A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge

by

George Berkeley (1685-1753)

WHEREIN THE CHIEF CAUSES OF ERROR AND DIFFICULTY IN THE SCIENCES, WITH THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM, ATHEISM, AND IRRELIGION, ARE INQUIRED INTO. 

DEDICATION

 To the Right Honourable THOMAS, EARL OF PEMBROKE, &C. , Knight of the most Noble Order of the Garter and one of the Lords of Her Majesty's most honourable privy council. 

My Lord, You will perhaps wonder that an obscure person, who has not the honour tobe known to your lordship, should presume to address you in this manner. But that a man who has written something with a design to promote UsefulKnowledge and Religion in the world should make choice of your lordshipfor his patron, will not be thought strange by any one that is notaltogether unacquainted with the present state of the church andlearning, and consequently ignorant how great an ornament and support youare to both. Yet, nothing could have induced me to make you this presentof my poor endeavours, were I not encouraged by that candour and nativegoodness which is so bright a part in your lordship's character. I mightadd, my lord, that the extraordinary favour and bounty you have beenpleased to show towards our Society gave me hopes you would not beunwilling to countenance the studies of one of its members. Theseconsiderations determined me to lay this treatise at your lordship'sfeet, and the rather because I was ambitious to have it known that I amwith the truest and most profound respect, on account of that learningand virtue which the world so justly admires in your lordship, MY LORD, Your lordship's most humble and most devoted servant, GEORGE BERKELEY

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CONTENTS

 PREFACE INTRODUCTION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

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PREFACE

What I here make public has, after a long and scrupulous inquiry, seemedto me evidently true and not unuseful to be known--particularly to thosewho are tainted with Scepticism, or want a demonstration of the existenceand immateriality of God, or the natural immortality of the soul. Whetherit be so or no I am content the reader should impartially examine; sinceI do not think myself any farther concerned for the success of what Ihave written than as it is agreeable to truth. But, to the end this maynot suffer, I make it my request that the reader suspend his judgmenttill he has once at least read the whole through with that degree ofattention and thought which the subject-matter shall seem to deserve. For, as there are some passages that, taken by themselves, are veryliable (nor could it be remedied) to gross misinterpretation, and to becharged with most absurd consequences, which, nevertheless, upon anentire perusal will appear not to follow from them; so likewise, thoughthe whole should be read over, yet, if this be done transiently, it isvery probable my sense may be mistaken; but to a thinking reader, Iflatter myself it will be throughout clear and obvious. As for thecharacters of novelty and singularity which some of the following notionsmay seem to bear, it is, I hope, needless to make any apology on thataccount. He must surely be either very weak, or very little acquaintedwith the sciences, who shall reject a truth that is capable ofdemonstration, for no other reason but because it is newly known, andcontrary to the prejudices of mankind. Thus much I thought fit topremise, in order to prevent, if possible, the hasty censures of a sortof men who are too apt to condemn an opinion before they rightlycomprehend it. 

INTRODUCTION

1. Philosophy being nothing else but THE STUDY OF WISDOM AND TRUTH, itmay with reason be expected that those who have spent most time and painsin it should enjoy a greater calm and serenity of mind, a greaterclearness and evidence of knowledge, and be less disturbed with doubtsand difficulties than other men. Yet so it is, we see the illiterate bulkof mankind that walk the high-road of plain common sense, and aregoverned by the dictates of nature, for the most part easy andundisturbed. To them nothing THAT IS FAMILIAR appears unaccountable ordifficult to comprehend. They complain not of any want of evidence intheir senses, and are out of all danger of becoming SCEPTICS. But nosooner do we depart from sense and instinct to follow the light of asuperior principle, to reason, meditate, and reflect on the nature ofthings, but a thousand scruples spring up in our minds concerning thosethings which before we seemed fully to comprehend. Prejudices and errorsof sense do from all parts discover themselves to our view; and, endeavouring to correct these by reason, we are insensibly drawn intouncouth paradoxes, difficulties, and inconsistencies, which multiply andgrow upon us as we advance in speculation, till at length, havingwandered through many intricate mazes, we find ourselves just where wewere, or, which is worse, sit down in a forlorn Scepticism. 

2. The cause of this is thought to be the obscurity of things, or thenatural weakness and imperfection of our understandings. It is said, thefaculties we have are few, and those designed by nature for the SUPPORTand comfort of life, and not to penetrate into the INWARD ESSENCE andconstitution of things. Besides, the mind of man being finite, when ittreats of things which partake of infinity, it is not to be wondered atif it run into absurdities and contradictions, out of which it isimpossible it should ever extricate itself, it being of the nature ofinfinite not to be comprehended by that which is finite. 

3. But, perhaps, we may be too partial to ourselves in placing the faultoriginally in our faculties, and not rather in the wrong use we make ofthem. IT IS A HARD THING TO SUPPOSE THAT RIGHT DEDUCTIONS FROM TRUEPRINCIPLES SHOULD EVER END IN CONSEQUENCES WHICH CANNOT BE MAINTAINED ormade consistent. We should believe that God has dealt more bountifullywith the sons of men than to give them a strong desire for that knowledgewhich he had placed quite out of their reach. This were not agreeable tothe wonted indulgent methods of Providence, which, whatever appetites itmay have implanted in the creatures, doth usually furnish them with suchmeans as, if rightly made use of, will not fail to satisfy them. Upon thewhole, I am inclined to think that the far greater part, if not all, ofthose difficulties which have hitherto amused philosophers, and blockedup the way to knowledge, are entirely owing to ourselves--that we havefirst raised a dust and then complain we cannot see. 

4. My purpose therefore is, to try if I can discover what thosePrinciples are which have introduced all that doubtfulness anduncertainty, those absurdities and contradictions, into the several sectsof philosophy; insomuch that the wisest men have thought our ignoranceincurable, conceiving it to arise from the natural dulness and limitationof our faculties. And surely it is a work well deserving our pains tomake a strict inquiry concerning the First Principles of Human Knowledge, to sift and examine them on all sides, especially since there may be somegrounds to suspect that those lets and difficulties, which stay andembarrass the mind in its search after truth, do not spring from anydarkness and intricacy in the objects, or natural defect in theunderstanding, so much as from false Principles which have been insistedon, and might have been avoided. 

5. How difficult and discouraging soever this attempt may seem, when Iconsider how many great and extraordinary men have gone before me in thelike designs, yet I am not without some hopes--upon the considerationthat the largest views are not always the clearest, and that he who isshort--sighted will be obliged to draw the object nearer, and may, perhaps, by a close and narrow survey, discern that which had escaped farbetter eyes. 

6. A CHIEF SOURCE OF ERROR IN ALL PARTS OF KNOWLEDGE. --In order toprepare the mind of the reader for the easier conceiving whatfollows, it is proper to premise somewhat, by way of Introduction, concerning the nature and abuse of Language. But the unravelling thismatter leads me in some measure to anticipate my design, by taking noticeof what seems to have had a chief part in rendering speculation intricateand perplexed, and to have occasioned innumerable errors and difficultiesin almost all parts of knowledge. And that is the opinion that the mindhas a power of framing ABSTRACT IDEAS or notions of things. He who isnot a perfect stranger to the writings and disputes of philosophers mustneeds acknowledge that no small part of them are spent about abstractideas. These are in a more especial manner thought to be the object ofthose sciences which go by the name of LOGIC and METAPHYSICS, and of allthat which passes under the notion of the most abstracted and sublimelearning, in all which one shall scarce find any question handled in sucha manner as does not suppose their existence in the mind, and that it iswell acquainted with them. 

7. PROPER ACCEPTATION OF ABSTRACTION. --It is agreed on all hands that thequalities or modes of things do never REALLY EXIST EACH OF THEM APART BYITSELF, and separated from all others, but are mixed, as it were, andblended together, several in the same object. But, we are told, the mindbeing able to consider each quality singly, or abstracted from those otherqualities with which it is united, does by that means frame to itselfabstract ideas. For example, there is perceived by sight an objectextended, coloured, and moved: this mixed or compound idea the mindresolving into its simple, constituent parts, and viewing each by itself, exclusive of the rest, does frame the abstract ideas of extension, colour, and motion. Not that it is possible for colour or motion to exist withoutextension; but only that the mind can frame to itself by ABSTRACTION theidea of colour exclusive of extension, and of motion exclusive of bothcolour and extension. 

8. OF GENERALIZING [Note]. --Again, the mind having observed that in theparticular extensions perceived by sense there is something COMMON andalike IN ALL, and some other things peculiar, as this or that figure ormagnitude, which distinguish them one from another; it considers apart orsingles out by itself that which is common, making thereof a most abstractidea of extension, which is neither line, surface, nor solid, nor has anyfigure or magnitude, but is an idea entirely prescinded from all these. Solikewise the mind, by leaving out of the particular colours perceived bysense that which distinguishes them one from another, and retaining thatonly which is COMMON TO ALL, makes an idea of colour in abstract which isneither red, nor blue, nor white, nor any other determinate colour. And, in like manner, by considering motion abstractedly not only from the bodymoved, but likewise from the figure it describes, and all particulardirections and velocities, the abstract idea of motion is framed; whichequally corresponds to all particular motions whatsoever that may beperceived by sense. 

[Note: Vide Reid, on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Essay V, chap iii. Sec. 1, edit. 1843]

9. OF COMPOUNDING. --And as the mind frames to itself abstract ideas ofqualities or MODES, so does it, by the same precision or mentalseparation, attain abstract ideas of the more compounded BEINGSwhich include several coexistent qualities. For example, the mindhaving observed that Peter, James, and John resemble each otherin certain common agreements of shape and other qualities, leavesout of the complex or compounded idea it has of Peter, James, andany other particular man, that which is peculiar to each, retainingonly what is common to all, and so makes an abstract idea whereinall the particulars equally partake--abstracting entirely fromand cutting off all those circumstances and differences which mightdetermine it to any particular existence. And after this manner it issaid we come by the abstract idea of MAN, or, if you please, humanity, orhuman nature; wherein it is true there is included colour, because thereis no man but has some colour, but then it can be neither white, norblack, nor any particular colour, because there is no one particularcolour wherein all men partake. So likewise there is included stature, but then it is neither tall stature, nor low stature, nor yet middlestature, but something abstracted from all these. And so of the rest. Moreover, their being a great variety of other creatures that partake insome parts, but not all, of the complex idea of MAN, the mind, leavingout those parts which are peculiar to men, and retaining those only whichare common to all the living creatures, frames the idea of ANIMAL, whichabstracts not only from all particular men, but also all birds, beasts, fishes, and insects. The constituent parts of the abstract idea of animalare body, life, sense, and spontaneous motion. By BODY is meant bodywithout any particular shape or figure, there being no one shape orfigure common to all animals, without covering, either of hair, orfeathers, or scales, &c. , nor yet naked: hair, feathers, scales, andnakedness being the distinguishing properties of particular animals, andfor that reason left out of the ABSTRACT IDEA. Upon the same account thespontaneous motion must be neither walking, nor flying, nor creeping; itis nevertheless a motion, but what that motion is it is not easy toconceive[Note. ]. 

[Note: Vide Hobbes' Tripos, ch. V. Sect. 6. ]

10. TWO OBJECTIONS TO THE EXISTENCE OF ABSTRACT IDEAS. --Whetherothers have this wonderful faculty of ABSTRACTING THEIR IDEAS, they best can tell: for myself, I find indeed I have a faculty ofimagining, or representing to myself, the ideas of those particularthings I have perceived, and of variously compounding and dividing them. I can imagine a man with two heads, or the upper parts of a man joined tothe body of a horse. I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose, each byitself abstracted or separated from the rest of the body. But thenwhatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have some particular shape andcolour. Likewise the idea of man that I frame to myself must be either ofa white, or a black, or a tawny, a straight, or a crooked, a tall, or alow, or a middle-sized man. I cannot by any effort of thought conceivethe abstract idea above described. And it is equally impossible for me toform the abstract idea of motion distinct from the body moving, and whichis neither swift nor slow, curvilinear nor rectilinear; and the like maybe said of all other abstract general ideas whatsoever. To be plain, Iown myself able to abstract IN ONE SENSE, as when I consider someparticular parts or qualities separated from others, with which, thoughthey are united in some object, yet it is possible they may really existwithout them. But I deny that I can abstract from one another, orconceive separately, those qualities which it is impossible should existso separated; or that I can frame a general notion, by abstracting fromparticulars in the manner aforesaid--which last are the two properacceptations of ABSTRACTION. And there are grounds to think most men willacknowledge themselves to be in my case. The generality of men which aresimple and illiterate never pretend to ABSTRACT NOTIONS. It is saidthey are difficult and not to be attained without pains and study; we maytherefore reasonably conclude that, if such there be, they are confinedonly to the learned. 

11. I proceed to examine what can be alleged in DEFENCE OF THE DOCTRINEOF ABSTRACTION, and try if I can discover what it is that inclines themen of speculation to embrace an opinion so remote from common sense asthat seems to be. There has been a late deservedly esteemed philosopherwho, no doubt, has given it very much countenance, by seeming to thinkthe having abstract general ideas is what puts the widest difference inpoint of understanding betwixt man and beast. "The having of generalideas, " saith he, "is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt manand brutes, and is an excellency which the faculties of brutes do by nomeans attain unto. For, it is evident we observe no foot-steps in them ofmaking use of general signs for universal ideas; from which we havereason to imagine that they have not the FACULTY OF ABSTRACTING, ormaking general ideas, since they have no use of words or any othergeneral signs. " And a little after: "Therefore, I think, we may supposethat it is in this that the species of brutes are discriminated from men, and it is that proper difference wherein they are wholly separated, andwhich at last widens to so wide a distance. For, if they have any ideasat all, and are not bare machines (as some would have them), we cannotdeny them to have some reason. It seems as evident to me that they do, some of them, in certain instances reason as that they have sense; but itis only in particular ideas, just as they receive them from their senses. They are the best of them tied up within those narrow bounds, and havenot (as I think) the faculty to enlarge them by any kind ofABSTRACTION. " Essay on Human Understanding, II. Xi. 10 and 11. I readilyagree with this learned author, that the faculties of brutes can by nomeans attain to ABSTRACTION. But then if this be made the distinguishingproperty of that sort of animals, I fear a great many of those that passfor men must be reckoned into their number. The reason that is hereassigned why we have no grounds to think brutes have abstract generalideas is, that we observe in them no use of words or any other generalsigns; which is built on this supposition--that the making use of wordsimplies the having general ideas. From which it follows that men who uselanguage are able to ABSTRACT or GENERALIZE their ideas. That this is thesense and arguing of the author will further appear by his answering thequestion he in another place puts: "Since all things that exist are onlyparticulars, how come we by general terms?" His answer is: "Words becomegeneral by being made the signs of general ideas. "--Essay on HumanUnderstanding, IV. Iii. 6. But [Note. 1] it seems that a word becomesgeneral by being made the sign, not of an ABSTRACT general idea, but ofseveral particular ideas [Note. 2], any one of which it indifferentlysuggests to the mind. For example, when it is said "the change of motionis proportional to the impressed force, " or that "whatever has extensionis divisible, " these propositions are to be understood of motionand extension in general; and nevertheless it will not follow thatthey suggest to my thoughts an idea of motion without a body moved, or any determinate direction and velocity, or that I must conceivean abstract general idea of extension, which is neither line, surface, nor solid, neither great nor small, black, white, nor red, nor of anyother determinate colour. It is only implied that whatever particularmotion I consider, whether it be swift or slow, perpendicular, horizontal, or oblique, or in whatever object, the axiom concerningit holds equally true. As does the other of every particular extension, it matters not whether line, surface, or solid, whether of this orthat magnitude or figure. 

[Note 1: "TO THIS I CANNOT ASSENT, BEING OF OPINION, " edit of 1710. ]

[Note 2: Of the same sort. ]

12. EXISTENCE OF GENERAL IDEAS ADMITTED. --By observing how ideasbecome general we may the better judge how words are made so. And here it is to be noted that I do not deny absolutely thereare general ideas, but only that there are any ABSTRACT GENERALIDEAS; for, in the passages we have quoted wherein there ismention of general ideas, it is always supposed that they are formed byABSTRACTION, after the manner set forth in sections 8 and 9. Now, if wewill annex a meaning to our words, and speak only of what we canconceive, I believe we shall acknowledge that an idea which, consideredin itself, is particular, becomes general by being made to represent orstand for all other particular ideas of the SAME SORT. To make this plainby an example, suppose a geometrician is demonstrating the method ofcutting a line in two equal parts. He draws, for instance, a black lineof an inch in length: this, which in itself is a particular line, isnevertheless with regard to its signification general, since, as it isthere used, it represents all particular lines whatsoever; so that whatis demonstrated of it is demonstrated of all lines, or, in other words, of a line in general. And, as that particular line becomes general bybeing made a sign, so the name LINE, which taken absolutely isPARTICULAR, by being a sign is made GENERAL. And as the former owes itsgenerality not to its being the sign of an abstract or general line, butof ALL PARTICULAR right lines that may possibly exist, so the latter mustbe thought to derive its generality from the same cause, namely, theVARIOUS PARTICULAR lines which it indifferently denotes. [Note. ]

[Note: "I look upon this (doctrine) to be one of the greatest and mostvaluable discoveries that have been made of late years in the republicof letters. "--Treatise of Human Nature, book i, part i, sect. 7. AlsoStewart's Philosophy of the Mind, part i, chapt. Iv. Sect. Iii. P. 99. ]

13. ABSTRACT GENERAL IDEAS NECESSARY, ACCORDING TO LOCKE. --To givethe reader a yet clearer view of the nature of abstract ideas, and the uses they are thought necessary to, I shall add one morepassage out of the Essay on Human Understanding, (IV. Vii. 9) which is asfollows: "ABSTRACT IDEAS are not so obvious or easy to children or theyet unexercised mind as particular ones. If they seem so to grown men itis only because by constant and familiar use they are made so. For, whenwe nicely reflect upon them, we shall find that general ideas arefictions and contrivances of the mind, that carry difficulty with them, and do not so easily offer themselves as we are apt to imagine. Forexample, does it not require some pains and skill to form the generalidea of a triangle (which is yet none of the most abstract, comprehensive, and difficult); for it must be neither oblique norrectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but ALL ANDNONE of these at once? In effect, it is something imperfect that cannotexist, an idea wherein some parts of several different and INCONSISTENTideas are put together. It is true the mind in this imperfect state hasneed of such ideas, and makes all the haste to them it can, for theCONVENIENCY OF COMMUNICATION AND ENLARGEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE, to both whichit is naturally very much inclined. But yet one has reason to suspectsuch ideas are marks of our imperfection. At least this is enough to showthat the most abstract and general ideas are not those that the mind isfirst and most easily acquainted with, nor such as its earliest knowledgeis conversant about. "--If any man has the faculty of framing in his mindsuch an idea of a triangle as is here described, it is in vain to pretendto dispute him out of it, nor would I go about it. All I desire is thatthe reader would fully and certainly inform himself whether he has suchan idea or no. And this, methinks, can be no hard task for anyone toperform. What more easy than for anyone to look a little into his ownthoughts, and there try whether he has, or can attain to have, an ideathat shall correspond with the description that is here given of thegeneral idea of a triangle, which is NEITHER OBLIQUE NOR RECTANGLE, EQUILATERAL, EQUICRURAL NOR SCALENON, BUT ALL AND NONE OF THESE AT ONCE?

14. BUT THEY ARE NOT NECESSARY FOR COMMUNICATIOPN. --Much is heresaid of the difficulty that abstract ideas carry with them, andthe pains and skill requisite to the forming them. And it is onall hands agreed that there is need of great toil and labour of the mind, to emancipate our thoughts from particular objects, and raise them tothose sublime speculations that are conversant about abstract ideas. Fromall which the natural consequence should seem to be, that so DIFFICULT athing as the forming abstract ideas was not necessary for COMMUNICATION, which is so EASY and familiar to ALL SORTS OF MEN. But, we are told, ifthey seem obvious and easy to grown men, IT IS ONLY BECAUSE BY CONSTANTAND FAMILIAR USE THEY ARE MADE SO. Now, I would fain know at what time itis men are employed in surmounting that difficulty, and furnishingthemselves with those necessary helps for discourse. It cannot be whenthey are grown up, for then it seems they are not conscious of any suchpainstaking; it remains therefore to be the business of their childhood. And surely the great and multiplied labour of framing abstract notionswill be found a hard task for that tender age. Is it not a hard thing toimagine that a couple of children cannot prate together of theirsugar-plums and rattles and the rest of their little trinkets, till theyhave first tacked together numberless inconsistencies, and so framed intheir minds ABSTRACT GENERAL IDEAS, and annexed them to every common namethey make use of?

15. NOR FOR THE ENLARGEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE. --Nor do I think thema whit more needful for the ENLARGEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE than forCOMMUNICATION. It is, I know, a point much insisted on, thatall knowledge and demonstration are about universal notions, towhich I fully agree: but then it doth not appear to me that those notionsare formed by ABSTRACTION in the manner PREMISED--UNIVERSALITY, so far asI can comprehend, not consisting in the absolute, POSITIVE nature orconception of anything, but in the RELATION it bears to the particularssignified or represented by it; by virtue whereof it is that things, names, or notions, being in their own nature PARTICULAR, are renderedUNIVERSAL. Thus, when I demonstrate any proposition concerning triangles, it is to be supposed that I have in view the universal idea of atriangle; which ought not to be understood as if I could frame an idea ofa triangle which was neither equilateral, nor scalenon, nor equicrural;but only that the particular triangle I consider, whether of this or thatsort it matters not, doth equally stand for and represent all rectilineartriangles whatsoever, and is in that sense UNIVERSAL. All which seemsvery plain and not to include any difficulty in it. 

