A TREATISE

ON THE

TACTICAL USE OF THE THREE ARMS:

INFANTRY, ARTILLERY, AND CAVALRY. 

BY

FRANCIS J. LIPPITT, EX-COLONEL SECOND INFANTRY, CALIFORNIA VOLUNTEERS. 

NEW YORK:D. VAN NOSTRAND, PUBLISHER, 192 BROADWAY. 1865. 

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1865, By D. VAN NOSTRAND, In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for theSouthern District of New York. 

ALVORD, PRINTER. 

TO THE MILITARY PUBLIC. 

The Author would feel obliged for any facts or suggestions which mightenable him to render a future edition of this work more valuable. 

PROVIDENCE, R. I. , _July, 1865_. 

TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

 PAGE

Tactical Use of Infantry 3

 I. ITS ATTACK, GENERALLY 4 II. FORMATIONS FOR ATTACK 8 III. THE ATTACK, HOW MADE 19 IV. BAYONET CHARGES 24 V. DEFENCE AGAINST INFANTRY 27 VI. DEFENCE AGAINST ARTILLERY 34 VII. DEFENCE AGAINST CAVALRY 36VIII. SQUARES 40 IX. SKIRMISHERS 49 A. THEIR USE 50 B. HOW POSTED 53 C. HOW HANDLED 55 D. RULES FOR INDIVIDUAL SKIRMISHERS 56

Tactical Use of Artillery 59

 I. HOW POSTED WITH RESPECT TO THE GROUND 59 II. HOW POSTED WITH RESPECT TO OUR OWN TROOPS 63 III. HOW POSTED WITH RESPECT TO THE ENEMY 66 IV. POSTING OF BATTERIES AND OF PIECES AS BETWEEN THEMSELVES 68 V. HOW USED 70 A. GENERALLY 70 B. IN OFFENSIVE COMBAT 72 C. IN DEFENSIVE COMBAT 75 D. AGAINST INFANTRY 78 E. AGAINST CAVALRY 82 F. AGAINST ARTILLERY 83 VI. ITS FIRE 85 VII. ITS SUPPORTS 89

Tactical Use of Cavalry 93

 I. ITS FORMATIONS 93 II. ITS STRONG AND ITS WEAK POINTS 98 III. HOW POSTED 99 IV. ITS SUPPORTS 104 V. HOW USED 106 VI. HOW IT FIGHTS 109 VII. ITS CHARGE 113VIII. ITS ATTACK ON INFANTRY 122 A. GENERALLY 122 B. ON SQUARES 124 IX. GENERAL REMARKS 127

TACTICAL USE OF THE THREE ARMS. 

Every complete military force consists of three arms, --INFANTRY, ARTILLERY, and CAVALRY. 

In battle, these three arms are united; and, other things being equal, that commander will prove victorious who is best acquainted with theircombined use in the field. 

In order thoroughly to understand the proper use of the three armscombined, we must obviously begin by learning the proper use of each ofthem separately. 

Hence the importance of the subject of the present treatise. Indiscussing it, we shall commence with the

TACTICAL USE OF INFANTRY. 

The subject will be considered under the following heads:--

 I. --ITS ATTACK, GENERALLY. II. --FORMATIONS FOR ATTACK. III. --THE ATTACK, HOW MADE. IV. --BAYONET CHARGES. V. --DEFENCE AGAINST INFANTRY. VI. --DEFENCE AGAINST ARTILLERY. VII. --DEFENCE AGAINST CAVALRY. VIII. --SQUARES. IX. --SKIRMISHERS. 

I. --Its Attack, generally. 

Infantry attacks with its fire, or with the bayonet. Which of these isthe more effective?

1. The _object_ of an attack is to destroy or capture the hostile force, or, at least, to drive it from the field. 

Capturing the enemy, or driving him from the field, cannot usually beeffected by merely firing upon him. 

True, a mere fire at a distance may finally destroy him. But aninsuperable objection to this mode of attack is, that while we arekilling or disabling his men, he is killing or disabling as many of ourown. 

2. If we fire from _behind cover_, our loss may be comparatively small. But, in that case, the enemy will never remain for any length of timeexposed to our fire. He will either attack and rout us from our cover, or retire. And even if he did neither, his actual and completedestruction, capture, or rout, would still require an attack with thebayonet. 

3. It follows that the proper mode of attack by infantry on infantry iswith the _bayonet_. 

The Russian Suwarrow's victories and reputation were won chiefly by hisfierce bayonet attacks, which often effected great results, in spite ofhis ignorance of the art of war. 

4. But there are _exceptional cases_ where infantry may properly useonly its fire; as--

(1. ) When acting as a support to artillery, it should rarely, if ever, leave its position to use the bayonet; thereby endangering the safety ofthe guns which it is its first duty to guard. Its function, in thiscase, being purely defensive, it should act by its fire alone. 

(2. ) Against a line of skirmishers deployed, a well-directed fire willusually be sufficiently effective. 

(3. ) In mountain warfare, its only practicable mode of attack willsometimes be by its fire. 

5. When both sides are _equally exposed_, the actual attack with thebayonet should not be preceded by a distant musketry fire; for, as inthat case, our loss will generally be equal to the enemy's, this firewill give us no superiority in the charge, and the loss we havesustained will be therefore entirely thrown away. 

6. Nevertheless, our actual attack should be _prepared_, when possible, by the infliction of such a loss on the enemy as will make him inferiorto us at the decisive moment. In war, the object is not to test thecomparative courage of the combatants, but to beat the enemy. We mustnever, therefore, when it can be avoided, fight him on equal terms; andso, never close with him without such a superiority in numbers, position, or spirit, as will make the chances decidedly in our favor. If, without exposing ourselves to much loss, we can inflict aconsiderable loss upon him, we shall render him inferior to us, both bythe number of his men we have disabled, and by the demoralizationthereby caused in his ranks. 

7. This preparatory loss can be most effectually inflicted by the _fireof artillery_; as, from its great superiority of range, it can sufferbut little, meanwhile, from the enemy's infantry fire. Our attackinginfantry are thus enabled to keep out of the range of the fire of theinfantry they are to attack, till the moment of advancing to close. 

8. When we have no artillery disposable for the purpose, the preparatoryeffect may be produced by a _well-sustained fire of infantry_, providedit can find a sheltered position to deliver it from; or, by the fire ofa heavy line of skirmishers. 

9. If we can make the infantry we wish to attack _engage in a prolongedfire_, this will exhaust them, and thus render them inferior to us instrength and in spirit, even if we inflict on them but little loss. Butas our attacking infantry should, in the mean time, be kept fresh, thepreparatory fire, in such case, should not devolve on the troops thatare to close with the enemy. 

10. One cause of the _indecisiveness of the results_ obtained in many ofthe battles of the late war, as compared with the great loss of life onboth sides, has been, that the opposing battalions were too often keptfiring at each other at a distance, both sustaining nearly equal loss, until the ranks were so weakened as to disable either party from makinga vigorous and decisive charge. Or else, charges were made on theenemy's battalions before they had been shattered by artillery; so thatthe attacking troops were easily repulsed, sometimes with greatslaughter. 

II. --Formations for Attack. 

1. Infantry may advance to attack in either of _three ways_: in column;in line, marching by the front; and by the flank; that is, in line, butfaced to a flank. 

2. Of these three formations, the last is undoubtedly the _worstpossible_; for--

(1. ) On arriving at the enemy, the troops are not concentrated at thepoint where the struggle is to be. As they must come up successively, they will be crushed in detail by superior numbers. 

(2. ) Advancing in such a formation, they would be exposed to adestructive raking fire from the enemy's guns; especially since theadoption of the new flank march by fours, which gives to rifledartillery a tolerable mark. 

3. The question is, then, between an attack in column and an attack inline. _Which is the better_ of the two?

The decisive effect of infantry is produced by a rush on the enemy withthe bayonet. The chief elements of success in this attack at closequarters are, the physical momentum of the charge, and the powerfulmoral effect caused by the swift approach of a compact and orderlyhostile mass. A charge in line does not admit of both these elements. The advance of a line of one or more battalions, to be united andorderly, cannot be rapid, and thus has no impetus. Such a line, advancing swiftly, especially over uneven ground, would soon become sobroken and disunited as to destroy, in a great measure, the effect, bothmoral and physical, of its charge, and, at the same time, to deprive theattacking troops of that confidence which is inspired by theconsciousness of moving together in one compact, formidable mass, inwhich every soldier feels himself fortified by the support of hiscomrades. 

4. On the other hand, _a column_ can move rapidly without losing itscompactness and order. 

In attacking the enemy's line, a close column concentrates successively, but rapidly, a force superior to the enemy at the decisive point, andcan hardly fail to pierce the line attacked, if it arrive with itsmomentum unchecked. 

In a close column, there is a real force created by the pressure of themass behind on the leading subdivision, pushing it on the enemy, andpreventing it from drawing back or stopping; thus imparting to itsomewhat of the actual physical momentum of a mechanical engine. 

A close column shelters raw troops, and carries them irresistibly alongwith it. 

A close column, in case of need, can rapidly extend its front bydeploying. 

It can promptly make itself impenetrable to cavalry. 

Finally, in a column, the officers being seen by the men, the benefit oftheir example is not lost. 

The close column would, therefore, seem to be the best formation forattack. 

5. Movements in line requiring that high degree of perfection in drillwhich can rarely be attained by any but regular troops, they wereaccordingly abandoned by the raw and undisciplined masses of Frenchsoldiers that so successfully defended the French Republic from invasionagainst the veteran armies of Europe; some of which were led by generalswho had served under Frederick the Great. Conscious of their militaryinferiority to the enemy, they instinctively clustered together inclose and heavy columns; then rushed down on the enemy's line with theforce of an avalanche, often carrying every thing before them. Thus wasinaugurated that system of attack in _deep and solid columns_, which wasafterwards so successfully used by Napoleon. 

6. Close columns have two defects. One is, that they are _oppressive andexhausting_ to the men, especially in hot weather. 

But this is not a very serious objection; for they are, or should be, formed only when about to be used, and then their work is generally soonover. 

7. The other defect, however, is of so grave a nature as, in the opinionof some, to more than outweigh their advantages; and this is, the_terribly destructive effect_ upon them of the enemy's artillery fire, or of that of his sharpshooters; for the solid mass is an easy target, into which every shot is sure to penetrate. Many of the missiles whichwould fly over an advancing line, are sure to fall, somewhere or other, in a deep column. 

This destructive effect was strikingly illustrated in Macdonald's chargeon the Allied centre at Wagram. The eleven thousand men (some accountssay fifteen thousand) composing that famous column, advanced under thefire of one hundred and eighty hostile guns. After being driven backtwice, they succeeded, in a third attack, in breaking the enemy'scentre. But of the entire column, only eleven hundred men, it is said, were left standing. 

8. The recent improvements in fire-arms must render the fire on a closecolumn of infantry, both by artillery and sharpshooters, still moredestructive than it was before. But this sacrifice of life can beprevented, to a great extent, by using the columns at a proper time andin a proper manner. They should, like storming parties (which theyreally are), never be launched against the enemy's line till the fire bywhich they would suffer has been _quite or nearly silenced_ by ourbatteries. Sometimes this may be impracticable; but this precaution hasoften been neglected when it was perfectly feasible, thus causing agreat and useless slaughter. 

9. But destructive as may be artillery fire on close columns, on troopsadvancing in line grape and canister _begin to be equally so_ on theirarriving within four hundred yards of the enemy's batteries; and arecertainly quite as destructive, and more so, at the distance of twohundred yards. So that, within this distance, at least, the superiorityof lines over columns ceases; and, probably, much sooner. 

10. The _desideratum_ is to preserve the advantages of the column, whilesaving the attacking troops from the almost total destruction whichwould now seem to threaten them, when marching in such a formation, fromthe new rifled artillery, which is said to fire with accuracy at twothousand yards, and from the new infantry rifles, said to be reliable, in the hands of sharpshooters, at five hundred yards. 

11. Perhaps this object might be attained by the advance of theattacking troops in line, but _in loose order_, and at double quick, toabout two hundred paces from the enemy, a halt, a prompt alignment onthe colors, a rapid ployment into close column doubled on the centre, followed by a swift and resolute charge with the bayonet. 

This method, while giving the rapid clearing of the intervening ground, to within two hundred paces of the enemy, and afterwards the impetus, and other advantages of the column, would, at the same time, afford thatcomparative immunity from a destructive fire which is the chiefadvantage of an advance in line. 

To guard against the danger, in the use of this method, of the troopsstopping to fire, instead of ploying into a column of attack, theyshould commence their advance with pieces unloaded. Their boxes mighteven be previously emptied of their ammunition. Why should not a battle, as well as an assault on a fortress, have its "forlorn hope?"

12. This mode of attack would be open, it is true, to _twoobjections_:--

First. It would require for its successful execution under fire greatcoolness, and much previous instruction in the manoeuvre, to enablethe troops to perform it promptly and accurately. 

Secondly. In presence of a bold and active enemy, it would expose theattacking troops to the danger of being charged and routed whilemanoeuvring. 

13. In the late War of the Rebellion, in lieu of close columns, attackshave been sometimes made in _several lines_, following each other atdistances of three hundred paces or more. Although these attacks havesometimes succeeded, they are objectionable in principle; for each lineis in danger of being repulsed successively, before the arrival of theone in its rear; and there is wanting that great superiority of force atthe decisive point which is the most important element of success in abattle. 

Such formations are essentially defensive in their nature, and notsuitable for attack. A line in position, against which the enemy isadvancing, is strong in its fire, which will usually preserve it fromabsolute defeat till a second line, posted at one hundred and fifty, oreven three hundred paces in its rear, has had time to come up insupport. But even these distances Napoleon's experience appears to havetaught him to be much too great; for in his last battle, at Waterloo, heposted his second line, both infantry and cavalry, at only sixty pacesbehind the first; thus sacrificing, to a great extent, the advantage ofkeeping the second line out of fire, in order to secure the moreimportant one of concentration of force. But this was only his formationfor defence; for, in the same battle, his formations for attack werealways in close columns. 

14. Our present Infantry Tactics have adopted two new expedients toaccelerate the advance of battalions, and diminish the loss to whichcolumns of attack are liable--Division Columns and Advancing by theFlank of Subdivisions. 

As _Division Columns_ break the battalion line into several columns, each of two or three subdivisions deep, as a substitute for a singlecolumn four or five subdivisions deep, they undoubtedly diminish theloss from the enemy's artillery fire in corresponding proportion. But incompensation for this partial advantage, they have three defects:--

(1. ) In moving rapidly for any distance, especially over broken orobstructed ground, both the alignment and the proper intervals betweenthe columns will usually be lost; thus causing, in the deployment, adangerous loss of time in re-establishing the alignment and the correctintervals. 

(2. ) In advancing in line of division columns, there is no means offorming square, except by passing through an intermediate formation. 

(3. ) The intervals between the columns are so many gaps, through whichcavalry could easily penetrate, and take the columns in rear. 

The line of division columns appears to have been first suggested byMarshal Marmont, who was a good artillery commander, but notnecessarily, for that reason, a weighty authority on a point ofInfantry Tactics. 

15. The manoeuvre of _Advancing by the Flank of Subdivisions_ isobnoxious to all the objections just pointed out in regard to DivisionColumns. On being threatened by cavalry, though the troops would have nointermediate formation to pass through to prepare for forming square, they would have to face into column and close to half distance, whichthere would often not be time to do. 

