A SELECTION

FROM THE

DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

WITH

THE ENCHEIRIDION

TRANSLATED BY

GEORGE LONG

CONTENTS. 

EPICTETUS (BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE)

A SELECTION FROM THE DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

THE ENCHEIRIDION, OR MANUAL

EPICTETUS. 

Very little is known of the life of Epictetus. It is said that he was anative of Hierapolis in Phrygia, a town between the Maeander and abranch of the Maeander named the Lycus. Hierapolis is mentioned in theepistle of Paul to the people of Colossae (Coloss. Iv. , 13); from whichit has been concluded that there was a Christian church in Hierapolis inthe time of the apostle. The date of the birth of Epictetus is unknown. The only recorded fact of his early life is that he was a slave in Rome, and his master was Epaphroditus, a profligate freedman of the EmperorNero. There is a story that the master broke his slave's leg bytorturing him; but it is better to trust to the evidence of Simplicius, the commentator on the Encheiridion, or Manual, who says that Epictetuswas weak in body and lame from an early age. It is not said how hebecame a slave; but it has been asserted in modern times that theparents sold the child. I have not, however, found any authority forthis statement. 

It may be supposed that the young slave showed intelligence, for hismaster sent or permitted him to attend the lectures of C. MusoniusRufus, an eminent Stoic philosopher. It may seem strange that such amaster should have wished to have his slave made into a philosopher; butGarnier, the author of a "Mémoire sur les Ouvrages d'Epictčte, " explainsthis matter very well in a communication to Schweighaeuser. Garniersays: "Epictetus, born at Hierapolis of Phrygia of poor parents, wasindebted apparently for the advantages of a good education to the whim, which was common at the end of the Republic and under the firstemperors, among the great of Rome to reckon among their numerous slavesgrammarians, poets, rhetoricians, and philosophers, in the same way asrich financiers in these later ages have been led to form at a greatcost rich and numerous libraries. This supposition is the only one whichcan explain to us how a wretched child, born as poor as Irus, hadreceived a good education, and how a rigid Stoic was the slave ofEpaphroditus, one of the officers of the imperial guard. For we cannotsuspect that it was through predilection for the Stoic doctrine, and forhis own use, that the confidant and the minister of the debaucheries ofNero would have desired to possess such a slave. "

Some writers assume that Epictetus was manumitted by his master, but Ican find no evidence for this statement. Epaphroditus accompanied Nerowhen he fled from Rome before his enemies, and he aided the miserabletyrant in killing himself. Domitian (Sueton. , Domit. 14), afterwards putEpaphroditus to death for this service to Nero. We may conclude thatEpictetus in some way obtained his freedom, and that he began to teachat Rome; but after the expulsion of the philosophers from Rome byDomitian, A. D. 89, he retired to Nicopolis in Epirus, a city built byAugustus to commemorate the victory at Actium. Epictetus opened a schoolor lecture room at Nicopolis, where he taught till he was an old man. The time of his death is unknown. Epictetus was never married, as welearn from Lucian (Demonax, c. 55, torn, ii. , ed. Hemsterh. , p. 393). When Epictetus was finding fault with Demonax, and advising him to takea wife and beget children, for this also, as Epictetus said, was aphilosopher's duty, to leave in place of himself another in theuniverse, Demonax refuted the doctrine by answering: Give me then, Epictetus, one of your own daughters. Simplicius says (Comment. , c. 46, p. 432, ed. Schweigh. ) that Epictetus lived alone a long time. At lasthe took a woman into his house as a nurse for a child, which one ofEpictetus' friends was going to expose on account of his poverty, butEpictetus took the child and brought it up. 

Epictetus wrote nothing; and all that we have under his name was writtenby an affectionate pupil, Arrian, afterwards the historian of Alexanderthe Great, who, as he tells us, took down in writing the philosopher'sdiscourses ("Epistle of Arrian to Lucius Gellius, " p. I). TheseDiscourses formed eight books, but only four are extant under the titleof [Greek: Epichtaeton diatribai]. Simplicius, in his commentary on the[Greek: Egcheiridion] or Manual, states that this work also was puttogether by Arrian, who selected from the discourses of Epictetus whathe considered to be most useful, and most necessary, and most adapted tomove men's minds. Simplicius also says that the contents of theEncheiridion are found nearly altogether and in the same words invarious parts of the Discourses. Arrian also wrote a work on the lifeand death of Epictetus. The events of the philosopher's studious lifewere probably not many nor remarkable; but we should have been glad ifthis work had been preserved, which told, as Simplicius says, what kindof man Epictetus was. 

Photius (Biblioth. , 58) mentions among Arrian's works "Conversationswith Epictetus, " [Greek: Homiliai Epichtaeton], in twelve books. Uptonthinks that this work is only another name for the Discourses, and thatPhotius has made the mistake of taking the Conversations to be adifferent work from the Discourses. Yet Photius has enumerated eightbooks of the Discourses and twelve books of the Conversations. Schweighaeuser observes that Photius had not seen these works of Arrianon Epictetus, for so he concludes from the brief notice of these worksby Photius. The fact is that Photius does not say that he had read thesebooks, as he generally does when he is speaking of the books which heenumerates in his Bibliotheca. The conclusion is that we are not certainthat there was a work of Arrian entitled "The Conversations ofEpictetus. "

Upton remarks in a note on iii. , 23 (p. 184, Trans. ), that "there aremany passages in these dissertations which are ambiguous or ratherconfused on account of the small questions, and because the matter isnot expanded by oratorical copiousness, not to mention other causes. "The discourses of Epictetus, it is supposed, were spoken extempore, andso one thing after another would come into the thoughts of the speaker(Wolf). Schweighaeuser also observes in a note (ii. , 336 of his edition)that the connection of the discourse is sometimes obscure through theomission of some words which are necessary to indicate the connection ofthe thoughts. The reader then will find that he cannot always understandEpictetus, if he does not read him very carefully, and some passagesmore than once. He must also think and reflect, or he will miss themeaning. I do not say that the book is worth all this trouble. Every manmust judge for himself. But I should not have translated the book, if Ihad not thought it worth study; and I think that all books of this kindrequire careful reading, if they are worth reading at all. 

G. L. 

A SELECTION FROM THE DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS. 

OF THE THINGS WHICH ARE IN OUR POWER AND NOT IN OUR POWER. --Of all thefaculties (except that which I shall soon mention), you will find notone which is capable of contemplating itself, and, consequently, notcapable either of approving or disapproving. How far does the grammaticart possess the contemplating power? As far as forming a judgment aboutwhat is written and spoken. And how far music? As far as judging aboutmelody. Does either of them then contemplate itself? By no means. Butwhen you must write something to your friend, grammar will tell you whatwords you should write; but whether you should write or not, grammarwill not tell you. And so it is with music as to musical sounds; butwhether you should sing at the present time and play on the lute, or doneither, music will not tell you. What faculty then will tell you? Thatwhich contemplates both itself and all other things. And what is thisfaculty? The rational faculty; for this is the only faculty that we havereceived which examines itself, what it is, and what power it has, andwhat is the value of this gift, and examines all other faculties: forwhat else is there which tells us that golden things are beautiful, forthey do not say so themselves? Evidently it is the faculty which iscapable of judging of appearances. What else judges of music, grammar, and the other faculties, proves their uses, and points out the occasionsfor using them? Nothing else. 

What then should a man have in readiness in such circumstances? Whatelse than this? What is mine, and what is not mine; and what ispermitted to me, and what is not permitted to me. I must die. Must Ithen die lamenting? I must be put in chains. Must I then also lament? Imust go into exile. Does any man then hinder me from going with smilesand cheerfulness and contentment? Tell me the secret which you possess. I will not, for this is in my power. But I will put you in chains. Man, what are you talking about? Me, in chains? You may fetter my leg, but mywill not even Zeus himself can overpower. I will throw you into prison. My poor body, you mean. I will cut your head off. When then have I toldyou that my head alone cannot be cut off? These are the things whichphilosophers should meditate on, which they should write daily, in whichthey should exercise themselves. 

What then did Agrippinus say? He said, "I am not a hindrance to myself. "When it was reported to him that his trial was going on in the Senate, he said: "I hope it may turn out well; but it is the fifth hour of theday"--this was the time when he was used to exercise himself and thentake the cold bath, --"let us go and take our exercise. " After he hadtaken his exercise, one comes and tells him, "You have been condemned. ""To banishment, " he replies, "or to death?" "To banishment. " "What aboutmy property?" "It is not taken from you. " "Let us go to Aricia then, " hesaid, "and dine. "

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HOW A MAN ON EVERY OCCASION CAN MAINTAIN HIS PROPER CHARACTER. --To therational animal only is the irrational intolerable; but that which isrational is tolerable. Blows are not naturally intolerable. How is that?See how the Lacedaemonians endure whipping when they have learned thatwhipping is consistent with reason. To hang yourself is not intolerable. When then you have the opinion that it is rational, you go and hangyourself. In short, if we observe, we shall find that the animal man ispained by nothing so much as by that which is irrational; and, on thecontrary, attracted to nothing so much as to that which is rational. 

Only consider at what price you sell your own will: if for no otherreason, at least for this, that you sell it not for a small sum. Butthat which is great and superior perhaps belongs to Socrates and such asare like him. Why then, if we are naturally such, are not a very greatnumber of us like him? Is it true then that all horses become swift, that all dogs are skilled in tracking footprints? What then, since I amnaturally dull, shall I, for this reason, take no pains? I hope not. Epictetus is not superior to Socrates; but if he is not inferior, thisis enough for me; for I shall never be a Milo, and yet I do not neglectmy body; nor shall I be a Croesus, and yet I do not neglect my property;nor, in a word, do we neglect looking after anything because we despairof reaching the highest degree. 

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HOW A MAN SHOULD PROCEED FROM THE PRINCIPLE OF GOD BEING THE FATHER OFALL MEN TO THE REST. --If a man should be able to assent to this doctrineas he ought, that we are all sprung from God in an especial manner, andthat God is the father both of men and of gods, I suppose that he wouldnever have any ignoble or mean thoughts about himself. But if Cęsar (theemperor) should adopt you, no one could endure your arrogance; and ifyou know that you are the son of Zeus, will you not be elated? Yet we donot so; but since these two things are mingled in the generation of man, body in common with the animals, and reason and intelligence in commonwith the gods, many incline to this kinship, which is miserable andmortal; and some few to that which is divine and happy. Since then it isof necessity that every man uses everything according to the opinionwhich he has about it, those, the few, who think that they are formedfor fidelity and modesty and a sure use of appearances have no mean orignoble thoughts about themselves; but with the many it is quite thecontrary. For they say, What am I? A poor, miserable man, with mywretched bit of flesh. Wretched, indeed; but you possess somethingbetter than your bit of flesh. Why then do you neglect that which isbetter, and why do you attach yourself to this?

Through this kinship with the flesh, some of us inclining to it becomelike wolves, faithless and treacherous and mischievous; some become likelions, savage and bestial and untamed; but the greater part of us becomefoxes, and other worse animals. For what else is a slanderer andmalignant man than a fox, or some other more wretched and meaner animal?See then and take care that you do not become some one of thesemiserable things. 

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OF PROGRESS OR IMPROVEMENT. --He who is making progress, having learnedfrom philosophers that desire means the desire of good things, andaversion means aversion from bad things; having learned too thathappiness and tranquillity are not attainable by man otherwise than bynot failing to obtain what he desires, and not falling into that whichhe would avoid; such a man takes from himself desire altogether andconfers it, but he employs his aversion only on things which aredependent on his will. For if he attempts to avoid anything independentof his will, he knows that sometimes he will fall in with somethingwhich he wishes to avoid, and he will be unhappy. Now if virtue promisesgood fortune and tranquillity and happiness, certainly also the progresstowards virtue is progress towards each of these things. For it isalways true that to whatever point the perfecting of anything leads us, progress is an approach towards this point. 

How then do we admit that virtue is such as I have said, and yet seekprogress in other things and make a display of it? What is the productof virtue? Tranquillity. Who then makes improvement? Is it he who hasread many books of Chrysippus? But does virtue consist in havingunderstood Chrysippus? If this is so, progress is clearly nothing elsethan knowing a great deal of Chrysippus. But now we admit that virtueproduces one thing, and we declare that approaching near to it isanother thing, namely, progress or improvement. Such a person, says one, is already able to read Chrysippus by himself. Indeed, sir, you aremaking great progress. What kind of progress? But why do you mock theman? Why do you draw him away from the perception of his ownmisfortunes? Will you not show him the effect of virtue that he maylearn where to look for improvement? Seek it there, wretch, where yourwork lies. And where is your work? In desire and in aversion, that youmay not be disappointed in your desire, and that you may not fall intothat which you would avoid; in your pursuit and avoiding, that youcommit no error; in assent and suspension of assent, that you be notdeceived. The first things, and the most necessary are those which Ihave named. But if with trembling and lamentation you seek not to fallinto that which you avoid, tell me how you are improving. 

Do you then show me your improvement in these things? If I were talkingto an athlete, I should say, Show me your shoulders; and then he mightsay, Here are my Halteres. You and your Halteres look to that. I shouldreply, I wish to see the effect of the Halteres. So, when you say: Takethe treatise on the active powers ([Greek: hormea]), and see how I havestudied it, I reply: Slave, I am not inquiring about this, but how youexercise pursuit and avoidance, desire and aversion, how you design andpurpose and prepare yourself, whether conformably to nature or not. Ifconformably, give me evidence of it, and I will say that you are makingprogress; but if not conformably, be gone, and not only expound yourbooks, but write such books yourself; and what will you gain by it? Doyou not know that the whole book costs only five denarii? Does then theexpounder seem to be worth more than five denarii? Never then look forthe matter itself in one place, and progress towards it in another. Where then is progress? If any of you, withdrawing himself fromexternals, turns to his own will ([Greek: proairesis]) to exercise itand to improve it by labor, so as to make it conformable to nature, elevated, free, unrestrained, unimpeded, faithful, modest; and if he haslearned that he who desires or avoids the things which are not in hispower can neither be faithful nor free, but of necessity he must changewith them and be tossed about with them as in a tempest, and ofnecessity must subject himself to others who have the power to procureor prevent what lie desires or would avoid; finally, when he rises inthe morning, if he observes and keeps these rules, bathes as a man offidelity, eats as a modest man; in like manner, if in every matter thatoccurs he works out his chief principles ([Greek: ta proaegoumena]) asthe runner does with reference to running, and the trainer of the voicewith reference to the voice--this is the man who truly makes progress, and this is the man who has not travelled in vain. But if he hasstrained his efforts to the practice of reading books, and labors onlyat this, and has travelled for this, I tell him to return homeimmediately, and not to neglect his affairs there; for this for which hehas travelled is nothing. But the other thing is something, to study howa man can rid his life of lamentation and groaning, and saying, Woe tome, and wretched that I am, and to rid it also of misfortune anddisappointment, and to learn what death is, and exile, and prison, andpoison, that he may be able to say when he is in fetters, Dear Crito, ifit is the will of the gods that it be so, let it be so; and not to say, Wretched am I, an old man: have I kept my gray hairs for this? Who is itthat speaks thus? Do you think that I shall name some man of no reputeand of low condition? Does not Priam say this? Does not Oedipus saythis? Nay, all kings say it! For what else is tragedy than theperturbations ([Greek: pathae]) of men who value externals exhibited inthis kind of poetry? But if a man must learn by fiction that no externalthings which are independent of the will concern us, for my part Ishould like this fiction, by the aid of which I should live happily andundisturbed. But you must consider for yourselves what you wish. 

What then does Chrysippus teach us? The reply is, to know that thesethings are not false, from which happiness comes and tranquillityarises. Take my books, and you will learn how true and conformable tonature are the things which make me free from perturbations. O greatgood fortune! O the great benefactor who points out the way! ToTriptolemus all men have erected temples and altars, because he gave usfood by cultivation; but to him who discovered truth and brought it tolight and communicated it to all, not the truth which shows us how tolive, but how to live well, who of you for this reason has built analtar, or a temple, or has dedicated a statue, or who worships God forthis? Because the gods have given the vine, or wheat, we sacrifice tothem; but because they have produced in the human mind that fruit bywhich they designed to show us the truth which relates to happiness, shall we not thank God for this?

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AGAINST THE ACADEMICS. --If a man, said Epictetus, opposes evidenttruths, it is not easy to find arguments by which we shall make himchange his opinion. But this does not arise either from the man'sstrength or the teacher's weakness; for when the man, though he has beenconfuted, is hardened like a stone, how shall we then be able to dealwith him by argument?

Now there are two kinds of hardening, one of the understanding, theother of the sense of shame, when a man is resolved not to assent towhat is manifest nor to desist from contradictions. Most of us areafraid of mortification of the body, and would contrive all means toavoid such a thing, but we care not about the soul's mortification. Andindeed with regard to the soul, if a man be in such a state as not toapprehend anything, or understand at all, we think that he is in a badcondition; but if the sense of shame and modesty are deadened, this wecall even power (or strength). 

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OF PROVIDENCE. --From everything, which is or happens in the world, it iseasy to praise Providence, if a man possesses these two qualities: thefaculty of seeing what belongs and happens to all persons and things, and a grateful disposition. If he does not possess these two qualities, one man will not see the use of things which are and which happen:another will not be thankful for them, even if he does know them. If Godhad made colors, but had not made the faculty of seeing them, what wouldhave been their use? None at all. On the other hand, if he had made thefaculty of vision, but had not made objects such as to fall under thefaculty, what in that case also would have been the use of it? None atall. Well, suppose that he had made both, but had not made light? Inthat case, also, they would have been of no use. Who is it then who hasfitted this to that and that to this?

What, then, are these things done in us only? Many, indeed, in us only, of which the rational animal had peculiar need; but you will find manycommon to us with irrational animals. Do they then understand what isdone? By no means. For use is one thing, and understanding is another;God had need of irrational animals to make use of appearances, but of usto understand the use of appearances. It is therefore enough for them toeat and to drink, and to copulate, and to do all the other things whichthey severally do. But for us, to whom he has given also theintellectual faculty, these things are not sufficient; for unless we actin a proper and orderly manner, and conformably to the nature andconstitution of each thing, we shall never attain our true end. Forwhere the constitutions of living beings are different, there also theacts and the ends are different. In those animals then whoseconstitution is adapted only to use, use alone is enough; but in ananimal (man), which has also the power of understanding the use, unlessthere be the due exercise of the understanding, he will never attain hisproper end. Well then God constitutes every animal, one to be eaten, another to serve for agriculture, another to supply cheese, and anotherfor some like use; for which purposes what need is there to understandappearances and to be able to distinguish them? But God has introducedman to be a spectator of God and of his works; and not only a spectatorof them, but an interpreter. For this reason it is shameful for man tobegin and to end where irrational animals do; but rather he ought tobegin where they begin, and to end where nature ends in us; and natureends in contemplation and understanding, and in a way of lifeconformable to nature. Take care then not to die without having beenspectators of these things. 

But you take a journey to Olympia to see the work of Phidias, and all ofyou think it a misfortune to die without having seen such things. Butwhen there is no need to take a journey, and where a man is, there hehas the works (of God) before him, will you not desire to see andunderstand them? Will you not perceive either what you are, or what youwere born for, or what this is for which you have received the facultyof sight? But you may say, There are some things disagreeable andtroublesome in life. And are there none at Olympia? Are you notscorched? Are you not pressed by a crowd? Are you not withoutcomfortable means of bathing? Are you not wet when it rains? Have younot abundance of noise, clamor, and other disagreeable things? But Isuppose that setting all these things off against the magnificence ofthe spectacle, you bear and endure. Well then and have you not receivedfaculties by which you will be able to bear all that happens? Have younot received greatness of soul? Have you not received manliness? Haveyou not received endurance? And why do I trouble myself about anythingthat can happen if I possess greatness of soul? What shall distract mymind, or disturb me, or appear painful? Shall I not use the power forthe purposes for which I received it, and shall I grieve and lament overwhat happens?

Come, then, do you also having observed these things look to thefaculties which you have, and when you have looked at them, say: Bringnow, O Zeus, any difficulty that thou pleasest, for I have means givento me by thee and powers for honoring myself through the things whichhappen. You do not so; but you sit still, trembling for fear that somethings will happen, and weeping, and lamenting, and groaning for whatdoes happen; and then you blame the gods. For what is the consequence ofsuch meanness of spirit but impiety? And yet God has not only given usthese faculties, by which we shall be able to bear everything thathappens without being depressed or broken by it; but, like a good kingand a true father, He has given us these faculties free from hindrance, subject to no compulsion, unimpeded, and has put them entirely in ourown power, without even having reserved to Himself any power ofhindering or impeding. You, who have received these powers free and asyour own, use them not; you do not even see what you have received, andfrom whom; some of you being blinded to the giver, and not evenacknowledging your benefactor, and others, through meanness of spirit, betaking yourselves to fault-finding and making charges against God. YetI will show to you that you have powers and means for greatness of souland manliness; but what powers you have for finding fault makingaccusations, do you show me. 

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HOW FROM THE FACT THAT WE ARE AKIN TO GOD A MAN MAY PROCEED TO THECONSEQUENCES. --I indeed think that the old man ought to be sitting here, not to contrive how you may have no mean thoughts nor mean and ignobletalk about yourselves, but to take care that there be not among us anyyoung men of such a mind, that when they have recognized their kinshipto God, and that we are fettered by these bonds, the body, I mean, andits possessions, and whatever else on account of them is necessary to usfor the economy and commerce of life, they should intend to throw offthese things as if they were burdens painful and intolerable, and todepart to their kinsmen. But this is the labor that your teacher andinstructor ought to be employed upon, if he really were what he shouldbe. You should come to him and say: Epictetus, we can no longer endurebeing bound to this poor body, and feeding it, and giving it drink andrest, and cleaning it, and for the sake of the body complying with thewishes of these and of those. Are not these things indifferent andnothing to us; and is not death no evil? And are we not in a mannerkinsmen of God, and did we not come from him? Allow us to depart to theplace from which we came; allow us to be released at last from thesebonds by which we are bound and weighed down. Here there are robbers andthieves and courts of justice, and those who are named tyrants, andthink that they have some power over us by means of the body and itspossessions. Permit us to show them that they have no power over anyman. And I on my part would say: Friends, wait for God: when he shallgive the signal and release you from this service, then go to him; butfor the present endure to dwell in this place where he has put you. Short indeed is this time of your dwelling here, and easy to bear forthose who are so disposed; for what tyrant, or what thief, or whatcourts of justice are formidable to those who have thus considered asthings of no value the body and the possessions of the body? Wait then, do not depart without a reason. 

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OF CONTENTMENT. --With respect to gods, there are some who say that adivine being does not exist; others say that it exists, but is inactiveand careless, and takes no forethought about anything; a third class saythat such a being exists and exercises forethought, but only about greatthings and heavenly things, and about nothing on the earth; a fourthclass say that a divine being exercises forethought both about things onthe earth and heavenly things, but in a general way only, and not aboutthings severally. There is a fifth class to whom Ulysses and Socratesbelong, who say:

 I move not without thy knowledge. --Iliad, x. , 278. 

Before all other things then it is necessary to inquire about each ofthese opinions, whether it is affirmed truly or not truly. For if thereare no gods, how is it our proper end to follow them? And if they exist, but take no care of anything, in this case also how will it be right tofollow them? But if indeed they do exist and look after things, still ifthere is nothing communicated from them to men, nor in fact to myself, how even so is it right (to follow them)? The wise and good man then, after considering all these things, submits his own mind to him whoadministers the whole, as good citizens do to the law of the state. Hewho is receiving instruction ought to come to be instructed with thisintention, How shall I follow the gods in all things, how shall I becontented with the divine administration, and how can I become free? Forhe is free to whom everything happens according to his will, and whom noman can hinder. What then, is freedom madness? Certainly not; formadness and freedom do not consist. But, you say, I would haveeverything result just as I like, and in whatever way I like. You aremad, you are beside yourself. Do you not know that freedom is a nobleand valuable thing? But for me inconsiderately to wish for things tohappen as I inconsiderately like, this appears to be not only not noble, but even most base. For how do we proceed in the matter of writing? Do Iwish to write the name of Dion as I choose? No, but I am taught tochoose to write it as it ought to be written. And how with respect tomusic? In the same manner. And what universally in every art or science?Just the same. If it were not so, it would be of no value to knowanything, if knowledge were adapted to every man's whim. Is it then inthis alone, in this which is the greatest and the chief thing, I meanfreedom, that I am permitted to will inconsiderately? By no means; butto be instructed is this, to learn to wish that everything may happen asit does. And how do things happen? As the disposer has disposed them?And he has appointed summer and winter, and abundance and scarcity, andvirtue and vice, and all such opposites for the harmony of the whole;and to each of us he has given a body, and parts of the body, andpossessions, and companions. 

What then remains, or what method is discovered of holding commerce withthem? Is there such a method by which they shall do what seems fit tothem, and we not the less shall be in a mood which is conformable tonature? But you are unwilling to endure, and are discontented; and ifyou are alone, you call it solitude; and if you are with men, you callthem knaves and robbers; and you find fault with your own parents andchildren, and brothers and neighbors. But you ought when you are aloneto call this condition by the name of tranquillity and freedom, and tothink yourself like to the gods; and when you are with many, you oughtnot to call it crowd, nor trouble, nor uneasiness, but festival andassembly, and so accept all contentedly. 

What then is the punishment of those who do not accept? It is to be whatthey are. Is any person dissatisfied with being alone? Let him be alone. Is a man dissatisfied with his parents? Let him be a bad son, andlament. Is he dissatisfied with his children? Let him be a bad father. Cast him into prison. What prison? Where he is already, for he is thereagainst his will; and where a man is against his will, there he is inprison. So Socrates was not in prison, for he was there willingly. Mustmy leg then be lamed? Wretch, do you then on account of one poor legfind fault with the world? Will you not willingly surrender it for thewhole? Will you not withdraw from it? Will you not gladly part with itto him who gave it? And will you be vexed and discontented with thethings established by Zeus, which he, with the Moirae (fates) who werepresent and spinning the thread of your generation, defined and put inorder? Know you not how small a part you are compared with the whole. Imean with respect to the body, for as to intelligence you are notinferior to the gods nor less; for the magnitude of intelligence is notmeasured by length nor yet by height, but by thoughts. 

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HOW EVERYTHING MAY BE DONE ACCEPTABLY TO THE GODS. --When some one asked, How may a man eat acceptably to the gods, he answered: If he can eatjustly and contentedly, and with equanimity, and temperately, andorderly, will it not be also acceptable to the gods? But when you haveasked for warm water and the slave has not heard, or if he did hear hasbrought only tepid water, or he is not even found to be in the house, then not to be vexed or to burst with passion, is not this acceptable tothe gods? How then shall a man endure such persons as this slave? Slaveyourself, will you not bear with your own brother, who has Zeus for hisprogenitor, and is like a son from the same seeds and of the samedescent from above? But if you have been put in any such higher place, will you immediately make yourself a tyrant? Will you not remember whoyou are, and whom you rule? That they are kinsmen, that they arebrethren by nature, that they are the offspring of Zeus? But I havepurchased them, and they have not purchased me. Do you see in whatdirection you are looking, that it is towards the earth, towards thepit, that it is towards these wretched laws of dead men? but towards thelaws of the gods you are not looking. 

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WHAT PHILOSOPHY PROMISES. --When a man was consulting him how he shouldpersuade his brother to cease being angry with him, Epictetus replied:Philosophy does not propose to secure for a man any external thing. Ifit did (or if it were not, as I say), philosophy would be allowingsomething which is not within its province. For as the carpenter'smaterial is wood, and that of the statuary is copper, so the matter ofthe art of living is each man's life. When then is my brother's? Thatagain belongs to his own art; but with respect to yours, it is one ofthe external things, like a piece of land, like health, like reputation. But Philosophy promises none of these. In every circumstance I willmaintain, she says, the governing part conformable to nature. Whosegoverning part? His in whom I am, she says. 

How then shall my brother cease to be angry with me? Bring him to me andI will tell him. But I have nothing to say to you about his anger. 

When the man who was consulting him said, I seek to know this, How, evenif my brother is not reconciled to me, shall I maintain myself in astate conformable to nature? Nothing great, said Epictetus, is producedsuddenly, since not even the grape or the fig is. If you say to me nowthat you want a fig, I will answer to you that it requires time: let itflower first, then put forth fruit, and then ripen. Is then the fruit ofa fig-tree not perfected suddenly and in one hour, and would you possessthe fruit of a man's mind in so short a time and so easily? Do notexpect it, even if I tell you. 

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THAT WE OUGHT NOT TO BE ANGRY WITH THE ERRORS (FAULTS) OF OTHERS. --Oughtnot then this robber and this adulterer to be destroyed? By no means sayso, but speak rather in this way: This man who has been mistaken anddeceived about the most important things, and blinded, not in thefaculty of vision which distinguishes white and black, but in thefaculty which distinguishes good and bad, should we not destroy him? Ifyou speak thus you will see how inhuman this is which you say, and thatit is just as if you would say, Ought we not to destroy this blind anddeaf man? But if the greatest harm is the privation of the greatestthings, and the greatest thing in every man is the will or choice suchas it ought to be, and a man is deprived of this will, why are you alsoangry with him? Man, you ought not to be affected contrary to nature bythe bad things of another. Pity him rather; drop this readiness to beoffended and to hate, and these words which the many utter: "Theseaccursed and odious fellows. " How have you been made so wise at once?and how are you so peevish? Why then are we angry? Is it because wevalue so much the things of which these men rob us? Do not admire yourclothes, and then you will not be angry with the thief. Consider thismatter thus: you have fine clothes; your neighbor has not; you have awindow; you wish to air the clothes. The thief does not know whereinman's good consists, but he thinks that it consist in having fineclothes, the very thing which you also think. Must he not then come andtake them away? When you show a cake to greedy persons, and swallow itall yourself, do you expect them not to snatch it from you? Do notprovoke them; do not have a window; do not air your clothes. I alsolately had an iron lamp placed by the side of my household gods; hearinga noise at the door, I ran down, and found that the lamp had beencarried off. I reflected that he who had taken the lamp had done nothingstrange. What then? To-morrow, I said, you will find an earthen lamp;for a man only loses that which he has. I have lost my garment. Thereason is that you had a garment. I have a pain in my head. Have you anypain in your horns? Why then are you troubled? For we only lose thosethings, we have only pains about those things, which we possess. 

But the tyrant will chain--what? The leg. He will take away--what? Theneck. What then will he not chain and not take away? The will. This iswhy the ancients taught the maxim, Know thyself. Therefore we ought toexercise ourselves in small things, and beginning with them to proceedto the greater. I have pain in the head. Do not say, Alas! I have painin the ear. Do not say alas! And I do not say that you are not allowedto groan, but do not groan inwardly; and if your slave is slow inbringing a bandage, do not cry out and torment yourself, and say, Everybody hates me; for who would not hate such a man? For the future, relying on these opinions, walk about upright, free; not trusting to thesize of your body, as an athlete, for a man ought not to be invinciblein the way that an ass is. 

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HOW WE SHOULD BEHAVE TO TYRANTS. --If a man possesses any superiority, orthinks that he does when he does not, such a man, if he is uninstructed, will of necessity be puffed up through it. For instance, the tyrantsays, I am master of all! And what can you do for me? Can you give medesire which shall have no hindrance? How can you? Have you theinfallible power of avoiding what you would avoid? Have you the power ofmoving towards an object without error? And how do you possess thispower? Come, when you are in a ship, do you trust to yourself or to thehelmsman? And when you are in a chariot, to whom do you trust but to thedriver? And how is it in all other arts? Just the same. In what, then, lies your power? All men pay respect to me. Well, I also pay respect tomy platter, and I wash it and wipe it; and for the sake of my oil-flask, I drive a peg into the wall. Well, then, are these things superior tome? No, but they supply some of my wants, and for this reason I takecare of them. Well, do I not attend to my ass? Do I not wash his feet?Do I not clean him? Do you not know that every man has regard tohimself, and to you just the same as he has regard to his ass? For whohas regard to you as a man? Show me. Who wishes to become like you? Whoimitates you, as he imitates Socrates? But I can cut off your head. Yousay right. I had forgotten that I must have regard to you, as I would toa fever and the bile, and raise an altar to you, as there is at Rome analtar to fever. 

