A LIE NEVER JUSTIFIABLE

A Study in Ethics

BY

H. CLAY TRUMBULL

1856

PREFACE. 

That there was need of a book on the subject of which this treats, will be evidenced to those who examine its contents. Whether this bookmeets the need, it is for those to decide who are its readers. 

The circumstances of its writing are recited in its opening chapter. Iwas urged to the undertaking by valued friends. At every step in itsprogress I have been helped by those friends, and others. For muchof that which is valuable in it, they deserve credit. For itsimperfections and lack, I alone am at fault. 

Although I make no claim to exhaustiveness of treatment in thiswork, I do claim to have attempted a treatment that is exceptionallycomprehensive and thorough. My researches have included extensive andvaried fields of fact and of thought, even though very much in thosefields has been left ungathered. What is here presented is at leastsuggestive of the abundance and richness of the matter available inthis line. 

While not presuming to think that I have said the last word on thisquestion of the ages, I do venture to hope that I have furnished freshmaterial for its more intelligent consideration. It may be that, inview of the data here presented, some will settle the question finallyfor themselves--by settling it right. 

If the work tends to bring any considerable number to this practicalissue, I shall be more than repaid for the labor expended on it; forI have a profound conviction that it is the question of questions inethics, now as always. 

H. CLAY TRUMBULL. 

PHILADELPHIA, August 14, 1893

CONTENTS. 

I. 

A QUESTION OF THE AGES. 

Is a Lie Ever Justifiable?--Two Proffered Answers. --Inducementsand Temptations Influencing a Decision. --Incident in Army PrisonLife. --Difference in Opinion. --Killing Enemy, or Lying toHim. --Killing, but not Lying, Possibility with God. --Beginning of thisDiscussion. --Its Continuance. --Origin of this Book. 

II. 

ETHNIC CONCEPTIONS. 

Standards and Practices of Primitive Peoples. --Sayings and Doings ofHindoos. --Teachings of the Mahabharata. --Harischandra andViswamitra, the Job and Satan of Hindoo Passion-Play. --ScandinavianLegends. --Fridthjof and Ingeborg. --Persian Ideals. --Zoroastrian Heavenand Hell. --"Home of Song, " and "Home of the Lie. "--Truth the MainCardinal Virtue with Egyptians. --No Hope for the Liar. --Ptah, "Lordof Truth. "--Truth Fundamental to Deity. --Relatively Low Standardof Greeks. --Incidental Testimony of Herodotus. --Truthfulness ofAchilles. --Plato. --Aristotle. --Theognis. --Pindar. --Tragedy ofPhiloctetes. --Roman Standard. --Cicero. --Marcus Aurelius. --GermanIdeal. --Veracity a Primitive Conception. --Lie Abhorrent among HillTribes of India. --Khonds. --Sonthals. --Todas. --Bheels. --Sowrahs. --Tipperahs. --Arabs. --American Indians. --Patagonians. --Hottentots. --East Africans. --Mandingoes. --Dyaks of Borneo, --"Lying Heaps. "--Veddahsof Ceylon. --Javanese. --Lying Incident of Civilization. --Influence ofSpirit of Barter. --"Punic Faith. "--False Philosophy of Morals. 

III. 

BIBLE TEACHINGS. 

Principles, not Rules, the Bible Standard. --Two Pictures ofParadise. --Place of Liars. --God True, though Men Lie. --HebrewMidwives. --Jacob and Esau. --Rahab the Lying Harlot. --Samuel atBethlehem. --Micaiah before Jehoshaphat and Ahab. --Characterand Conduct. --Abraham. --Isaac. --Jacob. --David. --Ananias andSapphira. --Bible Injunctions and Warnings. 

IV. 

DEFINITIONS. 

Importance of a Definition. --Lie Positive, and Lie Negative. --Speechand Act. --Element of Intention. --Concealment Justifiable, andConcealment Unjustifiable. --Witness in Court. --Concealment that isRight. --Concealment that is Sinful. --First Duty of Fallen Man. --BrutalFrankness. --Indecent Exposure of Personal Opinion. --Lie NeverTolerable as Means of Concealing. --False Leg or Eye. --Duty ofDisclosure Conditioned on Relations to Others. --Deception Purposed, and Resultant Deception. --Limits of Responsibility for Results ofAction. --Surgeon Refusing to Leave Patient. --Father with DrowningChild. --Mother and Wife Choosing. --Others Self-Deceived concerningUs. --Facial Expression. --"A Blind Patch. "--Broken Vase. --ClosedShutters in Midsummer. --Opened Shutters. --Absent Man's Hat inFront Hall. --When Concealment is Proper. --When Concealment isWrong. --Contagious Diseases. --Selling a Horse or Cow. --CoveringPit. --Wearing Wig. --God's Method with Man. --Delicate Distinction. --Truthful Statements Resulting in False Impressions. --ConcealingFamily Trouble. --Physician and Inquiring Patient. --IllustrationsExplain Principle, not Define it. 

V. 

THE PLEA OF "NECESSITY. "

Quaker and Dry-goods Salesman. --Supposed Profitableness ofLying. --Plea for "Lies of Necessity. "--Lying not Justifiable betweenEnemies in War-time. --Rightfulness of Concealing Movements and Plansfrom Enemy. --Responsibility with Flag of Truce. --Differencebetween Scout and Spy. --Ethical Distinctions Recognized byBelligerents. --Illustration: Federal Prisoner Questioned byConfederate Captors. --Libby Prison Experiences. --Physicians andPatients. --Concealment not Necessarily Deception. --Loss ofReputation for Truthfulness by Lying Physicians. --Loss ofPower Thereby. --Impolicy of Lying to Insane. --Dr. Kirkbride'sTestimony. --Life not Worth Saving by Lie. --Concealing One's Conditionfrom Robber in Bedroom. --Questions of Would-be Murderer. --"Do Rightthough the Heavens Fall. "--Duty to God not to be Counted out ofProblem. --Deserting God's Service by Lying. --Parting Prayer. 

VI. 

CENTURIES OF DISCUSSION. 

Wide Differences of Opinion. --Views of Talmudists. --Hamburger'sTestimony. --Strictness in Principle. --Exceptions in Practice. --IsaacAbohab's Testimony. --Christian Fathers not Agreed. --Martyrdom Priceof Truthtelling. --Justin Martyr's Testimony. --Temptations ofEarly Christians. --Words of Shepherd of Hermas. --Tertullian'sEstimate. --Origen on False Speaking. --Peter and Paul at Antioch. --Gregory of Nyssa and Basil the Great. --Deceit in Interests ofHarmony. --Chrysostom's Deception of Basil. --Chrysostom's Defenseof Deceit. --Augustine's Firmness of Position. --Condemnation ofLying. --Examination of Excuses. --Jerome's Weakness and Error. --FinalAgreement with Augustine. --Repetition of Arguments of Augustine andChrysostom. --Representative Disputants. --Thomas Aquinas. --MasterlyDiscussion. --Errors of Duns Scotus. --John Calvin. --Martin Luther. --Ignatius Loyola. --Position of Jesuits. --Protestants Defending Lying. --Jeremy Taylor. --Errors and Inconsistencies. --Wrong Definitions. --Misapplication of Scripture. --Richard Rothe. --Character, Ability, and Influence. In Definition of Lie. --Failure to Recognize. --ErrorLove to God as Only Basis of Love to Man. --Exceptions in Favor ofLying. --Nitzsch's Claim of Wiser and Nobler Methods than Lying inLove. --Rothe's Claim of Responsibility of Loving Guardianship--NoCountenance of Deception in Example of Jesus. --Prime Error of Rothe. --Opinions of Contemporary Critics. --Isaac Augustus Dorner. --Character and Principles. --Keen Definitions. --High Standards. --Clearness and Consistency. --Hans Lassen Martensen. --Logic Swayed byFeeling. --Right Premises and Wavering Reasonings. --Lofty Ideals. --Story of Jeanie Deans. --Correct Conclusions. --Influence of PersonalPeculiarities on Ethical Convictions. --Contrast of Charles Hodge andJames H. Thornwell. --Dr. Hodge's Correct Premises and AmiableInconsistencies. --Truth the Substratum of Deity. --Misconceptions ofBible Teachings. --Suggestion of Deception by Jesus Christ. --Error asto General Opinion of Christians. --Dr. Hodge's Conclusions Crushedby his Premises. --Dr. Thornwell's Thorough Treatment of Subject. --Right Basis. --Sound Argument. --Correct Definitions. --Firmness forTruth. --Newman Smyth's Manual. --Good Beginning and Bad Ending. --Confusion of Terms. --Inconsistencies in Argument. --Loose Reasoning. --Dangerous Teachings. --James Martineau. --Fine Moral Sense. --Conflictbetween Feeling and Conviction. --Safe Instincts. --Thomas Fowler. --Higher Expediency of Veracity. --Importance to General Good. --LeslieStephen. --Duty of Veracity Result of Moral Progress. --Kant andFichte. --Jacobi Misrepresented. --False Assumptions by Advocates of Lieof Necessity. --Enemies in Warfare not Justified in Lying. --Testimonyof Cicero. --Macaulay on Lord Clive's Treachery. --Woolsey onInternational Law. --No Place for Lying in Medical Ethics. --Opinionsand Experiences of Physicians. --Pliny's Story of Roman Matron. --VictorHugo's Sister Simplice. --Words of Abbé Sicard. --Tact andPrinciple. --Legal Ethics. --Whewell's View. --Opinion of Chief-JusticeSharswood. --Mistakes of Dr. Hodge. --Lord Brougham's Claim. --FalseCharge against Charles Phillips. --Chancellor Kent on MoralObligations in Law and in Equity. --Clerical Profession ChieflyInvolved. --Clergymen for and against Lying. --Temptation to Lies ofLove. --Supreme Importance of Sound Principle. --Duty of Veracity toLower Animals. --Dr. Dabney's View. --Views of Dr. Newman Smyth. --Dutyof Truthfulness an Obligation toward God. --Lower Animals not Exemptfrom Principle of Universal Application. --Fishing. --Hunting. --CatchingHorse. --Professor Bowne's Psychological View. --No Place for Lyingin God's Universe. --Small Improvement on Chrysostom's Argument forLying. --Limits of Consistency in Logical Plea. --God, or Satan. 

VII. 

THE GIST OF THE MATTER. 

One All-Dividing Line. --Primal and Eternal Difference. --Lie InevitablyHostile to God. --Lying Separates from God. --Sin _per se_. --PerjuryJustifiable if Lying be Justifiable. --Lying--Lying Defiles Liar, apart from Questions of Gain in Lying. --Social Evils Resultant fromLying. --Confidence Essential to Society. --Lying Destructive ofConfidence. --Lie Never Harmless. 

INDEXES. 

TOPICAL INDEX. SCRIPTURAL INDEX. 

I. 

A QUESTION OF THE AGES. 

Whether a lie is ever justifiable, is a question that has been indiscussion, not only in all the Christian centuries, but ever sincequestions concerning human conduct were first a possibility. Onthe one hand, it has been claimed that a lie is by its very natureirreconcilable with the eternal principles of justice and right; and, on the other hand, it has been asserted that great emergencies maynecessitate a departure from all ordinary rules of human conduct, andthat therefore there may be, in an emergency, such a thing as the "lieof necessity. "

It is not so easy to consider fairly a question like this in the hourwhen vital personal interests pivot on the decision, as it is in aseason of rest and safety; yet, if in a time of extremest peril theunvarying duty of truthfulness shines clearly through an atmosphere ofsore temptation, that light may be accepted as diviner because of itsvery power to penetrate clouds and to dispel darkness. Being forced toconsider, in an emergency, the possible justification of the so-called"lie of necessity, " I was brought to a settlement of that question inmy own mind, and have since been led to an honest endeavor to bringothers to a like settlement of it. Hence this monograph. 

In the summer of 1863 I was a prisoner of war in Columbia, SouthCarolina. The Federal prisoners were confined in the common jail, under military guard, and with no parole binding them not to attemptan escape. They were subject to the ordinary laws of war. Theircaptors were responsible for their detention in imprisonment, and itwas their duty to escape from captivity, and to return to the army ofthe government to which they owed allegiance, if they could do so byany right means. No obligations were on them toward their captors, save those which are binding at all times, even when a state of warsuspends such social duties as are merely conventional. 

Only he who has been a prisoner of war in a Southern prison inmidsummer, or in a Northern prison in the dead of winter, in time ofactive hostilities outside, can fully realize the heart-longings of asoldier prisoner to find release from his sufferings in confinement, and to be again at his post of duty at the front, or can understandhow gladly such a man would find a way, consistent with the right, toescape, at any involved risk. But all can believe that plans of escapewere in frequent discussion among the restless Federal prisoners inColumbia, of whom I was one. 

A plan proposed to me by a fellow-officer seemed to offer peculiarchances of success, and I gladly joined in it. But as its fullerdetails were considered, I found that a probable contingency wouldinvolve the telling of a lie to an enemy, or a failure of thewhole plan. At this my moral sense recoiled; and I expressed myunwillingness to tell a lie, even to regain my personal liberty orto advantage my government by a return to its army. This opened anearnest discussion of the question whether there is such a thing as a"lie of necessity, " or a justifiable lie. My friend was a pure-mindedman of principle, ready to die for his convictions; and he looked atthis question with a sincere desire to know the right, and to conformto it. He argued that a condition of war suspended ordinary socialrelations between the combatants, and that the obligation oftruth-speaking was one of the duties thus suspended. I, on the otherhand, felt that a lie was necessarily a sin against God, and thereforewas never justifiable. 

My friend asked me whether I would hesitate to kill an enemy who wason guard over me, or whom I met outside, if it were essential to ourescape. I replied that I would not hesitate to do so, any more than Iwould hesitate at it if we were over against each other in battle. In time of war the soldiers of both sides take the risks of alife-and-death struggle; and now that we were unparoled prisoners itwas our duty to escape if we could do so, even at the risk of ourlives or of the lives of our captors, and it was their duty toprevent our escape at a similar risk. My friend then asked me on whatprinciple I could justify the taking of a man's life as an enemy, andyet not feel justified in telling him a lie in order to save his lifeand secure our liberty. How could it be claimed that it was more of asin to tell a lie to a man who had forfeited his social rights, thanto kill him. I confessed that I could not at that time see the reasonfor the distinction, which my moral sense assured me was a real one, and I asked time to think of it. Thus it was that I came first to facea question of the ages, Is a lie ever justifiable? under circumstancesthat involved more than life to me, and when I had a strong inducementto see the force of reasons in favor of a "lie of necessity. "

In my careful study, at that time, of the principles involved in thisquestion, I came upon what seemed to me the conclusion of the wholematter. God is the author of life. He who gives life has the right totake it again. What God can do by himself, God can authorize anotherto do. Human governments derive their just powers from God. The powersthat be are ordained of God. A human government acts for God in theadministering of justice, even to the extent of taking life. If awar waged by a human government be righteous, the officers of thatgovernment take life, in the prosecution of the war, as God's agents. In the case then in question, we who were in prison as Federalofficers were representatives of our government, and would bejustified in taking the lives of enemies of our government whohindered us as God's agents in the doing of our duty to God and to ourgovernment. 

On the other hand, God, who can justly take life, cannot lie. A lieis contrary to the very nature of God. "It is impossible for God tolie. "[1] And if God cannot lie, God cannot authorize another to lie. What is unjustifiable in God's sight, is without a possibility ofjustification in the universe. No personal or social emergency canjustify a lie, whatever may be its apparent gain, or whatever harm mayseem to be involved in a refusal to speak it. Therefore we who wereFederal prisoners in war-time could not be justified in doing whatwas a sin _per se_, and what God was by his very nature debarredfrom authorizing or approving. I could see no way of evadingthis conclusion, and I determinedly refused to seek release fromimprisonment at the cost of a sin against God. 

[Footnote 1: Heb. 6: 18]

At this time I had no special familiarity with ethics as a study, andI was unacquainted with the prominence of the question of the "lieof necessity" in that realm of thought. But on my return from armyservice, with my newly awakened interest in the subject, I came toknow how vigorous had been its discussion, and how varied had been theopinions with reference to it, among philosophic thinkers in allthe centuries; and I sought to learn for myself what could be knownconcerning the principles involved in this question, and theirpractical application to the affairs of human life. And now, after allthese years of study and thought, I venture to make my contributionto this phase of Christian ethics, in an exhibit of the facts andprinciples which have gone to confirm the conviction of my ownmoral sense, when first I was called to consider this question as aquestion. 

II. 

ETHNIC CONCEPTIONS. 

The habit of lying is more or less common among primitive peoples, asit is among those of higher cultivation; but it is of interest to notethat widely, even among them, the standard of truthfulness as a dutyis recognized as the correct standard, and lying is, in theory atleast, a sin. The highest conception of right observable amongprimitive peoples, and not the average conformity to that standard inpractice, is the true measure of right in the minds of such peoples. If we were to look at the practices of such men in times oftemptation, we might be ready to say sweepingly with the Psalmist, inhis impulsiveness, "I said in my haste, All men are liars!"[1] But ifwe fixed our minds on the loftiest conception of truthfulness as aninvariable duty, recognized by races of men who are notorious asliars, we should see how much easier it is to have a right standardthan to conform to it. 

[Footnote 1: Psa. 116: II. ]

A careful observer of the people of India, who was long a residentamong them, [1] says: "More systematic, more determined, liars, thanthe people of the East, cannot, in my opinion, be found in the world. They often utter falsehoods without any apparent reason; and even whentruth would be an advantage, they will not tell it. .. . Yet, strange tosay, some of their works and sayings represent a falsehood as almostthe unpardonable sin. Take the following for an example: 'The sin ofkilling a Brahman is as great as that of killing a hundred cows; andthe sin of killing a hundred cows is as great as that of killing awoman; the sin of killing a hundred women is as great as that ofkilling a child in the womb; and the sin of killing a hundred[children] in the womb is as great as that of telling a lie. '"

[Footnote 1: Joseph Roberts, in his _Oriental Illustrations_, p. 580. ]

The Mahabharata is one of the great epics of ancient India. Itcontains a history of a war between two rival families, or peoples, and its text includes teachings with reference to "everything that itconcerned a cultivated Hindoo to know. " The heroes in this recordedwar, between the Pandavas and the Kauravas, are in the habit of lyingwithout stint; yet there is evidence that they recognized the sin oflying even to an enemy in time of war, and when a decisive advantagemight be gained by it. At a point in the combat when Yudhishthira, aleader of the Pandavas, was in extremity in his battling with Drona, aleader of the Kauravas, the divine Krishna told Yudhishthira that, ifhe would tell Drona (for in these mythical contests the combatantswere usually within speaking distance of each other) that his loved"son Aswatthanea was dead, the old warrior would immediately lay downhis arms and become an easy prey. " But Yudhishthira "had never beenknown to tell a falsehood, " and in this instance he "utterly refusedto tell a lie, even to secure the death of so powerful an enemy. " [1]Although it came about that Drona was, as a matter of fact, defeatedby treachery, the sin of lying, even in time of war, and to an enemy, is clearly brought out as a recognized principle of both theory andaction among the ancient Hindoos. 

[Footnote 1: See Wheeler's _History of India_, I. , 321. ]

There is a famous passion-play popular in Southern India and Ceylon, which illustrates the Hindoo ideal of truthfulness at every risk orcost. Viswamitra, the tempter and accuser as represented in the Vedas, appears in the council of the gods, face to face with Indra. Thequestion is raised by Indra, who is the most virtuous sovereign onearth. He asks, "What chief of mortals is there, who has never tolda lie?" Harischandra, king of Ayodiah (Oude) is named as such aman. Viswamitra denies it. It is agreed (as in the testing of Job, according to the Bible story) that Viswamitra may employ any meanswhatsoever for the inducing of Harischandra to lie, unhindered byIndra or any other god. If he succeeds in his effort, he shall secureto himself all the merit of the good deeds of Harischandra; but ifHarischandra cannot be induced to lie, Viswamitra must add half hismerit to that of Harischandra. [1]

[Footnote 1: Arichandra, the Martyr of Truth: A Tamil Drama translatedinto English by Muta Coomâra Swâmy; cited in Conway's _Demonology andDevil Lore_, II. , 35-43. ]

First, Viswamitra induces Harischandra to become the custodian of afabulous treasure, with a promise to deliver it up when calledfor. Then he brings him into such a strait that he must give up toViswamitra all his possessions, including that treasure and hiskingdom, in order to retain his personal virtue. After this, Viswamitra demands the return by Harischandra of the gold whichhas been already surrendered, claiming that its surrender was notaccording to the contract. In this emergency Viswamitra suggests, thatif Harischandra will only deny that he owes this amount to his enemythe debt shall at once be canceled. "Such a declaration I can nevermake, " says Harischandra. "I owe thee the gold, and pay it I will. "

From this time forward the efforts of Viswamitra are directed tothe inducing of Harischandra to say that he is not in debt to hisadversary; but in every trial Harischandra refuses to tell a lie. His only son dies in the desert. He and his wife are in povertyand sorrow; while all the time he is told that his kingdom and histreasures shall be restored to him, if he will tell only one lie. Atlast his wife is condemned to death on a false accusation, and he isappointed, by the sovereign of the land where she and he have beensold as slaves, to be her executioner. She calls on him to do hisduty, and strike off her head. Just then Viswamitra appears to him, saying: "Wicked man, spare her! Tell a lie even now, and be restoredto your former state!"

Harischandra's answer is: "Even though thou didst offer to methe throne of Indra, I would not tell a lie. " And to his wife, Chandravati, he says encouragingly: "This keen saber will do its duty. Thou dead, thy husband dies too--this selfsame sword shall pierce mybreast. .. . Yes, let all men perish, let all gods cease to exist, letthe stars that shine above grow dim, let all seas be dried up, letall mountains be leveled to the ground, let wars rage, blood flow instreams, let millions of millions of Harischandras be thus persecuted;yet let truth be maintained, let truth ride victorious over all, lettruth be the light, --truth alone the lasting solace of mortals andimmortals. "

As Harischandra strikes at the neck of Chandravati, "the sword, instead of harming her, is transformed into a necklace of pearls, which winds itself around her. The gods of heaven, all sages, and allkings, appear suddenly to the view of Harischandra, " and Siva, thefirst of the gods, commends him for his fidelity to truth, and tellshim that his dead son shall be brought again to life, and his kingdomand treasures and honors shall be restored to him. And thus the storyof Harischandra stands as a rebuke to the Christian philosopher whocould suppose that God, or the gods, would co-work with a man whoacted on the supposition that there is such an anomaly in the universeas "a lie of necessity. "

The old Scandinavian heroes were valiant in war, but they held thata lie was not justifiable under any pressure of an emergency. TheirValhalla heaven was the home of those who had fought bravely; butthere was no place for liars in it. A fine illustration of theirconception of the unvarying duty of truthfulness is given in the sagaof Fridthjof. Fridthjof, heroic son of Thorstein, loved Ingeborg, daughter of his father's friend, King Bele. Ingeborg's brother Helge, successor to his father's throne, opposed the match, and shut her upwithin the sacred enclosure of the god Balder. Fridthjof venturedwithin the forbidden ground, in order to pledge to her his manlytroth. The lovers were pure in purpose and in act, but, if theirinterview were known, they would both be permanently harmed inreputation and in standing. A rumor of their secret meeting wascirculated, and Fridthjof was summoned before the council of heroes toanswer to the charge. If ever a lie were justifiable, it would seem tobe when a pure woman's honor was at stake, and when a hero's happinessand power for good pivoted on it. Fridthjof tells to Ingeborg thestory of his sore temptation when, in the presence of the council, Helge challenges his course. 

 "'Say, Fridthjof, Balder's peace hast thou not broken, Not seen my sister in his house while Day Concealed himself, abashed, before your meeting? Speak! yea or nay!' Then echoed from the ring Of crowded warriors, 'Say but nay, say nay! Thy simple word we'll trust; we'll court for thee, --Thou, Thorstein's son, art good as any king's. Say nay! say nay! and thine is Ingeborg!' 'The happiness, ' I answered, 'of my life On one word hangs; but fear not therefore, Helge! I would not lie to gain the joys of Valhal, Much less this earth's delights. I've seen thy sister, Have spoken with her in the temple's night, But have not therefore broken Balder's peace!' More none would hear. A murmur of deep horror The diet traversed; they who nearest stood Drew back, as I had with the plague been smitten. "[1]

[Footnote 1: Anderson's _Viking Tales of the North_, p. 223. ]

And so, because Fridthjof would not lie, he lost his bride and becamea wanderer from his land, and Ingeborg became the wife of another;and this record is to this day told to the honor of Fridthjof, in accordance with the standard of the North in the matter oftruth-telling. 

In ancient Persia, the same high standard prevailed. Herodotus says ofthe Persians: "The most disgraceful thing in the world, they think, is to tell a lie; the next worse, to owe a debt; because, among otherreasons, the debtor is obliged to tell lies. "[1] "Their sons arecarefully instructed, from their fifth to their twentieth year, inthree things alone, --to ride, to draw the bow, and to speak thetruth. "[2] Here the one duty in the realm of morals is truth-telling. In the famous inscription of Darius, the son of Hystaspes, on the Rockof Behistun, [3] there are repeated references to lying as the chief ofsins, and to the evil time when lying was introduced into Persia, and"the lie grew in the provinces, in Persia as well as in Media and inthe other provinces. " Darius claims to have had the help of "Ormuzdand the other gods that may exist, " because he "was not wicked, nor aliar;" and he enjoins it on his successor to "punish severely him whois a liar or a rebel. "

[Footnote 1: Rawlinson's _Herodotus_, Bk. I. , § 139. ]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid_. , Bk. I. , § 136. ]

[Footnote 3: Sayce's _Introduction to Ezra, Nehemiah, and Esther_, pp. 120-137. ]

The Zoroastrian designation of heaven was the "Home of Song;"while hell was known as the "Home of the Lie. "[1] There was in theZoroastrian thought only two rival principles in the universe, represented by Ormuzd and Ahriman, as the God of truth, and the fatherof lies; and the lie was ever and always an offspring of Ahriman, theevil principle: it could not emanate from or be consistent with theGod of truth. The same idea was manifest in the designation of thesubordinate divinities of the Zoroastrian religion. Mithra was the godof light, and as there is no concealment in the light, Mithra was alsogod of truth. A liar was the enemy of righteousness. [2]

[Footnote 1: Müller's _Sacred Books of the East_, XXXI. , 184. ]

[Footnote 2: Müller's _Sacred Books of the East_, XXIII. , 119 f. , 124 f. , 128, 139. See reference to Jackson's paper on "the ancientPersians' abhorrence of falsehood, illustrated from the Avesta, " in_Journal of Am. Oriental Soc_. , Vol. XIII. , p. Cii. ]

"Truth was the main cardinal virtue among the Egyptians, " and"falsehood was considered disgraceful among them. "[1] Ra and Ma weresymbols of Light and Truth; and their representation was worn on thebreastplate of priest and judge, like the Urim and Thummim of theHebrews. [2] When the soul appeared in the Hall of Two Truths, forfinal judgment, it must be able to say, "I have not told a falsehood, "or fail of acquittal. [3] Ptah, the creator, a chief god of theEgyptians, was called "Lord of Truth. "[4] The Egyptian conception ofDeity was: "God is the truth, he lives by truth, he lives uponthe truth, he is the king of truth. "[5] The Egyptians, like theZoroastrians, seemed to count the one all-dividing line in theuniverse the line between truth and falsehood, between light anddarkness. 

