: "I am profitably engaged in reading the Bible. Takeall of this book upon reason that you can and the balance upon faithand you will live and die a better man. " It was not so much the OldTestament as the New Testament and what he called "the true spirit ofChrist" that he loved especially, and took with all possibleseriousness as the rule of life. His theology, in the narrower sense, may be said to have been limited to an intense belief in a vast andover-ruling Providence--the lighter forms of superstitious feelingswhich he is known to have had in common with most frontiersmen wereapparently of no importance in his life. And this Providence, darklyspoken of, was certainly conceived by him as intimately and kindlyrelated to his own life. In his Presidential candidature, when heowned to some one that the opposition of clergymen hurt him deeply, heis said to have confessed to being no Christian and to have continued, "I know that there is a God and that He hates injustice and slavery. Isee the storm coming and I know that His hand is in it. If He has aplace and work for me, and I think He has, I believe I am ready. I amnothing, but truth is everything; I know I am right because I know thatliberty is right, for Christ teaches it, and Christ is God. I havetold them that a house divided against itself cannot stand, and Christand reason say the same, and they will find it so. " When oldacquaintances said that he had no religion they based their opinion onsuch remarks as that the God, of whom he had just been speakingsolemnly, was "not a person. " It would be unprofitable to enquire whathe, and many others, meant by this expression, but, later at any rate, this "impersonal" power was one with which he could hold commune. Hisrobust intellect, impatient of unproved assertion, was unlikely to restin the common assumption that things dimly seen may be treated as notbeing there. So humorous a man was also unlikely to be too conceitedto say his prayers. At any rate he said them; said them intently;valued the fact that others prayed for him and for the nation; and, asin official Proclamations (concerning days of national religiousobservance) he could wield, like no other modern writer, the languageof the Prayer Book, so he would speak of prayer without the smallestembarrassment in talk with a general or a statesman. It is possiblethat this was a development of later years. Lincoln did not, like mostof us, arrest his growth. To Mrs. Lincoln it seemed that with thedeath of their child, Willie, a change came over his whole religiousoutlook. It well might; and since that grief, which came while histroubles were beginning, much else had come to Lincoln; and now throughfour years of unsurpassed trial his capacity had steadily grown, andhis delicate fairness, his pitifulness, his patience, his modesty hadgrown therewith. Here is one of the few speeches ever delivered by agreat man at the crisis of his fate on the sort of occasion which atragedian telling his story would have devised for him. This man hadstood alone in the dark. He had done justice; he had loved mercy; hehad walked humbly with his God. The reader to whom religious utterancemakes little appeal will not suppose that his imaginative words standfor no real experience. The reader whose piety knows no questions willnot be pained to think that this man had professed no faith. He said, "Fellow Countrymen: At this second appearance to take the oathof the Presidential office, there is less occasion for an extendedaddress than there was at the first. Then a statement, somewhat indetail, of a course to be pursued, seemed fitting and proper. Now, atthe expiration of four years, during which public declarations havebeen constantly called forth on every point and phase of the greatcontest which still absorbs the energies and engrosses the attention ofthe nation, little that is new could be presented. The progress of ourarms, upon which all else chiefly depends, is as well known to thepublic as to myself; and it is, I trust, reasonably satisfactory andencouraging to all. With high hope for the future, no prediction inregard to it is ventured. "On the occasion corresponding to this four years ago, all thoughtswere anxiously directed to an impending civil war. All dreaded it--allsought to avert it. While the inaugural address was being deliveredfrom this place, devoted altogether to saving the Union without war, insurgent agents were in the city seeking to destroy it withoutwar--seeking to dissolve the Union and divide effects, by negotiation. Both parties deprecated war; but one of them would make war rather thanlet the nation survive; and the other would accept war rather than letit perish. And the war came. "One-eighth of the whole population were coloured slaves, notdistributed generally over the Union, but localised in the Southernpart of it. These slaves constituted a peculiar and powerful interest. All knew that this interest was, somehow, the cause of the war. Tostrengthen, perpetuate, and extend this interest was the object forwhich the insurgents would rend the Union, even by war; while theGovernment claimed no right to do more than to restrict the territorialenlargement of it. Neither party expected for the war the magnitude orthe duration which it has already attained. Neither expected that thecause of the conflict might cease with, or even before, the conflictitself should cease. Each looked for an easier triumph, and a resultless fundamental and astounding. Both read the same Bible, and pray tothe same God; and each invokes His aid against the other. It may seemstrange that any men should dare to ask a just God's assistance inwringing their bread from the sweat of other men's faces; but let usjudge not, that we be not judged. The prayers of both could not beanswered--that of neither has been answered fully. The Almighty hasHis own purposes. 'Woe unto the world because of offenses! for it mustneeds be that offenses come; but woe to that man by whom the offensecometh. ' If we shall suppose that American slavery is one of thoseoffenses, which, in the providence of God, must needs come, but which, having continued through His appointed time, He now wills to remove, and that He gives to both North and South this terrible war, as the woedue to those by whom the offense came, shall we discern therein anydeparture from those divine attributes which the believers in a livingGod always ascribe to Him? Fondly do we hope--fervently do wepray--that this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass away. Yet, ifGod wills that it continue until all the wealth piled by the bondman'stwo hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and untilevery drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be paid with anotherdrawn with the sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so still itmust be said, 'The judgments of the Lord are true and righteousaltogether. ' "With malice toward none; with charity for all; with firmness in theright, as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish thework we are in; to bind up the nation's wounds, to care for him whoshall have borne the battle, and for his widow, and his orphan--to doall which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace amongourselves, and with all nations. " Lincoln's own commentary may follow upon his speech: "March 15, 1865. Dear Mr. Weed, --Every one likes a little compliment. Thank you for yours on my little notification speech and on the recentinaugural address. I expect the latter to wear as well as--perhapsbetter than--anything I have produced; but I believe it is notimmediately popular. Men are not flattered by being shown that therehas been a difference of purpose between the Almighty and them. Todeny it however in this case is to deny that there is a God governingthe world. It is a truth which I thought needed to be told, and, aswhatever of humiliation there is in it falls most directly on myself, Ithought others might afford for me to tell it. "Truly yours, "A. LINCOLN. " On March 20, 1865, a period of bright sunshine seems to have begun inLincoln's life. Robert Lincoln had some time before finished hiscourse at Harvard, and his father had written to Grant modestly askinghim if he could suggest the way, accordant with discipline and goodexample, in which the young man could best see something of militarylife. Grant immediately had him on to his staff, with a commission ascaptain, and now Grant invited Lincoln to come to his headquarters fora holiday visit. There was much in it besides holiday, for Grant wasrapidly maturing his plans for the great event and wanted Lincoln near. Moreover Sheridan had just arrived, and while Lincoln was there Shermancame from Goldsborough with Admiral Porter for consultation as toSherman's next move. Peremptory as he was in any necessary politicalinstructions, Lincoln was now happy to say nothing of military matters, beyond expressing his earnest desire that the final overmastering ofthe Confederate armies should be accomplished with the least furtherbloodshed possible, and indulging the curiosity that any other guestmight have shown. A letter home to Mrs. Lincoln betrays the interestwith which he heard heavy firing quite near, which seemed to him agreat battle, but did not excite those who knew. Then there were ridesin the country with Grant's staff. Lincoln in his tall hat and frockcoat was a marked and curious figure on a horse. He had once, by theway, insisted on riding with Butler, catechising him with remorselesschaff on engineering matters and forbidding his chief engineer toprompt him, along six miles of cheering Northern troops within easysight and shot of the Confederate soldiers to whom his hat and coatidentified him. But, however odd a figure, he impressed Grant'sofficers as a good and bold horseman. Then, after Sherman's arrival, there evidently was no end of talk. Sherman was at first amused by thePresident's anxiety as to whether his army was quite safe without himat Goldsborough; but that keen-witted soldier soon received, as he hassaid, an impression both of goodness and of greatness such as no otherman ever gave him. What especially remained on Sherman's and on Porter's mind was therecollection of Lincoln's over-powering desire for mercy and forconciliation with the conquered. Indeed Sherman blundered later in theterms he first accepted from Johnston; for he did not see thatLincoln's clemency for Southern leaders and desire for the welfare ofthe South included no mercy at all for the political principle of theConfederacy. Grant was not exposed to any such mistake, for a week ortwo before Lee had made overtures to him for some sort of conferenceand Lincoln had instantly forbidden him to confer with Lee for anypurpose but that of his unconditional surrender. What, apart from thereconstruction of Southern life and institutions, was in part weighingwith Lincoln was the question of punishments for rebellion. By Act ofCongress the holders of high political and military office in the Southwere liable as traitors, and there was now talk of hanging in theNorth. Later events showed that a very different sentiment would makeitself heard when the victory came; but Lincoln was much concerned. Tosome one who spoke to him of this matter he exclaimed, "What have I todo with you, ye sons of Zeruiah, that ye should this day be adversariesunto me? Shall there any man be put to death this day in Israel?"There can be no doubt that the prerogative of mercy would have beenvigorously used in his hands, but he did not wish for a conflict onthis matter at all; and Grant was taught, in a parable about a teetotalIrishman who forgave being served with liquor unbeknownst to himself, that zeal in capturing Jefferson Davis and his colleagues was notexpected of him. While Lincoln was at Grant's headquarters at City Point, Lee, hoping torecover the use of the roads to the south-west, endeavoured to cause adiversion of the besiegers' strength by a sortie on his east front. Itfailed and gave the besiegers a further point of vantage. On April 1Sheridan was sent far round the south of Lee's lines, and in a battleat a point called Five Forks established himself in possession of therailway running due west from Petersburg. The defences were weakest onthis side, and to prevent the entrance of the enemy there Lee was boundto withdraw troops from other quarters. On the two following daysGrant's army delivered assaults at several points on the east side ofthe Petersburg defences, penetrating the outer lines and pushing onagainst the inner fortifications of the town. On Sunday, April 2, Jefferson Davis received in church word from Lee to make instantpreparation for departure, as Petersburg could not be held beyond thatnight and Richmond must fall immediately. That night the ConfederateGovernment left the capital, and Lee's evacuation of the fortress beganthe next day. Lincoln was sent for. He came by sea, and to theastonishment and alarm of the naval officers made his way at once toRichmond with entirely insufficient escort. There he strolled about, hand in hand with his little son Tad, greeted by exultant