What is it then that disturbs and terrifies the multitude? Is it thetyrant and his guards? (By no means. ) I hope that it is not so. It isnot possible that what is by nature free can be disturbed by anythingelse, or hindered by any other thing than by itself. But it is a man'sown opinions which disturb him. For when the tyrant says to a man, Iwill chain your leg, he who values his leg says, Do not; have pity. Buthe who values his own will says, If it appears more advantageous to you, chain it. Do you not care? I do not care. I will show you that I ammaster. You cannot do that. Zeus has set me free; do you think that heintended to allow his own son to be enslaved? But you are master of mycarcase; take it. So when you approach me, you have no regard to me? No, but I have regard to myself; and if you wish me to say that I haveregard to you also, I tell you that I have the same regard to you that Ihave to my pipkin. 

What then? When absurd notions about things independent of our will, asif they were good and (or) bad, lie at the bottom of our opinions, wemust of necessity pay regard to tyrants: for I wish that men would payregard to tyrants only, and not also to the bedchamber men. How is itthat the man becomes all at once wise, when Cęsar has made himsuperintendent of the close stool? How is it that we say immediately, Felicion spoke sensibly to me? I wish he were ejected from thebedchamber, that he might again appear to you to be a fool. 

Has a man been exalted to the tribuneship? All who meet him offer theircongratulations; one kisses his eyes, another the neck, and the slaveskiss his hands. He goes to his house, he finds torches lighted. Heascends the Capitol; he offers a sacrifice on the occasion. Now who eversacrificed for having had good desires? for having acted conformably tonature? For in fact we thank the gods for those things in which we placeour good. 

A person was talking to me to-day about the priesthood of Augustus. Isay to him: Man, let the thing alone; you will spend much for nopurpose. But he replies, Those who draw up agreements will write myname. Do you then stand by those who read them, and say to such persons, It is I whose name is written there? And if you can now be present onail such occasions, what will you do when you are dead? My name willremain. Write it on a stone, and it will remain. But come, whatremembrance of you will there be beyond Nicopolis? But I shall wear acrown of gold. If you desire a crown at all, take a crown of roses andput it on, for it will be more elegant in appearance. 

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AGAINST THOSE WHO WISH TO BE ADMIRED. --When a man holds his properstation in life, he does not gape after things beyond it. Man, what doyou wish to happen to you? I am satisfied if I desire and avoidconformably to nature, if I employ movements towards and from an objectas I am by nature formed to do, and purpose and design and assent. Whythen do you strut before us as if you had swallowed a spit? My wish hasalways been that those who meet me should admire me, and those whofollow me should exclaim, O the great philosopher! Who are they by whomyou wish to be admired? Are they not those of whom you are used to saythat they are mad? Well, then, do you wish to be admired by madmen?

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ON PRĘCOGNITIONS. --Pręcognitions are common to all men, and pręcognitionis not contradictory to pręcognition. For who of us does not assume thatGood is useful and eligible, and in all circumstances that we ought tofollow and pursue it? And who of us does not assume that Justice isbeautiful and becoming? When then does the contradiction arise? Itarises in the adaptation of the pręcognitions to the particular cases. When one man says, "He has done well; he is a brave man, " and anothersays, "Not so; but he has acted foolishly, " then the disputes ariseamong men. This is the dispute among the Jews and the Syrians and theEgyptians and the Romans; not whether holiness should be preferred toall things and in all cases should be pursued, but whether it is holy toeat pig's flesh or not holy. You will find this dispute also betweenAgamemnon and Achilles; for call them forth. What do you say, Agamemnon?ought not that to be done which is proper and right? "Certainly. " Well, what do you say, Achilles? do you not admit that what is good ought tobe done? "I do most certainly. " Adapt your pręcognitions then to thepresent matter. Here the dispute begins. Agamemnon says, "I ought not togive up Chryseis to her father. " Achilles says, "You ought. " It iscertain that one of the two makes a wrong adaptation of the pręcognitionof "ought" or "duty. " Further, Agamemnon says, "Then if I ought torestore Chryseis, it is fit that I take his prize from some of you. "Achilles replies, "Would you then take her whom I love?" "Yes, her whomyou love. " "Must I then be the only man who goes without a prize? andmust I be the only man who has no prize?" Thus the dispute begins. 

What then is education? Education is the learning how to adapt thenatural pręcognitions to the particular things conformably to nature;and then to distinguish that of things some are in our power, but othersare not. In our power are will and all acts which depend on the will;things not in our power are the body, the parts of the body, possessions, parents, brothers, children, country, and, generally, allwith whom we live in society. In what then should we place the good? Towhat kind of things ([Greek: ousia]) shall we adapt it? To the thingswhich are in our power? Is not health then a good thing, and soundnessof limb, and life, and are not children and parents and country? Whowill tolerate you if you deny this?

Let us then transfer the notion of good to these things. Is it possible, then, when a man sustains damage and does not obtain good things, thathe can be happy? It is not possible. And can he maintain towards societya proper behavior? He can not. For I am naturally formed to look aftermy own interest. If it is my interest to have an estate in land, it ismy interest also to take it from my neighbor. If it is my interest tohave a garment, it is my interest also to steal it from the bath. Thisis the origin of wars, civil commotions, tyrannies, conspiracies. Andhow shall I be still able to maintain my duty towards Zeus? For if Isustain damage and am unlucky, he takes no care of me. And what is he tome if he cannot help me? And further, what is he to me if he allows meto be in the condition in which I am? I now begin to hate him. Why thendo we build temples, why setup statues to Zeus, as well as to evildemons, such as to Fever; and how is Zeus the Saviour, and how the giverof rain, and the giver of fruits? And in truth if we place the nature ofGood in any such things, all this follows. 

What should we do then? This is the inquiry of the true philosopher whois in labor. Now I do not see what the good is nor the bad. Am I notmad? Yes. But suppose that I place the good somewhere among the thingswhich depend on the will; all will laugh at me. There will come somegreyhead wearing many gold rings on his fingers, and he will shake hishead and say: "Hear, my child. It is right that you should philosophize;but you ought to have some brains also; all this that you are doing issilly. You learn the syllogism from philosophers; but you know how toact better than philosophers do. " Man why then do you blame me, if Iknow? What shall I say to this slave? If I am silent, he will burst. Imust speak in this way: "Excuse me, as you would excuse lovers; I am notmy own master; I am mad. "

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HOW WE SHOULD STRUGGLE WITH CIRCUMSTANCES. --It is circumstances(difficulties) which show what men are. Therefore when a difficultyfalls upon you, remember that God, like a trainer of wrestlers, hasmatched you with a rough young man. For what purpose? you may say. Why, that you may become an Olympic conqueror; but it is not accomplishedwithout sweat. In my opinion no man has had a more profitable difficultythan you have had, if you choose to make use of it as an athlete woulddeal with a young antagonist. We are now sending a scout to Rome; but noman sends a cowardly scout, who, if he only hears a noise and sees ashadow anywhere, comes running back in terror and reports that the enemyis close at hand. So now if you should come and tell us: "Fearful is thestate of affairs at Rome; terrible is death; terrible is exile; terribleis calumny; terrible is poverty; fly, my friends, the enemy is near, " weshall answer: "Begone, prophesy for yourself; we have committed only onefault, that we sent such a scout. "

Diogenes, who was sent as a scout before you, made a different report tous. He says that death is no evil, for neither is it base; he says thatfame (reputation) is the noise of madmen. And what has this spy saidabout pain, about pleasure, and about poverty? He says that to be nakedis better than any purple robe, and to sleep on the bare ground is thesoftest bed; and he gives as a proof of each thing that he affirms hisown courage, his tranquillity, his freedom, and the healthy appearanceand compactness of his body. There is no enemy near, he says; all ispeace. How so, Diogenes? "See, " he replies, "if I am struck, if I havebeen wounded, if I have fled from any man. " This is what a scout oughtto be. But you come to us and tell us one thing after another. Will younot go back, and you will see clearer when you have laid aside fear?

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ON THE SAME. --If these things are true, and if we are not silly, and arenot acting hypocritically when we say that the good of man is in thewill, and the evil too, and that everything else does not concern us, why are we still disturbed, why are we still afraid? The things aboutwhich we have been busied are in no man's power; and the things whichare in the power of others, we care not for. What kind of trouble havewe still?

But give me directions. Why should I give you directions? Has not Zeusgiven you directions? Has he not given to you what is your own free fromhindrance and free from impediment, and what is not your own subject tohindrance and impediment? What directions then, what kind of orders didyou bring when you came from him? Keep by every means what is your own;do not desire what belongs to others. Fidelity (integrity) is your own, virtuous shame is your own; who then can take these things from you? whoelse than yourself will hinder you from using them? But how do you act?When you seek what is not your own, you lose that which is your own. Having such promptings and commands from Zeus, what kind do you stillask from me? Am I more powerful than he, am I more worthy of confidence?But if you observe these, do you want any others besides? "Well, but hehas not given these orders, " you will say. Produce your pręcognitions([Greek: prolaepseis]), produce these proofs of philosophers, producewhat you have often heard, and produce what you have said yourself, produce what you have read, produce what you have meditated on; and youwill then see that all these things are from God. 

If I have set my admiration on the poor body, I have given myself up tobe a slave; if on my poor possessions, I also make myself a slave. For Iimmediately make it plain with what I may be caught; as if the snakedraws in his head, I tell you to strike that part of him which heguards; and do you be assured that whatever part you choose to guard, that part your master will attack. Remembering this, whom will you stillflatter or fear?

But I should like to sit where the Senators sit. Do you see that you areputting yourself in straits, you are squeezing yourself? How then shallI see well in any other way in the amphitheatre? Man, do not be aspectator at all, and you will not be squeezed. Why do you give yourselftrouble? Or wait a little, and when the spectacle is over, seat yourselfin the place reserved for the Senators and sun yourself. For rememberthis general truth, that it is we who squeeze ourselves, who putourselves in straits; that is, our opinions squeeze us and put us instraits. For what is it to be reviled? Stand by a stone and revile it, and what will you gain? If then a man listens like a stone, what profitis there to the reviler? But if the reviler has as a stepping-stone (orladder) the weakness of him who is reviled, then he accomplishessomething. Strip him. What do you mean by him? Lay hold of his garment, strip it off. I have insulted you. Much good may it do you. 

This was the practice of Socrates; this was the reason why he always hadone face. But we choose to practise and study anything rather than themeans by which we shall be unimpeded and free. You say: "Philosopherstalk paradoxes. " But are there no paradoxes in the other arts? And whatis more paradoxical than to puncture a man's eye in order that he maysee? If any one said this to a man ignorant of the surgical art, wouldhe not ridicule the speaker? Where is the wonder, then, if in philosophyalso many things which are true appear paradoxical to the inexperienced?

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IN HOW MANY WAYS APPEARANCES EXIST, AND WHAT AIDS WE SHOULD PROVIDEAGAINST THEM. --Appearances are to us in four ways. For either thingsappear as they are; or they are not, and do not even appear to be; orthey are, and do not appear to be; or they are not, and yet appear tobe. Further, in all these cases to form a right judgment (to hit themark) is the office of an educated man. But whatever it is that annoys(troubles) us, to that we ought to apply a remedy. If the sophisms ofPyrrho and of the Academics are what annoys (troubles), we must applythe remedy to them. If it is the persuasion of appearances, by whichsome things appear to be good, when they are not good, let us seek aremedy for this. If it is habit which annoys us, we must try to seek aidagainst habit. What aid, then, can we find against habit? The contraryhabit. You hear the ignorant say: "That unfortunate person is dead; hisfather and mother are overpowered with sorrow; he was cut off by anuntimely death and in a foreign land. " Hear the contrary way ofspeaking. Tear yourself from these expressions; oppose to one habit thecontrary habit; to sophistry oppose reason, and the exercise anddiscipline of reason; against persuasive (deceitful) appearances weought to have manifest pręcognitions ([Greek: prolaepseis]), cleared ofall impurities and ready to hand. 

When death appears an evil, we ought to have this rule in readiness, that it is fit to avoid evil things, and that death is a necessarything. For what shall I do, and where shall I escape it? Suppose that Iam not Sarpedon, the son of Zeus, nor able to speak in this noble way. Iwill go and I am resolved either to behave bravely myself or to give toanother the opportunity of doing so; if I cannot succeed in doinganything myself, I will not grudge another the doing of something noble. Suppose that it is above our power to act thus; is it not in our powerto reason thus? Tell me where I can escape death; discover for me thecountry, show me the men to whom I must go, whom death does not visit. Discover to me a charm against death. If I have not one, what do youwish me to do? I cannot escape from death. Shall I not escape from thefear of death, but shall I die lamenting and trembling? For the originof perturbation is this, to wish for something, and that this should nothappen. Therefore if I am able to change externals according to my wish, I change them; but if I cannot, I am ready to tear out the eyes of himwho hinders me. For the nature of man is not to endure to be deprived ofthe good, and not to endure the falling into the evil. Then at last, when I am neither able to change circumstances nor to tear out the eyesof him who hinders me, I sit down and groan, and abuse whom I can, Zeusand the rest of the gods. For if they do not care for me, what are theyto me? Yes, but you will be an impious man. In what respect, then, willit be worse for me than it is now? To sum up, remember that unless pietyand your interest be in the same thing, piety cannot be maintained inany man. Do not these things seem necessary (true)?

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THAT WE OUGHT NOT TO BE ANGRY WITH MEN; AND WHAT ARE THE SMALL AND THEGREAT THINGS AMONG MEN. --What is the cause of assenting to anything? Thefact that it appears to be true. It is not possible then to assent tothat which appears not to be true. Why? Because this is the nature ofthe understanding, to incline to the true, to be dissatisfied with thefalse, and in matters uncertain to withhold assent. What is the proof ofthis? Imagine (persuade yourself), if you can, that it is now night. Itis not possible. Take away your persuasion that it is day. It is notpossible. Persuade yourself or take away your persuasion that the starsare even in number. It is impossible. When then any man assents to thatwhich is false, be assured that he did not intend to assent to it asfalse, for every soul is unwillingly deprived of the truth, as Platosays; but the falsity seemed to him to be true. Well, in acts what havewe of the like kind as we have here truth or falsehood? We have the fitand the not fit (duty and not duty), the profitable and theunprofitable, that which is suitable to a person and that which is not, and whatever is like these. Can then a man think that a thing is usefulto him and not choose it? He cannot. How says Medea?

 "'Tis true I know what evil I shall do, But passion overpowers the better counsel. "

She thought that to indulge her passion and take vengeance on herhusband was more profitable than to spare her children. It was so; butshe was deceived. Show her plainly that she is deceived, and she willnot do it; but so long as you do not show it, what can she follow exceptthat which appears to herself (her opinion)? Nothing else. Why then areyou angry with the unhappy woman that she has been bewildered about themost important things, and is become a viper instead of a humancreature? And why not, if it is possible, rather pity, as we pity theblind and the lame, so those who are blinded and maimed in the facultieswhich are supreme?

Whoever then clearly remembers this, that to man the measure of everyact is the appearance (the opinion), whether the thing appears good orbad. If good, he is free from blame; if bad, himself suffers thepenalty, for it is impossible that he who is deceived can be one person, and he who suffers another person--whoever remembers this will not beangry with any man, will not be vexed at any man, will not revile orblame any man, nor hate, nor quarrel with any man. 

So then all these great and dreadful deeds have this origin, in theappearance (opinion)? Yes, this origin and no other. The Iliad isnothing else than appearance and the use of appearances. It appeared toAlexander to carry off the wife of Menelaus. It appeared to Helene tofollow him. If then it had appeared to Menelaus to feel that it was again to be deprived of such a wife, what would have happened? Not onlywould the Iliad have been lost, but the Odyssey also. On so small amatter then did such great things depend? But what do you mean by suchgreat things? Wars and civil commotions, and the destruction of many menand cities. And what great matter is this? Is it nothing? But what greatmatter is the death of many oxen, and many sheep, and many nests ofswallows or storks being burnt or destroyed? Are these things then likethose? Very like. Bodies of men are destroyed, and the bodies of oxenand sheep; the dwellings of men are burnt, and the nests of storks. Whatis there in this great or dreadful? Or show me what is the differencebetween a man's house and a stork's nest, as far as each is a dwelling;except that man builds his little houses of beams and tiles and bricks, and the stork builds them of sticks and mud. Are a stork and a man thenlike things? What say you? In body they are very much alike. 

Does a man then differ in no respect from a stork? Don't suppose that Isay so; but there is no difference in these matters (which I havementioned). In what then is the difference? Seek and you will find thatthere is a difference in another matter. See whether it is not in a manthe understanding of what he does, see if it is not in social community, in fidelity, in modesty, in steadfastness, in intelligence. Where thenis the great good and evil in men? It is where the difference is. If thedifference is preserved and remains fenced round, and neither modesty isdestroyed, nor fidelity, nor intelligence, then the man also ispreserved; but if any of these things is destroyed and stormed like acity, then the man too perishes: and in this consist the great things. Alexander, you say, sustained great damage then when the Hellenesinvaded and when they ravaged Troy, and when his brothers perished. Byno means; for no man is damaged by an action which is not his own; butwhat happened at that time was only the destruction of stork's nests. Now the ruin of Alexander was when he lost the character of modesty, fidelity, regard to hospitality, and to decency. When was Achillesruined? Was it when Patroclus died? Not so. But it happened when hebegan to be angry, when he wept for a girl, when he forgot that he wasat Troy not to get mistresses, but to fight. These things are the ruinof men, this is being besieged, this is the destruction of cities, whenright opinions are destroyed, when they are corrupted. 

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ON CONSTANCY (OR FIRMNESS). --The being (nature) of the good is a certainwill; the being of the bad is a certain kind of will. What, then, areexternals? Materials for the will, about which the will being conversantshall obtain its own good or evil. How shall it obtain the good? If itdoes not admire (over-value) the materials; for the opinions about thematerials, if the opinions are right, make the will good: but perverseand distorted opinions make the will bad. God has fixed this law, andsays, "If you would have anything good, receive it from yourself. " Yousay, No, but I will have it from another. Do not so: but receive it fromyourself. Therefore when the tyrant threatens and calls me, I say, Whomdo you threaten? If he says, I will put you in chains, I say, Youthreaten my hands and my feet. If he says, I will cut off your head, Ireply, You threaten my head. If he says, I will throw you into prison, Isay, You threaten the whole of this poor body. If he threatens me withbanishment, I say the same. Does he then not threaten you at all? If Ifeel that all these things do not concern me, he does not threaten me atall; but if I fear any of them, it is I whom he threatens. Whom then doI fear? the master of what? The master of things which are in my ownpower? There is no such master. Do I fear the master of things which arenot in my power? And what are these things to me?

Do you philosophers then teach us to despise kings? I hope not. Whoamong us teaches to claim against them the power over things which theypossess? Take my poor body, take my property, take my reputation, takethose who are about me. If I advise any persons to claim these things, they may truly accuse me. Yes, but I intend to command your opinionsalso. And who has given you this power? How can you conquer the opinionof another man? By applying terror to it, he replies, I will conquer it. Do you not know that opinion conquers itself, and is not conquered byanother? But nothing else can conquer will except the will itself. Forthis reason too the law of God is most powerful and most just, which isthis: Let the stronger always be superior to the weaker. Ten arestronger than one. For what? For putting in chains, for killing, fordragging whither they choose, for taking away what a man has. The tentherefore conquer the one in this in which they are stronger. In whatthen are the ten weaker? If the one possesses right opinions and theothers do not. Well then, can the ten conquer in this matter? How is itpossible? If we were placed in the scales, must not the heavier drawdown the scale in which it is. 

How strange then that Socrates should have been so treated by theAthenians. Slave, why do you say Socrates? Speak of the thing as it is:how strange that the poor body of Socrates should have been carried offand dragged to prison by stronger men, and that anyone should have givenhemlock to the poor body of Socrates, and that it should breathe out thelife. Do these things seem strange, do they seem unjust, do you onaccount of these things blame God? Had Socrates then no equivalent forthese things? Where then for him was the nature of good? Whom shall welisten to, you or him? And what does Socrates say? "Anytus and Melituscan kill me, but they cannot hurt me. " And further, he says, "If it sopleases God, so let it be. "

But show me that he who has the inferior principles overpowers him whois superior in principles. You will never show this, nor come nearshowing it; for this is the law of nature and of God that the superiorshall always overpower the inferior. In what? In that in which it issuperior. One body is stronger than another: many are stronger than one:the thief is stronger than he who is not a thief. This is the reason whyI also lost my lamp, because in wakefulness the thief was superior tome. But the man bought the lamp at this price: for a lamp he became athief, a faithless fellow, and like a wild beast. This seemed to him agood bargain. Be it so. But a man has seized me by the cloak, and isdrawing me to the public place: then others bawl out, Philosopher, whathas been the use of your opinions? see, you are dragged to prison, youare going to be beheaded. And what system of philosophy ([Greek:eisagogaen)] could I have made so that, if a stronger man should havelaid hold of my cloak, I should not be dragged off; that if ten menshould have laid hold of me and cast me into prison, I should not becast in? Have I learned nothing else then? I have learned to see thateverything which happens, if it be independent of my will, is nothing tome. I may ask, if you have not gained by this. Why then do you seekadvantage in anything else than in that in which you have learned thatadvantage is?

Will you not leave the small arguments ([Greek: logaria]) about thesematters to others, to lazy fellows, that they may sit in a corner andreceive their sorry pay, or grumble that no one gives them anything; andwill you not come forward and make use of what you have learned? For itis not these small arguments that are wanted now; the writings of theStoics are full of them. What then is the thing which is wanted? A manwho shall apply them, one who by his acts shall bear testimony to hiswords. Assume, I intreat you, this character, that we may no longer usein the schools the examples of the ancients, but may have some exampleof our own. 

To whom then does the contemplation of these matters (philosophicalinquiries) belong? To him who has leisure, for man is an animal thatloves contemplation. But it is shameful to contemplate these things asrunaway slaves do; we should sit, as in a theatre, free fromdistraction, and listen at one time to the tragic actor, at another timeto the lute-player; and not do as slaves do. As soon as the slave hastaken his station he praises the actor and at the same time looks round;then if any one calls out his master's name, the slave is immediatelyfrightened and disturbed. It is shameful for philosophers thus tocontemplate the works of nature. For what is a master? Man is not themaster of man; but death is, and life and pleasure and pain; for if hecomes without these things, bring Cęsar to me and you will see how firmI am. But when he shall come with these things, thundering andlightning, and when I am afraid of them, what do I do then except torecognize my master like the runaway slave? But so long as I have anyrespite from these terrors, as a runaway slave stands in the theatre, sodo I. I bathe, I drink, I sing; but all this I do with terror anduneasiness. But if I shall release myself from my masters, that is fromthose things by means of which masters are formidable, what furthertrouble have I, what master have I still?

What then, ought we to publish these things to all men? No, but we oughtto accommodate ourselves to the ignorant ([Greek: tois idiotais]) and tosay: "This man recommends to me that which he thinks good for himself. Iexcuse him. " For Socrates also excused the jailer who had the charge ofhim in prison and was weeping when Socrates was going to drink thepoison, and said, "How generously he laments over us. " Does he then sayto the jailer that for this reason we have sent away the women? No, buthe says it to his friends who were able to hear (understand) it; and hetreats the jailer as a child. 

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THAT CONFIDENCE (COURAGE) IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH CAUTION. --The opinionof the philosophers perhaps seem to some to be a paradox; but still letus examine as well as we can, if it is true that it is possible to doeverything both with caution and with confidence. For caution seems tobe in a manner contrary to confidence, and contraries are in no wayconsistent. That which seems to many to be a paradox in the matter underconsideration in my opinion is of this kind; if we asserted that weought to employ caution and confidence in the same things, men mightjustly accuse us of bringing together things which cannot be united. Butnow where is the difficulty in what is said? for if these things aretrue, which have been often said and often proved, that the nature ofgood is in the use of appearances, and the nature of evil likewise, andthat things independent of our will do not admit either the nature ofevil or of good, what paradox do the philosophers assert if they saythat where things are not dependent on the will, there you should employconfidence, but where they are dependent on the will, there you shouldemploy caution? For if the bad consists in the bad exercise of the will, caution ought only to be used where things are dependent on the will. But if things independent of the will and not in our power are nothingto us, with respect to these we must employ confidence; and thus weshall both be cautious and confident, and indeed confident because ofour caution. For by employing caution towards things which are reallybad, it will result that we shall have confidence with respect to thingswhich are not so. 

We are then in the condition of deer; when they flee from the huntsmen'sfeathers in fright, whither do they turn and in what do they seek refugeas safe? They turn to the nets, and thus they perish by confoundingthings which are objects of fear with things that they ought not tofear. Thus we also act: in what cases do we fear? In things which areindependent of the will. In what cases on the contrary do we behave withconfidence, as if there were no danger? In things dependent on the will. To be deceived then, or to act rashly, or shamelessly, or with basedesire to seek something, does not concern us at all, if we only hit themark in things which are independent of our will. But where there isdeath or exile or pain or infamy, there we attempt to run away, there weare struck with terror. Therefore, as we may expect it to happen withthose who err in the greatest matters, we convert natural confidence(that is, according to nature) into audacity, desperation, rashness, shamelessness; and we convert natural caution and modesty into cowardiceand meanness, which are full of fear and confusion. For if a man shouldtransfer caution to those things in which the will may be exercised andthe acts of the will, he will immediately by willing to be cautious havealso the power of avoiding what he chooses; but if he transfer it to thethings which are not in his power and will, and attempt to avoid thethings which are in the power of others, he will of necessity fear, hewill be unstable, he will be disturbed; for death or pain is notformidable, but the fear of pain or death. For this reason we commendthe poet, who said:

 "Not death is evil, but a shameful death. "

Confidence (courage) then ought to be employed against death, andcaution against the fear of death. But now we do the contrary, andemploy against death the attempt to escape; and to our opinion about itwe employ carelessness, rashness, and indifference. These thingsSocrates properly used to call tragic masks; for as to children masksappear terrible and fearful from inexperience, we also are affected inlike manner by events (the things which happen in life) for no otherreason than children are by masks. For what is a child? Ignorance. Whatis a child? Want of knowledge. For when a child knows these things, heis in no way inferior to us. What is death? A tragic mask. Turn it andexamine it. See, it does not bite. The poor body must be separated fromthe spirit either now or later as it was separated from it before. Whythen are you troubled if it be separated now? for if it is not separatednow, it will be separated afterwards. Why? That the period of theuniverse may be completed, for it has need of the present, and of thefuture, and of the past. What is pain? A mask. Turn it and examine it. The poor flesh is moved roughly, then on the contrary smoothly. If thisdoes not satisfy (please) you, the door is open; if it does, bear (withthings). For the door ought to be open for all occasions; and so we haveno trouble. 

What then is the fruit of these opinions? It is that which ought to bethe most noble and the most becoming to those who are really educated, release from perturbation, release from fear. Freedom. For in thesematters we must not believe the many, who say that free persons onlyought to be educated, but we should rather believe the philosophers whosay that the educated only are free. How is this? In this manner: Isfreedom anything else than the power of living as we choose? Nothingelse. Tell me then, ye men, do you wish to live in error? We do not. Noone then who lives in error is free. Do you wish to live in fear? Do youwish to live in sorrow? Do you wish to live in perturbation? By nomeans. No one then who is in a state of fear or sorrow or perturbationis free; but whoever is delivered from sorrows and fears andperturbations, he is at the same time also delivered from servitude. Howthen can we continue to believe you, most dear legislators, when yousay, We only allow free persons to be educated? For philosophers say weallow none to be free except the educated; that is, God does not allowit. When then a man has turned round before the prętor his own slave, has he done nothing? He has done something. What? He has turned roundhis own slave before the prętor. Has he done nothing more? Yes: he isalso bound to pay for him the tax called the twentieth. Well then, isnot the man who has gone through this ceremony become free? No more thanhe is become free from perturbations. Have you who are able to turnround (free) others no master? is not money your master, or a girl or aboy, or some tyrant or some friend of the tyrant? Why do you troublethen when you are going off to any trial (danger) of this kind? It isfor this reason that I often say, study and hold in readiness theseprinciples by which you may determine what those things are withreference to which you ought to be cautious, courageous in that whichdoes not depend on your will, cautious in that which does depend on it. 

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OF TRANQUILLITY (FREEDOM FROM PERTURBATION). --Consider, you who aregoing into court, what you wish to maintain and what you wish to succeedin. For if you wish to maintain a will conformable to nature, you haveevery security, every facility, you have no troubles. For if you wish tomaintain what is in your own power and is naturally free, and if you arecontent with these, what else do you care for? For who is the master ofsuch things? Who can take them away? If you choose to be modest andfaithful, who shall not allow you to be so? If you choose not to berestrained or compelled, who shall compel you to desire what you thinkthat you ought not to desire? who shall compel you to avoid what you donot think fit to avoid? But what do you say? The judge will determineagainst you something that appears formidable; but that you should alsosuffer in trying to avoid it, how can he do that? When then the pursuitof objects and the avoiding of them are in your power, what else do youcare for? Let this be your preface, this your narrative, this yourconfirmation, this your victory, this your peroration, this yourapplause (or the approbation which you will receive). 

Therefore Socrates said to one who was reminding him to prepare for histrial, Do you not think then that I have been preparing for it all mylife? By what kind of preparation? I have maintained that which was inmy own power. How then? I have never done anything unjust either in myprivate or in my public life. 

But if you wish to maintain externals also, your poor body, your littleproperty, and your little estimation, I advise you to make from thismoment all possible preparation, and then consider both the nature ofyour judge and your adversary. If it is necessary to embrace his knees, embrace his knees; if to weep, weep; if to groan, groan. For when youhave subjected to externals what is your own, then be a slave and do notresist, and do not sometimes choose to be a slave, and sometimes notchoose, but with all your mind be one or the other, either free or aslave, either instructed or uninstructed, either a well-bred cock or amean one, either endure to be beaten until you die or yield at once; andlet it not happen to you to receive many stripes and then to yield. Butif these things are base, determine immediately. Where is the nature ofevil and good? It is where truth is: where truth is and where nature is, there is caution: where truth is, there is courage where nature is. 

For this reason also it is ridiculous to say, Suggest something to me(tell me what to do). What should I suggest to you? Well, form my mindso as to accommodate itself to any event. Why that is just the same asif a man who is ignorant of letters should say, Tell me what to writewhen any name is proposed to me. For if I should tell him to write Dion, and then another should come and propose to him not the name of Dion butthat of Theon, what will be done? what will he write? But if you havepractised writing, you are also prepared to write (or to do) anythingthat is required. If you are not, what can I now suggest? For ifcircumstances require something else, what will you say, or what willyou do? Remember then this general precept and you will need nosuggestion. But if you gape after externals, you must of necessityramble up and down in obedience to the will of your master. And who isthe master? He who has the power over the things which you seek to gainor try to avoid. 

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HOW MAGNANIMITY IS CONSISTENT WITH CARE. --Things themselves (materials)are indifferent; but the use of them is not indifferent. How then shalla man preserve firmness and tranquillity, and at the same time becareful and neither rash nor negligent? If he imitates those who play atdice. The counters are indifferent; the dice are indifferent. How do Iknow what the cast will be? But to use carefully and dexterously thecast of the dice, this is my business. Thus then in life also the chiefbusiness is this: distinguish and separate things, and say: Externalsare not in my power: will is in my power. Where shall I seek the goodand the bad? Within, in the things which are my own. But in what doesnot belong to you call nothing either good or bad, or profit or damageor anything of the kind. 