In addition to this, the flank march being habitually by fours, thesubdivisions would offer a tolerable mark for the enemy's artillery, andthus be exposed to a destructive enfilade. 

And in forming into line, where the leading guides have not accuratelypreserved both their alignment and their intervals, which must be theusual case in the field, there must be more or less delay and confusion, of which a prompt and active enemy would not fail to take fataladvantage. 

The mode prescribed by the Tactics (Par. 150, School of the Battalion), for executing the manoeuvre of forming line while advancing bysubdivision flanks, seems also to call for remark; it being "by company(or division) into line. " In other words, each individual soldierbrings a shoulder forward, breaks off from his comrades, and hurries up, not on a line with them, but detached from them, and movingindependently, to find his proper place. This destroys for the timebeing, and at a critical moment, the unity of the subdivisions, and soimpairs the confidence soldiers derive from realizing that they formpart of a compact mass. In thus executing this manoeuvre under fire, and near the enemy, there is danger of the men becoming confused andbewildered. For this reason, a better method of forming line would seemto be to re-form the column by a simple facing, and then to _wheel_ intoline by subdivisions. 

16. The worst possible _order of marching_ in battle, for anyconsiderable number of men, as a battalion, for instance, is by theflank. Such a line, advancing in what is really a column of fours, wouldbe rolled up and crushed, on the enemy's attacking its head; and would, meanwhile, be exposed to enfilade. Marching _to_ a flank, it would berunning the gauntlet of the enemy's batteries and musketry fire. Informing into line in either case, much time would be lost; as in flankmarching in the field, especially when the ground is ragged orobstructed, distances cannot be preserved. 

It may be here remarked, that marching to a flank in column also, whether by division, company, or platoon, is highly objectionable, as itconstantly exposes the column to an enfilading fire, as well as to besuddenly charged in flank by cavalry. 

III. --The Attack, how made. 

1. The speed of a column of attack must _never be checked_ for a moment, to enable it to reply to the enemy's fire. The fire of the column willbe ineffective, for it will be the fire of excited men, and very limitedin extent, as it can proceed from the leading division only; and thefire once begun, it will be hard to stop it. If, in order to fire, wehalt the column, re-forming it under the excitement of the fire will bevery difficult; and the enemy's least forward movement may then cause arout. 

At Maida, in Calabria, in 1806, the French columns attacked the Englishunder General Stuart. When within thirty paces, the English gave them avolley. The French, stunned, as it were, began, at once, to deploy. TheEnglish fired again, and the French retreated. 

At Waterloo, in the last grand attack by the French, the advance columnof the Imperial Guard was decisively repulsed by the British Guards. These had been lying on the ground behind the crest of the slope untilthe French appeared, when they suddenly rose up and poured in amurderous volley at short range. Instead of instantly charging with thebayonet, the French hesitated, then began to deploy. The British chargedat once, and drove them down the hill. 

2. This dangerous halt and deployment is apt also to occur when thecolumn finds _sheltering objects by the way_. Therefore, hurry by these, and hasten the step. 

3. It will also tend to prevent such an untoward accident, if we furnishthe columns of attack, where several are employed, with _skirmishers_ intheir intervals, as well as on their outer flanks, to draw the enemy'sfire. Otherwise, the column fired into will be apt, in order to returnthe fire, to halt instinctively and deploy into line, which breaks upthe attack. 

4. From this it appears that the limited fire of a column of attack is, in fact, _no defect_, the highest offensive power of infantry being inthe bayonet. Fire, in the attack, is generally ineffective, andsometimes injurious. It should rarely be used till the enemy has turnedhis back. 

5. As to attacking _cavalry_:

Infantry may advance in line and attack cavalry safely, provided itsflanks are protected. Before a long line of infantry, cavalry mustretreat, or be destroyed by its fire. In the Austrian service it is saidto be a received maxim, that horses will not stand before the steadyapproach of a mass of infantry, with bayonets at the charge, but willalways retire before the infantry closes on them. 

6. So, infantry _in column_, either closed in mass, or at half distance, may attack cavalry successfully; taking care to be ready to form square, or "column against cavalry, " at the first symptom of their preparing tocharge. 

7. As to attacking _artillery_:

Before charging, the infantry sometimes first seeks the shelter ofground, using its sharpshooters to annoy it, and, if possible, tosilence its fire. 

Or, when circumstances are favorable, as when it can get a position nearits flank, it attacks it vigorously, at once, with fire and bayonet. 

But when infantry has to advance to the attack of a battery in front, itshould never be in any compact formation, but always deployed asskirmishers. Otherwise, it would usually meet with a bloody repulse;especially where any considerable space of ground is to be cleared. 

At the battle of Malvern Hill, the rebel General Magruder's division wassent, either in column or in line, to charge a powerful Union batteryjust beyond an open field a mile and three-quarters in length. Therebels rushed into the field at a full run, but encountered a murderousfire from the guns they were sent to attack, which mowed them down byhundreds. By the time they had cleared two-thirds of the ground, thecarnage was so dreadful as to drive them back to the woods from whichthey had started. Twice more they were sent forward in the same manner, but with the same result; when the undertaking was abandoned. 

8. In attacking a battery, we may often secure its capture by a volley_aimed at the horses_; the effect of which may prevent the enemy fromcarrying it off. But this should be avoided when there is a goodprospect of capturing the battery without disabling the horses; sincethen, if we succeed, we shall be able to immediately use the batteryagainst the enemy ourselves. 

9. In the French Revolution, the Chouans of La Vendée attacked theRepublican batteries in _several single files_, of one or two hundredmen each, at intervals of fifty paces. Such a formation protects theattacking columns, to a great extent, from the enemy's fire, but exposesthem to destruction by a charge from the battery supports. In theabsence of these, it would often be very advantageous; since, by properdrilling, these columns in one rank could be made, on arriving near theenemy, to rapidly double in two or four ranks, without halting, andthen, by filing to a flank and facing, to advance by the front in acompact line. 

The same formation would be useful for troops advancing to assault anintrenchment; but, as in the case of a battery, subject to the risk ofbeing destroyed by a sudden sortie from the work. 

10. Artillery is never without _supports_. One part of the infantry, therefore, deployed as skirmishers, should attack the guns, circlinground them, and opening fire on the men and horses; while the other partattacks the support in flank. On getting sufficiently near, theassailants should try to draw the fire of the guns, and then rush onthem before they have time to reload. 

If a battery gets into confusion, or there is any delay in unlimberingor limbering up, then is the most favorable time to capture it by avigorous charge with the bayonet. 

IV. --Bayonet Charges. 

1. When made resolutely, and _without slackening the gait_, bayonetcharges have succeeded in nine cases out of ten. 

2. The bayonet is usually more effective than _grape_, _canister_, or_bullets_. 

At the battle of Leipsic, in 1813, Kleist's Prussian division was sentto carry the position of Probstheyda. For this purpose it was necessaryto advance up a long slope, the crest of which was occupied by Drouot'sartillery. The French allowed the Prussians to approach to within ashort distance, and then poured into them a most destructive shower ofgrape, which drove them back for a moment in confusion. But theyimmediately rallied, and rushed desperately on again. Marshal Victorthen charged them with the bayonet, and completely repulsed them. 

Afterwards, having been re-enforced by Wittgenstein's Russian division, they again advanced, under a constant shower of grape from Drouot. They, nevertheless, kept advancing; and, in spite of the great loss theysuffered, were about carrying the position, when the French againcharged with the bayonet, forcing them down to the very foot of thedeclivity; where, being once more covered with grape, their repulse wascomplete and final. 

So, at the battle of Mill Springs, in January, 1862, after thecombatants had been exchanging musketry fires for several hours withoutany decisive result, the rebels' left was vigorously charged by theNinth Ohio with the bayonet. This charge broke the enemy's flank. Hiswhole line gave way in confusion, and the battle was won. 

So, at Malvern Hill, in 1862, in several instances, columns of rebelswhom a storm of canister and shell had failed to repulse, were drivenback and routed by a dash with the bayonet, after a volley poured in ata few yards from the muzzles of the guns. 

So, at the battle of Seven Pines, according to General Heintzelman'sreport, whenever our troops used the bayonet, their loss wascomparatively light, and the enemy was driven back, suffering heavily. 

3. The bayonet charge, when made from any considerable distance, shouldbe _in column_; the only formation in which order can be combined withsufficient speed. But, at a short distance, a bayonet charge by a line, instantly after firing a volley to repel an attack, will be veryeffective, and usually successful. 

4. In ordinary cases, the charge should be _prepared_ by firstshattering the hostile masses, or, at least, wearying and demoralizingthem by artillery, or by skirmishers' fire. 

5. The more _vigorous and resolute_ the charge, the greater the chanceof success. The enemy never retires before a moderate advance. 

6. Where the enemy is _forced into a defile_, a charge with the bayonet, preceded by a few rounds of grape, will complete his destruction. 

7. When the enemy is _behind cover_, the best way to drive him from itis with the bayonet. This will cause less loss of life than to attemptto return his fire. But, in such case, the charge should be prepared, when possible, by a few shells, or rounds of canister. 

8. Shots up or down a declivity usually miss. A _height_ should, therefore, be carried with the bayonet, without firing. 

The moral effect, moreover, of a steady charge of infantry up a hill, without stopping to fire, is very great; and such a charge is usuallysuccessful. Prince Czartoryski, Alexander's most experienced general atAusterlitz, admitted that he lost all confidence in the result on seeingthe French infantry ascending the plateau of Pratzen, the key to theAllies' position, with a firm and decided step, without once stopping tofire. 

So, at Chattanooga, in November, 1863, Thomas's troops carried theheight of Missionary Ridge by a similar steady and determined ascent, inspite of the volleys of grape and canister from nearly thirty pieces ofartillery, and of musketry from the rebels' rifle-pits at the summit. General Grant attributed the small number of casualties our troopssustained in the attack to the rebels' surprise at its audacity, causing"confusion and purposeless aiming of their pieces. "

V. --Defence against Infantry. 

1. The defence of infantry is by its fire, and therefore its properdefensive formation is in _deployed lines_. 

2. Avoid a _premature commencement_ of the fire. Long firing exhauststhe men's energy, expends the ammunition, fouls the pieces, destroys thesoldier's confidence in his weapon, and emboldens the enemy. 

3. So, a fire upon an enemy while _under cover_, as in a wood, would bevirtually thrown away. If his fire from such a position causes us anyloss, he had better be shelled, or driven away by skirmishers, accordingto circumstances. 

4. The practice of hostile regiments exchanging for a considerable timea _musketry fire at a distance_, is highly objectionable, as it causes agreat sacrifice of life without corresponding results. Instead ofstanding in line for ten minutes, receiving and returning fire at adistance of three hundred yards, it would be much better to clear thisspace at double quick in two or three minutes, and close with the enemy;for, in returning his fire, we can do him no more harm than we receive, while nothing decisive is accomplished. The case is, of course, different where our own troops are behind cover, while the enemy's areexposed. 

5. But in _special cases_, as where we have to cover a flank movement ofour second line, or of the reserve, or to await a force coming to oursupport, it may be necessary to keep up an incessant fusillade, withoutregard to losses received. 

6. Fire in action is of two kinds: the fire at will, and the fire byvolleys; the former kind being the rule, the latter the exception. Although the fire at will is the one principally used, there are _verystrong objections_ to it. 

(1. ) The men load and fire as individuals, and generally with greatrapidity, and under more or less excitement, rarely stopping to take adeliberate aim. The consequence is, that very few shots take effect, andthe fire is, for the greater part, wasted, as is shown by thewell-established fact that, in every engagement, for every man killed ordisabled, there have been from three to ten thousand musket or riflebullets fired. 

(2. ) Except on windy days, a cloud of smoke soon collects in front of aline firing at will, hiding, more or less completely, the enemy fromview. The fire being then at random, it is, of course, unreliable. 

(3. ) The fire at will leads to a rapid and enormous consumption ofammunition. To show how serious is this objection also, it is onlynecessary to consider in how many instances victory has been turned intodefeat by the premature exhaustion, by one or more regiments, of theirammunition. 

(4. ) As a necessary consequence of this rapid consumption of ammunition, the pieces soon become fouled, and thus, to a great extent, useless. 

(5. ) Troops under a musketry fire at will, soon become accustomed to it, and its incessant din produces on them a stunning effect, which deadens, in no small degree, their sensibility to danger. 

7. On the other hand, _volley firing_ has often been attended withdecisive results, especially when it has been reserved to the propermoment, and delivered at short range. Instances of this have occurred inalmost every great battle we read of in history, as also in the late Warof the Rebellion. For example: at the battle of South Mountain, Doubleday's brigade was engaged with a heavy force of rebels at somethirty or forty paces in its front. Our men were behind a fence, firingat will; but their fire made little or no impression on the enemy, whoattempted to charge at the least cessation of the fire. Our troops werethen made to cease firing, to lie down behind the fence, and, on theenemy's approach to within fifteen paces, to spring up and pour in avolley. This was so deadly, that the rebels fled in disorder, leavingtheir dead and wounded, and could not be rallied again. 

At Chickamauga, in 1863, the regiments of Hazen's brigade fired only byvolleys; every one of which, it is officially reported, was powerfullyeffective in checking the enemy's attacks. 

8. Nevertheless, it has been a common military saying, and supportedeven by high authority, that the fire at will is _the only one possiblein action_. This assertion implies that the rank and file are notsufficiently cool to reserve their fire, and that they must be keptconstantly occupied by the excitement, noise, and smoke of their ownfire, in order to make them remain steady in their ranks under that ofthe enemy. 

As applied to raw, undisciplined, or demoralized troops, the propositionmay be, to a great extent, true. But in reference to disciplined orveteran troops, whose _morale_ has not been impaired, it will be founddisproved on almost every page of military history; from which a fewexamples will be cited hereafter. For the present, one instance willsuffice; that of Colonel Willich's regiment of Thirty-second IndianaVolunteers, at the battle of Shiloh, in April, 1862. While under fire, their commander, perceiving their own fire to have become "a littlewild, " caused them to cease firing, and then drilled them in the manualof arms, which they went through as if on parade; after which, theyagain opened on the enemy a fire, which is reported to have been"deliberate, steady, and effective. "

It may be here observed that, whenever troops lose their presence ofmind, there is no surer way of restoring it than by the repetition, bytheir officers, in their usual tone, of any words of command they havelearned instinctively to obey on the drill-ground. 

9. Infantry, when charged in position, should reserve its fire till itcan be made _with deadly effect_, as at the distance of fifty paces; andthe volleys should be instantly followed up by a countercharge with thebayonet on the charging enemy. For, if our fire has staggered him, avigorous charge will complete his repulse; and if it has not, our onlychance of success is in suddenly taking the offensive ourselves. 

Whilst awaiting his charge, we shall incur but little, if any, lossfrom the enemy's fire; for the fire of troops advancing to attack isusually of very little account. 

The only disadvantage attending a volley just before we charge is, that, as the smoke veils us from the enemy's view, it will rob us, to someextent, of the moral effect of our swift advance. 

But, in many cases, if the enemy see us awaiting his bayonet attack, andreserving our fire to the very last, he loses resolution, relaxes hisspeed, and then stops short, or retires. 

At Cowpens, Colonel Howard broke and routed the British line which wasadvancing to attack him, by reserving his fire to within thirty yards, and then charging with the bayonet. 

At the battle of Friedland, the Russian Imperial Guard charged onDupont's division with the bayonet. The French did not wait for them toclose, but rushed on with the bayonet themselves, and completely routedthem. 