16. OBJECTION. --ANSWER. --But here it will be demanded, HOW WE CAN KNOW ANYPROPOSITION TO BE TRUE OF ALL PARTICULAR TRIANGLES, EXCEPT we have firstseen it DEMONSTRATED OF THE ABSTRACT IDEA OF A TRIANGLE which equallyagrees to all? For, because a property may be demonstrated to agree tosome one particular triangle, it will not thence follow that it equallybelongs to any other triangle, which in all respects is not the same withit. For example, having demonstrated that the three angles of an isoscelesrectangular triangle are equal to two right ones, I cannot thereforeconclude this affection agrees to all other triangles which have neithera right angle nor two equal sides. It seems therefore that, to be certainthis proposition is universally true, we must either make a particulardemonstration for every particular triangle, which is impossible, or oncefor all demonstrate it of the ABSTRACT IDEA OF A TRIANGLE, in which allthe particulars do indifferently partake and by which they are allequally represented. To which I answer, that, though the idea I have inview whilst I make the demonstration be, for instance, that of anisosceles rectangular triangle whose sides are of a determinate length, Imay nevertheless be certain it extends to all other rectilineartriangles, of what sort or bigness soever. And that because neither theright angle, nor the equality, nor determinate length of the sides are atall concerned in the demonstration. It is true the diagram I have in viewincludes all these particulars, but then there is not the least mentionmade of them in the proof of the proposition. It is not said the threeangles are equal to two right ones, because one of them is a right angle, or because the sides comprehending it are of the same length. Whichsufficiently shows that the right angle might have been oblique, and thesides unequal, and for all that the demonstration have held good. And forthis reason it is that I conclude that to be true of any obliquangular orscalenon which I had demonstrated of a particular right--angledequicrural triangle, and not because I demonstrated the proposition ofthe abstract idea of a triangle And here it must be acknowledged that aman may consider a figure merely as triangular, without attending to theparticular qualities of the angles, or relations of the sides. So far hemay abstract; but this will never prove that he can frame an abstract, general, inconsistent idea of a triangle. In like manner we may considerPeter so far forth as man, or so far forth as animal without framing thefore-mentioned abstract idea, either of man or of animal, inasmuch as allthat is perceived is not considered. 

17. ADVANTAGE OF INVESTIGATING THE DOCTRINE OF ABSTRACT GENERALIDEAS. --It were an endless as well as an useless thing to trace theSCHOOLMEN, those great masters of abstraction, through all the manifoldinextricable labyrinths of error and dispute which their doctrine ofabstract natures and notions seems to have led them into. What bickeringsand controversies, and what a learned dust have been raised about thosematters, and what mighty advantage has been from thence derived tomankind, are things at this day too clearly known to need being insistedon. And it had been well if the ill effects of that doctrine wereconfined to those only who make the most avowed profession of it. Whenmen consider the great pains, industry, and parts that have for so manyages been laid out on the cultivation and advancement of the sciences, and that notwithstanding all this the far greater part of them remainsfull of darkness and uncertainty, and disputes that are like never tohave an end, and even those that are thought to be supported by the mostclear and cogent demonstrations contain in them paradoxes which areperfectly irreconcilable to the understandings of men, and that, takingall together, a very small portion of them does supply any real benefitto mankind, otherwise than by being an innocent diversion andamusement--I say the consideration of all this is apt to throw them intoa despondency and perfect contempt of all study. But this may perhapscease upon a view of the false principles that have obtained in theworld, amongst all which there is none, methinks, has a more wide andextended sway over the thoughts of speculative men than [Note. ] this ofabstract general ideas. 

[Note: "That we have been endeavouring to overthrow. "--Edit 1710. ]

18. I come now to consider the SOURCE OF THIS PREVAILING NOTION, and thatseems to me to be LANGUAGE. And surely nothing of less extent than reasonitself could have been the source of an opinion so universally received. The truth of this appears as from other reasons so also from the plainconfession of the ablest patrons of abstract ideas, who acknowledge thatthey are made in order to naming; from which it is a clear consequencethat if there had been no such things as speech or universal signs therenever had been any thought of abstraction. See III. Vi. 39, and elsewhereof the Essay on Human Understanding. Let us examine the manner whereinwords have contributed to the origin of that mistake. --First[Vide sect. Xix. ] then, it is thought that every name has, orought to have, ONE ONLY precise and settled signification, whichinclines men to think there are certain ABSTRACT, DETERMINATE IDEASthat constitute the true and only immediate signification of eachgeneral name; and that it is by the mediation of these abstractideas that a general name comes to signify any particular thing. Whereas, in truth, there is no such thing as one precise and definitesignification annexed to any general name, they all signifyingindifferently a great number of particular ideas. All which dothevidently follow from what has been already said, and will clearly appearto anyone by a little reflexion. To this it will be OBJECTED that everyname that has a definition is thereby restrained to one certainsignification. For example, a TRIANGLE is defined to be A PLAIN SURFACECOMPREHENDED BY THREE RIGHT LINES, by which that name is limited todenote one certain idea and no other. To which I answer, that in thedefinition it is not said whether the surface be great or small, black orwhite, nor whether the sides are long or short, equal or unequal, norwith what angles they are inclined to each other; in all which there maybe great variety, and consequently there is NO ONE SETTLED IDEA whichlimits the signification of the word TRIANGLE. It is one thing for tokeep a name constantly to the same definition, and another to make itstand everywhere for the same idea; the one is necessary, the otheruseless and impracticable. 

19. SECONDLY, But, to give a farther account how WORDS came to PRODUCE THEDOCTRINE OF ABSTRACT IDEAS, it must be observed that it is a receivedopinion that language has NO OTHER END but the communicating our ideas, and that every significant name stands for an idea. This being so, and itbeing withal certain that names which yet are not thought altogetherinsignificant do not always mark out PARTICULAR conceivable ideas, it isstraightway concluded that THEY STAND FOR ABSTRACT NOTIONS. That there aremany names in use amongst speculative men which do not always suggest toothers determinate, particular ideas, or in truth anything at all, is whatnobody will deny. And a little attention will discover that it is notnecessary (even in the strictest reasonings) significant names whichstand for ideas should, every time they are used, excite in theunderstanding the ideas they are made to stand for--in reading anddiscoursing, names being for the most part used as letters are inALGEBRA, in which, though a particular quantity be marked by each letter, yet to proceed right it is not requisite that in every step each lettersuggest to your thoughts that particular quantity it was appointed tostand for. [Note. ]

[Note: Language has become the source or origin of abstract general ideason account of a twofold error. --(1. ) That every word has only onesignification. (2. ) That the only end of language is the communicationof our ideas--Ed. ]

20. SOME OF THE ENDS OF LANGUAGE. --Besides, the communicating of ideasmarked by words is not the chief and only end of language, as iscommonly supposed. There are other ends, as the raising of somepassion, the exciting to or deterring from an action, the puttingthe mind in some particular disposition--to which the former isin many cases barely subservient, and sometimes entirely omitted, when these can be obtained without it, as I think does not unfrequentlyhappen in the familiar use of language. I entreat the reader toreflect with himself, and see if it doth not often happen, either inhearing or reading a discourse, that the passions of fear, love, hatred, admiration, disdain, and the like, arise immediately in his mind upon theperception of certain words, without any ideas coming between. At first, indeed, the words might have occasioned ideas that were fitting toproduce those emotions; but, if I mistake not, it will be found that, when language is once grown familiar, the hearing of the sounds or sightof the characters is oft immediately attended with those passions whichat first were wont to be produced by the intervention of ideas that arenow quite omitted. May we not, for example, be affected with the promiseof a GOOD THING, though we have not an idea of what it is? Or is not thebeing threatened with danger sufficient to excite a dread, though wethink not of any particular evil likely to befal us, nor yet frame toourselves an idea of danger in abstract? If any one shall join ever solittle reflexion of his own to what has been said, I believe that it willevidently appear to him that general names are often used in thepropriety of language without the speaker's designing them for marks ofideas in his own, which he would have them raise in the mind of thehearer. Even proper names themselves do not seem always spoken with adesign to bring into our view the ideas of those individuals that aresupposed to be marked by them. For example, when a schoolman tells me"Aristotle has said it, " all I conceive he means by it is to dispose meto embrace his opinion with the deference and submission which custom hasannexed to that name. And this effect is often so instantly produced inthe minds of those who are accustomed to resign their judgment toauthority of that philosopher, as it is impossible any idea either of hisperson, writings, or reputation should go before [Note. ]. Innumerableexamples of this kind may be given, but why should I insist on thosethings which every one's experience will, I doubt not, plentifullysuggest unto him?

[Note: "So close and immediate a connection may custom establish betwixtthe very word ARISTOTLE, and the motions of assent and reverencein the minds of some men. "--Edit 1710. ]

21. CAUTION IN THE USE OF LANGUAGE NECESSARY. --We have, I think, shown the impossibility of ABSTRACT IDEAS. We have consideredwhat has been said for them by their ablest patrons; and endeavoredto show they are of no use for those ends to which they are thoughtnecessary. And lastly, we have traced them to the source fromwhence they flow, which appears evidently to be language. --It cannot bedenied that words are of excellent use, in that by their means all thatstock of knowledge which has been purchased by the joint labours ofinquisitive men in all ages and nations may be drawn into the view andmade the possession of one single person. But at the same time it must beowned that most parts of knowledge have been strangely perplexed anddarkened by the abuse of words, and general ways of speech wherein theyare delivered. [Note 1. ] Since therefore words are so apt to impose on theunderstanding[Note 2. ], whatever ideas I consider, I shall endeavour totake them bare and naked into my view, keeping out of my thoughts so faras I am able, those names which long and constant use has so strictlyunited with them; from which I may expect to derive the followingadvantages:

[Note 1: "That it may almost be made a question, whether languagehas contributed more to the hindrance or advancement of thesciences. "--Edit 1710. ]

[Note 2: "I am resolved in my inquiries to make as little use of themas possibly I can. "--Edit 1710. ]

22. FIRST, I shall be sure to get clear of all controversies PURELYVERBAL--the springing up of which weeds in almost all the sciences hasbeen a main hindrance to the growth of true and sound knowledge. SECONDLY, this seems to be a sure way to extricate myself out of thatfine and subtle net of ABSTRACT IDEAS which has so miserably perplexedand entangled the minds of men; and that with this peculiar circumstance, that by how much the finer and more curious was the wit of any man, by somuch the deeper was he likely to be ensnared and faster held therein. THIRDLY, so long as I confine my thoughts to my own ideas divested ofwords, I do not see how I can easily be mistaken. The objects I consider, I clearly and adequately know. I cannot be deceived in thinking I have anidea which I have not. It is not possible for me to imagine that any ofmy own ideas are alike or unlike that are not truly so. To discern theagreements or disagreements there are between my ideas, to see what ideasare included in any compound idea and what not, there is nothing morerequisite than an attentive perception of what passes in my ownunderstanding. 

23. But the attainment of all THESE ADVANTAGES doth PRESUPPOSE AN ENTIREDELIVERANCE FROM THE DECEPTION OF WORDS, which I dare hardly promisemyself; so difficult a thing it is to dissolve an union so early begun, and confirmed by so long a habit as that betwixt words and ideas. Whichdifficulty seems to have been very much increased by the doctrine ofABSTRACTION. For, so long as men thought abstract ideas were annexed totheir words, it doth not seem strange that they should use words forideas--it being found an impracticable thing to lay aside the word, andRETAIN THE ABSTRACT IDEA IN THE MIND, WHICH IN ITSELF WAS PERFECTLYINCONCEIVABLE. This seems to me the principal cause why those men whohave so emphatically recommended to others the laying aside all use ofwords in their meditations, and contemplating their bare ideas, have yetfailed to perform it themselves. Of late many have been very sensible ofthe absurd opinions and insignificant disputes which grow out of theabuse of words. And, in order to remedy these evils, they advise well, that we attend to the ideas signified, and draw off our attention fromthe words which signify them. But, how good soever this advice may bethey have given others, it is plain they could not have a due regard toit themselves, so long as they thought the only immediate use of wordswas to signify ideas, and that the immediate signification of everygeneral name was a DETERMINATE ABSTRACT IDEA. 

24. But, THESE BEING KNOWN TO BE MISTAKES, A MAN MAY with greater easePREVENT HIS BEING IMPOSED ON BY WORDS. He that knows he has no other thanparticular ideas, will not puzzle himself in vain to find out andconceive the abstract idea annexed to any name. And he that knows namesdo not always stand for ideas will spare himself the labour of lookingfor ideas where there are none to be had. It were, therefore, to bewished that everyone would use his utmost endeavours to obtain a clearview of the ideas he would consider, separating from them all that dressand incumbrance of words which so much contribute to blind the judgmentand divide the attention. In vain do we extend our view into the heavensand pry into the entrails of the earth, in vain do we consult thewritings of learned men and trace the dark footsteps of antiquity--weneed only draw the curtain of words, to hold the fairest tree ofknowledge, whose fruit is excellent, and within the reach of our hand. 

25. Unless we take care TO CLEAR THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF KNOWLEDGE FROMTHE embarras and DELUSION OF WORDS, we may make infinite reasonings uponthem to no purpose; we may draw consequences from consequences, and benever the wiser. The farther we go, we shall only lose ourselves the moreirrecoverably, and be the deeper entangled in difficulties and mistakes. Whoever therefore designs to read the following sheets, I entreat him tomake my words the occasion of his own thinking, and endeavour to attainthe same train of thoughts in reading that I had in writing them. By thismeans it will be easy for him to discover the truth or falsity of what Isay. He will be out of all danger of being deceived by my words, and I donot see how he can be led into an error by considering his own naked, undisguised ideas. 

OF THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

1. OBJECTS OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. --It is evident to any one who takes asurvey of the objects of human knowledge, that they are either IDEASactually imprinted on the senses; or else such as are perceived byattending to the passions and operations of the mind; or lastly, ideasformed by help of memory and imagination--either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways. By sight I have the ideas of light and colours, with their several degreesand variations. By touch I perceive hard and soft, heat and cold, motionand resistance, and of all these more and less either as to quantity ordegree. Smelling furnishes me with odours; the palate with tastes; andhearing conveys sounds to the mind in all their variety of tone andcomposition. And as several of these are observed to accompany eachother, they come to be marked by one name, and so to be reputed as onething. Thus, for example a certain colour, taste, smell, figure andconsistence having been observed to go together, are accounted onedistinct thing, signified by the name APPLE. Other collections of ideasconstitute a stone, a tree, a book, and the like sensible things--whichas they are pleasing or disagreeable excite the passions of love, hatred, joy, grief, and so forth. 

2. MIND--SPIRIT--SOUL. --But, besides all that endless variety of ideas orobjects of knowledge, there is likewise something which knows or perceivesthem, and exercises divers operations, as willing, imagining, remembering, about them. This perceiving, active being is what I call MIND, SPIRIT, SOUL, or MYSELF. By which words I do not denote any one of my ideas, but athing entirely distinct from them, WHEREIN THEY EXIST, or, which is thesame thing, whereby they are perceived--for the existence of an ideaconsists in being perceived. 

3. HOW FAR THE ASSENT OF THE VULGAR CONCEDED. --That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination, exist WITHOUT the mind, is what EVERYBODY WILL ALLOW. And it seems no less evident that thevarious sensations or ideas imprinted on the sense, however blendedor combined together (that is, whatever objects they compose), cannot exist otherwise than IN a mind perceiving them. I think anintuitive knowledge may be obtained of this by any one that shallattend to WHAT IS MEANT BY THE TERM EXIST, when applied to sensiblethings. The table I write on I say exists, that is, I see and feelit; and if I were out of my study I should say it existed--meaningthereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some otherspirit actually does perceive it. [Note. ] There was an odour, that is, itwas smelt; there was a sound, that is, it was heard; a colour or figure, and it was perceived by sight or touch. This is all that I can understandby these and the like expressions. For as to what is said of the absoluteexistence of unthinking things without any relation to their beingperceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible. Their ESSE is PERCIPI, nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds orthinking things which perceive them. 

[Note: First argument in support of the author's theory. ]

4. THE VULGAR OPINION INVOLVES A CONTRADICTION. --It is indeedan opinion STRANGELY prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by theunderstanding. But, with how great an assurance and acquiescence soeverthis principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find inhis heart to call it in question may, if I mistake not, perceive it toinvolve a manifest contradiction. For, what are the fore-mentionedobjects but the things we perceive by sense? and what do we PERCEIVEBESIDES OUR OWN IDEAS OR SENSATIONS? and is it not plainly repugnant thatany one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived?

5. CAUSE OF THIS PREVALENT ERROR. --If we thoroughly examine thistenet it will, perhaps, be found at bottom to depend on the doctrineof ABSTRACT IDEAS. For can there be a nicer strain of abstractionthan to distinguish the existence of sensible objects from theirbeing perceived, so as to conceive them existing unperceived?Light and colours, heat and cold, extension and figures--in aword the things we see and feel--what are they but so many sensations, notions, ideas, or impressions on the sense? and is it possible toseparate, even in thought, any of these from perception? For my part, Imight as easily divide a thing from itself. I may, indeed, divide in mythoughts, or conceive apart from each other, those things which, perhapsI never perceived by sense so divided. Thus, I imagine the trunk of ahuman body without the limbs, or conceive the smell of a rose withoutthinking on the rose itself. So far, I will not deny, I can abstract--ifthat may properly be called ABSTRACTION which extends only to theconceiving separately such objects as it is possible may really exist orbe actually perceived asunder. But my conceiving or imagining power doesnot extend beyond the possibility of real existence or perception. Hence, as it is impossible for me to see or feel anything without an actualsensation of that thing, so is it impossible for me to conceive in mythoughts any sensible thing or object distinct from the sensation orperception of it. [Note. ]

[Note: "In truth the object and the sensation are the same thing, andcannot therefore be abstracted from each other--Edit 1710. "]

6. Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind that a man needonly open his eyes to see them. Such I take this important one to be, viz. , that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a wordall those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have notany subsistence without a mind, that their BEING (ESSE) is to be perceivedor known; that consequently so long as they are not actually perceived byme, or do not exist in my mind or that of any other CREATED SPIRIT, theymust either have no existence at all, OR ELSE SUBSIST IN THE MIND OF SOMEETERNAL SPIRIT--it being perfectly unintelligible, and involving all theabsurdity of abstraction, to attribute to any single part of them anexistence independent of a spirit [Note. ]. To be convinced of which, thereader need only reflect, and try to separate in his own thoughts thebeing of a sensible thing from its being perceived. 

[Note: "To make this appear with all the light and evidence of an axiom, it seems sufficient if I can but awaken the reflection of the reader, that he may take an impartial view of his own meaning, and in turn histhoughts upon the subject itself, free and disengaged from all embarrassof words and prepossession in favour of received mistakes. "--Edit 1710]

7. SECOND ARGUMENT. [Note. ]--From what has been said it follows there isNOT ANY OTHER SUBSTANCE THAN SPIRIT, or that which perceives. But, for thefuller proof of this point, let it be considered the sensible qualitiesare colour, figure, motion, smell, taste, etc. , i. E. The ideas perceivedby sense. Now, for an idea to exist in an unperceiving thing is amanifest contradiction, for TO HAVE AN IDEA IS ALL ONE AS TO PERCEIVE;that therefore wherein colour, figure, and the like qualities exist mustperceive them; hence it is clear there can be no UNTHINKING substance orSUBSTRATUM of those ideas. 

[Note: Vide sect. Iii. And xxv. ]

8. OBJECTION. --ANSWER. --But, say you, though the ideas themselves do notexist without the mind, yet there may be things LIKE them, whereof theyare copies or resemblances, which things exist without the mind in anunthinking substance. I ANSWER, an idea can be like nothing but an idea; acolour or figure can be like nothing but another colour or figure. If welook but never so little into our thoughts, we shall find it impossiblefor us to conceive a likeness except only between our ideas. Again, I askwhether those supposed originals or external things, of which our ideasare the pictures or representations, be themselves perceivable or no? Ifthey are, THEN THEY ARE IDEAS and we have gained our point; but if you saythey are not, I appeal to any one whether it be sense to assert a colouris like something which is invisible; hard or soft, like something whichis intangible; and so of the rest. 