What then? Should we use such things carelessly? In no way: for this onthe other hand is bad for the faculty of the will, and consequentlyagainst nature; but we should act carefully because the use is notindifferent, and we should also act with firmness and freedom fromperturbations because the material is indifferent. For where thematerial is not indifferent, there no man can hinder me or compel me. Where I can be hindered and compelled, the obtaining of those things isnot in my power, nor is it good or bad; but the use is either bad orgood, and the use is in my power. But it is difficult to mingle and tobring together these two things--the carefulness of him who is affectedby the matter (or things about him), and the firmness of him who has noregard for it; but it is not impossible: and if it is, happiness isimpossible. But we should act as we do in the case of a voyage. What canI do? I can choose the master of the ship, the sailors, the day, theopportunity. Then comes a storm. What more have I to care for? for mypart is done. The business belongs to another, the master. But the shipis sinking--what then have I to do? I do the only thing that I can, notto be drowned full of fear, nor screaming nor blaming God, but knowingthat what has been produced must also perish: for I am not an immortalbeing, but a man, a part of the whole, as an hour is a part of the day:I must be present like the hour, and past like the hour. What differencethen does it make to me how I pass away, whether by being suffocated orby a fever, for I must pass through some such means. 

How then is it said that some external things are according to natureand others contrary to nature? It is said as it might be said if we wereseparated from union (or society): for to the foot I shall say that itis according to nature for it to be clean; but if you take it as a footand as a thing not detached (independent), it will befit it both to stepinto the mud and tread on thorns, and sometimes to be cut off for thegood of the whole body; otherwise it is no longer a foot. We shouldthink in some such way about ourselves also. What are you? A man. If youconsider yourself as detached from other men, it is according to natureto live to old age, to be rich, to be healthy. But if you consideryourself as a man and a part of a certain whole, it is for the sake ofthat whole that at one time you should be sick, at another time take avoyage and run into danger, and at another time be in want, and in somecases die prematurely. Why then are you troubled? Do you not know, thatas a foot is no longer a foot if it is detached from the body, so youare no longer a man if you are separated from other men. For what is aman? A part of a state, of that first which consists of gods and of men;then of that which is called next to it, which is a small image of theuniversal state. What then must I be brought to trial; must another havea fever, another sail on the sea, another die, and another be condemned?Yes, for it is impossible in such a universe of things, among so manyliving together, that such things should not happen, some to one andothers to others. It is your duty then since you are come here, to saywhat you ought, to arrange these things as it is fit. Then some onesays, "I shall charge you with doing me wrong. " Much good may it do you:I have done my part; but whether you also have done yours, you must lookto that; for there is some danger of this too, that it may escape yournotice. 

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OF INDIFFERENCE. --The hypothetical proposition is indifferent: thejudgment about it is not indifferent, but it is either knowledge oropinion or error. Thus life is indifferent: the use is not indifferent. When any man then tells you that these things also are indifferent, donot become negligent; and when a man invites you to be careful (aboutsuch things), do not become abject and struck with admiration ofmaterial things. And it is good for you to know your own preparation andpower, that in those matters where you have not been prepared, you maykeep quiet, and not be vexed, if others have the advantage over you. Foryou too in syllogisms will claim to have the advantage over them; and ifothers should be vexed at this, you will console them by saying, "I havelearned them, and you have not. " Thus also where there is need of anypractice, seek not that which is acquired from the need (of suchpractice), but yield in that matter to those who have had practice, andbe yourself content with firmness of mind. 

Go and salute a certain person. How? Not meanly. But I have been shutout, for I have not learned to make my way through the window; and whenI have found the door shut, I must either come back or enter through thewindow. But still speak to him. In what way? Not meanly. But supposethat you have not got what you wanted. Was this your business, and nothis? Why then do you claim that which belongs to another? Alwaysremember what is your own, and what belongs to another; and you will notbe disturbed. Chrysippus therefore said well, So long as future thingsare uncertain, I always cling to those which are more adapted to theconservation of that which is according to nature; for God himself hasgiven me the faculty of such choice. But if I knew that it was fated (inthe order of things) for me to be sick, I would even move towards it;for the foot also, if it had intelligence, would move to go into themud. For why are ears of corn produced? Is it not that they may becomedry? And do they not become dry that they may be reaped? for they arenot separated from communion with other things. If then they hadperception, ought they to wish never to be reaped? But this is a curseupon ears of corn to be never reaped. So we must know that in the caseof men too it is a curse not to die, just the same as not to be ripenedand not to be reaped. But since we must be reaped, and we also know thatwe are reaped, we are vexed at it; for we neither know what we are norhave we studied what belongs to man, as those who have studied horsesknow what belongs to horses. But Chrysantas when he was going to strikethe enemy checked himself when he heard the trumpet sounding a retreat:so it seemed better to him to obey the general's command than to followhis own inclination. But not one of us chooses, even when necessitysummons, readily to obey it, but weeping and groaning we suffer what wedo suffer, and we call them "circumstances. " What kind of circumstances, man? If you give the name of circumstances to the things which arearound you, all things are circumstances; but if you call hardships bythis name, what hardship is there in the dying of that which has beenproduced? But that which destroys is either a sword, or a wheel, or thesea, or a tile, or a tyrant. Why do you care about the way of going downto Hades? All ways are equal. But if you will listen to the truth, theway which the tyrant sends you is shorter. A tyrant never killed a manin six months: but a fever is often a year about it. All these thingsare only sound and the noise of empty names. 

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HOW WE OUGHT TO USE DIVINATION. --Through an unreasonable regard todivination many of us omit many duties. For what more can the divinersee than death or danger or disease, or generally things of that kind?If then I must expose myself to danger for a friend, and if it is myduty even to die for him, what need have I then for divination? Have Inot within me a diviner who has told me the nature of good and of evil, and has explained to me the signs (or marks) of both? What need have Ithen to consult the viscera of victims or the flight of birds, and whydo I submit when he says, It is for your interest? For does he know whatis for my interest, does he know what is good; and as he has learned thesigns of the viscera, has he also learned the signs of good and evil?For if he knows the signs of these, he knows the signs both of thebeautiful and of the ugly, and of the just and of the unjust. Do youtell me, man, what is the thing which is signified for me: is it life ordeath, poverty or wealth? But whether these things are for my interestor whether they are not, I do not intend to ask you. Why don't you giveyour opinion on matters of grammar, and why do you give it here aboutthings on which we are all in error and disputing with one another?

What then leads us to frequent use of divination? Cowardice, the dreadof what will happen. This is the reason why we flatter the diviners. Pray, master, shall I succeed to the property of my father? Let us see:let us sacrifice on the occasion. Yes, master, as fortune chooses. Whenhe has said, You shall succeed to the inheritance, we thank him as if wereceived the inheritance from him. The consequence is that they playupon us. 

Will you not then seek the nature of good in the rational animal? for ifit is not there, you will not choose to say that it exists in any otherthing (plant or animal). What then? are not plants and animals also theworks of God? They are; but they are not superior things, nor yet partsof the gods. But you are a superior thing; you are a portion separatedfrom the Deity; you have in yourself a certain portion of him. Why thenare you ignorant of your own noble descent? Why do you not know whenceyou came? will you not remember when you are eating who you are who eatand whom you feed? When you are in social intercourse, when you areexercising yourself, when you are engaged in discussion, know you notthat you are nourishing a god, that you are exercising a god? Wretch, you are carrying about a god with you, and you know it not. Do you thinkthat I mean some god of silver or of gold, and external? You carry himwithin yourself, and you perceive not that you are polluting him byimpure thoughts and dirty deeds. And if an image of God were present, you would not dare to do any of the things which you are doing; but whenGod himself is present within and sees all and hears all, you are notashamed of thinking such things and doing such things, ignorant as youare of your own nature and subject to the anger of God. Then why do wefear when we are sending a young man from the school into active life, lest he should do anything improperly, eat improperly, have improperintercourse with women; and lest the rags in which he is wrapped shoulddebase him, lest fine garments should make him proud. This youth (if heacts thus) does not know his own God; he knows not with whom he sets out(into the world). But can we endure when he says, "I wish I had you(God) with me. " Have you not God with you? and do you seek for any otherwhen you have him? or will God tell you anything else than this? If youwere a statue of Phidias, either Athena or Zeus, you would think both ofyourself and of the artist, and if you had any understanding (power ofperception) you would try to do nothing unworthy of him who made you orof yourself, and try not to appear in an unbecoming dress (attitude) tothose who look upon you. But now because Zeus has made you, for thisreason do you care not how you shall appear? And yet is the artist (inthe one case) like the artist in the other? or the work in the one caselike the other? And what work of an artist, for instance, has in itselfthe faculties, which the artist shows in making it? Is it not marble orbronze, or gold or ivory? and the Athena of Phidias, when she has onceextended the hand and received in it the figure of Victory, stands inthat attitude for ever. But the works of God have power of motion, theybreathe, they have the faculty of using the appearances of things andthe power of examining them. Being the work of such an artist do youdishonor him? And what shall I say, not only that he made you, but alsoentrusted you to yourself and made you a deposit to yourself? Will younot think of this too, but do you also dishonor your guardianship? Butif God had entrusted an orphan to you, would you thus neglect him? Hehas delivered yourself to your own care, and says: "I had no one fitterto entrust him to than yourself; keep him for me such as he is bynature, modest, faithful, erect, unterrified, free from passion andperturbation. " And then you do not keep him such. 

But some will say, Whence has this fellow got the arrogance which hedisplays and these supercilious looks? I have not yet so much gravity asbefits a philosopher; for I do not yet feel confidence in what I havelearned and in what I have assented to. I still fear my own weakness. Let me get confidence and then you shall see a countenance such as Iought to have and an attitude such as I ought to have; then I will showto you the statue, when it is perfected, when it is polished. What doyou expect? a supercilious countenance? Does the Zeus at Olympia lift uphis brow? No, his look is fixed as becomes him who is ready to say:

 Irrevocable is my word and shall not fail. --Iliad, i. , 526. 

Such will I show myself to you, faithful, modest, noble, free fromperturbation. What, and immortal, too, except from old age, and fromsickness? No, but dying as becomes a god, sickening as becomes a god. This power I possess; this I can do. But the rest I do not possess, norcan I do. I will show the nerves (strength) of a philosopher. Whatnerves are these? A desire never disappointed, an aversion which neverfalls on that which it would avoid, a proper pursuit ([Greek: hormaen]), a diligent purpose, an assent which is not rash. These you shall see. 

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THAT WHEN WE CANNOT FULFIL THAT WHICH THE CHARACTER OF A MAN PROMISES, WE ASSUME THE CHARACTER OF A PHILOSOPHER. --It is no common (easy) thingto do this only, to fulfil the promise of a man's nature. For what is aman? The answer is, A rational and mortal being. Then by the rationalfaculty from whom are we separated? From wild beasts. And from whatothers? From sheep and like animals. Take care then to do nothing like awild beast; but if you do, you have lost the character of a man; youhave not fulfilled your promise. See that you do nothing like a sheep;but if you do, in this case also the man is lost. What then do we do assheep? When we act gluttonously, when we act lewdly, when we act rashly, filthily, inconsiderately, to what have we declined? To sheep. What havewe lost? The rational faculty. When we act contentiously and harmfullyand passionately and violently, to what have we declined? To wildbeasts. Consequently some of us are great wild beasts, and others littlebeasts, of a bad disposition and small, whence we may say, Let me beeaten by a lion. But in all these ways the promise of a man acting as aman is destroyed. For when is a conjunctive (complex) propositionmaintained? When it fulfils what its nature promises; so that thepreservation of a complex proposition is when it is a conjunction oftruths. When is a disjunctive maintained? When it fulfils what itpromises. When are flutes, a lyre, a horse, a dog, preserved? (When theyseverally keep their promise. ) What is the wonder then if man also inlike manner is preserved, and in like manner is lost? Each man isimproved and preserved by corresponding acts, the carpenter by acts ofcarpentry, the grammarian by acts of grammar. But if a man accustomshimself to write ungrammatically, of necessity his art will be corruptedand destroyed. Thus modest actions preserve the modest man, and immodestactions destroy him; and actions of fidelity preserve the faithful man, and the contrary actions destroy him. And on the other hand contraryactions strengthen contrary characters: shamelessness strengthens theshameless man, faithlessness the faithless man, abusive words theabusive man, anger the man of an angry temper, and unequal receiving andgiving make the avaricious man more avaricious. 

For this reason philosophers admonish us not to be satisfied withlearning only, but also to add study, and then practice. For we havelong been accustomed to do contrary things, and we put in practiceopinions which are contrary to true opinions. If then we shall not alsoput in practice right opinions, we shall be nothing more than theexpositors of the opinions of others. For now who among us is not ableto discourse according to the rules of art about good and evil things(in this fashion)? That of things some are good, and some are bad, andsome are indifferent: the good then are virtues, and the things whichparticipate in virtues; and the bad are the contrary; and theindifferent are wealth, health, reputation. Then, if in the midst of ourtalk there should happen some greater noise than usual, or some of thosewho are present should laugh at us, we are disturbed. Philosopher, whereare the things which you were talking about? Whence did you produce andutter them? From the lips, and thence only. Why then do you corrupt theaids provided by others? Why do you treat the weightiest matters as ifyou were playing a game of dice? For it is one thing to lay up bread andwine as in a storehouse, and another thing to eat. That which has beeneaten, is digested, distributed, and is become sinews, flesh, bones, blood, healthy color, healthy breath. Whatever is stored up, when youchoose you can readily take and show it; but you have no other advantagefrom it except so far as to appear to possess it. For what is thedifference between explaining these doctrines and those of men who havedifferent opinions? Sit down now and explain according to the rules ofart the opinions of Epicurus, and perhaps you will explain his opinionsin a more useful manner than Epicurus himself. Why then do you callyourself a Stoic? Why do you deceive the many? Why do you act the partof a Jew, when you are a Greek? Do you not see how (why) each is calleda Jew, or a Syrian, or an Egyptian? and when we see a man inclining totwo sides, we are accustomed to say, This man is not a Jew, but he actsas one. But when he has assumed the affects of one who has been imbuedwith Jewish doctrine and has adopted that sect, then he is in fact andhe is named a Jew. 

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HOW WE MAY DISCOVER THE DUTIES OF LIFE FROM NAMES. --Consider who youare. In the first place, you are a man; and this is one who has nothingsuperior to the faculty of the will, but all other things subjected toit; and the faculty itself he possesses unenslaved and free fromsubjection. Consider then from what things you have been separated byreason. You have been separated from wild beasts; you have beenseparated from domestic animals ([Greek: probaton]). Further, you are acitizen of the world, and a part of it, not one of the subservient(serving), but one of the principal (ruling) parts, for you are capableof comprehending the divine administration and of considering theconnection of things. What then does the character of a citizen promise(profess)? To hold nothing as profitable to himself; to deliberate aboutnothing as if he were detached from the community, but to act as thehand or foot would do, if they had reason and understood theconstitution of nature, for they would never put themselves in motionnor desire anything otherwise than with reference to the whole. Therefore, the philosophers say well, that if the good man hadforeknowledge of what would happen, he would co-operate towards his ownsickness and death and mutilation, since he knows that these things areassigned to him according to the universal arrangement, and that thewhole is superior to the part, and the state to the citizen. But nowbecause we do not know the future, it is our duty to stick to the thingswhich are in their nature more suitable for our choice, for we were madeamong other things for this. 

After this, remember that you are a son. What does this characterpromise? To consider that everything which is the son's belongs to thefather, to obey him in all things, never to blame him to another, nor tosay or do anything which does him injury, to yield to him in all thingsand give way, co-operating with him as far as you can. After this knowthat you are a brother also, and that to this character it is due tomake concessions; to be easily persuaded, to speak good of your brother, never to claim in opposition to him any of the things which areindependent of the will, but readily to give them up, that you may havethe larger share in what is dependent on the will. For see what a thingit is, in place of a lettuce, if it should so happen, or a seat, to gainfor yourself goodness of disposition. How great is the advantage. 

Next to this, if you are a senator of any state, remember that you are asenator; if a youth, that you are a youth; if an old man, that you arean old man; for each of such names, if it comes to be examined, marksout the proper duties. But if you go and blame your brother, I say toyou, You have forgotten who you are and what is your name. In the nextplace, if you were a smith and made a wrong use of the hammer, you wouldhave forgotten the smith; and if you have forgotten the brother andinstead of a brother have become an enemy, would you appear not to havechanged one thing for another in that case? And if instead of a man, whois a tame animal and social, you are become a mischievous wild beast, treacherous, and biting, have you lost nothing? But (I suppose) you mustlose a bit of money that you may suffer damage? And does the loss ofnothing else do a man damage? If you had lost the art of grammar ormusic, would you think the loss of it a damage? and if you shall losemodesty, moderation ([Greek: chtastolaen]) and gentleness, do you thinkthe loss nothing? And yet the things first mentioned are lost by somecause external and independent of the will, and the second by our ownfault; and as to the first neither to have them nor to lose them isshameful; but as to the second, not to have them and to lose them isshameful and matter of reproach and a misfortune. 

What then? shall I not hurt him who has hurt me? In the first placeconsider what hurt ([Greek: blabae]) is, and remember what you haveheard from the philosophers. For if the good consists in the will(purpose, intention, [Greek: proaireeis]), and the evil also in thewill, see if what you say is not this: What then, since that man hashurt himself by doing an unjust act to me, shall I not hurt myself bydoing some unjust act to him? Why do we not imagine to ourselves(mentally think of) something of this kind? But where there is anydetriment to the body or to our possession, there is harm there; andwhere the same thing happens to the faculty of the will, there is (yousuppose) no harm; for he who has been deceived or he who has done anunjust act neither suffers in the head nor in the eye nor in the hip, nor does he lose his estate; and we wish for nothing else than (securityto) these things. But whether we shall have the will modest and faithfulor shameless and faithless, we care not the least, except only in theschool so far as a few words are concerned. Therefore our proficiency islimited to these few words; but beyond them it does not exist even inthe slightest degree. 

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WHAT THE BEGINNING OF PHILOSOPHY IS. --The beginning of philosophy, tohim at least who enters on it in the right way and by the door is aconsciousness of his own weakness and inability about necessary things;for we come into the world with no natural notion of a right-angledtriangle, or of a diesis (a quarter tone), or of a half-tone; but welearn each of these things by a certain transmission according to art;and for this reason those who do not know them do not think that theyknow them. But as to good and evil, and beautiful and ugly, and becomingand unbecoming, and happiness and misfortune, and proper and improper, and what we ought to do and what we ought not to do, who ever came intothe world without having an innate idea of them? Wherefore we all usethese names, and we endeavor to fit the preconceptions to the severalcases (things) thus: he has done well; he has not done well; he has doneas he ought, not as he ought; he has been unfortunate, he has beenfortunate; he is unjust, he is just; who does not use these names? whoamong us defers the use of them till he has learned them, as he defersthe use of the words about lines (geometrical figures) or sounds? Andthe cause of this is that we come into the world already taught as itwere by nature some things on this matter ([Greek: topon]), andproceeding from these we have added to them self-conceit ([Greek:oiaesin]). For why, a man says, do I not know the beautiful and theugly? Have I not the notion of it? You have. Do I not adapt it toparticulars? You do. Do I not then adapt it properly? In that lies thewhole question; and conceit is added here; for beginning from thesethings which are admitted men proceed to that which is matter of disputeby means of unsuitable adaptation; for if they possessed this power ofadaptation in addition to those things, what would hinder them frombeing perfect? But now since you think that you properly adapt thepreconceptions to the particulars, tell me whence you derive this(assume that you do so). Because I think so. But it does not seem so toanother, and he thinks that he also makes a proper adaptation; or doeshe not think so? He does think so. Is it possible then that both of youcan properly apply the preconceptions to things about which you havecontrary opinions? It is not possible. Can you then show us anythingbetter towards adapting the preconceptions beyond your thinking that youdo? Does the madman do any other things than the things which seem tohim right? Is then this criterion sufficient for him also? It is notsufficient. Come then to something which is superior to seeming ([Greek:tou dochein]). What is this?

Observe, this is the beginning of philosophy, a perception of thedisagreement of men with one another, and an inquiry into the cause ofthe disagreement, and a condemnation and distrust of that which only"seems, " and a certain investigation of that which "seems" whether it"seems" rightly, and a discovery of some rule ([Greek: chanonos]), as wehave discovered a balance in the determination of weights, and acarpenter's rule (or square) in the case of straight and crookedthings. --This is the beginning of philosophy. Must we say that allthings are right which seem so to all? And how is it possible thatcontradictions can be right?--Not all then, but all which seem to us tobe right. --How more to you than those which seem right to the Syrians?why more than what seem right to the Egyptians? why more than what seemsright to me or to any other man? Not at all more. What then "seems" toevery man is not sufficient for determining what "is"; for neither inthe case of weights nor measures are we satisfied with the bareappearance, but in each case we have discovered a certain rule. In thismatter then is there no rule superior to what "seems"? And how is itpossible that the most necessary things among men should have no sign(mark), and be incapable of being discovered? There is then some rule. And why then do we not seek the rule and discover it, and afterwards useit without varying from it, not even stretching out the finger withoutit? For this, I think, is that which when it is discovered cures oftheir madness those who use mere "seeming" as a measure, and misuse it;so that for the future proceeding from certain things (principles) knownand made clear we may use in the case of particular things thepreconceptions which are distinctly fixed. 

What is the matter presented to us about which we are inquiring?Pleasure (for example). Subject it to the rule, throw it into thebalance. Ought the good to be such a thing that it is fit that we haveconfidence in it? Yes. And in which we ought to confide? It ought to be. Is it fit to trust to anything which is insecure? No. Is then pleasureanything secure? No. Take it then and throw it out of the scale, anddrive it far away from the place of good things. But if you are notsharp-sighted, and one balance is not enough for you, bring another. Isit fit to be elated over what is good? Yes. Is it proper then to beelated over present pleasure? See that you do not say that it is proper;but if you do, I shall then not think you worthy even of the balance. Thus things are tested and weighed when the rules are ready. And tophilosophize is this, to examine and confirm the rules; and then to usethem when they are known is the act of a wise and good man. 

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OF DISPUTATION OR DISCUSSION. --What things a man must learn in order tobe able to apply the art of disputation, has been accurately shown byour philosophers (the Stoics); but with respect to the proper use of thethings, we are entirely without practice. Only give to any of us, whomyou please, an illiterate man to discuss with, and he cannot discoverhow to deal with the man. But when he has moved the man a little, if heanswers beside the purpose, he does not know how to treat him, but hethen either abuses or ridicules him, and says, He is an illiterate man;it is not possible to do anything with him. Now a guide, when he hasfound a man out of the road, leads him into the right way; he does notridicule or abuse him and then leave him. Do you also show theilliterate man the truth, and you will see that he follows. But so longas you do not show him the truth, do not ridicule him, but rather feelyour own incapacity. 

Now this was the first and chief peculiarity of Socrates, never to beirritated in argument, never to utter anything abusive, anythinginsulting, but to bear with abusive persons and to put an end to thequarrel. If you would know what great power he had in this way, read theSymposium of Xenophon, and you will see how many quarrels he put an endto. Hence with good reason in the poets also this power is most highlypraised:

 Quickly with skill he settles great disputes. Hesiod, Theogony, v. 87. 

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ON ANXIETY (SOLICITUDE). --When I see a man anxious, I say, What doesthis man want? If he did not want something which is not in his power, how could he be anxious? For this reason a lute player when he issinging by himself has no anxiety, but when he enters the theatre, he isanxious, even if he has a good voice and plays well on the lute; for henot only wishes to sing well, but also to obtain applause: but this isnot in his power. Accordingly, where he has skill, there he hasconfidence. Bring any single person who knows nothing of music, and themusician does not care for him. But in the matter where a man knowsnothing and has not been practised, there he is anxious. What matter isthis? He knows not what a crowd is or what the praise of a crowd is. However, he has learned to strike the lowest chord and the highest; butwhat the praise of the many is, and what power it has in life, heneither knows nor has he thought about it. Hence he must of necessitytremble and grow pale. Is any man then afraid about things which are notevils? No. Is he afraid about things which are evils, but still so farwithin his power that they may not happen? Certainly he is not. If thenthe things which are independent of the will are neither good nor bad, and all things which do depend on the will are within our power, and noman can either take them from us or give them to us, if we do notchoose, where is room left for anxiety? But we are anxious about ourpoor body, our little property, about the will of Cęsar; but not anxiousabout things internal. Are we anxious about not forming a false opinion?No, for this is in my power. About not exerting our movements contraryto nature? No, not even about this. When then you see a man pale, as thephysician says, judging from the complexion, this man's spleen isdisordered, that man's liver; so also say, this man's desire andaversion are disordered, he is not in the right way, he is in a fever. For nothing else changes the color, or causes trembling or chattering ofthe teeth, or causes a man to

 Sink in his knees and shift from foot to foot. Iliad, xiii. , 281. 

For this reason, when Zeno was going to meet Antigonus, he was notanxious, for Antigonus had no power over any of the things which Zenoadmired; and Zeno did not care for those things over which Antigonus hadpower. But Antigonus was anxious when he was going to meet Zeno, for hewished to please Zeno; but this was a thing external (out of his power). But Zeno did not want to please Antigonus; for no man who is skilled inany art wishes to please one who has no such skill. 

Should I try to please you? Why? I suppose, you know the measure bywhich one man is estimated by another. Have you taken pains to learnwhat is a good man and what is a bad man, and how a man becomes one orthe other? Why then are you not good yourself? How, he replies, am I notgood? Because no good man laments or groans or weeps, no good man ispale and trembles, or says, How will he receive me, how will he listento me? Slave, just as it pleases him. Why do you care about what belongsto others? Is it now his fault if he receives badly what proceeds fromyou? Certainly. And is it possible that a fault should be one man's, andthe evil in another? No. Why then are you anxious about that whichbelongs to others? Your question is reasonable; but I am anxious how Ishall speak to him. Cannot you then speak to him as you choose? But Ifear that I may be disconcerted? If you are going to write the name ofDion, are you afraid that you would be disconcerted? By no means. Why?is it not because you have practised writing the name? Certainly. Well, if you were going to read the name, would you not feel the same? andwhy? Because every art has a certain strength and confidence in thethings which belong to it. Have you then not practised speaking? andwhat else did you learn in the school? Syllogisms and sophisticalpropositions? For what purpose? was it not for the purpose ofdiscoursing skilfully? and is not discoursing skilfully the same asdiscoursing seasonably and cautiously and with intelligence, and alsowithout making mistakes and without hindrance, and besides all this withconfidence? Yes. When then you are mounted on a horse and go into aplain, are you anxious at being matched against a man who is on foot, and anxious in a matter in which you are practised, and he is not? Yes, but that person (to whom I am going to speak) has power to kill me. Speak the truth, then, unhappy man, and do not brag, nor claim to be aphilosopher, nor refuse to acknowledge your masters, but so long as youpresent this handle in your body, follow every man who is stronger thanyourself. Socrates used to practice speaking, he who talked as he did tothe tyrants, to the dicasts (judges), he who talked in his prison. Diogenes had practised speaking, he who spoke as he did to Alexander, tothe pirates, to the person who bought him. These men were confident inthe things which they practised. But do you walk off to your own affairsand never leave them: go and sit in a corner, and weave syllogisms, andpropose them to another. There is not in you the man who can rule astate. 

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TO NASO. --When a certain Roman entered with his son and listened to onereading, Epictetus said, This is the method of instruction; and hestopped. When the Roman asked him to go on, Epictetus said, Every artwhen it is taught causes labor to him who is unacquainted with it and isunskilled in it, and indeed the things which proceed from the artsimmediately show their use in the purpose for which they were made; andmost of them contain something attractive and pleasing. For indeed to bepresent and to observe how a shoemaker learns is not a pleasant thing;but the shoe is useful and also not disagreeable to look at. And thediscipline of a smith when he is learning is very disagreeable to onewho chances to be present and is a stranger to the art: but the workshows the use of the art. But you will see this much more in music; forif you are present while a person is learning, the discipline willappear most disagreeable; and yet the results of music are pleasing anddelightful to those who know nothing of music. And here we conceive thework of a philosopher to be something of this kind: he must adapt hiswish ([Greek: boulaesin]) to what is going on, so that neither any ofthe things which are taking place shall take place contrary to our wish, nor any of the things which do not take place shall not take place whenwe wish that they should. From this the result is to those who have soarranged the work of philosophy, not to fail in the desire, nor to fallin with that which they would avoid; without uneasiness, without fear, without perturbation to pass through life themselves, together withtheir associates maintaining the relations both natural and acquired, asthe relation of son, of father, of brother, of citizen, of man, of wife, of neighbor, of fellow-traveller, of ruler, of ruled. The work of aphilosopher we conceive to be something like this. It remains next toinquire how this must be accomplished. 

We see then that the carpenter ([Greek: techton]) when he has learnedcertain things becomes a carpenter; the pilot by learning certain thingsbecomes a pilot. May it not then in philosophy also not be sufficient towish to be wise and good, and that there is also a necessity to learncertain things? We inquire then what these things are. The philosopherssay that we ought first to learn that there is a God and that heprovides for all things; also that it is not possible to conceal fromhim our acts, or even our intentions and thoughts. The next thing is tolearn what is the nature of the gods; for such as they are discovered tobe, he, who would please and obey them, must try with all his power tobe like them. If the divine is faithful, man also must be faithful; ifit is free, man also must be free; if beneficent, man also must bebeneficent; if magnanimous, man also must be magnanimous; as being thenan imitator of God he must do and say everything consistently with thisfact. 

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TO OR AGAINST THOSE WHO OBSTINATELY PERSIST IN WHAT THEY HAVEDETERMINED. --When some persons have heard these words, that a man oughtto be constant (firm), and that the will is naturally free and notsubject to compulsion, but that all other things are subject tohindrance, to slavery, and are in the power of others, they suppose thatthey ought without deviation to abide by everything which they havedetermined. But in the first place that which has been determined oughtto be sound (true). I require tone (sinews) in the body, but such asexists in a healthy body, in an athletic body; but if it is plain to methat you have the tone of a frenzied man and you boast of it, I shallsay to you, Man, seek the physician; this is not tone, but atony(deficiency in right tone). In a different way something of the samekind is felt by those who listen to these discourses in a wrong manner;which was the case with one of my companions, who for no reason resolvedto starve himself to death. I heard of it when it was the third day ofhis abstinence from food, and I went to inquire what had happened. "Ihave resolved, " he said. "But still tell me what it was which inducedyou to resolve; for if you have resolved rightly, we shall sit with youand assist you to depart, but if you have made an unreasonableresolution, change your mind. " "We ought to keep to our determinations. ""What are you doing, man? We ought to keep not to all ourdeterminations, but to those which are right; for if you are nowpersuaded that it is right, do not change your mind, if you think fit, but persist and say, We ought to abide by our determinations. Will younot make the beginning and lay the foundation in an inquiry whether thedetermination is sound or not sound, and so then build on it firmnessand security? But if you lay a rotten and ruinous foundation, will notyour miserable little building fall down the sooner, the more and thestronger are the materials which you shall lay on it? Without any reasonwould you withdraw from us out of life a man who is a friend and acompanion, a citizen of the same city, both the great and the smallcity? Then while you are committing murder and destroying a man who hasdone no wrong, do you say that you ought to abide by yourdeterminations? And if it ever in any way came into your head to killme, ought you to abide by your determinations?"