10. A volley concentrated upon the enemy's _regimental colors_ willusually disable the color-guard and the men near it; and, if promptlyfollowed up by a charge, may enable us to capture the colors. This isalways an important advantage; for, by the loss of its colors, aregiment is not only dispirited, but in danger of disorganization;these being its proper rallying-point. 

11. When infantry is acting as a _support to artillery_ which isattacked, it should throw out sharpshooters to reply to the enemy'sskirmishers that are firing at the gunners and horses, whilst it engagesthe compact mass by which it is itself attacked. 

If the enemy should commit the blunder of attacking the battery with hisentire force, without detaching to engage the support, we should profitby it by instantly charging him in flank; but taking care not to be ledaway to any distance from the battery we are protecting. 

12. Infantry, surrounded by the enemy, will often be able to _cut itsway through_ and escape. For this purpose, as the highest degree ofconcentration is required, its formation should be in close column. 

VI. --Defence against Artillery. 

1. The best defence of infantry against artillery is by the fire of_sharpshooters_ deployed as skirmishers, to pick off the gunners and thehorses; the main body, meanwhile, occupying the most sheltered localityit can find. 

2. Where no shelter is afforded by any natural obstacles, or byirregularities of ground, it may be sometimes necessary to make the men_lie down_. 

But this expedient should be used as rarely as possible, on account ofits demoralizing tendency. Troops that have become accustomed to itcannot be expected to bravely face the enemy; and the habit is veryrapidly formed. At Bull Run, in July, 1861, a whole company was seen togrovel in the dust at the mere snapping of a percussion-cap of one oftheir own muskets. 

This demoralizing tendency does not exist, however, where troops liedown only to enable their own artillery to fire over them. This wasshown at the battle of Pea Ridge, where several of our regiments lay onthe ground for two hours or more, while thirty of our guns were firingover them. When, at last, this fire had silenced the enemy's guns, ourinfantry then rose, charged him in a compact line, and drove him fromthe field. 

3. A line of infantry may _avoid_ cannon-shot by advancing or retiringfifty paces. A column or a square would have to move this distance, ormore, according to its depth. 

Ricochet shots may be avoided by moving fifty paces to the right orleft. 

This shifting of position is but a temporary expedient, it is true, forthe enemy's guns will soon obtain the exact range again. But for this, several trial-shots will be requisite, thus making the enemy lose time;and, in battle, a few minutes lost or gained have often decided betweenvictory and defeat. 

4. When the enemy opens an artillery fire on a square, _preparatory to acavalry charge_, his fire must cease when his cavalry approaches thesquare; say, on its arriving within one hundred and fifty yards. Toavoid the artillery fire, the square may safely remain lying down untilthe hostile cavalry has reached this point. For, as they will requireabout half a minute to clear the intervening ground, the square willstill have time enough left to rise, align its ranks, and deliver avolley before the cavalry reaches it. 

VII. --Defence against Cavalry. 

1. The discipline of infantry is never put to a severer test than whenit is required to resist a _charge of cavalry_, properly made. The moraleffect of a charge of a body of horse at full speed, on the troopswaiting to receive it, is like that caused by the swift approach of alocomotive under full steam, seeming quite as irresistible. It would beso in reality, but for the counter effect produced both on the horsesand their riders by the sight of the infantry standing firm andreserving its fire. I have been told by an old cuirassier officer, whoserved through the campaigns of Napoleon with distinguished bravery, that there was no operation that his regiment so much dreaded as acharge upon well-disciplined infantry. 

2. This counter moral effect on the charging cavalry is the greater, _the longer the infantry reserve their fire_; since, the less thedistance at which it is delivered, the more fatal will be its effects. Avolley at long range is not destructive enough to check the cavalry'sadvance; while this effect has often been produced by the infantrymerely withholding its fire till the cavalry has approached very near;and a volley delivered at the very last moment has, in by far thegreater number of instances, effectually repulsed the charge. 

Infantry should, therefore, let cavalry approach to within forty paces, or nearer still, and then give them a general volley. 

At the battle of Neerwinden, in 1793, the Austrian cavalry was repulsedby the French infantry under Dumouriez, by a volley poured in at thevery muzzles of the pieces. 

At Austerlitz, a Russian cavalry charge on French infantry in line wasrepulsed by a volley delivered so near, that it stretched four hundredtroopers on the ground. The rest dispersed in disorder to the right andleft. 

3. The armor of cuirassiers is bullet-proof. To repel a charge of thesetroops, therefore, it will be necessary to _aim at the horses_. Theirarmor is so heavy, that the mere fall of the riders on the ground isusually sufficient to disable them, as was the case with the Frenchcuirassiers at Waterloo. 

4. Infantry in line, in two ranks even, may withstand cavalry, if incompact order, and attacked _in front_. But the slightest cavalry chargeon the flank of a line will rout it. 

At Quatre Bras, a French infantry line, advancing, repulsed a charge ofthe Brunswicker Lancers under the Duke of Brunswick, by receiving it insteadiness and good order, and then pouring in a destructive fire. 

But, in the same battle, the Sixty-ninth British Regiment was instantlyrolled up and destroyed by a charge of French cuirassiers on its flank. 

5. Where infantry is well disciplined, and its commander is cool andprompt, it may sometimes _avoid the effect_ of a cavalry charge by othermeans than its fire, or formation in square. At Talavera, a Frenchinfantry division, drawn up in close column, seeing an English cavalryregiment charging down upon them, avoided the shock by simply steppingaside, thus allowing the cavalry to pass by them. A portion of thecharging troops wheeled round to follow them; but, by the cross-fire ofanother division, and the charge of other cavalry, which fell upon it inits confusion, it was completely annihilated. 

6. A line of infantry charged by cavalry in flank, and so suddenly as toallow no time to form square, could hardly escape destruction. It wouldseem that the best course to be adopted in such a case would be to _openthe ranks_ by a rapid and simultaneous movement of both of them, thuscompelling the charging cavalry to ride between them. If the front rankshould then face about, this would bring the cavalry between two fires, which might be poured in with most destructive effect. 

But where the cavalry charges with a very wide front, or in line, thismanoeuvre might be difficult, or impossible. 

7. Whenever an infantry line is charged by cavalry in front, and it isdoubtful whether it will stand the shock, the wisest course would seemto be to make the men lie down, and let the charging cavalry _leap overthem_. This the horses will instinctively do, with but little risk ofinjury to the men, provided they lie in a position parallel to the lineof battle, thus presenting the least possible depth. It is said that theBritish infantry has sometimes done this, and risen up again immediatelyafter the cavalry had passed. The cavalry could thus be promptly takenin rear. 

8. In retreating, when threatened by cavalry, if there be a _long plain_in our rear, we must retire slowly. But if cover, or ground unfavorableto cavalry, be near, we must reach it as soon as possible. 

VIII. --Squares. 

1. In 1813, France was nearly exhausted of soldiers, so that Napoleon, on hastily preparing for his campaign of that year, was obliged toincorporate into his army a large number of raw conscripts, who hadscarcely begun their elementary drill. On the route to their respectivepoints of concentration, he accordingly ordered his columns to halt eachday, to practise _the three movements_ which he considered to be themost important for infantry to be familiar with. These were, formingbattalions in square, deploying in line, and re-forming in column ofattack. 

2. In the Austrian service, squares formed by a _column in mass_ areconsidered preferable to hollow ones, on the supposition that thoughhorses will recoil from a dense mass, they may be easily brought tobreak through a shallow formation, over which they can see the openground. But this theory seems to be refuted by numerous facts. A largeproportion of the formations that have successfully repulsed cavalry, since the beginning of this century, have been hollow squares. 

3. The rule laid down in the Tactics (Par. 143, Skirmishers), directingthe skirmishers, in rallying on the square, to "come to a ready withoutcommand, and fire upon the enemy; which will also be done by thereserve, as soon as it is unmasked by the skirmishers, " is an unsoundone, for a compliance with it would be dangerous. A square cannot expectto repulse cavalry by an irregular fire at will, but only bywell-directed _volleys_. If cavalry charge a square firing irregularly, it will probably rout it. On the other hand, if a square wait coollytill the cavalry is at twenty paces, its volley will be murderous. AtWaterloo, the Allied squares that reserved their fire till the Frenchcavalry had arrived at from twenty to forty paces, invariably repulsedit. At that battle, Ney led eleven cavalry charges against the Britishsquares, every one of which failed. 

At the opening of the campaign of 1813, Napoleon had, comparatively, buta handful of cavalry; so few, that they had to keep close to theirinfantry for protection. In crossing the plains of Lutzen, a large andsplendid cavalry force of the Allies, supported by infantry and byhorse-artillery, made an attack on Ney's corps, which consisted chieflyof young and raw recruits, who saw an enemy for the first time. Thesituation was extremely dangerous, and Ney and his principal generalsthrew themselves into the squares to encourage them. By volleysdelivered at a signal, the enemy's charges were all repulsed, and theconscripts acquired great confidence from the ease with which this wasdone. Ney then broke up his squares, and, pursuing the enemy in columns, completed their repulse. 

At Auerstadt, in 1806, Davoust's French squares had to sustain a longsuccession of charges from ten thousand Prussian horse. By reservingtheir fire, each time, to within thirty or forty paces, its effect wasso deadly, that a rampart of dead and disabled men and horses was soonformed around the squares, and the charges were all repulsed. 

So, at Jena, on the same day, Ney, posted in a square, allowed thePrussian cuirassiers to charge up to within fifteen or twenty paces, when the front attacked, at his word of command, poured in a fire whichcompletely repulsed the charge, strewing the whole ground with dead andwounded. The Prussian cavalry, in that battle, are said to have been"terrified at the sight of a motionless infantry reserving its fire. "

Again, at Mount Tabor, in 1798, General Kleber, marching with aninfantry division of only three thousand men, over an immense sandyplain, was attacked by twelve thousand Turkish horse. The French squaresresisted their successive charges for six hours, by means of volleysreserved till the enemy were at the very muzzles of their guns; whichsoon built up a rampart around them of men and horses. Bonaparte thenarrived with another division. Dividing it into two squares, he rapidlyadvanced them in such a manner as to enclose the Turks in a kind oftriangle; when, by a sudden fire upon them from three points at once, hedrove them upon each other in confusion, making them flee in everydirection. 

It may be observed, that advancing or manoeuvring in squares ispracticable only on open and level plains, like the sandy deserts ofEgypt and Syria. 

4. The best reliance of an infantry square being, therefore, on its fireby volleys, the men should be instructed to come to a _charge bayonet_, instead of a "ready, " immediately on forming square. From this latterposition, there would be much greater danger of the volley beingprematurely delivered. The fire of a single excited man will usually befollowed by a general discharge. 

5. It may be often advisable that the volley should be delivered by_both ranks_ at once, and not by a single one. Par. 1191, School of theBattalion, directing that "a battalion, in square, will never use anyother than the fire by file, or by rank, " should therefore be amended. 

6. Moreover, in view of what has been said as to volley-firing, and ofthe examples that have been cited in confirmation, there is reason todoubt the wisdom of the direction contained in Par. 67, School of theCompany: "The fire by file being that which is most frequently usedagainst an enemy, it is highly important that it be rendered perfectlyfamiliar to the troops. The instructor will, therefore, give it _almostexclusive preference_. "

The fire by file, after its commencement, becomes a mere individual fireat will. Independently of the general ineffectiveness of this kind offire, one would have supposed that the instructor's attention should berather directed to accustoming the men to the more difficult reservedfire by volleys, instead of practising them almost exclusively in a firewhich, once learned, they will use instinctively, and without anypractice at all. 

7. Infantry _breech-loading weapons_ would be very useful to troops insquare, when charged by cavalry; since, being rapidly reloaded, theywould enable the square to repulse, with a volley, each subdivisionsuccessively, where the charging column is formed at the usualdistances. But it is doubtful whether, on the whole, these weapons arepreferable to muzzle-loaders. Certain it is, that they exhaust theammunition much more rapidly, and so cause a suspension of fire, and awithdrawal from the line of battle, till a new supply can arrive. And, to obtain this new supply, a long time is generally required; infantryammunition being usually carried in the second, or more distantammunition train, instead of the first, or nearest one, as it ought tobe. 

8. Although a reserved fire is much the most reliable in repulsingcavalry, the men may sometimes be ordered to commence the fire at a_considerable distance_. In such case, they should be instructed to aimat the horses, instead of their riders, as affording a better mark. 

9. European cavalry is often practised, on arriving within four hundredyards, or effective grape-shot distance, of an infantry square, to halt, and then open at the centre, unmasking a battery of horse-artillery, which plays for a certain time on the square, when the cavalry closesagain, and charges. 

A square, however, attacked in this manner, is _not in so much danger_of being broken as might be imagined. The enemy's guns, after beingunmasked, would usually require several trial rounds to get the exactrange; and our sharpshooters, who could safely be thrown forward onehundred yards, with the new rifled arms, ought, in the mean time, toinflict such loss on the cavalry, as well as on the battery, as to causeit either to retire, or to charge feebly, and, therefore, ineffectively. At the very worst, the square would have ample time to re-form itsranks, and deliver a deadly volley before the cavalry could reach it, asit also would if this operation were attempted much nearer, say at twohundred yards. In this last case, a few volleys from the square itself, with the new arms, would probably be destructive enough to prevent thecharge altogether. 

10. It is hardly necessary to observe, that troops formed in square, when charged by cavalry, can secure their safety only by _standingfirm_. A single opening will suffice to let in the enemy, who will theneasily ride over the square, and cut it in pieces. Whereas, if thesquare remain unbroken, cavalry can inflict upon it no loss, or but atrifling one. 

11. In repulsing a cavalry charge, coolness and presence of mind willsometimes enable troops to accomplish _extraordinary results_. 

At Quatre Bras, the square of the Forty-second Highlanders was notcompleted, the companies still running in to form the rear face, whenthe enemy's leading troop entered. But the square, nevertheless, finished its formation; and the French cavalry, caught, as it were, in anet, was soon destroyed by the concentrated fire of all the fronts, which had faced inward. 

In the same battle, the Forty-fourth British Regiment, standing in linein two ranks, was suddenly charged in rear by the French Lancers, whohad dashed round one of their flanks for that purpose. The rear ranksuddenly faced about, and, at a very short distance, poured in a deadlyfire, which put them into confusion. On their way back to re-form, thefront rank, in its turn, gave them a volley, which destroyed greatnumbers of them, and completed their rout. 

12. Even when a square has been actually broken, it is _not necessarilylost_. If the troops are brave and well disciplined, it may sometimes berallied again, re-formed, and made to repulse the attacking cavalry, aswas the case with some of the Allied squares at Waterloo. 

So, at the battle of Pultusk, in 1806, a French battalion that had beenbroken and overthrown by Russian cavalry, immediately rallied, fell onthe troopers floundering in the mud, and dispatched them. 

So, at the battle of Krasnoe, in 1812, a large Russian square wasretreating before the French cavalry masses. Occasionally, in order topass a narrow defile, it was obliged, temporarily, to break the square. At these times the French made furious charges, penetrated into thecolumn, and captured men and guns. But as soon as the defile was passed, the Russians instantly re-formed the square, and continued theirretreat. They finally succeeded in reaching Korytnia, after killing andwounding some four hundred or five hundred of the French; though withthe loss of eight guns, one thousand prisoners, and seven hundred oreight hundred _hors de combat_, out of five thousand or six thousandmen. 