negroes, andstared at by angry or curious Confederates, while he visited the formerprison of the Northern prisoners and other places of more pleasantattraction without receiving any annoyance from the inhabitants. Hehad an interesting talk with Campbell, formerly a Supreme Court judge, and a few weeks back one of Davis' commissioners at Hampton Roads. Campbell obtained permission to convene a meeting of the members of theVirginia Legislature with a view to speedier surrender by Lee's army. But the permission was revoked, for he somewhat clumsily mistook itsterms, and, moreover, the object in view had meantime been accomplished. Jefferson Davis was then making his way with his ministers toJohnston's army. When they arrived he and they held council withJohnston and Beauregard. He would issue a Proclamation which wouldraise him many soldiers and he would "whip them yet. " No one answeredhim. At last he asked the opinion of Johnston, who bluntly undeceivedhim as to facts, and told him that further resistance would be a crime, and got his permission to treat with Sherman, while the fallenConfederate President escaped further south. Lee's object was to make his way along the north side of the AppomattoxRiver, which flows east through Petersburg to the James estuary, and ata certain point strike southwards towards Johnston's army. He foughtfor his escape with all his old daring and skill, while hardly lessvigorous and skilful efforts were made not only to pursue, but tosurround him. Grant in his pursuit sent letters of courteous entreatythat he would surrender and spare further slaughter. Northern cavalrygot ahead of Lee, tearing up the railway lines he had hoped to use andblocking possible mountain passes; and his supply trains were being cutoff. After a long running fight and one last fierce battle on April 6, at a place called Sailor's Creek, Lee found himself on April 9 atAppomattox Court House, some seventy miles west of Petersburg, surrounded beyond hope of escape. On that day he and Grant with theirstaffs met in a neighbouring farmhouse. Those present recalledafterwards the contrast of the stately Lee and the plain, ill-dressedGrant arriving mud-splashed in his haste. Lee greeted Meade as an oldacquaintance and remarked how grey he had grown with years. Meadegracefully replied that Lee and not age was responsible for that. Grant had started "quite jubilant" on the news that Lee was ready tosurrender, but in presence of "the downfall of a foe who had fought solong and valiantly" he fell into sadness. Pleasant "talk of old armytimes" followed, and he had almost forgotten, as he declares, thebusiness in hand, when Lee asked him on what terms he would acceptsurrender. Grant sat down and wrote, not knowing when he began what heshould go on to write. As he wrote he thought of the handsome swordLee carried. Instantly he added to his terms permission for everySouthern officer to keep his sword and his horse. Lee read the paperand when he came to that point was visibly moved. He gauged his man, and he ventured to ask something more. He thought, he said, Grantmight not know that the Confederate cavalry troopers owned their ownhorses. Grant said they would be badly wanted on the farms and added afurther concession accordingly. "This will have the best possibleeffect on the men, " said Lee. "It will do much towards conciliatingour people. " Grant included also in his written terms words of generalpardon to Confederate officers for their treason. This was aninadvertent breach, perhaps, of Lincoln's orders, but it was one whichmet with no objection. Lee retired into civil life and devoted himselfthereafter to his neighbours' service as head of a college inVirginia--much respected, very free with alms to old soldiers and notmuch caring whether they had fought for the South or for the North. Grant did not wait to set foot in the capital which he had conquered, but, the main business being over, posted off with all haste to see hisson settled in at school. Lincoln remained at City Point till April 8, when he started back bysteamer. Those who were with him on the two days' voyage toldafterwards of the happy talk, as of a quiet family party rejoicing inthe return of peace. Somebody said that Jefferson Davis really oughtto be hanged. The reply came in the quotation that he might almosthave expected, "Judge not, that ye be not judged. " On the second day, Sunday, the President read to them parts of "Macbeth. " Sumner, who wasone of them, recalled that he read twice over the lines, "Duncan is in his grave; After life's fitful fever he sleeps well; Treason has done his worst; nor steel, nor poison, Malice domestic, foreign levy, nothing Can touch him further. " On the Tuesday, April 11, a triumphant crowd came to the White House togreet Lincoln. He made them a speech, carefully prepared in substancerather than in form, dealing with the question of reconstruction in theSouth, with special reference to what was already in progress inLouisiana. The precise points of controversy that arose in this regardhardly matter now. Lincoln disclaimed any wish to insist pedanticallyupon any detailed plan of his; but he declared his wish equally to keepclear of any merely pedantic points of controversy with any in theSouth who were loyally striving to revive State Government withacceptance of the Union and without slavery; and he urged that genuinethough small beginnings should be encouraged. He regretted that inLouisiana his wish for the enfranchisement of educated negroes and ofnegro soldiers had not been followed; but as the freedom of the negroeswas unreservedly accepted, as provision was made for them in the publicschools, and the new State constitution allowed the Legislature toenfranchise them, there was clear gain. "Concede that the newgovernment of Louisiana is only to what it should be as the egg is tothe fowl, we shall sooner have the fowl by hatching the egg than bysmashing it. What has been said of Louisiana will apply generally toother States. So new and unprecedented, " he ended, "is the whole casethat no exclusive and inflexible plan can safely be prescribed as todetails and collaterals. Such exclusive and inflexible plan wouldsurely become a new entanglement. Important principles may and must beinflexible. In the present situation, as the phrase goes, it may be myduty to make some new announcement to the people of the South. I amconsidering, and shall not fail to act when satisfied that action willbe proper. " A full generation has had cause to lament that thatannouncement was never to be made. On Good Friday, April 14, 1865, with solemn religious service the Unionflag was hoisted again on Fort Sumter by General Anderson, its olddefender. On that morning there was a Cabinet Council in Washington. Seward was absent, in bed with an injury from a carriage accident. Grant was there a little anxious to get news from Sherman. Lincoln wasin a happy mood. He had earlier that morning enjoyed greatly a talkwith Robert Lincoln about the young man's new experience of soldiering. He now told Grant and the Cabinet that good news was coming fromSherman. He knew it, he said, for last night he had dreamed a dream, which had come to him several times before. In this dream, whenever itcame, he was sailing in a ship of a peculiar build, indescribable butalways the same, and being borne on it with great speed towards a darkand undefined shore. He had always dreamed this before victory. Hedreamed it before Antietam, before Murfreesborough, before Gettysburg, before Vicksburg. Grant observed bluntly that Murfreesborough had notbeen a victory, or of any consequence anyway. Lincoln persisted onthis topic undeterred. After some lesser business they discussed thereconstruction of the South. Lincoln rejoiced that Congress hadadjourned and the "disturbing element" in it could not hinder the work. Before it met again, "if we are wise and discreet we shall re-animatethe States and get their governments in successful operation, withorder prevailing and the Union re-established. " Lastly, there was talkof the treatment of rebels and of the demand that had been heard for"persecution" and "bloody work. " "No one need expect me, " saidLincoln, "to take any part in hanging or killing these men, even theworst of them. Frighten them out of the country, open the gates, letdown the bars, scare them off. " "Shoo, " he added, throwing up hislarge hands like a man scaring sheep. "We must extinguish ourresentments if we expect harmony and union. There is too much of thedesire on the part of some of our very good friends to be masters, tointerfere with and dictate to those States, to treat the people not asfellow citizens; there is too little respect for their rights. I donot sympathise in these feelings. " Such was the tenor of his lastrecorded utterance on public affairs. In the afternoon Mr. And Mrs. Lincoln drove together and he talked toher with keen pleasure of the life they would live when the Presidencywas over. That night Mr. And Mrs. Lincoln went to the theatre, for theday was not observed as in England. The Grants were to have been withthem, but changed their minds and left Washington that day, so a youngofficer, Major Rathbone, and the lady engaged to him, both of themthereafter ill-fated, came instead. The theatre was crowded; manyofficers returned from the war were there and eager to see Lincoln. The play was "Our American Cousin, " a play in which the part of LordDundreary was afterwards developed and made famous. Some time after 10o'clock, at a point in the play which it is said no person presentcould afterwards remember, a shot was heard in the theatre and AbrahamLincoln fell forward upon the front of the box unconscious and dying. A wild-looking man, who had entered the box unobserved and had done hiswork, was seen to strike with a knife at Major Rathbone, who tried toseize him. Then he jumped from the box to the stage; he caught a spurin the drapery and fell, breaking the small bone of his leg. He rose, shouted "Sic semper tyrannis, " the motto of Virginia, disappearedbehind the scenes, mounted a horse that was in waiting at the stagedoor, and rode away. This was John Wilkes Booth, brother of a famous actor then playing"Hamlet" in Boston. He was an actor too, and an athletic and daringyouth. In him that peculiarly ferocious political passion whichoccasionally showed itself among Southerners was further inflamed bybrandy and by that ranting mode of thought which the stage develops insome few. He was the leader of a conspiracy which aimed at compassingthe deaths of others besides Lincoln. Andrew Johnson, theVice-President, was to die. So was Seward. That same night one of theconspirators, a gigantic boy of feeble mind, gained entrance toSeward's house and wounded three people, including Seward himself, whowas lying already injured in bed and received four or five wounds. Neither he nor the others died. The weak-minded or mad boy, anotherman, whose offense consisted in having been asked to kill Johnson andrefused to do so, and another alleged conspirator, a woman, were hangedafter a court-martial whose proceedings did credit neither to the newPresident nor to others concerned. Booth himself, after manyadventures, was shot in a barn in which he stood at bay and which hadbeen set on fire by the soldiers pursuing him. During his flight he issaid to have felt much aggrieved that men did not praise him as theyhad praised Brutus and Cassius. There were then in the South many broken and many permanentlyembittered men, indeed the temper which would be glad at Lincoln'sdeath could be found here and there and notably among the partisans ofthe South in Washington. But, if it be wondered what measure ofsympathy there was for Booth's dark deed, an answer lies in the factthat the murder of Lincoln would at no time have been difficult for abrave man. Fair blows were now as powerless as foul to arrest the end. On the very morning when Lincoln and Grant at the Cabinet had beentelling of their hopes and fears for Sherman, Sherman himself atRaleigh in North Carolina had received and answered a letter fromJohnston opening negotiations for a peaceful surrender. Three dayslater he was starting by rail for Greensborough when word came to himfrom the telegraph operator that an important message was upon thewire. He went to the telegraph box and heard it. Then he swore thetelegraph operator to secrecy, for he feared that some provocationmight lead to terrible disorders in Raleigh, if his army, flushed withtriumph, were to learn, before his return in peace, the news that formany days after hushed their accustomed songs and shouts and cheeringinto a silence which was long remembered. He went off to meet Johnstonand requested to be with him alone in a farmhouse near. There he toldhim of the murder of Lincoln. "The perspiration came out in largedrops on Johnston's forehead, " says Sherman, who watched him closely. He exclaimed that it was a disgrace to the age. Then he asked to knowwhether Sherman attributed the crime to the Confederate authorities. Sherman could assure him that no one dreamed of such a suspicionagainst men like him and General Lee; but he added that he was not sosure of "Jefferson Davis and men of that stripe. " Then followed somedelay, through a mistake of Sherman's which the authorities inWashington reversed, but in a few days all was settled and the whole ofthe forces under Johnston's command laid down their arms. Twenty yearslater, as an old man and infirm, their leader left his Southern home tobe present at Sherman's funeral, where he caught a chill from which hedied soon after. Jefferson Davis was captured on May 10, near theborders of Florida. He was, not without plausible grounds but quiteunjustly, suspected in regard to the murder, and he sufferedimprisonment for some time till President Andrew Johnson released himwhen the evidence against him had been seen to be worthless. He livedmany years in Mississippi and wrote memoirs, in which may be found thefullest legal argument for the great Secession, his own view of hisquarrels with Joseph Johnston, and much besides. Amongst other thingshe tells how when they heard the news of Lincoln's murder some troopscheered, but he was truly sorry for the reason that Andrew Johnson wasmore hostile to the cause than Lincoln. It is disappointing to think, of one who played a memorable part in history with much determination, that in this reminiscence he sized his stature as a man fairlyaccurately. After several other surrenders of Southern towns and smallscattered forces, the Confederate General Kirby Smith, in Texas, surrendered to General Canby, Banks' successor, on May 26, and afterfour years and forty-four days armed resistance to the Union was at anend. On the night of Good Friday, Abraham Lincoln had been carried stillunconscious to a house near the theatre. His sons and other friendswere summoned. He never regained consciousness. "A look ofunspeakable peace, " say his secretaries who were there, "came over hisworn features. " At 7. 