Now this man was with difficulty persuaded to change his mind. But it isimpossible to convince some persons at present; so that I seem now toknow what I did not know before, the meaning of the common saying, thatyou can neither persuade nor break a fool. May it never be my lot tohave a wise fool for my friend; nothing is more untractable. "I amdetermined, " the man says. Madmen are also, but the more firmly theyform a judgment on things which do not exist, the more hellebore theyrequire. Will you not act like a sick man and call in the physician?--Iam sick, master, help me; consider what I must do: it is my duty to obeyyou. So it is here also: I know not what I ought to do, but I am come tolearn. --Not so; but speak to me about other things: upon this I havedetermined. --What other things? for what is greater and more useful thanfor you to be persuaded that it is not sufficient to have made yourdetermination and not to change it. This is the tone (energy) ofmadness, not of health. --I will die, if you compel me to this. --Why, man? What has happened?--I have determined--I have had a lucky escapethat you have not determined to kill me--I take no money. Why?--I havedetermined--Be assured that with the very tone (energy) which you nowuse in refusing to take, there is nothing to hinder you at some timefrom inclining without reason to take money, and then saying, I havedetermined. As in a distempered body, subject to defluxions, the humorinclines sometimes to these parts, and then to those, so too a sicklysoul knows not which way to incline; but if to this inclination andmovement there is added a tone (obstinate resolution), then the evilbecomes past help and cure. 

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THAT WE DO NOT STRIVE TO USE OUR OPINIONS ABOUT GOOD AND EVIL. --Where isthe good? In the will. Where is the evil? In the will. Where is neitherof them? In those things which are independent of the will. Well then?Does any one among us think of these lessons out of the schools? Doesany one meditate (strive) by himself to give an answer to things as inthe case of questions?--Is it day?--Yes. --Is it night?--No. --Well, isthe number of stars even?--I cannot say. --When money is shown (offered)to you, have you studied to make the proper answer, that money is not agood thing? Have you practised yourself in these answers, or onlyagainst sophisms? Why do you wonder then if in the cases which you havestudied, in those you have improved; but in those which you have notstudied, in those you remain the same? When the rhetorician knows thathe has written well, that he has committed to memory what he haswritten, and brings an agreeable voice, why is he still anxious? Becausehe is not satisfied with having studied. What then does he want? To bepraised by the audience? For the purpose then of being able to practisedeclamation he has been disciplined; but with respect to praise andblame he has not been disciplined. For when did he hear from any onewhat praise is, what blame is, what the nature of each is, what kind ofpraise should be sought, or what kind of blame should be shunned? Andwhen did he practise this discipline which follows these words (things)?Why then do you still wonder, if in the matters which a man has learned, there he surpasses others, and in those in which he has not beendisciplined, there he is the same with the many. So the lute playerknows how to play, sings well, and has a fine dress, and yet he trembleswhen he enters on the stage; for these matters he understands, but hedoes not know what a crowd is, nor the shouts of a crowd, nor whatridicule is. Neither does he know what anxiety is, whether it is ourwork or the work of another, whether it is possible to stop it or not. For this reason if he has been praised, he leaves the theatre puffed up, but if he has been ridiculed, the swollen bladder has been punctured andsubsides. 

This is the case also with ourselves. What do we admire? Externals. About what things are we busy? Externals. And have we any doubt then whywe fear or why we are anxious? What then happens when we think thethings, which are coming on us, to be evils? It is not in our power notto be afraid, it is not in our power not to be anxious. Then we say, Lord God, how shall I not be anxious? Fool, have you not hands, did notGod make them for you? Sit down now and pray that your nose may not run. Wipe yourself rather and do not blame him. Well then, has he given toyou nothing in the present case? Has he not given to you endurance? Hashe not given to you magnanimity? Has he not given to you manliness? Whenyou have such hands do you still look for one who shall wipe your nose?But we neither study these things nor care for them. Give me a man whocares how he shall do anything, not for the obtaining of a thing, butwho cares about his own energy. What man, when he is walking about, cares for his own energy? Who, when he is deliberating, cares about hisown deliberation, and not about obtaining that about which hedeliberates? And if he succeeds, he is elated and says, How well we havedeliberated; did I not tell you, brother, that it is impossible, when wehave thought about anything, that it should not turn out thus? But ifthe thing should turn out otherwise, the wretched man is humbled; heknows not even what to say about what has taken place. Who among us forthe sake of this matter has consulted a seer? Who among us as to hisactions has not slept in indifference? Who? Give (name) to me one that Imay see the man whom I have long been looking for, who is truly nobleand ingenuous, whether young or old; name him. 

What then are the things which are heavy on us and disturb us? What elsethan opinions? What else than opinions lies heavy upon him who goes awayand leaves his companions and friends and places and habits of life? Nowlittle children, for instance, when they cry on the nurse leaving themfor a short time, forget their sorrow if they receive a small cake. Doyou choose then that we should compare you to little children? No, byZeus, for I do not wish to be pacified by a small cake, but by rightopinions. And what are these? Such as a man ought to study all day, andnot to be affected by anything that is not his own, neither by companionnor place nor gymnasia, and not even by his own body, but to rememberthe law and to have it before his eyes. And what is the divine law? Tokeep a man's own, not to claim that which belongs to others, but to usewhat is given, and when it is not given, not to desire it; and when athing is taken away, to give it up readily and immediately, and to bethankful for the time that a man has had the use of it, if you would notcry for your nurse and mamma. For what matter does it make by what thinga man is subdued, and on what he depends? In what respect are you betterthan he who cries for a girl, if you grieve for a little gymnasium, andlittle porticos, and young men, and such places of amusement? Anothercomes and laments that he shall no longer drink the water of Dirce. Isthe Marcian water worse than that of Dirce? But I was used to the waterof Dirce. And you in turn will be used to the other. Then if you becomeattached to this also, cry for this too, and try to make a verse likethe verse of Euripides, The hot baths of Nero and the Marcian water. 

See how tragedy is made when common things happen to silly men. 

When then shall I see Athens again and the Acropolis? Wretch, are younot content with what you see daily? Have you anything better or greaterto see than the sun, the moon, the stars, the whole earth, the sea? Butif indeed you comprehend Him who administers the whole, and carry himabout in yourself, do you still desire small stones and a beautifulrock?

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HOW WE MUST ADAPT PRECONCEPTIONS TO PARTICULAR CASES. --What is the firstbusiness of him who philosophizes? To throw away self-conceit ([Greek:oiaesis]). For it is impossible for a man to begin to learn that whichhe thinks that he knows. As to things then which ought to be done andought not to be done, and good and bad, and beautiful and ugly, all ofus talking of them at random go to the philosophers; and on thesematters we praise, we censure, we accuse, we blame, we judge anddetermine about principles honorable and dishonorable. But why do we goto the philosophers? Because we wish to learn what we do not think thatwe know. And what is this? Theorems. For we wish to learn whatphilosophers say as being something elegant and acute; and some wish tolearn that they may get profit from what they learn. It is ridiculousthen to think that a person wishes to learn one thing, and will learnanother; or further, that a man will make proficiency in that which hedoes not learn. But the many are deceived by this which deceived alsothe rhetorician Theopompus, when he blames even Plato for wishingeverything to be defined. For what does he say? Did none of us beforeyou use the words good or just, or do we utter the sounds in anunmeaning and empty way without understanding what they severallysignify? Now who tells you, Theopompus, that we had not natural notionsof each of these things and preconceptions ([Greek: prolaepseis])? Butit is not possible to adapt preconceptions to their correspondentobjects if we have not distinguished (analyzed) them, and inquired whatobject must be subjected to each preconception. You may make the samecharge against physicians also. For who among us did not use the wordshealthy and unhealthy before Hippocrates lived, or did we utter thesewords as empty sounds? For we have also a certain preconception ofhealth, but we are not able to adapt it. For this reason one says, Abstain from food; another says, Give food; another says, Bleed; andanother says, Use cupping. What is the reason? is it any other than thata man cannot properly adapt the preconceptions of health to particulars?

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HOW WE SHOULD STRUGGLE AGAINST APPEARANCES. --Every habit and faculty ismaintained and increased by the corresponding actions: the habit ofwalking by walking, the habit of running by running. If you would be agood reader, read; if a writer, write. But when you shall not have readfor thirty days in succession, but have done something else, you willknow the consequence. In the same way, if you shall have lain down tendays, get up and attempt to make a long walk, and you will see how yourlegs are weakened. Generally then if you would make anything a habit, doit; if you would not make it a habit, do not do it, but accustomyourself to do something else in place of it. 

So it is with respect to the affections of the soul: when you have beenangry, you must know that not only has this evil befallen you, but thatyou have also increased the habit, and in a manner thrown fuel uponfire. 

In this manner certainly, as philosophers say, also diseases of the mindgrow up. For when you have once desired money, if reason be applied tolead to a perception of the evil, the desire is stopped, and the rulingfaculty of our mind is restored to the original authority. But if youapply no means of cure, it no longer returns to the same state, butbeing again excited by the corresponding appearance, it is inflamed todesire quicker than before: and when this takes place continually, it ishenceforth hardened (made callous), and the disease of the mind confirmsthe love of money. For he who has had a fever, and has been relievedfrom it, is not in the same state that he was before, unless he has beencompletely cured. Something of the kind happens also in diseases of thesoul. Certain traces and blisters are left in it, and unless a man shallcompletely efface them, when he is again lashed on the same places, thelash will produce not blisters (weals) but sores. If then you wish notto be of an angry temper, do not feed the habit: throw nothing on itwhich will increase it: at first keep quiet, and count the days on whichyou have not been angry. I used to be in passion every day; now everysecond day; then every third, then every fourth. But if you haveintermitted thirty days, make a sacrifice to God. For the habit at firstbegins to be weakened, and then is completely destroyed. "I have notbeen vexed to-day, nor the day after, nor yet on any succeeding dayduring two or three months; but I took care when some exciting thingshappened. " Be assured that you are in a good way. 

How then shall this be done? Be willing at length to be approved byyourself, be willing to appear beautiful to God, desire to be in puritywith your own pure self and with God. Then when any such appearancevisits you, Plato says, Have recourse to expiations, go a suppliant tothe temples of the averting deities. It is even sufficient if you resortto the society of noble and just men, and compare yourself with them, whether you find one who is living or dead. 

But in the first place, be not hurried away by the rapidity of theappearance, but say, Appearances, wait for me a little; let me see whoyou are, and what you are about; let me put you to the test. And then donot allow the appearance to lead you on and draw lively pictures of thethings which will follow; for if you do, it will carry you off whereverit pleases. But rather bring in to oppose it some other beautiful andnoble appearance, and cast out this base appearance. And if you areaccustomed to be exercised in this way, you will see what shoulders, what sinews, what strength you have. But now it is only trifling words, and nothing more. 

This is the true athlete, the man who exercises himself against suchappearances. Stay, wretch, do not be carried away. Great is the combat, divine is the work; it is for kingship, for freedom, for happiness, forfreedom from perturbation. Remember God; call on him as a helper andprotector, as men at sea call on the Dioscuri in a storm. For what is agreater storm than that which comes from appearances which are violentand drive away the reason? For the storm itself, what else is it but anappearance? For take away the fear of death, and suppose as manythunders and lightnings as you please, and you will know what calm andserenity there is in the ruling faculty. But if you have once beendefeated and say that you will conquer hereafter, and then say the sameagain, be assured that you will at last be in so wretched a conditionand so weak that you will not even know afterwards that you are doingwrong, but you will even begin to make apologies (defences) for yourwrong-doing, and then you will confirm the saying of Hesiod to be true, With constant ills the dilatory strives. 

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OF INCONSISTENCY. --Some things men readily confess, and other thingsthey do not. No one then will confess that he is a fool or withoutunderstanding; but quite the contrary you will hear all men saying, Iwish that I had fortune equal to my understanding. But men readilyconfess that they are timid, and they say: I am rather timid, I confess;but as to other respects you will not find me to be foolish. A man willnot readily confess that he is intemperate; and that he is unjust, hewill not confess at all. He will by no means confess that he is enviousor a busybody. Most men will confess that they are compassionate. Whatthen is the reason?

The chief thing (the ruling thing) is inconsistency and confusion in thethings which relate to good and evil. But different men have differentreasons; and generally what they imagine to be base, they do not confessat all. But they suppose timidity to be a characteristic of a gooddisposition, and compassion also; but silliness to be the absolutecharacteristic of a slave. And they do not at all admit (confess) thethings which are offences against society. But in the case of mosterrors for this reason chiefly they are induced to confess them, becausethey imagine that there is something involuntary in them as in timidityand compassion; and if a man confess that he is in any respectintemperate, he alleges love (or passion) as an excuse for what isinvoluntary. But men do not imagine injustice to be at all involuntary. There is also in jealousy, as they suppose, something involuntary; andfor this reason they confess to jealousy also. 

Living then among such men, who are so confused, so ignorant of whatthey say, and of the evils which they have or have not, and why theyhave them, or how they shall be relieved of them, I think it is worththe trouble for a man to watch constantly (and to ask) whether I also amone of them, what imagination I have about myself, how I conduct myself, whether I conduct myself as a prudent man, whether I conduct myself as atemperate man, whether I ever say this, that I have been taught to beprepared for everything that may happen. Have I the consciousness, whicha man who knows nothing ought to have, that I know nothing? Do I go tomy teacher as men go to oracles, prepared to obey? or do I like asnivelling boy go to my school to learn history and understand the bookswhich I did not understand before, and, if it should happen so, toexplain them also to others? Man, you have had a fight in the house witha poor slave, you have turned the family upside down, you havefrightened the neighbors, and you come to me as if you were a wise man, and you take your seat and judge how I have explained some word, and howI have babbled whatever came into my head. You come full of envy, andhumbled, because you bring nothing from home; and you sit during thediscussion thinking of nothing else than how your father is disposedtowards you and your brother. What are they saying about me there? nowthey think that I am improving, and are saying, He will return with allknowledge. I wish I could learn everything before I return; but muchlabor is necessary, and no one sends me anything, and the baths atNicopolis are dirty; everything is bad at home, and bad here. 

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ON FRIENDSHIP. --What a man applies himself to earnestly, that henaturally loves. Do men then apply themselves earnestly to the thingswhich are bad? By no means. Well, do they apply themselves to thingswhich in no way concern themselves? Not to these either. It remains thenthat they employ themselves earnestly only about things which are good;and if they are earnestly employed about things, they love such thingsalso. Whoever then understands what is good can also know how to love;but he who cannot distinguish good from bad, and things which areneither good nor bad from both, how can he possess the power of loving?To love, then, is only in the power of the wise. 

For universally, be not deceived, every animal is attached to nothing somuch as to its own interests. Whatever then appears to it an impedimentto this interest, whether this be a brother, or a father, or a child, orbeloved, or lover, it hates, spurns, curses; for its nature is to lovenothing so much as its own interests: this is father, and brother, andkinsman, and country, and God. When then the gods appear to us to be animpediment to this, we abuse them and throw down their statues and burntheir temples, as Alexander ordered the temples of Aesculapius to beburned when his dear friend died. 

For this reason, if a man put in the same place his interest, sanctity, goodness, and country, and parents, and friends, all these are secured:but if he puts in one place his interest, in another his friends, andhis country and his kinsmen and justice itself, all these give way, being borne down by the weight of interest. For where the I and the Mineare placed, to that place of necessity the animal inclines; if in theflesh, there is the ruling power; if in the will, it is there; and if itis in externals, it is there. If then I am there where my will is, thenonly shall I be a friend such as I ought to be, and son, and father; forthis will be my interest, to maintain the character of fidelity, ofmodesty, of patience, of abstinence, of active co-operation, ofobserving my relations (towards all). But if I put myself in one place, and honesty in another, then the doctrine of Epicurus becomes strong, which asserts either that there is no honesty or it is that whichopinion holds to be honest (virtuous). 

It was through this ignorance that the Athenians and the Lacedaemoniansquarrelled, and the Thebans with both; and the great king quarrelledwith Hellas, and the Macedonians with both: and the Romans with theGetae. And still earlier the Trojan war happened for these reasons. Alexander was the guest of Menelaus, and if any man had seen theirfriendly disposition, he would not have believed any one who said thatthey were not friends. But there was cast between them (as between dogs)a bit of meat, a handsome woman, and about her war arose. And now whenyou see brothers to be friends appearing to have one mind, do notconclude from this anything about their friendship, not even if theyswear it and say that it is impossible for them to be separated from oneanother. For the ruling principle of a bad man cannot be trusted; it isinsecure, has no certain rule by which it is directed, and isoverpowered at different times by different appearances. But examine, not what other men examine, if they are born of the same parents andbrought up together, and under the same pedagogue; but examine thisonly, wherein they place their interest, whether in externals or in thewill. If in externals, do not name them friends, no more than name themtrustworthy or constant, or brave or free; do not name them even men, ifyou have any judgment. For that is not a principle of human nature whichmakes them bite one another, and abuse one another, and occupy desertedplaces or public places, as if they were mountains, and in the courts ofjustice display the acts of robbers; nor yet that which makes themintemperate and adulterers and corrupters, nor that which makes them dowhatever else men do against one another through this one opinion only, that of placing themselves and their interests in the things which arenot within the power of their will. But if you hear that in truth thesemen think the good to be only there, where will is, and where there is aright use of appearances, no longer trouble yourself whether they arefather or son, or brothers, or have associated a long time and arecompanions, but when you have ascertained this only, confidently declarethat they are friends, as you declare that they are faithful, that theyare just. For where else is friendship than where there is fidelity, andmodesty, where there is a communion of honest things and of nothingelse. 

But you may say, Such a one treated me with regard so long; and did henot love me? How do you know, slave, if he did not regard you in thesame way as he wipes his shoes with a sponge, or as he takes care of hisbeast? How do you know, when you have ceased to be useful as a vessel, he will not throw you away like a broken platter? But this woman is mywife, and we have lived together so long. And how long did Eriphyle livewith Amphiaraus, and was the mother of children and of many? But anecklace came between them: and what is a necklace? It is the opinionabout such things. That was the bestial principle, that was the thingwhich broke asunder the friendship between husband and wife, that whichdid not allow the woman to be a wife nor the mother to be a mother. Andlet every man among you who has seriously resolved either to be a friendhimself or to have another for his friend, cut out these opinions, hatethem, drive them from his soul. And thus first of all he will notreproach himself, he will not be at variance with himself, he will notchange his mind, he will not torture himself. In the next place, toanother also, who is like himself, he will be altogether and completelya friend. But he will bear with the man who is unlike himself, he willbe kind to him, gentle, ready to pardon on account of his ignorance, onaccount of his being mistaken in things of the greatest importance; buthe will be harsh to no man, being well convinced of Plato's doctrinethat every mind is deprived of truth unwillingly. If you cannot do this, yet you can do in all other respects as friends do, drink together, andlodge together, and sail together, and you may be born of the sameparents, for snakes also are: but neither will they be friends, nor you, so long as you retain these bestial and cursed opinions. 

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ON THE POWER OF SPEAKING. --Every man will read a book with more pleasureor even with more ease, if it is written in fairer characters. Thereforeevery man will also listen more readily to what is spoken, if it issignified by appropriate and becoming words. We must not say then thatthere is no faculty of expression: for this affirmation is thecharacteristic of an impious and also of a timid man. Of an impious man, because he undervalues the gifts which come from God, just as if hewould take away the commodity of the power of vision, or hearing, or ofseeing. Has then God given you eyes to no purpose? and to no purpose hashe infused into them a spirit so strong and of such skilful contrivanceas to reach a long way and to fashion the forms of things which areseen? What messenger is so swift and vigilant? And to no purpose has hemade the interjacent atmosphere so efficacious and elastic that thevision penetrates through the atmosphere which is in a manner moved? Andto no purpose has he made light, without the presence of which therewould be no use in any other thing?

Man, be neither ungrateful for these gifts nor yet forget the thingswhich are superior to them. But indeed for the power of seeing andhearing, and indeed for life itself, and for the things which contributeto support it, for the fruits which are dry, and for wine and oil givethanks to God: but remember that he has given you something else betterthan all these, I mean the power of using them, proving them, andestimating the value of each. For what is that which gives informationabout each of these powers, what each of them is worth? Is it eachfaculty itself? Did you ever hear the faculty of vision saying anythingabout itself? or the faculty of hearing? or wheat, or barley, or ahorse, or a dog? No; but they are appointed as ministers and slaves toserve the faculty which has the power of making use of the appearancesof things. And if you inquire what is the value of each thing, of whomdo you inquire? who answers you? How then can any other faculty be morepowerful than this, which uses the rest as ministers and itself proveseach and pronounces about them? for which of them knows what itself is, and what is its own value? which of them knows when it ought to employitself and when not? what faculty is it which opens and closes the eyes, and turns them away from objects to which it ought not to apply them anddoes apply them to other objects? Is it the faculty of vision? No, butit is the faculty of the will. What is that faculty which closes andopens the ears? what is that by which they are curious and inquisitive, or on the contrary unmoved by what is said? is it the faculty ofhearing? It is no other than the faculty of the will. Will this facultythen, seeing that it is amidst all the other faculties which are blindand dumb and unable to see anything else except the very acts for whichthey are appointed in order to minister to this (faculty) and serve it, but this faculty alone sees sharp and sees what is the value of each ofthe rest; will this faculty declare to us that anything else is thebest, or that itself is? And what else does the eye do when it is openedthan see? But whether we ought to look on the wife of a certain person, and in what manner, who tells us? The faculty of the will. And whetherwe ought to believe what is said or not to believe it, and if we dobelieve, whether we ought to be moved by it or not, who tells us? Is itnot the faculty of the will?

But if you ask me what then is the most excellent of all things, whatmust I say? I cannot say the power of speaking, but the power of thewill, when it is right ([Greek: orthae]). For it is this which uses theother (the power of speaking), and all the other faculties both smalland great. For when this faculty of the will is set right, a man who isnot good becomes good: but when it fails, a man becomes bad. It isthrough this that we are unfortunate, that we are fortunate, that weblame one another, are pleased with one another. In a word, it is thiswhich if we neglect it makes unhappiness, and if we carefully look afterit, makes happiness. 

What then is usually done? Men generally act as a traveller would do onhis way to his own country, when he enters a good inn, and being pleasedwith it should remain there. Man, you have forgotten your purpose: youwere not travelling to this inn, but you were passing through it. Butthis is a pleasant inn. And how many other inns are pleasant? and howmany meadows are pleasant? yet only for passing through. But yourpurpose is this, to return to your country, to relieve your kinsmen ofanxiety, to discharge the duties of a citizen, to marry, to begetchildren, to fill the usual magistracies. For you are not come to selectmore pleasant places, but to live in these where you were born and ofwhich you were made a citizen. Something of the kind takes place in thematter which we are considering. Since by the aid of speech and suchcommunication as you receive here you must advance to perfection, andpurge your will and correct the faculty which makes use of theappearances of things; and since it is necessary also for the teaching(delivery) of theorems to be effected by a certain mode of expressionand with a certain variety and sharpness, some persons captivated bythese very things abide in them, one captivated by the expression, another by syllogisms, another again by sophisms, and still another bysome other inn ([Greek: paudocheiou]) of the kind; and there they stayand waste away as they were among sirens. 

Man, your purpose (business) was to make yourself capable of usingconformably to nature the appearances presented to you, in your desiresnot to be frustrated, in your aversion from things not to fall into thatwhich you would avoid, never to have no luck (as one may say), nor everto have bad luck, to be free, not hindered, not compelled, conformingyourself to the administration of Zeus, obeying it, well satisfied withthis, blaming no one, charging no one with fault, able from your wholesoul to utter these verses:

 Lead me, O Zeus, and thou too Destiny. 

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TO (OR AGAINST) A PERSON WHO WAS ONE OF THOSE WHO WERE NOT VALUED(ESTEEMED) BY HIM. --A certain person said to him (Epictetus): FrequentlyI desired to hear you and came to you, and you never gave me any answer;and now, if it is possible, I entreat you to say something to me. Do youthink, said Epictetus, that as there is an art in anything else, sothere is also an art in speaking, and that he who has the art, willspeak skilfully, and he who has not, will speak unskilfully?--I do thinkso. --He then who by speaking receives benefit himself, and is able tobenefit others, will speak skilfully; but he who is rather damaged byspeaking and does damage to others, will he be unskilled in this art ofspeaking? And you may find that some are damaged and others benefited byspeaking. And are all who hear benefited by what they hear? Or will youfind that among them also some are benefited and some damaged? There areboth among these also, he said. In this case also then those who hearskilfully are benefited, and those who hear unskilfully are damaged? Headmitted this. Is there then a skill in hearing also, as there is inspeaking? It seems so. If you choose, consider the matter in this wayalso. The practice of music, to whom does it belong? To a musician. Andthe proper making of a statue, to whom do you think that it belongs? Toa statuary. And the looking at a statue skilfully, does this appear toyou to require the aid of no art? This also requires the aid of art. Then if speaking properly is the business of the skilful man, do you seethat to hear also with benefit is the business of the skilful man? Nowas to speaking and hearing perfectly, and usefully, let us for thepresent, if you please, say no more, for both of us are a long way fromeverything of the kind. But I think that every man will allow this, thathe who is going to hear philosophers requires some amount of practice inhearing. Is it not so?

Why then do you say nothing to me? I can only say this to you, that hewho knows not who he is, and for what purpose he exists, and what isthis world, and with whom he is associated, and what things are the goodand the bad, and the beautiful and the ugly, and who neither understandsdiscourse nor demonstration, nor what is true nor what is false, and whois not able to distinguish them, will neither desire according to naturenor turn away nor move towards, nor intend (to act), nor assent, nordissent, nor suspend his judgment: to say all in a few words, he will goabout dumb and blind, thinking that he is somebody, but being nobody. Isthis so now for the first time? Is it not the fact that ever since thehuman race existed, all errors and misfortunes have arisen through thisignorance?

This is all that I have to say to you; and I say even this notwillingly. Why? Because you have not roused me. For what must I look toin order to be roused, as men who are expert in riding are roused bygenerous horses? Must I look to your body? You treat it disgracefully. To your dress? That is luxurious. To your behavior, to your look? Thatis the same as nothing. When you would listen to a philosopher, do notsay to him, You tell me nothing; but only show yourself worthy ofhearing or fit for hearing; and you will see how you will move thespeaker. 

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THAT LOGIC IS NECESSARY. --When one of those who were present said, Persuade me that logic is necessary, he replied, Do you wish me to provethis to you? The answer was, Yes. Then I must use a demonstrative formof speech. This was granted. How then will you know if I am cheating youby my argument? The man was silent. Do you see, said Epictetus, that youyourself are admitting that logic is necessary, if without it you cannotknow so much as this, whether logic is necessary or not necessary?

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OF FINERY IN DRESS. --A certain young man, a rhetorician, came to seeEpictetus, with his hair dressed more carefully than was usual and hisattire in an ornamental style; whereupon Epictetus said, Tell me if youdo not think that some dogs are beautiful and some horses, and so of allother animals. I do think so, the youth replied. Are not then some menalso beautiful and others ugly? Certainly. Do we then for the samereason call each of them in the same kind beautiful, or each beautifulfor something peculiar? And you will judge of this matter thus. Since wesee a dog naturally formed for one thing, and a horse for another, andfor another still, as an example, a nightingale, we may generally andnot improperly declare each of them to be beautiful then when it is mostexcellent according to its nature; but since the nature of each isdifferent, each of them seems to me to be beautiful in a different way. Is it not so? He admitted that it was. That then which makes a dogbeautiful, makes a horse ugly; and that which makes a horse beautiful, makes a dog ugly, if it is true that their natures are different. Itseems to be so. For I think that what makes a Pancratiast beautiful, makes a wrestler to be not good, and a runner to be most ridiculous; andhe who is beautiful for the Pentathlon, is very ugly for wrestling. Itis so, said he. What then makes a man beautiful? Is it that which in itskind makes both a dog and a horse beautiful? It is, he said. What thenmakes a dog beautiful? The possession of the excellence of a dog. Andwhat makes a horse beautiful? The possession of the excellence of ahorse. What then makes a man beautiful? Is it not the possession of theexcellence of a man? And do you then, if you wish to be beautiful, youngman, labor at this, the acquisition of human excellence? But what isthis? Observe whom you yourself praise, when you praise many personswithout partiality: do you praise the just or the unjust? The just. Whether do you praise the moderate or the immoderate? The moderate. Andthe temperate or the intemperate? The temperate. If then you makeyourself such a person, you will know that you will make yourselfbeautiful; but so long as you neglect these things, you must be ugly([Greek: aischron]), even though you contrive all you can to appearbeautiful. 

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IN WHAT A MAN OUGHT TO BE EXERCISED WHO HAS MADE PROFICIENCY; AND THATWE NEGLECT THE CHIEF THINGS. --There are three things (topics, [Greek:topoi]) in which a man ought to exercise himself who would be wise andgood. The first concerns the desires and the aversions, that a man maynot fail to get what he desires, and that he may not fall into thatwhich he does not desire. The second concerns the movements towards anobject and the movements from an object, and generally in doing what aman ought to do, that he may act according to order, to reason, and notcarelessly. The third thing concerns freedom from deception and rashnessin judgment, and generally it concerns the assents ([Greek:sugchatatheseis]). Of these topics the chief and the most urgent is thatwhich relates to the affects ([Greek: ta pathae] perturbations); for anaffect is produced in no other way than by a failing to obtain thatwhich a man desires or falling into that which a man would wish toavoid. This is that which brings in perturbations, disorders, badfortune, misfortunes, sorrows, lamentations, and envy; that which makesmen envious and jealous; and by these causes we are unable even tolisten to the precepts of reason. The second topic concerns the dutiesof a man; for I ought not to be free from affects ([Greek: apathae])like a statue, but I ought to maintain the relations ([Greek: scheseis])natural and acquired, as a pious man, as a son, as a father, as acitizen. 

The third topic is that which immediately concerns those who are makingproficiency, that which concerns the security of the other two, so thatnot even in sleep any appearance unexamined may surprise us, nor inintoxication, nor in melancholy. This, it may be said, is above ourpower. But the present philosophers neglecting the first topic and thesecond (the affects and duties), employ themselves on the third, usingsophistical arguments ([Greek: metapiptontas]), making conclusions fromquestioning, employing hypotheses, lying. For a man must, it is said, when employed on these matters, take care that he is not deceived. Whomust? The wise and good man. This then is all that is wanting to you. Have you successfully worked out the rest? Are you free from deceptionin the matter of money? If you see a beautiful girl do you resist theappearance? If your neighbor obtains an estate by will, are you notvexed? Now is there nothing else wanting to you except unchangeablefirmness of mind ([Greek: ametaptosia])? Wretch, you hear these verythings with fear and anxiety that some person may despise you, and withinquiries about what any person may say about you. And if a man come andtell you that in a certain conversation in which the question was, Whois the best philosopher, a man who was present said that a certainperson was the chief philosopher, your little soul which was only afinger's length stretches out to two cubits. But if another who ispresent says, You are mistaken; it is not worth while to listen to acertain person, for what does he know? he has only the first principles, and no more? then you are confounded, you grow pale, you cry outimmediately, I will show him who I am, that I am a great philosopher. Itis seen by these very things: why do you wish to show it by others? Doyou not know that Diogenes pointed out one of the sophists in this wayby stretching out his middle finger? And then when the man was wild withrage, This, he said, is the certain person: I have pointed him out toyou. For a man is not shown by the finger, as a stone or a piece ofwood; but when any person shows the man's principles, then he shows himas a man. 