IX. --Skirmishers. 

We shall consider--

First, THEIR USE. 

Secondly, HOW THEY ARE POSTED. 

Thirdly, HOW THEY ARE HANDLED. 

Fourthly, RULES FOR INDIVIDUAL SKIRMISHERS. 

A. THEIR USE. 

1. In approaching the enemy through a wooded or broken country, skirmishers thrown out in advance, and on the flanks of the leadingcolumn, are absolutely indispensable, in order to _reconnoitre theground_, and prevent a surprise. 

2. Skirmishers _protect_ the main body, or any particular portion of it, from attack while manoeuvring. 

A regiment, or a brigade, in covered ground, whether the enemy bevisible or not, should never change its position in battle, ormanoeuvre, without the protection of a skirmishing line. 

3. They furnish a screen, behind which the main body may _hide itsmovements_, and be enabled to attack at an unexpected point. 

4. Where a ravine, a wood, or other similar obstacle causes _a break inour line of battle_, by occupying it with skirmishers we guard itagainst penetration by the enemy, and connect the separated corps witheach other. 

5. Skirmishers may be used to alarm the enemy at a point where heexpected no attack, and thus _create a diversion_. 

6. By their attack at various points, they serve to _unmask the enemy'sposition_. 

7. They may be employed to _open the way for a charge_ with the bayonet. 

At the battle of Stone River, the rebels, on one occasion, advanced inline, with a double column in rear of each wing, preceded by a doubleline of skirmishers, who reserved their fire till close to our line, when they halted, poured in a murderous fire, and fell back on theirmain body, which then rushed forward. Both our first and second lines, staggered by this sudden and destructive fire, were swept from theground. 

8. Skirmishers have been sometimes thrown forward to _test the spiritand disposition_ of the enemy. 

At Biberach, in 1800, the French general St. Cyr, after having carriedthe place, and driven the Austrians through the defile in rear of itback upon their main body, posted on the heights of Wittenburg, sentforward a strong line of skirmishers to open fire on them, with the viewof ascertaining their temper and disposition after their vanguard hadbeen defeated and driven in. This drew forth a general and continueddischarge, like that which demoralized troops are apt to indulge in tokeep up their spirits by their own noise. Seeing this, St. Cyr instantlyprepared to charge, although he had with him but twenty thousand men, and the Austrians numbered sixty thousand, and were in a strongposition. The result justified his decision; for, on the near approachof the French, the Austrians fired a volley or two and then retreated inconfusion. 

9. Skirmishers should _accompany columns of attack_; for--

(1. ) They increase the confidence of the troops they accompany. Placedbetween the columns, they advance boldly because the columns advance, and the columns advance boldly because the skirmishers do. 

(2. ) Preceding the columns, by driving back the enemy's skirmishers, anddiverting his fire to themselves, they keep the attacking columns asfree from loss as possible till the shock. 

They, moreover, serve to annoy the troops we are about to attack, by theincessant sharp buzzing of their deadly bullets among them, like so manybees, killing some and disabling others; and this, sometimes, to such adegree as to demoralize them. 

It is said that, at Waterloo, the swarms of skirmishers that covered theFrench attacking columns so galled and excited the stationary columnsand squares of some of the Allies, as to nearly drive them from thefield. 

(3. ) On the flanks of a column, they cover them from attack. 

(4. ) They draw the enemy's fire prematurely, and thus render itcomparatively ineffective. 

(5. ) They prevent the columns from halting to deploy and fire. 

(6. ) They may sometimes conceal the direction of the march of theattacking column, and even seize the guns that have been playing on it. 

10. In defence, if they can _encircle the enemy's advancing column_, they may destroy it by their concentric fire. 

11. In a retreat, skirmishers _cover the rear_, so long as the enemyattacks without cavalry. 

12. The NEW RIFLED ARMS have obviously much increased the effectivenessof skirmishers. 

B. HOW POSTED. 

1. They should be always _near enough to the main body to be supportedby it_, if hard pressed, and also to enable the main body to profit atonce of any advantage that may have been gained by them. 

2. They should _cover the main body_, both in front and in flank, exceptwhere the ground may render this impracticable or unnecessary; and, indefensive positions, they should occupy every point from which theenemy's skirmishers might annoy us. 

3. In a defensive combat, they should be so posted as to take theenemy's attack _in flank_:

(1. ) Because their fire will be thus the more destructive; and--

(2. ) They will not be exposed to be driven back by the enemy's fire, orby his advance. 

4. If thrown into an enclosure, they must have _an easy exit_. Skirmishers feeling themselves in danger of being cut off, will losesomewhat of that coolness which is so essential to their efficiency. 

5. They should not be kept stationary _behind a straight line_, as awall, a fence, or a hedge; for this would expose them to enfilade. 

6. Skirmishers are only auxiliary to the main force, and are notcapable, by themselves, of effecting any decisive result. Therefore, inorder not to exhaust the men, _heavy_ skirmishing lines should not beused, except to lead a decided advance, or to repel one. 

7. The principle is, to post skirmishers so as to give them the _maximumof shelter_, whilst inflicting the _maximum of loss_ on the enemy. Thisapplies to the placing of the whole line, and to the separate groups. The way skirmishers produce their effect is by sharpshooting, whichrequires calmness; and the more completely sheltered they are, thecalmer they will be, and the more deadly will be their aim. 

C. HOW HANDLED. 

1. Deploy them _before coming within range of musketry_; for infantry incompact order is a good target for the enemy. 

2. They should be kept _well in hand_; especially at the moment ofsuccess, when they are in danger of rushing headlong to destruction. 

3. Coming upon the enemy's main body, they should _occupy him in frontand flank_ till our own main body gets up. 

4. Except in urgent cases, never deploy a line of skirmishers _on arun_; for this makes them lose breath and calmness, and, with theircalmness, their accuracy of aim. 

So, after deployment, avoid all rapid and violent movements. 

5. Skirmishers become exhausted after long firing. The longer theycontinue out, the worse they shoot. Therefore, _relieve them often_. 

6. Skirmishers should be accustomed to _lie down_ at a given signal; asit is sometimes very important that both our artillery and infantryshould be able to fire over them. 

7. In retreat, skirmishers occupy every favorable point for _holding theenemy in check_. 

D. RULES FOR INDIVIDUAL SKIRMISHERS. 

1. In advancing, in retreat, or at a halt, use _every cover_ thatpresents itself. 

2. Preserve _the alignment and the intervals_, so far as possible. Onopen ground, this may be done perfectly. In woods, skirmishers shouldnever, for a moment, lose sight of each other. 

3. The security of the _flanks_ should be looked out for by the men nearthem. 

4. Run over _exposed ground_ as quickly as possible. 

5. Approach the _crest of a hill_ with great caution. 

6. If threatened by _artillery alone_, advance and kill off the men andhorses before they get into battery. When the pieces have got intobattery, lie down, if on exposed ground, till they limber up again, andthen recommence the fire. 

7. A skirmisher, with the new rifled arms, ought, at five hundred yards, to be _more than a match for a gun_; for, in men and horses, he has amuch larger target than the gun has in him. 

Again, with the new rifle shells, he may be able to blow up a caisson. 

8. Neither should a skirmisher have much to fear from a _singlehorseman_. With his bayonet fixed, he would usually be able to defendhimself successfully against the trooper, whose sabre is the shorterweapon of the two; more especially, if he will take care to keep on thetrooper's left, which is his exposed side. 

9. Never lose your calmness. Your power consists, not in rapid firing, but in the _accuracy of your aim_. Avoid all hurried and violentmovements; and never raise your gun till sure of a shot. 

10. The aim, according to the Tactics, is made by bringing the gun down, instead of raising it up. However little the soldier may be excited, hewill be apt to pull the trigger more or less too soon; that is, whilethe muzzle is yet too elevated. This is the reason why infantry missilesusually _fly too high_. The difficulty would not be obviated by causingthe aim to be made by raising the piece; for then the same disturbingcause already mentioned, the soldier's excitement, would make the shotsfly as much too low, as they now fly too high. 

Rapid firing is another cause of this incompleteness of aim. Infantryfiring is already too rapid to be effective; so that what is claimed forthe new breech-loading weapons as an advantage, that they increase therapidity of fire, furnishes, on the contrary, a strong objection tothem. The effectiveness of the fire of a sharp-shooter, especially, willbe usually in inverse, instead of direct proportion to the number ofshots he delivers in a given time. 

In view of this, and of the tendency to pull the trigger before themuzzle is sufficiently depressed, it has become an established maxim, to

 "Aim low, Fire slow"

TACTICAL USE OF ARTILLERY. 

The subject will be treated under the following heads:--

 I. --HOW POSTED WITH RESPECT TO THE GROUND. II. --HOW POSTED WITH RESPECT TO OUR OWN TROOPS. III. --HOW POSTED WITH RESPECT TO THE ENEMY. IV. --POSTING OF BATTERIES AND PIECES AS BETWEEN THEMSELVES. V. --HOW USED. VI. --ITS FIRE. VII. --ITS SUPPORTS. 

I. --How posted with respect to the Ground. 

1. Artillery has a much longer range than musketry. In order to availourselves of this advantage, we must so post it as to overlook all theground to which its utmost range extends. It therefore requires _anelevated position_. 

2. It has been considered an additional advantage of a commandingposition for artillery, that it enables our guns to cover our infantry, attacking or attacked, by _firing over their heads_. 

This was done by the French at Waterloo, apparently with great effect. But the advantage is a doubtful one; for firing over our own troops, especially with cast-shot or shell, is very dangerous to them, and isapt to intimidate them. It moreover furnishes to the enemy a doubletarget. The shot which miss our troops will be apt to fall among theguns behind them; and some of those which do not reach the guns, willprobably take effect among the troops in front of them. 

3. But _very high_ points are unfavorable positions for batteries. Batteries so placed would not command the ground immediately below them;as guns cannot be depressed to fire below a certain angle without soondestroying their carriages. And this would facilitate their capture;for, once arrived on the ground near them, the assailants could not beinjured by their fire. It has been estimated that the slope in front ofa battery should not exceed one perpendicular to fifteen base. 

4. When guns have to be used as a support to other parts of the line, which is often the case, their capture might lead to seriousconsequences. They should therefore have the ground clear of allobstacles which may _mask their fire_, not only in front, but to theirright and left. 

5. Although the most favorable position for guns is an eminence slopinggradually towards the enemy, an _open and level plain_ is by no means anunfavorable one; for, on such ground, the enemy will be visible at agreat distance, and our shot may act by ricochet, which causes moredestruction than ordinary point-blank firing. 

For ricochet, firm and even ground is requisite; on soft or rough groundit is not attainable. 

6. In enfilading the enemy's position, or in raking his advancingcolumns from head to rear, a _grazing fire_ is the most destructive thatcan be used. This consists of a long succession of ricochets at lowheights. Where the ground is level and firm, we can obtain this fire ata short distance from the enemy; as, on such ground, ricochet shots donot rise much. But where the ground is uneven, to obtain such a fire, amore distant position will be requisite. 

7. _Muddy_ ground is unfavorable for artillery. Over such ground, itscarriages move slowly, and its fire is less effective. Balls cannotricochet; and shells often sink into the mud, and thus are eitherextinguished or explode with but little effect. 

Napoleon depended so much on his artillery at Waterloo that, althoughevery moment was precious, he delayed commencing the battle till hischief of artillery had reported the ground, which had been covered by asoaking rain, to be sufficiently dry for the movements and effectivenessof that arm. The three hours' delay thus caused, would have sufficed himto crush Wellington's army before the arrival of the Prussians. 

8. _Stony_ ground is a bad location for a battery; for the enemy's shotwill scatter the stones around it with more or less fatal effect. 

9. _Rough_ or _uneven_ ground immediately in front of a battery is notobjectionable, as it will stop the enemy's shot. 

10. A battery, when it is possible to avoid it, should not be postedwithin musket range of _woods_, _bushes_, _ravines_, _hedges_, _ditches_, or other cover from which the enemy's sharpshooters mightkill off the gunners, or, by a sudden dash, capture the guns. 

11. To prevent the enemy from approaching a battery under cover, itshould be so placed as to be able to sweep all _villages_, _hollows_, and _woods_, in front and in flank. 

12. In taking up a position, a battery should avail itself of all_inequalities of the ground_, for the shelter of its pieces and gunners, or of its limbers and caissons, at least. 

For the same purpose, a battery posted on an eminence should have itspieces some ten paces behind its crest. 

13. Where the ground affords no shelter, and where the position of theguns is not likely to be changed, it may be worth while to cover them byan _épaulement_ or breastwork, some three feet, or more, high. 

II. --How posted with respect to our own Troops. 

1. In order to be ready to support the flanks of our attacking columns, and to aid in the defence in every part of the field, batteries shouldbe placed at _several different points_ in the line of battle. 

2. In a defensive battle especially, as it is uncertain on what pointthe enemy will mass his principal attack, the artillery should usuallybe distributed _through the whole line_. 

3. A line of battle has been compared to the _front of a fortification_, of which the infantry is the curtain, and the artillery batteries thebastions. 

4. The _lighter_ guns should be placed on the _salient_ points of ourline, from which they can be more easily withdrawn; the heavier guns, constituting the stationary batteries, on the more retired points. 

5. Pieces should not be placed _in prolongation with troops_; for thiswould be giving the enemy a double mark. Artillery posted in front ofother troops will draw a fire on them. When a battery must be placed infront of the line, let the infantry in rear of it clear the ground byploying into double columns. 

6. Never place artillery so as to _impede the movements of the other twoarms_. A battery posted in front of the centre would often hamper themovements of the infantry; besides being peculiarly exposed to aconverging fire from the enemy's batteries. 

7. The safest position for a battery is on that wing which is mostsecure from a flank attack. 

But guns should re-enforce the weaker points, thus making the enemyattack the strongest ones. 

Therefore, _where a wing is weak_, place the largest number of gunsthere, to support it. If we have one wing entirely uncovered, of fourbatteries, for instance, we should give three to the uncovered wing. 

8. Of the heavy batteries, one, at least, should be placed in the firstline, so that we may be able to open an effective fire on the enemy atthe _earliest possible moment_. 

9. The prompt use, at the proper moment, of the reserve, may decide thebattle. The movements of heavy artillery, therefore, are too slow forthe reserve, which should have most of the light pieces. _Horseartillery_ is especially suitable for it. 

10. Guns near an infantry square should be posted at its _angles_. Ifthe square is charged by cavalry, the gunners run into the square, afterfilling their ammunition pouches, which they take in with them, as wellas their sponges and other equipments. The limbers and caissons are sentto the rear; or, if there is no time to do this, they may be broughtinto the square. If this is impossible, they may be formed into abarricade. 

At Waterloo, on the French cavalry's retiring from their charges on theenemy's squares, the British gunners rushed out from the squares inwhich they had taken refuge, and plied their guns on the retiringsquadrons. 

III. --How posted with respect to the Enemy. 

1. If the enemy's batteries are concentrated in one position, by placingour own batteries properly we may obtain a powerful _cross-fire_ onthem. 

2. It is always advantageous to so dispose our batteries as to takethose of the enemy _in enfilade_, or obliquely (_en écharpe_, as it iscalled). 

At the battle of Murfreesboro', in December, 1862, a rebel battery, being taken in enfilade by one of our own, was silenced in about fiveminutes. 

3. So, also, if we can obtain an oblique or enfilading fire _on histroops_, it will be very destructive. A flanking battery, raking theenemy's position, is often enough, of itself, to decide a battle. 