[Footnote 1: Wilkinson's _Ancient Egyptians_, I. , 299; III. , 183-185. ]

[Footnote 2: Exod. 39: 8-21; Lev. 8: 8. ]

[Footnote 3: Bunsen's _Egypt's Place in Universal History_, V. , 254. ]

[Footnote 4: Wilkinson's _Anc. Egyp_. , III. , 15-17. ]

[Footnote 5: Budge's _The Dwellers on the Nile_, p. 131. ]

Among the ancient Greeks the practice of lying was very general, so general that writers on the social life of the Greeks have beenaccustomed to give a low place relatively to that people in itsestimate of truthfulness as a virtue. Professor Mahaffy says on thispoint: "At no period did the nation ever attain that high standardwhich is the great feature in Germanic civilization. Even the Romans, with all their coarseness, stood higher in this respect. But neitherin Iliad nor in Odyssey is there, except in phrases, any reprobationof deceit as such. " He points to the testimony of Cicero, concerningthe Greeks, who "concedes to them all the high qualities they chooseto claim save one--that of truthfulness. "[1] Yet the very way in whichHerodotus tells to the credit of the Persians that they allowedno place for the lie in their ethics[2] seems to indicate hisapprehension of a higher standard of veracity than that which wasgenerally observed among his own people. Moreover, in the Iliad, Achilles is represented as saying: "Him I hate as I do the gates ofHades, who hides one thing in his heart and utters another;" and itis the straightforward Achilles, rather than "the wily and shiftfulUlysses, " who is the admired hero of the Greeks. [3] Plato asserts, andargues in proof of his assertion, that "the veritable lie . .. Is hatedby all gods and men. " He includes in the term "veritable lie, " or"genuine lie, " a lie in the soul as back of the spoken lie, and heis sure that "the divine nature is incapable of a lie, " and that inproportion as the soul of a man is conformed to the divine image, the man "will speak, act, and live in accordance with the truth. "[4]Aristotle, also, while recognizing different degrees of veracity, insists that the man who is in his soul a lover of truth will betruthful even when he is tempted to swerve from the truth. "For thelover of truth, who is truthful where nothing is at stake [or where itmakes no difference], will yet more surely be truthful where there isa stake [or where it does make a difference]; for he will [then] shunthe lie as shameful, since he shuns it simply because it is a lie. "[5]And, again, "Falsehood abstractly is bad and blamable, and truthhonorable and praiseworthy; and thus the truthful man being inthe mean is praiseworthy, while the false [in either extreme, of overstating or of understating] are both blamable, but theexaggerating man more so than the other. "[6]

[Footnote 1: Mahaffy's _Social Life in Greece_, pp. 27, 123. See alsoFowler's _Principles of Morals_, II. , 219-221. ]

[Footnote 2: _Hist_. , Bk. I. , §139. ]

[Footnote 3: Professor Fowler seems to be quite forgetful of thisfact. He speaks of Ulysses as if he had precedence of Achilles in theesteem of the Greeks. See his _Principles of Morals_, II. , 219. ]

[Footnote 4: Plato's _Republic_, II. , 382, a, b. ]

[Footnote 5: Aristotle's _Eth. Nic_. , IV. , 13, 1127, a, b. ]

[Footnote 6: _Ibid_. , IV. ]

Theognis recognizes this high ideal of the duty and the beauty oftruthfulness, when he says: "At first there is a small attractivenessabout a lie, but in the end the gain it brings is both shameful andharmful. That man has no fair glory, in whose heart dwells a lie, andfrom whose mouth it has once issued. "[1]

[Footnote 1: Theognis, 607. ]

Pindar looks toward the same standard when he says to Hiero, "Forge thy tongue on the anvil of truth;"[1] and when he declaresemphatically, "I will not stain speech with a lie. "[2] So, again, whenhis appeal to a divinity is: "Thou that art the beginning of loftyvirtue, Lady Truth, forbid thou that my poem [or composition] shouldstumble against a lie, harsh rock of offense. "[3] In his tragedy ofthe Philoctetes, Sophocles makes the whole play pivot on the remorseof Neoptolemus, son of Achilles, over his having lied to Philoctetes(who is for the time being an enemy of the Greeks), in order to securethrough him the killing of Paris and the overthrow of Troy. The liewas told at the instigation of Ulysses; but Neoptolemus repents itsutterance, and refuses to take advantage of it, even though the fateof Troy and the triumph of Greek arms depend on the issue. The plainteaching of the tragedy is that "the purposes of heaven are not tobe served by a lie; and that the simplicity of the young son oftruth-loving Achilles is better in the sight of heaven, even whenit seems to lead to failure, than all the cleverness of guilefulUlysses. "[4]

[Footnote 1: Pythian Ode, I, 86. ]

[Footnote 2: Olympian Ode, 4, 16. ]

[Footnote 3: Bergk's _Pindar_, 183 [221]. ]

[Footnote 4: Professor Lamberton]

It is admitted on all hands that the Romans and the Germans had a highideal as to the duty of truthfulness and the sin of lying. [1] And soit was in fact with all peoples which had any considerable measure ofcivilization in former ages. It is a noteworthy fact that the duty ofveracity is often more prominent among primitive peoples than amongthe more civilized, and that, correspondingly, lying is abhorred as avice, or seems to be unknown as an expedient in social intercourse. This is not always admitted in the theories of writers on morals, butit would seem to be borne out by an examination into the facts ofthe case. Lecky, in his study of "the natural history of morals, "[2]claims that veracity "usually increases with civilization, " and heseeks to show why it is so. But this view of Lecky's is an unfoundedassumption, in support of which he proffers no evidence; while HerbertSpencer's exhibit of facts, in his "Cyclopaedia of DescriptiveSociology, " seems to disprove the claim of Lecky; and he directlyasserts that "surviving remnants of some primitive races in India havenatures in which truthfulness seems to be organic; that not only tothe surrounding Hindoos, higher intellectually and relatively advancedin culture, are they in this respect far superior, but they aresuperior to Europeans. "[3]

[Footnote 1: See Fowler's _Principles of Morals_, II. , 220; alsoMahaffy's _Social Life in Greece_, p. 27. Note, for instance, the highstandard as to truthfulness indicated by Cicero, in his "Offices, "III. , 12-17, 32. "Pretense and dissimulation ought to be banishedfrom the whole of life. " "Reason . .. Requires that nothing be doneinsidiously, nothing dissemblingly, nothing falsely. " Note, also, Juvenal, Satire XIII. , as to the sin of a lie purposed, even if notspoken; and Marcus Aurelius in his "Thoughts, " Book IX. : "He . .. Wholies is guilty of impiety to the same [highest] divinity. " "He, then, who lies intentionally is guilty of impiety, inasmuch as he actsunjustly by deceiving; and he also who lies unintentionally, inasmuchas he is at variance with the universal nature, and inasmuch as hedisturbs the order by fighting against the nature of the world; for hefights against it, who is moved of himself to that which is contraryto truth, for he had received powers from nature through the neglectof which he is not able now to distinguish falsehood from truth. "]

[Footnote 2: _History of European Morals_, I. , 143. ]

[Footnote 3: See Spencer's _Principles of Sociology_, II. , 234 ff. ;also his _Inductions of Ethics_, p. 405 f. ]

Among those Hill Tribes of India which have been most secluded, andwhich have retained the largest measure of primitive life and customs, fidelity to truth in speech and act is still the standard, and a lieis abhorrent to the normal instincts of the race. Of the Khonds ofCentral India it is said that they, "in common with many other wildraces, bear a singular character for truthfulness and honesty;"[1] andthat especially "the aborigine is the most truthful of beings. "[2]"The Khonds believe that truthfulness is one of the most sacred ofduties imposed by the gods. "[3] "They are men of one word. "[4] "Thetruth is by a Sonthals held sacred. " [5] The Todas "call falsehood oneof the worst of vices. "[6] Although it is said by one traveler thatthe Todas "practice dissimulation toward Europeans, yet he recognizesthis as a trait consequent on their intercourse with Europeans. "[7]The Bheels, which were said to be "a race of unmitigated savages, without any sense of natural religion. " [8] and "which have preservedtheir rude habits and manners to the present day, " are "yet imbuedwith a sense of truth and honor strangely at contrast with theirexternal character. "[9] Bishop Heber says that "their word is more tobe depended on than that of their conquerors. "[10] Of the Sowrahs itis said: "A pleasing feature in their character is their completetruthfulness. They do not know how to tell a lie. "[11] Indeed, as Mr. Spencer sums up the case on this point, there are Hill Tribes in India"originally distinguished by their veracity, but who are rendered lessveracious by contact with the whites. 'So rare is lying among theseaboriginal races when unvitiated by the 'civilized, ' that of those inBengal, Hunter singles out the Tipperahs as 'the only Hill Tribe inwhich this vice is met with. '"[12]

[Footnote 1: Glasfurd, cited in _Cycl. Of Descrip. Sociol_. , V. , 32. ]

[Footnote 2: Forsyth, _Ibid_. ]

[Footnote 3: Macpherson, cited in _Ibid_. ]

[Footnote 4: _Ibid_. ]

[Footnote 5: Sherwill, cited in _Ibid_. ]

[Footnote 6: Harkness, cited in _Cycl. Of Descrip. Sociol_. , V. , 31. ]

[Footnote 7: Spencer's _Principles of Sociology_, II. , 234. ]

[Footnote 8: Marshman, cited in _Cycl. Of Descrip. Sociol_. , V. , 31. ]

[Footnote 9: Wheeler, cited in _Ibid_. ]

[Footnote 10: Cited in _Ibid_. ]

[Footnote 11: Shortt, cited in _Ibid_. ]

[Footnote 12: Spencer's _Principles of Sociology_, II. , 234 ff. ]

The Arabs are more truthful in their more primitive state than wherethey are influenced by "civilization, " or by dealings with those fromcivilized communities. [1] And the same would seem to be true of theAmerican Indians. [2] Of the Patagonians it is said: "A lie with themis held in detestation. " [3] "The word of a Hottentot is sacred;" andthe good quality of "a rigid adherence to truth, " "he is master of inan eminent degree. "[4] Dr. Livingstone says that lying was known tobe a sin by the East Africans "before they knew aught of Europeans ortheir teaching. "[5] And Mungo Park says of the Mandingoes, among theinland Africans, that, while they seem to be thieves by nature, "one of the first lessons in which the Mandingo women instruct theirchildren is _the practice of truth_. " The only consolation of a motherwhose son had been murdered, "was the reflection that the poor boy, inthe course of his blameless life, _had never told a lie_. "[6] RichardBurton is alone among modern travelers in considering lying natural toall primitive or savage peoples. Carl Bock, like other travelers, testifies to the unvarying truthfulness of the Dyaks in Borneo, [7] andanother observant traveler tells of the disgrace that attaches to a liein that land, as shown by the "lying heaps" of sticks or stones alongthe roadside here and there. "Each heap is in remembrance of some manwho has told a stupendous lie, or failed in carrying out an engagement;and every passer-by takes a stick or a stone to add to the accumulation, saying at the time he does it, 'For So-and-so's lying heap. ' It goes onfor generations, until they sometimes forget who it was that told thelie, but, notwithstanding that, they continue throwing the stones. "[8]What a blocking of the paths of civilization there would be if a "lyingheap" were piled up wherever a lie had been told, or a promise hadbeen broken, by a child of civilization!

[Footnote 1: Denham, and Palgrave, cited in _Cycl. Of Des. Social_. , V. , 30, 31. ]

[Footnote 2: See Morgan's _League of the Iroquois_, p. 335; alsoSchoolcraft, and Keating, on the Chippewas, cited in _Cycl. OfDescrip. Sociol_. , VI. , 30. ]

[Footnote 3: Snow, cited in _Ibid_. ]

[Footnote 4: Kolben, and Barrow, cited in _Cycl. Of Descrip. Sociol_. , IV. , 25. ]

[Footnote 5: _Cycl. Of Descrip. Sociol_. , IV. , 26. ]

[Footnote 6: _Cycl. Of Descrip. Social_. , IV. , 27. ]

[Footnote 7: _Head Hunters of Borneo_, p. 209. See also Boyle, citedin Spencer's _Cycl. Of Descrip. Social_. , III. , 35. ]

[Footnote 8: St. John's _Life in the Forests of the Far East_, I. , 88f. ]

The Veddahs of Ceylon, one of the most primitive of peoples, "areproverbially truthful. "[1] The natives of Java are peculiarly freefrom the vice of lying, except in those districts which have had mostintercourse with Europeans. [2]

[Footnote 1: Bailey, cited in Spencer's _Cycl. Of Descrip. Social_. , III. , 32. ]

[Footnote 2: Earl, and Raffles, cited in _Ibid_. , p. 35. ]

It is found, in fact, that in all the ages, the world over, primitiveman's highest ideal conception of deity has been that of a God whocould not tolerate a lie; and his loftiest standard of human actionhas included the readiness to refuse to tell a lie under anyinducement, or in any peril, whether it be to a friend or to an enemy. This is the teaching of ethnic conceptions on the subject. The liewould seem to be a product of civilization, or an outgrowth of thespirit of trade and barter, rather than a natural impulse of primitiveman. It appeared in full flower and fruitage in olden time among thecommercial Phoenicians, so prominently that "Punic faith" became asynonym of falsehood in social dealings. 

Yet it is in the face of facts like these that a writer like ProfessorFowler baldly claims, in support of the same presupposed theory asthat of Lecky, that "it is probably owing mainly to the development ofcommerce, and to the consequent necessity, in many cases, of absolutetruthfulness, that veracity has come to take the prominent positionwhich it now occupies among the virtues; though the keen sense ofhonor, engendered by chivalry, may have had something to do inbringing about the same result. "[1]

[Footnote 1: _Principles of Morality_, II. , 220. ]

III. 

BIBLE TEACHINGS. 

In looking at the Bible for light in such an investigation as this, it is important to bear in mind that the Bible is not a collection ofspecific rules of conduct, but rather a book of principlesillustrated in historic facts, and in precepts based on thoseprinciples, --announced or presupposed. The question, therefore, isnot, Does the Bible authoritatively draw a line separating the truthfrom a lie, and making the truth to be always right, and a lie tobe always wrong? but it is, Does the Bible evidently recognize anunvarying and ever-existing distinction between a truth and a lie, anddoes the whole sweep of its teachings go to show that in God's sighta lie, as by its nature opposed to the truth and the right, is alwayswrong?

The Bible opens with a picture of the first pair in Paradise, to whomGod tells the simple truth, and to whom the enemy of man tells a lie;and it shows the ruin of mankind wrought by that lie, and the authorof the lie punished because of its telling. [1] The Bible closes with apicture of Paradise, into which are gathered the lovers and doers oftruth, and from which is excluded "every one that loveth and doeth alie;"[2] while "all liars" are to have their part "in the lake thatburneth with fire and brimstone; which is the second death. "[3] In theOld Testament and in the New, God is represented as himself the Truth, to whom, by his very nature, the doing or the speaking of a lie isimpossible, [4] while Satan is represented as a liar and as the "fatherof lies. "[5]

[Footnote 1: Gen. 2, 3. ]

[Footnote 2: Rev. 22. ]

[Footnote 3: Rev. 21: 5-8. ]

[Footnote 4: Psa. 31:5; 146:6; John 14:6; Num. 23:19; 1 Sam. 15:29;Titus 1:2; Heb. 6:18; 1 John 5:7. ]

[Footnote 5: John 8:44. ]

While the human servants of God, as represented in the Biblenarrative, are in many instances guilty of lying, their lies areclearly contrary to the great principle, in the light of which theBible itself is written, that a lie is always wrong, and that itcannot have justification in God's sight. The idea of the Bible recordis that God is true, though every man were a liar. [1] God is uniformlyrepresented as opposed to lies and to liars, and a lie in his sight isspoken of as a lie unto him, or as a lie against him. In the few caseswhere the Bible narrative has been thought by some to indicate anapproval by the Lord of a lie, that was told, as it were, in hisinterest, an examination of the facts will show that they offer noexception to the rule that, by the Bible standard, a lie is neverjustifiable. 

[Footnote 1: Rom. 3:4. ]

Take, for example, the case of the Hebrew midwives, who lied to theofficials of Pharaoh, when they were commanded to kill every Hebrewmale child;[1] and of whom it is said that "God dealt well with themidwives;. .. And . .. Because the midwives feared God, . .. He made themhouses. "[2] Here it is plain that God commended their fear of him, not their lying in behalf of his people, and that it was "becausethe midwives feared God" not because they lied, "that he made themhouses. " It was their choice of the Lord above the gods and rulers ofEgypt that won them the approval of the Lord, even though they weresinners in being liars; as in an earlier day it was the approval ofJacob's high estimate of the birthright, and not the deceits practicedby him on Esau and his father Isaac, that the Lord showed inconfirming a blessing to Jacob. [3]

[Footnote 1: Exod. 1: 15-19. ]

[Footnote 2: Exod. I: 20, 21. ]

[Footnote 3: Gen. 25: 27-34; 27; 1-40; 28: 1-22]

So, also, in the narrative of Rahab, the Canaanitish young woman, whoconcealed the Israelitish spies sent into her land by Joshua, and liedabout them to her countrymen, and who was commended by the Lord forher faith in this transaction. [1] Rahab was a harlot by profession anda liar by practice. When the Hebrew spies entered Jericho, they wentto her house as a place of common resort. Rahab, on learning who theywere, expressed her readiness, sinner as she was, to trust the God ofIsrael rather than the gods of Canaan; and because of her trust sheput herself, with all her heathen habits of mind and conduct, atthe disposal of the God of Israel, and she lied, as she had beenaccustomed to lie, to her own people, as a means of securing safetyto her Hebrew visitors. Because of her faith, which was shown in thisway, but not necessarily because of her way of showing her faith, theLord approved of her spirit in choosing his service rather than theservice of the gods of her people. The record of her approval is, "Byfaith Rahab the harlot perished not with them that were disobedient, having received the spies with peace. "[2]

[Footnote 1: Josh. 2: 1-21. ]

[Footnote 2: Heb. II: 31. ]

It would be quite as fair to claim that God approved of Rahab'sharlotry, in this case, as to claim that he approved of her lying. Rahab was a harlot and a liar, and she was ready to practice in boththese lines in the service of the spies. She was not to be commendedfor either of those vices; but she was to be commended in that, withall her vices, she was yet ready to give herself just as she was, andwith her ways as they were, to Jehovah's side, in the crisis hour ofconflict between him and the gods of her people. It was the faith thatprompted her to this decision that God commended; and "by faith" shewas preserved from destruction when her people perished. 

Another case that has been thought to imply a divine approval of anuntrue statement, is that of Samuel, when he went to Bethlehem toanoint David as Saul's successor on the throne of Israel, and, at theLord's command, said he had come to offer a sacrifice to God. [1] Buthere clearly the narrative shows no lie, nor false statement, made orapproved. Samuel, as judge and prophet, was God's representative inIsrael. He was accustomed to go from place to place in the line of hisofficial ministry, including the offering at times of sacrifices ofcommunion. [2] When, on this occasion, the Lord told Samuel of hispurpose of designating a son of Jesse to succeed Saul on the throne, and desired him to go to Bethlehem for further instructions, Samuelwas unnecessarily alarmed, and said, in his fear, "How can I go? ifSaul hear it, he will kill me. " The Lord's simple answer was, "Takean heifer with thee, and say, I am come to sacrifice to the Lord. Andcall Jesse to the sacrifice, and I will shew thee what thou shalt do:and thou shalt anoint unto me him whom I name unto thee. "

[Footnote 1: 1 Sam. 16: 1-3. ]

[Footnote 2: 1 Sam. 7: 15-17; 9: 22-24; 11: 14, 15; 20:29. ]

In other words, the Lord said to Samuel, I want you to go toBethlehem as my representative, and offer a sacrifice there. Say thisfearlessly. In due time I will give you other directions; but do notborrow trouble on account of them. Do your duty step by step. Speakout the plain truth as to all that the authorities of Bethlehem haveany right to know; and do not fear any harm through my subsequentprivate revelations to you. In these directions of the Lord there isno countenance of the slightest swerving from the truth by Samuel;nor is there an authorized concealment of any fact that those to whomSamuel was sent had any claim to know. 

Still another Bible incident that has been a cause of confusion tothose who did not see how God could approve lying, and a cause ofrejoicing to those who wanted to find evidence of his justificationof that practice, is the story of the prophet Micaiah, saying beforeJehoshaphat and Ahab that the Lord had put a lying spirit into themouths of all the false prophets who were at that time beforethose kings. [1] Herbert Spencer actually cites this incident as anillustration of the example set before the people of Israel, by theirGod, of lying as a means of accomplishing a desired end. [2] But justlook at the story as it stands!

[Footnote 1: 1 Kings 22: 1-23; 2 Chron. 18: 1-34. ]

[Footnote 2: _The Inductions of Ethics_, p. 158. ]

Four hundred of Ahab's prophets were ready to tell him that a campaignwhich he wanted to enter upon would be successful. Micaiah, an honestprophet of the Lord, was sent for at Jehoshaphat's request, and wasurged by the messenger to prophesy to the same effect as Ahab'sprophets. Micaiah replied that he should give the Lord's message, whether it was agreeable or not to Ahab. He came, and at first hespoke satirically as if he agreed with the other prophets in deemingthe campaign a hopeful one. It was as though he said to the king, Youwant me to aid you in your plans, not to give you counsel from theLord; therefore I will say, as your prophets have said, Go ahead, andhave success. It was evident, however, to Ahab, that the prophet'swords were not to be taken literally, but were a rebuke to him inOriental style, and therefore he told the prophet to give him theLord's message plainly. Then the prophet gave a parable, or a messagein Oriental guise, showing that these four hundred prophets of Ahabwere speaking falsely, as if inspired by a lying spirit, and that, ifAhab followed their counsel, he would go to his ruin. 

To cite this parable as a proof of Jehovah's commendation of lying isan absurdity. Jehovah's prophet Micaiah was there before theking, telling the simple truth to the king. And, in order to meeteffectively the claim of the false prophets that they were inspired, he related, as it were, a vision, or a parable, in which he declaredthat he had seen preparations making in heaven for their inspiring bya lying spirit. This was, as every Oriental would understand it, aparliamentary way of calling the four hundred prophets a pack ofliars; and the event proved that all of them were liars, and thatMicaiah alone, as Jehovah's prophet, was a truth-teller. What follycould be greater than the attempt to count this public charge againstthe lying prophets as an item of evidence in proof of the Lord'sresponsibility for their lying--which the Lord's prophet took thismethod of exposing and rebuking!

There are, indeed, various instances in the Bible story of lies toldby men who were in favor with God, where there is no ground forclaiming that those lies had approval with God. The men of the Biblestory are shown as men, with the sins and follies and weaknesses ofmen. Their conduct is to be judged by the principles enunciated in theBible, and their character is to be estimated by the relation whichthey sustained toward God in spite of their human infirmities. 

Abraham is called the father of the faithful, [1] and he was known asthe friend of God. [2] But he indulged in the vice of concubinage, [3]in accordance with the loose morals of his day and of hissurroundings; and when he was down in Egypt he lied through hisdistrust of God, apparently thinking that there was such a thing asa "lie of necessity, " and he brought upon himself the rebuke of anEgyptian king because of his lying. [4] But it would be folly to claimthat God approved of concubinage or of lying, because a man whom hewas saving was guilty of either of these vices. Isaac also lied, [5]and so did Jacob;[6] but it was not because of their lies that thesemen had favor with God. David was a man after God's own heart[7] inhis fidelity of spirit to God as the only true God, in contrast withthe gods of the nations round about Israel; but David lied, [8] asDavid committed adultery. [9] It would hardly be claimed, however, thateither his adultery or his lying in itself made David a man afterGod's own heart. So all along the Bible narrative, down to the timewhen Ananias and Sapphira, prominent among the early Christians, liedunto God concerning their very gifts into his treasury, and werestruck dead as a rebuke of their lying. [10]

[Footnote 1: Josh. 24:3; Isa. 51: 2; Matt. 3: 9; Rom. 4:12; Gal. 3:9]

[Footnote 2: 2 Chron. 20: 7; Isa. 41: 8; Jas. 2: 23. ]

[Footnote 3: Gen. 16: 1-6. ]

[Footnote 4: Gen. 12: 10-19. ]

[Footnote 5: Gen. 26: 6-10. ]

[Footnote 6: Gen. 27: 6-29. ]

[Footnote 7: 1 Sam. 11: 1-27]

[Footnote 8: 1 Sam. 21: 1, 2. ]

[Footnote 9: 2 Sam. 11: 1-27. ]

[Footnote 10: Acts 5: 1-11. ]

The whole sweep of Bible teaching is opposed to lying; and thespecific injunctions against that sin, as well as the calls to theduty of truth-speaking, are illustrative of that sweep. "Ye shall notsteal; neither shall ye deal falsely, nor lie one to another, "[1] saysthe Lord, in holding up the right standard before his children. "Alying tongue" is said to be "an abomination" before the Lord. [2] "Afaithful witness will not lie: but a false witness breatheth outlies, "[3] says Solomon, in marking the one all-dividing line ofcharacter; and as to the results of lying he says, "He that breathethout lies shall not escape, "[4] and "he that breatheth out lies shallperish. "[5] And he adds the conclusion of wisdom, in view of thesupposed profit of lying, "A poor man is better than a liar;"[6] thatis, a truth-telling poor man is better than a rich liar. 

[Footnote 1: Lev. 19:11. ]

[Footnote 2: Prov. 6:16, 17. ]

[Footnote 3: Prov. 14:5. ]

[Footnote 4: Prov. 19:5. ]

[Footnote 5: Prov. 19:9. ]

[Footnote 6: Prov. 19:22. ]

The inspired Psalms are full of such teachings: "The wicked areestranged from the womb: they go astray as soon as they be born, speaking lies. "[1] "They delight in lies. "[2] "The mouth of them thatspeak lies shall be stopped. "[3] "He that speaketh falsehood shall notbe established before mine [the Psalmist's] eyes. "[4] And the Psalmistprays, "Deliver my soul, O Lord, from lying lips. "[5] In the NewTestament it is much the same as in the Old. "Lie not one to another;seeing that ye have put off the old man with his doings, "[6] is theapostolic injunction; and again, "Speak ye truth each one with hisneighbor: for we are members one of another. "[7] There is no place fora lie in Bible ethics, under the earlier dispensation or the later. 

[Footnote 1: Psa. 58:3. ]

[Footnote 2: Psa. 62:4. ]

[Footnote 3: Psa. 63:11. ]

[Footnote 4: Psa. 101: 7. ]

[Footnote 5: Psa. 120: 2. ]

[Footnote 6: Col. 3: 9. ]

[Footnote 7: Eph. 4: 25. ]

IV. 

DEFINITIONS. 

It would seem to be clear that the Bible, and also the other sacredbooks of the world, and the best moral sense of mankind everywhere, are united in deeming a lie incompatible with the idea of a holyGod, and consistent only with the spirit of man's arch-enemy--theembodiment of all evil. Therefore he who, admitting this, would find aplace in God's providential plan for a "lie of necessity" must beginwith claiming that there are lies which are not lies. Hence it is ofprime importance to define a lie clearly, and to distinguish it fromallowable and proper concealments of truth. 

A lie, in its stricter sense, is the affirming, by word or by action, of that which is not true, with a purpose of deceiving; or thedenying, by word or by action, of that which is true, with a purposeof deceiving. But the suppressing or concealing of essential facts, from one who is entitled to know them, with a purpose of deceiving, may practically amount to a lie. 