9. THE PHILOSOPHICAL NOTION OF MATTER INVOLVES A CONTRADICTION. --Somethere are who make a DISTINCTION betwixt PRIMARY and SECONDARYqualities. By the former they mean extension, figure, motion, rest, solidity or impenetrability, and number; by the latter they denote allother sensible qualities, as colours, sounds, tastes, and so forth. Theideas we have of these they acknowledge not to be the resemblances ofanything existing without the mind, or unperceived, but they will haveour ideas of the primary qualities to be patterns or images of thingswhich exist without the mind, in an unthinking substance which they callMATTER. By MATTER, therefore, we are to understand an inert, senselesssubstance, in which extension, figure, and motion DO ACTUALLY SUBSIST. But it is evident from what we have already shown, that extension, figure, and motion are ONLY IDEAS EXISTING IN THE MIND, and that an ideacan be like nothing but another idea, and that consequently neither theynor their archetypes can exist in an UNPERCEIVING substance. Hence, it isplain that that the very notion of what is called MATTER or CORPOREALSUBSTANCE, involves a contradiction in it. [Note. ]

[Note: "Insomuch that I should not think it necessary to spend more timein exposing its absurdity. But because the tenet of the existence ofmatter seems to have taken so deep a root in the minds of philosophers, and draws after it so many ill consequences, I choose rather to bethought prolix and tedious, than omit anything that might conduce tothe full discovery and extirpation of the prejudice. "--Edit 1710. ]

10. ARGUMENTUM AD HOMINEM. --They who assert that figure, motion, and therest of the primary or original qualities do exist without the mind inunthinking substances, do at the same time acknowledge that colours, sounds, heat cold, and suchlike secondary qualities, do not--which theytell us are sensations existing IN THE MIND ALONE, that depend on and areoccasioned by the different size, texture, and motion of the minuteparticles of matter. This they take for an undoubted truth, which they candemonstrate beyond all exception. Now, if it be certain that thoseoriginal qualities ARE INSEPARABLY UNITED WITH THE OTHER SENSIBLEQUALITIES, and not, even in thought, capable of being abstractedfrom them, it plainly follows that they exist only in the mind. But I desire any one to reflect and try whether he can, by anyabstraction of thought, conceive the extension and motion of abody without all other sensible qualities. For my own part, I seeevidently that it is not in my power to frame an idea of a bodyextended and moving, but I must withal give it some colour or othersensible quality which is ACKNOWLEDGED to exist only in the mind. Inshort, extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all otherqualities, are inconceivable. Where therefore the other sensiblequalities are, there must these be also, to wit, in the mind and nowhereelse. 

11. A SECOND ARGUMENT AD HOMINEM. --Again, GREAT and SMALL, SWIFT and SLOW, ARE ALLOWED TO EXIST NOWHERE WITHOUT THE MIND, being entirelyRELATIVE, and changing as the frame or position of the organs ofsense varies. The extension therefore which exists without themind is neither great nor small, the motion neither swift nor slow, that is, they are nothing at all. But, say you, they are extensionin general, and motion in general: thus we see how much the tenetof extended movable substances existing without the mind depends onthe strange doctrine of ABSTRACT IDEAS. And here I cannot but remark hownearly the vague and indeterminate description of Matter or corporealsubstance, which the modern philosophers are run into by their ownprinciples, resembles that antiquated and so much ridiculed notion ofMATERIA PRIMA, to be met with in Aristotle and his followers. Withoutextension solidity cannot be conceived; since therefore it has been shownthat extension exists not in an unthinking substance, the same must alsobe true of solidity. 

12. That NUMBER is entirely THE CREATURE OF THE MIND, even though theother qualities be allowed to exist without, will be evident to whoeverconsiders that the same thing bears a different denomination of number asthe mind views it with different respects. Thus, the same extension isone, or three, or thirty-six, according as the mind considers it withreference to a yard, a foot, or an inch. Number is so visibly relative, and dependent on men's understanding, that it is strange to think how anyone should give it an absolute existence without the mind. We say onebook, one page, one line, etc. ; all these are equally units, though somecontain several of the others. And in each instance, it is plain, theunit relates to some particular combination of ideas arbitrarily puttogether by the mind. 

13. UNITY I know some will have to be A SIMPLE OR UNCOMPOUNDED IDEA, accompanying all other ideas into the mind. That I have any such ideaanswering the word UNITY I do not find; and if I had, methinks I couldnot miss finding it: on the contrary, it should be the most familiar tomy understanding, since it is said to accompany all other ideas, and tobe perceived by all the ways of sensation and reflexion. To say no more, it is an ABSTRACT IDEA. 

14. A THIRD ARGUMENT AD HOMINEM. --I shall farther add, that, afterthe same manner as modern philosophers prove certain sensiblequalities to have no existence in Matter, or without the mind, the same thing may be likewise proved of all other sensible qualitieswhatsoever. Thus, for instance, it is said that heat and cold areaffections only of the mind, and not at all patterns of real beings, existing in the corporeal substances which excite them, for thatthe same body which appears cold to one hand seems warm to another. Now, why may we not as well argue that figure and extension are notpatterns or resemblances of qualities existing in Matter, because to thesame eye at different stations, or eyes of a different texture at thesame station, they appear various, and cannot therefore be the images ofanything SETTLED AND DETERMINATE WITHOUT THE MIND? Again, it is provedthat SWEETNESS is not really in the sapid thing, because the thingremaining unaltered the sweetness is changed into bitter, as in case of afever or otherwise vitiated palate. Is it not as reasonable to say thatMOTION is not without the mind, since if the succession of ideas in themind become swifter, the motion, it is acknowledged, shall appear slowerwithout any alteration in any external object?

15. NOT CONCLUSIVE AS TO EXTENSION. --In short, let any one considerthose arguments which are thought manifestly to prove that coloursand taste exist only in the mind, and he shall find they may withequal force be brought to prove the same thing of extension, figure, and motion. Though it must be confessed this method of arguingdoes not so much prove that there is no extension or colour inan outward object, as that we do not know by SENSE which is the TRUEextension or colour of the object. But the arguments foregoing plainlyshow it to be impossible that any colour or extension at all, or othersensible quality whatsoever, should exist in an UNTHINKING subjectwithout the mind, or in truth, that there should be any such thing as anoutward object. 

16. But let us examine a little the received opinion. --It is saidEXTENSION is a MODE or accident OF MATTER, and that Matter is theSUBSTRATUM that supports it. Now I desire that you would explain to mewhat is meant by Matter's SUPPORTING extension. Say you, I have no ideaof Matter and therefore cannot explain it. I answer, though you have nopositive, yet, if you have any meaning at all, you must at least have arelative idea of Matter; though you know not what it is, yet you must besupposed to know what relation it bears to accidents, and what is meantby its supporting them. It is evident SUPPORT cannot here be taken inits usual or literal sense--as when we say that pillars support abuilding; in what sense therefore must it be taken? [Note. ]

[Note: "For my part, I am not able to discover any sense at all that canbe applicable to it. "--Edit 1710. ]

17. PHILOSOPHICAL MEANING OF "MATERIAL SUBSTANCE" DIVISIBLE INTO TWOPARTS. --If we inquire into what the most accurate philosophers declarethemselves to mean by MATERIAL SUBSTANCE, we shall find them acknowledgethey have no other meaning annexed to those sounds but the idea of BEINGIN GENERAL, together WITH THE RELATIVE NOTION OF ITS SUPPORTINGACCIDENTS. The general idea of Being appeareth to me the most abstractand incomprehensible of all other; and as for its supporting accidents, this, as we have just now observed, cannot be understood in the commonsense of those words; it must therefore be taken in some other sense, butwhat that is they do not explain. So that when I consider the TWO PARTSor branches which make the signification of the words MATERIAL SUBSTANCE, I am convinced there is no distinct meaning annexed to them. But whyshould we trouble ourselves any farther, in discussing this materialSUBSTRATUM or support of figure and motion, and other sensible qualities?Does it not suppose they have an existence without the mind? And is notthis a direct repugnancy, and altogether inconceivable?

18. THE EXISTENCE OF EXTERNAL BODIES WANTS PROOF. --But, though itwere possible that solid, figured, movable substances may existwithout the mind, corresponding to the ideas we have of bodies, yet HOW IS IT POSSIBLE FOR US TO KNOW THIS? Either we must know it bysense or by reason. As for our senses, by them we have the knowledge ONLYOF OUR SENSATIONS, ideas, or those things that are immediately perceivedby sense, call them what you will: but they do not inform us that thingsexist without the mind, or unperceived, like to those which areperceived. This the materialists themselves acknowledge. It remainstherefore that if we have any knowledge at all of external things, itmust be by REASON, inferring their existence from what is immediatelyperceived by sense. But what reason can induce us to believe theexistence of bodies without the mind, from what we perceive, since thevery patrons of Matter themselves do not pretend there is ANY NECESSARYCONNEXION BETWIXT THEM AND OUR IDEAS? I say it is granted on all hands(and what happens in dreams, phrensies, and the like, puts it beyonddispute) that IT IS POSSIBLE WE MIGHT BE AFFECTED WITH ALL THE IDEAS WEHAVE NOW, THOUGH THERE WERE NO BODIES EXISTING WITHOUT RESEMBLING THEM. Hence, it is evident the supposition of external bodies is not necessaryfor the producing our ideas; since it is granted they are producedsometimes, and might possibly be produced always in the same order, wesee them in at present, without their concurrence. 

19. THE EXISTENCE OF EXTERNAL BODIES AFFORDS NO EXPLICATION OF THEMANNER IN WHICH OUR IDEAS ARE PRODUCED. --But, though we might possiblyhave all our sensations without them, yet perhaps it may be thoughtEASIER to conceive and explain the MANNER of their production, by supposing external bodies in their likeness rather than otherwise;and so it might be at least probable there are such things as bodiesthat excite their ideas in our minds. But neither can this be said;for, though we give the materialists their external bodies, theyby their own confession are never the nearer knowing how our ideasare produced; since they own themselves unable to comprehend inwhat manner BODY CAN ACT UPON SPIRIT, or how it is possible it shouldimprint any idea in the mind. Hence it is evident the production of ideasor sensations in our minds can be no reason why we should suppose Matteror corporeal substances, SINCE THAT IS ACKNOWLEDGED TO REMAIN EQUALLYINEXPLICABLE WITH OR WITHOUT THIS SUPPOSITION. If therefore it werepossible for bodies to exist without the mind, yet to hold they do so, must needs be a very precarious opinion; since it is to suppose, withoutany reason at all, that God has created innumerable beings THAT AREENTIRELY USELESS, AND SERVE TO NO MANNER OF PURPOSE. 

20. DILEMMA. --In short, if there were external bodies, it is impossible weshould ever come to know it; and if there were not, we might have the verysame reasons to think there were that we have now. Suppose--what no onecan deny possible--an intelligence without the help of external bodies, tobe affected with the same train of sensations or ideas that you are, imprinted in the same order and with like vividness in his mind. I askwhether that intelligence has not all the reason to believe theexistence of corporeal substances, represented by his ideas, and excitingthem in his mind, that you can possibly have for believing the samething? Of this there can be no question--which one consideration wereenough to make any reasonable person suspect the strength of whateverarguments be may think himself to have, for the existence of bodieswithout the mind. 

21. Were it necessary to add any FURTHER PROOF AGAINST THE EXISTENCE OFMATTER after what has been said, I could instance several of those errorsand difficulties (not to mention impieties) which have sprung from thattenet. It has occasioned numberless controversies and disputes inphilosophy, and not a few of far greater moment in religion. But I shallnot enter into the detail of them in this place, as well because I thinkarguments A POSTERIORI are unnecessary for confirming what has been, if Imistake not, sufficiently demonstrated A PRIORI, as because I shallhereafter find occasion to speak somewhat of them. 

22. I am afraid I have given cause to think I am needlessly prolix inhandling this subject. For, to what purpose is it to dilate on that whichmay be demonstrated with the utmost evidence in a line or two, to any onethat is capable of the least reflexion? It is but looking into your ownthoughts, and so trying whether you can conceive it possible for a sound, or figure, or motion, or colour to exist without the mind or unperceived. This easy trial may perhaps make you see that what you contend for is adownright contradiction. Insomuch that I am content to put the whole uponthis issue:--If you can but CONCEIVE it possible for one extended movablesubstance, or, in general, for any one idea, or anything like an idea, toexist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it, I shall readily give up thecause. And, as for all that COMPAGES of external bodies you contend for, I shall grant you its existence, THOUGH (1. ) YOU CANNOT EITHER GIVE ME ANYREASON WHY YOU BELIEVE IT EXISTS [Vide sect. Lviii. ], OR (2. ) ASSIGN ANYUSE TO IT WHEN IT IS SUPPOSED TO EXIST [Vide sect. Lx. ]. I say, the barepossibility of your opinions being true shall pass for an argument thatit is so. [Note: i. E. Although your argument be deficient in the tworequisites of an hypothesis. --Ed. ]

23. But, say you, surely there is nothing easier than for me to imaginetrees, for instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and nobodyby to perceive them. I answer, you may so, there is no difficulty in it;but what is all this, I beseech you, more than framing in your mindcertain ideas which you call BOOKS and TREES, and the same time omittingto frame the idea of any one that may perceive them? BUT DO NOT YOUYOURSELF PERCEIVE OR THINK OF THEM ALL THE WHILE? This therefore isnothing to the purpose; it only shows you have the power of imagining orforming ideas in your mind: but it does not show that you can conceive itpossible the objects of your thought may exist without the mind. To makeout this, IT IS NECESSARY THAT YOU CONCEIVE THEM EXISTING UNCONCEIVED ORUNTHOUGHT OF, WHICH IS A MANIFEST REPUGNANCY. When we do our utmost toconceive the existence of external bodies, we are all the while onlycontemplating our own ideas. But the mind taking no notice of itself, isdeluded to think it can and does conceive bodies existing unthought of orwithout the mind, though at the same time they are apprehended by orexist in itself. A little attention will discover to any one the truthand evidence of what is here said, and make it unnecessary to insist onany other proofs against the existence of material substance. 

24. THE ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE OF UNTHINKING THINGS ARE WORDS WITHOUTA MEANING. --It is very obvious, upon the least inquiry into our thoughts, to know whether it is possible for us to understand what is meant by theABSOLUTE EXISTENCE OF SENSIBLE OBJECTS IN THEMSELVES, OR WITHOUT THE MIND. To me it is evident those words mark out either a direct contradiction, orelse nothing at all. And to convince others of this, I know no readier orfairer way than to entreat they would calmly attend to their ownthoughts; and if by this attention the emptiness or repugnancy of thoseexpressions does appear, surely nothing more is requisite for theconviction. It is on this therefore that I insist, to wit, that theABSOLUTE existence of unthinking things are words without a meaning, orwhich include a contradiction. This is what I repeat and inculcate, andearnestly recommend to the attentive thoughts of the reader. 

25. THIRD ARGUMENT. [Note: Vide sect. Iii. And vii. ]--REFUTATIONOF LOCKE. --All our ideas, sensations, notions, or the things which weperceive, by whatsoever names they may be distinguished, are visiblyinactive--there is nothing of power or agency included in them. So thatONE IDEA or object of thought CANNOT PRODUCE or make ANY ALTERATION INANOTHER. To be satisfied of the truth of this, there is nothing elserequisite but a bare observation of our ideas. For, since they and everypart of them exist only in the mind, it follows that there is nothing inthem but what is perceived: but whoever shall attend to his ideas, whetherof sense or reflexion, will not perceive in them any power or activity;there is, therefore, no such thing contained in them. A littleattention will discover to us that the very being of an idea impliespassiveness and inertness in it, insomuch that it is impossible for anidea to do anything, or, strictly speaking, to be the cause of anything:neither can it be the resemblance or pattern of any active being, as isevident from sect. 8. Whence it plainly follows that extension, figure, and motion cannot be the cause of our sensations. To say, therefore, that these are the effects of powers resulting from theconfiguration, number, motion, and size of corpuscles, must certainlybe false. [Note: Vide sect. Cii. ]

26. CAUSE OF IDEAS. --We perceive a continual succession of ideas, some areanew excited, others are changed or totally disappear. There is thereforesome cause of these ideas, whereon they depend, and which produces andchanges them. That this cause cannot be any quality or idea or combinationof ideas, is clear from the preceding section. I must therefore be asubstance; but it has been shown that there is no corporeal or materialsubstance: it remains therefore that the CAUSE OF IDEAS is an incorporealactive substance or Spirit. 

27. NO IDEA OF SPIRIT. --A spirit is one simple, undivided, activebeing--as it perceives ideas it is called the UNDERSTANDING, and as itproduces or otherwise operates about them it is called the WILL. Hencethere can be no idea formed of a soul or spirit; for all ideas whatever, being passive and inert (vide sect. 25), they cannot represent unto us, by way of image or LIKENESS, that which acts. A little attention will makeit plain to any one, that to have an idea which shall be like that activeprinciple of motion and change of ideas is absolutely impossible. Such isthe nature of SPIRIT, or that which acts, that it cannot be of itselfperceived, BUT ONLY BY THE EFFECTS WHICH IT PRODUCETH. If any man shalldoubt of the truth of what is here delivered, let him but reflect and tryif he can frame the idea of any power or active being, and whether he hasideas of two principal powers, marked by the names WILL and UNDERSTANDING, distinct from each other as well as from a third idea of Substance orBeing in general, with a relative notion of its supporting or being thesubject of the aforesaid powers--which is signified by the name SOUL orSPIRIT. This is what some hold; but, so far as I can see, the wordsWILL [Note: "Understanding, mind. "--Edit 1710. ], SOUL, SPIRIT, do not standfor different ideas, or, in truth, for any idea at all, but for somethingwhich is very different from ideas, and which, being an agent, cannot belike unto, or represented by, any idea whatsoever. Though it must be ownedat the same time that we have some notion of soul, spirit, and theoperations of the mind: such as willing, loving, hating--inasmuch as weknow or understand the meaning of these words. 

28. I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and vary and shiftthe scene as oft as I think fit. It is no more than willing, andstraightway this or that idea arises in my fancy; and by the same powerit is obliterated and makes way for another. This making and unmaking ofideas doth very properly denominate the mind active. Thus much is certainand grounded on experience; but when we think of unthinking agents or ofexciting ideas exclusive of volition, we only amuse ourselves with words. 

29. IDEAS OF SENSATION DIFFER FROM THOSE OF REFLECTION OR MEMORY. --But, whatever power I may have over MY OWN thoughts, I find the ideasactually perceived by Sense have not a like dependence on my will. Whenin broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whetherI shall see or no, or to determine what particular objects shall presentthemselves to my view; and so likewise as to the hearing and othersenses; the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will. Thereis THEREFORE SOME OTHER WILL OR SPIRIT that PRODUCES THEM. 

30. LAWS OF NATURE. --The ideas of Sense are more strong, lively, andDISTINCT than those of the imagination; they have likewise a steadiness, order, and coherence, and are not excited at random, as those which arethe effects of human wills often are, but in a regular train or series, the admirable connexion whereof sufficiently testifies the wisdom andbenevolence of its Author. Now THE SET RULES OR ESTABLISHED METHODSWHEREIN THE MIND WE DEPEND ON EXCITES IN US THE IDEAS OF SENSE, ARE CALLEDTHE LAWS OF NATURE; and these we learn by experience, which teaches usthat such and such ideas are attended with such and such other ideas, inthe ordinary course of things. 

31. KNOWLEDGE OF THEM NECESSARY FOR THE CONDUCT OF WORLDLY AFFAIRS. --Thisgives us a sort of foresight which enables us to regulate ouractions for the benefit of life. And without this we should be eternallyat a loss; we could not know how to act anything that might procure usthe least pleasure, or remove the least pain of sense. That foodnourishes, sleep refreshes, and fire warms us; that to sow in theseed-time is the way to reap in the harvest; and in general that toobtain such or such ends, such or such means are conducive--all this weknow, NOT BY DISCOVERING ANY NECESSARY CONNEXION BETWEEN OUR IDEAS, butonly by the observation of the settled laws of nature, without which weshould be all in uncertainty and confusion, and a grown man no more knowhow to manage himself in the affairs of life than an infant just born. 

32. And yet THIS consistent UNIFORM WORKING, which so evidently displaysthe goodness and wisdom of that Governing Spirit whose Will constitutesthe laws of nature, is so far from leading our thoughts to Him, that itrather SENDS THEM A WANDERING AFTER SECOND CAUSES. For, when we perceivecertain ideas of Sense constantly followed by other ideas and WE KNOWTHIS IS NOT OF OUR OWN DOING, we forthwith attribute power and agency tothe ideas themselves, and make one the cause of another, than whichnothing can be more absurd and unintelligible. Thus, for example, havingobserved that when we perceive by sight a certain round luminous figurewe at the same time perceive by touch the idea or sensation called HEAT, we do from thence conclude the sun to be the cause of heat. And in likemanner perceiving the motion and collision of bodies to be attended withsound, we are inclined to think the latter the effect of the former. 

33. OF REAL THINGS AND IDEAS OR CHIMERAS. --The ideas imprinted on theSenses by the Author of nature are called REAL THINGS; and thoseexcited in the imagination being less regular, vivid, and constant, are more properly termed IDEAS, or IMAGES OF THINGS, which theycopy and represent. But then our sensations, be they never so vividand distinct, are nevertheless IDEAS, that is, they exist in themind, or are perceived by it, as truly as the ideas of its own framing. The ideas of Sense are allowed to have more reality in them, that is, tobe more (1)STRONG, (2)ORDERLY, and (3)COHERENT than the creatures of themind; but this is no argument that they exist without the mind. They arealso (4)LESS DEPENDENT ON THE SPIRIT [Note: Vide sect. Xxix. --Note. ], or thinking substance which perceives them, in that they are excited bythe will of another and more powerful spirit; yet still they are IDEAS, and certainly no IDEA, whether faint or strong, can exist otherwise thanin a mind perceiving it. 

34. FIRST GENERAL OBJECTION. --ANSWER. --Before we proceed any fartherit is necessary we spend some time in answering objections whichmay probably be made against the principles we have hitherto laiddown. In doing of which, if I seem too prolix to those of quickapprehensions, I hope it may be pardoned, since all men do notequally apprehend things of this nature, and I am willing to beunderstood by every one. 