Thus, the battle of Chippewa was finally decided by our getting a gun ortwo in a flanking position, enabling us to enfilade the British line. 

So, at the battle of Shiloh, the rebels' triumphant advance on theevening of the first day was effectually checked by the fire of ourgun-boats Tyler and Lexington, which had taken an enfilading positionopposite their right flank. 

4. For this reason, we must never post one of our own batteries so thatthe enemy's guns will take it _obliquely_, or _in flank_; unless, indeed, by doing so, we may probably obtain some important and decisiveeffect before it can be destroyed, or made unserviceable. 

5. Batteries should be so placed as to _command the whole ground in ourfront_, even almost up to our bayonets, and so as to be able to directtheir fire towards every point; at all events, so that a fire can bekept up on the enemy till he is within short musket-range. 

It is manifest that the best position for a battery, to enable it toeffectually cover the entire ground in our front, would not be in ourline of battle, but in advance of one of its flanks, from which it couldtake the enemy's troops advancing over it, in enfilade. 

6. Artillery fire from _an unexpected quarter_ always has a powerfulmoral effect. Two guns, even, hoisted up to a place where the enemy doesnot dream of there being any, may have a decisive effect. 

IV. --Posting of Batteries and of Pieces as between themselves. 

1. The best mode of posting batteries is in the form of a crescent, itshorns pointing towards the enemy, or forming the sides of a re-enteringangle; for this gives a _convergent fire_ to the enemy's divergent one. 

Its inconvenience is, the exposure of its flanks to attack, or toenfilade. Therefore, when such a position is adopted, its flanks must beprotected by natural obstacles or by artificial defences. 

2. Batteries, or parts of batteries, should be at _supporting distances_from each other; that is, not over six hundred yards apart, so as toeffectually cover the whole ground between them, in case of need, withgrape and canister. When rifled guns are used, this distance may beincreased. 

3. _A long line of guns_ in our line of battle is objectionable; for, ifit should become necessary to withdraw them, they would leave adangerous interval. 

4. It is dangerous to collect _a great many pieces in one battery_, especially in the beginning of an action, when the enemy is fresh, forit strongly tempts him to capture it. When used, such a battery shouldhave powerful supports to protect it, or should be sheltered by avillage, a defile, or other cover, occupied beforehand. 

5. Although, to be used offensively, guns should be in strong masses, inorder to strike a decisive blow on some single point; this is by nomeans the case when _used defensively_; for, (1. ) It is only when guns are more or less scattered over differentparts of the field, that they can be made to give a cross-fire on theenemy's advancing columns, or on any part of his line. 

(2. ) If the position where they are massed does not happen to beattacked, they become useless, while stripping the rest of the line. 

(3. ) If they are captured, all the artillery is lost at once, ashappened to the Austrians at the battle of Leuthen, causing theirdefeat. 

6. A certain number of pieces of horse-artillery must always be _kept inreserve_, so that, if an artillery fire at any point should be suddenlywanted, it may be furnished with the least possible delay. 

7. Guns of _various calibres_ should never be in the same battery, toprevent confusion as to the respective ranges, and in the supply oftheir ammunition. 

8. An independent section or battery should never consist of _howitzersalone_, for the proper fire of these pieces is too slow to be effectivein repulsing an attack on them. 

9. There should always be _wide intervals_ between the pieces; otherwisethe battery would offer too good a mark to the enemy. 

V. --How used. 

First, GENERALLY. Secondly, IN OFFENSIVE COMBAT. Thirdly, IN DEFENSIVE COMBAT. Fourthly, AGAINST INFANTRY. Fifthly, AGAINST CAVALRY. Lastly, AGAINST ARTILLERY. 

A. GENERALLY. 

1. So far as is possible, guns should be kept _hidden from the enemy_till the moment of opening on him. They may be masked by the ground, orother cover, natural or artificial, or by troops placed in front ofthem. The surprise will add much to their effect. Moreover, concealed, they will be less exposed to be taken. Nothing discourages troops morethan the loss of a battery at the beginning of an action. 

2. A desultory and indiscriminate artillery fire will accomplishnothing. To effect any thing important, it must be _concentrated on someobject_; and the fire must be persevered in till the desired effect hasbeen produced. 

3. It is a general principle that artillery should not reply to theenemy's batteries, unless compelled to by their effect on our owntroops. To obtain the most decisive effects from artillery fire, itshould be directed _on the enemy's troops_, instead of his guns. 

4. If it should become advisable to silence one of his batteries, itwill be done more promptly and effectually by the employment, for thispurpose, of _two_ of our own batteries, than of a single one. 

5. There is usually great advantage in keeping our batteries constantly_shifting their position_; for then--

(1. ) They have the effect of a surprise, by opening on the enemy atsome unexpected point. 

(2. ) They make the enemy believe our guns to be more numerous than theyreally are. 

(3. ) They are in less danger of being captured. 

But these changes of position are attended with this inconvenience, thatthey expose the horses to be taken in flank by the enemy's batteries andsharpshooters. 

6. The movements of a battery in the field should be _as rapid aspossible_; for, while moving, it is helpless and exposed. 

Moreover, celerity of movement and accuracy of fire will often more thancompensate for inferiority in the number of guns; as was the case at thebattle of Palo Alto, in the Mexican War, where the enemy's gunsoutnumbered ours two to one. 

B. IN OFFENSIVE COMBAT. 

1. When used to _prepare for an attack_ of infantry or cavalry, artillery concentrates as much fire as possible on the point where theattack is to be made, in order to overcome the resistance there, andthus make success easy. 

2. When there are several points on which our fire should be directed, we must not batter them all at once, but concentrate our whole fire onthem _in succession_. 

3. In attack, artillery should _not be split up_ among differentbrigades or divisions; else no decisive result can be expected from it. Whole batteries, used together, will have a more telling effect than ifscattered over the field in separate sections. 

In no case should less than two pieces be used together; for, while onepiece is being loaded, the piece and its gunners need the protection ofanother one ready to be discharged. 

4. Pieces in support of an infantry column of attack should never be inits rear, but _on its flanks_, near its head, in which position it willbest encourage the infantry. But if a battery have already a positionfrom which it can afford to the attack effective assistance, it shouldremain in it; sending a few pieces to accompany the infantry, whichalways greatly values artillery support. 

5. Powerful effects may be produced by the _sudden assemblage of a greatnumber of guns_ on some particular point. This was a favoritemanoeuvre of Napoleon; who, by his rapid concentration of immensebatteries of light artillery on the important point, usually obtainedthe most decisive results. At Wagram, for instance, when Macdonald'scolumn was ready to make its great charge on the Austrian centre, Napoleon suddenly massed one hundred guns in front of his own centre, and made it advance in double column at a trot, then deploy into line onthe leading section, and concentrate its fire on the villages formingthe keys to the enemy's position, in front of his right and left wingsrespectively; each battery opening its fire on arriving at half-rangedistance. The effect was overwhelming. 

6. The _nearer_ artillery delivers its fire, the more powerful, ofcourse, are its effects. Horse artillery, in sufficient strength, attacking the enemy at short grape-shot distance, say within threehundred or four hundred yards, may lose half its pieces, but with theother half it will probably decide the battle at that point. 

At Palo Alto, Duncan's rapid closing with his guns to less than halfrange, drove back the Mexican right wing, which could not stand thedestructive fire. 

7. _Horse artillery_ does not usually attempt to follow up cavalry inits attack; but takes a position to cover its retreat, if repulsed, orto push forward in support, in case of success. 

8. When cavalry has to _debouch from a defile_, horse artillery mayrender it most effectual assistance, by taking a position that willenable the cavalry to form without fear of being charged and destroyedwhile forming. 

C. IN DEFENSIVE COMBAT. 

1. Artillery should always reserve its fire till the enemy's _realattack_. 

2. It should play on that portion of the hostile force that _threatensus most_. 

3. It should wait till the enemy has come within _destructive distance_, and then open on his columns with a concentrated fire. 

4. It should protect our troops _while manoeuvring_, and accompanythem in retreat. 

5. We must _subdivide our batteries_ whenever we wish to obtaincross-fires on a _débouché_, or on the head of an advancing column, oron the ground in front of a weak part of our line. By so doing, wecompel the enemy to divide his own artillery in order to reply to ourfire. 

6. A _sudden concentration_ of a great number of guns at some particularpoint may be used with the same decisive effect in a defensive, as inan offensive battle; though in this case, artillery plays, for the timebeing, a part strictly offensive. 

At the battle of Friedland, where the French were attacked by theRussians in overwhelming numbers, Ney's corps was driven back by aterrific concentrated fire, in front and in flank, from the Russianbatteries on the opposite side of the river; its own artillery being toofeeble to stand before them. Seeing this, Napoleon instantly ordered allthe guns of the different divisions of the corps next to Ney's, on theleft, to be united and thrown in one mass in front of Ney's corps. Taking post at some hundred paces in front, these batteries, by theirpowerful fire, soon silenced the Russian batteries; then advancing onthe Russian troops that had crossed the river to within grape-shotrange, they made frightful havoc in their deep masses. The Frenchinfantry, profiting by this, rushed forward and captured the village ofFriedland, driving the enemy in their front over the bridges, which theythen burned. This was decisive of the battle; for the whole Russian armywas then driven into the river. 

So, at the battle of Kunersdorff, in 1759, after Frederick's left andcentre had driven the Russians, and captured seventy guns and manyprisoners, Soltikoff promptly massed the whole artillery of his rightwing at a single point behind a ravine, which, by its concentrated fire, swept away the flower of the Prussian army in their efforts to force itspassage; and Frederick was badly defeated. 

7. When compelled to retreat, guns should _retire successively_, inechelons of batteries, half-batteries, or sections, in order that thefire of one may cover the limbering up and retreat of another. 

Besides the mutual support thereby afforded, these successiveface-abouts of artillery have a powerful moral effect on the pursuingenemy, already more or less disorganized by success. 

It would be well for some pieces in each echelon to be kept loaded withcanister, so as to drive the enemy back if he should press very close. 

8. The protection afforded by artillery in retreat is very powerful, asit keeps the enemy constantly _at a distance_. 

A fine example of the use of it for this purpose occurred just beforethe battle of Pea Ridge, in March, 1862. A rear-guard of six hundredmen, under General Sigel, was retreating before a force of fourregiments of infantry and cavalry, that followed and attacked it onevery side. Sigel disposed his guns in echelons, the one of whichnearest the enemy played on his attacking squadrons with grape andshell, which suddenly checked them. Instantly profiting by theirtemporary hesitation, the echelon limbered up and galloped away toanother position, while the next echelon, again checking the enemy byits fire, followed its example. By this means, Sigel, cutting his waythrough a vastly superior force, succeeded, after a retreat of tenmiles, in rejoining the main body with but trifling loss. 

9. If driven to the last extremity, the gunners should try, at least, to_save the horses_, and to blow up the caissons they have to abandon. 

At the battle of La Rothière, in 1814, where Napoleon, with thirty-twothousand men, was overwhelmed by one hundred thousand Allies, and wasobliged to leave fifty guns on the field, he succeeded in bringing offall his gunners and horses. 

D. AGAINST INFANTRY. 

1. It is an important rule that artillery should play on the enemy's_troops_, without attending to his batteries, except in urgent cases. 

2. Against a _deployed line_, whether marching by the front or by aflank, case-shot, that is, grape, canister, and spherical case(sometimes called _shrapnel_), are most suitable; as these all scatter, right and left, to a considerable distance. 

The best effect of canister is within two hundred yards. Beyond threehundred and fifty yards, it should not be used. 

The best effect of grape is within four hundred yards. Over six hundredyards, it is not very effective. 

Spherical case is effective at much greater distances, its range beingnearly equal to that of solid shot. 

Against a line of infantry at a greater distance than six hundred yards, spherical case should be used, chiefly, if not exclusively; as beingmore likely to be effective than ball. 

3. But case-shot are _unsuitable against a column_, as they consist of anumber of small balls which have not momentum enough to penetrate intoit to any depth. When the enemy advances in columns, solid shot shouldplough through them from head to rear, a cross-fire being obtained uponthem when possible. 

4. Especially should _round-shot_ be used against a close column rushingto attack us through a defile. Grape and canister might sweep down theleading ranks, but the mass of the column sees not the destructiveeffect; and being carried forward by the pressure of the ranks behind, continues to rush on till the battery is carried, though with more orless loss. 

At the battle of Seven Pines, on one occasion, when the rebels wereadvancing in close columns, they were plied with grape and canister fromtwo of our batteries with but little effect. Every discharge made widegaps in their leading ranks, but these were instantly filled again, andthe columns pressed on. 

A round-shot, on the other hand, comes shrieking and tearing its waythrough the entire column, carrying destruction to the very rear-mostranks. The hesitation produced is not limited to the leading ranks, butextends throughout the column. Thus both the actual and the moral effectof ball on a close column is much superior to that of grape or canister. 

At the bridge of Lodi, the Austrian gunners plied the French columnwith grape. If they had used round-shot instead, it is doubtful whetherBonaparte would have succeeded in carrying the bridge. 

5. But a direct fire with ball on the head of a column of attack wouldbe much assisted by the fire of a few light pieces taking it _in flank_. And, for this fire in flank, case-shot would be powerfully effective;for, from their wide scattering, both their actual and their moraleffects would extend through the whole column, from front to rear. 

6. A battery with _guns enough to keep up a continuous fire_ has littleto fear from an open attack on it by infantry alone. Napoleon observedthat no infantry, without artillery, can march one thousand yards on abattery of sixteen guns, well directed and served; for, before clearingtwo-thirds of the way, they will have been all killed, wounded, ordispersed. 

This remark was made in reference to smooth-bore guns; the new rifledguns should be still more destructive. 

7. _Against skirmishers_, as they offer but a poor mark for ball, grapeand canister should alone be used. 

E. AGAINST CAVALRY. 

1. The ground round a battery should be so obstructed as to _prevent theenemy's cavalry from closing on it_; but in the case of a light battery, intended for manoeuvre, so far only as this can be done withoutimpeding the movements of the battery itself. 

2. On being threatened by cavalry, a light battery may sometimespromptly change its position to one where the cavalry would attack it_at great disadvantage_. For instance, if posted on an eminence, andcavalry should attempt to carry it by charging up the slope, instead ofawaiting the charge in a position which would allow the cavalry torecover breath, and form on the height, it might run its pieces forwardto the very brow of the slope, where the cavalry, having lost theirimpetus, and with their horses blown, would be nearly helpless andeasily repulsed. 

3. At a distance, the most effective fire on cavalry is with_howitzers_, on account of the terror and confusion caused among thehorses by the bursting of the shells. 

On the cavalry's flanks, when within four hundred or five hundredyards, the fire with grape would be most effective. 

4. The _last discharge_ should be of canister alone, and made by all thepieces at once, when the battery should be swiftly withdrawn. 

5. If the cavalry succeed in reaching the pieces before theirwithdrawal, the gunners may find temporary refuge _under the carriages_. 

F. AGAINST ARTILLERY. 

1. As guns in the field should generally play on troops instead ofbatteries, there should be a _reserve of horse artillery_ to take theenemy's batteries in flank, in case of need, as well as for otherpurposes. 

2. Though the ordinary use of artillery is against infantry and cavalryonly, special circumstances may render it expedient that a certainportion of it should _respond to the enemy's batteries_. In this case, not over one-third should be used for that purpose. 