Let us look at your principles also. For is it not plain that you valuenot at all your own will ([Greek: proairesis]), but you look externallyto things which are independent of your will? For instance, what will acertain person say? and what will people think of you? Will you beconsidered a man of learning; have you read Chrysippus or Antipater? forif you have read Archedamus also, you have every thing (that you candesire). Why you are still uneasy lest you should not show us who youare? Would you let me tell you what manner of man you have shown us thatyou are? You have exhibited yourself to us as a mean fellow, querulous, passionate, cowardly, finding fault with everything, blaming everybody, never quiet, vain: this is what you have exhibited to us. Go away nowand read Archedamus; then if a mouse should leap down and make a noise, you are a dead man. For such a death awaits you as it did--what was theman's name--Crinis; and he too was proud, because he understoodArchedamus. Wretch, will you not dismiss these things that do notconcern you at all? These things are suitable to those who are able tolearn them without perturbation, to those who can say: "I am not subjectto anger, to grief, to envy: I am not hindered, I am not restrained. What remains for me? I have leisure, I am tranquil: let us see how wemust deal with sophistical arguments; let us see how when a man hasaccepted an hypothesis he shall not be led away to any thing absurd. " Tothem such things belong. To those who are happy it is appropriate tolight a fire, to dine; if they choose, both to sing and to dance. Butwhen the vessel is sinking, you come to me and hoist the sails. 

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WHAT IS THE MATTER ON WHICH A GOOD MAN SHOULD BE EMPLOYED, AND IN WHATWE OUGHT CHIEFLY TO PRACTISE OURSELVES. --The material for the wise andgood man is his own ruling faculty: and the body is the material for thephysician and the aliptes (the man who oils persons); the land is thematter for the husbandman. The business of the wise and good man is touse appearances conformably to nature: and as it is the nature of everysoul to assent to the truth, to dissent from the false, and to remain insuspense as to that which is uncertain; so it is its nature to be movedtowards the desire for the good, and to aversion from the evil; and withrespect to that which is neither good nor bad it feels indifferent. Foras the money-changer (banker) is not allowed to reject Cęsar's coin, northe seller of herbs, but if you show the coin, whether he chooses ornot, he must give up what is sold for the coin; so it is also in thematter of the soul. When the good appears, it immediately attracts toitself; the evil repels from itself. But the soul will never reject themanifest appearance of the good, any more than persons will rejectCęsar's coin. On this principle depends every movement both of man andGod. 

Against (or with respect to) this kind of thing chiefly a man shouldexercise himself. As soon as you go out in the morning, examine everyman whom you see, every man whom you hear; answer as to a question, Whathave you seen? A handsome man or woman? Apply the rule. Is thisindependent of the will, or dependent? Independent. Take it away. Whathave you seen? A man lamenting over the death of a child. Apply therule. Death is a thing independent of the will. Take it away. Has theproconsul met you? Apply the rule. What kind of a thing is a proconsul'soffice? Independent of the will or dependent on it? Independent. Takethis away also; it does not stand examination; cast it away; it isnothing to you. 

If we practised this and exercised ourselves in it daily from morning tonight, something indeed would be done. But now we are forthwith caughthalf asleep by every appearance, and it is only, if ever, that in theschool we are roused a little. Then when we go out, if we see a manlamenting, we say, He is undone. If we see a consul, we say, He ishappy. If we see an exiled man, we say, He is miserable. If we see apoor man, we say, He is wretched; he has nothing to eat. 

We ought then to eradicate these bad opinions, and to this end we shoulddirect all our efforts. For what is weeping and lamenting? Opinion. Whatis bad fortune? Opinion. What is civil sedition, what is dividedopinion, what is blame, what is accusation, what is impiety, what istrifling? All these things are opinions, and nothing more, and opinionsabout things independent of the will, as if they were good and bad. Leta man transfer these opinions to things dependent on the will, and Iengage for him that he will be firm and constant, whatever may be thestate of things around him. Such as is a dish of water, such is thesoul. Such as is the ray of light which falls on the water, such are theappearances. When the water is moved, the ray also seems to be moved, yet it is not moved. And when then a man is seized with giddiness, it isnot the arts and the virtues which are confounded, but the spirit (thenervous power) on which they are impressed; but if the spirit berestored to its settled state, those things also are restored. 

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MISCELLANEOUS. --When some person asked him how it happened that sincereason has been more cultivated by the men of the present age, theprogress made in former times was greater. In what respect, he answered, has it been more cultivated now, and in what respect was the progressgreater then? For in that in which it has now been more cultivated, inthat also the progress will now be found. At present it has beencultivated for the purpose of resolving syllogisms, and progress ismade. But in former times it was cultivated for the purpose ofmaintaining the governing faculty in a condition conformable to nature, and progress was made. Do not then mix things which are different, anddo not expect, when you are laboring at one thing to make progress inanother. But see if any man among us when he is intent upon this, thekeeping himself in a state conformable to nature and living so always, does not make progress. For you will not find such a man. 

It is not easy to exhort weak young men; for neither is it easy to hold(soft) cheese with a hook. But those who have a good naturaldisposition, even if you try to turn them aside, cling still more toreason. 

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TO THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE FREE CITIES WHO WAS AN EPICUREAN. --When theadministrator came to visit him, and the man was an Epicurean, Epictetussaid, It is proper for us who are not philosophers to inquire of you whoare philosophers, as those who come to a strange city inquire of thecitizens and those who are acquainted with it, what is the best thing inthe world, in order that we also after inquiry may go in quest of thatwhich is best and look at it, as strangers do with the things in cities. For that there are three things which relate to man--soul, body, andthings external, scarcely any man denies. It remains for youphilosophers to answer what is the best. What shall we say to men? Isthe flesh the best? and was it for this that Maximus sailed as far asCassiope in winter (or bad weather) with his son, and accompanied himthat he might be gratified in the flesh? When the man said that it wasnot, and added, Far be that from him. Is it not fit then, Epictetussaid, to be actively employed about the best? It is certainly of allthings the most fit. What then do we possess which is better than theflesh? The soul, he replied. And the good things of the best, are theybetter, or the good things of the worse? The good things of the best. And are the good things of the best within the power of the will or notwithin the power of the will? They are within the power of the will. Isthen the pleasure of the soul a thing within the power of the will? Itis, he replied. And on what shall this pleasure depend? On itself? Butthat cannot be conceived; for there must first exist a certain substanceor nature ([Greek: ousia]) of good, by obtaining which we shall havepleasure in the soul. He assented to this also. On what then shall wedepend for this pleasure of the soul? for if it shall depend on thingsof the soul, the substance (nature) of the good is discovered; for goodcannot be one thing, and that at which we are rationally delightedanother thing; nor if that which precedes is not good, can that whichcomes after be good, for in order that the thing which comes after maybe good, that which precedes must be good. But you would not affirmthis, if you are in your right mind, for you would then say what isinconsistent both with Epicurus and the rest of your doctrines. Itremains then that the pleasure of the soul is in the pleasure fromthings of the body; and again that those bodily things must be thethings which precede and the substance (nature) of the good. 

Seek for doctrines which are consistent with what I say, and by makingthem your guide you will with pleasure abstain from things which havesuch persuasive power to lead us and overpower us. But if to thepersuasive power of these things, we also devise such a philosophy asthis which helps to push us on towards them and strengthens us to thisend, what will be the consequence? In a piece of toreutic art which isthe best part? the silver or the workmanship? The substance of the handis the flesh; but the work of the hand is the principal part (that whichprecedes and leads the rest). The duties then are also three: thosewhich are directed towards the existence of a thing; those which aredirected towards its existence in a particular kind; and third, thechief or leading things themselves. So also in man we ought not to valuethe material, the poor flesh, but the principal (leading things, [Greek:ta proaegoumena]). What are these? Engaging in public business, marrying, begetting children, venerating God, taking care of parents, and generally, having desires, aversions ([Greek: echchlinein]), pursuits of things and avoidances, in the way in which we ought to dothese things, and according to our nature. And how are we constituted bynature? Free, noble, modest; for what other animal blushes? what otheris capable of receiving the appearance (the impression) of shame? and weare so constituted by nature as to subject pleasure to these things, asa minister, a servant, in order that it may call forth our activity, inorder that it may keep us constant in acts which are conformable tonature. 

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HOW WE MUST EXERCISE OURSELVES AGAINST APPEARANCES ([Greek:phantasias]). --As we exercise ourselves against sophistical questions, so we ought to exercise ourselves daily against appearances; for theseappearances also propose questions to us. A certain person's son isdead. Answer; the thing is not within the power of the will: it is notan evil. A father has disinherited a certain son. What do you think ofit? It is a thing beyond the power of the will, not an evil. Cęsar hascondemned a person. It is a thing beyond the power of the will, not anevil. The man is afflicted at this. Affliction is a thing which dependson the will: it is an evil. He has borne the condemnation bravely. Thatis a thing within the power of the will: it is a good. If we trainourselves in this manner, we shall make progress; for we shall neverassent to anything of which there is not an appearance capable of beingcomprehended. Your son is dead. What has happened? Your son is dead. Nothing more? Nothing. Your ship is lost. What has happened? Your shipis lost. A man has been led to prison. What has happened? He has beenled to prison. But that herein he has fared badly, every man adds fromhis own opinion. But Zeus, you say, does not do right in these matters. Why? because he has made you capable of endurance? because he has madeyou magnanimous? because he has taken from that which befalls you thepower of being evils? because it is in your power to be happy while youare suffering what you suffer? because he has opened the door to you, when things do not please you? Man, go out and do not complain!

Hear how the Romans feel towards philosophers, if you would like toknow. Italicus, who was the most in repute of the philosophers, oncewhen I was present, being vexed with his own friends and as if he wassuffering something intolerable, said: "I cannot bear it, you arekilling me; you will make me such as that man is, " pointing to me. 

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TO A CERTAIN RHETORICIAN WHO WAS GOING UP TO ROME ON A SUIT. --When acertain person came to him, who was going up to Rome on account of asuit which had regard to his rank, Epictetus inquired the reason of hisgoing to Rome, and the man then asked what he thought about the matter. Epictetus replied: If you ask me what you will do in Rome, whether youwill succeed or fail, I have no rule ([Greek: theoraema]) about this. But if you ask me how you will fare, I can tell you: if you have rightopinions ([Greek: dogmata]), you will fare well; if they are false, youwill fare ill. For to every man the cause of his acting is opinion. Forwhat is the reason why you desired to be elected governor of theCnossians? Your opinion. What is the reason that you are now going up toRome? Your opinion. And going in winter, and with danger and expense? Imust go. What tells you this? Your opinion. Then if opinions are thecauses of all actions, and a man has bad opinions, such as the cause maybe, such also is the effect! Have we then all sound opinions, both youand your adversary? And how do you differ? But have you sounder opinionsthan your adversary? Why? You think so. And so does he think that hisopinions are better; and so do madmen. This is a bad criterion. But showto me that you have made some inquiry into your opinions and have takensome pains about them. And as now you are sailing to Rome in order tobecome governor of the Cnossians, and you are not content to stay athome with the honors which you had, but you desire something greater andmore conspicuous, so when did you ever make a voyage for the purpose ofexamining your own opinions, and casting them out, if you have any thatare bad? Whom have you approached for this purpose? What time have youfixed for it? What age? Go over the times of your life by yourself, ifyou are ashamed of me (knowing the fact) when you were a boy, did youexamine your own opinions? and did you not then, as you do all thingsnow, do as you did do? and when you were become a youth and attended therhetoricians, and yourself practised rhetoric, what did you imagine thatyou were deficient in? And when you were a young man and engaged inpublic matters, and pleaded causes yourself, and were gainingreputation, who then seemed your equal? And when would you havesubmitted to any man examining and showing that your opinions are bad?What then do you wish me to say to you? Help me in this matter. I haveno theorem (rule) for this. Nor have you, if you came to me for thispurpose, come to me as a philosopher, but as to a seller of vegetablesor a shoemaker. For what purpose then have philosophers theorems? Forthis purpose, that whatever may happen, our ruling faculty may be andcontinue to be conformable to nature. Does this seem to you a smallthing? No; but the greatest. What then? does it need only a short time?and is it possible to seize it as you pass by? If you can, seize it. 

Then you will say, I met with Epictetus as I should meet with a stone ora statue: for you saw me and nothing more. But he meets with a man as aman, who learns his opinions, and in his turn shows his own. Learn myopinions: show me yours; and then say that you have visited me. Let usexamine one another: if I have any bad opinion, take it away; if youhave any, show it. This is the meaning of meeting with a philosopher. Not so (you say): but this is only a passing visit, and while we arehiring the vessel, we can also see Epictetus. Let us see what he says. Then you go away and say: Epictetus was nothing; he used solecisms andspoke in a barbarous way. For of what else do you come as judges? Well, but a man may say to me, if I attend to such matters (as you do), Ishall have no land as you have none; I shall have no silver cups as youhave none, nor fine beasts as you have none. In answer to tins it isperhaps sufficient to say: I have no need of such things; but if youpossess many things you have need of others: whether you choose or not, you are poorer than I am. What then have I need of? Of that which youhave not? of firmness, of a mind which is conformable to nature, ofbeing free from perturbation. 

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IN WHAT MANNER WE OUGHT TO BEAR SICKNESS. --When the need of each opinioncomes, we ought to have it in readiness: on the occasion of breakfast, such opinions as relate to breakfast; in the bath, those that concernthe bath; in bed, those that concern bed. 

 Let sleep not come upon thy languid eyes Before each daily action thou hast scann'd; What's done amiss, what done, what left undone; From first to last examine all, and then Blame what is wrong, in what is right rejoice. 

And we ought to retain these verses in such way that we may use them, not that we may utter them aloud, as when we exclaim, "Paean Apollo. "Again in fever we should have ready such opinions as concern a fever;and we ought not, as soon as the fever begins, to lose and forget all. Aman who has a fever may say: If I philosophize any longer, may I behanged: wherever I go, I must take care of the poor body, that a fevermay not come. But what is philosophizing? Is it not a preparationagainst events which may happen? Do you not understand that you aresaying something of this kind? "If I shall still prepare myself to bearwith patience what happens, may I be hanged. " But this is just as if aman after receiving blows should give up the Pancratium. In thePancratium it is in our power to desist and not to receive blows. 

But in the other matter if we give up philosophy, what shall we gain?What then should a man say on the occasion of each painful thing? It wasfor this that I exercised myself, for this I disciplined myself. Godsays to you: Give me a proof that you have duly practised athletics, that you have eaten what you ought, that you have been exercised, thatyou have obeyed the aliptes (the oiler and rubber). Then do you showyourself weak when the time for action comes? Now is the time for thefever. Let it be borne well. Now is the time for thirst, bear it well. Now is the time for hunger, bear it well. Is it not in your power? Whoshall hinder you? The physician will hinder you from drinking; but hecannot prevent you from bearing thirst well: and he will hinder you fromeating; but he cannot prevent you from bearing hunger well. 

But I cannot attend to my philosophical studies. And for what purpose doyou follow them? Slave, is it not that you may be happy, that you may beconstant, is it not that you may be in a state conformable to nature andlive so? What hinders you when you have a fever from having your rulingfaculty conformable to nature? Here is the proof of the thing, here isthe test of the philosopher. For this also is a part of life, likewalking, like sailing, like journeying by land, so also is fever. Do youread when you are walking? No. Nor do you when you have a fever. But ifyou walk about well, you have all that belongs to a man who walks. Ifyou bear a fever well, you have all that belongs to a man in a fever. What is it to bear a fever well? Not to blame God or man; not to beafflicted at that which happens, to expect death well and nobly, to dowhat must be done: when the physician comes in, not to be frightened atwhat he says; nor if he says you are doing well, to be overjoyed. Forwhat good has he told you? and when you were in health, what good wasthat to you? And even if he says you are in a bad way, do not despond. For what is it to be ill? is it that you are near the severance of thesoul and the body? what harm is there in this? If you are not near now, will you not afterwards be near? Is the world going to be turned upsidedown when you are dead? Why then do you flatter the physician? Why doyou say if you please, master, I shall be well? Why do you give him anopportunity of raising his eyebrows (being proud; or showing hisimportance)? Do you not value a physician, as you do a shoemaker when heis measuring your foot, or a carpenter when he is building your house, and so treat the physician as to the body which is not yours, but bynature dead? He who has a fever has an opportunity of doing this: if hedoes these things, he has what belongs to him. For it is not thebusiness of a philosopher to look after these externals, neither hiswine nor his oil nor his poor body, but his own ruling power. But as toexternals how must he act? so far as not to be careless about them. Where then is there reason for fear? where is there then still reasonfor anger, and of fear about what belongs to others, about things whichare of no value? For we ought to have these two principles in readiness, that except the will nothing is good nor bad; and that we ought not tolead events, but to follow them. My brother ought not to have behavedthus to me. No, but he will see to that; and, however he may behave, Iwill conduct myself towards him as I ought. For this is my own business;that belongs to another: no man can prevent this, the other thing can behindered. 

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ABOUT EXERCISE. --We ought not to make our exercises consist in meanscontrary to nature and adapted to cause admiration, for if we do so, wewho call ourselves philosophers, shall not differ at all from jugglers. For it is difficult even to walk on a rope; and not only difficult, butit is also dangerous. Ought we for this reason to practice walking on arope, or setting up a palm-tree, or embracing statues? By no means. Every thing which is difficult and dangerous is not suitable forpractice; but that is suitable which conduces to the working out of thatwhich is proposed to us. And what is that which is proposed to us as athing to be worked out? To live with desire and aversion (avoidance ofcertain things) free from restraint. And what is this? Neither to bedisappointed in that which you desire, nor to fall into anything whichyou would avoid. Towards this object then exercise (practice) ought totend. For since it is not possible to have your desire not disappointedand your aversion free from falling into that which you would avoid, without great and constant practice, you must know that if you allowyour desire and aversion to turn to things which are not within thepower of the will, you will neither have your desire capable ofattaining your object, nor your aversion free from the power of avoidingthat which you would avoid. And since strong habit leads (prevails), andwe are accustomed to employ desire and aversion only to things which arenot within the power of our will, we ought to oppose to this habit acontrary habit, and where there is great slipperiness in theappearances, there to oppose the habit of exercise. Then at last, ifoccasion presents itself, for the purpose of trying yourself at a propertime you will descend into the arena to know if appearances overpoweryou as they did formerly. But at first fly far from that which isstronger than yourself; the contest is unequal between a charming younggirl and a beginner in philosophy. The earthen pitcher, as the sayingis, and the rock do not agree. 

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WHAT SOLITUDE IS, AND WHAT KIND OF PERSON A SOLITARY MAN IS. --Solitudeis a certain condition of a helpless man. For because a man is alone, heis not for that reason also solitary; just as though a man is amongnumbers, he is not therefore not solitary. When then we have lost eithera brother, or a son, or a friend on whom we were accustomed to repose, we say that we are left solitary, though we are often in Rome, thoughsuch a crowd meet us, though so many live in the same place, andsometimes we have a great number of slaves. For the man who is solitary, as it is conceived, is considered to be a helpless person and exposed tothose who wish to harm him. For this reason when we travel, thenespecially do we say that we are lonely when we fall among robbers, forit is not the sight of a human creature which removes us from solitude, but the sight of one who is faithful and modest and helpful to us. Forif being alone is enough to make solitude, you may say that even Zeus issolitary in the conflagration and bewails himself saying, Unhappy that Iam who have neither Hera, nor Athena, nor Apollo, nor brother, nor son, nor descendant, nor kinsman. This is what some say that he does when heis alone at the conflagration. For they do not understand how a manpasses his life when he is alone, because they set out from a certainnatural principle, from the natural desire of community and mutual loveand from the pleasure of conversation among men. But none the less a manought to be prepared in a manner for this also (being alone), to be ableto be sufficient for himself and to be his own companion. For as Zeusdwells with himself, and is tranquil by himself, and thinks of his ownadministration and of its nature, and is employed in thoughts suitableto himself; so ought we also to be able to talk with ourselves, not tofeel the want of others also, not to be unprovided with the means ofpassing our time; to observe the divine administration, and the relationof ourselves to everything else; to consider how we formerly wereaffected towards things that happened and how at present; what are stillthe things which give us pain; how these also can be cured and howremoved; if any things require improvement, to improve them according toreason. 

Well then, if some man should come upon me when I am alone and murderme? Fool, not murder You, but your poor body. 

What kind of solitude then remains? what want? why do we make ourselvesworse than children; and what do children do when they are left alone?They take up shells and ashes, and they build something, then pull itdown, and build something else, and so they never want the means ofpassing the time. Shall I then, if you sail away, sit down and weep, because I have been left alone and solitary? Shall I then have noshells, no ashes? But children do what they do through want of thought(or deficiency in knowledge), and we through knowledge are unhappy. 

Every great power (faculty) is dangerous to beginners. You must thenbear such things as you are able, but conformably to nature: but not . . . Practise sometimes a way of living like a person out of health that youmay at some time live like a man in health. 

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CERTAIN MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS. --As bad tragic actors cannot sing alone, but in company with many, so some persons cannot walk about alone. Man, if you are anything, both walk alone and talk to yourself, and do nothide yourself in the chorus. Examine a little at last, look around, stiryourself up, that you may know who you are. 

You must root out of men these two things, arrogance (pride) anddistrust. Arrogance then is the opinion that you want nothing (aredeficient in nothing); but distrust is the opinion that you cannot behappy when so many circumstances surround you. Arrogance is removed byconfutation; and Socrates was the first who practised this. And (toknow) that the thing is not impossible inquire and seek. This searchwill do you no harm; and in a manner this is philosophizing, to seek howit is possible to employ desire and aversion ([Greek: echchlisis])without impediment. 

I am superior to you, for my father is a man of consular rank. Anothersays, I have been a tribune, but you have not. If we were horses, wouldyou say, My father was swifter? I have much barley and fodder, orelegant neck ornaments. If then you were saying this, I said, Be it so:let us run then. Well, is there nothing in a man such as running in ahorse, by which it will be known which is superior and inferior? Isthere not modesty ([Greek: aidos]), fidelity, justice? Show yourselfsuperior in these, that you may be superior as a man. If you tell methat you can kick violently, I also will say to you, that you are proudof that which is the act of an ass. 

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THAT WE OUGHT TO PROCEED WITH CIRCUMSPECTION TO EVERYTHING. [Footnote:Compare Encheiridion, 29. ]--In every act consider what precedes and whatfollows, and then proceed to the act. If you do not consider, you willat first begin with spirit, since you have not thought at all of thethings which follow; but afterwards when some consequences have shownthemselves, you will basely desist (from that which you have begun). --Iwish to conquer at the Olympic games. --(And I too, by the gods; for itis a fine thing. ) But consider here what precedes and what follows; andthen, if it is for your good, undertake the thing. You must actaccording to rules, follow strict diet, abstain from delicacies, exercise yourself by compulsion at fixed times, in heat, in cold; drinkno cold water, nor wine, when there is opportunity of drinking it. In aword, you must surrender yourself to the trainer, as you do to aphysician. Next in the contest, you must be covered with sand, sometimesdislocate a hand, sprain an ankle, swallow a quantity of dust, bescourged with the whip; and after undergoing all this, you mustsometimes be conquered. After reckoning all these things, if you havestill an inclination, go to the athletic practice. If you do not reckonthem, observe you will behave like children who at one time play aswrestlers, then as gladiators, then blow a trumpet, then act a tragedy, when they have seen and admired such things. So you also do: you are atone time a wrestler (athlete), then a gladiator, then a philosopher, then a rhetorician; but with your whole soul you are nothing: like theape you imitate all that you see; and always one thing after anotherpleases you, but that which becomes familiar displeases you. For youhave never undertaken anything after consideration, nor after havingexplored the whole matter and put it to a strict examination; but youhave undertaken it at hazard and with a cold desire. Thus some personshaving seen a philosopher and having heard one speak like Euphrates--andyet who can speak like him?--wish to be philosophers themselves. 

Man, consider first what the matter is (which you propose to do), thenyour own nature also, what it is able to bear. If you are a wrestler, look at your shoulders, your thighs, your loins: for different men arenaturally formed for different things. Do you think that, if you do(what you are doing daily), you can be a philosopher? Do you think thatyou can eat as you do now, drink as you do now, and in the same way beangry and out of humor? You must watch, labor, conquer certain desires, you must depart from your kinsmen, be despised by your slaves, laughedat by those who meet you, in everything you must be in an inferiorcondition, as to magisterial office, in honors, in courts of justice. When you have considered all these things completely, then, if you thinkproper, approach to philosophy, if you would gain in exchange for thesethings freedom from perturbations, liberty, tranquillity. If you havenot considered these things, do not approach philosophy: do not act likechildren, at one time a philosopher, then a tax collector, then arhetorician, then a procurator (officer) of Cęsar. These things are notconsistent. You must be one man either good or bad; you must eitherlabor at your own ruling faculty or at external things; you must eitherlabor at things within or at external things; that is, you must eitheroccupy the place of a philosopher or that of one of the vulgar. 

A person said to Rufus when Galba was murdered: Is the world nowgoverned by Providence? But Rufus replied: Did I ever incidentally forman argument from Galba that the world is governed by Providence?

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THAT WE OUGHT WITH CAUTION TO ENTER INTO FAMILIAR INTERCOURSE WITHMEN. --If a man has frequent intercourse with others either for talk, ordrinking together, or generally for social purposes, he must eitherbecome like them, or change them to his own fashion. For if a man placesa piece of quenched charcoal close to a piece that is burning, eitherthe quenched charcoal will quench the other, or the burning charcoalwill light that which is quenched. Since then the danger is so great, wemust cautiously enter into such intimacies with those of the commonsort, and remember that it is impossible that a man can keep companywith one who is covered with soot without being partaker of the soothimself. For what will you do if a man speaks about gladiators, abouthorses, about athletes, or what is worse about men? Such a person isbad, such a person is good; this was well done, this was done badly. Further, if he scoff, or ridicule, or show an ill-natured disposition?Is any man among us prepared like a lute-player when he takes a lute, sothat as soon as he has touched the strings, he discovers which arediscordant, and tunes the instrument? Such a power as Socrates had whoin all his social intercourse could lead his companions to his ownpurpose? How should you have this power? It is therefore a necessaryconsequence that you are carried about by the common kind of people. 

Why then are they more powerful than you? Because they utter theseuseless words from their real opinions; but you utter your elegant wordsonly from your lips; for this reason they are without strength and dead, and it is nauseous to listen to your exhortations and your miserablevirtue, which is talked of everywhere (up and down). In this way thevulgar have the advantage over you; for every opinion ([Greek: dogma])is strong and invincible. Until then the good ([Greek: chompsai])sentiments ([Greek: hupolaepseis]) are fixed in you, and you shall haveacquired a certain power for your security, I advise you to be carefulin your association with common persons; if you are not, every day likewax in the sun there will be melted away whatever you inscribe on yourminds in the school. Withdraw then yourselves far from the sun so longas you have these waxen sentiments. For this reason also philosophersadvise men to leave their native country, because ancient habitsdistract them and do not allow a beginning to be made of a differenthabit; nor can we tolerate those who meet us and say: See such a one isnow a philosopher, who was once so and so. Thus also physicians sendthose who have lingering diseases to a different country and a differentair; and they do right. Do you also introduce other habits than thosewhich you have; fix you opinions and exercise yourselves in them. Butyou do not so; you go hence to a spectacle, to a show of gladiators, toa place of exercise ([Greek: chuston]), to a circus; then you come backhither, and again from this place you go to those places, and still thesame persons. And there is no pleasing (good) habit, nor attention, norcare about self and observation of this kind. How shall I use theappearances presented to me? according to nature, or contrary to nature?how do I answer to them? as I ought, or as I ought not? Do I say tothose things which are independent of the will, that they do not concernme? For if you are not yet in this state, fly from your former habits, fly from the common sort, if you intend ever to begin to be something. 

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ON PROVIDENCE. -When you make any charge against Providence, consider, and you will learn that the thing has happened according to reason. Yes, but the unjust man has the advantage. In what? In money. Yes, for he issuperior to you in this, that he flatters, is free from shame, and iswatchful. What is the wonder? But see if he has the advantage over youin being faithful, in being modest; for you will not find it to be so;but wherein you are superior, there you will find that you have theadvantage. And I once said to a man who was vexed because Philostorguswas fortunate: Would you choose to lie with Sura? May it never happen, he replied, that this day should come? Why then are you vexed, if hereceives something in return for that which he sells; or how can youconsider him happy who acquires those things by such means as youabominate; or what wrong does Providence, if he gives the better thingsto the better men? Is it not better to be modest than to be rich? Headmitted this. Why are you vexed then, man, when you possess the betterthing? Remember then always and have in readiness the truth, that thisis a law of nature, that the superior has an advantage over the inferiorin that in which he is superior; and you will never be vexed. 

But my wife treats me badly. Well, if any man asks you what this is, say, my wife treats me badly. Is there then nothing more? Nothing. Myfather gives me nothing. (What is this? my father gives me nothing. Isthere nothing else then? Nothing); but to say that this is an evil issomething which must be added to it externally, and falsely added. Forthis reason we must not get rid of poverty, but of the opinion aboutpoverty, and then we shall be happy. 

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ABOUT CYNICISM. --When one of his pupils inquired of Epictetus, and hewas a person who appeared to be inclined to Cynicism, what kind ofperson a Cynic ought to be, and what was the notion ([Greek:prolaepsis]) of the thing, we will inquire, said Epictetus, at leisure;but I have so much to say to you that he who without God attempts sogreat a matter, is hateful to God, and has no other purpose than to actindecently in public. 

In the first place, in the things which relate to yourself, you must notbe in any respect like what you do now; you must not blame God or man;you must take away desire altogether, you must transfer avoidance([Greek: echchlisis]) only to the things which are within the power ofthe will; you must not feel anger nor resentment or envy nor pity; agirl must not appear handsome to you, nor must you love a littlereputation, nor be pleased with a boy or a cake. For you ought to knowthat the rest of men throw walls around them and houses and darknesswhen they do any such things, and they have many means of concealment. Aman shuts the door, he sets somebody before the chamber; if a personcomes, say that he is out, he is not at leisure. But the Cynic insteadof all these things must use modesty as his protection; if he does not, he will be indecent in his nakedness and under the open sky. This is hishouse, his door; this is the slave before his bedchamber; this is hisdarkness. For he ought not to wish to hide anything that he does; and ifhe does, he is gone, he has lost the character of a Cynic, of a man wholives under the open sky, of a free man; he has begun to fear someexternal thing, he has begun to have need of concealment, nor can he getconcealment when he chooses. For where shall he hide himself and how?And if by chance this public instructor shall be detected, thispędagogue, what kind of things will he be compelled to suffer? when thena man fears these things, is it possible for him to be bold with hiswhole soul to superintend men? It cannot be: it is impossible. 

In the first place then you must make your ruling faculty pure, and thismode of life also. Now (you should say), to me the matter to work on ismy understanding, as wood is to the carpenter, as hides to theshoemaker; and my business is the right use of appearances. But the bodyis nothing to me: the parts of it are nothing to me. Death? Let it comewhen it chooses, either death of the whole or of a part. Fly, you say. And whither; can any man eject me out of the world? He cannot. Butwherever I go, there is the sun, there is the moon, there are the stars, dreams, omens, and the conversation ([Greek: omilia]) with gods. 

Then, if he is thus prepared, the true Cynic cannot be satisfied withthis; but he must know that he is sent a messenger from Zeus to menabout good and bad things, to show them that they have wandered and areseeking the substance of good and evil where it is not, but where it is, they never think; and that he is a spy, as Diogenes was carried off toPhilip after the battle of Chaeroneia as a spy. For in fact a Cynic is aspy of the things which are good for men and which are evil, and it ishis duty to examine carefully and to come and report truly, and not tobe struck with terror so as to point out as enemies those who are notenemies, nor in any other way to be perturbed by appearances norconfounded. 