FIRST, then, it will be objected that by the foregoing principles ALLTHAT IS REAL AND SUBSTANTIAL IN NATURE IS BANISHED OUT OF THE WORLD, andinstead thereof a chimerical scheme of ideas takes place. All things thatexist, exist only in the mind, that is, they are purely notional. Whattherefore becomes of the sun, moon and stars? What must we think ofhouses, rivers, mountains, trees, stones; nay, even of our own bodies?Are all these but so many chimeras and illusions on the fancy? To allwhich, and whatever else of the same sort may be objected, I ANSWER, thatby the principles premised we are not deprived of any one thing innature. Whatever we see, feel, hear, or anywise conceive or understandremains as secure as ever, and is as real as ever. There is a RERUMNATURA, and the distinction between realities and chimeras retains itsfull force. This is evident from sect. 29, 30, and 33, where we haveshown what is meant by REAL THINGS in opposition to CHIMERAS or ideas ofour own framing; but then they both equally exist in the mind, and inthat sense they are alike IDEAS. 

35. THE EXISTENCE OF MATTER, AS UNDERSTOOD BY PHILOSOPHERS, DENIED. [Vide sect. Lxxxiv. ]--I do not argue against the existence ofany one thing that we can apprehend either by sense or reflexion. That the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question. The only thing whoseexistence we deny IS THAT WHICH PHILOSOPHERS CALL MATTER or corporealsubstance. And in doing of this there is no damage done to the restof mankind, who, I dare say, will never miss it. The Atheist indeedwill want the colour of an empty name to support his impiety; andthe Philosophers may possibly find they have lost a great handle fortrifling and disputation. 

36. READILY EXPLAINED. --If any man thinks this detracts from the existenceor reality of things, he is very far from understanding what has beenpremised in the plainest terms I could think of. Take here anabstract of what has been said:--There are spiritual substances, minds, or human souls, which will or excite ideas in themselves atpleasure; but these are faint, weak, and unsteady in respect ofothers they perceive by sense--which, being impressed upon themaccording to certain rules or laws of nature, speak themselves theeffects of a mind more powerful and wise than human spirits. Theselatter are said to have more REALITY in them than the former:--bywhich is meant that they are more affecting, orderly, and distinct, and that they are not fictions of the mind perceiving them. Andin this sense the sun that I see by day is the real sun, and that which Iimagine by night is the idea of the former. In the sense here given ofREALITY it is evident that every vegetable, star, mineral, and in generaleach part of the mundane system, is as much a REAL BEING by ourprinciples as by any other. Whether others mean anything by the termREALITY different from what I do, I entreat them to look into their ownthoughts and see. 

37. THE PHILOSOPHIC, NOT THE VULGAR SUBSTANCE, TAKEN AWAY. --I willbe urged that thus much at least is true, to wit, that we takeaway all corporeal substances. To this my answer is, that if the wordSUBSTANCE be taken in the vulgar sense--for a combination of sensiblequalities, such as extension, solidity, weight, and the like--this wecannot be accused of taking away: but if it be taken in a philosophicsense--for the SUPPORT of accidents or QUALITIES WITHOUT THE MIND--thenindeed I acknowledge that we take it away, if one may be said to takeaway that which never had any existence, not even in the imagination. 

38. But, say you, it sounds very harsh to say we eat and drinkideas, and are clothed with ideas. I acknowledge it does so--the wordIDEA not being used in common discourse to signify the severalcombinations of sensible qualities which are called THINGS; and it iscertain that any expression which varies from the familiar use oflanguage will seem harsh and ridiculous. But this doth not concern thetruth of the proposition, which in other words is no more than to say, weare fed and clothed with those things which we perceive immediately byour senses. The hardness or softness, the colour, taste, warmth, figure, or suchlike qualities, which combined together constitute the severalsorts of victuals and apparel, have been shown to exist only in the mindthat perceives them; and this is all that is meant by calling them IDEAS;which word if it was as ordinarily used as THING, would sound no harshernor more ridiculous than it. I am not for disputing about the propriety, but the truth of the expression. If therefore you agree with me that weeat and drink and are clad with the immediate objects of sense, whichcannot exist unperceived or without the mind, I shall readily grant it ismore proper or conformable to custom that they should be called thingsrather than ideas. 

39. THE TERM IDEA PREFERABLE TO THING. --If it be demanded why I makeuse of the word IDEA, and do not rather in compliance with customcall them THINGS. I answer, I do it for two reasons:--first, becausethe term THING in contra-distinction to IDEA, is generally supposedto denote somewhat existing without the mind; secondly, becauseTHING has a more comprehensive signification than IDEA, includingSPIRIT or thinking things as well as IDEAS. Since therefore theobjects of sense exist only in the mind, and are withal thoughtlessand inactive, I chose to mark them by the word IDEA, which impliesthose properties. 

40. THE EVIDENCE OF THE SENSES NOT DISCREDITED. --But, say what we can, some one perhaps may be apt to reply, he will still believe hissenses, and never suffer any arguments, how plausible soever, to prevail over the certainty of them. Be it so; assert the evidenceof sense as high as you please, we are willing to do the same. That what I see, hear, and feel DOTH EXIST, THAT IS to say, IS PERCEIVEDBY ME, I no more doubt than I do of my own being. But I do not see howthe testimony of sense can be alleged as a proof for the existence ofanything which is not perceived by sense. We are not for having any manturn SCEPTIC and disbelieve his senses; on the contrary, we give them allthe stress and assurance imaginable; nor are there any principles moreopposite to Scepticism than those we have laid down [Note. ], as shall behereafter clearly shown. 

[Note: They extirpate the very root of scepticism, "the fallacyof the senses. "--Ed. ]

41. SECOND OBJECTION. --ANSWER. --Secondly, it will be OBJECTEDthat there is a great difference betwixt real fire for instance, and the idea of fire, betwixt dreaming or imagining oneself burnt, and actually being so: if you suspect it to be only the idea offire which you see, do but put your hand into it and you will beconvinced with a witness. This and the like may be urged in oppositionto our tenets. To all which the ANSWER is evident from what hasbeen already said; and I shall only add in this place, that if realfire be very different from the idea of fire, so also is the real painthat it occasions very different from the idea of the same pain, and yetnobody will pretend that real pain either is, or can possibly be, in anunperceiving thing, or without the mind, any more than its idea. 

42. THIRD OBJECTION. --ANSWER. --Thirdly, it will be objected thatwe see things actually without or at distance from us, and whichconsequently do not exist in the mind; it being absurd that thosethings which are seen at the distance of several miles should beas near to us as our own thoughts. In answer to this, I desire itmay be considered that in a DREAM we do oft perceive things asexisting at a great distance off, and yet for all that, those thingsare acknowledged to have their existence only in the mind. 

43. But, for the fuller clearing of this point, it may be worth while toconsider how it is that we perceive distance and things placed at adistance by sight. For, that we should in truth see EXTERNAL space, andbodies actually existing in it, some nearer, others farther off, seems tocarry with it some opposition to what has been said of their existingnowhere without the mind. The consideration of this difficulty it wasthat gave birth to my "Essay towards a New Theory of Vision, " which waspublished not long since, wherein it is shown (1) that DISTANCE or outnessis NEITHER IMMEDIATELY of itself PERCEIVED by sight, nor yet apprehendedor judged of by lines and angles, or anything that has a necessaryconnexion with it; but (2) that it is ONLY SUGGESTED to our thoughts bycertain visible ideas and sensations attending vision, which in their ownnature have no manner of similitude or relation either with distance orthings placed at a distance; but, by a connexion taught us BY EXPERIENCE, they come to signify and suggest them to us, after the same manner thatWORDS of any language suggest the ideas they are made to stand for;insomuch that a man BORN blind and afterwards made to see, would not, atfirst sight, think the things he saw to be without his mind, or at anydistance from him. See sect. 41 of the fore-mentioned treatise. 

44. The ideas of sight and touch make two species entirely distinct andheterogeneous. THE FORMER ARE MARKS AND PROGNOSTICS OF THE LATTER. Thatthe proper objects of sight neither exist without mind, nor are theimages of external things, was shown even in that treatise. Thoughthroughout the same the contrary be supposed true of tangibleobjects--not that to suppose that vulgar error was necessary forestablishing the notion therein laid down, but because it was beside mypurpose to examine and refute it in a discourse concerning VISION. Sothat in strict truth the ideas of sight, when we apprehend by themdistance and things placed at a distance, do not suggest or mark out tous things ACTUALLY existing at a distance, but only admonish us whatideas of touch will be imprinted in our minds at such and such distancesof time, and in consequence of such or such actions. It is, I say, evident from what has been said in the foregoing parts of this Treatise, and in sect. 147 and elsewhere of the Essay concerning Vision, thatvisible ideas are the Language whereby the governing Spirit on whom wedepend informs us what tangible ideas he is about to imprint upon us, incase we excite this or that motion in our own bodies. But for a fullerinformation in this point I refer to the Essay itself. 

45. FOURTH OBJECTION, FROM PERPETUAL ANNIHILATION ANDCREATION. --ANSWER. --Fourthly, it will be objected that from the foregoingprinciples it follows things are every moment annihilated and createdanew. The objects of sense exist only when they are perceived; the treestherefore are in the garden, or the chairs in the parlour, no longer thanwhile there is somebody by to perceive them. Upon SHUTTING MY EYES allthe furniture in the room is reduced to nothing, and barely upon openingthem it is again created. In ANSWER to all which, I refer the reader towhat has been said in sect. 3, 4, &c. , and desire he will considerwhether he means anything by the actual existence of an idea distinctfrom its being perceived. For my part, after the nicest inquiry I couldmake, I am not able to discover that anything else is meant by thosewords; and I once more entreat the reader to sound his own thoughts, andnot suffer himself to be imposed on by words. If he can conceive itpossible either for his ideas or their archetypes to exist without beingperceived, then I give up the cause; but if he cannot, he willacknowledge it is unreasonable for him to stand up in defence of he knowsnot what, and pretend to charge on me as an absurdity the not assentingto those propositions which at bottom have no meaning in them. 

46. ARGUMENTUM AD HOMINEM. --It will not be amiss to observe how farthe received principles of philosophy are themselves chargeablewith those pretended absurdities. (1) It is thought strangely absurdthat upon closing my eyelids all the visible objects around meshould be reduced to nothing; and yet is not this what philosopherscommonly acknowledge, when they agree on all hands that light andcolours, which alone are the proper and immediate objects of sight, are mere sensations that exist no longer than they are perceived?(2)Again, it may to some perhaps seem very incredible that things shouldbe every moment creating, yet this very notion is commonly taught in theschools. For the SCHOOLMEN, though they acknowledge the existence ofMatter, and that the whole mundane fabric is framed out of it, arenevertheless of opinion that it cannot subsist without the divineconservation, which by them is expounded to be a continual creation. 

47. (3) Further, a little thought will discover to us that though we allowthe existence of Matter or corporeal substance, yet it will unavoidablyfollow, FROM THE PRINCIPLES WHICH ARE NOW GENERALLY ADMITTED, that thePARTICULAR bodies, of what kind soever, do none of them exist whilst theyare not perceived. For, it is evident from sect. II and the followingsections, that the Matter philosophers contend for is an incomprehensiblesomewhat, WHICH HAS NONE OF THOSE PARTICULAR QUALITIES WHEREBY THEBODIES FALLING UNDER OUR SENSES ARE DISTINGUISHED ONE FROM ANOTHER. (2) But, to make this more plain, it must be remarked that the infinitedivisibility of Matter is now universally allowed, at least by the mostapproved and considerable philosophers, who on the received principlesdemonstrate it beyond all exception. Hence, it follows there is aninfinite number of parts in each particle of Matter which are notperceived by sense. The reason therefore that any particular body seemsto be of a finite magnitude, or exhibits only a finite number of parts tosense, is, not because it contains no more, since in itself it containsan infinite number of parts, BUT BECAUSE THE SENSE IS NOT ACUTE ENOUGH TODISCERN THEM. In proportion therefore as the sense is rendered moreacute, it perceives a greater number of parts in the object, that is, theobject appears greater, and its figure varies, those parts in itsextremities which were before unperceivable appearing now to bound it invery different lines and angles from those perceived by an obtuser sense. And at length, after various changes of size and shape, when the sensebecomes infinitely acute the body shall seem infinite. During all whichthere is no alteration in the body, but only in the sense. EACH BODYTHEREFORE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF, IS INFINITELY EXTENDED, AND CONSEQUENTLYVOID OF ALL SHAPE OR FIGURE. From which it follows that, though we shouldgrant the existence of Matter to be never so certain, yet it is withal ascertain, the materialists themselves are by their own principles forcedto acknowledge, that neither the particular bodies perceived by sense, nor anything like them, exists without the mind. Matter, I say, and eachparticle thereof, is according to them infinite and shapeless, AND IT ISTHE MIND THAT FRAMES ALL THAT VARIETY OF BODIES WHICH COMPOSE THE VISIBLEWORLD, ANY ONE WHEREOF DOES NOT EXIST LONGER THAN IT IS PERCEIVED. 

48. If we consider it, the objection proposed in sect. 45 will not befound reasonably charged on the principles we have premised, so as intruth to make any objection at all against our notions. For, though wehold indeed the objects of sense to be nothing else but ideas whichcannot exist unperceived; yet we may not hence conclude they have noexistence except only while they are perceived by US, since THERE MAY BESOME OTHER SPIRIT THAT PERCEIVES THEM THOUGH WE DO NOT. Wherever bodiesare said to have no existence without the mind, I would not be understoodto mean this or that particular mind, but ALL MINDS WHATSOEVER. It doesnot therefore follow from the foregoing principles that bodies areannihilated and created every moment, or exist not at all during theintervals between our perception of them. 

49. FIFTH OBJECTION. --ANSWER. --Fifthly, it may perhaps be OBJECTEDthat if extension and figure exist only in the mind, it followsthat the mind is extended and figured; since extension is a mode orattribute which (to speak with the schools) is predicated of thesubject in which it exists. I ANSWER, (1) Those qualities are in themind ONLY AS THEY ARE PERCEIVED BY IT--that is, not by way of MODEor ATTRIBUTE, but only by way of IDEA; and it no more follows thesoul or mind is extended, because extension exists in it alone, than it does that it is red or blue, because those colours are ONALL HANDS acknowledged to exist in it, and nowhere else. (2) As to whatphilosophers say of subject and mode, that seems very groundless andunintelligible. For instance, in this proposition "a die is hard, extended, and square, " they will have it that the word die denotes asubject or substance, distinct from the hardness, extension, and figurewhich are predicated of it, and in which they exist. This I cannotcomprehend: to me a die seems to be nothing distinct from those thingswhich are termed its modes or accidents. And, to say a die is hard, extended, and square is not to attribute those qualities to a subjectdistinct from and supporting them, but only an explication of the meaningof the word DIE. 

50. SIXTH OBJECTION, FROM NATURAL PHILOSOPHY. --ANSWER. --Sixthly, you will say there have been a great many things explained bymatter and motion; take away these and you destroy the wholecorpuscular philosophy, and undermine those mechanical principles whichhave been applied with so much success to account for the PHENOMENA. Inshort, whatever advances have been made, either by ancient or modernphilosophers, in the study of nature do all proceed on the suppositionthat corporeal substance or Matter doth really exist. To this I ANSWERthat there is not any one PHENOMENON explained on that supposition whichmay not as well be explained without it, as might easily be made appearby an INDUCTION OF PARTICULARS. To explain the PHENOMENA, is all one asto show why, upon such and such occasions, we are affected with such andsuch ideas. But (1) how Matter should operate on a Spirit, or produce anyidea in it, is what no philosopher will pretend to explain; it istherefore evident there can be no use of Matter in natural philosophy. Besides, (2) they who attempt to account for things do it not by CORPOREALSUBSTANCE, but by figure, motion, and other qualities, which are in truthno more than mere ideas, and, therefore, cannot be the cause of anything, as has been already shown. See sect. 25. 

51. SEVENTH OBJECTION. --ANSWER. --Seventhly, it will upon this bedemanded whether it does not seem ABSURD TO TAKE AWAY NATURAL CAUSES, AND ASCRIBE EVERYTHING TO THE IMMEDIATE OPERATION OF SPIRITS? Wemust no longer say upon these principles that fire heats, or watercools, but that a Spirit heats, and so forth. Would not a man bedeservedly laughed at, who should talk after this manner? I ANSWER, he would so; in such things we ought to THINK WITH THE LEARNED, AND SPEAK WITH THE VULGAR. They who to demonstration are convincedof the truth of the Copernican system do nevertheless say "the sunrises, " "the sun sets, " or "comes to the meridian"; and if theyaffected a contrary style in common talk it would without doubt appearvery ridiculous. A little reflexion on what is here said will make itmanifest that the common use of language would receive no manner ofalteration or disturbance from the admission of our tenets. 

52. IN THE ORDINARY AFFAIRS OF LIFE, ANY PHRASES MAY BE RETAINED, so longas they excite in us proper sentiments, or dispositions to act in such amanner as is necessary for our WELL-BEING, how false soever they may beif taken in a strict and SPECULATIVE SENSE. Nay, this is unavoidable, since, propriety being regulated by CUSTOM, language is suited to theRECEIVED opinions, which are not always the truest. Hence it isimpossible, even in the most rigid, philosophic reasonings, so far toalter the bent and genius of the tongue we speak, as never to give ahandle for cavillers to pretend difficulties and inconsistencies. But, afair and ingenuous reader will collect the sense from the scope and tenorand connexion of a discourse, making allowances for those inaccuratemodes of speech which use has made inevitable. 

53. As to the OPINION THAT THERE ARE NO CORPOREAL CAUSES, this has beenheretofore maintained by some of the Schoolmen, as it is of late byothers among the modern philosophers, who though they allow Matter toexist, yet will have God alone to be the immediate efficient cause of allthings. These men saw that amongst all the objects of sense there wasnone which had any power or activity included in it; and that byconsequence this was likewise true of whatever bodies they supposed toexist without the mind, like unto the immediate objects of sense. Butthen, that they should suppose an innumerable multitude of createdbeings, which they acknowledge are not capable of producing any oneeffect in nature, and which therefore are made to no manner of purpose, since God might have done everything as well without them: this I say, though we should allow it possible, must yet be a very unaccountable andextravagant supposition. 

54. EIGHTH OBJECTION. --TWOFOLD ANSWER. --In the eighth place, theuniversal concurrent assent of mankind may be thought by somean invincible argument in behalf of Matter, or the existence ofexternal things. Must we suppose the whole world to be mistaken?And if so, what cause can be assigned of so widespread and predominantan error? I answer, FIRST, that, upon a narrow inquiry, it willnot perhaps be found so many as is imagined do really believe theexistence of Matter or things without the mind. Strictly speaking, tobelieve that which involves a contradiction, or has no meaning in it, isimpossible; and whether the foregoing expressions are not of that sort, Irefer it to the impartial examination of the reader. In one sense, indeed, men may be said to believe that Matter exists, that is, they ACTas if the immediate cause of their sensations, which affects them everymoment, and is so nearly present to them, were some senseless unthinkingbeing. But, that they should clearly apprehend any meaning marked bythose words, and form thereof a settled SPECULATIVE opinion, is what I amnot able to conceive. This is not the only instance wherein men imposeupon themselves, by imagining they believe those propositions which theyhave often heard, though at bottom they have no meaning in them. 

55. But SECONDLY, though we should grant a notion to be never souniversally and steadfastly adhered to, yet this is weak argument of itstruth to whoever considers what a vast number of prejudices and falseopinions are everywhere embraced with the utmost tenaciousness, by theunreflecting (which are the far greater) part of mankind. There was atime when the antipodes and motion of the earth were looked upon asmonstrous absurdities even by men of learning: and if it be consideredwhat a small proportion they bear to the rest of mankind, we shall findthat at this day those notions have gained but a very inconsiderablefooting in the world. 

56. NINTH OBJECTION. --ANSWER. --But it is demanded that we assignA CAUSE OF THIS PREJUDICE, and account for its obtaining in theworld. To this I ANSWER, that men knowing they perceived severalideas, WHEREOF THEY THEMSELVES WERE NOT THE AUTHORS--as not beingexcited from within nor depending on the operation of their wills--thismade them maintain those ideas, or objects of perception had anEXISTENCE INDEPENDENT OF AND WITHOUT THE MIND, without ever dreamingthat a contradiction was involved in those words. But, philosophershaving plainly seen that the immediate objects of perception donot exist without the mind, THEY IN SOME DEGREE CORRECTED themistake of the vulgar; but at the same time run into another whichseems no less absurd, to wit, that there are certain objects reallyexisting without the mind, or having a subsistence distinct from beingperceived, OF WHICH OUR IDEAS ARE ONLY IMAGES or resemblances, imprintedby those objects on the mind. And this notion of the philosophers owesits origin to the same cause with the former, namely, their beingconscious that they were not the authors of their own sensations, whichthey evidently knew were imprinted from without, and which therefore musthave some cause distinct from the minds on which they are imprinted. 