3. When we have _guns in abundance_, it might be sometimes advisable, byusing several batteries at once, to silence the enemy's guns, beforebeginning to play on his troops. 

4. Artillery properly plays on the enemy's _guns_--

(1. ) At the moment of their coming into action, for then they are soexposed that our fire will be peculiarly effective, and perhaps to sucha degree as to prevent their opening on us. 

(2. ) When our troops move forward to attack, in order to draw away fromthem the fire of the enemy's batteries, or, at least, to render itunsteady, inaccurate, and ineffective; and

(3. ) Generally, when his guns are causing us very great damage. 

5. _Against guns_, solid shot or shells only should be used, since theyalone are capable of inflicting any serious injury on either guns ortheir carriages: solid shot, by their great weight and momentum; shells, by their bursting. 

But within three hundred or four hundred yards, grape and canister wouldsoon destroy the gunners and the horses. 

6. Our fire on a hostile battery would not only be very effective whenit is coming into action, but at all other times _when its flanks areexposed_; as in limbering up to move off, or in a flank march. On theseoccasions we should use grape, if near enough; otherwise, spherical casewould be generally the best. 

7. When possible to avoid it, _a field battery should not be opposed toa battery of position_, or, generally, a battery of light guns to oneof heavy guns. For even when the numbers of pieces on the two sides areequal, the enemy's superiority in range and in weight of metal wouldgive him such advantage in the duel that our own battery would soon bedestroyed or silenced. 

VI. --Its Fire. 

1. It is important not to commence the fire till our guns are in _surerange_--

(1. ) Because a harmless fire serves but to embolden the enemy anddiscourage our own troops. 

(2. ) Because artillery ammunition should never be wasted. The fate of abattle will sometimes depend on there being a sufficient supply of it ata particular moment. 

2. The usual maximum distances at which smooth-bore field guns may openfire _with any considerable effect_, are--

 For 12-pounders 1100 yards. For 6 " 750 "

What these distances are in respect to rifled guns, it does not appearto be yet definitively settled. The extreme range of the new rifledsix-pounders is said to be three thousand yards; of the twelve-pounders, four thousand five hundred yards. 

3. Guns are usually fired _by order_, and not by salvos, or volleys; andnever as soon as loaded, unless delay be dangerous. Artillery fire isformidable only in proportion to its accuracy; and this is attainableonly by a cool and calculated aim. 

4. Artillery fire should never cease _through the whole line at once_. This would have a discouraging effect on our own troops, and aninspiriting one on the enemy's. Especially must this not be done when weare about to execute any manoeuvre; for it would be sure to call theenemy's attention to it. 

Therefore, if a particular battery has to change its position, it mustnot cease the fire of all its pieces at once; for, besides itsdisquieting effect on our troops, it would notify the enemy of themovement. 

5. In _covering an attack_, our guns should keep up their fire till themoment it would begin to endanger our advancing columns. 

6. By a _ricochet_ fire, artillery is said to increase its effect, fromone-fourth to one-half. It is especially effective in enfilading a lineof troops, a battery, or the face of a work taken in flank. 

Ricochet shots have also great moral effect. 

7. When used against _breastworks of rails or logs of wood_, guns shouldbe fired with moderate or shattering charges; so as more surely todemolish them, and, at the same time, to increase the destructive effectof the fire by scattering the splinters. 

In view of the frequent necessity of battering such defences, and ofusing a ricochet fire, which also requires small charges of powder, itwould be an improvement in our artillery service to make a certainproportion of the ammunition in each gun limber to consist of cartridgesof half the usual size. 

8. In _bombarding a village_ during a battle, if our object be to setfire to and destroy it, this will be best accomplished with shells. Ifwe wish merely to drive the enemy from it, solid shot from heavycalibres will be necessary, which will more surely reach and destroy histroops, wherever they may show themselves. 

9. The _moral effect_, both of solid shot and of shells, is much greaterthan that of grape or other case-shot, from their more fearful effectson the human frame, and from the great number of men that a single ballor shell will kill or fatally wound. One twelve-pound solid shot hasbeen known to kill forty-two men, who happened to be exactly in itsrange. 

10. _Ball and shell_ should be used--

(1. ) When the enemy is at a distance. (2. ) When he is in mass. (3. ) When he is in several lines. (4. ) When his line may be enfiladed. 

11. In _silencing a battery_, our fire should be concentrated on onepiece at a time, while some of our guns throw spherical case, from araking position, if possible, on the gunners. 

12. Though grape has a much less range than ball, yet _within fourhundred yards_, on account of its scattering, its effect is superior toit. 

The fire of guns double shotted with ball and a stand of grape, isfearfully destructive when used at a short distance to repel a charge. 

13. It is artillerymen's point of honor _not to abandon their piecestill the last extremity_. They should always remember that when theenemy is closing on them, the last discharge will be the mostdestructive of all, and may suffice to repulse the attack and turn thetide of battle. 

In our attack on Quebec, in our War of Independence, on the nearapproach of our assaulting column, the British gunners fled from theirpieces; but the one who fled last, before leaving, discharged his gun, which was loaded with grape. The discharge killed and wounded several ofour men; among them the brave General Montgomery, who was leading thecolumn in person. The effect was decisive. The assailants fell back, panic-struck at the loss of their commander; and our attack failed. 

14. To prevent our own captured pieces from being turned on us by theenemy, it is the artillerymen's last duty, when it has become evidentthat the guns cannot be saved, to _spike_ them. The operation requiringbut a few moments, it can rarely be omitted without disgrace. 

VII. --Its Supports. 

1. Artillery must always be protected from the _mêlée_, in which it ishelpless whether against infantry or cavalry; and should therefore havea strong _support_. 

2. A portion, at least, of every artillery support, should consist of_sharpshooters_, whose fire will be the most effective in driving offskirmishers sent forward to threaten or attack the guns, or to pick offthe gunners. 

3. Batteries must be secured _on both flanks_, and their supports willbe posted with that view; on one or on both flanks, according tocircumstances, and more or less retired. 

4. A support should never be directly _in rear_ of the battery, where itwould be in danger, not only of receiving the shots aimed at thebattery, but also of killing the gunners belonging to it, as hasrepeatedly happened during the late war. 

5. A battery and its support owe each other _mutual protection_. Therefore, when an infantry support, after holding the enemy in check, to enable the battery to limber up and retire, is obliged, in its turn, to retreat, the battery should take such a position as will enable it tocover the retreat by its fire. 

6. A battery consisting of any considerable number of pieces may beable, sometimes, to _dispense with a support_. 

During the battle of Uclès, in Spain, in 1809, the French artillery, under General Senarmont, had been left behind, owing to the badness ofthe roads. The Spaniards came down upon it in large force. On theirapproach, the guns were formed in square, and, by their fire on everyside, defended themselves successfully, and finally repulsed the enemy. 

So, at Leipsic, in 1813, when the grand battery of the Guard, which hadbeen left temporarily without a support, was charged by the Russianhussars and Cossacks, Drouot, its commander, rapidly drew back itsflanks till they nearly met; and the cavalry were soon repulsed by itsfire. 

7. At the battle of Hanau, in 1813, Drouot's eighty guns were charged bythe Allied cavalry. Having no supports, he placed his gunners in frontof them with their carbines. This checked the cavalry, who were thencovered with grape, which drove them back to their lines. 

Ought not our gunners also to have _carbines slung on their backs_ forsuch emergencies? Against infantry, our guns would often need no othersupport. The carbines could be used to reply to the enemy's skirmishers;and the example just cited shows that, thus equipped, artillerymen maysometimes successfully defend their pieces even against cavalry. 

TACTICAL USE OF CAVALRY. 

We shall consider--

 I. --ITS FORMATIONS. II. --ITS STRONG AND ITS WEAK POINTS. III. --HOW IT IS POSTED. IV. --ITS SUPPORTS. V. --HOW IT IS USED. VI. --HOW IT FIGHTS. VII. --ITS CHARGE. VIII. --ITS ATTACK ON INFANTRY. 

And shall conclude with some--

IX. --GENERAL REMARKS. 

I. --Its Formations. 

1. The _formations_ of cavalry for battle are either--

(1. ) In deployed lines. (2. ) Lines of regiments, in columns of attack doubled on the centre. (3. ) A mixed formation of lines and columns. (4. ) Echelons of lines or columns; or--(5. ) Deep columns. 

2. _Deployed lines_ are not objectionable in principle. They are oftennot advisable; but are sometimes necessary. 

But long, continuous lines should always be avoided; being unfavorableto rapid manoeuvring, which cavalry is constantly called upon toexecute in the field. 

3. Cavalry has, in its horses, an unreasoning element, which is notcontrollable, like men; and is therefore much more easily thrown intodisorder than infantry. For this reason, when deployed, it should alwaysbe _in two lines_; the second behind the first; the first line deployed, and the second in columns of squadrons by platoons. There should be alsoa reserve at a few hundred paces behind the second line. 

The second line should be near enough to the first to be able to supportit, if checked; but not so near as to partake in its disorder, ifrepulsed. 

4. Cavalry should be always _in column_ when expecting to manoeuvre, or to be called on to make any rapid movement; this being the formationbest adapted for celerity. 

5. Cavalry deploys _in lines_--

(1. ) When preparing for a charge in line. 

(2. ) When preparing for any attack requiring the utmost possible widthof front; as where the enemy is to be suddenly surrounded. 

(3. ) When it becomes necessary in order to prevent our troops from beingoutflanked by the enemy's. 

(4. ) When exposed to continued artillery fire, which is much lessdestructive on a line than on a column. 

6. Cavalry should always present _a front at least equal to theenemy's_; otherwise, its flank, which is cavalry's weak point, will beexposed to attack. When inferior in numbers, we may extend our line byleaving intervals, more or less wide, between its different corps. Anyhostile squadrons that may attempt to pass through these intervals totake the line in rear, could be taken care of by the second line. 

7. The best formation in respect to _mobility_ is a line of regiments incolumns by squadrons, doubled on the centre; corresponding to infantrydouble columns. 

8. The _mixed formation_ of lines and columns is more manageable thansimple lines. Which of these two is preferable depends upon the ground, and upon all the other circumstances of the case. 

9. The order _in echelons_ is as good in attack as in retreat; since theechelons mutually support each other. 

10. Decidedly the most objectionable of all cavalry formations is thatin _deep columns_:

(1. ) From the almost entire loss which it involves of its sabres, whichare cavalry's peculiar and most effective weapon. 

(2. ) From the long flanks which it exposes to attack. 

11. The formation in _one rank_, instead of two, has been introduced bythe new Cavalry Tactics, though it has been as yet but partially adoptedin the field. 

This innovation has two advantages. It doubles the number of sabres tobe used against the enemy; and it enables the cavalry to cover doublethe ground; thus doubling, also, its power to outflank, which is avaluable advantage, especially when opposed to cavalry. 

Its disadvantage is, that it must, more or less seriously, impair thesolidity and vigor of the cavalry charge proper; in which a whole line, with "boot to boot" compactness, comes at once to the shock, like someterrific mechanical engine; and in which the riders in the front rankare compelled to dash on with full speed to the last; knowing that ifthey slacken rein, even for a moment, they would be ridden over by therear-rank men one yard behind them. From there being no rear-rank tofill up the gaps caused, during the charge, by the enemy's missiles, orby casualties occasioned by obstacles of the ground, the charging linemust generally arrive on the enemy broken and disunited, or as foragers. The moral effect of such a charge on our own men will be unfavorable, asthey will not realize the certainty of mutual support at the criticalmoment; and its moral effect on the enemy must be decidedly inferior tothat produced by a charge that is at once swift, solid, and compact. 

But the force of this objection is somewhat weakened, by theconsideration that the compact charge of "cavalry of the line" musthereafter be comparatively rare, in consequence of the introduction ofrifled artillery and infantry weapons, with their greatly increasedaccuracy and range; which ought to cause such slaughter in a line orcolumn of charging cavalry, that, if it arrive at all to the shock, itwould generally be only in scattered groups. 

12. In advancing over wooded, or other obstructed ground, it may benecessary to break the line into _company columns of fours_, as in theinfantry manoeuvre of advancing by the flanks of companies. 

As the cavalry column of fours corresponds to the march of infantry bythe flank, the use of this formation in action is open to the sameobjections that have been already pointed out as applying to flankmarches by infantry. 

II. --Its Strong and its Weak Points. 

1. The value of cavalry on the battle-field consists chiefly in itsvelocity and mobility. Its strength is in the _sabre-point and spurs_. 

2. Its charge is accompanied with a _powerful moral effect_, especiallyupon inexperienced troops. But, 3. Cavalry has but _little solidity_, and cannot defend a positionagainst good infantry. For, if it remain passive on the ground it is tohold, the infantry will soon destroy it by its fire, to which it cannot, with any effect, reply; and if it attack at close quarters, theinfantry, by means of its defensive formations, will be able, at least, to hold its ground, and probably repulse its charges by a reservedfire. So that the cavalry will finally have no alternative but toretire. 

4. It is exposed and helpless _during a change of formation_; likeartillery limbering up, or coming into action. 

5. _On its flanks_, it is the weakest of all arms. A single squadronattacking it suddenly in flank, will break and rout cavalry of ten timesits number. 

At the battle of the Pyramids, Napoleon kept a few squadrons in rear ofeither flank, which, on his line being charged by a formidable body ofMamelukes, vastly superior to his own cavalry in numbers, horses, andequipments, nevertheless suddenly fell on their flanks and destroyedthem. 

6. Cavalry is never so weak as directly _after a successful charge_;being then exhausted, and in more or less disorder. 

III. --How Posted. 

1. A part of our cavalry must be so posted as to _secure our flanks_;remaining in column behind the wings, till the enemy's movements requireits deployment. 

If one wing is covered by natural obstacles, give the cavalry to theuncovered wing; posting it in rear of the flank battalion of the secondline. 

2. When cavalry is posted on the flanks, it should _not usually be onthe first line of infantry_. If it is to be used for attack, it isbetter to keep it retired from view till the last moment, in order tostrengthen its attack by the powerful moral effect of a surprise. And, used defensively, it will be best posted on the flanks of the secondline; since, in advancing to charge, it must have a clear space in itsfront of at least two hundred or three hundred yards, to enable it toact with freedom and vigor. 

3. But if a position can be found for cavalry in front, where it wouldnot be too much exposed, this may sometimes enable it to exercise animportant moral effect, by _threatening the flank_ of such of theenemy's troops as may be sent forward to attack. 

At the battle of Leipsic, in 1813, the Wurtemburg cavalry was launchedagainst Blucher's Prussian cavalry. But, seeing the Prussians drawn upnot only in front, but opposite their flank, they lost confidence, charged feebly, and too late. They were consequently repulsed anddriven back on the Marine Battalion, which they threw into confusion. 

So, at the battle of Prairie Grove, in December, 1862, the First IowaCavalry, which was held in reserve, by its mere presence, caused everyattempt of the rebels' flanking regiments to be abandoned. 

4. In order not to impede the manoeuvres of the infantry, cavalryshould not _fill intervals_ in the lines, or be placed between thelines. 

It is dangerous when the ground is such as to require the cavalry in thecentre of the first line; for, if it is beaten, a gap is left throughwhich the enemy may penetrate. At the battle of Blenheim, in 1704, Marlborough owed his victory, in great measure, to the Allies' forcingback the cavalry forming the centre of the French army; thus turning thewhole of its right wing, and compelling the infantry posted at Blenheimto surrender. 