Obviously a lie may be by act, as really as by word; as when a manis asked to tell the right road, and he silently points in the wrongdirection. Obviously, also, the intention or purpose of deceiving isin the essence of the lie; for if a man says that which is not true, supposing it to be true, he makes a misstatement, but he does not lie;or, again, if he speaks an untruth playfully where no deception iswrought or intended, as by saying, when the mercury is below zero, that it is "good summer weather, " there is no lie in the patentuntruth. 

So far all are likely to be agreed; but when it comes to the questionof that concealment which is in the realm of the lie, as distinct fromright and proper concealment, there is more difficulty in makingthe lines of distinction clear to all minds. Yet those lines can bedefined, and it is important that they should be. 

A witness on the stand in a court of law is bound by his oath, or hisaffirmation, to tell "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but thetruth, " in the testimony that he gives in response to the questionsasked of him. If, therefore, in the course of his testimony, hedeclares that he received five dollars for his share in a certaintransaction, when in reality he received five hundred dollars, hisconcealment of the fact that he received a hundred times as much as headmits having received, is practically a lie, and is culpable as such. Any intentional concealment of essential facts in the matter at issue, in his answers to questions asked of him as a witness, is a lie inessence. 

But a person who is not before a court of justice is not necessarilybound to tell all the facts involved to every person whom headdresses, or who desires to have him do so; and therefore, while aconcealment of facts which ought to be disclosed may be equivalent toa lie, there is such a thing as the concealment of facts which is notonly allowable, but which is an unmistakable duty. And to knowwhen concealment is right, and when it is wrong, is to know whenconcealment partakes of the nature of a lie, and when it is a totallydifferent matter. 

Concealment, so far from being in itself a sin, is in itself right; itis only in its misuse that it becomes reprehensible in a given case. Concealment is a prime duty of man; as truly a duty as truth-speaking, or chastity, or honesty. God, who cannot lie to his creatures, conceals much from his creatures. "The secret things belong unto theLord our God: but the things that are revealed belong unto us and toour children for ever, "[1] says the author of Deuteronomy; and thewhole course of God's revelation to man is in accordance with thisannounced principle of God's concealment of that which ought to beconcealed. He who is himself the revelation of God says to his chosendisciples, even when he is speaking his latest words to them beforehis death: "I have yet many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bearthem now;"[2] and he conceals what, as yet, it is better for themshould remain concealed. 

[Footnote 1: Deut. 29: 29. ]

[Footnote 2: John 16:12. ]

There is a profound meaning in the suggestion, in the Bible story ofman's "fall, " that, when man had come to the knowledge of good andevil, the first practical duty which he recognized as incumbent uponhimself, was the duty of concealment;[1] and from that day to thisthat duty has been incumbent on him. Man has a duty to conceal hisbesetting impurities of thought and inclinations to sin; to concealsuch of his doubts and fears as would dishearten others and weakenhimself by their expression; to conceal his unkindnesses of spirit andhis unjust prejudices of feeling; to conceal, in fact, whatever of hisinnermost personality is liable to work harm by its disclosure, and toa knowledge of which his fellows have no just claim. In the world asit is, there is more to be concealed than to be disclosed in everyindividual life; and concealment rather than disclosure is the rule ofpersonal action. 

[Footnote 1: Gen. 3:6, 7. ]

Absolute and unrestricted frankness in social intercourse would bebrutal. The speaking of the whole truth at all times and to everybodycould have neither justification nor excuse between man and man. Wehave no right to tell our fellows all that we think of them, orfear for them, or suspect them of. We have no right to betray theconfidences of those who trust us, or to disclose to all the fact thatwe have such confidences to conceal. We have no right to let it begenerally known that there are such peculiar struggles within us asmake our lives a ceaseless battle with temptations and fears anddoubts. There is such a thing as an indecent exposure of personalopinions, and as a criminal disclosure of the treasures of the innerlife. [1] How to conceal aright that which ought to be concealed, isone of the vital questions of upright living. 

[Footnote 1: See 2 Kings 20: 12-19. ]

The duty of right concealment stands over against the sin of lying. Whatever ought to be concealed, should be concealed, if concealmentis a possibility without sinning. But the strongest desire forconcealment can never justify a lie as a means of concealment; andconcealment at the cost of a lie becomes a sin through the meansemployed for its securing. On the other hand, when disclosure is aduty, concealment is sinful, because it is made to stand in the way ofthe performance of a duty. Concealment is not in itself wrong, but itmay become wrong through its misuse. Lying is in itself wrong, and itcannot be made right through any seeming advantage to be gained by it. 

Concealment which is right in one instance may be wrong in anotherinstance, the difference being in the relations of the two parties inthe case. A man who has lost a leg or an eye may properly concealfrom others generally the fact of his loss by any legitimate means ofconcealment. His defect is a purely personal matter. The public hasno claim upon him for all the facts in the premises. He may have anartificial limb or an artificial eye, so constructed as to conceal hisloss from the ordinary observer. There is nothing wrong in this. Itis in the line of man's primal duty of concealment. But if a manthus disabled were applying for a life-insurance policy, or were anapplicant for re-enlistment in the army, or were seeking employmentwhere bodily wholeness is a requisite, it would be his duty tomake known his defect; and the concealment of it from the partiesinterested would be in the realm of the lie. 

So, again, if a man were proposing marriage, or were entering intoconfidential relations with a partner in business, or were seekingfinancial aid from a bank, he would have no right to conceal from theparty interested many a fact which he could properly conceal from thepublic. 

A man who would be justified in concealing from the general publichis mental troubles, or his business embarrassments, or his spiritualperplexities, could not properly conceal the essential facts in thecase from his chosen adviser in medicine, or in law, or in matters ofreligion. It is a man's duty to disclose the whole truth to him whohas a right to know the whole truth. It is a man's right, and it maybecome his duty, to conceal a measure of the truth from one who is notentitled to know that portion of the truth, so far as he can properlymake concealment. But as a lie is never justifiable, it is never aproper means of concealment; and if concealment be, in any case, amode of lying, it is as bad as any other form of lying. 

But concealment, even when it is of facts that others have no right toknow, may cause others to be deceived, and deliberate deceit is oneform of a lie. How, then, can concealment that is sure to result indeception be free from the sin that invariably attaches to a lie inany form, or of any nature whatsoever?

Concealment which is for the _purpose_ of deception, is one thing;concealment which is only for the purpose of concealment, but which issure to _result_ in deception, is quite another thing. The one is notjustifiable, the other may be. In the one case it is a man's purposeto deceive his fellow-man; in the other case it is simply his purposeto conceal what his fellow-man has no right to know, and thatfellow-man receives a false impression, or deceives himself, inconsequence. 

We may, or we may not, be responsible for the obvious results of ouraction; and the moral measure of any action depends on the measure ofour responsibility in the premises. A surgeon, who is engaged in animportant and critical operation, is told that he is wanted elsewherein a case of life and death. If he sees it to be his duty to continuewhere he is because he cannot safely leave this case at this time, heobviously is not responsible for results which come because of hisabsence from the side of the other sufferer. A man is by a river bankwhen a boy is sinking before his eyes. If the man were to reach outhis arms to him, the boy might be saved. But the man makes no movementin the boy's behalf, and the boy drowns. It might seem as though thatman were responsible for that boy's death; but when it is known thatthe man is at that moment occupied in saving the life of his own son, who is also struggling in the water, it will have to be admitted thatthe father is not responsible for the results of his inaction inanother sphere than that which is for the moment the sphere of hisimperative duty. 

If a wife and mother has to choose between her loving ministry to hersick husband and to her sick child, and she chooses that which shesees to be the more important duty of the hour, she is not responsiblefor any results that follow from her inability to be in two places atthe same time. A man with a limited income may know that ten familiesare in need of money, while he can give help to only two of them. Eventhough others starve while he is supplying food to all whom he canaid, he is not responsible for results that flow from his decision tolimit his ministry to his means. 

In all our daily life, our decision to do the one duty of the hourinvolves our refusal to do what is not our duty, and we have noresponsibility for the results which come from such a refusal. So inthe matter of the duty of concealment, if a man simply purposes theconcealment from another of that which the other has no right to know, and does not specifically affirm by word or act that which is nottrue, nor deny by act or word that which is true, he is in no degreeresponsible for the self-deception by another concerning a point whichis no proper concern of that other person. 

Others are self-deceived with reference to us in many things, beyondour responsibility or knowledge. We may be considered weaker orstronger, wiser or more simple, younger or older, gladder or sadder, than we are; but for the self-deception on that point by the averageobserver we are not responsible. We may not even be aware of it. Itis really no concern of ours--or of our neighbor's. It is merely anincident of human life as it is. We may have an aching tooth oran aching heart, and yet refrain from disclosing this fact in theexpression of our face. In such a case we merely conceal what is ourown possession from those who have no claim to know it. Even thoughthey deceive themselves as to our condition in consequence of ourlooks, we are not responsible for their self-deception, because theyare not possessed of all the facts, nor have they any right to them, nor yet to a fixed opinion in the case. 

If a man were to have a patch put on his coat, he might properly haveit put on the under side of the coat instead of the outer side, thusmaking what is called "a blind patch, " for the purpose of concealingthe defect in his garment. Even though this course might result in afalse impression on the mind of the casual observer, the man would notbe blameworthy, as he would be if he had pursued the same course witha purpose of deceiving a purchaser of the coat. So, again, in thecase of a mender of bric-a-brac: it would be right for him tocement carefully the parts of a broken vase for the mere purpose ofconcealing its damaged condition from the ordinary eye, but not forthe purpose of deceiving one who would be a purchaser. 

A man whose city house is closed from the public in the summer season, because of his absence in the country, has a perfect right to cometo that house for a single night, without opening the shutters andlighting up the rooms in intimation of his presence. He may even keepthose shutters closed while his room is lighted, for the expresspurpose of concealing the fact of his presence there, and yet not beresponsible for any false impression on the minds of passers-by, whothink that the proprietor is still in the country, and that the cityhouse is vacant. On the other hand, if the house be left lighted upall through the night, with the shutters open, while the inmates areasleep, for the very purpose of concealing from those outside the factthat no one in the house is awake and on guard, the proprietor is notresponsible for any self-deception which results to those who have noright to know the facts in the case. 

And so, again, in the matter of having a man's hat or coat on the rackin the front hall, while there are only women in the house, the solepurpose of the action may be the concealment of the real condition ofaffairs from those who have no claim to know the truth, and not thedeliberate deception of any party in interest. In so far as thepurpose is merely the concealment from others of the defenselesscondition of the house the action is obviously a proper one, notwithstanding its liability to result in false impressions on theminds of those who have no right to an opinion in the case. 

While a man would be justified in concealing, without falsehood, thefact of a bodily lack or infirmity on his part which concerned himselfalone, he would not be justified in concealing the fact that he wassick of a contagious disease, or that his house was infected bya disease that might be given to a caller there. Nor would he bejustified in concealing a defect in a horse or a cow in order todeceive a man into the purchase of that animal as a sound one, anymore than he would be justified in slightly covering an opening in theground before his house, so as to deceive a disagreeable visitor intostumbling into that hole. 

It would be altogether proper for a man with a bald head to concealhis baldness from the general public by a well-constructed wig. Itwould likewise be proper for him to wear a wig in order to guard hisshining pate against flies while at church in July, or against dangerfrom pneumonia in January, even though wide-awake children in theneighboring pews deceived themselves into thinking that he had a finehead of natural hair. But if that man were to wear that wig for thepurpose of deceiving a young woman, whom he wished to marry, as to hisage and as to his freedom from bodily defects, it would be quite adifferent matter. Concealment for the mere purpose of concealment maybe, not only justifiable, but a duty. Concealment for the purpose ofdeception is never justifiable. 

It would seem that this is the principle on which God acts withreference to both the material and the moral universe. He concealsfacts, with the result that many a man is self-deceived, in hisignorance, as to the size of the stars, and the cause of eclipses, andthe processes of nature, and the consequences of conduct, in many animportant particular. But man, and not God, is responsible for man'sself-deception concerning points at which man can make no claim to aright to know all the truth. 

It is true that this distinction is a delicate one, but it is adistinction none the less real on that account. A moral line, like amathematical line, has length, but neither breadth nor thickness. And the line that separates a justifiable concealment which causesself-deception on the part of those who are not entitled to know thewhole truth in the matter, and the deliberate concealment of truth forthe specific purpose of deception, is a line that runs all the wayup from the foundations to the summit of the universe. This line ofdistinction is vital to an understanding of the question of the dutyof truth-speaking, and of the sin of lying. 

An effort at right concealment may include truthful statements whichare likely, or even sure, to result in false impressions on the mindof the one to whom they are addressed, and who in consequence deceiveshimself as to the facts, when the purpose of those statements isnot the deception of the hearer. A husband may have had a seriousmisunderstanding with his wife that causes him pain of heart, so thathis face gives sign of it as he comes out of the house in the morning. The difficulty which has given him such mental anxiety is one which heought to conceal. He has no right to disclose it to others. Yet he hasno right to speak an untruth for the purpose of concealing that whichhe ought to conceal. 

It may be that the mental trouble has already deprived him of sleep, and has intensified his anxiety over a special business matter thatawaits his attention down town, and that all this shows in his face. If so, these facts are secondary but very real causes of his troubledlook, as he meets a neighbor on leaving his house, who says to him:"You look very much troubled this morning. What's the matter withyou?" Now, if he were to say in reply, "Then my looks belie me; for Ihave no special trouble, " he would say what was not true. But he mightproperly say, "I think it is very likely. I didn't sleep well lastnight, and I am very tired this morning. And I have work before meto-day that I am not easy about. " Those statements being literallytrue, and being made for the purpose of concealing facts which hisquestioner has no right to know, their utterance is justifiable, regardless of the workings of the mind of the one who hears them. Theyare made in order to conceal what is back of them, not in order todeceive one who is entitled to know those primary facts. 

If, again, a physician in attendance on a patient sees that thereis cause for grave anxiety in the patient's condition, and deemsit important to conceal his fears, so far as he can withoutuntruthfulness, he may, in answer to direct questions from hispatient, give truthful answers that are designed to conceal what hehas a right to conceal, without his desiring to deceive his patient, and without his being responsible for any self-deception on hispatient's part that results from their conversation. The patient mayask, "Doctor, am I very sick?" The doctor may answer truthfully, "Notso sick as you might be, by a good deal. " He may give this answer witha cheerful look and tone, and it may result in calming the patient'sfears. 

If, however, the patient goes on to ask, "But, doctor, do you thinkI'm going to die?" the doctor may respond lightly, "Well, most of uswill die sooner or later, and I suppose you are not to be exempt fromthe ordinary lot of mortals. " "But, " continues the patient, "do youthink I am going to die of this disease?" Then the doctor can say, seriously and truthfully, "I'm sure I don't know. The future isconcealed from me. You may live longer than I do. I certainly hopeyou are not going to die yet awhile, and I'm going to do all I can toprevent it. " All this would be justifiable, and be within the limitsof truthfulness. Concealment of the opinions of the physician as tothe patient's chances of life, and not the specific deception of thepatient, is the object of these answers. 

In no event, however, would the physician be justified in telling alie, any more than he would be in committing any other sin, as a meansof good. He is necessarily limited by the limits of right, in theexercise of his professional skill, and in the choice of availablemeans. He is in no wise responsible for the consequences of hisrefusal to go beyond those limits. 

Concealment may be, or may not be, of the nature of deception. Concealment is not right when disclosure is a duty. Concealment ofthat which may properly be concealed is not in itself wrong. Effortsat concealment must, in order to be right, be kept within the limitsof strict truthfulness of statement. Concealment for the purpose ofdeception is in the realm of the lie. Concealment for the mere purposeof concealment may be in the realm of positive duty--in the sight ofGod and for the sake of our fellows. 

It is to be borne in mind that the definitions here given do not pivoton the specific illustrations proffered for their explanation. If, inany instance, the illustration seems inapt or imperfect, it maybe thrown aside, and reference made to the definition itself. Thedefinition represents the principle involved; the illustration is onlya suggestion of the principle. 

V. 

THE PLEA OF "NECESSITY. "

The story is told of an old Quaker, who, after listening for a timeto the unstinted praises, by a dry-goods salesman, of the variousarticles he was trying to dispose of, said quietly: "Friend, it is agreat pity that lying is a sin, since it seems so necessary in thybusiness. " It has been generally supposed that this remark of the oldQuaker was a satirical one, rather than a serious expression of regretover the clashing of the demands of God's nature with the practicalnecessities of men. Yet, as a matter of fact, there are moralphilosophers, and writers on Christian ethics, who seem to takeseriously the position assumed by this Quaker, and who arguedeliberately that there are such material advantages to be securedby lying, in certain emergencies, that it would be a great pity torecognize any unvarying rule, with reference to lying, that wouldshut off all possibility of desired gain from this practice underconditions of greatest urgency. 

It is claimed that lying proffers such unmistakable advantages in timeof war, and of sickness, and in dealings with would-be criminalsand the insane, and other classes exempt from ordinary socialconsideration, that lying becomes a necessity when the gain from it isof sufficient magnitude. Looked at in this light, lying is not sinful_per se_, but simply becomes sinful by its misuse or untimeliness; forif it be sinful _per se_, no temporary or material advantage from itsexercise could ever make it other than sinful. 

If, indeed, the rightfulness of lying is contingent on the resultsto be hoped for or to be feared from it, the prime question withreference to it, in a moral estimate of its propriety, is the limit ofprofit, or of gain, which will justify it as a necessity. But with allthat has been written on this subject in the passing centuries, theadvocates of the "lie of necessity" have had to contend with the moralsense of the world as to the sinfulness of lying, and with the factthat lying is not merely a violation of a social duty, but is contraryto the demands of the very nature of God, and of the nature of manas formed in the image of God. And it has been the practice of suchadvocates to ignore or to deny the testimony of this moral sense ofthe race, and to persist in looking at lying mainly in the light ofits social aspects. 

That the moral sense of the race is against the admissibility of therightfulness of lying, is shown by the estimate of this sin as a sinin the ethnic conceptions of it, even among peoples who indulge freelyin its practice, as well as in the teachings of the sacred books ofthe ages. And, moreover, it is _not_ the fact, as is often claimed, that lying is generally admitted to be allowable between enemies inwar time, or by a physician to his patient, or by a sane man to onewho is insane, or in order to the prevention of crime, or for thepurpose of securing some real or supposed advantage in any case. 

The right to conceal from the enemy one's weakness, or one's plans, by any exhibit of "quaker guns, " or of mock fortifications, or ofmovements and counter-movements, or of feints of attack, or of surpluswatchfires, in time of warfare, is recognized on all sides. But theright to lie to or to deceive the enemy by sending out a flag oftruce, as if in desire for a peaceful conference, and following it upwith an attack on his lines in an unsuspecting moment, is not admittedin any theory of "civilized warfare. " And while a scout may creepwithin the enemy's lines, and make observations of the enemy'sweakness and strength of position, without being open to any charge ofdishonorable conduct, --if he comes disguised as a soldier of theother side than his own, or if he claims to be a mere civilian ornon-combatant, he is held to be a "spy, " and as such he is denied asoldier's death, and must yield his life on the gallows as a deceiverand a liar. 

The distinction between justifiable concealment for the mere purposeof concealment, and concealment for the express purpose of deceiving, is recognized as clearly in warfare as in peaceful civil life; and thewriter on Christian ethics who appeals to the approved practices ofwarfare in support of the "lie of necessity" can have only the plea ofignorance as an excuse for his baseless argument. 

An enemy in warfare has no right to know the details of his opponent'splans for his overcoming; but his opponent has no right to lie tohim, by word or action, as a means of concealment; for a lie is neverjustifiable, and therefore is never a necessity. And this is admittedin the customs of honorable warfare. Illustrations of this distinctionare abundant. A Federal officer, taken prisoner in battle, was broughtbefore a Confederate officer for examination. He was asked his name, his rank, his regiment, his brigade, his division, and his corps. Toall these questions he gave truthful answers promptly; for the enemyhad a right to information at these points concerning a prisoner ofwar. But when the question came, "What is the present strength of yourcorps?" he replied, "Two and a half millions. " "That cannot be true, "said the Confederate officer. "Do you expect me to tell you the truth, Colonel, in such a matter?" he responded, in reminder of the fact thatit was proper for him to conceal facts which the other had no right toknow; and his method of concealment was by an answer that was intendedto conceal, but not to deceive. 

In Libby Prison, during war time, the attempt to prevent writtenmessages being carried out by released prisoners was at first made bythe careful examination of the clothing and persons of such prisoners;but this proved to be ineffectual. Then it was decided to put everyoutgoing prisoner on his word of honor as a soldier in this matter;and that was effectual. A true soldier would require something morethan the average treatise on Christian ethics to convince him that alie to an enemy in war time is justifiable as a "lie of necessity, " onthe ground of its profitableness. 

In dealing with the sick, however desirable it may be, in anyinstance, to conceal from a patient his critical condition, thedifference must always be observed between truthful statements thatconceal that which the physician, or other speaker, has a right toconceal, and statements that are not strictly true, or that are madefor the explicit purpose of deceiving the patient. It is a physician'sduty to conceal from a patient his sense of the grave dangersdisclosed to his professional eye, and which he is endeavoring to meetsuccessfully. And, in wellnigh every case, it is possible for him togive truthful answers that will conceal from his patient what he oughtto conceal; for the best physician does not know the future, and hisprofessional guesses are not to be put forward as if they were assuredcertitudes. 

If, indeed, it were generally understood, as many ethical writers aredisposed to claim, that physicians are ready to lie as a help to theirpatients' recovery, physicians, as a class, would thereby be deprivedof the power of encouraging their patients by words of sincere andhearty confidence. There are physicians whose most hopeful assurancesare of little or no service to their patients, because thosephysicians are known to be willing to lie to a patient in anemergency; and how can a timid patient be sure that his case does notpresent such an emergency? Therefore it is that a physician's habit oflying to his patients as a means of cure would cause him to lose thepower of aiding by truthful assurances those patients who most neededhelp of this sort. 

It is poor policy, as policy, to venture a lie in behalf of a singlepatient, at the cost of losing the power to make the truth beneficialto a hundred patients whose lives may be dependent on wise words ofencouragement. And the policy is still poorer as policy, when it is inthe line of an unmistakable sin. And many a good physician like manya good soldier, repudiates the idea of a "lie of necessity" in hisprofession. 

Since lying is sinful because a lie is always a lie unto God, the factthat a lie is spoken to an insane person or to a would-be criminaldoes not make it any the less a sin in God's sight. And it is held bysome of the most eminent physicians to the insane that lying to theinsane is as poor policy as it is bad morals, and that it is neverjustifiable, and therefore is never a "necessity" in that sphere. [1]

[Footnote 1: See, for example, the views of Dr. Thomas S. Kirkbride, physician-in-chief and superintendent of the Pennsylvania Hospitalfor the Insane, in the Report of that institution for 1883, at pages74-76. In speaking of the duty of avoiding deception in dealings withthe insane, he said: "I never think it right to speak anything but thetruth. "]

So also in dealing with the would-be criminal, a lie is notjustifiable in order to save one's life, or one's possessions that aredearer than life, nor yet to prevent the commission of a crime or toguard the highest interests of those whom we love. Yet concealment ofthat which ought to be concealed is as truly a duty when disclosurewould lead to crime, or would imperil the interests of ourselves orothers, as it is in all the ordinary affairs of life; but lying as ameans of concealment is not to be tolerated in such a case any morethan in any other case. 

If a robber, with a pistol in his hand, were in a man's bedroom atnight, it would not be wrong for the defenseless inmate to remainquiet in his bed, in concealment of the fact that he was awake, ifthereby he could save his life, at the expense of his property. If awould-be murderer were seeking his victim, and a man who knew thisfact were asked to tell of his whereabouts, it would be that man'sduty to conceal his knowledge at this point by all legitimate means. He might refuse to speak, even though his own life were riskedthereby; for it were better to die than to lie. And so in many anotheremergency. 

A lie being a sin _per se_, no price paid for it, nor any advantage tobe gained from it, would make it other than a sin. The temptation tolook at it as a "necessity" may, indeed, be increased by increasingthe supposed cost of its refusal; but it is a temptation towrong-doing to the last. It was a heathen maxim, "Do right though theheavens fall, " and Christian ethics ought not to have a lower standardthan that of the best heathen morality. 

Duty toward God cannot be counted out of this question. God himselfcannot lie. God cannot justify or approve a lie. Hence it follows thathe who deliberately lies in order to secure a gain to himself, or toone whom he loves, must by that very act leave the service of God, andput himself for the time being under the rule of the "father oflies. " Thus in an emergency which seems to a man to justify a "lie ofnecessity" that man's attitude toward God might be indicated in thisaddress to him: "Lord, I should prefer to continue in your service, and I would do so if you were able and willing to help me. But I findmyself in an emergency where a lie is a 'necessity, ' and so I mustavail myself of the help of 'the father of lies. ' If I am carriedthrough this crisis by his help, I shall be glad to resume my positionin your service. " The man whose whole moral nature recoils from thisposition, will not be led into it by the best arguments of Christianphilosophers in favor of the "lie of necessity. "

VI. 

CENTURIES OF DISCUSSION. 

Because of the obvious gain in lying in times of extremity, andbecause of the manifest peril or cost of truth-telling in anemergency, attempts have been made, by interested or prejudicedpersons, all along the ages, to reconcile the general duty of adheringto an absolute standard of right, with the special inducements, ortemptations, to depart from that standard for the time being. It hasbeen claimed by many that the results of a lie would, under certaincircumstances, justify the use of a lie, --the good end in this casejustifying the bad means in this case. And the endeavor has also beenmade to show that what is called a lie is not always a lie. Yet therehave ever been found stalwart champions of the right, ready to insistthat a lie is a sin _per se_, and therefore not to be justified by anyadvantage or profit in its utterance. 

Prominent in the earlier recorded discussions of the centuriesconcerning the admissibility of the lie, are those of the JewishTalmudists and of the Christian Fathers. As in the Bible story thestandard of right is recognized as unvariable, even though such Biblecharacters as Abraham and Jacob and David, and Ananias and Sapphira, fail to conform to it in personal practice; so in the records of theTalmud and the Fathers there are not wanting instances of godly menwho are ready to speak in favor of a departure from the strictestrequirement of the law of truth, even while the great sweep ofsentiment is seen to be in favor of the line that separates the liefrom the truth eternally. 

Hamburger, a recognized Jewish authority in this sphere, representsthe teachings of the Talmud as even more comprehensive and explicitthan the Bible itself, in favor of the universal duty of truthfulness. He says: "Mosaism, with its fundamental law of holiness, hasestablished the standard of truthfulness with incomparabledefiniteness and sharpness (see Lev. 19: 2, 12, 13, 34-37). Truthfulness is here presented as derived directly from the principleof holiness, and to be practiced without regard to resulting benefitor injury to foe or to friend, to foreigner or to countryman. In thismoral loftiness these Mosaic teachings as to truthfulness pervade thewhole Bible. In the Talmud they receive a profounder comprehension anda further development. Truthfulness toward men is represented as aduty toward God; and, on the other hand, any departure from it is adeparture from God. "[1]

[Footnote 1: Hamburger's _Real-Encyclopadie für Bibel und Talmud_, I. , art. "Truthfulness" (_Wahrhaftigkeit_). ]

As specimen illustrations of the teachings of the Talmud on thistheme, Hamburger quotes these utterances from its pages: "He whoalters his word, at the same time commits idolatry. " "Three are hatedof God: he who speaks with his mouth otherwise than as he feels withhis heart; he who knows of evidence against any one, and does notdisclose it, " etc. "Four cannot appear before God: the scorner, thehypocrite, the liar, and the slanderer. " "'A just measure thou shaltkeep;' that is, we should not think one thing in our heart, and speakanother with our mouth. " "Seven commit the offense of theft: he whosteals [sneaks into] the good will of another; he who invites hisfriend to visit him, and does not mean it in his heart; he who offershis neighbor presents, knowing beforehand that he will not receivethem, " etc. 