57. BUT WHY THEY SHOULD SUPPOSE THE IDEAS OF SENSE TO BE EXCITED IN US BYTHINGS IN THEIR LIKENESS, and not rather have recourse to SPIRIT whichalone can act, may be accounted for, FIRST, because they were not awareof the repugnancy there is, (1) as well in supposing things like unto ourideas existing without, as in (2) attributing to them POWER OR ACTIVITY. SECONDLY, because the Supreme Spirit which excites those ideas in ourminds, is not marked out and limited to our view by any particular finitecollection of sensible ideas, as human agents are by their size, complexion, limbs, and motions. And thirdly, because His operations areregular and uniform. Whenever the course of nature is interrupted by amiracle, men are ready to own the presence of a superior agent. But, whenwe see things go on in the ordinary course they do not excite in us anyreflexion; their order and concatenation, though it be an argument of thegreatest wisdom, power, and goodness in their creator, is yet so constantand familiar to us that we do not think them the immediate effects of aFree Spirit; especially since inconsistency and mutability in acting, though it be an imperfection, is looked on as a mark of freedom. 

58. TENTH OBJECTION. --ANSWER. --Tenthly, it will be objected thatthe notions we advance are inconsistent with several sound truthsin philosophy and mathematics. For example, the motion of the earthis now universally admitted by astronomers as a truth grounded onthe clearest and most convincing reasons. But, on the foregoingprinciples, there can be no such thing. For, motion being only anidea, it follows that if it be not perceived it exists not; but themotion of the earth is not perceived by sense. I answer, that tenet, if rightly understood, will be found to agree with the principleswe have premised; for, the question whether the earth moves or noamounts in reality to no more than this, to wit, whether we havereason to conclude, from what has been observed by astronomers, thatif we were placed in such and such circumstances, and such or such aposition and distance both from the earth and sun, we should perceive theformer to move among the choir of the planets, and appearing in allrespects like one of them; and this, by the established rules of naturewhich we have no reason to mistrust, is reasonably collected from thephenomena. 

59. We may, from the experience we have had of the train and successionof ideas in our minds, often make, I will not say uncertain conjectures, but sure and well--grounded predictions concerning the ideas we shall beaffected with pursuant to a great train of actions, and be enabled topass a right judgment of what would have appeared to us, in case we wereplaced in circumstances very different from those we are in at present. Herein consists the knowledge of nature, which may preserve its use andcertainty very consistently with what has been said. It will be easy toapply this to whatever objections of the like sort may be drawn from themagnitude of the stars, or any other discoveries in astronomy or nature. 

60. ELEVENTH OBJECTION. --In the eleventh place, it will be demandedto what purpose serves that curious organization of plants, and theanimal mechanism in the parts of animals; might not vegetables grow, and shoot forth leaves of blossoms, and animals perform all theirmotions as well without as with all that variety of internal partsso elegantly contrived and put together; which, being ideas, havenothing powerful or operative in them, nor have any necessary connexionwith the effects ascribed to them? If it be a Spirit that immediatelyproduces every effect by a fiat or act of his will, we must think allthat is fine and artificial in the works, whether of man or nature, to be made in vain. By this doctrine, though an artist has made thespring and wheels, and every movement of a watch, and adjusted themin such a manner as he knew would produce the motions he designed, yet he must think all this done to no purpose, and that it is anIntelligence which directs the index, and points to the hour of theday. If so, why may not the Intelligence do it, without his being at thepains of making the movements and putting them together? Why does not anempty case serve as well as another? And how comes it to pass thatwhenever there is any fault in the going of a watch, there is somecorresponding disorder to be found in the movements, which being mendedby a skilful hand all is right again? The like may be said of all theclockwork of nature, great part whereof is so wonderfully fine and subtleas scarce to be discerned by the best microscope. In short, it will beasked, how, upon our principles, any tolerable account can be given, orany final cause assigned of an innumerable multitude of bodies andmachines, framed with the most exquisite art, which in the commonphilosophy have very apposite uses assigned them, and serve to explainabundance of phenomena?

61. ANSWER. --To all which I answer, first, that though there were somedifficulties relating to the administration of Providence, and the usesby it assigned to the several parts of nature, which I could not solve bythe foregoing principles, yet this objection could be of small weightagainst the truth and certainty of those things which may be proved apriori, with the utmost evidence and rigor of demonstration. Secondly, but neither are the received principles free from the like difficulties;for, it may still be demanded to what end God should take thoseroundabout methods of effecting things by instruments and machines, whichno one can deny might have been effected by the mere command of His willwithout all that apparatus; nay, if we narrowly consider it, we shallfind the objection may be retorted with greater force on those who holdthe existence of those machines without of mind; for it has been madeevident that solidity, bulk, figure, motion, and the like have noactivity or efficacy in them, so as to be capable of producing any oneeffect in nature. See sect. 25. Whoever therefore supposes them to exist(allowing the supposition possible) when they are not perceived does itmanifestly to no purpose; since the only use that is assigned to them, asthey exist unperceived, is that they produce those perceivable effectswhich in truth cannot be ascribed to anything but Spirit. 

62. (FOURTHLY. )--But, to come nigher the difficulty, it must be observedthat though the fabrication of all those parts and organs be notabsolutely necessary to the producing any effect, yet it is necessaryto the producing of things in a constant regular way according tothe laws of nature. There are certain general laws that run throughthe whole chain of natural effects; these are learned by the observationand study of nature, and are by men applied as well to the framingartificial things for the use and ornament of life as to theexplaining various phenomena--which explication consists only inshowing the conformity any particular phenomenon has to the generallaws of nature, or, which is the same thing, in discovering theuniformity there is in the production of natural effects; as willbe evident to whoever shall attend to the several instances whereinphilosophers pretend to account for appearances. That there is agreat and conspicuous use in these regular constant methods ofworking observed by the Supreme Agent has been shown in sect. 31. And it is no less visible that a particular size, figure, motion, and disposition of parts are necessary, though not absolutely tothe producing any effect, yet to the producing it according to thestanding mechanical laws of nature. Thus, for instance, it cannot bedenied that God, or the Intelligence that sustains and rules the ordinarycourse of things, might if He were minded to produce a miracle, cause allthe motions on the dial-plate of a watch, though nobody had ever made themovements and put them in it: but yet, if He will act agreeably to therules of mechanism, by Him for wise ends established and maintained inthe creation, it is necessary that those actions of the watchmaker, whereby he makes the movements and rightly adjusts them, precede theproduction of the aforesaid motions; as also that any disorder in them beattended with the perception of some corresponding disorder in themovements, which being once corrected all is right again. 

63. It may indeed on some occasions be necessary that the Author ofnature display His overruling power in producing some appearance out ofthe ordinary series of things. Such exceptions from the general rules ofnature are proper to surprise and awe men into an acknowledgement of theDivine Being; but then they are to be used but seldom, otherwise there isa plain reason why they should fail of that effect. Besides, God seems tochoose the convincing our reason of His attributes by the works ofnature, which discover so much harmony and contrivance in their make, andare such plain indications of wisdom and beneficence in their Author, rather than to astonish us into a belief of His Being by anomalous andsurprising events. 

64. To set this matter in a yet clearer light, I shall observe that whathas been objected in sect. 60 amounts in reality to no more thanthis:--ideas are not anyhow and at random produced, there being a certainorder and connexion between them, like to that of cause and effect; thereare also several combinations of them made in a very regular andartificial manner, which seem like so many instruments in the hand ofnature that, being hid as it were behind the scenes, have a secretoperation in producing those appearances which are seen on the theatre ofthe world, being themselves discernible only to the curious eye of thephilosopher. But, since one idea cannot be the cause of another, to whatpurpose is that connexion? And, since those instruments, being barelyinefficacious perceptions in the mind, are not subservient to theproduction of natural effects, it is demanded why they are made; or, inother words, what reason can be assigned why God should make us, upon aclose inspection into His works, behold so great variety of ideas soartfully laid together, and so much according to rule; it not beingcredible that He would be at the expense (if one may so speak) of allthat art and regularity to no purpose. 

65. To all which my answer is, first, that the connexion of ideas doesnot imply the relation of cause and effect, but only of a mark or signwith the thing signified. The fire which I see is not the cause of thepain I suffer upon my approaching it, but the mark that forewarns me ofit. In like manner the noise that I hear is not the effect of this orthat motion or collision of the ambient bodies, but the sign thereof. Secondly, the reason why ideas are formed into machines, that is, artificial and regular combinations, is the same with that for combiningletters into words. That a few original ideas may be made to signify agreat number of effects and actions, it is necessary they be variouslycombined together. And, to the end their use be permanent and universal, these combinations must be made by rule, and with wise contrivance. Bythis means abundance of information is conveyed unto us, concerning whatwe are to expect from such and such actions and what methods are properto be taken for the exciting such and such ideas; which in effect is allthat I conceive to be distinctly meant when it is said that, bydiscerning a figure, texture, and mechanism of the inward parts ofbodies, whether natural or artificial, we may attain to know the severaluses and properties depending thereon, or the nature of the thing. 

66. PROPER EMPLOYMENT OF THE NATURAL PHILOSOPHER. --Hence, it is evidentthat those things which, under the notion of a cause co-operatingor concurring to the production of effects, are altogether inexplicable, and run us into great absurdities, may be very naturally explained, and have a proper and obvious use assigned to them, when they areconsidered only as marks or signs for our information. And it isthe searching after and endeavouring to understand those signsinstituted by the Author of Nature, that ought to be the employment ofthe natural philosopher; and not the pretending to explain things bycorporeal causes, which doctrine seems to have too much estranged theminds of men from that active principle, that supreme and wise Spirit "inwhom we live, move, and have our being. "

67. TWELFTH OBJECTION. --ANSWER. --In the twelfth place, it may perhapsbe objected that--though it be clear from what has been said thatthere can be no such thing as an inert, senseless, extended, solid, figured, movable substance existing without the mind, such asphilosophers describe Matter--yet, if any man shall leave out ofhis idea of matter the positive ideas of extension, figure, solidityand motion, and say that he means only by that word an inert, senseless substance, that exists without the mind or unperceived, which is the occasion of our ideas, or at the presence whereof God ispleased to excite ideas in us: it doth not appear but that Matter takenin this sense may possibly exist. In answer to which I say, first, thatit seems no less absurd to suppose a substance without accidents, than itis to suppose accidents without a substance. But secondly, though weshould grant this unknown substance may possibly exist, yet where can itbe supposed to be? That it exists not in the mind is agreed; and that itexists not in place is no less certain--since all place or extensionexists only in the mind, as has been already proved. It remainstherefore that it exists nowhere at all. 

68. MATTER SUPPORTS NOTHING, AN ARGUMENT AGAINST ITS EXISTENCE. --Let usexamine a little the description that is here given us ofmatter. It neither acts, nor perceives, nor is perceived; for this is allthat is meant by saying it is an inert, senseless, unknown substance;which is a definition entirely made up of negatives, excepting only therelative notion of its standing under or supporting. But then it must beobserved that it supports nothing at all, and how nearly this comes tothe description of a nonentity I desire may be considered. But, say you, it is the unknown occasion, at the presence of which ideas are excited inus by the will of God. Now, I would fain know how anything can be presentto us, which is neither perceivable by sense nor reflexion, nor capableof producing any idea in our minds, nor is at all extended, nor has anyform, nor exists in any place. The words "to be present, " when thusapplied, must needs be taken in some abstract and strange meaning, andwhich I am not able to comprehend. 

69. Again, let us examine what is meant by occasion. So far as I cangather from the common use of language, that word signifies either theagent which produces any effect, or else something that is observed toaccompany or go before it in the ordinary course of things. But when itis applied to Matter as above described, it can be taken in neither ofthose senses; for Matter is said to be passive and inert, and so cannotbe an agent or efficient cause. It is also unperceivable, as being devoidof all sensible qualities, and so cannot be the occasion of ourperceptions in the latter sense: as when the burning my finger is said tobe the occasion of the pain that attends it. What therefore can be meantby calling matter an occasion? The term is either used in no sense atall, or else in some very distant from its received signification. 

70. You will Perhaps say that Matter, though it be not perceived by us, is nevertheless perceived by God, to whom it is the occasion of excitingideas in our minds. For, say you, since we observe our sensations to beimprinted in an orderly and constant manner, it is but reasonable tosuppose there are certain constant and regular occasions of their beingproduced. That is to say, that there are certain permanent and distinctparcels of Matter, corresponding to our ideas, which, though they do notexcite them in our minds, or anywise immediately affect us, as beingaltogether passive and unperceivable to us, they are nevertheless to God, by whom they art perceived, as it were so many occasions to remind Himwhen and what ideas to imprint on our minds; that so things may go on ina constant uniform manner. 

71. In answer to this, I observe that, as the notion of Matter is herestated, the question is no longer concerning the existence of a thingdistinct from Spirit and idea, from perceiving and being perceived; butwhether there are not certain ideas of I know not what sort, in the mindof God which are so many marks or notes that direct Him how to producesensations in our minds in a constant and regular method--much after thesame manner as a musician is directed by the notes of music to producethat harmonious train and composition of sound which is called a tune, though they who hear the music do not perceive the notes, and may beentirely ignorant of them. But, this notion of Matter seems tooextravagant to deserve a confutation. Besides, it is in effect noobjection against what we have advanced, viz. That there is no senselessunperceived substance. 

72. THE ORDER OF OUR PERCEPTIONS SHOWS THE GOODNESS OF GOD, BUTAFFORDS NO PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF MATTER. --If we follow the lightof reason, we shall, from the constant uniform method of oursensations, collect the goodness and wisdom of the Spirit whoexcites them in our minds; but this is all that I can see reasonablyconcluded from thence. To me, I say, it is evident that the being of aspirit infinitely wise, good, and powerful is abundantly sufficient toexplain all the appearances of nature. But, as for inert, senselessMatter, nothing that I perceive has any the least connexion with it, orleads to the thoughts of it. And I would fain see any one explain any themeanest phenomenon in nature by it, or show any manner of reason, thoughin the lowest rank of probability, that he can have for its existence, oreven make any tolerable sense or meaning of that supposition. For, as toits being an occasion, we have, I think, evidently shown that with regardto us it is no occasion. It remains therefore that it must be, if at all, the occasion to God of exciting ideas in us; and what this amounts to wehave just now seen. 

73. It is worth while to reflect a little on the motives which inducedmen to suppose the existence of material substance; that so havingobserved the gradual ceasing and expiration of those motives or reasons, we may proportionably withdraw the assent that was grounded on them. First, therefore, it was thought that colour, figure, motion, and therest of the sensible qualities or accidents, did really exist without themind; and for this reason it seemed needful to suppose some unthinkingsubstratum or substance wherein they did exist, since they could not beconceived to exist by themselves. Afterwards, in process of time, menbeing convinced that colours, sounds, and the rest of the sensible, secondary qualities had no existence without the mind, they stripped thissubstratum or material substance of those qualities, leaving only theprimary ones, figure, motion, and suchlike, which they still conceived toexist without the mind, and consequently to stand in need of a materialsupport. But, it having been shown that none even of these can possiblyexist otherwise than in a Spirit or Mind which perceives them it followsthat we have no longer any reason to suppose the being of Matter; nay, that it is utterly impossible there should be any such thing, so long asthat word is taken to denote an unthinking substratum of qualities oraccidents wherein they exist without the mind. 

74. But though it be allowed by the materialists themselves that Matterwas thought of only for the sake of supporting accidents, and, the reasonentirely ceasing, one might expect the mind should naturally, and withoutany reluctance at all, quit the belief of what was solely groundedthereon; yet the prejudice is riveted so deeply in our thoughts, that wecan scarce tell how to part with it, and are therefore inclined, sincethe thing itself is indefensible, at least to retain the name, which weapply to I know not what abstracted and indefinite notions of being, oroccasion, though without any show of reason, at least so far as I cansee. For, what is there on our part, or what do we perceive, amongst allthe ideas, sensations, notions which are imprinted on our minds, eitherby sense or reflexion, from whence may be inferred the existence of aninert, thoughtless, unperceived occasion? and, on the other hand, on thepart of an All-sufficient Spirit, what can there be that should make usbelieve or even suspect He is directed by an inert occasion to exciteideas in our minds?

75. ABSURDITY OF CONTENDING FOR THE EXISTENCE OF MATTER AS THE OCCASIONOF IDEAS. --It is a very extraordinary instance of the force of prejudice, and much to be lamented, that the mind of man retains so great a fondness, against all the evidence of reason, for a stupid thoughtless somewhat, bythe interposition whereof it would as it were screen itself from theProvidence of God, and remove it farther off from the affairs of theworld. But, though we do the utmost we can to secure the belief ofMatter, though, when reason forsakes us, we endeavour to support ouropinion on the bare possibility of the thing, and though we indulgeourselves in the full scope of an imagination not regulated by reason tomake out that poor possibility, yet the upshot of all is, that there arecertain unknown Ideas in the mind of God; for this, if anything, is allthat I conceive to be meant by occasion with regard to God. And this atthe bottom is no longer contending for the thing, but for the name. 

76. Whether therefore there are such Ideas in the mind of God, andwhether they may be called by the name Matter, I shall not dispute. But, if you stick to the notion of an unthinking substance or support ofextension, motion, and other sensible qualities, then to me it is mostevidently impossible there should be any such thing, since it is a plainrepugnancy that those qualities should exist in or be supported by anunperceiving substance. 

77. THAT A SUBSTRATUM NOT PERCEIVED, MAY EXIST, UNIMPORTANT. --But, say you, though it be granted that there is no thoughtless supportof extension and the other qualities or accidents which we perceive, yet there may perhaps be some inert, unperceiving substance orsubstratum of some other qualities, as incomprehensible to us as coloursare to a man born blind, because we have not a sense adapted to them. But, if we had a new sense, we should possibly no more doubt of theirexistence than a blind man made to see does of the existence of light andcolours. I answer, first, if what you mean by the word Matter be only theunknown support of unknown qualities, it is no matter whether there issuch a thing or no, since it no way concerns us; and I do not see theadvantage there is in disputing about what we know not what, and we knownot why. 

78. But, secondly, if we had a new sense it could only furnish us withnew ideas or sensations; and then we should have the same reason againsttheir existing in an unperceiving substance that has been already offeredwith relation to figure, motion, colour and the like. Qualities, as hasbeen shown, are nothing else but sensations or ideas, which exist only ina mind perceiving them; and this is true not only of the ideas we areacquainted with at present, but likewise of all possible ideaswhatsoever. 

79. But, you will insist, what if I have no reason to believe theexistence of Matter? what if I cannot assign any use to it or explainanything by it, or even conceive what is meant by that word? yet still itis no contradiction to say that Matter exists, and that this Matter is ingeneral a substance, or occasion of ideas; though indeed to go about tounfold the meaning or adhere to any particular explication of those wordsmay be attended with great difficulties. I answer, when words are usedwithout a meaning, you may put them together as you please without dangerof running into a contradiction. You may say, for example, that twice twois equal to seven, so long as you declare you do not take the words ofthat proposition in their usual acceptation but for marks of you know notwhat. And, by the same reason, you may say there is an inert thoughtlesssubstance without accidents which is the occasion of our ideas. And weshall understand just as much by one proposition as the other. 

80. In the last place, you will say, what if we give up the cause ofmaterial Substance, and stand to it that Matter is an unknownsomewhat--neither substance nor accident, spirit nor idea, inert, thoughtless, indivisible, immovable, unextended, existing in no place. For, say you, whatever may be urged against substance or occasion, or anyother positive or relative notion of Matter, has no place at all, solong as this negative definition of Matter is adhered to. I answer, youmay, if so it shall seem good, use the word "Matter" in the same sense asother men use "nothing, " and so make those terms convertible in yourstyle. For, after all, this is what appears to me to be the result ofthat definition, the parts whereof when I consider with attention, eithercollectively or separate from each other, I do not find that there is anykind of effect or impression made on my mind different from what isexcited by the term nothing. 

81. You will reply, perhaps, that in the fore-said definition is includedwhat doth sufficiently distinguish it from nothing--the positive abstractidea of quiddity, entity, or existence. I own, indeed, that those whopretend to the faculty of framing abstract general ideas do talk as ifthey had such an idea, which is, say they, the most abstract and generalnotion of all; that is, to me, the most incomprehensible of all others. That there are a great variety of spirits of different orders andcapacities, whose faculties both in number and extent are far exceedingthose the Author of my being has bestowed on me, I see no reason to deny. And for me to pretend to determine by my own few, stinted narrow inletsof perception, what ideas the inexhaustible power of the Supreme Spiritmay imprint upon them were certainly the utmost folly andpresumption--since there may be, for aught that I know, innumerable sortsof ideas or sensations, as different from one another, and from all thatI have perceived, as colours are from sounds. But, how ready soever I maybe to acknowledge the scantiness of my comprehension with regard to theendless variety of spirits and ideas that may possibly exist, yet for anyone to pretend to a notion of Entity or Existence, abstracted from spiritand idea, from perceived and being perceived, is, I suspect, a downrightrepugnancy and trifling with words. --It remains that we consider theobjections which may possibly be made on the part of Religion. 

82. OBJECTIONS DERIVED FROM THE SCRIPTURES ANSWERED. --Some there arewho think that, though the arguments for the real existence ofbodies which are drawn from Reason be allowed not to amount todemonstration, yet the Holy Scriptures are so clear in the point aswill sufficiently convince every good Christian that bodies do reallyexist, and are something more than mere ideas; there being in Holy Writinnumerable facts related which evidently suppose the reality of timberand stone, mountains and rivers, and cities, and human bodies. To which Ianswer that no sort of writings whatever, sacred or profane, which usethose and the like words in the vulgar acceptation, or so as to have ameaning in them, are in danger of having their truth called in questionby our doctrine. That all those things do really exist, that there arebodies, even corporeal substances, when taken in the vulgar sense, hasbeen shown to be agreeable to our principles; and the difference betwixtthings and ideas, realities and chimeras, has been distinctly explained. See sect. 29, 30, 33, 36, &c. And I do not think that either whatphilosophers call Matter, or the existence of objects without the mind, is anywhere mentioned in Scripture. 