22 on the morning of April 15, Stanton, watchinghim more closely than the rest, told them what had passed in the words, "Now he belongs to the ages. " The mourning of a nation, voiced to later times by some of the bestlines of more than one of its poets, and deeper and more prevailing forthe lack of comprehension which some had shown him before, followed hisbody in its slow progress--stopping at Baltimore, where once his lifehad been threatened, for the homage of vast crowds; stopping at NewYork, where among the huge assembly old General Scott came to bid himaffectionate farewell; stopping at other cities for the tribute ofreverent multitudes--to Springfield, his home of so many years, where, on May 4, 1865, it was laid to rest. After the burial service the"Second Inaugural" was read over his grave, nor could better words thanhis own have been chosen to honour one who "with malice toward none, with charity toward all, with firmness in the right as God gave him tosee the right, had striven on to finish the work that he was in. " InEngland, apart from more formal tokens of a late-learnt regard and anunfeigned regret, Punch embodied in verse of rare felicity the manlycontrition of its editor for ignorant derision in past years; and QueenVictoria symbolised best of all, and most acceptably to Americans, thefeeling of her people when she wrote to Mrs. Lincoln "as a widow to awidow. " Nor, though the transactions in which he bore his part werebut little understood in this country till they were half forgotten, has tradition ever failed to give him, by just instinct, his rank withthe greatest of our race. Many great deeds had been done in the war. The greatest was thekeeping of the North together in an enterprise so arduous, and anenterprise for objects so confusedly related as the Union and freedom. Abraham Lincoln did this; nobody else could have done it; to do it hebore on his sole shoulders such a weight of care and pain as few othermen have borne. When it was over it seemed to the people that he hadall along been thinking their real thoughts for them; but they knewthat this was because he had fearlessly thought for himself. He hadbeen able to save the nation, partly because he saw that unity was notto be sought by the way of base concession. He had been able to freethe slaves, partly because he would not hasten to this object at thesacrifice of what he thought a larger purpose. This most unrelentingenemy to the project of the Confederacy was the one man who had quitepurged his heart and mind from hatred or even anger towards hisfellow-countrymen of the South. That fact came to be seen in the Southtoo, and generations in America are likely to remember it when allother features of his statecraft have grown indistinct. A thousandreminiscences ludicrous or pathetic, passing into myth but enshrininghard fact, will prove to them that this great feature of his policy wasa matter of more than policy. They will remember it as adding apeculiar lustre to the renovation of their national existence; as nosmall part of the glory, surpassing that of former wars, which hasbecome the common heritage of North and South. For perhaps not manyconquerors, and certainly few successful statesmen, have escaped thetendency of power to harden or at least to narrow their humansympathies; but in this man a natural wealth of tender compassionbecame richer and more tender while in the stress of deadly conflict hedeveloped an astounding strength. Beyond his own country some of us recall his name as the greatest amongthose associated with the cause of popular government. He would haveliked this tribute, and the element of truth in it is plain enough, yetit demands one final consideration. He accepted the institutions towhich he was born, and he enjoyed them. His own intense experience ofthe weakness of democracy did not sour him, nor would any similarexperience of later times have been likely to do so. Yet if hereflected much on forms of government it was with a dominant interestin something beyond them. For he was a citizen of that far countrywhere there is neither aristocrat nor democrat. No political theorystands out from his words or actions; but they show a most unusualsense of the possible dignity of common men and common things. Hishumour rioted in comparisons between potent personages and Jim Jett'sbrother or old Judge Brown's drunken coachman, for the reason for whichthe rarely jesting Wordsworth found a hero in the "Leech-Gatherer" orin Nelson and a villain in Napoleon or in Peter Bell. He could use andrespect and pardon and overrule his far more accomplished ministersbecause he stood up to them with no more fear or cringing, with no moredislike or envy or disrespect than he had felt when he stood up longbefore to Jack Armstrong. He faced the difficulties and terrors of hishigh office with that same mind with which he had paid his way as apoor man or navigated a boat in rapids or in floods. If he had atheory of democracy it was contained in this condensed note which hewrote, perhaps as an autograph, a year or two before his Presidency:"As I would not be a slave, so I would not be a master. This expressesmy idea of democracy. Whatever differs from this, to the extent of thedifference, is no democracy. --A. LINCOLN. " APPENDIX BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE A complete bibliography of books dealing specially with Lincoln, and ofbooks throwing important light upon his life or upon the history of theAmerican Civil War, cannot be attempted here. The author aims only atmentioning the books which have been of greatest use to him and a fewothers to which reference ought obviously to be made. The chief authorities for the life of Lincoln are:-- "Abraham Lincoln: A History, " by John G. Nicolay and John Hay (hisprivate secretaries), in ten volumes: The Century Company, New York, and T. Fisher Unwin, London; "The Works of Abraham Lincoln" (_i. E. _, speeches, letters, and State papers), in eight volumes: G. Putnam'sSons, London and New York; and, for his early life, "The Life ofAbraham Lincoln, " by Herndon and Weik: Appleton, London and New York. There are numerous short biographies of Lincoln, but among these it isnot invidious to mention as the best (expressing as it does the maturejudgment of the highest authority) "A Short Life of Abraham Lincoln, "by John G. Nicolay: The Century Company, New York. The author may be allowed to refer, moreover, to the interest arousedin him as a boy by "Abraham Lincoln, " by C. G. Leland, in the "NewPlutarch Series": Marcus Ward & Co. , London; and to the light he hasmuch later derived from "Abraham Lincoln, " by John T. Morse, Junior:Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, U. S. A. Among studies of Lincoln, containing a wealth of illustrative stories, a very high place is due to "The True Abraham Lincoln, " by WilliamEleroy Curtis: The J. B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia and London. For the history of America at the period concerned the reader may bemost confidently referred to a work, which by plentiful extracts andcitations enables its writer's judgment to be checked, withoutdetracting from the interest and power of his narrative, namely, "History of the United States, 1850-1877, " by James Ford Rhodes, inseven volumes: The Macmillan Company, London and New York. Among the shorter complete histories of the United States are: "TheUnited States: an Outline of Political History, " by Goldwin Smith: TheMacmillan Company, London and New York; the article "United States ofAmerica" (section "History") in the "Encyclopaedia Britannica" (seealso the many excellent articles on American biography in the"Encyclopaedia Britannica"); "The Cambridge Modern History: Vol. VII. , United States of America": Cambridge University Press, and TheMacmillan Company, New York. Two volumes of special interest in regard to the early days of theUnited States, in some ways complementary to each other in theirdifferent points of view, are: "Alexander Hamilton, " by F. G. Oliver:Constable & Co. , and "Historical Essays, " by John Fitch. Almost every point in regard to American institutions and politicalpractice is fully treated in "The American Commonwealth, " by ViscountBryce, O. M. , two volumes: The Macmillan Company, London and New York. For the attitude of the British Government during the war theconclusive authority is the correspondence to be found in "The Life ofLord John Russell, " by Sir Spencer Walpole, K. C. B. , two volumes:Longmans, Green & Co. , London and New York; and light on the attitudeof the English people is thrown by "The Life of John Bright, " by G. M. Trevelyan: Constable, London, and Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, U. S. A. With respect to the military history of the Civil War the author isspecially indebted to "The Civil War in the United States, " by W. Birkbeck Wood and Major J. E. Edmonds, R. E. , with an introduction bySpenser Wilkinson: Methuen & Co. , London, and Putnam, New York, whichis the only concise and complete history of the war written with fullknowledge of all recent works bearing on the subject. Mr. Nicolay'schapters in the "Cambridge Modern History" give a very lucid narrativeof the war. Among works of special interest bearing on the war, though not muchconcerning the subject of this book, it is only necessary to mention"'Stonewall' Jackson, " by Colonel Henderson, C. B. , two volumes:Longmans, London and New York; "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War"(a book of monographs by several authors, many of them actors in thewar), four volumes: T. Fisher Unwin, London, and Century Company, NewYork, and "Story of the Civil War, " by J. C. Ropes: Putnam, London andNew York. It may be added that a life of General Robert E. Lee had beenprojected, as a companion volume to this in the same series, byBrigadier-General Frederick Maurice, C. B. , and it is to be hoped that, though suspended by the present war, this book may still be written. Existing biographies of Lee are disappointing. It has been (especiallyin view of this intended book on Lee) outside the scope of this volumeto present the history of the Civil War with special reference to theSouthern actors in it, but "Memoirs of Jefferson Davis" must be herereferred to as in some sense an authoritative, though not a veryattractive or interesting, exposition of the views of Southernstatesmen at the time. An interesting sidelight on the war may be found in "Life with theConfederate Army, " by Watson, being the experiences of a Scotchman whofor a time served under the Confederacy. In regard to slavery and to Southern society before the war the authorhas made much use of "Our Slave States, " by Frederick Law Olmsted; Dixand Edwards, New York, 1856, and other works of the same author. Mr. Olmsted was a Northerner, but his very full observations can be checkedby the numerous quotations on the same subject collected by Mr. Rhodesin his history. For the history of the South since the war and the present position ofthe negroes, see the chapters on this subject in Bryce's "AmericanCommonwealth, " second or any later edition, two volumes: Macmillan, London and New York. Mr. Owen Wister's novel, "Lady Baltimore": Macmillan, London and NewYork, embraces a most interesting study of the survivals of the oldSouthern society at the present time and of the present relationsbetween it and the North. The treatment of the negroes freed during the war is the main subjectof "Grant, Lincoln and the Freedmen, " by John Eaton and E. O. Mason:Longmans, Green & Co. , London and New York, a book to which the authoris also indebted for other interesting matter. The personal memoirs, and especially the autobiographies dealing withthe Civil War, are very numerous, and the author therefore would onlywish to mention those which seem to him of altogether unusual interest. "Personal Memoirs of General U. S. Grant": Century Company, New York, is a book of very high order (Sherman's memoirs: Appleton, New York, and his correspondence with his brother: Scribner, New York, have alsobeen quoted in these pages). Great interest both in regard to Lincoln personally and to the historyof the United States after his death attaches to "Reminiscences, " byCarl Schurz, three volumes (Vol. I. Being concerned with Germany in1848): John Murray, London, and Doubleday Page, New York, and to "TheLife of John Hay, " by W. R. Thayer, two volumes: Constable & Co. , London, and Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, U. S. A. The author has derived much light from "Specimen Days, and Collect, " byWalt Whitman: Wilson and McCormick, Glasgow, and McKay, U. S. A. He may be allowed, in conclusion, to mention the encouragement given tohim in beginning his work by the late Mr. Henry James, O. M. , whosevivid and enthusiastic judgment of Lincoln he had the privilege ofreceiving. CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE Some events in History of United Some events in English and States. General History. 