It is his duty then to be able with a loud voice, if the occasion shouldarise, and appearing on the tragic stage to say like Socrates: Men, whither are you hurrying, what are you doing, wretches? like blindpeople you are wandering up and down; you are going by another road, andhave left the true road; you seek for prosperity and happiness wherethey are not, and if another shows you where they are, you do notbelieve him. Why do you seek it without? In the body? It is not there. If you doubt, look at Myro, look at Ophellius. In possessions? It is notthere. But if you do not believe me, look at Croesus: look at those whoare now rich, with what lamentations their life is filled. In power? Itis not there. If it is, those must be happy who have been twice andthrice consuls; but they are not. Whom shall we believe in thesematters? You who from without see their affairs and are dazzled by anappearance, or the men themselves? What do they say? Hear them when theygroan, when they grieve, when on account of these very consulships andglory and splendor they think that they are more wretched and in greaterdanger. Is it in royal power? It is not: if it were, Nero would havebeen happy, and Sardanapalus. But neither was Agamemnon happy, though hewas a better man than Sardanapalus and Nero; but while others aresnoring, what is he doing?

 Much from his head he tore his rooted hair: Iliad, x. , 15. 

and what does he say himself?

 "I am perplexed, " he says, "and Disturb'd I am, " and "my heart out of my bosom Is leaping. " Iliad, x. , 91. 

Wretch, which of your affairs goes badly? Your possessions? No. Yourbody? No. But you are rich in gold and copper. What then is the matterwith you? That part of you, whatever it is, has been neglected by youand is corrupted, the part with which we desire, with which we avoid, with which we move towards and move from things. How neglected? He knowsnot the nature of good for which he is made by nature and the nature ofevil; and what is his own, and what belongs to another; and whenanything that belongs to others goes badly, he says, Woe to me, for theHellenes are in danger. Wretched is his ruling faculty, and aloneneglected and uncared for. The Hellenes are going to die destroyed bythe Trojans. And if the Trojans do not kill them, will they not die?Yes; but not all at once. What difference then does it make? For ifdeath is an evil, whether men die altogether, or if they die singly, itis equally an evil. Is anything else then going to happen than theseparation of the soul and the body? Nothing. And if the Hellenesperish, is the door closed, and is it not in your power to die? It is. Why then do you lament (and say), Oh, you are a king and have thesceptre of Zeus? An unhappy king does not exist more than an unhappygod. What then art thou? In truth a shepherd: for you weep as shepherdsdo, when a wolf has carried off one of their sheep: and these who aregoverned by you are sheep. And why did you come hither? Was your desirein any danger? was your aversion ([Greek: echchlisis])? was yourmovement (pursuits)? was your avoidance of things? He replies, No; butthe wife of my brother was carried off. Was it not then a great gain tobe deprived of an adulterous wife? Shall we be despised then by theTrojans? What kind of people are the Trojans, wise or foolish? If theyare wise, why do you fight with them? If they are fools, why do you careabout them?

Do you possess the body then free or is it in servile condition? We donot know. Do you not know that it is the slave of fever, of gout, ophthalmia, dysentery, of a tyrant, of fire, of iron, of everythingwhich is stronger? Yes, it is a slave. How then is it possible thatanything which belongs to the body can be free from hindrance? and howis a thing great or valuable which is naturally dead, or earth, or mud?Well then, do you possess nothing which is free? Perhaps nothing. Andwho is able to compel you to assent to that which appears false? No man. And who can compel you not to assent to that which appears true? No man. By this then you see that there is something in you naturally free. Butto desire or to be averse from, or to move towards an object or to movefrom it, or to prepare yourself, or to propose to do anything, which ofyou can do this, unless he has received an impression of the appearanceof that which is profitable or a duty? No man. You have then in thesethings also something which is not hindered and is free. Wretched men, work out this, take care of this, seek for good here. 

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THAT WE OUGHT NOT TO BE MOVED BY A DESIRE OF THOSE THINGS WHICH ARE NOTIN OUR POWER. --Let not that which in another is contrary to nature be anevil to you; for you are not formed by nature to be depressed withothers nor to be unhappy with others, but to be happy with them. If aman is unhappy, remember that his unhappiness is his own fault; for Godhas made all men to be happy, to be free from perturbations. For thispurpose he has given means to them, some things to each person as hisown, and other things not as his own; some things subject to hindranceand compulsion and deprivation; and these things are not a man's own;but the things which are not subject to hindrances, are his own; and thenature of good and evil, as it was fit to be done by him who takes careof us and protects us like a father, he has made our own. But you say, Ihave parted from a certain person, and he is grieved. Why did heconsider as his own that which belongs to another? why, when he lookedon you and was rejoiced, did he not also reckon that you are a mortal, that it is natural for you to part from him for a foreign country?Therefore he suffers the consequences of his own folly. But why do youor for what purpose bewail yourself? Is it that you also have notthought of these things? but like poor women who are good for nothing, you have enjoyed all things in which you took pleasure, as if you wouldalways enjoy them, both places and men and conversation; and now you sitand weep because you do not see the same persons and do not live in thesame places. Indeed you deserve this, to be more wretched than crows andravens who have the power of flying where they please and changing theirnests for others, and crossing the seas without lamenting or regrettingtheir former condition. Yes, but this happens to them because they areirrational creatures. Was reason then given to us by the gods for thepurpose of unhappiness and misery, that we may pass our lives inwretchedness and lamentation? Must all persons be immortal and must noman go abroad, and must we ourselves not go abroad, but remain rootedlike plants; and if any of our familiar friends goes abroad, must we sitand weep; and on the contrary, when he returns, must we dance and clapour hands like children?

But my mother laments when she does not see me. Why has she not learnedthese principles? and I do not say this, that we should not take carethat she may not lament, but I say that we ought not to desire in everyway what is not our own. And the sorrow of another is another's sorrow;but my sorrow is my own. I then will stop my own sorrow by every means, for it is in my power; and the sorrow of another I will endeavor to stopas far as I can; but I will not attempt to do it by every means; for ifI do, I shall be fighting against God, I shall be opposing Zeus andshall be placing myself against him in the administration of theuniverse; and the reward (the punishment) of this fighting against Godand of this disobedience not only will the children of my children pay, but I also shall myself, both by day and by night, startled by dreams, perturbed, trembling at every piece of news, and having my tranquillitydepending on the letters of others. Some person has arrived from Rome. Ionly hope there is no harm. But what harm can happen to you, where youare not? From Hellas (Greece) some one is come; I hope that there is noharm. In this way every place may be the cause of misfortune to you. Isit not enough for you to be unfortunate there where you are, and mustyou be so even beyond sea, and by the report of letters? Is this the wayin which your affairs are in a state of security? Well then suppose thatmy friends have died in the places which are far from me. What else havethey suffered than that which is the condition of mortals? Or how areyou desirous at the same time to live to old age, and at the same timenot to see the death of any person whom you love? Know you not that inthe course of a long time many and various kinds of things must happen;that a fever shall overpower one, a robber another, and a third atyrant? Such is the condition of things around us, such are those wholive with us in the world; cold and heat, and unsuitable ways of living, and journeys by land, and voyages by sea, and winds, and variouscircumstances which surround us, destroy one man, and banish another, and throw one upon an embassy and another into an army. Sit down then ina flutter at all these things, lamenting, unhappy, unfortunate, dependent on another, and dependent not on one or two, but on tenthousands upon ten thousands. 

Did you hear this when you were with the philosophers? did you learnthis? do you not know that human life is a warfare? that one man mustkeep watch, another must go out as a spy, and a third must fight? and itis not possible that all should be in one place, nor is it better thatit should be so. But you neglecting to do the commands of the generalcomplain when anything more hard than usual is imposed on you, and youdo not observe what you make the army become as far as it is in yourpower; that if all imitate you, no man will dig a trench, no man willput a rampart round, nor keep watch, nor expose himself to danger, butwill appear to be useless for the purposes of an army. Again, in avessel if you go as a sailor, keep to one place and stick to it. And ifyou are ordered to climb the mast, refuse; if to run to the head of theship, refuse; and what master of a ship will endure you? and will he notpitch you overboard as a useless thing, an impediment only and badexample to the other sailors? And so it is here also: every man's lifeis a kind of warfare, and it is long and diversified. You must observethe duty of a soldier and do every thing at the nod of the general; ifit is possible, divining what his wishes are; for there is noresemblance between that general and this, neither in strength nor insuperiority of character. Know you not that a good man does nothing forthe sake of appearance, but for the sake of doing right? What advantageis it then to him to have done right? And what advantage is it to a manwho writes the name of Dion to write it as he ought? The advantage is tohave written it. Is there no reward then? Do you seek a reward for agood man greater than doing what is good and just? At Olympia you wishfor nothing more, but it seems to you enough to be crowned at the games. Does it seem to you so small and worthless a thing to be good and happy?For these purposes being introduced by the gods into this city (theworld), and it being now your duty to undertake the work of a man, doyou still want nurses also and a mamma, and do foolish women by theirweeping move you and make you effeminate? Will you thus never cease tobe a foolish child? know you not that he who does the acts of a child, the older he is, the more ridiculous he is?

So in this matter also: if you kiss your own child, or your brother orfriend, never give full license to the appearance ([Greek: phantasian]), and allow not your pleasure to go as far as it chooses; but check it, and curb it as those who stand behind men in their triumphs and remindthem that they are mortal. Do you also remind yourself in like manner, that he whom you love is mortal, and that what you love is nothing ofyour own; it has been given to you for the present, not that it shouldnot be taken from you, nor has it been given to you for all time, but asa fig is given to you or a bunch of grapes at the appointed season ofthe year. But if you wish for these things in winter, you are a fool. Soif you wish for your son or friend when it is not allowed to you, youmust know that you are wishing for a fig in winter. For such as winteris to a fig, such is every event which happens from the universe to thethings which are taken away according to its nature. And further, at thetimes when you are delighted with a thing, place before yourself thecontrary appearances. What harm is it while you are kissing your childto say with a lisping voice: To-morrow you will die; and to a friendalso: To-morrow you will go away or I shall, and never shall we see oneanother again? But these are words of bad omen--and some incantationsalso are of bad omen; but because they are useful, I don't care forthis; only let them be useful. But do you call things to be of bad omenexcept those which are significant of some evil? Cowardice is a word ofbad omen, and meanness of spirit, and sorrow, and grief, andshamelessness. These words are of bad omen; and yet we ought not tohesitate to utter them in order to protect ourselves against the things. Do you tell me that a name which is significant of any natural thing isof evil omen? say that even for the ears of corn to be reaped is of badomen, for it signifies the destruction of the ears, but not of theworld. Say that the falling of the leaves also is of bad omen, and forthe dried fig to take the place of the green fig, and for raisins to bemade from the grapes. For all these things are changes from a formerstate into other states; not a destruction, but a certain fixed economyand administration. Such is going away from home and a small change:such is death, a greater change, not from the state which now is to thatwhich is not, but to that which is not now. Shall I then no longerexist? You will not exist, but you will be something else, of which theworld now has need; for you also came into existence not when you chose, but when the world had need of you. 

Let these thoughts be ready to hand by night and by day; these youshould write, these you should read; about these you should talk toyourself and to others. Ask a man: Can you help me at all for thispurpose? and further, go to another and to another. Then if anythingthat is said be contrary to your wish, this reflection first willimmediately relieve you, that it is not unexpected. For it is a greatthing in all cases to say: I knew that I begot a son who is mortal. Forso you also will say: I knew that I am mortal, I knew that I may leavemy home, I knew that I may be ejected from it, I knew that I may be ledto prison. Then if you turn round and look to yourself, and seek theplace from which comes that which has happened, you will forthwithrecollect that it comes from the place of things which are out of thepower of the will, and of things which are not my own. What then is itto me? Then, you will ask, and this is the chief thing: And who is itthat sent it? The leader, or the general, the state, the law of thestate. Give it me then, for I must always obey the law in everything. Then, when the appearance (of things) pains you, for it is not in yourpower to prevent this, contend against it by the aid of reason, conquerit: do not allow it to gain strength nor to lead you to the consequencesby raising images such as it pleases and as it pleases. If you be inGyara, do not imagine the mode of living at Rome, and how many pleasuresthere were for him who lived there and how many there would be for himwho returned to Rome; but fix your mind on this matter, how a man wholives in Gyara ought to live in Gyara like a man of courage. And if yoube in Rome, do not imagine what the life in Athens is, but think only ofthe life in Rome. 

Then in the place of all other delights substitute this, that of beingconscious that you are obeying God, that not in word, but in deed youare performing the acts of a wise and good man. For what a thing it isfor a man to be able to say to himself: Now whatever the rest may say insolemn manner in the schools and may be judged to be saying in a waycontrary to common opinion (or in a strange way), this I am doing; andthey are sitting and are discoursing of my virtues and inquiring aboutme and praising me; and of this Zeus has willed that I shall receivefrom myself a demonstration, and shall myself know if he has a soldiersuch as he ought to have, a citizen such as he ought to have, and if hehas chosen to produce me to the rest of mankind as a witness of thethings which are independent of the will: See that you fear withoutreason, that you foolishly desire what you do desire; seek not the goodin things external; seek it in yourselves: if you do not, you will notfind it. For this purpose he leads me at one time hither, at anothertime sends me thither, shows me to men as poor, without authority, andsick; sends me to Gyara, leads me into prison, not because he hatesme--far from him be such a meaning, for who hates the best of hisservants? nor yet because he cares not for me, for he does not neglectany even of the smallest things; but he does this for the purpose ofexercising me and making use of me as a witness to others. Beingappointed to such a service, do I still care about the place in which Iam, or with whom I am, or what men say about me? and do I not entirelydirect my thoughts to God and to his instructions and commands?

Having these things (or thoughts) always in hand, and exercising them byyourself, and keeping them in readiness, you will never be in want ofone to comfort you and strengthen you. For it is not shameful to bewithout something to eat, but not to have reason sufficient for keepingaway fear and sorrow. But if once you have gained exemption from sorrowand fear, will there any longer be a tyrant for you, or a tyrant'sguard, or attendants on Cęsar? Or shall any appointment to offices atcourt cause you pain, or shall those who sacrifice in the Capitol on theoccasion of being named to certain functions, cause pain to you who havereceived so great authority from Zeus? Only do not make a proud displayof it, nor boast of it; but show it by your acts; and if no manperceives it, be satisfied that you are yourself in a healthy state andhappy. 

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TO THOSE WHO FALL OFF (DESIST) FROM THEIR PURPOSE. --Consider as to thethings which you proposed to yourself at first, which you have secured, and which you have not; and how you are pleased when you recall tomemory the one, and are pained about the other; and if it is possible, recover the things wherein you failed. For we must not shrink when weare engaged in the greatest combat, but we must even take blows. For thecombat before us is not in wrestling and the Pancration, in which boththe successful and the unsuccessful may have the greatest merit, or mayhave little, and in truth may be very fortunate or very unfortunate; butthe combat is for good fortune and happiness themselves. Well then, evenif we have renounced the contest in this matter (for good fortune andhappiness), no man hinders us from renewing the combat again, and we arenot compelled to wait for another four years that the games at Olympiamay come again; but as soon as you have recovered and restored yourself, and employ the same zeal, you may renew the combat again; and if againyou renounce it, you may again renew it; and if you once gain thevictory, you are like him who has never renounced the combat. Only donot through a habit of doing the same thing (renouncing the combat), begin to do it with pleasure, and then like a bad athlete go about afterbeing conquered in all the circuit of the games like quails who have runaway. 

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TO THOSE WHO FEAR WANT. --Are you not ashamed at being more cowardly andmore mean than fugitive slaves? How do they when they run away leavetheir masters? on what estates do they depend, and what domestics dothey rely on? Do they not after stealing a little, which is enough forthe first days, then afterwards move on through land or through sea, contriving one method after another for maintaining their lives? Andwhat fugitive slave ever died of hunger? But you are afraid lestnecessary things should fail you, and are sleepless by night. Wretch, are you so blind, and don't you see the road to which the want ofnecessaries leads?--Well, where does it lead?--to the same place towhich a fever leads, or a stone that falls on you, to death. Have younot often said this yourself to your companions? have you not read muchof this kind, and written much? and how often have you boasted that youwere easy as to death?

Learn then first what are the things which are shameful, and then tellus that you are a philosopher: but at present do not, even if any otherman calls you so, allow it. 

Is that shameful to you which is not your own act, that of which you arenot the cause, that which has come to you by accident, as a headache, asa fever? If your parents were poor, and left their property to others, and if while they live, they do not help you at all, is this shameful toyou? Is this what you learned with the philosophers? Did you never hearthat the thing which is shameful ought to be blamed, and that which isblamable is worthy of blame? Whom do you blame for an act which is nothis own, which he did not do himself? Did you then make your father suchas he is, or is it in your power to improve him? Is this power given toyou? Well then, ought you to wish the things which are not given to you, or to be ashamed if you do not obtain them? And have you also beenaccustomed while you were studying philosophy to look to others and tohope for nothing from yourself? Lament then and groan and eat with fearthat you may not have food to-morrow. Tremble about your poor slaveslest they steal, lest they run away, lest they die. So live, andcontinue to live, you who in name only have approached philosophy, andhave disgraced its theorems as far as you can by showing them to beuseless and unprofitable to those who take them up; you, who have neversought constancy, freedom from perturbation, and from passions; you whohave not sought any person for the sake of this object, but many for thesake of syllogisms; you who have never thoroughly examined any of theseappearances by yourself, Am I able to bear, or am I not able to bear?What remains for me to do? But as if all your affairs were well andsecure, you have been resting on the third topic, that of things beingunchanged, in order that you may possess unchanged--what? cowardice, mean spirit, the admiration of the rich, desire without attaining anyend, and avoidance ([Greek: echchlisin]) which fails in the attempt?About security in these things you have been anxious. 

Ought you not to have gained something in addition from reason, and thento have protected this with security? And whom did you ever see buildinga battlement all around and encircling it with a wall? And whatdoorkeeper is placed with no door to watch? But you practise in order tobe able to prove--what? You practise that you may not be tossed as onthe sea through sophisms, and tossed about from what? Show me first whatyou hold, what you measure, or what you weigh; and show me the scales orthe medimnus (the measure); or how long will you go on measuring thedust? Ought you not to demonstrate those things which make men happy, which make things go on for them in the way as they wish, and why weought to blame no man, accuse no man, and acquiesce in theadministration of the universe?

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ABOUT FREEDOM. --He is free who lives as he wishes to live; who isneither subject to compulsion nor to hindrance, nor to force; whosemovements to action ([Greek: hormai]) are not impeded, whose desiresattain their purpose, and who does not fall into that which he wouldavoid ([Greek: echchliseis aperiptotoi]). Who then chooses to live inerror? No man. Who chooses to live deceived, liable to mistake, unjust, unrestrained, discontented, mean? No man. Not one then of the bad livesas he wishes; nor is he then free. And who chooses to live in sorrow, fear, envy, pity, desiring and failing in his desires, attempting toavoid something and falling into it? Not one. Do we then find any of thebad free from sorrow, free from fear, who does not fall into that whichhe would avoid, and does not obtain that which he wishes? Not one; northen do we find any bad man free. 

Further, then, answer me this question, also: does freedom seem to youto be something great and noble and valuable? How should it not seem so?Is it possible then when a man obtains anything so great and valuableand noble to be mean? It is not possible. When then you see any mansubject to another or flattering him contrary to his own opinion, confidently affirm that this man also is not free; and not only if he dothis for a bit of supper, but also if he does it for a government(province) or a consulship; and call these men little slaves who for thesake of little matters do these things, and those who do so for the sakeof great things call great slaves, as they deserve to be. This isadmitted also. Do you think that freedom is a thing independent andself-governing? Certainly. Whomsoever then it is in the power of anotherto hinder and compel, declare that he is not free. And do not look, Ientreat you, after his grandfathers and great-grandfathers, or inquireabout his being bought or sold, but if you hear him saying from hisheart and with feeling, "Master, " even if the twelve fasces precede him(as consul), call him a slave. And if you hear him say, "Wretch that Iam, how much I suffer, " call him a slave. If, finally, you see himlamenting, complaining, unhappy, call him a slave, though he wears apraetexta. If, then, he is doing nothing of this kind do not yet saythat he is free, but learn his opinions, whether they are subject tocompulsion, or may produce hindrance, or to bad fortune, and if you findhim such, call him a slave who has a holiday in the Saturnalia; say thathis master is from home; he will return soon, and you will know what hesuffers. 

What then is that which makes a man free from hindrance and makes himhis own master? For wealth does not do it, nor consulship, norprovincial government, nor royal power; but something else must bediscovered. What then is that which when we write makes us free fromhindrance and unimpeded? The knowledge of the art of writing. What thenis it in playing the lute? The science of playing the lute. Therefore inlife also it is the science of life. You have then heard in a generalway; but examine the thing also in the several parts. Is it possiblethat he who desires any of the things which depend on others can be freefrom hindrance? No. Is it possible for him to be unimpeded? No. Therefore he cannot be free. Consider then, whether we have nothingwhich is in our own power only, or whether we have all things, orwhether some things are in our own power, and others in the power ofothers. What do you mean? When you wish the body to be entire (sound) isit in your power or not? It is not in my power. When you wish it to behealthy? Neither is this in my power. When you wish it to be handsome?Nor is this. Life or death? Neither is this in my power. Your body thenis another's, subject to every man who is stronger than yourself. It is. But your estate is it in your power to have it when you please, and aslong as you please, and such as you please? No. And your slaves? No. Andyour clothes? No. And your house? No. And your horses? Not one of thesethings. And if you wish by all means your children to live, or yourwife, or your brother, or your friends, is it in your power? This alsois not in my power. 

Whether then have you nothing which is in your own power, which dependson yourself only and cannot be taken from you, or have you anything ofthe kind? I know not. Look at the thing then thus, and examine it. Isany man able to make you assent to that which is false? No man. In thematter of assent then you are free from hindrance and obstruction. Granted. Well; and can a man force you to desire to move towards that towhich you do not choose? He can, for when he threatens me with death orbonds he compels me to desire to move towards it. If then you despisedeath and bonds, do you still pay any regard to him? No. Is then thedespising of death an act of your own or is it not yours? It is my act. 

When you have made this preparation, and have practised this discipline, to distinguish that which belongs to another from that which is yourown, the things which are subject to hindrance from those which are not, to consider the things free from hindrance to concern yourself, andthose which are not free not to concern yourself, to keep your desiresteadily fixed to the things which do concern yourself, and turned fromthe things which do not concern yourself; do you still fear any man? Noone. For about what will you be afraid? About the things which are yourown, in which consists the nature of good and evil? and who has powerover these things? who can take them away? who can impede them? No mancan, no more than he can impede God. But will you be afraid about yourbody and your possessions, about things which are not yours, aboutthings which in no way concern you? and what else have you been studyingfrom the beginning than to distinguish between your own and not yourown, the things which are in your power and not in your power, thethings subject to hindrance and not subject? and why have you come tothe philosophers? was it that you may nevertheless be unfortunate andunhappy? You will then in this way, as I have supposed you to have done, be without fear and disturbance. And what is grief to you? for fearcomes from what you expect, but grief from that which is present. Butwhat further will you desire? For of the things which are within thepower of the will, as being good and present, you have a proper andregulated desire; but of the things which are not in the power of thewill you do not desire any one, and so you do not allow any place tothat which is irrational, and impatient, and above measure hasty. 

Then after receiving everything from another and even yourself, are youangry and do you blame the giver if he takes anything from you? Who areyou, and for what purpose did you come into the world? Did not he (God)introduce you here, did he not show you the light, did he not give youfellow-workers, and perceptions and reason? and as whom did he introduceyou here? did he not introduce you as subject to death, and as one tolive on the earth with a little flesh, and to observe hisadministration, and to join with him in the spectacle and the festivalfor a short time? Will you not then, as long as you have been permitted, after seeing the spectacle and the solemnity, when he leads you out, gowith adoration of him and thanks for what you have heard and seen? No;but I would still enjoy the feast. The initiated too would wish to belonger in the initiation; and perhaps also those at Olympia to see otherathletes. But the solemnity is ended; go away like a grateful and modestman; make room for others; others also must be born, as you were, and, being born, they must have a place, and houses, and necessary things. And if the first do not retire, what remains? Why are you insatiable?Why are you not content? why do you contract the world? Yes, but I wouldhave my little children with me and my wife. What, are they yours? dothey not belong to the giver, and to him who made you? then will you notgive up what belongs to others? will you not give way to him who issuperior? Why then did he introduce me into the world on theseconditions? And if the conditions do not suit you, depart. He has noneed of a spectator who is not satisfied. He wants those who join in thefestival, those who take part in the chorus, that they may ratherapplaud, admire, and celebrate with hymns the solemnity. But those whocan bear no trouble, and the cowardly, he will not unwillingly seeabsent from the great assembly ([Greek: panaeguris]) for they did notwhen they were present behave as they ought to do at a festival nor fillup their place properly, but they lamented, found fault with the deity, fortune, their companions; not seeing both what they had, and their ownpowers, which they received for contrary purposes, the powers ofmagnanimity, of a generous mind, manly spirit, and what we are nowinquiring about, freedom. For what purpose then have I received thesethings? To use them. How long? So long as he who has lent them chooses. What if they are necessary to me? Do not attach yourself to them andthey will not be necessary; do not say to yourself that they arenecessary, and then they are not necessary. 

You then, a man may say, are you free? I wish, by the gods, and pray tobe free; but I am not yet able to face my masters, I still value my poorbody, I value greatly the preservation of it entire, though I do notpossess it entire. But I can point out to you a free man, that you mayno longer seek an example. Diogenes was free. How was he free? Notbecause he was born of free parents, but because he was himself free, because he had cast off all the handles of slavery, and it was notpossible for any man to approach him, nor had any man the means oflaying hold of him to enslave him. He had everything easily loosed, everything only hanging to him. If you laid hold of his property, hewould have rather let it go and be yours, than he would have followedyou for it; if you had laid hold of his leg, he would have let go hisleg; if of all his body, all his poor body; his intimates, friends, country, just the same. For he knew from whence he had them, and fromwhom, and on what conditions. His true parents indeed, the gods, and hisreal country he would never have deserted, nor would he have yielded toany man in obedience to them and to their orders, nor would any man havedied for his country more readily. For he was not used to inquire whenhe should be considered to have done anything on behalf of the whole ofthings (the universe, or all the world), but he remembered thateverything which is done comes from thence and is done on behalf of thatcountry and is commanded by him who administers it. Therefore see whatDiogenes himself says and writes: "For this reason, " he says, "Diogenes, it is in your power to speak both with the King of the Persians and withArchidamus the King of the Lacedaemonians, as you please. " Was itbecause he was born of free parents? I suppose all the Athenians and allthe Lacedaemonians, because they were born of slaves, could not talkwith them (these kings) as they wished, but feared and paid court tothem. Why then does he say that it is in his power? Because I do notconsider the poor body to be my own, because I want nothing, because lawis everything to me, and nothing else is. These were the things whichpermitted him to be free. 

Think of these things, these opinions, these words; look to theseexamples, if you would be free, if you desire the thing according to itsworth. And what is the wonder if you buy so great a thing at the priceof things so many and so great? For the sake of this which is calledliberty, some hang themselves, others throw themselves down precipices, and sometimes even whole cities have perished; and will you not for thesake of the true and unassailable and secure liberty give back to Godwhen he demands them the things which he has given? Will you not, asPlato says, study not to die only, but also to endure torture, andexile, and scourging, and, in a word, to give up all which is not yourown? If you will not, you will be a slave among slaves, even if you beten thousand times a consul; and if you make your way up to the palace(Cęsar's residence), you will no less be a slave; and you will feel thatperhaps philosophers utter words which are contrary to common opinion(paradoxes), as Cleanthes also said, but not words contrary to reason. For you will know by experience that the words are true, and that thereis no profit from the things which are valued and eagerly sought tothose who have obtained them; and to those who have not yet obtainedthem there is an imagination ([Greek: phantasia]), that when thesethings are come, all that is good will come with them; then, when theyare come, the feverish feeling is the same, the tossing to and fro isthe same, the satiety, the desire of things, which are not present; forfreedom is acquired not by the full possession of the things which aredesired, but by removing the desire. And that you may know that this istrue, as you have labored for those things, so transfer your labor tothese: be vigilant for the purpose of acquiring an opinion which willmake you free; pay court to a philosopher instead of to a rich old man;be seen about a philosopher's doors; you will not disgrace yourself bybeing seen; you will not go away empty nor without profit, if you go tothe philosopher as you ought, and if not (if you do not succeed), try atleast; the trial (attempt) is not disgraceful. 

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ON FAMILIAR INTIMACY. --To this matter before all you must attend, thatyou be never so closely connected with any of your former intimates orfriends as to come down to the same acts as he does. If you do notobserve this rule, you will ruin yourself. But if the thought arises inyour mind, "I shall seem disobliging to him and he will not have thesame feeling towards me, " remember that nothing is done without cost, nor is it possible for a man if he does not do the same things to be thesame man that he was. Choose then which of the two you will have, to beequally loved by those by whom you were formerly loved, being the samewith your former self; or, being superior, not to obtain from yourfriends the same that you did before. 

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WHAT THINGS WE SHOULD EXCHANGE FOR OTHER THINGS. --Keep this thought inreadiness, when you lose anything external, what you acquire in place ofit; and if it be worth more, never say, I have had a loss; neither ifyou have got a horse in place of an ass, or an ox in place of a sheep, nor a good action in place of a bit of money, nor in place of idle talksuch tranquillity as befits a man, nor in place of lewd talk if you haveacquired modesty. If you remember this, you will always maintain yourcharacter such as it ought to be. But if you do not, consider that thetimes of opportunity are perishing, and that whatever pains you takeabout yourself, you are going to waste them all and overturn them. Andit needs only a few things for the loss and overturning of all--namely, a small deviation from reason. For the steerer of a ship to upset it, hehas no need of the same means as he has need of for saving it; but if heturns it a little to the wind, it is lost; and if he does not do thispurposely, but has been neglecting his duty a little, the ship is lost. Something of the kind happens in this case also; if you only fall anodding a little, all that you have up to this time collected is gone. Attend therefore to the appearances of things, and watch over them; forthat which you have to preserve is no small matter, but it is modestyand fidelity and constancy, freedom from the affects, a state of mindundisturbed, freedom from fear, tranquillity, in a word liberty. Forwhat will you sell these things? See what is the value of the thingswhich you will obtain in exchange for these. --But shall I not obtain anysuch thing for it?--See, and if you do in return get that, see what youreceive in place of it. I possess decency, he possesses a tribuneship:he possesses a prętorship, I possess modesty. But I do not makeacclamations where it is not becoming: I will not stand up where I oughtnot; for I am free, and a friend of God. And so I obey him willingly. But I must not claim (seek) anything else, neither body nor possession, nor magistracy, nor good report, nor in fact anything. For he (God) doesnot allow me to claim (seek) them, for if he had chosen, he would havemade them good for me; but he has not done so, and for this reason Icannot transgress his commands. Preserve that which is your own good ineverything; and as to every other thing, as it is permitted, and so faras to behave consistently with reason in respect to them, content withthis only. If you do not, you will be unfortunate, you will fail in allthings, you will be hindered, you will be impeded. These are the lawswhich have been sent from thence (from God); these are the orders. Ofthese laws a man ought to be an expositor, to these he ought to submit, not to those of Masurius and Cassius. 