And Hamburger adds: "Every lie, therefore, however excellent themotive, is decidedly forbidden. .. . In the tract Jebamoth, 63, Rabablames his son for employing a 'lie of necessity' _(nothlüge)_ torestore peace between his father and his mother. .. . It is clear thatthe Talmud decidedly rejects the principle that 'the end justifies themeans. '"[1]

[Footnote 1: Compare also art. "Falseness" _(Falscheit)_. ]

On the other hand, Hamburger cites Rabbi Ishmael, one of theTalmudists, as teaching that a Jew might transgress even theprohibition of idolatry (and lying is, according to Talmudic teaching, equivalent to idolatry) in order to save his life, provided the actwas not done in public. In support of his position, Rabbi Ishmaelcited the declaration concerning the statutes of Moses in Leviticus18: 5, "which if a man do he shall live in them, " and added by way ofexplanation: "He [the Israelite] is to live through the law, but isnot to die through it. "[1]

[Footnote 1: See Hamburger's _Real-Encyc_. , II. , art. "Ismael R. "]

And Isaac Abohab, an eminent Spanish rabbi, in his _MenorathHammaor_[1] gives other illustrations from the Talmud of the advocacyof special exceptions to the strict law of truthfulness, with a goodpurpose in view, notwithstanding the sweeping claim to the contraryby Hamburger. He says: "Only when it is the intention to bring aboutpeace between men, may anything be altered in discourse; as is taughtin the tract Jebamoth. Rabbi Ilai says, in the name of Rabbi Jehuda, son of Rabbi Simeon: 'One may alter something in discourse for thesake of establishing harmony. '. .. Rabbi Nathan says: 'This indeed is aduty. '. .. Rabbi Ishmael taught: 'Peace is of such importance that forits sake God even alters facts. '" In each of these cases the rabbicited misapplies a Bible passage in support of his position. 

[Footnote 1: See German translation by R. J. Fürstenthal, DiscourseII. , I. ]

Isaac Abohab adds: "In like manner the rabbis say that one may praisea bride in the presence of her bridegroom, and say that sheis handsome and devout, when she is neither, if the intentionpredominates to make her attractive in the eyes of her bridegroom. Nevertheless a man is not to tell lies even in trifling matters, lestlying should come to be a habit with him, as is warned against in thetract Jebamoth. "

Thus it would appear that there were discussions on this subjectamong the rabbis of the Talmud, and that while there were those whoadvocated the "lie of necessity, " as a matter of personal gain or as ameans of good to others, there were those who stood firmly against anyform of the lie, or any falsity, as in itself at variance with thevery nature of God, and with the plain duty of God's children. 

Among the Christian Fathers it was much the same as among the Jewishrabbis, in discussions over this question. The one unvarying standardwas recognized, by the clearest thinkers, as binding on all foralways; yet there were individuals inclined to find a reason forexceptions in the practical application of this standard. The phase ofthe question that immediately presented itself to the early Christianswas, whether it were allowable for a man to deny to a pagan enemy thathe was a Christian, or that one whom he held dear was a Christian, when the speaking of the truth would cost him his life, or cost thelife of one whom he loved. 

There were those who held that the duty to speak the truth was merelya social obligation, and that when a man showed himself as an enemyof God and of his fellows, he shut himself out from the pale of thissocial obligation; moreover, that when such a man could be deterredfrom crime, and at the same time a Christian's life could bepreserved, by the telling of an untruth, a falsehood would bejustifiable. If the lie were told in private under such circumstances, it was by such persons considered different from a public denial ofone's faith. But, on the other hand, the great body of Christians, in the apostolic age, and in the age early following, acted on theconviction that a lie is a sin _per se_, and that no emergency couldmake a lie a necessity. And it was in fidelity to this conviction thatthe roll of Christian martyrs was so gloriously extended. 

Justin Martyr, whose Apologies in behalf of the Christians are theearliest extant, speaks for the best of the class he represents whenhe says: "It is in our power, when we are examined, to deny that weare Christians; but we would not live by telling a lie. "[1] And again:"When we are examined, we make no denial, because we are not consciousof any evil, but count it impious not to speak the truth in allthings, which also we know is pleasing to God. "[2] There was nothought in such a mind as Justin Martyr's, or in the minds of hisfellow-martyrs, that any life was worth saving at the cost of a lie inGod's sight. 

[Footnote 1: First Apology, Chapter 8. ]

[Footnote 2: Second Apology, Chapter 4. ]

There were many temptations, and great ones, to the early Christians, to evade the consequences of being known as refusers to worship thegods of the Romans; and it is not to be wondered at that many poormortals yielded to those temptations. Exemption from punishment couldbe purchased by saying that one had offered sacrifices to the gods, or by accepting a certificate that such sacrifice had been made, evenwhen such was not the fact; or, again, by professing a readiness tosacrifice, without the intention of such compliance, or by permittinga friend to testify falsely as to the facts; and there were those whothought a lie of this sort justifiable, for the saving of their lives, when they would not have openly renounced their Christian faith. [1]There was much discussion over these practices in the writings of theFathers; but while there was recognized a difference between openapostasy and the tolerance of a falsehood in one's behalf, it was heldby the church authorities that a lie was always sinful, even thoughthere were degrees in modes of sinning. 

[Footnote 1: See Smith and Cheetham's _Dictionary of ChristianAntiquities_, art. "Libelli. " See also Bingham's _Antiquities of theChristian Church_, Book XVI. , Chap. 13, Section 5; also Book XVI. , Chap. 3, Section 14; with citations from Tertullian, Origen, andCyprian. ]

Ringing words against all forms of lying were spoken by some of theChristian Fathers. Says the Shepherd of Hermas: "Love the truth, andlet nothing but truth proceed from your mouth, that the spirit whichGod has placed in your flesh may be found truthful before all men; andthe Lord, who dwelleth in you, will be glorified, because the Lord istruthful in every word, and in him is no falsehood. They, therefore, who lie, deny the Lord, and rob him, not giving back to him thedeposit which they have received. For they received from him a spiritfree from falsehood. If they give him back this spirit untruthful, they pollute the commandment of the Lord, and become robbers. "[1]

[Footnote 1: Book II. , Commandment Third. _The Ante-Nicene Fathers_(Am. Ed. ), II. , 21. ]

Tertullian names among "sins of daily committal, to which we allare liable, " the "sin" of "lying, from bashfulness [or modesty], or'necessity. '"[1] Origen also speaks of the frequency of "lying, or ofidle talking;"[2] as if possibly its frequency were in some sense anexcuse for it. And Origen specifically claimed that the apostlesPeter and Paul agreed together to deceive their hearers at Antioch bysimulating a dissension between themselves, when in reality they wereagreed. [3] Origen also seemed to approve of false speaking to thosewho were not entitled to know all the truth; as when he says of thecautious use of falsehood, "a man on whom necessity imposes theresponsibility of lying is bound to use very great care, and to usefalsehood as he would a stimulant or a medicine, and strictly topreserve its measure, and not go beyond the bounds observed by Judithin her dealings with Holofernes, whom she overcame by the wisdom withwhich she dissembled her words. "[4]

[Footnote 1: "On Modesty, " Chap. 19. _The Ante-Nicene Fathers_, XIV. , 97. ]

[Footnote 2: Origen's Commentaries on Matthew, Tract VI. , p. 60; citedin Bingham's _Antiq. Of Chr. Ch_. , Book XVI. , Chap. 3. ]

[Footnote 3: Gal. 2: 11-14. A concise statement of the influenceof this teaching of Origen on the patristic interpretations of thepassage in Galatians, is given by Lightfoot in his commentary onGalatians, sixth edition, pp. 128-132. ]

[Footnote 4: Quoted from the sixth book of Origen's Miscellanies byJerome, in his Apology against Rufinus, Book I. , § 18. See _The Niceneand Post-Nicene Fathers_, second series (Am. Ed. ), III. , 492. See, also, Neander's _Geschichte der Christlichen Ethik_, pp. 160, 167. ]

There were Christian Fathers who found it convenient to lie, in theirown behalf or in behalf of others; and it was quite natural for suchmortals to seek to find an excuse for lies that "seemed so necessary"for their purposes. When Gregory of Nyssa, in his laudable effort tobring about a reconciliation between his elder brother Basil and theiruncle, was "induced to practice a deceit which was as irreconcilablewith Christian principles as with common sense, "[1] he was ready toargue in defense of such a course. 

[Footnote 1: Moore's _Life of S. Gregory of Nyssa. The Nicene andPost-Nicene Fathers_, second series (Am. Ed. ), V. , 5. ]

So again, when his brother Basil was charged with falsehood in acomparatively "trivial" matter, (where, in fact, he had merely beenin error unintentionally, ) Gregory falls back upon the comfortingsuggestion, that as to lying, in one way or another everybody is atfault; "accordingly, we accept that general statement which the HolySpirit uttered by the Prophet, 'Every man is a liar. '"[1] Gregoryprotests against the "solemn reflections on falsehood" by Eunomius, inthis connection, and his seeing equal heinousness in it whether ingreat or very trivial matters. "Cease, " he says, "to bid us think itof no account to measure the guilt of a falsehood by the slightnessor importance of the circumstances. " Basil, on the contrary, assertswithout qualification, as his conviction, that it never is permissibleto employ a falsehood even for a good purpose. He appeals to the wordsof Christ that all lies are of the Devil. [2]

[Footnote 1: _Ibid_. , p. 46. ]

[Footnote 2: Neander's _Geschichte der Christlichen Ethik_, p. 219. ]

Chrysostom, as a young man, evaded ordination for himself and securedit to his dearest friend Basil (who should not be confounded withBasil the Great, the brother of Gregory of Nyssa) by a course ofdeception, which he afterwards labored to justify by the claim thatthere were lies of necessity, and that God approved of deception as ameans of good to others. [1] In the course of his exculpatory argument, he said to his much aggrieved friend Basil: "Great is the value ofdeceit, provided it be not introduced with a mischievous intention. Infact, action of this sort ought not to be called deceit, but rather akind of good management, cleverness, and skill, capable of findingout ways where resources fail, and making up for the defects of themind. .. . That man would fairly deserve to be called a deceiver whomade an unrighteous use of the practice, not one who did so with asalutary purpose. And often it is necessary to deceive, and to do thegreatest benefits by means of this device, whereas he who has gone bya straight course has done great mischief to the person whom he hasnot deceived. "[2]

[Footnote 1: See Smith and Wace's _Dictionary of Christian Biography_, I. , 519 f. ; art. "Chrysostom, John. "]

[Footnote 2: See Chrysostom's "Treatise on the Priesthood, " in _TheNicene and Post-Nicene Fathers_, first series (Am. Ed. ), IX. , 34-38. ]

In fact, Chrysostom seems, in this argument, to recognize no absoluteand unvarying standard of truthfulness as binding on all at all times;but to judge lies and deceptions as wrong only when they are wronglyused, or when they result in evil to others. He appears to act on theanti-Christian theory[1] that "the end justifies the means. " Indeed, Dr. Schaff, in reprobating this "pious fraud" of Chrysostom, as"conduct which every sound Christian conscience must condemn, " saysof the whole matter: "The Jesuitical maxim, 'the end justifies themeans, ' is much older than Jesuitism, and runs through the wholeapocryphal, pseudo-prophetic, pseudo-apostolic, pseudo-Clementine, andpseudo-Isidorian literature of the early centuries. Several of thebest Fathers show a surprising want of a strict sense of veracity. They introduce a sort of cheat even into their strange theory ofredemption, by supposing that the Devil caused the crucifixion underthe delusion [intentionally produced by God] that Christ was a mereman, and thus lost his claim upon the fallen race. " [2]

[Footnote 1: Rom. 3: 7, 8. ]

[Footnote 2: See Dr. Schaff's "Prologemena to The Life and Works ofSt. Chrysostom, " in _The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers_, first Series(Am. Ed. ), IX. , 8. ]

Chrysostom, like Gregory of Nyssa, having done that which was wrong initself, with a laudable end in view, naturally attempts its defense bythe use of arguments based on a confusion in his own mind of thingswhich are unjustifiable, with things which are allowable. He does notseem to distinguish between deliberate deception as a mode of lying, and concealment of that which one has a right to conceal. Like manyanother defender of the right to lie in behalf of a worthy cause, inall the centuries, Chrysostom essays no definition of the "lie, " andindicates no distinction between culpable concealment, and concealmentthat is right and proper. Yet Chrysostom was a man of loving heart andof unwavering purpose of life. In an age of evil-doing, he stood firmfor the right. And in spite of any lack of logical perceptions on hispart in a matter like this, it can be said of him with truth that"perhaps few have ever exercised a more powerful influence over thehearts and affections of the most exalted natures. "[1]

[Footnote 1: Smith and Wace's _Dictionary of Christian Biography_, I. , 532. ]

Augustine, on the other hand, looks at this question, in accordancewith the qualities of his logical mind, in its relation to an absolutestandard; and he is ready to accept the consequences of an adherenceto that standard, whether they be in themselves desirable ordeplorable. He is not afraid to define a lie, and to stand by hisdefinition in his argument. He sees and notes the difference betweenjustifiable concealment, and concealment that is for the purpose ofdeception. "It is lawful then, " he says on this point, "to conceal atfitting time whatever seems fit to be concealed: but to tell a lie isnever lawful, therefore neither to conceal by telling a lie. "[1]In his treatise "On Lying" _(De Mendacid_), [2] and in his treatise"Against Lying" _(Contra Mendaciuni)[3]_ as well as in his treatiseon "Faith, Hope, and Love" _(Enchiridion)_, [4] and again in hisLetters to Jerome, [5] Augustine states the principle involved in thisvexed question of the ages, and goes over all the arguments for andagainst the so-called "lie of necessity. " He sees a lie to be a sin_per se_, and therefore never admissible for any purpose whatsoever. He sees truthfulness to be a duty growing out of man's primal relationto God, and therefore binding on man while man is in God's sight. He strikes through the specious arguments based on any temporaryadvantages to be secured through lying, and rejects utterly thesuggestion that man may do evil that good may come. 

[Footnote 1: _The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers_, first series (Am. Ed. ), IX. , 466. ]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid_. , III. , 455-477. ]

[Footnote 3: _Ibid_. , pp. 479-500. ]

[Footnote 4: _Ibid_. , pp. 230-276. ]

[Footnote 5: _Ibid_. , I. , "Letters of St. Augustine. "]

The sound words of Augustine on this question, as based on his soundarguments, come down to us with strength and freshness through theintervening centuries; and they are worthy of being emphasized as theexpressions of unchanging truth concerning the duty of truthfulnessand the sin of lying. "There is a great question about lying, " hesays at the start, "which often arises in the midst of our everydaybusiness, and gives us much trouble, that we may not either rashlycall that a lie which is not such, or decide that it is sometimesright to tell a lie; that is, a kind of honest, well-meant, charitablelie. " This question he discusses with fulness, and in view of all thatcan be said on both sides. Even though life or salvation were to pivoton the telling of a lie, he is sure that no good to be gained couldcompensate for the committal of a sin. 

Arguing that a lie is essentially opposed to God's truth--by whichalone man can have eternal life--Augustine insists that to attempt tosave another's life through lying, is to set off one's eternal lifeagainst the mere bodily life of another. "Since then by lying eternallife is lost, never for any man's temporal life must a lie be told. And as to those who take it ill, and are indignant that one shouldrefuse to tell a lie, and thereby slay his own soul in order thatanother may grow old in the flesh, what if by our committing adulterya person might be delivered from death: are we therefore to steal, tocommit whoredom. .. . To ask whether a man ought to tell a lie for thesafety of another, is just the same as asking whether for another'ssafety a man ought to commit iniquity. "

"Good men, " he says, "should never tell lies. " "To tell a lie is neverlawful, therefore neither to conceal [when concealment is desirable]by telling a lie. " Referring to the fact that some seek to find ajustification in the Bible teachings for lying in a good cause, --"evenin the midst of the very words of the divine testimonies seeking placefor a lie, "--he insists, after a full examination of this claim, "thatthose [cited] testimonies of Scripture have none other meaning thanthat we must never at all tell a lie. "

"A lie is not allowable, even to save another from injury. " "Every liemust be called a sin. " "Nor are we to suppose that there is any liethat is not a sin, because it is sometimes possible, by telling alie, to do service to another. " "It cannot be denied that they haveattained a very high standard of goodness who never lie except tosave a man from injury; but in the case of men who have reached thisstandard, it is not the deceit, but their good intention, that isjustly praised, and sometimes even rewarded, "--as in the case of Rahabin the Bible story. "There is no lie that is not contrary to truth. For as light and darkness, piety and impiety, justice and injustice, sin and righteousness, health and sickness, life and death, so aretruth and a lie contrary the one to the other. Whence by how much welove the former, by so much ought we to hate the latter. "

"It does indeed make very much difference for what cause, with whatend, with what intention, a thing be done: but those things which areclearly sins, are upon no plea of a good cause, with no seeming goodend, no alleged good intention, to be done. Those works, namely, of men, which are not in themselves sins, are now good, now evil, according as their causes are good or evil. .. . When, however, theworks in themselves are evil, . .. Who is there that will say, that upongood causes, they may be done, so as either to be no sins, or, what ismore absurd, to be just sins?" "He who says that some lies are just, must be judged to say no other than that some sins are just, and thattherefore some things are just which are unjust: than which what canbe more absurd?" "Either then we are to eschew lies by right doing, or to confess them [when guilty of them] by repenting: but not, whilethey unhappily abound in our living, to make them more by teachingalso. "

In replying to the argument that it would be better to lie concerningan innocent man whose life was sought by an enemy, or by an unjustaccuser, than to betray him to his death, Augustine said courageously:"How much braver, . .. How much more excellent, to say, 'I will neitherbetray nor lie. '" "This, " he said, "did a former bishop of the Churchof Tagaste, Firmus by name, and even more firm in will. For when hewas asked by command of the emperor, through officers sent by him, fora man who was taking refuge with him, and whom he kept in hiding withall possible care, he made answer to their questions, that he couldneither tell a lie nor betray a man; and when he had suffered so manytorments of body (for as yet emperors were not Christians), he stoodfirm in his purpose. Thereupon, being brought before the emperor, hisconduct appeared so admirable that he without any difficulty obtaineda pardon for the man whom he was trying to save. What conduct could bemore brave and constant?"[1]

[Footnote 1: See _The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers_, first series(Am. Ed. ), III. , 408. ]

The treatise "Against Lying" was written by Augustine with specialreference to the practice and teaching of the sect of Priscillianists. These Christians "affirmed, with some other of the theosophic sects, that falsehood was allowable for a holy end. Absolute veracity wasonly binding between fellow-members of their sect. "[1] Hence it wasclaimed by some other Christians that it would be fair to shut outPriscillianists from a right to have only truth spoken to them, sincethey would not admit that it is always binding between man and man. This view of truthfulness as merely a social obligation Augustineutterly repudiated; as, indeed, must be the case with every one whoreckons lying a sin in and of itself. Augustine considered, in thistreatise, various hypothetical cases, in which the telling of thetruth might result in death to a sick man, while the telling of afalsehood might save his life. He said frankly: "And who can bear mencasting up to him what a mischief it is to shun a lie that might savelife, and to choose truth which might murder a man? I am moved by thisobjection exceedingly, but it were doubtful whether also wisely. " Yethe sees that it were never safe to choose sin as a means to good, inpreference to truth and right with all their consequences. 

[Footnote 1: See Smith and Wace's _Dict. Of Chris. Biog_. , IV. , 478, art. "Priscillianus. "]

Jerome having, like many others, adopted Origen's explanation of thescene between Peter and Paul at Antioch, Augustine wrote to him inprotest against such teaching, with its implied approval of deceit andfalsehood. [1] A correspondence on this subject was continued betweenthese two Fathers for years;[2] and finally Jerome was led to adoptAugustine's view of the matter, [3] and also to condemn Origen for hisloose views as to the duty of veracity. [4] But however Jerome mightvacillate in his theory, as in his practice, concerning the permanentobligations of truthfulness, Augustine stood firm from first to lastin the position which is justified by the teachings of the Bible andby the moral sense of the human race as a whole, --that a lie is alwaysa lie and always a sin, and that a lie can never be justified as ameans to even the best of ends. 

[Footnote 1: See _The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers_, first series(Am. Ed. ), I. , Letters XXVIII. , XL. ]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid_. , Letters LXVII. , LXVIII. , LXXII. , LXXIII. , LXXIV. , LXXV. ]

[Footnote 3: _Ibid_. , Letter CLXXX. ]

[Footnote 4: _The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers_, second series (Am. Ed. ), III. , 460 ff. ; _Rufinus' Apology_, Book II. ; _Jerome's Apology_, Book I. , p. 492. ]

From the days of Chrysostom and Augustine to the present time, alldiscussions of this question have been but a repetition of thearguments and objections then brought forward and examined. There canbe, in fact, only two positions maintained with any show of logicalconsistency. Either a lie is in its very nature antagonistic tothe being of God, and therefore not to be used or approved by him, whatever immediate advantages might accrue from it, or whateverconsequences might pivot on its rejection; or a lie is not in itselfa sin, is not essentially at variance with the nature of God, but isgood or evil according to the spirit of its use, and the end to begained by it; and therefore on occasions God could lie, or couldapprove lying on the part of those who represent him. 

The first of these positions is that maintained by the Shepherd ofHermas, by Justin Martyr, by Basil the Great, and by Augustine;the second is practically that occupied by Gregory of Nyssa andChrysostom, even though they do not explicitly define, or even seem toperceive, it as their position. There are, again, those like Origenand Jerome, who are now on one side of the dividing line, and now onthe other; but they are not logically consistent with themselves intheir opinions or practices. And those who are not consistent usuallyrefrain from explicit definitions of the lie and of falsehood; theymake no attempt at distinguishing between justifiable concealment, andconcealment for the very purpose of deception. 

With all the arguments on this question, in all the centuries, comprised within these well-defined bounds, it were useless to nameeach prominent disputant, in order merely to classify him as on theone side or on the other, or as zigzagging along the line which hefails to perceive. It were sufficient to point out a few pre-eminentmountain peaks, in the centuries between the fifth and the nineteen ofthe Christian era, as indicative of the perspective history of thisdiscussion. 

Towering above the greatest of the Schoolmen in the later middle agesstands Thomas Aquinas. As a man of massive intellect, of keennessof perception, of consistent logical instincts, and of unquestionedsincerity and great personal devoutness, we might expect him to befound, like Augustine, on the side of principle against policy, inunqualified condemnation of lying under any circumstances whatsoever, and in advocacy of truthfulness at all hazards. And that, as a matterof fact, is his position. 

In his _Summa Theologies_[1] Aquinas discusses this whole questionwith eminent fairness, and with great thoroughness. He first statesthe claims of those who, from the days of Chrysostom, had made excusesfor lying with a good end in view, and then he meets those claimsseverally. He looks upon lies as evil in themselves, and as in noway to be deemed good and lawful, since a right concurrence of allelements is essential to a thing's being good. "Whence, every lie is asin, as Augustine says in his book 'Against Lying. '" His conclusion, in view of all that is to be said on both sides of the question, is:"Lying is sinful not only as harmful to our neighbor, but becauseof its own disorderliness. It is no more permitted to do what isdisorderly [that is, contrary to the divine order of the universe] inorder to prevent harm, than it is to steal for the purpose of givingalms, except indeed in case of necessity when all things are commonproperty [when, for instance, the taking of needful food in time of agreat disaster, as on a wrecked ship, is not stealing]. And thereforeit is not allowable to utter a lie with this view, that we may deliverone from some peril. It is allowable, however, to conceal the truthprudently, by a sort of dissimulation, as Augustine says. " Thisrecognizes the correctness of Augustine's position, that concealmentof what one has a right to conceal may be right, provided no lie isinvolved in the concealment. As to the relative grades of sin inlying, Aquinas counts lying to another's hurt as a mortal sin, andlying to avert harm from another as a venial sin; but he sees thatboth are sins. 

[Footnote 1: _Secunda Secundae_, Quaestio CX. , art. III. ]

It is natural to find Aquinas, as a representative of the keen-mindedDominicans, standing by truth as an eternal principle, regardless ofconsequences; as it is also natural to find, on the other side, DunsScotus, as a representative of the easy-going Franciscans, with hisdenial of good absolute save as manifested in the arbitrary will ofGod. Duns Scotus accepted the "theory of a twofold truth, " ascribed toAverroes, "that one and the same affirmation might be theologicallytrue and philosophically false, and _vice versa_. " In Duns Scotus'sview, "God does not choose a thing because it is good, but the thingchosen is good because God chooses it;" "it is good simply and solelybecause God has willed it precisely so; but he might just as readilyhave willed the opposite thereof. Hence also God is not [eternally]bound by his commands, and he can in fact annul them. "[1] According tothis view, God could forbid lying to-day and justify it to-morrow. Itis not surprising, therefore, that "falsehood and misrepresentation"are "under certain circumstances allowable, " in the opinion of DunsScotus. 

[Footnote 1: See Kurtz's _Church History_ (Macpherson's Translation), II. , 101, 167-169; Ueberweg's _History of Philosophy_, I. , 416, 456f. ; Wuttke's _Christian Ethics_ (Am. Ed. ), I. , 218, Sec. 34. ]

So, all along the centuries, the religious teacher who holds to theline between truth and falsehood as an eternal line must, if logicallyconsistent, refuse to admit any possible justification of lying. Onlyhe who denies an eternally absolute line between the true and thefalse could admit with consistency the justification by God of an actthat is essentially hostile to the divine nature. Any exception tothis rule is likely to be where a sympathetic nature inclines ateacher to seek for an excuse for that which seems desirable eventhough it be theoretically wrong. 

When it comes to the days of the Protestant Reformation, we find JohnCalvin, like his prototype Augustine, and like Augustine's followerAquinas, standing firmly against a lie as antagonistic to the verynature of God, and therefore never justifiable. Martin Luther, also, is a fearless lover of the truth; but he is disposed to find excusesfor a lie told with a good end in view, although he refrains fromasserting that even the best disposed lie lacks the element ofsinfulness. [1] On the other hand, Ignatius Loyola, and his associatesin the founding of the Society of Jesus as a means of checking theProtestant Reformation, acted on the idea that was involved in thetheology of Duns Scotus, that the only standard of truth and right isin the absolute and arbitrary will of God; and that, therefore, ifGod, speaking through his representative in the newly formed Society, commands the telling of a lie, a lie is justifiable, and its tellingis a duty. Moreover, these Jesuit leaders in defining, or inexplaining away, the lie, include, under the head of justifiableconcealment, equivocations and falsifications that the ordinary mindwould see to be forms of the lie. [2]

[Footnote 1: See Martensen's _Christian Ethics_, p. 216. Compare, forexample, Luther's comments on Exodus I: 15-21, with Calvin's commentson Genesis 12: 14-20. ]

[Footnote 2: See Symonds's _Renaissance in Italy_, I. , 263-267;Cartwright's _The Jesuits_; Meyrick's _Moral Theology of the Churchof Rome_; Pascal's _Provincial Letters_. See, also, Kurtz's _ChurchHistory_, II. , 430. ]

It is common to point to the arguments of the Jesuits in favor of liesof expediency, in their work for the Church and for souls, as thoughtheir position were exceptional, and they stood all by themselves inincluding falsehood as a means to be employed rightfully for a goodend. 