1759. Capture of Quebec. 1759. Capture of Quebec. 1757-60. Ministry of Chatham (William Pitt). 1760. _Contrat Social_ published. 1764-76. Great inventions in spinning industries. 1765. Stamp Act passed. 1765. Watt's steam engine. 1776. Declaration of 1776. Publication of "Wealth of Independence Nations. " 1778. Death of Chatham. 1782. Rodney's victory. 1783. American Independence recognised. 1787. Constitution framed. North West Territory ceded by States to Congress and slavery excluded from it. 1789. Constitution comes into 1789. Meeting of States General. Force. 1793. Eli Whitney invents cotton 1793. England at war with French gin. Republic. 1794. Slave Trade abolished by French Convention. 1799. Death of Washington. 1802. Peace of Amiens. 1803. Louisiana purchase. 1803. England at war with Napoleon. 1804. Death of Hamilton. 1805. Trafalgar. 1806. The American Fulton's steam-boat on Seine. 1807. Fulton's steam-boat on 1807. Slave Trade abolished by Hudson. Great Britain. 1808. Slave Trade abolished by 1808. Battle of Vimiera. U. S. A. Convention of Cintra. Wordsworth's literary activity about at its culmination. 1809. Abraham Lincoln born. 1809. Darwin, Tennyson, and Gladstone born. 1812-1814. War with Great Britain. 1815. Waterloo. 1820. Missouri Compromise. 1823. Monroe doctrine declared. 1825. First railway opened in England. 1826. Death of Jefferson. 1826. Independence of Mexico and Spanish Colonies in South America recognised by Canning. 1827. Navarino. 1828. Commencement of "nullification" movement. Election of Jackson. 1829. Catholic emancipation. 1830. Hayne-Webster debate. 1831. Garrison publishes first 1831. Mazzini founds Young number of _Liberator_. Italy. Lincoln starts life in New Salem. First railway opened in America. 1832. First Reform Bill. 1833. Slavery abolished in British Colonies. 1834. Lincoln elected to Illinois legislature 1836-40. Great Boer Trek. 1837. End of Jackson's second 1837. Queen Victoria's accession. Presidency. First steam-boat from England to America. 1838. First telegraph line in England. 1839. Lord Durham's report on Canada. 1841. First telegraph in America. 1842. Lincoln leaves Illinois legislature, and (Nov. ) is married. 1844. "Martin Chuzzlewit" published. 1845. Annexation of Texas. 1846. Boundary of Oregon and 1846. Boundary of Oregon and British Columbia settled British Columbia settled with Great Britain. With U. S. A. 1846-7. Mexican War. 1846-7. Irish famine. 1847-8. Lincoln in Congress. 1848. Gold discovery in 1848. Revolution in France and California. In many parts of Europe. 1850. Clay's compromise adopted. 1850. Constitution Act for Death of Calham. Australian colonies. 1852. Deaths of Clay and Webster. 1852. Constitution Act for New Zealand. 1854. Missouri Compromise 1854-5. Gold rush to Australia. Repealed. Republican Party formed. Crimean War. 1854-6. Abolition of slavery in various Portuguese Dominions. 1856. Defeat of Frémont by Buchanan. 1857. Dred Scott case. 1857-8. Indian Mutiny. 1858. Kansas. Lincoln-Douglas debate. 1859. John Brown's raid. 1859. Publication of "Origin of Species. " 1859-60. Kingdom of Italy formed. 1860. Nov. Lincoln elected 1860. Slavery abolished in Dutch President. East Indies. Dec. Secession carried in South Carolina. 1861. Feb. 4. Southern 1861. Emancipation of Russian Confederacy formed. Serfs. Mar. 4. Lincoln inaugurated. Ap. 12-14. Bombardment of Fort Sumter. Ap. War begins. Further secessions. July. First Battle of Bull Run. Dec. Claim of Great Britain as to Trent accepted. 1862. Ap. -Aug. McClellan in 1862. _Alabama_ escapes from the Peninsula. Mersey (July). Ap. Shiloh. May. Jackson in Shenandoah Valley. Aug. -Oct. Confederates in Kentucky. Aug. Second Battle of Bull Run. Sept. Antietam. Proclamation of emancipation. Nov. McClellan removed. Dec. Fredericksburg. Murfreesborough. 1863. Mar. 1. Conscription Act. 1863. Revolution in Poland. Maximilian proclaimed Emperor of Mexico. May. Chancellorsville. Jackson killed. July. Gettysburg, Vicksburg. New York riots. Sept. Chickamauga. Nov. Gettysburg speech. Chattanooga. 1864. May. Beginning of Grant's 1864. Prussia and Austria invade and Sherman's great Denmark. Campaigns. 1864. June. Cold Harbour. Baltimore Convention. July. Early's raid reaches Washington. Aug. Mobile. Chicago Convention. Sept. Sherman at Atlanta. Sheridan in Shenandoah Valley. Nov. Lincoln re-elected President. Dec. Nashville. Sherman at Savannah. 1865. Jan. Congress passes 13th Amendment. Feb. Further progress of Sherman and Sheridan. Mar. 4. Second inauguration of Lincoln. Ap. 2-9. Richmond falls, and Lee surrenders. Ap. 14-15. Lincoln assassinated and dies. Dec. 13. Amendment ratified. 1866. Atlantic cable 1866. Atlantic cable successfully successfully laid. Laid. War between Austria and Prussia. 1867. British North America Act. Slave children emancipated in Brazil. Fall and execution of Maximilian in Mexico. 1868. Rise of acute disorder in 1868. Mikado resumes "reconstructed" South. Government in Japan. 1870. Amendment securing negro 1870. Papal infallibility. Suffrage. Franco-German War. 1872. _Alabama_ arbitration with 1872. _Alabama_ arbitration with Great Britain. U. S. A. Responsible Government in Cape Colony. 1876. Admitted failure of Reconstruction. Election of Hayes. 1877. Federal troops withdrawn from South. 1878. Slavery abolished in Cuba (last of Spanish Colonies). INDEX Abolition and Abolitionists: Early movement dies down, 36-9; rise oflater movement, 50-2; persecuted, 51, 76; Lincoln's attitude, 76, 101, 116, 126-7, 151; their position in view of civil war, 172. _See_Slavery and Garrison. Adams, Charles Francis: 236, 262, 264, 328. Adams, John: 37, 236. Adams, John Quincy: 47, 51, 115, 314, 388. Aesop: 10. _Alabama_, the: 224, 251, 264. Alabama State: 175, 199, 212, 361, 388. Alamo, the: 91. Alexander II. Of Russia: 256. Alleghany (or Appalachian) Mountains: 26, 225, 244; distinct characterof people in them, 56, 198. Alley: 429. Alton: 76. Amendment of Constitution: how carried, 24; suggested amendment toconciliate South, 192; Thirteenth Amendment prohibiting slavery, 335-7, 431, 433; Fifteenth Amendment requiring negro suffrage, 334-5. America, United States of, and American: Diverse character of Colonies, resemblances to and differences from England, 16-20; first attempt atUnion, 20; independence and making of Constitution, 21-3; features ofConstitution, 23-5; expansion, 26-8; Union Government brought intoeffect, 28-30, 41; rise of national tradition, 30-5; compromise on maincause of disunion, slavery, 35-40; parties and tendencies in the firsthalf of nineteenth century, 40-52; triumph of Union sentiment, 45-6;growth of separate interest and sentiment in South, 43-5, 52-9;intellectual development and foundations of American patriotism, 59-61;further compromise on slavery, 96-101; political cleavage of North andSouth becomes definite, 109-12; "a house divided against itself, "143-7; for further developments, _see_ North and South; _see also_Lincoln; Lincoln's position as to enforcement of union, 143-4; commonheritage of America from Civil War, 455. American Party, or Know-Nothings: 112, 117-8. American Policy (so-called): 42-8. Anderson, Major: 189-90, 208, 212-3, 449. Appalachians. _See_ Alleghany Mountains. Appomattox River and Court House: 447. Arbitration: 263-4. Argyll, Duke of: 176, 260. Arizona: 96. Arkansas River: 28, 351. Arkansas State: 199, 229, 244, 351. Armstrong, Jack and Hannah: 64, 108. Army: comparison of Northern and Southern men, 216; and their officers, 216-7, 220, 223-4, 350; system of recruiting, 221-3, 363-74;discipline, 220, 248, 282, 420-1; size of regular army, 228. _Seealso_ Conscription, Voluntary Service and Militia. Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union: 20, 175. Atlanta: 226-7, 394-5, 396, 424. Augusta: 435. Baker: 90. Baltimore: 205, 239-42, 453; Conventions there, 159-60, 410-1. Banks, N. P. , General: 296, 354-5, 389. Bates, Attorney-General: 166, 201-2, 264, 320, 405. Battles (sieges, campaigns, etc. , separately entered): Antietam, 306-7, 313, 324-5, 450; Bentonville, 437; Bull Run, first battle, 245-9; BullRun, second battle, 305, 313; Cedar Creek, 396; Champion's Hill, 355;Chancellorsville, 311-13; Chattanooga, 360; Chickamauga, 360; ColdHarbour, 393, 410; Five Forks, 446; Fort Donelson, 281; Four Oaks, 295;Franklin, 396; Fredericksburg, 309, 313; Gettysburg, 357. 450; KenesawMountain, 394; Manassas (two battles), _see_ Bull Run; Mill Springs, 280; Mobile, 395; Murfreesborough, 343, 450; Nashville, 396; NewOrleans, 283; Perryville, 342; Sailor's Creek, 447; Seven Days'Battles, 298; Seven Pines, _see_ Four Oaks; Shiloh, 282-3;Spottsylvania, 392; Wilderness, 392. Bazaine, Marshal: 388. Bell, John: 159. Bentham, Jeremy: 32. Berry: 66-7. Bible: 10, 132, 439-40. Bismarck: 424. Black: 185. Black Hawk: 65. Blackstone's Commentaries: 67. Blair, Francis, senr. : 432-3. Blair, Montgomery: 202, 208, 245, 405, 410. Blockade: 224, 226, 251-2, 436. Booth, John Wilkes: 451. Border States: 171, 228-9, 243-5, 270, 318-9, 333-4. Boston: 47, 51, 59-60, 172-3. Boswell, James: 102. Bragg, General: 340-3, 352, 359-60, 387-8. Breckinridge, John C. : 159. Bright, John: 127, 236, 260. British Columbia: 28, 110. Brooks, Phillips: 60. Brooks, Preston: 138-9. Brown, John: 126, 150-5, 197, 397. Brown, Judge: 85. Buchanan, James: 113, 138, 140, 141, 177, 184-90, 206, 208, 231. Buell, Don Carlos, General; 274, 276-82, 339-44, 369. Bummers: 397. Burlingame: 139. Barns, Robert: 103, 105. Burnside, Ambrose, General: 307, 309, 359-60, 382, 393, 435. Burr, Aaron: 29. Butler, Benjamin, General: 268, 283, 392-3, 409, 436, 444. Butterfield: 95. Calhoun, John: 68. Calhoun, John Caldwell: his character and influence, 42-5: his doctrineof "nullification" and secession, 45-6; his death, 100; furtherreferences, 97, 113, 175, 182. California: 28, 91-3, 96-9. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 59. Cameron, Simon: 166-7, 201-3, 242, 271. Campbell, Justice: 210, 446. Canada: 176, 211, 383. Carolina. _See_ North Carolina and South Carolina. Cass, General: 65, 94, 96, 172, 186. Castlereagh: 377. Cecil, Lord R. _See_ Salisbury. Central America: 145. Charming, Rev. William Eleroy: 51. Charles I. : 433. Charleston: 43, 251-3, 387, 435. _And see_ Fort Sumter. Chase, Salmon P. ; rising opponent of slavery, 101; approves ofLincoln's opposition to Douglas, 141; claims to the Presidency, 161, 166; Secretary of the Treasury, 201-2; his successful administration offinance, 254; regarded as Radical leader, intrigues against Lincoln andcauses difficulty in Cabinet, 328-9; continues troublesome, desiresPresidency, resigns, 406-8; appointed Chief Justice, 429-30; otherreferences, 208, 311, 415. Chatham, 20, 234. Chattanooga: 226-7, 339-40, 342-3, 359-60, 387-8, 394. Chicago: Republican Convention there, 166-9; deputation of clergy, 323;Democratic Convention, 411-4. Choate, Joseph H. : 106, 156. Civil Service: 50. Civil War. _See_ War. Clary's Grove: 64, 66. Clay, Henry: 41; his character and career, 42, 48; compromise of 1850originated by him, 99; his death, 100; Lincoln on him, 101, 122. Cobb: 185. Cobden, Richard: 257-8. Cock-fighting: 63, 69. Collamer, Senator: 167. Colonies. _See_ America. Colonisation. _See_ Negroes. Columbia, South Carolina: 435. Columbia, District of: 94, 319. Columbia River: 28. Columbus, Georgia: 226-7. Compulsory Service. _See_ Conscription. Confederacy, Confederates; _see also_ South; Confederacy of six Statesformed and Constitution adopted at Montgomery and claims of theseStates to Federal Government's forts, etc. , or their soil taken over, 199-201; commencement of war by Confederacy, 212-3; area of its countryand difficulty of conquest, 214-6; character of population, 216; spiritof independence animating Confederacy, 218-9; other conditions tellingagainst or for its success in the war, 214-27; original ConfederateStates, viz. , South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Florida, joined subsequently by Texas, and on outbreak of war byVirginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas, 228-9; capital movedto Richmond, 242; for course of war, _see_ War; for political course ofConfederacy, _see_ J. Davis and Congress of Confederacy; attitude offoreign Governments to Confederacy, 256, 261, 302, 313; refusal ofLincoln to treat with Confederacy as an independent state, 403, 432-3;refusal of Davis to negotiate on other terms, 428, 432-3; ultimatesurrender of Confederate forces and dispersion of its Government, 445-8. Congregationalists: 17, 19. Congress of original American Confederation: 20, 38. Congress of U. S. A. Under the Constitution: distinguished fromParliament by the severance between it and the executive government, bythe limitation of its functions to strictly Federal matters, and by itssubjection to provisions of Constitution, 23-4, _see also_ 371, 377-9, 402, 429; for certain Acts of Congress, _see_ Slavery; attempts atpacification during progress of Secession, 192-3; action of anddiscussions in Congress during Civil War, 246, 253, 263, 265-6, 269, 271, 276, 288, 316-9, 321-3, 324-7, 333-6, 351, 369-70, 379, 380, 382, 388, 389, 400-1, 434. Congress of Confederacy: 200, 366-7, 431. Conscription: in South; 366-7; in North, 364-5, 369-70; superior ongrounds of moral principle to voluntary system, 366. _Conservative_, the: 119. Conservatives: 245, 267-8, 328. Constitution, British: 20, 23, 377. Constitution of United States: 22-5, 41. _See also_ Amendment ofConstitution. Contraband: 268, 409. Cooper Institute; 144, 155. Copperheads: 382. Corinth: 283, 338-9. Cotton: 39, 259-60, 313. Cow Island: 331. Cowper, William: 11. Crittenden: 192-5. Cuba: 145, 159. Cumberland River: 226, 277, 280-1. Curtis, B. R. , Justice; 114. Darwin, Charles: 138, 259. Davis, David, Justice: 167, 379. Davis, Henry Winter: 388, 401. Davis, Jefferson: his rise as an extreme Southern leader, 101, 138, 150; inclined to favour slave trade, 145; his-argument for right ofSecession, 176; his part in Secession, 198-200; President ofConfederacy, 200; vetoes Bill against slave trade as inadequate andfraudulent, 200; orders attack on Fort Sumter, 212; criticisms upon hismilitary policy, 217-8, 387-8; his part in the war, 246, 355, 387-8, 395, 431, 433, 446; his determination to hold out and his attitude topeace, 403-4, 431-4; as to prisoners of war, 330, 399; escape fromRichmond and last public action, 446; his capture, and his emotions onLincoln's assassination, 452-3; his memoirs, 453, 460. Dayton, Senator: 167. Declaration of Independence: meaning of its principles, 32-5; howslave-holders signed it, 35-9; Lincoln's interpretation of it, 123; hisgreat speech upon it, 184. Delaware: 17, 198, 318, 334. Democracy: fundamental ideas in it, 32-9, 123; development of extremeform and of certain abuses of it in America, 47-50; its institutionsand practices still in an early stage of development, 50; a foolishperversion of it in the Northern States, 59, 218; Lincoln sees a decayof worthy and honest democratic feeling, 117; the Civil War regarded byLincoln and many in North as a test whether democratic government couldmaintain itself, 183-4, 362-3, 425; the sense in which Lincoln was agreat democrat, 455-6. Democratic Party: traces descent from Jefferson, 30; originated orstarted anew by Jackson, its principles, 47-8; general subservience ofits leaders to Southern interests, 91, 110, 140, _see also_ Mexico, Pierce, Douglas, Buchanan; breach between Northern and SouthernDemocrats, 141, 148-50, 157-9; Northern Democrats loyal to Union, 172-4, 177, 188, 231; progress of Democratic opposition to Lincoln, 267, 316, 374-5, 381-5, 401, 411-5; Lincoln's appeal after defeatingthem, 425. Dickens, Charles: 31, 32, 41, 259. Disraeli, Benjamin: 74, 260. Dough-Faces: 40. Douglas, Stephen: rival to Lincoln in Illinois Legislature, 71;possibly also in love, 81, 87; his rise, influence, and character, 101, 110-1; repeals Missouri Compromise, 110-1; supports rights of Kansas, 115, 140; Lincoln's contest with him, 121-2, 132-7, 140-9; gist ofLincoln's objection to his principles, 130, 142-5; unsuccessfulcandidate for Presidency, 159, 168-9; attitude to Secession, 188;relations with Lincoln after Secession, 206, 210, 231; death, 231. Douglass, Frederick: 332. Drink: 63, 76-7, 353, 423. Dundreary: 451. Early, General: 394, 395, 438. Eaton, John: 330-2, 347, 416, 461. Edmonds. _See_ Wood and Edmonds. Edwards, Mrs. Ninian: 81. Emerson, Ralph Waldo: 60, 152, 426. Episcopalians: 85, 351, 440. Equality. _See_ Declaration of Independence. Euclid: 104, 132. Everett, Edward: 159, 362. Farragut, David, Admiral: 231, 283, 349, 388, 395, 412, 424, 435. Federalism: 22. Federalist Party: 30, 173. Filibustering: (1) in sense of piracy: 194. (2) in sense ofobstruction: 333. Fillmore, Millard: 99, 112, 114, 133. Finance: 67-8, 254. Florida: 16, 26, 199, 251, 453. Fort Donelson: 280-1. Fort Fisher: 436. Fort Henry: 281. Fort Monroe: 268, 292. Fort Sumter: 187-90, 201, 208, 210, 212-3, 228, 449. Fox, Gustavus V. : 202, 252-3, 264. France: influence of French Revolution, 31; Louisiana territoryacquired from France, 26; French settlers, 27; slavery in LouisianaState, 39-40; relations with America during Civil War, 211, 256, 262, 313, 388, 404, 420. Frankfort, Kentucky: 340. Franklin, Benjamin: 37. Franklin, Tennessee: 396-7. Free-Soil Party: 111. Free Trade: 45, 258. Frémont, John: 112, 133, 269-70, 274, 277, 296-7, 316, 409-10. Fry, J. B. , General: 370. Garrison, William Lloyd: 50-2, 336. Gentryville: 4, 6, 7. Gettysburg, Lincoln's speech at: 363. Georgia: 36, 56, 199, 226, 396-7. George II. : 353. Gibbon, Edward: 67. Gilmer: 194. Gladstone, W. E. : 258. Goldsborough: 437, 444. Governors of States: 20, 161, 222, 299, 343-5, 362. Graham, Mentor: 63, 64, 68. Grant, Ulysses S. , General: previous disappointing career and return toArmy, earlier success in Civil War, 280; captures Fort Henry and FortDonelson, surprised but successful at Shiloh, 280-4; negro refugeeswith his army, 330; kept idle as Halleck's second in command, and onhis departure left on defensive near Corinth, 339, 342; his reputationnow and his real greatness of character, 345-8; Vicksburg campaigns, 348-55; Lincoln's relations with him from the first, 352-3; Chattanoogacampaign, 359-60; appointed Lieutenant General, meeting with Lincoln, parting from Sherman, 389-90; plans for final stages of war, 390;unsuccessful attempts to crush Lee in the open field and movement toCity Point for siege of Petersburg and Richmond in which firstoperations fail, 391-2; sends Sheridan to Shenandoah Valley, 393-4;unnecessary anxiety as to Thomas, 397; siege of Petersburg and Richmondcontinued, 398; attempts to get him to run for Presidency, 410-11; hisloyalty to Lincoln, 416-7; his wish to promote peace, 433; furtherprogress of siege, 436, 437-8; Lincoln's visit to him at City Point, 443-5; forbidden to treat with Lee on political questions, 445; fall ofRichmond, 445-6; Lee forced to surrender, 446-8; last interview withLincoln, 449-50; Memoirs, 459. Granville, Earl: 260. Gray, Asa: 138. Great Britain and Ireland: early relations with U. S. A. , 16-20; relativeprogress of the two countries at different periods, 32, 33, 38; Englishviews of American Revolution, 21, _see_ Constitution of Great Britainand U. S. A. ; war in 1812-14 with U. S. A. , 42, 46, 273; comparisons ofEnglish and American Government, 49, 50; relations of the two countriesin the Civil War, 211, 256-65, 313; voluntary system of recruiting inthe two countries and its result in each, 364-6, 370; Lincoln's fame inEngland, 454. Greeley, Horace: 137, 143, 245, 322-3, 404. Greene, Bowline: 79. Greensborough: 437, 452. Grigsby, Reuben, and family: 6, 11, 12. Grimes, Senator: 194. Halleck, Henry W. , General: 274, 277-84, 297-8, 301-2, 306, 309, 338-43, 349, 356, 395. Hamilton, Alexander: his greatness, 29; his origin and career, hebrings the Union Government into successful operation, his beautifuland heroic character, 29-30; original source of Monroe doctrine, 385;other references, 34, 37; his view on construction of Statutes, 377-8. Hampton Roads: 433. Hanks, Dennis: 4, 6, 420. Hanks, John: 4, 6, 14, 166. Hanks, Joseph: 4. Harcourt, Lady: 417. Hardin: 90. Harper's Ferry: 151, 239. Harrison, William Henry: 72. Harrison's Landing: 298-302. Harvard: 59, 330, 444. Hawthorne, Nathaniel: 101. Hay, John: 235, 419, 458, 461. Hayne, Senator: 45. Henderson, Colonel: 221. Herndon, William: 66, 79, 87, 94, 102-3, 105, 119, 126, 142, 147, 165. Hood, John B. , General: 394, 396-7. Hooker, Joseph, General: 309-11, 355-6, 360, 362. House of Commons. _See_ Parliament. House of Lords: 33. House of Representatives. _See_ Congress of U. S. A. Houston, Governor: 199. Hugo, Victor: 152. Hunter, General: 321, 395. Hymns: 11, 440. Illinois, 27, 38, Chapters I. , III. , IV. , 1 and 3, and V. , 1, 3, and 5;344, 350. Inaugural Address: Lincoln's first, 206-7; his second, 441-3; JeffersonDavis', 200-1. Inaugural Ceremony: Lincoln's first, 206; Lincoln's second, 438. Independence. _See_ Declaration of Independence. Independents. _See_ Congregationalists. Indiana: 4, 9, 27, 38, 345. Indians, North American: 3, 65. Iowa; 27, 194. Ironclads: 252. Jackson, Andrew: his opinion of Calhoun, 43; frustrates movement fornullification, 46; his character, 46; revives party and promotes growthof party machinery, and adopts "spoils system, " 46-49; otherreferences, 66, 173, 209, 409. Jackson, Thomas J. , called "Stonewall, " General: his acknowledgedgenius, 217, 220; goes with State of Virginia, 229; his character, 230;Shenandoah Valley campaign and movement to outflank McClellan, 295-8;Antietam campaign, 305; killed during victory of Chancellorsville, 311;Lee's estimate of his loss, 357. James, Henry: 461. James River: 292, 298, 392-3, 438, 447. Jefferson, Thomas: curious and displeasing character, 30; great andlasting influence on American life, 30-2; practical achievements instatesmanship, 32; real sense and value of his doctrine, 32-5; opinionand action as to slavery, 37-8; other references, 28, 46, 56, 179. Jiggers: 331. Johnson, Andrew: 400, 411, 451, 453. Johnson, Samuel: 33, 35. Johnston, Albert Sidney, General: 276-7, 281-2. Johnston, John: 4, 6, 14. Johnston, Joseph, General; 218, 247-8, 287-8, 295, 354-5, 378, 387, 390, 394, 436-7, 452. Kansas: 110-2, 115, 117, 126, 128, 139-40, 162-3. Kentucky: 2-5, 9, 26, 81, 192, 197, 225, 229, 270, 334, 339-43. Kipling, Rudyard: 88. Kirkham's Grammar: 63. "Know-Nothings. " _See_ American Party. Knoxville: 226, 275, 359. Law, Lincoln's law study and practice, 10, 67, 68, 106-8, 271-2, 423. Lee, Robert E. , General: his acknowledged genius, 217, 220; goes withState of Virginia, 229, 239, 376; his character, 230; cautious militaryadvice at first, 246; opinion of McClellan, 285; operations againstMcClellan, Pope, Burnside, and Hooker, 297, 311; invasion ofPennsylvania and retreat, 355-8, 386-7; resistance to Grant, _see_Grant, 391-2, 398; appointed General in Chief, 431; abstains alwaysfrom political action, 431-2; final effort, surrender and later life, 445-6. Lincoln, Abraham, President: his career and policy up to hisPresidency, _see_ in Table of Contents; his military administration andpolicy, 273-9, 302, 308, 345, _and see_ McClellan; his administrationgenerally, 250-5; his foreign policy, 261-5; his policy generally, 265-72, _and see_ Slavery, Negotiations for Peace, Reconstruction;development of his abilities and character, 7-15, 62, 73-7, 87-8, 103-6, 134-6, 153-5, 163-6, 233-9, 337, 418-24, 439-41; his fameto-day, 454-6. Lodge, Senator: 261. Logan, General: 350, 397. Longfellow, Henry Wadsworth: 53, 60, 61, 137, 152. Longstreet, General: 357, 359-60, 387. Louisiana Purchase: 26, 32, 39-40. Louisiana State: 26, 39-40, 199, 283, 334, 400, 448-9. Louisville: 116, 339-41. Love joy: 76. Lowell, James Russell, and references to his writings: 19, 92, 138, 172, 209, 237, 261, 264. Lundy: 50. Lynchburg: 438. Lyon, Nathaniel: 244-5, 269. Lyons, Lord: 236, 237, 264. McDowell, General: 247-8, 290, 293-7. Machine, in politics: 48-9, 167-8. McClellan, George B. , General: practical help to Douglas, 134;successes in West Virginia, 243; put in command of Army of Potomac andlater of all armies, 272; his strategic views at outset of war, 274-5, 276, 280; his career and character, 284-6; Lincoln's problem about him, 286-7; procrastination and friction before he moved, 287-91;preliminaries to campaign in Peninsula, 291-3; relieved of command overWestern armies, 293; campaign in Peninsula, 293-5, 298-302; his recalland failure to support Pope, 302-4; army