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TO THOSE WHO ARE DESIROUS OF PASSING LIFE IN TRANQUILLITY. --Rememberthat not only the desire of power and of riches makes us mean andsubject to others, but even the desire of tranquillity, and of leisure, and of travelling abroad, and of learning. For, to speak plainly, whatever the external thing may be, the value which we set upon itplaces us in subjection to others. What then is the difference betweendesiring to be a senator or not desiring to be one; what is thedifference between desiring power or being content with a privatestation; what is the difference between saying, I am unhappy, I havenothing to do, but I am bound to my books as a corpse; or saying, I amunhappy, I have no leisure for reading? For as salutations and power arethings external and independent of the will, so is a book. For whatpurpose do you choose to read? Tell me. For if you only direct yourpurpose to being amused or learning something, you are a silly fellowand incapable of enduring labor. But if you refer reading to the properend, what else is this than a tranquil and happy life ([Greek: eusoia])?But if reading does not secure for you a happy and tranquil life, whatis the use of it? But it does secure this, the man replies, and for thisreason I am vexed that I am deprived of it. --And what is this tranquiland happy life, which any man can impede, I do not say Cęsar or Cęsar'sfriend, but a crow, a piper, a fever, and thirty thousand other things?But a tranquil and happy life contains nothing so sure as continuity andfreedom from obstacle. Now I am called to do something: I will go thenwith the purpose of observing the measures (rules) which I must keep, ofacting with modesty, steadiness, without desire and aversion to thingsexternal; and then that I may attend to men, what they say, how they aremoved; and this not with any bad disposition, or that I may havesomething to blame or to ridicule; but I turn to myself, and ask if Ialso commit the same faults. How then shall I cease to commit them?Formerly I also acted wrong, but now I do not: thanks to God. 

What then is the reason of this? The reason is that we have never readfor this purpose, we have never written for this purpose, so that we mayin our actions use in a way conformable to nature the appearancespresented to us; but we terminate in this, in learning what is said, andin being able to expound it to another, in resolving a syllogism, and inhandling the hypothetical syllogism. For this reason where our study(purpose) is, there alone is the impediment. Would you have by all meansthe things which are not in your power? Be prevented then, be hindered, fail in your purpose. But if we read what is written about action(efforts, [Greek: hormae]), not that we may see what is said aboutaction, but that we may act well; if we read what is said about desireand aversion (avoiding things), in order that we may neither fail in ourdesires, nor fall into that which we try to avoid; if we read what issaid about duty (officium), in order that remembering the relations (ofthings to one another) we may do nothing irrationally nor contrary tothese relations; we should not be vexed, in being hindered as to ourreadings, but we should be satisfied with doing the acts which areconformable (to the relations), and we should be reckoning not what sofar we have been accustomed to reckon: To-day I have read so manyverses, I have written so many; but (we should say), To-day I haveemployed my action as it is taught by the philosophers; I have notemployed my desire; I have used avoidance ([Greek: echchlisei]) onlywith respect to things which are within the power of my will; I have notbeen afraid of such a person, I have not been prevailed upon by theentreaties of another; I have exercised my patience, my abstinence, myco-operation with others; and so we should thank God for what we oughtto thank him. 

There is only one way to happiness, and let this rule be ready both inthe morning and during the day and by night: the rule is not to looktowards things which are out of the power of our will, to think thatnothing is our own, to give up all things to the Divinity, to Fortune;to make them the superintendents of these things, whom Zeus also hasmade so; for a man to observe that only which is his own, that whichcannot be hindered; and when we read, to refer our reading to this only, and our writing and our listening. For this reason I cannot call the manindustrious, if I hear this only, that he reads and writes; and even ifa man adds that he reads all night, I cannot say so, if he knows not towhat he should refer his reading. For neither do you say that a man isindustrious if he keeps awake for a girl, nor do I. But if he does it(reads and writes) for reputation, I say that he is a lover ofreputation. And if he does it for money, I say that he is a lover ofmoney, not a lover of labor; and if he does it through love of learning, I say that he is a lover of learning. But if he refers his labor to hisown ruling power that he may keep it in a state conformable to natureand pass his life in that state, then only do I say that he isindustrious. For never commend a man on account of these things whichare common to all, but on account of his opinions (principles); forthese are the things which belong to each man, which make his actionsbad or good. Remembering these rules, rejoice in that which is present, and be content with the things which come in season. If you see anythingwhich you have learned and inquired about occurring to you in yourcourse of life (or opportunely applied by you to the acts of life), bedelighted at it. If you have laid aside or have lessened bad dispositionand a habit of reviling; if you have done so with rash temper, obscenewords, hastiness, sluggishness; if you are not moved by what youformerly were, and not in the same way as you once were, you cancelebrate a festival daily, to-day because you have behaved well in oneact, and to-morrow because you have behaved well in another. How muchgreater is this a reason for making sacrifices than a consulship or thegovernment of a province? These things come to you from yourself andfrom the gods. Remember this, who gives these things and to whom, andfor what purpose. If you cherish yourself in these thoughts, do youstill think that it makes any difference where you shall be happy, whereyou shall please God? Are not the gods equally distant from all places?Do they not see from all places alike that which is going on?

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AGAINST THE QUARRELSOME AND FEROCIOUS. --The wise and good man neitherhimself fights with any person, nor does he allow another, so far as hecan prevent it. And an example of this as well as of all other things isproposed to us in the life of Socrates, who not only himself on alloccasions avoided fights (quarrels), but would not allow even others toquarrel. See in Xenophon's Symposium how many quarrels he settled, howfurther he endured Thrasymachus and Polus and Callicles; how hetolerated his wife, and how he tolerated his son who attempted toconfute him and to cavil with him. For he remembered well that no manhas in his power another man's ruling principle. He wished therefore fornothing else than that which was his own. And what is this? Not thatthis or that man may act according to nature, for that is a thing whichbelongs to another; but that while others are doing their own acts, asthey choose, he may nevertheless be in a condition conformable to natureand live in it, only doing what is his own to the end that others alsomay be in a state conformable to nature. For this is the object alwaysset before him by the wise and good man. Is it to be commander (aprętor) of an army? No; but if it is permitted him, his object is inthis matter to maintain his own ruling principle. Is it to marry? No;but if marriage is allowed to him, in this matter his object is tomaintain himself in a condition conformable to nature. But if he wouldhave his son not to do wrong or his wife, he would have what belongs toanother not to belong to another: and to be instructed is this, to learnwhat things are a man's own and what belongs to another. 

How then is there left any place for fighting (quarrelling) to a man whohas this opinion (which he ought to have)? Is he surprised at any thingwhich happens, and does it appear new to him? Does he not expect thatwhich comes from the bad to be worse and more grievous than that whatactually befalls him? And does he not reckon as pure gain whatever they(the bad) may do which falls short of extreme wickedness? Such a personhas reviled you. Great thanks to him for not having struck you. But hehas struck me also. Great thanks that he did not wound you. But hewounded me also. Great thanks that he did not kill you. For when did helearn or in what school that man is a tame animal, that men love oneanother, that an act of injustice is a great harm to him who does it. Since then he has not learned this and is not convinced of it, why shallhe not follow that which seems to be for his own interest? Your neighborhas thrown stones. Have you then done anything wrong? But the things inthe house have been broken. Are you then a utensil? No; but a free powerof will. What then is given to you (to do) in answer to this? If you arelike a wolf, you must bite in return, and throw more stones. But, if youconsider what is proper for a man, examine your storehouse, see withwhat faculties you came into the world. Have you the disposition of awild beast, have you the disposition of revenge for an injury? When is ahorse wretched? When he is deprived of his natural faculties, not whenhe cannot crow like a cock, but when he cannot run. When is a dogwretched? Not when he cannot fly, but when he cannot track his game. Isthen a man also unhappy in this way, not because he cannot stranglelions or embrace statues, for he did not come into the world in thepossession of certain powers from nature for this purpose, but becausehe has lost his probity and his fidelity? People ought to meet andlament such a man for the misfortunes into which he has fallen; notindeed to lament because a man has been born or has died, but because ithas happened to him in his lifetime to have lost the things which arehis own, not that which he received from his father, not his land andhouse, and his inn, and his slaves; for not one of these things is aman's own, but all belong to others, are servile, and subject to account([Greek: hupeithuna]), at different times given to different persons bythose who have them in their power: but I mean the things which belongto him as a man, the marks (stamps) in his mind with which he came intothe world, such as we seek also on coins, and if we find them we approveof the coins, and if we do not find the marks we reject them. What isthe stamp on this sestertius? The stamp of Trajan. Present it. It is thestamp of Nero. Throw it away; it cannot be accepted, it is counterfeit. So also in this case: What is the stamp of his opinions? It isgentleness, a sociable disposition, a tolerant temper, a disposition tomutual affections. Produce these qualities. I accept them: I considerthis man a citizen, I accept him as a neighbor, a companion in myvoyages. Only see that he has not Nero's stamp. Is he passionate, is hefull of resentment, is he fault-finding? If the whim seizes him, does hebreak the heads of those who come in his way? (If so), why then did yousay that he is a man? Is everything judged (determined) by the bareform? If that is so, say that the form in wax is an apple and has thesmell and the taste of an apple. But the external figure is not enough:neither then is the nose enough and the eyes to make the man, but hemust have the opinions of a man. Here is a man who does not listen toreason, who does not know when he is refuted: he is an ass; in anotherman the sense of shame is become dead: he is good for nothing, he isanything rather than a man. This man seeks whom he may meet and kick orbite, so that he is not even a sheep or an ass, but a kind of wildbeast. 

What then? would you have me to be despised?--By whom? by those who knowyou? and how shall those who know you despise a man who is gentle andmodest? Perhaps you mean by those who do not know you? What is that toyou? For no other artisan cares for the opinion of those who know nothis art. But they will be more hostile to me for this reason. Why do yousay "me"? Can any man injure your will, or prevent you from using in anatural way the appearances which are presented to you? In no way canhe. Why then are you still disturbed and why do you choose to showyourself afraid? And why do you not come forth and proclaim that you areat peace with all men whatever they may do, and laugh at those chieflywho think that they can harm you? These slaves, you can say, know noteither who I am, nor where lies my good or my evil, because they have noaccess to the things which are mine. 

In this way also those who occupy a strong city mock the besiegers (andsay): What trouble these men are now taking for nothing; our wall issecure, we have food for a very long time, and all other resources. These are the things which make a city strong and impregnable; butnothing else than his opinions makes a man's soul impregnable. For whatwall is so strong, or what body is so hard, or what possession is sosafe, or what honor (rank, character) so free from assault (as a man'sopinions)? All (other) things everywhere are perishable, easily taken byassault, and if any man in any way is attached to them, he must bedisturbed, except what is bad, he must fear, lament, find his desiresdisappointed, and fall into things which he would avoid. Then do we notchoose to make secure the only means of safety which are offered to us, and do we not choose to withdraw ourselves from that which is perishableand servile and to labor at the things which are imperishable and bynature free; and do we not remember that no man either hurts another ordoes good to another, but that a man's opinions about each thing, isthat which hurts him, is that which overturns him; this is fighting, this is civil discord, this is war? That which made Eteocles andPolynices enemies was nothing else than this opinion which they hadabout royal power, their opinion about exile, that the one is theextreme of evils, the other the greatest good. Now this is the nature ofevery man to seek the good, to avoid the bad; to consider him whodeprives us of the one and involves us in the other an enemy andtreacherous, even if he be a brother, or a son, or a father. For nothingis more akin to us than the good; therefore, if these things (externals)are good and evil, neither is a father a friend to sons, nor a brotherto a brother, but all the world is everywhere full of enemies, treacherous men, and sycophants. But if the will ([Greek: proairesis], the purpose, the intention) being what it ought to be, is the only good;and if the will being such as it ought not to be, is the only evil, where is there any strife, where is there reviling? about what? aboutthe things which do not concern us? and strife with whom? with theignorant, the unhappy, with those who are deceived about the chiefthings?

Remembering this Socrates managed his own house and endured a veryill-tempered wife and a foolish (ungrateful?) son. 

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AGAINST THOSE WHO LAMENT OVER BEING PITIED. --I am grieved, a man says, at being pitied. Whether then is the fact of your being pitied a thingwhich concerns you or those who pity you? Well, is it in your power tostop this pity? It is in my power, if I show them that I do not requirepity. And whether then are you in the condition of not deserving(requiring) pity, or are you not in that condition? I think that I amnot; but these persons do not pity me, for the things for which, if theyought to pity me, it would be proper, I mean, for my faults; but theypity me for my poverty, for not possessing honorable offices, fordiseases and deaths and other such things. Whether then are you preparedto convince the many, that not one of these things is an evil, but thatit is possible for a man who is poor and has no office ([Greek:anarchonti)] and enjoys no honor to be happy; or to show yourself tothem as rich and in power? For the second of these things belong to aman who is boastful, silly, and good for nothing. And consider by whatmeans the pretence must be supported. It will be necessary for you tohire slaves and to possess a few silver vessels, and to exhibit them inpublic, if it is possible, though they are often the same, and toattempt to conceal the fact that they are the same, and to have splendidgarments, and all other things for display, and to show that you are aman honored by the great, and to try to sup at their houses, or to besupposed to sup there, and as to your person to employ some mean arts, that you may appear to be more handsome and nobler than you are. Thesethings you must contrive, if you choose to go by the second path inorder not to be pitied. But the first way is both impracticable andlong, to attempt the very thing which Zeus has not been able to do, toconvince all men what things are good and bad. Is this power given toyou? This only is given to you, to convince yourself; and you have notconvinced yourself. Then I ask you, do you attempt to persuade othermen? and who has lived so long with you as you with yourself? and whohas so much power of convincing you as you have of convincing yourself;and who is better disposed and nearer to you than you are to yourself?How then have you not yet convinced yourself in order to learn? Atpresent are not things upside down? Is this what you have been earnestabout doing, to learn to be free from grief and free from disturbance, and not to be humbled (abject), and to be free? Have you not heard thenthat there is only one way which leads to this end, to give up (dismiss)the things which do not depend on the will, to withdraw from them, andto admit that they belong to others? For another man then to have anopinion about you, of what kind is it? It is a thing independent of thewill--Then is it nothing to you? It is nothing. When then you are stillvexed at this and disturbed, do you think that you are convinced aboutgood and evil?

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ON FREEDOM FROM FEAR. --What makes the tyrant formidable? The guards, yousay, and their swords, and the men of the bedchamber, and those whoexclude them who would enter. Why then if you bring a boy (child) to thetyrant when he is with his guards, is he not afraid; or is it becausethe child does not understand these things? If then any man doesunderstand what guards are and that they have swords, and comes to thetyrant for this very purpose because he wishes to die on account of somecircumstance and seeks to die easily by the hand of another, is heafraid of the guards? No, for he wishes for the thing which makes theguards formidable. If then any man neither wishing to die nor to live byall means, but only as it may be permitted, approaches the tyrant whathinders him from approaching the tyrant without fear? Nothing. If then aman has the same opinion about his property as the man whom I haveinstanced has about his body; and also about his children and his wife, and in a word is so affected by some madness or despair that he caresnot whether he possesses them or not, but like children who are playingwith shells (quarrel) about the play, but do not trouble themselvesabout the shells, so he too has set no value on the materials (things), but values the pleasure that he has with them and the occupation, whattyrant is then formidable to him, or what guards or what swords?

What hinders a man, who has clearly separated (comprehended) thesethings, from living with a light heart and bearing easily the reins, quietly expecting everything which can happen, and enduring that whichhas already happened? Would you have me to bear poverty? Come and youwill know what poverty is when it has found one who can act well thepart of a poor man. Would you have me to possess power? Let me havepower, and also the trouble of it. Well, banishment? Wherever I shallgo, there it will be well with me; for here also where I am, it was notbecause of the place that it was well with me, but because of myopinions which I shall carry off with me, for neither can any mandeprive me of them; but my opinions alone are mine and they cannot betaken from me, and I am satisfied while I have them, wherever I may beand whatever I am doing. But now it is time to die. Why do you say todie? Make no tragedy show of the thing, but speak of it as it is. It isnow time for the matter (of the body) to be resolved into the things outof which it was composed. And what is the formidable thing here? what isgoing to perish of the things which are in the universe? what new thingor wondrous is going to happen? Is it for this reason that a tyrant isformidable? Is it for this reason that the guards appear to have swordswhich are large and sharp? Say this to others; but I have consideredabout all these things; no man has power over me. I have been made free;I know his commands, no man can now lead me as a slave. I have a properperson to assert my freedom; I have proper judges. (I say) are you notthe master of my body? What then is that to me? Are you not the masterof my property? What then is that to me? Are you not the master of myexile or of my chains? Well, from all these things and all the poor bodyitself I depart at your bidding, when you please. Make trial of yourpower, and you will know how far it reaches. 

Whom then can I still fear? Those who are over the bedchamber? Lest theyshould do, what? Shut me out? If they find that I wish to enter, letthem shut me out. Why then do you go to the doors? Because I think itbefits me, while the play (sport) lasts, to join in it. How then are younot shut out? Because unless some one allows me to go in, I do notchoose to go in, but am always content with that which happens; for Ithink that what God chooses is better than what I choose. I will attachmyself as a minister and follower to him; I have the same movements(pursuits) as he has, I have the same desires; in a word, I have thesame will ([Greek: sunthelo]). There is no shutting out for me, but forthose who would force their way in. Why then do not I force my way in?Because I know that nothing good is distributed within to those whoenter. But when I hear any man called fortunate because he is honored byCęsar, I say what does he happen to get? A province (the government of aprovince). Does he also obtain an opinion such as he ought? The officeof a Prefect. Does he also obtain the power of using his office well?Why do I still strive to enter (Cęsar's chamber)? A man scatters driedfigs and nuts: the children seize them, and fight with one another; mendo not, for they think them to be a small matter. But if a man shouldthrow about shells, even the children do not seize them. Provinces aredistributed: let children look to that. Money is distributed; letchildren look to that. Prętorships, consulships, are distributed; letchildren scramble for them, let them be shut out, beaten, kiss the handsof the giver, of the slaves: but to me these are only dried figs andnuts. What then? If you fail to get them, while Cęsar is scattering themabout, do not be troubled; if a dried fig come into your lap, take itand eat it; for so far you may value even a fig. But if I shall stoopdown and turn another over, or be turned over by another, and shallflatter those who have got into (Cęsar's) chamber, neither is a driedfig worth the trouble, nor anything else of the things which are notgood, which the philosophers have persuaded me not to think good. 

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TO A PERSON WHO HAD BEEN CHANGED TO A CHARACTER OF SHAMELESSNESS. --Whenyou see another man in the possession of power (magistracy), set againstthis the fact that you have not the want (desire) of power; when you seeanother rich, see what you possess in place of riches: for if youpossess nothing in place of them, you are miserable; but if you have notthe want of riches, know that you possess more than this man possessesand what is worth much more. 

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WHAT THINGS WE OUGHT TO DESPISE AND WHAT THINGS WE OUGHT TO VALUE. --Thedifficulties of all men are about external things, their helplessness isabout external. What shall I do? how will it be? how will it turn out?will this happen? will that? All these are the words of those who areturning themselves to things which are not within the power of the will. For who says, How shall I not assent to that which is false? how shall Inot turn away from the truth? If a man be of such a good disposition asto be anxious about these things I will remind him of this: Why are youanxious? The thing is in your own power, be assured; do not beprecipitate in assenting before you apply the natural rule. On the otherside, if a man is anxious (uneasy) about desire, lest it fail in itspurpose and miss its end, and with respect to the avoidance of things, lest he should fall into that which he would avoid, I will first kiss(love) him, because he throws away the things about which others are ina flutter (others desire) and their fears, and employs his thoughtsabout his own affairs and his own condition. Then I shall say to him: Ifyou do not choose to desire that which you will fail to obtain nor toattempt to avoid that into which you will fall, desire nothing whichbelongs to (which is in the power of) others, nor try to avoid any ofthe things which are not in your power. If you do not observe this rule, you must of necessity fail in your desires and fall into that which youwould avoid. What is the difficulty here? where is there room for thewords How will it be? and How will it turn out? and Will this happen orthat?

Now is not that which will happen independent of the will? Yes. And thenature of good and of evil, is it not in the things which are within thepower of the will? Yes. Is it in your power then to treat according tonature everything which happens? Can any person hinder you? No man. Nolonger then say to me, How will it be? For, however it may be, you willdispose of it well, and the result to you will be a fortunate one. Whatwould Hercules have been if he said: How shall a great lion not appearto me, or a great boar, or savage men? And what do you care for that? Ifa great boar appear, you will fight a greater fight; if bad men appear, you will relieve the earth of the bad. Suppose then that I lose my lifein this way. You will die a good man, doing a noble act. For since hemust certainly die, of necessity a man must be found doing something, either following the employment of a husbandman, or digging, or trading, or serving in a consulship, or suffering from indigestion or fromdiarrhoea. What then do you wish to be doing when you are found bydeath? I, for my part, would wish to be found doing something whichbelongs to a man, beneficent, suitable to the general interest, noble. But if I cannot be found doing things so great, I would be found doingat least that which I cannot be hindered from doing, that which ispermitted me to do, correcting myself, cultivating the faculty whichmakes use of appearances, laboring at freedom from the affects (laboringat tranquillity of mind); rendering to the relations of life their due. If I succeed so far, also (I would be found) touching on (advancing to)the third topic (or head) safety in forming judgments about things. Ifdeath surprises me when I am busy about these things, it is enough forme if I can stretch out my hands to God and say: The means which I havereceived from thee for seeing thy administration (of the world) andfollowing it I have not neglected; I have not dishonored thee by myacts; see how I have used my perceptions, see how I have used mypreconceptions; have I ever blamed thee? have I been discontented withanything that happens, or wished it to be otherwise? have I wished totransgress the (established) relations (of things)? That thou hast givenme life, I thank thee for what thou hast given. So long as I have usedthe things which are thine I am content. Take them back and place themwherever thou mayest choose, for thine were all things, thou gavest themto me. Is it not enough to depart in this state of mind? and what lifeis better and more becoming than that of a man who is in this state ofmind? and what end is more happy?

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ABOUT PURITY (CLEANLINESS). --Some persons raise a question whether thesocial feeling is contained in the nature of man; and yet I think thatthese same persons would have no doubt that love of purity is certainlycontained in it, and that if man is distinguished from other animals byanything, he is distinguished by this. When then we see any other animalcleaning itself, we are accustomed to speak of the act with surprise, and to add that the animal is acting like a man; and on the other hand, if a man blames an animal for being dirty, straightway, as if we weremaking an excuse for it, we say that of course the animal is not a humancreature. So we suppose that there is something superior in man, andthat we first receive it from the gods. For since the gods by theirnature are pure and free from corruption, so far as men approach them byreason, so far do they cling to purity and to a love (habit) of purity. But since it is impossible that man's nature ([Greek: ousia]) can bealtogether pure, being mixed (composed) of such materials, reason isapplied, as far as it is possible, and reason endeavors to make humannature love purity. 

The first then and highest purity is that which is in the soul; and wesay the same of impurity. Now you could not discover the impurity of thesoul as you could discover that of the body; but as to the soul, whatelse could you find in it than that which makes it filthy in respect tothe acts which are her own? Now the acts of the soul are movementtowards an object or movement from it, desire, aversion, preparation, design (purpose), assent. What then is it which in these acts makes thesoul filthy and impure? Nothing else than her own bad judgments ([Greek:chrimata]). Consequently the impurity of the soul is the soul's badopinions; and the purification of the soul is the planting in it ofproper opinions; and the soul is pure which has proper opinions, for thesoul alone in her own acts is free from perturbation and pollution. 

For we ought not even by the appearance of the body to deter themultitude from philosophy; but as in other things, a philosopher shouldshow himself cheerful and tranquil, so also he should in the things thatrelate to the body. See, ye men, that I have nothing, that I wantnothing; see how I am without a house, and without a city, and an exile, if it happens to be so, and without a hearth I live more free fromtrouble and more happily than all of noble birth and than the rich. Butlook at my poor body also and observe that it is not injured by my hardway of living. But if a man says this to me, who has the appearance(dress) and face of a condemned man, what god shall persuade me toapproach philosophy, if it makes men such persons? Far from it; I wouldnot choose to do so, even if I were going to become a wise man. I indeedwould rather that a young man, who is making his first movements towardsphilosophy, should come to me with his hair carefully trimmed than withit dirty and rough, for there is seen in him a certain notion(appearance) of beauty and a desire of (attempt at) that which isbecoming; and where he supposes it to be, there also he strives that itshall be. It is only necessary to show him (what it is), and to say:Young man, you seek beauty, and you do well; you must know then that it(is produced) grows in that part of you where you have the rationalfaculty; seek it there where you have the movements towards andmovements from things, where you have the desires towards and theaversion from things; for this is what you have in yourself of asuperior kind; but the poor body is naturally only earth; why do youlabor about it to no purpose? if you shall learn nothing else, you willlearn from time that the body is nothing. But if a man comes to medaubed with filth, dirty, with a moustache down to his knees, what can Isay to him, by what kind of resemblance can I lead him on? For aboutwhat has he busied himself which resembles beauty, that I may be able tochange him and say, Beauty is not in this, but in that? Would you haveme to tell him, that beauty consists not in being daubed with muck, butthat it lies in the rational part? Has he any desire of beauty? has heany form of it in his mind? Go and talk to a hog, and tell him not toroll in the mud. 

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ON ATTENTION. --When you have remitted your attention for a short time, do not imagine this, that you will recover it when you choose; but letthis thought be present to you, that in consequence of the faultcommitted today your affairs must be in a worse condition for all thatfollows. For first, and what causes most trouble, a habit of notattending is formed in you; then a habit of deferring your attention. And continually from time to time you drive away by deferring it thehappiness of life, proper behavior, the being and living conformably tonature. If then the procrastination of attention is profitable, thecomplete omission of attention is more profitable; but if it is notprofitable, why do you not maintain your attention constant? Today Ichoose to play. Well then, ought you not to play with attention? Ichoose to sing. What then hinders you from doing so with attention? Isthere any part of life excepted, to which attention does not extend? Forwill you do it (anything in life) worse by using attention, and betterby not attending at all? And what else of the things in life is donebetter by those who do not use attention? Does he who works in wood workbetter by not attending to it? Does the captain of a ship manage itbetter by not attending? and are any of the smaller acts done better byinattention? Do you not see that when you have let your mind loose, itis no longer in your power to recall it, either to propriety, or tomodesty, or to moderation; but you do everything that comes into yourmind in obedience to your inclinations. 

First then we ought to have these (rules) in readiness, and to donothing without them, and we ought to keep the soul directed to thismark, to pursue nothing external, and nothing which belongs to others(or is in the power of others), but to do as he has appointed who hasthe power; we ought to pursue altogether the things which are in thepower of the will, and all other things as it is permitted. Next to thiswe ought to remember who we are, and what is our name, and to endeavorto direct our duties towards the character (nature) of our severalrelations (in life) in this manner: what is the season for singing, whatis the season for play, and in whose presence; what will be theconsequence of the act; whether our associates will despise us, whetherwe shall despise them; when to jeer ([Greek: schopsai]), and whom toridicule; and on what occasion to comply and with whom; and finally, incomplying how to maintain our own character. But wherever you havedeviated from any of these rules, there is damage immediately, not fromanything external, but from the action itself. 

What then? is it possible to be free from faults (if you do all this)?It is not possible; but this is possible, to direct your effortsincessantly to being faultless. For we must be content if by neverremitting this attention we shall escape at least a few errors. But nowwhen you have said, Tomorrow I will begin to attend, you must be toldthat you are saying this, Today I will be shameless, disregardful oftime and place, mean; it will be in the power of others to give me pain;today I will be passionate and envious. See how many evil things you arepermitting yourself to do. If it is good to use attention tomorrow, howmuch better is it to do so today? if tomorrow it is in your interest toattend, much more is it today, that you may be able to do so tomorrowalso, and may not defer it again to the third day. 

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AGAINST OR TO THOSE WHO READILY TELL THEIR OWN AFFAIRS. --When a man hasseemed to us to have talked with simplicity (candor) about his ownaffairs, how is it that at last we are ourselves also induced todiscover to him our own secrets and we think this to be candid behavior?In the first place, because it seems unfair for a man to have listenedto the affairs of his neighbor, and not to communicate to him also inturn our own affairs; next, because we think that we shall not presentto them the appearance of candid men when we are silent about our ownaffairs. Indeed, men are often accustomed to say, I have told you all myaffairs, will you tell me nothing of your own? where is this done?Besides, we have also this opinion that we can safely trust him who hasalready told us his own affairs; for the notion rises in our mind thatthis man could never divulge our affairs because he would be cautiousthat we also should not divulge his. In this way also the incautious arecaught by the soldiers at Rome. A soldier sits by you in a common dressand begins to speak ill of Cęsar; then you, as if you had received apledge of his fidelity by his having begun the abuse, utter yourselfalso what you think, and then you are carried off in chains. 

Something of this kind happens to us also generally. Now as this man hasconfidently intrusted his affairs to me, shall I also do so to any manwhom I meet? (No), for when I have heard, I keep silence, if I am ofsuch a disposition; but he goes forth and tells all men what he hasheard. Then, if I hear what has been done, if I be a man like him, Iresolve to be revenged, I divulge what he has told me; I both disturbothers, and am disturbed myself. But if I remember that one man does notinjure another, and that every man's acts injure and profit him, Isecure this, that I do not anything like him, but still I suffer what Ido suffer through my own silly talk. 

True, but it is unfair when you have heard the secrets of your neighborfor you in your turn to communicate nothing to him. Did I ask you foryour secrets, my man? did you communicate your affairs on certain terms, that you should in return hear mine also? If you are a babbler and thinkthat all who meet you are friends, do you wish me also to be like you?But why, if you did well in intrusting your affairs to me, and it is notwell for me to intrust mine to you, do you wish me to be so rash? It isjust the same as if I had a cask which is water-tight, and you one witha hole in it, and you should come and deposit with me your wine that Imight put it into my cask, and then should complain that I also did notintrust my wine to you, for you have a cask with a hole in it. How thenis there any equality here? You intrusted your affairs to a man who isfaithful and modest, to a man who thinks that his own actions alone areinjurious and (or) useful, and that nothing external is. Would you haveme intrust mine to you, a man who has dishonored his own faculty ofwill, and who wishes to gain some small bit of money or some office orpromotion in the court (emperor's palace), even if you should be goingto murder your own children, like Medea? Where (in what) is thisequality (fairness)? But show yourself to me to be faithful, modest, andsteady; show me that you have friendly opinions; show that your cask hasno hole in it; and you will see how I shall not wait for you to trust mewith your own affairs, but I myself shall come to you and ask you tohear mine. For who does not choose to make use of a good vessel? Whodoes not value a benevolent and faithful adviser? Who will not willinglyreceive a man who is ready to bear a share, as we may say, of thedifficulty of his circumstances, and by this very act to ease theburden, by taking a part of it. 

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THE ENCHEIRIDION, OR MANUAL. 

I. 

Of things some are in our power, and others are not. In our power areopinion ([Greek: hupolaepsis]), movement towards a thing ([Greek:hormae]), desire, aversion ([Greek: echchlisis]), turning from a thing;and in a word, whatever are our acts. Not in our power are the body, property, reputation, offices (magisterial power), and in a word, whatever are not our own acts. And the things in our power are by naturefree, not subject to restraint or hindrance; but the things not in ourpower are weak, slavish, subject to restraint, in the power of others. Remember then, that if you think the things which are by nature slavishto be free, and the things which are in the power of others to be yourown, you will be hindered, you will lament, you will be disturbed, youwill blame both gods and men; but if you think that only which is yourown to be your own, and if you think that what is another's, as itreally is, belongs to another, no man will ever compel you, no man willhinder you, you will never blame any man, you will accuse no man, youwill do nothing involuntarily (against your will), no man will harm you, you will have no enemy, for you will not suffer any harm. 

If then you desire (aim at) such great things remember that you must not(attempt to) lay hold of them with a small effort; but you must leavealone some things entirely, and postpone others for the present. But ifyou wish for these things also (such great things), and power (office)and wealth, perhaps you will not gain even these very things (power andwealth) because you aim also at those former things (such great things);certainly you will fail in those things through which alone happinessand freedom are secured. Straightway then practise saying to every harshappearance: You are an appearance, and in no manner what you appear tobe. Then examine it by the rules which you possess, and by this firstand chiefly, whether it relates to the things which are in our power orto things which are not in our power; and if it relates to anythingwhich is not in our power, be ready to say that it does not concern you. 

II. 