But in this they are simply logically consistent followers of thoseChristian Fathers, and their successors in every branch of the Church, who have held that a lie for righteous purposes was admissible whenthe results to be secured by it were of vital importance. All therefinements of casuistry have their value to those who admit that alie may be right under certain conceivable circumstances; but to thosewho, like Augustine and Aquinas, insist that a lie is a sin _per se_, and therefore never admissible, casuistry itself has no interest as ameans of showing when a sin is not sinful. [1]

[Footnote 1: Hence the casuistry of the Schoolmen and of the Jesuits, and the question of Mental Reservations, and of "Probabilities, " arenot treated in detail here. ]

Some of the zealous defenders of the principles and methods ofthe Jesuits affirm that, in their advocacy of dissimulation andprevarication in the interests of a good cause, the Jesuits do notintend to justify lying, but are pointing out methods of properconcealment which are not within the realm of the lie. In this(waiving the question whether these defenders are right or not as tothe fact) they seem even more desirous of being counted against lyingthan those teachers, in the Romish Church or among Protestants, whoboldly affirm that a lie itself is sometimes justifiable. Thus it is_claimed_ by a Roman Catholic writer, in defense of the Jesuits, thatLiguori, their favorite theologian, taught "that to speak falselyis immutably a sin against God. It may be permitted under nocircumstances, not even to save life. Pope Innocent III. Says, 'Noteven to defend our life is it lawful to speak falsely;'" therefore, when Liguori approves any actions that seem opposed to truthfulness, "he allows the instances because they are not falsehood. "[1] On theother hand, Jeremy Taylor squarely asserts: "It is lawful to tella lie to children or to madmen, because they, having no powers ofjudging, have no right to the truth. "[2]

[Footnote 1: See Meyrick's _Moral Theology of the Church of Rome_, Appendix, p. 256 f. ]

[Footnote 2: Jeremy Taylor's _Ductor Dubitantium_, in his Works, X. , 103. ]

But Jeremy Taylor's trouble is in his indefinite definition of "alie, " and in his consequent confusion of mind and of statement withreference to the limitations of the duty of veracity. He writes onthis subject at considerable length, [1] and in alternation declareshimself plainly first on one side, and then on the other, of the mainquestion, without even an attempt at logical consistency. He startsout with the idea that "we are to endeavor to be like God, who istruth essentially;" that "God speaks truth because it is his nature;"that "the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testament do indefinitelyand severely forbid lying, " and "our blessed Saviour condemns it bydeclaring every lie to be of the Devil;" and that "beyond these thingsnothing can [could] be said for the condemnation of lying. " All thatcertainly is explicit and sound, --as sound as Basil the Great, asSt. Augustine, or as Thomas Aquinas!

[Footnote 1: Jeremy Taylor's _Ductor Dubitantium_, in his Works, X. , 100-132. ]

When he attempts the definition of a lie, however, Jeremy Taylor wouldseem to claim that injustice toward others and an evil motive are ofits very essence, and that, if these be lacking, a lie is not a lie. "Lying is to be understood to be something said or written to the hurtof a neighbor, which cannot be understood [by the hearer or reader]otherwise than to differ from the mind of him that speaks. " AsMelanchthon says, "To lie is to deceive our neighbor to his hurt. " "Ifa lie be unjust, it can never become lawful; but if it can be separatefrom injustice, then it may be innocent. "

Jeremy Taylor naturally falls back on the Bible stories of the Hebrewmidwives and Rahab the harlot, and assumes that God commended theirlying, as lying, because they had a good end in view; and he assertsthat "it is necessary sometimes by a lie to advantage charity bylosing of a truth to save a life, " and that "to tell a lie forcharity, to save a man's life, the life of a friend, of a husband, ofa prince, of an useful and a public person, hath not only been done inall times, but commended by great and wise and good men. " From this itwould appear that lying, which Jeremy Taylor sets out with denouncingas contrary to God's nature, and as declared by our Saviour to bealways of the Devil, may, under certain circumstances, be a godly sin. Gregory of Nyssa and young Chrysostom could not have done better thanthis in showing the sinlessness of a sin in a good cause. 

Seeing that concealment of that which is true is often a duty, andseeing also that concealment of that which ought to be disclosedis often practically a lie, Jeremy Taylor apparently; jumps to theconclusion that concealment and equivocation and lying are practicallythe same thing, and that therefore lying is sometimes a duty, whileagain it is a sin. He holds that the right to be spoken to intruthfulness, "though it be regularly and commonly belonging to allmen, yet it may be taken away by a superior right supervening; or itmay be lost, or it may be hindered, or it may cease upon a greaterreason. " As "that which is but the half of a true proposition eithersignifies nothing or is directly a lie, " it must be admitted that "inthe same cases in which it is lawful to tell a lie, in the same casesit is lawful to use a mental reservation;" and "where it is lawful tolie, it is lawful to equivocate, which may be something less than aplain lie. " Moreover, "it is lawful upon a just cause of great charityor necessity to use, in our answers and intercourses, words of diverssignification, though it does deceive him that asks. "

Jeremy Taylor ingenuously confesses that, in certain cases where lyingis allowable or is a duty, "the prejudice which the question is liketo have is in the meaning and evil sound of the word lying; which, because it is so hateful to God and man, casts a cloud upon anythingthat it comes near. " But, on the whole, Jeremy Taylor is willing toemploy with commendation that very word "lying" which is "so hatefulto God and man. " And in various cases he insists that "it is lawful totell a lie, " although "the lie must be charitable and useful, "--a goodlie, and not a wicked lie; for a good lie is good, and a wicked lieis wicked. He does not shrink from the consequences of his falseposition. 

Jeremy Taylor can therefore be cited as arguing that a lie is neveradmissible, but that it often is commendable. He does not seem tobe quite sure of any real difference between lying and justifiableconcealment, or to have in his mind an unvarying line betweentruthfulness and lying. He admits that God and man hate lying, butthat a good lie, nevertheless, is a very good thing. And so he leavesthe subject in more of a muddle than he found it. 

Coming down to the present century, perhaps the most prominent andinfluential defender of the "lie of necessity, " or of limitations tothe law of veracity, is Richard Rothe; therefore it is important togive special attention to his opinions and arguments on this subject. Rothe was a man of great ability, of lovely spirit, and of pervasivepersonal influence; and as a consequence his opinions carry specialweight with his numerous pupils and followers. 

Kurtz[1] characterizes Rothe as "one of the most profound thinkersof the century, equaled by none of his contemporaries in the grasp, depth, and originality of his speculation, " and his "TheologicalEthics" as "a work which in depth, originality, and conclusivenessof reasoning, is almost unapproached. " And in the opinion ofLichtenberger, [2] Rothe "is unquestionably the most distinguishedtheologian of the School of Conciliation, and the most originalthinker since Schleiermacher, " while "he also showed himself to be oneof the humblest Christians and one of the finest formed characters ofhis age. " It is not to be wondered at therefore, that, when such aleader in thought and in influence as Rothe declares himself in favorof a judicious use of falsehood as a means of good, many are inclinedto feel that there must be some sound reason for his course. Yet, onthe other hand, the arguments in favor of falsehood, put forwardby even such a man, ought to be scrutinized with care, in order toascertain if they are anything more than the familiar arguments on thesame side repeated in varying phrase in all the former centuries fromChrysostom to Jeremy Taylor. 

[Footnote 1: _Church History_ (Macpherson's translation), III. , 201. ]

[Footnote 2: _History of German Theology in the 19th Century_, p. 492. ]

The trouble with Rothe in his treatment of this Matter[1] is, that heconsiders the duty of truthfulness merely in its personal and socialaspects, without any direct reference to the nature, and the declaredwill, of God. Moreover, his peculiar definition of a lie is adaptedto his view of the necessities of the case. He defines a lie as"the unloving misuse of speech (or of other recognized means ofcommunication) to the intentional deception of our neighbor. " In hismind, lovelessness toward one's fellow-man is of the very essence ofthe lie, and when one speaks falsely in expression of a spirit of loveto others, it is not necessarily a lie. 

[Footnote 1: Rothe's _Theologische Ethik_, IVter Band, §§ 1064, 1065. ]

Rothe does not seem to recognize, in its application to this matter, the great principle that there is no true love for man except inconformity to and in expression of love for God; hence that nothingthat is in direct violation of a primal law of God can be anexhibition of real love for one of God's creatures. 

It is true that Rothe assumes that the subject of Theological Ethicsis an essential branch of Speculative Theology; but in his treatmentof Special Duties he seems to assume that Society rather than God istheir background, and therefore the idea of sin as sin does not enterinto the discussion. His whole argument and his conclusions are anillustration of the folly of attempting to solve any problem in ethicswithout considering the relation to it of God's eternal laws, and ofthe eternal principles which are involved in the very conception ofGod. Ethics necessarily includes more than social duties, and must beconsidered in the light of duty to God as above all. 

"The intentional deception of our neighbor, " says Rothe, "by sayingwhat is untrue, is not invariably and unqualifiedly a lie. Thequestion in this case is essentially one of the purpose. .. . It is onlyin the case where the untruth spoken with intent to deceive is at thesame time an act of unlovingness toward our neighbor, that it is aviolation of truthfulness as already defined, that is, a lie. " InRothe's view, "there are relations of men to each other in which[for the time being] avowedly the ethical fellowship does not exist, although the suspension of this fellowship must, of course, alwaysbe regarded as temporary, and this indeed as a matter of duty for atleast one of the parties. Here there can be no mention of love, andtherefore no more of the want of it. " Social duties being in suchcases suspended, and the idea of any special duty toward God not beingin consideration, it is quite proper, as Rothe sees it, for enemies inwar, or in private life, to speak falsely to each other. Such enemies"naturally have in speech simply a weapon which one may use againstthe other. .. . The duty of speaking the truth cannot even be thought ofas existing between persons so arrayed against each other. .. . Howeverthey may try to deceive each other, even with the help of speech, theydo not lie. "

But Rothe goes even farther than this in the advocacy of suchviolations, or abrogations, of the law of veracity, as would underminethe very foundations of social life, and as would render the lawagainst falsehood little more than a variable personal rule forlimited and selected applications, --after the fashion of the Americanhumorist who "believed in universal salvation if he could pick hismen. " Rothe teaches that falsehood is a duty, not only when it isneedful in dealing with public or personal enemies, but often, also, in dealing with "children, the sick, the insane, the drunken, thepassionately excited, and the morally weak, "--and that takes ina large share of the human race. He gives many illustrations offalsehood supposed to be necessary (where, in fact, they would seem tothe keen-minded reader to be quite superfluous[1]) and having affirmedthe duty of false speaking in these cases, he takes it for granted(in a strange misconception of the moral sense of mankind) that thedeceived parties would, if appealed to in their better senses, justifythe falsehoods spoken by mothers in the nursery, by physicians in thesick-room, and by the clear-headed sober man in his intercourse withthe angry or foolish or drunken individual. 

[Footnote 1: Nitzsch, the most eminent dogmatic theologian amongSchleiermacher's immediate disciples, denies the possibility ofconceiving of a case where loving consideration for others, or anyother dutiful regard for them, will not attain its end otherwise andmore truly and nobly than by lying to them, or where "the loving liaror falsifier might not have acted still more lovingly and wiselywithout any falsification. .. . The lie told from supposed necessity orto serve another is always, even in the most favorable circumstances, a sign either of a wisdom which is lacking in love and truth, or of alove which is lacking in wisdom. "]

"Of course, " he says, "such a procedure presupposes a certain relationof guardianship, on the part of the one who speaks untruth, over himwhom he deceives, and a relative irresponsibility on the part of theother, --an incapacity to make use of certain truths except to hisactual moral injury. And in each case all depends on the accuracy ofthis assumption. " It is appalling to find a man like Rothe announcinga principle like this as operative in social ethics! Every man todecide for himself (taking the responsibility, of course, for hispersonal decision) whether he is in any sense such a guardian of hisfellow-man as shall make it his duty to speak falsely to him in love!

Rothe frankly admits that there is no evidence that Jesus Christ, while setting an example here among men, ever spoke one of thesedutiful untruths; although it certainly would seem that Jesus mighthave fairly claimed as good a right to a guardianship of his earthlyfellows as the average man of nowadays. [1] But this does not restrainRothe from deliberately advising his fellow-men to a different course. 

[Footnote 1: Rothe says on this point: "That the Saviour spoke untruthis a charge to whose support only a single passage, John 7:8, can bealleged with any show of plausibility. But even here there was nospeaking of untruth, even if [Greek: ank][a disputed reading] beregarded as the right reading. " See on this passage Meyer in his_Commentary_, and Westcott in _The Bible Commentary_. ]

Rothe names Marheineke, DeWette, von Ammon, Herbart, Hartenstein, Schwartz, Harless, and Reinhard, as agreeing in the main with hisposition; while as opposed to it he mentions Kant, Fichte, Krause, Schleiermacher, von Hirscher, Nitzsch, Flatt, and Baumgarten-Crusius. But this is by no means a question to be settled by votes; and not oneof the writers cited by Rothe as of his mind, in this controversy, has anything new to offer in defense of a position in such radicaldisagreement with the teachings of the Bible, and with the moral senseof the race, on this point, as that taken by Rothe. In his ignoringof the nature and the will of God as the basis of an argument in thismatter, and in his arbitrary and unauthorized definition of a lie(with its inclusion of the claim that the deliberate utterance of astatement known to be false, for the express purpose of deceiving theone to whom it is spoken, is not necessarily and inevitably a lie), Rothe stands quite pre-eminent. Wuttke says, indeed, of Rothe'streatment of ethics: "Morality [as he sees it] is an independentsomething alongside of piety, and rests by no means on piety, --isentirely co-ordinate to and independent of it. "[1] Yet so great is thegeneral influence of Rothe, that various echoes of his arguments forfalsehoods in love are to be found in subsequent English and Americanutterances on Christian ethics. 

[Footnote 1: Wuttke's _Christian Ethics_ (Lacroix's transl. ), § 48. ]

Contemporaneous with Richard Rothe, and fully his peer in intellectualforce and Christ-likeness of spirit, stands Isaac August Dorner. Dr. Schaff says of him:[1] "Dr. Dorner was one of the profoundest andmost learned theologians of the nineteenth century, and ranks withSchleiermacher, Neander, Nitzsch, Julius Müller, and Richard Rothe. Hemastered the theology of Schleiermacher and the philosophy of Hegel, appropriated the best elements of both, infused into them a positiveevangelical faith and a historic spirit;" and as a lecturer, especially "on dogmatics and ethics . .. He excelled all hiscontemporaries. " And to this estimate of him Professor Mead adds:[2]"Even one who knows Dorner merely as the theological writer, will inhis writings easily detect the fine Christian tone which characterizedthe man; but no one who did not personally know him can get a trueimpression of the Johannean tenderness and childlike simplicity whichdistinguished him above almost any one of equal eminence whom theworld has ever known. "

[Footnote 1: _Supplement to Schaff-Hertzog Encyc. Of Relig. Knowl_. , p. 58. ]

[Footnote 2: Preface to Dorner's _System of Christian Ethics_ (Am. Ed. ), p. Vii. ]

When, therefore, it is considered that, after Rothe had given hisviews on veracity to the world, Dorner wrote on the same subject, asthe very last work of his maturest life, a special interest attachesto his views on this mooted question. And Dorner is diametricallyopposed to Rothe in this thing. Dorner bases the duty of truthfulnesson our common membership in Christ, and the love that grows out ofsuch a relation. [1] "Truth does not, " indeed, "demand that all that isin a man should be brought out, else it would be a moral duty for himto let also the evil that is in him come forth, whereas it is hisduty to keep it down. " But if an untrue statement be made with theintention to deceive, it is a lie. 

[Footnote 1: See Dorner's _System of Christian Ethics_ (Am. Ed. ), pp. 487-492. ]

"Are there cases, " he asks, "where lying is allowable? Can we make outthe so-called 'white lie' to be morally permissible?" Then he takes upthe cases of children and the insane, who are not entitled to know allthe truth, and asks if it be right not only to conceal the truth butto falsify it, in talking with them. Concealment may be a duty, headmits, but he denies that falsifying is ever a duty. "How shallethics ever be brought to lay down a duty of lying [of 'white lying'], to recommend evil that good may come? The test for us is, whether wecould ever imagine Christ acting in this way, either for the sake ofothers, or--which would be quite as justifiable, since self-love is amoral duty--for his _own_ sake. "

As to falsifying to a sick or dying man, he says, "we overestimate thevalue of human life, and, besides, we in a measure usurp the placeof Providence, when we believe we may save it by committing sin. " Inother words, Dorner counts falsifying with the intention of deceiving, even with the best of motives, a lie, and therefore a sin--neverjustifiable. Like Augustine, Dorner recognizes degrees of guilt inlies, according to the spirit and motive of their telling; but in anyevent, if there be falsehood with the purpose of deceiving, it is asin--to be regretted and repented of. 

Dorner makes a fresh distinction between the stratagems of war andlying, which is worthy of note. He says that playful fictions, afterthe manner of riddles to be guessed out, are clearly allowable. So "inwar, too, something like a game of this kind is carried on, when byway of stratagem some deceptive appearance is produced, and a riddleis thus given to the enemy. In such cases there is no falsehood;for from the conditions of the situation, --whether friendly orhostile, --the appearance that is given is confessedly nothing morethan an appearance, and is therefore honest. "

The simplicity and clearness of Dorner, in his unsophistical treatmentof this question, is in refreshing contrast with the course ofRothe, --who confuses the whole matter in discussion by his arbitraryclaim that a lie is not a lie, if it be told with a good purpose and aloving spirit. And the two men are representative disputants inthis controversy of the centuries, as truly as were Augustine andChrysostom. 

A close friend of Dorner was Hans Lassen Martensen, "the greatesttheologian of Denmark, " and a thinker of the first class, "with highspeculative endowments, and a considerable tincture of theosophicalmysticism. "[1] Martensen's "Christian Ethics" do not ignore Godand the Bible as factors in any question of practical morals underdiscussion. He characterizes the result of such an omission as "areckoning of an account whose balance has been struck elsewhere; ifwe bring out another figure, we have reckoned wrong. " Martensen'streatment of the duty of veracity is a remarkable exhibit of theworkings of a logical mind in full view of eternal principles, yetmeasurably hindered and retarded by the heart-drawings of an amiablesentiment. He sees the all-dividing line, and recognizes the primalduty of conforming to it; yet he feels that it is a pity that suchconformity must be so expensive in certain imaginary cases, and helongs to find some allowance for desirable exceptions. [2]

[Footnote 1: See Kurtz's _Church History_ (Macpherson's transl. ), III. , 201; _Supplement to Schaff-Hertzog Encyc. Of Relig. Knowl_. , p. 57; _Johnson's Univ. Cycl. _. , art. "Martensen. "]

[Footnote 2: Martensen's _Christian Ethics (Individual)_, (Eng. Trans. , ) pp. 205-226. ]

Martensen gives as large prominence as Rothe to love for one'sfellow-man; but he bases that love entirely, as Rothe does not, onlove for Christ. "Only in Christ, and [in] the light which, proceedingfrom him, is poured over human nature and all human life, can we lovemen in the central sense, and only then does philanthropy receive itsdeepest religious and moral character, when it is rooted in the truthof Christ. " And as Christ is Truth, those who are Christ's must neverviolate the truth. "'Thou shalt not bear false witness; thou shalt notlie, neither in word nor deed; thou shalt neither deny the truth, norgive out anything that is not truth for truth, '--this commandment mustdominate and penetrate all our life's relations. " "Truth does notexist for man's sake, but man for the sake of the truth, because thetruth would reveal itself to man, would be owned and testifiedby him. " This would seem to be explicit enough to shut out thepossibility of a justifiable lie!

"Yet it does not follow from this, " says Martensen, "that our duty tocommunicate the truth to others is unlimited. .. . 'There is a time tobe silent, and a time to speak. ' No one is bound to say everything toeverybody. " Here he distinguishes between justifiable concealment andfalsehood. Then he comes to the question "whether the so-called 'lieof exigency' can ever be justifiable. " He runs over the arguments onboth sides, and recalls the centuries of discussion on the subject. He thinks that adherence to the general principle which forbids lyingwould, in certain cases where love prompted to falsehood, cause inmost minds an inward feeling that the letter killeth, and that tofollow the promptings of love were better. Hence he argues that "asin other departments there are actions which, although from thestandpoint of the ideal they are to be rejected, yet, from thehardness of men's hearts, must be approved and admitted, and underthis restriction become relatively justifiable and dutiful actions, simply because greater evils are thereby averted; so there is also anuntruth from exigency that must still be allowed for the sake of humanweakness. " And in his opinion "it comes to this, that the question ofcasuistry cannot be solved by general and abstract directions, butmust be solved in an individual, personal way, especially according tothe stage of moral and religious development and ripeness on which theperson in question is found. "

Having made these concessions, in the realm of feeling, to thedefenders of the "lie of exigency, " which may be "either uttered fromlove to men, or as defense against men--a defense in which either ajustifiable self-love or sympathy with others is operative, " Martensenproceeds to show that every such falsehood is abnormal and immoral. "When we thus maintain, " he says, "that in certain difficult cases an'untruth from necessity' may occur, which is to be allowed for thesake of human weakness, and under the given relations may be said tobe justified and dutiful, we cannot but allow, on the other hand, thatin every such untruth there is something of sin, nay something thatneeds excuse and forgiveness. .. . Certainly even the truth of theletter, the external, actual truth, even the formally correct, findsits right, the ground of its validity, in God's holy order of theworld. But by every lie of exigency the command is broken, 'Thou shaltnot bear false witness. '"

Martensen protests against the claim of Rothe that a falsehood spokenin love "is not at all to be called a lie, but can be absolutelydefended as morally _normal_, and so in no respect needs pardon. ""However sharply we may distinguish between lie and untruth(_mendacium_ and _falsilo-quium_), the untruth in question can neverbe resolved into the morally normal. " And he suggests that if one hadmore of wisdom and courage and faith, he might be true to the truth inan emergency without fear of the consequences. 

"Let us suppose, for instance, " he says, "the . .. Case, where thehusband deceives his sick spouse from fear that she could not survivethe news of the death of her child; who dare maintain that if the manhad been able in the right way, that is in the power of the gospel, with the wisdom and the comfort of faith, to announce the death of thechild, a religious crisis might not have arisen in her soul, whichmight have a healing and quickening effect upon her bodily state? Andsupposing that it had even led to her death, who dare maintain thatthat death, if it was a Christian death, were an evil, whether for themother herself, or for the survivors?

"Or, let us take the woman who, to save her chastity, applies thedefense of an untruth: who dare maintain that if she said the truth toher persecutors, but uttered it in womanly heroism, with a believinglook to God, with the courage, the elevation of soul springing froma pure conscience, exhibiting to her persecutors the badness andunworthiness of their object, she might not have disarmed them by thatmight that lies in the good, the just cause, the cause whose defenseand shield God himself will be? And even if she had to suffer what isunworthy, who dare maintain that she could not in suffering preserveher moral worth?"

Martensen recalls the story of Jeanie Deans, in Scott's "Heart ofMidlothian, " who refuses to tell a lie of exigency in order to saveher sister's life; yet who, having uttered the truth which led to hersister's sentence of death, set herself, in faith in God, to securethat sister's pardon, and by God's grace compassed it. "Most peoplewould at least be disposed to excuse Jeanie Deans, and to forgiveher, if she had here made a false oath, and thereby had afforded herprotection to the higher truth. " And if a loving lie of exigency be aduty before God, an appeal to his knowledge of the fact is, of course, equally a duty. To refuse to appeal to God in witness of the truth ofa falsehood that is told from a loving sense of duty, is to show alack of confidence in God's approval of such an untruth. "But shewill, can, and dare, for her conscience' sake, not do this. "

"But the best thing in this tale, " adds Martensen, "is that it isno mere fiction. The kernel of this celebrated romance is actualhistory. " And Sir Walter Scott caused a monument to be erected in hisgarden, with the following inscription, in memory of this faithfultruth-lover:

"This stone was placed by the Author of 'Waverley' in memory of HelenWalker, who fell asleep in the year of our Lord 1791. This maidenpracticed in humility all the virtues with which fancy had adorned thecharacter that bears in fiction the name of Jeanie Deans. She wouldnot depart a foot's breadth from the path of truth, not even to saveher sister's life; and yet she obtained the liberation of her sisterfrom the severity of the law by personal sacrifices whose greatnesswas not less than the purity of her aims. Honor to the grave wherepoverty rests in beautiful union with truthfulness and sisterly love. "

"Who will not readily obey this request, " adds Martensen, "and holdsuch a memory in honor?. .. Who does not feel himself penetrated withinvoluntary, most hearty admiration?"

In conclusion, in view of all that can be said on either side of thequestion, Martensen is sure that "the lie of exigency itself, which wecall inevitable, leaves in us the feeling of something unworthy, andthis unworthiness should, simply in following Christ, more and moredisappear from our life. That is, the inevitableness of the lieof exigency will disappear in the same measure that an individualdevelops into a true personality, a true character. .. . A lie ofexigency cannot occur with a personality that is found in possessionof full courage, of perfect love and holiness, as of the enlightened, all-penetrating glance. Not even as against madmen and maniacs will alie of exigency be required, for to the word of the truly sanctifiedpersonality there belongs an imposing commanding power that casts outdemons. It is this that we see in Christ, in whose mouth no guilewas found, in whom we find nothing that even remotely belongs to thecategory of the exigent lie. "

So it is evident that if one would seek excuse for the lie ofexigency, in the concessions made by Martensen, he must do so only onthe score of the hardness of his heart, and the softness of his head, as one lacking a proper measure of wisdom, of courage, and of faith, to enable him to conform to the proper ideal standard of humanconduct. And even then he must recognize the fact that in his weaknesshe has done something to be ashamed of, and to demand repentance. Coldcomfort that for a decent man!

It would seem that personal temperament and individual peculiaritieshad their part in deciding a man's attitude toward the question of theunvarying duty of veracity, quite as surely as the man's recognitionof great principles. An illustration of this truth is shown in thetreatment of the subject by Dr. Charles Hodge on the one hand, and byDr. James H. Thornwell on the other, as representatives, severally, ofCalvinistic Augustinianism in the Presbyterian Church of the UnitedStates, in its Northern and Southern branches. Starting from the samepoint of view, and agreeing as to the principles involved, these twothinkers are by no means together in their conclusions; and this, notbecause of any real difference in their processes of reasoning, butapparently because of the larger place given by the former to theinfluence of personal feeling, as over against the imperative demandsof truth. 

Dr. Hodge begins with the recognition and asseveration of eternalprinciples, that can know no change or variation in their applicationto this question; and then, as he proceeds with its discussion, he isamiably illogical and good-naturedly inconsistent, and he ends in amaze, without seeming quite sure as to his own view of the case, or giving his readers cause to know what should be their view. Dr. Thornwell, on the other hand, beginning in the same way, proceedsunwaveringly to the close, in logical consistency of reasoning;leaving his readers at the last as fully assured as he is as to theapplication of unchangeable principles to man's life and duties. 