of Potomac restored to him, 305; battle of Antietam and subsequent delays, 305-7; his finaldismissal and its cause, 307-9; his political career, 300, 308, 374, 413-5, 416, 424; resigns from Army, 437; Seward's judgment on him, 427. McClernand, General: 350-2. McLean, Justice: 114, 167. Madison, James: 37. Maine: 16, 40. Malplaquet: 364. Marcy: 49. Marshall, John: 41. Martial Law: 376-81. _See also_ 265-7, 269-70, 313, 321, 335-6, 451. Martineau, Harriet: 43. Maryland: 197, 225, 240-2, 304-7, 333-4. Mason: 263. Massachusetts: 16, 19, 172-3, 239-40, 296, 409. Mathematics: 67. _And see_ Euclid. Maximilian, Archduke and Emperor: 388. _Mayflower_: 150. Meade, George, General: 356-8, 391, 447. Memphis: 226, 275, 349, 389. Meridian: 227, 389. Merrimac: 292-3. Methodists: 150. Mexico: 28, 90; war with, 91-3; later relations, 211, 256, 388-9, 404, 420. Mexico, Gulf of: 27, 208. Michigan: 38, 172. Militia: 228, 246, 369. Mill, John Stuart: 260. Milligan, case of, in Supreme Court: 378. Minnesota: 27. Mississippi River: 7, 8, 13, 26, 56, 198, 226, 275, 281, 283, 348-55. Mississippi State: 26, 175, 179, 199, 227. _And see_ Meridian andVicksburg. Missouri Compromise: 39-40; repealed, 109-12; question whetherunconstitutional, 112-5. Missouri River: 26. Missouri State: 27, 39-40, 113, 197, 225, 229, 244-5, 269-70, 333-4, 400. Mobile: 227, 388, 395, 412. Moltke: 217. Monroe Doctrine: 388. Montana: 26. Montgomery: 199-200, 225. Mormons: 99, 130. Motley, John Lathrop: 138, 237, 238, 417. Napoleon I. : 26, 215. Napoleon III. : 256, 313, 388. Nashville: 339, 396. National Bank: 42, 47, 65. Nebraska: 110, 113. Negotiations for peace, impossible demand for them: 402-5, 428, 431-4. Negroes: Lincoln on notion of equality as applied to them, 124;Stephens on great moral truth of their inferiority, 179; their goodconduct during the war and their valour as soldiers, 330; Lincoln'shuman sympathy with them, and the right attitude in face of the barbetween the two races, 330-3; mistaken precipitancy in giving them thesuffrage, 334-5, 430; the Confederacy ultimately enlists negroes, 431;negro bodyguard at Lincoln's second Inauguration, 435; projects forcolonisation of negroes, 42, 317, 331, 332. _See also_ Slavery. Neuse River: 437. Nevada: 95. New Berne: 437. New England: 17, 173, 241, 326. New Hampshire: 100. New Jersey: 17. New Mexico: 96, 99, 145, 194. New Orleans; 4, 13-4, 46, 198, 226, 283. New Salem: 4, 63-9, 78-80. New York City: 29, 49, 144, 155-6, 205, 241, 254, 384. New York State: 16, 17, 29. Niagara: 105, 139, 404. Nicolay, John: 211, 235, 419, 458, 460. North: original characteristics and gradual divergence from South, inAmerica and South; advantages and disadvantages in the war, 214-9;divisions in the North, _see_ Democrats and Radicals; magnitude ofeffort and endurance shown by the North, 363-6, 426-7. North Anna River: 392. North Carolina: 26, 27, 194; secedes with Virginia, 229, 435-7, 452. North-West Territory: 38. Northcote, Sir Stafford: 260. Novels: 67. Nueces River: 92. Oberlin, 150. Officers: 220, 223-4, 350. Ohio River: 4, 8, 26, 117, 226, 243, 280. Ohio State: 38, 161, 172, 340-2, 344, 359, 381-3. Olmsted, Frederick Law: 53, 57, 460. Oratory in America: 34, 41, 133, 136, 138, 155, 159, 362. Oregon, Territory and State: 28, 92, 96, 112. Orsini: 152. Owens, Mary: 80-1. Paine, Tom: 69. Palmerston: 234, 260, 313. Pardon of offenders by Lincoln; 420-1. Parliament: relation to Colonies, 19; contrast with Congress, 20, 23. Parliamentarians under Charles I. : 33. Party and Parties: 46-50, 374-5, 385. _And see_ American, Federalist, Free-Soil, Democratic, Republican and Whig. Patterson, General: 247. Pemberton, General: 354-5. Pennsylvania: 17, 202, 355-8. Peoria: 72, 135, 142. Petersburg. _See_ Richmond. Philadelphia: 184, 356. Pierce, Franklin: 100, 111, 138, 218. Pilgrim's Progress: 10. Pitt, William, the younger: 376. Polk, President: 91-3. Polk, Bishop and General, 350. Pope, General: 283, 301, 302-3. Port Hudson: 343, 354-5. Porter, Admiral: 349, 353, 388, 435-6, 444. Post of Arkansas: 351. Potomac: 225, 243, 249, 288, 306, 358. Presbyterian: 77, 439. Prince Consort: 263. Prisoners of War: 398. Protection: 42, 45, 65, 68, 202. Public Works; 42, 65, 71. Puritans: 17. Quakers: 17, 50, 153. Radicals: 232-3, 245, 267-70, 328, 398-400, 410, 430. Railways: 7, 27, 226-7, 276, 339, 388, 396, 397, 447. Raleigh: 437, 452. Rapidan: 288, 311, 358, 391. Rappahannock: 309, 311, 355, 358. Rathbone, Major: 450-1. Raymond: 414. _And see_ 404. Reconstruction: 326-8, 333-5, 398-401, 434-5, 448-50. Red River: 388. Republican Party: (1) Party of this name which followed Jefferson andof which leading members were afterwards Democrats, 30, 31; (2) Newparty formed in 1854 to resist extension of slavery in Territories, 111; runs Frémont for Presidency, 112; embarrassed by Dred Scottjudgment, 112, 115; possibility of differences underlying its simpleprinciples, 122; disposition among its leaders to support Douglas afterKansas scandal, 141-3; consistency of thought and action supplied to itby Lincoln, 122, 145-6; nomination and election of Lincoln, 160-2, 166-9; sections in the party during war, 267-71; increasing divergencebetween Lincoln and the leading men in the party, 321, 326-9, 401-2, 409-14, 430, 434-5, 450. Reuben, First Chronicles of: 11-2. Revolution, American: 20-2. Revolution, French: 31. Rhodes, Cecil: 335. Rhodes, James Ford: 418, 459. Richmond: 225-7, 242, 245, 275, 302, 392; siege of Petersburg andRichmond, _see_ Lee or Grant; feeling in Richmond towards end, 431-2;Lincoln's visit to it, 447. Roberts, F. M. Earl: 364. Robinson Crusoe: 10. Rollin: 67. Romilly, Samuel: 32. Rosecrans, General: 342-3, 351, 359-60. Russell, Lord John: 260, 263, 313. Russia: 118, 211, 256. Rutledge, Ann: 78. St. Gaudens, Augustus: 330. St. Louis: 116, 244. Salisbury, Marquess of: 258, 259. Sangamon: 64-5, 166. Savannah: 398, 435. Schofield, General: 397, 436-7. Schools, Lincoln's: 10. Schurz, Carl: 235, 421. Scott, Dred, and his case; 112-5, 144. Scott, William: 421-2. Scott, Winfield, General: 93, 100, 205, 208, 231, 246-9, 274-5, 388, 453. Secession. _See_ South and Confederacy. Seward, William: opponent of compromise of 1850 and rising Republicanleader, 101, 137, 152; against opposing Douglas, 141; speaks well ofJohn Brown, 152; expected to be Republican candidate for Presidency, rejected partly for his unworthy associates, more for his supposedstrong opinions, 161-8; supports Lincoln in election, 169; actionduring progress of Secession, 193-5, 204; on First Inaugural, 206;action during crisis of Fort Sumter, 208-10; vain attempt to masterLincoln and generous acceptance of defeat, 210-1, 250; his part inforeign policy, 262-5, 387; wise advice to postpone Emancipation, 320;retained by Lincoln in spite of intrigues against him, 328-30;administration of martial law, 376; his usefulness and great loyalty, 406; his judgment on McClellan, 426; attempt to assassinate him, 451;certifies ratification of 13th amendment, 336. Seymour, Horatio: 381, 383-5, 413. Sigel, General: 394. Shakespeare: 103, 108, 423, 448. Shaw, Robert Gould: 330. Shenandoah Valley; 225, 247, 296, 394, 395-6, 424, 437-8. Sheridan, Philip, General: 220, 343, 395-6, 424, 437-8, 444. Sherman, John, Senator: 235, 380. Sherman, William Tecumseh, General; 52, 220, 224, 249; character andrelations with Grant, 348; failure in first attempt on Vicksburg, 350;under McClernand, takes Post of Arkansas, 351; with Grant in rest ofVicksburg campaigns, 353-5; at Chattanooga, 360; at Meridian, 388;parting with Grant, his fears for him, their concerted plans, 389;Atlanta campaign, 394-5, 424; detaches Thomas against Hood, 397-8; fromAtlanta to the sea, 397-9; campaigns in the Carolinas, 435-6; meetsLincoln at City Point, 444-5; Lincoln's dream about him, 449;Johnston's surrender to him, 452. Shields, Colonel: 85. Slave Trade: how treated by Constitution of U. S. A. , 24; prohibition ofit in American colonies vetoed, 36; prohibited by several AmericanStates, by United Kingdom, and by Union, 38; movement to revive it inSouthern States, 145, 150; prohibited by Confederate Constitution andinadequate Bill against it vetoed by J. Davis, 200; treaty betweenUnited Kingdom and U. S. A. , for its more effectual prevention, and firstactual execution of a slave-trader in U. S. A. , 317. Slavery: compromise about it in Constitution, 25; opinion and action ofthe "Fathers" in regard to it, 35-9; becomes more firmly rooted inSouth, 39; disputes as to it temporarily settled by MissouriCompromise, 39-40; its real character in America, 52-5; its politicaland social effect on the South, 43-5, 55-9; Abolition movement, _see_Abolition; its increasing influence on Southern policy; _see_ South;repeal of Missouri Compromise, and dicta of Supreme Court in favour ofslavery, 109-15; Lincoln's attitude from first in regard to it, 14, 76, 94; his principles as to it, 121-131, 144; slavery the sole cause ofSecession, 178-9; the progress of actual Emancipation, 313-37; alreadycoming to an end in the South before the end of the war, 429, 431. _See also_ Negroes. Slidell: 263. Smith, Baldwin, General: 308. Smith, Caleb: 167, 202, 405. Smith, Kirby, General: 339-42, 453. South: original difference of character and interest between Northernand Southern States becoming more marked concurrently with growth ofUnion, 17-8, 36, 39-40, 43-5; slavery and Southern society, 52-9;growing power of a Southern policy for slavery to which the Northgenerally is subservient, 91-2, 98-100, 117, 138-41; rise of resistanceto this, _see_ Republican Party; causes of Secession and prevailingfeeling in South about it, 170-88; history of Secession and War, _see_Confederacy and War; Southern spirit in the war, 216, 218-20; heroismof struggle, 397; memory of the war a common inheritance to North andSouth, 455. South Carolina: 26-7, 36, 44-6, 57-8, 173, 179-80, 182, 185-90, 200-1, 208, 253, 321, 386, 435. Spain: 16, 26, 90, 211. Speed, James: 405. Speed, Joshua: 70, 81, 87, 116-8, 405, 440. Spoils System: 49-50, 95, 254-5. Springfield: Lincoln's life there, 70-7, 81-7, 101-9; his farewellspeech there, 203; his funeral there, 453. Stanton, Edwin: rude to Lincoln in law case, services in Buchanan'sCabinet, denounces Lincoln's administration, made Secretary of War, 272; great mistake as to recruiting, 299, 368; Conservative hostilityto him, 328-9; services in War Department and loyalty to Lincoln, 272, 290, 329, 389, 406, 419-20; at Lincoln's death-bed, 453. States: relations to Federal Government and during secession toConfederacy, 24, 221-3. Stephens, Alexander: 179, 199-200, 432-4. Stevenson, Robert Louis: 87. Stowe, Mrs. Beecher: 51, 54, 110. Submarines: 251. Sumner, Charles: 101, 138-9, 418, 429, 448. Supreme Court: 41, 112-5, 144, 378, 382. Swedish colonists: 17. Swett, Leonard: 13. Talleyrand: 29. Taney, Roger: 112-5, 144, 206, 242, 429. Taylor, Zachary: 92-3, 95, 98. Tennessee River: 226, 280, 339. Tennessee State: 27, 199, 226, 229, 275-7, 279-84, 338-40, 342-3, 393-4, 397, 408. Tennyson, Alfred: 259. Territories: their position under Constitution, 25; expansion andsettlement, 26-8; cessions of Territories by States to Union, 38;conflict as to slavery in them, _see_ Slavery. Terry, General; 433. Texas: 28, 91, 198, 199, 388, 453. Thomas, George H. , General: 231, 280, 341, 343, 369, 388, 396-7. Todd, Mary. _See_ Lincoln, Mrs. Trumbull, Lyman: 120. Tyler, John: 72, 91, 200. "Underground Railway": 150. Union and United States. _See_ America. Union men: letter of Lincoln to great meeting of, 384-5. Urbana: 291-2. Usher: 405. Utah: 99. Vallandigham, Clement: 379, 381-3, 413. Van Buren, Martin: 47, 49, 66. Vandalia: 72. Vermont: 16, 38. Vicksburg: 226, 282, 339, 348-55, 449. Victoria, Queen: 263, 451. Virginia: 3, 27, 37, 38, 39, 47, 54, 69, 98, 197-200, 209, 213, 217, 228; and for stages of war in Virginia _see_ McClellan, Lee andShenandoah Valley. Volney: 69. Voltaire: 69. Voluntary enlistment in the North, 221-2; results here and in U. S. A. , 364-5; its fundamental immorality when used on a large scale, 366. Wad, Senator: 194, 400. Walker, Governor: 140. Wallace, General: 393. War, Civil, in U. S. A. : general conditions and strategic aspects of thewar, 214-27, 273-8; preliminary struggles in border States, 228-45;first Battle of Bull Run, 245-50; blockade of South and navaloperations generally, 251-3; war in West to occupation of Corinth andtaking of New Orleans, 279-84; _Merrimac_ and _Monitor_, 292-3;beginning of Peninsula campaign, 290-5; "Stonewall" Jackson's Valleycampaign, 295-7; end of Peninsula campaign, 298-302; second Battle ofBull Run, 303-4; Lee's invasion of Maryland and Antietam, 304-7;Fredericksburg, 309; Chancellorsville, 311; Buell's operations inautumn of 1863, Confederate invasion of Kentucky, and Murfreesborough, 338-43; Vicksburg campaigns and completion of, conquest of Mississippi, 348-55; Lee's invasion of Pennsylvania, Gettysburg, and Meade'scampaign in Virginia, 355-8; campaigns of Chickamauga, EasternTennessee, and Chattanooga, 358-64; certain minor operations, 386-8;military situation at beginning of 1864 and Grant's plans, 386, 389;Grant's campaign against Lee to beginning