5. Yet cavalry should always be near enough to the infantry to takeimmediate part in the combat; and although it should not be posted inthe intervals between infantry corps, it may _debouch through them_, inorder to attack more promptly. 

At the battle of Friedland, the Russian cavalry charged a Frenchinfantry division. Latour Maubourg's dragoons and the Dutch cuirassiers, riding through the battalion intervals, charged the Russians in turn, and drove them back on their infantry, throwing many of them into theriver. 

6. When _both wings are uncovered_, the best place for the cavalry willusually be in rear of the centre of the second line; whence it can besent in the shortest time to either wing. 

7. Cavalry should not be _scattered over the field_ in smalldetachments, but be kept massed at one or more suitable points; asbehind the centre, or behind one wing, or both wings. A small cavalryforce should be kept entire; or it will have very little chance ofeffecting any thing whatever. 

Cavalry of the line, to produce its decisive effects, must be used inheavy masses. In the beginning of the Napoleonic wars, the Frenchcavalry was distributed among the divisions. Napoleon's subsequentexperience led him to give it more concentration, by uniting in one massall the cavalry belonging to each army corps; and, finally, these masseswere again concentrated into independent cavalry corps; leaving to eacharmy corps only cavalry enough to guard it. 

8. For tactical operations in the field, cavalry insufficient in numberis _scarcely better than none at all_, as it can never show itself inpresence of the enemy's cavalry, which would immediately outflank anddestroy it, and must keep close behind its infantry. 

At the opening of Napoleon's campaign of 1813, he had but very littlecavalry to oppose to the overwhelming masses of this arm possessed bythe Allies. In consequence of this, he could make no use of it whatever;and the tactical results of the battles of Lutzen and Bautzen were farinferior to those habitually obtained in his former victories, and werepurchased with much greater loss. 

9. Small bodies of cavalry threatened by the enemy's cavalry in greatlysuperior force, may sometimes be saved by taking refuge _in an infantrysquare_, as practised by Napoleon at the battle of the Pyramids. 

10. Cavalry should _remain masked_ as long as possible; for it producesmost effect when its position and movements are hidden, so that a strongforce may suddenly be brought upon a weak point. 

For this reason, a flat, open country is less favorable for this armthan plains with undulations, hills with gentle slopes, woods, villages, and farms; all these being so many facilities for screeningcavalry from view. 

11. Cavalry should never be brought to the front, _except to engage_. Itis unfortunate when the ground is such as to prevent this; for cavalry, compelled to remain inactive under fire, is in great danger of becomingdemoralized. 

12. As to the _ground_:

(1. ) Cavalry must not rest its flank on a wood, a village, or othercover for an enemy, till it has been occupied by our own troops. Ifcompelled to do so, it should send out patrols to reconnoitre andobserve. Its position is no longer tenable from the moment the enemyappears within striking distance on its flank. 

(2. ) It must not be posted on the very ground it is to defend, but inrear of it; as it acts effectively only by its charge. 

Attacking cavalry must have favorable ground in front; defendingcavalry, in rear. An obstacle in either case may be fatal. 

IV. --Its Supports. 

1. The flanks of cavalry lines or columns are always exposed. Theyshould, therefore, be protected by _supports_ of light cavalry, whichcan act promptly and swiftly. When behind a line, these supports shouldbe usually in open column, so as to be able to wheel, without a moment'sdelay, into line. 

2. The _most effectual_ mode of protecting the flank of a line or columnof cavalry is by means of squadrons in rear, formed in echelonsextending outwards; as this exposes the enemy's cavalry that may attemptto charge the main body in flank to be immediately charged in flankthemselves; which would be destruction. For this purpose, irregularcavalry may be as effective as any other. 

3. This cavalry support or reserve behind the flanks may sometimes play_an important offensive_ part. The enemy's first line, the instant aftereither making or receiving a charge, is always in greater or lessdisorder; and a vigorous charge then made on it in flank by our ownflank reserve, would have a decisive effect. 

4. Cavalry should never engage without a support or _reserve in rear_, not only to guard its flanks, but also to support it when disorganizedby a successful charge. 

5. So, when engaged in _skirmishing order_, being then very muchexposed, it must always be protected, like infantry skirmishers, bysupports in close order. 

6. It has been already seen that, although cavalry may carry a position, it cannot hold it, if attacked by infantry. When used for such apurpose, therefore, it should always be accompanied by _an infantrysupport_. 

The French cavalry succeeded in carrying the plateau of Quatre Bras;but, having no infantry with it to reply to the terrible fire of theAllied infantry from the surrounding houses, it was compelled to retire, and yield it again to the enemy. 

According to Wellington, Napoleon frequently used his cavalry in seizingpositions, which were then immediately occupied by infantry orartillery. 

V. --How Used. 

1. Cavalry generally manoeuvres _at a trot_. At a gallop, disorder isapt to take place, and exhaustion of strength that will be needed in thecharge. 

2. The ordinary use of cavalry is to follow up infantry attacks andcomplete their success. It should never be sent _against freshinfantry_; and should generally, therefore, be reserved until towardsthe last of the action. 

Napoleon, who, by concentrating his cavalry into considerable masses, had enabled himself to use it on the battle-field as a principal arm, sometimes produced great effects by heavy cavalry charges at the verybeginning of the action. 

But, though Napoleon's splendidly trained heavy cavalry might sometimesbreak a well-disciplined infantry without any preparatory artilleryfire, it would be dangerous to attempt this with cavalry inferior to itin solidity; and the new rifled weapons would seem to render the cavalrycharges of his day no longer practicable. 

3. Cavalry _may_ be hurled against the enemy's infantry--

(1. ) When it has been a long time engaged, and therefore exhausted. 

(2. ) When it has been shattered by artillery. 

And _always should_ be--

(1. ) When it is manoeuvring. 

(2. ) When the attack would be a surprise. 

(3. ) When its ranks begin to waver, or when it manifests any unequivocalsymptom of hesitation or intimidation. 

In the three latter cases, success will usually be certain; in the twoformer ones, quite probable: but, in most other cases, a cavalry chargewill succeed, perhaps, only one time in ten. 

4. The chief duties of cavalry in a _defensive_ battle are--

(1. ) To watch the enemy's cavalry, to prevent its surprising ourinfantry. 

(2. ) To guard our troops from being outflanked. 

(3. ) To defend our infantry and artillery while manoeuvring. 

(4. ) To be ready to charge the enemy the instant his attack on ourtroops is repulsed. 

5. _Used offensively_, it must promptly attack--

(1. ) The enemy's flanks, if uncovered. 

(2. ) His infantry, when, from any cause, its attack would probablysucceed. 

(3. ) All detachments thrown forward without support. 

6. When cavalry has routed cavalry, the victorious squadrons should atonce charge in flank _the infantry protected by the cavalry justbeaten_. The great Condé, when only twenty-two years of age, by thismeans, won the victory of Rocroi. 

7. Deployed as skirmishers, by their noise, dust, and smoke, cavalry mayfurnish a good _screen_ for our movements. 

8. Cavalry skirmishers _scout their corps_, to prevent the enemyreconnoitring it too closely. 

9. When a cavalry rear-guard has to defend, temporarily, a defile, abridge, or a barricade, a part should _dismount_, and use their carbinestill the rest are safe. 

So, a cavalry vanguard, by its fire, dismounted, may prevent the enemyfrom destroying a bridge. 

In these, and in similar cases, the cavalrymen should habituallydismount, in order to render their fire effective; acting andmanoeuvring as skirmishers. 

VI. --How it Fights. 

1. The success of cavalry in battle depends on the _impetuosity of itscharge_, and its _use of the sabre_. When deployed as skirmishers, mounted or dismounted, its proper weapon is the carbine or pistol; andin individual combats, these weapons may occasionally be very useful. But when acting as cavalry proper, in any compact formation, it mustrely on the sabre. The aim with a pistol or carbine in the hands of amounted man is so unsteady, that the fire of a line of cavalry isgenerally ineffective; and there are few occasions where it should beresorted to. When cavalry has learned to realize that these are not itstrue arms, and that it is never really formidable but when it closeswith the enemy at full speed and with uplifted sabre, it has acquiredthe most important element of its efficiency. 

2. Cavalry should, therefore, not fight _in columns_, as most of itssabres would thereby become useless. But if a facing about to retreat isfeared, an attack in column would prevent it. It is said, also, that acolumn is more imposing than a line. If so, it might have a greatermoral effect on the enemy. 

3. When cavalry are deployed as skirmishers, as a curtain to hide ourmovements, they should be _in considerable number_, with smallintervals, and should make as much noise, and smoke, and dust aspossible. When the charge is sounded, the skirmishers wait and fall inwith the rest. 

4. The great rule in cavalry combats is to _cover our own flanks_, and_gain the enemy's_; for these are his and our weakest points. 

5. When the enemy's cavalry is already in full charge on our infantry, it is too late for our cavalry to charge it with much prospect ofsuccess. In such a case, it would be better to defer our own charge tillthe moment that the enemy's _is completed_; for our success then wouldbe certain. 

6. Cavalry attacks cavalry _in line_, in order to have the more sabres, and, if possible, to outflank the enemy. 

7. If we can manoeuvre so as to attack the enemy's cavalry _in flank_, our success will be certain. 

Military history affords hundreds of instances in proof of thisproposition. At one of the battles in Spain, for example, in 1809, fifteen hundred French horse, by charging four thousand Spanish cavalryin flank, completely cut it in pieces. 

8. Cavalry _never waits in position_ to be charged by cavalry. Its onlysafety is in meeting the charge with a violent gallop; it wouldotherwise be sure to be overthrown. 

When hostile cavalries thus meet each other, there is usually but smallloss on either side. A certain number of troopers are usuallydismounted; but the colliding masses somehow ride through each other, allowing but little time for the exchange of points and cuts. 

Thus cavalry can defend itself against cavalry only by attacking; whichit must do even when inferior to the enemy in number. 

9. To attack artillery, cavalry should be in _three detachments_;one-fourth to seize the guns; one-half to charge the supports; and theother fourth as a reserve. 

The first party attacks in dispersed order, as foragers, trying to gainthe flanks of the battery. The second party should manoeuvre to gainthe flanks of the supports. 

10. Where a cavalry attack can be masked, so as to operate _as asurprise_, a battery may be taken by charging it in front. Theformidable Spanish battery in the Pass of Somosierra, was finallycarried by a dash of Napoleon's Polish Lancers upon it, suddenlyprofiting of a temporary fog or mist. But, in ordinary cases, whencavalry has to charge a battery in front, its fire should be drawn byour own guns or infantry, immediately before the charge begins. 

11. In an attack on an _intrenchment_, the office of cavalry can rarelybe any thing else than to repulse sorties from the work, and to cut offthe enemy's retreat from it. 

VII. --Its Charge. 

1. As cavalry acts effectively on the field of battle only by itscharge, good cavalry of the line can be formed in no other way than bybeing _exercised in this_, its special and peculiar function. 

On taking command of the Army of Italy in 1796, Bonaparte found theFrench cavalry to be entirely worthless. They had never been accustomedto charge, and he had the greatest difficulty in making them engage. Seeing the great importance of this arm, he determined to make goodcavalry of them by compelling them to fight. So, in his attack onBorghetto, he sent his cavalry forward, with his grenadiers on theirflanks, and his artillery close behind them. Thus enclosed, and led onby Murat to the charge, they attacked and routed that famous Austriancavalry whose superiority they had so much dreaded. This was the firststep in the formation of the splendid French cavalry to which Napoleonafterwards owed so many of his victories. And, at the battle ofHochstedt, on the Danube, in 1801, its superiority over the Austriancavalry was, at last, completely established. 

2. Cavalry _charges_--

(1. ) In line; but this only on even ground, and at short distances;

(2. ) In column; and

(3. ) As foragers, or in dispersed order. But this kind of charge isexceptional. It can rarely be used with safety against any but anuncivilized or an undisciplined foe. 

3. A charge in _one long continuous line_ should never be attempted. Such a charge will be usually indecisive, as it cannot be made with thenecessary _ensemble_ or unity. The success of a charge in line dependson the preservation of a well-regulated speed and of a perfectalignment; by means of which the whole line reaches the enemy at once. At the charging gait, this is rarely attainable; so that the charge inline, except at short distances, and over very even ground, usuallydegenerates into a charge by groups, or individual troopers, arrivingsuccessively. The most dashing riders, or those mounted on the swiftesthorses, will naturally arrive first, and be overpowered by numbers. 

4. A charge _in deep column_ is also objectionable; its long flankexposing it too much to artillery fire and to the enemy's cavalry. 

But when cavalry is surprised, it must charge at once, in whatever orderit happens to be, rather than hesitate or attempt to manoeuvre, forthis would expose it to destruction. 

5. A prompt and unhesitating obedience to the command to charge, withoutregard to the circumstances under which it is given, may sometimes leadto results _unexpected even to the charging troops themselves_. 

One instance of this was related to me by an old officer of Napoleon'sfavorite Fifth Cuirassiers. The regiment was on the left of the line ofbattle. Directly in front of it was an extensive marsh; beyond whichrose an eminence, abrupt in front, but sloping gently towards the rear, the crest of which was crowned by formidable Austrian batteries. For twohours the cuirassiers had been standing in line, listening to the roarof battle on the right, and eagerly expecting a summons to go_somewhere_ to engage the enemy. The very horses were neighing andpawing the ground, in their impatience to be off. Just then galloped upone of the Emperor's aids, saying, "Colonel, the Emperor desires you tocharge directly on the enemy's batteries opposite your position. " Thebrave colonel, who was one of Napoleon's personal favorites, thoughchafing at the prolonged inaction of his command, pointed to the marsh, and requested the officer to inform the Emperor of the obstacle in hisfront, with the existence of which his majesty, he said, was probablyunacquainted. In a few minutes the officer came riding furiously backwith a message to the colonel, that "if he did not immediately charge, the Emperor would come and lead the regiment himself. " Stung by thisreproof, the colonel plunged his spurs into his horse's flanks, andgiving the command "Forward, " led his regiment, at full gallop, directlythrough the marsh upon the point that had been indicated. 

The charge itself was, of course, a failure. The regiment finallystruggled its way through the marsh to the opposite side, but leavingbehind it a large number of gallant officers and men, who had sunk torise no more; my informant being of the number who escaped. 

But the result of this demonstration was most decisive. Seeing that theheight on which the Austrians had planted their heavy batteries, andwhich commanded the entire ground, was the key of the battle, Napoleonhad determined to wrest it from them, together with the batteries whichcrowned it. Accordingly, the evening before, he had dispatched a body oflight infantry by a very circuitous route, to turn the position andattack the batteries in rear. He had accurately calculated the time thedetachment would require to reach its destination; and when the momentarrived at which it should be ready to commence its attack, he orderedthe cuirassiers to charge directly upon the position in front. TheAustrian artillery, suddenly attacked in rear, and, at the same time, threatened with a cavalry charge in front, where it had deemed itselfperfectly secure, tried to change the position of its pieces, so as toget a fire on its assailants from both directions. But it was too late;the temporary confusion into which it was thrown enabled the Frenchinfantry to carry all before it, and the height was won, with all itsbatteries. 

So, at Waterloo, Sir Hussey Vivian's brigade of Light Cavalry, which wasmarching in column by half squadrons, left in front, had begun to formup into line on the leading half squadron, when an order arrived fromWellington to charge. Instantly the charge was made, and, of course, inechelons of half squadrons, extending to the right. The effect of thiswas that a body of French cavalry on its right, then attacking theBritish line, was suddenly taken in flank and completely routed. 