No one could state the underlying principles involved in this questionmore clearly and explicitly than does Dr. Hodge at the outset;[1] andit would seem from this statement that he could not be in doubt as tothe issue of the discussion of this question of the ages. "The commandto keep truth inviolate belongs to a different class [of commands]from those relating to the sabbath, to marriage, or to property. Theseare founded on the permanent relations of men in the present state ofexistence. They are not in their own nature immutable. But truth isat all times sacred, because it is one of the essential attributes ofGod, so that whatever militates against or is hostile to truth is inopposition to the very nature of God. "

[Footnote 1: See Hodge's _Systematic Theology_, III. , 437-463. ]

"Truth is, so to speak, the very substratum of Deity. It is in such asense the foundation of all the moral perfections of God, that withoutit they cannot be conceived of as existing. Unless God really is whathe declares himself to be; unless he means what he declares himself tomean; unless he will do what he promises, --the whole idea of God islost. As there is no God but the true God, so without truth there isand can be no God. As this attribute is the foundation, so to speak, of the divine, so it is the foundation of the physical and moral orderof the universe. .. . There is, therefore, something awfully sacred inthe obligations of truth. A man who violates the truth, sins againstthe very foundation of his moral being. As a false god is no god, so afalse man is no man; he can never be what man was designed to be; hecan never answer the end of his being. There can be in him nothingthat is stable, trustworthy, or good. "

Here is a platform that would seem to be the right standing-place forall and for always. Dr. Hodge apparently recognizes its well-definedlimits and bounds; yet when he comes to discuss the question whether acertain person is, in a supposable case, on it, or off it, he does notseem so sure as to its precise boundary lines. He begins to waverwhen he cites Bible incidents. Recognizing the fact that fablesand parables, and works of fiction, even though untrue, are notfalsehoods, he strangely jumps to the conclusion that the "intentionto deceive" is "not always culpable. " He immediately follows thisnon-sequitur with a reference to the lying Hebrew midwives, [1] and hequotes the declaration of God's blessing on them, as if it were anapproval of their lying, or their false speaking with an intention todeceive, instead of an approval of their spirit of devotion to God'speople. [2]

[Footnote 1: Exod. I: 19, 20. ]

[Footnote 2: Comp. P. 35 f. , _supra_. ]

From the midwives he passes to Samuel, sent of God to Bethlehem; [1]and under cover of the expressed opinions of others, Dr. Hodge saysvaguely: "Here, it is said, is a case of intentional deceptioncommanded. Saul was to be deceived as to the object of Samuel'sjourney to Bethlehem. " Yet, whoever "said" this was guilty of agratuitous charge of intentional deception, against the Almighty. Samuel was directed of God to speak the truth, so far as he spoke atall, while he concealed from others that which others had no right toknow. [2] It would appear, however, throughout this discussion, thatDr. Hodge does not perceive the clear and important distinctionbetween justifiable concealment from those who have no right to aknowledge of the facts, and concealment, or even false speaking, withthe deliberate intention of deceiving those interested. In fact, Dr. Hodge does not even mention "concealment, " as apart from its use forthe specific purpose of deception. 

[Footnote 1: I Sam. 16: i, 2. ]

[Footnote 2: Comp. Pp. 38-40, _supra_. ]

Again Dr. Hodge cites the incident of Elisha at Dothan[1] as ifin illustration of the rightfulness of deception under certaincircumstances. But in this case it was concealment of facts that mightproperly be concealed, and not the deception of enemies as enemies, that Elisha compassed. The Syrians wanted to find Elisha. Their eyeswere blinded, so that they did not recognize him when in his presence. In order to teach them a lesson, Elisha told the Syrians that theycould not find him, or the city which was his home, by their ownseeking; but if they would follow him he would bring them to the manwhom they sought. They followed him, and he showed himself to them. When their eyes were opened in Samaria he would not suffer them to beharmed, but had them treated as guests, and sent back safely to theirking. 

[Footnote 1: Kings 6: 14-20. ]

Having cited these three cases, no one of which can fairly be made toapply to the argument he is pursuing, Dr. Hodge complacently remarks:"Examples of this kind of deception are numerous in the Old Testament. Some of them are simply recorded facts, without anything to indicatehow they were regarded in the sight of God; but others, as in thecases above cited, received either directly or by implication thedivine sanction. "

But Dr. Hodge goes even farther than this. He ventures to suggest thatJesus Christ deceived his disciples by intimating what was not trueas to his purpose, in more than one instance. "Of our blessedLord himself it is said in Luke 24:28, 'He made as though [Greek:prosepoieito]--he made a show of: he would have gone further. ' He soacted as to make the impression on the two disciples that it washis purpose to continue his journey. (Comp. Mark 6: 48. )"[1] Thissuggestion of Dr. Hodge's would have been rebuked by even RichardRothe, and would have shocked August Dorner. Would Dr. Hodge deny thatJesus _could_ have had it in his mind to "go further, " or to have"passed by" his disciples, if they would not ask him to stop? And ifthis were a possibility, is it fair to intimate that a purpose ofdeception was in his mind, when there is nothing in the text thatmakes that a necessary conclusion? Dr. Hodge, indeed, adds thesuggestion that "many theologians do not admit that the fact recordedin Luke 24:28 [which he cites as an illustration of justifiabledeception by our Lord] involved any intentional deception;" but thisfact does not deter him from putting it forward in this light. 

[Footnote 1: When Jesus came walking on the sea, toward his disciplesin their tempest-tossed boat, "he would have passed them by;" buttheir cry of fear drew him toward them. ]

In the discussion of the application to emergencies, in practicallife, of the eternal principle which he points out at the beginning, Dr. Hodge is as far from consistency as in his treatment of Biblenarratives. "It is generally admitted, " he says, "that in criminalfalsehoods there must be not only the enunciation or signification ofwhat is false, and an intention to deceive, but also a violation ofsome obligation. " What obligation can be stronger than the obligationto be true to God and true to one's self? If, as Dr. Hodge declares, "a man who violates the truth, sins against the very foundation of hismoral being, " a man would seem to be always under an obligation not toviolate the truth by speaking that which is false with an intention todeceive. But Dr. Hodge seems to lose sight of his premises, in all hisprogress toward his conclusions on this subject. 

"There will always be cases, " he continues, "in which the rule of dutyis a matter of doubt. It is often said that the rule above statedapplies when a robber demands your purse. It is said to be right todeny that you have anything of value about you. You are not bound toaid him in committing a crime; and he has no right to assume thatyou will facilitate the accomplishment of his object. This is not soclear. The obligation to speak the truth is a very solemn one; andwhen the choice is left a man to tell a lie or lose his money, hehad better let his money go. On the other hand, if a mother sees amurderer in pursuit of her child, she has a perfect right to misleadhim by any means in her power [including lying?]; because the generalobligation to speak the truth is merged or lost, for the timebeing, in the higher obligation. " Yet Dr. Hodge starts out with thedeclaration that the obligation "to keep truth inviolate, " is highestof all; that "truth is at all times sacred, because it is one of theessential attributes of God;" that God himself cannot "suspend ormodify" this obligation; and that man is always under its force. Andnow, strangely enough, he claims that in various emergencies "thegeneral obligation to speak the truth is merged, or lost, for the timebeing, in the higher obligation. " The completest and most crushinganswer to the vicious conclusions of Dr. Hodge as to the varyingclaims of veracity, is to be found in the explicit terms of hisunvaryingly correct premises in the discussion. 

Dr. Hodge appears to be conscious of his confusion of mind in thisdiscussion, but not to be quite sure of the cause of it. As to hisclaim that the general obligation to speak the truth may be merged forthe time being in a "higher obligation, " he says: "This principle isnot invalidated by its possible or actual abuse. It has been greatlyabused. " And he adds, farther on, in the course of the discussion:

"The question now under consideration is not whether it is ever rightto do wrong, which is a solecism; nor is the question whether it isever right to lie; but rather what constitutes a lie. "

Having claimed that a lie necessarily includes falsity of statement, an intention to deceive, and "a violation of some obligation, " Dr. Hodge goes on to show that "every lie is a violation of a promise, "as growing out of the nature of human society, where "every man isexpected to speak the truth, and is under a tacit but binding promisenot to deceive his neighbor by word or act. " And, after all this, heis inclined to admit that there are cases in which falsehoods withthe intention of deceiving are not lying, and are justifiable. "This, however, " he goes on to say, "is not always admitted. Augustine, forexample, makes every intentional deception, no matter what the objector what the circumstances, to be sinful. " And then, in artlesssimplicity, Dr. Hodge concludes: "This would be the simplest groundfor the moralist to take. But as shown above, and as generallyadmitted, there are cases of intentional deception which are notcriminal. "

According to the principles laid down at the start by Dr. Hodge, there is no place for a lie in God's service; but according to theinferences of Dr. Hodge, in the discussion of this question, there areplaces where falsehoods spoken with intent to deceive are admissiblein God's sight and service. His whole treatment of this subjectreminds me of an incident in my army-prison life, where this questionas a question was first forced upon my attention. The Union prisoners, in Columbia at that time, received their rations from the Confederateauthorities, and had them cooked in their own way, and at their ownexpense, by an old colored woman whom they employed for the purpose. Two of us had a dislike for onions in our stew, while the others werewell pleased with them. So we two agreed with old "Maggie, " for asmall consideration, to prepare us a separate mess without onions. Thenext day our mess came by itself. We took it, and began our meal withpeculiar satisfaction; but the first taste showed us an unmistakableonion flavor in our stew. When old Maggie came again, we remonstratedwith her on her breach of engagement. "Bless your hearts, honeys, " shereplied, "you must have _some_ onions in your stew!" She could notcomprehend the possibility of a beef stew without onions, even thoughshe had formally agreed to make it. 

Dr. Hodge's premises in the discussion of the duty of truthfulnessrule out onions; but his inferences and conclusions have the odor andthe taste of onions. He stands on a safe platform to begin with; buthe is an unsafe guide when he walks away from it. His arguments inthis case are an illustration of his own declaration: "An adept inlogic may be a very poor reasoner. "

Dr. Thornwell's "Discourses on Truth"[1] are a thorough treatment ofthe obligation of veracity and the sin of lying. He is clear in hisdefinitions, marking the distinction between rightful concealment asconcealment, and concealment for the purpose of deception. "There arethings which men have a right to keep secret, " he says, "and if aprurient curiosity prompts others officiously to pry into them, thereis nothing criminal or dishonest in refusing to minister to sucha spirit. Our silence or evasive answers may have the effect ofmisleading. That is not our fault, as it was not our design. Ourpurpose was simply to leave the inquirer as nearly as possible in thestate of ignorance in which we found him: it was not to misinform him, but not to inform him at all. 

[Footnote 1: In Thornwell's _Collected Writings_, II. , 451-613. ]

"'Every man, ' says Dr. Dick, 'has not a right to hear the truth whenhe chooses to demand it. We are not bound to answer every questionwhich may be proposed to us. In such cases we may be silent, or we maygive as much information as we please, and suppress the rest. If theperson afterward discover that the information was partial, he has notitle to complain, because he had no right even to what he obtained;and we are not guilty of a falsehood unless we made him believe, bysomething which we said, that the information was complete. '" "The_intention_ of the speaker, and the _effect_ consequent upon it, arevery different things. "

Dr. Thornwell recognizes the fact that the moral sense of humanitydiscerns the invariable superiority of truth over falsehood. "If weplace virtue in sentiment, " he says, "there is nothing, according tothe confession of all mankind, more beautiful and lovely than truth, more ugly and hateful than a lie. If we place it in calculations ofexpediency, nothing, on the one hand, is more conspicuously usefulthan truth and the confidence it inspires; nothing, on the other, moredisastrous than falsehood, treachery, and distrust. If there be then amoral principle to which, in every form, humanity has given utterance, it is the obligation of veracity. " "No man ever tells a lie without acertain degree of violence to his nature. "

Dr. Thornwell bases this obligation of veracity on the nature of God, and on the duty of man to conform to the image of God in which he wascreated. "Jesus Christ commends himself to our confidence and love, "he says, "on the ground of his being the truth;. .. And makes it theglory of the Father that he is the God of truth, and the shame andeverlasting infamy of the prince of darkness that he is the fatherof lies;" and he adds: "The mind cannot move in charity, nor rest inProvidence, unless it turn upon the poles of truth. " "Every man is asdistinctly organized in reference to truth, as in reference to anyother purpose. "

In Dr. Thornwell's view, it is not, as Dr. Paley would have it, that"a lie is a breach of promise, " because as between man and man "thetruth is expected, " according to a tacit understanding. As Dr. Thornwell sees it, "we are not bound by any other expectations of manbut those which we have authorized;" and he deems it "surprisingto what an extent this superficial theory of 'contract' has foundadvocates among divines and moralists, " as, for example, Dr. RobertSouth, whom he quotes. [1] "If Dr. Paley had pushed his inquiries alittle farther, " adds Thornwell, "he might have accounted for thisexpectation [of truthfulness] which certainly exists, independently ofa promise, upon principles firmer and surer than any he has admittedin the structure of his philosophy. He might have seen it in thelanguage of our nature proclaiming the will of our nature's God. " Themoral sense of mankind demands veracity, and abhors falsehood. 

[Footnote 1: Smith's _Sermon, on Falsehood and Lying_. ]

Dr. Thornwell is clear as to the teachings of the Bible, in itsprinciples, and in the illustration of those principles in the sacrednarrative. The Bible as he sees it teaches the unvarying duty ofveracity, and the essential sinfulness of falsehood and deception. Herepudiates the idea that God, in any instance, approved deception, orthat Jesus Christ practiced it. "When our Saviour 'made as though hewould have gone farther, ' he effectually questioned his disciplesas to the condition of their hearts in relation to the duties ofhospitality. The angels, in pretending that it was their purpose toabide in the street all night, made the same experiment on Lot. Thisspecies of simulation involves no falsehood; its design is not todeceive, but to catechize and instruct. The whole action is to beregarded as a sign by which a question is proposed, or the mindexcited to such a degree of curiosity and attention that lessons oftruth can be successfully imparted. "

And so on through other Bible incidents. Dr. Thornwell has nohesitation in distinguishing when concealment is right concealment, and when concealment is wrong because intended to deceive. 

Exposing the incorrectness of the claim, made by Dr. Paley, as byothers, that certain specific falsehoods are not lies, Dr. Thornwellshows himself familiar with the discussion of this question ofthe ages in all the centuries; and he moves on with his eye fixedunerringly on the polar star of truth, in refreshing contrast with theamiable wavering of Dr. Hodge's footsteps. 

"Paley's law, " he concludes, "would obviously be the destruction ofall confidence. How much nobler and safer is the doctrine of theScriptures, and of the unsophisticated language of man's moralconstitution, that truth is obligatory on its own account, and that hewho undertakes to signify to another, no matter in what form, and nomatter what may be the right in the case to know the truth, is boundto signify according to the convictions of his own mind! He is notalways bound to speak, but whenever he does speak he is solemnly boundto speak nothing but the truth. The universal application of thisprinciple would be the diffusion of universal confidence. It wouldbanish deceit and suspicion from the world, and restrict the use ofsigns to their legitimate offices. "

A later work on Christian Ethics, which acquires special prominencethrough its place in "The International Theological Library, " editedby Drs. Briggs and Salmond, is by Dr. Newman Smyth. It shows signs ofstrength in the premises assumed by the writer, in accordance with theteachings of Scripture and of the best moral sense of mankind; andsigns of weakness in his processes of reasoning, and in his finalconclusion, according to the mental methods of those who have waveredon this subject, from John Chrysostom to Richard Rothe and CharlesHodge. 

Dr. Smyth rightly bases Christian ethics on the nature and will ofGod, as illustrated in the life and teachings of the divine-human Sonof God. "A thoroughly scientific ethics must not only be adequateto the common moral sense of men, but prove true also to the moralconsciousness of the Son of man. No ethics has right to claim to bethoroughly scientific, or to offer itself as the only science ofethics possible to us in our present experience, until it has soughtto enter into the spirit of Christ, and has brought all its, analysisand theories of man's moral life to the light of the luminous ethicalpersonality of Jesus Christ. "[1]

[Footnote 1: Smyth's _Christian Ethics_, p. 6. ]

In his general statement of "the duty of speaking the truth, " Dr. Smyth is also clear, sound, and emphatic. [1] "The law of truthfulnessis, " he says, "a supreme inward law of thought. " "The obligation ofveracity . .. Is an obligation which every man owes to himself. It is aprimal personal obligation. Kant was profoundly right when he regardedfalsehood as a forfeiture of personal worth, a destruction of personalintegrity. .. . Truthfulness is the self-consistency of character;falsehood is a breaking up of the moral integrity. Inward truthfulnessis essential to moral growth and personal vigor, as it is necessaryto the live oak that it should be of one fiber and grain from root tobranch. What a flaw is in steel, what a foreign substance is in anytexture, that a falsehood is to the character, --a source of weakness, a point where under strain it may break. .. . Truthfulness, then, isdue, first by the individual to himself as the obligation of personalintegrity. The unity of the personal life consists in it. "

[Footnote 1: _Ibid_. , pp. 386-389. ]

And in addition to the obligation of veracity as a duty to one's self, Dr. Smyth recognizes it as a duty to others. He says: "Truthfulness isowed to society as essential to its integrity. It is the indispensablebond of social life. Men can be members, one of another in a socialorganism only as they live together in truth. Society would fall, topieces without credit; but credit rests on the general social virtueof truthfulness. .. . The liar is rightly regarded as an enemy tomankind. A lie is not only an affront against the person to whom it istold, but it is an offense against humanity. "

If Dr. Smyth had been content to leave this matter with the explicitstatement of the principles that are unvaryingly operative, he wouldhave done good service to the world, and his work could have beencommended as sound and trustworthy in this department of ethics; butas soon as he begins to question and reason on the subject, hebegins to waver and grow confused; and in the end his inconclusiveconclusions are pitiably defective and reprehensible. [1]

[Footnote 1: Smyth's _Christian Ethics_, pp. 392-403]

In considering "the so-called lies of necessity, " Dr. Smyth declareswith frankness: "Some moralists in their supreme regard for truth willnot admit that under any conceivable circumstances a lie can bedeemed necessary, not even to save life or to prevent a murderer fromaccomplishing his fiendish purpose. " And then over against this heindicates his fatal confusion of mind and weakness of reasoning inthe suggestion: "But the sound human understanding, in spite of themoralists, will prevaricate, and often with great vigor and success, in such cases. Who is right, --Kant, or the common moral sense? Whichshould be followed, --the philosophic morality, or the practice ofotherwise most truthful men?"

It is to be noted that, in these two declarations, Dr. Smyth putslying as if it were synonymous with prevarication; else there is noreason for his giving the one as over against the other. And thisindicates a peculiar difficulty in the whole course of Dr. Smyth'sargument concerning the "so-called lie of necessity. " He essays nodefinition of the "lie. " He draws no clear line of distinction betweena lie, a falsehood, a deceit, and a prevarication, or between ajustifiable concealment and an unjustifiable concealment; and inhis various illustrations of his position he uses these termsindiscriminately, in such a way as to indicate that he knows noessential difference between them, or that he does not care toemphasize any difference. 

If, in the instance given above, Dr. Smyth means that "the sound humanunderstanding, in spite of the moralists, " will approve lying, orfalsifying with the intention to deceive, he ought to know that thesound human understanding will not justify such a course, and that itis unfair to intimate such a thing. [1] And when he asks, in connectionwith this suggestion, "Who is right, --Kant, or the common moral sense?Which should be followed, the philosophic morality, or the practice ofotherwise most truthful men?" his own preliminary assertions are hisconclusive answer. He says specifically, "Kant was profoundly rightwhen he regarded falsehood as a forfeiture of personal worth, adestruction of personal integrity;" and the "common moral sense" ofhumanity is with Kant in this thing, in accordance with Dr. Smyth'sprimary view of the case, as over against the intimation of Dr. Smyth's question. As to the suggested "practice of otherwise mosttruthful men" in this thing, --if men who generally tell the truth, lie, or speak falsely, or deceive, under certain circumstances, theyare much like men who are generally decent, but who occasionally, under temptation, are unchaste or dishonest; they are better examplesin their uprightness than in their sinning. 

[Footnote 1: See pp. 9-32, _supra_. ]

It would seem, indeed, that, notwithstanding his sound basis ofprinciples, which recognizes the incompatibility of falsehood withtrue manhood and with man's duty to his fellows, Dr. Smyth does notcarry with him in his argument the idea of the essential sinfulness ofa lie, and therefore he is continually inconsistent with himself. Hesays, for example, in speaking of the suspension of social duties inwar time: "If the war is justifiable, the ethics of warfare come atonce into play. It would be absurd to say that it is right to killan enemy, but not to deceive him. Falsehood, it may be admitted, asmilitary strategy, is justifiable, if the war is righteous. "

Here, again, is the interchange of the terms "deception" and"falsehood. " But unless this is an intentional jugglery of words, which is not to be supposed, this means that it would be absurd tosay that it is right to kill an enemy, but not right to tell him afalsehood. And nothing could more clearly show Dr. Smyth's error ofmind on this whole subject than this declaration. "Absurd" to claimthat while it is right to take a man's life in open warfare, in a justcause, it would not be right to forfeit one's personal worth, and todestroy one's personal integrity, which Dr. Smyth says are involvedin a falsehood! "Absurd" to claim that while God who is the authorof life can justify the taking of life, he cannot justify the sin oflying! No, no, the absurdity of the case is not on _that_ side of theline. 

There is no consistency of argument on this subject in Dr. Smyth'swork. His premises are sound. His reasoning is confused andinconsistent. "Not only in some cases of necessity is falsehoodpermissible, but we may recognize a positive obligation of love tothe concealment of the truth, " he says. Here again is that apparentconfounding of unjustifiable "falsehood" with perfectly proper"concealment of truth. " He continues: "Other duties which under suchcircumstances have become paramount, may require the preservation ofone's own or another's life through a falsehood. Not only ought onenot to tell the truth under the supposed conditions, but, if theprinciple assumed be sound, a good conscience may proceed to enforce apositive obligation of untruthfulness. .. . There are occasions when theinterests of society and the highest motives of Christian love mayrender it much more preferable to discharge the duty of self-defensethrough the humanity of a successful falsehood, than by the barbarityof a stunning blow or a pistol-shot. General benevolence demands thatthe lesser evil, if possible, rather than the greater, should beinflicted on another. "

Just compare these conclusions of Dr. Smyth with his own premises. "Truthfulness . .. Is an obligation which every man owes to himself. It is a primal personal obligation. .. . Truthfulness is theself-consistency of character; falsehood is a breaking up of the moralintegrity. " "The liar is rightly regarded as an enemy to mankind. Alie is not only an affront against the person to whom it is told, butit is an offense against humanity. " But what of all that? "There areoccasions when the interests of society and the highest motives ofChristian love may render it much more preferable to discharge theduty of self-defense through the humanity of a successful falsehood, than by the barbarity of a stunning blow or a pistol-shot. Generalbenevolence demands that the lesser evil, if possible, rather than thegreater, should be inflicted on another. " Better break up one'smoral integrity, and fail in one's primal personal obligation tohimself, --better become an enemy of mankind, and commit an offenseagainst humanity, --than defend one's self against an outlaw by thebarbarity of a stunning blow or a bullet!

Would any one suppose from his premises that Dr. Smyth looked uponpersonal truthfulness as a minor virtue, and upon falsehood as alesser vice? Does he seem in those premises to put veracity belowchastity, and falsehood below personal impurity? Yet is he to beunderstood as intimating, in this phase of his argument, thatunchastity, or dishonesty, or any other vice than falsehood, is to bepreferred, in practice, over a stunning blow or a fatal bullet againsta would-be murderer?[1] The looseness of Dr. Smyth's logic, asindicated in this reasoning on the subject of veracity, would in itstendency be destructive to the safeguards of personal virtue and ofsocial purity; and his arguments for the lie of exigency are similarto those which are put forward in excuse for common sins againstchastity, by the free-and-easy defenders of a lax standard in suchmatters. "Some moralists, " says the average young man of the world, "in their extreme regard for personal purity, will not admit that anyact of unchastity is necessary, even to protect one's health, or as anact of love. But the men of virility and strong feeling will let downoccasionally at this point, in spite of the moralists. Which should befollowed, --the philosophic morality, or the practice of many otherwisedecent and very respectable men?"

[Footnote 1: See Augustine's words on this point, quoted at p. 100, _supra_. ]

Confounding, as always, a wise and right concealment of truth withactual falsehood, Dr. Smyth says of the duty of a teacher in thematter of imparting truth to a pupil according to the measure of thepupil's ability to receive it: "An occasional friendly use of truthas a crash towel may be wholesome; but ordinarily there is a moreexcellent way. " _That_ is a counting of truth precious, with avengeance!

Dr. Smyth seems inclined to accept in the main the conclusions, on this whole subject, of Rothe, but without Rothe's measure ofconsistency in the argument. Rothe starts wrong, and of course endswrong. Dr. Smyth, like Dr. Hodge, starts right and ends wrong. Nosorer condemnation of Dr. Smyth's position can be made, than by thesimple presentation of his own review of his own argument, when hesays: "To sum up, then, what has been said concerning the so-calledlies of necessity, the principle to be applied with wisdom is simplythis: give the truth always to those who in the bonds of humanityhave the right to the truth; conceal it or falsify it only when it isunmistakably evident that the human right to the truth from othershas been forfeited, or temporarily is held in abeyance by sickness, weakness, or some criminal intent: do not in any case prevaricate, unless you can tell the necessary falsehood deliberately andpositively, from principle, with a good conscience void of offensetoward men, and sincere in the sight of God. " What says the moralsense of humanity to such a position as that?

As over against the erroneous claim, made by Richard Rothe, and NewmanSmyth, and others, that the "moral sense" of mankind is atvariance with the demands of "rigid moralists, " in regard to theunjustifiableness of falsehood, it is of interest to note thetestimony of strong thinkers, who have written on this subject withthe fullest freedom, from the standpoint of speculative philosophy, rather than of exclusively Christian ethics. For example, JamesMartineau, while a Christian philosopher, discusses the question ofveracity as a philosopher, rather than as a Christian, in his "Typesof Ethical Theory;"[1] and he insists that "veracity is strictlynatural, that is, it is implied in the very nature which leads us tointercommunion in speech. "

[Footnote 1: Martineau's _Types of Ethical Theory_, II. , 255-265. ]

As he sees it, a man is treacherous to himself who speaks falsely atany time to any one, and the man's moral sense recoils from hisaction accordingly. Dr. Martineau says: "It is perhaps, the peculiar_treachery_ of this process which fixes upon falsehood a stamp of_meanness_ quite exceptional; and renders it impossible, I think, toyield to its inducements, even in cases supposed to be venial, withouta disgust little distinguishable from compunction. This must have beenKant's feeling when he said: 'A lie is the abandonment, or, as itwere, the annihilation of the dignity of man. '"

Dr. Martineau is not so rigid a moralist but that he is ready to agreewith those easy-going theologians who find a place for exceptionalfalsehoods in their reasoning; yet he is so true a man in his moralinstincts that his nature recoils from the results of such reasoning. "After all, " he says, "there is something in this problem whichrefuses to be thus laid to rest; and in treating it, it is hardlypossible to escape the uneasiness of a certain moral inconsequence. Ifwe consult the casuist of Common Sense he usually tells us that, intheory, Veracity can have no exceptions; but that, in practice, he isbrought face to face with at least a few; and he cheerfully accepts adispensation, when required, at the hands of Necessity. 