of siege of Petersburg, 390-2; Early's Shenandoah campaign, 394; Sherman's Atlanta campaign, 394-5; Farragut at Mobile, 395; Sheridan in Lower Shenandoah Valley, 395-6; Sherman's plans, 396; Hood's invasion of Tennessee, 396-7;Sherman's march to Savannah, 397-8; Petersburg siege continues, 398;effect of Sherman's operations, 431; Sherman's advance northward fromSavannah, 435; Porter and Terry take Fort Fisher, 435-6; Petersburgsiege progresses, 436; Sherman in North Carolina, 436-7; Sheridan inUpper Shenandoah Valley, 437-8; fall of Petersburg and Richmond, andsurrender of Lee, 445-8; surrender of other Confederate forces, 452-3. Ward, Artemus: 208, 231, 324. Washington City: its importance and dangers in the war, 225, 239-42, 248, 293-4, 295-7, 302, 304, 355-6, 376, 392-3; its political society, 418. Washington, George: 10, 21, 37, 76, 203-4, 388. Watson, William: 460. Webster, Daniel: his career and services, 41-2; his great speech, 45-6, 173; value of his support to Whigs, 68; Lincoln meets him, 91; hissupport of compromise of 1850 and his death, 99-100. Weed, Thurlow, 193-4, 414, 443. Weems' Life of Washington: 10. Welles, Gideon: 202, 252-3, 263, 271, 406. Wellington: 377. Wesley, Samuel: 35. West, the: 7-9, 27-8, 46, 61, 91, 93, 155, 224, 226, 303, 305. _Andsee_ War. West Indies, British: 29, 52. West Point: 223, 390. West Virginia: 225, 229, 243, 296, 334, 400. Whig Party: 48, 66-8, 91-3, 95, 100, 111, 117, 159, 433. Whites, Poor or Mean: 55, 178. Whitman, Walt: 61, 237, 238, 418-9. Whitney, Eli: 39. Wilmington: 251, 435-6. Wilmot, David and Wilmot Proviso: 96, 99, 117. Wilson, President: 45, 54. Wisconsin: 38, 172. Wood and Edmonds: 233, 456. Wood, Fernando: 309. Wolfe, Sir James: 353. Wolseley, F. M. Viscount: 217, 218, 229-30, 285. Yazoo: 350, 352. Young Men's Lyceum: 69. Zeruiah, her sons: 445. MAY WE HELP? _The publishers of Star books have tried to maintain a high standard inthe selection of titles for their list, and to offer a consistentquality of workmanship and material. They trust that the book you havejust read has, in part at least, earned your esteem for other titles intheir list. _ _They are trying to make the Star Library comprehend the best in theliterary fields of biography, science, history, true adventure, travel, art, philosophy, psychology, etc. _ _Believing that you will be interested in other books of a naturesimilar to that which you have just finished reading, the publishershave reproduced on the following pages a few extracts from other Starbooks. These are pages picked at random. Although there is nocontinuity, we hope that they will give you some idea of the style inwhich the books are written and perhaps the character of the subjectfrom which you may form an opinion as to its place on your personalbook shelf. _ _Reprinted by permission from_ LINCOLN'S OWN STORIES _told by Anthony Gross_ VI THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF Delegations from Baltimore called to protest against the "pollution" ofthe soil of Maryland by the feet of the soldiers marching across it tofight against the South. They had no difficulty in understanding thePresident's reply: "We must have troops; and, as they can neither crawl _under_ Marylandnor fly _over_ it, they must come across it. " When the war had actually begun he delighted in the soldiers' grimhumor in the face of death. He told story after story about the"boys, " laughing, with tears in his gray eyes, at their heroism indanger. He never laughed at the private soldier, except in the prideof his hearty patriotism. But he made constant fun of the assumptionsof generals and other high officials. The stories he most enjoyedtelling were of the soldiers' scoffing at rank and pretension. Hedelighted in the following: A picket challenged a tug going up Broad River, South Carolina, with: "Who goes there?" "The Secretary of War and Major-General Foster, " was the pompous reply. "Aw! We've got major-generals enough up here--why don't you bring usup some hardtack?" On another occasion a friend burst into his room to tell him that abrigadier-general and twelve army mules had been carried off by aConfederate raid. "How unfortunate! Those mules cost us two hundred dollars apiece!" wasthe President's only reply. Mr. Lincoln was a very abstemious man, ate very little and dranknothing but water, not from principle, but because he did not like wineor spirits. Once, in rather dark days early in the war, a temperancecommittee came to him and said that the reason we did not win wasbecause our army drank so much whisky as to bring the curse of the Lordupon them. He said, in reply, that it was rather unfair on the part ofthe aforesaid curse, as the other side drank more and worse whisky thanours did. Some one urged President Lincoln to place General Frémont in command ofsome station. While the President did not want to offend his friend ata rather critical time of the war, he pushed him gently and firmlyaside in this wise: He said he did not know where to place GeneralFrémont, and it reminded him of an old man who advised his son to takea wife, to which the young man responded, "Whose wife shall I take?" On one occasion, exasperated at the discrepancy between the aggregateof troops forwarded to McClellan and the number of men the Generalreported as having received, Lincoln exclaimed, "Sending men to thatarmy is like shoveling fleas across a barnyard--half of them never getthere. " Lincoln's orders to his generals are filled with the kindly courtesy, the direct argument, and the dry humor which are so characteristic ofthe man. To Grant, who had telegraphed, "If the thing is pressed, Ithink that Lee will surrender, " Lincoln replied, "Let the thing bepressed. " To McClellan, gently chiding him for his inactivity: "I have just readyour despatch about sore tongue and fatigued horse. Will you pardon mefor asking what the horses of your army have done since the battle ofAntietam that fatigues anything?" Referring to General McClellan's inactivity, President Lincoln onceexpressed his impatience by saying, "McClellan is a pleasant andscholarly gentleman; he is an admirable engineer, but he seems to havea special talent for stationary engineering. " After a long period of inaction on the part of the Union forces atelegram from Cumberland Gap reached Mr. Lincoln, saying that firingwas heard in the direction of Knoxville. The President simply remarkedthat he was glad of it. As General Burnside was in a perilous positionin Tennessee at that time, those present were greatly surprised atLincoln's calm view of the case. "You see, " said the President, "itreminds me of Mistress Sallie Ward, a neighbor of mine, who had a verylarge family. Occasionally one of her numerous progeny would be heardcrying in some out-of-the-way place, upon which Mrs. Ward wouldexclaim, 'There's one of my children not dead yet!'" Writing to Hooker, who succeeded Burnside, Lincoln said: "I believe you to be a brave and skilful soldier, which, of course, Ilike. I also believe you do not mix politics with your profession, inwhich you are right. You have confidence in yourself, which is avaluable, if not indispensable, quality. You are ambitious, whichwithin reasonable bounds does good rather than harm; but I think thatduring General Burnside's command of the army you have taken counselwith your ambition, and thwarted him as much as you could, in which youdid a great wrong to the country and to a most meritorious andhonorable brother-officer. I have heard, in such a way as to believeit, of your recently saying that both the army and the governmentneeded a dictator. Of course, it is not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the command. Only those generals who gainsuccesses can set up dictators. What I now ask of you is militarysuccess, and I will risk the dictatorship. " General Fry, who was Provost-Marshal of the War Department and receiveddaily instructions from the President in regard to the draft fortroops, which was one of the most embarrassing and perplexing questionsthat arose during the war, illustrates this peculiar trait by ananecdote. He says: "Upon one occasion the Governor of a State came to my office bristlingwith complaints in relation to the number of troops required from hisState, the details of drafting the men, and the plan of compulsoryservice in general. I found it impossible to satisfy his demands, andaccompanied him to the Secretary of War's office, whence, after astormy interview with Stanton, he went alone to press his ultimatumupon the highest authority. After I had waited anxiously for somehours, expecting important orders or decisions from the President, orat least a summons to the White House for explanation, the Governorreturned, and said, with a pleasant smile, that he was going home bythe next train, and merely dropping in _en route_ to say good-by. Neither the business he came upon nor his interview with the Presidentwas alluded to. "As soon as I could see Lincoln I said: 'Mr. President, I am veryanxious to learn how you disposed of Governor ----. He went to youroffice from the War Department in a towering rage. I suppose you foundit necessary to make large concessions to him, as he returned from youentirely satisfied. ' "'Oh no, ' he replied, 'I did not concede anything. You know how thatIllinois farmer managed the big log that lay in the middle of thefield? To the inquiries of his neighbors, one Sunday, he announcedthat he had got rid of the big log. "Got rid of it!" said they. "Howdid you do it? It was too big to haul out, too knotty to split, andtoo wet and soggy to burn; what did you do?" "Well, now, boys, "replied the farmer, "if you won't divulge the secret, I'll tell you howI got rid of it. I _plowed around_ it. " Now, ' said Lincoln, 'don'ttell anybody, but that's the way I got rid of Governor ----. I _plowedaround_ him, but it took me three mortal hours to do it, and I wasafraid every moment he'd see what I was at. '" Commenting on Jeb Stuart's raid into Maryland and Pennsylvania and hiscomplete circuit of McClellan's army and his return over the riverunharmed despite McClellan's attempt to head him off, Lincoln remarked: "When I was a boy we used to play a game, three times round and out. Stuart has been round twice; if he goes round him once more, gentlemen, McClellan will be out. " The General ascribed Stuart's success to his lack of horses, andtelegraphed that unless the army got more horses there would be similarexpeditions. To this Halleck telegraphed: "The President has read your telegram, and [Transcriber's note: end of this extract. ] The following is reprinted by permission from RECOLLECTIONS AND LETTERS OF ROBERT E. LEE by his son Captain Robert E. Lee LEE'S OPINION UPON THE LATE WAR envelope in which they were inclosed was the following indorsement inGeneral Lee's handwriting: "LONDON, July 31, 1866. "Herbert C. Saunders asks permission to publish his conversation withme. August 22d--Refused. " "3 BOLTON GARDENS, SOUTH KENSINGTON, "LONDON, July 31, 1866. "_My Dear General Lee_: Presuming on the acquaintance with you which Ihad the honour and pleasure of making last November at Lexington, whiletravelling in Virginia, I venture now to write to you under thesecircumstances. You may remember that, at the time I presented to youmy letter of introduction, I told you that two other Englishmen, friends of mine, who had come with me to America, were then making atour through Georgia, the Carolinas, and some other Southern States. One of them, Mr. Kennaway, was so much interested with all he saw, andthe people at home have appreciated his letters descriptive of it sowell, that he is intending to publish a short account of his visit. Not having, however, had an introduction to yourself, he is anxious toavail himself of the somewhat full accounts I wrote home at the time, descriptive of my most interesting interview with you, and, with thisview, he has asked me to put into the shape of a letter all those moreprominent points which occur to me as gathered from my letters and myrecollection, and which are likely to interest and instruct the Englishpublic. I have, after some hesitation, acceded to the request--ahesitation caused mainly by the fact that at the time I saw you Ineither prepared my notes with a view to publication nor did I informyou that there was any chance of what you told me being repeated. Imay add that I never until a month or two ago had the slightest thoughtof publishing anything, and, in fact, have constantly resisted the manyapplications by my friends that I should let my letters see the light. My object in now writing to you is to know whether you have anyobjection to my giving my friend the inclosed short account of ourinterview, as it would, I am convinced, add greatly to the interest ofthe narrative. If you have no objection to this, perhaps you wouldkindly correct any statements put into your mouth which are not quiteaccurate, or expunge anything which might prejudice you with the publiceither of the North or the South, if unluckily anything of this natureshould have crept in. My letters were written a day or two after theconversation, but you had so