6. A charge in deep column may sometimes be made necessary by _thenature of the ground_, which, at the same time, protects its longflanks: as where, in our pursuit of the rebels after the battle ofNashville, in 1864, the Fourth United States Cavalry, approaching themover a narrow turnpike, made a vigorous charge in column of fours, whichbroke their centre, and, with the help of infantry skirmishers on theflanks, drove them from the ground. 

7. When the ground is rugged, in order to lessen the number of falls, the rear-rank, in the charge, should _open out six paces_, closing upagain at the last moment. 

8. Cavalry advances to charge at a _trot_, or at a _gallop_. A fast trotis better than a gallop, as alignments are not easily kept at greatspeed. Experience has shown that the best distance from the enemy tobegin the gallop, is about two hundred and sixty yards; thence steadilyincreasing to the maximum of speed. This gradual increase of speed isvery important, to prevent the horses from being completely blown onreaching the enemy. 

9. Cavalry should not charge by _a wood_, till it has been carried byour own infantry, if it can possibly be avoided. 

At the battle of Kollin, in 1756, Frederick's cavalry, pursuing theAustrians, was taken in flank by some Austrian infantry posted in awood, and made to retire with great loss. 

10. When cavalry is required to charge over unknown ground, it should bepreceded by a few men thrown out to the front as skirmishers, in orderto _scout the ground_ to be passed over. The neglect of this precautionhas sometimes led to great disaster. 

At Talavera, two cavalry regiments, the First German Hussars and theTwenty-third Light Dragoons, were ordered to charge the head of someFrench infantry columns. When near the top of their speed they camesuddenly upon a deep ravine, with steep sides. Colonel Arentschildcommanding the Hussars, who was in front, at once reined up, and haltedhis regiment, saying: "I vill not kill my young mensch!" But the otherregiment, commanded by Colonel Seymour, which was on its left, notseeing the obstacle in time, plunged down it, men and horses rollingover on each other in frightful confusion. Of the survivors, whoarrived on the other side by twos and threes, many were killed ortaken; and only one-half of the regiment ever returned. 

So, at the battle of Courtrai, in 1302, from the French cavalry'somitting to scout the ground they charged over, the Flemings won a greatvictory. All the _élite_ of the French nobility and chivalry wasdestroyed, and gold spurs were collected by bushels on the field. It wasthe French Cannæ. The Flemings were drawn up behind a canal, flowingbetween high banks, and hidden from view. The French rushing on at fullgallop, all the leading ranks were plunged into the canal. The entirecavalry was thereby checked and thrown into irretrievable disorder, which extended to the infantry, in their rear. The Flemings, profitingby their confusion, crossed the canal at two points simultaneously, attacked them in flank, and completed their rout. 

So, at the battle of Leipsic, in 1813, Murat, in his great cavalrycharge on the Allied centre, had captured twenty-six guns, and wascarrying all before him, when he pushed on to the village of GuldenGossa, where the ground had not been reconnoitred, and could not bedistinctly seen from a distance. Here the French found their careersuddenly checked by a great hollow, full of buildings, pools of water, and clusters of trees; while the Allied infantry, from behind thevarious covers afforded by the ground, opened upon them a destructivefire. Being then suddenly charged in flank by the Russian cavalry, theywere driven back with heavy loss; the Allies recapturing twenty of thetwenty-six guns they had lost. 

The troopers employed to scout the ground before a charge would not bein much danger from the enemy, who would hardly fire on a horseman ortwo, especially when expecting a charge. 

11. Cavalry must never pursue, unless its supports are _close at hand_. 

In pursuing, it must be circumspect, and not go too far. Union and orderare indispensable; for, without them, a slight resistance may suffice tocause a repulse. 

VIII. --Its Attack on Infantry. 

First, as to its ATTACK GENERALLY. Secondly, its attack ON SQUARES. 

A. GENERALLY. 

1. Cavalry must avoid _distant engagements_ with infantry; in which thelatter must always have the advantage. 

2. The slightest cavalry charge on the _flank_ of infantry will rout it. 

3. As to a cavalry attack _in front_: If the infantry stand firm, thechances are against its success. If the infantry cannot be attacked inflank, the cavalry should therefore wait till it has been shattered byartillery, or has become exhausted, or demoralized, or till it begins tomanoeuvre. 

4. If the infantry be _in line_, or _in column_, cavalry should attackit in flank; if _in square_, at one of its angles; if _in severalsquares_, at one of its flank ones, so as to avoid a cross-fire from theother squares. If a flank square be broken, the next one to it, being nolonger protected by the fire of any other square, may be attacked withthe same prospect of success; and so on successively. 

5. But if the hostile infantry have _supporting cavalry_, we must notcharge in such a manner as to enable it to take us in flank. 

6. To _test the infantry_ about to be attacked, cavalry may pass a fewhundred paces in its front, to threaten it, sending forward a fewhorsemen to fire, gallop forward, and raise a dust. If the infantry, instead of disregarding these movements, begin to fire, it will probablybe broken, on the cavalry's charging it at once and vigorously, whetherin column or in line. But otherwise, if the infantry reserve its fire, and only sends out a few sharpshooters. 

7. _Ascending slopes_, if not too steep, are not unfavorable to attackson infantry; for their shots, as experience shows, will then mostly flytoo high. 

8. On a _descending slope_, cavalry charges down on infantry withterrible effect; as it then arrives with an impetus which nothing canstop. 

At Waterloo, a column of French infantry was ascending a steep slope. Suddenly the Scotch Greys cavalry regiment dashed down upon it fromabove, rode over, and destroyed it. 

B. ON SQUARES. 

1. Infantry squares are usually charged in _open column_; the distancebetween the subdivisions being a subdivision front and a few yards over;in order that each subdivision may have time to break into the square, or, if unsuccessful, to disengage itself and retire. 

But the distances should never be so great as to allow the square toreload after firing a volley at the next preceding subdivision. 

2. The leading subdivision will usually _draw the fire_ of the square. If this is delivered at very short range, say at twenty paces, it willraise up a rampart of dead and wounded men and horses which willprobably suffice to check the following subdivisions, and so repulse thecharge. But an infantry square rarely reserves its fire so long; and ifthe fire is delivered at any considerable distance, no such effect willbe produced. 

3. A _good formation_ to attack a square is said to be a column of threesquadrons, with squadron front, at double distance; followed by a fourthsquadron, in column of divisions or platoons, to surround the square, and make prisoners, if it is broken. 

4. Before cavalry charges a square, it should be first shattered ordemoralized by _artillery fire_, when this is practicable. In theabsence of artillery, sharpshooting infantry skirmishers may, to acertain extent, supply its place. 

5. A square should be attacked at one of its angles, which are obviouslyits weakest and most vulnerable points. But to cover a real attack on anangle, cavalry sometimes makes a _false attack_ on the front of asquare. 

6. When squares are formed checkerwise, cavalry must attack _a flanksquare_, and not expose itself to a cross-fire by charging an interiorone. 

7. Cavalry charging a square firing irregularly will usually break it. But when the square reserves its fire, and pours in well-aimed volleysat short range, the charge will rarely succeed. The cavalry should, therefore, before charging, use every effort to _draw the fire_ of thesquare, or of the fronts which threaten it. This is sometimesaccomplished by sending forward a few skirmishers to fire on the square. 

8. When one square fires to assist another, the firing square should be_instantly charged_, before it has time to reload. 

9. To succeed, a cavalry charge should be made with a _desperate, forlorn-hope recklessness_, and with reiterated attacks on one point. Ifthe fire has been delivered at very close range, though its effect hasprobably been destructive, the smoke will momentarily shut out the lineof infantry from the horses' view, thus removing the chief obstacle totheir breaking through it. The survivors of the fire should thereforerush desperately on. 

If the French attacks on the British squares at Quatre Bras had beenmade in this manner, instead of opening to the right and left, anddiverging to a flank at the moment of closing, they would probably havesucceeded. 

But this sudden divergence is often the fault of the horses, whichinstinctively recoil before a serried line of infantry, with bayonets atthe charge. Cavalry should, therefore, never be practised on thedrill-ground in charging a square, as the horses would thereby acquirethe habit of suddenly checking their course, or of diverging to a flank, on arriving at the enemy. This would so strengthen their naturalinstinct that they could never be got to break a square. Or, at least, when this manoeuvre is practised for the purpose of instruction, thehorses used should never afterwards be taken into the field. 

10. The cavalry most formidable to an infantry square are _Lancers_. Their lances, which are from eleven to sixteen feet long, easily reachand transfix the infantry soldier, while the sabres of the other cavalryare too short to reach him over the horse's neck, and over the musket, lengthened by the bayonet. But Lancers are usually no match againstother cavalry, who can parry and ripost before the lance can resume theguard. 

11. When cavalry has succeeded in completely breaking a body ofinfantry, it may often inflict _fearful slaughter_ upon them. 

At the battle of Rio Seco, in Spain, after Lasalle's twelve hundredhorse had broken the Spanish infantry, they galloped at will amongtwenty-five thousand soldiers, some five thousand of whom they slew. 

IX. --General Remarks. 

1. Besides its uses on the field of battle, cavalry may render mostimportant service in completing the destruction of beaten corps, orcompelling their surrender, and so enable us to secure the greatstrategic objects of the campaign. Thus, after the battle of Waterloo, it was the Prussian cavalry that completed the dispersion of the Frencharmy, and prevented it from rallying. And, but for Napoleon's illfortune in respect to Grouchy, in that battle, he would, to allappearance, have succeeded in accomplishing his plan of campaign, whichwas, to separate the English from the Prussians, beat them in detail, and complete their destruction with his twenty thousand cavalry. 

2. The battles of the late War of the Rebellion, the earlier ones, atleast, were mostly indecisive. One chief cause of this was, that neitherside had a sufficient force of true cavalry to enable it to complete avictory, to turn a defeat into a rout, and drive the enemy effectuallyfrom the field. The cavalry charges were generally such as mountedinfantry could have just as well made; charges in which the pistol andcarbine played the principal part, instead of the spur and sabre. It wasnot until the fight at Brandy Station, in June, 1863, that sabres wereused, to any extent, at close quarters. Thus, neither of the contendingarmies was able to break up and disperse, destroy, or capture itsenemy's infantry masses, in the manner practised in Napoleon's greatwars, not having, to any considerable extent, that description of forcecalled Cavalry of the Line, which alone is capable of effecting theseresults by its solid and compact formations, its skilful, yet rapidmanoeuvring, and its crashing charges. 

3. European cavalry of the line is divided into Heavy and Light. Heavycavalry is heavily armed; that is, their weapons are larger and heavierthan those of light cavalry, and to these weapons, carbines, in most ofthe corps, are added. Some of the corps wear steel or brass cuirasses;and the men and horses are of the largest size. 

In Light cavalry, the only weapons are the sabre and pistol; and the menand horses are light and active, rather than strong and large. 

Lancers are considered a medium between Heavy and Light cavalry. 

4. Great as may be the advantages of a large force of regular cavalry ofthe line, there were serious objections to its being raised at theopening of the late war. 

(1. ) The theatre of war presented nowhere any of those wide and levelplains so common in Europe, and on which cavalry masses are able toproduce such decisive effects in battle. On the contrary, the ground wasalmost everywhere so rugged and mountainous, or else so densely wooded, as to be extremely unfavorable to the movements of cavalry of thisdescription. 

(2. ) Since the introduction of the new rifled arms, exposing cavalrymasses to a deadly fire at far greater distances than ever before known, a fire often reaching to the reserves, it seemed doubtful whether themanoeuvring and charging in heavy, compact masses, which formerlyrendered cavalry of the line so formidable, would any longer bepracticable. 

(3. ) The comparative cost of this kind of force is so great, that, if ithad been raised and kept up on the scale required, the expense of thiswar, enormous as it has been, would have been vastly augmented. Threeyears are required for the thorough training and instruction of the menand horses; so that it would not have been until the fourth year of thewar that we could begin, even, to reap the fruits of so enormous anoutlay. 

5. But to carry on any war successfully, what is needed, and is, infact, indispensable, is an ample force of light cavalry, of a kindrequiring comparatively but little time and training to fit it for thevarious and important duties devolving upon it in the field, andtherefore far less expensive than cavalry of the line; and having allthe discipline of this latter kind of force, though wanting itsperfection of manoeuvre. Every army, or considerable detachment, musthave enough of this kind of force with it to furnish what is requisitefor Outpost duty, Patrols offensive and defensive, Escorts to trains, Foraging parties, Reconnoissances, and the various other purposesnecessarily incidental to operations in the field; and in marches, allAdvanced, Rear, and Flank guards should consist, in part, at least, ofcavalry. Finally, this description of force is needed for theperformance of those arduous, but most valuable, services often renderedby the quasi-independent bodies called Partisan Corps; services usuallyrequiring great celerity of movement. 

6. This kind of force being "the eyes and ears of an army, " it oftencontributes powerfully to the success of strategic operations. 

In the campaign of 1813, Napoleon complained that, for want of lightcavalry, he could get no intelligence of the enemy's movements. 

So, in the rebel campaign of 1863, culminating at Gettysburg, GeneralLee attributed his ignorance of our position and movements, which led tothe failure of his operations, to his being destitute of this arm;Stuart's cavalry, on which he depended for information, having got toofar away from him. 

In Pope's campaign in 1862, the rebels, by their cavalry raid onCatlett's Station, obtained possession of the commanding general'scorrespondence, plans, and orders from Washington. 

On the other hand, whilst keeping us informed of the enemy's movements, an abundant light cavalry, active and well commanded, may be so used asto constitute an impenetrable screen of our own movements from theenemy, as effectual as would be a lofty and impassable mountain range. 

Again, if we are greatly inferior to the enemy in cavalry, our owncavalry will have to keep itself within our infantry lines; and theconsequence will be that the enemy will obtain control of the entirecountry around us, and so deprive us of all the supplies it contains. 

As, besides this, cavalry is absolutely necessary for the protection ofconvoys, and, from its celerity of movement, is the kind of force bestfitted for guarding our communications, it is evident that thesubsistence of an army is dependent, to a great extent, upon this arm. 

From what has been said in relation to the three arms, it is evident--

1. That ARTILLERY, within the range of its fire, is powerful inpreventing the enemy's approach to it; but, only to a limited extent, can pursue and drive the enemy from his position; and that its functionis, therefore, mainly DEFENSIVE. 

2. That CAVALRY, by the impetuosity of its charge, is peculiarly fit fordriving the enemy from his position; but, remaining in position itself, has but feeble power to prevent the enemy's approaching it; and this, only by its carbine and pistol fire, which is far from effective; andthat its function is, therefore, mainly OFFENSIVE. 

3. That INFANTRY has great power, both in keeping the enemy at adistance by its fire and in driving him from his position with thebayonet; and that this arm is, therefore, both OFFENSIVE and DEFENSIVE. 

4. That although artillery is mainly a defensive arm, it plays animportant offensive part in the powerful assistance it renders toinfantry, in shattering and disorganizing the enemy's masses; therebyopening the way for our attacking columns. 

5. That although cavalry is mainly an offensive arm, its defensive valueis also very great in the protection it affords, in various emergencies, to the other arms, by its actual charge, or by its threatening position. 

The special parts usually played in battle by the three armsrespectively, may be briefly stated thus:--

Artillery prepares the victory; Infantry achieves it; Cavalry completesit, and secures its fruits. 

THE END.