"I confess rather to an inverse experience. The theoretic reasons forcertain limits to the rule of veracity appear to me unanswerable; norcan I condemn any one who acts in accordance with them. Yet when Iplace myself in a like position, at one of the crises demanding adeliberate lie, an unutterable repugnance returns upon me, and makesthe theory seem shameful. If brought to the test, I should probablyact rather as I think than as I feel, [1] without, however, being ableto escape the stab of an instant compunction and the secret wound of along humiliation. Is this the mere weakness of superstition? It may beso. But may it not also spring from an ineradicable sense of a commonhumanity, still leaving social ties to even social aliens, and, inthe presence of an imperishable fraternal unity, forbidding to theindividual of the moment the proud right of spiritual ostracism?. .. "

[Footnote 1: No, a man who feels like that would be true in the hourof temptation. His doubt of himself is only the tremulousness of truecourage. ]

"How could I ever face the soul I had deceived, when perhaps ourrelations are reversed, and he meets my sins, not with self-protectiverepulse, but with winning love? And if with thoughts like these therealso blends that inward reverence for reality which clings to the veryessence of human reason, and renders it incredible, _à priori_, that falsehood should become an implement of good, it is perhapsintelligible how there may be an irremediable discrepancy between thedioptric certainty of the understanding and the immediate insight ofthe conscience: not all the rays of spiritual truth are refrangible;some there are beyond the intellectual spectrum, that wake invisibleresponse, and tremble in the dark. "

Dr. Martineau's definition of right and wrong is this:[1] "Everyaction is right, which, in presence of a lower principle, followsa higher: every action is wrong, which, in presence of a higherprinciple, follows a lower;" and his moral sense will not admit thepossibility of falsehood being at any time higher than truth, or ofveracity ever being lower than a lie. 

[Footnote 1: _Types of Ethical Theory_, II. , 270. ]

Professor Thomas Fowler, of the University of Oxford, writing as abeliever in the gradual evolution of morals, and basing his philosophyon experience without any recognition of _à priori_ principles, ismuch more nearly in accord, at this point, [1] with Martineau, thanwith Rothe, Hodge, and Smyth. Although he is ready to concede thata lie may, theoretically, be justifiable, he is sure that the moralsense of mankind is, at the present state of average development, against its propriety. Hence, he asserts that, even when justicemight deny an answer to an improper question, "outside the limits ofjustice, and irrespectively of their duty to others, many persons areoften restrained, and quite rightly so, from returning an untruthfulor ambiguous answer by purely self-regarding feelings. They feel thatto give an untruthful answer, even under such circumstances as Ihave supposed, would be to burden themselves with the subsequentconsciousness of cowardice or lack of self-respect. And hence, whatever inconvenience or annoyance it may cost them, they tell thenaked truth, rather than stand convicted to themselves of a want ofcourage or dignity. "

[Footnote 1: _Principles of Morals_, II. , 159-161. ]

"Veracity, though this was by no means always the case, " ProfessorFowler continues, "has become the point of honor in the upper ranks ofmodern civilized societies, and hence it is invested with a sanctitywhich seems to attach to no other virtue; and to the uninstructedconscience of the unreflective man, the duty of telling the truthappears, of all duties, to be the only duty which never admits ofany exceptions, from the unavoidable conflict with other duties. "He ranges the moral sense of the "upper ranks of modern civilizedsocieties, " and "the uninstructed conscience of the unreflective man, "against any tolerance of the "lie of necessity, " leaving only thelocality of Muhammad's coffin for those who are arrayed against therigid moralists on this question. 

While he admits the theoretical possibility of the "lie of necessity, "Professor Fowler concludes as to its practical expediency: "Withoutmaintaining that there are no conceivable circumstances under which aman will be justified in committing a breach of veracity, it may atleast be said that, in the lives of most men, there is no case likelyto occur in which the greater social good would not be attained by theobservation of the general rule to tell the truth, rather than by therecognition of an exception in favor of a lie, even though that liewere told for purely benevolent reasons. " That is nearer right thanthe conclusions of many an inconsistent intuitionist!

Leslie Stephen, a consistent agnostic, and a believer in the slowevolution of morals, in his "Science of Ethics, "[1] naturally holds, like Herbert Spencer, to the gradual development of the custom oftruthfulness, as a necessity of society. [2] The moral sense ofprimitive man, as he sees it, might seem to justify falsehood to an_enemy_, rather than, as Rothe and Smyth would claim, to those who are_wards of love_. In illustration of this he says: "The obligation totruthfulness is [primarily] limited to relations with members of thesame tribe or state; and, more generally, it is curious to observe howa kind of local or special morality is often developed in regard tothis virtue. The schoolboy thinks it a duty to his fellows to lieto his master, the merchant to his customer, and the servant to hisemployer; and, inversely, the duty is often recognized as betweenmembers of some little clique or profession, as soon as it is seen tobe important for their corporate interest, even at the expense of thewider social organization. There is honor among thieves, both of therespectable and other varieties. "

[Footnote 1: Leslie Stephen's _Science of Ethics_, pp. 202-209. ]

[Footnote 2: See pp. 26-32, _supra_. ]

But Leslie Stephen sees that, in the progress of the race, theimportance of veracity has come to a recognition, "in which it differsfrom the other virtues. " While the law of marriage may vary atdifferent periods, "the rule of truthfulness, on the other hand, seemsto possess the _a priori_ quality of a mathematical axiom. .. . Truth, in short, being always the same, truthfulness must be unvarying. Thus, 'Be truthful' means, 'Speak the truth whatever the consequences, whether the teller or the hearer receives benefit or injury. ' Andhence, it is inferred, truthfulness implies a quality independent ofthe organization of the agent or of society. " While Mr. Stephen wouldhimself find a place for the "lie of necessity" under conceivablecircumstances, he is clear-minded enough to perceive that the moralsense of the civilized world is opposed to this view; and in this heis nearer correct than those who claim the opposite. 

It is true that those who seek an approbation of their defense offalsehoods which they deem a necessity, assume, without proof, theiragreement with the moral sense of the race. But it is also true thatthere stands opposed to their theory the best moral sense of primitiveman, as shown in a wide area of investigation, and also of thinkersall the way up from the lowest moral grade to the most rigorousmoralists, including intuitionists, utilitarians, and agnostics. However deficient may be the practice of erring mortals, the idealstandard in theory, is veracity, and not falsehood. 

As to the opinions of purely speculative philosophers, concerning theadmissibility of the "lie of necessity, " they have little value exceptas personal opinions. This question is one that cannot be discussedfairly without relation to the nature and law of God. It is ofinterest, however, to note that a keen mind like Kant's insists that"the highest violation of the duty owed by man to himself, consideredas a moral being singly (owed to the humanity subsisting in hisperson), is a departure from truth, or lying. "[1] And when a manlike Fichte, [2] whom Carlyle characterizes as "that cold, colossal, adamantine spirit, standing erect like a Cato Major among degeneratemen; fit to have been the teacher of the Stoa, and to have discoursedof beauty and virtue in the groves of Academe, " declares that nomeasure of evil results from truth-speaking would induce him to tell alie, a certain moral weight attaches to his testimony. And so withall the other philosophers. No attempt at exhaustiveness in theirtreatment is made in this work. But the fullest force of any freshargument made by them in favor of occasional lying is recognized sofar as it is known. 

[Footnote 1: See Semple's _Kant's Metaphysic of Ethics_, p. 267. ]

[Footnote 2: See Martensen's _Christian Ethics (Individual)_, § 97. ]

One common misquotation from a well-known philosopher, in this line, is, however, sufficiently noteworthy for special mention here. Jacobi, in his intense theism, protests against the unqualified idealism ofFichte, and the indefinite naturalism of Schelling; and, in his famousLetter to Fichte, [1] he says vehemently: "But the Good what is it?I have no answer if there be no God. As to me, this world ofphenomena--if it have all its truth in these phenomena, and no moreprofound significance, if it have nothing beyond itself to revealto me--becomes a repulsive phantom, in whose presence I curse theconsciousness which has called it into existence, and I invoke againstit annihilation as a deity. Even so, also, everything that I callgood, beautiful, and sacred, turns to a chimera, disturbing my spirit, and rending the heart out of my bosom, as soon as I assume that itstands not in me as a relation to a higher, real Being, --not a mereresemblance or copy of it in me;--when, in fine, I have within me anempty and fictitious consciousness only. I admit also that I knownothing of 'the Good _per se_, ' or 'the True _per se_, ' that I evenhave nothing but a vague notion of what such terms stand for. Ideclare that it revolts me when people seek to obtrude upon me theWill which wills nothing, this empty nut of independence and freedomin absolute indifference, and accuse me of atheism, the true andproper godlessness, because I show reluctance to accept it. "

[Footnote 1: F. H. Jacobi's _Werke_, IIIter Band, pp. 36-38. ]

Insisting thus that he must have the will of a personal God as asource of obligation to conform to the law of truth and virtue, andthat without such a source no assumed law can be binding on him, Jacobi adds: "Yes I am the atheist, and the godless man who, inopposition to the Will that wills nothing, will lie as the lyingDesdemona lied; will lie and deceive as did Pylades in passing himselfoff as Orestes; will commit murder as did Timoleon; break law and oathas did Epaminondas, as did John De Witt; will commit suicide as didOtho; will undertake sacrilege with David; yes and rub ears of corn onthe Sabbath merely because I am an hungered, and because the law ismade for man and not man for the law. "

Jacobi's reference, in this statement, to lying and other sins, wastaken by itself as the motto to one of Coleridge's essays;[1] and thisseems to have given currency to the idea that Jacobi was in favor oflying. Hence he is unfairly cited by ethical writers[2] as havingdeclared himself for the lie of expediency; whereas the context showsthat that is not his position. He is simply stating the logicalconsequences of a philosophy which he repudiates. 

[Footnote 1: Coleridge's Works: _The Friend_, Essay XV. ]

[Footnote 2: See, for instance, Martensen's _Christian Ethics(Individual)_, §97. ]

Among the false assumptions that are made by many of the advocates ofthe "lie of necessity" is the claim that in war, in medical practice, and in the legal profession, the propriety of falsehood and deceit, in certain cases, is recognized and admitted on all sides. While thebaselessness of this claim has been pointed out, incidentally, in theprogress of the foregoing discussion, [1] it would seem desirable togive particular attention to the matter in a fuller treatment of it, before closing this record of centuries of discussion. 

[Footnote 1: See pp. 71-75, _supra_. ]

It is not true that in civilized warfare there is an entireabrogation, or suspension, of the duty of truthfulness toward anenemy. There is no material difference between war and peace in thisrespect. Enemies, on both sides, understand that in warfare they areto kill each other if they can, by the use of means that are allowableas means; but this does not give them the privilege of doing what isutterly inconsistent with true manhood. 

Enemies are not bound to disclose their plans to each other. They havea duty of concealing those plans from each other. Hence, as Dorner hassuggested, they proffer to each other's sight only appearances, notassurances; and it is for each to guess out, if he can, the realpurpose of the other, below the appearance. An enemy can protect hisborders by pitfalls, or torpedoes, or ambushes, carefully concealedfrom sight, in order to guard the life of his own people by destroyingthe life of his opponents, or may make demonstrations, before theenemy, of possible movements, in order to conceal his purposedmovements; but in doing this he does only what is allowable, ineffect, in time of peace. [1]

[Footnote 1: Several of the illustrations of Oriental warfare in theBible record are to be explained in accordance with this principle. Thus with the ambush set by Joshua before Ai (Josh. 8: 1-26):the Canaanites did not read aright the riddle of the Israelitishcommander, and they suffered accordingly. Yet Dr. Dabney (_Theology_, p. 424) cites this as an instance of an intentional deception whichwas innocent in God's sight. And again, in the case recorded at 2Kings 7: 6, where the Lord "made the host of the Syrians to hear anoise of chariots, and a noise of horses, even the noise of a greathost, . .. And they arose and . .. Fled for their life, " thinking thatHittite and Egyptian forces were approaching, it is evident that Godsimply caused the Syrians, who were contending with his people, tofeel that they were fighting hopelessly against God's cause. Theimpression God made on their minds was a correct one. He could bringchariots and horses as a great host against them. They did well torealize this fact. But the Syrians' explanation of this impression wasincorrect in its details. ]

A similar method of mystifying his opponent is adopted by thebase-ball pitcher in his demonstrations with the ball before lettingit drive at the batsman. The batsman holds himself responsible forreading the riddle of the pitcher's motions. Yet the pitcher isforbidden to deceive the batsman by a feint of delivering the ballwithout delivering it. 

If an enemy attempts any communication with his opponent, he has noright to lie to, or to deceive him. He must not draw him into anambuscade, or over concealed torpedoes, on the plea of desiring anamicable interview with him; and his every word given to an enemy mustbe observed sacredly as an obligation of truth. 

Even before the Christian era, and centuries prior to the time whenChrysostom was confused in his mind on this point, Cicero wrote asto the obligations of veracity upon enemies in time of war, and inrepudiation of the idea that warfare included a suspension of allmoral relations between belligerents during active hostilities. [1]

[Footnote 1: Cicero's _De Officiis_, I. , 12, 13. ]

He said: "The equities of war are prescribed most carefully by theheralds' law (_lex fetialis_) of the Roman people, " and he went on togive illustrations of the recognized duty of combatants to keep withinthe bounds of mutual social obligations. "Even where private persons, under stress of circumstances, have made any promise to the enemy, " hesaid, "they should observe the exactest good faith, as did Regulus, inthe first Punic war, when taken prisoner and sent to Rome to treat ofthe exchange of prisoners, having sworn that he would return. First, when he had arrived, he did not vote in the Senate for the return ofthe prisoners. Then, when his friends and kinsmen would have detainedhim, he preferred to go back to punishment rather than evade his faithplighted to the enemy. 

"In the second Punic war also, after the battle of Cannae, of the tenRomans whom Hannibal sent to Rome bound by an oath that they wouldreturn unless they obtained an agreement for the redemption ofprisoners, the censors kept disfranchised those who perjuredthemselves, making no exception in favor of him who had devised afraudulent evasion of his oath. For when by leave of Hannibal he haddeparted from the camp, he went back a little later, on pretenseof having forgotten something. Then departing again from the camp[without renewing his oath], he counted himself set free from theobligation of his oath. And so he was free _so_ far as the words went, but not so in reality; for always in a promise we must have regard tothe meaning of our words, rather than to the words themselves. "

In modern times, when Lord Clive, in India, acted on the theory thatan utter lack of veracity and good faith on the part of an enemyjustified a suspension of all moral obligations toward him, andpracticed deceit on a Bengalee by the name of Omichund, in order togain an advantage over the Nabob of Bengal, he was condemned by themoral sense of the nation for which he thus acted deceitfully; and, inspite of the specious arguments put forth by his partisan defenders, his name is infamous because of this transaction. 

"English valor and English intelligence have done less to extendand preserve our Oriental empire than English veracity, " says LordMacaulay. "All that we could have gained by imitating the doublings, the evasions, the fictions, the perjuries, which have been employedagainst us, is as nothing when compared with what we have gained bybeing the one power in India on whose word reliance can be placed. No oath which superstition can devise, no hostage however precious, inspires a hundredth part of the confidence which is produced by the'yea, yea, ' and the 'nay, nay, ' of a British envoy. " Therefore it isthat Lord Macaulay is sure that "looking at the question of expediencyin the lowest sense of the word, and using no arguments but such asMachiavelli might have employed in his conferences with Borgia, weare convinced that Clive was altogether in the wrong, and that hecommitted, not merely a crime but a blunder. "[1]

[Footnote 1: Macaulay's _Essay on Lord Clive_. ]

So again when an English vessel of war made signals of distress, off the coast of France, during the war with Napoleon, and therebydeceived men from the enemy into coming to its relief, and then heldthem as prisoners, the act was condemned by the moral sense of theworld. As Woolsey says, in his "International Law:"[1] "Breach offaith between enemies has always been strongly condemned, and thatvindication of it is worthless which maintains that, without anexpress or tacit promise to our enemy, we are not bound to keep faithwith him. "

[Footnote 1: Sect. 133, p. 213. ]

The theologian who assumes that the duty of veracity is suspendedbetween enemies in war time is ignorant of the very theory ofcivilized warfare; or else he fails to distinguish between justifiableconcealment, by the aid of methods of mystifying, and falsehood whichis never justifiable. And that commander who should attempt to justifyfalsehood and bad faith in warfare on the ground that it is heldjustifiable in certain works on Christian ethics, would incur thescorn of the civilized world for his credulity; and he would be toldthat it is absurd to claim that because he is entitled to kill a manin warfare it must be fair to lie to him. 

In the treatment of the medical profession, many writers on ethicshave been as unfair, as in their misrepresentation of the generalmoral sense with reference to warfare. They have spoken as if "theethics of the medical profession" had a recognized place for falsehoodin the treatment of the sick. But this assumption is only anassumption. There are physicians who will lie, and there arephysicians who will not lie; and in each case the individual physicianacts in this matter on his own responsibility: he has no code ofprofessional ethics justifying a lie on his part as a physician, whenit would not be justifiable in a layman. 

Concealment of that which he has a right to conceal, is as clearly aduty, in many a case, on the part of a physician, as it is on thepart of any other person; but falsehood is never a legitimate, or anallowable, means of concealment by physician or layman. As has beenalready stated[1] if it be once known that a physician is ever readyto speak words of cheer to a patient falsely, that physician ismeasurably deprived of the possibility of encouraging a patient bytruthful words of cheer when he would gladly do so. And physicianswould probably be surprised to know how generally they are estimatedin the community according to their reputation in this matter. One isknown as a man who will speak falsely to his patients as a means ofencouragement, while another is known as a man who will be cautiousabout giving his opinion concerning chances of recovery, but who willnever tell an untruth to a patient or to any other person. But in nocase can a physician claim that the ethics of his profession as aprofession justify him in a falsehood to any person--patient or nopatient. 

[Footnote 1: See p. 75 f. , _supra_. ]

A distinguished professor in one of the prominent medical colleges ofthis country, in denying the claim of a writer on ethics that it maybecome the duty of a physician to deceive his patient as a means ofcuring him, declares that a physician acting on this theory "will notbe found in accord with the best and the highest medical teaching ofthe present day;" and he goes on to say:[1] "In my profession to-day, the truth properly presented, we have found, carries with it aconvincing and adjusting element which does not fail to bring theafflicted person to that condition of mind that is most conduciveto his physical well-being, and let me add also, I believe, to hisspiritual welfare. " This statement was made in connection with thedeclaration that in the hospital which was in his charge it is notdeemed right or wise to deceive a patient as to any operation to beperformed upon him. And there are other well-known physicians whotestify similarly as to the ethics of their profession. 

[Footnote 1: In a personal communication to the author. ]

An illustration of the possible good results of concealing anunpleasant fact from a sick person, that has been a favorite citationall along the centuries with writers on ethics who would justifyemergency falsehoods, is one which is given in his correspondence byPliny the younger, eighteen centuries ago. [1]

[Footnote 1: _Epistles of Pliny the Younger_, Book III. , Epis. 16. Pliny to Nepos. ]

Caecinna Paetus and his son "were both at the same time attacked withwhat seemed a mortal illness, of which the son died. .. . His mother[Arria] managed his funeral so privately that Paetus did not know ofhis death. Whenever she came into his bedchamber, she pretended thather son was better, and, as often as he inquired after his health, would answer that he had rested well, or had eaten with an appetite. When she found she could no longer restrain her grief, but her tearswere gushing out, she would leave the room, and, having given vent toher passion, return again with dry eyes and a serene countenance, asif she had dismissed every sentiment of sorrow. "

This Roman matron also committed suicide, as an encouragement to herhusband whom she desired to have put an end to his own life, when hewas likely to have it taken from him by the executioner; and Plinycommends her nobleness of conduct in both cases. It is common amongethical writers, in citing this instance in favor of lying, to saynothing about the suicide, and to omit mention of the fact that themother squarely lied, by saying that her dead boy had eaten a goodbreakfast, instead of employing language that might have been thetruth as far as it went, while it concealed that portion of the truthwhich she thought it best to conceal. It is common to quote her assimply saying of her son" He is better;"[1] quite a different versionfrom Pliny's, and presenting a different issue. 

[Footnote 1: See Newman Smyth's _Christian Ethics_, p. 395, wherethis case is stated with vagueness of phrase, and as thus stated isapproved. ]

It was perfectly proper for that mother to conceal the signs of hersorrow from her sick husband, who had no right to know the truthconcerning matters outside of his sick-room at such a time. And if, indeed, she could say in all sincerity, as expressive of her feelingsin the death of her son, by the will of the gods, "He is better, " itwould have been possible for her to feel that she was entitled to saythat as the truth, and not as a falsehood; and in that case she wouldnot have intended a deceit, but only a concealment. But when, on theother hand, she told a deliberate lie--spoke falsely in order todeceive--she committed a sin in so doing, and her sin was none theless a sin because it resulted in apparent good to her husband. Anillustration does not overturn a principle, but it may misrepresentit. 

Another illustration, on the other side of the case, is worth citinghere. Victor Hugo pictures, in his _Les Miserables_, [1] a sister ofcharity adroitly concealing facts from a sick person in a hospital, while refusing to tell a falsehood even for the patient's good. "Neverto have told a falsehood, never to have said for any advantage, oreven indifferently, a thing which was not the truth, the holy truth, was the characteristic feature of Sister Simplice. " She had taken thename of Simplice through special choice. "Simplice, of Sicily, ourreaders will remember, is the saint who sooner let her bosom beplucked out than say she was a native of Segeste, as she was born atSyracuse, though the falsehood would have saved her. Such a patronsaint suited this soul. " And in speaking of Sister Simplice, as neverhaving told even "a white lie, " Victor Hugo quotes a letter from theAbbé Sicard, to his deaf-mute pupil Massieu, on this point: "Can therebe such a thing as a white lie, an innocent lie? Lying is the absoluteof evil. Lying a little is not possible. The man who lies tellsthe whole lie. Lying is the face of the fiend; and Satan has twonames, --he is called Satan and Lying. " Victor Hugo the romancer wouldseem to be a safer guide, so far, for the physician or the nurse inthe sick-room, than Pliny the rhetorician, or Rothe the theologian. [2]

[Footnote 1: Book VII. ]

[Footnote 2: Yet Victor Hugo afterwards represents even SisterSimplice as lying unqualifiedly, when sorely tempted--although not inthe sick-room. ]

A well-known physician, in speaking to me of this subject, said:"It is not so difficult to avoid falsehood in dealing with anxiouspatients as many seem to suppose. _Tact_, as well as _principle_, willdo a good deal to help a physician out, in an emergency. I have neverseen any need of lying, in my practice. " And yet another physician, who had been in a widely varied practice for forty years, said that hehad never found it necessary to tell a lie to a patient; although hethought he might have done so if he had deemed it necessary to savea patient's life. In other words, while he admitted the possiblejustification of an "emergency lie, " he had never found a first-classopening for one in his practice. And he added, that he knew very wellthat if he had been known to lie to his patients, his professionalefficiency, as well as his good name, would have suffered. Medicalmen do not always see, in their practice, the supposed advantages oflying, which have so large prominence in the minds of ethical writers. 

Another profession, which is popularly and wrongly accused of havinga place for the lie in its system of ethics, is the legal profession. Whewell refers to this charge in his "Elements of Morality" (citingPaley in its support). He says: "Some moralists have ranked with thecases in which convention supersedes the general rule of truth, anadvocate asserting the justice, or his belief in the justice, of hisclient's cause. " But as to an advocate's right in this matter, Whewellsays explicitly: "If, in pleading, he assert his belief that his causeis just, when he believes it unjust, he offends against truth; as anyother man would do who, in like manner, made a like assertion. "[1]

[Footnote 1: Whewell's _Elements of Morality_, § 400. ]

Chief-Justice Sharswood, of Pennsylvania, in his standard work on"Legal Ethics, " cites this opinion of Whewell with unqualifiedapproval; and, in speaking for the legal profession, he says: "Nocounsel can with propriety and good conscience express to court orjury his belief in the justice of his client's cause, contrary to thefact. Indeed, the occasions are very rare in which he ought to throwthe weight of his private opinion into the scales in favor of the sidehe has espoused. " Calling attention to the fact that the officialoath of an attorney, on his admission to the bar, in the state ofPennsylvania, includes the specific promise to "use no falsehood, " hesays: "Truth in all its simplicity--truth to the court, client, and adversary--should be indeed the polar star of the lawyer. Theinfluence of only slight deviations from truth upon professionalcharacter is very observable. A man may as well be detected in a greatas a little lie. A single discovery, among professional brethren, of afailure of truthfulness, makes a man the object of distrust, subjectshim to constant mortification, and soon this want of confidenceextends itself beyond the Bar to those who employ the Bar. Thatlawyer's case is truly pitiable, upon the escutcheon of whose honestyor truth rests the slightest tarnish. "[1]

[Footnote 1: Sharswood's _Essay on Professional Ethics_, pp. 57, 99, 102, 167 f. ]

As illustrative of the carelessness with which popular charges againstan entire profession are made the basis of reflections upon theethical standard of that profession, the comments of Dr. Hodge onthis matter are worthy of particular notice. In connection with hisassertion that "the principles of professional men allow of manythings which are clearly inconsistent with the requirements of theninth commandment, " he says: "Lord Brougham is reported to have said, in the House of Lords, that an advocate knows no one but his client. He is bound _per fas et nefas_, if possible, to clear him. Ifnecessary for the accomplishment of that object, he is at liberty toaccuse and defame the innocent, and even (as the report stated) toruin his country. It is not unusual, especially in trials for murder, for the advocates of the accused to charge the crime on innocentparties and to exert all their ingenuity to convince the jury of theirguilt. " And Dr. Hodge adds the note that "Lord Brougham, accordingto the public papers, uttered these sentiments in vindication of theconduct of the famous Irish advocate Phillips, who on the trial ofCourvoisier for the murder of Lord Russell, endeavored to fasten theguilt on the butler and housemaid, whom he knew to be innocent, as hisclient had confessed to him that he had committed the murder. "[1]

[Footnote 1: Hodge's _Systematic Theology_, III. , 439. ]

Now the facts, in the two very different cases thus erroneouslyintermingled by Dr. Hodge, as given by Justice Sharswood, [1] presentquite another aspect from that in which Dr. Hodge sees them, asbearing on the accepted ethics of the legal profession. It wouldappear that Lord Brougham was not speaking in defense of anotherattorney's action, but in defense of his own course as attorney ofQueen Caroline, thirty years before the Courvoisier murder trial. AsJustice Sharswood remarks of Lord Brougham's "extravagant" claims: "Nodoubt he was led by the excitement of so great an occasion to say whatcool reflection and sober reason certainly never can approve. " YetLord Brougham does not appear to have suggested, in his claim, thata lawyer had a right to falsify the facts involved, or to utter anuntruth. He was speaking of his supposed duty to defend his client, the Queen, against the charges of the King, regardless of theconsequences to himself or to his country through his advocacy of hercause, which he deemed a just one. 

[Footnote 1: Sharswood's _Legal Ethics_, p. 86 f. ]

And as to the charge against the eminent advocate, Charles Phillips, of seeking to fasten the crime on the innocent, when he knew that hisclient was guilty, in the trial of Courvoisier for the murder of LordRussell, that charge was overwhelmingly refuted by the testimony oflawyers and judges present at that trial. Mr. Phillips supposed hisclient an innocent man until the trial was nearly concluded. Then camethe unexpected confession from the guilty man, accompanied by thedemand that his counsel continue in his case to the end. At first Mr. Phillips proposed to retire at once from the case; but, on advisingwith eminent counsel, he was told that it would be wrong for him tobetray the prisoner's confidence, and practically to testify againsthim, by deserting him at that hour. He then continued in the case, but, as is shown conclusively in his statement of the facts, with itsaccompanying proofs, without saying a word or doing a thing that mightproperly be deemed in the realm of false assertion or intimations. [1]

[Footnote 1: See Sharswood's _Legal Ethics_, pp. 103-107, 183-196. ]

The very prominence given in the public press to the charges againstMr. Phillips, and to their refutation, are added proof that the moralsense of the community is against falsehood under any circumstances orin any profession. 