much of interest and new to tell me that Ido not feel sure that I may not have confused names of battles, etc. , in some instances. It will be necessary for me to deliver my part ofthe performance early in September to the publishers, and, therefore, Ishould feel much obliged by your sending me an answer at your earliestconvenience. There will be a mail due here about the first of thatmonth, leaving the United States on Wednesday, the 22d. , and I shall, therefore, wait till its arrival before sending my letter to Mr. Kennaway; but should I not hear from you then I shall consider you haveno objections to make or alterations to suggest, and act accordingly. If you have any new facts which you think it desirable should be knownby the public, it will give me much pleasure to be the medium of theircommunication. "I am sure I need scarcely tell you with what keen interest I have readall the accounts from your continent of the proceedings in Congress andelsewhere in connection with the reconstruction of the South. I dosincerely trust it may be eventually effected in a way satisfactory tothe South, and I most deeply deplore the steps taken by the Radicalside of the House to set the two (North and South) by the ears again. President Johnson's policy seems to me to be that which, if pursued, would be most likely to contribute to the consolidation of the country;but I am both surprised and pained to find how little power theExecutive has against so strong a faction as the Radicals, who, whilethey claim to represent the North, do, in fact, but misrepresent thecountry. I am sure you will believe that I say with sincerity that Ialways take great interest in anything I hear said or that I read ofyourself, and I am happy to say that, even with all the rancour of theNorthern Radicals against the South, it is little they find of ill tosay of you. "Hoping you will not think I am doing wrong in the course I propose totake, and that your answer may be satisfactory, I remain, my dearGeneral Lee, "Yours very sincerely, HERBERT C. SAUNDERS. "GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE. " "LEXINGTON, Virginia, August 22, 1866. "MR. HERBERT C. SAUNDERS, "3 Bolton Gardens, "South Kensington, London, England. "_My Dear Mr. Saunders_: I received to-day your letter of the 31st ult. What I stated to you in conversation, during the visit which you did methe honour to pay me in November last, was entirely for your owninformation, and was in no way intended for publication. My onlyobject was to gratify the interest which you apparently evinced on theseveral topics which were introduced, and to point to facts which youmight investigate, if you so desired, in your own way. I have anobjection to the publication of my private conversations, which arenever intended but for those to whom they are addressed. I cannot, therefore, without an entire disregard of the rule which I havefollowed in other cases, and in violation of my own sense of propriety, assent to what you propose. I hope, therefore, you will excuse me. What you may think proper to publish I hope will be the result of yourown observations and convictions, and not on my authority. In thehasty perusal which I have been obliged to give the manuscript inclosedto me, I perceive many inaccuracies, resulting as much, perhaps, frommy imperfect narration as from misapprehension on your part. Thoughfully appreciating your kind wish to correct certain erroneousstatements as regards myself, I prefer remaining silent to doinganything that might excite angry discussion at this time, when strongefforts are being made by conservative men, North and South, to sustainPresident Johnson in his policy, which, I think, offers the only meansof healing the lamentable divisions of the country, and which theresult of the late convention at Philadelphia gives great promise ofdoing. Thanking you for the opportunity afforded me of expressing myopinion before executing your purpose, I am, etc. , "R. E. LEE. " The following is Mr. Saunders' account of the interview: "On only one subject would he talk at any length about his own conduct, and that was with reference to the treatment of the Federal prisonerswho had fallen into his hands. He seemed to feel deeply the backhandedstigma cast upon him by his having been included by name in the firstindictment framed against Wirz, though he was afterward omitted fromthe new charges. He explained to me the circumstances under which hehad arranged with McClellan for the exchange of prisoners; how he had, after the battles of Manassas, Fredericksburg, and (I think)Chancellorsville, sent all the wounded over to the enemy on theengagement of their generals to parole them. He also told me that onseveral occasions his commissary generals had come to him after abattle and represented that he had not rations enough both forprisoners and the army when the former had to be sent several days'march to their place of confinement, and he had always given ordersthat the wants of the prisoners should be first attended to, as fromtheir position they could not save themselves from starvation byforaging or otherwise, as the army could when in straits forprovisions. The General also explained how every effort had alwaysbeen made by the Confederates to do away with the necessity ofretaining prisoners by offering every facility for exchange, till atlast, when all exchange was refused, they found themselves with 30, 000prisoners for whom they were quite unable to do as much as they wishedin the way of food. He stated, furthermore, that many of theirhardships arose from the necessity of constantly changing the prisonsto prevent recapture. With the management of the prisons he assured mehe had no more to do than I had, and did not even know that Wirz was incharge of Andersonville prison (at least, I think he asserted this)till after the war was over. I could quite sympathise with him in hisfeeling of pain under which his generous nature evidently suffered thatthe authorities at Washington should have included him and otherssimilarly circumstanced in this charge of cruelty at the time thatletters written by himself (General Lee), taken in Richmond whencaptured, complaining that the troops in his army had actually been fordays together on several occasions without an ounce of meat, were inpossession of the military authorities. "When discussing the state of feeling in England with regard to thewar, he assured me that it had all along given him the greatestpleasure to feel that the Southern cause had the sympathies of so manyin the 'old country, ' to which he looked as a second home; but, inanswer to my questions, he replied that he had never expected us togive them material aid, and added that he thought all governments wereright in studying only the interests of their own people and in notgoing to war for an 'idea' when they had no distinct cause of quarrel. "On the subject of slavery, he assured me that he had always been infavour of the emancipation of the negroes, and that in Virginia thefeeling had been strongly inclining in the same direction, till theill-judged enthusiasm (amounting to rancour) of the abolitionists inthe North had turned the Southern tide of feeling in the otherdirection. In Virginia, about thirty years ago, an ordinance for theemancipation of the slaves had been rejected by only a small majority, and every one fully expected at the next convention it would have beencarried, but for the above cause. He went on to say that there wasscarcely a Virginian now who was not glad that the subject had beendefinitely settled, though nearly all regretted that they had not beenwise enough to do it themselves the first year of the war. Allusionwas made by him to a conversation he had with a distinguishedcountryman of mine. He had been visiting a large slave plantation(Shirley) on the James River. The Englishman had told him that theworking population were better cared for there than in any country hehad ever visited, but that he must never expect an approval of theinstitution of slavery by England, or aid from her in any cause inwhich that question was involved. Taking these facts and thewell-known antipathy of the mass of the English to the institution intoconsideration, he said he had never expected help from England. Thepeople 'at the South' (as the expression is), in the main, thoughscarcely unanimously, seem to hold much the same language as GeneralLee with reference to our neutrality, and to be much less bitter thanNortherners generally--who, I must confess, in my own opinion, havemuch less cause to complain of our interpretation of the laws ofneutrality than the South. I may mention here, by way of parenthesis, that I was, on two separate occasions (once in Washington and once inLexington), told that there were many people in the country who wishedthat General Washington had never lived and that they were stillsubjects of Queen Victoria; but I should certainly say as a rule theAmericans are much too well satisfied with themselves for this feelingto be at all common. General Lee, in the course of this to me mostinteresting evening's _séance_, gave me many details of the war toolong to put on paper, but, with reference to the small result of theirnumerous victories, accounted for it in this way: the force which theConfederates brought to bear was so often inferior in numbers to thatof the Yankees that the more they followed up the victory against oneportion of the enemy's line the more did they lay themselves open tobeing surrounded by the remainder of the enemy. He likened theoperation to a man breasting a wave of the sea, who, as rapidly as heclears a way before him, is enveloped by the very water he hasdisplaced. He spoke of the final surrender as inevitable owing to thesuperiority in numbers of the enemy. His own army had, during the lastfew weeks, suffered materially from defection in its ranks, and, discouraged by failures and worn out by hardships, had at the time ofthe surrender only 7, 892 men under arms, and this little army wasalmost surrounded by one of 100, 000. They might, the General said withan air piteous to behold, have cut their way out as they had donebefore, but, looking upon the struggle as hopeless, I was not surprisedto hear him say that he thought it cruel to prolong it. In two otherbattles he named (Sharpsburg and Chancellorsville, I think he said), the Confederates were to the Federals in point of numbers as 35, 000 to120, 000 and as 45, 000 to 155, 000 respectively, so that the meredisparity of numbers was not sufficient to convince him of thenecessity of surrender; but feeling that his own army was persuaded ofthe ultimate hopelessness of the contest as evidenced by theirdefection, he took the course of surrendering his army in lieu ofreserving it for utter annihilation. "Turning to the political bearing of the important question at issue, the great Southern general gave me, at some length, his feelings withregard to the abstract right of secession. This right, he told me, washeld as a constitutional maxim at the South. As to its exercise at thetime on the part of the South, he was distinctly opposed, and it wasnot until Lincoln issued a proclamation for 75, 000 men to invade theSouth, which was deemed clearly unconstitutional, that Virginiawithdrew from the United States. "We discussed a variety of other topics, and, at eleven o'clock when Irose to go, he begged me to stay on, as he found the nights full long. His son, General Custis Lee, who had distinguished himself much duringthe war, but whom I had not the good fortune of meeting, is the onlyone of his family at present with him at Lexington, where he occupiesthe position of a professor in the Military Institute of Virginia. This college had 250 cadets in it when the war broke out, General'Stonewall' Jackson being one of the professors. At one moment in thewar, when the Federals were advancing steadily up the ShenandoahValley, these youths (from 16 to 22 years of age) were marched to jointhe Confederate Army, and did good service. In one battle atNewmarket, of which I shall have occasion to speak later in my letters, they distinguished themselves in a conspicuous way under the leadershipof Colonel Shipp, who is still their commandant. By a brilliantcharge, they contributed, in a great measure, to turn the tide ofaffairs, losing nine of their number killed and more than fortywounded. General Hunter, on a subsequent occasion, when occupyingLexington with a body of Federal troops, quartered his men in theMilitary Institute for several days, and, on leaving, had thebuilding--a very handsome and extensive one--fired in numerous places, completely destroying all but the external walls, which now stand. Theprofessors' houses stood in detached positions, and these, too, withthe house of Mr. Letcher, a former governor of the State, he also burntto the ground. The Washington College, the presidency of which GeneralLee now holds, they also ransacked, destroying everything it contained, and were preparing it for the flames, to which they were withdifficulty restrained from devoting it by earnest representations ofits strictly educational nature. "