Remember that desire contains in it the profession (hope) of obtainingthat which you desire; and the profession (hope) in aversion (turningfrom a thing) is that you will not fall into that which you attempt toavoid; and he who fails in his desire is unfortunate; and he who fallsinto that which he would avoid is unhappy. If then you attempt to avoidonly the things contrary to nature which are within your power you willnot be involved in any of the things which you would avoid. But if youattempt to avoid disease, or death, or poverty, you will be unhappy. Take away then aversion from all things which are not in our power, andtransfer it to the things contrary to nature which are in our power. Butdestroy desire completely for the present. For if you desire anythingwhich is not in our power, you must be unfortunate; but of the things inour power, and which it would be good to desire, nothing yet is beforeyou. But employ only the power of moving towards an object and retiringfrom it; and these powers indeed only slightly and with exceptions andwith remission. 

III. 

In everything which pleases the soul, or supplies a want, or is loved, remember to add this to the (description, notion): What is the nature ofeach thing, beginning from the smallest? If you love an earthen vessel, say it is an earthen vessel which you love; for when it has been brokenyou will not be disturbed. If you are kissing your child or wife, saythat it is a human being whom you are kissing, for when the wife orchild dies you will not be disturbed. 

IV. 

When you are going to take in hand any act remind yourself what kind ofan act it is. If you are going to bathe, place before yourself whathappens in the bath; some splashing the water, others pushing againstone another, others abusing one another, and some stealing; and thuswith more safety you will undertake the matter, if you say to yourself, I now intend to bathe, and to maintain my will in a manner conformableto nature. And so you will do in every act; for thus if any hindrance tobathing shall happen let this thought be ready. It was not this onlythat I intended, but I intended also to maintain my will in a wayconformable to nature; but I shall not maintain it so if I am vexed atwhat happens. 

V. 

Men are disturbed not by the things which happen, but by the opinionsabout the things; for example, death is nothing terrible, for if it wereit would have seemed so to Socrates; for the opinion about death that itis terrible, is the terrible thing. When then we are impeded, ordisturbed, or grieved, let us never blame others, but ourselves--thatis, our opinions. It is the act of an ill-instructed man to blame othersfor his own bad condition; it is the act of one who has begun to beinstructed, to lay the blame on himself; and of one whose instruction iscompleted, neither to blame another, nor himself. 

VI. 

Be not elated at any advantage (excellence) which belongs to another. Ifa horse when he is elated should say, I am beautiful, one might endureit. But when you are elated, and say, I have a beautiful horse, you mustknow that you are elated at having a good horse. What then is your own?The use of appearances. Consequently when in the use of appearancesyou are conformable to nature, then be elated, for then you will beelated at something good which is your own. 

VII. 

As on a voyage when the vessel has reached a port, if you go out to getwater it is an amusement by the way to pick up a shellfish or some bulb, but your thoughts ought to be directed to the ship, and you ought to beconstantly watching if the captain should call, and then you must throwaway all those things, that you may not be bound and pitched into theship like sheep. So in life also, if there be given to you instead of alittle bulb and a shell a wife and child, there will be nothing toprevent (you from taking them). But if the captain should call, run tothe ship and leave all those things without regard to them. But if youare old, do not even go far from the ship, lest when you are called youmake default. 

VIII. 

Seek not that the things which happen should happen as you wish; butwish the things which happen to be as they are, and you will have atranquil flow of life. 

IX. 

Disease is an impediment to the body, but not to the will, unless thewill itself chooses. Lameness is an impediment to the leg, but not tothe will. And add this reflection on the occasion of everything thathappens; for you will find it an impediment to something else, but notto yourself. 

X. 

On the occasion of every accident (event) that befalls you, remember toturn to yourself and inquire what power you have for turning it to use. If you see a fair man or a fair woman, you will find that the power toresist is temperance (continence). If labor (pain) be presented to you, you will find that it is endurance. If it be abusive words, you willfind it to be patience. And if you have been thus formed to the (proper)habit, the appearances will not carry you along with them. 

XI. 

Never say about anything, I have lost it, but say I have restored it. Isyour child dead? It has been restored. Is your wife dead? She has beenrestored. Has your estate been taken from you? Has not then this alsobeen restored? But he who has taken it from me is a bad man. But what isit to you, by whose hands the giver demanded it back? So long as he mayallow you, take care of it as a thing which belongs to another, astravellers do with their inn. 

XII. 

If you intend to improve, throw away such thoughts as these: if Ineglect my affairs, I shall not have the means of living: unless Ichastise my slave, he will be bad. For it is better to die of hunger andso to be released from grief and fear than to live in abundance withperturbation; and it is better for your slave to be bad than for you tobe unhappy. Begin then from little things. Is the oil spilled? Is alittle wine stolen? Say on the occasion, at such price is sold freedomfrom perturbation; at such price is sold tranquillity, but nothing isgot for nothing. And when you call your slave, consider that it ispossible that he does not hear; and if he does hear, that he will donothing which you wish. But matters are not so well with him, butaltogether well with you, that it should be in his power for you to benot disturbed. 

XIII. 

If you would improve, submit to be considered without sense and foolishwith respect to externals. Wish to be considered to know nothing; and ifyou shall seem to some to be a person of importance, distrust yourself. For you should know that it is not easy both to keep your will in acondition conformable to nature and (to secure) external things: but ifa man is careful about the one, it is an absolute necessity that he willneglect the other. 

XIV. 

If you would have your children and your wife and your friends to livefor ever, you are silly; for you would have the things which are not inyour power to be in your power, and the things which belong to others tobe yours. So if you would have your slave to be free from faults, youare a fool; for you would have badness not to be badness, but somethingelse. But if you wish not to fail in your desires, you are able to dothat. Practise then this which you are able to do. He is the master ofevery man who has the power over the things which another person wishesor does not wish, the power to confer them on him or to take them away. Whoever then wishes to be free let him neither wish for anything noravoid anything which depends on others: if he does not observe thisrule, he must be a slave. 

XV. 

Remember that in life you ought to behave as at a banquet. Suppose thatsomething is carried round and is opposite to you. Stretch out your handand take a portion with decency. Suppose that it passes by you. Do notdetain it. Suppose that it is not yet come to you. Do not send yourdesire forward to it, but wait till it is opposite to you. Do so withrespect to children, so with respect to a wife, so with respect tomagisterial offices, so with respect to wealth, and you will be sometime a worthy partner of the banquets of the gods. But if you take noneof the things which are set before you, and even despise them, then youwill be not only a fellow banqueter with the gods, but also a partnerwith them in power. For by acting thus Diogenes and Heracleitus andthose like them were deservedly divine, and were so called. 

XVI. 

When you see a person weeping in sorrow either when a child goes abroador when he is dead, or when the man has lost his property, take carethat the appearance do not hurry you away with it, as if he weresuffering in external things. But straightway make a distinction in yourown mind, and be in readiness to say, it is not that which has happenedthat afflicts this man, for it does not afflict another, but it is theopinion about this thing which afflicts the man. So far as words then donot be unwilling to show him sympathy, and even if it happens so, tolament with him. But take care that you do not lament internally also. 

XVII. 

Remember that thou art an actor in a play, of such a kind as the teacher(author) may choose; if short, of a short one; if long, of a long one:if he wishes you to act the part of a poor man, see that you act thepart naturally; if the part of a lame man, of a magistrate, of a privateperson, (do the same). For this is your duty, to act well the part thatis given to you; but to select the part, belongs to another. 

XVIII. 

When a raven has croaked inauspiciously, let not the appearance hurryyou away with it; but straightway make a distinction in your mind andsay, None of these things is signified to me, but either to my poorbody, or to my small property, or to my reputation, or to my children, or to my wife: but to me all significations are auspicious if I choose. For whatever of these things results, it is in my power to derivebenefit from it. 

XIX. 

You can be invincible, if you enter into no contest in which it is notin your power to conquer. Take care then when you observe a man honoredbefore others or possessed of great power or highly esteemed for anyreason, not to suppose him happy, and be not carried away by theappearance. For if the nature of the good is in our power, neither envynor jealousy will have a place in us. But you yourself will not wish tobe a general or senator ([Greek: prutanis]) or consul, but a free man:and there is only one way to this, to despise (care not for) the thingswhich are not in our power. 

XX. 

Remember that it is not he who reviles you or strikes you, who insultsyou, but it is your opinion about these things as being insulting. Whenthen a man irritates you, you must know that it is your own opinionwhich has irritated you. Therefore especially try not to be carried awayby the appearance. For if you once gain time and delay, you will moreeasily master yourself. 

XXI. 

Let death and exile and every other thing which appears dreadful bedaily before your eyes; but most of all death: and you will never thinkof anything mean nor will you desire anything extravagantly. 

XXII. 

If you desire philosophy, prepare yourself from the beginning to beridiculed, to expect that many will sneer at you, and say, He has all atonce returned to us as a philosopher; and whence does he get thissupercilious look for us? Do you not show a supercilious look; but holdon to the things which seem to you best as one appointed by God to thisstation. And remember that if you abide in the same principles, thesemen who first ridiculed will afterwards admire you; but if you shallhave been overpowered by them, you will bring on yourself doubleridicule. 

XXIII. 

If it should ever happen to you to be turned to externals in order toplease some person, you must know that you have lost your purpose inlife. Be satisfied then in everything with being a philosopher; and ifyou wish to seem also to any person to be a philosopher, appear so toyourself, and you will be able to do this. 

XXIV. 

Let not these thoughts afflict you, I shall live unhonored and be nobodynowhere. For if want of honor ([Greek: atimia]) is an evil, you cannotbe in evil through the means (fault) of another any more than you can beinvolved in anything base. Is it then your business to obtain the rankof a magistrate, or to be received at a banquet? By no means. How thencan this be want of honor (dishonor)? And how will you be nobodynowhere, when you ought to be somebody in those things only which are inyour power, in which indeed it is permitted to you to be a man of thegreatest worth? But your friends will be without assistance! What do youmean by being without assistance? They will not receive money from you, nor will you make them Roman citizens. Who then told you that these areamong the things which are in our power, and not in the power of others?And who can give to another what he has not himself? Acquire money then, your friends say, that we also may have something. If I can acquiremoney and also keep myself modest and faithful and magnanimous, pointout the way, and I will acquire it. But if you ask me to lose the thingswhich are good and my own, in order that you may gain the things whichare not good, see how unfair and silly you are. Besides, which would yourather have, money or a faithful and modest friend? For this end thenrather help me to be such a man, and do not ask me to do this by which Ishall lose that character. But my country, you say, as far as it dependson me, will be without my help. I ask again, what help do you mean? Itwill not have porticos or baths through you. And what does this mean?For it is not furnished with shoes by means of a smith, nor with arms bymeans of a shoemaker. But it is enough if every man fully discharges thework that is his own: and if you provided it with another citizenfaithful and modest, would you not be useful to it? Yes. Then you alsocannot be useless to it. What place then, you say, shall I hold in thecity? Whatever you can, if you maintain at the same time your fidelityand modesty. But if when you wish to be useful to the state, you shalllose these qualities, what profit could you be to it, if you were madeshameless and faithless?

XXV. 

Has any man been preferred before you at a banquet, or in being saluted, or in being invited to a consultation? If these things are good, youought to rejoice that he has obtained them; but if bad, be not grievedbecause you have not obtained them. And remember that you cannot, if youdo not the same things in order to obtain what is not in our own power, be considered worthy of the same (equal) things. For how can a manobtain an equal share with another when he does not visit a man's doorsas that other man does; when he does not attend him when he goes abroad, as the other man does; when he does not praise (flatter) him as anotherdoes? You will be unjust then and insatiable, if you do not part withthe price, in return for which those things are sold, and if you wish toobtain them for nothing. Well, what is the price of lettuces? An obolusperhaps. If then a man gives up the obolus, and receives the lettuces, and if you do not give up the obolus and do not obtain the lettuces, donot suppose that you receive less than he who has got the lettuces; foras he has the lettuces, so you have the obolus which you did not give. In the same way then in the other matter also you have not been invitedto a man's feast, for you did not give to the host the price at whichthe supper is sold; but he sells it for praise (flattery), he sells itfor personal attention. Give then the price, if it is for your interest, for which it is sold. But if you wish both not to give the price and toobtain the things, you are insatiable and silly. Have you nothing thenin place of the supper? You have indeed, you have the not flattering ofhim, whom you did not choose to flatter; you have the not enduring ofthe man when he enters the room. 

XXVI. 

We may learn the wish (will) of nature from the things in which we donot differ from one another: for instance, when your neighbor's slavehas broken his cup, or anything else, we are ready to say forthwith, that it is one of the things which happen. You must know then that whenyour cup also is broken, you ought to think as you did when yourneighbor's cup was broken. Transfer this reflection to greater thingsalso. Is another man's child or wife dead? There is no one who would notsay, This is an event incident to man. But when a man's own child orwife is dead, forthwith he calls out, Woe to me, how wretched I am! Butwe ought to remember how we feel when we hear that it has happened toothers. 

XXVII. 

As a mark is not set up for the purpose of missing the aim, so neitherdoes the nature of evil exist in the world. 

XXVIII. 

If any person was intending to put your body in the power of any manwhom you fell in with on the way, you would be vexed; but that you putyour understanding in the power of any man whom you meet, so that if heshould revile you, it is disturbed and troubled, are you not ashamed atthis?

XXIX. 

In every act observe the things which come first, and those which followit; and so proceed to the act. If you do not, at first you will approachit with alacrity, without having thought of the things which willfollow; but afterwards, when certain base (ugly) things have shownthemselves, you will be ashamed. A man wishes to conquer at the Olympicgames. I also wish indeed, for it is a fine thing. But observe both thethings which come first, and the things which follow; and then begin theact. You must do everything according to rule, eat according to strictorders, abstain from delicacies, exercise yourself as you are bid atappointed times, in heat, in cold, you must not drink cold water, norwine as you choose; in a word, you must deliver yourself up to theexercise master as you do to the physician, and then proceed to thecontest. And sometimes you will strain the hand, put the ankle out ofjoint, swallow much dust, sometimes be flogged, and after all this bedefeated. When you have considered all this, if you still choose, go tothe contest: if you do not you will behave like children, who at onetime play at wrestlers, another time as flute players, again asgladiators, then as trumpeters, then as tragic actors. So you also willbe at one time an athlete, at another a gladiator, then a rhetorician, then a philosopher, but with your whole soul you will be nothing at all;but like an ape you imitate everything that you see, and one thing afteranother pleases you. For you have not undertaken anything withconsideration, nor have you surveyed it well; but carelessly and withcold desire. Thus some who have seen a philosopher and having heard onespeak, as Euphrates speaks--and who can speak as he does?--they wish tobe philosophers themselves also. My man, first of all consider what kindof thing it is; and then examine your own nature, if you are able tosustain the character. Do you wish to be a pentathlete or a wrestler?Look at your arms, your thighs, examine your loins. For different menare formed by nature for different things. Do you think that if you dothese things, you can eat in the same manner, drink in the same manner, and in the same manner loathe certain things? You must pass sleeplessnights, endure toil, go away from your kinsmen, be despised by a slave, in everything have the inferior part, in honor, in office, in the courtsof justice, in every little matter. Consider these things, if you wouldexchange for them, freedom from passions, liberty, tranquillity. If not, take care that, like little children, you be not now a philosopher, thena servant of the publicani, then a rhetorician, then a procurator(manager) for Cęsar. These things are not consistent. You must be oneman, either good or bad. You must either cultivate your own rulingfaculty, or external things. You must either exercise your skill oninternal things or on external things; that is you must either maintainthe position of a philosopher or that of a common person. 

XXX. 

Duties are universally measured by relations ([Greek: tais schsesi]). Isa man a father? The precept is to take care of him, to yield to him inall things, to submit when he is reproachful, when he inflicts blows. But suppose that he is a bad father. Were you then by nature made akinto a good father? No; but to a father. Does a brother wrong you?Maintain then your own position towards him, and do not examine what heis doing, but what you must do that your will shall be conformable tonature. For another will not damage you, unless you choose: but you willbe damaged then when you shall think that you are damaged. In this waythen you will discover your duty from the relation of a neighbor, fromthat of a citizen, from that of a general, if you are accustomed tocontemplate the relations. 

XXXI. 

As to piety towards the gods you must know that this is the chief thing, to have right opinions about them, to think that they exist, and thatthey administer the All well and justly; and you must fix yourself inthis principle (duty), to obey them, and to yield to them in everythingwhich happens, and voluntarily to follow it as being accomplished by thewisest intelligence. For if you do so, you will never either blame thegods, nor will you accuse them of neglecting you. And it is not possiblefor this to be done in any other way than by withdrawing from the thingswhich are not in our power, and by placing the good and the evil only inthose things which are in our power. For if you think that any of thethings which are not in our power is good or bad, it is absolutelynecessary that, when you do not obtain what you wish, and when you fallinto those things which you do not wish, you will find fault and hatethose who are the cause of them; for every animal is formed by nature tothis, to fly from and to turn from the things which appear harmful andthe things which are the cause of the harm, but to follow and admire thethings which are useful and the causes of the useful. It is impossiblethen for a person who thinks that he is harmed to be delighted with thatwhich he thinks to be the cause of the harm, as it is also impossible tobe pleased with the harm itself. For this reason also a father isreviled by his son, when he gives no part to his son of the things whichare considered to be good; and it was this which made Polynices andEteocles enemies, the opinion that royal power was a good. It is forthis reason that the cultivator of the earth reviles the gods, for thisreason the sailor does, and the merchant, and for this reason those wholose their wives and their children. For where the useful (yourinterest) is, there also piety is. Consequently he who takes care todesire as he ought and to avoid ([Greek: echchlinein]) as he ought, atthe same time also cares after piety. But to make libations and tosacrifice and to offer first-fruits according to the custom of ourfathers, purely and not meanly nor carelessly nor scantily nor above ourability, is a thing which belongs to all to do. 

XXXII. 

When you have recourse to divination, remember that you do not know howit will turn out, but that you are come to inquire from the diviner. Butof what kind it is, you know when you come, if indeed you are aphilosopher. For if it is any of the things which are not in our power, it is absolutely necessary that it must be neither good nor bad. Do notthen bring to the diviner desire or aversion ([Greek: echchlinein]): ifyou do, you will approach him with fear. But having determined in yourmind that everything which shall turn out (result) is indifferent, anddoes not concern you, and whatever it may be, for it will be in yourpower to use it well, and no man will hinder this, come then withconfidence to the gods as your advisers. And then when any advice shallhave been given, remember whom you have taken as advisers, and whom youwill have neglected, if you do not obey them. And go to divination, asSocrates said that you ought, about those matters in which all theinquiry has reference to the result, and in which means are not giveneither by reason nor by any other art for knowing the thing which is thesubject of the inquiry. Wherefore when we ought to share a friend'sdanger, or that of our country, you must not consult the diviner whetheryou ought to share it. For even if the diviner shall tell you that thesigns of the victims are unlucky, it is plain that this is a token ofdeath, or mutilation of part of the body, or of exile. But reasonprevails, that even with these risks, we should share the dangers of ourfriend, and of our country. Therefore attend to the greater diviner, thePythian god, who ejected from the temple him who did not assist hisfriend, when he was being murdered. 

XXXIII. 

Immediately prescribe some character and some form to yourself, whichyou shall observe both when you are alone and when you meet with men. 

And let silence be the general rule, or let only what is necessary besaid, and in few words. And rarely, and when the occasion calls, weshall say something; but about none of the common subjects, not aboutgladiators, nor horse-races, nor about athletes, nor about eating ordrinking, which are the usual subjects; and especially not about men, asblaming them or praising them, or comparing them. If then you are able, bring over by your conversation, the conversation of your associates, tothat which is proper; but if you should happen to be confined to thecompany of strangers, be silent. 

Let not your laughter be much, nor on many occasions, nor excessive. 

Refuse altogether to take an oath, if it is possible; if it is not, refuse as far as you are able. 

Avoid banquets which are given by strangers and by ignorant persons. Butif ever there is occasion to join in them, let your attention becarefully fixed, that you slip not into the manners of the vulgar (theuninstructed). For you must know, that if your companion be impure, healso who keeps company with him must become impure, though he shouldhappen to be pure. 

Take (apply) the things which relate to the body as far as the bare use, as food, drink, clothing, house, and slaves; but exclude everythingwhich is for show or luxury. 

As to pleasure with women, abstain as far as you can before marriage;but if you do indulge in it, do it in the way which is conformable tocustom. Do not however be disagreeable to those who indulge in thesepleasures, or reprove them; and do not often boast that you do notindulge in them yourself. 

If a man has reported to you, that a certain person speaks ill of you, do not make any defence (answer) to what has been told you; but reply, The man did not know the rest of my faults, for he would not havementioned these only. 

It is not necessary to go to the theatres often: but if there is ever aproper occasion for going, do not show yourself as being a partisan ofany man except yourself, that is, desire only that to be done which isdone, and for him only to gain the prize who gains the prize; for inthis way you will meet with no hindrance. But abstain entirely fromshouts and laughter at any (thing or person), or violent emotions. Andwhen you are come away, do not talk much about what has passed on thestage, except about that which may lead to your own improvement. For itis plain, if you do talk much, that you admired the spectacle (more thanyou ought). 

Do not go to the hearing of certain persons' recitations, nor visit themreadily. But if you do attend, observe gravity and sedateness, and alsoavoid making yourself disagreeable. 

When you are going to meet with any person, and particularly one ofthose who are considered to be in a superior condition, place beforeyourself what Socrates or Zeno would have done in such circumstances, and you will have no difficulty in making a proper use of the occasion. 

When you are going to any of those who are in great power, place beforeyourself that you will not find the man at home, that you will beexcluded, that the door will not be opened to you, that the man will notcare about you. And if with all this it is your duty to visit him, bearwhat happens, and never say to yourself that it was not worth thetrouble. For this is silly, and marks the character of a man who isoffended by externals. 

In company take care not to speak much and excessively about your ownacts or dangers; for as it is pleasant to you to make mention of yourown dangers, it is not so pleasant to others to hear what has happenedto you. Take care also not to provoke laughter; for this is a slipperyway towards vulgar habits, and is also adapted to diminish the respectof your neighbors. It is a dangerous habit also to approach obscenetalk. When then, anything of this kind happens, if there is a goodopportunity, rebuke the man who has proceeded to this talk; but if thereis not an opportunity, by your silence at least, and blushing andexpression of dissatisfaction by your countenance, show plainly that youare displeased at such talk. 

XXXIV. 

If you have received the impression ([Greek: phantasion]) of anypleasure, guard yourself against being carried away by it; but let thething wait for you, and allow yourself a certain delay on your own part. Then think of both times, of the time when you will enjoy the pleasure, and of the time after the enjoyment of the pleasure, when you willrepent and will reproach yourself. And set against these things how youwill rejoice, if you have abstained from the pleasure, and how you willcommend yourself. But if it seem to you seasonable to undertake (do) thething, take care that the charm of it, and the pleasure, and theattraction of it shall not conquer you; but set on the other side theconsideration, how much better it is to be conscious that you havegained this victory. 

XXXV. 

When you have decided that a thing ought to be done, and are doing it, never avoid being seen doing it, though the many shall form anunfavorable opinion about it. For if it is not right to do it, avoiddoing the thing; but if it is right, why are you afraid of those whoshall find fault wrongly?

XXXVI. 

As the proposition, it is either day, or it is night, is of greatimportance for the disjunctive argument, but for the conjunctive, is ofno value, so in a symposium (entertainment) to select the larger shareis of great value for the body, but for the maintenance of the socialfeeling is worth nothing. When, then, you are eating with another, remember, to look not only to the value for the body of the things setbefore you, but also to the value of the behavior towards the host whichought to be observed. 

XXXVII. 

If you have assumed a character above your strength, you have both actedin this manner in an unbecoming way, and you have neglected that whichyou might have fulfilled. 

XXXVIII. 

In walking about, as you take care not to step on a nail, or to sprainyour foot, so take care not to damage your own ruling faculty; and if weobserve this rule in every act, we shall undertake this act with moresecurity. 

XXXIX. 

The measure of possession (property) is to every man the body, as thefoot is of the shoe. If then you stand on this rule (the demands of thebody), you will maintain the measure; but if you pass beyond it, youmust then of necessity be hurried as it were down a precipice. As alsoin the matter of the shoe, if you go beyond the (necessities of the)foot, the shoe is gilded, then of a purple color, then embroidered; forthere is no limit to that which has once passed the true measure. 

XL. 

Women forthwith from the age of fourteen are called by the menmistresses ([Greek: churiai], dominę). Therefore, since they see thatthere is nothing else that they can obtain, but only the power of lyingwith men, they begin to decorate themselves, and to place all theirhopes in this. It is worth our while then to take care that they mayknow that they are valued (by men) for nothing else than appearing(being) decent and modest and discreet. 

XLI. 

It is a mark of a mean capacity to spend much time on the things whichconcern the body, such as much exercise, much eating, much drinking, much easing of the body, much copulation. But these things should bedone as subordinate things; and let all your care be directed to themind. 

XLII. 

When any person treats you ill or speaks ill of you, remember that hedoes this or says this because he thinks that it is his duty. It is notpossible then for him to follow that which seems right to you, but thatwhich seems right to himself. Accordingly if he is wrong in his opinion, he is the person who is hurt, for he is the person who has beendeceived; for if a man shall suppose the true conjunction to be false, it is not the conjunction which is hindered, but the man who has beendeceived about it. If you proceed then from these opinions, you will bemild in temper to him who reviles you; for say on each occasion, Itseemed so to him. 

XLIII. 

Everything has two handles, the one by which it may be borne, the otherby which it may not. If your brother acts unjustly, do not lay hold ofthe act by that handle wherein he acts unjustly, for this is the handlewhich cannot be borne; but lay hold of the other, that he is yourbrother, that he was nurtured with you, and you will lay hold of thething by that handle by which it can be borne. 

XLIV. 

These reasonings do not cohere: I am richer than you, therefore I ambetter than you; I am more eloquent than you, therefore I am better thanyou. On the contrary, these rather cohere: I am richer than you, therefore my possessions are greater than yours; I am more eloquent thanyou, therefore my speech is superior to yours. But you are neitherpossession nor speech. 

XLV. 

Does a man bathe quickly (early)? do not say that he bathes badly, butthat he bathes quickly. Does a man drink much wine? do not say that hedoes this badly, but say that he drinks much. For before you shall havedetermined the opinion how do you know whether he is acting wrong? Thusit will not happen to you to comprehend some appearances which arecapable of being comprehended, but to assent to others. 

XLVI. 

On no occasion call yourself a philosopher, and do not speak much amongthe uninstructed about theorems (philosophical rules, precepts); but dothat which follows from them. For example, at a banquet do not say how aman ought to eat, but eat as you ought to eat. For remember that in thisway Socrates also altogether avoided ostentation. Persons used to cometo him and ask to be recommended by him to philosophers, and he used totake them to philosophers, so easily did he submit to being overlooked. Accordingly, if any conversation should arise among uninstructed personsabout any theorem, generally be silent; for there is great danger thatyou will immediately vomit up what you have not digested. And when a manshall say to you that you know nothing, and you are not vexed, then besure that you have begun the work (of philosophy). For even sheep do notvomit up their grass and show to the shepherds how much they have eaten;but when they have internally digested the pasture, they produceexternally wool and milk. Do you also show not your theorems to theuninstructed, but show the acts which come from their digestion. 

XLVII. 

When at a small cost you are supplied with everything for the body, donot be proud of this; nor, if you drink water, say on every occasion, Idrink water. But consider first how much more frugal the poor are thanwe, and how much more enduring of labor. And if you ever wish toexercise yourself in labor and endurance, do it for yourself, and notfor others. Do not embrace statues; but if you are ever very thirsty, take a draught of cold water and spit it out, and tell no man. 

XLVIII. 

The condition and characteristic of an uninstructed person is this: henever expects from himself profit (advantage) nor harm, but fromexternals. The condition and characteristic of a philosopher is this: heexpects all advantage and all harm from himself. The signs (marks) ofone who is making progress are these: he censures no man, he praises noman, he blames no man, he accuses no man, he says nothing about himselfas if he were somebody or knew something; when he is impeded at all orhindered, he blames himself; if a man praises him he ridicules thepraiser to himself; if a man censures him he makes no defence; he goesabout like weak persons, being careful not to move any of the thingswhich are placed, before they are firmly fixed; he removes all desirefrom himself, and he transfers aversion ([Greek: echchlisin]) to thosethings only of the things within our power which are contrary to nature;he employs a moderate movement towards everything; whether he isconsidered foolish or ignorant he cares not; and in a word he watcheshimself as if he were an enemy and lying in ambush. 

XLIX. 

When a man is proud because he can understand and explain the writingsof Chrysippus, say to yourself, If Chrysippus had not written obscurely, this man would have had nothing to be proud of. But what is it that Iwish? To understand nature and to follow it. I inquire therefore who isthe interpreter? and when I have heard that it is Chrysippus, I come tohim (the interpreter). But I do not understand what is written, andtherefore I seek the interpreter. And so far there is yet nothing to beproud of. But when I shall have found the interpreter, the thing thatremains is to use the precepts (the lessons). This itself is the onlything to be proud of. But if I shall admire the exposition, what elsehave I been made unless a grammarian instead of a philosopher? except inone thing, that I am explaining Chrysippus instead of Homer. When, then, any man says to me, Read Chrysippus to me, I rather blush, when I cannotshow my acts like to and consistent with his words. 

L. 

Whatever things (rules) are proposed to you (for the conduct of life)abide by them, as if they were laws, as if you would be guilty ofimpiety if you transgressed any of them. And whatever any man shall sayabout you, do not attend to it; for this is no affair of yours. How longwill you then still defer thinking yourself worthy of the best things, and in no matter transgressing the distinctive reason? Have you acceptedthe theorems (rules), which it was your duty to agree to, and have youagreed to them? what teacher then do you still expect that you defer tohim the correction of yourself? You are no longer a youth, but already afull-grown man. If, then, you are negligent and slothful, and arecontinually making procrastination after procrastination, and proposal(intention) after proposal, and fixing day after day, after which youwill attend to yourself, you will not know that you are not makingimprovement, but you will continue ignorant (uninstructed) both whileyou live and till you die. Immediately then think it right to live as afull-grown man, and one who is making proficiency, and let everythingwhich appears to you to be the best be to you a law which must not betransgressed. And if anything laborious or pleasant or glorious oringlorious be presented to you, remember that now is the contest, noware the Olympic games, and they cannot be deferred; and that it dependson one defeat and one giving way that progress is either lost ormaintained. Socrates in this way became perfect, in all things improvinghimself, attending to nothing except to reason. But you, though you arenot yet a Socrates, ought to live as one who wishes to be a Socrates. 

LI. 

The first and most necessary place (part, [Greek: topos]) in philosophyis the use of theorems (precepts, [Greek: theoraemata]), for instance, that we must not lie; the second part is that of demonstrations, forinstance, How is it proved that we ought not to lie? The third is thatwhich is confirmatory of these two, and explanatory, for example, How isthis a demonstration? For what is demonstration, what is consequence, what is contradiction, what is truth, what is falsehood? The third part(topic) is necessary on account of the second, and the second on accountof the first; but the most necessary and that on which we ought to restis the first. But we do the contrary. For we spend our time on the thirdtopic, and all our earnestness is about it; but we entirely neglect thefirst. Therefore we lie; but the demonstration that we ought not to liewe have ready to hand. 

LII. 

In every thing (circumstance) we should hold these maxims ready to hand:

 Lead me, O Zeus, and thou O Destiny, The way that I am bid by you to go: To follow I am ready. If I choose not, I make myself a wretch, and still must follow. 

 But whoso nobly yields unto necessity, We hold him wise, and skill'd in things divine. 

And the third also: O Crito, if so it pleases the gods, so let it be;Anytus and Melitus are able indeed to kill me, but they cannot harm me.