83. NO OBJECTION AS TO LANGUAGE TENABLE. --Again, whether there canbe or be not external things, it is agreed on all hands that theproper use of words is the marking our conceptions, or things onlyas they are known and perceived by us; whence it plainly followsthat in the tenets we have laid down there is nothing inconsistentwith the right use and significancy of language, and that discourse, of what kind soever, so far as it is intelligible, remains undisturbed. But all this seems so manifest, from what has been largely set forthin the premises, that it is needless to insist any farther on it. 

84. But, secondly it will be urged that miracles do, at least, lose muchof their stress and import by our principles. What must we think of Moses'rod? was it not really turned into a serpent; or was there only a changeof ideas in the minds of the spectators? And, can it be supposed that ourSaviour did no more at the marriage-feast in Cana than impose on thesight, and smell, and taste of the guests, so as to create in them theappearance or idea only of wine? The same may be said of all othermiracles; which, in consequence of the foregoing principles, must belooked upon only as so many cheats, or illusions of fancy. To this Ireply, that the rod was changed into a real serpent, and the water intoreal wine. That this does not in the least contradict what I haveelsewhere said will be evident from sect. 34 and 35. But this business ofreal and imaginary has been already so plainly and fully explained, andso often referred to, and the difficulties about it are so easilyanswered from what has gone before, that it were an affront to thereader's understanding to resume the explication of it in its place. Ishall only observe that if at table all who were present should see, andsmell, and taste, and drink wine, and find the effects of it, with methere could be no doubt of its reality; so that at bottom the scrupleconcerning real miracles has no place at all on ours, but only on thereceived principles, and consequently makes rather for than against whathas been said. 

85. CONSEQUENCES OF THE PRECEDING TENETS. --Having done with theObjections, which I endeavoured to propose in the clearest light, and gave them all the force and weight I could, we proceed in thenext place to take a view of our tenets in their Consequences. Some of these appear at first sight--as that several difficult andobscure questions, on which abundance of speculation has beenthrown away, are entirely banished from philosophy. "Whethercorporeal substance can think, " "whether Matter be infinitely divisible, "and "how it operates on spirit"--these and like inquiries have giveninfinite amusement to philosophers in all ages; but depending on theexistence of Matter, they have no longer any place on our principles. Many other advantages there are, as well with regard to religion as thesciences, which it is easy for any one to deduce from what has beenpremised; but this will appear more plainly in the sequel. 

86. THE REMOVAL OF MATTER GIVES CERTAINTY TO KNOWLEDGE. --From theprinciples we have laid down it follows human knowledge may naturallybe reduced to two heads--that of ideas and that of spirits. Of eachof these I shall treat in order. 

And first as to ideas or unthinking things. Our knowledge of these hasbeen very much obscured and confounded, and we have been led into verydangerous errors, by supposing a twofold existence of the objects ofsense--the one intelligible or in the mind, the other real and withoutthe mind; whereby unthinking things are thought to have a naturalsubsistence of their own distinct from being perceived by spirits. This, which, if I mistake not, has been shown to be a most groundless andabsurd notion, is the very root of Scepticism; for, so long as menthought that real things subsisted without the mind, and that theirknowledge was only so far forth real as it was conformable to realthings, it follows they could not be certain they had any real knowledgeat all. For how can it be known that the things which are perceived areconformable to those which are not perceived, or exist without the mind?

87. Colour, figure, motion, extension, and the like, considered only asso many sensations in the mind, are perfectly known, there being nothingin them which is not perceived. But, if they are looked on as notes orimages, referred to things or archetypes existing without the mind, thenare we involved all in scepticism. We see only the appearances, and notthe real qualities of things. What may be the extension, figure, ormotion of anything really and absolutely, or in itself, it is impossiblefor us to know, but only the proportion or relation they bear to oursenses. Things remaining the same, our ideas vary, and which of them, oreven whether any of them at all, represent the true quality reallyexisting in the thing, it is out of our reach to determine. So that, foraught we know, all we see, hear, and feel may be only phantom and vainchimera, and not at all agree with the real things existing in rerumnatura. All this scepticism follows from our supposing a differencebetween things and ideas, and that the former have a subsistence withoutthe mind or unperceived. It were easy to dilate on this subject, and showhow the arguments urged by sceptics in all ages depend on the suppositionof external objects. 

88. IF THERE BE EXTERNAL MATTER, NEITHER THE NATURE NOR EXISTENCEOF THINGS CAN BE KNOWN. --So long as we attribute a real existence tounthinking things, distinct from their being perceived, it is notonly impossible for us to know with evidence the nature of any realunthinking being, but even that it exists. Hence it is that we seephilosophers distrust their senses, and doubt of the existence ofheaven and earth, of everything they see or feel, even of their ownbodies. And, after all their labour and struggle of thought, theyare forced to own we cannot attain to any self-evident or demonstrativeknowledge of the existence of sensible things. But, all this doubtfulness, which so bewilders and confounds the mind and makes philosophyridiculous in the eyes of the world, vanishes if we annex a meaningto our words, and not amuse ourselves with the terms "absolute, ""external, " "exist, " and such-like, signifying we know not what. I can aswell doubt of my own being as of the being of those things which Iactually perceive by sense; it being a manifest contradiction that anysensible object should be immediately perceived by sight or touch, and atthe same time have no existence in nature, since the very existence of anunthinking being consists in being perceived. 

89. OF THING OR BEING. --Nothing seems of more importance towardserecting a firm system of sound and real knowledge, which may beproof against the assaults of Scepticism, than to lay the beginningin a distinct explication of what is meant by thing, reality, existence; for in vain shall we dispute concerning the real existenceof things, or pretend to any knowledge thereof, so long as we havenot fixed the meaning of those words. Thing or Being is the mostgeneral name of all; it comprehends under it two kinds entirelydistinct and heterogeneous, and which have nothing common but thename. Viz. Spirits and ideas. The former are active, indivisiblesubstances: the latter are inert, fleeting, dependent beings, whichsubsist not by themselves, but are supported by, or exist in minds orspiritual substances. We comprehend our own existence by inward feelingor reflexion, and that of other spirits by reason. We may be said to havesome knowledge or notion of our own minds, of spirits and active beings, whereof in a strict sense we have not ideas. In like manner, we know andhave a notion of relations between things or ideas--which relations aredistinct from the ideas or things related, inasmuch as the latter may beperceived by us without our perceiving the former. To me it seems thatideas, spirits, and relations are all in their respective kinds theobject of human knowledge and subject of discourse; and that the termidea would be improperly extended to signify everything we know or haveany notion of. 

90. EXTERNAL THINGS EITHER IMPRINTED BY OR PERCEIVED BY SOME OTHERMIND. --Ideas imprinted on the senses are real things, or do really exist;this we do not deny, but we deny they can subsist without the minds whichperceive them, or that they are resemblances of any archetypes existingwithout the mind; since the very being of a sensation or idea consists inbeing perceived, and an idea can be like nothing but an idea. Again, thethings perceived by sense may be termed external, with regard to theirorigin--in that they are not generated from within by the mind itself, but imprinted by a Spirit distinct from that which perceives them. Sensible objects may likewise be said to be "without the mind" in anothersense, namely when they exist in some other mind; thus, when I shut myeyes, the things I saw may still exist, but it must be in another mind. 

91. SENSIBLE QUALITIES REAL. --It were a mistake to think that whatis here said derogates in the least from the reality of things. It is acknowledged, on the received principles, that extension, motion, and in a word all sensible qualities have need of a support, as not being able to subsist by themselves. But the objects perceivedby sense are allowed to be nothing but combinations of those qualities, and consequently cannot subsist by themselves. Thus far it is agreedon all hand. So that in denying the things perceived by sense anexistence independent of a substance of support wherein they mayexist, we detract nothing from the received opinion of their reality, andare guilty of no innovation in that respect. All the difference is that, according to us, the unthinking beings perceived by sense have noexistence distinct from being perceived, and cannot therefore exist inany other substance than those unextended indivisible substances orspirits which act and think and perceive them; whereas philosophersvulgarly hold that the sensible qualities do exist in an inert, extended, unperceiving substance which they call Matter, to which they attribute anatural subsistence, exterior to all thinking beings, or distinct frombeing perceived by any mind whatsoever, even the eternal mind of theCreator, wherein they suppose only ideas of the corporeal substancescreated by him; if indeed they allow them to be at all created. 

92. OBJECTIONS OF ATHEISTS OVERTURNED. --For, as we have shown thedoctrine of Matter or corporeal substance to have been the mainpillar and support of Scepticism, so likewise upon the same foundationhave been raised all the impious schemes of Atheism and Irreligion. Nay, so great a difficulty has it been thought to conceive Matterproduced out of nothing, that the most celebrated among the ancientphilosophers, even of those who maintained the being of a God, have thought Matter to be uncreated and co-eternal with Him. Howgreat a friend material substance has been to Atheists in all ages wereneedless to relate. All their monstrous systems have so visible andnecessary a dependence on it that, when this corner-stone is onceremoved, the whole fabric cannot choose but fall to the ground, insomuchthat it is no longer worth while to bestow a particular consideration onthe absurdities of every wretched sect of Atheists. 

93. AND OF FATALISTS ALSO. --That impious and profane persons shouldreadily fall in with those systems which favour their inclinations, by deriding immaterial substance, and supposing the soul to bedivisible and subject to corruption as the body; which exclude allfreedom, intelligence, and design from the formation of things, and instead thereof make a self--existent, stupid, unthinkingsubstance the root and origin of all beings; that they shouldhearken to those who deny a Providence, or inspection of a SuperiorMind over the affairs of the world, attributing the whole seriesof events either to blind chance or fatal necessity arising fromthe impulse of one body or another--all this is very natural. And, on the other hand, when men of better principles observe the enemiesof religion lay so great a stress on unthinking Matter, and allof them use so much industry and artifice to reduce everything to it, methinks they should rejoice to see them deprived of their grand support, and driven from that only fortress, without which your Epicureans, Hobbists, and the like, have not even the shadow of a pretence, butbecome the most cheap and easy triumph in the world. 

94. OF IDOLATORS. --The existence of Matter, or bodies unperceived, has not only been the main support of Atheists and Fatalists, but on the same principle doth Idolatry likewise in all its variousforms depend. Did men but consider that the sun, moon, and stars, and every other object of the senses are only so many sensationsin their minds, which have no other existence but barely beingperceived, doubtless they would never fall down and worship theirown ideas, but rather address their homage to that ETERNAL INVISIBLE MINDwhich produces and sustains all things. 

95. AND SOCINIANS. --The same absurd principle, by mingling itself withthe articles of our faith, has occasioned no small difficulties toChristians. For example, about the Resurrection, how many scruples andobjections have been raised by Socinians and others? But do not themost plausible of them depend on the supposition that a body isdenominated the same, with regard not to the form or that which isperceived by sense, but the material substance, which remains thesame under several forms? Take away this material substance, aboutthe identity whereof all the dispute is, and mean by body what everyplain ordinary person means by that word, to wit, that which isimmediately seen and felt, which is only a combination of sensiblequalities or ideas, and then their most unanswerable objectionscome to nothing. 

96. SUMMARY OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF EXPELLING MATTER. --Matter being onceexpelled out of nature drags with it so many sceptical and impiousnotions, such an incredible number of disputes and puzzling questions, which have been thorns in the sides of divines as well as philosophers, and made so much fruitless work for mankind, that if the argumentswe have produced against it are not found equal to demonstration(as to me they evidently seem), yet I am sure all friends to knowledge, peace, and religion have reason to wish they were. 

97. Beside the external existence of the objects of perception, anothergreat source of errors and difficulties with regard to ideal knowledge isthe doctrine of abstract ideas, such as it has been set forth in theIntroduction. The plainest things in the world, those we are mostintimately acquainted with and perfectly know, when they are consideredin an abstract way, appear strangely difficult and incomprehensible. Time, place, and motion, taken in particular or concrete, are whateverybody knows, but, having passed through the hands of a metaphysician, they become too abstract and fine to be apprehended by men of ordinarysense. Bid your servant meet you at such a time in such a place, and heshall never stay to deliberate on the meaning of those words; inconceiving that particular time and place, or the motion by which he isto get thither, he finds not the least difficulty. But if time be takenexclusive of all those particular actions and ideas that diversify theday, merely for the continuation of existence or duration in abstract, then it will perhaps gravel even a philosopher to comprehend it. 

98. DILEMMA. --For my own part, whenever I attempt to frame a simple ideaof time, abstracted from the succession of ideas in my mind, which flowsuniformly and is participated by all beings, I am lost and embrangled ininextricable difficulties. I have no notion of it at all, only I hearothers say it is infinitely divisible, and speak of it in such a manneras leads me to entertain odd thoughts of my existence; since thatdoctrine lays one under an absolute necessity of thinking, either that hepasses away innumerable ages without a thought, or else that he isannihilated every moment of his life, both which seem equally absurd. Time therefore being nothing, abstracted from the sucession of ideas inour minds, it follows that the duration of any finite spirit must beestimated by the number of ideas or actions succeeding each other in thatsame spirit or mind. Hence, it is a plain consequence that the soulalways thinks; and in truth whoever shall go about to divide in histhoughts, or abstract the existence of a spirit from its cogitation, will, I believe, find it no easy task. 

99. So likewise when we attempt to abstract extension and motion from allother qualities, and consider them by themselves, we presently lose sightof them, and run into great extravagances. All which depend on a twofoldabstraction; first, it is supposed that extension, for example, may beabstracted from all other sensible qualities; and secondly, that theentity of extension may be abstracted from its being perceived. But, whoever shall reflect, and take care to understand what he says, will, ifI mistake not, acknowledge that all sensible qualities are alikesensations and alike real; that where the extension is, there is thecolour, too, i. E. , in his mind, and that their archetypes can exist onlyin some other mind; and that the objects of sense are nothing but thosesensations combined, blended, or (if one may so speak) concretedtogether; none of all which can be supposed to exist unperceived. 

100. What it is for a man to be happy, or an object good, every one maythink he knows. But to frame an abstract idea of happiness, prescindedfrom all particular pleasure, or of goodness from everything that isgood, this is what few can pretend to. So likewise a man may be just andvirtuous without having precise ideas of justice and virtue. The opinionthat those and the like words stand for general notions, abstracted fromall particular persons and actions, seems to have rendered morality verydifficult, and the study thereof of small use to mankind. And in effectthe doctrine of abstraction has not a little contributed towards spoilingthe most useful parts of knowledge. 

101. OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY AND MATHEMATICS. --The two great provincesof speculative science conversant about ideas received from sense, are Natural Philosophy and Mathematics; with regard to each of theseI shall make some observations. And first I shall say somewhat ofNatural Philosophy. On this subject it is that the sceptics triumph. All that stock of arguments they produce to depreciate our facultiesand make mankind appear ignorant and low, are drawn principallyfrom this head, namely, that we are under an invincible blindnessas to the true and real nature of things. This they exaggerate, and love to enlarge on. We are miserably bantered, say they, by oursenses, and amused only with the outside and show of things. The realessence, the internal qualities and constitution of every the meanestobject, is hid from our view; something there is in every drop of water, every grain of sand, which it is beyond the power of human understandingto fathom or comprehend. But, it is evident from what has been shown thatall this complaint is groundless, and that we are influenced by falseprinciples to that degree as to mistrust our senses, and think we knownothing of those things which we perfectly comprehend. 

102. One great inducement to our pronouncing ourselves ignorant of thenature of things is the current opinion that everything includes withinitself the cause of its properties; or that there is in each object aninward essence which is the source whence its discernible qualities flow, and whereon they depend. Some have pretended to account for appearancesby occult qualities, but of late they are mostly resolved into mechanicalcauses, to wit, the figure, motion, weight, and suchlike qualities, ofinsensible particles; whereas, in truth, there is no other agent orefficient cause than spirit, it being evident that motion, as well as allother ideas, is perfectly inert. See sect. 25. Hence, to endeavour toexplain the production of colours or sounds, by figure, motion, magnitude, and the like, must needs be labour in vain. And accordingly wesee the attempts of that kind are not at all satisfactory. Which may besaid in general of those instances wherein one idea or quality isassigned for the cause of another. I need not say how many hypotheses andspeculations are left out, and how much the study of nature is abridgedby this doctrine. 

103. ATTRACTION SIGNIFIES THE EFFECT, NOT THE MANNER OR CAUSE. --The greatmechanical principle now in vogue is attraction. That a stonefalls to the earth, or the sea swells towards the moon, may to someappear sufficiently explained thereby. But how are we enlightened bybeing told this is done by attraction? Is it that that word signifies themanner of the tendency, and that it is by the mutual drawing of bodiesinstead of their being impelled or protruded towards each other? But, nothing is determined of the manner or action, and it may as truly (foraught we know) be termed "impulse, " or "protrusion, " as "attraction. "Again, the parts of steel we see cohere firmly together, and this also isaccounted for by attraction; but, in this as in the other instances, I donot perceive that anything is signified besides the effect itself; for asto the manner of the action whereby it is produced, or the cause whichproduces it, these are not so much as aimed at. 

104. Indeed, if we take a view of the several phenomena, and compare themtogether, we may observe some likeness and conformity between them. Forexample, in the falling of a stone to the ground, in the rising of thesea towards the moon, in cohesion, crystallization, etc, there issomething alike, namely, an union or mutual approach of bodies. So thatany one of these or the like phenomena may not seem strange or surprisingto a man who has nicely observed and compared the effects of nature. Forthat only is thought so which is uncommon, or a thing by itself, and outof the ordinary course of our observation. That bodies should tendtowards the centre of the earth is not thought strange, because it iswhat we perceive every moment of our lives. But, that they should have alike gravitation towards the centre of the moon may seem odd andunaccountable to most men, because it is discerned only in the tides. Buta philosopher, whose thoughts take in a larger compass of nature, havingobserved a certain similitude of appearances, as well in the heavens asthe earth, that argue innumerable bodies to have a mutual tendencytowards each other, which he denotes by the general name "attraction, "whatever can be reduced to that he thinks justly accounted for. Thus heexplains the tides by the attraction of the terraqueous globe towards themoon, which to him does not appear odd or anomalous, but only aparticular example of a general rule or law of nature. 

105. If therefore we consider the difference there is betwixt naturalphilosophers and other men, with regard to their knowledge of thephenomena, we shall find it consists not in an exacter knowledge of theefficient cause that produces them--for that can be no other than thewill of a spirit--but only in a greater largeness of comprehension, whereby analogies, harmonies, and agreements are discovered in the worksof nature, and the particular effects explained, that is, reduced togeneral rules, see sect. 62, which rules, grounded on the analogy anduniformness observed in the production of natural effects, are mostagreeable and sought after by the mind; for that they extend our prospectbeyond what is present and near to us, and enable us to make veryprobable conjectures touching things that may have happened at very greatdistances of time and place, as well as to predict things to come; whichsort of endeavour towards omniscience is much affected by the mind. 

106. CAUTION AS TO THE USE OF ANALOGIES. --But we should proceed warilyin such things, for we are apt to lay too great stress on analogies, and, to the prejudice of truth, humour that eagerness of the mindwhereby it is carried to extend its knowledge into general theorems. For example, in the business of gravitation or mutual attraction, because it appears in many instances, some are straightway forpronouncing it universal; and that to attract and be attractedby every other body is an essential quality inherent in all bodieswhatsoever. Whereas it is evident the fixed stars have no suchtendency towards each other; and, so far is that gravitation from beingessential to bodies that in some instances a quite contrary principleseems to show itself; as in the perpendicular growth of plants, and theelasticity of the air. There is nothing necessary or essential in thecase, but it depends entirely on the will of the Governing Spirit, whocauses certain bodies to cleave together or tend towards each otheraccording to various laws, whilst He keeps others at a fixed distance;and to some He gives a quite contrary tendency to fly asunder just as Hesees convenient. 

107. After what has been premised, I think we may lay down the followingconclusions. First, it is plain philosophers amuse themselves in vain, when they inquire for any natural efficient cause, distinct from a mindor spirit. Secondly, considering the whole creation is the workmanship ofa wise and good Agent, it should seem to become philosophers to employtheir thoughts (contrary to what some hold) about the final causes ofthings; and I confess I see no reason why pointing out the various endsto which natural things are adapted, and for which they were originallywith unspeakable wisdom contrived, should not be thought one good way ofaccounting for them, and altogether worthy a philosopher. Thirdly, fromwhat has been premised no reason can be drawn why the history of natureshould not still be studied, and observations and experiments made, which, that they are of use to mankind, and enable us to draw any generalconclusions, is not the result of any immutable habitudes or relationsbetween things themselves, but only of God's goodness and kindness to menin the administration of the world. See sect. 30 and 31 Fourthly, by adiligent observation of the phenomena within our view, we may discoverthe general laws of nature, and from them deduce the other phenomena; Ido not say demonstrate, for all deductions of that kind depend on asupposition that the Author of nature always operates uniformly, and in aconstant observance of those rules we take for principles: which wecannot evidently know. 

108. THREE ANALOGIES. --Those men who frame general rules from thephenomena and afterwards derive the phenomena from those rules, seemto consider signs rather than causes. A man may well understandnatural signs without knowing their analogy, or being able to sayby what rule a thing is so or so. And, as it is very possible towrite improperly, through too strict an observance of general grammarrules; so, in arguing from general laws of nature, it is not impossiblewe may extend the analogy too far, and by that means run into mistakes. 