Members of the legal profession are bound by the same ethicalobligations as other men; yet the civil law, in connection with whichthey practice their profession, is not in all points identicalwith the moral law; although it is not in conflict with any of itsparticulars. As Chancellor Kent says: "Human laws are not so perfectas the dictates of conscience, and the sphere of morality is moreenlarged than the limits of civil jurisdiction. There are many dutiesthat belong to the class of imperfect obligations, which are bindingon conscience, but which human laws do not and cannot undertakedirectly to enforce. But when the aid of a Court of Equity is soughtto carry into execution . .. A contract, then the principles of ethicshave a more extensive sway. "[1]

[Footnote 1: Kent's _Commentaries_, Lect. 39, p. 490 f. (4th ed. );cited in Story's _Equity Jurisprudence_, VI. , p. 229 (13th ed. ). ]

In the decisions of Equity courts, while the duty of absolutetruthfulness between parties in interest is insisted on as vital, anda suppression of the truth from one who had a right to its knowledge, or a suggestion of that which is untrue in a similar case("_suggestiofalsi aut suppressio veri_"), is deemed an element of fraud, thedistinction between mere silence when one is entitled to be silent, and concealment with the purpose of deception, is distinctlyrecognized, as it is not in all manuals on ethics. [1] This isindicated, on the one hand, in the legal maxim _Aliud est celare, aliud tacere_, --"It is one thing to conceal, another to be silent;"silence is not necessarily deceptive concealment;[2] and on the otherhand in such a statement as this, in Benjamin's great work on Sales:"The nondisclosure of hidden facts [to a party in interest] is themore objectionable when any artifice is employed to throw the buyeroff his guard; as by telling half the truth. "[3] It is not in anyprinciples which are recognized by the legal profession as binding onthe conscience, that loose ethics are to find defense or support. 

[Footnote 1: See Bispham's _Principles of Equity_, p. 261, (3d ed. );Broom's _Legal Maxims_, p. 781 f. (7th Am. Ed. ); Merrill's _Americanand English Encyclopedia of Law_, art. "Fraud. "]

[Footnote 2: See Anderson's _Dictionary of Law_, p. 220; Abbott's _LawDictionary_, I. , 53. ]

[Footnote 3: _Treatise on the Law of Sale of Personal Property_, p. 451 f. ]

But the profession that has most at stake in this discussion, andthat, indeed, is most involved in its issue, is the ministerial, orclerical, profession. While it was Jewish rabbis who affirmed mostpositively, in olden time, the unwavering obligations of truthfulness, it was Jewish rabbis, also, who sought to find extenuation or excusefor falsehoods uttered with a good intention. And while it wasChristian Fathers, like the Shepherd of Hermas, and Justin Martyr, andBasil the Great, and Augustine, who insisted that no tolerance shouldbe allowed to falsehood or deceit, it was also Christian Fathers, likeGregory of Nyssa, and Chrysostom, who having practiced deceit forwhat they deemed a good end, first attempted a special plea for suchfalsities as they had found convenient in their professional labors. And it was other Christian Fathers, like Origen and Jerome, who soughtto find arguments for laxity of practice, at this point, in the courseof the Apostles themselves. 

All the way along the centuries, while the strongest defenders of thelaw of truthfulness have been found among clergymen, more has beenwritten in favor of the lie of necessity by clergymen than by men ofany other class or profession. And if it be true, as many of thesehave claimed, that deceit and falsehood are a duty, on the part of aGod-loving teacher, toward those persons who, through weakness, ormental incapacity, or moral obliquity, are in the relation to him ofwards of love, or of subjects of guardianship, there is no professionin which there is more of a call for godly deception, and for holyfalsehood, than the Christian ministry. If it be true that a lie, or afalsehood, is justifiable in order to the saving of the physical lifeof another, how much better were it to tell such a lie in the lovingdesire to save a soul. 

If the lie of necessity be allowable for any purpose, it would seemto be more important as a means of good in the exercise of theministerial profession, than of any other profession or occupation. And if it be understood that this is the case, what dependence can beput, by the average hearer, on the most earnest words of a preacher, who may be declaring a truth from God, and who, on the other hand, maybe uttering falsehoods in love? And if it be true, also, as some ofthese clergymen have claimed, that God specifically approved falsehoodand deception, according to the Bible record, and that Jesus Christpracticed in this line, while here on earth, what measure ofconfidence can fallible man place in the sacred text as it has come tohim? The statement of this view of the case, is the best refutationof the claim of a possible justification for the most loving lieimaginable. 

The only other point remaining untouched, in this review of thecenturies of discussion concerning the possible justifiableness of alie under conceivable circumstances, is in its relation to the loweranimals. It has been claimed that "all admit" that there is noimpropriety in using any available means for the decoying of fish orof beasts to their death, or in saving one's self from an enragedanimal; hence that a lie is not to be counted as a sin _per se_, butdepends for its moral value on the relation subsisting between itsutterer and the one toward whom it is uttered. 

Dr. Dabney, who is far less clear and sound than Dr. Thornwell in hisreasoning on this ethical question, says: "I presume that no manwould feel himself guilty for deceiving a mad dog in order to destroyhim;"[1] and he argues from this assumption that when a man, throughinsanity or malice, "is not a rational man, but a brute, " he mayfairly be deemed as outside of the pale of humanity, so far asthe obligations of veracity, viewed only as a social virtue, areconcerned. 

[Footnote 1: Dabney's _Theology_ (second edition), p. 425 f. ]

Dr. Newman Smyth expands this idea. [1] He says: "We may say thatanimals, strictly speaking, can have no immediate right to our wordsof truth, since they belong below the line of existence which marksthe beginning of any functions of speech. " He adds that animals "mayhave direct claims upon our humanity, and so indirectly put us underobligations to give them straightforward and fair treatment, " and that"truthfulness to the domestic animal, to the horse or the dog, isto be included as a part of our general obligation of kindness tocreatures that are entirely dependent upon our fidelity to them andtheir wants. " But he cites the driving of horses with blinders, [2] andthe fishing for trout with artificial flies, as evidence of the factthat man recognizes no sinfulness in the deceiving of the loweranimals, and hence that the duty of veracity is not one of universalobligation. 

[Footnote 1: Smyth's _Christian Ethics_, p. 398. ]

[Footnote 2: Here is another illustration of Dr. Smyth's strangeconfusion of concealment with deception. It would seem as though a manmust have blinders before his own eyes, to render him incapable ofperceiving the difference between concealing a possible cause offright from an animal, and intentionally deceiving that animal. ]

If, indeed, the duty of truthfulness were only a social obligation, there might be a force in this reasoning that is lacking when we seethat falsehood and deceit are against the very nature of God, andare a violation of man's primal nature. A lie is a sin, whenever andhowever and to whomsoever spoken or acted. It is a sin against Godwhen uttered in his sight. 

Man is given authority from God over all the lower animals;[1] and heis empowered to take their lives, if necessary for his protection orfor his sustenance. In the exercise of this right, man is entitled toconceal from the animals he would kill or capture the means employedfor the purpose; as he is entitled to conceal similarly from hisfellow-man, when he is authorized to kill him as an enemy, in time ofwar waged for God. Thus it is quite proper for a man to conceal thehook or the net from the fish, or the trap or the pitfall from thebeast; but it is not proper to deceive an animal by an imitation ofthe cry of the animal's offspring in order to lure that animal toits destruction; and the moral sense of the human race makes thisdistinction. 

[Footnote 1: Gen. 1:28; 9:1-3. ]

An illustration that has been put forward, as involving a nicequestion in the treatment of an animal, is that of going toward aloose horse with a proffered tuft of grass in one hand, and a halterfor his capture concealed behind the back in the other hand. It isright to conceal the halter, and to proffer the grass, provided theyare used severally in their proper relations. If the grass be heldforth as an assurance of the readiness of the man to provide for theneeds of the horse, and it be given to him when he comes for it, thereis no deception practiced so far; and if, when horse and man arethus on good terms, the man brings out the halter for its use in therelation of master and servitor between the two, that also is proper, and the horse would so understand it. But if the man were to refusethe grass to the horse, when the two had come together, and were tosubstitute for it the halter, the man would do wrong, and the horsewould recognize the fact, and not be caught again in that way. 

Even a writer like Professor Bowne, who is not quite sure as to theright in all phases of the lying question, sees this point in itspsychological aspects to better advantage than those ethical writerswho would look at the duty of truthfulness as mainly a social virtue:"Even in cases where we regard truth as in our own power, " he says, "there are considerations of expediency which are by no means to bedisregarded. There is first the psychological fact that inexactness ofstatement, exaggeration, unreality in speech, are sure to react uponthe mental habit of the person himself, and upon the estimate in whichhis statements are held by others. In dealing with children, also, however convenient a romancing statement might momentarily be, it isunquestionable that exact truthfulness is the only way which does notlead to mischief. Even in dealing with animals, it pays in the longrun to be truthful. The horse that is caught once by false pretenseswill not be long in finding out the trick. The physician also whodissembles, quickly comes to lose the confidence of his patient, andhas thereafter no way of getting himself believed. "[1]

[Footnote 1: Bowne's _Principles of Ethics_, p. 224. ]

The main question is not whether it is fair toward an animal for a manto lie to him, but whether it is fair toward a man's self, or towardGod the maker of animals and of men, for a man to lie to an animal. Alie has no place, even theoretically, in the universe, unless it be insome sphere where God has no cognizance and man has no individuality. 

 * * * * *

It were useless to follow farther the ever-varying changes of thenever-varying reasonings for the justification of the unjustifiable"lie of necessity" in the course of the passing centuries. It isevident that the specious arguments put forth by young Chrysostom, indefense of his inexcusable lie of love fifteen centuries ago, haveneither been added to nor improved on by any subsequent apologistof lying and deception. The action of Chrysostom is declared by hisbiographers to be "utterly at variance with the principles of truthand honor, " one which "every sound Christian conscience must condemn;"yet those modern ethical writers who find force and reasonableness inhis now venerable though often-refuted fallacies, are sure that themoral sense of the race is with Chrysostom. 

Every man who recognizes the binding force of intuitions of a primallaw of truthfulness, and who gives weight to _à priori_ arguments forthe unchanging opposition of truth and falsehood, either admits, inhis discussion of this question, that a lie is never justifiable, or he is obviously illogical and inconsistent in his processes ofreasoning, and in his conclusions. Even those who deny any _à priori_argument for the superiority of truthfulness over falsehood, and whosephilosophy rests on the experimental evidence of the good or evil ofa given course, are generally inclined to condemn any departure fromstrict truthfulness as in its tendencies detrimental to the interestsof society, aside from any question of its sinfulness. The onlymen who are thoroughly consistent in their arguments in favor ofoccasional lying, are those who start with the false premise thatthere is no higher law of ethics than that of such a love for one'sneighbor as will make one ready to do whatever seems likely toadvantage him in the present life. 

Centuries of discussion have only brought out with added clearness theessential fact that a lie is eternally opposed to the truth; and thathe who would be a worthy child of the Father of truth must refuse toemploy, under any circumstances, modes of speech and action whichbelong exclusively to the "father of lies. "

VII. 

THE GIST OF THE MATTER. 

It would seem that the one all-dividing line in the universe, whichnever changes or varies, is the line between the true and the false, between the truth and a lie. All other lines of distinction, such evenas those which separate good from evil, light from darkness, purityfrom impurity, love from hate, are in a sense relative and variablelines, taking their decisive measure from this one primal and eternaldividing line. 

This is the one line which goes back of our very conception of apersonal God, or which is inherent in that conception. We cannotconceive of God as God, unless we conceive of him as the true God, andthe God of truth. If there be any falsity in him, he is not the trueGod. Truth is of God's very nature. To admit in our thought that a lieis of God, is to admit that falsity is in him, or, in other words, that he is a false god. 

A lie is the opposite of truth, and a being who will lie standsopposed to God, who by his very nature cannot lie. Hence he who liestakes a stand, by that very act, in opposition to God. Therefore if itbe necessary at any time to lie, it is necessary to desert God and bein hostility to him so long as the necessity for lying continues. 

If there be such a thing as a sin _per se_, a lie is that thing; asa lie is, in its very nature, in hostility to the being of God. Whatever, therefore, be the temptation to lie, it is a temptation tosin by lying. Whatever be the seeming gain to result from a lie, itis the seeming gain from a sin. Whatever be the apparent cost or lossfrom refusing to lie, it is the apparent cost or loss from refusing tosin. 

Man, formed in the moral image of God, is so far a representative ofGod. If a man lies, he misrepresents and dishonors God, and must incurGod's disapproval because of his course. This fact is recognized inthe universal habit of appealing to God in witness of the truthfulnessof a statement, when there is room for doubt as to its correctness. The feeling is general that a man who believes in God will not lieunto God under the solemnity of an oath. If, however, it were possiblefor God to approve a lie on the part of one of his children, then thatchild of God might confidently make solemn oath to the truth of hislie, appealing to God to bear witness to the lie--which in God's mindis, in this case, better than the truth. In God's sight an oath is nomore sacred than a yea, yea; and every child of God speaks always asin the sight of God. Perjury is no more of an immorality than ordinarylying; nor is ordinary lying any less a sin than formal perjury. 

The sin of lying consists primarily and chiefly in its inconsistencywith the nature of God and with the nature of God's image in man. Itis not mainly as a sin against one's neighbor, but it is as a sinagainst God and one's self, that a lie is ever and always a sin. If itwere possible to lie without harming or offending one's neighbor, oreven if it were possible to benefit one's fellow-man by a lie, no mancould ever tell a lie, under any circumstances or for any purposewhatsoever, without doing harm to his own nature, and offendingagainst God's very being. If a lie comes out of a man on anyinducement or provocation, or for any purpose of good, that man isthe worse for it. The lie is evil, and its coming out of the man isharmful to him. "The things which proceed out of the man are thosethat defile the man, "[1] said our Lord; and the experience of mankindbears witness to the correctness of this asseveration. 

[Footnote 1: Mark 7:15. ]

Yet, although the main sin and guilt and curse of a lie are ever onhim who utters that lie, whatever be his motive in so doing, theevil consequences of lying are immeasurable in the community as acommunity; and whoever is guilty of a new lie adds to the burden ofevil that weighs down society, and that tends to its disintegrationand ruin. The bond of society is confidence. A lie is inconsistentwith confidence; and the knowledge that a lie is, under certaincircumstances, deemed proper by a man, throws doubt on all that thatman says or does under any circumstances. No matter why or where theone opening for an allowable lie be made in the reservoir of publicconfidence, if it be made at all, the final emptying of that reservoiris merely a question of time. 

To-day, as in all the days, the chief need of men, for themselves andfor their fellows, is a likeness to God in the impossibility of lying;and the chief longing of the community is for such confidence of menin one another as will give them assurance that they will not lie oneto another. There was never yet a lie uttered which did not bring moreof harm than of good; nor will there ever be a harmless lie, while Godis Truth, and Satan is the father of lies. 

TOPICAL INDEX. 

 Abbé Sicard: cited Abbott, Benjamin V. ; cited Abohab, Isaac: quotation from Abraham: his deceiving Achilles, truthfulness of Act and speech, lying in Advantages of lying, supposed Africans, truthfulness among Ahab's false prophets Ahriman, father of lies American Indians, habits of Ananias and Sapphira Anderson, Rasmus B. : cited Animals, deception of Aquinas, Thomas: cited Arabs, influence of civilization on Aristotle: cited Army prison life, incidents in Augustine: cited Aurelius, Marcus: cited

 Bailey: cited Barrow, Sir John: cited Base-ball, concealment in Basil, friend of Chrysostom Basil the Great: cited Baumgarten-Crusius: cited Benjamin, Judah P. : cited Bergk, Theodor: cited Bethlehem, Samuel at Bheels, estimate of truth by Bible: principles, not rules, in first record of lie in story of man's "fall" in standard of right forbids lying Bible teachings on lying Bingham, Joseph: cited Bispham, George T. : cited Bock, Carl: cited Bowne, B. P. , quotation from Boyle, F. : cited Brahmans, estimate of truth by Briggs and Salmond: cited Broom, Dr. Herbert: cited Brougham, Lord: cited Budge, E. A. : cited Bunsen, C. K. J, ; cited Burton, Richard: cited, 30. 

 Caecinna Paetus: cited Calvin, John: cited Carlyle, Thomas: cited Cartwright, William C. : cited Chastity, lying to save Children's right to truth Choosing between duties Christ, example of Christian ethics, basis of Christian Fathers, discussion by Christians, early, discussion by Chrysostom: cited Cicero: cited Clergymen, position of Clive, Lord: cited Coleridge, S. T. : cited Concealment, justifiable Concealment, unjustifiable Confidence essential to society Contract, overpressing theory of Conway, Moncure D. : cited Court, oath in Courvoisier, trial of Crime, lying to prevent Cyprian: cited

 Dabney, Dr. R. L. : cited Darius, inscription of David: his deceiving "Deans, Jeanie, " story of Deception: antagonistic to nature of God among Phoenicians by Hebrew midwives by Rahab by Jacob Samuel charged with Micah charged with by Abraham by Isaac by David by Ananias and Sapphira in speech and in act concealment not necessarily purposed and resultant of lower animals in medical profession of insane in flag of truce teaching of Talmudists as to Peter and Paul charged with teaching of Jesuits of the intoxicated Elisha charged with Joshua charged with in legal profession in ministerial profession, Definitions of lie Denham: cited De Wette: cited Dick, Dr. , quotation from Dorner, Dr. Isaac A. : cited Drona, story of Yudhishthira and Duns Scotus: cited Duty: of truthfulness; of disclosure, conditional; choosing of more important; of right concealment; to God not to be counted out. Dyaks; their truthfulness

 Earl, G. W. : cited Early Christians, temptations of East Africans, estimate of truth by Egyptian idea of deity synonymous with truth Elisha and Syrians Enemy, duty of truthfulness to Esau, deceit practiced on Eunomius: cited Evil as a means of good Exigency, lie of (see _Lie of Necessity_)

 False impressions, limit of responsibility for Falsehood: estimate of, in India; in Ceylon; in Persia; in Egypt; "Punic faith, " synonym of; in medical profession; its use as means of good; spoken in love; in legal profession. Family troubles, concealment of Fichte: cited Firmus, Bishop: cited Flag of truce, sending of Flatt: cited Forsyth, Capt. J. : cited Fowler, Professor: cited Frankness, brutal Fridthjof and Ingeborg, story of Fürstenthal, R. J. : cited

 German ideal of truth Glasfurd: cited God: killing, but not lying, a possibility with; cannot lie; his concealments from man; is truth; called to witness lie; Greeks, ancient: their estimate of truth Gregory of Nyssa: cited "Hall of two truths" Hamburger, Dr. I. : cited Hannibal: cited Harischandra, story of Harkness, Capt. Henry: cited Harless: cited Hartenstein: cited Heber, Bishop: cited Hebrew midwives Hebrew spies Hegel: cited Heralds' law Herbart: cited Hennas, Shepherd of: cited Herodotus: cited Hill Tribes of India: their estimate of truth Hindoo; estimate of truth; passion-play. Hodge, Dr. Charles; cited "Home of Song" "Home of the Lie" Hottentot, estimate of truth Hugo, Victor: cited Hunter, W. W. : cited

 Ilai, Rabbi: cited Iliad, estimate of truth in Indians, American, influence of civilization on Ingeborg and Fridthjof of, story of Innocent III. : cited Insane: lying to their right to truth Inscription of Darius Intoxicated, the: their right to truth Isaac: his deceiving Isaac, Jacob, and Esau Ishmael, Rabbi: cited

 Jackson, Prof. A. V. W. : cited Jacob: his deceiving his lie to Isaac Jacobi, F. H. : cited Javanese: their truthfulness Jehoshaphat and Ahab Jehuda, Rabbi: cited Jerome: cited Jesuits, teaching of Jewish Talmudists, discussions of Johnson's Cyclopaedia: cited Judith and Holofernes Justin Martyr: cited Juvenal: cited

 Kant, Immanuel: cited Keating, W. H. : cited Kent, Chancellor: cited Khonds of Central India, truthfulness among Killing an enemy or lying to him Kirkbride, Dr. Thomas S. , testimony of Kolben, P. : cited Krause: cited Kurtz, Prof. J. H. : cited

 Lamberton, Prof. W. A. : cited Lecky, W. E. H. : cited Legal profession, ethics of Legends, Scandinavian Liar: an enemy of righteousness form of prayer for Liars, place of Libby Prison, incident of Lichtenberger, F. : cited Life, losing of truth to save Life insurance, truthfulness in Lightfoot, Bishop: cited Liguori: cited Livingstone, David: cited Logic swayed by feeling Loyola, Ignatius: cited Luther, Martin: cited

 MA, symbol of Truth Macaulay, Lord, on Lord Clive's treachery Macpherson, Lieutenant: cited Mahabharata on lying Mahaffy, Prof. J. P. : cited Mandingoes: their estimate of truth Marcus Aurelius, quotation from Marheineke: cited Marriage, duty of truthfulness in connection with Marshman, Joshua: cited Martensen, Hans Lassen: cited Martineau, Dr. James, quotations from Martyrdom price of truth-telling Mead, Professor: cited Medical profession, no justifiable falsehood in Melanchthon: cited _Menorath Hammaor_, reference to Merrill, J. H. : cited Meyer, Dr. H. A. W. : cited Meyrick, Rev. F. : cited Micaiah, story of Midwives, Hebrew, lies of Mithra, god of truth Moore, William: cited Moral sense of man against lying Morgan: cited Müller, Julius: cited Müller, Prof. Max: cited Murderer, concealment from would-be Nathan, Rabbi: cited Neander: cited Nitzsch: cited

 Oath of witness in court Omichund, deceit practiced on One all-dividing line Origen: cited Ormuzd, Zoroastrian god of truth

 Paley, Dr. : definition of lie Palgrave, W. G. : cited Paradise, two pictures of Park, Mungo: cited Pascal: cited Passion-play, Hindoo Patagonians: their view of lying Patient, deception of, by physician Paul and Peter: suggestion of their deceiving Perjury justifiable, if lying be Persian ideals Peter and Paul: suggestion of their deceiving Phillips, Charles, misrepresented Philoctetes, tragedy of Phoenicians: their untruthfulness Physician, lying by Pindar: cited Place of liars Plato: cited Pliny the younger: cited Pope Innocent III. : cited Prayer, form of, for liar Principles, not rules, Bible standard Priscillianists, sect of Prophets, lying Plan, lord of truth "Punic faith, " synonym of falsehood Pylades and Orestes

 Quaker and salesman "Quaker guns, " concealment by means of

 Ra, symbol of light Raba: cited Raffles, Sir T. S. : cited Rahab the harlot, lying of Rawlinson, Prof. George: cited Reinhard: cited Responsibility, limit of Robber: concealment from lying to Roberts, Joseph, quotation from Rock of Behistun, inscription on Roman Catholic writers, views of Roman matron, story of: cited by Pliny Roman standard of truthfulness Rothe, Richard: cited

 St. John, Sir Spencer: cited Samuel at Bethlehem Sapphira: her deceiving Satan, "father of lies" Sayce, Prof. A. H. : cited Scandinavian legends Schaff, Dr. Philip: cited Schaff-Hertzog: cited Schleiermacher: cited Schoolcraft, H. R. : cited Schwartz: cited Scott Sir Walter: cited Self-deception in others, limit of responsibility for Semple, J. W. : cited Sharswood, Chief-Justice: cited Shepherd of Hermas, quotation from Sherwill: cited Shorn, Dr. J. : cited Sick: their right to truth Simplice, Sister, story of Sin _per se_, lying Smith and Cheetham: cited Smith and Wace: cited Smyth, Dr. Newman: cited Sonthals, truthfulness among South, Dr. Robert: cited Sowrahs, truthfulness among Speech and act, lying in Spencer, Herbert: cited Spies, Hebrew, Rahab and Spy denied soldier's death Stephen, Leslie: cited Story, Justice: cited Surgeon's responsibility for his action testimony as to deceiving patient Symonds J. A. : cited Syrians, Elisha and

 Talmud, teachings of Talmudists, discussion among Taylor, Jeremy; cited Teaching of Jesuits Temptations influencing decision Tertullian: cited Theognis: cited Thornwell, Dr. James H. : cited Tipperahs: their habit of lying Todas, truthfulness among Tragedy of Philoctetes Truce, flag of, use of Truth: universal duty of telling God is not every one entitled to full dearer than life justifiable concealment of unjustifiable concealment of Truth, estimate of: among Hindoos among Scandinavians in ancient Persia in ancient Egypt among Romans among ancient Greeks among ancient Germans among Hill Tribes of India among Arabs among American Indians among Patagonians among Africans among Dyaks among Veddahs among Javanese

 Ueberweg, F. : cited Ulysses, reference to Urim and Thummim

 Veddahs of Ceylon: their truthfulness Veracity: duty of of Greeks of Persians of primitive and civilized peoples compared of Hill Tribes of India of Arabs of American Indians of Africans of Dyaks of Veddahs of Javanese Viswamitra and Indra, story of Von Ammon: cited Von Hirscher: cited

 Walker, Helen, example of War: justifiable concealment in duty of veracity in Westcott, Bishop: cited Wheeler, J. Talboys; cited Whewell, Dr. William: cited "White lie" Wig, concealment by Wilkinson, Sir J. G. : cited Witness, oath of, in court Woolsey, President: cited Wuttke, Dr. Adolf: cited

 Yudhishthira and Drona, mythical story of

 Zoroastrian designation of heaven and hell

 _SCRIPTURAL INDEX_. 

 GENESIS. 1: 28 2 and 3 3: 6, 7 9: 1-3 12: 10-19 12: 14-20 16: 1-6 25: 27-34 26: 6-10 27: 1-40 27: 6-29 28: 1-22 39: 8-21

 EXODUS. 1: 15-19 1: 15-21 1: 19, 20 1: 20, 21

 LEVITICUS. 8: 8 18: 5 19: 2, 12, 13, 34-37 19: 11

 NUMBERS. 23: 19

 DEUTERONOMY. 29: 29

 JOSHUA. 2: 1-21 8: 1-26 24: 3

 1 SAMUEL. 7: 15-17 9: 22-24 11: 14, 15 13: 14 15: 29 16: 1, 2 16: 1-3 20: 29 21: 1, 2

 2 SAMUEL. 11: 1-27

 1 KINGS. 22: 1-23

 2 KINGS. 6: 14-20 7: 6 20: 12-19

 2 CHRONICLES. 18: 1-34 20: 7

 PSALMS. 31: 5 58: 3 62: 4 63: 11 101: 7 116: 11 120: 2 146: 6

 PROVERBS. 6: 16, 17 14: 5 19: 5, 9, 22

 ISAIAH. 41: 8 51: 2

 MATTHEW. 3: 9

 MARK. 6: 48 7: 15

 LUKE. 24: 28

 JOHN. 7: 8 8: 44 14: 6 16: 12

 ACTS. 5: 1-11 13: 22

 ROMANS. 3: 4 3: 7, 8 4: 12

 GALATIANS. 2: 11-14 3: 9

 EPHESIANS. 4: 25

 COLOSSIANS. 3: 9

 TITUS. 1: 2

 HEBREWS. 6: 18 11: 31

 JAMES. 2: 23

 1 JOHN. 5: 7

 REVELATION. 21: 5-8 22