109. As in reading other books a wise man will choose to fix his thoughtson the sense and apply it to use, rather than lay them out in grammaticalremarks on the language; so, in perusing the volume of nature, it seemsbeneath the dignity of the mind to affect an exactness in reducing eachparticular phenomenon to general rules, or showing how it follows fromthem. We should propose to ourselves nobler views, namely, to recreateand exalt the mind with a prospect of the beauty, order. Extent, andvariety of natural things: hence, by proper inferences, to enlarge ournotions of the grandeur, wisdom, and beneficence of the Creator; andlastly, to make the several parts of the creation, so far as in us lies, subservient to the ends they were designed for, God's glory, and thesustentation and comfort of ourselves and fellow-creatures. 

110. The best key for the aforesaid analogy or natural Science will beeasily acknowledged to be a certain celebrated Treatise of Mechanics. Inthe entrance of which justly admired treatise, Time, Space, and Motionare distinguished into absolute and relative, true and apparent, mathematical and vulgar; which distinction, as it is at large explainedby the author, does suppose these quantities to have an existence withoutthe mind; and that they are ordinarily conceived with relation tosensible things, to which nevertheless in their own nature they bear norelation at all. 

111. As for Time, as it is there taken in an absolute or abstractedsense, for the duration or perseverance of the existence of things, Ihave nothing more to add concerning it after what has been already saidon that subject. Sect. 97 and 98. For the rest, this celebrated authorholds there is an absolute Space, which, being unperceivable to sense, remains in itself similar and immovable; and relative space to be themeasure thereof, which, being movable and defined by its situation inrespect of sensible bodies, is vulgarly taken for immovable space. Placehe defines to be that part of space which is occupied by any body; andaccording as the space is absolute or relative so also is the place. Absolute Motion is said to be the translation of a body from absoluteplace to absolute place, as relative motion is from one relative place toanother. And, because the parts of absolute space do not fall under oursenses, instead of them we are obliged to use their sensible measures, and so define both place and motion with respect to bodies which weregard as immovable. But, it is said in philosophical matters we mustabstract from our senses, since it may be that none of those bodies whichseem to be quiescent are truly so, and the same thing which is movedrelatively may be really at rest; as likewise one and the same body maybe in relative rest and motion, or even moved with contrary relativemotions at the same time, according as its place is variously defined. All which ambiguity is to be found in the apparent motions, but not atall in the true or absolute, which should therefore be alone regarded inphilosophy. And the true as we are told are distinguished from apparentor relative motions by the following properties. --First, in true orabsolute motion all parts which preserve the same position with respectof the whole, partake of the motions of the whole. Secondly, the placebeing moved, that which is placed therein is also moved; so that a bodymoving in a place which is in motion doth participate the motion of itsplace. Thirdly, true motion is never generated or changed otherwise thanby force impressed on the body itself. Fourthly, true motion is alwayschanged by force impressed on the body moved. Fifthly, in circular motionbarely relative there is no centrifugal force, which, nevertheless, inthat which is true or absolute, is proportional to the quantity ofmotion. 

112. MOTION, WHETHER REAL OR APPARENT, RELATIVE. --But, notwithstandingwhat has been said, I must confess it does not appear to me thatthere can be any motion other than relative; so that to conceivemotion there must be at least conceived two bodies, whereof thedistance or position in regard to each other is varied. Hence, if therewas one only body in being it could not possibly be moved. This seemsevident, in that the idea I have of motion doth necessarily includerelation. 

113. APPARENT MOTION DENIED. --But, though in every motion it benecessary to conceive more bodies than one, yet it may be that oneonly is moved, namely, that on which the force causing the changein the distance or situation of the bodies, is impressed. For, howeversome may define relative motion, so as to term that body movedwhich changes its distance from some other body, whether the forceor action causing that change were impressed on it or no, yet asrelative motion is that which is perceived by sense, and regarded inthe ordinary affairs of life, it should seem that every man of commonsense knows what it is as well as the best philosopher. Now, I ask anyone whether, in his sense of motion as he walks along the streets, thestones he passes over may be said to move, because they change distancewith his feet? To me it appears that though motion includes a relation ofone thing to another, yet it is not necessary that each term of therelation be denominated from it. As a man may think of somewhat whichdoes not think, so a body may be moved to or from another body which isnot therefore itself in motion. 

114. As the place happens to be variously defined, the motion which isrelated to it varies. A man in a ship may be said to be quiescent withrelation to the sides of the vessel, and yet move with relation to theland. Or he may move eastward in respect of the one, and westward inrespect of the other. In the common affairs of life men never go beyondthe earth to define the place of any body; and what is quiescent inrespect of that is accounted absolutely to be so. But philosophers, whohave a greater extent of thought, and juster notions of the system ofthings, discover even the earth itself to be moved. In order therefore tofix their notions they seem to conceive the corporeal world as finite, and the utmost unmoved walls or shell thereof to be the place wherebythey estimate true motions. If we sound our own conceptions, I believe wemay find all the absolute motion we can frame an idea of to be at bottomno other than relative motion thus defined. For, as has been alreadyobserved, absolute motion, exclusive of all external relation, isincomprehensible; and to this kind of relative motion all theabove-mentioned properties, causes, and effects ascribed to absolutemotion will, if I mistake not, be found to agree. As to what is said ofthe centrifugal force, that it does not at all belong to circularrelative motion, I do not see how this follows from the experiment whichis brought to prove it. See Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, in Schol. Def. VIII. For the water in the vessel at that time wherein itis said to have the greatest relative circular motion, has, I think, nomotion at all; as is plain from the foregoing section. 

115. For, to denominate a body moved it is requisite, first, that itchange its distance or situation with regard to some other body; andsecondly, that the force occasioning that change be applied to it. Ifeither of these be wanting, I do not think that, agreeably to the senseof mankind, or the propriety of language, a body can be said to be inmotion. I grant indeed that it is possible for us to think a body whichwe see change its distance from some other to be moved, though it have noforce applied to it (in which sense there may be apparent motion), butthen it is because the force causing the change of distance is imaginedby us to be applied or impressed on that body thought to move; whichindeed shows we are capable of mistaking a thing to be in motion which isnot, and that is all. 

116. ANY IDEA OF PURE SPACE RELATIVE. --From what has been said it followsthat the philosophic consideration of motion does not imply thebeing of an absolute Space, distinct from that which is perceivedby sense and related bodies; which that it cannot exist without themind is clear upon the same principles that demonstrate the likeof all other objects of sense. And perhaps, if we inquire narrowly, we shall find we cannot even frame an idea of pure Space exclusiveof all body. This I must confess seems impossible, as being a mosabstract idea. When I excite a motion in some part of my body, if it be free or without resistance, I say there is Space; but if Ifind a resistance, then I say there is Body; and in proportion as theresistance to motion is lesser or greater, I say the space is more orless pure. So that when I speak of pure or empty space, it is not to besupposed that the word "space" stands for an idea distinct from orconceivable without body and motion--though indeed we are apt to thinkevery noun substantive stands for a distinct idea that may be separatedfrom all others; which has occasioned infinite mistakes. When, therefore, supposing all the world to be annihilated besides my own body, I saythere still remains pure Space, thereby nothing else is meant but onlythat I conceive it possible for the limbs of my body to be moved on allsides without the least resistance, but if that, too, were annihilatedthen there could be no motion, and consequently no Space. Some, perhaps, may think the sense of seeing doth furnish them with the idea of purespace; but it is plain from what we have elsewhere shown, that the ideasof space and distance are not obtained by that sense. See the Essayconcerning Vision. 

117. What is here laid down seems to put an end to all those disputes anddifficulties that have sprung up amongst the learned concerning thenature of pure Space. But the chief advantage arising from it is that weare freed from that dangerous dilemma, to which several who have employedtheir thoughts on that subject imagine themselves reduced, to wit, ofthinking either that Real Space is God, or else that there is somethingbeside God which is eternal, uncreated, infinite, indivisible, immutable. Both which may justly be thought pernicious and absurd notions. It iscertain that not a few divines, as well as philosophers of great note, have, from the difficulty they found in conceiving either limits orannihilation of space, concluded it must be divine. And some of late haveset themselves particularly to show the incommunicable attributes of Godagree to it. Which doctrine, how unworthy soever it may seem of theDivine Nature, yet I do not see how we can get clear of it, so long as weadhere to the received opinions. 

118. THE ERRORS ARISING FROM THE DOCTRINES OF ABSTRACTION AND EXTERNALMATERIAL EXISTENCES, INFLUENCE MATHEMATICAL REASONINGS. --Hitherto ofNatural Philosophy: we come now to make some inquiry concerningthat other great branch of speculative knowledge, to wit, Mathematics. These, how celebrated soever they may be for their clearness andcertainty of demonstration, which is hardly anywhere else to befound, cannot nevertheless be supposed altogether free from mistakes, ifin their principles there lurks some secret error which is common to theprofessors of those sciences with the rest of mankind. Mathematicians, though they deduce their theorems from a great height of evidence, yettheir first principles are limited by the consideration of quantity: andthey do not ascend into any inquiry concerning those transcendentalmaxims which influence all the particular sciences, each part whereof, Mathematics not excepted, does consequently participate of the errorsinvolved in them. That the principles laid down by mathematicians aretrue, and their way of deduction from those principles clear andincontestible, we do not deny; but, we hold there may be certainerroneous maxims of greater extent than the object of Mathematics, andfor that reason not expressly mentioned, though tacitly supposedthroughout the whole progress of that science; and that the ill effectsof those secret unexamined errors are diffused through all the branchesthereof. To be plain, we suspect the mathematicians are as well as othermen concerned in the errors arising from the doctrine of abstract generalideas, and the existence of objects without the mind. 

119. Arithmetic has been thought to have for its object abstract ideas ofNumber; of which to understand the properties and mutual habitudes, issupposed no mean part of speculative knowledge. The opinion of the pureand intellectual nature of numbers in abstract has made them in esteemwith those philosophers who seem to have affected an uncommon finenessand elevation of thought. It has set a price on the most triflingnumerical speculations which in practice are of no use, but serve onlyfor amusement; and has therefore so far infected the minds of some, thatthey have dreamed of mighty mysteries involved in numbers, and attemptedthe explication of natural things by them. But, if we inquire into ourown thoughts, and consider what has been premised, we may perhapsentertain a low opinion of those high flights and abstractions, and lookon all inquiries, about numbers only as so many difficiles nugae, so faras they are not subservient to practice, and promote the benefit of life. 

120. Unity in abstract we have before considered in sect. 13, from whichand what has been said in the Introduction, it plainly follows there isnot any such idea. But, number being defined a "collection of units, " wemay conclude that, if there be no such thing as unity or unit inabstract, there are no ideas of number in abstract denoted by the numeralnames and figures. The theories therefore in Arithmetic, if they areabstracted from the names and figures, as likewise from all use andpractice, as well as from the particular things numbered, can be supposedto have nothing at all for their object; hence we may see how entirelythe science of numbers is subordinate to practice, and how jejune andtrifling it becomes when considered as a matter of mere speculation. 

121. However, since there may be some who, deluded by the specious showof discovering abstracted verities, waste their time in arithmeticaltheorems and problems which have not any use, it will not be amiss if wemore fully consider and expose the vanity of that pretence; and this willplainly appear by taking a view of Arithmetic in its infancy, andobserving what it was that originally put men on the study of thatscience, and to what scope they directed it. It is natural to think thatat first, men, for ease of memory and help of computation, made use ofcounters, or in writing of single strokes, points, or the like, eachwhereof was made to signify an unit, i. E. , some one thing of whateverkind they had occasion to reckon. Afterwards they found out the morecompendious ways of making one character stand in place of severalstrokes or points. And, lastly, the notation of the Arabians or Indianscame into use, wherein, by the repetition of a few characters or figures, and varying the signification of each figure according to the place itobtains, all numbers may be most aptly expressed; which seems to havebeen done in imitation of language, so that an exact analogy is observedbetwixt the notation by figures and names, the nine simple figuresanswering the nine first numeral names and places in the former, corresponding to denominations in the latter. And agreeably to thoseconditions of the simple and local value of figures, were contrivedmethods of finding, from the given figures or marks of the parts, whatfigures and how placed are proper to denote the whole, or vice versa. Andhaving found the sought figures, the same rule or analogy being observedthroughout, it is easy to read them into words; and so the number becomesperfectly known. For then the number of any particular things is said tobe known, when we know the name of figures (with their due arrangement)that according to the standing analogy belong to them. For, these signsbeing known, we can by the operations of arithmetic know the signs of anypart of the particular sums signified by them; and, thus computing insigns (because of the connexion established betwixt them and the distinctmultitudes of things whereof one is taken for an unit), we may be ablerightly to sum up, divide, and proportion the things themselves that weintend to number. 

122. In Arithmetic, therefore, we regard not the things, but the signs, which nevertheless are not regarded for their own sake, but because theydirect us how to act with relation to things, and dispose rightly ofthem. Now, agreeably to what we have before observed of words in general(sect. 19, Introd. ) it happens here likewise that abstract ideas arethought to be signified by numeral names or characters, while they do notsuggest ideas of particular things to our minds. I shall not at presententer into a more particular dissertation on this subject, but onlyobserve that it is evident from what has been said, those things whichpass for abstract truths and theorems concerning numbers, are in realityconversant about no object distinct from particular numeral things, except only names and characters, which originally came to be consideredon no other account but their being signs, or capable to represent aptlywhatever particular things men had need to compute. Whence it followsthat to study them for their own sake would be just as wise, and to asgood purpose as if a man, neglecting the true use or original intentionand subserviency of language, should spend his time in impertinentcriticisms upon words, or reasonings and controversies purely verbal. 

123. From numbers we proceed to speak of Extension, which, considered asrelative, is the object of Geometry. The infinite divisibility of finiteextension, though it is not expressly laid down either as an axiom ortheorem in the elements of that science, yet is throughout the sameeverywhere supposed and thought to have so inseparable and essential aconnexion with the principles and demonstrations in Geometry, thatmathematicians never admit it into doubt, or make the least question ofit. And, as this notion is the source from whence do spring all thoseamusing geometrical paradoxes which have such a direct repugnancy to theplain common sense of mankind, and are admitted with so much reluctanceinto a mind not yet debauched by learning; so it is the principaloccasion of all that nice and extreme subtilty which renders the study ofMathematics so difficult and tedious. Hence, if we can make it appearthat no finite extension contains innumerable parts, or is infinitelydivisible, it follows that we shall at once clear the science of Geometryfrom a great number of difficulties and contradictions which have everbeen esteemed a reproach to human reason, and withal make the attainmentthereof a business of much less time and pains than it hitherto has been. 

124. Every particular finite extension which may possibly be the objectof our thought is an idea existing only in the mind, and consequentlyeach part thereof must be perceived. If, therefore, I cannot perceiveinnumerable parts in any finite extension that I consider, it is certainthey are not contained in it; but, it is evident that I cannotdistinguish innumerable parts in any particular line, surface, or solid, which I either perceive by sense, or figure to myself in my mind:wherefore I conclude they are not contained in it. Nothing can be plainerto me than that the extensions I have in view are no other than my ownideas; and it is no less plain that I cannot resolve any one of my ideasinto an infinite number of other ideas, that is, that they are notinfinitely divisible. If by finite extension be meant something distinctfrom a finite idea, I declare I do not know what that is, and so cannotaffirm or deny anything of it. But if the terms "extension, " "parts, "&c. , are taken in any sense conceivable, that is, for ideas, then to saya finite quantity or extension consists of parts infinite in number is somanifest a contradiction, that every one at first sight acknowledges itto be so; and it is impossible it should ever gain the assent of anyreasonable creature who is not brought to it by gentle and slow degrees, as a converted Gentile to the belief of transubstantiation. Ancient androoted prejudices do often pass into principles; and those propositionswhich once obtain the force and credit of a principle, are not onlythemselves, but likewise whatever is deducible from them, thoughtprivileged from all examination. And there is no absurdity so gross, which, by this means, the mind of man may not be prepared to swallow. 

125. He whose understanding is possessed with the doctrine of abstractgeneral ideas may be persuaded that (whatever be thought of the ideas ofsense) extension in abstract is infinitely divisible. And one who thinksthe objects of sense exist without the mind will perhaps in virtuethereof be brought to admit that a line but an inch long may containinnumerable parts--really existing, though too small to be discerned. These errors are grafted as well in the minds of geometricians as ofother men, and have a like influence on their reasonings; and it were nodifficult thing to show how the arguments from Geometry made use of tosupport the infinite divisibility of extension are bottomed on them. Atpresent we shall only observe in general whence it is the mathematiciansare all so fond and tenacious of that doctrine. 

126. It has been observed in another place that the theorems anddemonstrations in Geometry are conversant about universal ideas (sect. 15, Introd. ); where it is explained in what sense this ought to beunderstood, to wit, the particular lines and figures included in thediagram are supposed to stand for innumerable others of different sizes;or, in other words, the geometer considers them abstracting from theirmagnitude--which does not imply that he forms an abstract idea, but onlythat he cares not what the particular magnitude is, whether great orsmall, but looks on that as a thing different to the demonstration. Henceit follows that a line in the scheme but an inch long must be spoken ofas though it contained ten thousand parts, since it is regarded not initself, but as it is universal; and it is universal only in itssignification, whereby it represents innumerable lines greater thanitself, in which may be distinguished ten thousand parts or more, thoughthere may not be above an inch in it. After this manner, the propertiesof the lines signified are (by a very usual figure) transferred to thesign, and thence, through mistake, though to appertain to it consideredin its own nature. 

127. Because there is no number of parts so great but it is possiblethere may be a line containing more, the inch-line is said to containparts more than any assignable number; which is true, not of the inchtaken absolutely, but only for the things signified by it. But men, notretaining that distinction in their thoughts, slide into a belief thatthe small particular line described on paper contains in itself partsinnumerable. There is no such thing as the ten--thousandth part of aninch; but there is of a mile or diameter of the earth, which may besignified by that inch. When therefore I delineate a triangle on paper, and take one side not above an inch, for example, in length to be theradius, this I consider as divided into 10, 000 or 100, 000 parts or more;for, though the ten-thousandth part of that line considered in itself isnothing at all, and consequently may be neglected without an error orinconveniency, yet these described lines, being only marks standing forgreater quantities, whereof it may be the ten--thousandth part is veryconsiderable, it follows that, to prevent notable errors in practice, theradius must be taken of 10, 000 parts or more. 

128. LINES WHICH ARE INFINITELY DIVISIBLE. --From what has been saidthe reason is plain why, to the end any theorem become universal inits use, it is necessary we speak of the lines described on paperas though they contained parts which really they do not. In doingof which, if we examine the matter thoroughly, we shall perhapsdiscover that we cannot conceive an inch itself as consisting of, or being divisible into, a thousand parts, but only some other line whichis far greater than an inch, and represented by it; and that when we saya line is infinitely divisible, we must mean a line which is infinitelygreat. What we have here observed seems to be the chief cause why, tosuppose the infinite divisibility of finite extension has been thoughtnecessary in geometry. 

129. The several absurdities and contradictions which flowed from thisfalse principle might, one would think, have been esteemed so manydemonstrations against it. But, by I know not what logic, it is held thatproofs a posteriori are not to be admitted against propositions relatingto infinity, as though it were not impossible even for an infinite mindto reconcile contradictions; or as if anything absurd and repugnant couldhave a necessary connexion with truth or flow from it. But, whoeverconsiders the weakness of this pretence will think it was contrived onpurpose to humour the laziness of the mind which had rather acquiesce inan indolent scepticism than be at the pains to go through with a severeexamination of those principles it has ever embraced for true. 

130. Of late the speculations about Infinities have run so high, andgrown to such strange notions, as have occasioned no small scruples anddisputes among the geometers of the present age. Some there are of greatnote who, not content with holding that finite lines may be divided intoan infinite number of parts, do yet farther maintain that each of thoseinfinitesimals is itself subdivisible into an infinity of other parts orinfinitesimals of a second order, and so on ad infinitum. These, I say, assert there are infinitesimals of infinitesimals of infinitesimals, &c. , without ever coming to an end; so that according to them an inch does notbarely contain an infinite number of parts, but an infinity of aninfinity of an infinity ad infinitum of parts. Others there be who holdall orders of infinitesimals below the first to be nothing at all;thinking it with good reason absurd to imagine there is any positivequantity or part of extension which, though multiplied infinitely, cannever equal the smallest given extension. And yet on the other hand itseems no less absurd to think the square, cube or other power of apositive real root, should itself be nothing at all; which they who holdinfinitesimals of the first order, denying all of the subsequent orders, are obliged to maintain. 

131. OBJECTION OF MATHEMATICIANS. --ANSWER. --Have we not thereforereason to conclude they are both in the wrong, and that there isin effect no such thing as parts infinitely small, or an infinitenumber of parts contained in any finite quantity? But you willsay that if this doctrine obtains it will follow the very foundationsof Geometry are destroyed, and those great men who have raisedthat science to so astonishing a height, have been all the whilebuilding a castle in the air. To this it may be replied that whatever isuseful in geometry, and promotes the benefit of human life, does stillremain firm and unshaken on our principles; that science considered aspractical will rather receive advantage than any prejudice from what hasbeen said. But to set this in a due light may be the proper business ofanother place. For the rest, though it should follow that some of themore intricate and subtle parts of Speculative Mathematics may be paredoff without any prejudice to truth, yet I do not see what damage will bethence derived to mankind. On the contrary, I think it were highly to bewished that men of great abilities and obstinate application would drawoff their thoughts from those amusements, and employ them in the study ofsuch things as lie nearer the concerns of life, or have a more directinfluence on the manners. 

132. SECOND OBJECTION OF MATHEMATICIANS. --ANSWER. --If it be saidthat several theorems undoubtedly true are discovered by methodsin which infinitesimals are made use of, which could never havebeen if their existence included a contradiction in it; I answerthat upon a thorough examination it will not be found that in anyinstance it is necessary to make use of or conceive infinitesimal partsof finite lines, or even quantities less than the minimum sensible; nay, it will be evident this is never done, it being impossible. 

133. IF THE DOCTRINE WERE ONLY AN HYPOTHESIS IT SHOULD BE RESPECTEDFOR ITS CONSEQUENCES. --By what we have premised, it is plain that verynumerous and important errors have taken their rise from those falsePrinciples which were impugned in the foregoing parts of this treatise;and the opposites of those erroneous tenets at the same time appear to bemost fruitful Principles, from whence do flow innumerable consequenceshighly advantageous to true philosophy, as well as to religion. Particularly Matter, or the absolute existence of corporeal objects, hasbeen shown to be that wherein the most avowed and pernicious enemies ofall knowledge, whether human or divine, have ever placed their chiefstrength and confidence. And surely, if by distinguishing the realexistence of unthinking things from their being perceived, and allowingthem a subsistance of their own out of the minds of spirits, no one thingis explained in nature, but on the contrary a great many inexplicabledifficulties arise; if the supposition of Matter is barely precarious, asnot being grounded on so much as one single reason; if its consequencescannot endure the light of examination and free inquiry, but screenthemselves under the dark and general pretence of "infinites beingincomprehensible"; if withal the removal of this Matter be not attendedwith the least evil consequence; if it be not even missed in the world, but everything as well, nay much easier conceived without it; if, lastly, both Sceptics and Atheists are for ever silenced upon supposing onlyspirits and ideas, and this scheme of things is perfectly agreeable bothto Reason and Religion: methinks we may expect it should be admitted andfirmly embraced, though it were proposed only as an hypothesis, and theexistence of Matter had been allowed possible, which yet I think we haveevidently demonstrated that it is not. 

134. True it is that, in consequence of the foregoing principles, severaldisputes and speculations which are esteemed no mean parts of learning, are rejected as useless. But, how great a prejudice soever against ournotions this may give to those who have already been deeply engaged, andmake large advances in studies of that nature, yet by others we hope itwill not be thought any just ground of dislike to the principles andtenets herein laid down, that they abridge the labour of study, and makehuman sciences far more clear, compendious and attainable than they werebefore. 

135. Having despatched what we intended to say concerning the knowledgeof IDEAS, the method we proposed leads us in the next place to treat ofSPIRITS--with regard to which, perhaps, human knowledge is not sodeficient as is vulgarly imagined. The great reason that is assigned forour being thought ignorant of the nature of spirits is our not having anidea of it. But, surely it ought not to be looked on as a defect in ahuman understanding that it does not perceive the idea of spirit, if itis manifestly impossible there should be any such idea. And this if Imistake not has been demonstrated in section 27; to which I shall hereadd that a spirit has been shown to be the only substance or supportwherein unthinking beings or ideas can exist; but that this substancewhich supports or perceives ideas should itself be an idea or like anidea is evidently absurd. 

136. OBJECTION. --ANSWER. --It will perhaps be said that we want a sense(as some have imagined) proper to know substances withal, which, if we had, we might know our own soul as we do a triangle. To thisI answer, that, in case we had a new sense bestowed upon us, wecould only receive thereby some new sensations or ideas of sense. But I believe nobody will say that what he means by the terms souland substance is only some particular sort of idea or sensation. We may therefore infer that, all things duly considered, it isnot more reasonable to think our faculties defective, in that they do notfurnish us with an idea of spirit or active thinking substance, than itwould be if we should blame them for not being able to comprehend a roundsquare. 

137. From the opinion that spirits are to be known after the manner of anidea or sensation have risen many absurd and heterodox tenets, and muchscepticism about the nature of the soul. It is even probable that thisopinion may have produced a doubt in some whether they had any soul atall distinct from their body since upon inquiry they could not find theyhad an idea of it. That an idea which is inactive, and the existencewhereof consists in being perceived, should be the image or likeness ofan agent subsisting by itself, seems to need no other refutation thanbarely attending to what is meant by those words. But, perhaps you willsay that though an idea cannot resemble a spirit in its thinking, acting, or subsisting by itself, yet it may in some other respects; and it is notnecessary that an idea or image be in all respects like the original. 

138. I answer, if it does not in those mentioned, it is impossible itshould represent it in any other thing. Do but leave out the power ofwilling, thinking, and perceiving ideas, and there remains nothing elsewherein the idea can be like a spirit. For, by the word spirit we meanonly that which thinks, wills, and perceives; this, and this alone, constitutes the signification of the term. If therefore it is impossiblethat any degree of those powers should be represented in an idea, it isevident there can be no idea of a spirit. 

139. But it will be objected that, if there is no idea signified by theterms soul, spirit, and substance, they are wholly insignificant, or haveno meaning in them. I answer, those words do mean or signify a realthing, which is neither an idea nor like an idea, but that whichperceives ideas, and wills, and reasons about them. What I am myself, that which I denote by the term I, is the same with what is meant by soulor spiritual substance. If it be said that this is only quarreling at aword, and that, since the immediately significations of other names areby common consent called ideas, no reason can be assigned why that whichis signified by the name spirit or soul may not partake in the sameappellation. I answer, all the unthinking objects of the mind agree inthat they are entirely passive, and their existence consists only inbeing perceived; whereas a soul or spirit is an active being, whoseexistence consists, not in being perceived, but in perceiving ideas andthinking. It is therefore necessary, in order to prevent equivocation andconfounding natures perfectly disagreeing and unlike, that we distinguishbetween spirit and idea. See sect. 27. 

140. OUR IDEA OF SPIRIT. --In a large sense, indeed, we may be saidto have an idea or rather a notion of spirit; that is, we understandthe meaning of the word, otherwise we could not affirm or denyanything of it. Moreover, as we conceive the ideas that are in theminds of other spirits by means of our own, which we suppose to beresemblances of them; so we know other spirits by means of our ownsoul--which in that sense is the image or idea of them; it havinga like respect to other spirits that blueness or heat by me perceivedhas to those ideas perceived by another. 

141. THE NATURAL IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL IS A NECESSARY CONSEQUENCEOF THE FOREGOING DOCTRINE. --It must not be supposed that they whoassert the natural immortality of the soul are of opinion that itis absolutely incapable of annihilation even by the infinite powerof the Creator who first gave it being, but only that it is notliable to be broken or dissolved by the ordinary laws of natureor motion. They indeed who hold the soul of man to be only a thinvital flame, or system of animal spirits, make it perishing andcorruptible as the body; since there is nothing more easily dissipatedthan such a being, which it is naturally impossible should survivethe ruin of the tabernacle wherein it is enclosed. And this notionhas been greedily embraced and cherished by the worst part of mankind, as the most effectual antidote against all impressions of virtueand religion. But it has been made evident that bodies, of what frame ortexture soever, are barely passive ideas in the mind, which is moredistant and heterogeneous from them than light is from darkness. We haveshown that the soul is indivisible, incorporeal, unextended, and it isconsequently incorruptible. Nothing can be plainer than that the motions, changes, decays, and dissolutions which we hourly see befall naturalbodies (and which is what we mean by the course of nature) cannotpossibly affect an active, simple, uncompounded substance; such a beingtherefore is indissoluble by the force of nature; that is to say, "thesoul of man is naturally immortal. "

142. After what has been said, it is, I suppose, plain that our souls arenot to be known in the same manner as senseless, inactive objects, or byway of idea. Spirits and ideas are things so wholly different, that whenwe say "they exist, " "they are known, " or the like, these words must notbe thought to signify anything common to both natures. There is nothingalike or common in them: and to expect that by any multiplication orenlargement of our faculties we may be enabled to know a spirit as we doa triangle, seems as absurd as if we should hope to see a sound. This isinculcated because I imagine it may be of moment towards clearing severalimportant questions, and preventing some very dangerous errors concerningthe nature of the soul. We may not, I think, strictly be said to have anidea of an active being, or of an action, although we may be said to havea notion of them. I have some knowledge or notion of my mind, and itsacts about ideas, inasmuch as I know or understand what is meant by thesewords. What I know, that I have some notion of. I will not say that theterms idea and notion may not be used convertibly, if the world will haveit so; but yet it conduceth to clearness and propriety that wedistinguish things very different by different names. It is also to beremarked that, all relations including an act of the mind, we cannot soproperly be said to have an idea, but rather a notion of the relationsand habitudes between things. But if, in the modern way, the word idea isextended to spirits, and relations, and acts, this is, after all, anaffair of verbal concern. 

143. It will not be amiss to add, that the doctrine of abstract ideas hashad no small share in rendering those sciences intricate and obscurewhich are particularly conversant about spiritual things. Men haveimagined they could frame abstract notions of the powers and acts of themind, and consider them prescinded as well from the mind or spirititself, as from their respective objects and effects. Hence a greatnumber of dark and ambiguous terms, presumed to stand for abstractnotions, have been introduced into metaphysics and morality, and fromthese have grown infinite distractions and disputes amongst the learned. 

144. But, nothing seems more to have contributed towards engaging men incontroversies and mistakes with regard to the nature and operations ofthe mind, than the being used to speak of those things in terms borrowedfrom sensible ideas. For example, the will is termed the motion of thesoul; this infuses a belief that the mind of man is as a ball in motion, impelled and determined by the objects of sense, as necessarily as thatis by the stroke of a racket. Hence arise endless scruples and errors ofdangerous consequence in morality. All which, I doubt not, may becleared, and truth appear plain, uniform, and consistent, could butphilosophers be prevailed on to retire into themselves, and attentivelyconsider their own meaning. 

145. KNOWLEDGE OF SPIRITS NOT IMMEDIATE. --From what has been said, it is plain that we cannot know the existence of other spiritsotherwise than by their operations, or the ideas by them excitedin us. I perceive several motions, changes, and combinations of ideas, that inform me there are certain particular agents, like myself, which accompany them and concur in their production. Hence, theknowledge I have of other spirits is not immediate, as is theknowledge of my ideas; but depending on the intervention of ideas, by mereferred to agents or spirits distinct from myself, as effects orconcomitant signs. 

146. But, though there be some things which convince us human agents areconcerned in producing them; yet it is evident to every one that thosethings which are called the Works of Nature, that is, the far greaterpart of the ideas or sensations perceived by us, are not produced by, ordependent on, the wills of men. There is therefore some other Spirit thatcauses them; since it is repugnant that they should subsist bythemselves. See sect. 29. But, if we attentively consider the constantregularity, order, and concatenation of natural things, the surprisingmagnificence, beauty, and perfection of the larger, and the exquisitecontrivance of the smaller parts of creation, together with the exactharmony and correspondence of the whole, but above all thenever-enough-admired laws of pain and pleasure, and the instincts ornatural inclinations, appetites, and passions of animals; I say if weconsider all these things, and at the same time attend to the meaning andimport of the attributes One, Eternal, Infinitely Wise, Good, andPerfect, we shall clearly perceive that they belong to the aforesaidSpirit, "who works all in all, " and "by whom all things consist. "

147. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD MORE EVIDENT THAN THAT OF MAN. --Hence, it is evident that God is known as certainly and immediately asany other mind or spirit whatsoever distinct from ourselves. We mayeven assert that the existence of God is far more evidently perceivedthan the existence of men; because the effects of nature are infinitelymore numerous and considerable than those ascribed to human agents. Thereis not any one mark that denotes a man, or effect produced by him, whichdoes not more strongly evince the being of that Spirit who is the Authorof Nature. For, it is evident that in affecting other persons the will ofman has no other object than barely the motion of the limbs of his body;but that such a motion should be attended by, or excite any idea in themind of another, depends wholly on the will of the Creator. He alone itis who, "upholding all things by the word of His power, " maintains thatintercourse between spirits whereby they are able to perceive theexistence of each other. And yet this pure and clear light whichenlightens every one is itself invisible. 

148. It seems to be a general pretence of the unthinking herd that theycannot see God. Could we but see Him, say they, as we see a man, weshould believe that He is, and believing obey His commands. But alas, weneed only open our eyes to see the Sovereign Lord of all things, with amore full and clear view than we do any one of our fellow--creatures. Notthat I imagine we see God (as some will have it) by a direct andimmediate view; or see corporeal things, not by themselves, but by seeingthat which represents them in the essence of God, which doctrine is, Imust confess, to me incomprehensible. But I shall explain my meaning;--Ahuman spirit or person is not perceived by sense, as not being an idea;when therefore we see the colour, size, figure, and motions of a man, weperceive only certain sensations or ideas excited in our own minds; andthese being exhibited to our view in sundry distinct collections, serveto mark out unto us the existence of finite and created spirits likeourselves. Hence it is plain we do not see a man--if by man is meant thatwhich lives, moves, perceives, and thinks as we do--but only such acertain collection of ideas as directs us to think there is a distinctprinciple of thought and motion, like to ourselves, accompanying andrepresented by it. And after the same manner we see God; all thedifference is that, whereas some one finite and narrow assemblage ofideas denotes a particular human mind, whithersoever we direct our view, we do at all times and in all places perceive manifest tokens of theDivinity: everything we see, hear, feel, or anywise perceive by sense, being a sign or effect of the power of God; as is our perception of thosevery motions which are produced by men. 

149. It is therefore plain that nothing can be more evident to any onethat is capable of the least reflexion than the existence of God, or aSpirit who is intimately present to our minds, producing in them all thatvariety of ideas or sensations which continually affect us, on whom wehave an absolute and entire dependence, in short "in whom we live, andmove, and have our being. " That the discovery of this great truth, whichlies so near and obvious to the mind, should be attained to by the reasonof so very few, is a sad instance of the stupidity and inattention ofmen, who, though they are surrounded with such clear manifestations ofthe Deity, are yet so little affected by them that they seem, as it were, blinded with excess of light. 

150. OBJECTION ON BEHALF OF NATURE. --ANSWER. --But you will say, has Nature no share in the production of natural things, and mustthey be all ascribed to the immediate and sole operation of God?I answer, if by Nature is meant only the visible series of effectsor sensations imprinted on our minds, according to certain fixedand general laws, then it is plain that Nature, taken in this sense, cannot produce anything at all. But, if by Nature is meant some beingdistinct from God, as well as from the laws of nature, and thingsperceived by sense, I must confess that word is to me an empty soundwithout any intelligible meaning annexed to it. Nature, in thisacceptation, is a vain chimera, introduced by those heathens who had notjust notions of the omnipresence and infinite perfection of God. But, itis more unaccountable that it should be received among Christians, professing belief in the Holy Scriptures, which constantly ascribe thoseeffects to the immediate hand of God that heathen philosophers are wontto impute to Nature. "The Lord He causeth the vapours to ascend; Hemaketh lightnings with rain; He bringeth forth the wind out of histreasures. " Jerem. 10. 13. "He turneth the shadow of death into themorning, and maketh the day dark with night. " Amos, 5. 8. "He visiteththe earth, and maketh it soft with showers: He blesseth the springingthereof, and crowneth the year with His goodness; so that the pasturesare clothed with flocks, and the valleys are covered over with corn. " SeePsalm 65. But, notwithstanding that this is the constant language ofScripture, yet we have I know not what aversion from believing that Godconcerns Himself so nearly in our affairs. Fain would we suppose Him at agreat distance off, and substitute some blind unthinking deputy in Hisstead, though (if we may believe Saint Paul) "He be not far from everyone of us. "

151. OBJECTION TO THE HAND OF GOD BEING THE IMMEDIATE CAUSE, THREEFOLD. --ANSWER. --It will, I doubt not, be objected that the slow andgradual methods observed in the production of natural things do not seemto have for their cause the immediate hand of an Almighty Agent. Besides, monsters, untimely births, fruits blasted in the blossom, rains falling indesert places, miseries incident to human life, and the like, are so manyarguments that the whole frame of nature is not immediately actuated andsuperintended by a Spirit of infinite wisdom and goodness. But the answerto this objection is in a good measure plain from sect. 62; it beingvisible that the aforesaid methods of nature are absolutely necessary, inorder to working by the most simple and general rules, and after a steadyand consistent manner; which argues both the wisdom and goodness of God. Such is the artificial contrivance of this mighty machine of nature that, whilst its motions and various phenomena strike on our senses, the handwhich actuates the whole is itself unperceivable to men of flesh andblood. "Verily" (saith the prophet) "thou art a God that hidest thyself. "Isaiah, 45. 15. But, though the Lord conceal Himself from the eyes of thesensual and lazy, who will not be at the least expense of thought, yet toan unbiased and attentive mind nothing can be more plainly legible thanthe intimate presence of an All-wise Spirit, who fashions, regulates andsustains the whole system of beings. It is clear, from what we haveelsewhere observed, that the operating according to general and statedlaws is so necessary for our guidance in the affairs of life, and lettingus into the secret of nature, that without it all reach and compass ofthought, all human sagacity and design, could serve to no manner ofpurpose; it were even impossible there should be any such faculties orpowers in the mind. See sect. 31. Which one consideration abundantlyoutbalances whatever particular inconveniences may thence arise. 

152. We should further consider that the very blemishes and defects ofnature are not without their use, in that they make an agreeable sort ofvariety, and augment the beauty of the rest of the creation, as shades ina picture serve to set off the brighter and more enlightened parts. Wewould likewise do well to examine whether our taxing the waste of seedsand embryos, and accidental destruction of plants and animals, beforethey come to full maturity, as an imprudence in the Author of nature, benot the effect of prejudice contracted by our familiarity with impotentand saving mortals. In man indeed a thrifty management of those thingswhich he cannot procure without much pains and industry may be esteemedwisdom. But, we must not imagine that the inexplicably fine machine of ananimal or vegetable costs the great Creator any more pains or trouble inits production than a pebble does; nothing being more evident than thatan Omnipotent Spirit can indifferently produce everything by a mere fiator act of His will. Hence, it is plain that the splendid profusion ofnatural things should not be interpreted weakness or prodigality in theagent who produces them, but rather be looked on as an argument of theriches of His power. 

153. As for the mixture of pain or uneasiness which is in the world, pursuant to the general laws of nature, and the actions of finite, imperfect spirits, this, in the state we are in at present, isindispensably necessary to our well-being. But our prospects are toonarrow. We take, for instance, the idea of some one particular pain intoour thoughts, and account it evil; whereas, if we enlarge our view, so asto comprehend the various ends, connexions, and dependencies of things, on what occasions and in what proportions we are affected with pain andpleasure, the nature of human freedom, and the design with which we areput into the world; we shall be forced to acknowledge that thoseparticular things which, considered in themselves, appear to be evil, have the nature of good, when considered as linked with the whole systemof beings. 

154. ATHEISM AND MANICHEISM WOULD HAVE FEW SUPPORTERS IF MANKIND WEREIN GENERAL ATTENTIVE. --From what has been said, it will be manifestto any considering person, that it is merely for want of attentionand comprehensiveness of mind that there are any favourers of Atheismor the Manichean Heresy to be found. Little and unreflecting soulsmay indeed burlesque the works of Providence, the beauty and orderwhereof they have not capacity, or will not be at the pains, tocomprehend; but those who are masters of any justness and extentof thought, and are withal used to reflect, can never sufficientlyadmire the divine traces of Wisdom and Goodness that shine throughoutthe Economy of Nature. But what truth is there which shineth sostrongly on the mind that by an aversion of thought, a wilful shuttingof the eyes, we may not escape seeing it? Is it therefore to be wonderedat, if the generality of men, who are ever intent on business orpleasure, and little used to fix or open the eye of their mind, shouldnot have all that conviction and evidence of the Being of God which mightbe expected in reasonable creatures?

155. We should rather wonder that men can be found so stupid as toneglect, than that neglecting they should be unconvinced of such anevident and momentous truth. And yet it is to be feared that too many ofparts and leisure, who live in Christian countries, are, merely through asupine and dreadful negligence, sunk into Atheism. Since it is downrightimpossible that a soul pierced and enlightened with a thorough sense ofthe omnipresence, holiness, and justice of that Almighty Spirit shouldpersist in a remorseless violation of His laws. We ought, therefore, earnestly to meditate and dwell on those important points; that so we mayattain conviction without all scruple "that the eyes of the Lord are inevery place beholding the evil and the good; that He is with us andkeepeth us in all places whither we go, and giveth us bread to eat andraiment to put on"; that He is present and conscious to our innermostthoughts; and that we have a most absolute and immediate dependence onHim. A clear view of which great truths cannot choose but fill our heartswith an awful circumspection and holy fear, which is the strongestincentive to Virtue, and the best guard against Vice. 

156. For, after all, what deserves the first place in our studies is theconsideration of GOD and our DUTY; which to promote, as it was the maindrift and design of my labours, so shall I esteem them altogether uselessand ineffectual if, by what I have said, I cannot inspire my readers witha pious sense of the Presence of God; and, having shown the falseness orvanity of those barren speculations which make the chief employment oflearned men, the better dispose them to reverence and embrace thesalutary truths of the Gospel, which to know and to practice is thehighest perfection of human nature.